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gao_NSIAD-95-38 | gao_NSIAD-95-38_0 | The Navy’s 1987 Shipboard Solid and Plastics Waste Management Program Plan set two objectives. In addition, by 1996, when the Navy’s plan is scheduled to be completed, the Navy will have about 4 years left to develop and install new technologies to meet requirements in special areas for surface ships, and only about 2 years in other areas. The Navy does not expect to identify tasks or milestones until after it submits its 1996 plan to Congress. Non-Navy Ships Have Implemented Approaches to Achieve Compliance
Non-Navy ships are using various approaches to meet discharge requirements. Although the Navy’s characteristics may delay its full compliance with the future requirements, we identified practices used by other federal agencies and commercial carriers that could apply to the Navy’s efforts to comply with discharge requirements. The headquarters primary focus has been on developing equipment that met Navy specifications, but three of its four long-term projects have been canceled, suspended, or reduced. Through fiscal year 1994, the Navy has spent $6 million on these projects, which are in the early research phase. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, to ensure that headquarters’ planning efforts include the (1) tasks and interim milestones to measure progress toward long-term goals for nonplastic solid waste for both surface ships and submarines and (2) necessary mechanisms to coordinate among all involved activities, especially to pass on lessons learned from non-Navy ships and individual Navy ships that report progress in complying with discharge requirements. The report includes solid and plastics waste management. This is the latest incident of the Navy discharging solid waste from ships. The Navy begins a study addressing shipboard solid waste discharges from its pulper and shredder. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's Shipboard Solid and Plastics Waste Management Program, focusing on the: (1) Navy's planning processes; and (2) program's effectiveness since its implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Navy's two prior plans for meeting shipboard solid waste discharge requirements were not well-coordinated and did not include interim milestones for minimizing waste until 1998 or later; (2) the Navy would benefit from examining other federal agencies' and commercial carriers' solid waste disposal experiences; (3) although the Navy has improved coordination for its November 1996 plan, the plan still does not include tasks or milestones to achieve near-term compliance for waste other than plastics; (4) by the time the Navy submits its 1996 plan to Congress, it will have 4 years to develop and install new technologies to meet the discharge requirements; (5) the Navy does not have an approach to meet future legal requirements for solid waste discharges; (6) the Navy has spent $52 million of the $80 million appropriated through fiscal year 1994 on discharge equipment; (7) three of the Navy's four primary developmental projects have been cancelled, suspended, or reduced; and (8) although two Navy ships have reported progress in complying with solid waste discharge requirements, the Navy has not given adequate consideration to whether lessons can be learned from the experiences of non-Navy ships and individual Navy ships that report progress in complying with discharge requirements. |
gao_GAO-11-661 | gao_GAO-11-661_0 | Northern Command Has Undertaken Maritime Homeland Defense Planning but Faces Increased Uncertainty about Mission Execution
Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense for the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed supporting plan for responding to maritime threats. As part of its planning efforts, Northern Command requires supporting DOD organizations and subordinate commands to develop supporting plans to its homeland defense plan. Because the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a concept plan, which are by definition less detailed than operation plans, and because the command does not have naval forces routinely under its operational control, these supporting plans provide critical details on how operations are to be conducted and allow Northern Command to assess the extent to which these organizations and subordinate commands are prepared to support the homeland defense mission. Fleet Forces Command Has Not Developed a Supporting Plan
The 2008 Northern Command homeland defense plan requires a number of supporting entities—including the commander of Fleet Forces Command in his role as the joint force maritime component commander—to develop supporting plans within 60 days of the completion of Northern Command’s 2008 plan. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council—the body responsible for overseeing the military requirements process—may validate the findings from such assessments and direct relevant DOD organizations to undertake actions to close any capability gaps that are identified. According to our analysis, the assessment identified three gaps specific to the maritime homeland defense mission area—such as engaging and defeating maritime threats—and eight gaps—such as information management and sharing—in capabilities that enable a number of missions, including maritime homeland defense. However, the responsible organizations did not provide Northern Command with implementation plans or other forms of documentation regarding actions taken or under way. Without implementation plans or other forms of documentation on progress in implementing recommended actions, Northern Command cannot be assured that it has full and accurate information about the extent to which the responsible organizations have implemented actions to address maritime homeland defense capability gaps. One effort, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is focusing on creating a common pool of data and establishing data standards. This effort is expected to leverage the existing National Information Exchange Model—an effort under way at DOD and the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to establish data standards including some applicable to the maritime domain—and provide supporting standards and guidance at a more detailed level. Rather than focusing on the development of one national common operational picture—presenting a single, unified display of maritime information—the National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture may facilitate the accessibility of common data across the maritime community and allow stakeholders to focus on configuring the display of information to best meet their specific missions, whether through data analysis capabilities or geographic displays. National and DOD documents identify challenges affecting the sharing of maritime domain information, such as international coordination, policy and processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers. DOD and interagency partners have efforts under way to address many of these challenges. To enable Northern Command to monitor progress toward addressing maritime homeland defense capability gaps—including the three specific to maritime homeland defense as well as the others that affect the mission—identified in the Northern Command homeland defense and civil support capabilities-based assessment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct responsible DOD organizations to provide Northern Command with implementation plans for undertaking the actions identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Northern Command, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent events, such as the seaborne terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 and the pirate attack on the Quest in February 2011, highlight maritime threats to the United States. The maritime domain presents a range of potential security threats--including naval forces of adversary nations, piracy, and the use of vessels to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons--which could harm the United States and its interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) has also identified homeland defense as one of its highest priorities. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) planned to conduct maritime homeland defense operations, (2) identified and addressed capability gaps in maritime homeland defense, and (3) made progress with interagency partners, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, in addressing information sharing challenges related to maritime domain awareness. To conduct this work, GAO examined national and DOD guidance and interviewed officials from DOD, Joint Staff, combatant commands, the military services, and others.
What GAO Found
U.S. Northern Command, as the command responsible for homeland defense for the continental United States, has undertaken a number of homeland defense planning efforts, but it does not have a key detailed supporting plan for responding to maritime threats. Northern Command requires supporting DOD organizations to develop plans to support its homeland defense plan. The current, 2008 version of the plan requires a supporting plan from the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, who is designated as the joint force maritime component commander for Northern Command. Fleet Forces Command has undertaken some planning efforts, but has not developed a supporting plan. Because the Northern Command homeland defense plan is a concept plan, which are less detailed than operation plans, and because the command does not have naval forces routinely under its operational control, supporting plans provide critical details on how operations are to be conducted and allow Northern Command to assess the extent to which subordinate commands are prepared to support the maritime homeland defense mission. DOD has identified maritime homeland defense capability gaps and determined actions necessary to address them, but it has not adequately assessed the extent to which those actions have been implemented. One way DOD identifies capability gaps that affect mission execution is through capabilities-based assessments. A 2008 assessment identified three capability gaps specific to the maritime homeland defense mission--such as engaging and defeating maritime threats--and eight other gaps that affect a number of missions, including maritime homeland defense--such as information management and sharing. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the findings and requested relevant DOD organizations to take action to close identified gaps. However, the responsible organizations did not provide implementation plans or other documentation of actions taken or under way to address these gaps. Without documentation on progress in implementing recommended actions, Northern Command cannot be assured that it has full and accurate information about the extent to which other organizations have taken action to close these gaps. National and DOD documents have identified challenges to the sharing of maritime domain information, such as international coordination, policy and processes, technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers. DOD and interagency partners, such as the Coast Guard, have efforts under way to address many of these challenges. One effort, the interagency National Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture, is intended to improve data management by establishing data standards, providing common terminology, and developing supporting technology. It is intended to leverage the interagency National Information Exchange Model, an effort currently under way to establish data standards, facilitate the accessibility of common data across the maritime community, and allow stakeholders to focus on configuring the display of information to best meet their specific missions, whether through data analysis capabilities or geographic displays.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Fleet Forces Command develop a plan to support Northern Command and that responsible DOD organizations provide Northern Command with implementation plans for the actions identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. DOD partially concurred and agreed to take actions on each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-123 | gao_GAO-13-123_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Given DOD’s difficulties in achieving audit readiness and addressing its long-standing financial management deficiencies, you asked us to assess DOD’s risk management process for implementing its FIAR Plan. Our objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has established an effective process for identifying, analyzing, and addressing risks that could impede its progress in achieving audit readiness. Based on our analysis, we found commonalities and identified five basic guiding principles governing effective risk management: (1) identify risks, (2) analyze risks, (3) plan for risk mitigation, (4) implement a risk mitigation plan, and (5) monitor risks and mitigation plans. Using these guiding principles as criteria, we analyzed DOD documents related to risk management, such as the May 2012 and November 2012 FIAR Plan Status Reports, which identified DOD’s program risks and mitigation plans, and FIAR oversight committee meeting minutes, which documented the results of DOD’s efforts to prioritize and manage these risks. Most recently, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 made the 2014 target for SBR auditability an ongoing component of the FIAR Plan by amending the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 such that it now explicitly refers to describing the actions and costs associated with validating as audit ready both DOD’s SBR by the end of fiscal year 2014 and DOD’s complete set of financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017. Identify risks. DOD Has Not Established an Effective Risk Management Process
DOD carried out some risk management practices centrally with respect to implementing the FIAR Plan, but did not follow many risk management principles necessary for effective risk management and did not document its risk management policies and procedures. In January 2012, DOD identified six risks that if not mitigated, could impede its efforts to achieve auditability. The following is DOD’s summary of the six risks it identified. A lack of DOD-wide commitment. Insufficient accountability. Poorly defined scope and requirements. Insufficient funding. In addition, guiding principles state that risk identification is an iterative process where program stakeholders continually forecast the outcomes of current strategies, plans, and activities and exercise their best judgment to identify new risks as the program progresses throughout its life cycle. Although DOD indicated that risks are discussed on an ongoing basis during various meetings, the risks it initially identified were not comprehensive, and it did not provide evidence of efforts to identify additional risks. Conducting a risk identification process in accordance with guiding principles would have increased the likelihood of DOD identifying additional risks that could impede the department’s ability to achieve its auditability goals. Both the Navy’s and DLA’s identified risks included the reliance on service providers and the need for better document retention. However, DOD did not have documented policies and detailed procedures for planning risk mitigation actions. For example, the plans did not include (1) assignment of responsibility or ownership of the risk mitigation actions, (2) information about DOD’s or the components’ roles and responsibilities in executing these plans, (3) deadlines or milestones for individual mitigation actions, and (4) resource needs. For example, the risk mitigation plan for addressing the risk of unqualified or inexperienced personnel did not provide sufficient information as recommended by guiding principles. Information system control weaknesses. DOD has taken some actions to manage its department-level risks associated with preparing auditable financial statements through its FIAR Plan. To improve management of the risks to the FIAR effort throughout the department, the risk management processes established by two DOD components—the Navy and DLA—could serve as a starting point. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense, in his capacity as the Chief Management Officer and in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to take the following two actions:
Design and implement department-level policies and detailed procedures for FIAR Plan risk management that incorporate the five guiding principles for effective risk management. However, DOD cited planned actions that are consistent with our recommendations and findings, including (1) improving the documentation related to FIAR risk management activities, (2) reinforcing the importance of more detailed risk management activity within each DOD component executing its detailed FIAR Plan, (3) reinstating the DOD probability and impact matrix for risk analysis for the FIAR initiative, and (4) reevaluating all metrics used to monitor progress and risk for audit readiness and developing new measures as appropriate. While these are good first steps, we continue to believe additional action is warranted. This raises concerns about whether DOD can effectively manage and mitigate risks in time to meet its audit readiness goals, beginning with achieving an audit-ready Statement of Budgetary Resources by September 30, 2014, as mandated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that DOD's consolidated financial statements be validated as audit ready by September 30, 2017. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 further mandated that DOD's General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources be audit ready by the end of fiscal year 2014. DOD issued the FIAR Plan and related guidance to provide a strategy and methodology for achieving its audit readiness goals. However, substantial risks exist that may impede DOD's ability to implement the FIAR methodology and achieve audit readiness.
GAO was asked to assess DOD's risk management process for implementing its FIAR Plan. This report addresses the extent to which DOD has established an effective process for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating risks that could impede its progress in achieving audit readiness. GAO interviewed DOD and component officials, reviewed relevant documentation, and compared DOD's risk management processes with guiding principles for risk management.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some actions to manage its department-level risks associated with preparing auditable financial statements through its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan. However, its actions were not fully in accordance with widely recognized guiding principles for effective risk management, which include (1) identifying risks that could prevent it from achieving its goals, (2) assessing the magnitude of those risks, (3) developing risk mitigation plans, (4) implementing mitigating actions to address the risks, and (5) monitoring the effectiveness of those mitigating actions. DOD did not have documented policies and procedures for following these guiding principles to effectively manage risks to the implementation of the FIAR Plan.
In January 2012, DOD identified six departmentwide risks to FIAR Plan implementation: lack of DOD-wide commitment, insufficient accountability, poorly defined scope and requirements, unqualified or inexperienced personnel, insufficient funding, and information system control weaknesses. DOD officials stated that risks are discussed on an ongoing basis during various FIAR oversight committee meetings; however, the risks they initially identified were not comprehensive, and they did not provide evidence of efforts to identify additional risks. For example, based on prior audits, GAO identified other audit-readiness risks that DOD did not identify, such as the reliance on service providers for much of the components' financial data and the need for better department-wide document retention policies. Risk management guiding principles provide that risk identification is an iterative process in which new risks may evolve or become known as a program progresses throughout its life cycle.
Similarly, DOD's actions to manage its identified risks were not in accordance with the guiding principles. GAO found little evidence that DOD analyzed risks it identified to assess their magnitude or that DOD developed adequate plans for mitigating the risks. DOD's risk mitigation plans, published in its FIAR Plan Status Reports, consisted of brief, high-level summaries that did not include critical management information, such as specific and detailed plans for implementation, assignment of responsibility, milestones, or resource needs. In addition, information about DOD's mitigation efforts was not sufficient for DOD to monitor the extent of progress in mitigating identified risks.
Without effective risk management at the department-wide level to help ensure the success of the FIAR Plan implementation, DOD is at increased risk of not achieving audit readiness initially for its Statement of Budgetary Resources and ultimately for its complete set of financial statements.
GAO identified two DOD components--the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)--that had established practices consistent with risk management guiding principles, such as preparing risk registers, employing analytical techniques to assess risk, and engaging internal and external stakeholders consistently to assess and identify new risks. These components' actions could serve as a starting point for improving department-level risk management.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD design and implement policies and procedures for FIAR Plan risk management that fully incorporate the five risk management guiding principles and consider the Navy's and DLA's risk management practices. While DOD did not fully concur, it cited planned actions that are consistent with GAO's recommendations and findings. These are good first steps, but GAO believes additional action is warranted. GAO affirms its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-713 | gao_GAO-04-713_0 | Twenty States Had Laws That Require Private Health Insurance Plans to Cover Colorectal Cancer Screening Tests
Twenty states had laws requiring private health insurance plans to cover colorectal cancer screening tests as of May 2004. In 19 of these states, the laws generally applied to group or individual health plans, and required coverage of all four tests—FOBT, flexible sigmoidoscopy, DCBE, and colonoscopy—typically consistent with ACS guidelines. However, the law in Wyoming had limitations. It was more limited in scope, applying to group and managed care plans and not explicitly requiring coverage of each of the four screening tests according to ACS guidelines. Among plans that covered fewer than four of the tests, DCBE and colonoscopy were least likely to be covered. In States Without Colorectal Cancer Screening Test Laws, Most of the Small Employer and Individual Plans Reviewed Provided Coverage for All Four Tests
In 10 states without laws requiring private health insurance coverage of colorectal cancer screening tests, most of the small employer plans we reviewed—16 of 19—covered all four colorectal cancer screening tests. The remaining 3 plans covered FOBT or FOBT and flexible sigmoidoscopy, but not DCBE or colonoscopy. Among the 14 individual plans we reviewed, 10 covered all four colorectal cancer tests for screening purposes. The remaining 4 plans did not offer screening coverage for any of the tests. Most Large Employer Plans Reviewed Covered All Four Colorectal Cancer Screening Tests
Twenty-four of the 35 large employer plans we reviewed, or approximately two-thirds of these plans, covered all four colorectal cancer tests for screening purposes. Seven of the 35 plans covered only one of the colorectal cancer screening tests: FOBT or flexible sigmoidoscopy. Four of the health plans offered by the large employers did not cover any of the colorectal cancer tests for screening purposes. Among the 17 national FEHBP plans, 12 covered all four tests, and 5 covered FOBT, flexible sigmoidoscopy, and colonoscopy, but not DCBE. External Comments and Our Evaluation
Representatives of ACS and AHIP provided comments on a draft of this report. In contrast, AHIP commented that the report overstates the lack of coverage, for example by highlighting the number of plans that covered fewer than four tests rather than the number of plans that covered at least one test. Recognizing that our findings are subject to varying interpretations, we attempted to report them neutrally and to not overly emphasize the coverage that did or did not exist. In response to ACS’s comments that we did not sufficiently address our study limitations, we modified the final report to more prominently highlight certain limitations of our methodology. AHIP Comments
AHIP commented that the draft report did not sufficiently address the low rate at which Americans actually receive colorectal cancer screening tests in spite of relatively high coverage rates among health plans, suggesting that factors other than insurance coverage are responsible for the low screening rate. However, an assessment of the factors influencing screening utilization rates, beyond the extent of health insurance coverage, was outside the scope of this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the extent to which the four key colorectal cancer tests are covered for screening purposes by private health insurance plans, we reviewed the extent to which state laws require such coverage, and we reviewed the extent of coverage among selected small employer and individual plans in states without such laws, a sample of large employer plans, and coverage within FEHBP plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Colorectal cancer is the second leading cause of cancer deaths in the United States. Its mortality can be reduced through early detection and treatment. Four key tests are used to detect the cancer--fecal occult blood test (FOBT), flexible sigmoidoscopy, double-contrast barium enema (DCBE), and colonoscopy. Private health insurance plans generally cover these tests to diagnose cancer; however, the extent to which plans cover the tests for screening purposes--where no symptoms are evident--is less clear. Congress is considering legislation that would require coverage of the tests for screening purposes among all private health insurance plans. GAO was asked to (1) identify the state laws that require private health insurance coverage of these screening tests; and (2) determine the extent to which the tests are covered among small employer, individual, large employer, and federal employee health plans. GAO summarized state laws that require coverage of the tests. GAO examined test coverage among a sample of the largest 19 small employer and 14 individual plans in 10 states without laws requiring the coverage, and among 35 large employer plans nationally. The findings cannot be generalized beyond these plans. GAO also reviewed brochures for 143 federal employee health plans.
What GAO Found
Twenty states had laws in place as of May 2004 requiring private insurance coverage of colorectal cancer tests for screening purposes. In 19 of these states, the laws generally applied to insurance sold to small employers and individuals, and required coverage of all four tests--FOBT, flexible sigmoidoscopy, DCBE, and colonoscopy. The law in 1 of the states was more limited in scope, applying to group and managed care plans and not explicitly requiring coverage of each of the four screening tests according to American Cancer Society (ACS) guidelines. Most, but not all, health plans offered by the insurers and employers GAO reviewed covered all four colorectal cancer tests for screening purposes. Over four-fifths of the small employer plans (16 of 19) covered all of the tests, whereas 1 plan covered only FOBT and flexible sigmoidoscopy and 2 plans covered only FOBT. Almost three-quarters of the individual plans (10 of 14), covered all of the tests, and the remaining 4 plans covered none of the tests. Approximately two-thirds of the large employer plans (24 of 35) covered all four of the tests. Among the remaining 11 plans, 5 covered only FOBT, 2 covered only flexible sigmoidoscopy, and 4 covered none of the tests. Over half of the plans offered to federal employees covered each of the four tests. Finally, among all plans that covered at least one but fewer than four tests, DCBE and colonoscopy were least likely to be covered. In commenting on a draft of this report, ACS suggested that the report overstated the extent of coverage and did not sufficiently highlight the methodological limitations of the study. In contrast, America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) commented that the report overstated the lack of coverage. Moreover, AHIP commented that the report did not address the low rate at which Americans actually receive colorectal cancer screening tests regardless of insurance coverage, suggesting that factors other than health insurance coverage are responsible for low screening rates. Recognizing that the findings are subject to varying interpretations, GAO attempted to report them neutrally. Although the draft report disclosed the methodological limitations of the study, in response to ACS comments, GAO more prominently highlighted certain of the limitations. Finally, whereas the draft report noted the screening utilization rates, assessing the factors responsible for them was beyond the scope of this study. |
gao_GAO-09-205 | gao_GAO-09-205_0 | In addition to the requirements under the APA, an agency may also need to comply with requirements imposed by other statutes. Agencies Have Limited Data on the Time and Resources Used to Address Regulatory Requirements in Their Rulemaking Processes
All agencies’ rulemaking processes share three basic steps or phases: initiation of rulemaking actions, development of proposed rules, and development of final rules. During initiation, agency officials identify issues that may potentially result in a rulemaking. During the course of our review, only DOT provided us with data that showed it routinely tracked these milestones. SEC did not have such systematic tracking and reporting of its scheduled and actual regulatory milestones. As noted above, internal control standards call for relevant, reliable and timely information. Similarly, there is limited information available regarding contract costs. Many of the Rules GAO Reviewed Triggered Few of the Broadly Applicable Rulemaking Requirements
When issuing major rules, agencies must generally comply with the APA and a number of other broadly applicable procedural and analytical requirements specified in law. Officials from case-study agencies identified two long-standing analytical and procedural requirements, the PRA regarding information collections and the RFA regarding analysis of rules’ effects on small entities, as having had more significant effects on time and resources than the more recent requirements. However, the documentation could be improved for greater transparency. As we also found in 2003, agencies sometimes included more information about OIRA’s review than required, and we found such information useful to more clearly explain what had occurred. Agencies’ labeling practices also sometimes made it difficult to find the relevant documentation about OIRA’s reviews. OIRA Implemented Only One of Eight Prior GAO Recommendations to Improve Transparency of the Regulatory Review Process
In our 2003 report on the OMB/OIRA regulatory review process, we made eight recommendations to the Director of OMB to improve the transparency of the process. 4. Our study of broadly applicable requirements illustrated the difficulties of evaluating the effects of regulatory requirements on the rulemaking process with limited data. However, in comments on our draft report, EPA and FDA subsequently provided some documentation and data on their tracking and reporting of milestones. If the current administration retains Executive Order 12866, or establishes similar transparency requirements, we recommend that the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of OIRA, take the following four actions to more consistently implement the order’s requirement to provide information to the public “in a complete, clear, and simple manner”: define in guidance what types of changes made as a result of the OIRA review process are substantive and need to be publicly identified, instruct agencies to clearly attribute those changes “made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA,” direct agencies to clearly state in final rules whether they made substantive changes as a result of the OIRA reviews, and standardize how agencies label documentation of these changes in public rulemaking dockets. Specifically, it provides that “no agency shall promulgate any regulation that has federalism implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs on state and local governments,” unless the agency (1) has consulted with state and local officials early in the process, (2) submitted to OMB copies of any written communications from such officials, and (3) published in the preamble of the rule “a federalism summary impact statement” describing the consultations, “a summary of the nature of concerns and the agency’s position supporting the need to issue the regulations, and a statement of the extent to which the concerns of State and local officials have been met.”
Executive Order 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments
This executive order provides that “no agency shall promulgate any regulation that has tribal implications” unless the agency (1) has consulted with tribal officials early in the process, (2) submitted to OMB copies of any written communications from such officials, and (3) published in the preamble of the rule “a tribal summary impact statement” describing the consultations, “a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency’s position supporting the need to issue the regulation, and a statement of the extent to which the concerns of tribal officials have been met.” On issues relating to tribal self-government, tribal trust resources, or Indian tribal treaty and other rights, each agency should explore and, where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated rulemaking. Appendix II: Case Studies of 16 Selected Rules
This appendix provides case studies on 16 final rules published between January 2006 and May 2008 that we reviewed for this report. The body of each case study includes identifying information, a brief summary or synopsis of the rule, a discussion of the regulatory requirements addressed in the final rule, a summary of the changes to the rule resulting from reviews of the draft rule by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (if applicable), and a timeline of important events in the course of the rulemaking. Changes Resulting from OIRA Review
There was a significant change to the regulatory text. March 14, 2006: OIRA staff met with outside parties to discuss this rule. Regulatory Management: Implementation of Selected OMB Responsibilities Under the Paperwork Reduction Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Regulation is one of the principal tools that the government uses to implement public policy. As part of the rulemaking process federal agencies must comply with an increasing number of procedural and analytical requirements. GAO was asked to examine how broadly applicable rulemaking requirements cumulatively have affected (1) agencies' rulemaking processes, in particular including effects of requirements added to the process since 2003, and (2) transparency of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) regulatory review process. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed selected rules issued between January 2006 and May 2008 and associated dockets and also interviewed knowledgeable agency and OIRA officials.
What GAO Found
The agencies GAO reviewed had little data on the time and resources used to comply with regulatory requirements making it difficult to evaluate the effects of these requirements on rulemaking. All the agencies set milestones for regulatory development. During our review, only the Department of Transportation (DOT) provided data showing that it tracked and reported on milestones, but EPA and FDA provided similar information in their agency comments. The agencies GAO reviewed also could provide little systematic data on the resources they used--such as staff hours, contract costs, and other expenses--in developing rules. DOT and SEC have attempted to identify staff time expended on individual rules but are encountering difficulties generating usable and reliable data. Despite the challenges they have encountered in attempting to track time and resources in rulemaking, agency officials identified potential benefits to the management of their processes if they had such information to evaluate. Systematic tracking and reporting by agencies on their schedules and milestones would also be consistent with internal control standards. Our review of 139 major rules including 16 case-study rules revealed that most triggered analytical requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), and Executive Order 12866, but few other requirements. Agency officials reported that requirements added to the rulemaking process by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) since 2003 sometimes required a learning period when first implemented, but their agencies either already performed the added requirements or recognized the revisions as best practices. The officials instead identified long-standing requirements of the PRA and the RFA as generally requiring a more significant investment of resources. Based on the limited information available, the average time needed to complete a rulemaking across our 16 case-study rules was about 4 years, with a range from about 1 year to nearly 14 years, but there was considerable variation among agencies and rules. OIRA's reviews of agencies' draft rules often resulted in changes. Of 12 case-study rules subject to OIRA review, 10 resulted in changes, about half of which included changes to the regulatory text. Agencies used various methods to document OIRA's reviews, which generally met disclosure requirements, but the transparency of this documentation could be improved. In particular, some prior issues persist, such as uneven attribution of changes made during the OIRA review period and differing interpretations regarding which changes are "substantive" and thus require documentation. Out of eight prior GAO recommendations to improve the transparency OIRA has implemented only one--to clarify information posted about meetings with outside parties regarding draft rules under OIRA review. |
gao_GAO-08-426 | gao_GAO-08-426_0 | Departmental and Military Service Efforts Are Under Way to Reduce Mobility Energy Demand
OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services have made efforts to reduce mobility energy demand for DOD’s forces and in weapons platforms. In 2006, OSD created the DOD Energy Security Task Force to address energy security concerns. The guidance defines a key performance parameter as an attribute or characteristic of a system that is considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability. Two of the Power Surety Task Force’s initiatives—foam-insulated tents and temporary biodegradable dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool—are expected to reduce the number of generators required to produce power at forward-deployed locations. The energy conservation program has both training and award components to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. Air refueling optimization. Efficient ground operations. Marine Corps Is Studying Technologies to Reduce Fuel Consumption
The Marine Corps has taken steps to reduce its fuel usage by initiating research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources and improve fuel management. DOD Has Not Established an Overarching Organizational Framework to Guide and Oversee Mobility Energy Reduction Efforts
While DOD and the military services have several efforts under way to reduce mobility energy demand, DOD lacks key elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. As a result, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel. While DOD has identified energy as one of its transformational priorities, DOD’s current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) top leadership, with a single executive-level OSD official—supported by an implementation team with dedicated resources and funding—who is accountable for mobility energy matters; (2) a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy; and (3) an effective mechanism to provide for communication and coordination of mobility energy efforts among OSD and the military services as well as leadership and accountability over each military service’s efforts. In the absence of a framework for mobility energy that includes these elements, DOD has made limited progress in incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in its key business processes—which include developing requirements for and acquiring new weapons systems—and in implementing recommendations made in department-sponsored studies. We noted that DOD has established new organizational frameworks to address other crosscutting issues, such as business systems modernization, corrosion control and prevention, contractors on the battlefield, and the defeat of improvised explosive devices. Moreover, a framework for mobility energy could provide greater assurance that DOD’s efforts to reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel will succeed without degrading its operational capabilities and that DOD is better positioned to address future mobility energy challenges. Increased national focus on the United States’ dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in the worldwide demand for oil, and uncertainties about world oil supplies will likely require DOD to further increase its focus on long-term energy issues, both within the department and as a stakeholder in interagency and national dialogues. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to establish an overarching organizational framework by taking the following three actions: Designate an executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters and sets the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across the department; improve business processes to incorporate energy efficiency considerations as a factor in DOD decision making; coordinate on energy issues with facility energy officials; act as DOD’s focal point in interagency deliberations about national energy concerns; and lead the department’s potential transition from petroleum- based fuel to alternative fuel sources. To assess the extent to which DOD has established an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy efforts, we reviewed and analyzed DOD documentation, such as policies and directives, DOD-sponsored fuel-related studies, and legislation, and interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel for mobility energy--the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. Dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in worldwide demand, and rising oil costs, as well as the significant logistics burden associated with moving fuel on the battlefield, will likely require DOD to address its mobility energy demand. GAO was asked to (1) identify key efforts under way to reduce mobility energy demand and (2) assess the extent to which DOD has established an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. GAO reviewed DOD documents, policies, and studies, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken efforts to reduce mobility energy demand in weapons platforms and other mobile defense systems. For example, OSD created a departmentwide Energy Security Task Force in 2006 that is monitoring the progress of selected energy related research and development projects. The Joint Staff updated its policy governing the development of capability requirements for new weapons systems to selectively consider energy efficiency as a key performance parameter--a characteristic of a system that is considered critical to the development of an effective military capability. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool, reducing the demand for fuel-powered generators. The Navy has established an energy conservation program to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force has developed an energy strategy and undertaken initiatives to determine fuel-efficient flight routes, reduce the weight on aircraft, optimize air refueling, and improve the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources and improve fuel management. While these and other efforts are under way and DOD has identified energy as one of its transformational priorities, DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts. In the absence of an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel. GAO found that DOD's current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) a single executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters; sets the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across DOD; and can serve as a mobility energy focal point within the department and with Congress and interagency partners; (2) a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy that aligns individual efforts with DOD-wide goals and priorities, establishes time frames for implementation, and uses performance metrics to evaluate progress; and (3) an effective mechanism to provide for communication and coordination of mobility energy efforts among OSD and the military services as well as leadership and accountability over each military service's efforts. GAO also found that DOD has made limited progress in incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in its key business processes--which include developing requirements for and acquiring new weapons systems. DOD has established new organizational frameworks to address other crosscutting issues, such as business systems modernization and corrosion control and prevention. Establishing an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy could provide greater assurance that DOD's efforts to reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel will succeed and that DOD is better positioned to address future mobility energy challenges--both within the department and as a stakeholder in national energy security dialogues. |
gao_GAO-01-425 | gao_GAO-01-425_0 | Because of limitations in the Army’s process for determining war reserve spare parts requirements, uncertainties exist regarding the accuracy of the war reserve spare parts requirements and funding needs. These limitations include (1) not using the best available data on the rate at which spare parts would be consumed during wartime for its war reserve spare parts requirements calculations, (2) having a potential mismatch between the Army’s process for determining spare parts requirements for war reserves and how the Army plans to repair equipment on the battlefield, and (3) lacking a fact-based assessment of industrial base capacity to provide needed parts for the two major theaters of war scenario. Some uncertainties are likely to remain for the foreseeable future as the Army contemplates a significant transformation of its forces and other changes are considered affecting military strategy and force structure. However, improvements in the above areas could lessen the degree of uncertainties that exist. | What GAO Found
According to the current National Military Strategy the United States should be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous wars in different parts of the world. Military policy calls for each of the services to acquire and maintain enough war material inventories to sustain a two-war scenario until the industrial base can resupply our armed forces. Because of limitations in the Army's process for determining war reserve spare parts requirements, however, the accuracy of the war reserve spare parts requirements and funding needs are uncertain. These limitations include (1) not using the best available data on the rate at which spare parts would be consumed during wartime for its war reserve spare parts requirements calculations, (2) having a potential mismatch between the Army's process for determining spare parts requirements for war reserves and how the Army plans to repair equipment on the battlefield, and (3) lacking a fact-based assessment of industrial base capacity to provide needed parts for the two-war scenario. Uncertainties are likely to persist for some time as the Army contemplates a significant transformation of its forces and other changes are considered affecting military strategy and force structure. However, improvements in the above areas could lessen the degree of uncertainties that exist. |
gao_NSIAD-97-88 | gao_NSIAD-97-88_0 | Table 1 describes the 17 aircraft programs and their estimated procurement funding requirements and appendix I provides details on these programs. Funding Needed for Aircraft Procurement Programs Will Exceed Historical Norms
DOD asserts that its aircraft modernization programs are affordable as planned. Funding for DOD’s aircraft purchases was at its highest point, both in dollar terms and as a percentage of the overall DOD budget, during the early to mid-1980s. Therefore, a long-term average would be more appropriate than early 1980’s historical norms as a benchmark for an analysis of funding patterns, and its use would even out the high aircraft procurement funding of the early 1980s and the lower funding of the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War eras. If DOD’s aircraft investment strategy is implemented as planned and the defense budget stabilizes at DOD’s currently projected fiscal year 2003 level (about $247 billion in constant fiscal year 1997 dollars), DOD’s projected funding for aircraft purchases will exceed the historical average percentage of the defense budget for aircraft purchases in all but 1 year between fiscal year 2000 and 2015. To increase procurement funding while keeping overall defense spending at current levels, DOD anticipates major savings will be generated from infrastructure reductions and acquisition reform initiatives, as well as increased purchasing power through significantly lower inflation projections. We found, however, that there are unlikely to be sufficient savings available to offset DOD’s projected procurement increases. DOD’s traditional approach to managing affordability problems is to reduce procurement quantities and extend production schedules without eliminating programs. Our work showed that DOD develops weapon system acquisition strategies that are based on optimistic projections of funding that are rarely achieved. If DOD’s assumptions regarding future spending for its aircraft programs do not materialize, DOD may need to (1) reduce funding for some or all of the aircraft programs; (2) reduce funding for other procurement programs; (3) implement changes in infrastructure, operations, or other areas; or (4) increase overall defense funding. DOD needs to reorient its aircraft investment strategy to recognize the reality of a constrained overall defense budget for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in close consultation with the defense and budget committees of the Congress, define realistic, long-term projections of overall defense funding and, within those amounts, the portion of the annual procurement funding that can be expected to be made available to purchase new or significantly improved aircraft. Our recent reviews of DOD’s previous initiatives to reduce the costs of defense infrastructure and reengineer business practices indicate that the amount and availability of savings from such initiatives may be substantially less than DOD has estimated. Descriptions of Planned Aircraft Acquisitions
Marine Corps aircraft. At this time, the availability of savings from planned initiatives is not clearly evident. 2. The Quadrennial Defense Review does not provide sufficiently detailed projections to judge the affordability of DOD’s new aircraft procurement plans by comparing the long-term funding expected to be available with the funding needed to fully implement those plans. 3. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) aircraft acquisition investment strategy, focusing on: (1) DOD's and the Congressional Budget Office's estimates of the annual funding needed for aircraft programs, as a percentage of the overall DOD budget, and a comparison of that percentage to a long-term historical average percentage of the defense budget; (2) the potential long-term availability of funding for DOD's planned aircraft procurements; and (3) DOD's traditional approach to resolving funding shortfalls.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to meet its future aircraft inventory and modernization needs, DOD's current aircraft investment strategy involves the purchase or significant modification of at least 8,499 aircraft in 17 aircraft programs, at a total procurement cost of $334.8 billion (fiscal year 1997 dollars) through their planned completions; (2) DOD has maintained that its investment plans for aircraft modernization are affordable within expected future defense budgets; (3) DOD had stated earlier that sufficient funds would be available for its aircraft programs based on its assumptions that: (a) overall defense funding would begin to increase in real terms after fiscal year (FY) 2002; and (b) large savings would be generated from initiatives to downsize defense infrastructure and reform the acquisition process; (4) DOD's aircraft investment strategy may be unrealistic in view of current and projected budget constraints; (5) recent statements by DOD officials, as well as congressional projections, suggest that overall defense funding will be stable, at best, for the foreseeable future; (6) DOD's planned funding for the 17 aircraft programs in all but one year between FY 2000 and 2015 exceeds the long-term historical average percentage of the budget devoted to aircraft purchases and, for several of those years, approaches the percentages of the defense budget reached during the peak Cold War spending era of the early-to-mid-1980s; (7) the amount and availability of savings from infrastructure reductions and acquisition reform, two main claimed sources for increasing procurement funding, are not clearly evident today; (8) GAO's recent reviews of these initiatives indicate there are unlikely to be sufficient savings available to offset projected procurement increases; (9) to deal with a potential imbalance between procurement funding requirements and the available resources, DOD may need to: (a) reduce planned aircraft funding and procurement rates; (b) reduce funding for other procurement programs; (c) implement changes in force structure, operations, or other areas; or (d) increase total defense funding; (10) DOD has historically made long-term commitments to acquire weapon systems based on optimistic procurement profiles and then significantly altered those profiles because of insufficient funding; and (11) to avoid or minimize affordability problems, DOD needs to bring its aircraft investment strategy into line with more realistic, long-term projections of overall defense funding, as well as the amount of procurement funding expected to be available for aircraft purchases. |
gao_T-RCED-96-224 | gao_T-RCED-96-224_0 | Also, weak management and information systems for evaluating program’s performance has long hindered DOE from exercising effective oversight. In addition, DOE’s elaborate and highly decentralized field structure has been slow to respond to changing conditions and priorities, is fraught with communication problems, and poorly positioned to tackle difficult issues requiring a high degree of cross-cutting coordination. Many believed that DOE must concentrate its attention more on energy-related missions such as energy policy, energy information, and energy supply research and development. Recognizing the need to change, DOE has several efforts under way to strengthen its capacity to manage. For example, DOE’s reform of its contracting practices aims to make them more business-like and results-oriented; decision-making processes have been opened up to the public in an attempt to further break down DOE’s long-standing culture of secrecy, which has historically shielded the Department from outside scrutiny; and high-level task forces convened by DOE have made recommendations on laboratory and research management and on the Department’s missions. We found that DOE’s planned budget savings are on target and that the Department is depending on process improvements and reengineering efforts to enable it to fulfill its missions under the reduced budgets called for by the Initiative. These issues include contract reform, major systems acquisitions, and environmental cleanup and waste management. Which organizational structure will provide the greatest focus on its mission(s)? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) future, focusing on DOE efforts to restructure its missions and address policy and management issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE is having a difficult time responding to its changing mission and organizational structure; (2) DOE is unable to evaluate its activities due to weak management and information systems; (3) DOE has a highly decentralized field structure that is unable to respond to changing conditions and priorities, fraught with communication problems, and ill-equipped to handle cross-cutting issues; (4) many former DOE officials and other experts believe that DOE should concentrate on several key issues such as energy policy, energy information, and energy supply research and development; (5) DOE is reforming its contracting practices to make them more business-like and results-oriented, opening up its decisionmaking processes to the public, and organizing high-level task forces on laboratory and research management; (6) DOE is on target with its planned budget savings under the Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative and is depending on its process improvements and reengineering efforts to fulfill its mission under reduced budgets; (7) a governmentwide approach to restructuring DOE is desirable, since transferring any DOE mission will have a broad impact on other federal agencies; and (8) DOE will have to address contract reform, acquisitions, and environmental cleanup and waste management issues to effectively restructure its organization. |
gao_HEHS-95-64 | gao_HEHS-95-64_0 | If an eligible borrower experiences difficulty obtaining a subsidized Stafford loan, guaranty agencies are required to provide one. Most but not all guaranty agencies have arrangements in place to provide loans to students that have difficulty obtaining loans. 1.) It is also uncertain how the actions of the 104th Congress, whose leadership has pledged to constrain federal spending, might affect federal student loan programs and the Department’s ability to ensure access. Conclusions
Generally FFELP administrators foresaw little or no risk of widespread loan access problems through fiscal year 1995, the period covered by our review. However, if such arrangements prove inadequate, the Department has several options to ensure students’ access to subsidized loans, which have proved adequate in the few instances in which they were used. It is too early to know with certainty if lenders will continue to provide subsidized loans to eligible borrowers, and this issue may need to be reevaluated in the future. Questionnaire Results
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) is conducting a congressionally requested study on the availability of guaranteed student loans to borrowers. 2. 1. 4. [ ] We have other arrangements. [] Both FFY 1992 and 2. (CONTINUE)
3. Solicit additional lenders not currently in LLR program to provide loans Seek additional guaranty agency funding from non-federal sources to make loans directly Request that the state secondary market seek additional funding to enable it to either make LLR loans or purchase them from the guaranty agency Ask the Department of Education to advance funds to enable the guaranty agency to make these loans Ask the Department of Education to request that Sallie Mae make these loans Ask the Department of Education to make the loans directly Ask the Department of Education for other forms of assistance (PLEASE SPECIFY) _______________________ Make other arrangement(s): (PLEASE SPECIFY) ________________________ Does your agency currently have any verbal (informal) or written (either informal or formal) agreements for LLR loans with participating lenders? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how recent legislative changes have affected the availability of federally subsidized Stafford student loans, focusing on: (1) the arrangements guaranty agencies have to provide loans to eligible borrowers; and (2) Department of Education efforts to ensure continued student access to subsidized Stafford loans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) eligible students will have difficulty obtaining access to subsidized loans due to recent changes to the Federal Family Education Loan program (FFELP) and the introduction of the Federal Direct Student Loan program; (2) most guaranty agencies have made arrangements to provide loans to students that have difficulty obtaining loans; (3) the Department of Education has made arrangements with Sallie Mae and a new guaranty agency to make loans if guaranty agencies are unable to provide guarantees to lenders; (4) although it is difficult to predict how these arrangements will affect loan access after fiscal year (FY) 1995, FFELP administrators believe that there is little or no risk of widespread loan access problems through FY 1995; (5) Education has several options to ensure students' access to subsidized loans if its financial arrangements prove inadequate; and (6) the issue of student loan access may need to be reevaluated in the future, since it is too early to know whether lenders will continue to provide subsidized loans to eligible borrowers. |
gao_GAO-07-592 | gao_GAO-07-592_0 | USDA’s decision to implement NAIS as a voluntary program without benchmarks to measure progress may affect the agency’s ability to attract the necessary levels of participation to quickly and efficiently locate all animals potentially exposed to a disease. In addition, USDA has not prioritized the implementation of NAIS by species or other criteria. The agency also does not clearly define the time frame for rapid traceback. Finally, USDA does not require potentially critical information for efficient traceback to be recorded in NAIS databases. Some industry groups believe that NAIS could succeed as a voluntary program or that USDA first needs to resolve several key implementation issues before making participation mandatory. Several Other Key Issues Hinder USDA’s Ability to Implement NAIS Effectively
Industry groups, market operators, state animal health officials, and others have identified several other key problems that, if left unresolved, could undermine the program’s goal, further hindering USDA’s ability to implement the NAIS program effectively. Consequently, federal, state, and industry resources for NAIS have been allocated widely, rather than being focused first on the species of greatest concern and allowing other species to be included later, on the basis of lessons learned. As a result, producers have generally been discouraged from investing in new ID devices for NAIS, according to industry groups we interviewed, thereby inhibiting implementation of the program’s animal ID and tracking components. Nonetheless, USDA officials are starting to address some integration issues. USDA Awarded 169 Cooperative Agreements between Fiscal Years 2004 and 2006
To help identify effective approaches to register premises and identify and track animals between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, USDA awarded 169 cooperative agreements, totaling $35.0 million, to 49 states, 29 tribes, and 2 territories. USDA Has Not Consistently Monitored or Formally Evaluated NAIS Cooperative Agreements or Consistently Shared Their Results
To date, USDA has not consistently monitored or formally evaluated NAIS cooperative agreements and has not consistently shared their results with state, industry, and other stakeholders. Total NAIS Program Costs Have Not Been Determined, but USDA Recently Announced Plans to Develop a Cost- benefit Analysis
USDA has not determined the program costs for NAIS but recently announced plans to hire a contractor to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for NAIS, in part to more precisely forecast the economic effects of the program. Without a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for NAIS, it is not known how much is required in federal, state, and industry resources to achieve rapid and effective traceback, or whether the potential benefits of the program outweigh the costs. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator of APHIS to take the following seven actions to implement NAIS more effectively and efficiently and achieve the program’s goal of rapid and effective traceback: set priorities, in consultation with the NAIS species working groups, state animal health officials, and others, for implementing NAIS incrementally by species or other criteria; determine how NAIS will integrate with existing USDA and state animal disease eradication programs and branding systems; establish a robust process to select, standardize, and independently test and evaluate the performance of animal ID and tracking devices to ensure they meet minimum standards; identify—in consultation with the NAIS species working groups, state animal health officials, and others—current baselines for animal disease traceback, and develop time-sensitive, cost-effective goals for traceback under NAIS, which may include separate time frames for specific diseases; evaluate what information is critical for efficient traceback, such as species, approximate age or date of birth, and require that participants record that information in the NAIS animal ID and tracking databases; increase the monitoring of NAIS cooperative agreements, and evaluate and publish the results of cooperative agreements on a timely basis; and conduct the planned analysis of the costs and benefits of NAIS following criteria established in OMB guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses for federal programs and publish the results for comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) how effectively the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is implementing the National Animal Identification System (NAIS) and, specifically, the key implementation issues identified by livestock industry groups, market operators, state animal health officials, and others; (2) how USDA has distributed cooperative agreement funding to help states and industry prepare for NAIS and evaluated the agreements’ results; and (3) what USDA and others estimate are the costs for USDA, states, and the livestock industry to implement and maintain NAIS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Livestock production contributed nearly $123 billion to the U.S. economy in 2006. In response to concerns about animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced in December 2003 that it would implement a nationwide program--later named the National Animal Identification System (NAIS)--to help producers and animal health officials respond quickly and effectively to animal disease events in the United States. In this context, GAO determined (1) how effectively USDA is implementing NAIS and, specifically, the key issues identified by livestock industry groups, market operators, state officials, and others; (2) how USDA has distributed cooperative agreement funds to help states and industry prepare for NAIS and evaluated the agreements' results; and (3) what USDA and others estimate are the costs for USDA, states, and industry to implement NAIS. In conducting its work, GAO reviewed USDA documents; interviewed agency, industry, and state officials; and consulted 32 animal identification (ID) experts.
What GAO Found
In implementing the NAIS program, USDA has taken some steps to address issues identified by livestock industry groups, market operators, state animal health officials, and others. Nonetheless, the agency has not effectively addressed several issues that, if left unresolved, could undermine the program's ability to achieve the goal of rapid and effective animal disease traceback. Specifically, USDA's decision to implement NAIS as a voluntary program may affect the agency's ability to attract the necessary levels of participation. However, some industry groups believe that NAIS could succeed as a voluntary program, or that USDA needs to first resolve several issues before making participation mandatory. Agency officials are analyzing what participation levels are necessary to meet the program's goal and may introduce benchmarks to measure progress. In addition, several key problems hinder USDA's ability to implement NAIS effectively. USDA has not prioritized the implementation of NAIS by species or other criteria. Instead, the agency is implementing NAIS for numerous species simultaneously, causing federal, state, and industry resources to be allocated widely, rather than being focused on the species of greatest concern. USDA has not developed a plan to integrate NAIS with preexisting USDA and state animal ID requirements. As a result, producers are generally discouraged from investing in new ID devices for NAIS. USDA has not established a robust process for selecting, standardizing, and testing animal ID and tracking technologies. USDA does not clearly define the time frame for rapid traceback, possibly slowing response and causing greater economic losses. USDA does not require potentially critical information to be recorded, such as species or age, in the NAIS databases. USDA has awarded $35 million in NAIS cooperative agreements from fiscal years 2004 through 2006 to 49 states, 29 tribes, and 2 territories to help identify effective approaches to register premises and identify and track animals. However, USDA has not consistently monitored or formally evaluated the results of cooperative agreements or consistently shared the results with states, industry groups, and other stakeholders. As a result, USDA cannot be assured that the agreements' intended outcomes have been achieved and, furthermore, that lessons learned and best practices are used to inform the program's progress. No comprehensive cost estimate or cost-benefit analysis for the implementation and maintenance of NAIS currently exists. As a result, it is not known how much is required in federal, state, and industry resources to achieve rapid and effective traceback, or whether the potential benefits of the program outweigh the costs. Industry groups and state officials say the cost of implementing NAIS is one of their biggest concerns. USDA plans to hire a contractor to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, in part to more precisely forecast the economic effects of NAIS. |
gao_GAO-15-29 | gao_GAO-15-29_0 | DOE and NNSA Cost Estimating Requirements and Guidance for Programs
DOE and NNSA cost estimating requirements and guidance for programs are primarily defined in four documents. DOE and NNSA Cost Estimating Requirements and Guidance Generally Do Not Reflect Best Practices for Developing Cost Estimates
DOE and NNSA cost estimating requirements and guidance for projects and programs generally do not reflect best practices for developing cost estimates. For projects, DOE requires one best practice, and DOE’s cost estimating guide does not fully reflect cost estimating best practices, and is not mandatory. DOE’s 2010 project management order requires the use of only 1 of the 12 cost estimating best practice steps. For example, the order does not require any of the other 11 best practice steps such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis, identifying ground rules and assumptions, documenting the estimate, developing a point estimate, or determining the estimating structure. Appendix I provides a comparison of the extent to which DOE’s cost guide contains information on the 12 best practice steps. However, because the cost guide was issued in 2011, a year after DOE’s latest version of the order was issued, the order contains no reference to this guide that a preparer of a cost estimate could use in developing an estimate, or that a reviewer could use in reviewing one, and users of the order may not be aware of the guide’s availability and may not benefit from its usefulness. In the absence of a DOE or NNSA requirement for programs to follow cost estimating best practices, we found that managers for the programs we reviewed—the B61 LEP and the Plutonium Disposition Program— used different processes in developing cost estimates for these programs. In February 2014, we found that NNSA’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Plutonium Disposition Program did not follow all key steps for developing high-quality cost estimates in part because it did not have a requirement to develop a life-cycle cost estimate. Project Reviews Indicate Cost Estimating Weaknesses and Program Reviews Are Not Required and Therefore the Extent of Weaknesses Is Largely Unknown
NNSA’s project and program reviews for fiscal years 2009 to 2014 identified cost estimating weaknesses that can be attributed to not following best practices. DOE and NNSA require reviews of projects, including reviews of cost estimates at various CD points and at the discretion of project managers; however, because DOE and NNSA do not require reviews of program cost estimates, the extent of weaknesses in program cost estimates is largely unknown. Project Reviews Identified Cost Estimating Weaknesses That Can Be Attributed to Not Following Best Practices
Of the 50 NNSA project reviews conducted from February 2009 through February 2014, 39 identified a total of 113 cost estimating weaknesses. We determined that 71 of the 113 weaknesses—or about 63 percent— can be attributed to not following 4 of the 12 best practice steps. These identified several weaknesses in the cost estimates for this program that can be attributed to not following three best practice steps: (1) obtaining data, (2) defining program characteristics, and (3) determining the estimating structure. However, we also found that NNSA did not follow other key steps such as conducting an independent cost estimate and, as a result, the estimate was not reliable. Without a requirement for conducting program reviews, NNSA does not have the appropriate internal controls necessary for assessing program performance. Because DOE does not require the use of most of the 12 cost estimating best practices for its projects and programs, it is unlikely that NNSA and its contractors will consistently develop reliable cost estimates. Finally, without a requirement for conducting reviews of programs with project-like characteristics, including the life-cycle cost estimates of these programs, neither DOE nor NNSA have appropriate internal controls to assess the quality of program performance over time. In regard to the report’s fourth recommendation—revise DOE directives that apply to programs to require that DOE and NNSA and its contractors develop cost estimates in accordance with the 12 cost estimating best practices, including developing lifecycle cost estimates for programs— DOE stated in its written comments that it is in the process of substantially revising the existing 1995 DOE Order 130.1, Budget Formulation, and that as part of this effort, DOE will assess the requirement for program cost estimates and will revise the order to provide more specificity on the cost estimating requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear security programs. These programs often include the design and construction of large projects to meet program needs. NNSA has a history of struggling to complete these and other projects and programs within cost estimates.
Senate Report 112-73 mandated that GAO report on NNSA's cost estimating practices. This report examines: (1) the extent to which DOE and NNSA cost estimating requirements and guidance for projects and programs reflect best practices and (2) the extent to which recent NNSA project and program reviews identified cost estimating weaknesses, and the extent to which the weaknesses can be attributed to not following best practices. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA cost estimating practices and compared them to best practices, NNSA project and program reviews, and two programs selected among the largest and most complex NNSA programs. GAO also interviewed DOE and NNSA officials about requirements and guidance for cost estimates.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) cost estimating requirements and guidance for projects and programs do not fully reflect best practices for developing cost estimates. In regard to cost estimating requirements for projects, DOE's 2010 project management order requires 1 of the 12 cost estimating best practices—conducting an independent cost estimate—for larger projects at certain stages of development. In contrast, DOE's 2011 cost estimating guide describes recommended approaches for using 10 of 12 best practices and partially contains information about the other 2. Furthermore, because DOE's cost estimating guide was issued in 2011—after DOE's 2010 project order was issued—it is not referenced in the order. As a result, users of the order may not be aware of the guide's availability and may not benefit from its usefulness. In addition, although NNSA programs are required to follow DOE's budget formulation order and NNSA's budget process, both of which require the development of cost estimates, neither the order nor the process requires the use of best practices in developing the estimates. In February 2014, for example, GAO found that NNSA's lifecycle cost estimate for the Plutonium Disposition Program did not follow all key steps for developing high-quality cost estimates, in part because the agency did not have a requirement to develop a life-cycle cost estimate. In the absence of a requirement for using best practices, it is unlikely that DOE, NNSA, and their contractors will consistently develop reliable cost estimates.
NNSA's project and program reviews issued during fiscal year 2009 through March 2014 identified cost estimating weaknesses that can be attributed to not following best practices. DOE and NNSA require independent project reviews, including reviews of cost estimates at certain stages of development and at the discretion of project managers. Of the 50 reviews GAO analyzed, 39 identified a total of 113 cost estimating weaknesses. GAO determined that 71 of the 113 weaknesses—or about 63 percent—can be attributed to not following four best practices: (1) determining the estimating structure, (2) identifying ground rules and assumptions, (3) conducting risk and uncertainty analysis, and (4) documenting the estimate. Neither DOE nor NNSA, however, requires reviews of program cost estimates. Of the three program reviews conducted during fiscal years 2009 to 2013, two were of the B61 Life Extension Program, which is to extend the operational life of this nuclear weapon. Both reviews identified weaknesses in the cost estimates that can be attributed to not following three best practices: (1) determining the estimating structure, (2) defining program characteristics, and (3) obtaining data. In addition, a February 2014 GAO report on NNSA's program to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium found that NNSA did not follow several cost estimating best practices, such as conducting an independent cost estimate and as a result, the program cost estimate was not reliable. While the program reviews and GAO's February 2014 report indicate weaknesses in a few program cost estimates, the extent of program cost estimate weaknesses is largely unknown because neither DOE nor NNSA requires reviews of program cost estimates. Without a requirement for conducting independent program reviews, NNSA does not have the internal control necessary for assessing program performance over time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE, among other things, revise DOE requirements and guidance that apply to projects and programs to ensure: (1) the guidance is referenced in the project management order, (2) DOE and NNSA and its contractors develop cost estimates in accordance with the 12 best practices, (3) its cost estimating guide fully reflects best practices, and (4) independent reviews of programs are conducted periodically. DOE agreed with the report and its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-398 | gao_GAO-08-398_0 | Through SAFETEA-LU, Congress authorized nearly $2.2 billion for 4 years, from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, for seven programs to provide safety grants to assist states in their efforts to reduce traffic fatalities (see table 1). One of these criteria is to pass a safety belt law providing for primary enforcement, which allows law enforcement officers to stop a driver for not wearing a safety belt. With the exception of the safety belt grant program, the number of states receiving the grants remained constant or increased from fiscal year 2006 to 2007, although the extent to which states qualified for the different grants varied, with fewer states receiving grants that require passing a law. The decline in the number of states receiving Safety Belt Use grants—from 22 states in fiscal year 2006 to 18 states in fiscal year 2007—reflects the fact that states passing a primary safety belt law for the first time received grants in a single year, while 16 states that had the law in place prior to 2003, received the grant over 2 years: In fiscal year 2006, 6 states qualified for grants by enacting laws to implement and enforce primary safety belt laws, in addition to the 16 states that had primary safety belt laws prior to 2003; these 6 states received the full amount of their grants in fiscal year 2006, while the 16 states received a first installment of their grants. 3). NHTSA Uses Several Oversight Processes to Assess States’ Progress toward Safety Goals and Monitor States’ Use of Grant Funds
NHTSA uses several processes to determine the extent to which states are meeting safety-related performance goals that grant-funded activities are designed to address and monitor how the states spend grant funds. Specifically, NHTSA uses a performance-based approach to assess state progress toward meeting safety goals and complements this assessment with oversight processes that monitor whether states are accomplishing the tasks that will allow the state to achieve its goals. States Are Planning and Implementing Safety Improvement Activities, but the Structure of the Grant Programs Has Created Eligibility and Management Difficulties
Using grant funds, states are planning and implementing safety improvement activities to address the key traffic safety issues in their states, but the structure of the grant programs has created eligibility difficulties for states, as well as management difficulties for governors’ highway safety offices that administer the grants. These activities generally fall within five categories of activities— education and training, media and public information, enforcement, data and technology, and infrastructure improvements (see table 2). Safety officials we spoke with in seven selected states agree that the safety incentive grant programs are assisting states in implementing activities that address key safety issues. The Traffic Safety Information Systems grant program allows states to focus activities specifically on data and technology activities. Some States Have Faced Difficulties in Passing Laws to Meet Eligibility Requirements and Manage Grants
While state safety officials we contacted during site visits agreed that the grants are helping states address key safety issues, they also noted difficulties in passing laws to meet eligibility requirements for some grants, as well as managing grant applications, deadlines, and timing. NHTSA officials agree with state officials’ concerns but noted they cannot take action to address these issues because the challenges stem from the grant requirements built into the law itself. NHTSA Plans to Develop More Comprehensive Performance Measures; Performance Accountability Mechanisms and Issues States Face in Using Grants Raise Implications for Reauthorization
NHTSA plans to develop more comprehensive performance measures to evaluate the results of these grant programs, but state performance is not tied to the receipt of the grants; the absence of such performance accountability mechanisms, as well as issues described above that states face in using grants, raise implications for reauthorization. As previously noted, we are currently examining NHTSA’s oversight approach and expect to issue a report on it in July 2008. DOT officials, including the Deputy Administrator of NHTSA, generally agreed with the findings of the report and offered technical corrections that we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to evaluate five safety incentive grant programs included in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU), specifically the Safety Belt Use, Child Safety and Child Booster Seat Use, Alcohol-Impaired Driving Countermeasures, Motorcyclist Safety, and State Traffic Safety Data Systems Improvement grant programs. This report addresses (1) the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) status in awarding and overseeing states’ use of these grant programs, (2) activities states have conducted using the grants and issues they have faced in applying for and implementing them, and (3) how NHTSA plans to evaluate the results of the grant programs and implications for reauthorizing the programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) included authorizations of nearly $2.2 billion for safety incentive grant programs to assist states in their efforts to reduce traffic fatalities. Administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), five of these programs provide incentive grants to states to implement legislation governing the use of safety belts and child safety seats, and promote activities to reduce alcohol-impaired driving, improve motorcycle training and awareness, and improve traffic safety information systems. To help Congress prepare for the reauthorization of the surface transportation programs in 2009, this report provides information on (1) NHTSA's status in awarding and overseeing states' use of these five grants programs, (2) activities states have conducted using the grants and issues they have faced in applying for and implementing the grants, and (3) how NHTSA plans to evaluate the results of the grant programs and implications for reauthorizing the programs. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed DOT and state officials, analyzed safety reports from 50 states, and analyzed grant data from DOT and 7 selected states. DOT officials generally agreed with the findings of the report and offered technical corrections that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, NHTSA awarded about $575 million to states for the five safety incentive grant programs; NHTSA uses several oversight processes to determine the extent to which states are meeting safety-related performance goals and to monitor how the states spend grant funds. The number of states receiving the grants generally remained constant or increased from fiscal year 2006 to 2007, although the extent to which states qualified for the different grant programs varied. For example, in 2006, 22 states received the Safety Belt Use grant and 5 states received the Child Safety and Child Booster Seat Use grant because not all states were able to pass the laws that the grant programs required, while the majority of states received the other grants. To oversee states' use of grants, NHTSA uses a performance-based approach to assess state progress toward meeting safety goals and complements this assessment with oversight processes that monitor whether states are accomplishing the tasks that will allow the state to achieve its goals. This approach allows NHTSA to be involved throughout the lifecycle of state grants. In response to a mandate to evaluate the effectiveness of NHTSA's oversight process, GAO plans to issue a report in July 2008. States are planning and implementing safety improvement activities using grant funds, but the structure of the grant programs has created eligibility and management difficulties for states. The activities generally fall within five categories--education and training, media and public information, enforcement, data and technology, and infrastructure improvements. Safety officials GAO spoke with in seven selected states agree that the safety incentive grant programs are assisting states in implementing activities that address key safety issues and meeting goals and performance measures established in state highway safety plans. However, state safety officials also noted difficulties in passing laws to meet eligibility requirements for some grant programs, as well as managing grant applications, deadlines, and timing. For example, not all states have passed a primary safety belt law, which allows law enforcement officers to stop a driver for not wearing a safety belt and is required to qualify for a Safety Belt Use grant. The selected states have also had difficulty managing the multiple grant applications, which are all due within a 3-month period. NHTSA officials acknowledge state officials' concerns but noted they cannot address the concerns because the difficulties stem from the grant requirements established in SAFETEA-LU. NHTSA plans to develop additional performance measures to evaluate the results of these grant programs, but state performance is generally not tied to receipt of the grants; the absence of such performance accountability mechanisms as well as issues described above that states face in using grants raise implications for reauthorization. Congress will be faced with deciding whether the grant programs could be designed differently to allow states more flexibility in using grant funds and to focus more specifically on performance accountability, as some have advocated. However, these changes would require improved safety data and a robust accountability system. |
gao_GAO-06-892T | gao_GAO-06-892T_0 | Background
Federal agencies, including the judiciary, that operate in facilities under the control and custody of GSA are required to pay rent for the space they occupy. Rent payments, which by law must approximate commercial rates, are deposited into the FBF, which is a revolving fund that GSA uses to provide a range of real property services, including maintenance, repairs, and alterations, to space occupied by federal agencies. The judiciary’s rent payments represent roughly 15 percent of all rent payments made into FBF, making it one of the two largest contributors. Increases in Square Footage and Operating and Security Costs have Driven Increases in the Judiciary’s Rent Bill from Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005
The federal judiciary’s rental obligations for federally owned and leased space have steadily risen from $780 million to $990 million, or 27 percent from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, after controlling for inflation using the Gross Domestic Product price index. During this period, the judiciary had a net increase in the amount of space it occupies, from 33.6 million to 39.8 million rentable square feet, which is a 19 percent increase nationwide. However, increases in operating costs (driven by increases in energy costs) and security costs grew disproportionately higher than the percentage of net space added, thus contributing to the overall increase in rent (see figure 2). Much of the judiciary’s recent growth in net square footage was caused by the construction of new courthouses. The judiciary’s courthouse construction effort may continue. We found that neither the judiciary nor GSA had routinely and comprehensively analyzed the factors influencing the rent increases. Judiciary Faces a Number of Challenges but Could Take Actions to Better Manage Its Future Rent Payments
The federal judiciary faces several challenges to managing its rent costs including costly new construction requirements, a lack of incentives for efficient space use, and a lack of space allocation criteria for appeals and senior district judges. First, modern courthouses require structural and architectural elements that make them among the most costly types of federal space to construct. Chief among these elements are the three separate circulation patterns for judges, prisoners, and the public that the U.S. The judiciary has initiated a rent validation effort, but it does not address the lack of incentives for efficient space use at the circuit and district levels. An example of the inefficiencies that may result is in the Eastern District of Virginia, where the judiciary paid about $272,000 in 2005 to rent 4,600 square feet of office space for an appeals judge in McLean, Virginia, in addition to paying for 4,300 square feet of chamber space originally designated for that judge in the Albert V. Bryan U.S. According to AOUSC, the judiciary has subsequently pursued alternative uses for this chamber space. Assigning space to appeals courts and senior district judges poses challenges due to a lack of criteria, which can lead to variation and inefficiencies and, thus, higher rent. | Why GAO Did This Study
The judiciary pays over $900 million in rent annually to GSA for court-related space, representing a growing proportion of the judiciary's budget. The judiciary's rent payments are deposited into GSA's Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), a revolving fund used to finance GSA's real property services, including the construction and repair of federal facilities under GSA control. In December 2004, the judiciary requested a $483 million dollar permanent, annual rent exemption which GSA denied, saying that it undermined the intent of FBF and that GSA was unlikely to obtain appropriations to replace lost FBF income. GAO reviewed (1) recent trends in the judiciary's rent and space occupied and (2) challenges that the judiciary faces in managing its rent costs.
What GAO Found
The federal judiciary's rental obligations to GSA for courthouses have increased from $780 million to $990 million or 27 percent from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, after controlling for inflation--primarily due to a simultaneous net increase in space from 33.6 million to 39.8 million rentable square feet, a 19 percent increase nationwide. Much of the net increase in space was the result of new courthouses that the judiciary has taken occupancy of since 2000. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), the judiciary's workload has grown substantially and the number of court staff has doubled since 1985. Shell rent (the building with basic infrastructure) increased proportionately with square footage growth, but operational (utilities and general maintenance) and security costs grew disproportionately higher than square footage due to external factors, such as increasing energy costs and security requirements. Neither GSA nor the judiciary had routinely and comprehensively analyzed the factors causing rent increases, making it more difficult for the judiciary to manage increases. The federal judiciary faces several challenges to managing its rental obligations, including costly new construction requirements, a lack of incentives for efficient space use, and a lack of space allocation criteria for appeals and senior judges. First, building enhancements, such as three separate circulation patterns for judges, prisoners, and the public, and structural and architectural elements make courthouses among the most expensive federal facilities to construct in GSA's inventory, often leading to higher rent payments. Second, the judiciary has begun a rent validation effort intended to monitor GSA rent charges, but it does not address the lack of incentives for efficient space management at the circuit and district levels. An example of the inefficiencies that may result is in the Eastern District of Virginia, where the judiciary paid about $272,000 in 2005 to rent space for an appeals judge in McLean, Virginia, in addition to paying for space designated for that judge in a nearby federal courthouse that the judiciary later used for alternative purposes. Finally, the lack of criteria for assigning courtrooms for appeals and senior judges can contribute to inefficiencies in the amount of space provided, which can result in higher rent payments. |
gao_GAO-16-297 | gao_GAO-16-297_0 | Background
Bank Secrecy Act/Anti- Money-Laundering Requirements
BSA established reporting, recordkeeping, and other anti-money- laundering (AML) requirements for financial institutions. Financial Institutions Have Paid Billions for Violations of Financial Crimes-Related Requirements since 2009
Since 2009, financial institutions have been assessed about $12 billion in fines, penalties, and forfeitures for violations of BSA/AML, FCPA, and U.S. sanctions program requirements. Specifically, from January 2009 through December 2015, federal agencies assessed about $5.2 billion for BSA violations, $27 million for FCPA violations, and about $6.8 billion for violations of U.S. sanctions program requirements. Of the $12 billion, federal agencies have collected all of these assessments, except for about $100 million. These payments are deposited into accounts in Treasury’s General Fund and are used for the general support of federal government activities. From January 2009 through December 2015, about $2.7 billion was collected from financial institutions for the covered violations and deposited into Treasury General Fund accounts. From January 2009 through December 2015, about $3.2 billion was deposited into the AFF and $5.7 billion into the TFF, of which $3.8 billion related to a sanctions case was rescinded in the fiscal year 2016 appropriation legislation. Funds from the AFF and TFF are primarily used for program expenses, payments to third parties—including the victims of the related crimes—and equitable sharing payments to law enforcement agencies that participated in the efforts resulting in forfeitures. For the cases in our review, as of December 2015, DOJ and Treasury had distributed about $1.1 billion in payments to law enforcement agencies and approximately $2 billion is planned to be distributed to victims of crimes. The remaining funds from these cases are subject to general rescissions to the AFF and TFF or may be used for program or other law enforcement expenses. Forfeitures Are Deposited into Accounts with Several Authorized Uses, Including Payments to Crime Victims and Law Enforcement Partners
Forfeitures—including those from financial institutions for violations of BSA/AML and U.S. sanctions programs requirements—are deposited into three accounts depending in part on the agency seizing the assets (DOJ and other law enforcement agencies use the AFF, Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security use the TFF, and U.S. U.S. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes the fines, penalties, and forfeitures federal agencies have collected from financial institutions for violations of Bank Secrecy Act and related anti-money-laundering requirements (BSA/AML), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), and U.S. sanctions programs requirements. Specifically, our objectives in this report were to describe (1) the amount of fines, penalties, and forfeitures that the federal government has collected for these violations from January 2009 through December 2015; and (2) the process for collecting these funds and the purposes for which they are used. The agencies and offices included in this review were: (1) offices within the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, including officials from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, and Treasury’s Office of Management; (2) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); (3) the federal banking regulators—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and (4) the Department of Justice (DOJ). To respond to our first objective, we identified and analyzed these agencies’ data on enforcement actions taken against financial institutions that resulted in fines, penalties, or forfeitures for violations of BSA/AML, FCPA, and U.S. sanctions programs requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last few years, billions of dollars have been collected in fines, penalties, and forfeitures assessed against financial institutions for violations of requirements related to financial crimes. These requirements are significant tools that help the federal government detect and disrupt money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery, corruption, and violations of U.S. sanctions programs.
GAO was asked to review the collection and use of these fines, penalties, and forfeitures assessed against financial institutions for violations of these requirements—specifically, BSA/AML, FCPA, and U.S. sanctions programs requirements. This report describes (1) the amounts collected by the federal government for these violations, and (2) the process for collecting these funds and the purposes for which they are used. GAO analyzed agency data, reviewed documentation on agency collection processes and on authorized uses of the funds in which collections are deposited, and reviewed relevant laws. GAO also interviewed officials from Treasury (including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control), Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice, and the federal banking regulators.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, financial institutions have been assessed about $12 billion in fines, penalties, and forfeitures for violations of Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money- laundering regulations (BSA/AML), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), and U.S. sanctions programs requirements by the federal government. Specifically, GAO found that from January 2009 to December 2015, federal agencies assessed about $5.2 billion for BSA/AML violations, $27 million for FCPA violations, and about $6.8 billion for violations of U.S. sanctions program requirements. Of the $12 billion, federal agencies have collected all of these assessments, except for about $100 million.
Collections of Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures from Financial Institutions for Violations of Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and U.S. Sanctions Programs Requirements, Assessed in January 2009–December 2015
Agencies have processes for collecting payments for violations of BSA/AML, FCPA, and U.S. sanctions programs requirements and these collections can be used to support general government and law enforcement activities and provide payments to crime victims. Components within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and financial regulators are responsible for initially collecting penalty payments, verifying that the correct amount has been paid, and then depositing the funds into Treasury's General Fund accounts, after which the funds are available for appropriation and use for general support of the government. Of the approximately $11.9 billion collected, about $2.7 billion was deposited into Treasury General Fund accounts. The BSA and U.S. sanctions-related criminal cases GAO identified since 2009 resulted in the forfeiture of almost $9 billion through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Treasury. Of this amount, about $3.2 billion was deposited into DOJ's Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) and $5.7 billion into the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF), of which $3.8 billion related to a sanctions case was rescinded in fiscal year 2016 appropriations legislation. Funds from the AFF and TFF are primarily used for program expenses, payments to third parties, including the victims of the related crimes, and payments to law enforcement agencies that participated in the efforts resulting in forfeitures. As of December 2015, DOJ and Treasury had distributed about $1.1 billion to law enforcement agencies and about $2 billion was planned for distribution to crime victims. Remaining funds from these cases are subject to general rescissions to the TFF and AFF or may be used for program or other law enforcement expenses. |
gao_T-RCED-96-185 | gao_T-RCED-96-185_0 | In particular, public health experts believe that the majority of cases of foodborne illness are not reported because the initial symptoms of most foodborne illnesses are not severe enough to warrant medical attention, the medical facility or state does not report such cases, or the illness is not recognized as foodborne. In addition, public health and food safety officials believe that the risk of foodborne illnesses is increasing for several reasons. Foodborne Illnesses Can Be Debilitating and Costly
While foodborne illnesses are often temporary, they can also result in more serious illnesses requiring hospitalization, long-term disability, and death. Although the overall cost of foodborne illnesses is not known, two recent USDA estimates place some of the costs in the range of $5.6 billion to more than $22 billion per year. Salmonella can lead to reactive arthritis, serious infections, and deaths. More uniform and comprehensive data on the number and causes of foodborne illnesses could form the basis of more effective control strategies. For example, as we reported in June 1992, food products posing the same risk are subject to different rules, limited inspection resources are inefficiently used, and agencies must engage in extensive and often unsuccessful coordination activities in an attempt to address food safety issues. Moreover, federal agencies are often slow to address emerging food safety concerns because of fragmented jurisdictions and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed foodborne pathogens and their impact on public health.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) millions of illnesses and thousands of deaths result annually from contaminated foods; (2) the actual incidence of foodborne illnesses is unknown because most cases go unreported; (3) public health officials believe that the risk of foodborne illnesses has increased over the last 20 years because of food production changes, broader distribution, food mishandling, demographic changes, and new and more resistant bacteria; (4) the Department of Agriculture estimates that the costs of foodborne illnesses range from $5.6 billion to over $22 billion per year; (5) foodborne illnesses can also cause long-term disabilities, such as reactive arthritis and paralysis; (6) states are not required to report all foodborne illnesses or their causes; (7) more uniform and comprehensive data on the number and causes of foodborne illnesses could lead to the development of more effective control strategies, but federal officials are not sure they can continue to fund such data collection efforts if budget cuts continue; (8) federal agencies often do not address emerging food safety concerns because there are different rules for foods posing the same risks and limited inspection resources; and (9) unsuccessful coordination of food safety activities results from agencies' fragmented responsibilities. |
gao_AIMD-97-66 | gao_AIMD-97-66_0 | This statement is based on our review of the administration’s fiscal year 1998 budget request, the interim results of our review of the 1997 tax return filing season, a review of IRS’ fiscal year 1997 spending plans for information systems, and our past work on Tax Systems Modernization (TSM). Given that and because IRS’ overall conversion needs are still being determined, it seems reasonable to question whether the amount requested for this effort in fiscal year 1998 will be sufficient. Funding limits faced by IRS in fiscal year 1997 and anticipated for fiscal year 1998 are projected to continue until at least 2002. Fiscal constraints as well as longstanding concerns about the operations and management of IRS make consensus on IRS performance goals and measuring progress in achieving those goals critically important. The provisions and requirements of the Chief Financial Officers Act, Clinger-Cohen Act, and Government Performance and Results Act provide a mechanism for accomplishing this. In response to its fiscal year 1997 appropriation and the congressional direction specified therein, IRS (1) revised its spending plans for information systems; (2) reallocated resources within the processing, assistance, and management account to direct more resources to taxpayer service activities; and (3) reduced the number of compliance staff. Increased Resources Provided for Taxpayer Service in 1997
Given congressional concerns about the level of taxpayer service and the low level of telephone accessibility documented in our annual filing season reports, IRS decided that its highest priority in 1997, other than processing returns and refunds, would be to improve taxpayer service, especially the ability of taxpayers to reach IRS on the phone. However, the impact of this procedure will not be evident until after the filing season. In addition to the $1.27 billion, the administration is requesting $1 billion over 2 years to fund a multi-year capital account, referred to as the Information Technology Investments Account, for new modernization projects at IRS. Our analysis of the information systems request raised several questions: (1) Should Congress approve the $131 million for developmental systems and the $1 billion capital account given the absence of the kind of supporting analyses required by the Clinger-Cohen Act, GPRA, and OMB? (2) Is the money being requested for IRS’ century date conversion effort sufficient? IRS has not yet instituted disciplined processes for designing and developing new systems and has not yet completed its systems architecture. IRS’ fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $84 million for the century date change effort, an increase of $39 million over the $45 million included for that effort in IRS’ fiscal year 1997 budget. IRS has also projected that 91 percent of the increase in primary tax returns (or 1.9 million returns) will be filed electronically. In recent years, Congress has put in place a statutory framework for addressing these challenges and helping Congress and the executive branch make the difficult trade-offs that the current budget environment demands. This framework includes as its essential elements the Chief Financial Officers Act; information technology reform legislation, including the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act; and GPRA. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) its review of the Administration's fiscal year (FY) 1998 budget request for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); (2) the interim results of its review of the 1997 tax return filing season; (3) a review of IRS' FY 1997 spending plans for information systems; and (4) GAO's past work on Tax Systems Modernization.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' FY 1997 appropriation act and accompanying conference report indicated that Congress was concerned about, among other things, the level of taxpayer service and IRS' lack of progress in modernizing its systems; (2) in response to congressional concerns about taxpayer service, IRS added more staff this year to answer the telephone and revised its procedures for handling more complicated calls for assistance; (3) as a result, IRS answered 52 percent of taxpayers' call attempts during the first 2 months of this filing season, compared with 21 percent during the same period last year; (4) this filing season has also seen a large increase in electronic filing; (5) to respond to congressional concerns about modernization, IRS realigned its FY 1997 information system spending plans; (6) GAO's review of eight projects showed that the spending plans appeared to be consistent with congressional direction; (7) however, IRS has since cancelled projects that it had estimated would cost a total of $36 million in FY 1997, and decided not to start any new systems modernization efforts until at least the second quarter of FY 1998; (8) included in IRS' budget request for FY 1998 is $131 million for developmental information systems; (9) in addition, the administration is proposing a $1-billion capital account for information technology investments at IRS; (10) neither the $131 million nor the $1 billion is supported by the type of analysis required by the Clinger-Cohen Act, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and the Office of Management and Budget; (11) IRS' budget request also includes $84 million for its turn-of-the-century date conversion effort; (12) there is reason to question the sufficiency of that amount because IRS has not yet determined its total conversion needs; (13) IRS expects the funding limits it faces in FY 1997 and anticipates for FY 1998 to continue until at least 2002; (14) fiscal constraints as well as long-standing concerns about the efficiency of IRS operations make consensus on IRS strategic goals and the measures for assessing progress against those goals critically important; (15) in recent years, Congress has put in place a statutory framework for accomplishing this; and (16) this framework includes as its essential elements the Chief Financial Officers Act, the Clinger-Cohen Act, and GPRA. |
gao_GAO-05-292 | gao_GAO-05-292_0 | On September 30, 2002—the latest date for which HHS figures were available for our review, 532,000 children were in foster care in the United States. Families who adopt children with special needs can receive monthly subsidies. States Reported That Limited Resources, Court-Related Processes, and Interstate Placement Delays Impede the Adoption of Special Needs Children
States we visited reported that limited resources, court-related processes, and delays in completing interstate placements were the major challenges to special needs adoption. Officials also reported that delays in completing home studies hindered adoptions that involved interstate placements. State Adoption Officials Report That Limited Resources Impede Adoptions
In part because of resource limitations, adoptive parents in many states received lower subsidies and fewer services than foster parents. Nearly half of the 49 states responding to a relevant question in our survey indicated that difficulty recruiting families was a great or very great challenge to the adoption of special needs children. States and HHS Have Promoted Special Needs Adoption, but Few Evaluations Measure Program Effectiveness
States and HHS have developed strategies and implemented programs to promote special needs adoptions, but few evaluations measure their effectiveness. This event has showcased professional photographs of children waiting to be adopted. Over the years, HHS has administered programs, sponsored campaigns, funded a resource center, and taken steps to disseminate information about adoptions. The Adoption Promotion Programs Have Supported Special Needs Adoption, but Data Are Lacking to Determine if Changes Are Needed
The adoption assistance and adoption incentive programs have supported the adoption of special needs children, but data are lacking to determine if changes are needed to better facilitate adoption. However, the income measure used to assess the standards of need in the AFDC program, as it existed in 1996, is outdated and in many states more restrictive than other programs’ standards of need, such as the measure used for TANF cash assistance eligibility. Data Are Lacking to Assess Interstate Placement Challenges and Credit States for Collaborating
In addition, the program does not provide a specific inducement for interstate placements. Interstate placements have delayed adoptions, but data to assess the timeliness of these placements are not available. Although states and HHS have developed strategies and innovative programs to promote and support special needs adoptions, HHS has done little to assess the effectiveness of its programs and funded projects. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The objectives of our study were to (1) identify the major challenges to placing and keeping special needs children in adoptive homes, (2) examine what states and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have done to facilitate special needs adoptions, and (3) assess how well the Adoption Assistance Program and the Adoption Incentives Program have worked to facilitate special needs adoptions and what changes, if any might be needed to further facilitate adoptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
On September 30, 2002, the most recent date for which Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) data were available, about 126,000 foster children were waiting to be adopted. Estimates suggest that a significant portion of these children had one or more special needs, such as a medical condition or membership in a minority group, that may discourage or delay their adoption. Federal support in the form of adoption subsidies and incentive payments to states is available to promote special needs adoption. This report (1) identifies the major challenges to placing and keeping special needs children in adoptive homes, (2) examines what states and HHS have done to facilitate special needs adoptions, and (3) assesses how well the Adoption Assistance Program and the Adoption Incentives Program have worked to facilitate special needs adoptions, and determines if changes might be needed.
What GAO Found
According to state child welfare officials, limited resources, court processes, and delays in completing interstate placements challenged the adoption of children with special needs by hindering recruitment of adoptive families and delaying the adoption process. In particular, adoptive parents in many states received lower subsidies and fewer services than foster parents. In addition, child welfare officials, court staff, and judges said that the adoption process can take months to complete because hearings to terminate parents' rights are hard to schedule and may involve appeals. Further, officials said that interstate placements are often hampered by delays in completing home studies of prospective families, although no data exist to assess the timeliness of such placements. States and HHS have developed and implemented strategies and programs to promote special needs adoptions, but few evaluations measure their effectiveness. Four of the 5 states we visited sponsored post adoption resource centers. However, only 9 of 49 states responding to a relevant question in our survey indicated that they had evaluated the effectiveness of their services. At the federal level, HHS supported and promoted local innovation, provided technical assistance, and disseminated information, but the agency has done little to assess the effectiveness of the programs it has funded. When HHS has taken steps to have states assess funded projects, the agency has not ensured sufficient rigor to assess effectiveness. The Adoption Assistance and Adoption Incentives Programs have provided support for special needs adoptions, but data are lacking to determine if changes are needed to better facilitate adoption. The former uses an income eligibility threshold that is more restrictive than other cash assistance programs' standards of need and may not include all who might otherwise qualify. Since 1998, the Adoption Incentives Program has provided financial awards to almost all states for increasing adoptions, but does not provide a specific inducement for interstate placements. Data to track and credit states for collaborating on interstate placements are not available. |
gao_GAO-14-605 | gao_GAO-14-605_0 | Taxpayer Services. According to the fiscal year 2015 congressional justification for IRS, the IRS strategic plan guides program and budget decisions and supports the Department of the Treasury Fiscal Year 2014 to 2017 Strategic Plan and the Agency Priority Goal of expanding the availability and improving the quality of customer service options. These cuts reduced IRS’s budget to below fiscal year 2009 funding levels. For fiscal year 2015, the President requested $12.5 billion for IRS, an increase of 10.5 percent ($1.2 billion) over fiscal year 2014 appropriations. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, telephone level of service—the percentage of callers seeking live assistance and receiving it—fluctuated between 61 percent and 74 percent. Reduced travel and training. IRS Has No Long-Term Strategy to Address an Uncertain Budget Environment
IRS does not outline a framework for how it should operate in an uncertain budget environment in either its fiscal year 2009 through 2013 strategic plan or its fiscal year 2014 goals and objectives included in the fiscal year 2015 congressional justification for IRS. Second, in May 2014, OMB generally required a 2 percent reduction in agencies’ fiscal year 2016 budget submission. 13576 and OMB guidance, agencies are to develop strategies for operating effectively and efficiently in an uncertain budget environment. Comparing projected ROI to actual ROI is consistent with project management concepts, internal control standards, OMB guidance, and our prior work on performance management. We have recognized that calculating actual ROI is challenging and existing data may not be complete. However, IRS does not use this actual ROI information for resource allocation decisions because the data do not reflect marginal ROI, nor do they include the indirect effects of IRS enforcement activities on voluntary compliance. These limitations are critical concerns, which is why we recommended in 2012 that IRS develop estimates of marginal direct revenue and marginal direct costs within each enforcement program. Creating such a roadmap will help ensure that IRS effectively provides taxpayers with services to make voluntary compliance easier and to enforce the tax laws, so that taxpayers fulfill their tax responsibilities. Because ROI provides insights on the productivity of a program and is one important factor in making resource allocation decisions, we recommend IRS calculate actual ROI for implemented initiatives, compare the actual ROI to projected ROI, and provide the comparison to budget decision makers for initiatives where IRS allocated resources; and use actual ROI calculations as part of resource allocation decisions. Regarding our recommendation to develop a long-term strategy to address operations amidst an uncertain budget environment, IRS noted that it is conducting a review of its budget base to ensure resources are aligned with IRS Strategic Goals, Objectives, and Priorities, and will adjust its fiscal year 2015 budget as a result of this review. Regarding our ROI recommendations, IRS agreed that ROI is one of several factors relevant to making resource allocation decisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To assess IRS’s strategy to address the budget cuts, including sequestration, we summarized IRS’s budget, staffing, performance, and workload trends for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. We also interviewed IRS officials in IRS offices of Corporate Budget and Information Technology and the NTA. To assess any new use of ROI analysis, we reviewed the fiscal year 2015 congressional justification to identify IRS’s projected and actual ROI; obtained data from IRS to determine the new initiatives by projected revenue, cost, and type; and summarized projected ROI by type for new enforcement initiatives and actual ROI for IRS’s three enforcement programs—Examination, Collection, and Automated Underreporter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The financing of the federal government depends largely upon the IRS's ability to collect taxes, including providing taxpayer services that make voluntary compliance easier and enforcing tax laws to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities. For fiscal year 2015, the President requested a $12.5 billion budget for IRS, a 10.5 percent increase over the fiscal year 2014 budget.
Because of the size of IRS's budget and the importance of its service and compliance programs for all taxpayers, GAO was asked to review the fiscal year 2015 budget request for IRS. (In April 2014, GAO reported interim information on IRS's budget.) Among other things, this report assesses IRS's (1) strategy to address budget cuts and (2) use of ROI analysis. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2015 budget justification, IRS and OMB budget guidance, and IRS workload and performance data from fiscal years 2009 to 2015. GAO also interviewed IRS officials and the National Taxpayer Advocate.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget has declined by about $900 million. As a result, funding is below fiscal year 2009 levels.
Staffing has also declined by about 10,000 full-time equivalents since fiscal year 2010, and performance has been uneven. For example, between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, the percentage of callers seeking live assistance and receiving it fluctuated between 61 percent and 74 percent. IRS took some steps to address budget cuts, such as reduced travel and training.
IRS's strategic plan does not address managing budget uncertainty, although there are several indicators that funding will be constrained for the foreseeable future. For example, in May 2014, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) generally required a 2 percent reduction in agencies' fiscal year 2016 budget submission. OMB guidance also requires agencies to develop strategies for operating in an uncertain budget environment. According to IRS, extensive senior leadership turnover has contributed to the lack of a long-term strategy. Without a strategy, IRS may not be able to operate effectively and efficiently in an uncertain budget environment.
For fiscal year 2015, IRS calculated projected return on investment (ROI) for most of its enforcement initiatives. However, due to limitations—such as estimating the indirect effect coverage has on voluntary compliance—IRS does not calculate actual ROI or use it for resource decisions. These limitations are important, which is why GAO recommended in 2012 that IRS explore developing such estimates. Given that these limitations could take time to address, GAO demonstrated how IRS could use existing ROI data to review disparities across different enforcement programs to inform resource allocation decisions. Comparing projected and actual ROI is consistent with OMB guidance. While not the only factor in making resource decisions, actual ROI could provide useful insights on the productivity of a program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS (1) develop a long-term strategy to manage uncertain budgets, and (2) calculate actual ROI for implemented initiatives, compare actual ROI to projected ROI, and use the data to inform resource decisions. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations, noting that it initiated a review of its base budget to ensure resources are aligned with its strategic plan and ROI is one of several factors relevant to making resource allocation decisions. |
gao_GAO-15-527 | gao_GAO-15-527_0 | The states also reported spending federal funds designated for Medicaid eligibility and enrollment systems on marketplace-related IT projects, although the actual amount spent was uncertain, as only a selected number of states reported on our survey that they tracked or estimated this information. In this regard, from April 2011 through December 2014, states reported spending $2.78 billion in combined federal and state Medicaid funds, a portion of which was spent to support the marketplaces. States Spent Most Federal Marketplace Grant Funds to Develop Systems Supporting State-Based Marketplaces and Used Medicaid Funds to Connect to Marketplaces
States reported to CMS spending approximately $1.45 billion in federal grant funds on IT projects to establish, support, and connect to health insurance marketplaces from September 2010 to March 2015. Following through on these efforts to collect more detailed information on states’ IT contract costs would increase CMS’s insight into states’ IT spending. Generally, the states used federal funds (both marketplace grant and Medicaid matching funds) for various IT projects, including the establishment and operation of their marketplaces and their connection to the federal marketplace. States Are Continuing to Improve the Development and Operations of Their Marketplace Systems, but Not All IT Functions Are Complete
As of February 2015, the 14 states with state-based marketplaces had developed and were operating systems to support their marketplaces; however, not all IT functions were complete. According to CMS documentation regarding marketplaces using the federal marketplace IT solution, as of November 2014, 7 of 37 states using the federal marketplace IT solution could not transfer applications for health insurance coverage between their state Medicaid systems and the federal data services hub or had not completed testing or certification of these functions. As previously described, CMS provided oversight and technical assistance to states in establishing their marketplaces. CMS Reviews of State Marketplace IT Projects Did Not Fully Ensure State Systems Were Ready for Operation
As part of its marketplace oversight, CMS established a process to review states’ progress on related IT projects. Existing state agencies included state departments of health or Medicaid agencies, which coordinated directly with CMS. As of the second enrollment period, states had largely established these systems, although some of their functions remain to be implemented. Specifically, because roles and responsibilities were not always clearly defined, documented or communicated, as recommended by leading practices for project management, a number of states faced hurdles in communicating with stakeholders and receiving timely CMS guidance. In addition, although called for by leading practices in investment management, relevant senior executives in the agency were not always involved in overseeing decisions to fund states’ marketplace IT projects, resulting in less accountability for such decisions. CMS has taken various actions to facilitate the sharing of these challenges and lessons learned, as well as best practices among the states, and it will be important for CMS to continue these efforts as states work to complete the remaining functions for their marketplace systems. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the oversight of states’ marketplace IT projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to take the following three actions: clearly document, define, and communicate to all state marketplace officials and stakeholders the roles and responsibilities of those CMS officials involved in overseeing state marketplaces in a comprehensive communication management plan; ensure that all CMS senior executives from IT and business units who are involved in the establishment of state marketplace IT projects review and approve funding decisions for these projects; and ensure that states have completed all testing of marketplace system functions prior to releasing them into operation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine how states have used federal funds for IT projects to establish, support, and connect to health insurance marketplaces, including amounts spent, and the overall status of their development and operation; (2) determine CMS’s and states’ roles in overseeing these state IT projects; and (3) describe IT challenges that states have encountered in developing and operating their marketplaces and connected systems, and lessons learned from their efforts. State- based marketplace challenges were divided into five areas in the survey (project management and oversight, marketplace IT solution design, marketplace IT solution development, resource allocation and distribution, and marketplace implementation and operation), while federally facilitated challenges were divided into two areas (project management and oversight and system design and development) based on the IT work each marketplace performs. We also interviewed CMS and state officials responsible for the oversight and implementation of the state marketplaces to determine what the agency did to identify and share states’ challenges, best practices, and lessons learned. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the establishment of health insurance exchanges—or marketplaces—to allow consumers and small employers to compare, select, and purchase health insurance plans. States can elect to establish a state-based marketplace, or cede this authority to CMS to establish a federally facilitated marketplace. To assist states in establishing their marketplaces and supporting IT systems, federal funding was made available, including grants and Medicaid matching funds. CMS has responsibilities for overseeing states' use of these funds and the establishment of their marketplaces.
The objectives of this study were to (1) determine how states have used federal funds for IT projects to support their marketplaces and the status of the marketplaces, (2) determine CMS's and states' roles in overseeing these projects, and (3) describe IT challenges states have encountered and lessons learned. To do this, GAO surveyed the 50 states and the District of Columbia, reviewed relevant documentation from the states and CMS, and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
States reported to the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) that they spent about $1.45 billion in federal marketplace grant funding on information technology (IT) projects supporting health insurance marketplaces, as of March 2015. The majority of this spending was for state-based marketplaces (i.e., marketplaces established and operated by the states). These marketplaces reported spending nearly 89 percent of the funds on IT contracts, and CMS has ongoing efforts to track states' IT spending in more detailed categories. States also reported spending, as of December 2014, $2.78 billion in combined federal and state funds designated for Medicaid eligibility and enrollment systems—a portion of which was used for marketplace IT projects. However, the specific amount spent on marketplace-related projects was uncertain, as only a selected number of states reported to GAO that they tracked or estimated this information. Regarding the status of states' marketplace IT projects, 14 states with state-based marketplaces had developed and were operating IT systems to support their marketplaces, but, as of February 2015, not all system functions were complete. In addition, as of November 2014, 7 of 37 states using the federal marketplace system could not transfer health insurance applications between their state Medicaid systems and a key component of the federal marketplace or had not completed testing or certification of these functions. According to CMS officials, states operating their own IT systems and states using the federal marketplace system were continuing to improve the development and operation of their marketplaces in the enrollment period that began in November 2014.
CMS tasked various offices with responsibilities for overseeing states' marketplace IT projects. However, the agency did not always clearly document, define, or communicate its oversight roles and responsibilities to states as called for by best practices for project management. According to some states, this resulted in instances of poor communication with CMS, which adversely affected states' deadlines, increased uncertainty, and required additional work. CMS also did not involve all relevant senior executives in decisions to approve federal funding for states' IT marketplace projects; such involvement, according to leading practices for investment management, can increase accountability for decision making. Further, while CMS established a process that required the testing of state marketplace systems to determine whether they were ready to be made operational, these systems were not always fully tested, increasing the risk that they would not operate as intended. For their part, states oversaw their IT projects through state agencies or quasi-governmental entities, depending on marketplace type, as well as using other oversight mechanisms.
States reported a number of challenges in establishing the systems supporting their marketplaces. These fell into several categories, including project management and oversight, system design and development, resource allocation and distribution, and marketplace implementation and operation. States also identified lessons learned from dealing with such challenges, including the need for strong project management and clear requirements development. CMS has taken various actions to respond to state challenges, identify lessons learned, and share best practices with states; continuing these efforts will be important as states work to complete their marketplace systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that CMS define and communicate its oversight roles and responsibilities, ensure senior executives are involved in funding decisions for state IT projects, and ensure that states complete testing of their systems before they are put into operation. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-385 | gao_GAO-16-385_0 | The POStPlan Initiative
In May 2012, USPS announced the POStPlan initiative. Through this analysis, USPS determined that it could reduce hours at 13,167 of these offices from 8- to 2-, 4-, or 6-hours of retail service a day. Regarding the staffing arrangements at these offices, USPS planned to replace career postmasters in the POStPlan post offices with less costly non-career or part-time employees, as shown in fig. USPS Had Largely Completed POStPlan Implementation Prior to the Arbitration Decision and Expected Total Cost Savings of $500 Million Annually
USPS Took Steps to Modify Retail Hours and Staffing at Most POStPlan Post Offices
Prior to the issuance of the POStPlan arbitration decision in September 2014, USPS had taken steps to reduce hours at almost three-quarters of POStPlan post offices. As a result, USPS projected that POStPlan will now result in total annual labor cost savings of about $337 million. This resulted in a difference of $181 million. USPS officials told us that while the arbitration decision reduced the cost savings it expected to achieve, POStPlan was still the correct operational decision for USPS and its stakeholders. Limitations Affect the Reliability of USPS’s POStPlan Cost- Savings Estimates and the Accuracy of Actual Savings Achieved
USPS Estimates of Expected Cost Savings Have Limitations That Affect Reliability, Including Data Errors That Affect the Accuracy of Calculations of Actual Savings Achieved
We reviewed USPS’s 2012 original POStPlan cost-savings estimate and 2015 estimate of the arbitration decision’s impact on cost savings and found that while POStPlan most likely resulted in some cost savings, the estimates have limitations that affect their reliability. Specifically, the limitations include: (1) imprecise and incomplete labor costs, including errors in the underlying data that affect the accuracy of calculations of actual savings achieved; (2) lack of a sensitivity review; and (3) the exclusion of other factors that would be necessary to consider the net cost savings of the POStPlan initiative, particularly the potential impact of reduced hours on retail revenue. Internal control standards adopted by USPS also state that program managers and decision makers need complete and accurate data to determine whether they are meeting their goals, and that they should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate an entity’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks. USPS’s post-arbitration decision estimate of $337 million in expected annual cost savings relies, in part, on USPS calculations of actual savings achieved due to POStPlan, but the accuracy of these actual savings calculations may be limited by errors in the underlying salaries and benefits data used to develop them. USPS’s calculation of labor costs in both its original and post-arbitration decision estimates was also incomplete. As of March 14, 2016, USPS officials were continuing to assess this issue, but USPS’s time frame for identifying the scope and resolving the issue remains unclear, and it is also unclear if USPS subsequently intends to update its calculations of actual savings achieved. Having reliable data and quality methods for calculating the potential savings USPS expects to achieve through these initiatives, the actual savings they achieve, and the potential effects they have on revenue are critical. Even the preliminary analysis of changes in revenue that USPS later conducted was limited because it was not consistent with USPS’s definition of what constitutes POStPlan post offices. Recommendations for Executive Action
The Postmaster General should direct executive leaders to: establish guidance that clarifies when USPS should develop cost- savings estimates using a rigorous approach that includes, for example, a sensitivity analysis and consideration of other factors that could affect net costs and savings, versus when it is sufficient to develop a rough estimate; continue to take steps to assess and resolve the salaries and benefits data errors and, subsequently, update calculations of actual cost savings achieved due to POStPlan as appropriate; and verify that calculations of changes in revenue at POStPlan post offices in USPS’s revenue analyses are consistent with USPS’s definition of POStPlan post offices and take steps to consider when it may be appropriate to develop an approach for these analyses that will allow USPS to more fully consider the effects of POStPlan on retail revenue across USPS. Additionally, as we note in our report, we believe such guidance will be helpful to USPS and its oversight bodies as it considers future initiatives. Finally, USPS disagreed with some of the specific examples we use in our report. Postal Service (USPS) took to implement the Post Office Structure Plan (POStPlan) before the September 2014 arbitration decision and the savings USPS estimated POStPlan would achieve, (2) the effect USPS determined the arbitration decision had on POStPlan staffing and cost savings, and (3) whether USPS’s POStPlan cost-savings estimates are reliable and any limitations of the estimates. Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS continues to experience a financial crisis and has undertaken many initiatives to reduce costs. In May 2012, USPS announced POStPlan, which aimed to reduce retail hours at post offices and use less costly labor. However, an arbitrator ruled in September 2014 that USPS must reverse several of these staffing changes. GAO was asked to review the arbitration decision's effects on POStPlan staffing and cost savings.
GAO examined: (1) USPS's actions to implement POStPlan before the decision and expected savings, (2) the decision's effects on POStPlan's staffing and savings, and (3) whether USPS's POStPlan cost-savings estimates are reliable. GAO reviewed relevant POStPlan documentation and data; compared USPS's POStPlan cost-savings estimating process to GAO's data reliability and cost- estimating guidance and internal control standards adopted by USPS; and interviewed officials from USPS, its regulatory body, and postmaster associations.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) had largely completed Post Office Structure Plan's (POStPlan) implementation prior to a 2014 POStPlan arbitration decision and expected millions in cost savings. Specifically, under POStPlan, USPS planned to reduce hours at about 13,000 post offices (from 8- to 2-, 4-, or 6-hours of retail service a day) and to staff them with employees less costly than postmasters. Prior to the arbitration decision, USPS had reduced hours at most of these offices and taken steps to make the staffing changes. For example, it replaced many career postmasters with non-career or part-time employees by offering separation incentives or reassignments. In July 2012, USPS estimated POStPlan would result in about $500 million in annual cost savings.
USPS determined that, while the 2014 arbitration decision significantly affected planned staffing at POStPlan post offices and estimated savings, POStPlan was the correct operational decision for USPS and its stakeholders. The arbitrator ruled that many offices be staffed by bargaining-unit employees, such as clerks, rather than the generally less costly employees USPS had planned to use. As a result, USPS estimated in June 2015 that POStPlan would now result in annual savings of about $337 million or 35 percent less than the about $500 million it expected.
USPS's original and post-arbitration decision estimates of expected POStPlan cost savings have limitations that affect their reliability. USPS officials noted that they do not have strict guidance on when a rough savings estimate is adequate versus when a more rigorous analysis is appropriate. Specific limitations include:
imprecise and incomplete labor costs, including errors in underlying data;
lack of a sensitivity review; and
the exclusion of other factors that affect net cost savings, particularly the potential impact of reduced retail hours on revenue.
For example, USPS's post-arbitration-decision estimate relies, in part, on its calculations of actual savings achieved due to POStPlan. While POStPlan most likely resulted in some savings, GAO found errors in the underlying salaries and benefits data used that may understate or overstate the amount of savings achieved. Additionally, while USPS later (i.e., after it developed its savings estimates) conducted analyses of changes in revenue, GAO found these analyses were limited because USPS's calculations of changes in revenue at POStPlan and non-POStPlan post offices were inconsistent with its definition of what constitutes a POStPlan office. As of March 2016, USPS was taking steps to understand the scope and origin of the errors in its salaries and benefits data, but its time frame for resolving the issue remains unclear, as does whether USPS subsequently intends to update its calculations of actual savings achieved. Internal control standards state that program managers and decision makers need quality data and information to determine whether they are meeting their goals. Without reliable data and quality methods for calculating the potential savings USPS expects to achieve through its initiatives, the actual savings they achieve, and the effects on revenue, USPS officials and oversight bodies may lack accurate and relevant information with which to make informed decisions regarding future cost-saving efforts in a time of constrained resources.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure that USPS has quality information regarding POStPlan, GAO recommends that USPS establish guidance that clarifies when to develop savings estimates using a rigorous approach; resolve errors in labor data and, as appropriate, recalculate actual savings achieved; and take steps to improve revenue analyses. USPS disagreed with some of GAO's findings but neither agreed or disagreed with the recommendations. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-1175T | gao_GAO-08-1175T_0 | Voluntary Organizations Are a Major Source of Mass Care and Other Services in Disasters and Have Significant Support Roles under the National Response Framework
As private service providers fulfilling their humanitarian missions, the voluntary organizations in our review have historically served as significant sources of mass care and other services in large-scale disasters and play key roles in national response—in coordination with local, state, and federal governments—under the National Response Framework. However, with regard to its ESF-6 responsibilities, Red Cross officials also said that while the organization will continue to fulfill its ESF-6 responsibilities, it is changing the way it staffs FEMA’s regional offices during disasters by assigning these responsibilities, among others, to state disaster officers and using trained volunteers to assist in this role. Under the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Red Cross Is Still Described as the Lead Agency for Mass Care, Which Is Inconsistent with Changes Made to ESF-6
While the Red Cross’s role for ESF-6 has been changed from that of a primary agency under the National Response Plan to that of a support agency under the new Framework, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement still reflects its earlier role, requiring the Red Cross to direct federal mass care resources. However, this understanding is not currently documented. Voluntary Organizations Have Taken Steps to Expand Coverage and Strengthen Their Service Delivery Structures
In response to weaknesses in service delivery that became evident during Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities have acted to expand their service coverage and strengthen key aspects of their structures. The Red Cross has reorganized its chapters and established new partnerships with local community and faith-based organizations, particularly in rural areas with hard-to-reach populations. Meanwhile, all four organizations, to varying degrees, have made changes to strengthen their ability to coordinate services by collaborating more on feeding and case management and improving their logistical and communications systems. While Voluntary Organizations’ Resources Are Substantial, Their Sheltering and Feeding Capabilities Would Likely Fall Short of Estimated Needs in a Worst-Case Large-Scale Disaster without Government and Other Assistance
Although systematic assessments of mass care capabilities are limited, it is evident that in large-scale, especially worst-case, catastrophic disasters, the three mass care voluntary organizations would not likely be able to fulfill the need for sheltering and feeding in the four metropolitan areas in our review without government and other assistance, according to voluntary organization officials we interviewed as well as our review of federal and other data. In New York and Los Angeles, officials from Catholic Charities confirmed that the lack of personnel capable of responding to disasters is an ongoing challenge for their organization. Voluntary Organizations Face Difficulties in Identifying and Dedicating Funding for Disaster Preparedness and Capacity Building
Identifying and dedicating funding for disaster preparedness is a challenge for voluntary organizations in light of competing priorities, such as meeting the immediate needs of disaster survivors. However, this broad assessment effort has yet to fully include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and has not yet begun to address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. First, to help ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement reflects the American Red Cross’s current role under ESF-6 as a support agency for mass care, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a time frame for updating the mass care section of the Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in the ESF-6 under the new Framework, and no longer requires the Red Cross to direct federal government resources. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to provide information on (1) what the roles of major national voluntary organizations are in providing mass care and other human services in response to large-scale disasters requiring federal assistance, (2) what steps these organizations have taken since Katrina to strengthen their capacity for service delivery, (3) what is known about these organizations’ current capabilities for responding to mass care needs in such a large-scale disaster, and (4) what the remaining challenges are that confront voluntary organizations in preparing for such large-scale disasters. Since the United Way of America does not provide direct services in disasters, we did not include it in our analysis of recent improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining challenges. GAO-08-823. Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance. Washington, D.C.: September 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
Voluntary organizations have traditionally played a major role in the nation's response to disasters, but the response to Hurricane Katrina raised concerns about their ability to handle large-scale disasters. This testimony examines (1) the roles of five voluntary organizations in providing mass care and other services, (2) the steps they have taken to improve service delivery, (3) their current capabilities for responding to mass care needs, and (4) the challenges they face in preparing for large-scale disasters. This testimony is based on GAO's previous report (GAO-08-823) that reviewed the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and United Way of America; interviewed officials from these organizations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); reviewed data and laws; and visited four high-risk metro areas--Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The five voluntary organizations we reviewed are highly diverse in their focus and response structures. They also constitute a major source of the nation's mass care and related disaster services and are integrated into the 2008 National Response Framework. The Red Cross in particular--the only one whose core mission is disaster response--has a federally designated support role to government under the mass care provision of this Framework. While the Red Cross no longer serves as the primary agency for coordinating government mass care services--as under the earlier 2004 National Plan--it is expected to support FEMA by providing staff and expertise, among other things. FEMA and the Red Cross agree on the Red Cross's role in a catastrophic disaster, but it is not clearly documented. While FEMA recognized the need to update the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement to conform with the Framework, it does not yet have a time frame for doing so. Since Katrina, the organizations we studied have taken steps to strengthen their service delivery by expanding coverage and upgrading their logistical and communications systems. The Red Cross, in particular, is realigning its regional chapters to better support its local chapters and improve efficiency and establishing new partnerships with local community-based organizations. Most recently, however, a budget shortfall has prompted the organization to reduce staff and alter its approach to supporting FEMA and state emergency management agencies. While Red Cross officials maintain that these changes will not affect improvements to its mass care service infrastructure, it has also recently requested federal funding for its governmental responsibilities. Capabilities assessments are preliminary, but current evidence suggests that in a worst-case large-scale disaster, the projected need for mass care services would far exceed the capabilities of these voluntary organizations without government and other assistance--despite voluntary organizations' substantial resources locally and nationally. Voluntary organizations also faced shortages in trained volunteers, as well as other limitations that affected their mass care capabilities. Meanwhile, FEMA's initial assessment does not necessarily include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and does not yet address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. In addition, the ability to assess mass care capabilities and coordinate in disasters is currently hindered by a lack of standard terminology and measures for mass care resources, and efforts are under way to develop such standards. Finding and training more personnel, dedicating more resources to preparedness, and working more closely with local governments are ongoing challenges for voluntary organizations. A shortage of staff and volunteers was most commonly cited, but we also found they had difficulty seeking and dedicating funds for preparedness, in part because of competing priorities. However, the guidance for FEMA preparedness grants to states and localities was also not sufficiently explicit with regard to using such funds to support the efforts of voluntary organizations. |
gao_T-GGD-98-198 | gao_T-GGD-98-198_0 | Proposed Legislation: Issues Related to Honesty in Sweepstakes Act of 1998
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to have this opportunity to discuss issues related to the proposed legislation entitled “Honesty in Sweepstakes Act of 1998,” (S. 2141), which was introduced on June 5, 1998, by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell. Also, I will provide information on our efforts to obtain similar information related to the mailing of documents that resembled cashier’s checks, also known as cashier’s check “look-alikes,” which are not the negotiable instruments that they appear to be. Extent and Nature of Consumers’ Problems With Mailed Sweepstakes Material and Cashier’s Check “Look-Alikes”
Of the 17 agencies and organizations from which we obtained information, we found that comprehensive data on the extent of consumers’ problems with mailed sweepstakes material and cashier’s check look-alikes were generally not available. We found that in 2 of the 17 agencies and organizations—namely FTC and the Postal Inspection Service—some data were available that could help indicate the nature or types of problems that consumers had experienced with mailed sweepstakes material. Regarding the first main reason for the lack of comprehensive data, officials and representatives told us that consumers often did not report problems because they were too embarrassed or did not realize that they had been victimized. FTC’s Consumer Information System Included Data That Could Indicate the Nature of Problems
In our discussions with various officials and representatives of the agencies and organizations from which we obtained information, they suggested that in order to obtain examples of such problems, in all likelihood, FTC would be the most appropriate agency to provide us with data on consumers’ complaints about sweepstakes mailings and cashier’s check look-alikes. Sweepstakes that required consumers to purchase products or services. Postal Inspection Service Has Investigated Various Cases Involving Mailed Sweepstakes Material
Postal Inspection Service officials told us that the Fraud Complaint System (FCS) is used by the Postal Inspection Service to collect and maintain consumer complaint information about various types of alleged fraudulent activities, including those involving deceptive mail marketing practices. The 16 cases most often involved sweepstakes and cash prize promotions for which up-front taxes or insurance, judging, or handling fees were required before consumers could participate in the sweepstakes. Examples of two of the more recent initiatives included (1) Project Mailbox and (2) the establishment of a multi-state sweepstakes committee, which resulted from a legal complaint involving AFP. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the issues related to the Honesty in Sweepstakes Act of 1998, introduced on June 5, 1998, by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, focusing on: (1) the extent and nature of problems that consumers may have experienced with various sweepstakes mailings; and (2) information related to the mailing of documents that resembled cashier's checks, which are not the negotiable instruments that they appear to be.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it found that comprehensive data that could indicate the full extent of the problems that consumers experienced with mailed sweepstakes material and cashier's check look-alikes were not available; (2) the main reasons officials and representatives gave for the lack of comprehensive data were that: (a) consumers oftentimes did not report their problems; and (b) no centralized database existed from which comprehensive data could be obtained; (3) although comprehensive data were unavailable, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Postal Inspection Service were two organizations that GAO identified as having some data on consumers' complaints about deceptive mail marketing practices, which could indicate the nature of these types of problems; (4) much of the consumer complaint information, which GAO obtained in a sample from FTC's Consumer Information System, showed that in many instances, consumers were required to remit money or purchase products or services before being allowed to participate in the sweepstakes; (5) information about Postal Inspection Service cases that had been investigated largely involved sweepstakes and cash prize promotions for which up-front taxes or insurance, judging, or handling fees were required before consumers could participate in sweepstakes promotions; (6) GAO was unable to identify examples of consumers' problems with cashier's check look-alikes similar to those involving mailed sweepstakes material because such information was not readily available; (7) two recent initiatives are intended to address consumers' problems with deceptive direct mail marketing practices; and (8) the initiatives are: (a) Project Mailbox, for which various participating organizations, including FTC, the Postal Inspection Service, and 25 state attorneys general, collectively took steps to target organizations that used such practices; and (b) the establishment of a multi-state sweepstakes committee that, among other things, is designed to facilitate cooperation among various states in dealing effectively with companies that attempt to defraud consumers through the use of mailed sweepstakes material. |
gao_AIMD-97-127 | gao_AIMD-97-127_0 | In response to our recommendation, the Federal Reserve Board hired Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., an independent public accounting firm, to examine and report on managements’ assertions about the effectiveness of the internal control structure over financial reporting and safeguardingfor cash at three banks—the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Home Office, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Los Angeles Branch, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Results of External Reviews of Control Over Cash Operations
For each examination, Coopers & Lybrand concluded that Federal Reserve Bank management fairly stated its assertion that the bank maintained an effective internal control structure over financial reporting and safeguarding for cash as of the date specified by management based on criteria established in the Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by COSO. We also reviewed the Coopers & Lybrand working papers supporting its opinions on internal controls at the Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Banks. We looked for evidence that the work had been planned and performed in accordance with applicable attestation standards. We visited the Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia banks to enhance our understanding of the respective internal control structures over financial reporting and safeguarding for cash. External Auditor’s Procedures
In performing its examinations, Coopers & Lybrand (1) obtained an understanding of the procedures and internal controls, (2) evaluated the design effectiveness of the controls, (3) tested and evaluated the operating effectiveness of the controls, and (4) formed opinions about whether managements’ assertions regarding the effectiveness of the internal controls were fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the COSO control criteria. Results of GAO’s Review of Coopers & Lybrand’s Examination
The results of our review disclosed no instances in which Coopers & Lybrand did not comply, in all material respects, with the AICPA’s Attestation Standards in the work described above. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the work of the Federal Reserve's external auditor, Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., in reporting on the effectiveness of the internal control structure over financial reporting for cash at the Atlanta and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Banks, and the Los Angeles Branch, focusing on whether: (1) the work was conducted in accordance with applicable professional standards; and (2) supported the auditor's opinion on managements' assertions on the effectiveness of the internal controls over cash operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's review disclosed no instances in which Coopers & Lybrand's work to support its opinions on the effectiveness of the internal control structures over financial reporting and safeguarding for coin and currency at the Atlanta and Philadelphia Federal Reserve Banks, and the Los Angeles Branch did not comply, in all material aspects, with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Attestation Standards; (2) Coopers & Lybrand obtained and documented an understanding of the internal control policies and procedures, developed by the Federal Reserve Banks, to manage and account for each of the four main cash operating functions: receiving/shipping, currency processing, vault, and cash administration; (3) Coopers & Lybrand also performed tests and other procedures in support of its evaluation of the design and operating effectiveness of the internal controls in order to form an opinion about the reliability of management's assertion; and (4) for each examination, Coopers & Lybrand concluded that the Federal Reserve Bank management fairly stated its assertion that the bank maintained an effective internal control structure over financial reporting and safeguarding for cash as of the date specified by management based on criteria established in the Internal Control--Integrated Framework issued by the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. |
gao_AIMD-98-11 | gao_AIMD-98-11_0 | Offsetting receipts are required by law to be deposited into receipt accounts. Scope and Methodology
To better understand differences in how offsetting collections for business-type activities are treated in the budget process and how they have fared recently, we created a universe of 27 agencies to review that rely on fees as a source of funds. To identify changes in agency reliance on user fees since the passage of BEA, we used OMB actual year data to construct a series of analyses that described trends in budget authority and collections for fee-reliant agencies. The Congress increased the reliance of the U.S. Mint and INS on user fees, though not to the extent of the agencies noted above. User Fees Increasingly Offset Discretionary Spending
Most new user fees enacted between fiscal years 1991 and 1996 were designated as offsets to discretionary spending for BEA purposes. Budgetary Treatment Among Agencies That Collect User Fees Is Inconsistent
The 27 fee-reliant agencies in our review varied in how their user fees were classified, what kind of account they were deposited into, the legislative controls on the amount or use of these fees, and how they were treated under BEA. For example, some agricultural inspection fees were netted against their accounts’ budget authority and outlays, which reduced spending counted against BEA discretionary spending limits. Budgetary Treatment of Similar User Fees
Although fees are treated differently for similar activities, increasingly authority is being provided to allow fees to offset discretionary spending no matter what the source or purpose of the fee. Issues for Consideration in the Design and Management of User Fees
Increased reliance on fee collections as an agency’s primary source of funding has implications for federal budgeting and management that may call for a reexamination of the basic principles as well as the actual practices underlying the treatment of fees. Fee-Reliant Agencies Face Unique Management Issues
Fee-reliant agencies face management issues not faced by those that depend primarily on general fund appropriations. Where the Congress and fee payers agree on priorities, there may be no conflict between oversight and accountability to the Congress and accountability to fee payers. In addition, agencies with some fee-funded activities will have to redefine relationships between fee-funded and appropriated activities. We will make copies available to others on request. We defined our universe of fee-reliant agencies using the following criteria: (1) fees from the public must be used to support the agency that generated the fee, (2) services, goods, or benefits must be provided in exchange for fees and the exchange should be closely linked in time, and (3) budget authority from fees from the public must represent 20 percent or more of the agency’s gross outlays from federal sources averaged over fiscal years 1991 through 1996. To meet these criteria, we excluded (1) agencies that collected fees that were deposited in the general fund of the Treasury instead of designated for the agency’s use, (2) insurance and retirement programs because of the delay between when a fee is paid and when there is a pay out, although many of these programs, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are totally self-supporting, (3) credit programs because they involve subsidies, (4) agencies that receive fees from the public that are then transferred to another federal agency or a state, (5) agencies that receive fees from the public intermittently, (6) Government-sponsored enterprises, such as the Federal Reserve, which receive funding from the public, but are classified as private and not included in the federal budget, and (7) agencies that receive most of their fees from other federal agencies, although many of the agencies included have some funding from this source. Discretionary Spending Limits/Spending Caps
Under the Budget Enforcement Act, discretionary spending limits, or spending caps, are maximum amounts of new budget authority and outlays for specific categories of discretionary appropriations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO identified 27 agencies that rely on federal user fees for a significant portion of their budget, focusing on: (1) identifying of changes in agency reliance on user fees since passage of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990; (2) describing the ways user fees are structured in the budget, including what budgetary controls govern the availability and use of theses fees and how they are treated under BEA; and (3) identifying of issues for consideration in the future design and management of user fees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since the 1990 enactment of BEA, the 27 agencies in its review have increased or maintained their reliance on user fees as a source of funding; (2) several of the regulatory agencies GAO surveyed were given authority to substantially increase user fee collections and to use these fees for program purposes; (3) importantly, most new user fees enacted between fiscal years 1991 and 1996 were authorized to offset discretionary spending; (4) the Congress authorized new user fees either: (a) to maintain program size by replacing general fund appropriations, which may then be used to fund other activities or (b) to increase program size without increasing budget authority and outlay totals; (5) this growth in new and existing fees does not add to the amount of spending that is scored under BEA discretionary spending limits, but frees up discretionary resources for other purposes; (6) although federal agencies often collect user fees for similar purposes, not all user fees are treated alike in the federal budget; (7) some user charges must be deposited in the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, while others are required by law to provide funding for specific purposes; (8) yet, even when fees are dedicated to the agency or activities that generated the fee, there are differences in when and how the fees are made available to the agency and in how much flexibility agencies have in using the fee revenue; (9) the attempt to distinguish between fees collected for the government's business-type activities from those derived from the government's power to tax was always problematic; (10) how fees are categorized has become increasingly important by the fact that under BEA scoring rules some fees are netted against their accounts' budget authority and outlay spending and not counted against discretionary spending limits; (11) the disparate treatment of fees--particularly those associated with discretionary spending--raises issues for congressional control, agency management, and competition for limited federal resources; (12) in shifting to a more fee-reliant government, inconsistencies in budgetary treatment of fees with similar characteristics are likely to increase; (13) unlike agencies that rely primarily on appropriated funds from general revenues, both the Congress and fee-reliant agencies face additional policy and management issues such as how to: (a) meet the needs for accountability to both the Congress and fee payers, including agreement on priorities and the appropriate assessment of fees and (b) define the relationship between fee-financed and appropriated activities, particularly if resource disparities between the two groups increase. |
gao_RCED-99-48 | gao_RCED-99-48_0 | In comparison to prior cost and schedule estimates prepared by DOE, the Corps’ cost estimates, in total, are higher. The Corps estimated that it would cost up to $2.25 billion and would take until after 2004 to complete cleanup at all sites. DOE had estimated that it would cost up to $1.5 billion and would take until as late as 2006 to complete cleanup. An examination of the individual cost estimates, however, shows that much of the difference between DOE’s and the Corps’ estimates can be attributed to two FUSRAP sites where new information became available after the program was transferred and/or the scope of cleanup alternatives was changed. The Corps is reviewing the proposal. In fiscal year 1998, the Corps had 71 full-time equivalents involved in program management and support. One site (Madison, Ill.) did not have any fiscal year 1998 milestones. One of the challenges the Corps identified during the program’s transition from DOE was completing environmental documents necessary to begin removal or remediation of contamination pursuant to the act. Transition Activities and Issues
During the transition from DOE to the Corps, the Corps established transition teams and met with DOE officials to transfer contracts and obtain information related to the FUSRAP sites. Specifically, the matter of which agency is responsible for property management has not been decided. DOE and Corps officials informed us that they are attempting to resolve this issue in the Memorandum of Understanding, which may be finalized in early 1999. The Corps reviewed all 22 sites, developed cost and schedule estimates for each, and established site-specific milestones. For most sites, these milestones were achieved or exceeded. As a result, there is potential for the Corps’ $2.25 billion cleanup cost estimate to increase in the future. In addition, several overall transition issues related to the Corps’ responsibilities and authorities remain to be formally resolved, particularly, its responsibility for determining the eligibility of new FUSRAP sites, accountability for the sites removed from the program, and accountability for the sites currently in the program. DOE’s letter provides a perspective on the last several years of the Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program—when it was managed by DOE—and the condition of the program when it was transferred to the Corps. To determine the basis for the Corps’ cost and schedule estimates contained in its report to Congress and to obtain information on the Corps’ program milestones, staffing levels, and environmental document preparation, we visited and held discussions with officials from the six Corps districts that are responsible for FUSRAP sites. No FY 1998 milestones. Complete Record of Decision. Issue Engineering Evaluation/Cost Assessment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers' Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP), focusing on the: (1) Corps' cost and schedule estimates for cleaning up the FUSRAP sites; (2) Corps' progress in meeting milestones for site cleanups, FUSRAP staffing levels, and environmental document preparation; and (3) transition of the program from the Department of Energy (DOE) to the Corps.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) when the Corps took over the program, it reviewed DOE's cost and schedule estimates for the 22 sites, visited the sites, and developed new cost and schedule estimates for each; (2) the Corps' cost estimates, in total, are higher than estimates previously developed by DOE; (3) the Corps estimated that it would cost up to $2.25 billion and would take until after 2004 to complete cleanup at all sites; (4) however, there is potential for the $2.25 billion estimate to increase in the future because no proven technology is available to clean up one site and characterization is incomplete for others; (5) DOE had estimated that it would cost up to $1.5 billion and would take until as late as 2006 to complete the cleanup; (6) an examination of the individual cost estimates, however, shows that much of the difference between DOE's and the Corps' estimates can be attributed to two sites where new information became available after the program was transferred or the scope of the cleanup alternatives was changed; (7) since the program was transferred to the Corps in October 1997, the Corps has achieved or exceeded its milestones for planned cleanup activities at 16 of the 22 sites; (8) the Corps did not achieve one or more of its milestones at five sites, and one site did not have any milestones for fiscal year (FY) 1998; (9) to accomplish its goals for the program, in FY 1998, the Corps had 71 full-time equivalents involved in program management and support; (10) in regard to completing the environmental documentation necessary to begin removal and remedial work, the Corps has made considerable progress, including issuing two Records of Decision and five Engineering Evaluation/Cost Assessments that provide detailed plans for site cleanups; (11) during the program's transition from DOE to the Corps, the Corps established transition teams and worked with departmental officials to transfer the 22 sites; (12) when the program was transferred, several issues remained unresolved; (13) only one issue remains to be formally resolved, specifically, which agency should be accountable for property management for the sites while they are in the program; and (14) attempts to resolve this issue through negotiation of a memorandum of understanding between the Corps and DOE are ongoing. |
gao_GAO-05-194 | gao_GAO-05-194_0 | Table 1 illustrates some of the major similarities and differences in the eligibility criteria of FHA and other mortgage institutions. Many institutions permit down payment assistance. FHA borrowers may also finance their insurance premium. This investment requirement can be used to pay either the down payment and in some cases the closing costs. On the other hand, another private insurer recommends, but does not require, prepurchase counseling for first-time homebuyers in its low and no down payment products. Research Shows LTV Ratio and Credit Score Are Important When Estimating Risk of Individual Mortgages
Economic research we reviewed indicated that LTV ratios and credit scores are among the most important factors when estimating the risk level associated with individual mortgages. FHA-Insured Mortgages with Higher LTV Ratios and Lower Credit Scores Are Riskier Than Other FHA-Insured Mortgages
When considering LTV alone, FHA-insured mortgages with higher LTV ratios (smaller down payments) generally perform worse than FHA-insured mortgages with lower LTV ratios. Several Practices Mortgage Institutions Use in Designing and Implementing Low and No Down Payment Products Could Be Instructive for FHA
Mortgage institutions we spoke with used a number of similar practices in designing and implementing new products, including low and no down payment products. FHA does sometimes use practices for limiting a new product but usually does not pilot products on its own initiative, and FHA officials question the circumstances in which they can limit the availability of a program and told us they do not have the resources to manage programs with limited availability. Mortgage Institutions Require Additional Credit Enhancements or Stricter Underwriting for New Low and No Down Payment Products
Some mortgage institutions require additional credit enhancements—mechanisms for transferring risk from one party to another—on low and no down payment products and set stricter underwriting requirements for these products. However, when FHA introduces new products or makes significant changes to existing products with risks that are not well understood, such actions could introduce significant risks when implemented broadly. Recommendations for Executive Action
If Congress provides the authority for FHA to implement a no down payment mortgage product or other products about which the risks are not well understood, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Assistant Secretary for HUD-Federal Housing Commissioner to consider the following three actions: incorporating stricter underwriting criteria such as appropriate credit score thresholds or borrower reserve requirements, piloting the initial product or limiting its initial availability and asking Congress for the authority if HUD officials determine they currently do not have this authority, and utilizing other techniques for mitigating risks including use of credit enhancements and prepurchase counseling. To report on the volume of mortgage products, we reviewed relevant reports including reports from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). To do this, we defined default as a credit event that includes foreclosed mortgages, as well as mortgages that did not experience foreclosure, but that would typically lead to a credit loss, such as a “short sale” or a “deed-in-lieu of foreclosure” termination of the mortgage; selected six LTV ratio categories; selected six credit score categories; combined Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage volume and combined mortgage volume and performance data for the sample (of mortgages insured by FHA in 1992, 1994, and 1996; and conventional mortgages originated in 1997, 1998, and 1999 and purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac); calculated the average 4-year default rate for FHA (weighted average) and for all conventional loans separately by dividing the total dollar amount of mortgages experiencing a credit event by the total dollar amount of mortgages originated (for FHA) or purchased (for conventional); calculated the average 4-year default rates for sampled FHA loans and for conventional loans that fell within each LTV ratio and credit score category; and calculated the relative 4-year default rates for each LTV ratio and credit score categories for FHA loans and for conventional loans by dividing the average 4-year default rate for each specific LTV and credit score category by the average 4-year default rate for sampled FHA loans and all conventional loans, respectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), through its Federal Housing Administration (FHA), insures billions of dollars in home mortgage loans made by private lenders. FHA insures low down payment loans and a number of parties have made proposals to either eliminate or otherwise change FHA's borrower contribution requirements. GAO was asked to (1) identify the key characteristics of existing low and no down payment products, (2) review relevant literature on the importance of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and credit scores to loan performance, (3) report on the performance of low and no down payment mortgages supported by FHA and others, and (4) identify lessons for FHA from others in terms of designing and implementing low and no down payment products.
What GAO Found
FHA and many other mortgage institutions provide many low and no down payment products with requirements that vary in terms of eligibility, borrower investment, underwriting, and risk mitigation. While these products are similar, there are some important differences, including that FHA has lower loan limits, allows closing costs and the up-front insurance premium to be financed in the mortgage, and permits the down payment funds to come from nonprofits that receive funds from sellers. FHA also differs in that it does not require prepurchase counseling. A substantial amount of research GAO reviewed indicates that LTV ratio and credit score are among the most important factors when estimating the risk level associated with individual mortgages. GAO's analysis of the performance of low and no down payment mortgages supported by FHA and others corroborates key findings in the literature. Generally, mortgages with higher LTV ratios (smaller down payments) and lower credit scores are riskier than mortgages with lower LTV ratios and higher credit scores. Some practices of other mortgage institutions offer a framework that could help FHA manage the risks associated with introducing new products or making significant changes to existing products. Mortgage institutions may impose limits on the volume of the new products they will permit and on who can sell and service these products. FHA officials question the circumstances in which they can limit volumes for their products and believe they do not have sufficient resources to manage a product with limited volumes. Mortgage institutions sometimes require additional credit enhancements, such as higher insurance coverage; and sometimes require stricter underwriting, such as credit score thresholds, when introducing a new low or no down payment product. FHA is authorized to require an additional credit enhancement by sharing risk through co-insurance but does not currently use this authority. FHA has used stricter underwriting criteria but this has not included credit score thresholds. |
gao_GAO-08-564 | gao_GAO-08-564_0 | Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 16 of the 21 weaknesses that we had previously reported as unresolved at the completion of the 2006 audit (see app. FDIC stated it has initiated and completed some actions to mitigate the remaining five prior year weaknesses. However, we have not verified that these actions have been completed. Weaknesses Continue to Reduce the Security of Financial Information
Although FDIC has made significant progress improving its information system controls, old and new weaknesses could limit the corporation’s ability to effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. In addition to the five previously reported weaknesses that remain unresolved, newly identified weaknesses in access controls and configuration management controls introduce risk to two key financial systems. Specifically, it did not adequately (1) maintain a full and complete baseline for system requirements; (2) assign unique identifiers to configuration items; (3) authorize, document, and report all configuration changes; and (4) perform configuration audits. FDIC Has Not Fully Implemented Its Information Security Program
FDIC has made important progress in implementing the corporation’s information security program; however, a key reason for these information security weaknesses is that FDIC did not always fully implement key information security program activities. For example, FDIC has included nonmajor applications in major systems security plans and developed a new security plan template; implemented a risk assessment process that identified possible threats and vulnerabilities to its systems and information, as well as the controls needed to mitigate potential vulnerabilities; implemented a test and evaluation process to assess the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices; ensured that vulnerabilities identified during its tests and evaluations are addressed in its remedial action plans; established a system for documenting and tracking corrective actions; recognized that NFE users are not physically or logically separated in terms of what they are allowed to access within NFE; implemented an incident handling program, including establishing a team and associated procedures for detecting, responding to, and reporting computer security incidents; developed an incident response policy to review events related to data loss, disclose, inappropriate access and loss of equipment in the Division of Finance to determine whether the events are computer security incidents; and developed the corporation’s business continuity of operations, updated the contingency plans and business impact analyses, and assessed the effectiveness of the plans through testing at a disaster recovery site. For example, it did not adequately conduct configuration control testing or complete remedial action plans in a timely manner to include key information. Until FDIC fully performs key information security program activities, its risk is increased because it may not be able to maintain adequate control over its financial systems and information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the progress the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has made in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of FDIC’s controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. FDIC did not use secure e-mail methods to protect the integrity of certain accounting data transferred over an internal communication network. FDIC did not adequately control physical access to the Virginia Square computer processing facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. Effective information security controls are essential to ensure that FDIC systems and information are adequately protected from inadvertent misuse, fraudulent, or improper disclosure. As part of its audit of FDIC's 2007 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the progress FDIC has made in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of FDIC's controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. To do this, GAO examined security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; observed controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key FDIC personnel.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made significant progress in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 16 of the 21 weaknesses that GAO had previously reported as unresolved at the completion of the 2006 audit. For example, FDIC has improved physical security controls over access to its Virginia Square computer processing facility, instructed personnel to use more secure e-mail methods to protect the integrity of certain accounting data transferred over an internal communication network, and updated the security plan and contingency plan of a key financial system. In addition, FDIC stated it has initiated and completed some actions to mitigate the remaining five prior weaknesses. However, we have not verified that these actions have been completed. Although FDIC has made significant progress improving its information system controls, old and new weaknesses could limit the corporation's ability to effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. In addition to the five previously reported weaknesses that remain unresolved, newly identified weaknesses in access controls and configuration management controls introduce risk to two key financial systems. For example, FDIC did not always implement adequate access controls. Specifically, multiple FDIC users shared the same login ID and password, had unrestricted access to application source code, and used passwords that were not adequately encrypted. In addition, FDIC did not adequately (1) maintain a full and complete baseline for system requirements; (2) assign unique identifiers to configuration items; (3) authorize, document, and report all configuration changes; and (4) perform configuration audits. Although these weaknesses do not pose significant risk of misstatement of the corporation's financial statements, they do increase preventable risk to the corporation's financial systems and information. A key reason for these weaknesses is that FDIC did not always fully implement key information security program activities. For example, it did not adequately conduct configuration control testing or complete the remedial action plan in a timely manner and did not include necessary and key information. Until FDIC fully performs key information security program activities, its ability to maintain adequate control over its financial systems and information will be limited. |
gao_GAO-09-400 | gao_GAO-09-400_0 | DOD and OPM Met 2008 Timeliness Requirements, but the Executive Branch’s 2009 Report Did Not Reflect the Full Range of Clearance Timeliness
IRTPA currently requires that the executive branch report annually on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting the act’s timeliness requirements for clearances and that clearance decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within 120 days, on average. IRTPA also requires that a plan be implemented by December 2009 under which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions be made within 60 days, on average. The report stated that the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days. However, because the average is the sole metric presented for timeliness and because the slowest 10 percent of the data is excluded, the report does not communicate the full range of time it took OPM and DOD to complete the clearances. 2). Investigation and Adjudication Documentation Was Incomplete for Favorably Adjudicated Initial Top Secret Clearances
Documentation in Most of the OPM-Provided Investigative Reports Was Incomplete
Based on our independent analysis, we estimated that 87 percent of the investigative reports for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances—which were favorably adjudicated—were missing at least one type of documentation required by federal investigative standards and OPM’s internal guidance. DOD Adjudicators Accept Incomplete Investigative Reports
DOD adjudicators made their clearance decisions based on incomplete investigative reports. DOD has not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative reports, although DOD adjudicators follow a risk-managed approach when granting security clearances. Documentation in Some DOD Adjudicative Files Was Incomplete
We estimated that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were favorably adjudicated had incomplete documentation. By not measuring the completeness of adjudicative files departmentwide, DOD is limited in its ability to explain the extent to which incomplete files exist and reasons why some files are incomplete. Incomplete Investigation and Adjudication Documentation Negatively Affects the Clearance Process
Incomplete OPM-provided investigative reports lead to delays and increase the cost of DOD’s personnel security clearance process. Executive Branch Reports on the Personnel Security Clearance Process Contain Limited Information on Quality
Past executive branch IRTPA-required reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided congressional decision makers with limited information on quality in the process. Previously we have pointed out that an emphasis on timeliness in the clearance process alone does not provide a complete picture of the process. To provide more comprehensive information about personnel security clearance timeliness, which would aid the ongoing personnel security clearance reform efforts, we recommend that the OMB Deputy Director for Management, in the capacity as the Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, include appropriate statistics that describe the full range of the time required to complete all initial clearance applications in the executive branch’s IRTPA-required annual reports. IRTPA currently requires that 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made within 120 days, on average. As we explained in our report, basing clearance decisions on incomplete documentation that has not fully adhered to federal investigative standards may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. As a result, the executive branch has missed opportunities to provide congressional decision makers with full transparency over the clearance process. We are sending copies of this report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the completeness of the timeliness data that the executive branch reported for clearances granted in fiscal year 2008 for the Department of Defense (DOD), we reviewed Title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), measured the timeliness of nearly 630,000 clearances completed in fiscal year 2008 for military, DOD civilian, and industry personnel, and analyzed the executive branch 2009 annual report to Congress required by IRTPA. GAO-09-261R. DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) personnel security clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list since 2005, due to delays in the process and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts most of DOD's clearance investigations, which DOD adjudicators use to make clearance decisions. The Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) chairs a Performance Accountability Council that is responsible for reforming the clearance process. Conducted under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO's report addresses the (1) reporting on timeliness for DOD clearances, (2) documentation completeness for making initial top-secret clearance decisions for DOD personnel, and (3) reporting on the quality of the clearance process. To assess these issues, GAO analyzed data on most DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, randomly sampled and analyzed 100 OPM investigative reports and DOD adjudicative files for clearances granted in July 2008, and analyzed 2006-09 executive branch annual clearance reports.
What GAO Found
DOD and OPM met statutory timeliness requirements for personnel security clearances in fiscal year 2008, but the executive branch's 2009 required report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time to make all initial clearance decisions. Currently, 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made within 120 days, on average, and by December 2009, a plan is to be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 60 days, on average. Under both requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest percent, and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. The most recent report stated that the average time to complete the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days, on average. However, without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances, GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD adjudicative files. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation, and the documentation most often missing was employment verification. Although DOD leadership asserted that adjudicators follow a risk-managed approach, DOD has not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative reports. For DOD adjudicative files, GAO estimated that 22 percent were missing required documentation of the rationale for granting clearances to applicants with security concerns, and the documentation most often missing was related to foreign influence. Neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of its investigative reports or adjudicative files. As a result, both are limited in their ability to explain the extent or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both the time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. The executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality. The 2009 report did not provide any data on quality but, unlike previous reports, identified quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal entity's clearances. The executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information and has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress. |
gao_GAO-05-828 | gao_GAO-05-828_0 | Management Controls Are in Place for Two of the Three NNSA Offices Administering Contracts for Nuclear Nonproliferation Projects
Two NNSA offices, NA-23 and NA-25, documented management controls for almost all of their contracts that we reviewed; but the third office, NA- 24, could not provide us with the complete records necessary to document these controls. Similarly, NA-23 and NA-25 provide their technical reviewers and contract managers with procedural guidance that assists in maintaining these controls, while NA-24 did not provide this type of guidance. NA-23 and NA-25 Documented Management Controls for the Contracts We Reviewed
Two NNSA offices, NA-23 and NA-25, documented management controls for most of their contracts that we reviewed. As shown in table 1, for eight of the nine contracts we reviewed from these two offices, NA-23 staff and national laboratory officials who manage NA-25’s contracts provided us with complete records of deliverables and invoices as well as evidence that technical reviewers and contract officers reviewed and approved deliverables and invoices, respectively. Recommendations
To ensure that each NNSA office that we reviewed maintains complete documentation of its management controls, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, require NNSA to take the following three actions: each NNSA office use formal, procedural guidance that clearly states NNSA’s program managers maintain quick access to key contract records such as deliverables and invoices that relate to management controls, regardless of whether the records are located at a national laboratory or headquarters; and NNSA perform periodic reviews of its management control processes to be certain that each program office’s management controls can be documented and remain appropriate and effective. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) with a draft of this report for its review and comment. In most cases, they were unable to do so. In addition, the documentation that officials at the laboratory sent us on August 16, 2005, did not provide all the information that was missing. Scope and Methodology
To assess the effectiveness of the NNSA’s management controls of its nonproliferation projects, we identified the three offices within NNSA that currently oversee and manage the nonproliferation projects that fell within the scope of our work: (1) the Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction (designated by NNSA as NA-23), (2) the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24), and (3) the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation (NA-25). We focused on identifying the controls implemented to ensure that former Soviet Union partners meet contract terms before the invoices for the deliverables are paid. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 mandated that we assess the management of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that the Departments of Defense and Energy each administer. The objective of this report is to assess how the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) implements management controls, which we define here to be the processes ensuring that work done under a contract meets contract specifications and that payments go to contractors as intended.
What GAO Found
Two NNSA offices, the Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction (designated by NNSA as NA-23) and International Material Protection and Cooperation (NA- 25), documented management controls for almost all of their contracts that we reviewed, but the third office, the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24), did not document controls for most of their contracts because they could not provide the required documentation. More specifically, for eight of the nine NA-23 and NA-25 contracts we reviewed, the NA-23 headquarters staff and the laboratory staff that manage the contracts for NA-25 provided to us complete records of deliverables and invoices, as well as evidence that technical officials reviewed and approved the deliverables and contract officers reviewed and approved the invoices. (For the ninth contract, NA-25 provided us with incomplete documentation of its controls.) In addition, NA-23 and NA-25 each apply procedural guidance that assists managers in maintaining these controls. However, according to an NNSA official, none of the three offices currently perform periodic reviews to ensure their existing management controls remain appropriate. In contrast, we were unable to determine if NA-24 implements management controls because, for seven of the nine contracts we reviewed, the documentation it provided to us was in most cases either incomplete or it provided no clear audit trail that we could follow. (Documentation was complete for the eighth and ninth contracts.) The types of documents that were missing varied across and within some contracts. In addition, NA-24 does not provide its contract managers with procedural guidance on how to maintain its management controls, nor does it perform a periodic review of its controls to ensure the controls are effective and appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-386T | gao_GAO-15-386T_0 | Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. population, we concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite data is a high-risk area. We added this area to our High-Risk List in 2013 and it remains on the 2015 update to the High-Risk List that was issued yesterday. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather satellites, the first of which is due to reach the end of its useful life in 2015. Furthermore, NOAA is currently developing JPSS within its cost and schedule baselines. As a result, a gap in polar satellite data may occur earlier and last longer than NOAA anticipates. In one scenario, S-NPP would last its full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit testing for 6 months as predicted by the JPSS program office (until September 2017). While all of the alternatives have trade-offs, several alternatives may represent the best known options for reducing the impact of a gap:
Extending legacy satellites, continuing to obtain data from European midmorning satellites, and ensuring legacy and European satellites’ data quality remains acceptable;
Obtaining additional observations of radio occultation
Advancing 4-dimensional data assimilation and the next generation global forecast model to make more efficient use of data still available and produce improved techniques for evaluating data; Increasing high-performance computing capacity, a key factor for enabling greater resolution in existing and future models, which drives the pace of development for assimilation of data that could further improve NOAA’s models. Until NOAA fully addresses key elements to improve its contingency plan, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in polar satellite coverage. Among a list of available alternatives, NOAA identified 21 mitigation projects that are to be implemented in order to address the potential for satellite data gaps in the afternoon polar orbit. However, the agency has not prioritized or accelerated activities most likely to address a gap because it has been focused on implementing many different initiatives to see which ones will have the most impact. The GOES-R Program Has Made Development Progress, but Faces Schedule Risks and a Potential Coverage Gap, and Challenges Remain in Mitigation Planning
After spending 10 years and just over $5 billion, the GOES-R program has completed important steps in developing its first satellite, and has entered the integration and test phase of development for the satellite. The GOES-R program has also not efficiently closed defects on selected components. Thus, the agency will have only two operational satellites in orbit—and no backup satellite—until GOES-R is launched and completes an estimated 6-month post-launch test period. Any delay to the GOES-R launch date would extend the time without a backup to more than 17 months. NOAA has improved its plan to mitigate gaps in satellite coverage. In the JPSS report released in December, we recommended, among other things, that NOAA update the JPSS program’s assessment of potential polar satellite data gaps to include more accurate assumptions about launch dates and the length of the data calibration period, as well as key risks such as the potential effect of space debris on JPSS and other polar satellites expected lifetimes; revise its existing contingency plan to address shortfalls noted in the 2014 report, such as identifying DOD’s and Japan’s plans to continue weather satellite observations, including recovery time objectives for key products, completing the contingency plan with selected strategies, and establishing a schedule with meaningful timelines and linkages among mitigation activities; and investigate ways to prioritize mitigation projects with the greatest potential benefit to weather forecasting in the event of a gap in JPSS satellite data. For both reports, NOAA agreed with our recommendations and identified steps it plans to take to implement them. However, the program continues to face increasing costs and schedule delays on key components. NOAA has made improvements to its polar satellite gap contingency plan, but has experienced delays in executing key mitigation activities, and has not prioritized or accelerated activities most likely to address a gap. NOAA could experience a gap in satellite data coverage if GOES-R is delayed further and one of the two remaining operational satellites experiences a problem. Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a potential gap in backup coverage on the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken steps to study alternatives, establish mitigation plans, and improve its satellite contingency plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA is procuring the next generation of polar and geostationary weather satellites to replace aging satellites that are approaching the end of their useful lives. Both new sets of satellites will provide critical weather forecasting data over the next two decades. GAO has reported that gaps in polar satellite coverage and in backup coverage for geostationary satellites are likely in the near future. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. population, GAO added mitigating weather satellite gaps to its High-Risk List in 2013 and it remains on the 2015 update to the High-Risk List.
GAO was asked to testify on two recently released reports on NOAA's satellite programs, specifically on (1) the JPSS program's status, the potential for a gap and mitigation alternatives, and contingency plans, and (2) the GOESR program's status, potential for a gap, and contingency plans.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) $11.3 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program has recently completed significant development activities and remains within its cost and schedule baselines; however, recent cost growth on key components is likely unsustainable, and schedule delays could increase the potential for a near-term satellite data gap. In addition, while the program has reduced its estimate for a near-term gap in the afternoon orbit, its gap assessment was based on incomplete data. A gap in satellite data may occur earlier and last longer than NOAA anticipates. The figure below depicts a possible 11-month gap, in which the current satellite lasts its full expected 5-year life (until October 2016) and the next satellite is launched in March 2017 and undergoes on-orbit testing until September 2017.
Multiple alternatives to prevent or reduce the impact of a gap exist. Key options for reducing the impact of a near-term gap include extending legacy satellites, obtaining additional observations such as data from aircraft, advancing data assimilation and a global forecast model, and increasing high performance computing capacity. While NOAA has improved its contingency plan by identifying mitigation strategies and specific activities, the agency's plan has shortfalls such as not assessing the cost and impact of available alternatives. In addition, NOAA has not yet prioritized mitigation projects most likely to address a gap, and key mitigation projects have been delayed. Until the agency addresses these shortfalls, the agency will have less assurance that it is prepared to deal with a near-term gap in polar satellite coverage.
NOAA's $10.8 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) program has also made major progress on its first satellite. However, the program has continued to experience delays in major milestones and has not efficiently closed defects on selected components, both of which could increase the risk of a launch delay. As the GOES-R program approaches its expected launch date of March 2016, it faces a potential gap of more than a year during which an on-orbit backup satellite would not be available. Specifically, there could be no backup from April 2015 (when an operational satellite is expected to reach its end-of-life) through September 2016 (after GOES-R completes its post-launch test period). Any delay to the GOES-R launch date would extend the length of time without a backup satellite and, if an operational satellite were to experience a problem during that time, there could be a gap in GOES coverage. NOAA has improved its plan to mitigate gaps in satellite coverage, but it does not yet include steps for mitigating a delayed launch.
What GAO Recommends
In its recently issued reports, GAO recommended that NOAA update its polar data gap assessment, address shortfalls in both its polar and geostationary contingency plans, and prioritize mitigation projects most likely to address a gap in polar satellite coverage. NOAA concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-16-472 | gao_GAO-16-472_0 | This appropriation also includes expenses related to prisoner transportation and medical care. Prisoner Housing
USMS does not own or operate its own detention facilities. USMS Facility Payments Are the Primary Prisoner Operations Cost, and Total Prisoner Operations Costs Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2012
Facility Payments Comprise About 86 Percent of USMS’s Prisoner Operations Costs
In fiscal year 2015, USMS expended about $1.20 billion in payments to state and local government and private detention facilities. Costs Are Higher in Districts Where Prisoner Population Is Concentrated and the Districts Cannot Rely on BOP Facilities to House Most Prisoners
In general, districts with larger prisoner populations have more costs than districts with lower prisoner populations. USMS officials stated that bed space in locations with the highest ADP—such as along the southwest border—often overtake the federal, state, and local facilities’ capacity. USMS Has Taken Steps to Reduce Prison Costs, but Could Improve the Reliability of Its Cost Savings Estimates
USMS Implemented Several Initiatives and Other Actions to Reduce Prison Operations Costs
USMS has implemented a number of actions to manage costs and meet its strategic goal of optimizing detention operations, which it estimates have achieved costs savings in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Alternatives to Pre-Trial Detention: We also found that USMS’s cost savings estimate of approximately $375 million from the alternatives to pre-trial detention program—for fiscal years 2010 through 2015—had limited reliability because USMS lacked adequate documentation to support the estimates, did not validate estimates, and reported inconsistent savings estimates. However, USMS officials did not provide documentation or a timeframe in which they will do so. USMS Has Designed Systems to Identify Opportunities for Additional Cost Efficiencies, but Could Improve its Monitoring of Internal Control
USMS has Systems to Help Identify Opportunities for Cost Efficiencies and Savings
USMS has several systems it uses to help it identify cost savings opportunities, including: Strategic Plan. For example, according to the officials, the U.S. By developing a mechanism that would allow them to aggregate and analyze results from the annual self-assessments, USMS would be better positioned to more consistently and comprehensively identify deficiencies and monitor corrective actions across districts and over time that could result in additional opportunities to achieve cost savings and efficiencies. Conclusions
USMS provided for the care of over 50,000 federal prisoners daily at a cost of about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2015. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that costs savings estimates are reliable, we recommend that the Director of the USMS direct its Prisoner Operations Division to develop reliable methods for estimating cost savings and validating reported savings achieved. To enable USMS to more consistently identify deficiencies and monitor corrective actions, we recommend that the Director of the USMS establish a mechanism to aggregate and analyze the results of annual district self-assessments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We addressed the following questions as part of this review: (1) What are the primary costs associated with United States Marshals Service (USMS) prisoner operations, and what have been the trends in spending from fiscal years 2010 through 2015? (2) What recent actions has USMS taken to reduce its prisoner operations costs and how much has been saved? Additionally, we used USMS’s housing data on facilities’ per diem costs per prisoner and average daily population to determine the percentage of USMS prisoners housed in federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) facilities for fiscal years 2010 through 2015—for which USMS does not pay—and to monetize any potential cost savings resulting from USMS housing some of its prisoners in BOP facilities. To monetize potential costs savings, we developed two estimates: (1) an estimate of USMS’s potential costs avoided by using BOP facilities for fiscal years 2010 through 2015; and (2) an estimate of the potential cost savings to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)—of which both USMS and BOP are component agencies—in fiscal year 2015 due to USMS housing its prisoners in BOP facilities versus in potentially more costly non-federal facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) USMS is responsible for managing more than 50,000 federal prisoners during criminal proceedings until their acquittal or their conviction and transfer to the Federal Bureau of Prisons to serve their sentence. USMS provides housing, clothing, food, transportation, and medical care. The USMS does not own or manage any of its own facilities and instead relies on a combination of federal, state, local, and privately-managed facilities to house and care for these prisoners. Senate Report 113-78 of the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014 included a provision for GAO to assess the costs of housing federal inmates and detainees.
This report (1) identifies the primary costs associated with USMS prisoner operations, and the trends in spending from fiscal years 2010 through 2015; (2) assesses recent actions USMS has taken to reduce its prisoner operations costs and how much has been saved; and (3) determines systems USMS has to identify additional opportunities to save costs. GAO analyzed USMS's financial and operational data related to its prisoner operations costs from fiscal year 2010 through 2015, analyzed USMS documentation, and interviewed USMS officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the U.S. Marshals Service's (USMS) largest prisoner costs were housing payments to state, local, and private prisons. For example, in fiscal year 2015 USMS spent 86 percent of its $1.4 billion in prisoner operation costs on housing. While total prisoner costs and prisoner populations decreased since fiscal year 2012, per prisoner costs increased. USMS officials attributed the increase in part to lower than expected prisoner populations, resulting in USMS not filling guaranteed bed space at certain facilities. Also, prisoner costs generally were higher in districts with larger populations and limited use of federal facilities, for which USMS does not pay. Both population and costs were highest in 5 districts along the southwest border (see figure).
USMS has implemented actions that it reports have continued to save prisoner-related costs from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, such as the alternatives to pre-trial detention program to reduce prisoners in USMS's custody. However, for actions with identified savings over this time period, GAO found that about $654 million of USMS's estimated $858 million in total savings is not reliable. For example, USMS identified $375 million in savings from the alternatives to pre-trial detention program for fiscal years 2010 through 2015, but did not verify the data or methodology used to develop the estimate or provide documentation supporting its reported savings for fiscal years 2012 onward. By developing reliable methods for estimating costs and validating savings, USMS would be better positioned to assess the effectiveness of its cost savings efforts.
USMS has designed systems to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies, including savings. For example, the agency requires districts to conduct annual self-assessments of their procedures to identify any deficiencies which could lead to cost savings. However, USMS cannot aggregate and analyze the results of the assessments across districts. Developing a mechanism to do so would better position USMS to identify deficiencies or develop corrective actions that could result in additional cost savings opportunities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USMS develop reliable methods for estimating cost savings and validating reported savings achieved, and establish a mechanism to aggregate and analyze the results of annual district self- assessments. USMS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-644T | gao_GAO-08-644T_0 | In addition to the improper sale of sensitive defense-related items, we have also reported that the sale of demil code A and other nonsensitive military items can result in waste and reduces the efficiency of DOD operations. Sensitive and Stolen Defense-Related Items Available on the Internet to the Highest Bidder
We found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder on eBay and Craigslist from January 2007 through March 2008. Undercover investigators purchased a dozen sensitive items to demonstrate how easy it was to obtain them. The items were shipped to us “no questions asked.” Many of these items were stolen from the U.S. military. According to DOD, it considers the sensitive items we purchased to be on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales. However, if investigators had been members of the general public, there is a risk that they could have illegally resold these items to an international broker or transferred them overseas. In addition to the threat that sensitive items could be used directly against U.S. troops or allies, criminals could take advantage of some sensitive items to commit domestic crime. Sensitive defense-related items could also be reverse-engineered to develop countermeasures or equivalent technologies. Sensitive and Stolen Defense-Related Items Purchased on the Internet
Our investigators purchased a dozen sensitive defense-related items from Internet sellers during the period of our review. Munitions List, meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales. We were unable to determine how this part became available to the general public. Our intent was to demonstrate that the general public can purchase, over the Internet, all the gear necessary to dress and look like a U.S. service member. Other Defense-Related Items
Our investigators also identified examples of U.S. government property— both sensitive and nonsensitive—that was likely stolen and sold for personal profit rather than being utilized by DOD (i.e., conversion of government property). Civilian Sellers of Stolen Property
We identified two civilian sellers with eBay store fronts who bought defense-related items from service members and sold these items to the general public on eBay. Gun-Store Owner. We cross-matched the names of the individuals who sold items to the gun- store owner with the DEIDS database to determine whether any of the sellers were currently serving in the military. eBay and Craigslist Have Few Safeguards to Prevent the Sale of Stolen and Sensitive U.S. Military Items
Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items we purchased were not removed by eBay and Craigslist Web site administrators, allowing us to complete the transactions. Both Web sites maintain published lists of items that are prohibited from sale, including stolen items, but only eBay contains warnings related to sensitive defense-related or export-controlled items even though both Web sites have an international reach. The official stated that the Fraud Investigations Team also proactively refers cases to relevant law enforcement agencies for further investigation and prosecution. Because these items are not included on the list, Craigslist officials and users are unlikely to prohibit these sales. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unauthorized individuals, companies, terrorist organizations, and other countries continue their attempts to obtain sensitive items related to the defense of the United States. The Internet is one place that defense-related items can be purchased, raising the possibility that some sensitive items are available to those who can afford them. In addition to the risk that sensitive defense-related items could be used to directly harm U.S. service members or allies on the battlefield, these items could be disassembled and analyzed (i.e., reverse engineered) to develop countermeasures or equivalent technology. Given the risks posed by the sale of sensitive defense-related items to the public, and the Internet's international reach and high volume of commerce, the Subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover testing to determine whether the general public can easily purchase these items on the Internet, including on the Web sites eBay and Craigslist. To perform this work, GAO investigators used undercover identities to pose as members of the general public, meaning that they conducted their work with names, credit cards, and contact information that could not be traced to GAO. Investigators interviewed sellers where possible and referred cases to the appropriate law enforcement entities for further investigation.
What GAO Found
GAO found numerous defense-related items for sale to the highest bidder on eBay and Craigslist. A review of policies and procedures for these Web sites determined that there are few safeguards to prevent the sale of sensitive and stolen defense-related items using the sites. During the period of investigation, GAO undercover investigators purchased a dozen sensitive items on eBay and Craigslist to demonstrate how easy it was to obtain them. Many of these items were stolen from the U.S. military. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), it considers the sensitive items GAO purchased to be on the U.S. Munitions List, meaning that there are restrictions on their overseas sales. However, if investigators had been members of the general public, there is a risk that they could have illegally resold these items to an international broker or transferred them overseas. GAO investigators also identified examples of U.S. government property that was stolen and sold for a profit rather than being utilized by DOD. For example, GAO found two civilian store owners who acted as conduits for defense-related property that was likely stolen from the military. The store owners told GAO they purchased gear from service members--including Kevlar vests, flak jackets, and gas masks--and sold it through eBay to the general public. GAO also purchased stolen military meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) and found a robust market for stolen military MREs on eBay and Craigslist. Advertisements for the sensitive defense-related items GAO purchased were not removed by Web site administrators, allowing investigators to buy the items. Both Web sites maintain lists of items that are prohibited from sale, including stolen items, but only eBay contains warnings related to overseas sales and the improper sale of sensitive defense-related items. |
gao_OSI-00-251 | gao_OSI-00-251_0 | Such variety is needed because one technique alone may not uncover all types of improper payments. Current Methodology Not Designed to Measure the Full Extent of Potential Fraud and Abuse
The primary purpose of the current methodology is to provide an estimate of improper payments that HCFA can use for financial statement reporting purposes, and it has served as a performance measure. These experts emphasize that no set of techniques, no matter how extensive, can be expected to identify and measure all potential fraud and abuse. However, determining the appropriate nature and extent of third party verification procedures to incorporate into efforts to measure improper payments should be considered carefully. Recommendations
To improve the usefulness of measuring Medicare fee-for-service improper payments, including those attributable to potential fraud and abuse, we recommend that the HCFA Administrator take the following actions:
Experiment with incorporating additional techniques for detecting potential fraud and abuse into methodologies used to identify and measure improper payments and then evaluate their effectiveness. We also reviewed various documents including HCFA and OIG Fraud Alerts, prior GAO, OIG, and other studies on health care fraud and abuse, particularly those related to the Medicare fee-for-service program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) efforts to improve the measurement of improper payments in the Medicare fee-for-service program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because it was not intended to include procedures designed specifically to identify all types of potential fraudulent and abusive activity, the current methodology does not provide an estimate of the full extent of improper Medicare fee-for-service payments; (2) HCFA has initiated three projects designed to further its measurement efforts which offer some promise for determining the extent of improper payments attributable to potential fraud and abuse; (3) based on careful evaluation of their effectiveness, performing additional potential fraud identification techniques as part of its efforts to measure improper payments could assist HCFA in arriving at a more comprehensive measurement and, ultimately, develop cost-effective internal controls to combat improper payments; and (4) however, no set of techniques, no matter how extensive, can be expected to measure all potential fraud and abuse. |
gao_GAO-12-600T | gao_GAO-12-600T_0 | MDA Experienced Mixed Progress in Development and Delivery Efforts
MDA experienced mixed results in executing its fiscal year 2011 development goals and BMDS tests. For the first time in 5 years, we are able to report that all of the targets used in fiscal year 2011 test events were delivered as planned and performed as expected. In addition, the Aegis BMD program’s SM-3 Block IA missile was able to intercept an intermediate-range target for the first time. Also, the THAAD program successfully conducted its first operational flight test in October 2011. However, none of the programs we assessed were able to fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the year. These as well as a test anomaly and delays disrupted MDA’s flight test plan and the acquisition strategies of several components. Overall, flight test failures and an anomaly forced MDA to suspend or slow production of three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured. While MDA has incorporated some acquisition best practices in its newer programs, its acquisition strategies still include high or elevated levels of concurrency that result in increased acquisition risk—including performance shortfalls, cost growth, and schedule delays—for these newer programs. Concurrency is broadly defined as overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production of a system. In recent years, MDA has taken positive steps to incorporate some acquisition best practices, such as increasing competition and partnering with laboratories to build prototypes. For example, MDA took actions in fiscal year 2011 to reduce acquisition risks and prevent future cost growth in its Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA program. In our April 2012 report, we made two recommendations to strengthen MDA’s longer-term acquisition prospects. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Acquisition Technology and Logistics to (1) review all of MDA’s acquisitions for concurrency and determine whether the proper balance has been struck between the planned deployment dates and the concurrency risks taken to achieve those dates and (2) review and report to the Secretary of Defense the extent to which the directed capability delivery dates announced by the President in 2009 are contributing to concurrency in missile defense acquisitions and recommend schedule adjustments where significant benefits can be obtained by reducing concurrency. DOD agreed with four of the five missile defense element-specific recommendations and partially agreed with our recommendation to report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to Congress the root cause of the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test failure, path forward for future development, and the plans to bridge production from the SM-3 Block IA to the SM-3 Block IB before committing to additional purchases of the SM-3 Block IB. Parts Quality Issues Have Also Had a Significant Effect on Performance, Cost, and Schedule
MDA parts quality issues have seriously impeded the development of the BMDS in recent years. For example, during a THAAD flight test in fiscal year 2010, the air-launched target failed to initiate after it was dropped from the aircraft and fell into the ocean. The test was aborted and a subsequent failure review board investigation identified as the immediate cause of the failure the rigging of cables to the missile in the aircraft and shortcomings in internal processes at the contractor as the underlying cause. This failure led to a delay of the planned test, restructuring of other planned tests, and hundreds of millions of dollars being spent to develop and acquire new medium-range air-launched targets. present examples of the parts quality issues we found at MDA below, the June 2011 report also describes the parts quality issues we found with other space agencies. This new clause shows some leadership by MDA to hold contractors accountable for parts quality. Our June 2011 report recommended greater coordination between government organizations responsible for major space and missile defense programs on parts quality issues and periodic reporting to Congress. The parts quality issues will require sustained attention from both the executive and legislative branches to improve the quality of the systems in development, particularly because there are significant barriers to addressing quality problems, such as an increase in counterfeit electronic parts, a declining government share of the overall electronic parts market, and workforce gaps within the aerospace sector. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its mission, MDA is developing a highly complex system of systemsground-, sea-, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and battle management. Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the ballistic missile defense system. This statement addresses progress MDA made in the past year, the challenges it still faces with concurrent acquisitions and how it is addressing parts quality issues. It is based on GAOs April 2012 report on missile defense and its June 2011 report on space and missile defense parts quality problems.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) experienced mixed results in executing its fiscal year 2011 development goals and tests. For the first time in 5 years, GAO was able to report that the agency delivered all of the targets used in fiscal year 2011 test events with the targets performing as expected. In addition, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense programs Standard Missile-3 Block IA missile was able to intercept an intermediate-range target for the first time and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense program successfully conducted its first operational flight test. However, none of the programs GAO assessed were able to fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the year. Flight test failures, a test anomaly, and delays disrupted MDAs flight test plan and the acquisition strategies of several components. Flight test failures forced MDA to suspend or slow production of three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured. Some of the difficulties in MDAs testing and production of assets can be attributed to its highly concurrent acquisition approach.
Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production. High levels of concurrency were present in MDAs initial efforts and are present in current efforts. For example, MDAs flight test failures of a new variant of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense programs interceptors while production was underway delayed delivery to the warfighter, increased costs, and will require retrofit of fielded equipment. Flight test costs to confirm its capability has increased from $236 million to about $1 billion. MDA has taken positive steps to incorporate some acquisition best practices, such as increasing competition and partnering with laboratories to build prototypes. For example, MDA took actions in fiscal year 2011 to reduce acquisition risks and prevent future cost growth in its Aegis SM-3 Block IIA program. Nevertheless, as long as newer programs adopt acquisition approaches with elevated levels of concurrency, there is still considerable risk of future performance shortfalls that will require retrofits, cost overruns, and schedule delays.
MDA is also taking the initiative to address parts quality issues through various means, including internal policies, collaborative initiatives with other agencies, and contracting strategies to hold its contractors more accountable. Quality issues have seriously impeded to the development of the missile defenses in recent years. For example, during a fiscal year 2010 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense flight test, the air-launched target failed to initiate after it was dropped from the aircraft and fell into the ocean. A failure review board identified shortcomings in internal processes at the contractor to be the cause of the failure. This failure led to a delay of the planned test, restructuring of other planned tests, and hundreds of millions of dollars being spent to develop and acquire new medium-range air-launched targets. Parts quality issues will require sustained attention from both the executive and legislative branches. MDA is exhibiting some leadership, but there are significant barriers to addressing quality problems, such as the increase in counterfeit electronic parts, a declining government share of the overall electronic parts market, and workforce gaps within the aerospace sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations in this statement. In the April 2012 report, GAO made recommendations to strengthen MDAs longer-term acquisition prospects including a review of MDAs acquisitions for concurrency to determine whether the proper balance has been struck between planned deployment dates and concurrency risks to achieve those dates. The report includes additional recommendations on how individual program elements can reduce concurrency. DOD agreed with six of the seven recommendations and partially agreed with one.
DOD generally concurred with the recommendations in the June 2011 report for greater coordination between government organizations responsible for major space and missile defense programs on parts quality issues and periodic reporting to Congress. |
gao_RCED-96-211 | gao_RCED-96-211_0 | As table 1 shows, the most recent RCRA inspections of fuel blending facilities in the five states identified at least one minor violation of treatment, storage, and disposal regulations at 23 of the 34 facilities. These violations included, among others, inadequately labeling hazardous waste storage containers, having incomplete records for training and equipment inspections, and failing to submit estimates of the costs of closing facilities and maintaining sites. According to state officials, these types of violations generally are corrected at the time of the inspection or shortly thereafter. The significant violations included having waste containers in poor condition, storing waste that was not approved under the facility’s operating permit, and having inadequate backup systems for containing leaks of hazardous waste. To provide information on the nature and severity of the violations of RCRA’s treatment, storage, and disposal and boiler and industrial furnace regulations by fuel blenders and cement producers, we asked state and EPA regional officials to (1) describe or provide examples of any violations that were identified during the most recent inspections of the fuel blending and cement production facilities and (2) characterize these violations as either minor or significant on the basis of each state’s or EPA region’s criteria for making such determinations or, in lieu of such criteria, their professional judgment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed separate sets of regulations for facilities operating in interim status and with a final operating permit. State inspections also identified significant violations at five facilities, including using storage containers in poor condition, storing hazardous waste in excess of allowed capacity, and inadequately analyzing waste. EPA officials are reviewing the results of these inspections and related information to determine whether violations occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on five states' cement production facility inspections, focusing on their compliance with various Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulations for processing hazardous waste fuels.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there was at least one minor violation of treatment, storage, and disposal regulations at 23 of the cement production facilities reviewed; (2) these violations included the inadequate labeling of hazardous waste storage containers, incomplete records of training and equipment inspections, and failure to submit cost estimates for facility maintenance and operation; (3) these violations were generally corrected at the time of inspection or shortly thereafter; (4) significant violations occurred at 11 hazardous waste fuel burning facilities; (5) these facilities had storage containers in poor condition, stored waste in excess of allowed capacity, and used inadequate backup systems for hazardous waste leaks; (6) one of the facilities reviewed had violated boiler and industrial furnace regulations; and (7) the results of these inspections are incomplete, since the Environmental Protection Agency is still reviewing relevant data from the most recent inspections. |
gao_GAO-01-813 | gao_GAO-01-813_0 | The ABA’s recommended standards define these characteristics as follows: Independence—An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent from control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing entity or a person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. Key Aspects of EPA’s National Hazardous Waste Ombudsman Are Not Consistent With Relevant Professional Standards
Important characteristics of EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman differ from the professional standards of practice adopted by various ombudsman associations. In terms of organizational structure, the national ombudsman is located within OSWER, the organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is responsible for investigating. The officials also said that at the time the structure was established, the ombudsman’s workload consisted primarily of responding to informational inquiries rather than conducting investigations. OSWER officials pointed out that the ombudsmen in other federal agencies generally have an agency-wide jurisdiction, while EPA’s ombudsman is responsible only for inquiries and investigations relating to the hazardous waste programs managed by OSWER. Most of the regional ombudsmen devote less than 25 percent of their time to the ombudsman role. If the regional ombudsmen are to be truly independent, EPA’s national ombudsman believes that they should report to him and should not have other responsibilities that pose a potential conflict. In the case of the national hazardous waste ombudsman, EPA could help ensure that the ombudsman is perceived as independent by locating the function outside the unit he is responsible for investigating and by giving him control over his budget and staff resources. To obtain information on the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA’s national and regional ombudsmen, we developed a data collection instrument to question the regional ombudsmen on their functions in each of EPA’s 10 regions for calendar years 1999 and 2000. We discussed the operations of the regional ombudsmen with OSWER officials and with the national ombudsman and compared those operations with those of the national ombudsman and the relevant professional standards for independence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the impartial and independent investigation of citizens' complaints, federal ombudsmen provide the public with an informal and accessible avenue of redress. Ombudsmen help federal agencies be more responsive to persons who believe that their concerns have not been dealt with fully or fairly through normal problem-solving channels. A national hazardous waste ombudsman was established at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1984. In recent years, that ombudsman has increasingly investigated citizen complaints referred by Members of Congress. As the number and significance of the ombudsman's investigations have increased, so have questions about the adequacy of available resources and whether other impediments exist to fulfilling the ombudsman's responsibilities. This report (1) compares the national ombudsman's operations with professional standards for independence and other factors and (2) determines the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA's national and regional ombudsmen.
What GAO Found
GAO found that key aspects of EPA's national hazardous waste ombudsman differ from professional standards for ombudsmen who deal with inquiries from the public. For example, an effective ombudsman must have independence from any person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. However, EPA's national ombudsman is in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER), the organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is responsible for investigating, and his budget and staff resources are controlled by unit managers within OSWER. GAO also found that, compared with EPA's national hazardous waste ombudsman, the regional ombudsmen are less independent and play a reduced role, primarily responding to informational inquiries on a part-time basis. Most of the ombudsmen in EPA's 10 regional offices hold positions within the regional organization that appear to compromise their independence. The regional ombudsmen split their time between performing duties related to the ombudsman function and duties related to the implementation of the hazardous waste programs that they are responsible for investigating. Communication between the national and regional ombudsmen is limited, despite operating guidelines that call for close communication. The national ombudsman periodically refers informational inquiries to the regional ombudsmen but rarely requests their assistance in investigations. |
gao_GAO-15-620T | gao_GAO-15-620T_0 | The Coast Guard Is Reevaluating Its Aviation Fleet Mix in Light of C-27J Transfer
The Coast Guard is in the process of receiving 14 C-27Js as a part of a Congressionally mandated transfer, at no cost to the Coast Guard, from the Air Force, and these aircraft are planned to significantly contribute to the Coast Guard’s missions once they are operational. However, as we reported in March 2015, it will take time and money to fully transfer and modify the aircraft. However, the Coast Guard is working to mitigate these risks. According to initial Coast Guard estimates, while the C-27J aircraft come at no acquisition cost to the Coast Guard, the costs to fully operationalize them will total about $600 million. The Capital Investment Plan also notes that the Coast Guard has yet to fully estimate the total cost of incorporating and operating the C-27J. In addition to the challenges in converting the C-27Js to fully operational aircraft, we found in March 2015 that the Coast Guard faces a shortfall in To fully meet its mission needs, the achieving its overall flight hour goal.Coast Guard’s 2005 mission needs statement set forth a goal of 52,400 hours per year. Table 1 shows: (1) the aircraft that comprise the current 2014 fleet plan and the Coast Guard’s planned fleet once the C-27Js are operational, (2) the annual flight hours each fleet provides, and (3) the difference between the flight hours of the fleets and the 52,400 hour goal. According to the fiscal year 2016 Capital Investment Plan, the Coast Guard is currently conducting a revised fixed-wing fleet analysis, intended to be a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities and mix of fixed- wing assets needed to fulfill its missions. The Coast Guard has begun to rewrite its mission needs statement and concept of operations and plans to complete this effort by 2016. We recommended in our March 2015 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard inform Congress of the time frames and key milestones for completing the fleet mix study, including the specific date when the Coast Guard will publish its revised annual flight hour needs and when it plans to inform Congress of the corresponding changes to the composition of its fixed-wing fleet to meet these needs. The Coast Guard Is Beginning to Field New Surface Fleet Assets but Faces Potentially Significant Capability Gap
The Coast Guard continues to field National Security Cutters (NSCs) and Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), which are replacing the legacy 378’-foot high endurance cutters and the 110’-foot patrol boats, respectively. As we reported in April 2015, the Coast Guard is also in the process of working with three potential shipbuilders to design the Offshore Patrol Cutter, but this asset, needed to recapitalize the vast majority of the major cutter fleet, remains years away from being fielded. In the meantime, the Coast Guard’s legacy Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Offshore Patrol Cutter is planned to replace, have begun to reach the end of their service lives creating a potential gap. Despite the mixed test results, Navy and DHS testers as well as Coast Guard program officials all agreed that the FRC is a capable vessel, and the Coast Guard plans to confirm that it has resolved these issues during follow-on testing planned to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2015. We found in June 2014 that there are gaps between what the Coast Guard estimates it needs to carry out its program of record for its major acquisitions and what it has traditionally requested and received. For example, senior Coast Guard officials have stated a need for over $2 billion per year, but the Coast Guard has received $1.5 billion or less over the past 5 years. The Coast Guard, DHS, and Office of Management and Budget officials have acknowledged that the Coast Guard cannot afford to recapitalize and modernize its assets in accordance with the current plan at current funding levels. Efforts are underway to address this issue, but so far, these efforts have not led to the difficult trade-off decisions needed to improve the affordability of the Coast Guard’s portfolio. These issues pose additional potential challenges to the affordability of the Coast Guard’s overall acquisition portfolio. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard is managing a multi-billion dollar effort to modernize aging assets, including ships, aircraft, and information technology, to provide new capabilities to conduct missions ranging from marine safety to defense readiness. The Coast Guard has made progress in its acquisition management capabilities, such as more closely following acquisition best practices and taking steps to increase competition. However, GAO has consistently found that DHS and the Coast Guard recognize, but have yet to address, the fact that the Coast Guard's acquisition needs are not affordable.
This statement is based on GAO's body of work issued during the past three years on Coast Guard major acquisitions and highlights GAO's recently completed review of the transfer to the Coast Guard of the C-27J aircraft as well as observations regarding the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2016 Capital Investment Plan. The statement addresses the status of the Coast Guard's (1) aviation assets, particularly the C-27J aircraft and (2) surface assets, as well as (3) the overall affordability of its major acquisition portfolio.
GAO has made a number of recommendations to improve acquisition management and assess the affordability of the Coast Guard's portfolio. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with GAO's recommendations and are working on implementing them by revisiting the Coast Guard's mission needs and fleet mix, as well as creating a 20-year acquisition plan that balances needs and resources, though the agencies have not specified when they will finish these efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in March 2015 that the Coast Guard is in the process of receiving 14 C-27J fixed-wing aircraft transferred from the Air Force at no cost to the Coast Guard. However, it will take 7 years and about $600 million to fully transfer and modify the aircraft by adding information technology and surveillance systems. Transfer of the C-27J faces a number of risks but the aircraft is expected to contribute significant flight hours toward the Coast Guard's goal once complete. In light of this transfer, the Coast Guard is in the process of determining the best mix of fixed-wing aircraft to provide the capabilities it needs to carry out its missions. As shown in the table, GAO reported that the Coast Guard has fallen short of its flight hour goal; this trend is expected to continue until the Coast Guard revises its mission needs, an effort it expects to complete in 2016. The Coast Guard also plans to complete a fixed-wing fleet mix analysis by 2019, which will revisit the current flight hour goal and the assets that will best meet its needs. The table reflects the existing fleet and flight hours as compared to GAO's analysis of the Coast Guard's planned fleet including the C-27J aircraft.
Note: The HC-144 and C-27J are medium range assets while the HC-130H and HC-130J are long range assets. The fiscal year 2014 ‘medium range' column includes 4 legacy medium range aircraft.
According to GAO's April 2015 review, the Coast Guard continues to field National Security Cutters and Fast Response Cutters. The Coast Guard is also working with three potential shipbuilders to design the Offshore Patrol Cutter, needed to recapitalize the majority of the major cutter fleet, with plans for the first ship to be fielded in 2022. In the meantime, the Coast Guard's legacy Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Offshore Patrol Cutter is planned to replace, have begun to reach the end of their service lives. The Coast Guard currently has no definitive plan to extend the service life of these legacy assets and as a result faces a potentially significant capability gap.
GAO found in June 2014 that budget officials have acknowledged that the Coast Guard's current plan for developing new, more capable assets is not affordable given current and expected funding levels. For the past 5 years, GAO has found that the Coast Guard's acquisition funding has fallen short of what it estimates it needs to fully recapitalize its assets. The Coast Guard has responded by annually delaying or reducing its capability. The Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have taken some steps to address these affordability issues, but as yet these efforts have not led to the types of significant trade-off decisions among resources and needs that would improve the long-term outlook of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. |
gao_GAO-08-958 | gao_GAO-08-958_0 | TSA Has a Risk-Based Covert Testing Strategy to Identify Vulnerabilities and Measure the Performance of Selected Aviation Security Systems, but Could Strengthen Its Testing Efforts
TSA has designed and implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to achieve its goals of identifying vulnerabilities in and measuring the performance of passenger checkpoint and checked baggage screening systems and airport perimeters and access controls, and has begun to determine the extent to which covert testing will be used to identify vulnerabilities and measure the effectiveness of security practices related to non-aviation modes of transportation. OI used information on terrorist threats to design and implement its national covert tests and determine at which airports to conduct tests based on analyses of risks. Without systematically recording reasons for test failures, such as failures caused by screening equipment not working properly, as well as reasons for test passes, TSA is limited in its ability to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. TSA recently redesigned its local covert testing program to address limitations in its previous program. Furthermore, according to OI officials, identifying a single cause for a test failure may be difficult since covert testing failures can be caused by multiple factors. As a result, it is too soon to determine whether ASAP will meet its goals of measuring the performance of passenger and checked baggage screening systems and identifying vulnerabilities. TSA Could More Fully Use the Results of Covert Tests to Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities Identified in the Commercial Aviation System
TSA’s national aviation covert testing program has identified vulnerabilities in select aspects of the commercial aviation security system at airports of all sizes; however, the agency is not fully using the results of these tests to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. However, OSO lacks a systematic process to ensure that OI’s recommendations are considered, and does not systematically document its rationale for why it did or did not implement OI’s recommendations. In the absence of a systematic process for considering OI’s recommendations, documenting their decision-making process, and evaluating whether corrective actions mitigated identified vulnerabilities, TSA is limited in its ability to use covert testing results to improve the security of the commercial aviation system. OSO senior leadership stated that opportunities exist to improve the agency’s processes in this area. While the specific results of these tests and the vulnerabilities they identified are classified, covert test failures can be caused by multiple factors, including TSOs not properly following TSA procedures when screening passengers, screening equipment that does not detect a threat item, or TSA screening procedures that do not provide sufficient detail to enable TSOs to identify the threat item. DHS and TSA concurred with the findings and recommendations, and stated that the report will be useful in strengthening TSA’s covert testing programs. In response to our recommendation that TSA develop a process to systematically coordinate with domestic and foreign transportation organizations as the agency explores the use of covert testing in non- aviation modes of transportation to learn from their experiences, DHS stated that it is taking a number of actions. To identify TSA’s strategy for conducting covert testing of the transportation system and the extent to which the agency has designed and implemented its covert tests to achieve identified goals, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures to determine the requirements for conducting covert testing in the transportation sector. To determine the results of TSA’s national covert tests and the extent to which TSA used the results of these tests to mitigate security vulnerabilities in the aviation system, we obtained and analyzed a database of the results of TSA’s national covert tests conducted from September 2002 to June 2007. We analyzed the test data according to airport category, threat item, and type of test conducted between September 2002 and June 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses undercover, or covert, testing to approximate techniques that terrorists may use to identify vulnerabilities in and measure the performance of airport security systems. During these tests, undercover inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through passenger and baggage screening systems, and access secure airport areas. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined (1) TSA's strategy for conducting covert testing of the transportation system and the extent to which the agency has designed and implemented its covert tests to achieve identified goals; and (2) the results of TSA's national aviation covert tests conducted from September 2002 to June 2007, and the extent to which TSA uses the results of these tests to mitigate security vulnerabilities. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed covert testing documents and data and interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials.
What GAO Found
TSA has designed and implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to achieve its goals of identifying vulnerabilities in and measuring the performance the aviation security system, and has begun to determine the extent to which covert testing will be used in non-aviation modes of transportation. TSA's Office of Inspection (OI) used information on terrorist threats to design and implement its national covert tests and determine at which airports to conduct tests based on the likelihood of a terrorist attack. However, OI did not systematically record the causes of test failures or practices that resulted in higher pass rates for tests. Without systematically recording reasons for test failures, such as failures caused by screening equipment not working properly, as well as reasons for test passes, TSA is limited in its ability to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. OI officials stated that identifying a single cause for a test failure is difficult since failures can be caused by multiple factors. TSA recently redesigned its local covert testing program to more effectively measure the performance of passenger and baggage screening systems and identify vulnerabilities. However, it is too early to determine whether the program will meet its goals since it was only recently implemented and TSA is still analyzing the results of initial tests. While TSA has a well established covert testing program in commercial aviation, the agency does not regularly conduct covert tests in non-aviation modes of transportation. Furthermore, select domestic and foreign transportation organizations and DHS components use covert testing to identify security vulnerabilities in non-aviation settings. However, TSA lacks a systematic process for coordinating with these organizations. TSA covert tests conducted from September 2002 to June 2007 have identified vulnerabilities in the commercial aviation system at airports of all sizes, and the agency could more fully use the results of tests to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. While the specific results of these tests and the vulnerabilities they identified are classified, covert test failures can be caused by multiple factors, including screening equipment that does not detect a threat item, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), formerly known as screeners, not properly following TSA procedures when screening passengers, or TSA screening procedures that do not provide sufficient detail to enable TSOs to identify the threat item. TSA's Administrator and senior officials are routinely briefed on covert test results and are provided with test reports that contain recommendations to address identified vulnerabilities. However, TSA lacks a systematic process to ensure that OI's recommendations are considered and that the rationale for implementing or not implementing OI's recommendations is documented. Without such a process, TSA is limited in its ability to use covert test results to strengthen aviation security. TSA officials stated that opportunities exist to improve the agency's processes in this area. In May 2008, GAO issued a classified report on TSA's covert testing program. That report contained information that was deemed either classified or sensitive. This version of the report summarizes our overall findings and recommendations while omitting classified or sensitive security information. |
gao_GAO-01-536 | gao_GAO-01-536_0 | Specifically, the staff office’s policies and procedures do not provide for determining at the time a panel is being developed and convened what financial conflict-of-interest requirements, if any, the panel is subject to; routinely ensuring that potential panelists’ financial disclosure forms contain sufficient information to evaluate potential conflicts of interest; systematically requesting other information pertinent to assessing independence and overall balance of the panel, such as previous public positions that panelists have taken on the matter being reviewed, before the panel members are appointed; and adequately training prospective panel members on the financial conflict- of-interest requirements and other issues that could raise questions about their impartiality. This information is not systematically requested until the panelists have been selected and are participating in the first meeting of the peer review panel—the public disclosure session. Limited Information Is Available to the Public on the Board’s Panelists
The staff office’s policies and procedures for providing the public with information on the backgrounds of its peer review panelists are not sufficient to ensure that the public is adequately informed about the points of view represented on the panels. The policies and procedures used by the staff office to date have limitations. In our view, this question highlights the importance of ensuring that the peer review panels are properly balanced in terms of points of view and expertise represented. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews whether the policies and procedures of the Environmental Protection Agency's Science Advisory Board ensure that (1) its peer review panelists are independent and the panels are properly balanced and (2) the public is sufficiently informed about the points of view represented on the panels.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the policies and procedures used by the staff office to ensure the independence of the Board's peer reviewers and the balancing of viewpoints have limitations that reduce their effectiveness. The staff office has not systematically requested information that is needed to assess the independence and overall balance of viewpoints represented on the panel--such as previous public positions the panelists have taken on the matter being reviewed--until the first meeting, when the panelists have already been chosen. Furthermore, conflicts of interest may not be identified and mitigated in a timely manner. GAO also found that the staff office's policies and procedures for providing the public with information on the backgrounds of the Board's peer review panelists do not adequately inform the public about the points of view represented on the panels. |
gao_GAO-13-445 | gao_GAO-13-445_0 | Similarly, expenditures for self-referred anatomic pathology services increased at a faster rate than expenditures for non-self-referred services. Number of Self-referred Anatomic Pathology Services Increased at a Faster Rate Than Non-self- referred Services
While both the number of self-referred and non-self-referred anatomic pathology services grew overall from 2004 through 2010, self-referred services increased at a faster rate than non-self-referred services. Specifically, the number of self-referred anatomic pathology services more than doubled over the period we reviewed, growing from about 1.06 million services in 2004 to about 2.26 million services in 2010 (see fig. In contrast, the number of non-self-referred anatomic pathology services increased about 38 percent, growing from about 5.64 million services to about 7.77 million services. Self-referring Providers Generally Referred More Anatomic Pathology Services Than Other Providers Regardless of Practice or Patient Characteristics
Across the three provider specialties—dermatology, gastroenterology, and urology—that refer the majority of anatomic pathology services, we found that in 2010, self-referring providers referred more anatomic pathology services, on average, than other providers, regardless of number of Medicare FFS beneficiaries seen. For further information on referral of anatomic pathology services across provider specialties and size categories in urban and rural areas, see appendix V.
Providers’ Referrals for Anatomic Pathology Services Increased the Year after They Began to Self-refer
Our analysis shows that, across the three provider specialties we reviewed, providers’ referrals for anatomic pathology services substantially increased the year after they began to self-refer. In our analysis we examined the number of anatomic pathology referrals made by “switchers”—those providers that did not self-refer in 2007 or 2008 but began to self-refer in 2009 and continued to do so in 2010—and compared these referrals to the number made by providers that did not begin to self-refer during this period. Higher Use of Anatomic Pathology Services by Self- Referring Providers Results in Substantial Additional Medicare Spending
We estimate that Medicare spent about $69 million more in 2010 than the program would have spent if self-referring providers performed biopsy procedures at the same rate as and referred the same number of services per biopsy procedure as non-self-referring providers of the same provider size and specialty (see fig. Taken together, this suggests that financial incentives for self-referring providers were likely a major factor driving the increase in anatomic pathology referrals. To the extent that these additional services are unnecessary, avoiding them could result in savings to Medicare and to beneficiaries. We continue to believe that CMS should develop a payment approach that addresses the incentive to provide more services. To the extent that self-referral for anatomic pathology services continues to be permitted, we believe that including an indicator or flag on the claims would likely be the easiest and most cost-effective approach to improve CMS’s ability to identify self-referred anatomic pathology services. Self-referral, however, could be a factor CMS considers in its ongoing efforts to identify and address inappropriate use of Medicare services. 5). Appendix II: Scope and Methods
This section describes the scope and methodology used to analyze our three objectives: (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self- referred and non-self-referred anatomic pathology services from 2004 through 2010, (2) how the provision of anatomic pathology services may differ for providers who self-refer when compared with other providers, and (3) the implications of self-referral for Medicare spending on anatomic pathology services. For all three objectives, we used the Medicare Part B Carrier File, which contains final action Medicare Part B claims for noninstitutional providers, such as physicians. As part of developing this claims-based methodology to identify self-referred services, we interviewed officials from CMS, provider groups, and other researchers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Questions have been raised about self-referral's role in Medicare Part B expenditures' rapid growth. Self-referral occurs when providers refer patients to entities in which they or their family members have a financial interest. Services that can be self-referred under certain circumstances include anatomic pathology--the preparation and examination of tissue samples to diagnose disease. GAO was asked to examine the prevalence of anatomic pathology self-referral and its effect on Medicare spending. This report examines (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self-referred and non-self-referred anatomic pathology services, (2) how provision of these services may differ on the basis of whether providers self-refer, and (3) implications of self-referral for Medicare spending. GAO analyzed Medicare Part B claims data from 2004 through 2010 and interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and other stakeholders. GAO developed a claims-based approach to identify self-referred services because Medicare claims lack such an indicator.
What GAO Found
Self-referred anatomic pathology services increased at a faster rate than non-self-referred services from 2004 to 2010. During this period, the number of self-referred anatomic pathology services more than doubled, growing from 1.06 million services to about 2.26 million services, while non-self-referred services grew about 38 percent, from about 5.64 million services to about 7.77 million services. Similarly, the growth rate of expenditures for self-referred anatomic pathology services was higher than for non-self-referred services. Three provider specialties--dermatology, gastroenterology, and urology--accounted for 90 percent of referrals for self-referred anatomic pathology services in 2010.
Referrals for anatomic pathology services by dermatologists, gastroenterologists, and urologists substantially increased the year after they began to self-refer. Providers that began self-referring in 2009--referred to as switchers--had increases in anatomic pathology services that ranged on average from 14.0 percent to 58.5 percent in 2010 compared to 2008, the year before they began self-referring, across these provider specialties. In comparison, increases in anatomic pathology referrals for providers who continued to self-refer or never self-referred services during this period were much lower. Thus, the increase in anatomic pathology referrals for switchers was not due to a general increase in use of these services among all providers. GAO's examination of all providers that referred an anatomic pathology service in 2010 showed that self-referring providers of the specialties we examined referred more services on average than non-self referring providers. Differences in referral for these services generally persisted after accounting for geography and patient characteristics such as health status and diagnosis. These analyses suggest that financial incentives for self-referring providers were likely a major factor driving the increase in referrals.
GAO estimates that in 2010, self-referring providers likely referred over 918,000 more anatomic pathology services than if they had performed biopsy procedures at the same rate as and referred the same number of services per biopsy procedure as non-self-referring providers. These additional referrals for anatomic pathology services cost Medicare about $69 million. To the extent that these additional referrals were unnecessary, avoiding them could result in savings to Medicare and beneficiaries, as they share in the cost of services.
What GAO Recommends
CMS should identify self-referred anatomic pathology services and address their higher use. The Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees CMS, agreed with GAO's recommendation that CMS address higher use of self-referral through a payment approach, but disagreed with GAO's other two recommendations to identify self-referred services and address their higher use. GAO believes the recommended actions could result in Medicare savings. |
gao_GAO-06-580 | gao_GAO-06-580_0 | However, more can be done to better address several aspects of these conditions. CBP has prepared an initial version of an accountability framework that it intends to improve as it proceeds. The framework should ensure that future expenditure plans report progress against commitments contained in prior expenditure plans. The current expenditure plan does not adequately describe progress against commitments made in previous plans. Such concurrence between ACE release activities has led to cost overruns and schedule delays in the past. Thus, the revised ACE plans and actions are potentially reintroducing the same problems that produced past shortfalls. In addition, ACE goals, expected mission benefits, and performance measures are not fully defined and adequately aligned with each other. For example, not every goal has defined benefits, every benefit is defined only in terms of efficiency gains, not every benefit has an associated business result, and not every benefit and business result has associated performance measures. For example, the performance target in fiscal year 2005 for ACE usage was that 11 percent of all CBP employees would use ACE. However, that many CBP employees will never need to use the system. This performance target does not reflect that. Because performance measures are not always realistic or aligned with program goals and benefits, it is unclear whether ACE has realized—or will realize—the mission value that it was intended to bring to CBP’s and other agencies’ trade- and border security-related operations. In this regard, some recommendations have been addressed, while progress has been slow on others, such as accurately reporting to the Appropriations Committees on CBP’s progress in implementing our prior recommendations; developing and implementing a strategic approach to meeting the program’s human capital needs; using criteria for exiting key milestones that adequately consider indicators of system maturity, such as severity of open defects and the associated risks; and developing and implementing a performance and accountability framework for ensuring that promised capabilities and benefits are delivered on time and within budget. However, it will be important for CBP to effectively address long-standing ACE management challenges along with emerging problems. We also recommend that the Secretary, through CBP’s Acting Commissioner, direct the Assistant Commissioner for Information and Technology to fully address those legislative conditions associated with measuring ACE performance and results and employing effective IV&V practices; accurately report to the appropriations committees on CBP’s progress in implementing our prior recommendations; include in the June 30, 2006, quarterly update report to the appropriations committees a strategy for managing ACE human capital needs and the ACE framework for managing performance and ensuring accountability; document key milestone decisions in a way that reflects the risks associated with proceeding with unresolved severe defects and provides for mitigating these risks; minimize the degree of overlap and concurrence across ongoing and future ACE releases, and capture and mitigate the associated risks of any residual concurrence; use EVM in the development of all existing and future releases; develop the range of realistic ACE performance measures and targets needed to support an outcome-based, results-oriented accountability framework, including user satisfaction with ACE; and explicitly align ACE program goals, benefits, desired business outcomes, and performance measures. DHS also described actions that it has under way and planned to address the recommendations. DHS currently plans to acquire and deploy ACE in 11 increments, referred to as releases. Objectives
As agreed, our objectives were to
determine whether the ACE fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan satisfies the determine the status of our open recommendations on ACE, and provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and DHS’s management of the ACE program. The legislative conditions that the Congress placed on the use of fiscal year 2006 ACE appropriated funds have been either partially or fully satisfied by the latest expenditure plan and related program documentation and activities. Is reviewed by GAO. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is conducting a multiyear, multibillion-dollar acquisition of a new trade processing system, planned to support the movement of legitimate imports and exports and strengthen border security. By congressional mandate, plans for expenditure of appropriated funds on this system, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), must meet certain conditions, including GAO review. This study addresses whether the fiscal year 2006 plan satisfies these conditions; it also describes the status of DHS's efforts to implement prior GAO recommendations for improving ACE management, and provides observations about the plan and DHS's management of the program.
What GAO Found
The fiscal year 2006 ACE expenditure plan, including related program documentation and program officials' statements, either satisfied or partially satisfied the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress; however, more can be done to better address several aspects of these conditions. In addition, DHS has addressed some recommendations that GAO has previously made, but progress has been slow in addressing several recommendations aimed at strengthening ACE management. For example, DHS has more to do to implement the recommendation that it establish an ACE accountability framework that, among other things, ensures that expenditure plans report progress against commitments made in prior plans. Implementing a performance and accountability framework is important for ensuring that promised capabilities and benefits are delivered on time and within budget. In addition, describing progress against past commitments is essential to permit meaningful congressional oversight. Among GAO's observations about the ACE program and its management are several related to the need to effectively set and use performance goals and measures. Although the program set performance goals, these targets were not always realistic. For example, in fiscal year 2005, the program set a target that 11 percent of all Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees would use ACE. However, this target does not reflect the fact that many CBP employees will never need to use the system. Additionally, the program has established 6 program goals, 11 business results, 23 benefits, and 17 performance measures, but the relationships among these are not fully defined or adequately aligned with each other. For example, not every goal has defined benefits, and not every benefit has an associated performance measure. Without realistic ACE performance measures and targets that are aligned with the overall program goals and desired results, DHS will be challenged in its efforts to establish an accountability framework for ACE that will help to ensure that the program delivers its expected benefits. In addition, DHS plans to develop several increments, referred to as "releases," concurrently; in the past, such concurrency has led to cost overruns and schedule delays because releases contended for the same resources, and resources that were to be used on later releases were diverted to earlier ones. However, because of DHS's belief that such concurrent development will allow it to deliver ACE functionality sooner, it is reintroducing the same problems that resulted in past shortfalls. |
gao_GAO-13-270 | gao_GAO-13-270_0 | However, DOD did not agree with our recommendation. As of November 2012, our review found that project managers had not submitted the required final reports for 50 of the 80 projects (over 60 percent) funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Project Managers Have Not Submitted Many Final and Follow-On Reports
DOD has invested more than $68 million in 80 infrastructure-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, but project managers have not submitted all of the required reports on whether the corrosion-control technologies are effective. DOD’s strategic plan also requires that follow-on reports be submitted within two years after a project is completed and transitioned to use in the military department. We found that project managers had not submitted 15 of the 41 required follow-on reports (37 percent). According to Standards for Internal Control in agencies should use internal controls that the Federal Government,provide a reasonable assurance that the agencies have effective and efficient operations, and have reliable financial reports and other reports for internal and external use. However, when comparing the reassessed return-on-investment estimates included in the projects’ follow-on reports with the reassessed estimates in the Corrosion Office’s records, we found that the Corrosion Office had not updated all of its records with the return-on-investment estimates from the follow-on reports. Specifically, we found that for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the Corrosion Office had not updated its records to reflect the reassessed return-on- investment estimates included in the projects’ follow-on reports. The Corrosion Office may use this return-on-investment data in its reporting, both internally and externally, such as in DOD’s annual corrosion budget report to Congress. Without accurate and timely return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records for corrosion projects, Congress and DOD corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient and reliable information about returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects. However, in our interviews with installation officials who were involved with corrosion work, slightly more than half of the officials were unaware of DOD’s Corrosion Office, their respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and other resources available through the related offices. Without effective actions to ensure timely submission of reports, decision makers may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments will meet reporting milestones for future projects, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics— in coordination with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight—revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define a role for the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives to assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in holding their departments’ project management offices accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. To ensure that all relevant infrastructure officials receive pertinent corrosion information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries responsible for acquisitions, technology and logistics to require the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives—in coordination with their installation management commands and in consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight—to develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key information to all relevant service officials, particularly to officials at the installation level, about corrosion-control activities and initiatives, such as training opportunities and outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion projects. In its comments, DOD stated that it is developing a web-based tracking tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives, and project managers to input and extract project-related data, and DOD expects the change to result in increased timeliness and standardization of project data to include revised reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports. In response to our fourth recommendation that DOD take action to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely and accurate data on the projects’ return on investment, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation and stated that this new web-based system would provide data including return-on- investment estimates, and would be accessible to other parties, including the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives and project managers. We continue to believe that the Corrosion Office could use its existing authorities to identify and implement other incentives or methods to address reasons that project management offices cite for not meeting reporting milestones. To address our third objective to assess the extent to which DOD’s corrosion-control officials have fully informed all relevant officials within each department about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of facilities and other infrastructure, we reviewed relevant legislation and guidance, DOD policies and publications, and the DOD and the military departments’ strategic plans to obtain information on the management of DOD’s corrosion prevention and control program. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of facility maintenance and the expected service life of DOD facilities. While corrosion is not always highly visible, it can lead to structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental damage. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed DODs corrosion prevention and control program for facilities and infrastructure. In this report, GAO assessed the extent that DOD (1) met reporting requirements, (2) maintained accurate return-on-investment data in its records, and (3) fully informed relevant officials of its corrosion-control efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans, met with corrosion-control officials, and visited and interviewed officials at 32 installations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $68 million in 80 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new technology addressing infrastructure-related corrosion, but project managers have not submitted all required reports on the results of these efforts to the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office). The DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan requires project managers to submit a final report when a project is complete, and submit a follow-on report within two years after the military department implements the technology. As of November 2012, GAO found that project managers had not submitted final reports for 50 of the 80 projects (63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, project managers had not submitted follow-on reports for 15 of the 41 projects (37 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007. GAO found that the Corrosion Offices tracking system lacks key information to help ensure that project managers meet reporting requirements. Furthermore, the Corrosion Office is not fully exercising its authority to identify and implement options or incentives to address funding and other reasons given for not meeting reporting milestones. Also, GAO found inconsistency among the military departments Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives (Corrosion Executives) in holding project managers accountable for submitting the required reports. Without effective actions to ensure timely submission of final and follow-on reports, decision makers may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion.
The Corrosion Office maintains records on its infrastructure-related corrosion projects, including initial and reassessed return-on-investment estimates, for internal and external reporting, such as in DODs annual budget report to Congress. GAO found that the Corrosion Offices records showed updates to the initial estimates for the proposed projects, but the office has not consistently updated its records to show the reassessed estimates included in the follow-on reports. Specifically, GAO found that the Corrosion Office did not update data in its records for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) with completed follow-on reports. Federal internal control standards require agencies to use internal controls to provide assurance that they have reliable financial and other reports for internal and external use. Without accurate and timely data, Congress and DOD managers may not have reliable information on the estimated return on investment as they oversee corrosion projects.
DODs Corrosion Executives use mechanisms, such as briefings and site visits, to collect and disseminate information on corrosion-control activities in their departments; however, GAO found that slightly more than half of public works officials interviewed at 32 installations were unaware of DODs corrosion-related offices and resources. Under federal statute, Corrosion Executives are tasked with coordinating corrosion activities in their departments. GAO found that many relevant service officials interviewed did not receive key corrosion-control information because their Corrosion Executives do not have targeted communication strategies and accompanying action plans. Without a strategy and action plan, managers of facilities and infrastructure may not have access to all available information on efficient methods for corrosion prevention and control.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends five actions to improve DODs project reporting and tracking, the accuracy of its return-on-investment data, and its communication with stakeholders on corrosion-control activities for facilities and other infrastructure. DOD partially concurred with three recommendations and did not agree with two. DOD plans to implement a web-based tracking tool to improve data timeliness and standardization, among other actions. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations to improve project reporting are warranted, that the Corrosion Office should use its existing authorities to identify and implement other incentives for project managers to meet reporting milestones and that DOD should revise its guidance so that Corrosion Executives would assist with the oversight of project reporting. |
gao_GAO-04-883 | gao_GAO-04-883_0 | We could not determine the full extent of the department’s compliance with its guidelines because it does not have sufficient documentation to describe the quality and range of its efforts. State Has Fulfilled Some but Not All of Its Oversight Responsibilities
While State has met some aspects of the guidelines for overseeing MFO, it has not fully complied with its guidelines in other areas such as evaluating MFO’s financial practices. Recruiting Candidates Suited for Chief Observer Position Remains a Concern
NEA guidelines note that the transfer of U.S government personnel to key MFO positions—including the U.S. civilian observer unit (COU)—is an informal mechanism of U.S. oversight. MFO Has Not Addressed Other Important Personnel Management Practices
Despite its efforts to improve its personnel management practices, the MFO has not addressed two challenges that leading practices indicate could adversely affect its ability to strategically manage its human capital resources more effectively. The United Nations, for example, determined that the gender balance of its professional workforce was problematic, particularly in the management of peace operations. MFO Strengthened Financial Accountability and Internal Controls in Recent Years
The MFO has taken steps to improve financial accountability and strengthen internal controls. It issued unqualified or clean opinions on MFO’s financial statements between 1996 and 2004. However, Israeli and Egyptian officials stated that their governments do not support increases in their contributions, and U.S. and MFO efforts to obtain support from other contributors have not succeeded. In addition, the U.S. Army, State, and MFO officials have yet to agree on who should pay the increased costs associated with changes in the composition and pay scales of U.S. troops under current arrangements. MFO Has Maintained a Level Budget of $51 Million since 1995
MFO financial reports show that the organization has kept its budget at about $51 million between fiscal years 1995 and 2003. We reviewed MFO’s budget from fiscal years 1995 through 2002. Despite these changes, MFO contributors may face increased budgetary challenges due to the possible replacement of MFO’s helicopter fleet. To promote improved oversight of the MFO and ensure that NEA redresses these issues, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following four actions: resolve the recurring concern of finding qualified candidates for the chief of the civilian observer unit; ensure that staff with accounting expertise are available to carry out NEA’s financial oversight responsibilities for MFO and, if necessary, review the terms of MFO’s external audits to ensure that they are appropriate; direct the MFO management advisory board to monitor and document NEA’s compliance with its guidelines for overseeing the MFO; and work with Army officials to reconcile differences between Army and State views about the current MFO cost-sharing arrangements. To assess the reliability of the data on the costs associated with U.S. participation in the MFO, we (1) interviewed State, Army, and MFO officials about the sources of their data and the means used to calculate costs, (2) reviewed MFO’s annual financial reports and State’s annual report to Congress on the MFO, (3) traced U.S. Army’s reported costs for its contributions to the MFO back to the source documents, (4) traced the Army’s calculation of the costs associated with providing salaries to the soldiers stationed with the MFO—these salary costs constitute over 80 percent of the total costs of the U.S. Army contribution to the MFO– back to the DOD personnel composite standard pay and reimbursement rates for fiscal years 1999 through 2003, (5) performed tests on the data provided by the U.S. Army regarding the cost of U.S. participation in the MFO between 1999 and 2003 to check for obvious errors or miscalculations, and (6) reviewed the report of the MFO’s independent external auditor on State’s contributions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has monitored compliance with the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace. The United States, while not a party to the treaty, contributes 40 percent of the troops and a third of MFO's annual budget. All personnel in the MFO civilian observer unit (COU) are Americans. GAO (1) assessed State's oversight of the MFO, (2) reviewed MFO's personnel and financial management practices, and (3) reviewed MFO's emerging budget challenges and U.S. MFO cost sharing arrangements.
What GAO Found
The State Department has fulfilled some but not all of its operational and financial oversight responsibilities for MFO, but lack of documentation prevented us from determining the quality and extent of its efforts. State has not consistently recruited candidates suited for the leadership position of the MFO's civilian observer unit, which monitors and verifies the parties' compliance with the treaty. State also has not evaluated MFO's financial practices as required by State's guidelines because they lacked staff with expertise in this area. However, State recently formed an MFO management advisory board to improve its oversight of MFO operations. MFO has taken actions in recent years to improve its personnel system, financial accountability, and internal controls. For example, it has provided incentives to retain experienced staff and taken steps to standardize its performance appraisal system. It has received clean opinions on its annual financial statements and on special reviews of its internal controls. MFO has also controlled costs, reduced its military and civilian personnel levels, and kept its budget at $51 million since 1995, while meeting mission objectives and Treaty party expectations. MFO faces a number of personnel, management, and budgetary challenges. For example, leading practices suggest its employees' access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for discrimination complaints, and the gender imbalance in its workforce, could be issues of concern. Moreover, MFO lacks oversight from an audit committee or senior management review committee to ensure the independence of its external auditors. Finally, MFO's budget is likely to increase because of costs associated with replacing its antiquated helicopter fleet. U.S. and MFO efforts to obtain support from other contributors generally have not succeeded. Army, State, and MFO officials have yet to agree who should pay the increased costs associated with changes in the composition and pay scales of U.S. troops deployed at MFO. |
gao_T-OCG-96-7 | gao_T-OCG-96-7_0 | For example, as a pilot agency under GPRA, SSA has worked to strengthen its strategic management process and to identify and develop performance measures that help its managers, the Congress, and the public assess its performance. Meanwhile, the ratio of contributing workers to beneficiaries will decline. By 2015, an estimated 2.6 workers will be paying taxes into the Social Security system per beneficiary; in 1950, 16.5 workers were paying Social Security taxes per beneficiary. Given the magnitude of the financial problems facing the Social Security system and the nature of the proposals for changing the system, we can expect the debate over the financing and structure of the Social Security system to continue and intensify in the coming years. SSA Is Redesigning Its Disability Claims Process but Has Placed Little Priority on Return-to-Work Efforts
In recent years, disability caseloads have faced unprecedented growth. Although SSA has begun many of its planned initiatives, none is far enough along for SSA to know whether specific proposed process changes will achieve the desired results. SSA Must Manage Growing Workloads With Reduced Resources
As the baby boom generation ages, more and more people will be applying for and receiving SSA program benefits. This important issue needs serious consideration. Leadership Needed to Manage Challenges
services delivered. First, SSA must step up to its role as the nation’s expert on Social Security issues; it is uniquely positioned to inform the public policy debate on the future financing and structure of Social Security. Second, SSA must redesign the disability claims process and place greater emphasis on return to work in its disability programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts to address future policy changes and program issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA is strengthening its strategic management process, developing performance measures, measuring customer satisfaction, and producing accurate financial statements; (2) SSA has not performed the research, analysis, and evaluation needed to inform the public on the future of social security financing; (3) by 2015, 50 million people will be receiving social security benefits and 2.6 workers will be paying taxes into the social security system; (4) the aging of the baby boom generation, coupled with increasing life expectancy and the declining ratio of contributing workers to beneficiaries, will place unprecedented strains on the social security system; (5) SSA disability caseloads have grown by 70 percent in the last decade; (6) SSA has attempted to redesign its disability claims process, but it is unable to determine whether specific process changes will achieve the desired results; (7) SSA has not sufficiently promoted return-to-work initiatives in the disability program; (8) SSA faces significant challenges in modernizing its information systems, managing increasing workloads with a reduced workforce, and delivering its services; and (9) SSA needs effective leadership to inform the national debate on social security financing issues, complete the redesign of the disability claims process, promote return to work programs, enhance program integrity, and make technological enhancements. |
gao_GAO-16-117 | gao_GAO-16-117_0 | TSA concurred with this recommendation. TSA’s test and evaluation process is guided by DHS and TSA policies. TSA Has Identified Technologies to Meet Mission Needs, but Failures during Testing Have Contributed to Acquisition Inefficiencies
Consistent with departmental guidance and acquisition best practices, TSA’s test and evaluation process supports its acquisition decisions by providing information regarding the ability of passenger and baggage screening technologies to meet mission needs prior to full production decisions. Only Half of Screening Systems Tested in the Last 5 Years Passed Testing and TSA Procured Almost All of the Successful Systems
Of the 22 PSP and EBSP systems TSA and DHS tested from June 2010 to July 2015, 11 successfully completed qualification and operational testing, and TSA procured all but one of the 11. Too Soon to Tell Whether TSA’s Actions to Ensure Technology Maturity Will Address All Factors Contributing to Acquisition Inefficiencies
TSA has acknowledged the need to better ensure technology maturity at the start of testing to improve the efficiency of its test and evaluation process. In addition to other efforts, a key action TSA is taking to achieve this goal is developing a third party testing strategy—through which a third party tester will help ensure systems are mature prior to entering TSA’s test and evaluation process. For example, TSA has not identified whether there are a sufficient number of eligible third party testers or established a mechanism to oversee the testing they will perform. Further, TSA did not conduct a comprehensive assessment of testing data prior to developing its third party testing strategy and may be missing opportunities to identify additional areas for improvement in its acquisition process. TSA Is Implementing a Third Party Testing Strategy but Has Not Finalized Its Approach or Conducted a Comprehensive Assessment of Testing Data
TSA Has Yet to Finalize Key Aspects of the Third Party Testing Strategy
TSA is developing a third party testing strategy and plans to implement it for select technologies in 2016. Due to the significant challenge the agency faces in balancing security concerns with efficient passenger movement, it is important that TSA procure and deploy effective passenger and baggage screening technologies. Unintended consequences, such as increased acquisition costs, could result. Given TSA’s emphasis on improving its acquisition and test and evaluation processes, an assessment of TSA’s testing data would help guide future TSA reforms. To help ensure that the reforms TSA has underway are informed by existing information, conduct and document a comprehensive assessment of testing data available to date, such as timeframes for completing testing, costs incurred, and testing delays across all technology areas to identify key factors contributing to any acquisition inefficiencies and potential areas for reform. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act included a provision for GAO to examine the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) test and evaluation process for security-related technologies. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which (1) TSA’s test and evaluation process helps TSA meet mission needs through the acquisition of passenger and baggage screening technologies, and (2) TSA’s planned actions to improve the test and evaluation process address factors contributing to inefficiencies, if any, in acquiring those technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA, within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for securing the nation's civil aviation system while facilitating the movement of passengers and commerce at approximately 440 airports nationwide. TSA tests passenger and baggage screening technologies developed by industry to ensure they support TSA missions. In reviews from 2010 to 2014, GAO found that TSA encountered challenges in acquiring and deploying technologies. The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act contained a provision for GAO to assess TSA's test and evaluation activities for security-related technologies. This report assesses the extent to which (1) TSA's test and evaluation process helps it meet mission needs through the acquisition of passenger and baggage screening technologies, and (2) TSA has taken steps to improve the test and evaluation process.
GAO reviewed DHS and TSA acquisition and test policies, analyzed testing and acquisition documentation for technologies tested in the past five years, observed the testing process at DHS and TSA facilities, and spoke with DHS, TSA, and industry officials.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) test and evaluation process has enabled TSA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials to identify passenger and baggage screening technologies that will meet mission needs, but technology failures during testing have contributed to inefficiencies in the acquisition process. Consistent with departmental guidance and acquisition best practices, TSA's test and evaluation process provides information regarding the ability of technologies to meet mission needs before agency officials decide whether to begin full production, saving the agency from investing in potentially expensive yet ineffective equipment. From June 2010 to July 2015, half of the 22 systems that TSA tested successfully completed qualification and operational testing. TSA procured all but 1 of the 11 successful systems. Technologies that entered the test and evaluation process and were immature required significant modifications and retesting.
TSA has taken steps to improve its test and evaluation process by helping ensure technologies are mature before entering testing, but it is too soon to tell whether these actions will address all of the factors that contribute to acquisition inefficiencies. A key action TSA is taking involves developing a third party testing strategy, through which a third party will help ensure systems are mature prior to entering TSA's test and evaluation process. TSA plans to implement its approach in 2016, but it has yet to finalize key aspects of the strategy. For example, TSA has not identified whether there are a sufficient number of eligible third party testers or established a mechanism to oversee that testing. Without a finalized strategy, TSA risks unintended consequences, such as increasing acquisition costs. Further, TSA has not conducted or documented a comprehensive assessment of testing data and thus may be missing opportunities to identify additional areas for improvements to its acquisition process. An assessment of this data, such as costs incurred, could help TSA guide future reforms to the test and evaluation process to help ensure they address factors contributing to any acquisition inefficiencies.
What GAO Recommends
TSA should finalize its third party testing strategy before implementation and conduct and document a comprehensive assessment of testing data to identify key factors contributing to any acquisition inefficiencies. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-89 | gao_GAO-04-89_0 | In addition, for one unit, these pay problems resulted in largely erroneous debts totaling $1.6 million. Nonetheless, we found the inaccurate, late, and missing pays and associated erroneous debts found during our current audit had a profound financial impact on individual soldiers and their families. Significant Weaknesses in Processes over Mobilized Army Guard Pay
Procedural requirements, particularly in light of the potentially hundreds of organizations and thousands of personnel involved, were not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to make timely, accurate active duty pays to mobilized Army Guard soldiers and (2) the component responsible, among Army Guard, active Army, and DFAS, for taking the required actions. These lengthy processing delays resulted in late payroll payments to deployed soldiers. Human Capital Issues Affect Ability to Pay Mobilized Army Guard Soldiers Promptly and Accurately
With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses, including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Insufficient Numbers of Military Pay Processing Personnel
Our audit identified concerns with the numbers of knowledgeable personnel dedicated to entering and processing active duty pays and allowances to mobilized Army Guard soldiers. Systems Problems Hamper Prompt and Accurate Army Guard Pay
Several systems issues were significant factors impeding accurate and timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including the lack of an integrated or effectively interfaced pay system with both the personnel and order-writing systems, limitations in DJMS-RC processing capabilities, and ineffective system edits of payments and debts. The personal toll that these pay problems have had on mobilized soldiers and their families cannot be readily measured, but clearly may have a profound effect on reenlistment and retention. Instead, we used a case study approach to provide a more detailed perspective of the nature of pay deficiencies in the three key areas of processes, people (human capital), and systems. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VIII. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the war on terrorism and homeland security, GAO was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel provided assurance that such pays were accurate and timely. GAO's audit used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key areas: processes, people (human capital), and systems.
What GAO Found
The existing processes and controls used to provide pay and allowances to mobilized Army Guard personnel are so cumbersome and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, the mobilized Army Guard soldiers could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payroll payments. Weaknesses in these processes and controls resulted in over- and underpayments and late active duty payments and, in some cases, largely erroneous debt assessments to mobilized Army Guard personnel. The end result of these pay problems is to severely constrain DOD's ability to provide active duty pay to these personnel, many of whom were risking their lives in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, these pay problems have had a profound financial impact on individual soldiers and their families. For example, many soldiers and their families were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while the soldiers were deployed in remote, combat environments overseas, seeking corrections to active duty pays and allowances. The pay process, involving potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Guard organizations and thousands of personnel, was not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to make timely, accurate pays to mobilized soldiers, and (2) the organization responsible for taking the required actions. With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Several systems issues were also a significant factor impeding accurate and timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including (1) non-integrated systems, (2) limitations in system processing capabilities, and (3) ineffective system edits. |
gao_GAO-03-482 | gao_GAO-03-482_0 | As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD material. To address these issues, we assessed U.S. efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we assessed U.S. plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in Russia; U.S. progress in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian sites. Our review of DOD’s biosecurity program focused on assistance provided since 1998 to improve the security of biological sites in Russia. The majority of DOE’s expenditures during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were for activities other than securing buildings such as securing material during transport and maintaining previously installed equipment. While these efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOE’s goal of securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008. Access to Sensitive Sites Remains a Barrier to Completing Security Improvements by 2008
DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear material, in particular to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, is the greatest challenge to providing assistance to improve nuclear material security in Russia. DOD has made limited progress in securing storage sites. However, because DOD and DOE have different approaches to achieving a common objective critical to U.S. national interests, coordination is essential. Recommendation
The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated plan to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia’s nuclear warheads work together to address implementation issues, such as determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites and resolving equipment standardization concerns. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. Thus far, DOD has focused its security program on sites where it has identified dangerous pathogen collections and where it has access. Second, the United States does not have access to former biological weapons sites. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. Recommendations
Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider: reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security assistance; and working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for securing chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft. |
gao_RCED-95-71 | gao_RCED-95-71_0 | (See table 1.1.) Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report’s objectives were to assess (1) Amtrak’s financial and operating conditions, (2) the likelihood that Amtrak can overcome its financial and operating problems, and (3) alternative actions that could be considered in deciding on Amtrak’s future mission and on commitments to fund the railroad. In this report, • chapter 2 describes the extent to which Amtrak’s financial condition has • chapter 3 describes the increased costs facing Amtrak over the next several years that will make recovery from the financial and operating problems difficult; • chapter 4 assesses the extent to which revenues are likely to increase, pay for these increased costs, and improve Amtrak’s financial condition; and • chapter 5 assesses the likelihood that Amtrak will be able to continue to provide nationwide service at the current federal subsidy level. Amtrak’s actions to reduce operating expenses have not been sufficient to offset the shortfall in revenues. Although Amtrak reduced its budgeted expenses, continued declines in revenues, cash, and working capital threaten Amtrak’s ability to provide high quality intercity passenger rail service and compete effectively for customers. Amtrak is unlikely to be able to address these challenges under the current operating environment and at the current funding level. 3.6.) This facility has almost no maintenance structures. 3.7.) On April 30, 1996, most of Amtrak’s initial 25-year operating agreements with freight railroads will expire, and new agreements must be negotiated. 3.8.) Lacking the resources to purchase the new equipment that would increase the quality of service and constrained to match operating costs with federal subsidies, Amtrak has been forced to cut costs, delay maintenance of equipment, and generally let the quality and attractiveness of train travel deteriorate further. High quality nationwide passenger service of the present scope that might attract and retain passengers would require substantially higher levels of additional support, particularly for capital investment. Redefining System and Realigning Service Could Improve Amtrak’s Financial Condition and Service Quality
The Congress could redefine Amtrak’s role and mission by restructuring and realigning Amtrak’s route system to a smaller basic network that would continue to be eligible for federal funding. First, it is not clear what would be privatized. Therefore, even if privatized, Amtrak will continue to need federal or state funds to meet its capital needs. This is an important assumption. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed Amtrak's financial and operating condition, focusing on: (1) whether Amtrak can overcome its financial and operating problems; and (2) alternative actions Amtrak could take to meet its future funding requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition has declined steadily since 1990 and its ability to provide nationwide service is seriously threatened; (2) although Amtrak's funding has increased to almost $1 billion in 1995, the increase has not been sufficient to cover its operating deficiencies and capital investment, equipment, and facility improvement requirements; (3) although Amtrak has assumed debt, deferred maintenance, and reduced staffing to address its capital shortfall, these actions have diminished the quality and reliability of Amtrak's service; (4) it is unlikely that Amtrak can overcome its financing, capital investment, and service quality problems without significant increases in passenger revenues or funding; (5) Amtrak revenues have suffered from an unfavorable operating environment and intense fare competition from airlines; (6) Amtrak faces additional equipment and facility maintenance costs and must negotiate new agreements with freight railroads to access their track; (7) Amtrak could substantially increase its funding by making capital investments and improving service quality to retain current riders and attract new ones, but this approach would be costly and difficult to achieve in the current budget environment; (8) the privatization of Amtrak is not feasible because few private firms would be willing to assume the risks of providing intercity passenger service; and (9) Amtrak could realign or reduce its current route system and retain service in the locations where it could cost-effectively carry the largest number of passengers. |
gao_GAO-07-99 | gao_GAO-07-99_0 | Under NEPA, agencies such as the Forest Service generally evaluate the likely environmental effects of projects they propose using an EA or, if the projects likely would significantly affect the environment, a more detailed EIS. The Forest Service may decide to prepare an environmental assessment for a project that could qualify for approval using a categorical exclusion. As of 2003, the Forest Service had one categorical exclusion for use in approving projects involving certain vegetation management activities— timber stand or wildlife habitat improvement—that, still today, has no acreage limitation. Categorical Exclusions Were Used to Approve Most Vegetation Management Projects and about Half of the Total Treatment Acres
For calendar years 2003 through 2005, as shown in table 2, the Forest Service approved about 3,000 vegetation management projects to treat about 6.3 million acres. Although a majority of projects were approved using categorical exclusions, these projects accounted for slightly less than half of the total treatment acres because the size of these projects was much smaller than those approved using an EA or EIS. According to several Forest Service officials, the number of vegetation management projects approved and the type of environmental analysis used in approving them depended on the forest’s size, ecology, and location, as can be seen in the following examples: At the 2 million-acre Superior National Forest, a pine, fir, and spruce forest, in rural northeastern Minnesota, forest officials relied more on environmental assessments and environmental impact statements in approving projects because most of the projects were larger in terms of geographic coverage and more inherently complex; they used categorical exclusions only for a few smaller scale projects or projects undertaken in response to unanticipated events such as a wind storm that blew down trees on several hundred thousands of acres and that subsequently needed to be removed to reduce the risk of wildland fire. Categorical Exclusion for Improving Timber Stands or Wildlife Habitat Was Used the Most Frequently to Treat the Most Acreage
Of the almost 2,200 projects approved using categorical exclusions over the 3-year period, the Forest Service most frequently used the vegetation management categorical exclusion for improving timber stands or wildlife habitat; this categorical exclusion was used on half of the projects to treat about 2.4 million acres. As can be seen in table 3, for the remaining projects, the Forest Service primarily used the categorical exclusion for reducing hazardous fuels, followed by salvaging dead or dying trees, conducting limited timber harvests of live trees, and removal of trees to control the spread of insects or disease; in all, these categorical exclusions were used to approve treatments on about a half-million acres. Primary Reasons for Not Using Categorical Exclusions Varied Depending on the Ranger District and Type of Categorical Exclusion Used
Of the 509 ranger districts, 11 percent had not used any of the five vegetation management categorical exclusions during the 3-year period. As can be seen in table 5, the percentage of ranger districts that did not use specific categorical exclusions ranged widely, from 91 percent not using the category for the removal of trees to control the spread of insects or disease, to 32 percent not using the category for timber stand or wildlife habitat improvement. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Forest Service. The Forest Service generally agreed with our findings and observations, and specifically that it is premature to extrapolate trends given the studied categorical exclusions’ limited period of use. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to determine how many vegetation management projects the Forest Service approved for calendar years 2003 through 2005, including those approved using categorical exclusions, and the number of associated acres proposed for treatment. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Forest Service manages over 192 million acres of land, in part through vegetation management projects such as thinning trees. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires the Forest Service to prepare either an environmental assessment (EA) or an environmental impact statement (EIS) before approving a project that may significantly affect the environment. The agency generally does not need to prepare such environmental analyses, however, if the project involves categories of activities that it previously found to have no significant environmental effects--activities known as a categorical exclusion. As of 2003, the Forest Service had one categorical exclusion--activities to improve timber stands or wildlife habitat. It has since added four new exclusions, but little is known about their use. GAO was asked to determine, for calendar years 2003 through 2005, (1) how many vegetation management projects the Forest Service approved, including those approved using categorical exclusions; (2) which categorical exclusions the agency used in approving projects; and (3) if field offices are not using categorical exclusions, why. To answer these objectives, GAO surveyed Forest Service officials from all of the 155 national forests. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service generally agreed with GAO's findings and observations.
What GAO Found
For calendar years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service approved 3,018 vegetation management projects to treat about 6.3 million acres. Of these projects, the Forest Service approved about 28 percent using an EA or EIS to treat about 3.4 million acres, while it approved the remainder using categorical exclusions. Although a majority of the projects were approved using categorical exclusions, these projects accounted for less than half of the total treatment acres. The number and size of projects and types of environmental analysis used during the 3-year period varied, depending upon forest size, ecology, and location, according to Forest Service officials. Of nearly 2,200 vegetation management projects approved using categorical exclusions, the Forest Service approved half of them using the categorical exclusion for improving timber stands or wildlife habitat. In approving the remaining projects, the agency primarily used the categorical exclusion for reducing hazardous fuels, followed by those for salvaging dead or dying trees, conducting limited harvests of live trees, and removing trees to control the spread of insects or disease. The projects approved using the categorical exclusion to improve timber stands or wildlife habitat accounted for about 2.4 million of the 2.9 million acres to be treated under projects approved using categorical exclusions. About 11 percent of the Forest Service's 509 field offices had not used any of the five vegetation management categorical exclusions during the 3-year period. The reasons why they had not used specific categorical exclusions varied by office and categorical exclusion. For example, about 91 percent of the field offices had not used the categorical exclusion for the removal of trees to control the spread of insects or disease primarily because they did not have a sufficient number of insect- or disease-infested trees. Similarly, 32 percent of the field offices had not used the categorical exclusion to improve timber stands or wildlife habitat, primarily because no projects of this type had been proposed during the 3-year period. |
gao_GAO-10-453 | gao_GAO-10-453_0 | The budget justification for the fiscal year 2010 budget request includes details on construction projects and investigations projects—studies to determine whether the Corps should initiate construction projects—included in the budget request, including a narrative description and such details as the total estimated federal cost and amount allocated in prior years. The Corps’ Budget Formulation Process Favors Projects with the Highest Anticipated Outcomes and Emphasizes Agencywide Priorities
The Corps’ Use of Performance-Based Budgeting Emphasizes Anticipated Returns and Takes a Centralized Approach to Decision Making
Prior to fiscal year 2006, the Corps’ budget formulation process was relatively decentralized, with divisions playing a significant role. Corps officials told us that they sought to provide continued funding to all ongoing projects that fit within administration guidelines. Under its current budget formulation process, the Corps uses performance metrics to evaluate projects’ estimated future outcomes, and gives priority to those with the highest expected returns for the national economy and the environment, as well as those that reduce risk to human life. For example, the Corps calculates the economic benefits of most construction and investigations projects using a BCR. Additionally, the Corps’ use of performance metrics makes projects in certain geographic areas more likely to be included in the budget request, since they produce higher returns on investment. According to Corps and OMB staff, another effect of the performance criteria used as part of the current budget process is that fewer construction and investigation projects have been included in the budget request in recent years. Although review boards collect a variety of performance information, the Corps does not have written guidance establishing a process for incorporating their findings into budget formulation decisions. The Corps collects numerous data and has detailed processes for evaluating projects during the budget formulation process; however, in the absence of a documented process for considering information on demonstrated performance—such as the performance information discussed during review board meetings on whether projects are on time and on budget—the Corps may miss opportunities to make the best use of this information. Finally, the budget presentation for the Corps does not include information on how much carryover of unobligated appropriations is available to potentially offset new requests for projects that were previously funded, which congressional users of the budget presentation stated would be useful. Second, the budget presentation lacks information on the amount of unobligated appropriations that remain available for each project. To improve the transparency and usefulness of the Corps’ budget presentation to Congress, building on the information the appropriators have requested the Corps provide, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to work with OMB and Congress to take the following four actions: Include in the annual budget presentation for the Corps summary-level information on how the budget request reflects decisions made across project categories, business lines, and accounts. Provide project-level information on all projects with continuing resource needs, either as part of the budget presentation or as supplementary information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) budget formulation process, we examined (1) the information the Corps uses in its budget formulation process and the implications of the process and (2) whether the President’s budget request for the Corps is presented so that agency priorities are clear and the proposed use of funds transparent. The Operation and Maintenance Account
For the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account, the divisions have a greater role in selecting projects in certain funding increments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is the world's largest public engineering, design, and construction management agency. In fiscal year 2006 it began incorporating performance information into its budget process, but Congress raised concerns that the criteria used by the Corps to prioritize projects are not transparent and the budget formulation process could achieve a higher return on investment. GAO was asked to (1) describe the information the Corps uses in its budget formulation process and the implications of the process, and (2) evaluate whether the President's recent budget requests for the Corps are presented so that agency priorities are clear and proposed use of funds transparent. GAO reviewed the Corps' internal budget guidance, documentation of its project rankings and budget formulation process, performance review materials, and budget presentation materials. GAO also interviewed Corps and Office of Management and Budget officials.
What GAO Found
With the introduction of performance-based budgeting in fiscal year 2006, the Corps began emphasizing projects with the highest anticipated returns on investment. Previously, Corps division officials sought to provide continued funding to all ongoing projects that fit within administration guidelines. Now, under the current process, Corps headquarters plays an increased role in selecting projects, and evaluates projects using certain performance metrics. The Corps gives priority to those projects with the highest anticipated returns for the economy and the environment, as well as those that reduce risk to human life. The Corps' use of performance metrics makes projects in certain geographic areas more likely to be included in the budget request. For example, the benefit-cost ratio, a measure of economic benefit that is used to rank certain projects, tends to favor areas with high property values. Another effect of the Corps' use of performance-based budgeting is that fewer construction and investigation projects--studies to determine whether the Corps should initiate construction projects--have been included in the budget request in recent years. In contrast, the number of projects in the Operation and Maintenance account has been relatively stable, which Corps officials attributed partially to its emphasis on routine activities. While the metrics used by the Corps in its budget formulation process focus on anticipated benefits, the Corps monitors the progress of ongoing projects through review boards at the headquarters, division, and district levels. However, the Corps does not have written guidance establishing a process for incorporating information on demonstrated performance, such as review board findings, into budget formulation decisions. In the absence of such a process, the Corps may miss opportunities to make the best use of this performance information. The budget presentation for the Corps lacks transparency on key elements of the budget request. It focuses on requested construction and investigations projects, but does not describe how the decisions made during the budget formulation process affected the budget request. For example, the budget presentation does not include an explanation of the relative priority given to project categories or how they are evaluated against each other. Also, while the number of construction and investigations projects receiving appropriations is typically much greater than the number requested, the budget presentation does not include detailed information on all projects with continuing resource needs. The budget presentation also lacks detail on the amount of the balance of unobligated appropriations (carryover) that remain available for each project. Users of the budget presentation told GAO that these two types of project information would be useful. |
gao_GAO-11-422T | gao_GAO-11-422T_0 | Our recent work has identified several particular management challenges at EPA, including the need to address workload and workforce planning, to ensure consistent environmental enforcement and compliance data, and to better coordinate with other agencies to more effectively leverage limited resources. Addressing Workload and Workforce Planning Needs
EPA has struggled for years to identify its human resource needs and to deploy its staff throughout the agency in a manner that would do the most good. The agency has taken some recent steps to improve its workforce planning. EPA has generally agreed with our recommendations and is in the process of implementing them. Transforming EPA’s Processes for Assessing and Controlling Toxic Chemicals
As we reported in March 2009, EPA’s ability to effectively implement its mission of protecting public health and the environment depends on credible and timely assessment of the risks posed by toxic chemicals. Because EPA had not developed sufficient chemical assessment information under these programs to limit public exposure to many chemicals that may pose substantial health risks, in 2009 we added this issue to our list of areas at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or in need of broad-based transformation. These challenges include (1) the need to focus more attention on diffuse, or “nonpoint,” sources of pollution to address the most significant of the nation’s remaining water quality problems; (2) the unique challenges posed by deterioration in the nation’s premier watersheds including, among others, the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes; and (3) daunting challenges posed by the multibillion dollar liabilities associated with replacing, maintaining, and building new water infrastructure. Costs and Pace of Cleanup at Superfund and Other Hazardous Waste Sites
To protect human health and the environment from the effects of hazardous substances, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980, which established the Superfund program. Among the key findings of our recent work are that (1) cleanup costs are likely to be substantial, (2) problems with the accuracy and completeness of data prevent the agency from estimating future cleanup costs, and (3) several key obstacles have delayed cleanup progress at Department of Defense (DOD) installations. As a result, we recommended that EPA determine the extent to which EPA will consider vapor intrusion as part of the listing process for the National Priorities List and how this phenomenon will affect the number of sites listed in the future. Addressing EPA’s Emerging Role in Climate Change
As one of the most complicated interdisciplinary environmental issues currently facing the federal government, climate change poses particular management challenges for EPA. Recent GAO work has also identified a range of climate change management challenges for the federal government at large, including a broad array of departments with diverse missions. For EPA, particular challenges relate to the agency’s ongoing efforts to reduce carbon emissions; to coordinate activities with other agencies; and to account for and manage data on greenhouse gas emissions. We noted that EPA was addressing some of these uncertainties (specifically by issuing a rule to govern underground injection of carbon dioxide for geologic sequestration), but that “many of them fall within the domain of the Departments of Energy, the Interior, Transportation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and other agencies in a manner that would require collaboration between agencies and, in many cases, coordination with state governments and other entities.”
We recommended that EPA more comprehensively examine barriers to the development of carbon capture and storage by identifying key issues that fall outside the agency’s Safe Drinking Water Act authority. Washington, D.C.: February 2011. Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: EPA’s Effort to Improve and Make More Consistent Its Compliance and Enforcement Activities. Transforming EPA’s Processes for Assessing and Controlling Toxic Chemicals
Nanotechnology: Nanomaterials Are Widely Used in Commerce, but EPA Faces Challenges in Regulating Risk. Chemical Regulation: Actions Are Needed to Improve the Effectiveness of EPA’s Chemical Review Program. Reducing Pollution in the Nation’s Waters
Wastewater Infrastructure Financing: Stakeholder Views on a National Infrastructure Bank and Public-Private Partnerships. Great Lakes Initiative: EPA and States Have Made Progress, but Much Remains to Be Done If Water Quality Goals Are to Be Achieved. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) overarching mission is to protect human health and the environment by implementing and enforcing the laws intended to improve the quality of the nation's air, water, and lands. EPA's policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and government. As such, it operates in a highly complex and controversial regulatory arena. In recent years, GAO's work has identified several significant and persistent challenges across a range of EPA programs and activities and has proposed corrective actions to enable the agency to more effectively accomplish its mission. Based on this work, this testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing EPA today, the agency's efforts to address them, and the work GAO believes remains to be done.
What GAO Found
On the basis of recent GAO work, key management challenges facing EPA include the following: (1) Improving agencywide management. EPA has struggled for years to deploy its staff efficiently and in a manner that would do the most good. It has also sought to improve the reliability of its environmental enforcement and other program data, as well as its coordination among EPA offices and with other agencies to improve efficiency and leverage limited resources. Generally, the agency's initiatives in these areas have yet to achieve their intended goals. In this connection, GAO is currently examining the extent to which EPA is taking a coordinated approach in managing its laboratories. (2) Transforming EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals. EPA has yet to develop sufficient chemical assessment information for limiting public exposure to many chemicals that may pose substantial health risks. As a consequence, GAO in February 2011 reaffirmed the need to transform EPA's process for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals by continuing it as one if GAO's "high-risk" areas warranting increased attention by Congress and the executive branch. (3) Reducing pollution in the nation's waters. Among the nation's most pressing water quality problems with which EPA and other stakeholders struggle are the contributions of diffuse, or "nonpoint," sources of pollution and the challenges posed by deterioration in the nation's premier watersheds, such as the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes. Multibillion-dollar liabilities associated with replacing and upgrading the nation's aging water infrastructure are a looming issue that, if not sufficiently addressed, will impact water quality. (4) Addressing the cost and pace of cleanup at Superfund and other hazardous waste sites. EPA's Superfund program is intended to ensure the cleanup of hazardous waste sites on both private and public lands. Nonetheless, 30 years after the program began, GAO found that cleanup costs for remaining hazardous waste sites will not only be substantial, but that problems with the accuracy and completeness of data on the amount of remaining cleanup work prevent EPA from reliably estimating these costs. (5) Addressing the agency's emerging role in climate change issues. As a highly interdisciplinary issue, climate change poses management challenges for the federal government at large. For EPA, particular climate change-related challenges pertain to the legal and administrative barriers facing the agency in its ongoing efforts to reduce carbon emissions, its difficulties in coordinating activities involving numerous other agencies and other levels of government, and its efforts to account for and manage data on greenhouse gas emissions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations intended to improve EPA's programs by, for example, improving the information upon which key regulatory decisions are based; improving oversight over enforcement and other key program activities; and improving EPA's coordination with other agencies in program delivery. EPA has concurred with most of the recommendations and has taken steps to implement some of them. |
gao_GAO-08-1048 | gao_GAO-08-1048_0 | The U.S. Voluntary Market Is Growing Rapidly with Limited Federal Oversight
Over 600 organizations develop, market, or sell offsets in the United States, and the market involves a wide range of participants, prices, transaction types, and projects. While the exact scope of the U.S. voluntary market is uncertain because of a lack of complete data, available information shows that the supply of offsets generated in the United States has increased by about 66 percent over the last 3 years, from about 6.2 million tons in 2004 to about 10.2 million tons in 2007. The Federal Government Plays a Small Role in the Market
While no single regulatory body has oversight of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market as a whole, offset transactions are subject to applicable state fraud and consumer protection laws, which are generally enforced by each state’s attorney general. A Variety of Quality Assurance Mechanisms Are Available and Used, but Information on the Credibility of Offsets Is Limited
Multiple quality assurance mechanisms are available and used to ensure the credibility of carbon offsets available for purchase on the U.S. voluntary offset market, but a lack of centralized information makes it difficult to estimate the extent of their use. Participants in the offset market face several challenges to ensuring the credibility of offsets, including problems determining additionality, and the availability and use of many mechanisms for verification, and monitoring. Several stakeholders said that there is no correct technique for determining additionality because it requires comparison of expected reductions against a projected business-as-usual emissions baseline (also referred to as a counterfactual scenario). Information Provided to Consumers Offers Limited Assurance of Credibility
The information provided to consumers about offset projects and quality assurance mechanisms offers limited assurance of credibility, according to certain stakeholders and analysis of documents obtained through the purchase of offsets. Both Increased Federal Oversight and the Use of Offsets in Climate Change Policies Involve Trade-offs between Cost and Credibility
Increased government oversight of the voluntary market could address some concerns about the credibility of offsets by standardizing quality assurance mechanisms and registries, and this could encourage new projects and help protect consumers. Offsets could lower the cost of compliance, encourage investment and innovation in sectors not required to reduce emissions, and provide time for regulated entities to change existing technologies. However, if the offsets used for compliance are not credible, the environmental integrity of a compliance system may be compromised. For example, unregulated facilities may devise new ways to limit greenhouse gas emissions because they could sell offsets in the compliance market. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the scope of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market, including the role of the federal government; (2) the extent to which mechanisms for ensuring the credibility of voluntary carbon offsets are available and used, and what, if any, related information is shared with consumers; and (3) the trade-offs associated with increasing the oversight of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market and incorporating offsets into broader climate change mitigation policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Carbon offsets--reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere--are a way to address climate change by paying someone else to reduce emissions. To be credible, an offset must be additional--it must reduce emissions below the quantity emitted in a business-as-usual scenario--among other criteria. Assessing credibility is inherently challenging because it is difficult to make business-as-usual projections. Outside the U.S., offsets may be purchased on compliance markets to meet requirements to reduce emissions. In the U.S., there are no federal requirements and offsets may be purchased in the voluntary market. GAO was asked to examine (1) the scope of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market, including the role of the federal government; (2) the extent to which mechanisms for ensuring the credibility of offsets are available and used and what, if any, related information is shared with consumers; and (3) trade-offs associated with increased oversight of the U.S. market and including offsets in climate change mitigation policies. This report is based on analysis of literature and data, interviews with stakeholders, and GAO's purchase of offsets.
What GAO Found
The scope of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market is uncertain because of limited data, but available information indicates that the supply of offsets generated from projects based in the United States is growing rapidly. Data obtained from a firm that analyzes the carbon market show that the supply of offsets increased from about 6.2 million tons in 2004 to about 10.2 million tons in 2007. Over 600 organizations develop, market, or sell offsets in the United States, and the market involves a wide range of participants, prices, transaction types, and projects. The federal government plays a small role in the voluntary market by providing limited consumer protection and technical assistance, and no single regulatory body has oversight responsibilities. A variety of quality assurance mechanisms, including standards for verification and monitoring, are available and used to evaluate offsets, but data are not sufficient to determine the extent of their use. Information shared with consumers on credibility is also limited. Participants in the offset market face challenges ensuring the credibility of offsets, including problems determining additionality, and the existence of many quality assurance mechanisms. GAO, through its purchase of offsets, found that the information provided to consumers by retailers offered limited assurance of credibility. Increased federal oversight of the U.S. voluntary market could enhance the market's transparency and improve consumer protection, but may also reduce flexibility, increase administrative costs, and stifle innovation, according to certain stakeholders. Including offsets in regulatory programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions could also lower the cost of compliance, according to recent EPA analyses and economic literature. However, some stakeholders said that concerns about the credibility of offsets could compromise the environmental integrity of a compliance system. |
gao_GAO-03-304 | gao_GAO-03-304_0 | Agency Compliance with the Privacy Act and OMB Guidance Is Uneven
While compliance with Privacy Act provisions and related OMB guidance was generally high in many areas, according to agency reports, it was uneven across the federal government—ranging from 100 percent for some requirements to about 70 percent for others. For example, for 100 percent of agency systems of records, agencies followed the requirement to issue a rule that explains to the public why a system of records is exempt from one or more of the act’s privacy protections. Agency privacy officials attending our forum acknowledged this uneven compliance; they pointed out, however, that implementation of the Privacy Act in a rapidly changing environment presents a number of difficult issues. Specifically, these officials identified barriers to improved compliance that include a need for more OMB leadership and guidance on the act, low agency priority given to implementing the act, and insufficient training on the act. In the absence of consistent compliance with the Privacy Act, the government cannot adequately assure the public that all legislated individual privacy rights are being protected. Safeguarding personal information. Protecting personal information that is maintained in automated information systems is of particular importance. According to agency responses to our surveys, agencies are not generally dissatisfied with OMB’s guidance and assistance on the Privacy Act: for example, most agencies judged that OMB’s assistance on the act was at least “moderately effective” overall. Until these issues are addressed by agencies and OMB and compliance with the Privacy Act across government is improved, the government cannot adequately assure the public that all legislated individual privacy rights are being protected. To address implementation issues related to compliance with the Privacy Act, we recommend that the Director assess the need for specific changes to OMB guidance, especially with regard to electronic records, and update the guidance, as appropriate; raise the awareness and commitment of senior agency officials to the importance of the principles that underlie the Privacy Act; lead a governmentwide effort to (1) determine the level of resources, including human capital, currently devoted to Privacy Act implementation by both OMB and the agencies, (2) assess the level of resources needed to fully implement the act, (3) identify the gap, if any, between current and needed resources, and (4) develop a plan for addressing any gap that may exist; and oversee the development of Privacy Act training that meets the needs of the wide range of employees who carry out the act and make this training readily available to agencies. Comments from the Office of Management and Budget
GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Privacy Act regulates how federal agencies may use the personal information that individuals supply when obtaining government services or fulfilling obligations--for example, applying for a small business loan or paying taxes. GAO was asked to review, among other things, agency compliance with the Privacy Act and related guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
What GAO Found
Based on responses from 25 selected agencies to GAO surveys, compliance with Privacy Act requirements and OMB guidance is generally high in many areas, but it is uneven across the federal government. For example, GAO used agency responses to estimate 100 percent compliance with the requirement to issue a rule explaining to the public why personal information is exempt from certain provisions of the act. In contrast, GAO estimates 71 percent compliance with the requirement that personal information should be complete, accurate, relevant, and timely before it is disclosed to a nonfederal organization. As a result of this uneven compliance, the government cannot adequately assure the public that all legislated individual privacy rights are being protected. Agency senior privacy officials acknowledge the uneven compliance but report a number of difficult implementation issues in a rapidly changing environment. Of these issues, privacy officials gave most importance to the need for further OMB leadership and guidance. Although agencies are not generally dissatisfied with OMB's guidance on the Privacy Act, they made specific suggestions regarding areas in which additional guidance is needed, such as the act's application to electronic records. Besides these gaps in guidance, additional issues included the low agency priority given to implementing the act and insufficient employee training on the act. If these implementation issues and the overall uneven compliance are not addressed, the government will not be able to provide the public with sufficient assurance that all legislated individual privacy rights are adequately protected. |
gao_GAO-13-627T | gao_GAO-13-627T_0 | Launched by OMB in March 2012, PortfolioStat requires agencies to conduct an annual agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending, demonstrate how its IT investments align with the agency’s mission and business functions, and make decisions on eliminating duplication. OMB’s March 2013 memorandum discusses OMB’s efforts to further the PortfolioStat initiative by incorporating several changes, such as consolidating previously collected IT-related plans, reports, and data submissions. The memorandum also establishes new agency reporting requirements and related time frames. Specifically, agencies are no longer required to submit the data center consolidation plans previously required under FDCCI. GAO Has Previously Reported on Significant Weaknesses in Agencies’ Inventories and Plans
In July 2012, we issued a report on the status of FDCCI and found that, while agencies’ 2011 inventories and plans had improved as compared to their 2010 submissions, significant weaknesses still remained. have documented the need for initiatives The 24 agencies have collectively made progress towards OMB’s data center consolidation goal to close 40 percent, or approximately 1,253 of the 3,133 data centers, by the end of 2015. While the number of data centers that agencies are planning to close from October 2013 through December 2015 (the planned completion date of FDCCI) is not reported on http://data.gov, OMB’s July 2012 quarterly report to Congress on the status of federal IT reform efforts contains other information on agencies’ data center closure plans. See figure 3 for a graphical depiction of agencies’ progress against OMB’s data center consolidation goal. However, OMB has not measured agencies’ progress against the cost savings goal of $3 billion by the end of 2015. Finally, the staff member stated that OMB recognizes the importance of tracking cost savings and is working to identify a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings as part of the integration of FDCCI with PortfolioStat, but stated that there was no time frame for when this would occur. Specifically, in July 2012, we reported that most agencies had not reported their expected cost savings in their 2011 consolidation plans. Until OMB tracks cost savings data, the agency will be limited in its ability to determine whether or not FDCCI is on course toward achieving planned performance goals. In addition, OMB launched a publically available electronic dashboard to track and report on agencies’ consolidation progress. Although OMB is the approval authority of agencies’ consolidation plans, it has not approved agencies’ submissions on the basis of their completeness. OMB has not reported on agencies’ progress against its key performance goal of achieving $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. These weaknesses in oversight are due, in part, to OMB not ensuring that assigned responsibilities are being executed. Improved oversight could better position OMB to assess progress against its cost savings goal and minimize agencies’ risk of not realizing anticipated cost savings. Using these tools, an agency is to report on, among other things, its approach to optimizing its data centers; the state of its data center population, including the number of core and non-core data centers; the agency’s progress on closures; and the extent to which an agency’s data centers are optimized for total cost of ownership. In addition, although OMB has indicated which performance measures it plans to use going forward, such as those related to data center energy and labor, it has not documented the specific metrics for agencies to report against. For example, with the elimination of the requirement to submit separate data center consolidation plans under the new combined initiative, the memorandum does not discuss whether either the Task Force or the GSA Program Management Office will continue to be used in their same oversight roles for review of agencies’ documentation. Specifically, we are recommending that the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO to track and annually report on key data center consolidation performance measures, such as the size of data centers being closed and cost savings to date; extend the time frame for achieving cost savings related to data center consolidation beyond the current 2015 horizon, to allow time to meet the initiative’s planned cost savings goal; and establish a mechanism to ensure that the established responsibilities of designated data center consolidation oversight organizations are fully executed, including responsibility for the documentation and oversight of the peer review process, the review of agencies’ updated consolidation inventories and plans, and approval of updated consolidation plans. Recognizing the importance of effective oversight of major IT initiatives, OMB directed that three oversight organizations—the Task Force, the GSA FDCCI Program Management Office, and OMB—be responsible for federal data center consolidation oversight activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, as focal point for information technology management across the government, OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer launched the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiativean effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers. In July 2011 and July 2012, GAO evaluated 24 agencies progress and reported that nearly all of the agencies had not completed a data center inventory or consolidation plan and recommended that they do so.
GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, that evaluated agencies' reported progress against OMBs planned consolidation and cost savings goals, and assessed the extent to which the oversight organizations put in place by OMB for the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative are adequately performing oversight of agencies' efforts to meet these goals. In this report, GAO assessed agencies progress against OMBs goals, analyzed the execution of oversight roles and responsibilities, and interviewed OMB, GSA, and Data Center Consolidation Task Force officials about their efforts to oversee agencies consolidation efforts.
What GAO Found
The 24 agencies participating in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative made progress towards the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) goal to close 40 percent, or 1,253 of the 3,133 total federal data centers, by the end of 2015, but OMB has not measured agencies progress against its other goal of $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. Agencies closed 420 data centers by the end of December 2012, and have plans to close an additional 548 to reach 968 by December 2015285 closures short of OMBs goal. OMB has not determined agencies progress against its cost savings goal because, according to OMB staff, the agency has not determined a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings. This lack of information makes it uncertain whether the $3 billion in savings is achievable by the end of 2015. Until OMB tracks and reports on performance measures such as cost savings, it will be limited in its ability to oversee agencies progress against key goals.
Pursuant to OMB direction, three organizationsthe Data Center Consolidation Task Force, the General Services Administration (GSA) Program Management Office, and OMBare responsible for federal data center consolidation oversight activities; while most activities are being performed, there are still several weaknesses in oversight. Specifically,
While the Data Center Consolidation Task Force has established several initiatives to assist agencies in their consolidation efforts, such as holding monthly meetings to facilitate communication among agencies, it has not adequately overseen its peer review process for improving the quality of agencies' consolidation plans.
The GSA Program Management Office has collected agencies quarterly data center closure updates and made the information publically available on an electronic dashboard for tracking consolidation progress, but it has not fully performed other oversight activities, such as conducting analyses of agencies inventories and plans.
OMB has implemented several initiatives to track agencies consolidation progress, such as establishing requirements for agencies to update their plans and inventories yearly and to report quarterly on their consolidation progress. However, the agency has not approved the plans on the basis of their completeness or reported on progress against its goal of $3 billion in cost savings.
The weaknesses in oversight of the data center consolidation initiative are due, in part, to OMB not ensuring that assigned responsibilities are being executed. Improved oversight could better position OMB to assess progress against its cost savings goal and minimize agencies risk of not realizing expected cost savings.
In March 2013, OMB issued a memorandum that integrated the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative with the PortfolioStat initiative, which requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of its information technology investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication, among other things. The memorandum also made significant changes to the federal data center consolidation effort, including the initiatives reporting requirements and goals. Specifically, agencies are no longer required to submit the previously required consolidation plans and the memorandum does not identify a cost savings goal.
What GAO Recommends
In its report, GAO recommended that OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer track and report on key performance measures, extend the time frame for achieving planned cost savings, and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities. OMB agreed with two of GAOs recommendations and plans to evaluate the remaining recommendation related to extending the time frame. |
gao_T-RCED-96-180 | gao_T-RCED-96-180_0 | For example, from 1987 to 1995 the availability of the plants in the Corps’ South Atlantic Division dropped from 95.4 percent to 87.2 percent. Many of the Corps’ hydroelectric power plants in the Southeast are aging. Also, according to Corps officials, some units are poorly designed by the manufacturer and not properly installed by the contractor, and other units are adversely affected by the way in which they are operated. Extended outages, Southeastern officials estimate, have resulted in lost revenues of about $13 million to Southeastern since fiscal year 1986. The need to spend more to maintain and repair the Corps’ aging hydroelectric power plants will compete with the need to maintain and repair other Corps facilities, such as those related to commercial navigation, flood damage reduction, hurricane and storm damage reduction, and the restoration and protection of environmental resources (including fish and wildlife habitat). Given the emphasis on routine and ongoing maintenance and repair work and the lengthy justification processes that must be followed for extensive repairs when units break down unexpectedly, the Corps frequently performs repairs that are short-term and reactive. Specifically, we examined the extent to which (1) these power plants are experiencing outages and (2) the current planning and budgeting processes allow the Corps to perform timely and effective repairs and rehabilitations of its hydroelectric assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the maintenance and repair of hydroelectric powerplants operated by the Army Corps of Engineers in the Southeast, focusing on the extent to which: (1) the power plants are experiencing outages; and (2) planning and budgeting processes allow the Corps to perform timely and effective repairs and rehabilitation of its hydroelectric assets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) due to lengthy outages, the plants' availability to generate power dropped from 95.4 percent to 87.2 percent and have lost about $13 million since fiscal year (FY) 1986; (2) some of the plants' units are aging, need repair or replacement, were poorly designed, were not properly installed, and have been adversely affected by the way they have been operated; (3) the need to spend more to maintain and repair the aging hydroelectric power plants will compete with the need to maintain and repair other Corps facilities; (4) the Corps' emphasis on routine, ongoing maintenance and repair work and the lengthy justification process for extensive work delays long-term repairs; and (5) the Corps is addressing the plants' planning and budgeting needs. |
gao_GAO-08-63 | gao_GAO-08-63_0 | Figure 1 depicts the execution process. State indicated that it has begun to take actions that would address our recommendations. Prior to this legislation, U.S. citizens did not need a passport to enter the United States if they were traveling from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, or Bermuda. The current passport book fee is $97 for first time, adult applicants (16 years and older). Thus, in October 2006, State announced plans to produce a passport card as a lower cost means of establishing citizenship and identity for U.S. citizens. For the passport card, State has proposed to charge $45, which includes a $25 execution fee. State Proposes Reduced Execution Fee Based on Commitment to Congress and Other Factors
State considered several factors, including congressional interest in having a low-cost travel document and its own estimated execution costs, when setting the proposed execution fee. These include: Commitment to Congress to issue a low-cost document. According to consular officials, the department made a commitment to issue an alternative document to meet WHTI requirements that would be, at most, one-half the cost of the passport book, which currently costs $97. State’s estimates of its passport execution costs. According to consular officials, State wanted to ensure that, while the cost of the passport card was lower than the cost for the current passport book, that its execution fee was not so low that it jeopardized State’s relationship with its network of acceptance facilities, on which the department depends to provide passport services to U.S. citizens. Based, in part, on these data, consular officials concluded that, even with the reduced execution fee, the department and its acceptance facilities could continue to expect additional funds from passport services. For example, the estimates that USPS provided to Congress and State did not account for the projected increase in passport application volume or the growth in active postal acceptance facilities. Lack of Transparency in State’s Most Recent Passport Execution Cost Estimate
We found that State’s most recent cost of service study, which the department considered when establishing the reduced passport execution fee, lacked documentation of several of the contractor’s key decisions. Rigorous documentation increases the credibility of an estimate and helps support an organization’s decision- making process. In particular, the documentation should explicitly identify the primary methods, calculations, results, rationales or assumptions, and sources of the data used to generate each cost element. We requested documentation from State on the contractor’s sampling plan and survey results, but officials were not able to provide additional details about the survey’s sample design, results by office, or how the data was used to arrive at the final estimated time State officials spend on passport execution. In addition, USPS did not provide detailed information regarding its estimated passport execution costs, which were based on a fiscal year 2001 study. The study should also document the extent to which State’s contractor incorporated estimated passport execution costs from USPS and other acceptance facilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the process by which the Department of State (State) set the proposed passport execution fee, we reviewed current laws and regulations that authorize the setting of fees, as well as guidance to agencies on the fee-setting process from the Office of Management and Budget, and State’s procedures as outlined in the Foreign Affairs Manual. | Why GAO Did This Study
As early as January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens will be required to present a passport or other approved document to enter the United States at all ports of entry. The Department of State (State) is developing a "passport card" as a means of establishing U.S. citizenship for individuals crossing U.S. land borders or arriving by sea from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, or Bermuda. State proposes to charge $45 for the card, which would include a $25 execution fee. Acceptance facilities, including State's passport offices, as well as post offices and state courts, execute passport applications on State's behalf, and retain this fee. GAO was asked to examine (1) the factors State considered when setting the proposed fee and (2) how execution cost data were developed. GAO reviewed current laws that authorize the setting of fees and met with State officials to determine how they set the execution fee. GAO also met with officials from State and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to discuss acceptance facility execution costs and how these costs were estimated.
What GAO Found
State considered several factors, including congressional interest in having a low-cost travel document, when setting the proposed passport execution fee. State has proposed to reduce the current execution fee from $30 to $25, which would help the department to issue a lower cost passport card that meets the new documentation requirements. Consular officials told GAO that State made a commitment to Congress to issue a document that would be, at most, one-half the price of the current passport book, which costs $97 for first time, adult applicants. To do this, State needed to reduce its fees, including the execution fee. Consular officials stated that State did not want to reduce the execution fee below $25 because it wanted to recover its costs, which it estimated at $24.36 per execution. In addition, the fee needed to be high enough to avoid jeopardizing State's relationship with acceptance facilities, on which State depends to provide passport services. State concluded that $25 would compensate acceptance facilities based, in part, on data from USPS that initially indicated its passport execution costs were about $19, as well as a projected increase in application volume. USPS later told State that the $19 figure did not include additional indirect costs. GAO found that State's most recent cost of service study, which estimated passport execution costs, lacked documentation of key decisions. Rigorous documentation increases an estimate's credibility and helps support an organization's decision-making process. Documentation of cost estimates should explicitly identify the primary methods, calculations, results, and rationales or assumptions. State was not able to provide documentation of critical components of the study's methodology. For example, consular officials could not provide details of its survey used to estimate the time it takes to execute a passport, including how the data was used to arrive at the final time estimate. State has begun a new cost study that will provide updated estimates of execution costs. |
gao_GAO-12-366 | gao_GAO-12-366_0 | Figure 1 below depicts a notional schedule of how the Air Force plans to replace its current KC-135s over the next several decades. KC-46 Program Has Established Its Acquisition Strategy
The KC-46 program has established its acquisition strategy for aircraft development and production, which includes a total cost estimate of $51.7 billion, aircraft quantities to be procured, key milestone dates, and test and manufacturing schedules. The KC-46 program is using a fixed- price contract for development, designed to provide a profit incentive for the contractor to control costs, while limiting government liability for increased costs over a certain amount. The program has also identified nine key performance parameters (KPP) critical to enabling the KC-46 to meet mission requirements, but has not yet fully implemented metrics that will be used to track the achievement of these KPPs. At this price, aircraft would cost almost $230 million on average. Table 3 provides development contract details and the current contract and government estimates to complete development. The target price is $4.4 billion and the ceiling price $4.9 billion. The government’s share is 60 percent while Boeing’s is 40 percent. Legislation and defense policy now directs the Milestone Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to select the contract type for a development program at the time of a decision on Milestone B that is consistent with the level of program risk for the program. Also, while designing a new tanker that uses a modified commercial platform may not be as technically challenging as an all new weapon system, the program still faces some technical risks, including three critical technologies that have not yet been tested in a realistic environment. The Air Force and Boeing are both concerned about the risks in the KC- 46 development and test schedule. Software. These technologies have not yet been demonstrated in a realistic environment, a higher level of maturity that is a best practice. Wing Aerial Refueling Pod instability. With Some Exceptions, the Program’s Development Strategy Generally Adheres to Best Practices, Acquisition Reform Legislation, and DOD Policy
The KC-46 program’s acquisition strategy and business case generally meet GAO’s knowledge-based acquisition approach and best acquisition practices, including those in legislation to improve the weapon system acquisition process. Also, the contents of the program’s requirements documentation generally comply with DOD guidance. Instead, the design review is planned for March 2012, about a year after the start of development. Its fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract is designed to limit the government’s liability for increased costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
As one of only a few major acquisition programs to award a fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract in recent years, evaluating performance and identifying lessons learned will be very illustrative and important to inform decision-makers and help guide and improve future defense acquisition programs. To determine the program’s acquisition strategy, including its contracting approach, we reviewed briefings by program and contractor officials, budget documents, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), monthly activity reports, performance indicators, risk assessments and other data. In order to evaluate the major schedule and technical risks faced by the program, we reviewed the KC-46 Integrated Master Schedule and compared it to the program’s APB and SAR in order to identify potential concurrency in the program’s design reviews, flight testing, and low rate production. To assess the extent the program is complying with acquisition policy, legislation, and best practices, we also compared key program documentation and execution with current DOD policy, GAO best practices, and recent acquisition reform legislation to determine areas of compliance and areas for further review as the program continues forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aerial refueling is essential to global U.S. military operations. The backbone of the nations tanker forcesthe KC-135 Stratotankeris over 50 years old on average with age-related problems and increasing support costs that could ground the fleet. Given this, the Air Force has initiated the $51.7 billion KC-46 program to start replacing the current fleet. Plans are to produce 18 tankers by 2017 and 179 aircraft through 2027. Other follow-on procurements are anticipated to replace all KC-135s.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires GAO to annually review the KC-46 program through 2017. This report addresses (1) the programs acquisition strategy, including its contracting approach; (2) the major schedule and technical risks; and (3) the extent the programs acquisition strategy and documentation comply with policy, legislation, and best practices. To address these areas, GAO reviewed key documents on the programs contract and cost baseline. GAO discussed the major schedule and technical risks with program office officials and examined an independent technology readiness assessment. GAO also assessed the acquisition plan and required documentation to determine compliance with acquisition legislation, policy, and best practices.
What GAO Found
The KC-46 program has established its acquisition strategy for development and production, including total cost, procurement quantities, and key milestone dates. The program is using a $4.4 billion fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract that provides contractor incentives to control costs and limits the governments liability for increased costs over a certain amount. While estimated development costs are currently $900 million higher than the February 2011 contract award amount, the governments share of these extra costs is limited to about $500 million. The program has identified key performance parameters, but has not yet fully implemented the metrics for tracking their achievement.
There is broad agreement that KC-46 schedule risk is a concern. In GAOs assessment, significant concurrency, or overlap, among development and production activities add risk to the program. The Air Force and contractor have assessed overall schedule risk as moderate, citing concerns about software and the ability to complete development flight testing on time. Further, the DODs chief testing official finds the testing schedule not executable as currently planned. While designing a new tanker using a modified commercial platform is not as technically challenging as a more revolutionary weapon system, the program still faces some technical risks, including technologies that have not yet been demonstrated during flight.
The KC-46 programs acquisition strategy provides a good framework for meeting GAOs knowledge-based best practices, and generally adheres to defense policy guidance and recent acquisition reform legislation. DOD waived the requirement for a preliminary design review before the program began system development and demonstration, but this design review is planned for March 2012. Although the programs three critical technologies have not yet achieved the level of maturity indicated in best practices, they have reached a level of maturity consistent with DOD policy. Given that the KC-46 is one of only a few major programs in recent years to use a fixed-price incentive contract and the importance of tanker replacement to national security, rigorous monitoring of the programs progress will be essential.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD leadership monitor the progress and outcomes of this contract to provide lessons learned for future acquisition programs, and the program fully implement metrics to track achievement of key performance parameters. DOD fully concurred. |
gao_OSI-95-1 | gao_OSI-95-1_0 | RTC/FDIC Are Vulnerable
RTC and FDIC are vulnerable to fraud, abuse, and mismanagement because they do not systematically screen job applicants or current employees to determine if they have been found culpable in the losses that caused federally insured institutions to fail. A similar situation exists with the RTC databases. It does not have the capability to retrieve defendants by name. RTC and FDIC Did Not Communicate Culpability Determinations Promptly
Neither RTC nor FDIC has established a systematic means for communicating determinations of culpability to managers in a timely way. RTC/FDIC Employees Found Culpable
After our request, RTC and FDIC identified 12 individuals, one of whom was a conservatorship institution employee, whom the Corporations had previously determined to be culpable and who were holding vital positions in FDIC, RTC, or conservatorship institutions. Additionally, RTC maintained no database of employees of institutions that were in conservatorship and could not identify those having previous culpability determinations. Recommendations
We recommend that the Acting Chairman of FDIC and the Deputy and Acting Chief Executive Officer of RTC direct their agencies to perform employment screening before hiring individuals and routinely do so for their current employees, using reliable databases of individuals found responsible for institution failures; develop reliable databases that will effectively identify individuals found culpable in institution failures; share information systematically, enabling each to be aware of those individuals the other has found culpable in the failure of federally insured institutions; and ensure that personnel guidance is clear and appropriate regarding employees and prospective employees for whom the Corporations have made culpability determinations. We reviewed and considered relevant laws, regulations, and policies and interviewed responsible management officials at RTC and FDIC headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have sufficient systems to assist hiring and management officials in culpability determinations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RTC and FDIC are vulnerable to fraud, abuse, or mismanagement because they do not systematically screen employees or applicants found culpable for bank failures; (2) RTC and FDIC databases do not include the names of all culpable directors and officers of failed institutions; (3) RTC and FDIC databases do not include personal identifiers of culpable individuals; (4) the RTC database includes the names of individuals against whom no suits have been filed; (5) RTC and FDIC have no systematic means for promptly notifying managers and supervisors of employees against whom a culpability determination has been made; (6) RTC and FDIC do not share information regarding individuals found culpable for institution failures; (7) certain employees of RTC, FDIC, and conservatorship institutions hold vital positions although they have previously been determined to be culpable; (8) RTC and FDIC cannot ensure the identification of all culpable employees; (9) RTC is vulnerable to conservatorship employees who have been found culpable, since it does not maintain a database of non-federal conservatorship employees; and (10) RTC and FDIC should address these vulnerability issues to ensure the proper disposition of failed institutions' assets and to protect insurance funds' and taxpayers' interests. |
gao_GAO-12-276T | gao_GAO-12-276T_0 | The 2010 NCR Strategy Is Largely Consistent with Desirable Characteristics for Effective Strategies
We have previously identified six characteristics of effective strategies that could be applied to the NCR. The scope of the plan, as outlined in the introduction, is strategic investment in new and existing capabilities to help all localities in the NCR prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all-hazards threats and events. However, it is not clear that NCR has a systematic process for identifying and allocating funding other than UASI to help achieve priority objectives. We will continue to monitor this issue as we conduct future work on NCR preparedness. According to the 2010 NCR strategy, NCR stakeholders have constructed the strategy to complement state and local operational plans. For example, the Emergency Preparedness Council is described as the body that provides oversight of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the NCR Strategic Plan to identify and address gaps in readiness in the NCR, among other responsibilities. However, we have previously noted that strategies themselves are not endpoints, but rather, starting points. As with any strategic planning effort, implementation is the key. The ultimate measure of value for a strategy is how useful it is as guidance for policymakers and decisionmakers in allocating resources and balancing priorities. It remains to be seen the extent to which the plan is implemented effectively. Appendix I: The NCR Region and Organizations
National Capital Region
The National Capital Region (NCR) is a complex multijurisdictional area comprising the District of Columbia and surrounding counties and cities in the states of Maryland and Virginia (as shown in figure 1) and is home to the federal government, many national landmarks, and military installations. The Homeland Security Act established the Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) within the Department of Homeland Security. In this statement, we reported on the implementation of the recommendations from our May 2004 report. DHS was working with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan. Specifically, we reported that a well-defined, comprehensive strategic plan for the NCR was essential for assuring that the region is prepared for the risks it faces and that the NCR could focus on strengthening (1) initiatives that will accomplish objectives under the NCR strategic goals, (2) performance measures and targets that indicate how the initiatives will accomplish identified strategic goals, (3) milestones or time frames for initiative accomplishment, (4) information on resources and investments for each initiative, and (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination and integration and implementation plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the status of efforts to enhance emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region (NCR). The NCR is a partnership among the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, area local governments, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office for National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and nonprofit organizations and private sector interests. The partnership aims to help the region prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from "all-hazards" threats or events. Gridlock and hazardous conditions during recent events like the January 26, 2011, snow and ice storm and the August 23, 2011, earthquake demonstrate the importance of regional communication and coordination in the NCR and that challenges remain. Well-crafted and executed operational plans are critical for effective response to emergencies, but sound strategic planning is also important. A coordinated strategy to establish and monitor the achievement of regional goals and priorities is fundamental to enhancing emergency preparedness and response capabilities in the NCR. We reported on this issue repeatedly from 2004 through 2006. This testimony focuses on the extent to which strategic planning for NCR preparedness is consistent with characteristics we have previously identified as desirable for strategies for complex undertakings, such as NCR preparedness. This statement is based on work we recently completed for Congress.
What GAO Found
The 2010 NCR strategic plan, when accompanied by its supporting documents--investment plans, work plans, and a Performance Management Plan--collectively referred to in this statement as the NCR strategy, is largely consistent with the six characteristics of a strategy that we advocated for complex homeland-security undertakings where multiple organizations must act together to achieve goals and objectives. However, neither the Performance Management Plan nor the investment plans have yet been finalized; decisions remain regarding how the NCR will conduct future regional risk assessments; and it is not clear that NCR has systematic processes in place to identify the full range of resources available to support its goals. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that strategies themselves are not endpoints, but rather, starting points. As with any strategic planning effort, implementation is the key. The ultimate measure of the 2010 NCR strategy's value is how useful it is as guidance for policymakers and decisionmakers in allocating resources and balancing priorities. |
gao_GAO-06-989 | gao_GAO-06-989_0 | Navy Did Not Provide Data and Other Supporting Evidence for Its Overall Assessment
The Navy’s March 2006 report to Congress included sections corresponding to each of the matters specified in Section 322(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. However, although the report addressed the Navy’s assessment of the conversion of Puget Sound to direct funding, it did not provide data and other supporting evidence for the Navy’s overall assessment that direct funding was more advantageous than working capital funding and can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities. More specifically, the report did not provide evidence that direct funding had provided for a more agile workforce—the ability to more easily move workers among maintenance projects in response to fleet priorities— which was a key benefit the Navy claimed was achieved by converting to direct funding. Moreover, it did not provide data to support the overall conclusion that direct funding can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities without sacrificing cost visibility, performance accountability, or quality of work. Navy Did Not Address Unresolved Issues Identified in Prior Studies
The Navy’s March 2006 report did not show data that adequately addressed issues identified as unresolved in prior studies. Navy Did Not Identify Methodologies for Total Cost Visibility
The Navy’s report did not discuss the Navy’s approach and methodology for achieving total cost visibility at the consolidated facility. Prior reviews have raised issues about the Navy’s ability to provide data showing total cost visibility. Determining the total cost of delivering specific ship maintenance is important for other reasons as well. Consequently, OSD and Navy officials do not yet have complete and reliable cost and related data needed for making fully informed decisions related to ship maintenance activities. Navy Did Not Identify Performance Metrics Demonstrating Improved Results Achieved by Consolidating Maintenance Facilities and Converting to Direct Funding
The Navy’s report did not provide performance metrics demonstrating improved results associated with consolidating ship maintenance facilities at Puget Sound and converting the shipyard to direct funding. Without performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting goals and objectives, the Navy lacks data needed for evaluating the changes it has made and making fully informed decisions related to the management of consolidated ship maintenance activities. Navy Report Did Not Identify Problems with Information Systems Not Designed for Direct Funding
The Navy’s report did not disclose shortcomings in its information systems at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard that have hindered its ability to efficiently and reliably meet its financial and business operations reporting requirements. Our review verified that the information systems at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard consolidated facility were not designed to provide the types of cost and operational data being requested under direct funding. As a result, the systems have required extensive changes and manual administrative efforts by shipyard personnel to support the consolidated facility’s financial and business operations reports being requested under direct funding. Navy officials in headquarters and Puget Sound recognized the need for improved information systems to support the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard consolidated facility and other East Coast shipyards converting from working capital funding to direct funding. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Navy’s management of consolidated maintenance facilities and the conversion of shipyards to direct funding, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions: Implement a method to routinely and systematically provide for total cost visibility of ship maintenance work performed. Scope and Methodology
To assess the Navy’s March 2006 report to Congress, we reviewed the Navy’s reporting requirements established in Section 322(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. F. Operational and financial flexibility and responsiveness of funding on a direct basis compared to funding through the working capital fund of the Navy. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve fleet support activities, the Navy is consolidating maintenance facilities and converting its shipyards from financing under the Navy Working Capital Fund to funding through direct appropriations (direct funding). Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was converted to direct funding in 2003. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the Navy to assess the impact of converting Puget Sound to direct funding and directed that GAO review the Navy's report. The Navy submitted its report to Congress in March 2006, confirming its position that direct funding was more advantageous than working capital funding and can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities. GAO's objectives were to evaluate the extent to which the Navy's report (1) provided data and other supporting evidence for its overall assessment of the impact of converting Puget Sound to direct funding, (2) addressed unresolved issues that had been identified in prior studies, and (3) disclosed any other issues that have affected the implementation of direct funding.
What GAO Found
The Navy's March 2006 report to Congress did not provide data and other supporting evidence for its overall assessment of the impact of converting Puget Sound Naval Shipyard to direct funding. While the Navy reported on the matters specified in the defense authorization act, it did not provide data needed to support the Navy's position that direct funding was more advantageous than working capital funding and can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities. More specifically, the report did not provide evidence that direct funding had provided for a more agile workforce--the ability to more easily move workers among maintenance projects in response to fleet priorities--which was a key benefit the Navy claimed was achieved by converting to direct funding. The Navy's March 2006 report did not show data that adequately addressed two key issues--cost visibility and performance metrics--which had been identified as unresolved in prior studies by GAO and others. First, the report did not present the Navy's approach and methodology for achieving total cost visibility for specific work performed. Determining the total cost of delivering specific ship maintenance work is recommended by federal accounting standards and is a key metric for evaluating a consolidated facility's productivity and performance. Although the Navy was attempting to gather cost data to show the full costs of operations at its shipyards, GAO found that the Navy has not developed policies and procedures to routinely and systematically accumulate these total cost data. Second, with respect to performance metrics, the Navy's report did not provide data that demonstrated improved results, such as increased productivity, of consolidating ship maintenance facilities at Puget Sound and converting the shipyard to direct funding. Prior reviews have raised issues related to total cost visibility and performance metrics as unresolved issues and recommended the Navy take corrective actions. While the Department of Defense concurred, it has not yet resolved these issues. Consequently, complete and reliable cost data are lacking for making fully informed decisions related to ship maintenance activities. Further, without performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting goals and objectives, the Navy lacks data needed for evaluating the changes it has made and making fully informed decisions related to the management of consolidated ship maintenance activities. The Navy's March 2006 report did not disclose shortcomings in its information systems at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard that have hindered its ability to efficiently and reliably meet its financial and business operations reporting requirements. The information systems at the consolidated facility were not designed to provide the types of cost and operational data being requested under direct funding. As a result, the systems have required extensive changes and manual administrative efforts by shipyard personnel to support the consolidated facilities' financial and business operations reports being requested. |
gao_GAO-14-650T | gao_GAO-14-650T_0 | Operators Extol New Assets’ Performance Compared to Aging Counterparts, but These Assets Have Yet to Meet Key Requirements
Coast Guard operators and commanding officers told us that the National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, and HC-144 are performing well during missions and are an improvement over the vessels and aircraft they are replacing. Based on the results, neither asset met all key requirements during this testing. We recommended that DHS and the Coast Guard revise their acquisition guidance to specify when minimum performance standards should be met and clarify the performance data that should be used to determine whether a performance breach has occurred. Further, several issues occurred prior to the start of operational testing that required retrofits or design changes to meet mission needs. The Coast Guard has not yet evaluated the C4ISR system through operational testing even though the system has been fielded on nearly all new assets. In response, the Coast Guard stated that it now plans to test the C4ISR system’s key performance parameters during follow on testing for the National Security Cutter. These cost increases are consuming a large portion of funding. Consequently, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of money needed to finish these programs. Figure 1 shows the total cost of the portfolio and cost to complete the major programs included in the Coast Guard’s 2007 baseline in 2009 and 2014. The mechanism in place for reporting to certain congressional committees, the Capital Investment Plan, does not reflect the full effects of these trade-off decisions on the total cost and schedule of its acquisition programs. This information is not currently required by statute, but without it, decision makers do not have the information to understand the full extent of funding that will be required to complete the Coast Guard’s planned acquisition programs. In our report, we suggest that Congress consider amending the law that governs the 5- year Capital Investment Plan to require the Coast Guard to submit cost and schedule information that reflects the impact of the President’s annual budget request on each acquisition across the portfolio. Long Term Plan Needed to Address Gaps That Are Materializing as Coast Guard Shapes Its Capability through the Budget Process
To address budget constraints, the Coast Guard is repeatedly delaying and reducing its capability through its annual budget process. However, the Coast Guard does not know the extent to which its mission needs can be tailored through the annual budget process and still achieve desired results. For example, the Coast Guard does not know if it can meet its other acquisition needs while the Offshore Patrol Cutter is being built. The Coast Guard is not currently required to develop a long-term fleet modernization plan that considers its current service levels for the next 20 years in relation to its expected acquisition funding. Without this type of plan, decision makers do not have the information they need to better understand the Coast Guard’s long-term outlook. Without such a plan, we believe it will remain difficult for the Coast Guard to fully understand the extent to which future needs match the current level of resources and its expected performance levels—and capability gaps—if funding levels remain constant. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's June 2014 report, entitled Coast Guard Acquistions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls , GAO-14-450 .
What GAO Found
The selected Coast Guard assets that GAO reviewed are generally demonstrating improved performance--according to Coast Guard operators--but GAO found that they have yet to meet all key requirements. Specifically, two assets, the HC-144 patrol aircraft and Fast Response Cutter, did not meet all key requirements during operational testing before being approved for full-rate production, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard guidance do not clearly specify when this level of performance should be achieved. Additionally, the Coast Guard changed its testing strategy for the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and, as a result, is no longer planning to test the system's key requirements. Completing operational testing for the C4ISR system would provide the Coast Guard with the knowledge of whether this asset meets requirements.
As acquisition program costs increase across the portfolio, consuming significant amounts of funding, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of the money needed to finish these programs. In 2009, GAO found that the Coast Guard needed $18.2 billion to finish its 2007 baseline, but now needs $20.7 billion to finish these assets.
To inform Congress of its budget plans, the Coast Guard uses a statutorily required 5-year Capital Investment Plan, but the law does not require the Coast Guard to report the effects of actual funding levels on individual projects and, thus, it has not done so. For example, the Coast Guard has received less funding than planned in its annual budgets, but has not reflected the effects of this reduced funding in terms of increased cost or schedule for certain projects. Without complete information, Congress cannot know the full cost of the portfolio.
The Coast Guard has repeatedly delayed and reduced its capability through its annual budget process and, therefore, it does not know the extent to which it will meet mission needs and achieve desired results. This is because the Coast Guard does not have a long-term fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to meet mission needs over the next two decades within available resources. Without such a plan, the Coast Guard cannot know the extent to which its assets are affordable and whether it can maintain service levels and meet mission needs. Congress should consider requiring the Coast Guard to include additional information in its Capital Investment Plan. In addition, the Secretary of DHS should clarify when minimum performance standards should be achieved, conduct C4ISR testing, and develop a long-term modernization plan. DHS concurred with the recommendations, but its position on developing a long-term plan does not fully address GAO's concerns as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-34 | gao_GAO-03-34_0 | Government Has Important Opportunity To Affect SES Diversity, but Little Will Change If Current Appointment Trends Continue
Because of the wave of retirements and normal attrition for other reasons, the federal government will have the challenge and opportunity to replace over half of its SES corps during fiscal years 2001 through 2007. Our simulation estimates that almost 3,400 of the 6,100 career SES members as of October 2000 will have left the service by October 2007. This is because minorities will be leaving at essentially the same rate overall as white members. To ascertain what the racial, ethnic, and gender profile of the candidate pool for SES replacements will look like, we performed the same simulations and projections for GS-15s and GS-14s as we did for the SES. However, as with the governmentwide numbers discussed in the previous section, agencies tend to increase the proportion of women in the SES, particularly white women, and decrease the proportion of white men. The racial, ethnic, and gender profiles of the career SES at the 24 CFO agencies varied significantly on October 1, 2000. Our simulation results also varied for the proportion of SES members who will leave service by October 1, 2007, but most of the CFO agencies are estimated to lose at least half of their SES corps. Only 3 agencies exhibited increases in minority representation of more than 1 percentage point. They all said that more diversity was needed in the SES and that based on our estimates more efforts would need to be taken if diversity is to increase. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the effect of estimated employment separations on the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity among the career Senior Executive Service (SES), GS-15s, and GS-14s in the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) agencies and governmentwide, (2) determine the effect of estimated appointments to refill these vacancies on diversity, and (3) obtain from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and four selected agencies their observations on our estimates and on SES diversity during this time of change. Therefore, the number of estimated accessions equaled the number of estimated separations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces large losses in its Senior Executive Service (SES), primarily through retirement but also because of other normal attrition. This presents the governmental with substantial challenges to assuring an able management cadre and also provides opportunities to affect the composition of the SES. GAO estimated the number of SES members who would actually leave service through fiscal year 2007 and reviewed the implications for diversity, as defined by race, ethnicity, and gender, of the estimated losses. Specifically, GAO estimated by race, ethnicity, and gender the number of members of the career SES who will leave government service from October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2007, and what the profile of the SES will be if appointment trends do not change. GAO made the same estimates for the pool of GS-15s and GS-14s, from whose ranks the vast majority of replacements for departing SES members come, to ascertain the likely composition of that pool.
What GAO Found
More than half of the 6,100 career SES members employed on October 1, 2000, will have left service by October 1, 2007. Using current SES appointment trends, the only significant changes in diversity will be an increase in the number of white women and an essentially equal decrease in white men. About 46 percent of GS-15s and 34 percent of GS-14 workforce will provide agencies the opportunity to select minority members for the SES. Estimates for 24 large agencies showed substantial variation in SES losses in the proportion leaving and the effect on agencies' racial, ethnic, and gender profiles, with 10 agencies with decreases in minority representation and 12 with increases. The 6 agencies GAO visited recognize that the SES needs to be more diverse than GAO's projections estimate and have efforts under way to address SES diversity. They also recognize that more will have to be done than in the past if diversity is to be enhanced. |
gao_GAO-10-378 | gao_GAO-10-378_0 | In 1994, the United States declared 38.2 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium as surplus to national security needs. In 2000, DOE announced in a record of decision that it would construct a pit disassembly and conversion facility, a MOX fuel fabrication facility, and an immobilization facility at SRS. In addition, according to NNSA documents, NNSA plans to obtain plutonium from nonpit forms in two ways. Construction Projects Appear to Be Meeting Cost Targets, but the MFFF Has Had Schedule Delays
The MFFF and WSB construction projects both appear to be meeting their cost targets, but the MFFF project has experienced some delays over the past 2 years. According to the data and project officials, delays during 2008 were due primarily to the delivery of reinforcing bars that did not meet nuclear quality standards. However, NNSA has not sufficiently planned for such a contingency. In addition, NNSA has not sufficiently planned for the maturation of critical technologies to be used in pit disassembly and conversion operations. However, it appears unlikely that NNSA will be able to establish a pit disassembly and conversion capability in time to produce the plutonium feedstock needed to operate the MFFF beginning in 2021, due to the amount of time and effort needed to reconsider alternatives and construct a facility as well as the amount of uncertainty associated with the agency’s new proposal. NNSA Has One Potential Customer for Most of Its MOX Fuel, but Outreach to Others May Be Insufficient
NNSA has offered several incentives to attract customers for its MOX fuel and is working toward a formal agreement for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to purchase most of this fuel. However, NNSA’s outreach to other utilities may not yet be sufficient to inform potential customers of incentives to use MOX fuel. However, despite the incentives offered, as of October 2009 the majority of the utilities that we interviewed expressed little or no interest in becoming MOX fuel customers. When asked to consider the proposed incentives, however, 8 utilities expressed such interest. NRC Has Been Reviewing the MFFF’s License Application and Has Identified Issues with Construction Practices
NRC is responsible for licensing the MFFF to produce fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. DOE Included Nuclear Safety in Management Reviews of the Projects, but Oversight by DOE’s Independent Nuclear Safety Entities Has Been Limited
Although DOE has incorporated elements of nuclear safety in management reviews of the MFFF and the WSB projects that were conducted as part of its critical decision review process, DOE’s independent nuclear safety entities were minimally involved. Regarding nuclear safety oversight of the WSB project, which is solely regulated by DOE, we found that HSS had not conducted any oversight activities or participated in any critical decision reviews. Specifically, although the WSB is considered a category 2 (high-hazard) nuclear facility, it is categorized as a nonmajor project. We have concerns with these options, including: NNSA’s use of a “wait-and-see” approach to the ARIES project, and the implications this may have on the ability of the ARIES project to meet its current and future production goals; the implications of the use of fuel-grade plutonium on the design and safety of the MFFF, and the extent to which DOE has adequately determined how much additional material throughout the DOE complex may be suitable and available for use by the MFFF; how DOE plans to establish limited pit disassembly processes given the current lack of a definitive strategy for pit disassembly operations; and how DOE plans to adjust the MOX fuel production schedule, and the implications this may have on the cost and schedule for operating the MFFF and DOE’s ability to attract potential MOX fuel customers. This plan should include, at a minimum, the following five items: (1) the actions needed to ensure that the ARIES project will meet its existing production goals, and the cost and schedule associated with any needed expansion of the project; (2) an assessment of how much additional plutonium material, including fuel-grade plutonium, is available within the DOE complex for use as feedstock for the MFFF; (3) an assessment of the effect on the design and safety of the MFFF from the use of fuel-grade plutonium as feedstock; (4) an assessment of potential changes to the MOX fuel production schedule and the effect of these changes on the cost and schedule for operating the MFFF; and (5) an assessment of the cost and schedule associated with obtaining a limited but sufficient pit disassembly process to produce feedstock for the MFFF. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a draft of this report for their review and comment. We also toured the ARIES facility at DOE’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico and interviewed officials involved in the project. We interviewed officials from NNSA’s Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, HSS’s Office of Independent Oversight, and the Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
The end of the Cold War left the United States with a surplus of weapons-grade plutonium, which poses proliferation and safety risks. Much of this material is found in a key nuclear weapon component known as a pit. The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for domestic nuclear reactors. To do so, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is constructing two facilities--a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and a Waste Solidification Building (WSB)--at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. GAO was asked to assess the (1) cost and schedule status of the MFFF and WSB construction projects, (2) status of NNSA's plans for pit disassembly and conversion, (3) status of NNSA's plans to obtain customers for MOX fuel from the MFFF, and (4) actions that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE have taken to provide independent nuclear safety oversight. GAO reviewed NNSA documents and project data, toured DOE facilities, and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, and nuclear utilities.
What GAO Found
The MFFF and WSB projects both appear to be meeting their cost targets for construction, but the MFFF project has experienced schedule delays. Specifically, the MFFF and WSB projects are on track to meet their respective construction cost estimates of $4.9 billion and $344 million. However, the MFFF project has experienced some delays over the past 2 years, due in part to the delivery of reinforcing bars that did not meet nuclear quality standards. Project officials said that they expect to recover from these delays by the end of 2010 and plan for the start of MFFF operations on schedule in 2016. The WSB project appears to be on schedule. NNSA is reconsidering its alternatives for establishing a pit disassembly and conversion capability. However, it seems unlikely that NNSA will be able to establish this capability in time to produce the plutonium feedstock needed to operate the MFFF, due to the amount of time and effort needed to reconsider alternatives and construct a facility as well as the amount of uncertainty associated with NNSA's current plans. NNSA had previously planned to build a stand-alone facility near the MFFF construction site to disassemble pits and convert the plutonium into a form suitable for use by the MFFF. However, NNSA is now considering a plan to combine this capability with another project at an existing facility at the Savannah River Site. NNSA officials could not estimate when the agency will reach a final decision or establish more definitive cost and schedule estimates for the project. However, NNSA's new alternative depends on an aggressive, potentially unrealistic schedule. In addition, NNSA has not sufficiently planned for the maturation of critical technologies to be used in pit disassembly and conversion operations, some of which are being tested at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. NNSA has one potential customer for most of its MOX fuel, but outreach to other utilities may be insufficient. NNSA is in discussions with the Tennessee Valley Authority to provide MOX fuel for five reactors. NNSA plans to offer several incentives to potential customers, including offering to sell MOX fuel at a discount relative to the price of uranium fuel. In interviews with the nation's nuclear utilities, GAO found that while many of the utilities expressed interest in NNSA's proposed incentives, the majority of utilities also expressed little interest in becoming MOX fuel customers. This suggests that NNSA's outreach to utilities may not be sufficient. NRC is currently reviewing the MFFF's license application and has identified several issues related to construction. However, oversight of the MFFF and the WSB by DOE's independent nuclear safety entities has been limited. For example, DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security has not conducted any oversight activities or participated in any project reviews of the WSB, despite the WSB's status as a high-hazard nuclear facility. In addition, NNSA's Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety has not conducted any nuclear safety oversight activities for the MFFF project and has not conducted all oversight activities for the WSB project that are required by DOE order. |
gao_GAO-06-336 | gao_GAO-06-336_0 | Financial Incentives and Benefits, Access to an Affordable Supply, and Environmental Benefits Facilitated the Use of Woody Biomass among Users We Reviewed
The users in our review cited several factors contributing to their use of woody biomass, primarily financial incentives and benefits but also other factors such as an affordable supply of woody biomass and environmental considerations. Financial incentives encouraging the use of woody biomass included financial assistance, while financial benefits included energy cost savings from using woody biomass in place of other fuels. Two users were unable to obtain a sufficient supply of woody biomass, and several more told us they had difficulty obtaining the material from federal lands. The lack of supply from federal lands was a commonly expressed concern among the woody biomass users on the West Coast and in the Rocky Mountain region, with five of the seven users we reviewed in these regions (including one of the power plants running at about 60 percent capacity) telling us they had difficulty obtaining supply from federal lands. In such cases, users obtained woody biomass from state or private lands, or relied on alternative wood materials such as sawmill residues or urban wood waste. Current Users’ Experiences Offer Insights for Government Efforts to Expand the Use of Woody Biomass
Our findings offer several insights for promoting greater use of woody biomass. First, rather than helping to defray the costs of forest thinning, attempts to encourage the use of woody biomass may instead stimulate the use of other wood materials such as mill residues or commercial logging slash. Market Forces May Lead Wood Users to Forgo Small- Diameter Trees in Favor of Alternatives
One goal of the federal government’s efforts to stimulate woody biomass use is to defray the cost to the government of thinning millions of acres of land at risk of wildland fire by creating a market for the resulting materials. The Effectiveness of Efforts to Encourage Woody Biomass Use May Depend on the Presence of Other Wood-Related Industries
Government activities may be more effective in stimulating woody biomass use if they take into account the extent to which a logging and milling infrastructure is in place in potential users’ locations. The availability of an affordable supply of woody biomass depends to a significant degree on the presence of a local logging and milling infrastructure to collect and process forest materials. Efforts to Encourage Woody Biomass Use May Be More Effective If They Are Tailored to the Scale and Nature of Recipients’ Use
Government activities may be more effective in stimulating woody biomass use if their efforts are tailored to the scale and nature of the users being targeted. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior for review and comment. The departments generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments that were incorporated into this report, as appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify key factors facilitating the use of woody biomass among selected users, (2) identify challenges these users have faced in using woody biomass, and (3) discuss the insights our findings offer for promoting greater use of woody biomass. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is placing greater emphasis on thinning vegetation on public lands to reduce the risk of wildland fire. To help defray the cost of thinning efforts, it also is seeking to stimulate a market for the resulting material, including the smaller trees, limbs, and brush--referred to as woody biomass--that traditionally have had little or no commercial value. As GAO has reported in the past, the increased use of woody biomass faces obstacles, including the high cost of harvesting and transporting it and an unpredictable supply in some locations. Nevertheless, some entities, such as schools and businesses, are utilizing the material, potentially offering insights for broadening its use. GAO agreed to (1) identify key factors facilitating the use of woody biomass among selected users, (2) identify challenges these users have faced in using woody biomass, and (3) discuss any insights that these findings may offer for promoting greater use of woody biomass. In responding to a draft of this report, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior all generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
Financial incentives and benefits associated with using woody biomass were the primary factors facilitating its use among the 13 users GAO reviewed. Four users received financial assistance (such as state or federal grants) to begin their use of woody biomass, three received ongoing financial support related to its use, and several reported energy cost savings over fossil fuels. Using woody biomass also was attractive to some users because it was available, affordable, and environmentally beneficial. Several users GAO reviewed, however, cited challenges in using woody biomass, such as difficulty obtaining a sufficient supply of the material. For example, two power plants reported running at about 60 percent of capacity because they could not obtain enough material. Some users also reported that they had difficulty obtaining woody biomass from federal lands, instead relying on woody biomass from private lands or on alternatives such as sawmill residues. Some users also cited increased equipment and maintenance costs associated with using the material. The experiences of the 13 users offer several important insights for the federal government to consider as it attempts to promote greater use of woody biomass. First, if not appropriately designed, efforts to encourage its use may simply stimulate the use of sawmill residues or other alternative wood materials, which some users stated are cheaper or easier to use than woody biomass. Second, the lack of a local logging and milling infrastructure to collect and process forest materials may limit the availability of woody biomass; thus, government activities may be more effective in stimulating its use if they take into account the extent of infrastructure in place. Similarly, government activities such as awarding grants or supplying woody biomass may stimulate its use more effectively if they are tailored to the scale and nature of the targeted users. However, agencies must remain alert to potential unintended ecological consequences of their efforts. |
gao_RCED-97-194 | gao_RCED-97-194_0 | 2.) Commercial passenger vehicles enter the United States through the U.S. Customs Service’s passenger vehicle ports of entry, which are physically separate from the crossings that commercial trucks use to enter the United States. For the most part, the states have adopted the federal standards. FHWA and state safety inspectors use these procedures when inspecting commercial passenger vehicles entering the United States from Mexico. Limited Information Exists on Commercial Passenger Vehicles Entering the United States From Mexico
Customs data show that, from June 1996 through May 1997 (the latest data available), there were an average of about 598 northbound commercial passenger vehicle crossings each day along the U.S.-Mexico border (see table 1). While Customs records the number of crossings, it does not keep records on the number or type of individual commercial passenger vehicles that cross the border. FHWA inspectors in Texas and state inspectors in California conducted border safety inspections of 528 commercial passenger vehicles from January through May 1997 out of an estimated 90,000 border crossings during that period. About 22 percent of the vehicles inspected were placed out of service. Some of these were vehicles owned and operated by U.S. carriers. FHWA inspectors in California and state inspectors in Texas had not conducted any inspections as of May 1997. The dearth of safety inspections, coupled with insufficient information on the number and kinds of Mexican commercial passenger vehicles entering the United States, precludes any assessment of whether these commercial passenger vehicles are safe and are being operated safely. Safety Inspections in California
FHWA is not conducting safety inspections of commercial passenger vehicles entering California from Mexico. 4). Twenty-eight (21 percent) of these vehicles were placed out of service for serious safety violations, such as inoperative brakes or air suspension problems. Of these 28 vehicles, 24 were owned and operated by U.S. carriers, 17 of them by a single U.S. company. Texas safety inspectors are not inspecting commercial passenger vehicles arriving from Mexico because (1) their priority is to inspect commercial trucks entering the United States from Mexico, (2) FHWA is currently inspecting commercial passenger vehicles at the border, and (3) they need a budget for these activities from the state legislature and inspection locations that provide for passenger safety while inspections are taking place. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether commercial passenger vehicles entering the United States from Mexico are meeting U.S. safety standards, focusing on: (1) the number and types of commercial passenger vehicles entering U.S. border states from Mexico; and (2) actions taken by the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) and U.S. border states to provide safety inspections for commercial passenger vehicles arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to the U.S. Customs Service, there were about 218,000 commercial passenger vehicle crossings from Mexico to the United States, a daily average of 598 crossings, from June 1996 through May 1997, the latest data available; (2) about 85 percent of these crossings occurred at four crossing points, two in California and two in Texas; (3) while Customs records the number of vehicle crossings from Mexico into the United States, many of these vehicles may cross the border several times a day (e.g., airport shuttles) and each crossing is included in Customs' vehicle crossing count; (4) furthermore, Customs does not record the identity of individual vehicles, the type of vehicle (e.g., motor coaches or vans), or whether the vehicle is owned by either a U.S. or Mexican carrier; (5) as a result, no reliable information exists either on the actual number of Mexican-owned commercial passenger vehicles that enter the United States or on how many of each type of vehicle enters the country--information needed to assess the extent to which these vehicles are safe and are operated safely; (6) FHwA and state inspectors have carried out few safety inspections of commercial passenger vehicles entering the United States from Mexico primarily because their emphasis has been on inspecting commercial trucks; (7) FHwA inspectors in Texas and state inspectors in California conducted border safety inspections of 528 commercial passenger vehicles from January through May 1997 out of an estimated 90,000 crossings; (8) about 22 percent of these commercial passenger vehicles were placed out of service for serious safety violations, such as steering or brake problems; (9) FHwA inspectors in California and state inspectors in Texas had not conducted any inspections as of May 1997; and (10) the dearth of safety inspections, coupled with insufficient information on the number and kinds of Mexican-owned commercial passenger vehicles entering the United States, precludes any assessment of whether these commercial passenger vehicles are safe and are being operated safely. |
gao_GAO-17-115 | gao_GAO-17-115_0 | Some Pharmacies Can Provide Accessible Labels but Dispensed Few of Them and Have Implemented Most of the U.S. Access Board’s Best Practices
Mail Order Pharmacies and Some Retail Pharmacies Can Provide Accessible Labels
The mail order pharmacies operated by the 4 PBMs, some retail pharmacies operated by the 9 chain pharmacy companies, and some of the 18 individual chain and independent retail pharmacy locations that we contacted for this review said they can provide accessible labels as of March 31, 2016. Additionally, officials from 8 of the 18 randomly selected individual chain and independent retail pharmacy locations reported they can provide accessible labels. Mail Order and Retail Pharmacies Dispensed Few Prescriptions with Accessible Labels
Officials from the four PBMs and three of the six chain pharmacy companies that can provide accessible labels through their pharmacies reported that the percent of prescriptions dispensed with such labels was generally low—less than 1 percent. Mail Order and Retail Pharmacies Reported Implementing Most of the Best Practices for Accessible Labels
Officials from the four PBMs, six chain pharmacy companies, and eight individual retail pharmacy locations that we contacted and that can provide accessible labels reported that their mail order and retail pharmacies have generally implemented most of the 34 best practices for these labels. See tables 5 through 7 for further detail on the audible, braille, and large print format-specific best practices implemented by PBMs, chain pharmacy companies, and individual retail pharmacy locations. Stakeholders Identified Pharmacy Challenges and Steps for Providing Accessible Labels or Implementing the U.S. Access Board’s Best Practices
Stakeholders most often identified four key challenges that pharmacies had in providing accessible labels or implementing the best practices and identified steps that could address some of these challenges. Other stakeholders. For example, the four states and an industry group representing physicians told us that they were unaware of the best practices prior to our contact with them. Low demand and high costs for providing accessible labels. Absence of requirements to implement the best practices. State regulations. NCD Has Conducted Limited Campaign Activities, but Has Not Assigned Responsibilities for Future Activities Nor Evaluated Its Activities
We found that NCD conducted limited campaign activities from July 2013 through August 2016 to inform and educate pharmacies (including pharmacists and pharmacy staff), individuals who are blind or visually impaired, and the public about the best practices. However, the agency did not conduct any campaign activities in 2015. Most of the selected stakeholders we spoke with—including PBMs, chain pharmacy companies, states, and advocacy groups—have not had any communication with NCD about its campaign, and, as previously discussed, some were unaware of the best practices. The development of this corrective action plan is a positive step to conduct campaign activities. However, neither the original plan nor the corrective action plan assigned responsibilities for campaign activities. However, there continues to be a lack of awareness among a variety of stakeholders that these best practices exist. Although NCD now has a corrective action plan for activities it intends to conduct through fiscal year 2017, it has not assigned responsibilities for these activities and has not developed an evaluation strategy for its activities, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Without ensuring these elements are in place, NCD will be unable to adjust its corrective action plan and assess whether the information it is providing on the best practices are effectively reaching its target audience. Recommendation for Executive Action
The Executive Director of NCD should assign responsibilities for conducting future campaign activities and develop an evaluation plan for its activities. Appendix I: Description of Web-Based Questionnaire
We developed a web-based questionnaire that included questions on 1. the extent to which pharmacies can provide accessible labels and have implemented the specific U.S. Access Board’s best practices for making information on prescription drug container labels accessible to individuals who are blind or visually impaired (henceforth referred to as best practices); 2. barriers that individuals who are blind or visually impaired face in accessing information on prescription drug container labels; and 3. factors that affect pharmacies’ implementation of the best practices and steps that could address any implementation challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 7.4 million Americans are blind or visually impaired and may face difficulty reading prescription drug container labels. FDASIA required the U.S. Access Board to develop best practices for accessible labels and NCD to conduct an informational campaign on these best practices.
FDASIA also included a provision for GAO to review pharmacies' implementation of these best practices. This report examines: the extent to which pharmacies can and do provide accessible labels and implement the best practices; pharmacy challenges; and the extent to which NCD conducted its informational campaign, among others.
GAO collected information from 55 stakeholders, including 4 PBMs used by large insurers; 9 of the largest chain pharmacy companies; 18 randomly selected individual retail pharmacy locations in 4 states with varying levels of visually impaired residents; and 24 others, such as state regulating bodies and advocacy and industry groups. GAO sent a web-based questionnaire to PBMs, chain pharmacy companies, and individual retail pharmacy locations. GAO also interviewed stakeholders and reviewed state regulations and documents from NCD.
What GAO Found
GAO found that some pharmacies can provide accessible prescription drug labels, which include labels in audible, braille, and large print formats and are affixed to prescription drug containers.
Mail order pharmacies: Four pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) used by large insurers that GAO contacted reported that they can provide accessible labels through their mail order pharmacies.
Retail pharmacies: Six of the 9 largest chain pharmacy companies and 8 of the 18 selected individual retail pharmacy locations GAO contacted also reported that they can provide accessible labels through their store-based retail pharmacies.
The percent of prescriptions dispensed with accessible labels was generally low—less than one percent of all prescriptions dispensed—according to some PBMs and chain pharmacy companies that GAO contacted. With regard to best practices, a working group convened by the U.S. Access Board—a federal agency that promotes accessibility for individuals with disabilities—developed and published 34 best practices for accessible labels. Four PBMs, six chain pharmacy companies, and eight individual retail pharmacy locations GAO contacted reported that they have generally implemented most of the 34 best practices for accessible labels. However, stakeholders GAO contacted said that individuals who are blind or visually impaired continue to face barriers accessing drug label information, including identifying pharmacies that can provide accessible labels.
Stakeholders GAO contacted identified four key challenges that pharmacies faced in providing accessible labels or implementing the best practices: (1) lack of awareness of the best practices; (2) low demand and high costs for providing accessible labels; (3) technical challenges for providing these labels; and (4) an absence of requirements to implement the best practices. Many stakeholders identified greater dissemination of the best practices as a step, among others, that could help address some of these challenges.
The National Council on Disability (NCD)—the federal agency responsible for conducting an informational campaign on the best practices, as required by the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA)—has conducted limited campaign activities. Primarily in 2013 and 2014, NCD used its website and social media to disseminate an agency statement and press releases on the best practices. However, most stakeholders GAO spoke with said they had no communication with NCD about its campaign, and some said they were unaware of the best practices. Agency officials provided GAO with an original plan for conducting campaign activities through 2014, but most activities were not conducted. During the course of our review, NCD developed a corrective action plan for conducting future campaign activities. However, neither plan assigned responsibilities for conducting these activities nor does the agency have plans to evaluate them, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Without assigning responsibilities and developing an evaluation plan, NCD will be unable to adjust its action plan and assess whether the information on the best practices is effectively reaching its target audience.
What GAO Recommends
NCD should assign responsibility for conducting campaign activities and evaluate these activities. NCD neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation but indicated that it is taking steps to address this issue. |
gao_GAO-09-607T | gao_GAO-09-607T_0 | USAID’s total obligations for A&A instruments more than doubled from about $5 billion in fiscal year 2002 to about $11 billion in fiscal year 2008. USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce Plan
USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable and Up-to-Date Data on A&A Staff Levels
In September 2008, we reported that USAID lacked the capacity to develop and implement an A&A strategic workforce plan because the agency lacked sufficiently reliable and up-to-date overseas A&A staff level data and comprehensive information on the competencies of its A&A staff, who play a critical role in assisting COs and CTOs in overseas missions. We also noted that OAA does not systematically track the number of overseas A&A specialists, and its data on overseas A&A staff levels are out of date. USAID Has Not Matched A&A Staff to Workload at Missions We Visited
A possible effect of USAID’s lack of reliable and up-to-date data on the level of A&A staffing at its overseas locations is that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff do not match A&A workload. At some missions we visited last year, the numbers of A&A staff with the necessary competencies were considerably less than adequate, while at other missions they were more than adequate, according to mission officials. The mission director and A&A staff in Kazakhstan—a regional mission responsible for A&A activities at missions in Kazakhstan and four other Central Asian countries that do not have on-site A&A specialists—told us that they could not adequately support A&A activities at those four missions because of a heavy workload and competing demands from other missions in the region. For example, they said they had delayed time-sensitive seasonal agricultural projects because the CO was not available when needed to approve contracts. USAID’s Recent Planning Efforts Do Not Comprehensively Address Its Strategic A&A Workforce Planning Needs
USAID has launched some ad hoc attempts to address its A&A workforce issues. Taken together, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function
USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide adequate oversight of its A&A function. OAA’s Evaluation Division is responsible for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing the agency’s A&A operations worldwide. In fiscal year 2007, the Evaluation Division developed an annual scorecard evaluation, intended to be completed by all COs as a self-assessment of their A&A operations. The division has finished piloting the scorecard evaluations at four missions and identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has set a goal of implementing the scorecard evaluation and on-site visits to at least 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, agency officials informed us that the Evaluation Division did not have the staff needed to fully implement the evaluation mechanism. Without implementing the evaluation mechanism it has developed, USAID cannot certify the overall adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function. Without sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff, which are key elements of federal workforce planning models, USAID cannot identify its critical staffing needs and adjust its staffing patterns to meet those needs. Finally, the Evaluation Division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9 staff as of April 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition and assistance (A&A) instruments--contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements--it awards to implementing organizations. From fiscal years 2002 through 2008, USAID's A&A obligations increased from about $5 billion to about $11 billion. A&A staff--contracting officers (COs) and A&A specialists--are primarily responsible for managing A&A instruments. This testimony is based on a September 2008 GAO report that examined USAID's capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function.
What GAO Found
USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan because it is missing two elements: (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A staff. Data on the numbers of overseas A&A specialists collected by two USAID offices were unreliable or out of date. GAO found significant discrepancies between these offices' data sets and officials acknowledged that their A&A staff level data are neither reliable nor up-to-date. Also, USAID has not collected comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists. GAO's model of strategic workforce planning notes the importance of these data in developing a plan that could enable the agency to better match staff levels to changing workloads. During fieldwork at 7 USAID missions, GAO found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workloads at some missions. The numbers of A&A staff with the needed competencies were less than adequate at some missions, while at others they were more than adequate. For example, officials at the mission in Mali said they had delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the mission in Peru said the current number of A&A staff may be more than adequate. In GAO's survey administered to USAID A&A staff in headquarters and overseas, most of the survey respondents overseas reported difficulty in altering staffing patterns to meet A&A workloads. USAID's efforts to address its A&A workforce issues do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, USAID does not have adequate information to address current workload imbalances. USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A function. The Evaluation Division in the Office of Acquisition and Assistance is responsible for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing A&A operations worldwide. In fiscal year 2007, the division developed an evaluation mechanism that combines scorecard evaluations, in which COs self-assess their A&A operations, and onsite visits by division staff to selected locations based on the scorecard results and other factors. The division has completed scorecard evaluations at 4 missions and identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has set a goal of implementing this evaluation mechanism, including on-site visits to 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, according to agency officials, the division did not have the staff level needed to fully implement this evaluation mechanism. The division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9 staff as of April 2009 and completed two more evaluations. However, USAID officials told us that OAA has not implemented the evaluation mechanism due to other priorities. As a result, USAID cannot certify the adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function. |
gao_GAO-13-211 | gao_GAO-13-211_0 | DOJ Has Determined That 19 of 56 Jurisdictions Have Substantially Implemented SORNA; Other Jurisdictions Reported Political Will and Legal Barriers as Challenges
DOJ Has Determined That 19 Jurisdictions Have Substantially Implemented SORNA and Another 17 Have Implemented More than Half of the Act’s Requirements
As of November 2012, 37 of 56 jurisdictions had submitted complete implementation packages for review, and the SMART Office has determined that 19 of those jurisdictions (16 states and 3 territories) have substantially implemented SORNA and another 17 have not, as shown in figure 1. Although the SMART Office determined that the remaining 17 states and territories that submitted complete implementation packages for review have not yet substantially implemented SORNA, the office concluded that 15 of these 17 jurisdictions have implemented at least half of the 14 sections of requirements outlined in the checklist tool. Officials from the SMART Office presented Officials who responded to our survey identified actions their jurisdictions were taking to address implementation challenges. Stakeholders Reported Both Positive and Negative Effects as a Result of Implementing SORNA
Given the lack of studies and data on the impact of SORNA, as part of our review, we obtained perspectives from representatives of various criminal justice components in five jurisdictions that implemented the act about the outcomes, both positive and negative, that they have experienced as a result of implementation. Officials from 4 of 12 implementing jurisdictions that responded to the question about positive effects of SORNA reported that a benefit of implementing the act was improved monitoring of registered sex offenders, and perspectives from officials representing state registries, law enforcement agencies, and probation offices also indicated that SORNA resulted in benefits In particular, stakeholders associated with tracking sex offenders.identified increased information sharing, as well as other aspects of SORNA, such as increased frequency of registration, and increased collaboration, as helping them to better track the whereabouts of sex offenders, as described below. Survey respondents and representatives from various criminal justice components said that SORNA has enhanced information sharing on registered sex offenders between criminal justice components, in part through the use of certain databases to exchange information. For example, in one federal district, U.S. Officials from public defender and probation offices stated that SORNA implementation has made it more difficult for registered sex offenders to obtain housing and employment, which can negatively affect their ability to reintegrate into their communities. A Comprehensive Study by NIJ on SORNA’s Effects Should Help Address Research Gaps on the Law’s Impact
The Adam Walsh Act requires NIJ, the research and evaluation agency of DOJ, to conduct a comprehensive examination of sex offender issues, including SORNA’s effectiveness in increasing compliance with sex offender registration and notification requirements and the effect of sex offender registration and notification requirements on increasing public safety. NIJ officials stated that the money authorized in support of this study has not been appropriated. The Deputy Director of NIJ stated that NIJ does not proactively request funding that Congress has authorized for specific studies, but typically waits for Congress to decide when to appropriate the funding. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to address the following questions:
To what extent has the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) determined that jurisdictions have met the requirements for substantial implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and what challenges, if any, have jurisdictions faced in implementing the act? For jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA, what are the reported effects that the act has had on public safety, criminal justice stakeholders, and registered sex offenders? For this report, we assessed SORNA implementation efforts for the 50 states, the 5 principal U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), and the District of Columbia. To address the first objective, we analyzed reports that the SMART Office prepared from September 2009 through September 2012 for jurisdictions that submitted packages on their implementation efforts to the office for review. We selected these jurisdictions to represent a range in the number of registered sex offenders per 100,000 residents and the year that the jurisdiction substantially implemented the act. Appendix V: Challenges to Implementing SORNA Reported by Survey Respondents from Nonimplemented Jurisdictions
Officials from 29 of the 33 nonimplemented jurisdictions that responded to our survey questions on challenges to implementing SORNA reported that their jurisdictions faced challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Studies estimate that about 1 in every 5 girls and 1 in every 7 to 10 boys are sexually abused. In 2006, Congress passed SORNA, which introduced new sex offender registration standards for all 50 states, 5 U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), the District of Columbia, and certain Indian tribes. SORNA established the SMART Office to determine if these jurisdictions have "substantially implemented" the law, and to assist them in doing so. The deadline to implement SORNA was July 2009; given that none of the jurisdictions met this deadline, DOJ authorized two 1-year extensions. This report addresses: (1) To what extent has the SMART Office determined that jurisdictions have substantially implemented SORNA, and what challenges, if any, have jurisdictions faced? (2) For jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA, what are the reported effects that the act has had on public safety, criminal justice stakeholders, and registered sex offenders?
GAO analyzed SMART Office implementation status reports from September 2009 through September 2012. To identify any challenges, GAO surveyed officials in the 50 states, 5 U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia; GAO received responses from 93 percent (52 of 56) of them. The survey results can be viewed at GAO-13-234SP . GAO visited or interviewed criminal justice officials in five jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA, chosen to represent a range in the number of registered sex offenders per 100,000 residents. Their perspectives are not generalizable, but provided insights.
What GAO Found
The Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) has determined that 19 of the 37 jurisdictions that have submitted packages for review have substantially implemented the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Although the SMART Office has determined that 17 of the jurisdictions that submitted packages have not yet substantially implemented SORNA, the office concluded that 15 of these 17 jurisdictions have implemented at least half of the SORNA requirements; the office has not yet made a determination for 1 jurisdiction that submitted a package. A majority of nonimplemented jurisdictions reported that generating the political will to incorporate the necessary changes to their state laws and related policies or reconciling legal conflicts are among the greatest challenges to implementation. For example, officials from 27 nonimplemented jurisdictions reported reconciling conflicts between SORNA and state laws--such as which offenses should require registration--as a challenge to implementing SORNA. Officials from 5 of 18 jurisdictions that responded to a survey question asking how DOJ could help address these challenges reported that the SMART Office could provide greater flexibilities; however, SMART Office officials said they have offered as many flexibilities as possible and further changes would take legislative action.
A few studies have been conducted on the effects of certain SORNA requirements on jurisdictions and registered sex offenders, but GAO did not find any that evaluated the effects on public safety following SORNA implementation; stakeholders reported both positive and negative effects as a result of implementing the law. Officials from 4 of 12 implementing jurisdictions who responded to the survey reported that one benefit was improved monitoring of registered sex offenders. Stakeholders also reported that SORNA resulted in enhanced information sharing on registered sex offenders between criminal justice components, in part through the use of certain databases that enable jurisdictions to share information with one another. Stakeholders and survey respondents also identified negative or unintended consequences of implementing SORNA. For example, officials from three of five state agencies and all eight of the local law enforcement agencies GAO interviewed stated that their workload has increased, in part because of the increased frequency at which sex offenders must update their registration information as a result of the act. Officials from a majority of the public defender and probation offices also said that SORNA implementation has made it more difficult for registered sex offenders to obtain housing and employment, which can negatively affect their ability to reintegrate into their communities. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is statutorily required to study SORNA's effectiveness in increasing compliance with requirements and the effect of these requirements on increasing public safety. As of December 2012, DOJ had not requested the funding to conduct this study and the funding had not been appropriated. NIJ officials stated that NIJ does not proactively request funding for specific studies, but waits for Congress to decide when to appropriate the funding. Neither DOJ nor the Administrative Office of the United States Courts provided written comments on this report. |
gao_GAO-16-228T | gao_GAO-16-228T_0 | Ineffective protection of these information systems and networks can impair delivery of vital services, and result in loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, such as personally identifiable information; disruption of essential operations supporting critical infrastructure, national defense, or emergency services; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that erode the public’s confidence in government; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch attacks on other systems; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation. To support these activities, the department relies on a variety of information technology (IT) systems and infrastructure. Cyber Threats to Federal Systems Continue to Evolve amid Increasing Numbers of Incidents
Risks to cyber-based assets can originate from unintentional or intentional threats. Unintentional threats can be caused by, among other things, natural disasters, defective computer or network equipment, software coding errors, and the actions of careless or poorly trained employees. As we reported in February 2015, since fiscal year 2006, the number of information security incidents reported to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) affecting systems supporting the federal government has steadily increased each year. Figure 2 shows the different types of incidents reported by Education in fiscal year 2014. Similar to Other Agencies, Information Security Weaknesses Place Education’s Systems and Sensitive Data at Risk
Given the risks posed by cyber threats and the increasing number of incidents, it is crucial that federal agencies, such as Education, take appropriate steps to secure their systems and information. As we reported in September 2015, for fiscal year 2014 most of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act, including Education, had weaknesses in most of the five major categories of information system controls. These control categories are: (1) access controls, which limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure; (2) configuration management controls, intended to prevent unauthorized changes to information system resources (for example, software programs and hardware configurations) and assure that software is current and known vulnerabilities are patched; (3) segregation of duties, which prevents a single individual from controlling all critical stages of a process by splitting responsibilities between two or more organizational groups; (4) contingency planning, which helps avoid significant disruptions in computer-dependent operations; and (5) agency-wide security management, which provides a framework for ensuring that risks are understood and that effective controls are selected, implemented, and operating as intended. Security management: For fiscal year 2014, 23 agencies, including Education, had weaknesses reported in security management, which is an underlying cause for information security control deficiencies identified at federal agencies. Specifically, for fiscal year 2014, 19 agencies—including Education—reported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency in internal controls over their financial reporting. Further, 23 of 24 inspectors general for the agencies, including Education, cited information security as a “major management challenge” for their agency. Over the last several years, we and agency inspectors general have made thousands of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their implementation of information security controls. For example, we have made about 2,000 recommendations over the last 6 years. Agency inspectors general have also made a multitude of recommendations to assist their agencies. Many agencies continue to have weaknesses in implementing these controls in part because many of these recommendations remain unimplemented. Until federal agencies take actions to implement the recommendations made by us and the inspectors general—federal systems and information, as well as sensitive personal information about the public, will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats. While federal agencies, including the Department of Education, have established information security programs, weaknesses in these programs persist, and more needs to be done to fully implement them and to address existing weaknesses. Federal Information Security: Agencies Need to Correct Weaknesses and Fully Implement Security Programs, GAO-15-714. Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Address Challenges Facing Federal Systems. Information Security: Federal Agencies Need to Enhance Responses to Data Breaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats to its systems and data, and data breaches at federal agencies have compromised sensitive personal information, affecting millions of people. Education, in carrying out its mission of serving America's students, relies extensively on IT systems that collect and process a large amount of sensitive information. Accordingly, it is important for federal agencies such as Education to implement information security programs that can help protect systems and networks. GAO has identified federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997, and in February 2015 expanded this to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information.
This statement provides information on cyber threats facing federal systems and information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies, including Education. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work and updated data on security incidents and federal cybersecurity efforts.
What GAO Found
Cyber-based risks to federal systems and information can come from unintentional threats, such as natural disasters, software coding errors, and poorly trained or careless employees, or intentional threats, such as disgruntled insiders, hackers, or hostile nations. These threat sources may exploit vulnerabilities in agencies' systems and networks to steal or disclose sensitive information, among other things. Since fiscal year 2006, the number of reported information security incidents affecting federal systems has steadily increased, rising from about 5,500 in fiscal year 2006 to almost 67,200 in fiscal year 2014. At the Department of Education, the number of incidents reported since 2009 has fluctuated, but generally increased.
GAO reported in September 2015, that most of 24 major agencies (including Education) had weaknesses in at least three of five major categories of information security controls for fiscal year 2014. These are controls intended to (1) limit unauthorized access to agency systems and information; (2) ensure that software and hardware are authorized, updated, monitored, and securely configured; (3) appropriately divide duties so that no single person can control all aspects of a computer-related operation; (4) establish plans for continuing information system operations in the event of a disaster, and (5) provide a security management framework for understanding risks and ensuring that controls are selected, implemented, and operating as intended. The figure below shows the number of agencies with weaknesses in these control categories.
In addition, 19 agencies—including Education—reported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency for fiscal year 2014. Further, inspectors general for 23 of 24 agencies, including Education, cited information security as a major management challenge. In prior reports, GAO and inspectors general have made thousands of recommendations to agencies to address deficiencies in their information security controls and weaknesses in their programs, but many of these recommendations remain open. Until agencies implement these recommendations, sensitive information will remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction.
What GAO Recommends
Over the past 6 years, GAO has made about 2,000 recommendations to federal agencies to correct weaknesses and fully implement agency-wide information security programs. Agencies have implemented about 58 percent of these recommendations. Agency inspectors general have also made a multitude of recommendations to assist their agencies. |
gao_GAO-07-604 | gao_GAO-07-604_0 | However, they generally agree that the level of risk that H5N1 will spark a pandemic varies with (1) environmental factors, defined as the extent to which a country or region has already become infected with the virus—or may become infected from a neighboring country—and provides conditions in which the virus can spread in poultry and infect humans, and (2) preparedness factors, defined as the extent to which the country or region is prepared to detect the virus in poultry and humans and respond appropriately. This increases the potential for mutations, and thus the emergence of a pandemic strain. Four of these focus in large measure on improving capacity to forestall a pandemic:Improve animal health practices and the performance of veterinary services. Assessment efforts that we examined, carried out by U.S. and international agencies from late 2005 through late 2006, illustrate these gaps. Efforts to assemble more comprehensive information are under way, but will take time to produce results. USAID, State Department, and UN Data Collection Efforts Have Found Widespread Preparedness Weaknesses but Have Not Resulted in Clear Country Comparisons
USAID, the State Department, and the UN System Influenza Coordinator have each administered questionnaires to assess country-by-country avian and pandemic influenza preparedness. These efforts identified widespread preparedness shortfalls. For example, the UN found that about one-third of the countries lacked the capacity to diagnose avian influenza in humans. World Bank-Led Missions Have Provided Additional Information for Some Countries but Have Not Provided Basis for Comprehensive Comparisons
The World Bank has conducted more in-depth assessments of both environmental and preparedness-related risk factors in some countries (those that have expressed interest in World Bank assistance), but they do not provide a basis for making complete or comprehensive global comparisons. The United States Has Prioritized Countries Based on Available Information
The United States has prioritized countries for U.S. assistance, with the Homeland Security Council identifying about 20 “priority countries,” and agency officials have determined that the United States should focus in particular on certain of these countries where pandemic risk levels appear comparatively high. In May 2006, the Homeland Security Council categorized countries, using the limited information available on environmental and preparedness- related risks from U.S. and international agencies, and also taking U.S. foreign policy concerns into account. The United States Has Played a Prominent Role in Global Efforts to Improve Preparedness
The United States has played a prominent role in global efforts to improve avian and pandemic influenza preparedness, committing more funds than any other donor country and creating a framework for monitoring its efforts. USAID and HHS have provided most of the U.S. funds, while the State Department coordinates the United States’ international efforts. The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan establishes a framework for U.S. efforts to improve international (and domestic) preparedness, listing specific action items, assigning agencies responsibility for completing them, and specifying performance measures and time frames for determining whether they have been completed. The council reported in December 2006 that all action items due to be completed by November had been completed, and provided evidence of timely completion for the majority of the items. Most Country-Specific Commitments Have Gone to U.S. According to data compiled by the World Bank, about 72 percent of U.S. country-specific commitments and about 76 percent of overall donor country-specific commitments through December 2006 were to U.S. priority countries. These agencies generally concurred with our findings, and we incorporated their technical comments in the report as appropriate. To describe the overall strategy that the United States and its international partners have developed to respond to the H5N1 epidemic, we interviewed and examined relevant documents from U.S. and UN agencies, including the U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and strategy statements and progress reports produced by the UN System Influenza Coordinator and the World Bank. To examine the extent to which U.S. and international agencies have been able to assess the pandemic risk that H5N1 presents in individual countries and prioritize them for international assistance, we reviewed and analyzed assessments of environmental risk and preparedness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, a global epidemic of avian influenza has raised concern about the risk of an influenza pandemic among humans, which could cause millions of deaths. The United States and its international partners have begun implementing a strategy to forestall (prevent or delay) a pandemic and prepare to cope should one occur. Disease experts generally agree that the risk of a pandemic strain emerging from avian influenza in a given country varies with (1) environmental factors, such as disease presence and certain high-risk farming practices, and (2) preparedness factors, such as a country's capacity to control outbreaks. This report describes (1) U.S. and international efforts to assess pandemic risk by country and prioritize countries for assistance and (2) steps that the United States and international partners have taken to improve the ability to forestall a pandemic. To address these objectives, we interviewed officials and analyzed data from U.S. agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental experts. The U.S. and international agencies whose efforts we describe reviewed a draft of this report. In general, they concurred with our findings. Several provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Assessments by U.S. agencies and international organizations have identified widespread risks of the emergence of pandemic influenza and the United States has identified priority countries for assistance, but information gaps limit the capacity for comprehensive comparisons of risk levels by country. Several assessments we examined, which have considered environmental or preparedness-related risks or both, illustrate these gaps. For example, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assessment categorized countries according to the level of environmental risk--considering factors such as disease presence and the likelihood of transmission from nearby countries, but factors such as limited understanding of the role of poultry trade or wild birds constrain the reliability of the conclusions. Further, USAID, the State Department, and the United Nations have administered questionnaires to assess country preparedness and World Bank-led missions have gathered detailed information in some countries, but these efforts do not provide a basis for making comprehensive global comparisons. Efforts to get better information are under way but will take time. The U.S. Homeland Security Council has designated priority countries for assistance, and agencies have further identified several countries as meriting the most extensive efforts, but officials acknowledge that these designations are based on limited information. The United States has played a prominent role in global efforts to improve avian and pandemic influenza preparedness, committing the greatest share of funds and creating a framework for managing its efforts. Through 2006, the United States had committed about $377 million, 27 percent of the $1.4 billion committed by all donors. USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services have provided most of these funds for a range of efforts, including stockpiles of protective equipment and training foreign health professionals in outbreak response. The State Department coordinates international efforts and the Homeland Security Council monitors progress. More than a third of U.S. and overall donor commitments have gone to individual countries, with more than 70 percent of those going to U.S. priority countries. The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan provides a framework for U.S. international efforts, assigning agencies specific action items and specifying performance measures and time frames for completion. The Homeland Security Council reported in December 2006 that all international actions due to be completed by November had been completed, and provided evidence of timely completion for the majority of those items. |
gao_GAO-01-810 | gao_GAO-01-810_0 | The legal framework underlying chemical regulation influences both the extent to which risk assessment is needed for regulatory decision making and how risk assessments are supposed to be conducted. Comparison of risk assessment estimates from different agencies and programs therefore requires careful consideration of these contextual differences. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Scope and Objectives
As requested, our review focused on the chemical risk assessment procedures, assumptions, and policies of four federal agencies with responsibilities for regulating or managing risks from potential exposure to chemicals—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) within the Department of Labor, and the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA—in particular the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety). Our specific objectives were to identify and describe (1) the general context for the agencies’ chemical risk assessment activities; (2) what the agencies view as their primary procedures for conducting risk assessments; (3) what the agencies view as the major assumptions or methodological choices in their risk assessment procedures; and (4) the agencies’ procedures or policies for characterizing the results of risk assessments. That objective is, however, addressed in the letter portion of this report.) | What GAO Found
As used in public health and environmental regulations, risk assessment is the systematic, scientific description of potential harmful effects of exposures to hazardous substances or situations. It is a complex but valuable set of tools for federal regulatory agencies to identify issues of potential concern, select regulatory options, and estimate the range of a forthcoming regulation's benefits. However, given the significant yet controversial nature of risk assessments, it is important that policymakers understand how they are conducted, the extent to which risk estimates produced by different agencies and programs are comparable, and the reasons for differences in agencies' risk assessment approaches and results. GAO studied the human health and safety risk assessment procedures of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration. This report describes (1) the agencies' chemical risk assessment activities, (2) the agencies primary procedures for conducting risk assessments, (3) major assumptions or methodological choices in their risk assessment procedures, and (4) the agencies' procedures or policies for characterizing the results of risk assessments. |
gao_GAO-05-840T | gao_GAO-05-840T_0 | Agencies Have Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear smuggling both domestically and in other countries by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second Line of Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly in Russia. Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to install radiation detection equipment at major foreign seaports to enable foreign government personnel to screen shipping containers entering and leaving these ports for nuclear and other radioactive material. After September 11, 2001, this effort was expanded by DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In May 2005, DHS reported that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at sites including international mail and package handling facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling in the United States and Other Countries Have Lacked Effective Planning and Coordination
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among the U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border crossings. Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology used in portal monitors. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. Currently Deployed Radiation Detection Equipment Has Limitations
Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. In particular, nuclear materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used to shield them. Given the inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it is important that it be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’ ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. DHS has faced similar concerns from port operators in the United States. It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of the tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards must use to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at foreign or U.S. borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear warhead from reaching the United States. Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United States and other countries.
What GAO Found
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation detection equipment--regardless of how well such equipment works--is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations. |
gao_GAO-08-554 | gao_GAO-08-554_0 | The Bureau has estimated that, with the redesign option, the total life cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census will be from $13.7 billion to $14.5 billion. 2). With the redesign, this plan will need to be updated. The Census Bureau’s 2010 Census Life Cycle Cost Estimate Is Not Reliable
The 2010 Census Life Cycle Cost Estimate Is Not Adequately Documented
The Bureau’s life cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census is not adequately documented. The Bureau did not provide detailed documentation for data sources and significant assumptions used in estimating the cost of the short form 2010 Census. The 2010 Census Life Cycle Cost Estimate Is Not Comprehensive
The 2010 Census life cycle cost estimate is not comprehensive because the Bureau did not include all potential costs or clearly define some of the cost elements in the model for the short form Census. In addition, the Bureau provided documentation that the life cycle cost estimate did not include the cost to fingerprint temporary workers. Updating this productivity assumption resulted in a significant increase of approximately $270 million to the cost of the address canvassing operation. Further, the Bureau cannot readily demonstrate the accuracy of its cost estimates because it does not maintain historical data, which include previous versions of the estimate, in a centralized, standard format that is readily available. An independent cost estimate is considered to be one of the most reliable validation methods. Performing uncertainty analysis would enable the Bureau to quantify the risk and uncertainty associated with the cost model; provide a level of confidence for its cost estimate; and give decision makers perspective on the potential variability of the cost estimate should facts, circumstances, and assumptions change. Unreliable 2010 Census Cost Estimate Does Not Fully Inform Annual Budgets
The Bureau uses the life cycle cost estimate as the starting point for annual budget formulation. In addition, while the Bureau revises the life cycle cost estimate based on appropriations received and updated budget information, the Bureau does not update the cost estimate to reflect actual costs. However, because the life cycle cost estimate is not valid and reliable, as described above, budget requests based on that estimate are not fully informed. The Bureau Has Insufficient Policies and Inadequately Trained Staff for Conducting High- Quality Cost Estimation; However, a New System May Help Improve the Bureau’s Cost Estimation Practices
The Bureau has insufficient policies and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation. The Bureau does not have formal cost estimation policies and procedures. Conclusions
On April 3, 2008, the Secretary of Commerce presented a redesigned 2010 Census plan with significant cost increases. However, until the Bureau makes fundamental changes to how it estimates and updates cost information, uncertainties about the ultimate cost of the 2010 Census will remain. The Bureau’s ability to produce well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible cost estimates for the 2010 and future decennial censuses and its ability to effectively manage operations and contain costs will continue to be hampered unless improvements are made to its cost estimation processes and systems. 2. 3. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) assess the extent to which the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) 2010 Census life cycle cost estimate adheres to characteristics defined for high-quality cost estimation, (2) report on the relationship between the life cycle cost estimate and the Bureau’s budget, and (3) assess whether the Bureau’s existing policies and resources are sufficient to conduct high-quality cost estimation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 Census will be the most expensive census in our nation's history, even after adjusting for inflation. The Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that the life cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be from $13.7 billion to $14.5 billion. GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which the Bureau's 2010 Census life cycle cost estimate adheres to characteristics defined for high-quality cost estimation, (2) report on the relationship between the estimate and the Bureau's budget, and (3) assess whether the Bureau's existing policies and resources are sufficient to conduct cost estimation. To assess the reliability of the Bureau's cost estimate, GAO analyzed the Bureau's methods and approaches to determine if the estimate is well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's 2010 Census life cycle cost estimate is not reliable because it lacks adequate documentation and is not comprehensive, accurate, or credible. The Bureau could not provide detailed documentation on data sources, significant assumptions, or changes in assumptions for the cost estimate. The cost estimate is not comprehensive because the Bureau did not include the potential cost to fingerprint temporary workers or clearly define some of the cost elements in the model. The cost estimate is not accurate because it does not reflect updated information on address canvassing productivity that was identified during the dress rehearsal and that should result in a significant cost increase. Further, the Bureau does not maintain historical data in a centralized way that is easily accessible for analysis. The cost estimate is not credible because the Bureau did not perform sensitivity or uncertainty analyses, which would have helped quantify the risk and uncertainty associated with the cost model and provided a level of confidence for the estimate. The Bureau also did not validate the estimate with an independent cost estimate. The Bureau uses the life cycle cost estimate as the starting point for annual budget formulation and revises the life cycle cost estimate based on appropriations received and updated budget information. However, the Bureau does not update the cost estimate to reflect actual costs. Further, because the life cycle cost estimate is not reliable, annual budget requests based on that estimate are not fully informed. The Bureau has insufficient policies and procedures and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation for the decennial census. The Bureau does not have established cost estimation guidance and procedures in place or staff certified in cost estimation techniques. While the Bureau is developing a new budget management tool called the Decennial Budget Integration Tool, which will support the cost estimation process, the Bureau will need to establish rigorous cost estimation policies and procedures and use skilled estimators to ensure that future cost estimates are reliable and of high quality. On April 3, 2008, the Secretary of Commerce announced a redesign of the 2010 Census plan that included significant cost increases of $2.2 billion to $3 billion. The details of this cost increase were not available at the time of this review; however, until the Bureau makes fundamental changes to its cost estimation process, uncertainties about the ultimate cost of the 2010 Census will remain. Without improvements to the cost estimation process, the Bureau's ability to effectively manage operations will be hampered and Congress's ability to oversee the 2010 Census will be constrained. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-158 | gao_T-HEHS-96-158_0 | About 67 percent of proprietary school students receive federal student aid under Title IV. Fewer proprietary schools participate in Title IV programs now than 5 years ago, a trend reflected in decreased numbers of schools accredited by the six primary accrediting agencies. And, while the default rates for proprietary school students are still far above those associated with nonprofit institutions, the rates have declined over the past few years. 1). The proportion receiving aid fell from nearly 80 percent in 1986-87 to about 67 percent in 1992-93, while the proportion of students receiving aid at the public and private nonprofit schools remained steady. The 85-15 Rule
One new measure adopted in the 1992 HEA amendments to help tighten eligibility for Title IV student financial aid programs was the so-called 85-15 rule. This provision prohibits proprietary schools from participating in Title IV programs if more than 85 percent of their revenues come from these programs. Thus far, however, only four proprietary schools have notified the Department of their failure to meet the 85-15 standard. For example, it may be that very few schools actually had more than 85 percent of their revenues coming from Title IV when the rule became law or that most such schools adjusted their operations to meet the standard when it took effect. Students who enroll in occupational education programs, obtain grants, and incur significant debt often risk being unable to find work because they have been trained for fields in which no job demand exists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether proprietary schools receiving Title IV funding are providing students with quality educational programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) fewer proprietary schools have been accredited since 1992 because of increases in school closures and oversight by accrediting agencies; (2) the proportion of proprietary school students receiving Title IV aid fell from 80 percent in the 1986-87 school year to 67 percent in the 1992-93 school year; (3) loan default rates fell, but remained substantially higher than those for students attending nonprofit institutions; (4) the 1992 Higher Education Act Amendments adopted a rule prohibiting schools from participating in Title IV programs if they receive more than 85 percent of their revenue from Title IV programs; (5) since the so-called 85-15 rule went into effect, only four proprietary schools have notified the Department of Education of their failure to meet the 85-percent standard; (6) schools not meeting the standard had more than 85 percent of their revenue coming from Title IV funding, improperly documented their eligibility, misunderstood the reporting rules, or intentionally misrepresented their findings; and (7) proprietary school students incur significant debt and are often unable to find jobs in their fields. |
gao_GAO-12-112 | gao_GAO-12-112_0 | 1.) The four criteria are the Impact of the proposed technology relative to the state of the art. Most of these award winners did not explain why investors were not willing to fund proposed work. This letter provided additional third-party support for the funding information in the application. Officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Technology Innovation Program told us they request that applicants provide letters from private investors to document why applicants’ projects could not be privately funded. Private venture capital firms told us that, among other considerations, they generally do not invest in projects that cannot be commercialized in less than 3 years. First, venture capital firms generally do not fund projects that rely on unproven technological concepts or lack working prototypes demonstrating the technology. Data from ARPA-E on award winners show that 91 out of 121 ARPA-E projects from the first three funding rounds had technological concepts that had not yet been demonstrated in a According to a recent report from the American laboratory setting.Energy Innovation Council, private investors consider these projects too high risk for investment, even for concepts with promising technological potential. However, we found that nearly all of the ARPA-E award winners and most contingently selected applicants we spoke with estimated that their projects were 3 or more years away from potential commercialization. For example, ARPA-E’s data indicate that 18 out of 121 ARPA-E award winners from ARPA-E’s first three rounds of funding had received private sector funding totaling $318 million after receiving ARPA-E funding. ARPA-E Officials Have Taken Steps to Coordinate with Other Department of Energy Offices in Advance of Awarding Funds
According to ARPA-E officials and documents, agency officials have taken steps to coordinate with other DOE offices in advance of awarding ARPA-E funds to help avoid duplication of efforts. ARPA-E has also used application reviewers from other federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense. Where applicants provided little information, ARPA-E’s program directors spent time and resources to determine the extent of such funding for projects related to or similar to the applicants’ proposed ARPA-E projects. This approach was used by one ARPA-E award winner, who included a letter from the company’s venture capital investors to explain why the investors were not willing to fund the project proposed to ARPA-E. Also, ARPA-E officials said that they have not used venture capital data to identify applicants with prior private investors and to check information applicants provide to them, but that they have considered doing so. Examining such data allowed us to quickly cross-check applicants’ self- reported prior private funding. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that ARPA-E uses a more complete range of methods to ensure that limited federal funds are targeted appropriately, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy consider taking the following three actions: provide guidance with a sample response to assist applicants in providing information on sources of private funding for proposed ARPA-E projects, require that applicants provide letters or other forms of documentation from private investors that explain why investors are not willing to fund the projects proposed to ARPA-E, and use venture capital funding databases to help identify applicants with prior private investors and to help check information applicants provide on their applications. ARPA-E concurred with key findings and our recommendations in its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy’s (ARPA-E) use of criteria and other considerations for making awards and the extent to which applicants identify and explain other private funding information, we reviewed 20 applications drawn from a nonprobability sample of the 4,788 applicants ARPA-E received during its first three funding rounds. To analyze the extent to which ARPA-E projects could have been funded through the private sector, we conducted three sets of interviews with ARPA-E applicants and award winners. We also conducted interviews with a variety of companies and individuals knowledgeable about research associated with ARPA-E-type projects, including six venture capital firms and the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), a trade association, to determine the availability of private capital for ARPA-E-type projects and the criteria venture capital firms apply in making their investment decisions; two additional public companies that were awarded ARPA-E funding to discuss the ability of a public company to internally fund research; and three economists to discuss the role and effectiveness of government-funded research and development of technology. To examine the extent to which ARPA-E coordinates with other DOE programs to avoid duplicating efforts, we spoke with the ARPA-E program directors as well as officials from other DOE program offices including the Office for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) and the Office of Science. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energys (DOE) Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy's (ARPA-E) purpose is to overcome long-term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy technologies. Since 2009, ARPA-E has awarded $521.7 million to universities, public and private companies, and national laboratories to fund energy research projects.
GAO was asked to examine (1) ARPA-Es use of criteria and other considerations for making awards and the extent to which applicants identify and explain other private funding information, (2) the extent to which ARPA-E-type projects could have been funded through the private sector, and (3) the extent to which ARPA-E coordinates with other DOE program offices to avoid duplicating efforts. GAO interviewed ARPA-E program directors, award winners, and nonwinners with characteristics similar to those of award winners. GAO also analyzed private venture capital funding data and spoke with venture capital firms.
What GAO Found
ARPA-E uses four selection criteria, such as the potential impact of the proposed technology relative to the state of the art, and other considerations in awarding funds. Other considerations include balancing a variety of technology approaches and the likelihood the technology would be brought to market. GAO identified 18 out of 121 award winners through ARPA-Es first three funding rounds that had received some prior private sector investment, and ARPA-E took steps to identify and understand how this funding was related to proposed projects. Beginning with the third funding round, ARPA-E began requiring that applicants explain why private investors were not willing to fund proposed projects. However, ARPA-E did not provide applicants with guidance, such as a sample response, to assist them in completing this requirement, and responses were generally limited. Some applicants provided general information about prior research but did not specifically explain why private investors would not support their projects. When applicants provided little prior funding information, ARPA-Es program directors spent time and resources to determine the extent of such funding for proposed ARPA-E projects. One applicant included a letter from its venture capital investor to explain why the investor was not willing to fund the work proposed to ARPA-E, an approach the National Institute of Standards and Technology uses as a check in its funding applications for advanced research but that ARPA-E currently does not use. Also, ARPA-E officials said that they have considered but have not used venture capital data to identify applicants with prior private investors. Examining such data allowed GAO to quickly cross-check applicants prior private funding.
GAOs review suggests that most ARPA-E projects could not have been funded solely by private investors. Private venture capital firms told GAO that, among other considerations, they generally do not fund projects that rely on unproven technologies and tend to invest in projects that can be commercialized in less than 3 years. Data from ARPA-E on award winners show that 91 out of 121 ARPA-E projects from the first three funding rounds had technological concepts that had not yet been proven in a laboratory setting. Also, nearly all of the ARPA-E award winners and applicants GAO spoke with estimated that their projects were at least 3 years away from potential commercialization. In addition, GAO found that few eligible applicants that were not selected for an award later secured private funding.
ARPA-E officials have taken steps to coordinate with other DOE offices to avoid duplication. For example, ARPA-E program directors told GAO they engage in outreach with officials from related DOE offices in advance of funding announcements to identify funding gaps in research. In addition, program directors have recruited officials from other DOE offices and the Department of Defense (DOD) to review ARPA-E applications. This cross-agency interaction may also reduce the potential for overlap in funding.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ARPA-E consider providing applicants guidance with a sample response explaining prior sources of funding, requiring applicants to provide letters from investors explaining why they are not willing to fund proposed projects, and using third-party venture capital data to identify applicants' prior funding. ARPA-E commented on a draft of this report and concurred with key findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-443T | gao_GAO-09-443T_0 | Laws guiding the management of the forests require that the Forest Service manage its lands for various purposes—including recreation; rangeland; wilderness; and the protection of watersheds, fish, and wildlife—and to ensure that the agency’s management of the lands does not impair their long-term productivity. While the agency has improved some areas, progress has been lacking in other key areas, and management challenges remain. The Forest Service Continues to Lack Short- or Long-Term Strategies for Using Wildland Fire Management Funds Effectively
Perhaps the most daunting challenge facing the Forest Service is the dramatic worsening of our nation’s wildland fire problem over the past decade. In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and cost of suppression efforts, we recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed to identify the available long-term options for reducing fuels and the associated funding requirements. By laying out various potential approaches for addressing wildland fire, the estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved, such a strategy would help Congress and the agencies make informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches to addressing the nation’s wildland fire problems. Establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain wildland fire costs. Continue to improve its processes for allocating fuel reduction funds and selecting fuel reduction projects. Take steps to improve its use of a new interagency budgeting and planning tool. Lack of Complete and Accurate Data on Activities and Costs Continues to Hamper Program Management
Long-standing data problems have plagued the Forest Service, hampering its ability to manage its programs and account for its costs and reflecting deep-rooted and persistent shortcomings in the agency’s management of its activities. Forest Service Lacks Adequate Data on Land Management Activities
In recent years we have identified several land management programs for which the Forest Service lacks sufficient data, keeping the agency from effectively overseeing its activities and understanding whether it is using its appropriated dollars most efficiently. The Forest Service Has Struggled with Financial and Performance Accountability
Over the years, the Forest Service has struggled to provide adequate financial and performance accountability. Regarding its performance, the agency has not always been able to provide Congress and the public with a clear understanding of what its 30,000 employees accomplish with the approximately $5 billion the agency receives every year. In fact, in 2008—only 7 months ago, and more than 5 years after our 2003 report on the problem—the Inspector General echoed our earlier findings, stating, “Some of these issues have been reported in multiple reports for over a decade, but their solutions are still in the study and evaluation process by .”
Emerging Issues Magnify the Need to Address Management Challenges
Several emerging issues are likely to have profound implications for the agency, complicating its management responsibilities and underscoring the importance of addressing the management challenges we have highlighted so that the agency is well positioned to meet these new issues. The aging of the federal workforce. Our nation’s long-term fiscal condition. Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. Department of Agriculture: Status of Efforts to Address Major Financial Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, manages over 190 million acres of forest and grassland. The agency is responsible for managing its lands for various purposes--including recreation, grazing, timber harvesting, and others--while ensuring that such activities do not impair the lands' long-term productivity. Carrying out these often competing responsibilities has been made more difficult by the increasing cost of wildland fires and the budgetary constraints necessitated by our nation's long-term fiscal outlook. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges the Forest Service faces in carrying out its land management responsibilities. It is based on numerous reports GAO has issued on a wide variety of the agency's activities.
What GAO Found
While the Forest Service has made improvements in many areas GAO has reported on in recent years, certain management challenges persist--with the agency struggling to manage a worsening wildland fire problem and spiraling fire costs, collect data on its activities and their costs, and demonstrate financial and performance accountability to Congress and the public. Several emerging issues facing the agency underscore the urgency of addressing these challenges. The Forest Service continues to lack strategies for using its wildland fire management funds effectively. In numerous reports over the past decade, GAO has highlighted the challenges the Forest Service faces in protecting the nation against the threat of wildland fires. While the agency has taken important steps to improve its wildland fire management, other key steps remain. Specifically, the agency needs to (1) develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential long-term approaches for addressing wildland fire, the estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved; (2) establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain increasing wildland fire costs; (3) continue improving its processes for allocating funds and selecting projects to reduce potentially hazardous vegetation; and (4) take steps to improve its use of a new interagency budgeting and planning tool. Program management suffers from lack of data on activities and costs. GAO's work over the years points to a persistent shortcoming in the Forest Service's management of its activities: the lack of adequate data on program activities and costs. This shortcoming spans multiple land management programs, including programs for selling timber and rehabilitating and reforesting lands that have been burned, as well as administrative functions such as the competitive sourcing program, which aims to increase competition between federal entities and private sector organizations. Inadequate data have hindered field managers in carrying out their duties and prevented the agency from understanding how much its activities are costing. Financial and performance accountability have been inadequate. The Forest Service has struggled to implement adequate internal controls over its funds, generate accurate financial information, and provide clear measures of what it accomplishes with the appropriations it receives every year. GAO's concerns about these issues date back to the 1990s but have yet to be fully addressed. Several emerging issues underscore the need for the Forest Service to improve its management. The evolving effects of climate change, increasing development in and near wildlands, the aging of the federal workforce, and our nation's long-term fiscal condition likely will have profound implications for the agency and magnify the urgency of addressing these challenges. |
gao_GAO-06-251T | gao_GAO-06-251T_0 | Work and Revisions to the Project Schedule Continue, but Delays Hamper Progress
Work in several areas has moved forward since the Subcommittee’s October 18 CVC hearing, but additional delays have occurred, and AOC’s construction management contractor has identified several concerns about the project schedule. The contractor’s October schedule indicates that, with some exceptions, construction work on the base CVC project will be essentially complete by September 15, 2006, and the remaining work will be completed by December 8, 2006. AOC and its construction management contractor expect to complete their reviews of this part of the schedule and resolve the Fire Marshal Division’s concerns by December 31, 2005. Among our reasons for concern are the uncertainty associated with the fire protection system schedule, including the concerns expressed by AOC’s Fire Marshal Division and our earlier work that raised questions about the amount of time being provided for system testing and inspections; the schedule slippages to date; the optimistic durations for a number of activities based on the views of CVC team members and the results of the construction management contractor’s recently completed review; the large number of activity paths that are critical; and the risks and uncertainties that continue to face the project. AOC Has Been Addressing Previously Identified Schedule-Related Issues
AOC and its construction management contractor have been working to implement recommendations we have made to improve AOC’s schedule management and to address other schedule-related issues we have identified. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that Congress receives a more reliable estimate of the project’s completion date in order to plan for the CVC’s opening to the public and make more informed decisions about AOC’s funding needs for CVC construction and operations, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol (1) implement the recommendations (which are consistent with our prior recommendations on schedule management) made by its construction management contractor in its November 9 report on its schedule evaluation; and (2) reassess its proposal to open the CVC in mid- December 2006 when it is confident that it has a project schedule that reflects realistic durations, enhanced logic, the resolution of concerns expressed by the Fire Marshal Division, and the impact of delays and contract changes. This preliminary estimate falls between our September 15, 2005, interim estimate of $525.6 million without provision for risks and uncertainties, and our November 2004 estimate of about $559 million with provision for risks and uncertainties. As we said at the Subcommittee’s October 18 hearing, we are waiting for the project schedule to stabilize before we comprehensively update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project, including any costs to the government for delays. Estimate Is Preliminary
Our preliminary estimate of the cost to complete the entire CVC project, which we will discuss today, is based on information provided by AOC and its construction management contractor. CVC Costs Are Likely to Increase, Largely Because of Actual and Anticipated Changes and Delays
Assuming that the base project and the House and Senate expansion spaces are completed in the spring of 2007 and considering the qualifications just discussed, our preliminary estimate of the cost to complete the entire project is about $542.9 million without provision for risks and uncertainties. This estimate is about $17.3 million greater than our September updated estimate of $525.6 million without provision for risks and uncertainties and about $16.1 million less than our November 2004 estimate of about $559 million with provision for risks and uncertainties. Additional contingency funds. 3. Our Estimate Differs from MBP’s Estimate Largely Because We Included More Items in the Project Scope and More Funds for Contingencies
Our preliminary $542.9 million estimate of the cost to complete the CVC project is significantly higher than MBP’s November 1, 2005, $481.9 million estimate for several reasons. For example, the CVC injury and illness rate declined, from 9.1 in 2003 and 12.2 in 2004, to 5.9 for the first 10 months of 2005—below the 2003 industry average of 6.1. AOC and its contractors have taken a number of actions during 2005 to improve worker safety at the CVC site. Poor housekeeping has been an ongoing issue at the site, and the sequence 2 contractor has recently taken actions to address this issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the status of the project schedule since Congress's October 18, 2005, hearing on the project, (2) the project's costs and funding, and (3) worker safety issues. We will discuss the progress made and problems encountered in completing scheduled construction work and in continuing to develop the project schedule, as we indicated during Congress's October 18 hearing; however, we will not be able to estimate specific completion dates until the project schedule is stable and the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and its construction management contractor--Gilbane Building Company--have completed their assessments of the schedule and we have had an opportunity to evaluate them. Also, we will update the information we previously provided on the project's costs and funding, using readily available data, but we will wait until the project schedule is stable and has been fully reviewed before we comprehensively update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project and update the provision in our estimate for risks and uncertainties facing the project.
What GAO Found
Construction work in several areas has moved forward since Congress's October 18 CVC hearing, but additional delays have occurred, and AOC's construction management contractor has identified several concerns with the schedule that raise questions about its proposed mid-December 2006 opening of the base CVC project to the public. AOC and its construction management contractor expect to resolve outstanding scheduling concerns and issues by the end of this year. When AOC and its construction management contractor have prepared what they consider to be a reasonably stable project schedule, we will reevaluate the schedule and inform Congress of our results. In the interim, to help ensure that Congress has better information for making CVC-related decisions, we are recommending that AOC (1) implement the recommendations for obtaining a more reliable project schedule contained in its construction management contractor's November 2005 report, which are consistent with our previous recommendations on schedule management, and (2) reassess its proposed December 2006 date for opening the CVC to the public when it has a more reliable construction schedule. Our preliminary work indicates that the entire CVC project is likely, at a minimum, to cost $542.9 million. This preliminary estimate falls about midway between our September 15, 2005, interim estimate of $525.6 million, which did not provide for risks and uncertainties, and our November 2004 estimate of about $559 million, which did provide for risks and uncertainties. Specifically, this current $542.9 preliminary estimate is about $17.3 million more than the September 15 interim estimate and about $16.1 million less than the November 2004 estimate. The current $542.9 million preliminary estimate does not provide for risks and uncertainties or for additional payments to contractors to cover the costs of certain delays and other contingencies. Even without providing for risks and uncertainties, though, we have increased our cost estimate since September 15 because additional and more expensive changes to the project have been identified; we have increased our allowance for contingencies; and we have added funding for AOC and contractor staff that we believe are likely to be working on the project through the spring of 2007. Our preliminary estimate substantially exceeds MBP's November 2005 updated estimate of $481.9 million, largely because MBP's estimate does not cover a number of project components and does not, in our view, provide adequately for contingencies. According to our analysis of CVC data, worker safety rates have improved substantially this year, although the lost-time rate remains above industry norms. The injury and illness rate for the first 10 months of 2005 declined 52 percent from the rate for 2004, putting the CVC site's rate 3 percent below the average for comparable construction sites. The lost-time rate decreased 62 percent during the same period, but the CVC site's rate is still 29 percent higher than the average rate for comparable construction sites. AOC and its contractors have taken a number of actions during 2005 to improve safety performance on the project, such as conducting training to elevate safety awareness and placing safety posters around the worksite. In addition, senior managers are meeting periodically to develop strategies to improve safety. Poor housekeeping, however, has been an ongoing issue at the site, and the sequence 2 contractor has recently taken actions to address this issue. |
gao_GAO-15-119 | gao_GAO-15-119_0 | In addition to identifying IDT refund fraud as a major issue and requesting additional resources, IRS has developed a number of tools to address IDT refund fraud throughout the tax return filing process—and has done so amidst budget reductions and other challenges.IDT refund fraud includes efforts to authenticate taxpayer identities as well as several tools used to detect and prevent IDT refund fraud, as described below (see appendix II for more detail on these IDT refund fraud tools). IRS’s response to Authenticating Taxpayer Identities. IRS has enhanced its authentication efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. Taxonomy Notes Relevant Cost Assumptions Used, but Does Not Provide the Rationale or Analysis Supporting the Assumptions
Developing loss estimates of illicit activities is challenging because such activities are difficult to observe. Given the evolving nature of IDT refund fraud, documenting Taxonomy assumptions and the rationale used to develop the assumptions would help IRS management and policymakers to determine whether the assumptions remain valid or need to be revised or updated. They stated that IRS did not document its rationale for selecting assumptions because of the time and resources required. That analysis shows that making different assumptions could affect the estimate of category 5 IDT refunds paid by billions of dollars in either direction (see appendix III, example 1). As a result, the level of uncertainty associated IRS officials stated that they did not conduct such analyses because of resource constraints and methodological challenges. Reporting the uncertainty that is known already, and conducting further sensitivity analyses when not cost prohibitive, might help IRS communicate the complexities inherent in combating the evolving threat of IDT refund fraud. A point estimate, compared to a range or some other indication of uncertainty, could provide a false sense of precision leading to different decisions about how to allocate resources to combat IDT refund fraud. The group has also documented short- and long-term priorities, including implementation plans. In recent discussions, agency officials said they would coordinate analysis of costs, benefits and risks with several IRS offices. However, a commitment to cost, benefit and risk analysis is not documented in the group’s short- and long-term priorities. The draft planning documentation that we were given by IRS makes no mention of where such analyses would be included in IRS’s priorities. Without analysis of costs, benefits and risks, IRS and Congress will not have quantitative information that could inform decisions about whether and how much to invest in the various authentication options. Cost, benefit and risk estimates for authentication would have the additional benefit of allowing comparisons with other options for combating IDT refund fraud, such as pre-refund W-2 matching. Both approaches could have significant costs for taxpayers and IRS, so more information about the tradeoffs would help inform IRS and congressional decision making. Recommendations
To improve the reliability of Taxonomy estimates for future filing seasons, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should follow relevant best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Guide by taking the following two actions:
Documenting the underlying analysis justifying cost-influencing
Reporting the inherent imprecision and uncertainty of the estimates. With regard to our second recommendation, IRS stated that its authentication group will develop a repeatable process to estimate and document the costs, benefits and risks of possible options for taxpayer authentication, in accordance with OMB and NIST guidance. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) the quality of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Identity Theft Taxonomy’s (Taxonomy) estimates of the cost of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud, and (2) IRS’s progress in developing processes to track device identification numbers and to enhance taxpayer authentication. To assess the quality of the Taxonomy’s estimates of IDT refund fraud, we reviewed the Taxonomy’s methodology and estimates for filing season 2013 and evaluated them against selected best practices in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO Cost Guide) that were applicable to the Taxonomy and consistent with IRS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) information quality guidelines (see text box).Taxonomy is an estimate of the amount of revenue lost to IDT refund fraud—a cost to taxpayers. Met. To learn about additional actions IRS could take to prevent IDT refund fraud, we interviewed associations representing software companies, return preparers, and financial institutions. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS estimated it prevented $24.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in 2013, but paid $5.8 billion later determined to be fraud. Because of the difficulties in knowing the amount of undetected fraud, the actual amount could differ from these point estimates. IDT refund fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information to file a fraudulent tax return and claims a refund.
GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the second in a series, assesses (1) the quality of IRS's IDT refund fraud cost estimates, and (2) IRS's progress in developing processes to enhance taxpayer authentication.
GAO compared IRS's IDT estimate methodology to GAO Cost Guide best practices (fraud is a cost to taxpayers). To assess IRS's progress enhancing authentication, GAO reviewed IRS documentation and interviewed IRS officials, other government officials, and associations representing software companies, return preparers, and financial institutions.
What GAO Found
Identity Theft (IDT) Refund Fraud Cost Estimates. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) fraud estimates met several GAO Cost Guide best practices, such as documenting data sources and detailing calculations. However, the estimates do not reflect the uncertainty inherent in measuring IDT refund fraud because they are presented as point estimates. Best practices suggest that agencies assess the effects of assumptions and potential errors on estimates. Officials said they did not assess the estimates' level of uncertainty because of resource constraints and methodological challenges. Because making different assumptions could affect IDT fraud estimates by billions of dollars, a point estimate (as opposed to, for example, a range) could lead to different decisions about allocating IDT resources. Reporting the uncertainty that is already known from IRS analysis (and conducting further analyses when not cost prohibitive) might help IRS communicate IDT refund fraud's inherent complexity.
While IRS's fraud estimates note the relevant cost assumptions used to develop estimates, they do not provide the rationale or analysis to support them. Officials stated they did not document the rationale because of the time and resources required. Best practices suggest that agencies should document assumptions. Given the evolving nature of IDT refund fraud, documenting assumptions' rationale would help IRS management and policymakers determine whether the assumptions remain valid or need to be updated.
Taxpayer Authentication. IRS recently created a group aimed at centralizing several prior ad hoc efforts to authenticate taxpayers across its systems. IRS's planning documentation contains goals and short- and long-term priorities (including implementation plans). However, a commitment to cost, benefit and risk analysis is not documented in the group's short- and long-term priorities. The draft planning documentation makes no mention of where such analyses would be included in IRS's priorities. Office of Management and Budget guidance states that agencies should use cost-benefit analyses that consider alternatives to promote efficient resource allocation and that agencies should ensure that authentication processes provide the appropriate level of assurance by assessing risks. Without analysis of costs, benefits and risks, IRS and Congress will not have quantitative information that could inform decisions about whether and how much to invest in the various authentication options. Cost, benefit and risk estimates for authentication would have the additional benefit of allowing comparisons with other options for combating IDT refund fraud. IDT options could have significant costs for taxpayers and IRS, so more information about the tradeoffs would help inform IRS and congressional decision making.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS improve its fraud estimates by (1) reporting the inherent imprecision and uncertainty of estimates, and (2) documenting the underlying analysis justifying cost-influencing assumptions. In addition, IRS should estimate and document the economic costs, benefits and risks of possible options for taxpayer authentication. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-135 | gao_GAO-16-135_0 | FPS is primarily responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in federal facilities held or leased by GSA. GSA also has primary responsibility for providing facilities maintenance, space for communications equipment, and building plans, among other services. As such, we have made previous recommendations to FPS and GSA related to improving their collaboration. FPS and GSA Collaborate to Some Extent, but Could Strengthen Efforts in Several Areas
FPS and GSA Have Not Fully Defined or Articulated a Common Outcome or Established Mutually Reinforcing or Joint Strategies
While FPS and GSA officials have drafted a joint strategy, the agencies have not defined and articulated a common outcome or fully established mutually reinforcing or joint strategies because they have not agreed on how they will work together to achieve their respective missions. As a result, the regions rely on informal communication between the agencies for day-to-day operations. For example, GSA officials at one region told us that their role, as compared with FPS’s role, in the protection of federal facilities is not clearly defined and said that they were unaware of formal security standards, policies, and procedures for GSA. FPS’s and GSA’s Incomplete Collaboration Creates Inefficiencies and Security Risks at the Regional Level
FPS’s and GSA’s incomplete collaboration, particularly with regard to three key collaboration practices—the lack of agreement on roles and responsibilities, communicating compatible policies and procedures, and mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results—essential elements to organizing joint efforts and facilitating decision making across agency boundaries—makes day-to-day operations more challenging and creates inefficiencies and security risks at the regional level, as discussed below. To meet these challenges, FPS and GSA have taken some steps to improve collaboration over the past year, and as of October 2015, FPS and GSA officials stated that they plan to address several of these issues. Reaching agreement in these key areas will help to enhance the agencies’ ability to protect federal facilities and has become more pressing given how much has changed in the security environment since the original MOA was put in place nearly 10 years ago. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the collaboration challenges that FPS and GSA face in protecting federal facilities, we are making four recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. GSA agreed with our findings and agreed to work with FPS to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to assess (1) how the agencies’ collaboration reflects key practices to ensure facility security and (2) the impact of their collaboration practices on day-to-day operations at the regional and facility levels. We used the information from these site visits and interviews to provide illustrative examples throughout our report. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated federal real-property management as a high-risk area in part because of physical security challenges at federal facilities. FPS and GSA have joint responsibility for protecting federal facilities held or leased by GSA. FPS has primary responsibility for the security and protection of buildings and their occupants, whereas GSA has primary responsibility for security fixtures, maintenance, and building access.
In light of these challenges, GAO was asked to review (1) how the agencies' collaboration reflects key practices to ensure facility security and (2) the impact of their collaboration practices on day-to-day operations at the regional and facility level. GAO analyzed pertinent laws and documents, compared FPS's and GSA's collaboration efforts against GAO's selected key-collaboration practices, and interviewed agency officials at the headquarters and regional levels selected based on various factors. While the results from regions cannot be generalized, they provided illustrative examples.
What GAO Found
The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the General Services Administration (GSA) have taken some steps to improve collaboration, such as drafting a joint strategy. While each agency has some individual policies for collaboration, the two agencies have made limited progress in agreeing on several key practices as described below. Reaching agreement on these practices will help to enhance the agencies' ability to protect federal facilities and to improve day-to-day operations at the regional level.
As a result of not having key practices in place, regional officials said they were not aware of agreed upon collaborative policies and procedures to conduct day-to-day operations. GAO found that this created inefficiencies and security risks. For example, FPS officials told GAO that GSA did not coordinate with them on new construction intended for law enforcement tenants, and as a result, it was not suitable for law enforcement use. GSA officials told GAO that they did not have sufficient information from FPS about security plans for upcoming events and, therefore, were not able to inform tenants of necessary security measures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FPS and GSA take actions to improve their collaboration in several areas, including defining common outcomes, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and communicating compatible policies and procedures. DHS specifically concurred with GAO's recommendations, and GSA agreed to work with FPS to address the findings. |
gao_GAO-14-741 | gao_GAO-14-741_0 | Soil Moisture. Precipitation. These officials said that probabilistic forecasts provide a range of potential outcomes and their likeliness. Experts Said the Corps Could Not Have Predicted or Prevented Flooding Due to Extreme Weather in 2011 and Its Release Decisions Were Appropriate
Experts who participated in our meeting discussed the above normal snowpack in the mountains and the plains, but they agreed the flood was triggered by the extreme rain in eastern Montana in May and June 2011. The experts agreed that no existing forecasting tools, including those used by the Corps and NOAA, could have accurately predicted the extreme rainstorms that occurred in Montana more than a week in advance. One of the experts said it would have taken several months for the Corps to release enough water from the reservoirs to make space for the runoff from the rainstorms and melting snow, and that action also could have resulted in downstream flooding. Experts Did Not Suggest Changes to the Master Manual
Experts who participated in our meeting agreed that the Corps does not need to change the Master Manual due to the 2011 flood or 2012 and 2013 drought, noting that there are no obvious deficiencies in the Master Manual. Other experts who participated in our meeting noted, however, that if the Corps could develop improved forecasting tools, it might be useful to evaluate whether changes to the Master Manual would help the Corps to act on information from the new tools. However, it is important to note that the hydrologic data systems discussed by the experts are not managed by the Corps but by other federal agencies as part of nationwide efforts to gather this data. DEP officials said that a similar tool could help the Corps better manage other reservoir systems, such as along the Missouri River. Some of the experts said that the Corps can achieve better outcomes for the basin using probabilistic techniques than their current methods. Stakeholders Were Generally Satisfied with Corps’ Communication during the Flood and Drought
During both the 2011 flood and the subsequent drought, the Corps communicated with Missouri River stakeholders in a variety of ways, which most stakeholders we interviewed said were effective. Nearly all stakeholders we interviewed were generally satisfied with the Corps’ communication with them during these events, saying that the information they received from the Corps was timely and sufficient for their purposes. However, there was no consensus among stakeholders on these suggestions. A few stakeholders suggested that the Corps communicate any uncertainty associated with its release estimates. Corps officials also said that having separate conference calls for agency officials and elected officials and media is feasible and that they would consider this in the future. Conclusions
The extreme flood of 2011 followed by severe drought in 2012 and 2013 created challenging conditions on the Missouri River for the Corps. Experts who participated in our meeting agreed that the Corps made appropriate release decisions during the flood and drought, given the circumstances. However, the experts agreed that techniques such as probabilistic forecasting have the potential to improve the Corps’ ability to make release decisions in nonextreme events. Probabilistic forecasting could allow the Corps to make better risk-based decisions and provide increased benefits to residents in the Missouri River basin, such as higher reliability of water supply, increased flood protection, small increases in hydropower production, and easier implementation of variable river flows to create fish and wildlife habitats. However, the Corps currently uses deterministic forecasting methods, and Corps officials told us that they have not assessed the pros and cons of using probabilistic techniques because they are not sure that the benefits of more sophisticated probabilistic modeling techniques would outweigh the difficulty of creating the models or explaining the new methods to the stakeholders in the Missouri River basin. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers considers a full range of forecasting options to manage the Missouri River mainstem reservoir system, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate the pros and cons of probabilistic forecasting techniques that could improve the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ ability to anticipate weather developments, and to evaluate whether forecasting changes are warranted. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) experts’ views on the Corps’ release decisions during the 2011 flood and 2012 and 2013 drought; (2) additional actions, if any, experts recommend to improve the Corps’ ability to make future release decisions; and (3) stakeholders’ views on how the Corps communicated information during the flood and drought and improvements, if any, stakeholders suggest. To obtain expert views on the Corps’ information and release decisions, we convened a meeting of experts to discuss these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Missouri River stretches from western Montana to St. Louis, Missouri. The Corps manages six dams and reservoirs on the river to provide flood control and for other purposes, such as recreation and navigation. The Corps bases reservoir release decisions on the guidance in the Master Manual. In the 2011 flood, the Corps managed the highest runoff volume since 1898, resulting in record reservoir releases. Subsequently, drought occurred in the basin in 2012 and 2013.
GAO was asked to review the Corps' release decisions and communication during the flood and drought. This report examines (1) experts' views on the Corps' release decisions; (2) experts' recommendations to improve the Corps' release decisions; and (3) stakeholders' views on the Corps' communication, as well as any suggested improvements. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a meeting of nine experts to discuss the Corps' data, forecasts, and release decisions. GAO also interviewed 45 Missouri River basin stakeholders, including state and local agencies, among others, to discuss their views on the Corps' communication. The views of stakeholders are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
Experts who participated in a GAO-sponsored meeting agreed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) made appropriate release decisions during the 2011 flood and 2012 and 2013 drought affecting the Missouri River basin, given the severity of these events. These experts acknowledged that the flood was primarily due to extreme rain in eastern Montana in May and June 2011. The experts agreed that no existing forecasting tools could have accurately predicted these extreme rainstorms more than a week in advance. One of the experts also said that the Corps would have needed several months to release enough water from the reservoirs to have sufficient space for the runoff that occurred in 2011, and predicting an extreme runoff year that far in advance is beyond the current state of science. Moreover, the experts agreed that the Corps appropriately followed the drought conservation procedures in the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System Master Water Control Manual (Master Manual), which sets out policies for managing the river. The experts agreed that the Corps does not need to change the Master Manual in response to the 2011 flood or subsequent drought. However, some of the experts noted that if the Corps develops improved forecasting tools, it might be useful to evaluate whether changes to the Master Manual would help the Corps to act on information from the new tools.
The experts suggested that improving data systems and introducing new runoff forecasting techniques could improve the Corps' ability to make release decisions in less extreme events than the 2011 flood. These data systems—such as streamgages, weather radar, precipitation gauges, soil moisture monitoring, and monitoring for snow on the plains—are not managed by the Corps, but by other federal and state agencies, which creates challenges beyond the Corps' control. The experts agreed that probabilistic forecasting techniques—which correct for unknown initial conditions using statistical techniques and provide a range of potential outcomes and their likeliness—could help the Corps manage risks better than their current methods that create one forecast estimate. One of the experts said that probabilistic methods could provide greater benefits, such as higher water supply reliability, increased flood protection and hydropower production, and easier implementation of variable flows to create fish and wildlife habitats. Probabilistic techniques are currently used by New York City to support reservoir releases to manage flood risk and meet water quality goals without adding expensive new filtration equipment. Corps officials said that they have not considered using probabilistic techniques in the Missouri River basin because they are not sure the benefits would outweigh the difficulty of creating the models or explaining the new methods to their stakeholders.
During both the flood and drought, the Corps communicated with Missouri River stakeholders in a variety of ways, which most stakeholders GAO spoke with said were effective. Most stakeholders were generally satisfied with the Corps' communication, saying that the information they received from the Corps was timely and sufficient for their purposes. Most stakeholders had at least one suggestion on how the Corps could improve communication; however, there was little consensus on any one suggestion. A few stakeholders suggested that the Corps hold separate conference calls to discuss sensitive response-related issues. Corps officials said that they would consider this in the future.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps evaluate the pros and cons of incorporating new forecasting techniques into its management of the Missouri River reservoirs. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-657 | gao_GAO-15-657_0 | Figure 2 below shows an illustration of a MGUE receiver card. The Air Force plans to develop MGUE in two increments. The Air Force initially began development of M-code in fiscal year 2003. Poor Acquisition Decisions and a Slow Recognition of Development Problems Led to Significant OCX Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
OCX development contract costs have more than doubled since the contract was awarded in February 2010, increasing by approximately $1.1 billion to $1.98 billion, and the program’s schedule has roughly doubled over estimates at contract award. As Raytheon continued to struggle developing OCX, the program office paused development in late 2013 to fix what it believed were the root causes of the development issues, and significantly increased the program’s cost and schedule estimates. The Air Force Accelerated OCX Development to Meet Optimistic GPS III Satellite Launch Time Frames Even as OCX Was Experiencing Problems
In the midst of mounting OCX problems, the Air Force disrupted the ongoing software development effort. The persistently high defect rate for OCX may be a result of as-yet unidentified systemic issues. Even so, the military services are unlikely to have sufficient knowledge about MGUE design and performance to make informed procurement decisions starting in fiscal year 2018 because it is uncertain whether an important design review will be conducted prior to that time and because operational testing will still be under way. MGUE’s Acquisition Strategy May Limit Insight into MGUE Design
The Air Force has revised the MGUE acquisition strategy several times as it pursued the program’s development. They can, as provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, request a waiver of such procurement. The Air Force Is Taking Actions to Sustain the GPS Constellation Given Delays to OCX, but These Efforts Will Not Fully Exploit GPS Capabilities
GPS capabilities are unbalanced, with satellite capabilities outstripping those supported by the ground and user equipment segments. Initial M-code Capability Will Not Be Available until OCX Delivery in Mid-2019, and Full M-code Deployment Is Likely at Least Another Decade Away
M-code initial operational capability is defined as having 18 M-code capable satellites on orbit, the control segment able to command/upload M-code capabilities to the space segment, and MGUE receivers fielded across the military services to utilize M-code capabilities operationally. Nevertheless, DOD cannot take full advantage of M-code capability until MGUE receivers are deployed in sufficient numbers across the services. Until the OCX program trajectory is corrected, those delays are likely to pose significant risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, and consequently, delivering GPS capability to the military community. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position DOD as it continues pursuing GPS modernization, to have the information necessary to make decisions on how best to improve that modernization, and to mitigate risks to sustaining the GPS constellation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
Convene an independent task force comprising experts from other military services and defense agencies with substantial knowledge and expertise to provide an assessment to USD AT&L of the OCX program and concrete guidance for addressing the OCX program’s underlying problems, particularly including:
A detailed engineering assessment of OCX defects to determine the systemic root causes of the defects;
Whether the contractor’s software development procedures and practices match the levels described in the OCX systems engineering and software development plans; and
Whether the contractor is capable of executing the program as currently resourced and structured. Additionally, in June 2014, Senate Report No. In response, for this report our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which DOD is meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements for next generation operational control system (OCX), (2) the progress DOD has made in delivering M-code capable military GPS user equipment (MGUE) by the end of fiscal year 2017, and (3) the challenges DOD faces in synchronizing the development of GPS III satellites, OCX, and MGUE to deploy M-code. To assess the status of the GPS constellation, we interviewed officials from the Air Force SMC GPS program office and AFSPC. | Why GAO Did This Study
The satellite-based GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide. The Air Force is modernizing the satellite, ground control, and user equipment segments to enhance GPS performance.
The Senate and House Armed Services Committee reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included provisions for GAO to review the status of OCX development and DOD's efforts to field M-code signal capability. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DOD is meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements for OCX; (2) the progress DOD is making in delivering M-code capable MGUE by the end of fiscal year 2017; and (3) the challenges DOD faces in synchronizing the development of GPS III, OCX, and MGUE to deploy M-code.
To conduct this work, GAO analyzed program documents such as acquisition strategies; reviewed oversight reporting; assessed constellation reliability metrics; and interviewed officials from DOD programs and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has experienced significant difficulties developing the Global Positioning System (GPS) next generation operational control system (OCX) and consistently overstated progress to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) compared to advisory independent assessments it received. It needs $1.1 billion and 4 years more than planned to deliver OCX due to poor acquisition decisions and a slow recognition of development problems. The Air Force began OCX development in 2010 prior to completing preliminary development reviews in contrast with best acquisition practices. It accelerated OCX development in 2012 to meet optimistic GPS III satellite launch timeframes even as OCX development problems and costs grew, and then paused development in 2013 to address problems and resolve what it believed were root causes. However, as the figure below shows, OCX cost and schedule growth have persisted due in part to a high defect rate, which may result from systemic issues. Further, unrealistic cost and schedule estimates limit OSD visibility into and oversight over OCX progress.
The Air Force is implementing the military GPS user equipment (MGUE) program to develop for the military services GPS receiver cards capable of receiving the military-code (M-code) signal—which can help users operate in jamming environments. The Air Force has revised MGUE's acquisition strategy several times in its quest to develop the cards. Even so, the military services are unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to make informed procurement decisions starting in fiscal year 2018 because operational testing that provides valuable information about MGUE performance will not be complete until fiscal year 2019.
The current GPS constellation has proven to be much more reliable than the Air Force predicted when GAO last reported on it in 2010. Given delays to OCX, the Air Force has prepared contingency plans for sustaining the GPS constellation, but these plans may not deliver the full range of GPS capability. Initial M-code capability will not be available until OCX delivery in mid-2019 at the earliest and full M-code capability is likely at least a decade away—once the services are able to deploy MGUE receivers in sufficient numbers. Until the OCX program trajectory is corrected, additional delays to it may likely pose significant risks to sustaining the GPS constellation and delivering GPS capability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD obtain a more robust independent assessment of OCX to identify and resolve root causes, and ensure MGUE design is stable to inform testing and procurement decisions. DOD concurred on OCX but stated that actions taken to date are sufficient. DOD partially concurred on MGUE. GAO believes all recommended actions are necessary to address systemic problems. |
gao_GAO-15-22 | gao_GAO-15-22_0 | These findings led to several recommendations to DOD: conduct a cost-benefit analysis on required CVN 78 capabilities, namely reduced manning and the increased sortie generation rate, in light of known and projected reliability shortfalls for critical systems; update the Ford-class program’s test and evaluation master plan to allot sufficient time after ship delivery to complete developmental test activities prior to beginning integration testing; adjust the planned post-delivery test schedule to ensure that system integration testing is completed before IOT&E; defer the CVN 79 detail design and construction contract award until land-based testing for critical systems is complete; and, update the CVN 79 cost estimate on the basis of actual costs and labor hours needed to construct CVN 78. With Risks Remaining in CVN 78 Construction, the Navy Plans to Defer Work in an Effort to Meet Delivery Schedule and Cost Cap Goals
The extent to which CVN 78 will be delivered within the Navy’s revised schedule and cost goals is dependent on deferring work and costs to the ship’s post-delivery period. However, challenges with certain key technologies are likely to further exacerbate an already compressed test schedule. With the shipbuilder embarking on one of the most complex phases of construction with the greatest likelihood for cost growth, cost increases beyond the current $12.9 billion cost cap appear likely. In response, the Navy is deferring work until after ship delivery to create a reserve to help ensure that funds are available to pay for any additional cost growth stemming from remaining construction risks. In essence, the Navy will have a ship that is less complete than initially planned at ship delivery, but at a greater cost. The strategy of deferring work will result in the need for additional funding later, which the Navy plans to request through its post-delivery and outfitting budget account—Navy officials view this plan as an approach to managing the cost cap. Further, cost and analyses offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense have tracked the ship’s costs for several years and report that without significant improvements in the program’s overall cost performance, CVN 78’s total costs will likely exceed the program’s $12.9 billion cost cap by approximately $300 million to $800 million.fall within this range, the Navy will need to either defer additional work to post-delivery or request funding under the ship’s procurement budget line above the $12.9 billion cap. At the same time, however, because the Navy considers post-delivery and outfitting activities as “non end-cost” items—meaning that funds from this account are not included when calculating the total construction cost of the ship—visibility into the ship’s true construction cost is obscured. CVN 78 Will Not Demonstrate Key Capabilities Prior to Deployment and Faces Continued Post-Delivery Testing Challenges
CVN 78 will not demonstrate its required capabilities prior to deployment because it cannot achieve certain key requirements according to its current test schedule. This margin includes berths as well as support services for personnel aboard the ship, such as food and sanitation facilities. Changes to Post-Delivery Test Plans Coupled with Key Systems’ Developmental Delays Could Result in CVN 78 Deploying Without FullyTested Systems
The Navy has further compressed post-delivery plans to test CVN 78’s capabilities and increased concurrency between test phases since our last report in September 2013. Navy’s Ability to Meet CVN 79 Cost Cap Predicated on Ambitious Efficiency Gains and Deferring Work until after Ship Delivery
To meet the $11.5 billion legislative cost cap for CVN 79, the Navy is assuming the shipbuilder will make efficiency gains in construction that are unprecedented for aircraft carriers and has proposed a revised acquisition strategy for the ship. With shipbuilder prices for CVN 79 growing beyond the Navy’s expectations, the Navy extended the construction preparation (CP) contract to allow additional time for the shipbuilder to reduce cost risks prior to awarding a construction contract. Further, should construction costs grow above estimates, the Navy may subsequently choose to use funding intended for phase II work to pay for construction cost increases without increasing the cost cap. To understand the true cost of each Ford-class ship, Congress should consider revising the cost cap legislation to ensure that all work included in the initial ship cost estimate that is deferred to post-delivery and outfitting account is counted against the cost cap. If warranted, the Navy would be required to seek statutory authority to increase the cap. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are not making any new recommendations, but our recommendations from our September 2013 report remain valid. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD agreed with much of the report but disagreed with our position on cost cap compliance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines remaining risks in the CVN 78 program since September 2013 by assessing: (1) the extent to which CVN 78 will be delivered to the Navy within its revised cost and schedule goals; (2) if, after delivery, CVN 78 will demonstrate its required capabilities through testing before the ship is deployment ready; and (3) the steps the Navy is taking to achieve CVN 79 cost goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ford-class aircraft carriers will feature new technologies designed to reduce life-cycle costs. The lead ship, CVN 78, has been under construction since 2008, and early construction on CVN 79 is underway. In 2007 Congress established a cap for procurement costs—which has been adjusted over time. In September 2013, GAO reported on a $2.3 billion increase in CVN 78 construction costs.
GAO was mandated to examine risks in the CVN 78 program since its September 2013 report. This report assesses (1) the extent to which CVN 78 will be delivered within revised cost and schedule goals; (2) if CVN 78 will demonstrate its required capabilities before ship deployment; and (3) the steps the Navy is taking to achieve CVN 79 cost goals. To perform this work, GAO analyzed Navy and contractor data, and scheduling best practices.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the lead Ford-class ship, CVN 78, will be delivered by its current March 2016 delivery date and within the Navy's $12.9 billion estimate is dependent on the Navy's plan to defer work and costs to the post-delivery period. Lagging construction progress as well as ongoing issues with key technologies further exacerbate an already compressed schedule and create further cost and schedule risks. With the shipbuilder embarking on one of the most complex phases of construction with the greatest likelihood for cost growth, cost increases beyond the current $12.9 billion cost cap appear likely. In response, the Navy is deferring some work until after ship delivery to create a funding reserve to pay for any additional cost growth stemming from remaining construction risks. This strategy will result in the need for additional funding later, which the Navy plans to request through its post-delivery and outfitting budget account. However, this approach obscures visibility into the true cost of the ship and results in delivering a ship that is less complete than initially planned.
CVN 78 will deploy without demonstrating full operational capabilities because it cannot achieve certain key requirements according to its current test schedule. Key requirements—such as increasing aircraft launch and recovery rates—will likely not be met before the ship is deployment ready and could limit ship operations. Further, CVN 78 will not meet a requirement that allows for increases to the size of the crew over the service life of the ship. In fact, the ship may not even be able to accommodate the likely need for additional crew to operate the ship without operational tradeoffs. Since GAO's last report in September 2013, post-delivery plans to test CVN 78's capabilities have become more compressed, further increasing the likelihood that CVN 78 will not deploy as scheduled or will deploy without fully tested systems.
The Navy is implementing steps to achieve the $11.5 billion congressional cost cap for the second ship, CVN 79, but these are largely based on ambitious efficiency gains and reducing a significant amount of construction, installation, and testing—work traditionally completed prior to ship delivery. Since GAO last reported in September 2013, the Navy extended CVN 79's construction preparation contract to allow additional time for the shipbuilder to reduce cost risks and incorporate lessons learned from construction of CVN 78. At the same time, the Navy continues to revise its acquisition strategy for CVN 79 in an effort to ensure that costs do not exceed the cost cap, by postponing installation of some systems until after ship delivery, and deferring an estimated $200 million - $250 million in previously planned capability upgrades of the ship's combat systems to be completed well after the ship is operational. Further, if CVN 79 construction costs should grow above the legislated cost cap, the Navy may choose to use funding intended for work to complete the ship after delivery to cover construction cost increases. As with CVN 78, the Navy could choose to request additional funding through post-delivery budget accounts not included in calculating the ship's end cost. Navy officials view this as an approach to managing the cost cap. However, doing so impairs accountability for actual ship costs.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider revising the cost cap legislation to improve accountability of Ford-class construction costs, by requiring that all work included in the initial ship cost estimate is counted against the cost cap. If warranted, the Navy would be required to seek statutory authority to increase the cap. GAO is not making new recommendations, but believes previous recommendations, including a re-examination of requirements and improvements to the test plan, remain valid. DOD agreed with much of the report, but disagreed with GAO's position on the cost caps. GAO believes that changes to the legislation are warranted to improve cost accountability. |
gao_GAO-08-1136T | gao_GAO-08-1136T_0 | Related to watch-list matching, TSA outlines air carrier requirements in the No Fly List Procedures security directive, requiring domestic air carriers to conduct checks of passenger information against the No Fly List to identify individuals who should be precluded from boarding flights, and the Selectee List Procedures security directive, directing domestic air carriers to conduct checks of passenger information against the Selectee List to identify individuals who should receive enhanced screening (e.g., additional physical screening or a hand-search of carry-on baggage) before proceeding through the security checkpoint. TSA expects to begin assuming from air carriers the watch-list matching function for domestic flights in January 2009, and to assume this function from U.S. Customs and Border Protection for flights departing from and to the Unites States by fiscal year 2010. Prior to April 2008, TSA Watch-List- Matching Requirements Were Broad and Allowed Air Carriers Discretion in Comparing Name Variations, Which Resulted in Less Effective Processes
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has imposed, through security directives, requirements for watch-list matching, which include identifying passengers with names similar to those on the No Fly and Selectee lists—a process TSA refers to as similar-name matching. Before undertaking revisions of the relevant security directives in 2008, TSA expected air carriers to conduct similar-name matching, but TSA’s security directives did not specify how many and what types of such name variations air carriers should compare. Some carriers reported comparing more name variations than others, and not every air carrier reported conducting similar-name comparisons. Moreover, there have been incidents, based on information provided by TSA’s Office of Intelligence, of air carriers failing to identify potential matches by not successfully conducting similar-name matching. Also, TSA announced that it planned to similarly revise the Selectee List security directive to require the new baseline capability. According to TSA officials, the new baseline capability is intended to improve the effectiveness of watch-list matching, particularly for those air carriers that had been using less-thorough approaches for identifying similar-name matches and those air carriers that did not conduct any similar-name comparisons. Until a 2008 Special Emphasis Inspection, TSA Had Conducted Limited Testing of Air Carriers’ Capability to Perform Similar-Name Matching
Until 2008, TSA had conducted limited testing of air carriers’ similar-name- matching capability, although the agency had undertaken various efforts to assess domestic air carriers’ compliance with watch-list matching requirements in the No Fly and Selectee list security directives. These efforts included a special emphasis assessment conducted in 2005 and regular inspections conducted in conjunction with annual inspection cycles. However, before being revised in 2008, TSA’s inspection guidelines for watch-list-related inspections were broadly stated and did not specifically direct inspectors to test air carriers’ similar-name- matching capability. Moreover, TSA’s guidance provided no baseline criteria or standards regarding the number or types of such variations that must be assessed. However, TSA began taking corrective actions during the course of our review and after it found deficiencies in the capability of air carriers to conduct similar-name matching during the January 2008 special emphasis inspection. Also, officials reported that, following the issuance of TSA’s revised No Fly List security directive in April 2008, the agency had plans to assess air carriers’ progress in meeting the baseline capability specified in the new security directive after 30 days, and that the agency’s internal guidance for inspectors would be revised to help ensure compliance by air carriers with requirements in the new security directive. However, while these actions and plans are positive developments, it is too early to determine the extent to which TSA will assess air carriers’ compliance with watch-list-matching requirements based on the new security directives since these efforts are still underway and have not been completed. However, we reported that challenges remain that may hinder the program’s progress moving forward. If these challenges are not addressed effectively, the risk of the program not being completed on schedule and within estimated costs is increased, and the chances of it performing as intended are diminished. Concluding Observations
Until the Secure Flight program is implemented, TSA’s oversight of air carriers’ compliance with watch-list-matching requirements remains an important responsibility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Domestic air carriers are responsible for checking passenger names against terrorist watch-list records to identify persons who should be denied boarding (the No Fly List) or who should undergo additional security scrutiny (the Selectee List). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is to assume this function through its Secure Flight program. However, due to program delays, air carriers retain this role. This testimony discusses (1) TSA's requirements for domestic air carriers to conduct watch-list matching, (2) the extent to which TSA has assessed compliance with watch-list matching requirements, and (3) TSA's progress in developing Secure Flight. This statement is based on GAO's report on air carrier watch-list matching (GAO-08-992) being released today and GAO's previous and ongoing reviews of Secure Flight. In conducting this work, GAO reviewed TSA security directives and TSA inspections guidance and results, and interviewed officials from 14 of 95 domestic air carriers.
What GAO Found
TSA's requirements for domestic air carriers to conduct watch-list matching include a requirement to identify passengers whose names are either identical or similar to those on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Similar-name matching is important because individuals on the watch list may try to avoid detection by making travel reservations using name variations. According to TSA, there have been incidents of air carriers failing to identify potential matches by not successfully conducting similar-name matching. However, until revisions were initiated in April 2008, TSA's security directives did not specify what types of similar-name variations were to be considered. Thus, in interviews with 14 air carriers, GAO found inconsistent approaches to conducting similar-name matching, and not every air carrier reported conducting similar-name comparisons. In January 2008, TSA conducted an evaluation of air carriers and found deficiencies in their capability to conduct similar-name matching. Thus, in April 2008, TSA revised the No Fly List security directive to specify a baseline capability for conducting watch-list matching and reported that it planned to similarly revise the Selectee List security directive. While recognizing that the new baseline capability will not address all vulnerabilities, TSA emphasized that establishing the baseline capability should improve air carriers' performance of watch-list matching and is a good interim solution pending the implementation of Secure Flight. TSA has undertaken various efforts to assess domestic air carriers' compliance with watch-list matching requirements; however, until 2008, TSA had conducted limited testing of air carriers' similar-name-matching capability. In 2005, for instance, TSA evaluated the capability of air carriers to identify names that were identical--but not similar--to those in terrorist watch-list records. Also, TSA's internal guidance did not specifically direct inspectors to test air carriers' similar-name-matching capability, nor did the guidance specify the number or types of name variations to be assessed. Records in TSA's database for regular inspections conducted during 2007 made reference to name-match testing in only 61 of the 1,145 watch-list-related inspections that GAO reviewed. During the course of GAO's review, and prompted by findings of the evaluation conducted in January 2008, TSA reported that its guidance for inspectors would be revised to help ensure air carriers' compliance with security directives. Although TSA has plans to strengthen its oversight efforts, it is too early to determine the extent to which TSA will provide oversight of air carriers' compliance with the revised security directives. In February 2008, GAO reported that TSA has made progress in developing Secure Flight but that challenges remained, including the need to more effectively manage risk and develop more robust cost and schedule estimates (GAO-08-456T). If these challenges are not addressed effectively, the risk of the program not being completed on schedule and within estimated costs is increased, and the chances of it performing as intended are diminished. TSA plans to begin assuming watch-list matching from air carriers in January 2009. |
gao_GAO-09-41 | gao_GAO-09-41_0 | In November 2001, DOD identified PBL as the preferred weapons system support strategy. Most Remaining Programs Used Business Case Analyses That Were Not Comprehensive
Service program officials could provide documentation of the business case analyses conducted for 14 of the PBL arrangements we reviewed, but all but 1 of the 14 analyses were missing one or more of the elements recommended in DOD’s economic analysis instruction. Further, with the exception of the Army, the services’ have not established effective internal controls to ensure that the analyses are prepared in accordance with service policies and guidance. Various other factors, such as the lack of systems that are supported by both PBL and non-PBL support arrangements, the lack of sound program baseline information, and changing operational and materiel conditions, also limited our ability to assess the impact of PBL implementation on support costs. As a result, DOD cannot be assured that PBL arrangements will reduce support costs and provide cost-effective support for DOD systems. However, program officials could not provide the data on which they based their decision. A Few Indicators Showed That PBL Arrangements Reduced Support Costs for Some Programs
Only a few of programs we reviewed were able to provide some indicators of reduced weapon system support costs that could be attributed to the use of a PBL arrangement. Availability of Cost Metrics and Effective Incentives
Finally, many of DOD’s PBL arrangements do not contain cost metrics or offer specific incentives to encourage reduced costs. DOD Did Not Emphasize the Potential for PBL Arrangements to Reduce Costs or Require the Collection and Reporting of Detailed Contractor Support Cost Data
Although PBL arrangements were included in a DOD pilot program intended to demonstrate the ability of various initiatives to reduce support costs, DOD did not emphasize this goal in its guidance or requirements as it established the concept as the department’s preferred weapon system support strategy. In general, improved performance was given greater emphasis, and we found only a few references to cost reduction in DOD’s guidance on implementing PBL arrangements. Use and Characteristics of Availability Contracts by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence
The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence also uses performance-based arrangements to support its weapon systems. In general, the availability contracts used by the ministry are significantly longer than those used by DOD, and the ministry uses an “open book accounting” arrangement to gain visibility into the contractors’ costs to provide support. Nonetheless, in the future they intend to pursue transfer of inventory ownership as much as possible. This access is not without limits. Although DOD’s guidance recommends using business case analyses to guide decisions about using PBL arrangements for weapon system support, the DOD guidance does not require these analyses and almost half of the programs we reviewed either did not perform a business case analysis or did not retain documentation of their analysis. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that PBL arrangements are the most cost-effective option for weapon system support, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to take the following five actions: revise DOD’s Acquisition Directive to require development of a business case analysis to support the decision-making process regarding weapon system support alternatives, including PBL; revise PBL business case analysis guidance to more clearly define what should be included in a business case analysis and to establish specific criteria and methods for evaluating PBL support arrangements, including evaluation at the subsystem and component levels; revise PBL business case analysis guidance to more clearly define when business case analyses should be updated during the weapon system life cycle; require that each service revise guidance to implement internal controls to ensure that program offices prepare and update business case analyses that are comprehensive and sound; and require program offices to collect and report cost data for PBL arrangements in a consistent, standardized format with sufficient detail to support traditional cost analysis and effective program management. Thus, reducing costs was a central focus of the adoption of PBL as DOD’s preferred support strategy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) used business case analyses to guide decisions regarding performance based logistics (PBL) arrangements and (2) the impact PBL arrangements have had on weapon system support costs, we selected a nonprobability sample of 29 PBL arrangements for weapon system support initiated from 1996 through 2007. In addition, we asked program officials to identify support cost reductions that occurred as a result of PBL implementation. We also interviewed officials from programs identified by the Ministry of Defence as using availability contracts for weapon system support to identify the characteristics of the specific arrangements and the impact that the use of these contracts had on support costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) identified performance based logistics (PBL) as the preferred weapon system support strategy. Within DOD, PBL is the purchase of performance outcomes, such as system availability, rather than the purchase of individual elements of logistics support--such as parts, repairs, and engineering support. Although PBL initially arose from efforts to reduce support costs, questions have arisen about whether PBL has reduced support costs as originally intended. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DOD has used business case analyses to guide decisions related to PBL arrangements and the impact PBL arrangements have had on weapon system support costs. In conducting the review, GAO analyzed the implementation of PBL arrangements for 29 weapon system programs. GAO also looked at the use and characteristics of performance-based contracting in the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence.
What GAO Found
Although DOD's guidance recommends that business case analyses be used to guide decision making regarding the implementation of PBL to provide weapon system support, the services are not consistent in their use of such analyses. About half of the DOD program offices responsible for the 29 PBL arrangements GAO reviewed either did not use a business case analysis or could not provide documentation for significant parts of their analyses. Almost all of the remaining analyses were missing one or more of the recommended elements in DOD's instruction for economic analysis. Finally, business case analyses were often not updated in accordance with service policies and guidance. Program office use of these analyses is inconsistent because DOD only recommends, but does not require, that they be prepared and because DOD's guidance on preparing a business case analysis is not comprehensive and does not adequately specify the criteria to be included. Also, most of the services have not established effective internal controls to ensure that the analyses are prepared or that they provide a consistent and comprehensive assessment. As a result, DOD has implemented PBL arrangements without the benefit of sound analyses that ensure that the chosen approach will provide the most cost-effective support option. While one of DOD's goals in moving toward the use of PBL arrangements was to reduce weapon system support costs, the ability of these arrangements to reduce costs remains unclear 7 years after DOD first identified PBL as the preferred weapon system support strategy. Many DOD program offices that implemented PBL arrangements have limited cost data, and various other factors--such as the lack of business case analyses--further limit an evaluation of the costs of this support strategy. Available data from the programs GAO reviewed indicated mixed results. Although a few programs in GAO's sample provided evidence of some cost reductions, GAO's analysis of the only two systems in its sample that are managed using both a PBL arrangement and a more traditional, non-PBL arrangement indicated that in both cases the PBL arrangement had higher costs. Also, GAO found that certain characteristics of DOD's PBL arrangements--contract length, funding stability, ownership of inventory, and the lack of cost metrics and effective incentives--could limit the ability of and incentive for contractors to reduce support costs. Neither DOD nor the services require detailed cost reporting for PBL arrangements and the lack of detailed cost data hinders DOD's ability to determine whether PBL has reduced support costs as intended. GAO describes the use of performance-based arrangements for weapon system support in the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, which the ministry refers to as contracting for availability. The Ministry of Defence began awarding availability contracts as an approach to reduce weapon system support costs, and officials believe that support cost reductions have been achieved as a result of using availability contracts. In general, the availability contracts used are significantly longer than those used by DOD, and the ministry uses an "open book accounting" arrangement to gain visibility into the contractors' costs to provide support. |
gao_GAO-02-943 | gao_GAO-02-943_0 | The federal government encourages employers to sponsor and maintain private pension plans for their employees and provides tax incentives offered under the Internal Revenue Code to those who do. In 1987, Congress limited the use of such plans significantly invested in employer securities. More Than Half of the Fortune 1,000 Companies Hold Employer Securities in Their Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Plans
About 550 of the Fortune 1,000 firms in 1998 held employer securities in their defined contribution or defined benefit plans. Investing in Employer Securities Can Present Significant Risks for Employees’ Retirement Savings
Investment in employer securities through employer-sponsored retirement plans can present significant risks for employees. If the employees’ retirement savings is largely in employer securities or other employer assets, employees risk losing not only their jobs should the company go out of business, but also a significant portion of their savings. Even if Companies Do Not Declare Bankruptcy, Employees Are Still Subject to Certain Risks
Even without bankruptcy, employees are still subject to the dual risk of loss of job and retirement savings because corporate losses and stock price declines can result in companies significantly reducing their operations. The largest of these plans covered about 20,000 participants. Current Laws Provide for Disclosures to Plan Participants, but Information about Investment Diversification and Risk Is Not Required
ERISA and the Securities Act of 1933 require DOL and SEC to ensure that appropriate disclosures are made to plan participants and investors regarding their investments. The Securities Act of 1933 requires companies with defined contribution plans that offer employer stock to employees to register and disclose to SEC specific information about those plans. SEC generally makes the companies’ Form S-8 publicly available, but does not routinely review these forms. In addition, providing plan participants with disclosures on the risks of holding employer securities and the benefits of diversification in mitigating employees’ losses may help employees make more informed decisions regarding the amount of employer securities they hold in their retirement plans. Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Labor | What GAO Found
The financial collapse of large firms and the effects on workers and retirees has raised questions about retirement funds being invested in employer securities and the laws governing such investments. Pensions are important source of income of many retirees, and the federal government has encouraged employers to sponsor and maintain pension and savings plans for their employees. The continued growth in these plans and their vulnerabilities has caused Congress to focus on issues related to participants investing in employer securities through employer-sponsored retirement plans. GAO's analysis of the 1998 plan data for the Fortune 1,000 firms showed that 550 of those companies held employer securities in their defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans, covering 13 million participants. Investment in employer securities through employer-sponsored retirement plans can present significant risks for employees. If the employees' retirement savings is largely in employer securities in these plans, employees risk losing not only their jobs should the company go out of business, but also a significant portion of their savings. Even if employers do not declare bankruptcy, employees are still subject to the dual risk of loss of job and loss of retirement savings because corporate losses and stock price declines can result in companies significantly reducing their operations. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Securities Acts, the Department of Labor and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are responsible for ensuring that certain disclosures are made to plan participants regarding their investments. Although employees in plans where they control their investments receive disclosures under the act regarding their investments, such regulations do not require companies to disclose the importance of diversification or warn employees about the potential risks of owning employer securities. SEC requires companies with defined contribution plans that offer employees an opportunity to invest in employer stock to register and disclose to SEC specific information about those plans. In addition, in most cases the underlying securities of those plans must be registered with SEC. However, SEC does not routinely review these company plan filings because pension plans generally fall under other federal regulation. |
gao_GAO-09-683 | gao_GAO-09-683_0 | States Are Implementing Some Performance Measures Using Different Approaches and Report That the Greatest Challenge Is Collecting Data on Technical Skill Attainment and Student Placement
Flexibility in Law and Guidance Allows for Differences in How States Implement Some Performance Measures and Results in Variation in the Student Outcome Data Education Will Collect
A key feature of Perkins IV—to enhance state and local flexibility in developing, implementing, and improving career and technical education—allows for considerable variation in how states implement some performance measures. 1). Consistent with Perkins IV, Education’s guidance to states also allows for flexibility. 2). States Face the Most Challenge Collecting Data on Student Technical Skill Attainment and Placement Measures because of Cost and Data Concerns
States reported in our surveys that they face the most difficulty in collecting student data for two of the performance measures: technical skill attainment and student placement (see fig. 4). In addition to challenges due to cost, states are limited in their ability to access accurate and complete data. According to Education’s inventory of open monitoring findings, as of May 2009, 9 of the 28 open findings were related to accountability and states failing to submit complete or reliable data. Most states reported that the assistance provided by Education has helped them implement the performance measures, but that more assistance in the area of technical skill attainment would be helpful. We found that Education officials were aware of states’ need for additional assistance and that Education has taken some actions to address these needs, particularly in the area of technical assessments. Education Relies on the Performance Measures to Gauge the Success of State CTE Programs
State performance measures are the primary source of data available to Education for determining the effectiveness of CTE programs, and Education relies on student outcomes reported through these measures to gauge the success of states’ programs. While Perkins IV requires states to evaluate their programs supported with Perkins funds, it only requires states to report to Education—through their state plans—how they intend to evaluate the effectiveness of their CTE programs. Because only 2 of 11 measures have been implemented and reported on thus far, Education has little information to date on program outcomes. In our surveys of state CTE directors, nearly half of states (23 states at the secondary level and 21 states at the postsecondary level) responded that they have conducted or sponsored a study, in the past 5 years, to examine the effectiveness of their CTE programs. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report and the electronic supplement to the Department of Education for review and comment. Education provided technical comments on the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To obtain national-level information on states’ implementation of Perkins IV, we designed and administered two Web-based surveys, at the secondary and postsecondary levels, to state directors of career and technical education (CTE) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. We also interviewed officials from local recipients of Perkins funds—that is, school districts and postsecondary institutions. Through our interviews with state and local officials, we collected information on efforts to implement the Perkins performance measures and uses of Perkins funding, experiences with Education’s monitoring and technical assistance, and methods for CTE program evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV) supports career and technical education (CTE) in high schools and postsecondary institutions, such as community colleges. Perkins IV established student performance measures at the secondary and postsecondary levels for state agencies, such as state educational agencies, and local recipients, such as school districts, eligible to receive funds. GAO examined (1) how states have implemented the Perkins IV performance measures and what, if any, challenges they have faced in implementing the measures; (2) to what extent the Department of Education (Education) has ensured that states are implementing the new performance measures and supported states in their efforts; and (3) what Education knows about the effectiveness of CTE programs. To collect national-level data, GAO surveyed state CTE directors in the 50 states and District of Columbia between January and April 2009, and received responses from all states and the District of Columbia. To view survey results, click on http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-09-737sp/index.html . We provided a draft copy of this report to Education for comment. We received technical comments, which we incorporated into the draft where appropriate.
What GAO Found
States are implementing some of the Perkins IV performance measures using different approaches and report that the greatest challenge is collecting data on technical skill attainment and student placement. Flexibility in Perkins IV and Education's guidance permits differences in how states implement the measures. According to our surveys, 34 states at the secondary level and 29 at the postsecondary level intend to adopt Education's recommended use of assessments--such as those for industry certifications--to measure technical skills. States reported that they face the most challenge collecting data on the technical skill attainment and student placement measures because of cost and concerns with their ability to access complete and accurate data. Education ensures states are implementing the Perkins IV accountability requirements through on-site monitoring and off-site document reviews, and supports states through technical assistance and guidance. Monitoring findings were most often related to states failing to submit complete or reliable data, and Education uses its findings to guide the technical assistance it provides to states. States reported that Education's assistance has helped them implement the performance measures, but that more assistance with technical skill attainment would be helpful. Education is aware of states' need for additional assistance and has taken actions to address this, including facilitating a state-led committee looking at technical assessment approaches. State performance measures are the primary source of data available to Education for determining the effectiveness of CTE programs, and Education relies on student outcomes reported through these measures to gauge the success of states' programs. Because only 2 of 11 measures (secondary and postsecondary have 3 measures in common) have been implemented and reported on thus far, Education has little information to date on program outcomes. In addition, Perkins IV does not require states to report to Education the findings of their program evaluations. In our surveys of state CTE directors, nearly half of states responded that they have conducted or sponsored a study to examine the effectiveness of their CTE programs. We reviewed 7 of these studies and found that only 4 were outcome evaluations. |
gao_GGD-95-182 | gao_GGD-95-182_0 | Since Defender Services represents defendants, not cases, the district court defendant data are more appropriate than case data in comparing district court and Defender Services workloads. 5). 6). Other criminal representations closed declined 7 percent between fiscal years 1990 and 1993. Cost Per Representation Closed Has Grown for All Types of Defender Services Attorneys
For each fiscal year 1990 through 1993, panel attorney costs per representation closed were the highest and CDO costs the lowest. 8). In 1992 almost 4,000 cases, or 36 percent of all drug cases, involved multiple defendants. While the number of death penalty cases in federal courts has increased, the lack of a reliable death penalty identifier in the database precluded an accurate measure of the increase. Specifically, we were asked to assess, for fiscal years 1990 to 1993 and the first half of 1994: the causes of the growth in overall Defender Services workload and costs, including the reasons that Defender Services workload has grown faster than district court criminal cases; the comparative costs of representations closed provided by FDOs and panel attorneys and, if the FDO costs were lower, what actions the federal judiciary was taking to increase the use of FDOs; the additional costs of paying standard higher hourly rates to panel attorneys in all or parts of 16 districts; and the causes of the increased workload and costs of the DPRCs, including whether the DPRCs had helped to reduce or contain the costs of panel attorney death penalty representations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Defender Services program, focusing on: (1) the causes of the program's increased workload and costs; and (2) whether death penalty resource centers (DPRC) have reduced the federal costs of representing indigent defendants in death penalty cases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Defender Services program represents individual defendants rather than cases and during fiscal years (FY) 1990 through 1993 there was an average of 1.4 defendants per criminal case filed; (2) the Defender Services program workload has grown and costs have increased because the number of defendants have increased and the cases have become more complex, resulting in more work for attorneys in each case; (3) there was insufficient data to determine why overall program costs doubled and DPRC costs tripled between FY 1990 and FY 1993; (4) federal public defender and community defender organization representations cost less than panel attorney representations, although the cost advantage has gradually declined; and (5) death penalty representations accounted for 0.6 percent of all panel attorney representations closed in FY 1993, but accounted for 8.7 percent of all panel attorney payments. |
gao_GAO-05-133 | gao_GAO-05-133_0 | Because the Emergency Plan is largely funded under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the purchase of ARVs with these funds is subject to a provision of the act that prohibits the purchase of any medication manufactured outside the United States if the manufacture of that medication in the United States would be covered by a valid U.S. patent, unless the patent owner gives its permission. Emergency Plan Provides Smaller Selection of ARV Products Than Other Initiatives
The Emergency Plan provides a smaller selection of ARV products than the other initiatives. In addition to ARV products that have met the Emergency Plan’s quality assurance requirement, other initiatives also provide generic ARVs that have been prequalified by WHO. Emergency Plan’s Selection of ARV Products Results in Higher Prices for Most First-Line Treatment Regimens
At the prices quoted to us during June and July 2004, most first-line regimens could be built for a lower price with the generic ARV products provided under the other initiatives than with the original ARV products provided under the Emergency Plan. The difference in price between the original ARVs provided under the Emergency Plan and the lowest-priced generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives ranged from $11 less per person per year for original 3TC to $328 more for original NVP. 2.) At these prices, three of the four first-line regimens could be built for a lower price with the generic ARV products provided under the other initiatives than with the original ARV products provided under the Emergency Plan. Differences in the price of a regimen per person per year can translate into millions of dollars of additional expense when considered on the scale of the Emergency Plan’s goal of treating 2 million people by the end of 2008. Coordinator’s Office Has Made Efforts to Expand the Selection of Quality- Assured ARV Products It Provides
The Coordinator’s Office has worked with FDA to expand the selection of quality-assured ARV products, particularly the preferred FDCs, that the Emergency Plan provides to the focus countries. Although the selection of ARV products available under the plan is currently limited primarily by the quality assurance requirement, if generic ARVs receive FDA approval, the patent requirement could be a barrier to expansion. If such permission is not granted, this requirement could prevent the purchase of generic ARVs, including generic FDCs, that have met the plan’s quality assurance requirement. However, unless the patent holders for these ARVs give permission or the Coordinator’s Office exercises its authority to purchase these products notwithstanding the patent requirement, the selection of ARVs provided under the Emergency Plan may not expand rapidly enough to address the AIDS emergency. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report compares the selection of antiretroviral medication (ARV) products that are being provided under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Emergency Plan) with that provided under other initiatives that also fund HIV/AIDS treatment programs in the focus countries, as of December 2004. Our discussion is focused specifically on the ARVs that are recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) for first-line treatment of HIV/AIDS in countries where health care resources are limited. Examining the Efforts of the Coordinator’s Office to Expand the Selection of ARVs It Provides
To examine the efforts of the Coordinator’s Office to expand the selection of quality-assured ARV products provided under the Emergency Plan to the focus countries, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance from which the plan’s quality assurance and patent requirements arise. Global Health: The U.S. and U.N. | Why GAO Did This Study
In developing countries, only about 7 percent of people with HIV/AIDS receive treatment. In 2003, the Congress authorized the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a 5-year, $15 billion initiative under the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The Emergency Plan focuses on 15 developing countries, with a goal of supporting treatment for 2 million people. Treatment regimens use multiple antiretroviral medications (ARV), which can be original or generic. Fixed-dose combinations (FDC) combine two or three ARVs into one pill. Questions have been raised about whether the plan is providing ARVs preferred by the focus countries at reasonable prices. GAO compared the selection of ARVs provided under the plan with that provided under other major treatment initiatives, compared the prices of those selections, and determined what the Coordinator's Office is doing to expand the plan's selection of quality-assured lower-priced ARVs.
What GAO Found
The Emergency Plan provides a smaller selection of recommended first-line ARVs than other major HIV/AIDS treatment initiatives in developing countries. The plan's selection includes six original ARV products--the only ARVs that have met the plan's quality assurance requirement--and does not include some FDCs that are preferred by most of the focus countries because they can simplify treatment. In contrast, the other initiatives provide a selection that in addition to the six original ARVs includes generic ARVs and more of the preferred FDCs. The original ARVs provided under the plan are generally higher in price than the generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives. The differences in the prices, quoted to GAO during June and July 2004 by 13 manufacturers, ranged from $11 less to $328 more per person per year for original ARVs than for the lowest-priced corresponding generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives. At these prices, three of the four first-line regimens recommended by the World Health Organization could be built for less--from $40 to $368 less depending on the regimen--with the generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives than with the original ARVs provided under the plan. Such differences in price per person per year could translate into hundreds of millions of dollars of additional expense when considered on the scale of the plan's goal of treating 2 million people by the end of 2008. The Coordinator's Office has worked to expand the selection of quality-assured ARVs--including FDCs and lower-priced generics--that it provides to the focus countries under the plan. The selection of ARVs available under the plan is primarily limited by its quality assurance requirement. The Coordinator's Office is working with manufacturers to take the steps necessary for more ARVs to meet this requirement. However, if generic ARVs meet the plan's quality assurance requirement, a statutory prohibition on the purchase of any medication manufactured outside the United States if the manufacture of that medication in the United States would be covered by a valid U.S. patent could become a barrier to expansion because all ARVs are currently under U.S. patents. Unless the patent holders for ARVs that have met the plan's quality requirement give permission or the Coordinator's Office exercises its authority to purchase these products notwithstanding the patent requirement, the selection of ARVs provided under the Emergency Plan may not expand rapidly enough to address the AIDS emergency. |
gao_GAO-11-565 | gao_GAO-11-565_0 | For example, 14 agencies do not provide a complete listing of data centers and 15 do not provide a complete listing of software assets in their inventories. Further, OMB did not require that agencies verify these inventory data. Additionally, in their consolidation plans, 20 agencies do not provide a master schedule, 12 agencies do not address cost-benefit calculations, and 9 do not address risk management. Several agency officials noted that they had difficulty completing their inventories and plans within OMB’s timelines. Until these inventories and plans are complete, agencies may not be able to implement their consolidation activities or to realize expected cost savings. Moreover, without an understanding of the validity of agencies’ consolidation data, OMB cannot be assured that agencies are providing a sound baseline for estimating consolidation savings and measuring progress against those goals. IT software assets. Cost-benefit analysis. These include challenges related to the data center consolidation initiative as well as those that are cultural, funding related, operational, and technical. Specifically, 19 agencies reported that obtaining power usage data was a challenge. Nine agencies reported that maintaining services during the consolidation transition is a challenge. Many state governments have undertaken data center consolidation initiatives in recent years. Although they have encountered unique challenges, they have also encountered challenges similar to those reported by federal agencies. Of these, 19 reported lessons learned that could be leveraged at the federal level. For example, officials from North Carolina reported that organizations are typically concerned that by consolidating data centers, they will lose control of their data, service levels will decline, or costs will rise. The state learned that to help mitigate this during the process of consolidation, the organizations’ concerns should be documented, validated, and addressed. In another example, a West Virginia official reported that since the state had no funding for a consolidation, it had to be creative in executing the consolidation. The state used the natural aging cycle of hardware to force consolidation; that is, when a piece of hardware was ready to be replaced, the applications and software were put onto a consolidated server. OMB and federal agencies have also taken important steps to reduce the number and increase the efficiency of the federal data centers. Specifically, we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Federal Chief Information Officer to require that agencies, when updating their data center inventories in the third quarter of each fiscal year, state what actions have been taken to verify the inventories and to identify any limitations of this information; require that agencies complete the missing elements in their respective plans and submit complete data center consolidation plans, or provide a schedule for when they will do so, by September 30, 2011; require agencies to consider consolidation challenges and lessons learned when updating their plans; and utilize the existing accountability infrastructure by requiring the Data Center Consolidation Task Force to assess agency consolidation plans to ensure they are complete and to monitor the agencies’ implementation of their plans. Most agencies generally agreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess whether agency consolidation documents include adequate detail, such as performance measures and milestones, for agencies to consolidate their centers; (2) identify the key challenges reported by agencies in consolidating centers; and (3) evaluate whether lessons learned during state government consolidation efforts could be leveraged to mitigate challenges at the federal level. We compared agency consolidation inventories and plans to OMB’s required elements, and identified gaps and missing elements. Appendix III: Assessment of Agencies’ Completion of Key Consolidation Planning Elements, Arranged by Agency
As part of its data center consolidation initiative, OMB required 24 federal departments and agencies to submit a data center inventory and a data center consolidation plan. However, the agency’s asset inventory and consolidation plan are not complete. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over time, the federal government's demand for information technology has led to a dramatic rise in the number of federal data centers and an increase in operational costs. Recognizing this increase, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has launched a governmentwide initiative to consolidate data centers. GAO was asked to (1) assess whether agency consolidation documents include adequate detail for agencies to consolidate their centers, (2) identify the key consolidation challenges reported by agencies, and (3) evaluate whether lessons learned during state government consolidation efforts could be leveraged at the federal level. To address these objectives, GAO assessed the completeness of agency inventories and plans, interviewed agencies about their challenges, and evaluated the applicability of states' consolidation lessons to federal challenges.
What GAO Found
In launching its federal data center consolidation initiative, OMB required the 24 participating agencies to submit data center inventories and consolidation plans by the end of August 2010, and provided guidance on key elements to include in the inventories and plans--such as hardware and software assets, goals, schedules, and cost-benefit calculations. The plans indicate that agencies anticipate closing about 650 data centers by fiscal year 2015 and saving about $700 million in doing so. However, only one of the agencies submitted a complete inventory and no agency submitted complete plans. Further, OMB did not require agencies to document the steps they took, if any, to verify the inventory data. For example, in their inventories, 14 agencies do not provide a complete listing of data centers and 15 do not list all of their software assets. Also, in their consolidation plans, 20 agencies do not reference a master schedule, 12 agencies do not address cost-benefit calculations, and 9 do not address risk management. The reason for these gaps, according to several agency officials, was that they had difficulty completing their inventories and plans within OMB's timelines. Until these inventories and plans are complete, agencies may not be able to implement their consolidation activities and realize expected cost savings. Moreover, without an understanding of the validity of agencies' consolidation data, OMB cannot be assured that agencies are providing a sound baseline for estimating consolidation savings and measuring progress against those goals. Agencies identified multiple challenges during data center consolidation, including those that are specific to OMB's consolidation initiative as well as those that are cultural, funding-related, operational, and technical in nature. For example, in attempting to fulfill OMB's requirements, 19 agencies reported difficulty in obtaining power usage data. In addition, 9 agencies reported challenges in maintaining services during the transition to consolidated services. Moving forward, it will be important for agencies to focus on mitigating such challenges as they implement their consolidation plans. Many state governments have undertaken data center consolidation initiatives in recent years and have encountered challenges similar to those reported by federal agencies. Specifically, 19 states reported lessons learned that could be leveraged at the federal level. For example, a West Virginia official reported that since the state had no funding for data center consolidation, it used the natural aging cycle of hardware to force consolidation; that is, when a piece of hardware was ready to be replaced, the new applications and software were put onto a consolidated server. Also, officials from North Carolina reported that organizations are typically concerned that by consolidating data centers, they will lose control of their data, service levels will decline, or costs will rise. The state learned that during the process of consolidation, the organizations' concerns should be documented, validated, and addressed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Federal Chief Information Officer, department secretaries, and agency heads take steps to ensure that agency data center inventories and consolidation plans are complete. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations. Defense and SSA did not agree to complete all missing elements of their inventories and plans. Based on OMB guidance on the importance of these elements, GAO maintains these recommendations to be reasonable and appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-78 | gao_GAO-07-78_0 | However, the Afghan government would not allow the use of herbicides. 3) had not been in place long enough to determine whether they had contributed toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. Because the teams were not fully fielded, they were unable to work as intended with provincial officials to coordinate alternative livelihoods projects, assist with eradication verification as planned, or coordinate public information projects to discourage poppy growing. State transferred $2 million to the Department of Justice to continue to pay for U.S. prosecutors from the Criminal Division’s Senior Federal Prosecutors’ Program to provide legal and legislative assistance. U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges
The deteriorating security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity, including governmental institutions, are tremendous challenges to reducing illicit drug production and trafficking. During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication forces and alternative livelihoods personnel were attacked several times and in some cases killed, slowing or preventing their efforts. Afghan Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Government Institutional Capacities Are Limited
Reducing opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan will take at least a decade, in part because of the need to address Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure, human capital, and government capacity. USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but Lack of Information and Security Limited Some Efforts
In an effort to prevent counternarcotics funds from assisting terrorists, drug traffickers, or human rights violators in Afghanistan, USAID and State required that grantees sign antiterrorism and antitrafficking certifications, financial agreements contain antiterrorism and antitrafficking clauses, and Afghan security personnel receiving training be vetted for associations with prohibited activities when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State made efforts to monitor ongoing projects to ascertain their status, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited the agencies’ monitoring of sites outside Kabul. Concluding Observations
Despite significant efforts by USAID and State, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan threatens the success of the U.S. counternarcotics goal of significantly reducing illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. They reported some accomplishments in each of the strategy’s five pillars; nevertheless, the opium poppy crop in 2006 grew by over 50 percent, reaching a record amount. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State, USAID, Defense, and Justice. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and Department of State’s (State) progress in implementing counternarcotics programs, projects, and activities under each pillar, and the factors, if any, limiting implementation, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State planning, funding, and reporting documents for their counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. In addition, we met with cognizant officials from Departments of Defense (Defense), Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, Afghanistan. To examine USAID’s and State’s efforts to ensure that the fiscal year 2005 counternarcotics funds were used for intended purposes, we reviewed the contracts, grants, and other financial agreements by which these funds were obligated and expended. | Why GAO Did This Study
The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report, but did not provide formal comments.
What GAO Found
USAID and State received about $532 million fiscal year 2005 funds and initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited site visits. |
gao_GAO-17-47 | gao_GAO-17-47_0 | We focus on SEC oversight since 2007 later in this report. Increased Demand for Proxy Advisory Firms’ Services Stems from Rise of Institutional Investing and Requirements for Shareholder Voting
The market for proxy advisory firms has grown over the last 30 years as institutional investors have relied more on firms to provide research, analysis, and vote recommendations. Studies and Market Participants Agreed That Proxy Advisory Firms Influence Voting and Corporate Governance, but Had Mixed Views about Extent of Influence
Recent studies, market participants, and other stakeholders agree that proxy advisory firms have influence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices, but had mixed views about the extent of their influence. Most of the 13 institutional investors,11 corporate issuers, 4 proxy solicitors, and 8 industry association representatives with whom we spoke stated that proxy advisory firms (more specifically, ISS and Glass Lewis—the two firms with the largest number of institutional investor clients) have influence on shareholder voting. According to large institutional investors and a few investor association representatives that we spoke to, some smaller institutional investors who do not have their own in-house research staffs to analyze the many proxy voting issues and companies in their portfolio will obtain such services from proxy advisory firms and rely more on the research and recommendations proposed by the firms. Proxy Advisory Firms Have Increased Engagement with Market Participants and Stakeholders in the Vote Recommendation Process
Proxy advisory firms develop their general voting policies and update them through an iterative process involving analysis of institutional investor and corporate issuer input, industry practices, and discussions with other stakeholders. Proxy advisory firms have taken steps to communicate with corporate issuers when developing voting recommendations and have allowed some to review proxy reports for accuracy before they are final. While some corporate issuers said they still do not understand the bases for some vote recommendations and would like to have a dialogue about the proxy reports, proxy advisory firms said that to maintain objectivity and satisfy research reporting timelines for clients they have to limit the breadth of such discussions. Some corporate issuers we interviewed said that both ISS and Glass Lewis recently have made more of an effort to engage market participants in the general policy development process unlike in the past when their outreach was less frequent or formal. Also, Glass Lewis officials said that they work with an independent advisory council that provides guidance in the development and updating of its voting policies. According to market participants, the increased rise of shareholder activism also saw increased attention on the issue of proxy access. Corporate issuers we interviewed expressed concern that firms applied these policies in a one-size-fits-all or rules-based manner. SEC Oversight Activities of Proxy Advisory Services Have Included Information Gathering, Guidance, and Examinations
Since 2007, SEC oversight of proxy advisory firms and the services they provide has included information gathering on issues relating to the firms, issuance of guidance, and examinations of firms registered as investment advisors and of registered investment companies or investment advisers using proxy advisory services (see fig. 5). The 2010 concept release discusses, among other things, concerns that had been raised by corporate issuers and industry participants about the level of accuracy and transparency in how proxy advisory firms formulate voting recommendations and potential conflicts of interest. In December 2013, SEC held a roundtable to discuss issues facing the proxy advisory industry. The roundtable discussed the use of proxy advisory firms in general and also reviewed key topics of interest, including potential conflicts of interest for proxy advisory firms and users of their services, the transparency and accuracy of the recommendations the firms make, and what the nature and extent of institutional investor reliance on proxy advisor recommendations is and should be. Examinations. SEC staff efforts on this priority were incorporated into an ongoing Never-Before-Examined Investment Company Initiative that launched in April 2015. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses (1) the demand for proxy advisory services and the extent to which firms may influence proxy voting and corporate governance practices, (2) how proxy advisory firms develop and apply voting policies to make vote recommendations and efforts to increase transparency, and (3) Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) oversight since 2007 related to proxy advisory firms and the services they provide. In selecting institutional investors for our interviews, we obtained information from the Council for Institutional Investors and the Investment Company Institute to judgmentally select a mix of 13 institutional investors (based on asset size) and type (mutual fund companies and pension funds). We reviewed the transcript and comments on a roundtable SEC held about the proxy advisory industry in 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
As institutional investment has grown over the last 30 years, institutional investors increasingly have relied on proxy advisory firms. The proxy advisory industry in the United States consists of five firms—two of which are the largest and most dominant proxy advisory firms. Some members of Congress, industry associations, and academics have raised issues about proxy advisory firms' influence on voting and corporate governance, the level of transparency in their methods, and the level of regulatory oversight.
GAO was asked to review the current state of the proxy advisory industry. This report discusses (1) the influence proxy advisory firms may have on voting and corporate governance, (2) how firms develop and apply policies to make vote recommendations, and (3) SEC's oversight activities. GAO reviewed literature; analyzed the proxy advisory firms' policies and SEC policies and examinations; and interviewed the 5 proxy advisory firms, 13 institutional investors, 11 corporate issuers, SEC officials, and industry stakeholders. GAO randomly selected corporate issuers from Standard and Poor's indexes and judgmentally selected institutional investors (based on size and type of investor) from industry associations' information.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to SEC for its review and received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Institutional investors, such as pension plans and mutual funds, hire proxy advisory firms to obtain research and vote recommendations on issues, such as executive compensation and proposed mergers that are addressed at shareholder meetings of public corporations (corporate issuers). Market participants and other stakeholders with whom GAO spoke agreed that with the increased demand for their services, proxy advisory firms' influence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices has increased. But recent studies, market participants, and stakeholders had mixed views about the extent of the influence. For example, some said influence can vary based on institutional investor size (there is less influence on large institutional investors that often perform research in-house and have their own voting policies).
Proxy advisory firms, specifically Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Company—the two largest firms—develop and update their general voting policies through an iterative process, involving analysis of regulatory requirements, industry practices, and discussions with market participants. Corporate issuers and institutional investors told GAO that unlike in the past, the firms have made more of an effort to engage market participants in the development and updating of voting policies, such as criteria for assessing the independence of board directors and executive compensation packages. According to the firms, they apply these general voting policies to publicly available company information to develop vote recommendations, which also are based on institutional investor voting instructions and criteria that firm analysts determine are applicable to the issue being voted on. Firms have taken steps to communicate with corporate issuers and allow review of data used to make vote recommendations before they are finalized. However, some corporate issuers told GAO that firms continue to apply policies in a one-size-fits-all manner, which can lead to recommendations not in the best interest of shareholders. Corporate issuers also stated that they often do not understand the rationale for some vote recommendations and would like to discuss them before they are finalized. Proxy advisory firms told GAO that to maintain objectivity and satisfy research reporting timelines for clients, they limit the breadth of such discussions.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight of proxy advisory firms and the services they provide has included gathering information, issuing guidance, and examining proxy advisory firms and use of the firms by investment companies, such as mutual funds. In 2010, SEC summarized concerns that market participants raised about conflicts of interest, accuracy, and transparency of proxy advisory firms and requested comments on potential regulatory solutions. In December 2013, SEC held a roundtable to discuss issues facing the proxy advisory industry, and issued guidance in June 2014 on disclosure of conflicts of interest, among other things. According to SEC, it also has continued to address concerns surrounding proxy advisory firms through its examinations of investment advisers and investment companies that retain their services. SEC made these examinations a priority in 2015 and an area of focus in its ongoing initiative for registered investment companies that had not been examined by SEC. |
gao_HEHS-99-5 | gao_HEHS-99-5_0 | Financial Condition of PBGC’s Single-Employer and Multiemployer Programs Has Improved, but Some Concerns Remain
PBGC’s financial condition has improved greatly over the past few years, and both of its insurance programs currently have a surplus. As shown in figure 1, the single-employer program moved from a deficit of $2.9 billion in 1993 to a surplus of $3.5 billion in 1997. The number of single-employer plans insured by PBGC has declined significantly since the mid-1980s; however, the number of participants has increased slightly. Offsetting the decline in the number of small plans has been growth in the number of plans with 10,000 or more participants. The number of multiemployer plans and participants has remained relatively stable since the early 1980s. Despite the improvement in multiemployer plan funding since 1980, some large plans remain underfunded and could pose a risk to the multiemployer program. However, in its 1996 report on the financial condition of the multiemployer program, PBGC reported that it expected the multiemployer insurance program to remain financially strong, even with the decline in the contribution base. Despite PBGC’s Improved Financial Condition, Long-Term Risks Remain
Although PBGC’s financial condition has significantly improved over the past few years, risks remain from the possibility of an overall economic downturn or a decline in certain sectors of the economy, substantial drops in interest rates, and actions by sponsors that reduce plan assets. A lower interest rate would reduce the future returns on a given level of assets and require that the amount of assets be increased to ensure that all benefit liabilities could be paid.Lower interest rates increase (1) the calculated liabilities from plans administered by PBGC, (2) the number of ongoing underfunded plans, and (3) PBGC’s potential liabilities from ongoing underfunded plans. PBGC Is Improving Efforts to Forecast Its Future Financial Condition
PBGC’s limited ability to protect itself from exposure makes accurately forecasting its financial condition especially important, because it gives PBGC and the Congress time to enact policy and legislative changes to improve the long-term viability of the insurance programs. It is also increasing its oversight activities and working with plan sponsors to reduce the administrative burdens on plans. Plan Monitoring
PBGC has also improved its monitoring of underfunded, single-employer pension plans. Its Early Warning Program targets plans that pose the greatest risk to the agency because of underfunding. Conclusions
While PBGC’s financial condition has significantly improved, risks to the long-term financial viability of the insurance programs remain. Continued underfunding among some large plans poses a risk to the agency. In addition, PBGC’s current methodology for forecasting the future financial condition of the single-employer program does not take into account the range of economic conditions that can result in plan terminations, nor does it measure the probability that such future terminations will result in claims. PBGC has made significant progress in addressing the financial systems and internal control weaknesses that had plagued the agency for many years. PBGC Efforts to Improve Forecasting Methodologies
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is required to annually provide an actuarial valuation of the single-employer program’s expected operations and financial status over the next 5 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the long-term financial viability of the pension insurance programs, focusing on: (1) the financial condition of the insurance programs and trends in the plans they insure; (2) the impact the Retirement Protection Act of 1994 has had on the financial condition of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and insured plans; (3) risks to PBGC's solvency; (4) PBGC's efforts to forecast its future financial condition; and (5) PBGC's efforts to improve administration of the programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) PBGC's financial condition has improved significantly over the past few years; (2) the agency has had a surplus for the past two fiscal years, after having a deficit for over 20 years; (3) the single-employer program improved from a deficit of $2.9 billion in 1993 to a surplus of nearly $3.5 billion in 1997; (4) the multiemployer program has maintained a surplus since the early 1980s; (5) like that of PBGC, the financial condition of most insured, underfunded plans has also improved, but underfunding among some large plans continues to pose a risk to the agency; (6) the improved financial condition of both PBGC and the plans it insures has resulted from better funding of underfunded plans and economic improvements; (7) over the past decade, the number of insured single-employer plans has fallen by more than one-half, to about 43,000, because of the termination of many small plans; (8) the number of participants, about 33 million, has increased slightly because of an increase in the number of large plans; (9) the number of multiemployer plans and participants has remained relatively stable since the early 1980s; (10) the declining number of active workers participating in multiemployer plans could increase the level of unfunded liabilities and place increased financial burdens on the multiemployer program; (11) PBGC experienced an increase in premium revenue immediately following passage of the legislation that contributed to its improved financial condition; (12) despite improvements in PBGC's financial condition, risks to the agency's long-term financial viability remain; (13) factors beyond PBGC's control could increase plan underfunding and PBGC's liabilities by reducing the future returns on assets; (14) PBGC is developing a new single-employer program forecasting model designed to estimate the probability of bankruptcies and terminations of underfunded plans under various economic conditions; (15) in addition, PBGC has already improved its methodology for forecasting the financial status of the multiemployer program; (16) PBGC has also improved its techniques for estimating its liability for plans that are likely to require future financial assistance and is now more closely monitoring the companies with underfunded plans that represent its biggest risks; and (17) while PBGC has made progress, it is important that it continue its efforts to reduce the time it takes to assume control of terminated plans, improve the timeliness of final determinations of participants' benefits, and monitor the performance of contractors that assist PBGC in administering the insurance programs. |
gao_GAO-10-120 | gao_GAO-10-120_0 | While not required, some regions choose to carry out regional airport planning—which may include the development of regional airport system plans (RASP) or other regional airport plans—to identify critical regional airport issues and to integrate aviation with other modes in a region’s transportation system. Many Airports Are or Will Become Significantly Congested in Coming Years and Regional Airport Planning Has the Potential to Identify Solutions
FAA Has Identified 14 Airports That May Become Significantly Congested by 2025, Even If Planned Improvements Occur, and 27 Airports If They Do Not Occur
FAA’s FACT 2 report forecast that 14 airports will be significantly capacity constrained—and thus potentially congested—by 2025, even if currently planned improvements are carried out. Many Regions Face Obstacles to Developing New Airport Capacity
Developing new airport capacity can be costly, complex, and time- consuming. Most Regions with Significantly Congested Airports Have Engaged in Regional Airport Planning, but Regional Airport Plans Have Been Used Selectively for FAA or Airport Decision Making
Nearly All Regions Forecast to Have Significantly Congested Airports Have Received FAA Funding for Regional Airport Planning
Nine of the 10 regions forecast by FAA to have one or more significantly congested airports in 2025 received FAA funding from 1999 through 2008 in support of regional airport planning (see table 3). Since Regional Airport Planning Is Advisory, Competing Interests Can Derail Development and Implementation, While Aligned Interests Can Aid Implementation
The Advisory Nature of RASPs and Other Regional Airport Plans and Competing Interests Are Factors That Hinder Planning and Implementation
The MPOs that conduct regional airport planning have no authority over which airport improvement projects are priorities in their regions and, as a result, the RASPs they produce have little direct influence over airport capital investment and other decisions. When the individual interests of airports, communities, and airlines are not aligned, for example, they can hinder regional airport planning and implementation. A number of constraints to airport construction—geographic, environmental, and political—spur regional airport planning. Each of these regions is using regional airport planning to help identify additional options for providing transportation capacity. FAA guidance for airport system planning also includes an inventory of the current aviation system, forecasting, an identification of air transportation needs, and the consideration of alternative airport systems. Except in the Boston region, the recommendations made in RASPs that we reviewed have not been systematically integrated into airport capital plans that currently guide airport decision making and FAA funding. We interviewed FAA officials in the Office of Airport Planning and Programming to collect information about the types of plans involved in aviation planning; the nature and extent of regional airport planning in congested regions; the history of such regional planning; the roles of various stakeholders, including FAA; and the outcomes associated with regional airport planning to date. Designation of Capacity- Constrained Airports
The key findings of the FACT 2 study are that assuming all capacity improvements—including those associated with NextGen for 2025—are taken into account, 6 airports will be capacity constrained in 2015 and 14 (an additional 8) will be capacity constrained in 2025. This effort is being funded by FAA, the MPO, and airports in the region. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that the national airspace system will become increasingly congested over time, imposing costs of delay on passengers and regions. While transforming the current air-traffic control system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) may provide additional en route capacity, many airports will still face constraints at their runways and terminals. In light of these forecasts, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to evaluate regional airport planning in metropolitan regions with congested airports. GAO (1) identified which airports are currently or will be significantly congested and the potential benefits of regional airport planning, (2) assessed how regions with congested airports use regional airport planning in decision making, and (3) identified factors that hinder or aid in the development and implementation of regional airport plans. GAO reviewed studies; interviewed FAA, airport, and other aviation and transportation officials; and conducted case studies in selected regions.
What GAO Found
A number of airports are or will be significantly capacity constrained and thus congested within the next 16 years. However, many of them face environmental and other obstacles to developing additional airport capacity. In 2007, FAA identified 14 airports (in 10 metropolitan regions) that will be significantly capacity constrained by 2025, even assuming all currently planned improvements occur (see figure). Planned improvements include airport construction projects and implementation of NextGen technologies. Without these improvements, FAA predicts that 27 airports will be congested. According to the FAA assessment and other studies, regional airport planning may identify additional solutions, such as the increased use of alternate airports or other modes of travel, to help relieve airport congestion. From 1999 through 2008, 9 of the 10 metropolitan regions with airports forecast to be significantly capacity constrained by 2025 have received a total of $20 million in FAA funding for regional airport planning. Of those regions, 6 have developed or will develop regional airport system plans (RASP), which we found largely followed FAA's guidance for airport system planning. The remaining 4 regions have engaged in less comprehensive planning. FAA does not formally review RASPs, and they have been used selectively by FAA and airports in decision making for the planning and funding of individual airport projects. A few airport sponsors have pursued select strategies outlined in plans, while one airport sponsor rejected the RASP for its decision making. Because regional airport planning is advisory, competing interests can derail development and implementation. Metropolitan planning organizations generally develop RASPs but have no authority over airport development. That authority rests with airports, which are not required to incorporate planning recommendations into their capital plans, and with FAA, which makes funding decisions on the basis of national priorities. In addition, airport, community, and airline interests may conflict in a region. For example, Philadelphia International does not support planning efforts that may divert traffic from its airport to alternate regional airports. By contrast, aligned interests and FAA involvement may aid regional planning and implementation, as has occurred in the Boston region. |
gao_GAO-13-498 | gao_GAO-13-498_0 | The aging services network is now made up of 56 state aging agencies, 629 area agencies on aging (AAAs), and almost 20,000 service provider organizations, many of which rely on volunteers, that deliver services to older adults.7 Further, the OAA authorizes grants administered by the AoA, within ACL, to fund initiatives for those 60 years of age and older throughout the aging services network, including social services such as home-delivered meals, legal assistance, employment programs, research and community development projects, and training for professionals in the field of aging.8 Elder justice programs supported by the Department of Justice (Justice) also are delivered through the aging services network as well as through other state agencies, local social service and government agencies, and tribal government agencies. Federal Elder Justice Programs Are Fragmented but Minimally Overlapping, Reducing the Risk for Duplication
Federal Elder Justice Programs Are Administered by Multiple Agencies
In fiscal year 2011, HHS and Justice administered 12 programs that directed federal funds toward elder justice programs. 3). Because few of these programs provided formula grants to all states and most dispersed discretionary grants to limited number of recipients of several types, there is minimal overlap in this area. Specifically, 3 of the 10 grant programs provided a guaranteed base of funding through formula grants to all states; however, each of these programs awarded grants to state agencies for different purposes and the state agency recipients of the HHS grants differed from the recipients of the Justice grant.23 One HHS program awarded formula grants to state aging agencies to fund elder justice prevention and awareness activities and the other program funded assistance to residents of long term care facilities. Federal elder justice programs also provided support for a variety of types of victims and potential victims of elder abuse. In addition to serving a range of elder abuse victims and service providers, the 12 programs we identified varied with respect to the activities they supported, with minimal overlap in some activities (see table 4). For example, 4 programs provided victim assistance services. When considering, collectively, the variation in the types of funding mechanisms and grant recipients, the elder abuse victims and service providers targeted by the grants, and the types of activities conducted, we found overlap across the 12 programs was minimal. Program officials reported that 4 of the 12 federal programs we identified tracked elder justice outcomes in 2011 and one had conducted a program evaluation to determine effectiveness. Challenges Persist in Serving Older Adults and Stakeholders Identified a Need for Additional Training and Awareness
Officials from the state aging agencies, area agencies on aging, and service providers we interviewed identified the increased demand for services in a constrained fiscal environment as a major challenge in meeting the needs of the growing older adult population. State aging agency, area agency on aging, and service provider officials also cited the need for greater awareness of elder abuse, by both the public and individuals who interact with older adults, to help prevent elder abuse or recognize its symptoms. However, although the Older Americans Act calls for a coordinated federal elder justice system, which includes educating the public, the seven agencies reviewed in that prior study did not undertake these activities as part of a broader coordinated approach.37 In other work on public program effectiveness, we have concluded that agencies can use limited funding more efficiently by coordinating their activities and can strengthen their collaboration by establishing joint strategies.38 Of the nine AAA officials we spoke with for this review, five said that there is a need for a strategic, national public awareness campaign on elder justice, not limited to financial exploitation. In addition, given the range of elder justice activities and individuals served under federal programs, coordination is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources. Further, while federal agencies have taken some initial steps toward coordinating their elder justice activities, such as forming the Elder Justice Coordinating Council, their efforts to develop a coordinated response to elder abuse would be further supported by an assessment of the effectiveness of federal elder justice programs. Until common objectives and outcomes for federal elder justice programs are defined, agencies may be working at cross purposes. To provide the basis for greater consistency across states in assessing elder justice service delivery, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS, as chairman of the Elder Justice Coordinating Council, direct the Council to make it a priority to identify common objectives for the federal elder justice effort and define common outcomes. 2. HHS also asked us to consider that improved public surveillance could help better describe the extent and patterns of abuse among older adults. Examples of elder justice activities:
Training law enforcement officers, health care providers, and other professionals on how to recognize and respond to elder abuse. In some instances, the elderly were specifically targeted. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the percentage of older adults in the population increases, the number of older adults at risk of abuse also is growing. At the same time, constraints on public funds may limit assistance to the growing population of older adults in need. GAO was asked to review elder justice program issues. This report addresses: (1) the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication across the federal grant programs that support elder justice; (2) the extent to which federal programs coordinate their efforts and monitor elder justice outcomes; and (3) how state aging agencies, area agencies on aging, and service providers deliver federal elder justice services and what challenges, if any, they face in doing so. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, identified federal elder justice programs, surveyed federal officials about program elements, reviewed program documentation, and visited agencies responsible for elder justice in Illinois, Virginia and Arizona. GAO selected states based on the percentage of the elderly in the state population, geographic dispersion, and percentage of the state's Older American Act funds devoted to elder care.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, two agencies--the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice (Justice) --separately administered 12 fragmented but minimally overlapping programs that directed funds toward elder justice, with low risk of duplication. Specifically, because more than one federal agency administers these programs, GAO found that these grant programs are fragmented. Further, GAO found that overlap across the 12 programs was minimal because the programs varied with respect to (1) funding mechanisms and recipients, (2) elder abuse victims targeted, (3) service providers, and (4) activities conducted. For example, a few of these programs provided formula grants to all states and most dispersed discretionary grants to a limited number of recipients. Programs that supported victims of elder abuse generally assisted all types of victims, but some also focused on certain subgroups, such as older women. Some programs that assisted service providers also targeted specific subgroups, such as judges and court personnel. In addition, elder justice programs supported a wide range of activities. For example, one HHS program provided public education to help identify and prevent elder abuse, while a Justice program trained law enforcement officers to investigate instances of elder abuse. Considering the variation across funding mechanisms and recipients, the elder abuse victims and service providers targeted by the grants, and the types of activities conducted, overlap across the 12 programs is minimal and the risk of duplication--when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries--is low.
We have previously reported that coordination is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources to address issues that cut across more than one agency. While federal coordination is in development--for example, HHS, Justice, and other agencies recently formed the Elder Justice Coordinating Council--federal agencies have yet to articulate common objectives and outcomes as precursors to future measures for elder justice programs, which would provide a rationale for coordination. Further, few federal programs tracked elder justice outcomes in 2011 or conducted program evaluations to assess effectiveness, making it difficult to determine what impact, if any, many programs have on victims of elder abuse.
Officials representing state aging agencies, area agencies on aging and service providers in the three states GAO visited identified the increased demand for elder justice services in a constrained fiscal environment as a major challenge in meeting the needs of the growing older adult population. Officials also cited the need for greater awareness of elder abuse by the public and training of direct service providers who interact with older adults on a regular basis, to help prevent elder abuse or recognize its symptoms. Five of the nine regional agency officials GAO spoke with said elder justice issues need to be elevated to national attention for the general public by a national public awareness campaign. The Elder Justice Coordinating Council is considering a recommendation to sponsor a national campaign but has not yet done so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS take the lead in identifying common objectives and outcomes for the federal elder justice effort and that HHS and Justice develop a national elder justice public awareness campaign. HHS concurred and Justice did not comment. |
gao_AIMD-98-150 | gao_AIMD-98-150_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the status of Navy’s effort to identify and correct its Year 2000 problem and (2) the appropriateness of the Navy’s strategy and actions for remediating Year 2000 problems. Moreover, the problem could adversely impact critical maritime operations such as combat, communications, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strategic sealift, and fleet mobilization and readiness. The Navy’s Year 2000 Efforts to Date
To increase awareness of Year 2000 and to foster coordination among its components, the Navy has taken the following actions. For example, although Defense required that all systems be assessed by June 1997, the Navy reported that it did not finish assessing its mission-critical systems until December 1997, and, as of February 1998, reported it was still assessing about 2 percent of its nonmission-critical systems . Our guide recommends that this be done early in the assessment phase. Further, it is still assessing whether corrective actions are needed for other equipment such as computer hardware, communications equipment, and security systems. Even though Navy CIO officials acknowledged that the department is behind schedule, the Navy has recently moved up its target completion dates for its mission-critical systems for the remaining three phases. In addition, Navy operations are at risk because the Navy has not developed contingency plans to ensure that mission functions can be performed if mission-critical systems are not corrected in time. The Navy Has Not Been Effectively Overseeing and Managing Year 2000 Remediation Efforts
In view of the magnitude of the Year 2000 problem, our Assessment Guide recommends that agencies plan and manage their Year 2000 programs as a single large information system development effort and promulgate and enforce good management practices at the program and project levels. The Navy is not developing contingency plans that focus on ensuring the continuity of all of its critical military operations and business processes. At this point, the Navy does not know whether it has identified all systems and interfaces; it lacks reliable data on the status and cost of remediation efforts; and it does not know if it has the capacity to handle the demanding task of testing systems, networks, operating platforms, and databases. In response to our recommendations, the Navy agreed to establish a complete and accurate inventory of its information systems, ensure that components have identified and corrected interfaces and developed memorandums of agreement with interface partners, develop a departmentwide test strategy, and ensure that contingency planning focuses on the continuity of critical military operations and business processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's program for addressing its year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) status of the Navy's efforts to oversee its year 2000 program; and (2) appropriateness of the Navy's strategy and actions for ensuring that the problem will be successfully addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy relies on computer systems for some aspect of virtually every operation, including strategic and tactical operations; sophisticated weaponry; intelligence, surveillance, and security efforts; strategic sealift and fleet mobilization and readiness; and routine business functions such as financial, personnel, logistics, and contract management; (2) failure to address the year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disrupt the Navy's day-to-day and, more importantly, mission-critical operations; (3) the Navy has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage its components to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (4) however, it is behind schedule in remediating systems; (5) for example, the Navy did not finish assessing its mission-critical systems until December 1997 even though it anticipated that this would be done in June 1997; (6) in addition, it is still in the initial stages of assessing whether year 2000 fixes are required for computer hardware, communications equipment, security and building systems, and other infrastructure equipment; (7) furthermore, the Navy lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress in remediating systems; (8) for example, the Navy: (a) currently lacks a comprehensive departmentwide inventory of systems requiring remediation; (b) has not been tracking component progress in developing written agreements with their interface partners; (c) has not developed a test strategy for the department; and (d) is not developing contingency plans that focus on ensuring the continuity of all of its critical military operations and business processes; (9) as a result, the Navy lacks complete and reliable information on its systems, and on the status and cost of its remediation efforts; and (10) it has also increased the risk that: (a) year 2000 errors will be propagated from one organization's systems to another's; (b) all systems, interfaces, and equipment important to Navy operations will not be thoroughly and carefully tested; and (c) the department will not be prepared if systems are not corrected or replaced by the year 2000 deadline. |
gao_T-GGD-99-35 | gao_T-GGD-99-35_0 | IRS’ Reports Do Not Provide a Complete Picture of Mission- Critical Systems’ Status
IRS’ Year 2000 status reports do not provide a complete picture of the status of IRS’ mission-critical systems because IRS does not monitor Year 2000 status for its mission-critical systems in their entirety. Instead, IRS monitors the Year 2000 status of the components of an information system, such as the application software, systems software, and hardware for each of its three types of computers—mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers. IRS also monitors its telecommunications networks separately. Reports Indicate That IRS Met the January 1999 Completion Goal for Some Areas but Not for Others
IRS’ reports indicate that it met the January 1999 completion goal for some areas but not for others. IRS fully implemented the Year 2000 aspects for one of its major system replacement projects. Reports Indicate That IRS Met its Goal for Application Software for Existing Systems and Telecommunications Networks
Since we testified in May 1998, IRS has continued to make progress in correcting the application software for its mission-critical systems. Reports Indicate That IRS Did Not Meet the Goal for Systems Software and Hardware
IRS’ reports indicate that IRS made significant progress in an area that in May 1998 we said was lagging—upgrading systems software and hardware for its three types of computers: mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers. Despite this progress, IRS did not meet the January 31, 1999, completion goal for its three types of computers. As a result of the delay, some changes are not to be tested until October 1999, when the second part of the Year 2000 end-to-end test is to begin. This delay reduces the time available to make any needed corrections before January 1, 2000. Full Implementation of Year 2000 Changes Achieved for One of the Two Replacement Projects; Less Than Full Implementation Achieved for the Other
For one of IRS’ two major system replacement projects, IRS implemented the Year 2000 changes at all 10 service centers by January 31, 1999; for the other system replacement project, 6 of the 10 service centers were using the full suite of Year 2000 changes for the system by January 31, 1999. The test will involve 97 of IRS’ 133 mission-critical systems. Staggered Milestones Developed for Completing IRS’ Contingency Plans
In 1999, IRS is to complete the development of 36 contingency plans that IRS determined are needed to address various Year 2000 failure scenarios for its core business processes. One key support services contingency plan and 12 compliance contingency plans are to be completed by May 31, 1999. Other Business Initiatives Are Creating Competing Demands on Certain Staff Needed for Year 2000 Efforts
In addition to Year 2000 efforts, IRS has other ongoing business initiatives that are placing competing demands on its information systems and business staff. Over the last several months, IRS has taken various actions to address these competing demands. To date, IRS has taken actions to address these competing demands, including delaying the completion milestones for some Year 2000 activities. As IRS passes each one, it will have more information on the status of its Year 2000 effort and the amount of remaining work. The results of this test will be an indicator of the extent to which, for the work completed thus far, IRS has been successful in making its systems Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) year 2000 efforts and the remaining challenges IRS faces in making its information systems year 2000 compliant, focusing on: (1) the extent to which IRS monitors the year 2000 status of its mission-critical systems in their entirety; (2) whether IRS met the January 31, 1999, completion goal for the areas that it monitors--application software, systems software, hardware, and telecommunications networks; (3) the status of two remaining, critical year 2000 tasks--conducting year 2000 testing and completing 36 contingency plans; and (4) the fact that other business initiatives are creating competing demands on staff needed for year 2000 efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a complete picture cannot be provided of the year 2000 status of IRS' 133 mission-critical systems because IRS does not report year 2000 status for these systems in their entirety; (2) instead, IRS monitors the year 2000 status of the components of an information system, such as the application software, systems software, and hardware, for each of its three types of computers--mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers; (3) IRS reports that it met the January 31, 1999, completion goal for some of the areas that it monitors but not for others; (4) IRS reports that it met the January 1999 completion goal for: (a) correcting application software; (b) upgrading telecommunications networks; and (c) fully implementing one of its two major system replacement projects; (5) despite significant progress since GAO's testimony in May, IRS did not meet the goal for: (a) upgrading systems software and hardware for its three types of computers; and (b) fully implementing the other major system replacement project; (6) as a result of not meeting the goal for upgrading systems software and hardware, some changes will not be tested until late in 1999, reducing the time available to make corrections before January 2000; (7) for the replacement project, some service center staffs will have no experience before 2000 using the new system to process peak filing season volumes of remittances; (8) IRS must conduct the year 2000 end-to-end testing of its mission-critical systems; (9) testing is to begin in April 1999; (10) the second critical task is to develop 36 contingency plans that IRS has determined are needed to address various failure scenarios for its core business processes; (11) IRS is developing these plans in response to GAO's June 1998 report; (12) IRS has delayed the completion dates so that the first set of plans are to be completed by March 31, 1999, and the second set of plans by May 31, 1999; (13) as IRS continues its year 2000 efforts, it will face the challenge of how to address the competing demands on its staff; (14) these competing demands are created by IRS' other major business initiatives, such as implementing tax law changes and completing the non-year 2000 portions of one of IRS' major system replacement projects; and (15) to address these competing demands, in the past several months, IRS has: (a) transferred staff from other areas; (b) hired additional staff; and (c) delayed some activities. |
gao_GAO-16-39 | gao_GAO-16-39_0 | GSA Has Largely Met Its Lead-Agency Responsibilities and Has Begun Implementing the Act for Its Own Employees
GSA Has Completed Most of Its Requirements for Government-wide Implementation and Is Drafting an Interagency Framework for Collaboration
GSA has identified the core competencies—knowledge, skills, and abilities—and related training to meet the government-wide requirements of the Act for federal and contract employees and has begun implementing the requirements for its own personnel but has not yet finalized compliance methods for contractors. In 2011, GSA began working to create an approach for federal buildings personnel to use to satisfy the Act’s requirements by demonstrating proficiency in the core competencies. Selected Agencies Have Taken Some Action, but Overall Response to the Act Has Been Limited
Of the five agencies we reviewed—two, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE)—have taken some actions to respond to the Act while three—the Departments of Justice (DOJ), the Interior (DOI), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—have not yet determined how to respond. As a result, at this time little is known about the numbers of federal and contractor employees covered by the Act at these agencies or the status of their compliance with the Act. Various Factors Have Contributed to Limited Implementation of the Act
We found that the pace of implementation has been limited by four factors that make federal buildings personnel compliance with the Act’s requirements essentially voluntary. Because the Act does not give any agency the authority to enforce compliance of the Act government-wide, GSA sees its role as advisory. For example, an official from GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy said that while GSA shares its internal guidance and procedures informally with other agencies, GSA is not authorized to issue official government-wide guidance on implementation. We asked officials from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) why the agency has not been involved in implementing the Act, and were given two reasons: (1) the Act did not direct OPM to do so and (2) GSA did not request OPM’s implementation assistance for any changes that would affect policies administered under OPM’s authorities, such as the management of government-wide position classifications. Agencies are not required to report progress. Agencies report having limited training and implementation funds. However, according to federal internal control standards, the management of an agency’s human capital is essential to achieving results and is an important part of internal control. No interagency group has been created to ensure consistent implementation of the Act across the government, a situation that has resulted in a lack of coordinated implementation policy and guidance. We have previously found that agencies can benefit from considering government-wide reforms when planning their training and development programs. Our past work found that interagency groups are mechanisms that can be used to develop policy, guide program implementation, and conduct oversight and monitoring. GSA has taken steps to create such a group, but this process is still in the development stage. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration develop a legislative proposal to enhance accountability for government-wide implementation of the Act. GSA should consider including the following in its proposal: establishing authorities for a single agency to monitor and enforce implementation of the Act; establishing agency responsibilities for reporting progress on implementation of the Act; establishing agency responsibilities for assessing employee skill levels related to the Act and identifying training that allows employees to develop and retain skills required by the Act; and establishing an interagency group to further government-wide collaboration on implementation of the Act. GSA stated it agreed with the report’s findings and that it would work with the appropriate agencies to address these findings (see app. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to review the status of the implementation of the Federal Buildings Personnel Training Act of 2010 (the Act). 3. To determine the progress GSA has made in responding to the provisions of the Act, we reviewed the Act, congressional committee and Congressional Budget Office reports, and GSA’s web sites and documents—including GSA’s required annual update of its core competencies and recommended curriculum, its www.fmi.gov web site, and a report on the implementation of the Act by GSA’s Public Buildings Service. Together with GSA, the agencies we selected occupy about 90 percent of federal real property gross square footage, according to the 2014 Federal Real Property Profile. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's management of its real property holdings costs billions of dollars and has been on GAO's High Risk List since 2003. Some agencies lack the staff expertise needed to oversee building management activities. GAO was asked to report on the status of the implementation of the Act, which directed GSA to, among other things, consult with the training industry to identify core competencies for federal buildings personnel and required these personnel to demonstrate proficiency in these competencies.
This report examines (1) the progress GSA has made in implementing the Act's requirements, (2) the actions selected agencies have taken to respond to the Act, and (3) the factors that have affected implementation of the Act. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed the Act and agency documentation and studies. GAO also interviewed officials from GSA as well as DOD, DOE, DOI, DOJ, and VA. Together with GSA, the agencies GAO interviewed occupy about 90 percent of federal real property gross square footage.
What GAO Found
The General Services Administration (GSA) has largely met its lead-agency responsibilities for implementing the Federal Buildings Personnel Training Act of 2010 (the Act) government-wide. For example, it has identified core competencies and a recommended curriculum for federal buildings personnel. While not required by the Act, GSA has also drafted a charter for an interagency advisory board to help coordinate government-wide implementation and has developed software tools to assist agencies with compliance efforts. GSA is in the process of implementing the requirements for its own employees. GSA has identified affected personnel, directed them to inventory their qualifications, and assessed their skills. GSA must still align job descriptions and performance reviews with the Act's requirements and implement contractor compliance efforts.
Of the five selected agencies GAO reviewed, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have taken some actions to respond to the Act, while the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Interior (DOI), and Veterans Affairs (VA) have not yet determined how to respond. For example, DOD is conducting a pilot program through its Defense Health Agency to align five positions with the core competency model GSA developed, while DOI's National Park Service has only discussed potential responses to the Act. As a result, little is known about the numbers of federal and contractor employees at these agencies covered by the Act or the status of their compliance with the Act.
The pace of implementation of the Act has been limited by at least four factors that make compliance essentially voluntary. First, the Act does not provide any agency with the authority to enforce compliance government-wide. According to GSA, it is not authorized to issue official government-wide guidance on implementation, and it has come to see its role as advisory. In addition, the Act does not provide an implementation role for the Office of Personnel Management, the agency generally responsible for government-wide personnel related issues. Second, agencies are not required to report the status of their employees' compliance with the Act, a circumstance that leaves agencies with little incentive to determine how many employees are affected or complying. Third, the Act did not provide funding for additional training, and according to agency officials, many other priorities compete for limited training resources. Fourth, no interagency group has been established that ensures consistent implementation of the Act government-wide. This gap has resulted in a lack of coordinated implementation policy and guidance. While GSA has taken steps to create such a group, this process is still in the development stage. Federal internal control standards emphasize that establishing good human capital policies and practices, including ensuring that personnel are properly trained, is critical for achieving results and improving organizational accountability. These standards also call for assessing the quality of performance over time. Such an assessment would include monitoring training practices. Further, prior GAO work has found that agencies can benefit from considering government-wide reforms when planning training programs and that the coordinated efforts of several agencies through interagency groups can help develop policy, guide program implementation, and conduct oversight and monitoring.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA develop a legislative proposal to establish agency authorities and reporting responsibilities—as well as an interagency group—to enhance accountability for implementation of the Act. GSA stated that it agreed with the report's findings and would work with the appropriate agencies to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-41 | gao_GAO-16-41_0 | As shown in figure 1, since the 2008 financial crisis, the amount of federal direct loans and loan guarantees outstanding has nearly doubled from $1.5 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2008 to $2.9 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2014. Subsidy Cost Estimates and Reestimates
FCRA requires agencies to estimate the cost to the government of extending or guaranteeing credit. This cost, referred to as subsidy cost, equals the net present value of estimated cash flows from the government minus estimated cash flows to the government over the life of the loan and excluding administrative costs. The data used for budgetary subsidy cost estimates are generally updated—or reestimated—annually after the end of the fiscal year to reflect actual loan performance and to incorporate any changes in assumptions about future loan performance. The financing account, which is nonbudgetary, is used to (1) collect the subsidy cost from the program account, (2) borrow from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to provide financing for loan disbursements, and (3) record the cash flows between the government and the borrower or lender associated with direct loans or loan guarantees over the life of the loan. These cash flows include loan disbursements, default payments to lenders, loan repayments, interest payments, recoveries on defaulted loans, and fee collections. In addition, FCRA requires that the rate of interest charged on financing account transactions with Treasury be the same as the final discount rate used to calculate the net present value of cash flows when estimating the subsidy cost of a credit program. As a result, the discount rate reflects the federal government’s actual borrowing cost and incorporates into the subsidy cost calculation an agency’s cost of financing its lending. Some have suggested revising FCRA to include in the subsidy cost an additional estimated cost related to certain market risk. This suggestion has been referred to as the fair value approach and centers around the debate that beyond the cash flows associated with the direct loan or loan guarantee, which are recognized under FCRA, costs are imposed on taxpayers who would, in a similarly risky private market transaction, require compensation for bearing the aggregate risk associated with making the loan. Based on our analyses of these factors related to reestimate data for the fiscal years 2001 through 2014 cohorts, we did not identify any overall consistent trends in under- or overestimates of subsidy costs across federal credit programs government-wide. Specifically, although both direct loan and loan guarantee programs government-wide had overall lifetime upward reestimates for the cohorts over the 14-year period of our analysis, the reestimates fluctuated significantly from year to year. These reestimates could generally be explained by specific events affecting a few large programs. Chief among these changes affecting the cost were downward adjustments to long-term housing price and interest rate assumptions stemming from the mortgage and financial crises in the late 2000s. More specifically, the fair value approach would (1) add noncash costs into the budgeting process, which is based on cash costs; (2) be inconsistent with the budget treatment of similarly risky programs; (3) lack transparency with respect to inclusion of a noncash cost in budget totals; (4) involve significant implementation issues; and (5) be complicated by comparisons to GAAP fair value. Consequently, we do not support the fair value approach to estimate subsidy costs for the budget and believe the current FCRA methodology is more appropriate, as it represents the best estimate of the direct cost to the government and is consistent with current budgetary practices .Other experts we interviewed, as well as OMB, opposed the fair value approach. Aggregate Risk Premium In private financial markets, taxpayers as investors with diversified portfolios would still demand compensation for bearing the risk that the macroeconomy—the national or global economy as a whole—may falter. This risk—referred to as aggregate risk (which represents a portion of overall market risk)— arises from the possibility of significant economic downturns, when even a well- diversified portfolio of financial investments will experience a reduction in value. To incorporate the cost of bearing this aggregate risk into budget costs for loans, the fair value approach adds an aggregate risk premium to the discount rate used in FCRA calculations, which is determined based on interest rates on Treasury securities. The debate over the fair value approach rests on whether the cost associated with aggregate risk should be considered in the subsidy cost of credit programs for the budget of the federal government. Reflecting a different concern, some proponents of the fair value approach to budgeting for federal credit programs, cited as motivation the perceived over-reliance on federal credit as a policy tool and the desire to correct any bias toward underestimated costs under FCRA. Some proponents of the fair value approach told us that adopting the fair value approach would help address concerns about the over-reliance on federal credit programs by raising the subsidy cost of credit programs, likely resulting in fewer loans being made. In contrast, proponents of the FCRA methodology stated that to the extent that agencies were underestimating subsidy costs under FCRA, this would be more appropriately addressed through improvements in the subsidy estimation process rather than application of the fair value approach. Fair Value Approach Subsidy Cost Estimates Are Not Consistent with Long-standing Federal Budgeting Practices, Involve Significant Implementation Challenges, and Should Not Be Included in the Budget
While fair value approach estimates may provide useful information for evaluating the costs against the benefits of credit programs, the additional market risk recognized under that approach do not reflect additional estimated cash costs beyond those recognized by FCRA. Because of these issues, we do not support the fair value approach to estimate credit program subsidy costs for the budget and believe that the current FCRA methodology is more appropriate for this purpose. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to CBO and OMB for their review and comment. To evaluate implications of using subsidy cost estimates developed under the fair value approach for the budget and to determine whether we believe such concepts should be incorporated into subsidy cost estimates for the budget, we reviewed literature related to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), the budget, and the fair value approach. We conducted semistructured interviews with 30 experts to achieve a variety of expertise and viewpoints. Budget Issues: Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal direct loans and loan guarantees outstanding have nearly doubled from $1.5 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2008 to $2.9 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2014. For the past several years, concerns have been raised by some experts both in and out of the federal government that FCRA may understate credit program subsidy costs. Some of these experts have suggested that FCRA be modified with an approach—referred to as the fair value approach—to include certain market risk not currently considered under FCRA.
GAO was asked to examine the budgetary treatment of the cost of federal credit programs. This report addresses (1) whether trends exist in subsidy cost reestimates and what factors, if any, help explain any significant trends in reestimates and (2) the implications of using the fair value approach to estimate subsidy costs in the budget and whether GAO believes such concepts should be incorporated into subsidy cost estimates for the budget.
GAO analyzed reestimate data from fiscal years 2001 to 2014 as reported in the President's Budgets and conducted interviews with 30 experts.
What GAO Found
The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) requires agencies to estimate the cost to the government of extending or guaranteeing credit. This cost, referred to as subsidy cost, equals the net present value of estimated cash flows from the government (e.g., loan disbursements and claim payments to lenders) minus estimated cash flows to the government (e.g., loan repayments, interest payments, fees, and recoveries on defaulted loans) over the life of the loan, excluding administrative costs. Discount rates that reflect the federal government's cost of financing are used to determine the net present value of estimated cash flows. Agencies generally update—or reestimate—subsidy costs annually to reflect both actual loan performance and changes in expected future loan performance.
Based on GAO's analyses of credit program reestimates for direct loans and loan guarantees obligated or committed from fiscal years 2001 through 2014 and considering various factors to identify trends, GAO did not identify any overall consistent trends in under- or overestimates of subsidy costs across federal credit programs government-wide. Overall, both direct loan and loan guarantee programs government-wide underestimated costs by $3.1 billion and $39.0 billion, respectively, over the 14-year period. These amounts represent less than 1 percent of the amounts disbursed or guaranteed during the period. Annual reestimates fluctuated from year to year, indicating both under- and overestimates of subsidy costs. Further, significant lifetime reestimates could generally be explained by specific events affecting a few large programs. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Program reported underestimating costs over this period because of a variety of factors, including long-term housing prices and interest rate changes stemming from the mortgage and financial crises in the late 2000s.
While subsidy cost estimates under the fair value approach may provide useful information to decision makers for evaluating the costs against the benefits of credit programs, GAO does not support the use of the fair value approach to estimate subsidy costs for the budget. Proponents of the fair value approach have asserted that beyond the cash flows associated with a direct loan or loan guarantee, costs are imposed on taxpayers who would, in a similarly risky private market transaction, require compensation for bearing the risk associated with making the loan or guarantee. Taxpayers as investors with diversified portfolios would still demand compensation, or a premium, for bearing the risk that the macroeconomy—the national or global economy—may falter. This risk—referred to as aggregate risk (a portion of overall market risk)—arises from the possibility of significant economic downturns, when even a well-diversified portfolio of financial investments will decrease in value. To incorporate the cost of bearing aggregate risk into subsidy cost estimates for the budget, the fair value approach adds an aggregate risk premium to the discount rate used in FCRA calculations, which is based on interest rates of Treasury securities. Including the aggregate risk premium incorporates a noncash cost into the subsidy cost estimate. The actual cash flows to and from the federal government associated with a credit program are the same under the fair value approach and FCRA. The debate over the fair value approach rests on whether the cost associated with aggregate risk should be considered in the subsidy cost estimates for the budget of the federal government.
Reflecting a different concern, some proponents of the fair value approach cited as motivation the perceived overreliance on federal credit programs as a policy tool and the desire to correct any bias toward underestimates of costs under FCRA. Raising the subsidy cost would likely result in fewer loans being made. In contrast, some proponents of FCRA stated that any overreliance on credit programs should be addressed as a policy decision, and that to the extent that agencies were underestimating subsidy costs under FCRA, improvements in the subsidy estimation process should be pursued.
The additional market risk recognized under the fair value approach does not reflect additional cash costs beyond those already recognized by FCRA. The introduction of market risk into subsidy costs under the fair value approach would (1) be inconsistent with long-standing federal budgeting practices primarily based on cash outlays; (2) be inconsistent with the budgetary treatment of similarly risky programs; (3) introduce transparency and verification issues with respect to inclusion of a noncash cost in budget totals; and (4) involve significant implementation issues, such as the need for additional agency resources. Consequently, GAO does not support the use of the fair value approach to estimate subsidy costs for the budget and believes the current FCRA methodology is more appropriate for this purpose as it represents the best estimate of the direct cost to the government and is consistent with current budgetary practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO supports maintaining the current FCRA method for estimating credit subsidy cost for the budget and therefore is not making any recommendations. The Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-225 | gao_GAO-15-225_0 | Additionally, in January 2013, the Bureau implemented an Internet response option for its American Community Survey (ACS), which is another household survey conducted by the 2020 Census Directorate on a smaller scale than the decennial census. The Bureau has stated that it plans to use cloud computing solutions, which is a means for establishing on-demand access to shared and scalable pools of computing resources, to help support the large volume of data processing, storage, and transactions needed for Internet responses. The Bureau has identified segments of the population that are more difficult to enumerate based on prior censuses, such as minorities, renters, children, low-income households, and low-education households. Census Bureau Has Taken Preliminary Steps to Examine the Impact of the Internet Option on Hard-to- Count Populations and Has Further Evaluation Plans
The Bureau has taken preliminary steps to identify demographic groups likely to use the Internet response option in the 2020 census and how they compare to historically hard-to-count populations by examining existing ACS studies in this area and applying the lessons learned to the decennial census. For example, the Bureau is planning two tests in 2015 that are expected to provide data on Internet response rates among different demographic groups, including historically hard-to-count populations. Specifically:
The Internet response option cost estimate was not comprehensive. They stated that the estimate will be updated to reflect the program’s work breakdown structure once the preliminary design decision is made in September 2015. According to Bureau officials, they are in the process of developing estimated costs for relevant CEDCAP projects, and these will be incorporated into the Internet response option cost estimate. We identified four major challenges the Bureau faces in implementing an Internet response option for the 2020 census: project schedules associated with the Internet response option are not fully integrated; key questions may not be answered in time for the preliminary design decision; high-level time frames for cloud computing decisions and implementation for the 2020 census have not been determined; and gaps in IT skill sets continue to exist. Without established high- level time frames, Bureau officials will not know whether there is enough time to effectively implement a cloud environment. While the Bureau’s initial estimate of approximately $73 million for the Internet response option was included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request, this estimate lacks reliability, which in turn, calls into question the reliability of the potential cost savings estimate of about $550 million to $1 billion for the optimizing self-response design category (which includes the Internet response option). Additionally, the Bureau’s ability to effectively manage the scheduling, task, and capability challenges it faces in planning for an Internet response option will be critical to the success of the 2020 census. Accordingly, until clear plans for answering these questions are established and implemented, the Bureau will have limited information for beginning its development and implementation of systems and infrastructure. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Bureau is better positioned to deliver an Internet response option for the 2020 Decennial Census, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs to direct the Director of the Census Bureau to take the following three actions: ensure that the estimated costs associated with the Internet response option are updated to reflect significant changes in the program and to fully meet the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate; ensure that the methodologies for answering the Internet response rate and IT infrastructure research questions are determined and documented in existing or future project plans in time to inform key design decisions; and develop high-level time frames for selecting, testing, and deploying a cloud environment to guide the Bureau’s approach to enabling scalability for the 2020 census. The department neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but provided comments that are discussed in detail below. Regarding our conclusions on key challenges associated with delivering an Internet response option, the department stated that it believed it had developed project plans, methodologies, and time frames for making decisions related to IT infrastructure needs, including the use of cloud computing to support 2020 census requirements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Census Bureau’s (Bureau) efforts to identify demographic groups likely to use Internet response and how they compare to historically hard-to-count populations, (2) assess the reliability of estimated costs and savings for the Internet response option, and (3) determine key challenges associated with delivering an Internet response option for the 2020 census. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau plans to significantly change the methods and technology it uses to count the population with the 2020 Decennial Census, such as offering an option for households to respond to the survey via the Internet. This involves developing and acquiring IT systems and infrastructure to support the collection and processing of Internet response data.
GAO was asked to review the Bureau's efforts to deliver an Internet response option for the 2020 census. GAO's objectives were to (1) describe the Bureau's efforts to identify demographic groups likely to use Internet response and how they compare to historically hard-to-count populations, (2) assess the reliability of estimated costs and savings for Internet response, and (3) determine key challenges associated with delivering an Internet response option. To do this, GAO reviewed Bureau studies, cost estimates, project plans, schedules, and other documentation and compared them against relevant guidance. GAO also interviewed Bureau officials and experts.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has taken preliminary steps and plans to further examine the impact of introducing an Internet response option on historically hard-to-count segments of the population (these include, but are not limited to, minorities, renters, children, low-income households, and low-education households). For example, the Bureau is applying lessons learned from its implementation of an Internet response option for another household survey, called the American Community Survey, which is conducted on a smaller scale than the decennial census. Additionally, the Bureau is planning two 2020 census field tests in 2015 that are expected to provide data on Internet response rates among different demographic groups, including the historically hard-to-count populations.
The Bureau's preliminary estimated costs of about $73 million for the Internet response option are not reliable because its estimate did not conform to best practices. For example, the estimate has not been updated to reflect significant changes related to the Internet response option that have occurred since it was developed in 2011. Additionally, the unreliability of the Bureau's cost estimate for the Internet response option cast doubt on the reliability of associated potential cost savings estimates. Officials have recognized weaknesses in the Bureau's cost estimate and stated that they plan to update it based on a preliminary decision for the overall design of the 2020 census.
While efforts to deliver an Internet response option are under way, the Bureau faces several scheduling, task, and capability challenges in developing such an option for the 2020 census, including:
Key questions related to estimating the Internet self-response rate and determining the information technology (IT) infrastructure needed to support it may not be answered in time for the preliminary design decision, scheduled for September 2015. Specifically, the Bureau has not developed project plans and research methodologies for answering these questions. In November 2014, officials stated that they had recently begun working on establishing methodologies for answering these questions. However, Bureau officials do not know when the methodologies will be established or when project plans will be updated or created to reflect this new work. Until such plans and methodologies are established, concerns will persist as to whether these two critical questions will be answered in time to inform the design decision in September 2015.
High-level time frames for making decisions related to implementing cloud computing (i.e., a means for enabling on-demand access to shared and scalable pools of computing resources), such as selecting, testing, and implementing a cloud environment that meets the Bureau's scalability, budget, security, and privacy needs, have not been established. While Bureau officials estimated that such time frames will be established around June 2015, until they are established the Bureau will lack assurance that it has enough time to successfully implement a cloud environment prior to system testing, which is to begin in 2018.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Commerce's Census Bureau update estimated costs for the Internet response option and ensure they are reliable, develop methodologies for answering key research questions, and establish high-level time frames for cloud computing decisions. The department neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. |
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