id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-02-799 | gao_GAO-02-799_0 | There are approximately 3,500 local emergency planning committees across the nation. Emergency Response Community Has Varied Views on the Adequacy of Federally Required Chemical Information and the Manner in Which It Is Delivered
The members of the emergency response community we contacted have varied views on the adequacy of the information reported in chemical inventory forms and risk management plans and on the manner in which that information is delivered. Representatives from the National Volunteer Fire Council believe that forms need to be electronic to be useful. EPA’s Sense of Compliance with the Risk Management Plan Requirements Varies
EPA officials told us that the agency has undertaken several efforts to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act’s risk management program. | What GAO Found
The United States has become increasingly aware of the need to be prepared for emergencies, including those involving hazardous chemicals. The local emergency responders and representatives from national organizations that GAO contacted have varied views on the adequacy of (1) information in chemical inventory forms and risk management plans and (2) the manner in which that information is delivered. Most members of the emergency response community believe that the manner of delivery of federally required information could be improved. Environmental Protection Agency officials cited their efforts to ensure compliance with provisions of the Clean Air Act's risk management program. However, their sense of the extent of compliance varies across three specific provisions; that is, the extent to which (1) facilities have registered risk management plans, (2) the plans contain accurate information, and (3) local responders are receiving the plans. |
gao_GAO-04-249T | gao_GAO-04-249T_0 | In implementing EEOICPA, the President acknowledged that it had been Energy’s past policy to encourage and assist its contractors in opposing workers’ claims for state workers’ compensation benefits based on illnesses said to be caused by exposure to toxic substances at Energy facilities. Energy then develops the claims by requesting records of employment, medical treatment, and exposure to toxic substances from the Energy facilities at which the workers were employed. If Energy determines that the worker was not employed by one of its facilities or did not have an illness that could be caused by exposure to toxic substances, the agency finds the claimant ineligible. Energy Has Fully Processed Few Cases, and Systems Limitations Complicate Program Management
As of June 30, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the nearly 19,000 cases that had been filed, and the majority of all cases filed were associated with facilities in nine states. At the time of our study, Energy had not yet begun processing more than half of the cases, and an additional 40 percent of cases were in processing (see fig. 2). The contractors considered to be willing payers are those that have an order from, or agreement with, Energy to not contest claims. A Majority of Cases in Nine States Potentially Have a Willing Payer
A majority of cases in nine states will potentially have a willing payer of workers’ compensation benefits, assuming that for all cases there has been a positive physician panel determination and the claimant can demonstrate a loss from the worker’s illness that has not previously been compensated. Specifically, based on our analysis of workers’ compensation programs and the different types of workers’ compensation coverage used by the major contractors, it appears that approximately 86 percent of these cases will potentially have a willing payer—that is, contractors and their insurers who will not contest the claims for benefits. However, since no claimants to date have received compensation as a result of their cases filed with Energy, there is no actual experience about how contractors and state workers’ compensation programs treat such cases. Concerns about the extent to which there will be willing payers of benefits have led to various proposals for addressing this issue. Bottlenecks in Energy’s Claims Process Delay Filing of Workers’ Compensation Claims
As a result of Energy’s policies and procedures for processing claims, claimants have experienced lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers’ compensation claims. In particular, the number of cases developed during initial case processing has not always been sufficient to allow the physician panels to operate at full capacity. Moreover, even if these panels were operating at full capacity, the small pool of physicians qualified to serve on the panels would limit the agency’s ability to produce more timely determinations. When Energy first began developing cases, in the fall of 2002, the case development process had a staff of about 14 case managers and assistants. Currently, approximately 100 physicians are assigned to panels of 3 physicians. Energy officials are exploring ways that the panel process could be made more efficient. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (Energy) and its predecessor agencies and contractors have employed thousands of workers in the nuclear weapons production complex. Some employees were exposed to toxic substances, including radioactive and hazardous materials, during this work and many subsequently developed illnesses. Subtitle D of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 allows Energy to help its contractor employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to be caused by exposure to toxic substances in the course of employment at an Energy facility. Energy began accepting applications under this program in July 2001, but did not begin processing them until its final regulations became effective on September 13, 2002. The Congress mandated that GAO study the effectiveness of the benefit program under Subtitle D of this Act. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work on this issue and focuses on three key areas: (1) the number, status, and characteristics of claims filed with Energy; (2) the extent to which there will be a "willing payer" of workers' compensation benefits, that is, an insurer who--by order from, or agreement with, Energy--will not contest these claims; and (3) the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for these state benefits.
What GAO Found
As of June 30, 2003, Energy had completely processed only about 6 percent of the nearly 19,000 cases it had received. More than three-quarters of all cases were associated with facilities in nine states. Processing had not begun on over half of the cases and, of the remaining 40 percent of cases that were in processing, almost all were in the initial case development stage. While the majority of cases (86 percent) associated with major Energy facilities in nine states potentially have a willing payer of workers' compensation benefits, actual compensation is not certain. This figure is based primarily on the method of workers' compensation coverage used by Energy contractor employers and is not an estimate of the number of cases that will ultimately be paid. Since no claimants to date have received compensation as a result of their cases filed with Energy, there is no actual experience about how contractors and state programs treat such claims. Claimants have been delayed in filing for state worker's compensation benefits because of two bottlenecks in Energy's claims process. First, the case development process has not always produced sufficient cases to allow the panels of physicians who determine whether the worker's illness was caused by exposure to toxic substances to operate at full capacity. While additional resources may allow Energy to move sufficient cases through its case development process, the physician panel process will continue to be a second, more important, bottleneck. The number of panels, constrained by the scarcity of physicians qualified to serve on panels, will limit Energy's capacity to decide cases more quickly, using its current procedures. Energy officials are exploring ways that the panel process could be made more efficient. |
gao_GAO-13-862T | gao_GAO-13-862T_0 | Background
The demands on judges’ time are largely a function of both the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets. To measure the case- related workload of district court judges, the Judicial Conference has adopted weighted case filings. The purpose of the district court case weights was to create a measure of the average judge time that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court would require. Importantly, the weights were designed to be descriptive, not prescriptive—that is, the weights were designed to develop a measure of the national average amount of time that judges actually spent on specific cases, not to develop a measure of how much time judges should spend on various types of cases. Moreover, the weights were designed to measure only case-related workload. Judges have noncase-related duties and responsibilities, such as administrative tasks, that are not reflected in the case weights. With few exceptions, such as cases that are remanded to a district court from the court of appeals, each civil or criminal case filed in a district court is assigned a case weight. For example, in the 2004 case weights—which are still in use—drug possession cases are weighted at 0.86, while civil copyright and trademark cases are weighted at 2.12. The total annual weighted filings for a district are determined by summing the case weight associated with all the cases filed in the district during the year. A weighted case filing per authorized judgeship is the total annual weighted filings divided by the total number of authorized judgeships. The Judicial Conference uses weighted filings of 430 or more per authorized judgeship as an indication that a district may need additional judgeships. Thus, for example, a district with 460 weighted filings per authorized judgeship, including newly requested judgeships, could be considered for an additional judgeship. However, the Judicial Conference does not consider a district for additional judgeships, regardless of its weighted case filings, if the district does not request any additional judgeships. Accuracy of Judiciary’s Workload Measures Could Not Be Determined
1993 District Case Weights Reasonably Accurate, but Accuracy of 2004 Case Weights Could Not Be Statistically Determined
In our 2003 report, we found the district court case weights approved in 1993 to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time demands a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that court. The methodology used to develop the weights used a valid sampling procedure, developed weights based on actual case-related time recorded by judges from case filings to disposition, and included a measure (standard errors) of the statistical confidence in the final weight for each weighted case type. Without such a measure, it is not possible to objectively assess the accuracy of the final case weights. At the time of our 2003 report, the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Judicial Conference’s Judicial Resources Committee had approved the research design for revising the 1993 case weights, with a goal of having new weights submitted to the Judicial Resources Committee for review in the summer of 2004. The design for the new case weights relied on three sources of data for specific types of cases: (1) data from automated databases identifying the docketed events associated with the cases; (2) data from automated sources on the time associated with courtroom events for cases, such as trials or hearings; and (3) consensus of estimated time data from structured, guided discussion among experienced judges on the time associated with noncourtroom events for cases, such as reading briefs or writing opinions. Accuracy of Courts of Appeals Case-Related Workload Measure Could Not Be Assessed
In 2003, we found that the principal quantitative measure the Judicial Conference used to assess the need for additional courts of appeals judgeships was adjusted case filings. The measure is based on data available from standard statistical reports for the courts of appeals. The adjusted filings workload measure is not based on any empirical data regarding the time that different types of cases required of appellate judges. The Judicial Conference’s policy is that courts of appeals with adjusted case filings of 500 or more per 3-judge panel may be considered for 1 or more additional judgeships. Courts of appeals generally decide cases using constantly rotating 3-judge panels. Thus, if a court had 12 authorized judgeships, those judges could be assigned to four panels of 3 judges each. In assessing judgeship needs for the courts of appeals, the conference may also consider factors other than adjusted filings, such as the geography of the circuit or the median time from case filings to disposition. | Why GAO Did This Study
The demands on judges' time are largely a function of both the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets. To measure the case-related workload of district court judges, the Judicial Conference has adopted weighted case filings. The purpose of the district court case weights was to create a measure of the average judge time that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court would require. Importantly, the weights were designed to be descriptive, not prescriptive--that is, the weights were designed to develop a measure of the national average amount of time that judges actually spent on specific cases, not to develop a measure of how much time judges should spend on various types of cases. Moreover, the weights were designed to measure only case-related workload. Judges have noncase-related duties and responsibilities, such as administrative tasks, that are not reflected in the case weights.
With few exceptions, such as cases that are remanded to a district court from the court of appeals, each civil or criminal case filed in a district court is assigned a case weight. For example, in the 2004 case weights--which are still in use--drug possession cases are weighted at 0.86, while civil copyright and trademark cases are weighted at 2.12. The total annual weighted filings for a district are determined by summing the case weight associated with all the cases filed in the district during the year. A weighted case filing per authorized judgeship is the total annual weighted filings divided by the total number of authorized judgeships. The Judicial Conference uses weighted filings of 430 or more per authorized judgeship as an indication that a district may need additional judgeships. Thus, for example, a district with 460 weighted filings per authorized judgeship, including newly requested judgeships, could be considered for an additional judgeship. However, the Judicial Conference does not consider a district for additional judgeships, regardless of its weighted case filings, if the district does not request any additional judgeships.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's 2003 report, it was found that the district court case weights approved in 1993 to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time demands a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that court. The methodology used to develop the weights used a valid sampling procedure, developed weights based on actual case-related time recorded by judges from case filings to disposition, and included a measure (standard errors) of the statistical confidence in the final weight for each weighted case type. Without such a measure, it is not possible to objectively assess the accuracy of the final case weights.
At the time of GAO's 2003 report, the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Judicial Conference's Judicial Resources Committee had approved the research design for revising the 1993 case weights, with a goal of having new weights submitted to the Judicial Resources Committee for review in the summer of 2004. The design for the new case weights relied on three sources of data for specific types of cases: (1) data from automated databases identifying the docketed events associated with the cases; (2) data from automated sources on the time associated with courtroom events for cases, such as trials or hearings; and (3) consensus of estimated time data from structured, guided discussion among experienced judges on the time associated with noncourtroom events for cases, such as reading briefs or writing opinions.
In addition, GAO found that the principal quantitative measure the Judicial Conference used to assess the need for additional courts of appeals judgeships was adjusted case filings. The measure is based on data available from standard statistical reports for the courts of appeals. The adjusted filings workload measure is not based on any empirical data regarding the time that different types of cases required of appellate judges.
The Judicial Conference's policy is that courts of appeals with adjusted case filings of 500 or more per 3-judge panel may be considered for 1 or more additional judgeships. Courts of appeals generally decide cases using constantly rotating 3-judge panels. Thus, if a court had 12 authorized judgeships, those judges could be assigned to four panels of 3 judges each. In assessing judgeship needs for the courts of appeals, the conference may also consider factors other than adjusted filings, such as the geography of the circuit or the median time from case filings to disposition. |
gao_GAO-08-983T | gao_GAO-08-983T_0 | Both government employers and employees generally make contributions to fund state and local pension benefits. The excess of actuarial accrued liabilities over the actuarial value of assets is referred to as the “unfunded actuarial accrued liability” or “unfunded liability.” Under accounting standards, such information is disclosed in financial statements. Federal law generally does not require state and local governments to prefund or report on the funded status of pension plans. State And Local Government Pension Plans Typically Include A Defined Benefit Plan And A Supplemental Voluntary Savings Plan And Laws Protect Benefits
State and local governments typically provide their employees with retirement benefits that include a defined benefit plan and a supplemental defined contribution plan for voluntary savings. Statutes and local ordinances protect and manage pension plans and are often anchored by provisions in state constitutions and local charters. About 90 percent of full-time state and local employees participated in defined benefit plans as of 1998. 1.) We found that defined benefit plans were still prevalent for most of these other state and local employees as well. Provisions in state constitutions often protect pensions from being eliminated or diminished. The majority of states have some form of constitutional protection for their pensions. Pensions Are Typically Managed as Trust Funds with Board Oversight
In accordance with state constitution and/or statute, the assets of state and local government pension plans are typically managed as trusts and overseen by boards of trustees to ensure that the assets are used for the sole purpose of meeting retirement system obligations and that the plans are in compliance with the federal tax code. 2.) Most Public Pensions Have Assets To Pay Benefits Over Several Decades, But Contributions Vary
Currently, most state and local government pension plans have enough invested resources set aside to pay for the benefits they are scheduled to pay over the next several decades. Many experts consider a funded ratio of about 80 percent or better to be sound for state and local government pensions. While most plans’ funding may be sound, a few plans have persistently reported low funded ratios, which will eventually require the government employer to improve funding, for example, by reducing benefits or by increasing contributions. Even for many plans with lower funded ratios, benefits are generally not at risk in the near term because current assets and new contributions may be sufficient to pay benefits for several years. Still, many governments have often contributed less than the amount need to improve or maintain funded ratios. Low contributions raise concerns about the future funded status, and may shift costs to future generations. Many experts and officials to whom we spoke consider a funded ratio of 80 percent to be sufficient for public plans for a couple of reasons. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of state and local government employees are promised pension benefits when they retire. Although these benefits are not subject, for the most part, to federal laws governing private sector benefits, there is a federal interest in ensuring that all American have a secure retirement, as reflected in the special tax treatment provided for private and public pension funds. Recently, new accounting standards have called for the reporting of liabilities for future retiree health benefits. It is unclear what actions state and local governments may take once the extent of these liabilities become clear but such anticipated fiscal and economic challenges have raised questions about the unfunded liabilities for state and local retiree benefits, including pension benefits. GAO was asked to report on (1) the current structure of state and local government pension plans and how pension benefits are protected and managed, and (2) the current funded status of state and local government pension plans. GAO spoke to a wide range of public experts and officials from various federal and nongovernmental entities, made several site visits and gathered detailed information about state benefits, and analyzed self-reported data on the funded status of state and local pension plans from the Public Fund Survey and Public Pension Coordinating Council.
What GAO Found
State and local entities typically provide pension plans with defined benefits and a supplemental defined contribution plan for voluntary savings. Most states still have traditional defined benefit plans as the primary retirement plans for their workers. However, a couple of states have adopted defined contribution and other plans as their primary plan. State and local entities typically offer tax-deferred supplemental voluntary plans to encourage workers to save. State statutes and local ordinances protect and manage pension benefit and often include explicit protections, such as provisions stating that pensions promised to public employees cannot be eliminated or diminished. In addition, state constitutions and/or statutes often require pension plans to be managed as trust funds and overseen by boards of trustees. Most state and local government pension plans have enough invested resources set aside to fund the benefits they are scheduled to pay over the next several decades. Many experts consider a funded ratio (actuarial value of assets divided by actuarial accrued liabilities) of about 80 percent or better to be sound for government pensions. We found that 58 percent of 65 large pension plans were funded to that level in 2006, a decrease since 2000 when about 90 percent of plans were so funded. Low funded ratios would eventually require the government employer to improve funding, for example, by reducing benefits or by increasing contributions. However, pension benefits are generally not at risk in the near term because current assets and new contributions may be sufficient to pay benefits for several years. Still, many governments have often contributed less than the amount needed to improve or maintain funded ratios. Low contributions raise concerns about the future funded status. |
gao_GAO-10-368 | gao_GAO-10-368_0 | U.S. In response, the U.S. government made counternarcotics a top U.S. priority and developed a strategy in 2004 to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production, and trafficking, shifting the emphasis of the United States’ agricultural assistance programs in Afghanistan from food security programs to counternarcotics-related ADP. As part of its counternarcotics efforts, beginning in 2005, USAID awarded most of its new agricultural funds to alternative-development programs (ADP)—to (1) increase agricultural productivity, (2) accelerate economic growth, and (3) eliminate illicit drug cultivation. Further, the Administration noted that economic growth and new job creation were critical to U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan because they provide licit alternatives to narcotics- and insurgent-related activities and connect people to their government. Gaps Exist in USAID’s Efforts to Plan, Monitor, and Evaluate Agricultural Programs in Afghanistan
USAID’s Automated Directives System establishes performance management and evaluation procedures that USAID expects its staff to follow in planning, monitoring, and evaluating its agricultural assistance programs in Afghanistan. The Mission PMP did not include plans for evaluations and special studies for the high-level objective that the eight programs included in this review supported; but according to USAID, the agency has planned evaluations for seven of the eight agricultural programs included in this review during fiscal year 2010. However, we found that USAID had not always approved these plans and did not require implementing partners to set targets for each of their indicators, which are needed to assess program performance. Some USAID officials in Afghanistan told us that they reviewed the information reported in implementing partners’ quarterly reports in efforts to analyze and interpret a program’s performance for the eight programs in our review, although they could not provide any documentation of their efforts to analyze and interpret program performance. We are uncertain of the extent to which USAID used the 2007 evaluation to adapt current programs and plan future programs. Additionally, although USAID requires implementing partners to submit information on indicators, targets, and results, as previously noted, not all indicators had established targets to allow for performance assessments. As figure 8 shows, six of the eight programs we reviewed did not meet their performance targets in the most recent year for which information was reported on performance targets. For the two programs that met all their targets, we found, as previously discussed, that they did not establish targets for several indicators and, thus, we could not fully assess performance for those indicators. We also found that the three longest-running programs in our review showed declines in performance over time. We measured performance for the eight agricultural programs in our review by comparing annual results against annual targets reported by USAID’s implementing partners. Specifically, USAID has cited the security environment in Afghanistan as a severe impediment to its ability to monitor projects. USAID Faces Challenges to Maintaining Institutional Knowledge
USAID has not taken steps to mitigate challenges to maintaining institutional knowledge, a problem exacerbated by high staff turnover. USAID officials noted that a lack of documentation and knowledge transfer may have contributed to the loss of institutional knowledge. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the performance management of USAID’s agricultural programs in Afghanistan, we recommend the Administrator of USAID take steps to ensure the approval of implementing partner performance indicators; ensure that implementing partners establish targets for all performance consistently analyze and interpret program data, such as determining the extent to which annual targets are met; make use of results from evaluations of its agricultural programs; and address preservation of institutional knowledge. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review assesses (1) how the United States has changed the focus of its agricultural efforts in Afghanistan since 2002, (2) USAID’s performance management and evaluation efforts of agricultural programs in Afghanistan, (3) the extent to which USAID’s agricultural programs in Afghanistan met targets, and (4) USAID’s efforts to mitigate challenges in implementing agricultural programs in Afghanistan. As of the end of fiscal year 2009, these eight programs accounted for 69 percent of total USAID agricultural assistance disbursements, with one program accounting for 18 percent of all disbursements. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Eighty percent of Afghans are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agricultural assistance is a key U.S. contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. Since 2002, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has awarded about $1.4 billion for agricultural programs to increase agricultural productivity, accelerate economic growth, and eliminate illicit drug cultivation. This report (1) describes the change in U.S. focus on agricultural assistance since 2002, (2) assesses USAID's performance management and evaluation of its agricultural programs, (3) analyzes the extent to which certain programs met targets, and (4) addresses efforts to mitigate implementation challenges. GAO reviewed USAID documents; analyzed program data; and interviewed program implementers and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO has prepared this report as part of its ongoing efforts to monitor key aspects of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The United States' focus in providing agricultural assistance to Afghanistan shifted from food security programs in 2002 to counternarcotics-related alternative-development programs in 2005. This focus on providing farmers with alternatives to growing opium poppy lasted through 2008. In 2009, the Administration shifted the focus of its agricultural strategy in Afghanistan from counternarcotics to counterinsurgency, noting that economic growth and new job creation were critical to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan because they provide alternatives to narcotics- and insurgent-related activities. USAID's Automated Directives System established planning, monitoring, and evaluation procedures that USAID was expected to follow in Afghanistan. USAID planning efforts prior to 2009 largely follow these procedures. However, since the end of 2008, USAID has operated without a required Mission performance management plan for Afghanistan. In addition, USAID did not approve all implementing partner monitoring plans for the eight USAID agricultural programs, which represented about 75 percent of all USAID agricultural awards since 2002. USAID also did not assure all indicators had targets. USAID undertook efforts to monitor agricultural programs, but due to security concerns could not consistently verify reported data. USAID did not consistently analyze and interpret or document program performance for these eight programs, active between 2007 and 2009, on which our review focused. In the absence of this analysis, USAID did not document decisions linking program performance to changes made to the duration or funding of programs. USAID conducted one evaluation covering three of the eight programs, but the extent to which or whether USAID used the evaluation to enhance current or future programs is unclear. We found that the eight agricultural programs we reviewed did not always establish or achieve their targets for each performance indicator. USAID requires implementing partners to submit information on indicators, targets, and results. We measured performance for the eight programs by comparing annual results against annual targets and determining the extent to which targets were met. Six of the eight programs did not meet their performance targets in the most recent year for which targets were reported. For the two programs that met all their targets, we found they failed to establish targets for several indicators and, thus, we could not fully assess performance for those indicators. We also found that the three longest-running programs in our review showed declines in performance from fiscal years 2006 to 2008. USAID faces several challenges to implementing its agricultural programs in Afghanistan, such as the security environment, and has taken steps to mitigate other challenges, such as working to improve Afghan government capacity. However, while USAID's lack of documentation and high staff turnover have hampered USAID's ability to maintain institutional knowledge, the agency has not taken steps to address this challenge.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator take a number of steps to enhance performance planning, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge transfer procedures. USAID agreed with our recommendations, highlighted ongoing efforts to improve in these areas, and noted the high-threat environment in which they are operating. |
gao_GAO-14-465 | gao_GAO-14-465_0 | Background
The Education for Homeless Children and Youth Program
The EHCY program is the key federal education program targeted to homeless children and youth, and, in school year 2011-12, more than 1.1 million were enrolled in our nation’s public schools, according to Education data. In determining which districts to fund, states are required to consider certain factors, such as the needs of homeless children and youth enrolled in the school district, the types of services to be provided under the program, and the extent to which the services will be coordinated with other services available to homeless children and youth. Selected School Districts Leveraged Existing Resources to Identify and Serve Homeless Students, but Faced Resource Limitations and Other Challenges
Selected School Districts Largely Relied on Enrollment Forms and Referrals to Identify Homeless Students, but Faced Challenges and Noted Problems with Under-Identification
To identify homeless students, officials in a majority of school districts (13 of 20) said their districts systematically requested some information on the housing status of new students using a form during the enrollment Two of these districts also requested housing information from process.every student every year to help identify eligible students whose housing circumstances may have changed following enrollment. Despite ongoing efforts to identify homeless students through housing surveys and referrals, officials in 8 out of the 20 districts we interviewed noted a problem with the under-identification of homeless students. To help address the needs of homeless students, grantee school districts in school year 2010-11 reported providing a variety of services, according to Education’s survey (see fig. Officials in 11 of the 20 districts we interviewed cited challenges due to limited staff availability or resources with which to serve homeless students and adequately address their needs. In addition, the EHCY program manager provides training and technical assistance to state program coordinators. Federal and State Agencies Face Similar Barriers to Greater Collaboration
42 U.S.C. Education Currently Lacks a Comprehensive Oversight Plan and Faces Limitations in Using its Performance Data to Assess Program Results
Education Has Protocols for Monitoring State EHCY Programs but Lacks a Plan to Ensure Oversight of All States
Education has protocols and procedures in place to monitor state EHCY programs. monitoring of school districts; implementation of procedures to identify, enroll, and retain homeless students by coordinating and collaborating with other program offices and state agencies; provision of technical assistance to school districts; efforts to ensure that school district grant plans for services to eligible homeless students meet all requirements; compliance with statutory and other regulatory requirements governing the reservation of funds for state-level coordination activities; and prompt resolution of disputes. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2009, Education’s policy was to monitor 50 states and 3 other areas (i.e., 53 “states”)least once during that 3-year time period and it followed this policy. Since Education adopted this approach in fiscal year 2010, it has monitored 31 of the 53 states for the EHCY program—28 from October 2009 to September 2012 and 3 from October 2012 to July 2014. Education officials cited the shift to a risk-based approach to monitoring the EHCY program, the more recent need to focus on ESEA flexibility waiver monitoring, and a lack of staff capacity as the primary reasons why they have not been able to monitor the states as frequently in recent years as in the past. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, monitoring is a key management tool that helps agencies assess the quality of performance over time and ensure that the Additionally, one state EHCY program problems are promptly resolved.coordinator we interviewed said that federal monitoring ensures a higher level of compliance with the McKinney-Vento Act and that it is in a state’s best interest to be monitored regularly. Such problems suggest inadequate state-level monitoring of school districts, reinforcing the importance of effective federal monitoring of states. Conclusions
The EHCY program, funded at about $65 million for fiscal year 2014, is intended to remove barriers to educational achievement for homeless students and provide them with access to critical services—such as transportation to school and referrals for health care. Education concurred with our recommendation that, in order to ensure compliance with the McKinney-Vento Act, the department should develop a monitoring plan to ensure adequate oversight of the EHCY program. We selected school districts, with assistance from state EHCY program coordinators, to represent a mix of urban, suburban, and rural districts, as well as districts that received EHCY program funds (grantees) and those that did not (non-grantees). Education’s surveys collected information on services school districts provided to homeless children and youth; state and local collaboration efforts with other Education programs; and how states monitored school districts, including any differences in monitoring among grantee and non-grantee districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act established a grant program to help the nation's homeless students—more than one million in school year 2011-12—have access to public education. Under the Education for Homeless Children and Youth grant program, states and their school districts are required to identify homeless children and provide them with needed services and support. In fiscal year 2014, Education received about $65 million to administer this program. Education provided formula grants to states, which competitively awarded funds to school districts to help meet program requirements. GAO was asked to review program implementation and oversight.
GAO examined (1) how districts identify and serve homeless students and challenges they face (2) how Education and states collaborate with other service providers to address student needs and any barriers, and (3) the extent to which Education monitors program compliance. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, guidance, and reports, and analyzed Education's state and school district survey data from school year 2010-11. GAO also interviewed federal officials, and state and local officials in 20 school districts—representing a mix of urban, suburban, and rural districts and grant status—in four states, selected for geographic diversity and other characteristics, such as experience with natural disasters.
What GAO Found
To identify and serve homeless students under the Education for Homeless Children and Youth (EHCY) program, officials in the 20 school districts where GAO conducted interviews reported conducting a range of activities to support homeless youth, but cited several challenges. With regard to GAO's interviews, 13 of the 20 districts identified homeless students through housing surveys at enrollment, while all 20 relied on referrals from schools or service providers. However, officials in 8 of the 20 districts noted that the under-identification of homeless students was a problem. Districts GAO reviewed provided eligible students with transportation to and from school, educational services, and referrals to other service providers for support such as health care or food assistance. Among the challenges that officials in the 20 districts cited were limited staff and resources to provide services, the cost of transportation, student stigma associated with homelessness, and responding to students made homeless by natural disasters. Nationally, school districts surveyed most recently in school year 2010-11 by the Department of Education (Education) reported providing many services while facing similar challenges.
Education's EHCY program manager and state program coordinators have collaborated with other government agencies and with private organizations by sharing information, participating in interagency councils on homelessness, and providing technical assistance to relevant staff. In addition, state EHCY program coordinators have provided training to school districts and helped connect local programs to ensure homeless students receive various services. However, federal and state officials frequently cited limited resources and differing federal definitions of homelessness as constraints to greater collaboration.
Education has protocols for monitoring state EHCY programs, but no plan to ensure adequate oversight of all states, though monitoring is a key management tool for assessing the quality of performance over time and resolving problems promptly. Prior to fiscal year 2010, it had been Education's policy to monitor 50 states and 3 area programs at least once during a 3-year period, and it did so for fiscal years 2007 to 2009. Subsequently, the department adopted a risk-based approach in fiscal year 2010 and monitored 28 states over the next 3 years. In fiscal year 2013, Education again changed its approach to EHCY program monitoring and has monitored 3 state programs since then. Department officials cited other priorities and a lack of staff capacity as reasons for the decrease in oversight. As a result, Education lacks assurance that states are complying with program requirements. GAO found gaps in state monitoring of districts that could weaken program performance, reinforcing the importance of effective federal monitoring of states.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education develop a plan to ensure adequate oversight of the EHCY program. Education concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-153 | gao_GAO-15-153_0 | Table 2 provides information about each of these three sets of standards. Incomplete ICE Data and Limitations in Controls to Track and Manage Costs Limit Assessment of Cost Variances across Detention Facility Types
ICE Does Not Have Complete Data for Managing Detention Costs and Operations
ICE has two offices, OBPP and ERO Operations Support Division, that use different methods to collect and assess data on detention expenditures and costs for different purposes; however, these two methods do not provide ICE with complete data for managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. First, for the purposes of developing ICE’s annual budget requests for detention, ICE’s OBPP developed a method to estimate total detention costs per detainee per day. These standardized queries provide ICE with an average overall bed rate and the average bed rate for each of ICE’s 24 areas of responsibility.However, ICE officials stated that through fiscal year 2013 these queries did not produce data that can be used to track or manage costs for individual facilities or facility types because of errors in how ICE field office personnel enter data into ICE’s Federal Financial Management System and limitations in the system that make it difficult for ICE to accurately record expenditures for all individual facilities. The agency, however, has taken steps to manually track and manage costs, referred to as manual work-arounds. ICE also identified challenges in tracking and maintaining complete data on all costs or expenditures associated with individual facilities, including costs for medical care and transportation, for example. Assessing the extent to which ICE’s manual work-arounds could provide ICE with more complete data on facility costs and the extent to which additional controls may be needed could better position ICE to have more reliable data for tracking and managing costs across facilities and facility types. ICE Applied Different Federal Standards across Facilities but Has Not Documented Reasons for the Differences
ICE Applies the Most Rigorous Detention Standards to 15 Percent of Facilities Housing Over Half of Detainees
ICE detention standards vary in rigor as defined by the number and content of standards in place to protect detainees and focus on performance outcomes. In fiscal year 2013, ICE housed approximately 54 percent of its ADP in these 25 facilities. ICE Did Not Have Documentation for Reasons Why Standards Vary across Facilities
ICE has not documented the reasons for using different standards across facilities or why the 125 facilities under 2000 NDS as of January 2014 had not been transitioned to the 2011 PBNDS. Documenting reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards could help strengthen ICE’s ability to oversee facilities’ compliance with detention standards and could provide an institutional record of decisions ICE has made about why facilities are held or not held to certain standards. Eighteen facilities that housed about 1 percent of total ADP in fiscal year 2013 were not subject to any of the four types of oversight mechanisms. Further, in fiscal year 2013, the majority of detainees—94 percent of ICE’s average daily population—were in facilities that received an annual ERO inspection—and continuous on-site monitoring by a DSM—78 percent of ICE’s average daily population—as shown in figure 5. ICE officials stated that ERO and ODO have not discussed differences in their inspection findings and have not addressed broader issues of why ERO and ODO inspection results differed across almost all inspections conducted at the same facilities within fiscal year 2013, or to what extent oversight mechanisms are functioning as intended. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance ICE’s ability to analyze and manage detention facility costs, ensure transparency and accountability in the management of detention facilities, and strengthen the oversight mechanisms that ensure detention facilities provide safe, secure, and humane confinement, we recommend that the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement take the following five actions: assess the extent to which ICE has appropriate internal controls for tracking and managing detention facility costs and develop additional controls as necessary; develop an oversight mechanism to ensure that field offices comply with guidance to appropriately consider costs in making detainee placement decisions; take additional steps to help ensure that personnel responsible for reviewing and paying facility detention invoices follow internal control procedures to ensure proper payments; document the reasons facilities cannot be transitioned to the most review reasons for differences between ERO and ODO inspection results and assess the extent to which differences reflect broader issues with the inspection mechanisms themselves to help ensure the mechanisms are working as intended. DHS did not concur with one recommendation in the report. We continue to believe that ICE should document the reasons why individual facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards. 3. To what extent do federal oversight and the results of that oversight vary across different types of immigration facilities? We determined that the data are not reliable for reporting on the differences in cost by facility type, as discussed in this report. We compared the percentage of fiscal year 2013 ADP in immigration detention facilities by facility type and oversight mechanisms used at facilities to determine what percentage of detainees are housed in facilities at which ICE uses the various oversight mechanisms. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has reported that the number of noncitizens in immigration detention has increased from about 230,000 in fiscal year 2005 to about 440,600 in fiscal year 2013. ICE applies various sets of detention standards—such as medical services—at over 250 facilities owned by ICE or private contractors, or owned by or contracted to state and local governments. GAO was asked to examine differences in cost, standards, and oversight across types of facilities.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) ICE has processes to track costs, (2) standards vary across facility types and the reasons for any differences, and (3) oversight and the results of that oversight vary across facility types. GAO reviewed ICE data and information on costs, detention population, standards, and oversight for 166 facilities that held detainees for 72 hours or more, from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, reviewed facility contracts, and interviewed federal contractors and DHS and ICE officials.
What GAO Found
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses two different methods to collect and assess data on detention costs; however, these methods do not provide ICE with complete data for managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. One method uses the agency's financial management system to estimate total detention costs per detainee per day for the purposes of developing ICE's annual detention budget request. However, ICE identified errors in the entry of data into this system and limitations in the system make it difficult for ICE to accurately record expenditures for individual facilities. ICE's other method involves the manual tracking of monthly costs by individual facilities for the purposes of reviewing data on individual facility costs. However, this method does not include data on all costs for individual facilities, such as for medical care and transportation, and such costs are not standardized within or across facility types. Thus, ICE does not have complete data for tracking and managing detention costs across facilities and facility types. ICE has taken some steps to strengthen its financial management system, such as implementing manual work-arounds to, among other things, better link financial transactions to individual facilities. However, ICE has not assessed the extent to which these manual work-arounds position ICE to better track and manage costs across facilities or facility types and the extent to which additional controls are needed to address limitations in its methods for collecting and assessing detention costs, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Conducting these assessments could better position ICE to have more reliable data for tracking and managing costs across facility types.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility data showed that ICE primarily used three sets of detention standards, with the most recent and rigorous standards applied to 25 facilities housing about 54 percent of ICE's average daily population (ADP) as of January 2014. ICE plans to expand the use of these standards to 61 facilities housing 89 percent of total ADP by the end of fiscal year 2014; however, transition to these standards has been delayed by cost issues and contract negotiations and ICE does not have documentation for reasons why some facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards in accordance with internal control standards. Documenting such reasons could provide an institutional record and help increase transparency and accountability in ICE's management of detention facilities.
GAO's analysis of ICE facility oversight programs showed that ICE applied more oversight mechanisms at facilities housing the majority of the ADP in fiscal year 2013. For example, 94 percent of detainees were housed in facilities that received an annual inspection. GAO's analysis of ICE's inspection reports showed that inspection results differed for 29 of 35 facilities inspected by both ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) in fiscal year 2013. ICE officials stated that ODO and ERO have not discussed differences in inspection results and whether oversight mechanisms are functioning as intended. Assessing the reasons why inspection results differ, in accordance with internal control standards, could help ICE better ensure that inspection mechanisms are working as intended.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that ICE assess the extent to which it has appropriate controls for tracking facility costs, document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards, and review reasons for differences in inspection results. DHS concurred with all recommendations but one to document reasons why facilities cannot be transitioned to the most recent standards because, among other reasons, DHS believes it already has sufficient documentation. As discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe in the need for such documentation. |
gao_GAO-05-881 | gao_GAO-05-881_0 | For fiscal year 2004, offices of inspectors general (OIG) and their contract auditors reported that the systems of 16 of the 23 CFO Act agencies did not substantially comply with at least one of FFMIA’s three requirements— federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, or the SGL at the transaction level. While substantially more CFO Act agencies have obtained clean or unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements, as shown in figure 2, the underlying agency financial systems remain a serious problem. Auditors provide negative assurance when they state that nothing came to their attention during the course of their planned procedures to indicate that these agencies’ financial management systems did not meet FFMIA requirements. In fiscal year 2004, auditors for DOL provided an opinion, or positive assurance, of DOL’s financial management systems’ compliance with FFMIA. For the fiscal year 2005 financial statement audit, the auditors plan to increase their focus on the types of reports being produced currently by the cost system and how managers are using that information for day-to-day operations. We look forward to other agencies adopting similar auditing and reporting practice. OMB continues to support the requirement for negative assurance of FFMIA compliance. Nonintegrated Financial Management Systems
The CFO Act calls for agencies to develop and maintain integrated accounting and financial management systems that comply with federal systems requirements and provide for (1) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information that is responsive to the financial information needs of the agency and facilitates the systematic measurement of performance; (2) the development and reporting of cost management information; and (3) the integration of accounting, budgeting, and program information. For instance, the U.S. For example, in fiscal year 2003, auditors for the Department of Transportation (DOT) reported that the department had not implemented effective processes to reconcile transactions with other federal agencies. OMB continues to move forward on new initiatives to enhance financial management and provide results-oriented information in the federal government. Furthermore, the continuing leadership and support of Congress will be crucial to sustaining momentum in the reformation of financial management in the federal government. As shown by the FFMIA-related problems reported in agency audit reports, federal financial management systems are not currently able to provide federal managers with the financial data needed for effective day-to-day management of their programs or for efficient external reporting. As we have stated in prior reports, the auditors we have interviewed expressed concerns about providing positive assurance when reporting on agency systems’ FFMIA compliance because of their belief that the meaning of substantial compliance needs to be clarified. Finally, we continue to believe that a statement of positive assurance is a statutory requirement under the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ability to produce the data needed to efficiently and effectively manage the day-to-day operations of the federal government and provide accountability to taxpayers continues to be a challenge for most federal agencies. To help address this challenge, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) federal accounting standards, and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger (SGL). FFMIA also requires GAO to report annually on the implementation of the act.
What GAO Found
While most CFO Act agencies have obtained clean or unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements, the underlying financial systems remain a serious problem. Agencies still lack the capacity to create the full range of information needed for effective day-to-day management. In fiscal year 2004, auditors for 16 of the 23 CFO Act agencies reported that agencies' financial management systems failed to comply with FFMIA. Primarily six types of problems related to agencies systems were identified in the audit reports. These same types of problems have been consistently reported for agencies with noncompliant systems for a number of years. GAO views these problems with agency financial systems to be a significant challenge to improving the management of the federal government. Auditors for six agencies provided negative assurance on systems' FFMIA compliance for fiscal year 2004. This means that nothing came to their attention to indicate that financial management systems did not meet FFMIA requirements. OMB's current reporting guidance calls for negative assurance; however, GAO continues to believe that this type of reporting is not sufficient for reporting under the act. In addition, negative assurance may provide the false impression that the auditors are reporting that the agencies' systems are compliant. In contrast, auditors for the Department of Labor (DOL) provided positive assurance by reporting that DOL's financial management systems substantially complied with FFMIA requirements. In fiscal year 2005, DOL auditors plan to enhance their audit procedures to focus on the reliability and use of managerial cost information. GAO looks forward to other auditors adopting a similar reporting practice that adds more value. In addition, auditors have expressed concern about providing positive assurance because of the need to clarify the meaning of substantial compliance. OMB continues to move ahead on other initiatives to enhance financial management in the federal government. Moreover, the continuing leadership and support of Congress will be crucial in reforming financial management in the federal government. |
gao_RCED-98-174 | gao_RCED-98-174_0 | Although HUD did not base housing agencies’ allowable expenses on what it should cost to provide a standard set of housing services, twice over the program’s life the Department has used quantitative cost models, based on two different sets of cost data, to better define subsidy levels: once at the outset to establish an upper limit for allowable costs and again in 1992 to adjust some agencies’ costs that, according to the second cost model, were less than 85 percent of their predicted levels. We found that because of these conditions, housing agency managers believed that PFS significantly underfunds their need for subsidy. HUD Bases Its PFS Budget Estimate on Projections of Income, Inflation, and Expense Levels of a Sample of Housing Agencies
Each year, HUD’s Office of Finance and Budget forecasts how much will be needed to fund PFS’ operating subsidies for the fiscal year by estimating the future costs of a sample of housing agencies and projecting these costs to the total population of nearly 3,200 agencies. In addition, in years when HUD’s budget estimate is not fully funded by the congressional appropriation, HUD prorates the appropriation across all agencies, which results in a relatively greater hardship for the agencies that are more dependent on the subsidy to help cover their expenses. Since HUD implemented PFS in 1975, public housing agencies’ subsidies have been based for the most part on the actual costs those agencies incurred in the base year 1975, with annual adjustments–primarily for inflation. As HUD considers its various options for redesigning the Performance Funding System, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD also consider establishing a process that (1) allows housing agencies to appeal their expense levels when they believe that significant changes have occurred over time in their operating circumstances that cause their subsidy to be inappropriate and (2) HUD can use to review housing agencies’ expense levels that it believes may be excessive. Agency officials believe that the operating subsidy provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is not sufficient to operate the housing agency effectively. The inflation adjustments over the last 23 years have not been sufficient to account for increasing maintenance costs, they said. Thus, the agency’s allowable costs under PFS do not include the costs of developing and maintaining an information system. They attributed other increasing operating costs to the age of the development, its architectural design, and the residents. GAO Comments
1. Instead, on the basis of our case studies, a survey of 800 housing agencies done by a trade group representing housing agencies, discussions with officials of trade groups and HUD, we conclude that operating subsidies may not be adequate for housing agencies whose base year expenditures were low or whose operating circumstances or costs have undergone significant change since 1975. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Therefore, we conclude that those housing agencies with operating circumstances that have changed significantly or whose initial base year expenses might have been too low might be currently underfunded. How well does PFS meet the subsidy needs of individual housing agencies? How does HUD develop budget estimates of housing agencies’ annual need for operating subsidies and are the estimates appropriate? What are some of the possible options that HUD might have for changing PFS to make it a more effective tool for subsidizing housing agencies? Scope and Methodology
To determine how PFS allocates the congressionally appropriated subsidy among public housing agencies, we reviewed and evaluated the history and documentation of the PFS prototype formula. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Performance Funding System (PFS) for allocating appropriated funds to housing agencies as operating subsidies, focusing on: (1) how PFS allocates the congressionally appropriated subsidy among public housing agencies; (2) whether PFS meets the subsidy needs of individual housing agencies; (3) how HUD's budget estimates of housing agencies' annual need for operating subsidies are developed and whether the estimates are appropriate; and (4) some of the possible options that HUD might have for changing PFS to make it a more effective tool for subsidizing housing agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) PFS allocates the congressional appropriation by providing an operating subsidy to each housing agency based on that agency's HUD-approved operating expenses during the base year 1975, less its income, plus certain annual adjustments; (2) the adjusted base year cost is known as the allowable expense level; (3) HUD did not develop its allocation method on the basis of standards of housing needs because it believed that reaching a consensus on these standards would have been too difficult; (4) however, twice over the last 23 years, HUD developed and used cost models based on specific factors directly related to the operating costs of well-managed housing agencies, including the age and height of buildings and the prevailing government wage rates; (5) the operating subsidies that the PFS provides to housing agencies may not be adequate for agencies with base year expenditures that were low or agencies with operating circumstances or costs that have undergone significant change since 1975; (6) although the PFS provides for annual adjustments to account for inflation and the aging of public housing stock, these increases might not have been enough for the agencies with base year spending that did not adequately reflect their needs or those with expenses that have increased more rapidly than HUD's allowed adjustments; (7) GAO found that agencies have experienced significant operational changes since 1975 that have affected their costs; (8) to develop its budget estimate for the operating subsidies housing agencies will need in a coming fiscal year, HUD estimates the needs of a representative sample of housing agencies and projects this estimate to the population of nearly 3,200 housing agencies; (9) inadequate subsidies can be a serious problem for housing agencies that are highly dependent on subsidies and need them to meet current obligations; (10) HUD has several options for making PFS a more accurate and effective funding tool; (11) in the past, information on physical housing conditions, comparative costs, or other data needed to implement a cost model has not been readily obtainable, and the cost of developing such information for all agencies was believed to be high; and (12) data that HUD is currently developing on housing agencies' financial and physical conditions should be useful to HUD as it considers new ways of allocating operating subsidies. |
gao_GAO-10-21 | gao_GAO-10-21_0 | For example, operators must identify the area to be permitted, provide technical descriptions of how mining operations will be conducted, and describe how the land will be reclaimed. Similarly, the acres associated with open permits are sometimes referred to as “acres under open permit” or “open acres.” If a permit is closed because the bond associated with it was completely released, the permit is referred to as a “released permit,” and the acres associated with the released permit are sometimes referred to as “released acres.” If the permit is closed because the bond was forfeited, the permit is referred to as a “forfeited permit,” and the acres associated with the permit are sometimes referred to as “forfeited acres.”
Characteristics of Surface Coal Mining in Mountainous Areas in Kentucky and West Virginia
Based on data provided to us by Kentucky and West Virginia, we are reporting on three characteristics in surface mining in the mountainous areas of these two states. The average annual growth rate from January 1990 through July 2008 was about 2.2 percent in Kentucky and 1.7 percent in West Virginia. Fourth, nearly half of the permitted acres in West Virginia are concentrated in 28 contiguously permitted areas. Mining in Kentucky and West Virginia Has Become More Geographically Concentrated
According to the two states’ databases, mining activity in the mountainous areas of Kentucky is concentrated in the southeastern part of the state, while mining in West Virginia is concentrated in the southwestern part of the state. The length of time these permits were open ranged from less than 1 year to more than 18 years and averaged about 7-1/2 years. Characteristics of Reclaimed Lands That Were Disturbed by Surface Coal Mining in Mountainous Areas of Kentucky and West Virginia
In summary, the states’ data for permits issued from January 2000 through July 2008 provides information on three important characteristics of land reclaimed after being disturbed by surface mining: the approved post- mining land use (PMLU), the extent to which the land is restored to its original contour, and the number and size of fills created from excess spoil. First, fish and wildlife habitat and forestland were the most common types of PMLU approved in Kentucky and West Virginia, respectively. Most of the AOC variances granted were “remining” variances, meaning that the variance was granted because the land had been previously mined but not reclaimed, leaving insufficient spoil to restore AOC. Finally, Kentucky and West Virginia collectively approved nearly 2,000 fills to be placed in nearby valleys and hollows, with a storage volume of at least 4.85 billion cubic yards of excess spoil, on permits issued from January 2000 through July 2008. Figure 16 shows these data, including the number of permits that did not identify a pre-mining land use type. Most Operations Are Required to Recl aim the Land to AOC, but There Are Exceptions
SMCRA generally requires surface-mined land to be reclaimed to AOC. The agencies generally agreed with our findings. This report focuses on surface coal mining in the mountainous areas of Appalachia—often referred to as mountaintop mining—because of the controversy that mountaintop mining generates. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 2. 3. 4. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Surface coal mining in the mountainous areas of Appalachia--often called "mountaintop mining"--generates controversy, in part because of its scale and the post-mining appearance of the land. Yet there is limited public access to information on the size, location, and life span of these operations, or on how the land can be expected to look afterward. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to report on the characteristics of (1) surface coal mining and (2) reclaimed lands that were disturbed by surface coal mining in the mountainous, eastern part of Kentucky and in West Virginia, where most such mining occurs. Federal and state law requires mining operators to obtain permits before mining. Among other things, the permits identify the acres under open permit (the acres subject to mining associated with a permit that has not been closed) and how the land will be reclaimed--including the post-mining land use, whether the approximate original contour (AOC) of the land will be restored, and the extent to which excess earth, rock, and other materials (known as "spoil") are placed in nearby valleys. For this study, GAO relied on electronic databases of mining permits maintained by Kentucky and West Virginia. This report makes no recommendations. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of the Interior and the two state mining agencies generally agreed with our findings
What GAO Found
Surface coal mining in Kentucky and West Virginia had the following important characteristics, based on permits issued from January 1990 through July 2008: (1) The number of acres under open permit increased by an average annual rate of 2.2 percent in Kentucky and 1.7 percent in West Virginia; (2) the number of acres under open permit became more geographically concentrated; (3) the length of time that permits were open varied from less than a year to more than 18 years; (4) in West Virginia, 28 contiguously permitted areas contained nearly half of the permitted acres, as of July 2008. Reclaimed lands had the following important characteristics, based on permits issued from January 2000 through July 2008: (1) The most common type of post-mining land use in Kentucky was fish and wildlife habitat and, in West Virginia, it was forestlandl; (2) most permits required operators to reclaim the land to AOC, but there were some exceptions (called variances). Most of the variances were for lands where there was insufficient spoil to restore AOC because the land had been previously mined but not reclaimed; (3) Kentucky and West Virginia collectively approved nearly 2,000 fills to store at least 4.9 billion cubic yards of excess spoil in nearby valleys. |
gao_HEHS-96-45 | gao_HEHS-96-45_0 | The extent to which the PBMs and their sponsors are successful in obtaining physician compliance with formularies can increase the sales and market share within a therapeutic class of a prescription drug, particularly for products on the formulary with the lowest cost designations. Incentive-based and closed formularies increase competition among drug manufacturers with competing drugs to get their drugs on PBMs’ formularies. In response to a changing environment, large pharmaceutical manufacturers have vertically integrated into the market for PBM services. II for additional information on the companies involved in these ventures.) The manufacturers believe that merging or allying with a PBM will provide competitive advantages that will enable them to maintain profits. Competitive advantages can be gained by eliminating opportunities for other manufacturers to compete for inclusion and low-cost designation for their drugs on the PBM partner’s formularies. PBMs in our study contend that they remain independent of their manufacturer partners in serving their customers, particularly in containing their customers’ overall drugs costs. Scope and Methodology
To address the study’s objectives, we first determined the role of PBMs in the health care industry. Third, to understand specific concerns about the mergers and alliances, we contacted nonaligned PBMs, health plan sponsors, and pharmaceutical economists. Fourth, to assess the extent to which PBMs may have given preference to their manufacturer partners’ drugs over competitors’ drugs, we compared formularies for DPS and Medco before and after the mergers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed mergers between pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) and pharmaceutical manufacturers, focusing on: (1) PBM role in the health care industry; (2) the mergers' objectives and effect on competition; and (3) the extent to which PBM have given preference to their manufacturer partners' drugs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) drug manufacturers have allied with PBM to help maintain their profits in an increasingly competitive marketplace; (2) PBM help health plan sponsors administer prescription drug benefits and help them contain their overall drug costs; (3) manufacturers rely on their PBM partners to develop new programs for treating specific diseases and increase the market share for their drugs; (4) critics of PBM alliances are concerned that the companies involved could act to restrict competition among manufacturers for inclusion on PBM formularies; (5) variations exist in the extent to which PBM have given preferences to their manufacturer partners' drugs; and (6) the Federal Trade Commission monitors PBM alliances to help ensure that PBM maintain competitive processes that allow other manufacturers to compete for low-cost designation for their drugs on PBM formularies. |
gao_HEHS-95-19 | gao_HEHS-95-19_0 | This shortfall occurred because the Albuquerque center’s charges were based on an unrealistically high estimate of the total number of lithotripsy procedures it would perform in 1993. Albuquerque Center’s Charges Could Recover Full Costs and Remain Competitive in the Albuquerque Market
The effect of changes in the center’s pricing practices on its competitiveness in the market for lithotripsy services in Albuquerque is also difficult to determine precisely. Recommendations
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Director of the Albuquerque medical center to raise the price of lithotripsy services provided to nonveterans to a level that will recover the full fixed and variable costs of the services provided, as VA policy requires; and implement a process for periodically reviewing the adequacy of workload projections as VA procedures recommend, and use the results to adjust prices, as appropriate. This pricing practice may not fully recover costs. This appendix compares the center’s actual costs for the major cost components of its basic lithotripsy service to the amounts the center charged for each component. Two key assumptions in the center’s calculations make it unlikely that this rate will be sufficient for VA to recover the costs of providing lithotripsy services to UNM patients. The center did not follow this approach. Since 2 years of the period have gone by, 3 years remain over which to depreciate the equipment. The center used the actual annual contract cost, as did we. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Albuquerque Medical Center's contracting practices, focusing on: (1) whether the center fully recovered the government's cost of providing nonveteran lithotripsy services; and (2) the effects of the center's pricing policy on competition for lithotripsy services in the Albuquerque area.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1993, the Albuquerque VA Medical Center did not fully recover the costs of providing lithotripsy services to nonveterans; (2) the center used an unrealistically high annual workload estimate in calculating its fixed costs; (3) the center's lithotripsy prices for 1994 were still unrealistically high, even though VA policy requires price adjustments if estimates are significantly off; (4) the center lengthened the equipment's depreciation period to compensate for its low procedure rate, but this was not practical, since the equipment will be obsolete before the end of its useful life; (5) the contractor lowered its charges for lithotripsy services significantly below market rates, which may have allowed it to gain a larger market share; (6) the impact of the contractor's lower prices is difficult to estimate because consumers' health care decisions are not driven by cost considerations alone; and (7) the center could raise its prices to cover its full costs for the services and still remain competitive. |
gao_GAO-15-285 | gao_GAO-15-285_0 | DOD Has Not Addressed Issues Potentially Limiting the Use of the Pilot Program
Our review of the input provided by the defense components, as well as our information from interviews with policy, program, and contracting officials at the 11 components we contacted, identified a number of issues that may be contributing to the lack of use of the pilot program, including limited awareness of the pilot program, challenges in meeting all the criteria required to use the pilot program, and the ability to use other flexibilities to obtain needed items. DOD is aware of a number of issues but has no ongoing efforts to address them. Limited awareness of the pilot program: In several instances, DOD officials from commands and contracting activities that we interviewed were generally unaware of the pilot program prior to our review, noting that the program had not been well publicized or could only cite its inclusion into DFARS. Challenges in meeting all the criteria required to use the pilot program: Program and contracting officials from commands and contracting activities we interviewed stated that it was difficult to identify proposed acquisitions that met all the requirements for using the pilot program. The ability to use other flexibilities to obtain needed items: Contracting officials from the military departments with whom we spoke identified other existing authorities—such as commercial item acquisition procedures—that they would use to acquire items that they identified as potentially covered by the pilot program. GAO’s prior work has identified several sound management practices when developing, implementing, and assessing pilot programs, including developing objectives that link to the goals of the pilot and ensuring the results of the In the case of the MPNDI pilot pilot are communicated to stakeholders.program, DOD has not proactively identified opportunities to use the pilot program in areas useful to DOD—a goal of the pilot—such as by identifying how the authority might help DOD attract nontraditional contractors to fill needs in specific industries, technologies, or for certain capabilities that are not met by existing authorities. The pilot program was also intended to test whether streamlined acquisition procedures, similar to those available for commercial items, can serve as an incentive for “nontraditional defense contractors” to innovate in areas useful to DOD. DOD has not determined whether the pilot program provides new flexibilities or the opportunity to use streamlined acquisition procedures that are not already available under other authorities. Lastly, DOD’s prior annual reports to Congress have not identified whether there are specific requirements under the pilot program, such as the need to award contracts competitively, that might hinder its use. Determining whether the pilot program provides meaningful value to the department requires that DOD do more than make the authority available for use by its personnel. If so, DOD will have missed an opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether authority provided under the pilot program would provide value to the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To maximize the potential value of the MPNDI pilot program, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics take the following three actions: identify how this authority, as currently structured, may assist DOD in attracting nontraditional contractors in specific industries, technologies, or capabilities; identify whether there are opportunities to test flexibilities or streamlined procedures that are not otherwise available under existing authorities; and if DOD believes changes are needed to the current structure of the pilot program to increase its utility, to identify such issues in its subsequent annual reports to Congress. Specifically, Section 866 mandated that GAO assess whether the pilot program (1) enabled DOD to acquire items that otherwise might not have been available to DOD; (2) assisted the department in the rapid acquisition and fielding of capabilities needed to meet urgent operational needs; and (3) protected the interests of the United States in paying fair and reasonable prices for the item or items acquired. This report addresses the extent to which DOD awarded contracts that met these goals and issues potentially affecting use of the pilot program. To determine the extent to which DOD awarded contracts under the pilot program that met these goals, we reviewed Section 866 of the NDAA and other applicable laws, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), DOD’s annual reports to Congress on the pilot program from fiscal years 2011 to 2013 (the most recent fiscal year for which DOD submitted a report at the time of our review), DOD’s preliminary data gathered in preparation for its fiscal year 2014 report, and DOD’s implementing guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 866 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 established a pilot program authorizing DOD to award contracts for MPNDI to nontraditional defense contractors—companies that had not contracted with DOD for at least a year. The pilot program was designed to streamline acquisition procedures and to serve as an incentive for nontraditional defense contractors to innovate in areas useful to DOD.
Section 866 mandated that GAO assess DOD's use of the pilot program to acquire items that otherwise might not have been available to DOD, assisted in meeting urgent operational needs, and protected the interests of the U.S. in paying fair and reasonable prices. This report addresses the extent to which DOD awarded contracts that met these goals and issues potentially affecting use of the pilot program. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed applicable laws, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DOD's annual reports to Congress on the pilot program from fiscal years 2011 to 2013, and DOD's implementing guidance. GAO collected information from DOD, the military departments, and selected defense organizations.
What GAO Found
Since the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented a pilot program in 2011 to award contracts for military purpose nondevelopmental items (MPNDI), it has not awarded any contracts using the authority. An MPNDI is generally an item that meets a validated military requirement and has been developed exclusively at private expense. GAO's analysis identified a number of issues that may be contributing to the lack of use of the pilot program, including the following:
Limited awareness of the pilot program : In several instances, DOD officials from commands and contracting activities that GAO interviewed were unaware of the pilot program prior to GAO's review. Further, the Air Force noted that the program had not been well publicized within the department.
Challenges in meeting all the criteria required to use the pilot program : DOD program and contracting officials that GAO contacted stated that it was difficult to identify proposed acquisitions that could meet all the criteria for using the pilot program, which include that the items must be developed at private expense, the initial lot of items be delivered within nine months after contract award, contractors be nontraditional defense contractors, competitive procedures be used, and contracts are $50 million or less.
The ability to use other flexibilities to obtain needed items: Contracting officials from the military departments with whom GAO spoke identified other existing authorities—such as commercial item acquisition procedures—that they would use to acquire items they identified as potentially covered by the pilot program.
DOD officials told GAO that they were aware of these issues but had no ongoing efforts to address them. GAO's prior work has identified several sound management practices to effectively implement or assess pilot programs, including developing objectives that link to the goals of the pilot and ensuring the results of the pilot are communicated to stakeholders. In the case of the MPNDI pilot program, DOD has not proactively identified opportunities to use the pilot program in areas useful to DOD—a goal of the pilot—such as by identifying specific industries, technologies or capability gaps where its use may provide an additional incentive for nontraditional defense contractors to do business with DOD. Additionally, DOD has not determined whether the pilot program provides new flexibilities or the opportunity to use streamlined acquisition procedures that are not already available under other authorities. Lastly, DOD's annual reports to Congress have not identified whether there are specific requirements under the pilot program, such as the need to award contracts competitively, that might hinder its use. Determining whether the pilot program provides meaningful value to the department requires that DOD do more than make the authority available for use by its personnel. Unless DOD takes action to identify opportunities to use the authority and report on issues hindering its use, DOD may miss an opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether the authority provided under the pilot program would provide value to the department.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD identify how the pilot program can help DOD attract nontraditional contractors, to test flexibilities or streamlined procedures not otherwise available under existing authorities, and include issues hindering its use in its annual reports to Congress. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-559 | gao_GAO-16-559_0 | 1 and 2). The Frequency and Extent of Unauthorized Grazing on Agency Lands Are Largely Unknown, and Its Effects May Include Rangeland Degradation
The frequency and extent of unauthorized grazing on BLM and Forest Service lands are largely unknown because according to agency officials the agencies prefer to handle most incidents informally and do not record them. The agencies’ databases contained information on nearly 1,500 incidents of unauthorized grazing where formal action was taken by the agencies’ range program or law enforcement field staff for grazing years 2010 through 2014. Agency Databases Identified Nearly 1,500 Incidents of Unauthorized Grazing Where Formal Action Was Taken from 2010 to 2014
The agencies’ databases identified nearly 1,500 incidents of unauthorized grazing where formal action was taken by range program staff or by agency law enforcement officers for grazing years 2010 through 2014; BLM data identified a total of 859 incidents, and Forest Service data identified 618 incidents (see table 1). Agencies Report Handling Most Unauthorized Grazing Incidents Informally and Do Not Record Them in Their Databases
The full extent and frequency of unauthorized grazing is unknown because most unauthorized grazing incidents identified by the agencies’ range program field staff are handled informally and are not recorded in their databases, according to agency officials. However, they said that such information is not consistently recorded in the permittee files, in part because they do not consider recording such information a priority. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to clearly document all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. Until the agencies require that all incidents of unauthorized grazing be recorded, including those incidents resolved informally, BLM and the Forest Service will not have a complete record of unauthorized grazing incidents for tracking patterns of any potential repeat offenders. Agencies’ Efforts to Detect, Deter, and Resolve Unauthorized Grazing Have Shortcomings That Limit Their Effectiveness
BLM and the Forest Service undertake similar efforts to detect and deter unauthorized grazing, such as conducting compliance inspections on grazing allotments and charging penalties for unauthorized grazing, but agency field staff told us that such efforts have limited effectiveness for various reasons. Penalties for Unauthorized Grazing
Agency field staff—primarily those from the Forest Service—told us that penalties for unauthorized grazing are too low under current agency policy to act as an effective deterrent. For grazing years 2009 through 2012, the Forest Service’s unauthorized grazing penalty formula calculation would have resulted in a negative number or a number lower than the permitted grazing fee. By adopting a penalty structure for unauthorized grazing use that is, similar to BLM’s, based on the current commercial value of forage (a fair market value), the Forest Service’s penalty for unauthorized grazing can better serve as a deterrent to such grazing and be consistent with BLM’s penalty. For example, field staff said that they may agree to waive the expenses if they were insignificant or to make it less likely that the permittee will appeal the decision. BLM and Forest Service Regulations Do Not Provide Flexibility for the Agencies’ Preferred Practice of Informal Resolution for Unauthorized Grazing
BLM and Forest Service regulations do not provide field staff of both agencies with the flexibility to follow their preferred practice of informally resolving unauthorized grazing incidents with no written notice of violation and no penalty for unauthorized grazing. As discussed in federal internal control standards, program operations are effective and efficient in achieving agency objectives when they produce the intended results and minimize the waste of resources. Alternatively, rather than amending their existing regulations to match their practices, the agencies could change their practices to comply with their existing regulations. By amending the regulations to establish procedures for the informal resolution of non-willful violations of the grazing regulations at the local level, agency management could achieve the objective of quickly resolving incidental unauthorized grazing with minimal conflict, in a manner consistent with its regulations and with the most efficient use of the agency’s resources. We conducted in-person and telephone interviews with staff in 22 of the 218 agency field office locations in eight western states where most such grazing had occurred. To examine the agencies’ efforts to detect, deter, and resolve unauthorized grazing, we analyzed federal laws to identify agency requirements for addressing such grazing as well as the agencies’ regulations, policies, and practices. Appendix II: Grazing Information for the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service
This appendix provides detailed information on grazing permits, leases, fees, and penalties on lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture. | Why GAO Did This Study
BLM, within the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, are responsible for managing most of the nation's public rangelands. Ranchers must obtain permits or leases from the agencies to graze livestock on federal lands. Unauthorized grazing may take various forms, such as grazing more livestock than permitted or grazing without a permit.
GAO was asked to examine unauthorized grazing. This report (1) describes what is known about the frequency and extent of unauthorized grazing, and its effects, and (2) examines the agencies' efforts to detect, deter, and resolve unauthorized grazing. GAO analyzed 5 years of the most recent data available on incidents where the agencies had taken formal action on unauthorized grazing (grazing years 2010 through 2014); examined federal laws and agency regulations, policies, and practices; and interviewed by telephone or site visit officials in a nongeneralizable sample of 22 agency field offices in eight western states where most unauthorized grazing had occurred.
What GAO Found
The frequency and extent of unauthorized grazing on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and U.S. Forest Service lands are largely unknown because according to agency officials, the agencies prefer to handle most incidents informally (e.g., with a telephone call) and do not record them. The agencies' databases contained information on nearly 1,500 incidents of unauthorized grazing where formal action was taken by the agencies' range program or law enforcement staff for grazing years 2010 through 2014 (March 1 to February 28). Unauthorized grazing incidents were recorded in the agencies' databases when the agencies billed a penalty for unauthorized grazing or prepared a law enforcement report. However, agency staff told GAO that they handle most incidents informally—their preferred practice—and do not record them in databases or consistently in paper files, because, in part, they do not consider it a priority. As a result, the agencies have incomplete information on the extent of unauthorized grazing. Federal internal control standards call for clear documentation of all transactions and other significant events. Until the agencies require that all incidents of unauthorized grazing be recorded, including those incidents resolved informally, BLM and the Forest Service will not have a complete record of unauthorized grazing incidents with which to identify any potential pattern of violations.
GAO found that the agencies' preferred practice of informally resolving unauthorized grazing is not provided for under agency regulations. Specifically, the regulations do not provide the flexibility to resolve incidents informally without a written notice of violation (in the case of BLM) and without charging unauthorized grazing penalties (in the case of the Forest Service). Most agency staff told GAO that informal resolution is the most effective way to resolve non-willful unauthorized grazing (e.g., when livestock stray outside of their permitted area and graze in an unauthorized area). As discussed in federal internal control standards, program operations are effective and efficient in achieving agency objectives when they produce the intended results and minimize the waste of resources. By amending regulations to establish a procedure for the informal resolution of minor infractions, the agencies could achieve the objective of efficiently resolving such incidents with minimal conflict within its regulatory authority. Alternatively, rather than amending their existing regulations to match their practices, the agencies' could change their practices to comply with their existing regulations. In addition, BLM and the Forest Service undertake similar efforts to detect and deter unauthorized grazing, such as conducting compliance inspections and assessing penalties for unauthorized grazing, but agency staff said that such efforts have limited effectiveness. For example, most of the Forest Service staff GAO interviewed said that unauthorized grazing penalties are too low to act as an effective deterrent. Under current policy, the Forest Services' unauthorized grazing penalty formula calculated a negative number or a number less than the permitted grazing fee for grazing years 2009 through 2012. By adopting an unauthorized grazing penalty structure that is, like BLM's, based on the current price of private forage, the Forest Service's unauthorized grazing penalty can better serve as a deterrent to such grazing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that the agencies take actions to record all incidents of unauthorized grazing, that they amend regulations to reflect their practices for resolving such incidents or comply with their regulations, and that the Forest Service revise its unauthorized grazing penalty structure. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-224 | gao_GAO-12-224_0 | DOD Has Identified Initiatives Aimed at Slowing Medical Cost Growth but Has Not Fully Applied Results- Oriented Management Practices
DOD has identified 11 initiatives aimed at slowing medical cost growth, but it has not fully applied results-oriented management practices to its efforts. Cost savings estimates are critical to successful management of the initiatives so that DOD can achieve its goal of reducing growth in medical costs as stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. As DOD completes its dashboards, implementation plans, and cost savings estimates, it could benefit from the application of the six characteristics of a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework, on which GAO has previously reported, including a thorough description of the initiatives’ mission statement; problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals, objectives, activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and investments; organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals. DOD Is in the Initial Stages of Developing a Monitoring Process for Measuring the Progress of Its Health Care Initiatives
DOD also has not completed the implementation of an overall process for monitoring progress across its portfolio of health care initiatives and has not completed the process of identifying accountable officials and their roles and responsibilities for all of its reform efforts. Without sustained top civilian and military leadership which is consistently involved throughout the implementation of its various initiatives and until DOD fully implements for all of its initiatives a mechanism to monitor performance and identify accountable officials, including their roles and responsibilities, DOD may be hindered in its ability to achieve a more cost-efficient MHS and at the same time address its medical readiness goals, improve its overall population health, and improve its patients’ experience of care. However, DOD officials have not fully employed several key management practices to help ensure that these medical governance initiatives will achieve their stated goals. DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Seven Governance Initiatives
DOD has to varying degrees taken steps to implement some of the seven governance initiatives approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2006 with the goal of achieving economies of scale, operational efficiencies, and financial savings as well as consolidating common support functions and eliminating administrative redundancies. Initially, DOD expected that the seven initiatives would save at least $200 million annually once implemented. During the course of our work examining DOD’s health care initiatives, we determined that six of the key practices identified at our 2002 forum were especially important to ensure that DOD has the framework needed to implement its governance initiatives: (1) a focus on a key set of principles and priorities that are embedded in the organization to reinforce the new changes, (2) coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, (3) implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one, (4) a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, (5) a dedicated implementation team with the responsibility and authority to drive the department’s governance initiatives, and (6) committed and sustained leadership. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to enhance DOD’s efforts to manage rising health care costs and demonstrate sustained leadership commitment for achieving the performance goals of the MHS’s strategic initiatives, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, in conjunction with the service surgeons general, to take the following three actions:
Complete and fully implement, within an established time frame, the dashboards and detailed implementation plans for each of the approved health care initiatives in a manner that incorporates the desired characteristics of results-oriented management practices, such as the inclusion of performance metrics, investment costs, and cost savings estimates. Complete the implementation of an overall monitoring process across DOD’s portfolio of initiatives for overseeing the initiatives’ progress and identifying accountable officials and their roles and responsibilities for all of its initiatives. Complete the implementation of the governance initiatives that are already under way by employing key management practices in order to show financial and nonfinancial outcomes and to evaluate both interim and long-term progress of the initiatives. Agency Comments
In written comments provided in response to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings and recommendations. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified initiatives to reduce health care costs and applied results- oriented management practices in developing plans to implement and monitor them, we interviewed DOD officials concerning their approach to this challenge and examined documentation of related plans and policies. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
DODs health care costs have risen significantly, from $19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $48.7 billion in its fiscal year 2013 budget request, and are projected to increase to $92 billion by 2030.
GAO reviewed DODs efforts to slow its rising health care costs by changing selected clinical, business, and management practices. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which DOD has (1) identified initiatives to reduce health care costs and applied results-oriented management practices in developing plans for implementing and monitoring them and (2) implemented its seven medical governance initiatives approved in 2006 and employed key management practices. For this review, GAO analyzed policies, memorandums, directives, and cost documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from the three services, and at each of the sites where the governance initiatives were under way.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified 11 initiatives aimed at slowing its rising health care costs, but has not fully applied results-oriented management practices in developing plans to implement and monitor its initiatives. Results-oriented management practices include developing plans that identify goals, activities, and performance measures; resources and investments; organization roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and key external factors that could affect goals, such as a decrease of funding to a program. At the conclusion of GAOs review, DOD had completed and approved a detailed implementation plan, including a cost savings estimate, for just 1 of its 11 initiatives. Developing cost savings estimates is critical to successful management of the initiatives for achieving the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews call for reduced growth in medical costs. DOD also has not completed the implementation of an overall process for monitoring progress across its portfolio of health care initiatives and has not completed the process of identifying accountable officials and their roles and responsibilities for all of its initiatives. Without comprehensive, results-oriented plans, a monitoring process, and clear leadership accountability, DOD may be hindered in its ability to achieve a more cost-efficient Military Health System, address its medical readiness goals, improve its overall population health, and improve its patients experience of care.
Additionally, DOD has another set of initiatives, which were approved in 2006 to change aspects of its medical governance structure. GAO found that DOD had implemented some of the initiatives but had not consistently employed several key management practices that would have helped it achieve its stated goals and sustain its efforts. DOD approved the implementation of the seven governance initiatives with the goal of achieving economies of scale and operational efficiencies, sharing common support functions, and eliminating administrative redundancies. Specifically, DOD expected the initiatives to save at least $200 million annually once implemented; however, to date, only one initiative has projected any estimated financial savings. DOD officials stated that the other governance initiatives have resulted in efficiencies and have significant potential for cost savings. Further, the governance initiatives that are further developed were driven primarily by requirements of Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations and their associated statutory deadlines for completion. Additionally, GAO found that DOD had not consistently employed several key management practices, which likely hindered the full implementation of the initiatives. For example, the initiatives initial timeline was high-level and generally not adhered to, a communication strategy was not prepared, an overall implementation team was never established, and performance measures to monitor the implementation process and achievement of the goals were not established. With more emphasis on the key practices of a successful transformation, DOD will be better positioned in the future to realize efficiencies and achieve its goals as it continues to implement the initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) complete and fully implement comprehensive results-oriented plans for each of its medical initiatives; (2) fully implement an overall monitoring process across the portfolio of initiatives and identify accountable officials and their roles and responsibilities; and (3) complete its governance initiatives and employ key management practices to show financial and nonfinancial outcomes and evaluate interim and long-term progress. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with each of these three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1084T | gao_GAO-07-1084T_0 | Role of Nonprofit Organizations in the Economy and as Providers of Services Is Significant
While the majority of nonprofits individually have relatively small operating budgets, as a whole, the nonprofit sector has a significant presence in the U.S. economy, according to researchers of the nonprofit sector. During the period 1998 through 2002, spending reported by tax-exempt entities was roughly 11 to 12 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. The tax-exempt sector had over 9.6 million employees, about 9 percent of the civilian workforce in 2002. Experts have identified several possible contributing reasons for this increase: a shift in recent decades away from government providing most services directly; the expansion of service-related industries in the U.S., of which many nonprofits are a part; deinstitutionalization during the 1960s and 1970s that eliminated large, public care facilities in favor of smaller, community-based organizations, often operated by nonprofit entities; and the trend in devolution in certain policy areas such as welfare, which contributed to a lessening role of the federal government and more localized control in the hands of state, local, and nonprofit organizations. Federal Government Increasingly Partnering with Nonprofit Organizations
Nonprofit organizations bring many strengths to their partnerships with the federal government. Their research indicates that nonprofit organizations receive significant funds from government sources and that over time these funds have increased. For example: Researchers have reported that the federal government provided about $115 billion directly to nonprofits in fiscal year 2001, the majority of which hospitals received through the Medicare program. Data from other researchers indicate that the federal government spent an estimated $317 billion on nonprofit organizations in fiscal year 2004. Also, some federal funds move to nonprofits on the basis of individuals’ decisions, that is, from federal programs to nonprofits selected by the consumer, such as for health care. Emerging Policy Issues and Challenges Facing the Nonprofit Sector
The current federal oversight of nonprofits is focused on organizations’ tax-exempt status and on specific programs. However, there is less focus on understanding the overall role of nonprofits as implementers of national and federal initiatives, and how to best ensure that nonprofits have the support they need. As we spoke with researchers and practitioners, several issues emerged as needing attention in order to ensure the strength of this important partner to the federal government. We heard several common issues while taking this more comprehensive look at nonprofit organizations’ interaction with the federal government (see fig. Coordination and collaboration—One theme that surfaced in our preliminary research was the importance and value of coordination and collaboration between nonprofit organizations and government at all levels. Capacity—Another area to which researchers suggest attention should be paid is improving the capacity that smaller nonprofit organizations have to address weaknesses in finances, administration, and human capital. Nonprofit sector data – As I mentioned earlier, there is a lack of sufficient knowledge on a key federal government partner and its role. In addition, the funds to perform the analysis generally come from the nonprofit sector, and are not consistently available. Administrative and reporting requirements—Practitioners and researchers alike addressed the difficulty that nonprofit organizations, particularly smaller entities, have in responding to the administrative and reporting requirements of their diverse funders. In addition, federal, state, and local governments rely on nonprofit organizations as key partners in implementing programs and providing services to the public. At the request of the Congress, we are beginning work to examine these issues further. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nonprofit sector is an important means through which public services are delivered and national goals addressed. The federal government increasingly relies on networks, often involving nonprofits that address many issues--health care, education, and human services, for example. Because nonprofit organizations play a key role as partners with the federal government, there is a need to better understand the sector. This testimony (1) provides a picture of the nonprofit sector--its size, composition, and role in the economy; (2) discusses how and why the federal government partners with the sector; and (3) identifies issues related to the sector as a federal partner that need to be better understood. GAO's preliminary work on this topic focused on the intersection of nonprofit organizations and the federal government, including trends, the use of federal funding, and emerging issues. GAO interviewed key experts from relevant associations and academia, reviewed related research, and hosted roundtable discussions with key researchers and practitioners in the nonprofit area.
What GAO Found
U.S. nonprofit organizations have a significant role both in the economy as awhole and as providers of services. While the majority of nonprofit organizations have relatively small operating budgets, together their impact is large. For example, researchers estimate that the sector's spending in recent years was roughly 11 to 12 percent of the nation's gross domestic product and, in 2002, the sector had over 9.6 million employees, about 9 percent of the civilian workforce. Further, the sector has grown; the number of charitable organizations reporting almost tripled over the last two decades. The federal government increasingly partners with nonprofit organizations as they bring many strengths to these partnerships, such as flexibility to respond to needs and access to those needing services. These organizations receive significant funds from government sources to provide services. Researchers have attempted to quantify these funds. For example, one estimate is that the federal government spent about $317 billion on nonprofit organizations in fiscal year 2004. However, the lack of data makes measuring federal funds to nonprofit organizations difficult. Many funds come through indirect routes, such as through state and local government, adding to the difficulty of determining funding and measuring performance. Although IRS is generally responsible for overseeing the tax-exempt status of these organizations, there is less focus at the federal level on the comprehensive role of nonprofits in providing services using federal funds. Our preliminary look at how the federal government interacts with the nonprofit sector indicates that several policy issues have emerged, for example: (1) Coordination and collaboration--the increasing importance of collaboration between all levels of the government and nonprofit organizations. (2) Internal governance issues--the need to strengthen internal governance of nonprofit organizations. (3) Capacity--the need to improve smaller nonprofit organizations' capacity to address weaknesses in finances, administration, and human capital. (4) Nonprofit sector data--the need for improved data on the sector's size, financial status, and funds from federal sources. (5) Administrative and reporting requirements--the many requirements to be accountable, which while important and necessary, require information in different formats and with increasing complexity. (6) Fiscal challenges for nonprofits--the instability of some nonprofits' financial position. At the request of the Congress, we are beginning work to examine these issuesfurther. |
gao_GAO-17-93 | gao_GAO-17-93_0 | Among other things, capital acts as a financial cushion to absorb unexpected losses, promotes public confidence in the solvency of the institution and the stability of the banking sector, and provides protection to depositors and deposit insurance funds. U.S. federal banking regulators have adopted various risk-based capital regimes over the past decades. Risk weights for mortgages and other mortgage-related assets have been included in a number of these regulatory capital frameworks over the years, including the following:
The Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), which was adopted in 1988 and implemented in the United States in the early 1990s, established a system of generally applicable risk weights for specific assets (including mortgage-related assets) to calculate total risk-weighted assets and defined a minimum total risk-based capital ratio (the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets) of 8 percent with limited exceptions. In 2007, U.S. federal banking regulators adopted capital rules for large internationally active banking organizations that were based on a revised framework published by the Basel Committee in 2006 (Basel II). Other entities that hold mortgages and mortgage-related assets have different capital requirements. The Basel III-Based Final Rule Changes the Risk Weights for Some Mortgage- Related Assets
The Basel III final rule adopted in 2013 by the U.S. federal banking regulators and generally effective as of January 2015 incorporates higher risk weights for certain mortgage-related exposures while leaving others unchanged (see table 1). For example, the risk weights for most single- family residential mortgages are largely unchanged by the final rule. The advanced internal ratings-based approach requires banking organizations to use a formula defined in regulation to determine the capital requirements for residential mortgage exposures, which are grouped into segments that have similar (homogeneous) risk characteristics. I). This formula is unchanged since it went into effect in 2008. Under the standardized approach, residential MBS guaranteed by Ginnie Mae have a risk weight of 0 percent, while residential MBS issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a risk weight of 20 percent—unchanged since Basel I. Securitization Exposure Calculations under the Standardized Approach
The Basel III final rule establishes two methods for calculating risk weights for securitization exposures under the standardized approach:
The simplified supervisory formula approach relies on objective inputs to calculate risk weights for securitization exposures using a formula. Risk Weights for Mortgage Servicing Assets Will Increase
The Basel III-based final rule changes the treatment of mortgage servicing assets by (1) lowering the cap on the amount of mortgage servicing assets that can be included in capital calculations, which reflects, in part, the uncertainty regarding the ability of banking institutions to realize value from these assets, especially under adverse financial conditions, and (2) increasing the risk weights. Effects of Changes to Capital Requirements on Holdings of Mortgage- Related Assets Are Uncertain
The full impact of the changes to capital requirements for holdings of mortgage-related assets remains uncertain because insufficient time has passed since these changes took effect for both banks and nonbank mortgage servicers, and for some assets the changes have not yet been fully phased in. However, our past work suggested that—based on analysis of data included in banks’ Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (commonly referred to as Call Reports) and Credit Union 5300 Call Reports—many lenders generally appeared to be participating in residential mortgage lending much as they had in the past. But increased risk weights for some mortgage-related assets, among other factors, can have potential implications for banks’ decisions about securitizing and servicing mortgages and investing in MBS. Banks that exceed the cap may need to hold more capital for these assets. Under current credit risk retention rules, banks must retain an interest equal to at least 5 percent of the credit risk for mortgage-backed securities they sponsor unless the security qualifies for an applicable exemption, including being exclusively backed by mortgages that meet the definition of a “qualified mortgage.” These residual interests are included in risk-weighted assets and may carry higher risk weights under the Basel III-based rules than under the previous rules, depending on how they are structured. Finally, the Basel III-based final rule largely left unchanged the historically lower risk weights of MBS guaranteed by the enterprises vis-à-vis other mortgage-related assets, which can influence the demand for these securities relative to whole loans and privately issued MBS. While holdings of MBS guaranteed by Ginnie Mae retain a 0 percent risk weight and holdings of MBS guaranteed by the enterprises retain a 20 percent risk weight under the standardized approach (and their treatment under the advanced approach has not changed), holdings of privately issued MBS may face higher risk weights than under the prior rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 2007–2009 financial crisis, many banking organizations lacked capital of sufficient quality and quantity to absorb substantial losses on mortgages and mortgage-related assets, revealing these assets to be riskier than previously thought. In response to the crisis, banking regulators around the world moved to strengthen requirements for capital adequacy. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act introduced, among other things, new capital requirements for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies. Internationally, in December 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (which had issued the Basel I and Basel II frameworks) issued the Basel III framework—a comprehensive set of reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity standards—with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. Under this framework, banks apply risk weights to different assets to determine the amount of capital they need to meet regulatory requirements.
GAO was asked to explain how capital requirements for a mortgage depend upon how it is financed and how the requirements have changed since the crisis. This report examines the risk weights for residential mortgages and certain other mortgage-related assets under the U.S. Basel III-based rule and how they compare to those in effect under prior capital regimes and for nonbank entities. GAO examined information on capital requirements from current and past rules.
GAO received technical comments from the banking regulators, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Rules for capital adequacy require banks to hold a percentage of their assets as capital to act as a financial cushion to absorb unexpected losses. Under current rules, banks must hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Since the early 1990s, U.S. federal banking regulators have used a risk-weighting system under which banks multiply asset amounts by factors, known as risk weights, to calculate risk-weighted assets. Different types of assets have different risk weights that attempt to capture the assets' relative risk. The Basel III-based final rule adopted in 2013 by the U.S. federal banking regulators incorporates higher risk weights for certain mortgage-related assets while leaving others unchanged from prior capital regimes (Basel I and Basel II). Most banks use the standardized approach for calculating risk-weighted assets, but large internationally active banks use an advanced approach that relies on formulas established by the regulators and inputs from their internal systems.
Under the standardized approach, the risk weights for single-family residential mortgages are largely unchanged by the final rule. Similarly, the risk weights under this approach for residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac have not changed since Basel I.
Under the advanced approach, large internationally active banks use a formula defined in regulation to determine the capital requirements for residential mortgage exposures, which include whole loans as well as MBS guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. This formula has not changed since it went into effect in 2008 under the Basel II-based rule.
For both approaches, the ways for determining risk weights for securitization exposures and mortgage servicing assets have changed under the final rule, which may increase these risk weights. As required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the final rule eliminates the use of credit ratings for determining risk weights for securitization exposures, instead relying on regulator-established formulas. Also, the final rule reduces the cap on mortgage servicing assets that can be included in capital calculations and will raise the risk weight from 100 percent to 250 percent.
The Basel III-based final rule largely left in place the historically lower risk weights of MBS guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac vis-à-vis other mortgage-related assets, which can influence the demand for these securities relative to whole loans and privately issued MBS. However, the full impact of changes in risk weights for holdings of mortgage-related assets remains uncertain because insufficient time has passed since these changes took effect, and for some assets the changes have not yet been fully phased in. GAO's recent work suggested that many lenders generally appeared to be participating in residential mortgage lending much as they had before capital requirements changed. Also, data on mortgage debt outstanding and on banks' holdings of different assets indicate that trends in holdings of mortgage debt and mortgage-related assets that predate the changes in risk weights have continued. But increased risk weights for some mortgage-related assets may lead to changes in banks' decisions about securitizing and servicing mortgages. |
gao_GAO-06-694T | gao_GAO-06-694T_0 | Financial Incentives and Benefits, Access to an Affordable Supply, and Environmental Benefits Facilitated the Use of Woody Biomass among Users We Reviewed
The users in our review cited several factors contributing to their use of woody biomass. Financial Incentives and Benefits Encouraged Woody Biomass Use by Several Users
Financial incentives for, and benefits from, using woody biomass were the primary factors for its use among several users we reviewed. The Montana school district also received ongoing financial assistance from a nearby nonprofit organization. Challenges Faced by Woody Biomass Users Included Inadequate Supply and Costs Associated with Handling and Using the Material
Users in our review experienced several factors that limited their use of woody biomass or made it more difficult or expensive to use. These factors included an insufficient supply of the material and increased costs related to equipment and maintenance. Two power plants reported to us that they were operating at about 60 percent of their capacity because they were unable to obtain sufficient woody biomass or other fuel for their plants. Wood utilization also increased operation and maintenance costs for some users, in some cases because of problems associated with handling wood. Current Users’ Experiences Offer Insights for Government Efforts to Expand the Use of Woody Biomass
Our findings offer several insights for promoting greater use of woody biomass. First, rather than helping to defray the costs of forest thinning, attempts to encourage the use of woody biomass may instead stimulate the use of other wood materials such as mill residues or commercial logging slash. Market Forces May Lead Wood Users to Forgo Small-Diameter Trees in Favor of Alternatives
Unless efforts to stimulate woody biomass utilization are focused on small-diameter trees and other material contributing to the risk of wildland fire, such efforts may simply increase the use of alternative wood materials (such as mill residues) or slash from commercial logging operations. In fact, several users told us that they prefer such materials because they are cheaper or easier to use than woody biomass. The Effectiveness of Efforts to Encourage Woody Biomass Use May Depend on the Presence of Other Wood-Related Industries
Government activities may be more effective in stimulating woody biomass use if they take into account the extent to which a logging and milling infrastructure is in place in potential users’ locations. The availability of an affordable supply of woody biomass depends to a significant degree on the presence of a local logging and milling infrastructure to collect and process forest materials. Efforts to Encourage Woody Biomass Use May Be More Effective If They Are Tailored to the Scale and Nature of Recipients’ Use
Government activities may be more effective in stimulating woody biomass use if their efforts are tailored to the scale and nature of the users being targeted. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is placing greater emphasis on thinning vegetation on public lands to reduce the risk of wildland fire. To help defray the cost of thinning efforts, it also is seeking to stimulate a market for the resulting material, including the smaller trees, limbs, and brush--referred to as woody biomass--that traditionally have had little or no commercial value. As GAO has reported in the past, the increased use of woody biomass faces obstacles, including the high cost of harvesting and transporting it and an unpredictable supply in some locations. Nevertheless, some entities, such as schools and businesses, are utilizing the material, potentially offering insights for broadening its use. GAO agreed to (1) identify key factors facilitating the use of woody biomass among selected users, (2) identify challenges these users have faced in using woody biomass, and (3) discuss any insights that these findings may offer for promoting greater use of woody biomass. This testimony is based on GAO's report Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users' Experiences Offer Insights for Government Efforts Aimed at Promoting Its Use (GAO-06-336).
What GAO Found
Financial incentives and benefits associated with using woody biomass were the primary factors facilitating its use among the 13 users GAO reviewed. Four users received financial assistance (such as state or federal grants) to begin their use of woody biomass, three received ongoing financial support related to its use, and several reported energy cost savings over fossil fuels. Using woody biomass also was attractive to some users because it was available, affordable, and environmentally beneficial. Several users GAO reviewed, however, cited challenges in using woody biomass, such as difficulty obtaining a sufficient supply of the material. For example, two power plants reported running at about 60 percent of capacity because they could not obtain enough material. Some users also reported that they had difficulty obtaining woody biomass from federal lands, instead relying on woody biomass from private lands or on alternatives such as sawmill residues. Some users also cited increased equipment and maintenance costs associated with using the material. The experiences of the 13 users offer several important insights for the federal government to consider as it attempts to promote greater use of woody biomass. First, if not appropriately designed, efforts to encourage its use may simply stimulate the use of sawmill residues or other alternative wood materials, which some users stated are cheaper or easier to use than woody biomass. Second, the lack of a local logging and milling infrastructure to collect and process forest materials may limit the availability of woody biomass; thus, government activities may be more effective in stimulating its use if they take into account the extent of infrastructure in place. Similarly, government activities such as awarding grants or supplying woody biomass may stimulate its use more effectively if they are tailored to the scale and nature of the targeted users. However, agencies must remain alert to potential unintended ecological consequences of their efforts, such as excessive thinning to meet demand for woody biomass. |
gao_RCED-97-64 | gao_RCED-97-64_0 | For many years, this act was interpreted to exclude Native Americans living in or near tribal areas. With the recently enacted Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (regulations are scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1997), the Congress completed the process of separating Indian housing from public housing. Through its Native American Programs headquarters office and its six field offices, and with the help of approximately 189 Indian housing authorities (IHA), HUD administers the majority of the housing programs that benefit Native American families in or near tribal areas. Among the challenges and conditions highlighted in our discussions with officials of HUD and several IHAs, as well as in the May 1996 study by the Urban Institute, are the remoteness and limited human resources of many IHAs and the Native American communities they serve; the lack of suitable land and the inhospitality of the climate; the difficulty contractors and IHAs have in complying with statutory requirements to give hiring preference to Native Americans; and the pressure that vandalism, tenants’ neglect, and unpaid rent put on scarce maintenance funds. However, HUD officials told us that this requirement generally increases IHAs’ cost of developing housing in tribal areas. Native American Housing Assistance and Self- Determination Act of 1996 Could Initially Increase HUD’s Workload
By establishing a block grant mechanism to replace all housing assistance that tribes currently receive indirectly through their IHAs and HUD—except for the funding set aside for Native Americans in the Community Development Block Grant Program—the act allows greater discretion for tribes to address their housing needs. Among other provisions, the new statute also provides the following:
The existing housing authority or some other entity designated by a tribe must administer the block grant funds and develop 1-year and 5-year housing plans for HUD’s approval. The new act could, at least initially, cause HUD’s oversight workload to increase. She believes, moreover, that the new program’s success will depend on the extent to which HUD is effective in reviewing the required plans, monitoring the tribes’ implementation of the plans, and acting on potential noncompliance. Many Tribes Receive Gaming Revenues, but HUD Does Not Consider Them Directly When Determining Housing Assistance
About 177, or half of the 356 federally recognized tribes in the continental United States operated gaming facilities as of July 1996. Thus, to the extent that gaming revenues enhance tribes’ overall economic well-being, HUD considers them indirectly in its funding allocations. Of this amount, 74 tribes received about $1.2 billion in transfers from their gaming facilities. HUD Is Not Required and Lacks the Data to Take Gaming Revenues Directly Into Account
For the most part, housing needs are the primary factor that HUD is required to consider when allocating funds to IHAs for housing programs. Nevertheless, the act requires HUD to develop a housing assistance allocation formula that reflects the housing needs of Indian tribes and is based on (1) the number of low-income units owned or operated pursuant to a contract between the Department and IHAs; (2) the extent of poverty and economic distress within tribal areas; and (3) other objectively measurable conditions specified by HUD, which, we believe, could include business revenues. Funding and Results for Major Housing Programs for Native Americans
The funding for and accomplishments of HUD’s housing and community development programs for Native Americans have been steady or increasing in proportion to the increases in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) appropriations over the 1986-95 decade, as discussed below. From 1961, when Native Americans first began to receive assistance under the Housing Act of 1937, through fiscal year 1995, HUD provided Indian housing authorities (IHA) over $5 billion (in nominal dollars) for Indian housing programs and constructed over 82,000 units. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) housing programs for Native Americans, focusing on the: (1) funding history and measurable results of the housing programs administered by HUD for Native Americans in or near tribal areas; (2) significant factors that complicate and make costly the provision of housing assistance to Native Americans in or near tribal areas; (3) potential initial impact of the recently enacted Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 on HUD's oversight of housing assistance to Native Americans living in or near tribal areas; and (4) the extent to which gaming occurs in tribal areas, its profitability, and whether HUD takes revenues from gaming into account when allocating funding to Native American housing authorities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal year (FY) 1986 through FY 1995, HUD provided $4.3 billion for housing and community development in tribal areas; (2) of this amount, HUD provided $3.9 billion to approximately 189 Indian housing authorities to develop and maintain affordable housing and assist low-income renters; (3) in this period, the authorities used the funds to construct over 24,000 single-family homes, operate and maintain existing housing, and encourage other development; (4) over the decade, HUD also provided direct block grants totalling over $424 million to eligible tribes for community development and mortgage assistance; (5) many factors complicate and make costly the development and maintenance of affordable housing for Native Americans; (6) these factors include the remoteness and limited human resources of many Indian housing authorities and the Indian communities they serve, land-use restrictions and the inhospitality of the land, the difficulty that contractors and Indian housing authorities have in complying with statutory requirements to give hiring preference to Native Americans, and vandalism and neglect, which draw on scarce maintenance funds; (7) HUD believes that, initially, its workload could increase as it monitors tribes' compliance with the new Indian housing legislation set to take effect on October 1, 1997; (8) the new act changes the way HUD provides housing assistance to Native Americans by requiring block grants to each of the over 550 federally recognized tribes instead of categorical grants to the 189 Native American housing authorities that currently exist; (9) moreover, to qualify for the block grants, tribes must submit housing plans for HUD's approval; (10) although the law requires HUD to conduct only a limited review of the tribes' plans, HUD officials believe that this activity will, for the first year at least, be a labor-intensive function for HUD field offices; (11) of the 356 Indian tribes in the continental United States alone, 177 operated 240 gaming facilities as of July 1996; (12) according to 1994 and 1995 data submitted by 85 of these tribes, their gaming revenues after expenses totalled about $1.5 billion; (13) HUD officials told GAO that they do not take gaming revenues directly into account when allocating funds because, in addition to these revenues, HUD would need to know other business revenues and federal assistance available to each tribe in order to determine a fair allocation; and (14) to the extent that HUD takes a tribe's general economic well-being and housing needs into account, it is indirectly factoring gaming revenues into its funding allocation decisions. |
gao_GAO-17-296 | gao_GAO-17-296_0 | DB integrates design and construction responsibilities into a single contract. Aesthetics. In 2010, then U.S. Quality. Location. This issue also arose in a 2007 report to State entitled The Embassy of the Future. Functionality. Key elements under the Excellence approach include (1) allotting funding and time for developing custom designs; (2) hiring leading design firms for projects and promoting innovation in design; (3) conducting peer reviews of designs; and (4) using bridging and DBB project delivery (rather than DB). New design firms OBO has hired for Excellence projects have faced some challenges, and OBO only recently began assessing their performance. OBO’s staff had split opinions regarding the Excellence approach compared to the SED approach. Thus OBO did not contract with design firms to develop customized designs. OBO’s Excellence approach—using bridging and DBB—also represents a new investment in up-front design time, potentially up to 2 additional years (compared to the SED approach) to develop custom, innovative designs before OBO contracts for construction. OBO officials believe that greater design control under Excellence will improve embassies’ appearance in representing the United States, functionality, quality, and operating costs. However, OBO has not defined performance measures specific to Excellence goals at either the strategic or project level, such as greater adaptability to individual locations, functionality, or environmental sustainability. OBO also lacks a centralized database to broadly manage Excellence by enabling, for example, effective reporting on projects’ design and construction costs and schedules. Without performance measures specific to Excellence and sufficient systems to collect and analyze relevant data, OBO will not be able to demonstrate whether the performance of Excellence projects over time justifies the increased emphasis on and investment in their designs. The consultant’s report made numerous recommendations to OBO, including that OBO (1) seek to manage and clarify change internally; (2) assign dedicated staff to be responsible for instituting change; (3) utilize more standardization for project requirements, while acknowledging the recommendation may seem counterintuitive in light of OBO’s move away from the SED; (4) further define the Excellence program to capture the new standards and processes OBO was instituting; and (5) train OBO personnel and modify internal systems and practices to be compatible with the new OBO project delivery methods and design standards. The largest percent of OBO staff who responded generally agreed with the statement: “Since 2011, OBO has provided clear and comprehensive technical standards and guidelines related to my job.” The largest percent of OBO staff who responded generally disagreed with the statement: “Since 2011, OBO has provided clear and comprehensive strategic or long-term guidance to implement its planning, design, construction, and maintenance approach.”
OBO Lacks Performance Measures to Evaluate the Potential Costs and Benefits of Excellence
While OBO has established Excellence and taken some steps to implement it, OBO has not established strategic or project-level performance measures to evaluate and communicate the effectiveness of the Excellence approach in delivering embassies under the Capital Security Construction Program. Performance measures are essential tools for managers to evaluate progress toward a program’s objectives. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies’ internal controls should include the establishment and review of performance indicators. In its written comments, State concurred with our four recommendations and described actions planned or under way to address each of them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) reasons for the Department of State’s (State) shift to its Excellence approach, (2) key elements and trade-offs of the new approach, and (3) the extent to which State has established guidance and tools to implement and evaluate its Excellence approach. To conduct this review, we obtained and analyzed information from State policy, planning, funding, and reporting documents, administrative memos, and select project documentation. Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Survey of Staff of the Department of State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
We conducted a web-based survey of the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) staff from July 15 through August 12, 2016, soliciting their views on the sufficiency of OBO’s strategic vision, policies, procedures, and technical guidance for the Excellence approach to the design and construction of U.S. embassies and consulates, as well as any particular efficiencies or challenges brought about by the approach. Selected Survey Comments on Concerns with SED The SED program was a failure for site specific implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 220 people and injuring 4,000. In 1999, State began a new embassy construction program, administered by OBO, which to date has received $21 billion, according to State. OBO's primary goal was to provide secure, safe, and functional workplaces, and it adopted SED with a streamlined, standard design for all embassies. In 2011, OBO replaced the SED with the Excellence approach, which makes use of customized designs for each embassy.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of Excellence. This report examines (1) the reasons for State's shift to the Excellence approach, (2) key elements and tradeoffs of the new approach, and (3) the extent to which State has established guidance and tools to implement and evaluate its Excellence approach. GAO analyzed information from State policy, planning, funding, and reporting documents and interviewed State and industry officials. GAO also surveyed OBO staff about, among other things, the sufficiency of OBO's policies, procedures, and technical guidance for the Excellence approach. GAO will examine project cost and schedule issues in a subsequent report.
What GAO Found
In 2011, the U.S. Department of State's (State) Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) established the Excellence approach in response to concerns regarding the aesthetics, quality, location, and functionality of embassies built using its Standard Embassy Design (SED). The SED utilized a standard prototypical design for new embassies and consulates along with a streamlined delivery method combining responsibility for design and construction under a single contract. Under the Excellence approach, OBO now directly contracts with design firms to develop customized embassy designs before contracting for construction. OBO officials believe that greater design control under Excellence will improve embassies' appearance in representing the United States, functionality, quality, and operating costs.
Excellence consists of several key elements and involves trade-offs. For example, OBO now allots time and funding to develop customized designs and hires leading design firms to produce them. These design firms have faced initial adjustment challenges designing U.S. embassies, and OBO only recently began evaluating their performance as required by federal regulation. OBO's new approach poses cost and schedule trade-offs since, for example, OBO now has greater design control but may also be responsible if design problems are identified during construction. GAO's survey found that OBO staff who responded held split or conflicting opinions on Excellence compared with SED.
While OBO has established guidance to implement Excellence, it lacks tools to fully evaluate the performance of this new approach. Performance measures are essential tools for managers to evaluate progress toward a program's goals, as noted in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government . However, OBO has not established performance measures to specifically evaluate and communicate the effectiveness of Excellence in delivering embassies. Moreover, OBO's bureau-wide strategic measures do not address Excellence priorities, such as greater adaptability to individual locations, functionality, or sustainability. OBO also lacks a reliable system to monitor operating performance, such as building energy usage, and a centralized database to broadly manage the Excellence program, to include effectively reporting on projects' design and construction costs and schedules. Without performance measures and reliable systems to collect and analyze relevant data, OBO cannot fully assess the value of shifting to the Excellence approach and away from the SED.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations that State take several steps to strengthen performance measures and reporting, monitoring mechanisms, and data systems for the Excellence approach. State concurred with all four recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-892 | gao_GAO-07-892_0 | The WTC Health Registry is also collecting information to assess the long-term public health consequences of the disaster. WTC Federal Responder Screening Program Has Had Difficulties Ensuring the Availability of Screening Services and Is Not Designed to Provide Monitoring
HHS’s WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has not ensured the uninterrupted availability of screening services for federal responders. 1). From January to May 2007, FOH, the program’s implementing agency, did not schedule screening examinations for federal responders. This interruption in service occurred because there was a change in the administration of the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, and certain interagency agreements were not established in a timely way to keep the program fully operational. The WTC Federal Responder Screening Program stopped scheduling and paying for these specialty diagnostic services for almost a year, from April 2006 to March 2007. The contract with the new provider network did not cover specialty diagnostic services by ear, nose, and throat doctors; cardiologists; and pulmonologists. Almost a year later, in March 2007, FOH modified its contract with the provider network and resumed scheduling and paying for specialty diagnostic services for federal responders. The WTC Federal Responder Screening Program was designed to provide a onetime screening examination; however, NIOSH officials told us they want to expand the program to offer monitoring examinations—that is, follow-up physical and mental health examinations—to federal responders. NIOSH Has Not Ensured the Availability of Services for Nonfederal Responders Residing outside the NYC Metropolitan Area
NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. The first effort, in which NIOSH arranged for AOEC to provide screening services, began in late 2002 and ended in July 2004. In June 2005, NIOSH began its second effort by awarding funds to Mount Sinai’s DCC to provide both screening and monitoring services. However, these efforts are incomplete. From August 2004 until June 2005, NIOSH did not fund any organization to provide screening or monitoring services outside the NYC metropolitan area for nonfederal responders. DCC, however, had difficulty establishing a network of providers that could serve nonfederal responders residing throughout the country—ultimately contracting with only 10 clinics in 7 states to provide screening and monitoring services. In May 2007, NIOSH took steps toward establishing the national program, but its efforts are incomplete. CDC’s NIOSH Awarded Funding for Treatment Services to Four WTC Health Programs, but Does Not Have a Reliable Estimate of Service Costs
In fall 2006, CDC’s NIOSH awarded $44 million to four programs in the NYC metropolitan area for providing outpatient treatment services to responders. NIOSH has worked with two of its grantees to estimate the cost of monitoring and treating responders; however, the most recent effort, in 2007, has not produced reliable results because the estimate included potential costs for certain program changes that may not be implemented as well as some costs that reduced the estimate’s accuracy. NIOSH Awarded $44 Million in Outpatient Treatment Funding, Which Is Expected to Be Spent by End of Fiscal Year 2007, and Set Aside $7 Million for Hospital Care
In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded and set aside funds totaling $51 million from its $75 million appropriation for four WTC health programs in the NYC metropolitan area to provide treatment services to responders enrolled in these programs. In the absence of actual cost data, NIOSH and its grantees relied on workers’ compensation reimbursement rates for specific services as a proxy for outpatient treatment costs. It is unclear whether the overall estimate overstated or understated the costs of monitoring and treating responders. HHS Officials Have Taken Steps to Develop More Reliable Cost Estimates
To improve the reliability of future efforts to estimate the cost of providing services to responders, NIOSH officials and the Assistant Secretary for Health—in his capacity as chairman of the HHS WTC Task Force—have required the FDNY WTC program and NY/NJ WTC Consortium to report detailed demographic, service utilization, and cost information. At that time we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, congressional committees, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Responders to the World Trade Center (WTC) attack were exposed to many hazards, and concerns remain about long-term health effects of the disaster and the availability of health care services for those affected. In 2006, GAO reported on problems with the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) WTC Federal Responder Screening Program and on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) distribution of treatment funding. GAO was asked to update its 2006 testimony. GAO assessed the status of (1) services provided by the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, (2) efforts by CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to provide services for nonfederal responders residing outside the New York City (NYC) area, and (3) NIOSH's awards to grantees for treatment services and efforts to estimate service costs. GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed HHS officials, grantees, and others.
What GAO Found
HHS's WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has had difficulties ensuring the uninterrupted availability of services for federal responders. From January 2007 to May 2007, the program stopped scheduling screening examinations because there was a change in the administration of the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, and certain interagency agreements were not established in a timely way to keep the program fully operational. In April 2006 the program also stopped scheduling and paying for specialty diagnostic services because a contract with the program's new provider network did not cover these services. Almost a year later, the contract was modified, and the program resumed scheduling and paying for these services in March 2007. NIOSH is considering expanding the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program to include monitoring--follow-up physical and mental health examinations--and is assessing options for funding and service delivery. If federal responders do not receive monitoring, health conditions that arise later may not be diagnosed and treated, and knowledge of the health effects of the WTC disaster may be incomplete. NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. In late 2002, NIOSH arranged for a network of occupational health clinics to provide screening services. This effort ended in July 2004, and until June 2005, NIOSH did not fund screening or monitoring services for nonfederal responders outside the NYC area. In June 2005, NIOSH funded the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide screening and monitoring services; however, DCC had difficulty establishing a nationwide network of providers and contracted with only 10 clinics in 7 states. In 2006, NIOSH began to explore other options for providing these services, and in May 2007, it took steps toward expanding the provider network. However, these efforts are incomplete. NIOSH has awarded treatment funds to four NYC-area programs, but does not have a reliable cost estimate of serving responders. In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded $44 million for outpatient treatment and set aside $7 million for hospital care. The New York/New Jersey WTC Consortium and the New York City Fire Department WTC program, which received the largest awards, used NIOSH's funding to continue outpatient services, offer full coverage for prescriptions, and cover hospital care. Program officials expect that NIOSH's outpatient treatment awards will be spent by the end of fiscal year 2007. NIOSH lacks a reliable estimate of service costs because the estimate that NIOSH and its grantees developed included potential costs for certain program changes that may not be implemented, and in the absence of actual treatment cost data, they relied on questionable assumptions. It is unclear whether the estimate overstates or understates the cost of serving responders. To improve future cost estimates, HHS officials have required the two largest grantees to report detailed cost data. |
gao_GAO-06-709 | gao_GAO-06-709_0 | Corrosion can also reduce the safety of equipment items. In addition, the Defense Science Board in 2004 stated that “accurate and objective corrosion data collection and new incentives to reward life-cycle cost reduction efforts must be implemented” as part of an effective corrosion control program and that such data are critical “not only to understand the depth of the problem, but to enable a quantitative corrosion mitigation strategy, which is founded on fact.”
Army and Marine Corps Have Taken Some Measures to Reduce Impact of Corrosion on Prepositioned Assets, but the Army Could Increase Its Use of Storage Facilities
The Army and Marine Corps have taken some measures to reduce the impact of corrosion on prepositioned assets, but the Army could increase its use of storage facilities for land-based assets. However, we identified several locations where the Army is currently storing a substantial portion of its prepositioned equipment outdoors. Temporary shelters may be a feasible option to address immediate storage needs. Prepositioned Equipment Deployed for Military Operations Was Reported to Be in Good Operating Condition
When prepositioned equipment was drawn by Army and Marine Corps units in military operations in Iraq during 2003, it was reported to be in good working condition and was not degraded by corrosion. Under Army policy, the preferred method for storing prepositioned assets is in humidity-controlled facilities because such storage is considered highly effective in preserving equipment. Marine Corps prepositioned assets are stored in humidity-controlled facilities either on ships or in caves in Norway. At these locations, assets are left relatively unprotected from moisture, sand, and other elements that contribute to corrosion. Officials cited competing funding priorities as the primary reason for not providing indoor storage for all land-based prepositioned assets. According to a study by the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center, sheltering Army National Guard equipment in a humidity-controlled facility had a potential return on investment of a minimum of $8 for every $1 invested. Army and Marine Corps Are Not Collecting Corrosion Data on Prepositioned Assets
Corrosion-related data that could enhance efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of prepositioned assets is unavailable because the Army and Marine Corps consider collection of this information to be a low priority and, consequently, do not systematically collect it. Although the Army and Marine Corps are not collecting data about the current costs to prevent and mitigate corrosion of prepositioned assets, the military services have estimated that at least 25 percent of overall maintenance costs are corrosion related and that as much as one-third of these costs could be reduced through more effective corrosion prevention and mitigation. Because of the lack of available cost data, the Army, at our request, conducted a limited review of maintenance records for about 2,000 pieces of prepositioned stock in South Korea. The Army determined that about $8.7 million (31 percent) of the estimated $28 million spent to restore this equipment to serviceable condition was used to address corrosion-related problems. The Army has had previous success using corrosion data regarding non-prepositioning programs to support corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts that achieved long-term cost savings. Conclusions
Effectively addressing corrosion on prepositioned stocks of equipment can enable the services to achieve significant cost savings and increase readiness and safety for rapidly fielding combat-ready forces around the world. Sheltering assets— especially sheltering in humidity-controlled facilities—has been shown to be a key anticorrosion practice, yet large amounts of Army land-based prepositioned assets are stored outdoors without adequate sheltering. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the impact of corrosion on prepositioned assets and support additional corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: Direct the Secretary of the Army to examine the feasibility of using temporary shelters, including humidity-controlled facilities, to store land-based prepositioned assets currently stored outdoors, and if such use is determined to be feasible, to take appropriate actions to implement the use of shelters to the maximum extent possible. Most of the military services store equipment and supplies in Southwest Asia, the Pacific theater, Europe, and aboard prepositioning ships. | Why GAO Did This Study
The military services store prepositioned stocks of equipment and material on ships and land in locations around the world to enable the rapid fielding of combat-ready forces. GAO's prior work has shown that the readiness and safety of military equipment can be severely degraded by corrosion and that the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars annually to address corrosion. GAO was asked to review the impact of corrosion on prepositioned assets. GAO's specific objectives were to assess (1) the measures taken by the Army and the Marine Corps to reduce the impact of corrosion on prepositioned assets and (2) the availability of corrosion-related data to the Army and the Marine Corps to support corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts for prepositioned assets.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps have taken some measures to reduce the impact of corrosion on prepositioned assets, primarily through the use of humidity-controlled storage facilities on ships and in some land-based locations, but a substantial portion of Army land-based prepositioned assets are stored outdoors and are left relatively unprotected from elements that contribute to corrosion. When equipment was drawn for military operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2003, it was reported in good operating condition and not degraded by corrosion. Most of this equipment had been stored in humidity-controlled facilities. However, whereas all Marine Corps prepositioned assets are stored in humidity-controlled facilities, the Army currently stores a significant amount of its land-based prepositioned assets outdoors. Under Army policy, the preferred method for storing prepositioned assets is in humidity-controlled facilities because outdoor storage makes equipment more susceptible to corrosion and increases maintenance requirements and costs. One Army study showed that sheltering equipment in a humidity-controlled facility had a return on investment, at minimum, of $8 for every $1 invested. In South Korea, the Army has recently completed an intensive effort to repair prepositioned assets and correct some long-standing problems, but almost one-third of the assets continue to be stored outside. Similarly, as the Army reconstitutes its prepositioned equipment in Southwest Asia, thousands of Army equipment items in Kuwait are stored outdoors in harsh environmental conditions. Army officials cited competing funding priorities and other factors as reasons for not providing indoor storage for all land-based prepositioned assets. However, temporary shelters may be a feasible option to address immediate storage needs. The Army has used temporary shelters and humidity-controlled storage for some prepositioned assets. Although the Army requires corrosion-related data collection for equipment items and Marine Corps officials believe them to be beneficial, data that could help reduce corrosion of prepositioned assets are not available. They are not available because the services consider this information to be a low priority and do not systematically collect it. Without these data, the services are not in a position to identify causes of corrosion, support efforts to more effectively reduce corrosion, and achieve long-term cost savings. Army and Marine Corps documents include information on the maintenance condition, actions, and costs for prepositioned equipment, but provide little data on corrosion. While cost data are limited, the services have estimated that about 25 percent of overall equipment maintenance costs are corrosion related and perhaps as much as one-third of these costs could be reduced through more effective corrosion prevention and mitigation. An Army review of maintenance records for about 2,000 pieces of prepositioned stock in South Korea found that $8.7 million (31 percent) of the estimated $28 million spent to restore this equipment was used to address corrosion. The Army has had previous success using corrosion data on non-prepositioned equipment programs to support corrosion prevention and mitigation. |
gao_GAO-12-408 | gao_GAO-12-408_0 | Typically, eligible unemployed workers can receive UI benefits for up to 26 weeks in most states, though individuals may be eligible for fewer weeks. 1). 2 Million of Those Who Lost Jobs in the Recession Years Exhausted UI Benefits by Early 2010
Half of Workers Who Lost Jobs in the Recession Years Received UI, an Increase from Prior Years
The number of displaced workers increased substantially during the recession years, and proportionately more of them received UI than in the 3 years prior to the recession. 2). 3). 2 Million Displaced Workers Exhausted UI by January 2010, with More since Then
Two million of the 7.5 million workers who lost jobs from 2007 to 2009 and received UI had exhausted their UI benefits by January 2010, based on the 2010 Displaced Worker Supplement (see fig. Many UI Exhaustees Faced Difficult Economic Circumstances, but Few Were Likely to Qualify for TANF
18 Percent of Exhaustees Were in Poverty in 2009
For those who lost jobs from 2007 to 2009 and exhausted UI, the CPS data suggest that many faced difficult economic circumstances. Among the exhaustees who were unemployed in January 2010, about half appeared to have worked at some point in the previous year. These data suggest that some exhaustees may have been helped by other sources of income, such as a household member who was earning income in 2009, or income from assets, such as interest or dividends. The majority of UI exhaustees would not have qualified because they did not have a minor child—55 percent of exhaustees did not have a child age 18 or younger in their household. Significantly more of the households of UI exhaustees received benefits from Social Security programs (18 percent for retirement, Disability Insurance, and survivors programs) or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program)(15 percent) than from TANF. Among the households of UI exhaustees that had minor children and income below 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold, less than 10 percent received TANF or other welfare benefits in 2009 (see table 4). More than one-third of these households received SNAP benefits. Most State UI Agencies Reported Efforts to Provide UI Exhaustees with Information about Other Support Programs
While there are no federal requirements to refer UI exhaustees to other support programs, most (45) of the state UI agencies we surveyed reported providing information or connections to support programs for exhaustees.These connections are made in a number of ways, such as through websites, mail, staff referrals, and interagency coordination (see table 5). In Washington state, a multiagency working group created a detailed demographic analysis of potential exhaustees, shared data on exhaustees across agencies, developed a resource guide that was mailed to exhaustees and posted online, and established a new unit of employees and a phone number to handle questions from individuals about to exhaust UI. Despite the temporary benefit extensions, however, some individuals have exhausted UI benefits without a job, and a significant percentage have low incomes. Those eligible for Social Security retirement, disability, or survivors programs appear to have turned to those programs. Specifically, we analyzed pertinent data from two supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS): the Displaced Worker Supplement and the Annual Social and Economic Supplement; conducted a web-based survey with Unemployment Insurance (UI) agencies in 50 states and the District of Columbia; conducted structured phone interviews with officials from 16 state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) agencies; analyzed data on the UI program from the Department of Labor (Labor), on the TANF program from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and conducted interviews with officials from Labor and HHS, as well as researchers, and reviewed applicable federal laws and regulations, studies, and policy documents. More specifically, the estimate of the number of displaced workers who exhausted UI does not include workers who may have exhausted UI at some point after January 2010. The 16 states we selected to interview were chosen to represent a range of unemployment rates and TANF cash assistance caseloads and to achieve geographic diversity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recession of 2007 to 2009 was the most severe in the United States since the 1930s, resulting in a net loss of 7.5 million jobs. Workers who lose a job through no fault of their own (referred to as displaced workers in this report) may turn to financial assistance offered through the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. Currently, through benefit extensions authorized by Congress, eligible displaced workers can receive UI benefits for up to 99 weeks in certain states. However, with the slow economic recovery, some may exhaust UI benefits without finding a new job. This raises questions about how Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a program that provides cash assistance to low-income families with children, and other support programs are aiding those who have exhausted UI benefits.
GAO was asked to examine: (1) how many of the workers who lost jobs in the recession received and exhausted UI; (2) what are the economic circumstances of those who exhausted UI, and how many received support from TANF and other programs; and (3) the extent to which UI agencies refer those exhausting UI to other support programs. GAO analyzed data from the Current Population Surveys 2008 and 2010 Displaced Worker Supplements and the 2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement and data from the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services. GAO also surveyed 51 state UI agencies and conducted interviews with 16 state TANF agencies, selected to reflect a range of unemployment rate changes in recent years.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Among the 15 million workers who lost jobs from 2007 to 2009, half received Unemployment Insurance (UI), and about one-fourth of the recipients exhausted UI benefits by January 2010. This represents 2 million displaced workers who exhausted UI as of early 2010, the most recent survey data available. Labor estimated that about an additional 3-1/2 million individuals exhausted benefits in 2010 and 2011.
Many of the displaced workers who exhausted UI by January 2010 appear to have faced difficult economic circumstances. Their unemployment rate was high46 percent in January 2010. Most, however, appeared to have worked at some point in 2009 or to have been supported by another household member who was working, and some had income from assets, such as interest or dividends. Nevertheless, the poverty rate of displaced workers who exhausted UI was higher than the rate among working-age adults18 percent compared to 13 percent, and more than 40 percent had relatively low incomes, below 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold. Few (less than 3 percent) of the households of those who exhausted UI received TANF benefits in 2009. Most would not have qualified for TANF because they did not have children age 18 or younger, a general TANF eligibility criteria. More of these households received benefits from Social Security programs (18 percent) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (15 percent for the program formerly known as the Food Stamp Program).
While there are no federal requirements to refer those exhausting UI benefits to other support programs, most (45) of the state UI agencies GAO surveyed reported providing such individuals with information or connecting them to support programs. UI agencies made these connections in a variety of ways, such as through websites, mail, staff referrals, and interagency coordination. For example, Washington state has a multiagency workgroup which developed a resource guide that was mailed to those exhausting UI benefits and posted online and established a phone number to handle questions from these individuals. |
gao_GAO-08-428T | gao_GAO-08-428T_0 | All establishments that manufacture medical devices for marketing in the United States must register with FDA. As part of its efforts to ensure the safety, effectiveness, and quality of medical devices, FDA is responsible for inspecting certain domestic and foreign establishments to ensure that they meet manufacturing standards established in FDA’s quality system regulation. In describing this requirement, the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that some manufacturers have faced an increase in the number of inspections required by foreign countries, and that the number of inspections could be reduced if the manufacturers could contract with a third-party organization to conduct a single inspection that would satisfy the requirements of both FDA and foreign countries. In addition to the Accredited Persons Inspection Program, FDA has a second program for accredited third-party inspections of medical device establishments. More than half—about 5,600—of these establishments were located in the United States. 1.) FDA Is Not Inspecting Domestic Establishments Biennially as Required and Faces Challenges in Inspecting Foreign Establishments
FDA has not met the statutory requirement to inspect domestic establishments manufacturing class II or III medical devices every 2 years. The databases that provide FDA with data about the number of foreign establishments manufacturing medical devices for the U.S. market contain inaccuracies. In addition, inspections of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments pose unique challenges to FDA—both in human resources and logistics. For foreign establishments—for which there is no comparable inspection requirement—FDA officials estimated that the agency inspects class II manufacturers every 27 years and class III manufacturers every 6 years. 2.) FDA’s Databases Provide Inconsistent Information Regarding the Number of Foreign Medical Device Manufacturing Establishments Subject to Inspection
FDA’s databases on registration and imported products provide divergent estimates regarding the number of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments. DRLS provides FDA with information about domestic and foreign medical device establishments and the products they manufacture for the U.S. market. Although comparing information from these two databases could help FDA determine the number of foreign establishments marketing medical devices in the United States, the databases cannot exchange information to be compared electronically and any comparisons are done manually. Few Third-Party Inspections Are Conducted, but Recent Changes Could Eliminate Some Obstacles to Manufacturers’ Participation
Few inspections of medical device manufacturing establishments have been conducted through FDA’s two accredited third-party inspection programs—the Accredited Persons Inspection Program and PMAP. FDAAA specified several changes to the requirements for inspections by accredited third parties that could result in increased participation by manufacturers. Few inspections have been conducted through FDA’s Accredited Persons Inspection Program since March 11, 2004—the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections. Through January 11, 2008, five inspections had been conducted independently by accredited organizations (two inspections of domestic establishments and three inspections of foreign establishments), an increase of three since we reported on this program one year ago. According to FDA officials and representatives of affected entities, potential incentives to participation include the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA and other countries’ requirements. These potential disincentives include bearing the cost for the inspection, doubts about whether accredited organizations can cover multiple requirements in a single inspection, and uncertainty about the potential consequences of an inspection that otherwise may not occur in the near future—consequences that could involve regulatory action. As of January 11, 2008, two inspections, both of domestic establishments, had been conducted through PMAP, FDA’s second program for inspections by accredited third parties. Although recent statutory changes to the requirements for inspections by accredited third parties may encourage greater participation in these programs, the lack of meaningful progress raises questions about the practicality and effectiveness of establishing similar programs that rely on third parties to quickly help FDA fulfill other responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) oversight of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices marketed in the United States, it inspects domestic and foreign establishments where these devices are manufactured. To help FDA address shortcomings in its inspection program, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 required FDA to accredit third parties to inspect certain establishments. In response, FDA has implemented two such voluntary programs. GAO previously reported on the status of one of these programs, citing concerns regarding its implementation and factors that may influence manufacturers' participation. (Medical Devices: Status of FDA's Program for Inspections by Accredited Organizations, GAO-07-157 , January 2007.) This statement (1) assesses FDA's management of inspections of establishments--particularly those in foreign countries--manufacturing devices for the U.S. market, and (2) provides the status of FDA's programs for third-party inspections of medical device manufacturing establishments. GAO interviewed FDA officials; reviewed pertinent statutes, regulations, guidance, and reports; and analyzed information from FDA databases. GAO also updated its previous work on FDA's programs for inspections by accredited third parties.
What GAO Found
FDA has not met the statutory requirement to inspect certain domestic establishments manufacturing medical devices every 2 years, and the agency faces challenges inspecting foreign establishments. FDA primarily inspected establishments located in the United States. The agency has not met the biennial inspection requirement for domestic establishments manufacturing medical devices that FDA has classified as high risk, such as pacemakers, or medium risk, such as hearing aids. FDA officials estimated that the agency has inspected these establishments every 3 years (for high risk devices) or 5 years (for medium risk devices). There is no comparable requirement to inspect foreign establishments, and agency officials estimate that these establishments have been inspected every 6 years (for high risk devices) or 27 years (for medium risk devices). FDA faces challenges in managing its inspections of foreign medical device establishments. Two databases that provide FDA with information about foreign medical device establishments and the products they manufacture for the U.S. market contain inaccuracies that create disparate estimates of establishments subject to FDA inspection. Although comparing information from these two databases could help FDA determine the number of foreign establishments marketing medical devices in the United States, these databases cannot exchange information and any comparisons must be done manually. Finally, inspections of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments pose unique challenges to FDA in human resources and logistics. Few inspections of medical device manufacturing establishments have been conducted through FDA's two accredited third-party inspection programs--the Accredited Persons Inspection Program and the Pilot Multi-purpose Audit Program (PMAP). From March 11, 2004--the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections--through January 11, 2008, five inspections have been conducted by accredited organizations through FDA's Accredited Persons Inspection Program. An incentive to participation in the program is the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA and other countries' requirements. Disincentives include bearing the cost for the inspection, particularly when the consequences of an inspection that otherwise might not occur in the near future could involve regulatory action. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 made several changes to program eligibility requirements that could result in increased participation by manufacturers. PMAP was established on September 7, 2006, and as of January 11, 2008, two inspections had been conducted by an accredited organization through this program, which is more limited than the Accredited Persons Inspection Program. The small number of inspections completed to date by accredited third-party organizations raises questions about the practicality and effectiveness of establishing similar programs that rely on third parties to quickly help FDA fulfill its responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-03-207 | gao_GAO-03-207_0 | We concluded that Congress did not intend for states to convert federal money to state money by buying and selling property and/or use the federal share of recaptured funds to reduce or avoid their obligation to provide matching funds. All States Report Selling, Leasing, or Disposing of Real Property
All 51 of the state DOTs we surveyed, including the District of Columbia, reported selling, leasing, or disposing of real property purchased with federal-aid funds (see app. We found that from June 1998 through May 2002, 37 states reported they sold, leased, or disposed of at least 5,636 properties that generated about $148 million (2001 dollars) in revenue for the states. For states that retain the federal share of the net proceeds, five state officials that we contacted said they view the current regulations that allow them to retain the federal share of the proceeds generated from the sale or lease of real property as positive because it gives the states greater flexibility to sell or lease real property to support the states’ transportation programs. Proceeds from Property Sales and Leases Are Not a Major Source of Revenue
The proceeds generated from the state DOTs’ sales or leases of real property do not currently appear to be a major source of revenue for the states’ transportation programs. States’ Use of Proceeds Vary and Sometimes May Not Comply with the Statutory Requirements on the Use of the Proceeds
States reported using the proceeds generated from the sale or lease of real property in different ways; and their survey responses indicated that some uses of the proceeds may not comply with specific statutory requirements of only using the proceeds on projects eligible for funding under federal-aid highway and related programs. Officials from 47 state DOTs reported using the proceeds to fund other state transportation projects eligible for federal aid, and at least four states use the proceeds as their match for projects receiving federal contributions. Therefore, in at least two cases, it is possible that states have used the proceeds on projects that are not eligible for federal aid. New Mexico DOT officials reported that the proceeds are not restricted to funding eligible federal-aid projects; therefore, the funds could be used for other transportation projects not eligible for federal aid. However, they also noted that TEA-21 does not require states to track and report the federal share. The DOT’s General Counsel is considering GAO’s legal opinion on how the federal share of the proceeds should be used, so the officials did not comment on those sections of the draft report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested that we determine (1) the extent to which states are selling, leasing, or disposing of real property purchased with federal-aid funds and (2) how the proceeds generated from the sale or lease of real property are being used in accordance with the intent of TEA-21. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), authorized the states to retain the federal share of proceeds from the sale or lease of real property that had been purchased with federal-aid funds. It also required the states to use the federal share on other highway projects eligible for funding under the federal-aid highway program. GAO determined (1) the extent to which states are selling, leasing, or disposing of real property purchased with federal-aid funds and (2) how the proceeds generated from the sale or lease of real property are being used, including whether they are being used in accordance with TEA-21. GAO issued a related legal opinion in September 2002.
What GAO Found
All of the 51 state Departments of Transportation GAO surveyed, including the District of Columbia, reported selling, leasing, or disposing of real property, such as unused land purchased with federal-aid funds. From June 1998 through May 2002, 37 states sold, leased, or disposed of at least 5,636 properties that generated about $148 million in proceeds for the states. States varied on whether they tracked and reported this information to DOT; therefore, GAO did not report this information for the other 14 states. State DOT officials view the policy that allowed them to retain the federal share of the proceeds as being positive because it provided states greater flexibility for financing their transportation programs. However, proceeds generated from the sale or lease of property are not currently a major source of revenue for states' transportation programs. GAO determined that the proceeds generated from the sale, lease, or disposal of real property were less than 1 percent of states' transportation revenue from other sources, including federal aid, in 1999 and 2000. States reported using the proceeds generated from the sale or lease of property in different ways; and at least 2 states may have used the proceeds in ways that do not comply with the specific statutory requirements to use the proceeds on projects eligible for federal-aid highway funding. Forty-seven states reported using the proceeds to fund other state transportation projects, and at least 4 states use the proceeds as their match for projects receiving federal funds. GAO issued a legal opinion in September 2002, concluding that Congress did not intend for states to use such proceeds as their match. DOT has interpreted TEA-21 as allowing for the use of the federal share as a state's match. GAO also found that 2 states did not have restrictions on how the federal share of the proceeds should be used; therefore, the proceeds may have been used on projects not eligible for federal-aid. DOT issued some guidance but is considering issuing more guidance to states to ensure proceeds are used for eligible projects under the federal-aid highway program. |
gao_GAO-02-107 | gao_GAO-02-107_0 | Two exceptions are allowed: (1) in the case of an emergency as determined by the chief election officer of the state, and (2) when the chief election officer of the state determines that all potential polling places have been surveyed and no such accessible place is available, nor is the political subdivision able to make one temporarily accessible in the area involved. State Provisions for Addressing Accessibility of Polling Places Vary Widely
All states have laws and other provisions concerning voting access for people with disabilities, including their access to polling places, but the extent and manner in which these provisions promote accessibility vary from state to state. Although curbside voting is not available at a number of polling places with potential impediments, as noted earlier, all states have provisions for absentee voting, and many states provide for other alternative voting methods or accommodations that may facilitate voting by people with disabilities on or before Election Day. For voters experiencing difficulties using these various voting methods, we found that one or more accommodations may be provided. Election officials also told us that the cost of acquiring voting equipment that is more accessible is another major challenge. | What GAO Found
Federal law requires that disabled persons have access to polling places on election day. State political subdivisions must ensure that polling places used in federal elections are accessible. Exceptions are allowed if all potential polling places have been surveyed, no accessible place is available, and the political subdivision cannot make one temporarily accessible. In these cases, disabled voters must either be reassigned to an accessible polling place or provided another means for voting on election day. All states have provisions that address voting by people with disabilities, but these provisions vary greatly. All states provide for one or more alternative voting methods or accommodations that may facilitate voting by people with disabilities. States and localities have made several efforts to improve voting accessibility for the disabled, such as modifying poling places, acquiring new voting equipment, and expanding voting options. Nevertheless, state and county election officials GAO surveyed cited various challenges to improving access. |
gao_GAO-16-304 | gao_GAO-16-304_0 | While ICs are responsible for determining which clinical trials to fund and for overseeing the progress of individual clinical trials, officials from the OD are responsible for overseeing the operations of the ICs and, in consultation with the ICs, ensuring that NIH’s research portfolio across the ICs is balanced, not unnecessarily duplicative, and utilizes cross- cutting research. NIH Surveyed ICs to Assess the Applicability of the IOM Recommendations and Determined Not to Apply the Recommendations across ICs
In response to a conference report provision to review the applicability of the IOM recommendations, NIH administered a survey to all 24 of the ICs that fund clinical trials and then aggregated the results. The survey results showed that over half of the ICs surveyed indicated that 7 of the 12 IOM recommendations were applicable to their IC. OD officials told us that NIH decided not to apply the IOM recommendations across all of its ICs that fund clinical trials because more analysis was needed before proposing any NIH-wide recommendations, given the variation across ICs. Officials explained that the IOM recommendations were designed for one program within NCI— the Cooperative Group Program—and most ICs do not support clinical trial networks that operate with the size and volume of NCI’s Cooperative Group Program, thus making the recommendations more pertinent to NCI. Leaders from NIH and the ICs indicated that more analysis was needed to account for the ICs’ portfolios and management activities. NIH Developed Its Own Recommendations That Aim to Enhance its Stewardship of Clinical Trials, Including Several to Improve Data Collection across its ICs
Through its CTWG, NIH developed recommendations that aim to enhance its stewardship of clinical trials, including several recommendations to improve NIH’s ability to collect data on clinical trial activity across its ICs. The CTWG indicated that one type of additional data that could be collected across the ICs is accrual data—that is, information on the number of patients enrolled in a research study, such as a clinical trial. NIH’s OD Reviews Some Data on Clinical Trial Activity across ICs, but Has Not Finalized What Additional Data it Needs or Established a Process for Using These Data
NIH’s OD reviews some data on clinical trial activity across the agency, but has not finalized what other data it needs to enhance its stewardship of clinical trials, as intended by the CTWG recommendations, or established a process for using these data. Specifically, the OD only reviews two types of data related to clinical trial activity on a regular basis: financial data and inclusion data. The OD reviews this information as part of the agency’s efforts to develop its annual budget. Rather, OD officials review data from the ICs on clinical trial activity in response to specific inquiries. While officials from the OD acknowledged that they do not regularly review much data specifically related to clinical trial activity, they are also considering changing this practice and reviewing additional data collected from the ICs to inform the OD’s stewardship of clinical trial activity across NIH. In addition, the OD has not established a process that specifies how and when the OD will use the additional data it decides to review. As a result, it is unclear how often the OD will review the data, for what purpose, and what the product of its analysis will be. Federal Standards for Internal Control state that agencies need operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting their goals for effective and efficient use of resources. Given that ICs oversee the clinical trials they award, the OD may not need the same data or level of detail collected by ICs, or need to review the data with the same frequency. However, until the OD determines which additional data it will review and the process it will use to review these data, NIH is limited in its ability to make data-driven decisions about the use of its roughly $3 billion annual investment in clinical trials. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance its stewardship of clinical trials across the ICs, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the NIH OD to take the following two actions: 1. finalize data on clinical trial activity that the OD needs to collect from 2. establish and implement a process for using those data. We maintain that the report appropriately describes the steps taken by NIH to assess the applicability of IOM's recommendations and to enhance its stewardship of clinical trials. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, NIH spent nearly $3.2 billion on clinical trials as part of its research activities. NIH's OD oversees the operations of 27 ICs to ensure that NIH's research portfolio is balanced, not unnecessarily duplicative, and utilizes cross-cutting research. In 2010, IOM made recommendations for clinical trials supported by NCI, one of NIH's ICs. In 2012, NIH was directed to conduct a review of the applicability of IOM's recommendations across all NIH ICs that conduct clinical trials.
A Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying a 2015 appropriations act included a provision for GAO to review how NIH applied the IOM recommendations. This report examines (1) the steps that NIH took, if any, to apply the IOM recommendations across its ICs other than the NCI, and (2) the extent to which NIH's OD uses data to oversee clinical trial activity across the ICs. GAO reviewed NIH documentation on the applicability of the IOM recommendations, data the OD uses to oversee clinical trial activity, and its process for using such data. GAO compared these to federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed NIH and IC officials, IOM officials, and stakeholders, such as a group representing researchers.
What GAO Found
Although the National Institutes of Health (NIH) assessed the applicability of recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 2010 to improve clinical trials—studies involving human subjects that test the effects of interventions on health-related outcomes—within one of its Institutes and Centers (IC), NIH did not apply the recommendations across its ICs. In response to a conference report provision that it review the applicability of the IOM recommendations across its ICs, NIH administered a survey to all 24 of the ICs that fund clinical trials and presented the findings at a leadership forum and in a report to Congress. These findings showed that over half of the ICs surveyed indicated that the majority of the recommendations were applicable. NIH decided not to apply the recommendations across its ICs because more analysis was needed before proposing any NIH-wide recommendations, given the variation across ICs. Officials explained that the IOM recommendations were designed for one program within the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and that most ICs do not support clinical trial networks that operate with the size and volume of the program, thus making the recommendations more pertinent to NCI. Leaders from NIH and the ICs indicated that more analysis was needed to account for the ICs' portfolios and management activities. As a result, NIH developed its own recommendations that aimed to enhance its stewardship of clinical trials, including several to improve data collection across the ICs. For example, its recommendation to improve monitoring systems, tools, and processes could assist NIH in identifying additional data that could be collected across the ICs.
NIH's Office of the Director (OD) reviews some data on clinical trial activity across NIH but has not finalized what additional data it needs or established a process for using these data to enhance its stewardship of clinical trials, as intended by NIH's own recommendations. The OD only reviews two types of data related to clinical trial activity on a regular basis: financial data and data on the inclusion of minorities and women. Beyond these data, OD officials review other data from the ICs on clinical trial activity if there is a specific inquiry. Officials from the OD acknowledged that they do not regularly review much data specifically related to clinical trial activity, but they are considering reviewing additional data collected from the ICs to inform the OD's stewardship of clinical trial activity across NIH. However, the OD has not finalized what data it needs from the ICs. In addition, the OD has not established a process that specifies how and when the OD will use the additional data it decides to review. As a result, it is unclear how often the OD will review the data, for what purpose, and what the product of its analysis will be. Federal Standards for Internal Control state that agencies need operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting their goals for effective and efficient use of resources. Given that ICs oversee specific clinical trials, the OD may not need the same data or level of detail collected by ICs. However, until the OD determines which additional data it will review and the process it will use to review these data, NIH is limited in its ability to make data-driven decisions regarding the use of its roughly $3 billion annual investment in clinical trials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the NIH OD (1) finalize data on clinical trial activity that the OD needs to collect from ICs, and (2) establish and implement a process for using those data. HHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-95-135 | gao_HEHS-95-135_0 | These include hospitals, nursing homes, home health care providers, hospices, and health maintenance organizations, but not providers of outpatient services or emergency medical teams.Specifically, the provider or organization is required to provide to all adult patients, residents, and enrollees written information on their rights under state law to make decisions concerning medical care, including the right to execute an advance directive, as well as maintain the policies of the provider regarding implementation of advance directives; document in the medical record whether the individual has an advance educate the staff and the community about advance directives; not condition the provision of care, or otherwise discriminate, on the basis of whether a patient has an advance directive; and ensure compliance with state law respecting advance directives. In addition, PSDA requires that HHS conduct a public education campaign about advance directives and oversee provider compliance. HHS, through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), has complied with most PSDA provisions. Limited Information Suggests That Institutions Comply With Most Requirements
Under PSDA, Medicare and Medicaid hospitals, nursing facilities, and other providers must inform patients of their decision-making rights, distribute state-specific information about advance directives, and inquire and document whether a patient has an advance directive. A variety of factors affects whether an advance directive actually controls end-of-life care decisions, including the availability or specificity of a living will, family wishes, physicians’ attitudes, and legal issues. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, interested congressional committees, and others. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), and the effectiveness of advance directives in ensuring a patient's desired care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) health care institutions and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are generally complying with most PSDA requirements; (2) most health care providers inform patients of their right to have an advance directive, but fewer consistently document whether the patient actually received an advance directive; (3) HHS has incorporated PSDA provisions into Medicare and Medicaid provider requirements, expanded the Medicare handbook, and engaged in a limited public education campaign, but HHS has not informed Social Security recipients about advance directives as required by PSDA; (4) only 10 to 25 percent of Americans have documented their end-of-life choices or appointed a health care agent to do so; and (5) an advance directive decision takes into consideration the availability or specificity of a living will, family wishes, physicians' attitudes, and legal issues. |
gao_GAO-03-489 | gao_GAO-03-489_0 | We requested comments from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. This created an environment where improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection and likely contributed to the $2.3 million in improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases we identified through our data mining efforts. Control Weaknesses Contributed to Improper, Potentially Improper, and Questionable Purchase Card Transactions
Poor internal controls created an environment where improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection. We also found 2,507 transactions, totaling about $1.3 million, with vendors that would not routinely be expected to engage in commerce with HUD. In order to determine whether these questionable purchases were a valid use of government funds, we requested supporting documentation for each purchase. In these instances, we were unable to determine what was purchased, for whom, and why. Because HUD was unable to provide adequate documentation for these purchases, we consider them to be a questionable use of government funds and therefore potentially improper purchases. For example, our testing revealed that HUD employees used their purchase cards to buy portable assets, such as computer equipment and digital cameras, totaling over $74,500 for which they have provided either no support or inadequate support. Our review of HUD’s remedial purchase card action plan found that it did not address all the weaknesses we identified. Conclusions
The problems we identified with HUD’s purchase card program leave the agency vulnerable to wasteful, fraudulent, or otherwise improper purchases. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen its internal control over the purchase card program and reduce HUD’s vulnerability to improper purchases, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Administration to take the following actions: implement the preapproval requirement in the existing purchase card develop and implement a robust review and approval function for purchase card transactions, focusing on identifying split purchases and other inappropriate transactions, and on performing a detailed review of relevant supporting documentation for each purchase; update the list of approving officials and their designated cardholders quarterly to ensure accuracy and completeness; establish specific requirements for documentation and records to support all purchase card purchases; develop and implement a formal monitoring process to periodically assess the effectiveness of the enhanced review and approval process; revise the remedial action plan for purchase cards to include the specific steps necessary to fully implement the above five recommendations; and follow up on the purchases we identified for which cardholders did not provide adequate supporting documentation to determine the validity and the propriety of the purchases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) increasing use of purchase cards and the inherent risk associated with their use, Congress asked GAO to audit the purchase card program concentrating on assessing internal controls and determining whether purchases being made are a valid use of government funds.
What GAO Found
Significant internal control weaknesses in HUD's approximately $10.6 million purchase card program resulted in improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases in fiscal year 2001. Because of these internal control weaknesses, there was often inadequate documentation supporting many purchases GAO reviewed, and as a result, GAO was unable to determine whether these purchases were a valid use of government funds. GAO also found that HUD's remedial action plan for its purchase card program does not adequately address all the control weaknesses we identified. These weaknesses created an environment in which improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection and likely contributed to the $2.3 million in improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases GAO identified. GAO found improper and potentially improper purchases totaling about $1 million where HUD employees either split or appeared to have split purchases into multiple transactions to circumvent cardholder limits. GAO also found that HUD employees lacked adequate supporting documentation for about $1.3 million in questionable purchases including those from vendors not expected to engage in commerce with HUD, purchases made on holidays and weekends, and $74,500 in portable assets such as computer equipment and digital cameras. In these instances, it was not possible to determine what was purchased, for whom, and why. The problems GAO identified with HUD's purchase card program leave the agency vulnerable to wasteful, fraudulent, or otherwise improper purchases. Unless HUD makes specific improvements to its review and approval process, requirements for documentation and record retention, monitoring process, and remedial action plan, the department remains susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse. |
gao_GAO-11-573T | gao_GAO-11-573T_0 | Over 40 percent of the United States-Mexico border, or 820 linear miles, is managed by Interior’s land management agencies and the Forest Service. Under these laws, Border Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from federal land management agencies before its agents can undertake certain activities on federal lands, such as maintaining roads and installing surveillance equipment. Endangered Species Act of 1973. The national-level memorandum of understanding was signed in 2006 by the secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture and is intended to provide consistent principles to guide the agencies’ activities on federal lands along the U.S. borders. Land Management Laws Have Limited Border Patrol’s Access in Some Areas, but Most Agents-in-Charge Reported No Effect on Their Stations’ Border Security Status
Border Patrol’s access has been limited on some federal lands along the southwestern border because of certain land management laws, according to patrol agents-in-charge in the borderlands region. Despite these delays and restrictions, patrol agents-in- charge at 22 of the 26 Border Patrol stations reported that the border security status of their area of operation had not been affected by land management laws. Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act Have Caused Delays
Patrol agents-in-charge at 14 of the 26 Border Patrol stations along the southwestern border reported experiencing delays in getting a permit or permission from land managers to gain access to portions of federal land because of the time it took land managers to complete the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. The 2006 memorandum of understanding directs the agencies to cooperate with each other to complete, in an expedited manner, all compliance required by applicable federal laws, but such cooperation has not always occurred, as shown in the following examples: Federal lands in Arizona. For example, Border Patrol requested permission to move a mobile surveillance system to a certain area but by the time permission was granted—more than 4 months after the initial request—illegal traffic had shifted to other areas. In our October 2010 report, we recommended that to help expedite Border Patrol’s access to federal lands, the agencies should, when and where appropriate, (a) enter into agreements that provide for Border Patrol to use its own resources to pay for or to conduct the required environmental and historic property assessments and (b) prepare programmatic National Environmental Policy Act documents for Border Patrol activities in areas where additional access may be needed. The agencies concurred with this recommendation. For these stations, the access restrictions lessen the effectiveness of agents’ patrol and monitoring operations. While four patrol agents-in-charge reported that delays and restrictions resulting from compliance with land management laws had negatively affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control, they had either not requested resources to facilitate increased or timelier access or had their requests denied by senior Border Patrol officials, who said that other needs were greater priorities for the station or sector. Most Stations’ Border Security Status Has Been Unaffected by Land Management Laws
Patrol agents-in-charge at 22 of the 26 stations with jurisdiction for federal lands along the southwestern border told us that their ability to achieve or maintain operational control in their areas of responsibility has been unaffected by land management laws; in other words, no portions of these stations’ jurisdictions have had their border security status, such as “controlled,” “managed,” or “monitored,” downgraded as a result of land management laws. Instead, for these stations, the primary factor affecting operational control has been the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain or the dense vegetation their agents patrol and monitor. Federal Agencies Reported That Information Sharing and Communication Had Improved, but Additional Coordination Is Needed to Close Critical Gaps
Information sharing and communications among Border Patrol, Interior, and Forest Service have generally increased over the last several years, according to Border Patrol and federal land law enforcement officials in the Tucson sector, but critical gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements. The lack of early and continued consultation among agencies to implement these agreements has resulted in critical information-sharing gaps that compromise officer safety and a timely and effective coordinated law enforcement response to illegal activity on federal lands. In our November 2010 report, we recommended that DHS, Interior, and Agriculture take necessary action to ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct early and continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 memorandum of understanding, including the coordination of threat information for federal lands that is timely and actionable, and the coordination of future plans for upgrades of compatible radio communications used for daily law enforcement operations on federal lands. The agencies concurred with these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
To stem the flow of illegal traffic from Mexico into the United States over the last 5 years along the U.S. southwestern border, the Border Patrol has nearly doubled the number of agents on patrol, constructed hundreds of miles of border fences, and installed a variety of surveillance equipment. About 40 percent of these border lands are managed by the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, and coordination and cooperation between Border Patrol and land management agencies is critical to ensure national security. As requested, this statement summarizes GAO's findings from two reports issued on southwest border issues in the fall of 2010. The first report, GAO-11-38 , focused on the key land management laws that Border Patrol must comply with and how these laws affect the agency's operations. The second report, GAO-11-177 , focused on the extent to which Border Patrol and land management agencies' law enforcement units share threat information and communications.
What GAO Found
When operating on federal lands, Border Patrol must comply with the requirements of several federal land management laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, Wilderness Act, and Endangered Species Act. Border Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from federal land management agencies before agents can undertake operations, such as maintaining roads and installing surveillance equipment, on federal lands. To fulfill these requirements, Border Patrol generally coordinates with land management agencies through national and local interagency agreements. The most comprehensive agreement is a 2006 memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and the Interior that is intended to guide Border Patrol activities on federal lands. Border Patrol's access to some federal lands along the southwestern border has been limited because of certain land management laws, according to 17 of 26 patrol agents-in-charge that GAO surveyed. For example, these patrol agents-in-charge reported that implementation of these laws had resulted in delays and restrictions in their patrolling and monitoring operations. Specifically, 14 patrol agents-in-charge reported that they had been unable to obtain a permit or permission to access certain areas in a timely manner because of the time it takes for land managers to conduct required environmental and historic property assessments. The 2006 memorandum of understanding directs the agencies to cooperate and complete, in an expedited manner, all compliance required by applicable federal laws, but such cooperation has not always occurred. For example, when Border Patrol requested permission to move surveillance equipment, it took the land manager more than 4 months to conduct the required historic property assessment and grant permission, but by then illegal traffic had shifted to other areas. Despite the access delays and restrictions experienced by these stations, 22 of the 26 patrol agents-in-charge reported that the overall security status of their jurisdiction had not been affected by land management laws. Instead, factors such as the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain have had the greatest effect on their ability to achieve operational control in these areas. Four patrol agents-in-charge reported that delays and restrictions had affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control, but they either had not requested resources for increased or timelier access or their requests had been denied by senior Border Patrol officials because of higher priority needs of the agency. Information sharing and communication among the agencies have increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials had access to threat information and compatible secure radio communications for daily operations. GAO found that enhanced coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and a more efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity along the southwest border. This statement contains no new recommendations. In its 2010 reports, GAO made several recommendations to the Departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security, and the Interior to help expedite Border Patrol's access to federal lands and recommended that the agencies take actions to improve communication and information sharing. The departments concurred with GAO's recommendations in those reports. |
gao_GAO-11-826 | gao_GAO-11-826_0 | In recent years, OMB e-government initiatives have fostered the establishment of centralized systems across the government. As part of the annual budget, OMB publishes a report on IT spending for the federal government representing a compilation of exhibit 53 data submitted by the 26 agencies. More recently, in June 2009, to further improve the transparency into and oversight of agencies’ IT investments, OMB publicly deployed a website, known as the IT Dashboard, which replaced its Management Watch List and High-Risk List. Key Federal Agencies Plan to Spend Almost $79 Billion on 7,248 IT Investments in Fiscal Year 2011
As of July 2011, the 26 federal agencies that submit information to the IT Dashboard planned to spend about $78.8 billion on 7,248 IT investments in fiscal year 2011. The IT Dashboard Does Not Include All Federal IT Investments
OMB often refers to the federal government’s approximately $79 billion annual investment in IT; however, the Dashboard does not provide data for all federal agencies. It also does not include information from the legislative or judicial branch agencies. In their fiscal year 2011 submissions, agencies reported the greatest number of IT investments in the information and technology management category (1,536 investments), followed by supply chain management (781 investments), human resources management (661 investments), and financial management (580 investments). OMB’s Guidance on Reporting IT Investments Does Not Ensure Complete Reporting or Facilitate Identifying Duplicative Investments
The guidance that OMB provides to agencies on how to report on their IT investments does not ensure complete reporting or fully facilitate the identification of duplicative investments. For example, 5 agencies reported that they include all research and development systems, and 5 do not. This limits OMB’s ability to identify potentially duplicative investments both within and across agencies because similar investments may be organized under different functions. Specifically, in implementing OMB’s guidance, 6 of the 10 agencies we evaluated exclude systems that fit the definition of an IT investment. According to OMB guidance, each investment needs to be mapped to a single functional category within the FEA. OMB and Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Address Potentially Duplicative Investments, but Results to Date Are Mixed and More Remains to Be Done
OMB and federal agencies have undertaken several initiatives to address potentially duplicative IT investments. For example, OMB has efforts under way to consolidate similar functions through its LOB and FEA initiatives and has eliminated duplicative systems identified during its TechStat sessions. In addition, several of the agencies we evaluated have established guidance for ensuring new investments are not duplicative with existing systems. However, most of OMB’s recent initiatives have not yet demonstrated results. However, several of the agencies do not routinely assess legacy systems to determine if they are duplicative. Until agencies routinely assess their entire IT portfolios (including both developmental and operational systems) to identify and reduce duplicative systems, such duplication will continue to exist. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that IT investments are adequately identified and categorized, we recommend that the Director of OMB take the following four actions: specify which executive branch agencies are included when discussing the annual federal IT investment portfolio; clarify guidance to federal agencies in reporting on their IT investments by specifying whether certain types of systems, such as those in research and development and space systems, should be included; revise guidance to federal agencies on categorizing IT investments to ensure that the categorizations are clear and allow agencies to choose secondary categories, where applicable, which will aid in identifying potentially duplicative investments; and require federal agencies to report the steps they take to ensure that their IT investments are not duplicative as part of their annual budget and IT investment submissions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the current number and types of information technology (IT) investments reported by federal agencies on the IT Dashboard, (2) evaluate the adequacy of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidance to federal agencies in reporting on IT investments, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify and address potentially duplicative investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government invests heavily in information technology (IT). In recent years, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has made efforts to improve the transparency, oversight, and management of the federal government's IT investments. More recently, in June 2009, OMB deployed the IT Dashboard, a Web-based system that provides detailed performance information on federal IT investments. GAO was asked to (1) describe the current number and types of IT investments reported by federal agencies on the IT Dashboard, (2) evaluate the adequacy of OMB's guidance to federal agencies in reporting on IT investments, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify and address potentially duplicative investments. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data from the IT Dashboard, analyzed 10 federal agencies' investment guidance and reports, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
According to data reported on OMB's IT Dashboard in July 2011, 26 federal agencies plan to spend almost $79 billion on 7,248 IT investments in fiscal year 2011. OMB often uses the $79 billion figure in referring to annual federal investments in IT; however, it is important to note that this figure does not reflect the spending of the entire federal government. It does not include IT investments by 58 independent executive branch agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the legislative or judicial branches. A closer look at the $79 billion in investments for the 26 agencies reveals that (1) the expenditures are split almost evenly between major and nonmajor (in terms of cost, risk, and other factors) investments; (2) about two-thirds of the expenditures are for systems in an operational state, while about one-third of the expenditures provide for the development of new systems; and (3) there are hundreds of investments providing similar functions across the federal government. For example, agencies reported 1,536 information and technology management investments, 781 supply chain management investments, and 661 human resource management investments. OMB provides guidance to agencies on how to report on their IT investments, but this guidance does not ensure complete reporting or facilitate the identification of duplicative investments. Specifically, agencies differ on what investments they include as an IT investment; for example, 5 of the 10 agencies GAO reviewed consistently consider investments in research and development systems as IT, and 5 do not. As a result, the 26 federal agencies' annual IT investments are likely greater that the $79 billion reported in fiscal year 2011. In addition, OMB's guidance to federal agencies requires each investment to be mapped to a single functional category. This limits OMB's ability to identify duplicative investments both within and across agencies because similar investments may be organized into different categories. OMB and federal agencies have undertaken several initiatives to address potentially duplicative IT investments. For example, OMB has efforts under way to consolidate similar functions through its "line of business" initiatives and has reduced the scope of three duplicative systems identified during executive reviews of high-priority projects. In addition, most of the agencies GAO reviewed established guidance for ensuring new investments are not duplicative with existing systems. However, most of OMB's recent initiatives have not yet demonstrated results. Further, agencies do not routinely assess operational systems to determine if they are duplicative. Until agencies routinely assess their IT investment portfolios to identify and reduce duplicative systems, the government's current situation of having hundreds of similar IT investments will continue to exist.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB clarify its reporting on IT investments and improve its guidance to agencies on identifying and categorizing IT investments. OMB did not agree that further efforts were needed to clarify reporting. Given the importance of continued improvement in OMB's reporting and guidance, GAO maintains its recommendations are warranted. |
gao_NSIAD-99-2 | gao_NSIAD-99-2_0 | Milstar I Support to Some Critical Strategic Mission Areas Could Be Limited
The Milstar I system is expected to provide communication networks in support of designated strategic mission areas. However, a May 1998 draft operational test report, prepared by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, concluded that although the Milstar system was found to be effective for communications during normal operations, numerous deficiencies would require corrective action before the full nuclear wartime strategic capabilities could be realized. In addition, more recent testing revealed that peripheral equipment and software to be used with Milstar has not been effectively controlled to ensure communications interoperability with other systems. Program officials stated that communication signal delays and poor voice quality are inherent characteristics in Milstar LDR technology and associated peripheral equipment. Transmitting accurate and timely messages from the North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers is critical to ensuring a timely retaliatory response to an attack. However, operational testing of this network was not performed. The result was that operational test officials could not verify that ballistic missile alert messages could be reliably transmitted by the Milstar system. The Air Force Space Command subsequently tested the missile warning teletype network and identified that a required redundancy check could not be performed to ensure data accuracy. Continuous communication capabilities with deployed bomber forces are required if it became necessary to recall or redirect these forces. The year 2003 is also when the deployment of MDR terminals to tactical forces is to be completed and tactical forces will have become dependent on the Milstar II system. Although DOD is aware of this potential degradation in Milstar communications capabilities, it has not fully assessed the associated operational risks. Because the Milstar II satellite constellation’s communications capacity is predicted to degrade from fiscal years 2003 through 2006, when an advanced capability is to be available, the continuity of protected and mobile satellite communications capacity is a potentially significant issue. In addition, because the deployment of Milstar II terminals is expected to be completed by fiscal year 2003, such degradation in communications capacity could result in users not having the capabilities they require or expect to execute their missions. In assessing the operational risks associated with the predicted degradation of Milstar communications, as directed by the House Committee on Appropriations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense specifically address (1) the minimally acceptable level of extremely high frequency satellite communications needed to support tactical forces and (2) the capability of the Milstar system to provide this minimum level of communications until an advanced extremely high frequency communications capability is deployed. The matters were (1) funding for voice conferencing network upgrades to improve timeliness and voice quality; (2) completing software upgrades, equipment installations, and certification of the missile warning teletype network; (3) performing operational testing of nuclear bomber force communications and endurance requirements; (4) implementing a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, that addresses the management of satellite communications, to ensure interoperability certification of input-output communication devices, which are critical for user-to-user communications connectivity; and (5) completing ACMS development and performing tests to demonstrate the complex function of allocating and apportioning the fixed amount of Milstar communications capabilities. Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on Milstar system effectiveness and DOD’s plans to provide continuing comparable EHF communications capabilities after the existing system degrades. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) multiservice Milstar system, focusing on the: (1) Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic and tactical missions; and (2) extent to which DOD has provided assurance of continuing comparable satellite communications among the users after the Milstar satellites under development are launched.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there are several limitations associated with the Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic missions; (2) although the Milstar I system has been deployed for over 2 years, a May 1998 draft operational test report revealed that system support could be limited in some critical strategic mission areas; (3) operational testing showed that military commanders could not communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner, when using the low data rate capabilities; (4) this limitation was attributable to inherent characteristics of Milstar's low data rate technology and associated peripheral equipment; (5) operational testing of the missile warning teletype network was planned, but not performed, to verify that accurate and timely ballistic missile alert messages could be transmitted from North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers; (6) a subsequent Air Force test of this teletype network determined that a required redundancy check for data accuracy could not be performed without software modifications; (7) operational testing revealed a Milstar system endurance issue, associated with the nuclear bomber force, that must be resolved because of the requirement for continuous communication capabilities if the bomber force needed to be recalled or redirected; (8) testing showed that the configuration of peripheral equipment and its accompanying software has not been effectively controlled or fully certified to ensure communications interoperability with the Milstar system; (9) DOD has identified corrective actions for the limitations in these four areas; (10) final resolutions are dependent on approval of requirements, verification through testing, a certification process, or obtaining necessary funds; (11) DOD has not provided assurance that the continuity of protected medium data rate satellite communication capabilities will be maintained for tactical forces after the four Milstar II satellites are launched; (12) the satellite constellation's communication capabilities are predicted to degrade below a minimally acceptable level in fiscal year (FY) 2003, before the advanced satellite system is expected to be available in FY 2006; (13) the deployment of Milstar II tactical terminals is expected to be completed by 2003, and tactical forces will have become dependent on the Milstar II system; (14) this situation could result in users not having the communications capacity they require to execute their missions; and (15) DOD has not fully assessed the associated operational risks to tactical forces. |
gao_RCED-95-156 | gao_RCED-95-156_0 | FHWA’s Metric Conversion Plan
FHWA established a metric work group in December 1990 to develop a conversion plan and timetable. Highway Sign Conversion Requirement Deferred
Although FHWA was moving forward on other aspects of converting its highway program to metric, on June 27, 1994, it issued a Federal Register notice apprising the public that the agency had postponed the September 30, 1996, deadline for highway sign conversion until at least after 1996. The officials said that postponement was necessary because of recent legislative prohibitions on the use of federal-aid highway funds for this activity and because of negative comments received on FHWA’s August 31, 1993, Federal Register notice. Most states have not taken any action to convert their signs to metric units. As such, activities that support sign conversion continue. For example, FHWA is currently converting the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices into dual units—English and metric. Initially, Alabama estimated that it would cost $2.7 million to convert its state highway signs, using the quick-conversion option, to metric units by October 1995. As a result, FHWA has postponed requiring states to implement the conversion. However, there is concern that little data may be available to estimate the cost of converting signs on local roads. Recommendations
To help to ensure that the Federal Highway Administration has sufficient information to analyze the implications of the metric conversion of highway signs, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, to expand the national cost estimate study to include the potential costs of educating the public about converting highway signs to metric units. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Highway Administration's (FHwA) metric conversion plan, focusing on the: (1) status of federal and states' efforts to convert highway signs to metric units; and (2) possible costs involved in implementing the conversion.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in June 1994, FHwA announced that it was postponing the deadline for converting highway signs until at least after 1996 and as a result, most states have deferred their sign conversion activities; (2) FHwA postponed the conversion because recent legislative requirements have prohibited the use of federal-aid highway funds for this activity, and it received negative comments regarding the costs of the conversion; (3) since sign conversion remains a goal, FHwA is continuing with activities to support conversion, such as converting its manual on highway signs into English and metric units; (4) there is no comprehensive estimate of the costs to convert highway signs to metric units, but Alabama has determined that it would cost about $420 million to convert the signs in state and local roads; and (5) an FHwA contractor will be developing a comprehensive estimate, but there is concern that little data are available to estimate sign conversions on local roads, since inventories of local signs may not exist. |
gao_GAO-09-83 | gao_GAO-09-83_0 | DOD Has Not Comprehensively and Accurately Assessed Whether It Has the Required Core Capability to Support Fielded Systems
DOD, through its core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD generally followed its own guidance for conducting the 2007 biennial core assessment, we found that (1) DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core requirements and associated workloads for the 2007 core process did not reveal shortfalls that the services had identified for specific equipment/technology categories, (2) the services had errors and inconsistencies in their identification of core requirements and associated workloads, and (3) there was no mechanism for ensuring that the services take corrective actions to resolve capability shortfalls. Finally, DOD is not required to provide Congress information on its core process, and therefore the results of the core process are not readily and routinely visible for purposes of congressional oversight. As a result, DOD did not present a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the services’ 2007 core capability. Their projected organic workloads in military depots are adequate to support core capability requirements.” More specifically, the memorandum stated that the department’s planned maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours was “well over” the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots. The Marine Corps had shortfalls in 7 categories and the Navy in 6. However, this still leaves a net shortfall of more than 1.3 million hours. Moreover, DOD did not have effective internal controls to prevent these errors and deficiencies in the core process. Because the Army could not show whether all systems were included in the biennial core process, the Army lacks the assurance that core capabilities were identified for all required weapon systems. DOD Has Neither Identified nor Established Core Capabilities in a Timely Manner to Prepare Military Depots to Support Future Core Requirements for Some New and Modified Systems
DOD has neither identified nor established core capabilities in a timely manner to prepare military depots to support future core requirements for some new and modified systems included in our review. Although DOD acquisition guidance requires that core logistics capabilities be identified no later than Milestone B, or by Milestone C if there is no Milestone B, the identification of core requirements did not normally occur until later for most of the systems we reviewed. According to DOD officials and based on the results of our analyses, if core capability requirements for new and modified systems have not been identified early in the acquisition process, and if there is no existing DOD capability for a particular system, it is unlikely that core capability can be established at military depots within 4 years of initial operational capability, as required by DOD guidance. DOD Is Not Establishing Required Core Capabilities for Some New and Modified Systems in a Timely Manner
In addition to not identifying core capability requirements in a timely manner for new and modified systems in the acquisition process, program offices are also not taking the actions that are needed to establish required core capabilities in a timely manner. More specifically, (1) acquisition guidance provides little to no information on how to identify and plan for the establishment of core capability, (2) acquisition strategies do not fully address core requirements, and (3) some program offices are not procuring technical data required to establish core capabilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which the DOD has accurately assessed whether it has the required core capabilities in military depots to support fielded systems, we reviewed DOD’s core determination process for 2007. We reviewed the military services’ implementation of the core determination methodology. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is required, by law, to maintain a core logistics capability that is government owned and government operated to meet contingency and other emergency requirements. Military depots play a key role in maintaining this "core capability," although in recent years DOD has significantly increased its use of contractors. At the subcommittee's request, GAO examined the extent to which (1) DOD has accurately assessed whether it has the required core capabilities in military depots and (2) DOD is preparing to support future core requirements for new and modified systems. GAO reviewed DOD's biennial process for determining core capability requirements and the associated workloads for fielded systems. GAO also reviewed whether DOD had identified and established core capability in a timely manner for new and modified systems.
What GAO Found
DOD, through its biennial core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD internally reported that its maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours in 2007 was "well over" the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots and that the services were complying with their core capability requirements, this assessment did not show capability shortfalls identified by the services in their core computations. GAO's analysis of the services' 2007 core capabilities data determined that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had shortfalls for some equipment categories or technologies. For example, the Army identified core shortfalls of 1.4 million hours for 10 equipment categories. Several factors contributed to the deficiencies in the core process. Current guidance does not address how DOD is to consolidate the services' results into a meaningful department wide assessment. Also, there were errors and inconsistencies in the services' core calculations, making the full extent of the shortfalls unclear, and DOD also did not have effective internal controls in place to identify and resolve these errors and deficiencies. Further, DOD's core process does not have an effective mechanism for ensuring that corrective actions are taken to resolve shortfalls for fielded systems. As a result of shortcomings in the core process, DOD does not know the extent to which the military depots will have the capability to repair weapon systems to support future military operations. Finally, since DOD is not required to provide Congress information on its core process, the results of the process are not readily and routinely visible for purposes of congressional oversight. DOD is not adequately preparing military depots to support future core requirements through its acquisition process. Specifically, for the new and modified systems included in our review, the department had neither identified nor established core capabilities for certain systems in a timely manner. DOD acquisition guidance requires that an analysis of core requirements for new and modified systems be conducted early in the acquisition phase (no later than Milestone B or no later than Milestone C if there is no Milestone B). However, GAO found that program offices managing 20 of 52 systems we reviewed did not identify core requirements by Milestone C. DOD is also not establishing core capabilities for new and modified systems in a timely manner--that is, within 4 years of the system's achieving its initial operational capability, as required under DOD guidance. Shortcomings in the acquisition process include (1) acquisition guidance provides little or no information on how to identify and plan for the establishment of core capability, (2) program acquisition strategies do not fully address core requirements, and (3) some program offices are not procuring technical data necessary to establish a core capability. As a result, DOD has little assurance that the department is preparing military depots to meet future national defense contingencies. |
gao_GAO-06-214 | gao_GAO-06-214_0 | Although responsibility for the EEO framework policies is generally assigned to either EEOC or OPM, similarities in implementation requirements for federal agencies and the fact that both EEOC and OPM have jurisdiction over the agencies can result in overlap between programs and in EEOC’s and OPM’s oversight responsibilities. As we reported in our April 2005 report on the EEO framework, both EEOC, under MD-715, and OPM, under FEORP and Executive Order No. A majority of agency EEO and human capital officials responding to our survey said that guidance and feedback from EEOC was useful or very useful, while less than half said that about guidance and feedback from OPM. With regard to feedback on their agencies’ performance or on the contents of reports submitted under the EEO framework, from 45 to 60 percent of respondents who had at least some interaction with EEOC said that feedback from EEOC was useful or very useful, while less than 34 percent of those respondents who had at least some interaction with OPM said that of feedback from OPM. A lack of a mutual understanding of one another’s authority, roles, and responsibilities contributes to this limited coordination, which in turn can result in lost opportunity to realize consistency, efficiency, and value in EEO policy making and oversight and in making EEO integral to human capital management. OMB indicated that although EEOC has the statutory responsibility to coordinate EEO efforts, OPM should seek opportunities for collaboration with EEOC in order to improve overall government efficiency in the area of compliance reviews. EEOC officials acknowledged a need for better coordination between the two agencies. OPM officials, on the other hand, did not think that a formal coordination mechanism was necessary. Examples of how these recommendations could be implemented include (but are not limited to) the following: regularly exchanging data from reports submitted by agencies to EEOC and OPM; adopting a common format for reports to EEOC under MD-715 and reports to OPM under FEORP; resolving policy disagreements regarding the collection and use of collaborating to help ensure that EHRI can support agencies in meeting both EEOC and OPM reporting requirements; regularly meeting and exchanging information between EEOC and OPM staff performing oversight of the same agency; identifying opportunities for joint reviews of an agency’s EEO and establishing an “e-diversity” Web page created and maintained jointly by EEOC and OPM; and meeting jointly with federal agency EEO and human capital managers during on-site visits. OMB made a similar recommendation to OPM in 2005 with respect to those programs where it shares oversight responsibility with EEOC. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) obtain federal agency equal employment opportunity (EEO) and human capital managers’ views of the requirements dealing with EEO, affirmative employment, and workforce diversity and the extent to which the requirements contribute to ensuring EEO, affirmative employment, and diversity in the workplace; (2) obtain EEO and human capital managers’ views on the guidance and feedback given them by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on EEO, affirmative employment, and workforce diversity issues; and (3) determine how and to what extent EEOC and OPM coordinate with each other in developing policy, providing guidance, and exercising oversight of line agencies, as well as obtaining EEO and human capital managers’ views on EEOC and OPM coordination and how it affects their work. The act required that executive agencies conduct a continuing program for recruiting minorities to address underrepresentation of minorities in the federal workplace. We clarified this in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2005 GAO reported on the EEO policy framework in the federal workplace and the roles of EEOC and OPM. This report, in response to a congressional request, provides information on (1) federal agency EEO and human capital managers' views of the EEO framework requirements; (2) their views on the usefulness of guidance and feedback from EEOC and OPM concerning these requirements; and (3) how and to what extent EEOC and OPM coordinate in developing policy, providing guidance, and exercising oversight.
What GAO Found
EEO and human capital officials in federal agencies we surveyed said that some requirements of the EEO framework contribute more than others to achieving EEO, affirmative employment, and workforce diversity, and in influencing human capital policies, practices, and strategic planning. They also said that some requirements are very similar or redundant, such as EEOC's affirmative employment program and OPM's program for recruiting minorities and women. This creates duplication of effort as agencies sometimes have to submit the same information in different reports to EEOC and OPM. Further, the officials said they experienced added administrative burden because of inconsistent requirements. The officials also said that guidance from EEOC on EEO, affirmative employment, and workforce diversity issues was more frequent and more useful than that from OPM. Some officials questioned the usefulness of feedback from EEOC and OPM on their agencies' performance or submitted reports. Less than half reported that the feedback was useful or very useful and a substantial number of respondents reported that they received no feedback from OPM. In addition, EEO and human capital officials expressed the strong view that both OPM and EEOC could be doing more to help their agencies. We found little evidence of coordination at the operating level between EEOC and OPM in developing policy, providing guidance, and exercising oversight, despite overlapping responsibilities in federal workplace EEO. For example, EEOC and OPM officials do not routinely review reports that the other agency receives from federal agencies, even though those reports deal with similar matters. In addition, EEOC and OPM officials do not coordinate with each other when conducting on-site reviews of EEO-related matters at agencies. Good management practice as well as federal statute and executive order call for coordination, and not doing so results in lost opportunity to realize consistency, efficiency, and public value in EEO policy making and oversight. The Office of Management and Budget made a recommendation to OPM in 2005 that it develop a regular/formal working relationship with EEOC with respect to those programs where it shares oversight responsibility with EEOC in order to improve overall government efficiency. Although EEOC officials acknowledged a need to coordinate at the operating level and to develop an institutional coordination process, OPM officials suggested that coordination need not be institutionalized. |
gao_GAO-05-126 | gao_GAO-05-126_0 | Beginning on November 19, 2004, all commercial airports with federal security screening will be eligible to apply to opt-out of using federal screeners. The five airports selected to participate in the pilot program have decided to continue using private screeners and will not have to apply for the opt-out program beginning in November 2004. TSA Is Finalizing Policies and Procedures Governing the Opt-Out Program
TSA Has Developed Criteria for Qualifying Private Contractors, with Additional Information under Development
In late October 2004, TSA finalized and publicly released guidelines providing criteria for determining how and when private screening contractors will be evaluated and selected to participate in the opt-out program. TSA’s Internal Policies and Procedures for the Opt-Out Program Are under Development
TSA developed draft procedures to document how opt-out program applications will be processed. TSA expects to finalize this study later in November 2004. In addition, TSA developed a draft transition plan, which will serve as internal guidance for the agency and is not intended for public release. This is to be an operations plan designed to support TSA’s efforts to transition airports from federal to private screeners. TSA Is Taking Steps to Communicate with Stakeholders about the Opt-Out Program, but Some Say Additional Information Is Needed
Stakeholders Seek Additional Information from TSA on Operational Flexibilities, Liability, and Cost Issues
In addition to the June 2004 initial guidance, statement of work for the pilot program contractors, and presolicitation synopsis, TSA has finalized other informational guidance for airport operators and private screening contractors. TSA also asks airport officials to provide information on the airport authority’s primary reason for wanting to participate in the opt-out program, whether the airport has a preferred timeline for when the transition to private screening should occur, and to list scheduled activities that could interfere with the transition, such as peak travel season and major construction. Based in part on these e-mails, in early September 2004, TSA developed and posted on its Web site an initial list of responses to frequently asked questions (FAQ). The information that stakeholders told TSA and us that they needed falls into three categories: operational flexibility with respect to how much leeway airports and private screening contractors would have to manage the program; liability protection in the event that a screener fails to detect a threat object; and costs related to participating in the opt-out program. Some airport industry representatives we spoke with raised operational flexibility as a concern as well. As of November 15, 2004, this information had not been posted. TSA Is Developing Performance Measures for the Opt- Out Program, but More Work Remains To Be Done
TSA is developing measures to assess the screening performance of airports that will participate in the opt-out program and individual contractors performing the screening services, but specific performance measures have not been finalized. In June 2004, TSA developed a draft of the performance measurement principles and actual measures that TSA is considering to measure the performance of the entire opt-out program and private screening operations. In addition to assessing how the performance of federal and private screening services compare, TSA is working to develop performance measures for evaluating how well private screening contractors comply with the terms of their contracts. The contractor-related performance measures TSA plans to develop are to be included in a quality assurance plan. TSA expects to implement these measures in mid-2005, as contracts are being awarded. The agencies generally agreed with our findings, and we incorporated their technical comments where appropriate. We reviewed documents including: all guidance-related materials TSA had developed to date for airports; reports from an independent consulting study prepared for TSA that evaluated the contract screening pilot program and made suggested improvements to the program; information from two congressional committee-sponsored roundtables on the program; testimony at congressional hearings on the program; provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act; our prior reports that addressed issues related to the opt-out program, including the performance of airport passenger and checked baggage screeners. | Why GAO Did This Study
Beginning on November 19, 2004, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is required by law to begin allowing commercial airports to apply to use private contractors to screen passengers and checked baggage. A federal workforce has performed this work since November 2002, in response to a congressional mandate that the federal government take over screening services after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A 2-year pilot program at five airports testing the effectiveness of private sector screening in a post-September 11 environment concluded on November 18, 2004. This report contains GAO's preliminary observations related to TSA's progress in developing a private-sector screening program that allows airports to apply to opt out of using federal screeners. GAO assessed: (1) the status of TSA's efforts to develop policies and procedures for the opt-out program, including operational plans and guidelines for selecting airports and contractors that may participate; (2) guidance about the opt-out program that TSA has provided to airport operators and other stakeholders, or plans to develop, and how the information is communicated; and (3) TSA's efforts to develop performance measures for evaluating the opt-out program and contractor performance.
What GAO Found
As of November 2004, TSA has completed or is developing key policies and procedures for the opt-out program. Specifically, TSA has completed and released guidelines for determining how and when private screening contractors will be evaluated and selected to participate in the opt-out program. TSA also has released supplemental information for evaluating potential contractors, such as their financial capabilities. TSA also has prepared a draft technical statement of work for the private screening contractors operating at five pilot program airports, which is to serve as a basis for contractors seeking to serve other airports. In addition, TSA has developed, or is currently developing, internal guidance for managing the opt-out program, such as a transition plan for helping airports to move from federal to private screeners. TSA expects to complete the remaining policies and procedures by mid-2005. TSA is taking steps to communicate with stakeholders about the opt-out program by developing informational guidance and soliciting information and suggestions from them. For instance, since releasing initial summary guidance about the program in June 2004, TSA has posted an opt-out program application for airport operators that asks, among other things, the primary reason for wanting to participate in the opt-out program and the preferred timeline for transitioning to private screening operations. TSA also has posted lists of frequently asked questions and answers on its Web site, in response to questions from stakeholders about the airport application and contracting process. However, some airport operators, private screening contractors, and aviation industry representatives told GAO that they need additional information about how much leeway airports and contractors would have to manage the program, liability protection, and costs related to participating in the opt-out program. TSA is developing performance measures both to assess the screening performance of airports that will participate in the opt-out program and individual contractors performing the screening services, but specific performance measures have not been finalized. TSA said measures for the opt-out program will be based on measures already developed by an independent consulting firm for the five airports participating in the opt-out pilot program. These measures include how well screeners detect test threat objects, such as guns and knives, during screening operations. TSA is also developing performance measures to evaluate how well private screening contractors comply with the terms of their contracts, which will become part of a quality assurance plan. TSA expects to implement contractor-related performance measures in mid-2005, as contracts are being awarded. A draft of this report was provided to TSA. TSA officials generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-241 | gao_GAO-12-241_0 | As a result, we recommended that OMB require federal agencies to report the steps they take to ensure that their IT investments are not duplicative as part of their annual budget and IT investment submissions. Selected Agencies Have Potentially Duplicative Investments; DOD and DOE Need to Do More to Address Them
Although the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security utilize various processes to prevent and reduce investment in duplicative programs and systems, potentially duplicative IT investments exist. Further complicating agencies’ ability to identify and address duplicative investments is miscategorization of investments within agencies. Even with such investment review processes, of the 810 investments we reviewed, we identified 37 potentially duplicative investments at DOD and DOE within three FEA categories (Human Resource Management, Information and Technology Management, and Supply Chain These investments account for about $1.2 billion in total Management).IT spending for fiscal years 2007 through 2012. We also identified four DOD Navy personnel assignment investments—one system for officers, one for enlisted personnel, one for reservists, and a general assignment system—each of which is responsible for managing similar assignment functions. We did not identify any potentially duplicative investments at DHS within our sample; however, DHS has independently identified several duplicative investments and systems. Officials from the three agencies reported that duplicative investments exist for a number of reasons, including decentralized governance within the departments and a lack of control over contractor facilities. Agencies Have Recently Initiated Plans to Address Potential Duplication in Many Investments, but Results Have Yet to Be Realized at DOD and DOE
DHS has taken action to improve its processes for identifying and eliminating duplicative investments, which has produced tangible results. While these efforts could eventually yield results, DOD’s and DOE’s initiatives have not yet led to the consolidation or elimination of duplication. For example, while DOD provided us with documented milestones—several of which have passed—for improving the Department of the Navy’s IT investment review processes, officials did not provide us with any examples of duplicative investments that they had consolidated or eliminated. These investments account for about $1.2 billion in total IT spending for fiscal years 2007 through 2012. Without demonstrating the progress of efforts to identity and eliminate duplicative investments, DOD and DOE will be unable to provide assurance that they are avoiding investment in unnecessary systems. Similarly, until DOD, DOE, and DHS, correctly categorize their investments, they are limiting their ability to identify opportunities to consolidate or eliminate duplicative investments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure agencies avoid investing in duplicative investments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the CIO to take the following two actions: utilize existing transparency mechanisms, such as the IT Dashboard, to report on the results of the department’s efforts to identify and eliminate, where appropriate, each potentially duplicative investment we have identified, as well as any other duplicative investments; and correct the miscategorizations for the DOD investments we identified and ensure that investments are correctly categorized in agency submissions. DOE generally agreed with our first recommendation and disagreed with parts of our second recommendation. We used this analysis to select for review three of the agencies with the highest number of IT investments—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billions of dollars on information technology (IT) each year, with such investments accounting for at least $79 billion in fiscal year 2011. Given the size of these investments, it is important that federal agencies avoid duplicative investments when possible to ensure the most efficient use of resources. GAO has previously reported on initiatives under way to address potentially duplicative IT investmentsi.e., investments providing similar functions across the government. GAO was asked to review the extent to which potentially duplicative IT investments exist within three categories at selected agencies (the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Homeland Security (DHS)) and actions these agencies are taking to address them. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed budget data on agency IT investments, reviewed agency information related to efforts to address duplication, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Although the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) use various investment review processes to identify duplicative investments, GAO found that 37 of its sample of 810 investments were potentially duplicative. These investments account for about $1.2 billion in total information technology (IT) spending for fiscal years 2007 through 2012. For example, GAO identified four DOD Navy personnel assignment investmentsone system for officers, one for enlisted personnel, one for reservists, and a general assignment systemeach of which is responsible for managing similar functions. While GAO did not identify any potentially duplicative investments at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within its sample, DHS officials have independently identified several duplicative investments and systems.
DOD and DOE officials offered a variety of reasons for the potential duplication, such as decentralized governance and a lack of control over certain facilities. Further complicating agencies ability to identify and eliminate duplicative investments is that investments are, in certain cases, misclassified by function. Until agencies correctly categorize their investments, they cannot be confident that their investments are not duplicative.
DHS has taken action to improve its processes for identifying and eliminating duplicative investments. For example, through reviewing portfolios of IT investments, DHS has identified much, and eliminated some, duplicative functionality in certain investments. Additionally, DOD and DOE have recently initiated plans to address potential duplication in many of the investments GAO identified, which include consolidating or eliminating systems. While these efforts may eventually yield results, they have not yet led to the elimination of duplication. For example, while DOD and DOE have specific plans to improve their IT investment review processes, officials did not provide examples of duplicative investments that had been consolidated or eliminated. Until DOD and DOE demonstrate progress on these efforts, the agencies will be unable to provide assurance that they are avoiding investment in unnecessary systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and DOE report on the progress of efforts to identify and eliminate duplication, where appropriate. GAO is also recommending that DOD, DOE, and DHS correct misclassifications of investments. DOD and DHS agreed with the recommendations. DOE generally agreed with the first recommendation, but disagreed with parts of the second recommendation regarding the number of misclassified investments. However, GAO believes the number is accurate. |
gao_GGD-98-85 | gao_GGD-98-85_0 | Prior to December 1997, the procedures required district offices to conduct annual reviews of participating lenders having more than three outstanding SBA guaranteed loans. The current policy requires a review at least once every 3 years for regular and certified lenders with three or more loans and annually for preferred lenders. Without conducting periodic lender reviews, SBA has no systematic means to evaluate lenders’ determinations of loan eligibility, creditworthiness, or collectibility, thus increasing the risk of loss to the agency. Such monitoring becomes more important as the agency moves from direct involvement in each loan guarantee transaction to increased reliance on participating lenders in processing, servicing, and liquidating loans. In the 5 district offices, of the 744 lenders that had been in the program at least 1 year, we found no evidence that 625 had ever been reviewed since they began participating in the 7(a) program. The preferred lender review program may offer a more comprehensive and systematic approach to assessing lender practices. However, it is too early to tell how successful it will be until reviews are conducted and information on the program is available. In the last 5 years, SBA’s Inspector General conducted audits at three SBLCs. As of the end of March 1998, SBA was in the process of implementing its centralized review program for preferred lenders, but it had not yet conducted any reviews. Recommendations
We recommend that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration ensure that the required 7(a) lender oversight reviews are conducted. Scope and Methodology
As requested by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Small Business, our objectives were to determine (1) how SBA conducts on-site reviews to monitor participating lenders’ compliance with its 7(a) loan program policies and procedures, and (2) what actions SBA is taking to comply with the preferred lender oversight provisions of the Small Business Programs Improvement Act of 1996. To determine SBA’s compliance with the preferred lender oversight requirements of SBPIA, we reviewed documentation relating to SBA’s implementation of a centralized review program for preferred lenders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) how the Small Business Administration (SBA) conducts on-site reviews to monitor participating lenders' compliance with its 7(a) loan program policies and procedures; and (2) what actions SBA is taking to comply with the preferred lender oversight provisions of the Small Business Programs Improvement Act of 1996 (SBPIA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) prior to December 1997, SBA's operating procedures for the 7(a) program required annual on-site reviews of lenders having more than three outstanding guaranteed loans; (2) GAO could not determine from the district offices' files which lenders met this criterion and should have been reviewed; (3) in five SBA district offices GAO visited, about 96 percent of the lenders had not been reviewed by SBA in the past 5 years; (4) for some lenders that had participated in the program for more than 25 years, GAO found no evidence that they had ever been reviewed; (5) without conducting periodic on-site lender reviews, SBA does not have a systematic means to help ensure that lenders' actions do not render loans ineligible, uncreditworthy, or uncollectible, thus increasing the risk of loss to the agency; (6) such monitoring is particularly important as the agency moves from direct involvement on loan approvals to increased reliance on participating lenders to perform the approval and other functions related to the loan process; (7) in the last 5 years, SBA's Inspector General conducted audits at only 3 of the 12 current small business lending companies (SBLC) that all operate as preferred lenders; (8) beginning December 1997, SBPIA required SBA to review preferred lenders annually or more frequently; (9) SBPIA did not change the oversight requirements for regular and certified lenders; (10) as of May 1998, SBA was in the process of implementing a central review program for preferred lenders, but SBA had not yet conducted any reviews because of delays in developing the program; and (11) although the central review program may offer a more comprehensive and systematic approach to assessing lender compliance with SBA's standards, it is too early to tell how successful the program will be until reviews are conducted and information on the program is available. |
gao_GAO-14-93 | gao_GAO-14-93_0 | Background
ROTC is the largest of the three major officer commissioning programs for DOD. However, each service reported that various factors may affect their ability to meet these goals, and that they have faced challenges commissioning officers for certain occupational specialties. In addition, half of all ROTC units did not produce the minimum average annual production of officers over a 5-year period required by DOD to justify investment in an ROTC unit. The Services Met Some, but Not All, of Their Overall ROTC Officer Production Goals for Newly Commissioned Officers
In fiscal years 2008 through 2012, each service came within a few percentage points of meeting or exceeding its overall ROTC officer production goals for newly commissioned officers. In addition, over the past decade, the services have conducted a total of 11 evaluations to identify units for consolidation or closure. However, the evaluations have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis and are narrowly focused on assessing the productivity of individual ROTC units, rather than the overall performance of the program. DOD Has Not Established Clearly Defined, Comprehensive Performance Measures
DOD’s management of ROTC programs is hampered by not having performance measures that provide a comprehensive understanding of the overall cost-effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC programs. Key attributes of successful performance measures include clearly defined, comprehensive measures that enable an organization to evaluate accomplishments, make decisions, and balance competing priorities. DOD’s instruction specifies five factors for the military services to consider before closing a unit, including, the (1) quality of the officers produced by the unit, (2) operations and maintenance cost of maintaining the unit, (3) numbers of officers produced to meet service commissioning goals from categories that are difficult to achieve, (4) number of officers produced by the unit, and (5) number and location of units in an area or state where the unit being considered for closure resides. Specifically, DOD’s instruction directs the services to consider the quality of officers produced by a unit that is being evaluated for closure. Our prior work has shown that results-oriented program management practices include routine program evaluations, which are a key source of information about how well a program is working and whether it is achieving its intended results. Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness conducts some oversight functions such as setting policy, DOD’s Instruction 1215.08 does not specify department-level review of performance measures. Further, services do not consistently communicate with key stakeholders, such as members of Congress and schools, about performance of ROTC programs, except when closure decisions are being considered. This has contributed to difficulty gaining political support for such closures. OSD and the Military Services Do Not Regularly Communicate with Key Stakeholders on ROTC Program Performance
The military services have had difficulty gaining buy-in for recommendations to close dozens of underproductive ROTC units collectively across the services, in part because they do not have an effective strategy for communicating with stakeholders such as Congress or school administrators about ROTC program performance. Until the military services establish a formal strategy to communicate with key stakeholders on ROTC program performance, the military services will find it difficult to obtain the support that is needed to make the necessary changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ROTC programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that OSD, the military services, and congressional decision makers have a comprehensive understanding of whether ROTC programs are achieving desired results in a cost-effective and efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the military services, to establish a systematic process to routinely evaluate ROTC program performance that includes taking the following three actions: establish performance measures that are clearly defined and require routine evaluations of ROTC programs that measure progress against the strategic goals and objectives of ROTC programs; and use the performance information resulting from ROTC program evaluations to assess and document the need for the existing number of units, To help improve the oversight and accountability of the military services’ ROTC programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following three actions: reexamine and clarify DOD Instruction 1215.08 to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities for oversight of ROTC programs; coordinate with the military services to ensure that service ROTC guidance aligns with the updated DOD instruction; and develop and implement, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the military services, a strategy to periodically communicate with Congress and other key stakeholders on ROTC program performance. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the military services’ ROTC programs met goals and minimum requirements for producing officers over a 5-year period, we obtained and analyzed ROTC unit production data from each of the military services for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fiscal year 2012 enrollment data. To assess the extent to which the military services’ ROTC programs are subject to oversight and have effective processes for communicating with key stakeholders, we reviewed and analyzed relevant OSD and military service guidance to identify guidelines and responsibilities for conducting oversight of ROTC programs and communicating with key stakeholders about ROTC program performance. Reserve Officers’ Training Corps: Questions Related to Organizational Restructuring. | Why GAO Did This Study
ROTC is the largest source of newly commissioned officers for DOD. GAO's analysis of DOD data identified more than 9,000 officers commissioned from ROTC in fiscal year 2012. ROTC is critical for producing officers from the nation's colleges and universities to meet the leadership and readiness needs of the armed forces. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review the services' ROTC programs. This report assesses the extent that ROTC programs (1) met goals and minimum annual requirements for producing officers over a 5-year period, (2) have established performance measures and conducted evaluations for managing ROTC programs, and (3) are subject to oversight and have effective processes for communicating with key stakeholders. GAO analyzed ROTC production data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012; reviewed relevant legislation and DOD and service policies and guidance for ROTC; and reviewed and discussed assessments of ROTC efficiency and effectiveness, and oversight of ROTC with officials from OSD and the services.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, each military service met at least 91 percent of their overall Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) goals for producing the number of officers needed to meet service end strength authorizations, but each has reported challenges in commissioning officers for some certain occupational specialties, such as engineers and nurses. Further, GAO's analysis found that half of the Department of Defense's (DOD) ROTC units did not meet DOD's minimum average annual production requirement over the 5-year period reviewed. Further, cost per commissioned officer varies greatly depending on unit production. For example, excluding tuition costs, the average cost per officer produced across all units was about $68,000, compared to an average cost of about $95,000 per officer for units that produced fewer than 15 officers on average annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2012.
DOD's instruction specifies factors to consider before closing ROTC units, but these factors do not constitute clearly defined performance measures that provide a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC programs, and service evaluations of ROTC programs are ad hoc. DOD's instruction specifies that in assessing units for closure, the services are to consider the quality of officers produced by a unit but it does not clearly define characteristics that comprise quality, which has led to the inconsistent application of the measure by the services. The services conducted 11 evaluations over the past decade to assess performance and identify units for consolidation or closure. However, the evaluations have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis because the services have not established a systematic process to routinely evaluate ROTC program performance. Key attributes of successful performance measures include clearly, defined measures. Moreover, results-oriented program management practices include routine program evaluations that determine how well a program is working. Without clearly defined performance measures and routinely conducted evaluations, it will be difficult for the services to accurately determine if ROTC programs are effectively and efficiently operating.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducts some oversight functions, such as setting policy for the ROTC program. However, although specified in guidance, OSD does not review the services' methodologies for closing ROTC units because OSD officials believe this is a service responsibility. Further, the services do not consistently communicate with key stakeholders, such as members of Congress and schools, about performance of ROTC programs, except when closure decisions are being considered. This may have contributed to the difficulty the services have experienced in gaining political support for such closures. GAO has noted that regular communication with stakeholders helps build trusting relationships to gain buy-in. Without clearly delineated responsibilities for oversight of ROTC programs and a formal strategy to communicate with key stakeholders on ROTC program performance, DOD will find it difficult to obtain the support that is needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ROTC programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to DOD, to include establishing clearly defined performance measures and conducting routine program evaluations; reexamining oversight roles and responsibilities; and developing a strategy for communicating with Congress and other key stakeholders on program performance. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-673 | gao_GAO-12-673_0 | OGAC, CDC, and USAID Evaluated a Broad Range of Programs
OGAC, CDC, and USAID provided 496 evaluations addressing programs ongoing during fiscal years 2008 to 2010 in all PEPFAR program areas relating to HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention, and care. Our assessments of judgmental and randomly selected samples of PEPFAR evaluations indicate that many—particularly those managed by PEPFAR country and regional teams—contain findings, conclusions, and recommendations that are not fully supported. Our assessment of seven OGAC- managed PEPFAR PHEs indicates that they all generally adhered to common evaluation standards, and thus their findings, conclusions, and recommendations were fully supported. CDC and USAID headquarters-managed evaluations. Based on our analysis of a randomly selected sample of country and regional team evaluations, we estimate that findings, conclusions, and recommendations were fully supported in 41 percent of all evaluations provided to us by country and regional teams, partially supported in 44 percent of these evaluations, and not supported in 15 percent of these evaluations. As a result, the objectivity and credibility of these evaluations’ findings, conclusions, and recommendations are in question. PEPFAR Policies and Procedures Do Not Fully Adhere to AEA Evaluation Principles Relating to Planning, Independence, and Dissemination
State, OGAC, CDC, and USAID have developed policies and procedures that apply to evaluations of PEPFAR programs, as called for in the AEA Roadmap. Second, State, OGAC, CDC, and USAID guidance does not specify how to document the independence and competency of evaluators, and almost half of the evaluations we reviewed did not provide sufficient information to fully determine whether evaluators were free of conflicts of interest. Finally, not all evaluation reports are available online, thus limiting their accessibility and usefulness to PEPFAR decision makers and other stakeholders. USAID evaluation policy. OGAC. For example, OGAC officials noted that the PEPFAR website contains information on PEPFAR results as well as monitoring and evaluation guides. CDC policy advises that effort is needed to ensure that evaluation findings are disseminated appropriately but does not require online dissemination of evaluation reports. State, CDC, and USAID have demonstrated a clear commitment to program evaluation by conducting a wide variety of program evaluations that address at least one activity in each PEPFAR program area. Global AIDS Coordinator to take the following four actions in collaboration with CDC and USAID to enhance PEPFAR evaluations: 1. develop a strategy to improve PEPFAR implementing agencies’ and country and regional teams’ adherence to common evaluation standards; 2. require implementing agency headquarters and country and regional teams to include evaluation plans in their annual operational plans; 3. provide detailed guidance for implementing agencies and country and regional teams on assessing, ensuring, and documenting the independence and competence of PEPFAR program evaluators; and 4. increase the online accessibility of PEPFAR program evaluation results. Responding jointly with CDC and USAID, State OGAC provided written comments (see app. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) evaluation activities and examines the extent to which evaluation results are supported and (2) examines the extent to which PEPFAR policies and procedures adhere to established principles for the evaluation of U.S. government programs. To identify PEPFAR program evaluations and examine the extent to which they generated supported evaluation results, we collected and analyzed program evaluation documents provided by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in the 31 PEPFAR countries and 3 regions with PEPFAR country or regional operational plans in fiscal year 2010, as well as the Department of State’s (State) Office of the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
PEPFAR, reauthorized by Congress in fiscal year 2008, supports HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care overseas. The reauthorizing legislation, as well as other U.S. law and government policy, stresses the importance of evaluation for improving program performance, strengthening accountability, and informing decision making. OGAC leads the PEPFAR effort by providing funding and guidance to implementing agencies, primarily CDC and USAID. Responding to legislative mandates, GAO (1) identified PEPFAR evaluation activities and examined the extent to which evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations were supported and (2) examined the extent to which PEPFAR policies and procedures adhere to established general evaluation principles. GAO reviewed these principles as well as agencies policies and guidance; surveyed CDC and USAID officials in 31 PEFAR countries and 3 regions; and analyzed evaluations provided by OGAC, CDC, and USAID.
What GAO Found
The Department of States (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have evaluated a wide variety of Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program activities, demonstrating a clear commitment to evaluation. However, GAO found that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations were not fully supported in many PEPFAR evaluations. Agency officials provided nearly 500 evaluations addressing activities ongoing in fiscal years 2008 through 2010 in all program areas relating to HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention, and care. GAOs assessment of a selected sample of seven OGAC-managed evaluations found that they generally adhered to common evaluation standards, as did most of a selected sample of 15 evaluations managed by CDC and USAID headquarters. Based on this assessment, GAO determined that these evaluations generally contained fully supported findings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, based on a similar assessment of a randomly selected sample taken from 436 evaluations provided by PEPFAR country and regional teams, GAO estimated that 41 percent contained fully supported findings, conclusions, and recommendations, while 44 percent contained partial support and 15 percent were not supported.
State, OGAC, CDC, and USAID have established detailed evaluation policies, as recommended by the American Evaluation Association (AEA). However, PEPFAR does not fully adhere to AEA principles relating to evaluation planning, independence and qualifications of evaluators, and public dissemination of evaluation results. Specifically, OGAC does not require country and regional teams to include evaluation plans in their annual operational plans, limiting its ability to ensure that evaluation resources are appropriately targeted. Further, although OGAC, CDC, and USAID evaluation policies and procedures provide some guidance on how to ensure evaluator independence and qualifications, they do not require documentation of these issues. GAO found that most PEPFAR program evaluations did not fully address whether evaluators had conflicts of interest and some did not include detailed information on the identity and makeup of evaluation teams. Finally, although OGAC, CDC, and USAID use a variety of means to share evaluation findings, not all evaluation reports are available online, limiting their accessibility to the public and their usefulness for PEPFAR decision makers, program managers, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State work with CDC and USAID to (1) improve adherence to common evaluation standards, (2) develop PEPFAR evaluation plans, (3) provide guidance for assessing and documenting evaluators independence and qualifications, and (4) increase online accessibility of evaluation results. Commenting jointly with HHSs CDC and USAID, State agreed with these recommendations and noted steps it will take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-03-1004 | gao_GAO-03-1004_0 | DOD Lacks Data to Determine the Need for Income Protection Programs
DOD lacks sufficient information from the survey data to determine the magnitude of income loss or gain experienced by reservists, the causes for this change, and the effects of income loss on reserve retention. DOD self-reported survey data from past and current military operations indicate that reservists have experienced widely varying degrees of income change when they are activated. While many reservists have reported lost income during activation, more than half of reservists have reported either no change or a gain in income. Such data are critical for assessing the full nature and scope of income change problems and in developing cost-effective solutions. DOD Faces Challenges in Family Readiness and Support
Although DOD has placed greater emphasis on family readiness, many reserve families indicate they do not feel prepared for call-ups. DOD has not assessed the financial well-being of reserve families, nor has it assessed the impact of reservists’ financial problems on mission readiness. DOD Has Identified Outreach Challenges for Personal Financial Management Programs
Personal financial management, one of DOD’s core family support programs, illustrates the continuing challenges DOD faces in providing outreach to reservists. These challenges include improving access to and awareness of personal financial management programs for reservists and their family members. For example, DOD does not know the impact this proposal would have on recruiting and retention, the effects on active duty personnel, the extent reservists and their families might participate in such a program, or the impact on the TRICARE system. Cost estimates range up to $5.1 billion a year. 107-314, sec. Estimates from DOD’s 2000 survey showed that nearly 80 percent of reservists had health care coverage when they were not on active duty and about 20 percent did not. DOD Has Not Assessed the Need for or Ramifications of Expanding TRICARE to Reservists Not on Active Duty and Paying Health Insurance Premiums of Activated Reservists
To further expand reservists and their family members’ access to health care, Congress is considering legislation to offer TRICARE to reservists when they are not on active duty. In addition, a high percentage of reservists’ civilian employers who currently pay some or all of health care premiums for reservists during activations could discontinue providing such assistance if DOD makes this coverage available to reservists year-round. However, these data are questionable because it is unclear what survey respondents considered as income loss or gain in determining their financial status. Of these three, only the last is targeted at reservists who (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high degrees of income loss when on active duty, and (3) demonstrate that income loss is a significant factor in their retention decisions. In the area of family support, DOD and the military services have taken steps to improve personal financial management programs. Our review of DOD survey data showed that reservists reported having many of the same financial problems as their active duty counterparts. Recent improvements have been made to reservists and their families’ access to TRICARE when the member is activated. DOD has not yet identified problems reservists and their families have experienced with access to health care during mobilizations since September 11, 2001, such as problems in maintaining continuity of health care; the causes of these problems; and their effects on readiness, recruiting, and retention. U.S. To evaluate a legislative proposal for DOD to offer TRICARE to reservists and their families when members are not on active duty, we reviewed relevant GAO reports. 2002 Survey of Spouses of Activated National Guard and Reserve Component Members
The 2002 survey of spouses was sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to assess the needs and concerns of National Guard and Reserve families prior to and during activation, to assess the status of family support initiatives, and to gather data from spouses of members who have been activated since September 11, 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, National Guard and Reserve personnel have been deployed to a number of contingency operations. Since September 2001, about 300,000 reservists have been called to active duty, and the pace of reserve operations is expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. House Report 107-436 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) directed GAO to review compensation programs for reservists serving on active duty. GAO evaluated information on income change reported by reservists when activated; reserve families' readiness for call-ups and their awareness and use of family support programs, focusing on personal financial management; and a legislative proposal for the Department of Defense (DOD) to offer TRICARE, the military's health care program, to reservists and their families when members are not on active duty.
What GAO Found
DOD lacks sufficient information on the magnitude, the causes, and the effects of income change to determine the need for compensation programs targeting reservists who (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high degrees of income loss when on extended periods of active duty, and (3) demonstrate that income loss is a significant factor in their retention decisions. Such data are critical for assessing the full nature and scope of income change problems and in developing cost-effective solutions. DOD self-reported survey data from past and current military operations indicate that activated reservists have experienced widely varying degrees of income change. While many reservists lost income, more than half of reservists had either no change or a gain in income. However, survey data are questionable primarily because it is unclear what survey respondents considered as income loss or gain in determining their financial status. DOD has placed greater emphasis on preparing reservists' families for potential call-ups, yet survey data show that one-third of spouses do not feel prepared, over half of reservists are not aware of family support programs, and more than 90 percent of spouses do not use these programs. Personal financial management, one of DOD's core family support programs, illustrates the continuing challenges DOD faces in providing outreach to reservists. The 2000 survey data showed that 61 percent of reservists did not know whether personal financial management services were available. The survey also showed that reservists have financial problems similar to their active duty counterparts. DOD is taking steps to improve personal financial management, but it has not assessed the financial well-being of reserve families, assessed the impact of reservists' financial problems on mission readiness, or determined how to tailor its programs to reservists. Available DOD data do not identify a need to offer TRICARE to reservists and their families when members are not on active duty. Estimates from DOD's 2000 survey showed that nearly 80 percent of reservists had health care coverage when they were not on active duty. This rate is similar to that of comparable groups within the overall U.S. population. DOD has expressed concern over the estimated costs of this proposal. Cost estimates range up to $5.1 billion a year. However, DOD has not fully assessed the ramifications of this proposed legislation, including the impact on recruiting and retention, the effects on active duty personnel, the extent reservists and their families might participate in such a program, or the impact on the TRICARE system. In addition, a high percentage of reservists' civilian employers who currently pay some or all of health care premiums for reservists during activations could discontinue providing such assistance. A number of recent improvements have been made to reservists and their families' health care when members are activated. However, DOD lacks data on problems reservists and their families have experienced with health care since the mobilizations following September 11, 2001; the causes of these problems; and their effects on readiness, recruiting, and retention. |
gao_GAO-13-727 | gao_GAO-13-727_0 | Patriot Express Loans Default at a Higher Rate Than Other SBA Loans, and Costs Have Exceeded Overall Program Income Since 2007
From 2007 through 2012, SBA made 8,511 Patriot Express loans. The higher numbers of Patriot Express loans approved in 2009 and 2010 may be attributable, in part, to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and subsequent legislation, which provided funding to temporarily subsidize the overall 7(a) guarantee program’s fees and to increase the maximum loan guarantee percentage from 75 or 85 percent to 90 percent, with the exception of loans approved under the SBA Express 7(a) subprogram.With a 5 to 15 percent increase in the maximum allowed guarantee through ARRA, lenders had a greater incentive to approve SBA loans in general (including Patriot Express loans), knowing that SBA would guarantee a higher percentage of the loan. More than 64 percent of loans up to $25,000 were provided by one lender and this lender accounted for about 26 percent of total loans in the program. Although overall default rates have decreased since 2008, the default rates for this lender remain significantly higher than those of all other lenders. Stakeholders Reported Benefits and Challenges, but SBA Has Not Evaluated the Effects of the Patriot Express Pilot
Selected loan recipients and lenders, as well as veteran service organizations we met with, identified various benefits and challenges to Patriot Express, but SBA has not evaluated the effects of the Patriot Express pilot. GAO’s guide for designing evaluations states that an evaluation gives an agency the opportunity to refine the design of a program and provides a useful tool to determine whether program operations have resulted in the desired benefits for participants. SBA has conducted performance measurement and monitoring activities—such as internally reporting the number of Patriot Express loans made each quarter and deciding not to renew a top lender’s delegated authority to make Patriot Express loans based on ongoing monitoring, as previously mentioned—but these Because there are activities are not the same as program evaluation.many more 7(a) loans, which therefore pose a greater risk to SBA than the smaller volume of Patriot Express loans, SBA officials told us that they have focused more resources on evaluating the performance of 7(a) loans. SBA’s Internal Controls May Not Provide Assurance of Borrower Eligibility
SBA has two primary internal control activities to ensure lender compliance with borrower eligibility requirements—on-site examinations and purchase reviews. In addition, although SBA officials told us that they expect borrowers to maintain their eligibility throughout the term of the loan, SBA has not developed procedures to provide reasonable assurance that Patriot Express loans continue to serve eligible borrowers after a loan is disbursed. Conclusions
Prior to 2007, SBA served the small business needs of veteran entrepreneurs through its 7(a) and SBA Express programs. SBA established the Patriot Express Pilot Loan initiative in 2007 as a targeted effort to provide veterans and other eligible members of the military community access to capital to establish or expand small businesses. Without evaluations of pilot initiatives, SBA lacks the information needed to determine if a pilot program is achieving its intended goals and whether it should be cancelled, modified, or expanded. Finally, SBA’s reliance on lenders to assess borrowers’ eligibility for Patriot Express highlights the importance of strong internal controls over lenders to ensure that only eligible borrowers are served by the program. Federal internal control guidance and GAO’s fraud-prevention framework indicate that program controls should include monitoring and detection. As a result, SBA’s internal controls may not provide the necessary assurance that Patriot Express loans are made to and used by only eligible members of the military community—the intended mission of the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
As SBA considers whether or not to extend the Patriot Express Pilot Loan program, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA design and implement an evaluation plan for the pilot program that assesses how well the Patriot Express pilot is achieving program goals and objectives regarding its performance and its effect on eligible borrowers. The evaluation plan should include information such as evaluation of SBA data on performance of Patriot Express loans; evaluation of borrowers served by Patriot Express in relation to veteran borrowers served by other SBA loan programs; and review of relevant SBA OIG reports and other external studies. To help ensure that Patriot Express loans are only provided to members of the military community eligible to participate in the program, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA strengthen existing internal controls, including sampling a larger number of Patriot Express loans during examinations; developing a requirement in SBA’s Standard Operating Procedures for lenders to verify the eligibility of the borrower, including the 51 percent ownership requirement, after the loan has been disbursed; and periodically monitoring the lenders’ implementation of this eligibility requirement. He stated that the agency will consider the findings from this report as it reviews the extension of the Patriot Express Pilot Loan Program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) trends in the Patriot Express program and related Small Business Administration (SBA) guarantee programs, including performance of these loans, and what is known about the costs of the Patriot Express program, (2) the benefits and challenges of the Patriot Express program for members of the military community eligible to participate as well as training and counseling opportunities available to them, and (3) what internal controls SBA has in place to ensure that the Patriot Express program is available only to eligible members of the military community. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2007, SBA established the Patriot Express Pilot Loan Program within its 7(a) loan guarantee program to provide small businesses owned and operated by veterans and other eligible members of the military community access to capital. Through Patriot Express, SBA guarantees individual small business loans that lenders originate. GAO was asked to evaluate the program. This report examines (1) trends in the volume and performance of Patriot Express and related SBA loan programs; (2) the effect of the program on eligible members of the military community; and (3) SBA internal controls to ensure that only eligible borrowers participate. GAO analyzed data on performance and costs of Patriot Express and other similar SBA loan programs from 2007 through 2012; interviewed selected borrowers, lenders, and veteran service organizations; and reviewed SBA internal control guidance on borrower eligibility.
What GAO Found
Patriot Express loans valued at about $703 million have defaulted at a higher rate than loans under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) other related loan guarantee programs, and losses for Patriot Express have exceeded its income. With the exception of loans approved in 2007, Patriot Express loans have defaulted at a higher rate than loans made under SBA's main 7(a) program or loans made under SBA's streamlined loan guarantee program (SBA Express). The Patriot Express program's overall default rate was significantly higher for smaller loans, especially for loans below $25,000 (20 percent). Additionally, one lender accounted for more than 64 percent of these smaller loans and experienced higher default rates than the remaining lenders. From 2007 through 2012, losses in the Patriot Express program exceeded income by $31.1 million (not accounting for future fee revenues or funds recovered from loans in default).
Selected borrowers and lenders, as well as veteran service organizations GAO met with, reported various benefits and challenges to the Patriot Express program, but SBA has yet to evaluate the effect of this pilot program on eligible members of the military community. Borrowers and lenders said that some benefits of the program were that it helped veterans expand their businesses and allowed them to take advantage of the streamlined application process. Some challenges they identified were low awareness of the program and which lenders participated in the program. In 2010, SBA extended the Patriot Express pilot through 2013 to allow time to evaluate the effect of the program. To date, SBA has not evaluated the program or established a plan of what it intends to do to evaluate it. SBA officials told us that they focused their resources on evaluating 7(a) loans because there are many more of them and, therefore, they pose a greater risk to SBA than Patriot Express loans. In addition to Patriot Express, SBA has previously initiated other pilot programs that it has not evaluated. GAO has found that a program evaluation gives an agency the opportunity to refine program design, assess if program operations have resulted in the desired benefits, and, for pilots, determine whether to make the programs permanent. Without conducting evaluations of pilot programs, SBA lacks the information needed to assess their performance and their effects on eligible participants and decide whether to extend these programs, including Patriot Express.
SBA's internal controls over lenders may not provide reasonable assurance that Patriot Express loans are only made to eligible members of the military community and that only these members benefit from loan proceeds. SBA relies on lenders to verify and document borrower eligibility at the time of loan approval. One of SBA's controls over lenders' compliance with eligibility requirements consists of sampling loan files during examinations of the 7(a) program, but few Patriot Express loans are reviewed. Patriot Express is intended to assist only eligible members of the military community and SBA officials told us that they expect borrowers to maintain eligibility after the loan is disbursed. But SBA has not developed procedures for lenders to provide reasonable assurance that borrowers maintain this eligibility. Federal internal control standards and GAO's fraud-prevention framework indicate that ongoing monitoring is an important component of an effective internal control system. Without enhanced internal controls, particularly with respect to monitoring of borrowers, SBA lacks assurance that Patriot Express loans are serving only eligible borrowers.
What GAO Recommends
SBA should design and implement an evaluation plan to assess how well the Patriot Express pilot is achieving program objectives and goals and serving the needs of veterans and eligible borrowers. Going forward, SBA should include an evaluation plan as part of any pilot programs initiated under its own authority and consider the results of the evaluation when deciding whether to extend or terminate a pilot. Further, SBA should enhance internal controls over borrower eligibility requirements. SBA said that it will consider the findings from this report as it reviewed the extension of the Patriot Express pilot. |
gao_GAO-10-386 | gao_GAO-10-386_0 | Further, in its Vision 2020 statement, NORTHCOM identifies a strategic goal of providing timely and effective civil support by anticipating requests for support and providing military capabilities at the right place and the right time. DOD and DHS have undertaken some recent initiatives to address gaps in strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its capability requirements for the civil support mission. Key Policies and Guidance for DOD’s Civil Support Mission Are Outdated, Inconsistent, and Unclear
DOD Policies Are Outdated
DOD’s capabilities-based assessment highlighted a lack of alignment across DOD’s policies, strategy, and doctrine for its civil support mission, making it difficult to determine DOD’s capability requirements. Thus, we note that incomplete DOD policy guidance for its civil support mission may lead to confusion and misunderstanding among the military services and other DOD components regarding the proper employment of defense capabilities in support of civil authorities. DOD Has Personnel to Coordinate DOD Capabilities for Civil Support, but Roles, Responsibilities, and Command Relationships Are Not Clearly Defined, and DOD Has Not Assessed Its Staff Needs
Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers Constitute Important DOD Capabilities for Civil Support
DOD guidance and the National Response Framework state that the Defense Coordinating Officer, when requested by civil authorities and approved by DOD, serves as the single point of contact for DOD at the FEMA regions, and is responsible for coordinating with federal and state authorities on the use of military capabilities for defense support of civil authorities. Staff Composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer Program Is Not Based on a Staffing Needs Assessment
The size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officer program is not based on a staffing needs assessment and therefore does not necessarily reflect the unique characteristics or disaster needs of the several FEMA regions. Although DOD has improved its support of civil authorities through improvements in the Defense Coordinating Officer program, its outdated, inconsistent, and unclear guidance on roles, responsibilities, and command and control relationships; and lack of a staffing needs assessment increase the risk that DOD may not be appropriately staffed to meet the varying needs of the FEMA regions, thus potentially limiting its ability to provide an optimally coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate multiservice capabilities. DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities, but It Has Not Established a Comprehensive System to Track Requests-for- Assistance
DOD Has Established Processes to Respond to Civil Authorities
The National Response Framework broadly calls for DOD and other federal agencies to respond to requests-for-assistance from state and local civilian authorities, and DOD follows an internal process to respond to these requests-for-assistance when both state and other federal civilian resources have been exhausted or are unavailable. However, the current tracking system contained no record of this request. Without a comprehensive, unclassified system that tracks requests-for- assistance from, and is shared with, all of DOD’s interagency partners, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness and in maintaining a common operational picture of DOD’s assistance for all participants involved in disaster-response missions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission, (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions, and (3) shares and tracks information concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil authorities, we reviewed and analyzed available DOD, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) civil support guidance and 4 of the 20 civil support operational plans, as well as DOD’s March 2009 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based Assessment. | Why GAO Did This Study
In addition to its primary mission of warfighting, the Department of Defense (DOD) plays an important role in civil support. Four years after the poorly coordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, issues remain about DOD's progress in identifying its capability requirements for supporting a coordinated civilian-military response to a catastrophic domestic event. This report addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has identified and addressed its capability gaps for its civil support mission; (2) has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships and identified appropriate levels and types of personnel to assign to the FEMA regions; and (3) shares and tracks information concerning its civil support requirements response process with civil authorities. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD civil support guidance and plans and met with DOD and FEMA officials regarding the support that civilian authorities may request during a catastrophic incident.
What GAO Found
DOD has identified capability gaps for its civil support mission by completing a capabilities-based assessment, but key DOD policies and guidance for the civil support mission are outdated, limiting DOD's ability to fully address capability gaps. DOD's strategic guidance requires that it anticipate requests for civil support by identifying capability gaps. However, inconsistency and misalignment across DOD's policies, strategy, and doctrine for civil support make it difficult for DOD to address capability gaps and pre-position equipment and supplies. GAO found this was due to outdated key DOD policies and guidance that do not reflect DOD's current organizational framework for providing assistance to civil authorities. If DOD updates key policies for civil support, it will be better able to address capability gaps and provide timely and appropriate support to civil authorities. DOD has increased its personnel dedicated to coordinate civilian requests for assistance, but it has not clearly defined their roles, responsibilities, and relationships, and its staffing is not based upon a staffing assessment by FEMA region. DOD guidance calls for coordination with federal and state authorities on military capabilities for civil support. However, while the Defense Coordinating Officer program has improved civil authorities' overall awareness of DOD's capabilities, roles, and responsibilities, command and control and coordination among the Defense Coordinating Officers and the military services' liaison officers have been confusing and sometimes problematic because DOD's civil support guidance is outdated. Further, DOD officials noted that staffing of the Defense Coordinating Officer program should reflect its multiservice environment and the unique challenges of each FEMA region. Different FEMA regions are prone to different disasters and have varying needs for DOD support, but the size and composition of the Defense Coordinating Officers' staff--nearly all from the Army--were not based on a staffing needs assessment. Therefore, they do not necessarily reflect variations in the support needs of the regions. As a result, DOD may be missing an opportunity to optimize its ability to provide a coordinated response to civil authorities with appropriate multiservice capabilities. While DOD follows established processes in responding to requests for assistance from civil authorities, it has not established a system to track civilian requests that is accessible to DOD's interagency partners. The National Response Framework broadly identifies how DOD responds to requests for assistance, and DOD guidance further specifies DOD's processes. However, civil authorities are not fully aware of the length of this process. While DOD has several different tracking systems in use by different DOD components for the civil support mission, it lacks a formal, interoperable, and unclassified system for tracking all requests for assistance across DOD. Without such a system, gaps will remain in gaining real-time situational awareness and maintaining a common operational picture of DOD support for all federal partners in disaster-response missions including DOD. |
gao_GAO-11-463T | gao_GAO-11-463T_0 | Background
As computer technology has advanced, federal agencies and our nation’s critical infrastructures—such as power distribution, water supply, telecommunications, and emergency services—have become increasingly dependent on computerized information systems to carry out their operations and to process, maintain, and report essential information. Cyber-reliant Critical Infrastructure and Federal Systems Face Increasing Cyber Threats
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems are evolving and growing. Government officials are concerned about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as criminals, terrorists, and foreign nations. These groups and individuals have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal that can be used to determine vulnerabilities and gain entry into targeted systems. The connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures also creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, and other critical services. Reported Security Incidents Are on the Rise
Consistent with the evolving and growing nature of the threats to federal systems, agencies are reporting an increasing number of security incidents. Reports of cyber attacks and information security incidents against federal systems and systems supporting critical infrastructure illustrate the effect that such incidents could have on national and economic security. The Federal Government Has Taken Actions to Address Cyber Threats, but Challenges Remain in Protecting Critical Systems
The federal government has a variety of roles and responsibilities in protecting the nation’s cyber-reliant critical infrastructure, enhancing the nation’s overall cybersecurity posture, and ensuring the security of federal systems and the information they contain. Despite these efforts, the federal government continues to face significant challenges in protecting the nation’s cyber- reliant critical infrastructure and federal information systems. Key Actions to Improve Our Current National Approach to Cybersecurity Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
The administration and executive branch agencies have not yet fully implemented key actions that are intended to address threats and improve the current U.S. approach to cybersecurity. Implementing actions recommended by the president’s cybersecurity policy review. In February 2009, the president initiated a review of the government’s cybersecurity policies and structures, which resulted in 24 near- and mid-term recommendations to address organizational and policy changes to improve the current U.S. approach to cybersecurity. Updating the national strategy for securing the information and communications infrastructure. Developing a comprehensive national strategy for addressing global cybersecurity and governance. Creating a prioritized national and federal cybersecurity research and development (R&D) agenda. Strengthening the public-private partnerships for securing cyber critical infrastructure. Federal Agencies Have Not Addressed Persistent Control Weaknesses or Implemented Effective Information Security Programs
Federal systems continue to be afflicted by persistent information security control weaknesses. In addition, GAO determined that serious and widespread information security control deficiencies were a governmentwide material weakness in internal control over financial reporting as part of its audit of the fiscal year 2010 financial statements for the United States government. Over the past several years, we and inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. In addition, the White House, OMB, and selected federal agencies have undertaken governmentwide initiatives to enhance information security at federal agencies. However, the projects face challenges in achieving their objectives related to securing federal information, including better defining agency roles and responsibilities, establishing measures of effectiveness, and establishing an appropriate level of transparency. These challenges require sustained attention, which agencies have begun to provide. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pervasive and sustained cyber attacks continue to pose a potentially devastating threat to the systems and operations of our nation's critical infrastructure and the federal government. In recent testimony, the Director of National Intelligence stated that there had been a dramatic increase in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and networks. In addition, recent reports of cyber attacks and incidents affecting federal systems and critical infrastructures illustrate the potential impact of such events on national and economic security. The nation's ever-increasing dependence on information systems to carry out essential everyday operations makes it vulnerable to an array of cyber-based risks. Thus it is increasingly important that federal and nonfederal entities carry out concerted efforts to safeguard their systems and the information they contain. GAO is providing a statement describing (1) cyber threats to cyber-reliant critical infrastructures and federal information systems and (2) the continuing challenges facing federal agencies in protecting the nation's cyber-reliant critical infrastructure and federal systems. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in the area, which included many recommendations for improvements.
What GAO Found
Cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure and federal systems are evolving and growing. These threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminals and foreign nations, as well as hackers and disgruntled employees. These potential attackers have a variety of techniques at their disposal that can vastly expand the reach and impact of their actions. In addition, the interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructure presents increasing opportunities for such attacks. Consistent with this, reports of security incidents from federal agencies are on the rise, increasing over 650 percent over the past 5 years. In addition, reports of cyber attacks and information security incidents affecting federal systems and systems supporting critical infrastructure illustrate the serious impact such incidents can have on national and economic security, including the loss of classified information and intellectual property worth millions of dollars. The administration and executive branch agencies continue to act to better protect cyber-reliant critical infrastructures, improve the security of federal systems, and strengthen the nation's cybersecurity posture. However, they have not yet fully implemented key actions that are intended to address threats and improve the current U.S. approach to cybersecurity, such as (1) implementing near- and mid-term actions recommended by the cybersecurity policy review directed by the president; (2) updating the national strategy for securing the information and communications infrastructure; (3) developing a comprehensive national strategy for addressing global cybersecurity and governance; and (4) creating a prioritized national and federal research and development agenda for improving cybersecurity. Federal systems continue to be afflicted by persistent information security control weaknesses. For example, as part of its audit of the fiscal year 2010 financial statements for the U.S. government, GAO determined that serious and widespread information security control deficiencies were a governmentwide material weakness. Over the past several years, GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. The White House, the Office of Management and Budget, and selected federal agencies have undertaken additional governmentwide initiatives intended to enhance information security at federal agencies. However, these initiatives face challenges, such as better defining agency roles and responsibilities and establishing measures of effectiveness, and require sustained attention, which agencies have begun to provide. As such, GAO continues to identify protecting the federal government's information systems and the nation's cyber critical infrastructure as a governmentwide high-risk area. |
gao_NSIAD-96-169 | gao_NSIAD-96-169_0 | Military Services Differ in How They Classify Recruits for Physically Demanding Jobs
DOD has left it to the services to determine how to classify servicemembers into physically demanding occupations. The Air Force is the only service that requires recruits to take a strength aptitude test. It required new recruits to take a strength test using the “incremental lifting machine,” a weight-lifting machine developed and used by the Air Force. The Services Have Little Data to Assess Capability to Perform Physically Demanding Tasks
Except for the Army, the services have not collected data on servicemembers’ ability to do physically demanding jobs and have little basis on which to conclude that servicemembers are not having problems. In the 1994-95 follow-on survey of 10 of 267 occupations, ARI found that 51 to 79 percent of servicemembers reported no difficulty in lifting objects in some of the same occupations as those looked at in the 1989 survey. Given the questions concerning the validity of the strength aptitude test and the implementation problems we found, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force reassess the use of the strength aptitude test as a means of predicting future performance in physically demanding occupations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the use and development of gender-neutral occupational performance standards in the military services, focusing on how the services implement and evaluate standards.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) each service takes a different approach to screening members' physical fitness; (2) the Air Force is the only service that requires new recruits to take a strength aptitude test; (3) the Air Force uses the results to qualify individuals for their military occupations; (4) the services believe that their approaches to assigning members to physically demanding tasks are appropriate, because they receive few complaints from members about such tasks; (5) the services have little data to assess a member's capability to perform tasks; (6) the Army has systematically collected physical performance data since 1989; (7) the data show that at least 84 percent of the Army members had no problems in completing their tasks; (8) a 1994-1995 survey determined that 51 to 79 percent of members have no problem in completing physically demanding tasks; and (9) the validity of the Air Force's strength aptitude test is questionable because of concerns about the administration, accuracy, and relevance of the test's physical requirements. |
gao_GAO-11-580 | gao_GAO-11-580_0 | DOD Faces Longstanding and Systemic Contract Management Challenges
DOD faces a number of longstanding and systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes— obtaining the right goods and services, at the right time, at the right cost. These challenges include addressing the issues posed by DOD’s reliance on contractors, ensuring that DOD personnel use sound contracting approaches, and maintaining a workforce with the skills and capabilities needed to properly manage the acquisitions and oversee contractors. The issues encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan are emblematic of these systemic challenges, though their significance and effect are heightened in a contingency environment. DOD’s Increased Reliance on Contractors Poses Risks
Our concerns about DOD’s acquisition of services, including the department’s reliance on contractors and the support they provide to deployed forces, predate the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We identified DOD contract management as a high-risk area in 1992 and since then we continued to identify a need for DOD to better manage services acquisitions at both the strategic and individual contract levels. Similarly, in 1997 we raised concerns about DOD’s management and use of contractors to support deployed forces in Bosnia. Our reviews of SPOT, however, have highlighted shortcomings in the system’s implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD’s Efforts Have Not Yet Resolved Contract Management Challenges or Fully Addressed Its Reliance on Contractors
DOD has recognized the need to take action to address the challenges it faces regarding contract management and its reliance on contractors, including those related to operational contract support. Over the past several years, the department has announced new policies, guidance and training initiatives, but not all of these actions have been implemented and their expected benefits have not yet been fully realized. Specifically we concluded that DOD needs to take steps to strategically manage services acquisition, including defining and measuring against desired outcomes, and developing the data needed to do so; determine the appropriate mix, roles, and responsibilities of contractor, federal civilian, and military personnel; assess the effectiveness of efforts to address prior weaknesses with specific contracting arrangements and incentives; ensure that its acquisition workforce is adequately sized, trained, and equipped to meet the department’s needs; and fully integrate operational contract support throughout the department through education and predeployment training. DOD has generally agreed with the recommendations we have previously made and has actions under way to implement them. Furthermore, DOD has taken several steps intended to improve planning for the use of contractors in contingencies and to improve contract administration and oversight. In June 2010, we called for a cultural change in DOD that emphasizes an awareness of operational contract support throughout all aspects of the department to help it address the challenges it faces in ongoing and future operations. In a January 2011 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense expressed concern about the risks introduced by DOD’s current level of dependency on contractors, future total force mix, and the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future. The Secretary’s recognition and directions are significant steps, yet cultural change will require sustained commitment from senior leadership for several years to come. State and USAID Confront Similar Contracting Challenges
While my statement has focused on the challenges confronting DOD, our work involving State and USAID has found similar issues, particularly related to not planning for and not having insight into the roles performed by contractors and workforce challenges. More generally, in June 2010, we reported that USAID’s 5-year workforce plan for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 had a number of deficiencies, such as lacking supporting workforce analyses that covered the agency’s entire workforce, including contractors, and not containing a full assessment of the agency’s workforce needs, including identifying existing workforce gaps and staffing levels required to meet program needs and goals. Similarly, in April 2010, we noted that State’s departmentwide workforce plan generally does not address the extent to which contractors should be used to perform specific functions, such as contract and grant administration. The agencies have generally agreed with the recommendations we have made to address these challenges. To their credit, senior agency leaders acknowledged that they came to rely on contractors and other nongovernmental organizations to carry out significant portions of State and USAID’s missions. As part of this effort, the QDDR called for State and USAID to ensure that work that is critical to carrying out their core missions is performed by an adequate number of government employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) obligated about $367 billion in fiscal year 2010 to acquire goods and services to meet its mission and support its operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO's work, as well as that of others, has documented shortcomings in DOD's strategic and acquisition planning, contract administration and oversight, and acquisition workforce. These are challenges that need to be addressed by DOD and by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as they carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and prepare for future contingencies. Today's statement discusses (1) contract management challenges faced by DOD, including those that take on heightened significance in a contingency environment; (2) actions DOD has taken and those needed to address these challenges; and (3) similar challenges State and USAID face. The statement is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD contingency contracting, contract management, and workforce, as well as prior reports on State and USAID's contracting and workforce issues.
What GAO Found
DOD faces a number of longstanding and systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes--obtaining the right goods and services, at the right time, at the right cost. These challenges include addressing the issues posed by DOD's reliance on contractors, ensuring that DOD personnel use sound contracting approaches, and maintaining a workforce with the skills and capabilities needed to properly manage acquisitions and oversee contractors. The issues encountered with contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan are emblematic of these systemic challenges, though their significance and impact are heightened in a contingency environment. GAO's concerns regarding DOD contracting predate the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO identified DOD contract management as a high-risk area in 1992 and raised concerns in 1997 about DOD's management and use of contractors to support deployed forces in Bosnia. In the years since then, GAO has continued to identify a need for DOD to better manage and oversee its acquisition of services. DOD has recognized the need to address the systemic challenges it faces, including those related to operational contract support. Over the past several years, DOD has announced new policies, guidance, and training initiatives, but not all of these actions have been implemented and their expected benefits have not yet been fully realized. While DOD's actions are steps in the right direction, DOD needs to (1) strategically manage services acquisition, including defining desired outcomes; (2) determine the appropriate mix, roles, and responsibilities of contractor, federal civilian, and military personnel; (3) assess the effectiveness of efforts to address prior weaknesses with specific contracting arrangements and incentives; (4) ensure that its acquisition workforce is adequately sized, trained, and equipped; and (5) fully integrate operational contract support throughout the department through education and predeployment training. In that regard, in June 2010 GAO called for a cultural change in DOD that emphasizes an awareness of operational contract support throughout all aspects of the department. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense expressed concerns about DOD's current level of dependency on contractors and directed the department to take a number of actions. The Secretary's recognition and directions are significant steps, yet instilling cultural change will require sustained commitment and leadership. State and USAID face contracting challenges similar to DOD's, particularly with regard to planning for and having insight into the roles performed by contractors. In April 2010, GAO reported that State's workforce plan did not address the extent to which contractors should be used to perform specific functions. Similarly, GAO reported that USAID's workforce plan did not contain analyses covering the agency's entire workforce, including contractors. The recently issued Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review recognized the need for State and USAID to rebalance their workforces and directed the agencies to ensure that they have an adequate number of government employees to carry out their core missions and to improve contract administration and oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made multiple recommendations to the agencies to address contracting and workforce challenges. The agencies have generally agreed with the recommendations and have efforts under way to implement them. |
gao_GAO-05-945 | gao_GAO-05-945_0 | In August 2004, we reported on the financial condition of the airline industry. At the same time, low cost airlines have been able to continue producing modest profits (see fig. Bankruptcy Is a Response to the Airline Industry’s Structural Challenges
Bankruptcy filings are prevalent in the U.S. airline industry because of long- standing economic structural issues that have led to historically weak financial performance for the industry. Structurally, the airline industry is characterized by high fixed costs, cyclical demand for its services, intense competition, and vulnerability to external shocks. Since 1978, there have been 162 airline bankruptcy filings in the United States, 22 of them since 2000. Airlines Seek Bankruptcy as a Means to Restructure, but Are Not Always Successful in Reducing Costs
Bankruptcy has played a prominent role in the U.S. airline industry since deregulation because many carriers have used the bankruptcy code in an effort to restructure their operations and cut costs—by, for example, terminating defined pension benefit plans and rejecting high-cost aircraft leases. Generally, major airlines have been able to reduce their costs during bankruptcy. According to our analysis of the Bankruptcy Research Database, airline bankruptcies ranked fifth in overall duration (averaging 714 days), behind bankruptcies in such industries as water transportation and petroleum refining, and lasted significantly longer than the average for bankruptcies in all of the industries in the database, which was 518 days. As a result, filings by companies not meeting one or the other criterion were not counted. No Evidence That Bankruptcy Protection Harms the Industry or Hurts Competitors
There is no clear evidence that airlines in bankruptcy are harming the industry or their rivals or that bankruptcy is a panacea for airlines seeking an easy path to profitability. We also found that capacity rebounded quickly in individual markets that experienced the liquidation or retreat of a significant airline, as other carriers quickly expanded capacity to compensate with little or no increase in overall average fares. Several studies have also found that airlines in bankruptcy have not reduced fares and did not harm rival airlines financially. Very Few Airlines Have Emerged Successfully from Bankruptcy
Very few airlines have emerged from bankruptcy and are still operating. Airline Pension Underfunding Contributes to Airline Liquidity Problems, Threatens Employee Retirement Benefits, and Is Costing PBGC Billions
Estimated minimum pension contribution requirements of $10.4 billion over the next 4 years, combined with other fixed obligations, threaten the liquidity position of the remaining legacy airlines with pension plans. When United and US Airways terminated their pension plans and transferred $19.6 billion in pension obligations to PBGC, participants lost a total of $5.3 billion in benefits, and PBGC incurred costs of $9.7 billion to cover the gap between guaranteed benefits and available assets. While cash from operations can fund some of these obligations, continued losses and the size of these obligations put these airlines in a sizable liquidity bind. If their plans are frozen so that their liabilities do not continue to grow, allowing an extended payback period may reduce the likelihood that these airlines will file for bankruptcy and terminate their pension plans in the coming year. To assess the effect of airline pension underfunding on employees, airlines, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), we relied on a variety of sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001 the U.S. airline industry has lost over $30 billion. Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways have filed for bankruptcy, the latter two terminating and transferring their pension plans to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The net claim on PBGC from these terminations was $9.7 billion; plan participants lost $5.3 billion in benefits (in constant 2005 dollars). Considerable debate has ensued over airlines' use of bankruptcy protection as a means to continue operations. Many in the industry have maintained that airlines' use of this approach is harmful to the industry. This debate has received even sharper focus with pension defaults. Critics argue that by not having to meet their pension obligations, airlines in bankruptcy have an advantage that may encourage other companies to take the same approach. At the request of the Congress, we have continued to assess the financial condition of the airline industry and focused on the problems of bankruptcy and pension terminations. This report details: (1) the role of bankruptcy in the airline industry, (2) whether bankruptcies are harming the industry, and (3) the effect of airline pension underfunding on employees, airlines, and the PBGC. DOT and PBGC agreed with this report's conclusions. GAO is making no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Bankruptcy is endemic to the airline industry, owing to long-standing structural challenges and weak financial performance in the industry. Structurally, the industry is characterized by high fixed costs, cyclical demand for its services, and intense competition. Consequently, since deregulation in 1978, there have been 162 airline bankruptcy filings, 22 of them in the last five years. Airlines have used bankruptcy in response to liquidity pressures and as a means to restructure their costs. Our analysis of major airline bankruptcies shows mixed results in being able to significantly reduce costs--most but not all airlines were able to do so. However, bankruptcy is not a panacea for airlines. Few have emerged from bankruptcy and are still operating. There is no clear evidence that airlines in bankruptcy keep capacity in the system that otherwise would have been eliminated, or harm the industry by lowering fares below what other airlines charge. While the liquidation of an airline may reduce capacity in the near-term, capacity returns relatively quickly. In individual markets where a dominant carrier significantly reduces operations, other carriers expand capacity to compensate. Several studies have found that airlines in bankruptcy have not reduced fares and rival airlines were not harmed financially. The defined benefit pension plans of the remaining airlines with active plans are underfunded by $13.7 billion, raising the potential of more sizeable losses to PBGC and plan participants. These airlines face an estimated $10.4 billion in minimum pension contribution requirements over the next 4 years, significantly more than some of them may be able to afford given their continued operating losses and other fixed obligations. While spreading these contributions over more years would relieve some of these airlines' liquidity pressures, it does not ensure that they will avoid bankruptcy because it does not fully address other fundamental structural problems, such as other high fixed costs. |
gao_GAO-08-288 | gao_GAO-08-288_0 | Through a combination of permanent and temporary measures, the Corps planned to restore the level of hurricane protection to the New Orleans area that existed prior to Hurricane Katrina by June 1, 2006. 2). 3). Commitment to Meet Schedule Drove Specifications but Resulted in Deficiencies in Some Key Contract Terms
The Corps’ efforts to develop the specifications for the pumping systems were driven by its commitment to have as much pumping capacity as possible in place at the drainage canals by June 1, 2006—the start of the first Atlantic hurricane season after Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the original factory test requirements were ambiguous, there were limited provisions for on-site testing, and there were no criteria for acceptance of the pumping systems by the government. The Corps Used a Streamlined Solicitation Process and Awarded the Pumping Systems Contract to the Highest-Rated Competitor
Given the need to procure and install the temporary pumping systems before the June 1 start of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps decided to use a streamlined process to contract for the pumping systems. The Corps and the Contractors Have Addressed Pumping System Testing and Performance Issues
The Corps and its contractors have addressed and corrected the pumping system testing and performance issues identified by both our May 2007 report and the ITR. Beginning in June 2006, however, even though all of the problems identified during factory testing had not been resolved, the systems were installed as planned because the Corps believed it was better to have some pumping capacity along the drainage canals during the 2006 hurricane season rather than none. Pumping System Performance Issues Have Been Addressed by the Corps and the Contractors
The Corps and the contractors have addressed and corrected the concerns raised about some components of the pumping systems during factory and on-site testing. As noted in our May 2007 report and in the ITR, the primary concerns identified during testing included undersized gear oil circulation motors, hydraulic motor vibrations, the design of the hydraulic intake line, suspect pipe welds, and lower than expected pumping capacity. After installation, the Corps and its contractors took several steps to correct known performance issues with the pumping systems. In addition, as of September 2007, each pumping system had been successfully tested on site for at least 2 hours, providing greater assurance that they will perform as designed during future hurricane seasons. Contract Files Remained Incomplete for Months, but Currently Contain Required Documentation for the Type and Value of Procurement
Contract files for the pumping systems, although incomplete at the time of the ITR review, now contain the required documentation for the type of contract and the value of the associated modifications. In a number of cases, however, Corps officials inserted required documentation in the contract files several months after modifications were issued and only after the ITR reported its findings. While the ITR correctly noted the absence of some forms of required documentation, we found that much of the documentation specifically cited—including requests for proposals, independent government estimates, certified cost or pricing data, technical analyses, and price negotiation memorandums—was not required for the modifications in question. In addition, while the ITR found that it appeared as though the contractor developed the scope of work and pricing for some of the modifications without a subsequent analysis by the Corps, we found no instance of this occurring. The Corps Has Not Overpaid the Contract and Has Plans to Reconcile Payments Made in Error
As of October 31, 2007, the Corps had paid the contractor about $30.5 million of the $33 million contract for the 40 hydraulic pumping systems and has plans for reconciling mistaken payments it made. Our review found no other instances where duplicate payments were made to the contractor. According to Corps officials, the final payment and reconciliation of the contract, including any incentive payments or penalties, will be settled with the contractor after final acceptance of the pumping systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina caused several breaches in the floodwalls along three drainage canals in New Orleans, contributing to catastrophic flooding. To restore the pre-Katrina level of hurricane-related flood protection, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) decided to acquire several large-capacity pumping systems. During the process of acquiring, testing, and installing the pumping systems, issues with the pump contract and operation of the pumping systems came to light, including several identified in a Corps Independent Team Report (ITR). GAO was asked to evaluate the Corps' efforts to (1) develop contract specifications and award the contract, (2) address pumping system performance issues, (3) document contract modifications, and (4) reconcile contract payments. GAO reviewed contract and testing documents, observed the operation of the pumping system, and interviewed officials from the Corps, its consultants and contractors, and the ITR team.
What GAO Found
Schedule concerns drove the Corps' decisions in developing specifications for the pumping systems and awarding the contract, but the rush to award the contract resulted in deficiencies in key contract provisions. Specifically, the original factory test requirements were ambiguous, there were only limited provisions for on-site testing, and there were no criteria for acceptance of the pumping systems by the government. The Corps conducted an expedited competition to contract for the pumping systems and selected a supplier for contract award based largely on its ability to deliver the pumping systems by the June 1 start of the 2006 Atlantic hurricane season. The Corps and the contractors have addressed and corrected known performance issues with the pumping systems. Concerns included hydraulic motor vibrations, the design of the hydraulic intake line, suspect pipe welds, and lower than expected pumping capacity. The pumping systems were installed prior to correcting these issues because the Corps believed it was better to have some pumping capacity along the drainage canals during the 2006 hurricane season rather than none, despite uncertainty over how much of the pumping system capacity would be available, and for how long, if needed. Between November 2006 and September 2007, the Corps and the contractors completed all of the repairs and reinstalled the pumping systems. Documents that GAO reviewed indicate that, as of September 2007, each pumping system had been successfully tested on site for at least 2 hours, thus providing greater assurance that they will perform as designed. The contract files for the pumping systems contained the required documentation for the type and value of the contract and associated modifications, though, in a number of cases, documentation was inserted in the contract files several months after modifications were issued and only after the ITR reported its findings. While the ITR correctly noted the absence of some required documentation, GAO found that much of the specific documentation cited as missing was not required for the modifications in question because of the nature and value of these modifications. In addition, while the ITR found that it appeared as though the contractor developed the scope of work and pricing for some of the modifications without a subsequent analysis by the Corps, GAO found no instance of this occurring. As of October 31, 2007, the Corps had paid the contractor about $30.5 million of the $33 million contract amount. In a few instances, the Corps made duplicate payments to the contractor. GAO found that these payments were due to Corps mistakes, not inappropriate billing by the contractor. GAO found no other cases of duplicate payments. The Corps plans to adjust for the duplicate payments by deducting the balance from remaining funds, including any incentive payments, owed to the contractor. According to Corps officials, final payment and reconciliation of the contract is expected by early 2008; however, it is unknown to what extent contract or pump performance issues will affect the final amount paid for the contract during the close-out process. |
gao_GGD-97-180 | gao_GGD-97-180_0 | This standard statement notes that each appropriations subcommittee “takes (the annual performance plan) requirement of the Results Act very seriously and plans to carefully examine agency performance goals and measures during the appropriations process.”
Most Plans Lacked Some Required Elements
A significant amount of work remains to be done by executive branch agencies before their strategic plans can fulfill the requirements of the Results Act, serve as a basis for guiding agencies, and help congressional and other policymakers make decisions about activities and programs. Although all 27 of the draft plans included a mission statement, 21 plans lacked 1 or more of the other required elements. Specifically, of the 27 draft strategic plans:
2 did not include agencywide strategic goals and objectives,
6 did not describe approaches or strategies for achieving those goals and
19 did not describe the relationship between long-term goals and objectives and annual performance goals,
6 did not identify key factors that are external to the agency and beyond its control that could affect the achievement of the goals and objectives, and
16 did not discuss program evaluations that the agency used to establish or revise goals and objectives or provide a schedule of future program evaluations. Moreover, while all but six of the plans were missing at least one required element, one-third were missing two required elements. Just over one-fourth of the plans failed to cover at least three of the required elements. Critical Strategic Planning Issues Most in Need of Sustained Attention
Many agencies showed progress in developing comprehensive mission statements upon which they can build strategic goals and strategies for achieving those goals. However, our reviews of draft strategic plans for 27 agencies found several critical strategic planning issues that are in need of sustained attention to ensure that those plans better meet the needs of agencies, Congress, and other stakeholders and that agencies shift their focus from activities to results. These issues were: the lack of linkages among required elements in the draft plans, the weaknesses in long-term strategic goals, the lack of fully developed strategies to achieve the goals, the lack of evidence that agencies’ plans reflect coordination with other federal agencies having similar or complementary programs, the limited capacity of agencies to gather performance information, and the lack of attention to program evaluations. Under the Results Act, all of an agency’s strategic goals do not need to be explicitly results oriented, although the intent of the Act is to have agencies focus on results to the extent feasible. Although most agencies attempted to articulate agencywide strategic goals and objectives in their plans, many of those goals and objectives tended to be weak. The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the U.S. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed individual agencies' draft strategic plans, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, focusing on: (1) summarizing the overall results of GAO's reviews of those plans; and (2) identifying, on the basis of those reviews, the strategic planning issues most in need of sustained attention.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a significant amount of work remained to be done by executive branch agencies if their strategic plans are to fulfill the requirements of the Results Act, serve as a basis for guiding agencies, and help congressional and other policymakers make decisions about activities and programs; (2) although all 27 of the draft plans included a mission statement, 21 plans lacked 1 or more of 5 other required elements; (3) overall, one-third of the plans were missing two required elements; and just over one-fourth were missing three or more of the required elements; (4) GAO's reviews of agencies' draft strategic plans also revealed several critical strategic planning issues that are in need of sustained attention if agencies are to develop the dynamic strategic planning processes envisioned by the Results Act; (5) most of the draft plans did not adequately link required elements in the plans; (6) these linkages are important if strategic plans are to drive the agencies' daily activities and if agencies are to be held accountable for achieving intended results; (7) furthermore, 19 of the 27 draft plans did not attempt to describe the linkages between long-term strategic goals and annual performance goals; (8) long-term strategic goals often tended to have weaknesses; (9) although the Results Act does not require that all of an agency's strategic goals be results oriented, the intent of the Act is to have agencies focus their strategic goals on results to the extent feasible; (10) many agencies did not fully develop strategies explaining how their long-term strategic goals would be achieved; (11) most agencies did not reflect in their draft plans the identification and planned coordination of activities and programs that cut across multiple agencies; (12) the questionable capacity of many agencies to gather performance information has hampered, and may continue to hamper, efforts to identify appropriate goals and confidently assess performance; (13) the draft strategic plans did not adequately address program evaluations; and (14) evaluations are important because they potentially can be critical sources of information for ensuring that goals are reasonable, strategies for achieving goals are effective, and that corrective actions are taken in program implementation. |
gao_GAO-12-441 | gao_GAO-12-441_0 | In the United States, PSI is not a program housed in a single agency, but instead is a set of activities with participation by seven agencies and the intelligence community. Agencies Have Adopted Policies and Procedures, but Annual Reports Lack Some Required Information
U.S. agencies have adopted interagency guidance documents that establish policies and procedures for all agencies participating in PSI activities. As we noted in our 2008 report, while DOD and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had established some policies and procedures for their PSI activities, State and some law enforcement agencies had not. State and DOD have submitted annual PSI reports in 2009, 2010, and 2011 including descriptions of PSI activities, but these reports do not include all required estimated expenditures for PSI activities over the next 3 fiscal years and the amount expended in the prior year. For example, the 2011 report states that DOD’s total PSI expenditures for that year were approximately $519,000. The annual reports do not uniformly include expenditure data for any other agencies participating in PSI. Extent to Which Activities Meet PSI Objective Is Unclear because Agencies Lack Measures of Results
DOD, State, CBP, and FBI officials participated in a range of PSI activities since 2008 to meet their objective of expanding and enhancing counterproliferation efforts, but it is unclear to what extent these activities have achieved the objective because agencies lack measures of results. The agencies either led or participated in 22 PSI activities from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, including multilateral meetings and exercises. In addition, they have extended access to PSI activities to more countries that are not part of the 21-country OEG. Despite recommendations in the 9/11 Act and by GAO that agencies develop PSI performance indicators, DOD, State, CBP, and FBI have not developed indicators that can be used to systematically measure progress toward Further, the agencies have not systematically the stated PSI objective.evaluated PSI activity results. Although some officials indicated plans to develop PSI performance indicators, officials from DOD and State also cited several challenges to developing indicators to measure PSI activities’ results, including difficulty quantifying how PSI activities improved capacity. However, GAO has previously reported that, despite challenges, evaluating results and developing measures are possible. One approach PSI agency officials could consider is developing a framework to link performance measures, such as number of participants trained, to outcomes, such as changes in national policies that strengthen their authority to perform interdictions. For example, the U.S. Agencies Have Not Established a Framework to Measure PSI’s Results
While U.S. agencies have undertaken a range of PSI efforts since 2008, they have not established a framework to measure PSI activities’ results and, therefore, it is unclear to what extent these activities have enhanced and expanded capacity to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a results framework. State partially concurred with the recommendation to provide expenditure information for all U.S. agencies participating in PSI activities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the progress agencies have made since 2008 in establishing recommended Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) policies and procedures, and issuing required annual reports, we reviewed the findings and recommendations in GAO’s 2006 and 2008 reports on PSI and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (the 9/11 Act). We also reviewed PSI annual reports submitted to Congress by the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and analyzed them for compliance with the requirements in the 9/11 Act. To assess the extent to which PSI activities have enhanced and expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials, we reviewed and analyzed documents from DOD, State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the Bush Administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI is not a program housed in only one agency, but instead is a set of activities with participation by multiple U.S. agencies and other countries. Congress recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) establish policies, procedures, and indicators to measure results and required that they submit annual reports. It also mandated that GAO report on PSI effectiveness. In 2008, GAO likewise recommended that law enforcement agencies also establish policies, procedures, and performance indicators.
This report assesses (1) the progress relevant agencies have made since 2008 in establishing recommended PSI policies and procedures and issuing required annual reports; and (2) the extent to which PSI activities have enhanced and expanded U.S. counterproliferation efforts.
GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies with PSI responsibilities.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies have adopted interagency guidance documents that establish PSI policies and procedures and have submitted annual reports; however, these reports do not contain expenditure data for all agencies as required by law. The agencies produced documents that contain general PSI policies and procedures. In addition, DOD and the Department of Homeland Securitys Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed policies and procedures specifically to guide their agencies PSI activities. The annual reports submitted in 2009, 2010, and 2011 met requirements to describe PSI-related activities planned for future years and those that took place in the preceding year. Although the reports included an account of DODs PSI expenditures, they did not contain all expenditures for other agencies for PSI activities as required by law.
U.S. officials participated in a range of PSI activities since 2008 to meet their objective of expanding and enhancing counterproliferation efforts, but it is unclear to what extent these activities have achieved the objective because agencies lack measures of results. The agencies either led or participated in 22 PSI activities from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011 including multilateral meetings and exercises. Officials stated that their outreach efforts contributed to increased support for PSI since GAOs 2008 report, such as the increase from 93 to 98 countries endorsing PSI. In addition, they have extended access to PSI activities to more countries that are not part of the group of 21 PSI Operational Experts Group countries, for example by holding regional planning meetings. Despite recommendations of Congress and GAO that agencies develop PSI performance indicators, DOD, State, CBP, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have not developed indicators that can be used to systematically measure progress toward the stated PSI objective. Further, the agencies have not systematically evaluated PSI activity results. Although some officials indicated plans to develop PSI performance indicators, officials from DOD and State also cited several challenges to developing indicators to measure PSI activities results including difficulty quantifying how PSI activities improved capacity. However, GAO has previously reported that, despite such challenges, developing measures that help link activities to results is possible. PSI agencies could develop a framework that links performance measures to outcomes. For example, such a framework could link the number of participants trained to changes in national policies that strengthen participant countries authority to interdict the shipment of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State and DOD provide all required expenditure information in PSI annual reports and develop a framework for measuring PSIs results. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations and State partially concurred with the reporting recommendation. State disagreed with the framework recommendation, but noted its support for analysis consistent with it. |
gao_HEHS-97-160 | gao_HEHS-97-160_0 | On the other hand, beneficiaries may be reluctant to enroll in HMOs because they give up their freedom to choose any provider. New HMO Enrollees Show Better Health Status Overall
Comparing the two groups of beneficiaries, those who enrolled in an HMO and those who remained in FFS, we found that a larger proportion of the enrolled group had better health status. New HMO Enrollees With Chronic Conditions Are Low Cost Compared With Their FFS Counterparts
Not only were the enrollment rates for beneficiaries with chronic conditions lower than those with none of the selected conditions, but the prior costs of those who enrolled were substantially less than those who remained in FFS. Most Costly Beneficiaries in Each Health Status Group Remained in FFS
The enrollment patterns show that Medicare HMOs attracted people who did not need as costly medical care. Beneficiaries who enrolled in an HMO in 1993 or 1994 had substantially lower 1992 costs compared with those that remained in FFS during that period. The differences in prior costs ranged from 31 percent among those with no chronic conditions to 16 percent for those with multiple chronic conditions. New HMO enrollees with chronic conditions rapidly disenrolled and returned to FFS at higher rates than healthier new enrollees. Comparing the two groups of beneficiaries, those who disenrolled early also had substantially higher 1992 costs than those remaining in their HMO. The weighed average cost for beneficiaries who returned to FFS was 79 percent more than those who stayed on in an HMO. Conclusions
Compared with healthier beneficiaries, California Medicare beneficiaries with selected chronic conditions were less likely to enroll in HMOs and more likely to rapidly disenroll from HMOs. Thus, this study helps explain a pattern of favorable selection in California Medicare HMOs despite the presence of some new enrollees with chronic conditions. Scope, Data Sources, and Methodology
This appendix describes our (1) scope and data sources, (2) methodology for identifying Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries with selected chronic conditions, and (3) methodology for analyzing the health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment and disenrollment patterns of FFS beneficiaries. In 1995, over 40 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in risk contract HMOs resided in the state. Identifying FFS Beneficiaries With Chronic Conditions
We also used claims information contained in the SAFs to determine the health status of each beneficiary, as measured by the presence or absence of any of five chronic conditions; that is, whether a claimant had been diagnosed with zero, one, or two or more of the chronic conditions. During the period, the proportion who died was 6.2 percent for those with none of the selected conditions, 9.6 percent for those with one condition, and 18.6 percent for those with two or more conditions; the percentage who moved was about 5 percent for each health status group. We then calculated their 1992 average monthly FFS expenditures, by number of chronic conditions and age group, and the proportion of the remaining beneficiaries that enrolled in an HMO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined a mature managed care market to determine: (1) the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions enroll in health maintenance organizations (HMO); (2) whether beneficiaries with chronic conditions who enroll in HMOs are as costly as those remaining in fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare; and (3) whether beneficiaries with chronic conditions rapidly disenroll from HMOs to FFS at rates different from other newly enrolled beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) data on California's FFS beneficiaries who enrolled in HMOs help explain why, despite the presence of chronic conditions among new HMO enrollees, their average costs are lower than the average FFS beneficiary; (2) the health status of beneficiaries, as measured by the number of selected chronic conditions they have, showed significant differences between those who enrolled in an HMO and those who remained in FFS; (3) also, when comparing beneficiaries categorized by the presence of none, one, or multiple chronic conditions, new HMO enrollees tended to be the least costly in each health status group; (4) this resulted in a substantial overall cost difference between those that did and did not enroll in HMOs; (5) about one in six 1992 California FFS Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an HMO in 1993 and 1994; (6) HMO enrollment rates differed significantly for beneficiaries with selected chronic conditions compared to other beneficiaries; (7) among those with none of the selected conditions, 18.4 percent elected to enroll in an HMO compared to 14.9 percent of beneficiaries with a single chronic condition and 13.4 percent of those with two or more conditions; (8) GAO found that prior to enrolling in an HMO a substantial cost difference, 29 percent, existed between new HMO enrollees and those remaining in FFS because HMOs attracted the least costly enrollees within each health status group; (9) even among beneficiaries belonging to either of the groups with chronic conditions, HMOs attracted those with less severe conditions as measured by their 1992 average monthly costs; (10) GAO found that rates of early disenrollment from HMOs to FFS were substantially higher among those with chronic conditions; (11) while only 6 percent of all new enrollees returned to FFS within 6 months, the rates ranged from 4.5 percent for beneficiaries without a chronic condition to 10.2 percent for those with two or more chronic conditions; (12) also, disenrollees who returned to FFS had substantially higher costs prior to enrollment compared to those who remained in their HMO; and (13) these data indicated that favorable selection still exists in California Medicare HMOs because they attract and retain the least costly beneficiaries in each health status group. |
gao_GAO-02-939 | gao_GAO-02-939_0 | If the amount of the capital surplus account and undistributed net income combined is greater than capital paid-in, the excess is paid to the Treasury a week later. The Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks states that the primary purpose of the Federal Reserve capital surplus account is to provide capital to supplement paid-in capital for use in the event of loss. The growth in the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus account can be attributed to growth in the banking system together with the Federal Reserve Board policy of equating the amount in the capital surplus account with paid-in capital. Several Foreign Central Banks Maintain Accounts That Function Much Like the Federal Reserve Surplus Account
Three of the four central banks that we contacted had capital accounts that included ownership shares as well as “surplus” accounts with functions similar to the Federal Reserve System capital surplus account (see table 1). The Bundesbank and the ECB, for instance, use accounts that are not part of capital to serve as a cushion against loss. Reserve Banks Occasionally Have Used Funds from Their Surplus Accounts to Absorb Losses
The Federal Reserve System has not had an annual operating loss since 1915. Reserve Bank Earnings Were Not Sufficient to Absorb All of the Reserve Bank Weekly Losses
The individual Reserve Banks transferred funds occasionally from their capital surplus accounts to absorb losses from 1989 through 2001. Reducing the Surplus Account Provides One-Time Increase in Federal Receipts but Yields No New Resources for the Federal Government
Reducing the Federal Reserve surplus account would create a one-time increase in federal government receipts, thereby reducing the budget deficit (or increasing the federal budget surplus) at the time of the transfer. Because the Federal Reserve System is not included in the federal budget, a Reserve Bank transfer to the Treasury is recorded as a receipt under current budget accounting. We also reviewed reports from CBO on the Reserve Banks’ transfers of net earnings to the Treasury. | What GAO Found
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) reviewed its policies regarding the size of the Federal Reserve Banks' combined capital surplus account to determine if opportunities exist to decrease the amount held in the account. The consolidated capital surplus account is the aggregate of separate surplus accounts held at each of the 12 Reserve Banks, and the account represents cumulative retained net earnings for the Reserve Banks--that is, cumulative net earnings not paid to the Department of the Treasury. The Reserve Banks use their capital surplus accounts to act as a cushion to absorb losses. The Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks says that the primary purpose of the surplus account is to provide capital to supplement paid-in capital for use in the event of loss. Selected major foreign central banks maintain accounts with functions similar to the Federal Reserve System's capital surplus account. Although their accounts are not fully comparable with the Federal Reserve System capital surplus account, the Bank of England, the Bundesbank, and the European Central Bank have capital surplus or reserve accounts in addition to their paid-in capital accounts that are used as cushions against loss. The Federal Reserve System calculates earnings and transfers excess earnings to the Treasury on a weekly basis. Although the Federal Reserve System has not had an annual operating loss since 1915, the Reserve Banks recorded some weekly losses between 1989 through 2001, thus temporarily reducing their capital surplus accounts to cover these weekly losses. Reducing the Federal Reserve System capital surplus account would create a one-time increase in federal receipts, but the transfer by itself would have no significant long-term effect on the budget or the economy. Amounts transferred to the Treasury from reducing the capital surplus account would be treated as a receipt under federal budget accounting but do not produce new resources for the federal government as a whole |
gao_GAO-03-472 | gao_GAO-03-472_0 | In fiscal year 2002, these activities employed about 72,000 civilian employees—about 10 percent of DOD’s civilian workforce. In the other DOD industrial activities, military personnel are largely in managerial or supervisory positions. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the department’s plan to support military systems, the increased use of the private sector to perform work previously performed by DOD employees has decreased the role of the services’ depots and raised questions regarding their future. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan, the services have in varying degrees initiated a strategic depot planning effort. Although this guidance has been issued, questions remain about the guidance and the services are not accomplishing key analyses to identify essential core capabilities. In addition, 10 U.S.C. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public-sector performance of these workloads. DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot maintenance provisions. The work at two government-owned and government-operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years, but it is now increasing. Some Depot Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Competency Assessments, Comprehensive Retention Plans, and Evaluative Performance Measures
Depot workforce planning, as done by the services’ depots, generally does not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and high-performing organizations as key to effective workforce planning: (1) the assessment of competencies needed to address skill gaps; (2) the development of comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the implementation of performance measures to evaluate the success of the workforce plans. A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning
The services’ depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect DOD’s strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian workforce. Private sector industrial activities have also implemented multiskilling. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management and direction of DOD’s strategic planning for maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness to complete the revisions to DOD’s core policy and develop a schedule for the services to complete the computation of core requirements; require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for defining workloads that should be performed in government facilities by government personnel; and require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop, or complete the development of, and implement strategic plans that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is developed and that delineate industrial workloads to be accomplished in each service’s depots, other service’s depots, by contractors at their own sites and at government sites and using partnerships and identify the workforce requirements to support the performance of this work. The department did not concur with our recommendation to implement a working group to explore (1) options for innovative and cost-effective training and (2) appropriate funding alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. To determine the extent to which the services have developed and implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and obtained and reviewed DOD’s Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008 and the services’ strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and services’ and depots’ workforce plans (including recruiting/hiring plans, training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to determine whether they had a strategic/long-term perspective or a short-term focus that was oriented toward the budget process. In doing so, we also determined civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the services will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large numbers of eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years, the total weighted average age based on the civilian staffing at each industrial facility, whether the services are having difficulties implementing the multiskilling concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity, and whether increased funding will be needed to address increased training requirements. GAO-03-2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent. Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent years GAO has identified shortcomings in DOD's strategic planning and was asked to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and implemented comprehensive strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning.
What GAO Found
DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to be accomplished in each of the services' depots. The DOD depot system has been a key part of the department's plan to support military systems in the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work has decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U.S. code requires DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be spent for public-sector performance, questions remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic depot planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also remain about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal year 2002. The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the industrial activities, generally it is short-term rather than strategic. Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that the Office of Personnel Management guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the competencies; (2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not develop performance measures and evaluate workforce plans. Several challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots' viability. Second, the services are having difficulty implementing multiskilling--an industry and government best practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce--even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer employees. Finally, increased training funding and innovation in the training program will be essential for revitalizing the aging depot workforce. |
gao_GAO-02-362 | gao_GAO-02-362_0 | Increased Competition Has Heightened Some Market Participants’ Concerns about Conflicts of Interest
Nasdaq increasingly has been in competition with NASD members that operate as ECNs, while NYSE has competed for many years with members that trade its listed securities off of the exchange. This competition has heightened some SRO members’ concerns that an SRO could abuse its regulatory authority through rule-making processes, disciplinary actions, or use of proprietary information. In addition, some broker-dealers with multiple SRO memberships said that examinations by multiple SROs were unnecessarily burdensome. Some Broker-Dealers Were Concerned about Inefficiencies Associated with Differing Rules and Interpretations
According to both market participants and regulators, SROs generally had the same or similar rules. While no formal process exists for addressing differences among SRO rules and interpretations that might cause material regulatory inefficiencies, SEC, NASDR, and NYSE officials told us that they have found the existing rule review and public comment process to be effective for addressing concerns about rules. SEC officials said that the agency did not plan to dictate changes in the current structure to address these concerns but instead preferred that market participants reach a consensus on whether a need for change existed and, if so, the type of change that would be appropriate. However, this alternative would not address the regulatory inefficiencies that result from broker-dealers having multiple SRO memberships. Conclusions
As competition continues to drive the evolution of the securities markets, concerns about the conflicts of interest inherent in the current self- regulatory structure have grown in importance. For example, differences in rules and their interpretations have been used to justify the need for multiple examinations. Appendix I: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission
Appendix II: Comments from the National Association of Securities Dealers
Appendix III: Comments from Nasdaq
Appendix IV: Comments from the Securities Industry Association | What GAO Found
In the securities markets, competition among self-regulatory organizations (SRO) and their members for customer orders has heightened concerns about conflicts of interest in their roles as both market operators and regulators. Nasdaq--the market run by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)--has been in competition with NASD members that run electronic communications networks. For years, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has faced competition from members that trade NYSE-listed securities off of the exchange. Greater competition has generated concern that an SRO might abuse its regulatory authority--for example, by imposing rules or disciplinary actions that are unfair to the competitors it regulates. Some broker-dealers subject to the jurisdiction of multiple SROs also are concerned that differences among SRO rules and rule interpretations have caused inefficiencies in the use of broker-dealers' compliance resources. No formal process exists, however, for addressing rule differences that might cause material inefficiencies in the regulatory process. The law does not require SRO rules to be the same, and many differences exist for legitimate business reasons according to regulators. Broker-dealers with multiple SRO memberships said that examinations by multiple SROs were unnecessarily burdensome. Securities market participants have discussed alternatives that would address concerns about conflicts of interest and inefficiencies in the current self-regulatory structure. Securities and Exchange Commission officials said that they had no plans to change the current structure, preferring to let the industry reach a consensus on the need for appropriate change. |
gao_GAO-11-191T | gao_GAO-11-191T_0 | In November 2007, DOD and VA began piloting the IDES, a joint disability evaluation system, to eliminate duplication in their separate systems and expedite receipt of VA benefits for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. 1). In that report, the agencies concluded that, as of February 2010, servicemembers who went through the IDES pilot were more satisfied than those who went through the legacy system, and that the IDES process met the agencies’ goals of delivering VA benefits to active duty servicemembers within 295 days and to reserve component servicemembers within 305 days. Average case processing times: The agencies have been meeting their 295- day and 305-day timeliness goals for much of the past 2 years, but the average case processing time for active duty servicemembers has steadily increased from 274 days in February 2010 to 296 days, as of August 2010. While still an improvement over the 540-day estimate for the legacy system, the agencies missed their timeliness goal by 1 day. Although DOD and VA’s evaluation results indicate promise for the IDES, the extent to which the IDES is an improvement over the legacy system cannot be known because of limitations in the legacy data. DOD and VA’s estimate of 540 days for the legacy system was based on a small, nonrepresentative sample of cases. Pilot Sites Experienced Several Challenges
As DOD and VA tested the IDES at different facilities and added cases to the pilot, they encountered several challenges that led to delays in certain phases of the process. Staffing: Most significantly, most of the 10 sites we visited reported experiencing staffing shortages and related delays to some extent, in part due to workloads exceeding the agencies’ initial estimates. These staffing shortages contributed to delays in the IDES process. As a result, at Fort Carson, it took 140 days on average to complete the single exam for active duty servicemembers, as of August 2010, far exceeding the agencies’ goal to complete the exams in 45 days. Logistical challenges integrating VA staff at military treatment facilities: DOD and VA officials at some pilot sites we visited said that they experienced logistical challenges integrating VA staff at the military facilities. Housing and other challenges posed by extended time in the military disability evaluation process: Although many DOD and VA officials we interviewed at central offices and pilot sites felt that the IDES process expedited the delivery of VA benefits to servicemembers, several also indicated that it may increase the amount of time servicemembers are in the military’s disability evaluation process. DOD and VA Expansion Plans Incorporate Many Lessons Learned but Do Not Address All Challenges
DOD and VA plan to expand the IDES to military facilities worldwide on an ambitious timetable—to 113 sites during fiscal year 2011, a pace of about 1 site every 3 days. In preparing for IDES expansion military-wide, DOD and VA have many efforts under way to address challenges experienced to date, though their efforts have yet to be implemented or tested. The matrix also asks sites to anticipate any surges in caseloads and to provide a written contingency plan for dealing with them. Ensuring sufficient DOD MEB physician staffing: DOD does not yet have strategies or plans to address potential shortages of physicians to serve on MEBs. Significantly, DOD and VA do not have a mechanism for tracking when and where disagreements about diagnoses and ratings occur and, consequently, may not be able to determine whether the guidance sufficiently addresses the discrepancies. As DOD and VA move to implement the IDES worldwide, they have some mechanisms in place to monitor challenges that may arise in the IDES, such as regular reporting of data on caseloads, processing times, and servicemember satisfaction, and preparation of an annual report on challenges in the IDES. DOD and VA are currently taking steps to address many of these challenges. We have draft recommendations aimed at helping DOD and VA further address challenges surfaced during the pilot, which we plan to finalize in our forthcoming report after fully considering agency comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have been pilot testing a new disability evaluation system designed to integrate their separate processes and thereby expedite veterans' benefits for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. Having piloted the integrated disability evaluation system (IDES) at 27 military facilities, they are now planning for its expansion military-wide. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing review of the IDES pilot and draft report, which is currently with DOD and VA for agency comment. GAO conducted this review pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This review specifically examined: (1) the results of the agencies' evaluation of the IDES pilot, (2) challenges in implementing the IDES pilot to date, and (3) whether the agencies' plans to expand the IDES adequately address potential future challenges. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data from DOD and VA, conducted site visits at 10 military facilities, and interviewed DOD and VA officials.
What GAO Found
In their evaluation of the IDES pilot, DOD and VA concluded that, as of February 2010, the pilot had (1) improved servicemember satisfaction relative to the existing "legacy" system and (2) met their established goal of delivering VA benefits to active duty and reserve component servicemembers within 295 and 305 days, respectively, on average. While these results are promising, average case processing times have since steadily increased--for example, for active duty servicemembers, the average has increased from 274 days in February 2010 to 296 days in August 2010. At 296 days, processing time for the IDES is still an improvement over the 540 days that DOD and VA estimated the legacy process takes to deliver VA benefits to servicemembers. However, the full extent of improvement of the IDES over the legacy system is unknown because (1) the 540-day estimate was based on a small, nonrepresentative sample of cases and (2) limitations in legacy case data prevent a comprehensive comparison of processing times, as well as appeal rates. In piloting the IDES, DOD and VA have run into several implementation challenges that have contributed to delays in the process. The most significant challenge was insufficient staffing by DOD and VA. Staffing shortages and process delays were particularly severe at two pilot sites we visited where the agencies did not anticipate caseload surges. For example, at one of these sites, due to a lack of medical examiners, it took 140 days on average to complete one of the key features of the pilot--the single exam--compared with the agencies' goal to complete this step of the process in 45 days. The single exam posed other challenges that contributed to process delays, such as disagreements between DOD and VA medical staff about diagnoses for servicemembers' medical conditions. Cases involving such disagreements often required further attention, adding time to the process. Pilot sites also experienced logistical challenges, such as incorporating VA staff at military facilities and housing and managing personnel going through the process. As DOD and VA move forward with plans to expand the IDES worldwide, they have taken steps to address a number of these challenges; however, these mitigation efforts have yet to be tested, and not all challenges have been addressed. For example, to address staffing shortages and ensure timely processing, VA is developing a contract for additional medical examiners, and DOD and VA are requiring local staff to develop written contingency plans for handling surges in caseloads. On the other hand, the agencies have not yet developed strategies for ensuring sufficient military physicians to handle anticipated workloads. Significantly, DOD and VA do not have a comprehensive monitoring plan for identifying problems as they occur--such as staffing shortages and disagreements about diagnoses--in order to take remedial actions as early as possible. GAO has draft recommendations aimed at helping DOD and VA, as they move forward with IDES expansion plans, to further address challenges surfaced during the pilot, which GAO plans to finalize in the forthcoming report after fully considering agency comments. |
gao_GAO-17-36 | gao_GAO-17-36_0 | Private insurers become WYO companies by signing a Financial Assistance/Subsidy Arrangement with FEMA under which the insurers agree to issue flood policies in their own name, adjust flood claims, and settle and defend all claims arising from the flood policies. FEMA Still Relies on Insurance Industry Proxies for Setting Compensation and Has Not Yet Revised Its Practices in Response to the Biggert-Waters Act
FEMA continues to lack the information it needs to determine whether its compensation payments are appropriate and how much profit is included in what it pays WYO companies. But we found inconsistencies in how companies reported federal flood data to NAIC, which limits the usefulness of the data for setting compensation rates. Efforts Have Resulted in Some Improvements to Federal Flood Financial Data Critical to Revising Compensation
Efforts by FEMA, NAIC, and WYO companies have resulted in some improvements to federal flood financial data reported to NAIC that are critical to a revised compensation methodology. Among the 10 recommendations in the report, we made the following five relating to compensation methodology and data quality that have not been fully addressed:
We recommended that FEMA (1) determine in advance the amounts built into the payment rates for estimated expenses and profit; (2) annually analyze actual expenses and profit in relation to the estimated amounts used in setting payment rates; and (3) consider the results of the analysis of payments, actual expenses, and profit in evaluating methods for paying WYO companies. Our 2009 recommendations to FEMA remain relevant as FEMA seeks to develop a compensation methodology as required by the Biggert-Waters Act. These reviews examine NFIP policies written by WYO companies as well as those written by the DSA. Most WYO companies we interviewed preferred the current WYO arrangement over any of the three potential alternatives we identified. Trade-offs of Current Arrangement Include Advantages for Consumers and Insurers from WYO Company Competition but Disadvantages for FEMA Oversight
Based on our analysis and interviews with FEMA, WYO companies, and stakeholders (relevant organizations and vendors), the current WYO arrangement has trade-offs (see table 9). This stability could continue to encourage WYO participation. All three potential alternatives involve FEMA contracting with participating companies (WYO companies or vendors), a status that most WYO company representatives cited as creating more regulatory burden because of federal contract requirements. The vendor would sell flood insurance policies through independent insurance agents, and insurance companies would not be involved. Alternative 1, in which FEMA would contract with one or more insurance companies to sell and service flood policies and adjust claims, would maintain the WYO company network to some extent but likely would involve fewer participating WYO companies (see table 10). Fully addressing these recommendations will help FEMA meet the Biggert-Waters Act requirement to develop a methodology for determining appropriate compensation for WYO companies that uses the companies’ actual flood expenses. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the transparency and accountability over the compensation paid to WYO companies and set appropriate compensation rates, the FEMA administrator should take into account WYO company characteristics that may impact companies’ expenses and profits when developing the new compensation methodology and rates. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to describe the (1) Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) current compensation practices for Write- Your-Own (WYO) companies and the extent to which FEMA revised its practices in response to the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act); (2) information on over- and underpayments of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policy claims; and (3) the trade-offs of selected potential alternatives to FEMA’s current arrangement with WYO companies for selling and servicing flood insurance policies. We also interviewed officials from FEMA and representatives from 10 WYO companies with varying NFIP premium bases. We also interviewed National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) officials about expense data WYO companies report to NAIC. To compare FEMA compensation paid to WYO companies to actual expense data WYO companies reported to NAIC, we obtained and analyzed premium, loss, and compensation data for all WYO companies for fiscal years 2008–2014 from FEMA and premium, loss and expense data for all WYO companies from SNL Financial and NAIC for calendar years 2008–2014. From our prior work, we identified three potential alternative approaches to the current WYO arrangement: (1) FEMA contracts with one or more insurance companies; (2) FEMA contracts with one vendor; or (3) FEMA contracts with multiple vendors and maintains the WYO network. In the WYO program, private insurers sell and service flood insurance policies and adjust claims for NFIP under an arrangement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Private insurers (WYO companies) sell and service flood policies and adjust claims for NFIP under an arrangement with FEMA. In GAO-09-455 , GAO made recommendations on FEMA's WYO compensation methodology and data quality. The Biggert-Waters Act built on these recommendations and required FEMA to develop a methodology for determining appropriate amounts WYO companies should be reimbursed. GAO was asked to review the status of FEMA efforts. This report examines, among other issues, (1) the extent to which FEMA revised compensation practices, and (2) trade-offs of potential alternatives to the WYO arrangement. GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed FEMA data and data on expenses reported to NAIC for 2008–2014 (most recent available), and interviewed FEMA and NAIC officials, stakeholders (11 organizations with flood insurance expertise, three vendors), and 10 selected WYO companies with varying NFIP premium bases. To compare FEMA compensation with actual expenses, GAO examined information on accounting and reporting practices from a second selection of 10 WYO companies (in this case, insurers wiithin10 insurance groups) that received about 60 percent of compensation in 2008–2014.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has yet to revise its compensation practices for Write-Your-Own (WYO) companies to reflect actual expenses as required by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act), and as GAO recommended in 2009. FEMA continues to rely on insurance industry expense information for other lines of property insurance to set compensation rates for WYO companies. Efforts by FEMA, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)—which collects data by line of insurance from insurance companies—and the WYO companies have resulted in some improvements to financial data on National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) expenses that WYO companies report to NAIC. But GAO found inconsistencies among how 10 selected WYO companies (which received about 60 percent of the compensation FEMA paid in 2008–2014) reported federal flood data to NAIC that limit the usefulness of these data for determining expenses and setting compensation rates. For example, GAO analysis showed that adjusting for inconsistencies due to unreported expenses significantly reduced WYO company profits. Consequently, without quality data on actual expenses, FEMA continues to lack the information it needs to incorporate actual flood expense data into its compensation methodology as well as determine how much profit WYO companies make and whether its compensation payments are appropriate. FEMA has not clarified what other analyses it will undertake to address GAO 2009 recommendations concerning data quality. GAO also found the ways in which WYO companies operate, including how companies compensate agents and third-party vendors (with which some companies contract to conduct some or all of the management of their NFIP policies) can affect a company's expenses and profits. Considering company characteristics would allow FEMA to more effectively develop its compensation methodology and determine the appropriate amounts to reimburse WYO companies as required by the Biggert-Waters Act.
According to WYO companies and stakeholders, the current WYO arrangement and three potential alternatives GAO identified all involve trade-offs. Private insurers become WYO companies by signing a Financial Assistance/Subsidy Arrangement with FEMA and FEMA annually publishes terms for participation in the WYO program, including amounts companies will be paid for expenses. The current arrangement includes benefits for consumers from competition among approximately 75 WYO companies, but poses oversight challenges for FEMA due to the large number of companies. The three potential alternatives involve FEMA contracting with (1) one or more insurance companies to sell and service flood policies; (2) one vendor that would sell policies through agents and insurance companies would not be involved; or (3) multiple vendors to service policies while maintaining the WYO network to market and sell flood policies. All three potential alternatives would involve FEMA contracting with either WYO companies or vendors as federal contractors, a status that most WYO company representatives cited as creating more regulatory burden because of federal contract requirements. Representatives of most WYO companies and several stakeholders GAO interviewed preferred the current arrangement because of its predictability and noted that this characteristic would continue to encourage WYO company participation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO maintains that its 2009 recommendations remain valid and will help FEMA meet Biggert-Waters Act requirements. In this report, GAO recommends that FEMA take into account company characteristics when developing the new WYO compensation methodology. FEMA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-203 | gao_GAO-06-203_0 | Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft. DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA
In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals’ career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents, but suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’ career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by providing additional opportunities through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed adjustments to future goals and milestones—a key practice for a successful merger and transformation effort. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including how these key practices can facilitate FAMS’s transfer back to TSA. Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within the organization and report related progress on FAMS’s transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders—another key practice of a successful merger or transformation. FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are recorded. In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed. Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service’s management of incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly during their missions, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service to take the following four actions: Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air marshals to complete a mission report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.
What GAO Found
DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections--a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress on the transition to employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful transition. FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future. |
gao_GAO-16-97 | gao_GAO-16-97_0 | In fiscal year 2014, the judiciary’s rent payments to GSA totaled over $1 billion. However, we found that the judiciary does not fully know how much it has saved as a result of these efforts because it has not developed a reliable method for estimating cost savings achieved by major cost containment initiative. Furthermore, court and defender organization officials we interviewed identified efforts to achieve cost savings and efficiencies over the past 10 fiscal years. However, according to our analysis of available documentation and discussions with judiciary officials, the $1.5 billion cost savings estimate has limited reliability because the estimate does not include all savings realized, includes savings not attributable to cost containment initiatives, does not always include the costs associated with implementing initiatives, and was not always supported by adequate documentation. Information technology cost savings estimate—The $89 million estimated savings resulting from information technology (IT) initiatives has limitations because AOUSC officials did not include all potential cost savings achieved or all costs to implement the initiatives. For example, the officials acknowledged that $291 million of the $538 million in space- and facilities-related savings resulted from lower than anticipated rent inflation and was not the result of judiciary actions. We reviewed the judiciary’s annual congressional budget justifications for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 and confirmed that congressional budget justifications did not consistently report information on cost containment initiatives or the estimated cost savings realized from the initiatives. The Judiciary Imposed Emergency Measures and Has Identified Negative Effects of the 2013 Sequestration and 2014 Lapse in Appropriations on Judiciary Personnel and Operations
The Judiciary Began Preparing for Sequestration in 2012 and Imposed Emergency Measures
According to AOUSC and court officials we interviewed, the judiciary’s cost containment initiatives helped to prepare the judiciary for potential budget reductions, but the judiciary still needed to impose a set of emergency measures to achieve the $346 million in budget cuts caused by the 2013 sequestration and faced some planning challenges. AOUSC officials stated that some courts cut hours of operation, closed 1 day per week, or chose not to hear criminal cases every other Friday. Reduced court staff and implemented furloughs—AOUSC officials stated that one of the most significant effects of the 2013 sequestration was the continuing loss of court staff through attrition, including buyouts and voluntary early retirements, among other actions. According to GAO analysis of judiciary data, in the 12 months following sequestration, total onboard full-time equivalent staff in federal courts nationwide declined by nearly 1,600 full-time equivalent staff—or by approximately 8 percent. See figure 9 for the total number of onboard full-time equivalent staff in federal defender organizations as of the end of fiscal years 2010 to 2014. Reduced services to the public—Officials we interviewed representing 6 of 12 circuit courts, 1 district court, and 2 of 4 defender organizations reported that they reduced court services to the public, such as reducing the number of hours open to the public, as a result of sequestration. Recommendations
To provide more reliable information for assessing the progress of its cost containment efforts and for informing judiciary and congressional oversight and decision making, we recommend that the Director of AOUSC take the following two actions for major cost containment initiatives (as determined by the judiciary): develop a reliable method for estimating cost savings achieved (i.e., that ensures that cost savings are calculated in an accurate and complete manner); and regularly report estimated cost savings achieved. Specifically, the draft report identifies and describes the judiciary’s long- range budget planning process and strategic policy documents, such as the Cost Containment Strategy for the Federal Judiciary: 2005 and Beyond, among others, as mechanisms the judiciary uses to identify opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies and describes several examples of the cost containment initiatives that the judiciary has undertaken in the past 10 years, including a list of multiple examples of the judiciary’s cost containment initiatives in all categories in appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2013, the President ordered spending reductions, known as sequestration, across the federal government. As a result, the federal judiciary's resources were reduced by about $346 million over the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The judiciary has been affected by decreasing federal resources, such as the sequestration, and has been implementing various cost containment initiatives.
GAO was asked to evaluate judiciary cost savings actions and the effects of the 2013 sequestration. This report examines, among other things, (1) judiciary actions to achieve cost savings and efficiencies, and the extent to which the judiciary has estimated cost savings; and (2) judiciary actions to implement the 2013 sequestration and any effects from these actions on judiciary personnel and operations.
GAO analyzed relevant judiciary documents and collected information from and interviewed judiciary officials in all 12 regional circuit courts and the district court, bankruptcy court, and federal defender organization in four judicial districts, selected to obtain a diverse group of districts on the basis of funding level, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The federal judiciary has implemented cost containment initiatives for over 10 years, but the judiciary does not fully know how much it has saved because it has not developed a reliable method for estimating cost savings achieved. For example, GAO found that the judiciary's estimate of cost savings primarily attributed to cost containment initiatives since fiscal year 2005—nearly $1.5 billion, relative to projected costs—does not include all savings realized from cost containment initiatives, includes amounts that did not result from initiatives, does not always include the costs associated with implementing initiatives, and was not always supported by adequate documentation. Examples of cost-saving initiatives are establishing rent budget caps and providing incentives to courts for work efficiency. Judiciary officials confirmed, for example, that $291 million of the $538 million in space and facilities estimated savings is the result of lower than anticipated rent inflation. Also, an estimated $89 million in savings resulting from information technology (IT) initiatives did not include all savings (such as savings from an IT-based solution to manage and administer the jury function) or provide adequate documentation of costs to implement the initiatives. Judiciary officials stated that they discuss cost containment initiatives in the judiciary's congressional budget justifications, among other documents. GAO analyzed the judiciary's congressional budget justifications and found that these documents did not consistently report information on cost savings achieved for major initiatives. Reliable information on and reporting of estimated cost savings achieved for major initiatives could help the judiciary better assess the progress of its initiatives and help inform congressional oversight and decision making.
The judiciary imposed emergency measures in response to the 2013 sequestration and has identified negative effects of the sequestration on the judiciary. Examples of emergency measures were postponing and reducing payments to private attorneys representing individuals who cannot afford counsel in criminal cases. One of the most significant effects of sequestration cited by judiciary officials was continued court staff loss. According to GAO analysis of judiciary data, in the 12 months following sequestration, total onboard court full-time equivalent staff declined by nearly 1,600—or about 8 percent (see fig.). Also, over 3,600 court and defender organization staff were furloughed in fiscal year 2013. Funding for expenses such as drug abuse treatment for offenders was reduced by 20 percent. Further, according to judiciary officials, some courts and defender organizations reduced services, such as closing 1 day per week.
Total Onboard Court Full-Time Equivalent Staff, as of End of Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) take the following two actions for major cost containment initiatives: (1) develop a reliable method for estimating cost savings achieved, and (2) regularly report estimated cost savings achieved. AOUSC said it will seriously consider GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-766 | gao_GAO-16-766_0 | The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 expanded the purchase requirement for federally backed mortgages on properties located in special flood hazard areas. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 was enacted in March 2014 and sought largely to address affordability concerns by repealing or altering some Biggert-Waters Act requirements. In this context, HFIAA included provisions that FEMA produce a study and submit a report that assess and recommend options, methods, and strategies for making voluntary CBFI available through NFIP. Policy Goals for Federal Involvement in Natural Catastrophe Insurance
In 2007, we identified four broad policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance: (1) charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risks; (2) encouraging private markets to provide natural catastrophe insurance; (3) encouraging broad participation in natural catastrophe insurance programs; and (4) limiting costs to taxpayers before and after a disaster. We have previously used these policy goals to evaluate potential changes to NFIP. FEMA’s Study and Report Provided Relevant Information and Concluded that FEMA Should Not Implement CBFI
The Design of FEMA’s Study Was Reasonable, with Methodology Supporting Study Objectives
We determined that the CBFI study objectives and methodology agreed upon by FEMA and NAS were reasonable. The objectives were clearly stated and designed to provide relevant, high-level considerations that could help FEMA decide whether CBFI should be implemented before determining how it should be implemented, which FEMA officials said was an important step. The methodology was consistent with the study’s objectives and was reasonable given the limitations identified by FEMA: short time frames, the need to obtain informed opinions, and unavailable data. FEMA and NAS took several steps to design the objectives and methodology of the CBFI study. According to FEMA and NAS officials, FEMA and NAS agreed that the study’s objectives were to examine future prospects for CBFI by identifying and discussing issues that would require further evaluation in order for FEMA and others to better evaluate CBFI’s strengths and weaknesses. To execute the CBFI study, NAS convened an expert committee to produce a report using a consensus report process. The committee was composed of 12 members that represented academia, the private sector, and state and federal government. Further, FEMA officials said that alternative approaches they considered would have faced various limitations. To further assess FEMA’s study, we evaluated relevant elements of its findings against the four public policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance that we have previously identified. The public policy goals, along with examples of elements from the study, follow. The study also outlined concepts for innovative uses of CBFI that could help NFIP charge full- risk rates, such as requiring communities interested in CBFI to provide comprehensive analysis of flood risk in their communities, which would enhance NFIP’s knowledge of flood risk at the community level. Our prior work has shown that covering flood-related losses through NFIP involves significant federal expense, and Congress has shown interest in reducing the federal government’s role in flood insurance by transferring its exposure to the private sector. FEMA’s study discusses ways in which CBFI could encourage or discourage private market participation in flood insurance markets. However, the study also suggests several challenges that may outweigh these potential benefits. FEMA officials explained that, after reviewing the results of the study, they concluded that FEMA should not conduct further related research or implement CBFI for several reasons:
The challenges outlined in the study—such as administrative burden on communities and FEMA, unavailable data, unclear cost distribution among community members, and potential legislative requirements— are significant and likely outweigh the benefits. Dedicating FEMA’s resources to other potential NFIP reforms and strengthening existing programs would be a better use of these resources. Based on the factors cited by FEMA officials and our prior work, we agree that FEMA’s conclusion that it was not advisable to implement CBFI at this time was reasonable. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FEMA for its review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Floods are the most common and destructive natural disaster in the United States. The National Flood Insurance Program, which FEMA administers, has struggled financially to both pay for flood losses and keep rates affordable. To address these and other challenges, Congress has passed legislation including the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA). HFIAA included provisions for FEMA to conduct a study and submit a report that assesses and recommends options, methods, and strategies for making CBFI available through NFIP. FEMA presented the study and related report to Congress in March 2016.
HFIAA also includes a provision for GAO to review the FEMA report, which is to include the study and submit a related report to Congress. To review the study and report FEMA submitted to Congress, GAO analyzed the FEMA study's objectives, methodology, and findings, and evaluated the FEMA report's conclusions.
GAO analyzed the appropriateness of the objectives, the reasonableness of the methodology, and the extent to which the conclusions were supported by the findings. GAO also evaluated relevant study findings against public policy goals for federal involvement in catastrophe insurance previously identified by GAO, and interviewed FEMA and NAS officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) used reasonable objectives and methodology for its study on community-based flood insurance (CBFI)—flood insurance that a community would purchase to cover all properties located within it. FEMA contracted with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct the study, and worked with NAS to design a study that would provide a high-level, independent discussion of issues related to CBFI. According to FEMA officials, such a study would help FEMA decide whether CBFI should be implemented, an important step before developing any plans to implement CBFI. Once the study was designed, NAS conducted the study independently, using input obtained from an expert committee that met twice in early 2015. The members of the committee represented academia, the private sector, and state and federal government. GAO determined that the study objectives were designed to meet FEMA's needs, the methodology supported the objectives, and alternative methodologies that were considered would have faced various limitations.
In its report submitted to Congress, which contained the study, FEMA concluded that it should not conduct further related research or implement CBFI. Specifically, it concluded that the challenges outlined in the study outweigh any potential benefit when considered against limited community interest. FEMA officials further cited the need to dedicate FEMA's resources to effective National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) reform. Based on the factors cited by FEMA officials, and the consistency of these factors with findings in prior GAO reports on NFIP, GAO determined that FEMA's conclusion was reasonable. For example, prior GAO work has highlighted challenges FEMA faces in balancing reform efforts with limited resources.
In prior work, GAO identified four public policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance and used them to evaluate changes to NFIP. While the FEMA study did not use these goals, as part of its assessment GAO evaluated relevant elements of the study against them. For example, one of these goals is charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risk, and the study discussed innovative uses of CBFI that could help NFIP charge such rates. Another goal is encouraging private markets to provide natural catastrophe insurance, and the study discusses ways in which CBFI could encourage private market participation in flood insurance markets, as well as challenges that CBFI would pose to private insurers. |
gao_GAO-09-600 | gao_GAO-09-600_0 | Characteristics of Students Attending Proprietary Schools
Students who attend proprietary schools generally have characteristics that differ from students at public and private non-profit schools. ATB Test
Generally, students without a high school diploma or GED can qualify for Title IV loans, grants, and campus-based aid if they pass an independently administered test of basic math and English skills, called an “ability-to- benefit” or ATB test. Consequences of Student Loan Defaults
When students do not make payments on their federal loans and the loans are in default, the federal government and taxpayers assume nearly all the risk and are left with the costs. Education’s Analysis Shows That Default Rates Are Higher at Proprietary Schools than at Public and Private Non-Profit Schools and Studies Link High Default Rates to Borrowers’ Characteristics
Default Rates of Borrowers from Proprietary Schools Are Higher than Those of Borrowers from Other Schools and Increase over Time
Default rates measured 2 years after students begin repaying their loans show that students from proprietary schools have higher default rates than students from public and private non-profit schools. Among 4-year schools, the default rates at 2, 3, and 4 years into repayment are higher among proprietary schools than other schools. In several of the studies, two borrower characteristics closely linked to higher default rates are low family income and parents who lack a higher education degree. Weaknesses in Education’s Oversight of Federal Aid Eligibility Requirements Place Students and Title IV Funds at Risk of Potential Fraud and Abuse at Proprietary Schools
Education’s Weak Oversight of ATB Test Requirements Allows Ineligible Students to Receive Federal Aid
Through separate investigations at proprietary schools, we, along with other federal and state investigative agencies, found test administrators or school officials violating rules to ensure prospective students without high school diplomas passed required tests and obtained access to Title IV aid. Each analyst was sent separately to the school and on both occasions, the independent test administrator gave them and all the test takers in the room–about 20 in total–answers to some of the test questions. We later obtained copies of the analysts’ test forms and found that they had been tampered with–their actual answers had been crossed out and changed–to ensure the analysts passed and would become eligible to receive Title IV funds. As a result, prospective students who are academically unqualified are more likely to be admitted to a school and receive federal student aid. Through one of our site visits and interviews with students and student interest groups, we learned of cases where recruiters at two separate publicly traded proprietary schools referred students to diploma mills for invalid high school diplomas in order to gain access to federal loans without having to take an ATB test. In addition, taxpayers and the government, which guarantees the loans, are left with the cost when students default on their school loans. While our findings do not represent nor should they be interpreted as implying widespread problems at all proprietary schools, our work has identified significant vulnerabilities in Education’s oversight that should be addressed. Unqualified students who receive federal financial aid for higher education programs are at greater risk of dropping out of school, incurring substantial debt, and defaulting on federal loans. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing two research questions: (1) How does the student loan default profile of proprietary schools compare with that of other types of schools? Analysis of Education Policies and Records
To determine the extent to which Education’s policies and procedures for monitoring student eligibility requirements for federal aid at proprietary schools protect students and the investment of Title IV funds, we reviewed Education’s policies and procedures for monitoring the administration of ability-to-benefit (ATB) tests and high school diploma requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
For-profit schools-also known as proprietary schools-received over $16 billion in federal loans, grants, and campus-based aid under Title IV of the Higher Education Act in 2007/08. GAO was asked to determine (1) how the student loan default profile of proprietary schools compares with that of other types of schools and (2) the extent to which Education's policies and procedures for monitoring student eligibility requirements for federal aid at proprietary schools protect students and the investment of Title IV funds. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data and records from Education, examined Education's policies and procedures, reviewed relevant research studies, conducted site visits and undercover investigations at proprietary schools, and interviewed officials from Education, higher education associations, and state oversight agencies.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education makes loans available to students to help them pay for higher education at public, private non-profit, and proprietary schools, and the students who attend proprietary schools are most likely to default on these loans, according to analysis of recent student loan data. Students from proprietary schools have higher default rates than students from other schools at 2, 3, and 4 years into repayment. Academic researchers have found that higher default rates at proprietary schools are linked to the characteristics of the students who attend these schools. Specifically, students who come from low income backgrounds and from families who lack higher education are more likely to default on their loans, and data show that students from proprietary schools are more likely to come from low income families and have parents who do not hold a college degree. Borrowers who are not successful in school and drop out also have high default rates. Ultimately, when student loan defaults occur, both taxpayers and the government, which guarantees the loans, are left with the costs. Although students must meet certain eligibility requirements to demonstrate that they have the ability to succeed in school before they receive federal loans, weaknesses in Education's oversight of these requirements place students and federal funds at risk of potential fraud and abuse at proprietary schools. Students are required to pass a test of basic math and English skills or have a high school diploma or GED to qualify for federal student aid. Yet, GAO and others have found violations of these requirements. For example, when GAO analysts posing as prospective students took the basic skills test at a local proprietary school, the independent test administrator gave out answers to some of the test questions. In addition, the analysts' test forms were tampered with-their actual answers were crossed out and changed-to ensure the individuals passed the test. GAO also identified cases in which officials at two proprietary schools helped prospective students obtain invalid high school diplomas from diploma mills in order to gain access to federal loans. GAO's findings do not represent nor imply widespread problems at all proprietary schools. However, GAO's work has identified significant vulnerabilities in Education's oversight. Education's inadequate monitoring of basic skills tests and lack of guidance on valid high school diplomas enables unqualified students to gain access to federal student aid. Unqualified students are at greater risk of dropping out of school, incurring substantial debt, and defaulting on federal loans. |
gao_GAO-03-644 | gao_GAO-03-644_0 | Multiple Factors Contributed to the Food Crisis
The immediate factor contributing to the food crisis was the erratic weather patterns that disrupted the normal growing cycle, causing maize production in southern Africa to drop from a 5-year average of about 7.3 million MT to about 5.2 million MT in 2002. The dramatic reduction in available maize can also be linked to a weak agricultural sector and government actions, such as Malawi’s decision to sell off its strategic grain reserve and Zimbabwe’s fast-tracked land reform. Widespread Poverty Contributed to Food Insecurity
The six nations affected by the food crisis are generally low-income countries. HIV/AIDS Reduces Food Supplies
HIV/AIDS has decreased household food production by attacking people in their most productive working years, thus reducing the labor force. Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted
By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93 percent of the regional cereal gap appeared to have been met. Slow Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with Biotech Food Were Major Obstacles to an Effective Response
Major obstacles to the food aid effort’s success were the lack of sufficient, timely food donations; poor infrastructure in recipient countries; and concerns associated with biotech food. Nonetheless, in aggregate, donors did not make sufficient, timely donations to WFP. Despite the United States’ early and large donations, the impasse over biotech food significantly compromised the food pipeline in several ways: Food aid was reduced and delayed. Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic Pose Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained Recovery
The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into sustained recovery include (1) a decline in agriculture sector investments; (2) limited scope of existing programs in agricultural development; and (3) the negative impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, this does not negate the overall declining trend in agricultural lending between 1990 and 2000. Without a concerted strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, destabilizing food crises are likely to recur. USAID objected to our use of the term “biotech food aid,” noting that the United States provides food aid from the general U.S. food supply, which may contain biotech crops. U.N. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The southern Africa food crisis threatened 15.3 million people in six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO was asked to look at (1) factors that contributed to the crisis, (2) how well the populations' needs were met, (3) obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4) challenges to emerging from crisis.
What GAO Found
Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather reduced maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural sector caused food supply shortages. Government actions--including the sale of Malawi's grain reserve and Zimbabwe's land reform--further cut available food. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by reducing the labor force. Food aid averted famine, but the overall response did not prevent widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereal gap--the difference between domestic needs and production--was met by the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period. However, food aid deliveries fell short in several countries, and vulnerable households had limited ability to purchase commercial maize. Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns about biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response. Excluding the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, timely donations to the World Food Program. Poor transportation systems and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery. Zambia rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech food; other countries required milling maize for the same reason. This compromised the food aid pipeline given the United States was the region's key donor and its aid may contain biotech food. Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/AIDS epidemic pose challenges to emerging from crisis into sustained recovery. U.N. and U.S. officials cite the need to reverse declining trends in agricultural investments by international financing organizations, national governments, and donors. Without a strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, food crises will recur. |
gao_GAO-12-1014 | gao_GAO-12-1014_0 | DOD Assessed Skills and Competencies for a Majority of Its Mission- Critical Occupations, but the Assessments Varied Widely
Section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code requires that DOD’s strategic workforce plan include an assessment of the critical skills and competencies of the existing civilian-employee workforce and DOD, in response to that requirement, assessed to varying degrees the existing critical skills and competencies for 21 of its 22 mission-critical occupations. DOD is also required to report on the critical skills and competencies that will be needed in its future workforces. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 repealed this requirement, and enacted section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code. DOD Did Not Assess the Appropriate Mix of Military, Civilian, and Contractor Personnel Capabilities
DOD, in its 2010-2018 workforce plan, did not include an assessment of the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel or an assessment of the capabilities of each of these workforces. For example, a February 2005 DOD directive states that missions shall be accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel (military, civilian, and contract) consistent with military requirements and other needs of the department. In the meantime, the functional communities did not provide all required information, in part, because the department did not request it. DOD Developed Results-Oriented Performance Measures to Assess Progress, but These Measures Do Not Fully Align with Congressional Reporting Requirements
DOD developed five performance measures to assess progress in implementing its strategic workforce plan, and the measures generally align with the department’s goals. Section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code requires DOD to include in its 2010-2018 strategic workforce plan an assessment of, among other things, gaps in the existing and future civilian workforce that should be addressed to ensure that the department has continued access to the critical skills and competencies, and the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities. Further, while DOD officials have stated that they do not have the necessary tools in place to conduct gap analyses across the board, the department has not reported the results of any gap analyses that it has conducted nor provided reporting timeframes for conducting remaining gap analyses; this situation diminishes the plan’s utility as a workforce planning document. Finally, where DOD has identified performance measures and indicated progress toward the goals of the strategic plan, those measures are not, in all cases, aligned with DOD’s congressionally mandated reporting requirements; also, the measures do not provide detail about how DOD plans to meet those requirements, making it difficult for DOD to demonstrate progress. To enhance the information that DOD provides Congress in its strategic workforce plan, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to provide guidance for developing future strategic workforce plans that clearly directs the functional communities to collect information that identifies not only the number or percentage of personnel in its military, civilian, and contractor workforces but also the capabilities of the appropriate mix of those three workforces. We first reported on DOD’s strategic workforce planning for its civilian workforce in 2004. DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that DOD conduct gap analyses for DOD’s mission-critical occupations and report on the results, and, when managers cannot conduct such analyses, report a timeline for providing these assessments. However, we reported that DOD is required to include an assessment of competency gaps in its existing and future civilian employee workforces, and that our analyses found that DOD’s functional community managers reported conducting gap assessments for only 8 of DOD’s 22 mission-critical occupations. However, our analysis did find that DOD continues to struggle to meet its statutory reporting requirements. We also met with functional community managers in the information technology, financial management, logistics, and law enforcement communities to determine how each of these communities conducted their strategic workforce planning and how coordination occurred between the various levels of DOD. To determine the extent to which DOD assessed existing and future critical skills, competencies, and gaps in its civilian workforce, we reviewed information and data contained in DOD’s 2010-2018 strategic workforce plan to identify which of the functional communities completed these assessments, the methods and tools that the functional communities used to conduct the assessments, and the extent to which the functional communities reported the results of their assessments. To determine the extent to which DOD assessed its progress in implementing its strategic workforce plan by using results-oriented performance measures, we reviewed DOD’s 2010-2018 strategic workforce plan to identify the performance measures DOD chose to assess its implementation of its plan. DOD Civilian Workforce: Observations on DOD’s Efforts to Plan for Civilian Workforce Requirements. Human Capital: Opportunities Exist for DOD to Enhance Its Approach for Determining Civilian Senior Leader Workforce Needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of June 2012, DOD reported a full-time civilian workforce of about 780,000 personnel. According to DOD, about 30 percent of its civilian workforce and 60 percent of its civilian senior leaders will be eligible to retire by March 31, 2015. Such potential loss may result in significant skill gaps. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires GAO to submit a report on DOD's 2010-2018 strategic civilian workforce plan. In response, GAO determined the extent to which DOD identified critical skills, competencies, and gaps; assessed its workforce mix; and measured progress in implementing its strategic workforce plan. GAO analyzed DOD's strategic workforce plan and supporting documents, and met with managers of four functional communities within the civilian personnel community (information technology, financial management, logistics, and law enforcement), because they represent the three largest and the one smallest of the functional communities, to determine how they conducted their strategic workforce planning.
What GAO Found
Over the last decade, Congress has passed legislation requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct human capital planning efforts for the department's civilian workforce. Specifically, section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code, enacted in October 2009, requires DOD to develop and submit to congressional defense committees a strategic workforce plan to shape and improve the department's civilian workforce. Among other things, the law requires DOD to report on the mission-critical skills, competencies, and gaps in its existing and future civilian workforces; the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities; and the department's progress in implementing its strategic workforce plan using results-oriented performance measures. While DOD has addressed some of its reporting requirements to some extent, it has not addressed others.
DOD, to varying degrees, assessed the existing and future critical skills and competencies for 21 of the 22 occupations that it has identified as mission critical, but conducted competency gap assessments only for 8 of these 22 occupations. In some but not all cases, DOD provided details about skills and competencies. However, it did not report the results of any of its gap analyses for its mission-critical occupations.
DOD did not assess the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor workforces or provide an assessment of the capabilities of each of these workforces. Only two of the civilian community managers who provided input presented data on all three workforces. The remaining nine community managers provided data only on military and civilian personnel. DOD guidance requires, among other things, that DOD missions be accomplished with the least costly mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, consistent with military requirements and other needs of the department.
DOD assessed progress in implementing its strategic workforce plan by using newly developed measures that contain characteristics of valid results-oriented performance measures, but these measures are not aligned with DOD's statutory reporting requirements. For example, although DOD is required to conduct gap analyses and assess its workforce mix, it is unclear how the measures that DOD developed will help to address these requirements.
The input to DOD's strategic workforce plan on critical skills and competencies varied, in part, because the reporting template that DOD sent to its civilian personnel community managers did not contain sufficient detail and clear definitions. Also, the template did not provide departmental expectations for conducting gap analyses or communicate clear guidance for reporting on workforce mix assessments. Without sufficiently detailed guidance to help ensure complete reporting, input into future plans will continue to vary and the plan's usefulness as a workforce planning document will be diminished. Further, in those cases where DOD's performance measures are not aligned with its congressionally mandated reporting requirements, it is difficult for DOD to demonstrate progress against those requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommendations include that DOD issue clearer guidance for assessing its skills and competencies, conduct and report on gap analysis of mission-critical occupations, clarify its guidance for assessing workforce mix issues, and enhance its performance measures to align with congressionally mandated reporting requirements. DOD concurred or partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. While DOD raised some issues about the need for further actions, GAO continues to believe that DOD's workforce planning could be enhanced. |
gao_GAO-17-633T | gao_GAO-17-633T_0 | Improper Payments Remain a Significant and Pervasive Government-Wide Issue
As we recently reported, improper payments remain a significant and pervasive government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003—when certain agencies began reporting improper payments as required by IPIA— cumulative reported improper payment estimates have totaled over $1.2 trillion, as shown in figure 1. For fiscal year 2016, agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling $144.3 billion, an increase of over $7 billion from the prior year’s estimate of $136.7 billion. As we have previously reported, the federal government faces multiple challenges that hinder its efforts to determine the full extent of and reduce improper payments. Changes in VA’s Evaluation Procedures Caused Significant Increases in Reported Improper Payment Estimates since Fiscal Year 2013
For fiscal year 2016, VA’s reported improper payment estimate totaled $5.5 billion, an increase of about $500 million from the prior year. Specifically, for fiscal year 2016, VA’s reported improper payment estimate for VA’s Community Care was approximately $3.6 billion (about 65 percent of VA’s total reported improper payments estimate) and for VA’s Purchased Long-Term Services and Support was approximately $1.2 billion (about 22 percent of VA’s total reported improper payments estimate). The significant increase in VA’s reported improper payment estimates and error rates primarily occurred, according to the VA OIG, because VA changed its sample evaluation procedures in fiscal year 2015, which resulted in more improper payments being identified. The OIG reported that when those purchases do not follow applicable legal requirements, such as having FAR-compliant contracts in place, the resulting payments are improper because they “should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements, according to the definition of improper payments set forth in OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C.” As a result of the change in its sample evaluation procedures, VA reported significant increases in estimated improper payments for both its Community Care and Purchased Long- Term Services and Support programs. Ongoing Efforts for Reducing Improper Payments at VA
According to OMB guidance, to reduce improper payments, VA can use root cause analysis to identify why improper payments are occurring and develop effective corrective actions to address those causes. VA can implement our recommendations from these two reports to better ensure the accuracy of or eligibility for disability benefits. According to VA’s fiscal year 2016 agency financial report, the root cause for over three-fourths of VA’s reported fiscal year 2016 improper payment estimates was program design or structural issues. In the fiscal year 2016 agency financial report, VA provided details on how it plans to correct some program design issues by making its procurement practices compliant with relevant laws and regulations. VA reported that most of these errors occurred in its Compensation program. In November 2014, we reported that while VA pays billions of dollars to millions of disabled veterans, there were problems with VA’s ability to ensure that claims were processed accurately and consistently by its regional offices. We also identified shortcomings in quality review practices that could reduce their effectiveness. To date, VA has implemented six of the report’s eight recommendations. VA has initiated action on the remaining two recommendations related to quality review of the claims processes. VA stated that this new database will support increased data analysis capabilities and allow the agency to evaluate the effectiveness of quality assurance activities through improved and vigorous error rate trend analysis. In conclusion, in light of VA’s significant financial management challenges, we continue to be concerned about VA’s ability to reasonably ensure its resources are being used cost-effectively and efficiently. While VA has taken several actions to help prevent improper payments, further efforts are needed to help minimize the risks of improper payments across its programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
For several years, GAO has reported in its audit reports on the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government that the federal government is unable to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that actions are taken to reduce them.
Strong financial management practices, including effective internal control, are important for federal agencies to better detect and prevent improper payments. VA faces significant financial management challenges. In 2015, GAO designated VA health care as a high-risk area because of concern about VA's ability to ensure that its resources are being used cost effectively and efficiently to improve veterans' timely access to health care and to ensure the quality and safety of that care. Further, improving and modernizing federal disability programs has been on GAO's high-risk list since 2003, in part because of challenges that VA has faced in providing accurate, timely, and consistent disability decisions related to disability compensation. In addition, in VA's fiscal year 2016 agency financial report, the independent auditor cited material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.
This statement discusses improper payments on both the government-wide level and at VA. The statement also discusses certain actions that VA has taken and other actions that VA can take to reduce improper payments. This statement is based on GAO's recent work on improper payments and its analysis of agency financial reports and VA's Office of Inspector General reports.
What GAO Found
Improper payments, which generally include payments that should not have been made, were made in the incorrect amount, or were not supported by sufficient documentation, remain a significant and pervasive government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003—when certain agencies began reporting improper payments as required by the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002—cumulative improper payment estimates have totaled over $1.2 trillion. For fiscal year 2016, agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling $144.3 billion, an increase of about $7.6 billion from the prior year's estimate of $136.7 billion.
For fiscal year 2016, the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) reported improper payment estimate totaled $5.5 billion. VA's Community Care and Purchased Long-Term Services and Support programs accounted for reported improper payment estimates of $3.6 billion and $1.2 billion, respectively, or about 87 percent of VA's reported improper payment estimate for fiscal year 2016. VA's reported improper payment estimates increased significantly from $1.6 billion for fiscal year 2014 to $5.0 billion for fiscal year 2015. According to the VA Office of Inspector General, this increase was primarily due to a change in VA's evaluation procedures, which resulted in more improper payments being identified.
In accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidance, to reduce improper payments, VA can use detailed root cause analysis to identify why improper payments are occurring and to develop corrective actions. For example, according to VA, the root cause for over 75 percent of VA's reported improper payments for fiscal year 2016 was program design or structural issues. Most of these errors occurred in VA's health care area. To reduce these improper payments, VA stated that it will make its procurement practices compliant with Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions. GAO has also recommended steps that VA can take to reduce the risk of improper payments related to disability benefits. For example, in November 2014, GAO reported that VA had shortcomings in quality review practices that could reduce its ability to ensure accurate and consistent processing of disability compensation claim decisions, and GAO made eight related recommendations to improve the program. To date, VA has implemented six of the report's eight recommendations and expects to implement the other two recommendations related to the effectiveness of quality assurance activities later this summer. |
gao_GAO-14-50 | gao_GAO-14-50_0 | These payments include royalties, rents, and other payments—items generally specified within the lease terms. In addition to the collection of these payments by Interior, the federal government assesses taxes on the profits companies earn on the sale of oil and gas produced from federal leases. In our May 2007 report, we found that, based on results of a number of studies, the government receives one of the lowest government takes in the world. Interior Has Taken Some Steps to Help Ensure a Fair Return but Does Not Have Procedures for Periodically Conducting Assessments of the Fiscal System
Interior has taken some steps to help ensure a fair return on federal oil and gas resources since our 2007 report, including: (1) changing offshore lease terms, while considering but not making changes to onshore lease terms; (2) contracting for studies of various aspects of the fiscal system; and (3) examining potential regulatory changes that could simplify royalty payments and collections. In response to our 2008 findings, Interior contracted for a study—the 2011 Comparative Assessment of the Federal Oil and Gas Fiscal System study—that compared the federal oil and gas fiscal systems of selected federal oil and gas regions to that of other resource owners. According to Interior officials, the study conducted in response to our 2008 findings—the 2011 Comparative Assessment of the Federal Oil and Gas Fiscal System—provided some useful information about the fiscal system such as how fiscal terms in the United States compared with other resource owners, but it has not directly led to any changes to the fiscal system or lease terms for new federal oil and gas leases. Interior is examining potential regulatory changes that could simplify royalty payments and collections. As we found in our past work, complex valuation regulations can result in inaccurate royalty payments made by industry, and this could increase ONRR’s costs to ensure accurate royalty payments because of the need for potentially detailed and time-consuming audits of records. Interior did not meet this time frame due to several factors including the complexity of oil and gas valuation, according to Interior officials. According to ONRR officials, the proposed regulations were undergoing internal review as of September 2013 and are expected to be published in the Federal Register in 2014. Interior Does Not Have Documented Procedures for Conducting Periodic Assessments of the Fiscal System or for Supporting Potential Changes to New Lease Terms
Interior does not have documented procedures in place for determining (1) when to conduct periodic assessments of the overall fiscal system or (2) whether and how to make changes to lease terms for new offshore leases. Although Interior recently contracted for such an assessment, it was the first in well over 25 years. Without documented procedures, Interior cannot ensure that it will consistently conduct such assessments in the future, and without periodically conducting such assessments, Interior cannot know whether there is a proper balance between the attractiveness of federal leases for investment and appropriate returns for federal oil and gas resources, limiting Interior’s ability to ensure a fair return on federal oil and gas resources. Without documented procedures for determining whether and how to make changes to new offshore lease terms, Interior is at risk of making inconsistent determinations about lease terms. Officials told us Interior does not have documented procedures or criteria for determining whether and how to make changes to offshore lease terms. Conclusions
Interior has taken several steps intended to help ensure that the public receives a fair return on oil and gas produced from federal leases. Although leasing programs for both onshore and offshore areas are subject to many of the same market conditions, and Interior has increased offshore royalty rates, officials overseeing onshore leasing are currently unable to make timely adjustments to onshore royalty rates because, in general, BLM’s regulations fix the rate at 12.5 percent, potentially limiting Interior’s ability to ensure that the public is receiving a fair return and potentially resulting in foregone revenue. Without such documented procedures, Interior’s rationale is not transparent, and it is at risk of making inconsistent determinations about lease terms. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the government receives a fair return on its oil and gas resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior take the following three actions:
Take steps, within existing authority, to revise BLM’s regulations to provide for flexibility to the bureau to make changes to onshore royalty rates, similar to that which is already available for offshore leases, to enhance Interior’s ability to make timely adjustments to the terms for federal onshore leases. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, companies received over $66 billion from the sale of oil and gas produced from federal lands and waters, and they paid $10 billion to the federal government for developing these resources according to the Department of the Interior. The federal government seeks a fair return on its share of revenue from leasing and production activities on federal lands and waters through the federal oil and gas fiscal system. Under the fiscal system, companies pay royalties, rents, and other payments--payments generally specified in lease terms-- and taxes on profits from the sale of oil and gas produced from federal leases. In May 2007, GAO found, based on several studies, that the government received one of the lowest percentages of value of oil and gas produced in the world. In September 2008, GAO found that Interior had not evaluated the federal oil and gas fiscal system for over 25 years and recommended that a periodic assessment was needed.
GAO was asked to review Interior's collection of oil and gas revenues. This report examines steps Interior has taken to ensure the public receives a fair return on oil and gas resources since 2007. GAO reviewed applicable law and regulations; examined prior GAO studies, Interior policies and documents; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Interior has taken some steps intended to help ensure a fair return on federal oil and gas resources but does not have documented procedures for periodically conducting assessments of the fiscal system. Specifically, Interior has taken the following steps:
Changed offshore lease terms and considered but has not changed onshore lease terms . Interior changed certain offshore lease terms-- including raising royalty rates twice in response to changing market conditions. For onshore resources, which are subject to many of the same market conditions, Interior has considered but not made changes to royalty rates. Interior officials are currently unable to make timely adjustments to onshore royalty rates. Current regulations generally provide for a fixed onshore royalty rate that limits Interior's flexibility to make timely adjustments.
Contracted for studies of various aspects of the fiscal system . Interior contracted for three studies examining its fiscal system including a study done in 2011, in response to GAO's September 2008 report that compared the U.S. government's oil and gas fiscal system to other resource owners. Interior officials said the reports provided some useful information such as how fiscal terms in the United States compared to other resource owners.
Interior is examining potential regulatory changes that could simplify royalty payments . Interior is examining potential regulatory changes that could simplify royalty payments. GAO found in the past that complex valuation regulations can result in inaccurate royalty payments made by industry, and this could increase costs to ensure accurate royalty payments because of the need for potentially detailed and timeconsuming audits of records. In May 2011, Interior published the Advance Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking for a proposed rule currently undergoing internal review. According to officials, the proposed rule is expected to be published in 2014, and officials explained that it took several years due to factors including the complexity of oil and gas valuation.
Interior does not have documented procedures in place for determining when to conduct periodic assessments of the fiscal system. Although Interior recently contracted for such an assessment, it was the first in well over 25 years. Without documented procedures, Interior will not have reasonable assurance that it will consistently conduct such assessments in the future and, without periodically conducting such assessments, Interior cannot know whether there is a proper balance between the attractiveness of federal leases for investment and appropriate returns for federal oil and gas resources, limiting Interior's ability to ensure a fair return. Further, Interior does not have documented procedures for determining whether and how to make changes to new offshore lease terms. Without documented procedures for determining whether and how to make changes to new offshore lease terms, Interior's rationale is not transparent and may result in inconsistent decisions. Such inconsistencies would undermine Interior's credibility and ability to better ensure a fair return on federal oil and gas resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommendations include that Interior establish documented procedures for (1) periodically assessing the fiscal system and (2) determining whether and how to change new offshore lease terms. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-740T | gao_GAO-10-740T_0 | Framework for Fraud Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution
The results of our investigation serve to emphasize the overall lesson that a complete fraud prevention framework is necessary in order to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse within the SDVOSB program. The most effective and most efficient part of the framework involves the institution of rigorous controls at the beginning of the process for becoming eligible to bid on SDVOSB contracts. Next, active and continual monitoring of contractors performing SDVOSB contracts is also essential. Given the numerous examples we identified of firms owned by a service-disabled veteran who subcontracted 100 percent of contract work to non-SDVOSB firms, it is essential that program officials monitor compliance with program rules after contract performance has begun. Finally, as shown in our investigation, preventive and monitoring controls are not effective unless identified abusers are aggressively prosecuted and/or face other consequences such as suspension, debarment or termination of contracts and future contract options. Preventive Controls Reduce the Potential for Fraud through Limiting Access to SDVOSB Contracts
Preventive controls are a key element of an effective fraud prevention framework and are also described in the Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government. This firm is a prime example of why the relatively simple process of validating an individual’s status as a service-disabled veteran can prevent fraud within the SDVOSB program. Verifying businesses prior to site visits may allow ineligible firms to appear as eligible and to receive SDVOSB set-aside and sole-source contracts. In order for the SBA and VA to ensure the highest level of compliance with SDVOSB program requirements, there must be consequences for those firms that chose to fraudulently misrepresent themselves as SDVOSB firms. Referrals from GAO’s Investigation Have Resulted in Action from Agency Inspector General Offices
Our prior investigation into allegations of fraud and abuse within SDVOSB contracts found 10 firms that were ineligible for the program but received approximately $100 million in SDVOSB contracts. Upon completion of our investigation, we referred all 10 cases to various agency officials who had contracts with the firms and to each agency’s IG. Based on our referrals, agencies have taken a variety of actions including the termination of existing contracts, the decision not to extend contract performance by exercising future contract options, and the opening of civil and criminal investigations. IG officials have stated that most of their investigations are ongoing and that therefore, details cannot be provided because of the risk of jeopardizing the investigation. The subcontractor’s investigation determined one of its employees helped to perpetrate the fraud by creating fictitious documents at the request of the SDVOSB firm’s owner. Additionally, these 10 case-study firms have received more than $5 million in new contract obligations on SDVOSB sole-source and set-aside contacts and more than $10 million in other new contract obligations since November 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program is intended to provide federal contracting opportunities to qualified firms. In fiscal year 2008, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported $6.5 billion in sole-source, set-aside, and other SDVOSB contract awards. Testimonies GAO delivered on November 19 and December 16, 2009 identified millions of dollars in SDVOSB contracts that were awarded to ineligible firms, and weaknesses in fraud prevention controls at the SBA and VA which allowed ineligible firms to receive contracts. GAO was asked to testify about the key elements of a fraud prevention framework within the SDVOSB program and to provide an update on the status of fraud referrals made based on the prior investigation of selected SDVOSB firms. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed prior findings from audits and investigations of the SDVSOB program and contacted investigative agency officials concerning the referrals GAO made on prior work. GAO also reviewed applicable guidance on internal control standards from the Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government.
What GAO Found
GAO founda lack of government-wide prevention controls, a lack of validation of information provided by SDVOSB firms used to substantiate their eligibility for the program, non-existent monitoring of continued compliance with program requirements, and an ineffective process for investigating and prosecuting firms found to be abusing the program. The results of GAO's investigation serve to emphasize the overall lesson that a complete fraud prevention framework is necessary in order to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse within the SDVOSB program. The most effective and most efficient part of the framework involves the institution of rigorous controls at the beginning of the process for becoming eligible to bid on SDVOSB contracts. Next, active and continual monitoring of contractors performing SDVOSB contracts is also essential. Given the examples GAO identified of firms owned by a service-disabled veteran who subcontracted 100 percent of contract work to non-SDVOSB firms, it is essential that federal agencies monitor compliance with program rules after contract performance has begun. Finally, as shown in GAO's investigation, prevention and monitoring controls are not effective unless identified fraud is aggressively prosecuted or companies are suspended, debarred or otherwise held accountable. GAO's prior investigation into allegations of fraud and abuse within SDVOSB contracts found 10 firms that were ineligible for the program but received approximately $100 million in SDVOSB contracts. Upon completion of its investigation, GAO referred all 10 cases to various agency officials who had contracts with the firms, and each agency's Inspector General (IG). Based on the referrals, agencies have taken a variety of actions including the cancellation of existing contracts, termination of future contract options, and opening of civil and criminal investigations. IG officials have stated that many of their investigations are ongoing, and therefore details cannot be provided due to the risk of jeopardizing the investigation. These 10 companies have obtained over $5 million in new SDVOSB sole-source and set-aside contact obligations since November 2009. |
gao_GAO-05-364T | gao_GAO-05-364T_0 | Funding Has Escalated in Recent Years, but Is Difficult to Link to Performance Results
The Coast Guard’s 2006 budget request continues a trend of increasing budgets that began in fiscal year 2002, as figure 1 shows. The fiscal year 2006 budget request shows a $570 million increase to $8.1 billion, which is an increase of about 11 percent in its discretionary funding over the enacted budget for fiscal year 2005. 2). Efforts Made on Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Strategy Show Promise, but Concerns Remain
One of the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2006 priorities involves implementing a maritime strategy for homeland security. Major portions of this endeavor are heavily influenced by the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. Since MTSA was enacted, the Coast Guard has worked to address vulnerabilities by spurring the development of meaningful security plans for thousands of facilities and vessels in the nation’s ports. These are a new coastal communication system, called Rescue 21; a new field command structure, called Sectors; and efforts to improve readiness at multimission stations that conduct search and rescue as well as other missions. All three efforts carry some risk and will merit close attention. The Coast Guard has resolved some initial development problems that delayed the implementation of this new coastal command and control communication system and is now poised to move forward again, with a fiscal year 2006 budget request of $101 million. While the establishment of Sectors appears to be an important step that could positively affect the Coast Guard’s mission performance, the Coast Guard is likely to face a number of implementation challenges that it will need to overcome to help ensure success. Important but Costly Programs for Maintaining and Recapitalizing Deepwater Assets Need Careful Monitoring
The third Coast Guard priority involves the single largest and most complex acquisition program in the agency’s history—a project designed to improve the mission performance of the range of cutters and aircraft that currently conduct the agency’s offshore missions. As it undergoes a transformation to these new or upgraded assets, the Coast Guard is also faced with sustaining its legacy assets to ensure that they can continue to perform the Coast Guard’s missions until new or upgraded assets are in place. And, although funding in the fourth year of the program (fiscal year 2005) exceeded the Coast Guard’s request by about $46 million, the early shortfalls, according to the Coast Guard, resulted in schedule slippage and led to increases in the total projected costs for the program. In most cases, however, while actions are under way to address these concerns, management challenges remain that may take some time to fully address. According to the Coast Guard, some of the functional capabilities now deemed to be required include the following: Rotary wing airborne use of force and vertical insertion/vertical delivery Greater speed, a larger flight deck, and automated defensive and weapons systems for the National Security Cutter and Offshore Patrol Cutter classes; A common operating picture (COP) for the entire Coast Guard (and maritime ports of a unified Department of Homeland Security COP), an interoperable network to improve performance in all mission areas, and a Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility for improved intelligence capabilities; and Chemical, biological, radiological defense and decontamination capability While we have not conducted an analysis of the likely cost and schedule impact of the revised MNS requirements, they undoubtedly will have an effect on cost and schedule. So far, the Coast Guard’s budget plans and requests do not address this potential need. We think the issues we have highlighted are potential areas for ongoing congressional attention, and we will continue to work with the Coast Guard on them. Marine environmental protection. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's budget has steadily increased in recent years, reflecting the agency's need to address heightened homeland security responsibilities while also addressing traditional programs such as rescuing mariners in distress and protecting important fishing grounds. The fiscal year 2006 budget request, which totals $8.1 billion, reflects an increase of $570 million over the previous year. GAO has conducted reviews of many of the Coast Guard's programs in recent years, and this testimony synthesizes the results of these reviews as they pertain to three priority areas in the Coast Guard's budget: (1) implementing a maritime strategy for homeland security, (2) enhancing performance across missions, and (3) recapitalizing the Coast Guard, especially the Deepwater program--an acquisition that involves replacing or upgrading cutters and aircraft that are capable of performing missions far out at sea. GAO's observations are aimed at highlighting potential areas for ongoing congressional attention.
What GAO Found
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 charged the Coast Guard with many maritime homeland security responsibilities, such as assessing port vulnerabilities and ensuring that vessels and port facilities have adequate security plans, and the Coast Guard has worked hard to meet these requirements. GAO's reviews of these efforts have disclosed some areas for attention as well, such as developing ways to ensure that security plans are carried out with vigilance. The Coast Guard has taken steps to deal with some of these areas, but opportunities for improvement remain. The Coast Guard has three efforts under way that hold promise for enhancing mission performance but also merit ongoing attention. One is a new coastal communication system. The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $101 million to move the system forward. A successful system would help almost all Coast Guard missions, but to develop it the Coast Guard must build more than 300 towers along the nation's coasts, some of them in environmentally sensitive areas. The second effort involves restructuring the Coast Guard's field units--tying resources and command authority closer together. This effort represents a major organizational change, and as such, it may be challenging to implement successfully. The third effort, enhancing readiness at the Coast Guard's stations for search and rescue and other missions, remains a work in process. The Deepwater program, which would receive $966 million under the budget request, appears to merit the most ongoing attention. GAO reviews of this program have shown that the Coast Guard clearly needs new or upgraded assets, but the Coast Guard's contracting approach carries a number of inherent risks that, left unaddressed, could lead to spiraling costs and slipped schedules. The Coast Guard is taking some action in this regard, but GAO continues to regard this approach as carrying substantial risk. Some expansion of cost and slippage in schedule has already occurred. |
gao_GAO-15-768 | gao_GAO-15-768_0 | Federal internal control standards suggest that agencies should monitor performance data to assess the quality of performance over time. DOD Has Not Systematically Monitored the Availability of Covered Medications or the Timeliness and Accuracy of Prescriptions Filled for the Pilot across MTF Pharmacies
For the pilot, DOD has not systematically monitored the availability of covered medications, or the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled across MTF pharmacies. According to the standards for internal control in the federal government, agencies should establish and review performance standards, and then monitor these data to assess the quality of performance over time. DOD has not established performance standards across MTF pharmacies for ensuring that covered medications are available and prescriptions are filled in a timely and accurate manner for pilot beneficiaries. DOD Has Not Monitored Beneficiary Satisfaction with the Pilot
DOD has not monitored the extent to which beneficiaries who participated in the pilot were satisfied with the transfer of prescriptions to mail order or MTF pharmacies. Federal internal control standards suggest that agencies obtain information from external stakeholders who may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Federal internal control standards also require agencies to monitor and assess the quality of performance over time in order to ensure that findings are promptly resolved. By not separately surveying pilot beneficiaries’ satisfaction with mail order or MTF pharmacies, DOD does not know whether beneficiaries faced any difficulties obtaining their covered medications, which is particularly important to monitor during transitions of care. For mail order, DOD officials who monitor the pilot told us they have relied on the results from a quarterly survey of all TRICARE mail-order pharmacy users— the TRICARE Mail-Order Pharmacy Satisfaction Survey—to assess the satisfaction of pilot beneficiaries. However, other DOD officials who monitor the survey results said they do not recommend generalizing the survey results to the overall TRICARE mail-order population or to pilot beneficiaries, thus making the use of these data for this purpose questionable. DOD Has Issued Regulations, but Has Not Finalized Planning Documents for the Expansion of the Pilot Requirements
As of August 6, 2015, DOD issued an interim final rule implementing the expansion of the pilot requirements to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries.developing planning documents for the expansion of the pilot requirements to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries, but have not finalized these documents. Officials said these contract requirements will likely model those that were developed for the pilot, including requiring ESI to report monthly cost savings estimates. We recognize that NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 shortened the period of the pilot; however, the lack of systematic monitoring that we identified and discussed earlier in the report suggests that DOD, in planning for the expansion of the pilot requirements, would benefit from enhanced emphasis on the monitoring of the availability of covered medications, the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled through mail order and MTF pharmacies, and beneficiary satisfaction. These savings are expected to grow once the requirements of the pilot are expanded to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our audit findings and conclusions, as well as our recommendation that planning documents for the expansion should include requirements to monitor affected beneficiaries, including the availability of covered medications, the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled, and the satisfaction of beneficiaries with mail order and MTF pharmacies. Appendix I: Methodologies to Develop the TRICARE for Life Pharmacy Pilot’s Cost Savings Estimates
The estimated cost savings for the first year of the pilot of $123 million were generally comparable to the projected cost savings of approximately $120 million that the Department of Defense (DOD) reported prior to the start of the pilot. To develop the cost savings estimate of $123 million for the first year of the pilot (February 15, 2014 through February 28, 2015), ESI officials explained that they used data from February 15, 2014 through February 28, 2015 to determine that approximately 785,000 prescriptions for covered medications were filled through mail order for the pilot, determined the mail-order cost of these prescriptions, typically filled for a 90-day supply, including ingredient cost, dispensing fees, and administrative fees, converted the mail-order cost of each of these prescriptions from a 90-day supply to the cost for a 30-day supply (e.g., the ingredient cost for a 90-day supply at mail order of $30 would have been $10 for a 30-day supply at a retail pharmacy), determined what the cost would have been for these prescriptions if they had been filled at a retail pharmacy, typically filled for a 30-day supply, calculated the difference between the copayments at mail order to the copayments that beneficiaries would pay at retail pharmacies, calculated the total cost savings for filling these 785,000 prescriptions through mail order instead of at retail pharmacy: total ingredient cost difference plus dispensing fee difference plus administrative fee difference less copayment difference. Mail Order Pharmacies: DOD’s Use of VA’s Mail Pharmacy Could Produce Savings and Other Benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD offers a pharmacy benefit to TRICARE beneficiaries who may obtain prescriptions from TRICARE's mail-order program, MTF pharmacies, or retail pharmacies. In 2013, the DOD Inspector General reported it was more cost efficient to fill prescriptions through mail order than retail pharmacies. To reduce costs, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 required DOD to implement a pilot for certain TRICARE beneficiaries to obtain covered brand maintenance medications through mail order or MTF pharmacies. Under NDAA 2015, the pilot terminates at the end of fiscal year 2015, after which the pilot requirements are to be expanded to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries.
The NDAA 2015 included a provision for GAO to examine the pilot. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) monitored whether covered brand maintenance medications were available, and prescriptions were filled on time and accurately, (2) monitored the satisfaction of participating beneficiaries, (3) achieved expected cost savings, and (4) prepared for the expansion. GAO reviewed and analyzed pilot performance and beneficiary satisfaction data, and cost savings estimates, and interviewed DOD officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
For covered brand maintenance medications—those medications that are taken on a regular and recurring basis—the Department of Defense (DOD) has not fully monitored availability or the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled for the TRICARE for Life Pharmacy Pilot. Specifically, GAO found that for the
mail-order program: DOD has monitored the availability of medications. It has also established and monitored performance standards on the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled through mail order for all of TRICARE, but has not separately monitored performance through mail order for the pilot.
military-treatment-facility (MTF) pharmacies: DOD has not established or systematically monitored performance standards for the pilot on the availability of covered medications, or the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled across MTF pharmacies.
Federal internal control standards suggest that agencies establish and review performance standards and monitor performance data to assess the quality of performance over time. Without fully monitoring the pilot's performance, DOD does not know whether it is working as intended, information that would be beneficial given the upcoming expansion of its requirements to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries.
DOD has not monitored the extent to which beneficiaries were satisfied with the transfer of prescriptions to mail order or MTF pharmacies for the pilot. DOD officials said they relied on the results from a quarterly survey of TRICARE mail-order users to assess the satisfaction of pilot beneficiaries. However, other DOD officials who monitor the survey data said they do not know how representative the respondents are of pilot beneficiaries making the use of these data for this purpose questionable. Moreover, DOD has not monitored satisfaction of pilot beneficiaries across MTF pharmacies. Federal internal control standards require agencies to obtain information from external stakeholders to assess if they are achieving their goals, and to monitor and assess the quality of performance over time to ensure that issues are resolved. Without this stakeholder input, DOD lacks important information as to whether pilot beneficiaries faced any difficulties, including with obtaining their medications.
DOD appears to have achieved its expected cost savings based on estimates GAO reviewed. For the first year of the pilot, DOD's estimated cost savings were approximately $123 million based on the prescriptions for covered medications filled through mail order. This was comparable to DOD's projected cost savings of $120 million, an estimate that DOD developed prior to the start of the pilot.
DOD has issued regulations, but not finalized planning documents for the expansion of the pilot requirements. Officials said that they are in the process of developing planning documents, which will generally model those that were developed for the pilot. Given the limited monitoring conducted during the pilot, as it finalizes its planning documents for the expansion of the pilot to all eligible TRICARE beneficiaries, DOD would benefit from developing a robust monitoring process of affected beneficiaries, including the availability of medications, the timeliness and accuracy of prescriptions filled, and beneficiary satisfaction.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a monitoring plan as part of its expansion planning documents. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-75 | gao_T-AIMD-96-75_0 | Our ongoing assessment has found that IRS has initiated a number of activities and made some progress in addressing our recommendations to improve management of information systems; enhance its software development capability; and better define, perform, and manage TSM’s technical activities. Consequently, IRS today is not in an appreciably better position than it was a year ago to ensure the Congress that it will spend its 1996 and future TSM appropriations judiciously and effectively. Since then, IRS has performed an electronic filing marketing analysis at local levels; developed a marketing plan to promote electronic filing; consolidated 21 electronic filing initiatives into its Electronic Filing Strategies portfolio; and initiated a reengineering project to begin this month with a goal to reduce paper tax return filings to 20 percent or less of the total volume by 2000. For example, IRS has created the executive-level Investment Review Board for selecting, controlling, and evaluating all information technology investments; developed initial and revised sets of decision criteria that it used last summer to rank and prioritize TSM projects and used it in November 1995 to recommend additional changes to information systems resource allocations, respectively; developed its Investment Evaluation Handbook and Business Case Handbook to strengthen management decision-making on systems investments; and is using the Investment Evaluation Handbook to review operational TSM projects. Specifically, Cyberfile is not being developed (1) using disciplined systems development processes and (2) to provide the security needed to protect taxpayer data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Tax Systems Modernization (TSM) plan, focusing on IRS efforts to correct: (1) management and technical weaknesses that have impeded TSM; and (2) analogous technical weaknesses in its Cyberfile initiative.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although IRS has enhanced its software development capability and better defined TSM performance and management activities, it is unable to assure Congress that it can spend its 1996 and future TSM appropriations judiciously and effectively; (2) IRS has performed an electronic filing marketing analysis at the local level, developed a marketing plan to promote electronic filing, consolidated 21 electronic filing initiatives into its Electronic Filing Strategies portfolio, and initiated a project to reduce paper tax return filings by 20 percent in 2000; (3) IRS has created an executive-level investment review board to select, control, and evaluate information technology investments, and developed an investment evaluation handbook and business case handbook to strengthen management's decisionmaking concerning system investments; (4) IRS has standardized new and existing contracts and initiated plans to acquire expertise in software capability evaluations; (5) Cyberfile does not use disciplined systems development processes or provide taxpayers with data confidentiality; and (6) because IRS Cyberfile project planning is schedule driven, security policies, security architecture, and testing plans cannot be made. |
gao_GAO-07-764 | gao_GAO-07-764_0 | Prominent among the stewardship contracting authorities is the ability to (1) trade goods—timber, for example—for contract services, such as thinning of small trees and brush, and (2) retain for use in future stewardship projects any revenue generated through selling forest products such as timber, rather than returning the revenue to the Department of the Treasury, as is required for traditional timber sales. These timber sales are funded by the Management of Lands and Resources appropriation, which was $10.4 million in fiscal year 2006. The Forest Service’s Aggregation of Obligation and Expenditure Data Hinders Field-Level Project Management
The Forest Service tracks obligation and expenditure data at the program and forest levels through its accounting system—the Department of Agriculture’s Foundation Financial Information System (FFIS). To compensate for the lack of detailed information, field managers have spent considerable time and effort to develop and maintain a variety of “cuff records,” such as spreadsheets, that contain the data they need to manage their projects, including timber sales. These obligations include costs for personnel, vehicles, and supplies and equipment. Lacking the System Data They Need, Many Field Managers Rely on Cuff Records
Although several Forest Service officials contend that information on district- and project-level obligations and expenditures is not needed, managers we talked to at various levels of the Service’s field organization said they rely on cuff records, such as spreadsheets, to track this information and help manage their projects. As a result, these managers have created cuff records to monitor projects as they proceed. Forest Service headquarters officials told us that the agency has not attempted to determine the amount of time currently spent by field managers tracking this information or the associated costs of doing so. Both Agencies Have Systems That Track Revenue by Timber Sale
The Timber Sale Accounting system maintains the Forest Service’s timber sales revenue data, while two systems—the Timber Sale Information System and the Collections and Billing System—maintain BLM’s timber sales revenue data. The system tracks the volume, type, and value of timber harvested by individual timber sale; automatically generates bills to timber purchasers; and tracks payments against these bills. TSA tracks revenue from sales conducted with appropriated monies as well as those conducted with monies from the salvage sale and pipeline funds. TSA maintains timber sales revenue data by individual timber sale contract or permit. The reporting system in CBS allows staff to track revenue in various ways, such as by sale, purchaser, type of timber, or fund. BLM developed a separate system for recording revenue from timber sales conducted under stewardship contracting authority, the Stewardship Contracting Information Database (SCID). Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that field managers responsible for carrying out Forest Service operations have the data they need to manage effectively, and to provide the Congress and the public with useful cost data to assess the fiscal accountability of Service operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to systematically determine the information needs of the field managers on whom the Service relies to carry out its operations, and, based on the results of this analysis, take appropriate action to provide data that meet those information needs. In addition, given that the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) also conducts timber sales, we included that agency in our review. Specifically, our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) the Forest Service tracks timber sales-related obligations and expenditures, including the extent to which the Service uses this information in making management decisions; (2) BLM tracks timber sales-related obligations and expenditures, and how BLM’s methods for doing so compare to those of the Forest Service; and (3) the Forest Service and BLM account for their timber sales-related revenue. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, GAO has raised concerns about the ability of the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (Service) to track the amounts it obligates for and spends on timber sales and to use this information in managing the sales. Timber sales are generally carried out by ranger districts (the lowest level of the Service's decentralized organizational structure), which are overseen by national forest offices. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior also conducts timber sales. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Forest Service tracks timber sales-related obligations and expenditures, including the extent to which the Service uses this information in making management decisions; (2) BLM tracks timber sales-related obligations and expenditures; and (3) both agencies track their timber sales-related revenue.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service tracks the funds it spends to conduct timber sales--such as funds for personnel and equipment--in a way that does not provide the detailed data many field managers, such as district rangers and forest supervisors, told us they need in order to properly manage these sales. The Service's accounting system aggregates obligation and expenditure data by the programs that fund the sales--such as the Forest Products Program and the Salvage Sale Program--and by national forest, rather than by individual timber sale or by ranger district. Forest Service headquarters officials told us that field managers do not need sale-by-sale or district-level data. However, many field managers told us that such data are crucial to their management of timber sales. For example, without such data to monitor the progress and cost of individual sales, field managers have difficulty both knowing when to redirect resources among sales and assessing the cost-effectiveness of individual sales. Without detailed data in the Service's accounting system, many field managers have developed manual "cuff records," such as spreadsheets, to maintain obligation and expenditure data at the individual sale or ranger district level. However, maintaining these cuff records can be time consuming, according to field managers, and can thus take time away from conducting "on the ground" activities such as overseeing timber harvests. Although headquarters officials said that aggregating data has reduced the cost of managing the accounting system data, the resources field managers are expending to compensate for the lack of detailed system data may partially offset those savings. However, the Service does not know the cost of maintaining cuff records, and it has not systematically identified field managers' information needs. BLM, in contrast to the Forest Service, tracks many timber sales obligations and expenditures by individual sale. BLM has chosen to maintain detailed data in order to allow its field managers to use these data in managing timber sales--by, for example, monitoring the progress and cost of sales. As a result of BLM's approach, field managers have access to detailed data without relying on cuff records. Overall, the Forest Service and BLM have systems that track revenue data by timber sale. These systems track the volume, type, and value of timber harvested; generate bills to timber purchasers; and track payments against those bills. Both agencies have struggled with, but are resolving, the challenge of tracking revenue from sales conducted under their stewardship contracting authority. Stewardship contracts generally involve the exchange of goods, such as timber, for contract services, such as thinning of brush. The Forest Service recently added a module to its accounting system to track revenue from stewardship contracting projects, while BLM has developed a database for this purpose. |
gao_GAO-09-497 | gao_GAO-09-497_0 | In addition to the capabilities described in figure 1, according to the Coast Guard, the NSC also has the following capabilities that go beyond those of an HEC: NSC’s engine and propulsion systems are more efficient than the HEC’s; allowing the NSC to transit faster while burning less fuel; the higher transit speed of the NSC allows it to maximize the time that it operates inside of the mission area; the NSC has the ability to conduct missions in rougher seas than the HEC; and the NSC has more comfortable accommodations for the crew, with larger sleeping and living areas that include many modern conveniences, such as computers, entertainment systems, and exercise facilities. Delays in the Delivery of the NSC and Its Support Assets Have Created an Anticipated Loss of Operational Days and Will Result in the NSC Being Deployed without Certain Operational Capabilities
Delays in the delivery of the NSC and its associated support assets— primarily unmanned aircraft and small boats—have created an anticipated loss of cutter operational days and delays in achieving certain other operational capabilities. Enhancements to the NSC’s capabilities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as damage to the shipyard and the exodus of workers as a result of Hurricane Katrina, contributed to these delays. As a result, the Coast Guard cannot determine the extent to which the NSC’s final capabilities will exceed those of the HECs at this time and it may take several years before some of these capabilities are realized. However, because the acquisition program is in its early stages, the Coast Guard has not yet determined a date for the deployment of an NSC-based unmanned aircraft. Until these onboard deficiencies are addressed and the NSC’s unmanned aircraft and new small boats are delivered, the NSC will be operating without planned assets that would enhance its capabilities over those of an HEC. The Coast Guard Plans to Mitigate Identified Operational Gaps by Upgrading Certain High Endurance Cutters and Using Existing Support Assets, but the Success and Costs of These Plans Cannot Be Fully Determined
To mitigate the operational gaps identified to date that have been created by delays in deployment of the NSC and its associated support assets, the Coast Guard plans to keep the HECs operational and to use existing air assets and small boats until new assets are acquired. As a result, the Coast Guard has not determined the extent to which existing small boats will help mitigate the operational gap between the existing small boats that will be initially deployed on the NSC and the new small boats with which the NSC will deploy in the future. The Coast Guard Is Working to Finalize Its Key Logistics Plan by October 2009, but Complete Logistics Costs Cannot Yet Be Determined
The Coast Guard has begun planning for the logistics support transition to the NSC from the HEC, and is working to finalize its key NSC logistics support plan by October 2009, but the Coast Guard cannot determine the complete logistics transition costs. The Deepwater contractor developed the initial NSC logistics plans, but in 2007, the Coast Guard assumed responsibility for NSC logistical planning because, according to Coast Guard officials, the contractor’s plans were deficient. For example, Coast Guard officials said that the contractor’s logistics plans did not include the necessary details, such as how the contractor would support the NSC after it becomes fully operational. The Coast Guard Continues to Develop Required Components of the National Security Cutter Deployment Plan
The Coast Guard has made some progress in developing a deployment plan that is to address the logistics transition from the HEC to the NSC and some of the costs of this transition and expects to complete this plan by 2012, as required by the MSAM. Further, while the Coast Guard expects to complete the Integrated Logistics Support Plan by October 2009, the plan may not include the required details of logistics support documents to be used and time frames for completing them because the Coast Guard is still determining how to proceed with finalizing the plan and did not commit to including these details. Recommendation for Executive Action
To meet MSAM requirements and aid the Coast Guard in making operational decisions, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure that as the Coast Guard finalizes the Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the NSC, that the plan includes the required logistics support documents to be used and the time frames for completing them. Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its more than $24 billion Deepwater program to replace aging vessels and aircraft with new or upgraded assets, the Coast Guard is preparing the National Security Cutter (NSC) for service. GAO previously reported on Deepwater assets' deployment delays and the Coast Guard's management of the Deepwater program. GAO was legislatively directed to continue its oversight of the Deepwater program. As a result, this report addresses: (1) the operational effects, if any, of delays in the delivery of the NSC and its support assets of unmanned aircraft and small boats; (2) Coast Guard plans for mitigating any operational effects and any associated costs of these plans; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard has plans, to include cost estimates, for phasing in logistics support of the NSC while phasing out support for the High Endurance Cutter (HEC) it is replacing. GAO's work is based on analyses of the (1) operational capabilities and maintenance plans of the NSC and its support assets and (2) data on the HECs' condition; comparison of an NSC and HEC; and, interviews with Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Found
Delays in the delivery of the NSC and the support assets of unmanned aircraft and small boats have created operational gaps for the Coast Guard that include the projected loss of thousands of days in NSC availability for conducting missions until 2018. Enhancements to the NSC's capabilities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the effects of Hurricane Katrina were factors that contributed to these delays. Given the delivery delays, the Coast Guard must continue to rely on HECs that are becoming increasingly unreliable. Coast Guard officials said that the first NSC's capabilities will be greater than those of an HEC; however, the Coast Guard cannot determine the extent to which the NSC's capabilities will exceed those of the HECs until the NSC's support assets are operational, which will take several years. To mitigate these operational gaps, the Coast Guard plans to upgrade its HECs and use existing aircraft and small boats until unmanned aircraft and new small boats are operational, but because the mitigation plans are not yet finalized, the costs are largely unknown. Also, the Coast Guard has not yet completed operational requirements for the unmanned aircraft or new small boats. As a result, the Coast Guard has not determined the cost of the HEC upgrade plan or the operational gap created by the delay in fielding new support assets for the NSC. The Coast Guard's logistics support plans for its transition to the NSC from the HEC are not finalized, and it has not yet fully determined transition costs. The contractor developed the initial NSC logistics plans, but Coast Guard officials said the plans lacked needed details, such as how the contractor would support the NSC after it becomes fully operational, and so, in 2007, the Coast Guard took over logistics planning. Coast Guard acquisition guidance states that an Integrated Logistics Support Plan should be completed by the time production of an asset is started. Although the first NSC has already been delivered, the Coast Guard has not yet finalized this plan, but expects to do so by October 2009. While the Coast Guard has developed an interim plan, it did not commit to including required logistics support documents to be used or time frames for completing them in the Integrated Logistics Support Plan because it is in the process of determining how to finalize the plan. Ensuring the plan includes these documents and time frames would better prepare the Coast Guard to support the NSC and aid it in making operational decisions given that the Coast Guard has not yet developed a deployment plan or completed cost estimates of the logistics transition from the HEC to the NSC. |
gao_GAO-04-403 | gao_GAO-04-403_0 | 2). In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and increased its assistance to Afghanistan. The United States accounted for 38 percent of the $3.7 billion in nonsecurity-related international funding disbursed in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003. U.S. Assistance Focused on Humanitarian and Quick- Impact Projects
The U.S. government obligated $1.4 billion for assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003, including $782 million for humanitarian and quick- impact projects and $647 million for strategic, longer-term reconstruction projects. USAID obligated $942 million, of which it spent about $508 million by September 2003. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer- term Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results
In fiscal years 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance benefited Afghanistan, but longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results. However, because of delayed funding, most major contracts for reconstruction activities were not signed until summer 2003, limiting the results achieved by the end of that fiscal year. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Vulnerable Populations and Averted Famine
In fiscal years 2002–2003, to help redress the complex humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, the U.S. government provided emergency assistance that helped avert a famine, significantly reduce the suffering of the most vulnerable Afghans, and assist the return of refugees. The Department of Defense’s quick-impact projects were similar in size and scope to those implemented by USAID’s OTI. In addition, coordination officials lacked complete and accurate financial data needed for effective program management. Comprehensive Financial Data Was Not Readily Available
The coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, as well as others responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked complete and accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002–2003. Afghanistan exhibits many of the characteristics that other nations have faced in their efforts to transition from a postconflict environment to a stable democracy. 20.) Accelerating Success Initiative Designed to Increase Funding for Reconstruction
The U.S. government announced in September 2003 a new initiative called “Accelerating Success,” to increase funding and expedite the reconstruction efforts, particularly regarding infrastructure, democratization and human rights, and security. This delay, as well as a lack of staff and equipment, further hindered U.S. efforts. To meet the requirements of the directive and provide Congress with a comprehensive accounting of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan for fiscal years 2002–2003, we (1) analyzed U.S. obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results of assistance projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S. and international assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S. assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction effort. Departments of State and Defense and USAID. Support Afghan government’s projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regime's protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002, Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
What GAO Found
Of the $900 million that the U.S. government spent on nonsecurity-related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, over 75 percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction. USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense spent $508 million, $254 million, and $64 million, respectively, for humanitarian, quick-impact, and some longer-term projects. U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the $3.7 billion the international community disbursed over the 2-year period. U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but longerterm reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. By providing food and shelter to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S. assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. USAID's and Defense's quick-impact projects also helped rebuild smallscale infrastructure such as schools and bridges. USAID initiated several longerterm reconstruction activities, such as repairing the Kabul-Kandahar road and starting a democracy program. However, because of delays in funding most major assistance contracts were not signed until summer 2003, limiting the results in fiscal years 2002-2003. U.S. coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan assistance were generally effective, but international assistance was not well coordinated in fiscal years 2002-2003. In addition, the United States lacked a complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S. government's ability to focus available resources and hold itself accountable for measurable results. Further, U.S. officials responsible for coordinating efforts lacked complete financial data, which hindered their ability to oversee the assistance. In fiscal years 2002-2003, Afghanistan confronted many obstacles that other postconflict nations have faced, such as multiple competing parties. In addition, security deteriorated and opium production increased, thereby jeopardizing U.S. reconstruction efforts. Lack of staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding further impeded U.S. efforts. In September 2003, to expedite progress, the U.S. government announced the "Accelerating Success" initiative, providing $1.76 billion for reconstruction in 2004. |
gao_GAO-17-92 | gao_GAO-17-92_0 | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac retain their government charters and continue to operate legally as business corporations. Using its authority provided in HERA, Treasury provides capital support to the enterprises while in conservatorships through senior preferred stock purchase agreements. FHFA’s Reformulated Goals for the Conservatorships and Its Supporting Actions Reflect a Shift in Priorities and Changing Market Conditions
While the three goals FHFA outlined in its 2014 strategic plan for the conservatorships are similar to those in the previous 2012 plan in a number of ways, there are key differences that reflect a shift in priorities for the conservatorships and changing market conditions. FHFA Increased Its Emphasis on Maintaining Credit Availability and Foreclosure Prevention Options to Align with Statutory Responsibilities
In the 2014 plan, FHFA indicated it was placing greater emphasis on its goal for maintaining credit availability and foreclosure prevention options (Maintain goal). Additionally, FHFA changed the wording of the Maintain goal from “maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages” to “maintain, in a safe and sound manner, foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages to foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets.” The new wording more closely aligns the goal with FHFA’s responsibilities outlined in statute and Congress’s stated purpose for the enterprises. FHFA Shifted Efforts for Reducing Taxpayer Risk Away from Decreasing the Enterprises’ Role
FHFA’s second goal in the 2014 plan, like the corresponding goal in the 2012 plan, is aimed at transferring risk from the enterprises (and taxpayers) to private investors. FHFA Has Reduced the Scope of the Securitization Infrastructure Being Built, Focusing Instead on Initiatives for the Enterprises
FHFA narrowed the focus of its goal of building a securitization infrastructure (Build goal) from creating a new secondary mortgage market infrastructure to primarily addressing the enterprises’ current operational needs. In the Absence of Congressional Direction, FHFA’s Shift in Priorities Adds to Uncertainty about the Future Structure of the Housing Finance System
FHFA Partially Changed Direction on Reducing the Enterprises’ Role in Housing Finance
Prior to 2014, FHFA was taking explicit steps to shrink the enterprises’ role in the secondary market. However, other actions that serve to reduce the depth and breadth of the enterprises’ activities and that are written into the enterprises’ agreements with Treasury continue. These actions include reducing retained mortgage portfolios and reducing the enterprises’ capital bases to $0 by January 2018. Our analysis comparing FHFA’s actions with legislative proposals to reform the enterprises’ structure found that some proposals continue or build upon actions FHFA has taken, such as the common securitization platform and credit risk transfers. Whether FHFA’s Actions Reduce the Likelihood of Drawing on Treasury’s Capital Commitment Is Uncertain
FHFA has taken some actions that could increase the likelihood of drawing on Treasury’s capital commitment under the agreements as well as other actions that could have the opposite effect, and the net effect of these actions is uncertain. One of the long-standing principles we have identified that should serve as a guide for providing government assistance to private market participants is setting clear objectives. As we have previously found, the federal government should set clear goals and objectives when providing financial assistance to private market participants. However, Congress has yet to establish objectives for the future of the enterprises after conservatorship or the future federal role in housing finance. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reduce uncertainty and provide FHFA sufficient direction for carrying out its responsibilities as conservator of the enterprises, Congress should consider legislation that establishes objectives for the future federal role in housing finance, including the structure of the enterprises, and a transition plan to a reformed housing finance system that enables the enterprises to exit conservatorship. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, FHFA used its authority under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorships out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition threatened the stability of the financial market. Eight years later, the enterprises remain in conservatorships. However, FHFA says the conservatorships were not intended to be permanent. FHFA has issued two strategic plans for its conservatorship of the enterprises, one in 2012 and another in 2014.
GAO was asked to examine FHFA's actions as conservator. This report addresses (1) the extent to which FHFA's goals for the conservatorships have changed and (2) the implications of FHFA's actions for the future of the enterprises and the broader secondary mortgage market.
GAO analyzed and reviewed FHFA's actions as conservator and supporting documents; legislative proposals for housing finance reform; the enterprises' senior preferred stock agreements with Treasury; and GAO, Congressional Budget Office, and FHFA inspector general reports. GAO also interviewed FHFA and Treasury officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a new strategic plan for the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) in 2014 with reformulated goals and supporting actions that reflect a shift in priorities and changing market conditions. While the three goals in the 2014 strategic plan are broadly similar to those in the previous plan issued in 2012, FHFA changed the weight and wording of the goals (see table) to align the plan more closely with FHFA's statutory responsibilities. Specifically, compared with the 2012 plan FHFA (1) increased its emphasis on maintaining credit availability and foreclosure prevention options; (2) shifted away from shrinking the enterprises as a way to reduce taxpayer risk (focusing instead on transferring credit risk to private investors, for example); and (3) reduced the scope of the securitization infrastructure being built, such as a new technology platform for securitizing mortgages, to focus on meeting the enterprises' current needs.
In the absence of congressional direction, FHFA's shift in priorities has altered market participants' perceptions and expectations about the enterprises' ongoing role and added to uncertainty about the future structure of the housing finance system. In particular, FHFA halted several actions aimed at reducing the scope of enterprise activities and is seeking to maintain the enterprises in their current state. However, other actions (such as reducing their capital bases to $0 by January 2018) are written into agreements for capital support with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and continue to be implemented. In addition, the change in scope for the technology platform for securitization puts less emphasis on reducing barriers facing private entities than previously envisioned, and new initiatives to expand mortgage availability could crowd out market participants. Furthermore, some actions, such as transferring credit risk to private investors, could decrease the likelihood of drawing on Treasury's funding commitment, but others, such as reducing minimum down payments, could increase it. GAO has identified setting clear objectives as a key principle for providing government assistance to private market participants. Because Congress has not established objectives for the future of the enterprises after conservatorships or the federal role in housing finance, FHFA's ability to shift priorities may continue to contribute to market uncertainty.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider legislation that would establish clear objectives and a transition plan to a reformed housing finance system that enables the enterprises to exit conservatorship. FHFA agreed with our overall findings. |
gao_GAO-04-54 | gao_GAO-04-54_0 | II for more details on this study.) FAA has Taken Action to Address Council Recommendations On Cabin Air Quality, but These Efforts Could Be Improved
The December 2001 Council report on airliner cabin air quality made 10 recommendations about air quality standards for the cabins of commercial airliners and the need for more information concerning the health effects of cabin air. In implementing the Council report recommendations, FAA is attempting to balance the need to conduct additional research on the healthfulness of cabin air quality with other research priorities, such as improving passenger safety. Specifically, some in the aviation community have raised concerns that FAA’s planned actions for implementing the Council recommendations on cabin air quality, including its research and surveillance efforts, will not be adequate to answer long-standing questions about the nature and extent of potential health effects posed by cabin air. According to FAA, the surveillance and research program is to be carried out in two parts; the first started in December 2003 and the second will start in December 2004 and end in late 2006 or early 2007. These officials also noted that a voluntary injury and illness reporting system that it has in place could capture air quality incidents if it were made mandatory. In addition to citing the need for FAA to increase the accessibility of health-related information on its Web site, six of the eight committee members also mentioned that FAA should take further steps to make health information available to the flying public. Some Technologies Exist for Improving Cabin Air Quality, but There Are Questions About Whether They Should be Required
Several technologies exist today that could improve cabin air quality, but opinions vary on whether requiring the use of improved technologies in commercial airliner cabins is warranted. We found one of these technologies, HEPA filters, is strongly endorsed by cabin air quality and health experts as providing the best possible protection against one cabin air problem—the presence of particulates, bacteria, and viruses in recirculated air. However, some regional jets, which have fewer than 100 seats, are not equipped with filters, and some older large aircraft still use less efficient filters. One airline has plans to retrofit a small number of these aircraft with HEPA filters. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that FAA’s research and surveillance efforts on airliner cabin air quality answer critical outstanding questions about the nature and extent of potential health effects of cabin air quality on passengers and flight attendants, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to develop a detailed plan for the research and surveillance efforts, including key milestones and funding estimates, in accordance with generally accepted practices for oversight and independence; appoint a committee of acknowledged experts in the fields of aircraft ventilation and public health, including representatives of EPA and NIOSH, to assist in planning and overseeing the research and surveillance efforts recommended by the National Research Council in 2001; leverage the findings of international research on airliner cabin air quality to inform FAA’s surveillance and research efforts; and report to Congress annually on the progress and findings of the research and surveillance efforts and funding needs. In order to help improve the healthfulness of cabin air for commercial aircraft passengers and cabin crews, the FAA Administrator should assess the costs and benefits of requiring the use of HEPA filters on commercial aircraft with ventilation systems that recirculate cabin air. (2) What actions has the National Research Council recommended to improve cabin air quality, and what is the status of those actions? We also interviewed officials representing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA), the Air Transport Association (ATA), the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the International Airline Passengers Association (IAPA), aircraft and air filter manufacturers, as well as experts on cabin air quality issues, including members of the committee that produced the 2001 Council report on cabin air quality. Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) on Board Aircraft Is Rare and Associated with Proximity
Aboard aircraft, cabin occupants are confined in close quarters for extended periods and can be exposed to infectious diseases carried by other occupants. Does recirculating cabin air increase cabin occupants’ risk of exposure? National Research Council. National Research Council. U.S. General Accounting Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, the traveling public, flight attendants, and the medical community have raised questions about how airliner cabin air quality contributes to health effects, such as upper respiratory infections. Interest in cabin air quality grew in 2003 when a small number of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infections may have occurred on board aircraft serving areas that were experiencing outbreaks of the disease. In 2001, a National Research Council report on airliner cabin air quality and associated health effects recommended that additional research be done on the potential health effects of cabin air. GAO reviewed what is known about the health effects of cabin air, the status of actions recommended in the 2001 National Research Council report, and whether available technologies should be required to improve cabin air quality.
What GAO Found
Despite a number of studies of the air contaminants that airline passengers and flight attendants are potentially exposed to, little is known about their associated health effects. Reports on airliner cabin air quality published by the National Research Council in 1986 and 2001 concluded that more research was needed to determine the nature and extent of health effects on passengers and cabin crew. Although significant improvements have been made to aircraft ventilation systems, cabin occupants are still exposed to allergens and infectious agents, airflow rates that are lower than those in buildings, and air pressures and humidity levels that are lower than those normally present at or near sea level. The 2001 National Research Council report on airliner cabin air quality made 10 recommendations, 9 of which directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to collect more data on the potential health effects of cabin air and to review the adequacy of its standards for cabin air quality. FAA has addressed these 9 recommendations to varying degrees as it attempts to balance the need for more research on cabin air with other research priorities (e.g., passenger safety). However, some in the aviation community, including some of the committee members who produced the report on cabin air, do not feel that FAA's planned actions will address these recommendations adequately. For example, most members were concerned that FAA's plan for implementing the report's key recommendations on the need for more comprehensive research on the health effects of cabin air was too limited. FAA plans to address these recommendations in two parts--the first, which started in December 2003, and the second, which will start in December 2004 and end in late 2006 or early 2007. However, FAA lacks a comprehensive plan, including key milestones and funding needs. In addition, most committee members thought that FAA's response to a recommendation for it to improve public access to information on the health risks of flying was inadequate. We also had difficulty accessing this information on FAA's Web site. Several technologies are available today that could improve cabin air quality, (e.g., increasing cabin humidity and pressure or absorbing more cabin odors and gasses); however, opinions vary on whether FAA should require aircraft manufacturers and airlines to use these technologies. GAO found that one available technology, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtering, was strongly endorsed by cabin air quality and health experts as the best way to protect cabin occupants' health from viruses and bacteria in recirculated cabin air. While FAA does not require the use of these filters, GAO's survey of major U.S. air carriers found that 85 percent of large commercial airliners in their fleets that recirculate cabin air and carry more than 100 passengers already use these filters. However, the use of HEPA filters in smaller commercial aircraft that carry fewer than 100 passengers is much lower. The cost to retrofit the smaller aircraft to accept the HEPA filter, if it were made mandatory, could be expensive. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-106 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-106_0 | Significant Agricultural Market Openings Generally Achieved in Both Uruguay Round and NAFTA
The Uruguay Round and NAFTA included significant provisions to liberalize agricultural trade. Challenges in Implementing WTO and NAFTA Provisions on SPS Measures and STEs
While forecasters have estimated that increases in agricultural trade would account for a sizable portion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA accords’ projected benefits to the United States, challenges exist for ensuring their full implementation. WTO and NAFTA SPS Provisions
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and chapter 7 of NAFTA, established guidelines regarding the appropriate use of SPS measures in relation to trade. Strategy to Address Foreign SPS Measures
Although USTR has identified some foreign SPS measures as key barriers to U.S agricultural exports, our recent report to Congress found several weaknesses in the federal government’s approach to identifying and addressing such measures. Because of these weaknesses, the federal government cannot be assured that it is adequately monitoring other countries’ compliance with the WTO or NAFTA SPS provisions and effectively protecting the interests of U.S. agricultural exporters. USTR and USDA have primary responsibility for addressing agricultural trade issues, and they receive technical support from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of State. USDA Agencies’ Balancing of Regulatory and Trade Facilitation Roles
Absent a coordinated approach for addressing foreign SPS measures, the specific role of USDA regulatory and research agencies in resolving SPS has not been clearly defined. Potential Benefits of Long-Term SPS Objectives Versus Immediate Resolution of Disputes Over SPS Measures
WTO and USTR officials suggest that member countries appear to have focused on implementing provisions of the SPS agreement that enable them to resolve SPS disputes as they arise, such as the requirement that SPS measures be based on scientific evidence, but have paid less attention to other key provisions. WTO Provisions on STEs
The agricultural and SPS agreements of the Uruguay Round were intended to move member nations toward establishing a market-oriented agricultural trading system by minimizing government involvement in regulating agricultural markets. As a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO officially defined STEs and addressed procedural weaknesses of GATT’s article XVII by improving the process for obtaining and reviewing information. Lack of Transparency in STE Pricing Practices
In the absence of complete and transparent information on the activities of STEs, member countries are hindered in determining whether STEs operate in accordance with GATT disciplines and whether STEs have a trade-distorting effect on the global market. U.S. Efforts to Address STEs
U.S. agricultural interests have expressed concern regarding the potential of STEs to distort trade, and USDA officials have said that a focused U.S. effort to address STEs is vitally important. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implementation of certain agricultural provisions of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focusing on: (1) the impact of measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health--referred to as sanitary and phytosantiary (SPS) measures; and (2) state trading enterprises (STEs).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Uruguay Round and NAFTA included significant provisions to liberalize agricultural trade; (2) while forecasters have estimated that increases in agricultural trade would account for a sizeable portion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA agreements' projected benefits to the United States, challenges exist for ensuring their full implementation; (3) the World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitiary measures, and chapter 7 of NAFTA, established guidelines regarding the appropriate use of SPS measures in relation to trade; (4) although the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has identified some foreign SPS measures as key barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, GAO's recent report to Congress found several weaknesses in the federal government's approach to identifying and addressing such measures; (5) because of these weaknesses, the federal government cannot be assured that it is adequately monitoring other countries' compliance with the WTO or NAFTA SPS provisions and effectively protecting the interests of U.S. agricultural exporters; (6) USTR and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) have primary responsibility for addressing agricultural trade issues, and they receive technical support from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of State; (7) absent a coordinated approach for addressing foreign SPS measures, the specific role of USDA regulatory and research agencies in resolving SPS has not been clearly defined; (8) WTO and USTR officials suggest that member countries appear to have focused on implementing provisions of the SPS agreement that enable them to resolve SPS disputes as they arise; (9) the agricultural and SPS agreements of the Uruguay Round were intended to move member nations toward establishing a market-oriented agricultural trading system by minimizing government involvement in regulating agricultural markets; (10) as a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO officially defined STEs and addressed procedural weaknesses of article XVII by improving the process for obtaining and reviewing information; (11) in the absence of complete and transparent information on the activities of STEs, member countries are hindered in determining whether STEs operate in accordance with GATT disciplines and whether they have a trade-distorting effect on the global market; and (12) U.S. agriculture interests have expressed concern regarding the potential of STEs to distort trade, and USDA officials have said that a focused U.S. effort to address STEs is vitally important. |
gao_GGD-99-183 | gao_GGD-99-183_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what efforts LSC and its grantees have made to correct problems with case service reporting, and (2) whether these efforts are likely to resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997. Most grantees indicated that the new guidance helped clarify LSC’s reporting requirements, and virtually all of them indicated that they had or planned to make program changes as a result of the requirements. If the error rate was 5 percent or less, they could certify that their data were substantially correct. Grantees were not required to apply these new documentation requirements to their 1998 case data. They noted that approximately 30 of the 50 grantees with the largest caseloads were unable to certify their 1998 data. In our telephone interviews with 79 executive directors, 24 reported that they did not certify their 1998 data to LSC. As a result, we could not assess whether the number of certified programs and case closures that LSC estimated for 1998 is correct, lower, or higher than it should be. Grantees that could not certify their data wrote letters to LSC in which they described the errors they uncovered. We are also concerned that LSC’s instructions to grantees on how to conduct the self-inspections may have led some of the smaller grantees to select too few test cases to make a reliable assessment of the proportion of error in their case data. However, many grantees remain unclear about and/or misunderstood certain aspects of the reporting requirements. The validity of the results are difficult to determine because LSC did not standardize the way that grantees were to report their results, some of the grantees used samples that were too small to assess the proportion of error in their data, some grantees did not correctly follow LSC’s reporting guidance, and LSC had done no verification of the grantees’ self-inspection procedures. We do not believe that LSC’s efforts, to date, have been sufficient to fully resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997. Recommendations
We recommend that the President of LSC clarify and disseminate information on the specific information on client assets that grantees must obtain, record, and maintain; clarify and disseminate information on the types of citizenship/alien eligibility information grantees must obtain, record, and maintain for clients who receive legal assistance only over the telephone; clarify and disseminate LSC’s criteria for single recording of cases; clarify and disseminate LSC’s policy concerning who can provide legal assistance to clients for the service to be counted as a case; explore options for facilitating correct and consistent understanding of reporting requirements, such as developing and disseminating a training video for grantee staff; develop a standard protocol for future self-inspections to ensure that grantees systematically and consistently report their results for open and closed cases; direct grantees to select samples for future self-inspections that are sufficient to draw reliable conclusions about magnitude of case data errors; and finally, ensure that procedures are in place to validate the results of LSC’s 1998 self-inspection, as well as of any future self-inspections. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined: (1) what efforts the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) and its grantees have made to correct problems with case service reporting; and (2) whether these efforts are likely to resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) LSC revised its written guidance and issued a new handbook to its grantees to clarify case reporting requirements; (2) based on telephone interviews with a sample of 79 LSC grantee executive directors, GAO estimates that 90 percent of grantees viewed the new guidance as having clarified reporting requirements, overall; (3) virtually all grantees said they responded to the new requirements by making or planning to make one or more changes to their program operations; (4) however, many grantees indicated that they were unclear about certain aspects of LSC's reporting requirements, particularly regarding: (a) the specific information required on client assets; (b) the information required for documenting citizenship/alien eligibility for services provided over the telephone; (c) the criteria for avoiding duplicate counts of cases; and (d) who can provide legal assistance to clients in order for the service to be counted as a case; (5) LSC initiated a self-inspection procedure in which grantees were required to review their 1998 case data and submit certification letters to LSC if they found that the extent of error in their data was 5 percent or less; (6) grantees who could not certify their 1998 data were required to develop corrective actions that would address the problems identified; (7) about 75 percent of the grantees submitted letters to LSC certifying that the error rate in their 1998 data was 5 percent or less, while about 25 percent of the grantees submitted letters to LSC indicating that they could not certify their 1998 data; (8) according to LSC, about 30 of the 50 grantees with the largest caseloads were unable to certify their 1998 case data; (9) GAO could not assess whether the number of certified and uncertified programs that LSC obtained for 1998 was correct, lower, or higher than it should be; (10) this is because LSC did not provide grantees with a standardized way of reporting their self-inspection results, and LSC's instructions on how to conduct the self-inspections may have led some of the smaller grantees to select too few cases to reliably assess the amount of error in their case data; (11) some grantees did not correctly interpret LSC's case reporting requirements; and (12) for these reasons, GAO does not believe that LSC's efforts to date have been sufficient to fully resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997. |
gao_GAO-15-31 | gao_GAO-15-31_0 | TANF Programs Currently Engage Recipients in a Limited Range of Work- related Activities
Our work has shown that over the years, states have engaged about one third of families receiving TANF cash assistance in federally-defined work activities nationwide while still meeting their required work participation rates. Selected State and Local Programs Reflect Elements of Four Promising Approaches
Research Indicates Several Promising Approaches for Increasing Employment and Earnings
A body of rigorous research points to four approaches that can be used to increase the employment and earnings of TANF cash assistance recipients: subsidized employment, treatment and employment services, career pathways, and modified work-first.this research is based on programs that operated, at least in part, during TANF’s predecessor program, AFDC, and have since ended; and some of these older studies focused on programs that predominantly targeted women. Career pathways – This approach has been defined in different ways, but can involve providing contextual learning to prepare individuals of various skill levels to advance in a high-demand occupation or industry. Research shows that programs using this approach increased employment and earnings and reduced welfare receipt. For example:
San Francisco’s Jobs Now! New York City WeCARE was designed to provide comprehensive services to hard-to-employ clients with mental or physical health needs or substance abuse problems. regarding how activities related to the career pathways approach may be allowable under TANF rules could address misperceptions and encourage more widespread use of this approach by state and local TANF agencies. Expertise and Dedicated Funds Facilitated the Use of Promising Approaches, but the TANF Program Lacks Incentives for Wider Adoption or Testing
The Selected Programs Benefitted from Partner Expertise and Dedicated Funding
Nearly all of the 10 programs we examined that currently use elements of promising approaches drew on expertise beyond the state or local TANF agency (see table 2). Nine of these programs involved partnerships with organizations and agencies such as community college systems, workforce agencies, and nonprofit organizations or contracted vendors. Officials said participation in technical Decisions by state and local policymakers to dedicate funds for the selected programs also facilitated the use of promising approaches, according to program officials. However, some of these funds may have included federal TANF funds that were being allocated by state and local entities. HHS’s authority over many aspects of TANF is limited and it has not proposed legislative changes to address these areas. Without federal action, adoption and evaluation of promising approaches may continue to be limited to select states and localities, leaving TANF recipients in other locations without access to these promising approaches. As a result, any additional resources needed for implementing more costly promising approaches for TANF cash assistance clients may compete with other allowable uses of TANF funds. Conclusions
While the 10 state and local programs we examined are making use of some promising approaches for moving TANF recipients into employment and increasing their earnings, incentives are lacking for large numbers of state and local TANF agencies to adopt and test such approaches under the structure of the TANF program. TANF’s goals include ending needy families’ dependence on government benefits by promoting work. Yet, HHS, as the federal agency that oversees TANF, is positioned to identify, suggest, and work in consultation with Congress on potential changes that would address the lack of incentives for states to adopt promising approaches. Recommendations for Executive Action
To encourage broader adoption and evaluation of promising approaches and address impediments to the use of the career pathways approach among TANF agencies, we recommend that HHS should take the following two actions: In consultation with Congress, identify potential changes that would address the lack of incentives for states and localities to adopt promising approaches and then develop and submit a legislative proposal outlining those changes. HHS also agreed with our recommendation that the agency issue formal guidance to clarify how the career pathways approach can be used by TANF agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report (1) reviews some approaches that have been identified as holding promise to engage TANF recipients in employment and increase their earnings and examines ways in which selected states and localities have used them, and (2) identifies factors that influence the use of these and other promising approaches. To first identify promising approaches, we reviewed research summaries and syntheses of rigorous research on approaches for engaging TANF recipients in employment and increasing their earnings. To identify state and local programs that are currently using these approaches to serve TANF cash assistance recipients, we interviewed cognizant researchers; officials from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Labor, and the Department of Education; and others with TANF expertise. We assessed information and communication HHS provides to states related to promising approaches against federal internal control standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The TANF block grant requires states to engage a certain percentage of work-eligible cash assistance recipients in specified work-related activities, such as job search assistance and training. Yet, data suggest that more TANF recipients could receive assistance that would help them gain employment and reduce their dependence. GAO was asked to provide examples of what some states are doing to achieve these goals and how to expand these efforts.
This report (1) reviews some approaches that have been identified as holding promise for engaging TANF recipients in employment and increasing their earnings and examines ways in which selected states and localities have used them, and (2) identifies factors that influence their use. To first identify promising approaches, GAO reviewed summaries and syntheses of rigorous research on approaches that increase employment and earnings, and profiled 10 state and local programs that were nominated by experts familiar with welfare research and state and local efforts, and that were selected to represent a range of approaches. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance, and interviewed agency officials and experts with a range of views.
What GAO Found
The 10 state and local programs GAO examined used various promising approaches to help Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance recipients gain employment by meeting a range of participant needs. These approaches included the use of subsidized employment, employment alongside treatment for a health condition, and training for high-demand jobs. For example, for individuals in need of additional work experience, San Francisco's TANF program has provided subsidies to employers to place participants in temporary, wage-paying jobs. To help individuals with mental and physical disabilities and substance abuse problems, nonprofit contractors for New York City's TANF program have provided individualized assessment and treatment, often combined with employment. To prepare individuals with various skill levels for high-demand jobs, Minnesota and Washington have used a career pathways approach of combining occupation-specific training with basic skills education and support services. However, experts told us that some states have a misperception that this approach is not allowable under TANF rules, even though the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS) support its use. HHS told us that states could still meet program requirements while using this approach, but the agency has not issued formal guidance clarifying this. Internal control standards for the federal government state that information should be communicated to managers in a form that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. As a result of these misperceptions, the career pathways approach may be underused by TANF agencies and TANF recipients could miss out on the potential benefits of this approach.
Expertise and dedicated funds facilitated use of these promising approaches, but the federal TANF program, itself, lacks incentives for their wider adoption. Of the 10 programs GAO examined, 9 drew on the expertise of partner organizations—including community college systems, workforce agencies, and nonprofits. The programs also benefitted from decisions by state and local policymakers to dedicate funds—including TANF funds—for the selected programs, according to officials. However, incentives for large numbers of state and local TANF agencies to adopt and test promising approaches are lacking under the structure of the TANF program for several reasons. First, many program design and funding choices are left to the states, and GAO's prior work has shown that state use of TANF funds for more costly welfare-to-work approaches can compete with other allowable uses of TANF funds. Second, TANF's main performance measure does not necessarily encourage agencies to use certain approaches that incorporate longer-term education and training or treatment services, although states are not prohibited from doing so. Third, little incentive exists for TANF agencies to evaluate their programs. HHS's authority over many aspects of TANF is limited and it has not proposed legislative changes to address these areas. Yet, because HHS oversees TANF, it is positioned to identify, suggest, and work in consultation with Congress on potential changes that would better address the lack of incentives for the use of promising approaches by states and to better meet the TANF goal of increasing employment. Without federal action, adoption and evaluation of promising approaches may continue to be limited to select states and localities, leaving TANF recipients in other locations without access to these promising approaches.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS should issue guidance to clarify how the career pathways approach can be used by TANF agencies and identify potential changes to address the lack of incentives in the TANF program. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-917T | gao_GAO-10-917T_0 | OIA, established in 1995, is responsible for carrying out the Secretary’s responsibilities for U.S. insular areas. Among the random sample of 173 OIA grant project files that we reviewed in our March 2010 report, we identified 49 OIA technical assistance grant projects from a variety of technical assistance grant types (see table 2). Nearly 40 Percent of OIA Grant Projects Have Internal Control Weaknesses That Could Increase Susceptibility to Mismanagement
On the basis of our review of grant files from a random sample of grant projects, we determined that the long-standing internal control weaknesses that we, Interior’s Office of Inspector General, and others, identified between 2000 and 2009 still exist. The eight internal control weaknesses that we assessed can be grouped into three categories based on the entity responsible for the activities: grant recipient activities, OIA grant management activities, or joint activities between grant recipients and OIA. The most prevalent weaknesses for the 49 technical assistance grant projects were insufficient reporting and record-keeping discrepancies. OIA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Implementation and Management of Grant Projects
Over the past 5 years, OIA has taken the following steps to improve grant project implementation and management: Competitive allocation system. This system provides incentives for financial management improvements and project completion by tying a portion of each insular area’s annual allocation to the insular governments’ efforts in these areas—such as their efforts to submit financial and status reports on time. Beginning in 2005, to encourage expeditious use of funds, OIA established 5-year expiration dates in the terms and conditions of new capital improvement project grants. Actions to improve insular area grant management continuity. Several Obstacles to Timely and Effective Project Completion Remain
Despite OIA’s efforts, some insular areas are still not completing their projects in a timely and effective manner, and OIA faces the following key obstacles in compelling them to do so: Lack of sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects. Current OIA grant procedures provide few sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects. OIA officials report that resource constraints impede effective project completion and proactive monitoring and oversight. Inconsistent and insufficiently documented project redirection policies. OIA’s current project redirection approval practices do little to discourage insular areas from redirecting project funds in ways that hinder project completion. OIA’s current data system for tracking grants is limited in the data elements it contains, leading to inconsistencies in the data that some grant managers rely on for monitoring and oversight activities. Our March 2010 report contained three recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior designed to improve the department’s management and oversight of grants to the insular areas, including one that would directly impact OIA’s technical assistance grant programs. OIA agreed with our report and told us that it will implement these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. insular areas face serious economic and fiscal challenges and rely on federal funding to support their governments and deliver critical services. The Department of the Interior, through its Office of Insular Affairs (OIA), provides about $70 million in grants annually, including technical assistance grants, to increase insular area self-sufficiency. In the past, GAO and others have raised concerns regarding insular areas' internal control weaknesses, which increase the risk of grant fund mismanagement, fraud, and abuse. In March 2010, GAO reported on insular area grants (GAO-10-347); this testimony summarizes that report and focuses on (1) whether previously reported internal control weaknesses have been addressed and, if not, to what extent they are prevalent among OIA grant projects, including technical assistance grant projects, as of March 2010; and (2) the extent to which OIA has taken action to improve the implementation and management grant projects, as of March 2010. For the March 2010 report, GAO reviewed a random sample of 173 OIA grant project files and interviewed OIA and insular area officials. For this testimony, GAO conducted additional analysis for the 49 technical assistance grant projects included in the sample. GAO's March 2010 report contained three recommendations. Interior agreed with the recommendations. This testimony statement contains no new recommendations.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses previously reported by GAO and others continue to exist, and about 40 percent of grant projects funded through OIA have these weaknesses, which may increase their susceptibility to mismanagement. These weaknesses can be categorized into three types of activities: grant recipient activities, joint activity between grant recipients and OIA, and OIA's grant management activities. For the 49 technical assistance grant projects in GAO's sample, the most prevalent weaknesses were insufficient reporting and record-keeping discrepancies. Over the past 5 years, OIA has taken steps to improve project implementation and management. Most notably, OIA established incentives for financial management improvements and project completion by tying a portion of each insular area's annual allocation to the insular governments' efforts in these areas--such as their efforts to submit financial and status reports on time. In addition, OIA established expiration dates for grants to encourage expeditious use of the funds. Despite these and other efforts, some insular areas are still not completing their projects in a timely and effective manner, and OIA faces key obstacles in compelling them to do so. Specifically, (1) current OIA grant procedures provide few sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects, and the office is not clear on its authorities to modify its policies; (2) resource constraints impede effective project completion and proactive monitoring and oversight; (3) inconsistent and insufficiently documented project redirection policies do little to discourage insular areas from redirecting grant funds in ways that hinder project completion; and (4) OIA's current data system for tracking grants is limited and lacks specific features that could allow for more efficient grant management. |
gao_GAO-15-610 | gao_GAO-15-610_0 | FAA intends to use this approach to facilitate further incremental steps toward its goal of seamlessly integrating UAS flight into the national airspace. While these planning documents provide a broad framework for integration, FAA is still in process of developing an implementation plan for integrating UASs. An internal FAA report from August 2014 prepared by MITRE Corporation (MITRE) was intended to assist FAA’s development of the key components of an implementation plan.among other actions FAA’s implementation plan should: identify the tasks necessary, responsibilities, resources, and expected time frames for incremental expansion of UAS operations; clarify the priorities for aligning internal resources in support of near- term and long-term integration efforts and provide consistent communication with external stakeholders on the expected progress, cost, and extent of UAS integration during these time periods; align resources supporting UAS integration including allocation of FAA personnel and funds used for contracts and to acquire systems and services in support of integration; and establish the operational, performance, and safety data needed and also the associated infrastructure for collecting, storing, disseminating, and analyzing data, actions that could be a component of an implementation plan. According to FAA, it continues to work with MITRE developing the foundation for a detailed implementation plan. Issuing a Final Rule for Small UAS Operations
In February 2015, FAA made progress toward the 2012 Act’s requirement to issue a final rule for the operations of small UASs—those weighing less than 55 pounds—by issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that could, once finalized, allow greater access to the national airspace.To mitigate risk, the proposed rule would limit small UASs to daylight-only operations, confined areas of operation, and visual-line-of-sight operations. In addition, FAA does not provide funding to support the test sites. FAA’s Designated Test Sites Have Conducted UAS Test Flights and Addressed Challenges
FAA’s Designated Test Sites Are Operating and Conducting UAS Operations
Since being named in December 2013, the six designated test sites have become operational, applying for and receiving authorization from FAA to conduct test flights. In May 2015, FAA approved a “blanket” COA allowing the test sites to conduct UAS operations at or below 200 feet anywhere in the national airspace, similar to the authority provided to Section 333 exemptions. Test Sites Faced Challenges during Their First Year
Despite the progress made since they began operating, according to test site operators, they faced a number of challenges in the first year of operations:
Guidance on research: According to FAA, because the test sites receive no federal funding, FAA can neither direct specific research to be conducted nor direct the test sites to share specific research data, other than the operations and safety data required by the COA. However, unlike the Other Transaction Agreement in place for the test sites, according to FAA, many of these agreements have language specifically addressing the sharing of research and data. In addition, FAA has participated in the twice-a-year technical interchange meetings with the test sites. Other Countries Have Established Regulations, and Some Allow More Commercial Operations Than the United States
Numerous Countries Allow UAS Operations
According to numerous studies and stakeholders we interviewed, many countries around the world, have been allowing commercial UAS operations in their airspace for differing purposes. UAS Regulations in Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom Are Similar to Each Other and to Proposed Regulations in This Country
We studied the UAS regulations of Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and found that these countries impose similar types of requirements and restrictions on commercial UAS operations. Table 6 shows how FAA’s proposed rules compare with the regulations of Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, according to a French civil aviation official, France approves on a case- by-case basis, very limited beyond-line-of-sight operations. Specifically, some of the challenges are:
Technology shortfalls and unresolved spectrum issues. In comments, which were provided in an email, DOT stated that the report addresses many of the challenges of UAS integration but does not address any environmental concerns and that the report should state that it did not examine the environmental considerations of UAS integration. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the status of FAA’s progress toward safe integration of UAS into the national airspace, (2) research and development support from FAA’s test sites and other resources, and (3) how other countries have progressed toward UAS integration into their airspace for commercial purposes. We reviewed FAA’s Comprehensive Plan and Roadmap for UAS integration. We selected these countries based on several factors including the status of regulatory requirements for commercial UASs, beyond-line-of-site activities, and whether the country allows non-military UAS to operate in the airspace. Appendix II: Selected Requirements and Status for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Integration under the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, as of December 2014
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement Enter into agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA) or waivers for public unmanned aerial systems (UAS). | Why GAO Did This Study
UASs are aircraft that do not carry a pilot aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually controlled by following commands from pilot-operated ground control stations. Unauthorized UAS operations have, in some instances, compromised safety. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 directed FAA to take actions to safely integrate UASs into the national airspace. In response, FAA developed a phased approach to facilitate integration and established test sites among other things.
GAO was asked to review FAA's progress in integrating UASs. This report addresses (1) the status of FAA's progress toward safe integration of UASs into the national airspace, (2) research and development support from FAA's test sites and other resources, and (3) how other countries have progressed toward UAS integration into their airspace for commercial purposes. GAO reviewed and analyzed FAA's integration- planning documents; interviewed officials from FAA and UAS industry stakeholders; and met with the civil aviation authorities from Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected based on several factors including whether they have regulatory requirements for commercial UASs, operations beyond the view of the pilot, and whether non-military UAS are allowed to operate in the airspace. In comments on this report, the Department of Transportation noted that GAO did not address environmental considerations of UAS integration; such considerations were outside the scope of this report.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has progressed toward its goal of seamlessly integrating unmanned aerial system (UAS) flights into the national airspace. FAA has issued its UAS Comprehensive Plan and UAS Integration Roadmap , which provide broad plans for integration. However, according to FAA, it is working with MITRE to develop a foundation for an implementation plan; FAA then expects to enact a plan by December 2015. While FAA still approves all UAS operations on a case-by-case basis, in recent years it has increased approvals for UAS operations. Specifically, the total number of approvals for UAS operations has increased each year since 2010, and over the past year has included approvals for commercial UAS operations for the first time. In addition, FAA has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes regulations for small UASs (less than 55 pounds).
The FAA's six designated test sites have become operational but have had to address various challenges during the process. The designated test sites became operational in 2014, and as of March 2015, over 195 test flights had taken place. These flights provide operations and safety data to FAA in support of UAS integration. In addition, FAA has provided all test sites with a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization allowing small UAS operations below 200 feet anywhere in the United States. However, during the first year of operations, the test sites faced some challenges. Specifically, the test sites sought additional guidance regarding the type of research they should conduct. According to FAA, it cannot direct the test sites, which receive no federal funding, to conduct specific research. However, FAA did provide a list of potential research areas to the test sites to provide some guidance on areas for research. FAA has conducted other UAS research through agreements with MITRE and some universities, and in May 2015 named the location of the UAS Center of Excellence—a partnership among academia, industry, and government conducting additional UAS research. Unlike FAA's agreements with the test sites, many of these arrangements have language specifically addressing the sharing of research and data.
Around the world, countries have been allowing UAS operations in their airspace for purposes such as agricultural applications and aerial surveying. Unlike in the United States, countries GAO examined—Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom—have well-established UAS regulations. Also, Canada and France currently allow more commercial operations than the United States. While the United States has not finalized UAS regulations, the provisions of FAA's proposed rules are similar to those in the countries GAO examined. However, FAA may not issue a final rule for UASs until late 2016 or early 2017, and rules in some of these countries continue to evolve. Meanwhile, unlike under FAA's proposed rule, Canada has created exemptions for commercial use of small UASs in two categories that allow operations without a government-issued certification, and France and Australia are approving limited beyond line-of-sight operations. Similar to the United States, other countries are facing technology shortfalls, such as the ability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles, as well as unresolved issues involving limited spectrum that limit the progress toward full integration of UASs into the airspace in these countries. |
gao_GAO-13-792 | gao_GAO-13-792_0 | DOD’s Methodology for Estimating and Comparing the Full Cost to the Taxpayer of Work Performed by Its Workforces is Limited in Certain Aspects
DOD Instruction 7041.04 reflects improvements to DOD’s methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost to the taxpayer of work performed by military and civilian personnel and contractor support since the initial issuance of DTM 09-007, but the instruction is still limited in certain areas. Further, CAPE has not yet evaluated certain retirement and retiree health benefit cost elements that it is using to reflect the full cost of currently employed military and civilian personnel. Best practices as reflected in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide state, however, that establishing ground rules for cost estimating provides a common set of agreed on estimating standards that provide guidance and minimize conflicts in definitions. For example, the average rate for training in the Army for fiscal year 2012 was $6,490 per servicemember. However, according to Army data, the amortized cost of training for an officer with a general aviation area of concentration can range from about $6,500 to $93,600 a year, depending on rank. Some officials have requested more developed guidance on these cost elements, but CAPE did not provide more specific direction in its recently issued instruction. CAPE Has Not Established Business Rules for Estimating Reserve and National Guard Costs
Although Reserve and National Guard personnel are a significant part of the military workforce, comprising about 38 percent of the military workforce end strength in fiscal year 2012, CAPE did not establish business rules for developing cost estimates for these personnel in its instruction. The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Handbook states that a cost methodology that captures full costs should include any resources directly or indirectly used to perform work. Portions of Certain Retirement-Related Cost Elements May Not Be Relevant
The instruction directs users to include payments the government makes into funds to support the retirement and health benefits that current military and civilian personnel who become eligible for retirement will receive upon retirement; however, a portion of these payments may not be relevant to current personnel. Still, implementation challenges exist. DOD Components Reported Incorporating the Business Rules into Their Workforce Mix Decisions, but Opportunities for Use Have Been Limited
While the DOD components we examined generally reported to us that they have incorporated the business rules identified in the preceding DTM and current instruction to create cost estimates in support of workforce mix decisions, their opportunities to use the business rules have been limited. Some DOD officials said they were not clear on uses of the DTM beyond in-sourcing, and others said their reported instances of using the business rules may underestimate the actual number of reported instances. Officials within OSD and headquarters elements said they did not know the extent to which officials throughout the department are aware of the instruction and the requirement to use the associated business rules. DOD Components Use Different Tools to Implement the DTM
CAPE recently completed development of a DOD-wide software tool for implementing DOD Instruction 7041.04. In addition, best practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide state that in order to be reliable, cost estimates should be derived using an overall process that produces high- quality cost estimates that are comprehensive and accurate and that can be easily and clearly traced, replicated, and updated. Officials in CAPE told us that the components’ use of the DOD-wide tool will not be required, enforced, or monitored. An assessment of these various tools would enable CAPE to identify the advantages and disadvantages of allowing multiple cost estimation tools. DOD Components May Be Relying on Data Sources That Do Not Contain the Most Accurate Data for Determining Contractor Costs
When estimating contractor support costs for a new or expanding mission, Instruction 7041.04 provides several options for users to consider, although these options may not be the most accurate data sources. Further, DOD officials we spoke to during this review said that GSA’s website does not provide targeted data, such as actual contractor rates by function or geographic location. To improve DOD’s methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost of its various workforces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office to take the following three actions:
Further develop guidance for cost elements that users have identified as challenging to calculate, such as general and administrative, overhead, advertising and recruiting, and training;
Develop business rules for estimating the full cost of National Guard and Reserve personnel; and In coordination with the department’s Office of the Actuary and appropriate federal actuarial offices, reevaluate the inclusion and quantification of pension, retiree health care costs, and other relevant costs of an actuarial nature and make revisions as appropriate. Specifically, DOD concurred with two of our recommendations and partially concurred with three. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) methodology for estimating and comparing the cost of work performed by military, civilian, and contractors reflects the full cost to the taxpayer, we identified each of the cost elements contained in the most recent version of Directive Type-Memorandum (DTM) 09-007 and DOD Instruction 7041.04 and compared them to best practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, guidance in the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Handbook, and the Office of Management and Budget guidelines for Performance of Commercial Activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD must make cost-effective decisions in the use of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces, and CAPE issued guidance that provides a methodology for cost estimates and comparisons among workforces. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO review the cost methodology in Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-007 or its successor guidance to determine whether they reflect the actual, relevant, and quantifiable costs to taxpayers for work performed by these workforces. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD's methodology reflects the full cost to the taxpayer, and (2) DOD's components incorporated the business rules in the memorandum and successor instruction into workforce mix decisions. GAO compared DOD's cost methodology to guidance from other government entities and interviewed officials from components applying the methodology, as well as other appropriate DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has improved its methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost to the taxpayer of work performed by military and civilian personnel and contractor support, but the methodology continues to have certain limitations. Best practices state that cost estimating rules should include a common set of standards that minimize conflicts in definitions, but DOD's methodology does not provide guidance for certain costs. For instance, its estimate of service training costs divides total training funding by the number of servicemembers. Using this method yields an average training cost of $6,490 per servicemember in the Army for fiscal year 2012. However, Army data show that training for a general aviation officer can be as high as $93,600 a year, while the training for an enlisted infantryman can be as low as about $4,600 a year. DOD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office has not provided more specific direction on training costs, although some officials have requested it. Additionally, CAPE officials told GAO they did not include Reserve and National Guard personnel in the methodology because usually these personnel are used on a short-term basis. However, a portion of these personnel do serve in a full-time capacity. The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board has noted that a cost methodology should include any resources directly or indirectly used to perform work, and DOD relies on Reserve and National Guard personnel, for example, to provide airlift capabilities in support of military operations. Further, CAPE has not yet evaluated certain retirement-related cost elements. A portion of these cost elements may not be appropriate to include because they are not attributable to current military and civilian personnel. Without more specific direction in these areas, it will be more difficult for DOD to have reasonable assurance that its cost estimates and comparisons reflect the full and most accurate cost to the taxpayer of work performed by its various workforces.
DOD components GAO examined generally have incorporated business rules contained in the memorandum and successor instruction into their workforce mix decisions, although DOD officials said opportunities to use the rules have been limited due to budgetary factors and few new or expanded missions. Moreover, implementation challenges exist. Some officials raised questions about the extent to which other officials throughout DOD are aware of a requirement to use the methodology for decisions other than in-sourcing. Further, CAPE recently completed a DOD-wide software tool for implementing its instruction, but at the time of GAO's review, some DOD components had developed their own tools. CAPE officials told GAO that the components' use of its DOD-wide tool will not be required, enforced, or monitored, and that CAPE has not reviewed the components' tools. Best practices state that to be reliable, cost estimates should be derived using a process that produces results that are accurate and can be traced, replicated, and updated. Assessing these tools would enable CAPE to identify the advantages and disadvantages of allowing multiple tools and provide reasonable assurance that cost estimates are reliable. Further, the instruction directs users to a General Services Administration (GSA) website for determining contractor support costs. GAO has reported on limitations of GSA's website such as its reporting of data that do not reflect post-competition prices. Without reliable data sources, DOD components may not be using the most suitable data needed to produce credible cost estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD develop further guidance on certain cost elements, such as training; develop business rules for estimating Reserve and National Guard costs; evaluate inclusion or non-inclusion of cost elements related to retirement; assess cost models being used across the department; and reassess sources for contractor data. DOD concurred with two and partially concurred with three of GAOs recommendations. GAO continues to believe it is important for DOD to fully address the recommendations in order to achieve desired results. |
gao_GAO-10-65 | gao_GAO-10-65_0 | VA Faces Continuing Financial Reporting Deficiencies as a Result of Uncorrected Long-Standing Material Weaknesses
Although VA had eliminated some significant deficiencies in prior years, other deficiencies have emerged that require attention. As a result of its recurring internal control weaknesses in financial reporting, VA continues to be at risk of processing errors and misstatements in VA’s financial reports. However, although VA had corrective action plans in place, many of these corrective action plans did not contain the detail needed to provide VA or congressional oversight officials with assurance that the plans had near-term actions that could be effectively implemented on schedule. However, VA lacked documented policies and procedures to ensure the consistent and comprehensive design of these plans, and most of VA’s plans for correcting financial reporting deficiencies in the near term lacked key information suggested in CFOC A- 123 Guidance. As of August 2009, VA had missed milestones in 5 of the 13 corrective action plans to remediate fiscal year 2008 significant deficiencies underlying the financial management system functionality and financial management oversight material weaknesses. Our analysis of corrective action plans for two significant deficiencies— the untimely capitalization of construction projects and inadequate reconciliations related to benefit payments—showed that slipping milestones could jeopardize VA’s completion of these plans by fiscal years 2009 and 2012 respectively, and therefore may impair VA’s ability to obtain the improved data reliability originally envisioned within those time frames. In addition, VA lacked documented policies and procedures for overseeing the implementation of corrective action plans to remediate material weaknesses identified in financial statement audits. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the nature of the internal control weaknesses identified in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) fiscal year 2008 financial audit report and how long they have been outstanding, we obtained and analyzed the financial statement audit reports for fiscal years 2000 to 2008. To determine whether VA had plans appropriately focused on near-term actions to address financial reporting deficiencies prior to the implementation of its Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise (FLITE) system in fiscal year 2014, we analyzed VA’s corrective action plans for remediating significant deficiencies underlying two of the three material weaknesses impacting the reliability of financial information integral for helping inform management decision making— weaknesses in VA’s financial management systems and in its financial management oversight. To determine whether VA had appropriate oversight mechanisms in place to help ensure that near-term corrective action plans to address financial reporting deficiencies are implemented on schedule, we assessed the status of plan implementation in July and August 2009 by identifying whether VA met specific milestones and any slippages that had occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identified three material internal control weaknesses over financial reporting--financial management system functionality, IT security controls, and financial management oversight. VA is developing a new financial system--FLITE--but full implementation is not expected until 2014. Therefore, the Subcommittee asked us to determine whether VA corrective action plans and oversight are appropriately focused on near-term actions to provide improved financial information. This report addresses (1) the nature of the internal control weaknesses identified in the VA fiscal year 2008 financial audit report and how long they have been outstanding, (2) whether VA had plans appropriately focused on near-term corrective actions, and (3) whether VA had appropriate oversight mechanisms in place to help assure that near-term corrective action plans are implemented on schedule. GAO reviewed corrective action plans for significant deficiencies underlying 2 of the 3 material weaknesses and performed additional analysis for two underlying significant deficiencies.
What GAO Found
VA's fiscal year 2008 material weaknesses in financial management system functionality and financial management oversight have been reported since fiscal years 2000 and 2005, respectively. These two material weaknesses are comprised of 16 underlying significant financial reporting control deficiencies. Although VA had eliminated some significant deficiencies in prior years, other deficiencies have emerged. As a result, continuing serious deficiencies in financial reporting leave VA at risk of processing errors and misstatements in its financial statements. Although VA had corrective action plans in place intended to result in near-term remediation of the 16 fiscal year 2008 significant control deficiencies, many of these plans did not contain the detail needed to provide VA officials with assurance that the plans could be effectively implemented on schedule. VA lacked documented policies and procedures needed to assure the consistent and comprehensive design of these corrective action plans, and 8 of 13 of VA's plans for correcting its financial reporting deficiencies lacked key information regarding milestones for action steps and validation activities.As of August 2009, VA had missed milestones in 5 of the 13 corrective action plans. For example, our analysis of plans for remediating deficiencies regarding the capitalization of property, plant, and equipment and inadequate benefit payment reconciliations showed that slipping milestones could jeopardize VA's timely completion of these plans, and consequently may impair VA's ability to obtain improved data reliability within the time frames originally envisioned. VA lacked documented policies and procedures for overseeing implementation of the corrective action plans, but recently took steps intended to better coordinate its oversight activities. |
gao_GAO-03-473T | gao_GAO-03-473T_0 | FAA’s and the Airport Industry’s Estimates of Planned Capital Development Vary Substantially
The estimated costs of planned airport capital development vary depending on which projects are included in the estimates. Airports Obtain Most Funding from Bonds and Federal Sources
From 1999 through 2001, the 3,364 airports that make up the national airport system received an average of about $12 billion per year for planned capital development. Prior Years’ Funding Levels Would Cover All of FAA’s Planned Development Estimate but Would Fall About $3 Billion Short of ACI’s Estimate
If the funding for airport capital development remains at about $12 billion a year over the next 5 years, it would cover all of the projects in FAA’s estimate. If the smaller airports were to continue to receive an average of about $2.4 billion per year, they would be able to fund about 73 percent of the estimated cost of their total planned development. FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan Encompasses Capacity and Efficiency Improvements
In December 2002, FAA published the most recent version of its Operational Evolution Plan, a 10-year plan to increase the capacity and efficiency of the national airspace system, primarily by focusing on building runways. Some airports said these actions could help airports resolve challenges more quickly; however, we believe it is too early to assess the impact of these actions on the runway development process. While FAA is making progress in managing the air traffic control modernization, key programs continue to experience cost, schedule, and performance problems. FAA Is Implementing Human Capital and Procurement Reforms
As problems with the air traffic control modernization program mounted in the early 1990s, FAA attributed the delays in implementing air traffic control projects, at least in part, to burdensome governmentwide human capital rules and federal acquisition regulations that impeded its ability to hire, train, and deploy personnel and to acquire equipment and systems. In response to these claims, the Congress exempted FAA from many federal laws governing human capital and acquisitions, and the agency began implementing human capital and procurement reforms in 1996. For example, it has not implemented a new compensation system for about 20 percent of its 50,000 employees—those staff whose unions have not reached agreements with FAA. FAA and Industry Have Taken Actions to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate
Reducing fatal aviation accidents is key to improving aviation safety. Setting priorities among projects, identifying opportunities for streamlining the runway development process, and fully implementing human capital and procurement reforms should help to ensure efficiency. However, we have not finished analyzing our survey data, and the results presented in this testimony are still preliminary. Aviation Safety: Better Guidance and Training Needed on Providing Files on Pilots’ Background Information. Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps to Reduce Accident Rates by 2007. Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing the Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much has changed since the Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) 3 years ago--the downturn in the nation's economy and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Competition for federal funding has also grown. The reauthorization of AIR-21 provides an opportunity for the Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to focus on several challenges to improving the national airspace system. These challenges include (1) funding planned airport capital development, (2) increasing capacity and efficiency, (3) implementing human capital and procurement reforms, and (4) ensuring aviation safety. This testimony is based on ongoing and published GAO work. The information on funding and development, obtained from FAA and the Airport Council International (ACI), a key organization representing the airport industry, is preliminary and therefore subject to change.
What GAO Found
Funding planned airport development: Estimates vary as to the annual cost of planned airport capital development over the next 5 years, from FAA's estimate of about $9 billion to the airport industry's estimate of about $15 billion. If airports continue to receive about $12 billion a year for planned capital development--the average for 1999 through 2001--they would be able to fund all of the projects included in FAA's estimate, but would fall about $3 billion short of the industry's estimate. Increasing capacity and efficiency: Recently, airports have taken about 10 years to develop runways, and ongoing runway projects are expected to take even longer. The federal government and airports have taken actions to expedite runway development, but it is still too early to assess the impact of these actions. FAA's management of costly air traffic control acquisitions has improved, but cost, schedule, and performance problems remain. Implementing human capital and procurement reforms: FAA is making progress in implementing human capital and procurement reforms, but it has not fully implemented a new compensation system, in part because it has to negotiate with multiple unions, and it is not yet systematically evaluating the results of reforms in either area. Ensuring aviation safety: The Safer Skies program, which focuses on identifying and correcting the causes of aviation accidents, and FAA's redesigned program to inspect airline operations are two important aviation safety initiatives. While both programs have made good starts, some challenges remain. The Safer Skies program, which began in 1998, is not fully implemented, and the inspection system has encountered startup problems with inspector training and guidance. |
gao_GAO-12-444T | gao_GAO-12-444T_0 | Those material weaknesses relate to the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the accrual-based consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the reported total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain federal entities; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; ensure that the federal government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities’ financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); and identify and either resolve or explain material differences between (1) certain components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury’s records that are used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit, the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and the Fiscal Projections for the U.S. government (included in the Supplemental Information section of the Financial Report) and (2) related amounts reported in federal entities’ financial statements and underlying financial information and records. These material weaknesses continued to (1) hamper the federal government’s ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; (2) affect the federal government’s ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities; (3) impair the federal government’s ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; and (4) hinder the federal government from having reliable financial information to operate in an efficient and effective manner. Addressing Impediments to an Opinion on the Accrual-Based Consolidated Financial Statements
Three long-standing major impediments continued to prevent us from expressing an opinion on the U.S. government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD that have prevented DOD’s financial statements from being auditable, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. The most recent update of the plan also emphasizes the importance of leadership, including senior leaders and field commanders, to achieving DOD’s goals, and it links accountability to performance appraisals. With respect to budgetary information, in October 2011, the Secretary of Defense directed the DOD Comptroller to provide him with a plan to achieve audit readiness for the Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) by the end of 2014. We recommended actions for improving the development, implementation, documentation, and oversight of DOD’s financial management improvement efforts. Treasury has taken or plans to take actions to address these recommendations. During fiscal year 2011, Treasury furthered its commitment to resolve differences in intragovernmental activity and balances, which included several short- and long-term initiatives. Resolving the intragovernmental transactions problem remains a difficult challenge and will require a strong and sustained commitment by federal entities, as well as continued strong leadership by Treasury and OMB. Significant Uncertainties Result in Disclaimers of Opinion on the 2011 and 2010 Statements of Social Insurance as well as on the 2011 Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts
Significant uncertainties, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth reflected in the 2011 and 2010 Statements of Social Insurance, prevented us from expressing opinions on the 2011 and 2010 Statements of Social Insurance, as well as on the 2011 Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts.Statement of Social Insurance presents the actuarial present value of the federal government’s estimated future revenue to be received from or on behalf of participants and estimated future expenditures to be paid to or on behalf of participants, based on benefit formulas in current law and The using a projection period sufficient to illustrate the long-term sustainability of the social insurance programs. Such reporting provides a much needed perspective on the federal government’s long-term fiscal position and outlook. Both the Financial Report and GAO’s simulations assume these reductions occur, and that the savings as a share of GDP continue beyond the decade. Addressing the long-term fiscal imbalance is made more difficult by the need to balance achieving the goals of sustaining economic growth in the near term, while producing a plan to change the federal government’s long-term fiscal path. We are encouraged by DOD’s efforts toward addressing its long- standing financial management weaknesses and its efforts to achieve auditability. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO annually audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. The Congress and the President need reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information to make sound decisions and conduct effective oversight of federal government programs and policies.
However, over the years, certain material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. Unless these weaknesses are adequately addressed, they will, among other things, continue to (1) hamper the federal governments ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (2) affect the federal governments ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities.
This testimony presents the results of GAOs audit for fiscal year 2011 and discusses certain of the federal governments significant long-term fiscal challenges.
What GAO Found
Three long-standing major impediments continued to prevent GAO from expressing an opinion on the federal governments accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense (DOD) that have prevented DODs financial statements from being audited, (2) federal entities inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances, and (3) the federal governments ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. GAO also reported material weaknesses involving billions of dollars in improper payments, information security, and tax collection activities. Also, GAO was prevented from expressing opinions on the 2011 and 2010 Statements of Social Insurance and the 2011 Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts because of significant uncertainties primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth reflected in the statements.
GAO is encouraged by the commitment of DOD leaders to improving DODs financial management and achieving auditiability and by the congressional attention being given to this important matter. The Congress set statutory deadlines for DOD auditability, convened a congressional panel to focus on the issue, and held several hearings on DOD financial management. The Secretary of Defense accelerated the timeline for DOD auditability, setting a 2014 deadline for audit readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources, and DOD has issued a plan for meeting that date, which GAO is in the process of reviewing. The plan emphasizes the importance of leadership, including senior leaders and field commanders, to achieving DODs goals, and it links accountability to performance appraisals. To meet their financial management and auditability goals, DOD and its components will need to overcome significant challenges, including implementation of its financial improvement plan, deployment of supporting automated systems, and assessment and resolution of gaps in workforce skills.
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) furthered its commitment to resolve unreconciled differences between federal entities regarding intragovernmental activity and balances, which included several short- and long-term initiatives. In addition, Treasury, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), implemented corrective actions during 2011 to address certain deficiencies regarding the preparation of the consolidated financial statements. Fully addressing the numerous issues in these areas will require a strong and sustained commitment by federal entities and leadership by Treasury and OMB.
The 2011 Financial Report of the United States Government included comprehensive long-term fiscal projections for the U.S. government, which provides a much needed perspective on the federal governments long-term fiscal position and outlook. These, like GAOs simulations, include the savings provided by the Budget Control Act of 2011. While assuming that the savings as a share of gross domestic product continue beyond the decade leads to an improvement in the long-term fiscal path, it does not make the path sustainable. Addressing the long-term fiscal imbalance is made more difficult by the need to balance achieving the goals of sustaining economic growth in the near term, while producing a plan to change the federal governments long-term fiscal path.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations directed at improving federal financial management. The federal government has generally taken or plans to take actions to address GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-393 | gao_GAO-02-393_0 | Most States Are Not in Compliance with the 1994 Title I Accountability and Assessment Requirements
As of March 2002, 17 states were in compliance with the 1994 Title I assessment requirements; however, 35 were not. So far, Education has granted timeline waivers to 30 states. States failing to meet these negotiated timelines will be subject to loss of some of their Title I administrative funds. New 2001 requirements listed in table 1 have deadlines that vary according to the requirement, and the Secretary of Education can give states 1 additional year from those deadlines to meet the new requirements, but only in case of a “natural disaster or a precipitous and unforeseen decline in the financial resources of the state.” Since the majority of states have not met the requirements of the 1994 law, it appears that many states may not be well-situated as they work to meet the schedule for implementing new requirements that build upon the 1994 requirements. For example, one governor spearheaded a plan that used commissions to develop content standards and assessments aligned with those standards. They said that efforts to ensure buy-in paved the way for changes meant to ensure compliance with the assessment and accountability requirements of the1994 legislation. Most states reported taking some actions to ensure that students with limited English proficiency and disabilities received appropriate accommodations during testing. The errors were discovered by a number of individuals, including local district officials, parents, and state agency staff. Specifically, we reviewed three key questions: (1) the status of states’ compliance with key 1994 Title I assessment requirements; (2) factors that have hindered or helped states move toward meeting the requirements; and (3) the actions states are taking to ensure that Title I assessments are scored accurately, exemptions for students with limited English proficiency are justified, and students with disabilities are accommodated during testing according to federal regulations. | What GAO Found
Concerned that Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) had not significantly improving the educational achievements of children at risk, Congress mandated major changes in 1994. States were required to adopt or develop challenging curriculum content and performance standards, assessments aligned with content standards, and accountability systems to measure progress in raising student achievement. In return, states were given greater flexibility in the use of Title I and other federal funds. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 augments the assessment and accountability requirements that states must implement and increases the stakes for schools that fail to make adequate progress. The 1994 legislation required states to comply with the requirements by January 2001 but allowed the Department of Education to extend that deadline. Education has granted waivers to 30 states to give them more time to meet all requirements. If states fail to meet the extended timeliness, they are subject to the withholding of some Title I administrative funds. Title I directors indicated that a state's ability to meet the 1994 requirements improved when both state leaders and state agency staff made compliance a priority and coordinated with one another. Most directors said that inadequate funding hindered compliance. Many of the states reported taking action to ensure that Title I assessments were scored accurately, that any exemptions for students with limited English proficiency were justified, and students with disabilities were receiving appropriate testing accommodations. As of March 2002, 17 states had complied with the 1994 assessment requirements; 35 states had not. |
gao_GAO-14-131 | gao_GAO-14-131_0 | EDA’s two largest grant assistance programs are Public Works and EAA. EDA Offices Did Not Consistently Document Funding Decisions
EDA has a history of inconsistently documenting the results of committee meetings in which proposed projects are recommended for funding. In March 2012, EDA implemented new procedures in response to the Commerce OIG’s December 2000 recommendations. We reviewed a random and generalizable sample of IRC record templates for 74 Public Works and EAA projects that EDA regional offices funded in fiscal year 2012, and we estimate that the regional offices filled out the template in its entirety for only 46 percent of all projects funded that year. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires that all transactions and other significant events be clearly documented and the documentation be readily available for examination. Until EDA ensures that its regional offices consistently and fully complete an IRC record template for all proposed projects considered for funding, EDA will not have adequate assurance that its funding decisions are consistent and transparent. Project Counties Were Generally Distressed Relative to National and State Averages and Located in Nonrural Areas
Based on our analysis of the economic distress characteristics of the counties where EDA funded projects under its Public Works and EAA programs in fiscal years 2007 and 2011, we found that counties where EDA funded projects generally had lower per capita income and higher unemployment rates than national and state averages. Furthermore, some projects that EDA funded under the Public Works and EAA programs in fiscal years 2007 and 2011 had a special need, as defined by EDA. In addition, we found that for fiscal years 2007 and 2011, more than half of the projects EDA funded were located in counties that were part of nonrural areas, or areas with an urban center of more than 50,000 people. As previously discussed, EDA can determine a project to be eligible for funding based on a special need arising from actual or threatened severe unemployment or economic adjustment problems resulting from severe short-term or long-term changes in economic conditions. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service’s Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, 52 percent of all EDA grants awarded in fiscal year 2007 and 67 percent of those awarded in fiscal year 2011 funded projects in nonrural areas. EDA Funded Various Types of Projects under Its Public Works and Economic Adjustment Assistance Programs
Based on our analysis of EDA-funded projects, EDA provided funding for various types of economic-development-related projects under its Public Works and EAA programs in fiscal years 2007 and 2011. As figure 9 shows, EDA most often funded projects in two categories under its Public Works program: infrastructure (projects that involve, among other things, constructing and repairing various modes of transportation; constructing and repairing water, sewer, gas, and electrical systems; and developing telecommunications and broadband infrastructure) and commercial and industrial (projects that involve the design, construction, demolition, or renovation of commercial buildings and industrial and business parks, including infrastructure to support the parks and financial support to existing businesses). Recommendation
To increase transparency in the award selection process, the Secretary of Commerce should direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Development to develop and implement procedures to ensure that EDA regional offices consistently complete the required Investment Review Committee record template for each proposed project considered for funding. EDA agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement procedures to ensure that regional offices consistently complete the required Investment Review Committee (IRC) template. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines, for the Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) Public Works and Economic Development (Public Works) and Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) programs, (1) the extent to which EDA documented grant selection decisions; (2) the indicators of economic distress for counties with EDA-funded projects and how these funds have been distributed to rural and nonrural areas; and (3) the types of projects that have been funded by these programs. EDA awarded more than 1,500 grants under the Public Works and EAA grant programs in fiscal years 2006 through 2012 (the period of interest in the congressional mandate). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's EDA provides financial assistance through grants to rural and urban communities experiencing substantial and persistent economic distress. EDA grants are intended to leverage existing regional assets to support the implementation of economic development strategies that advance new ideas and creative approaches to promote economic prosperity in distressed communities. House Report 112-463 included a mandate that GAO review grants EDA made under its Public Works and EAA programs from fiscal years 2006 through 2012. This report discusses (1) the extent to which EDA documented its funding decisions (2) the levels of economic distress and population density of counties where EDA funded projects, and (3) the types of projects EDA funded. GAO reviewed EDA regulations and guidance; analyzed EDA project data from fiscal years 2007 (the year in the period covered by the mandate in which EDA awarded the most grants), 2011 (the most recent year with reliable data), and 2012 (the year in which EDA implemented new documentation procedures), as well as other federal data; and interviewed EDA staff.
What GAO Found
The Economic Development Administration (EDA) implemented a new procedure in fiscal year 2012 that requires its regional offices to complete a standard template to document the results of committee meetings in which proposed projects are discussed and potentially recommended for funding. However, GAO found that for the Public Works and Economic Development (Public Works) program and the Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) program—EDA's two largest grant assistance programs—EDA regional offices had not completed the template consistently. GAO estimated that only 46 percent of all projects recommended for funding in fiscal year 2012 under these programs were documented using the complete template. EDA has a history of inconsistent documentation: for example, in 2000 the Department of Commerce's Inspector General reported inconsistencies in how EDA's regional offices documented the project review process. Standards for internal control in the federal government require all transactions and significant events to be clearly documented and available for examination. Until EDA takes steps to ensure that all of its regional offices consistently and fully complete the standard template for all proposed projects considered for funding, EDA will not have adequate assurance that its funding decisions are consistent and transparent.
GAO found that counties where EDA funded projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2011 under its Public Works and EAA programs generally had lower per capita income and higher unemployment rates than national and state averages. Furthermore, some projects that EDA funded under the Public Works and EAA programs in fiscal years 2007 and 2011 had an EDA-defined special need arising from actual or threatened severe unemployment or economic adjustment problems. In addition, GAO found that counties where EDA funded projects under Public Works and EAA were generally part of nonrural areas (areas with an urban center of more than 50,000 people). Specifically, in fiscal years 2007 and 2011, respectively, 52 percent and 67 percent of all of EDA's funded projects under the two programs were in nonrural areas.
GAO found that various types of economic development projects received funding under Public Works and EAA in fiscal years 2007 and 2011. The most common types of projects funded under Public Works involved constructing or repairing infrastructure (such as water, sewer, gas, and electrical systems) or constructing or renovating commercial buildings and industrial and business parks. The most common types of projects funded under EAA involved helping businesses get started, planning and research to support job creation and retention, and constructing or repairing infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
To increase transparency in the award selection process, GAO recommends that EDA develop and implement procedures to ensure that EDA regional offices consistently complete the required template for each proposed project considered for funding. EDA agreed with the recommendation and described its plans to address it. |
gao_GGD-96-43 | gao_GGD-96-43_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our first objective was to evaluate recent studies of the research tax credit for the adequacy of the data and methods used to determine the amount of research spending stimulated per dollar of revenue cost. In particular, we were to determine if recent studies provided adequate evidence to conclude that each dollar of tax credit stimulates at least one dollar of research spending in the short run and, over the long run, stimulates about two dollars of research spending. These estimates appear to be consistent with the claim that the credit stimulates spending that exceeds its revenue cost. However, the studies have the following data and methodological limitations. These confidential tax return data were not available to the authors of the studies. The eight studies all used measures of the tax incentive that did not incorporate important interactions with other features of the tax code. Factors Determining the Research Tax Credit’s Value to Society
The value of the research tax credit to society cannot be determined simply by comparing the amount of research spending stimulated by the credit versus the credit’s revenue cost. To fully evaluate the credit’s effect, one would have to (1) estimate the total benefits gained by society from the research stimulated by the credit; (2) estimate the resource costs of doing the research; (3) estimate the administration, compliance, and efficiency costs to society resulting from the collection of taxes (or the borrowing of money) required to fund the credit; and (4) compare the benefits to the costs. The publicly available data will not be as accurate because they use definitions of research spending and tax liabilities that are different from IRS. COMPUSTAT and NSF data do not accurately reflect this relationship because both data sources include spending that does not qualify for the credit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed eight studies of the research tax credit, focusing on the: (1) adequacy of the studies' data and methods to determine the amount of research spending stimulated per dollar of foregone tax revenue; and (2) other factors that determine the credit's value to society.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) four studies supported the claim that, during the 1980s, the research credit stimulated research spending that exceeded its revenue cost, but the other four studies did not support the claim or were inconclusive; (2) all of the studies had significant data and methodological limitations that made it difficult to evaluate industry's true responsiveness to the research tax credit; (3) the studies did not use tax return data to determine the credit's incentive because the authors did not qualify for access to such data; (4) publicly available data were not a suitable substitute for the tax return data because public sources used different definitions of taxable income and research spending; (5) the studies' analytical methods, such as use of industry aggregates and failure to incorporate important tax code interactions, made their findings imprecise and uncertain; (6) there was little research on the latest design of the credit to determine its effect on incentives and costs; (7) the studies' evidence was not adequate to conclude that a dollar of research tax credit would stimulate a dollar of additional short-term research spending or about two dollars of additional long-term research spending; and (8) to measure the credit's true impact, the studies would need to assess the research's net benefit to society, resource costs of research, and administrative, compliance, and efficiency costs of funding the credit. |
gao_GAO-15-498T | gao_GAO-15-498T_0 | 1). The three primary sources of funding for airport development are Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, PFCs, and locally generated revenue. All three sources of funds are linked to passenger aviation activity. The grants generally require matching funds from the local match ranging from 10 to 25 percent depending on the size of the airport and type of project. The Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), a trade association for airports, also estimates the cost of planned airport capital projects. We reported in June 2014 that economic issues such as volatile fuel prices and the economic recession have affected the industry as have airlines’ consolidation and an adoption of business models that focus For instance, the 2007-2009 recession more on capacity management.combined with a spike in fuel prices, helped spur industry mergers and a change in airline business models. The greatest reduction in scheduled flights occurred at medium-hub airports, which decreased nearly 24 percent from 2007 to 2013, compared to a decrease of about 9 percent at large-hub airports and about 20 percent at small-hub airports. 2). While 2014 passenger activity as represented by the number of passengers onboard aircraft departing U.S. airports has rebounded nearly back to 2007 levels (down 4 percent), the total number of commercial passenger and cargo aircraft departures (operations) in 2014 is still down 18.5 percent since 2007. In June 2014, we reported that GA activity has also declined since 2007, particularly affecting airports that rely on general aviation activity for a large share of their revenue. According to the MIT study, the number of annual hours flown by GA pilots, as estimated by FAA, has also decreased over the past decade. Airport Capacity Needs and AIP- Eligible Planned Development Costs Have Mostly Declined
The Projected Number of Future Capacity Constrained Airports Has Declined
Earlier this year, FAA reported on airport capacity needs through 2030. To do this, FAA modeled recent and forecasted changes in aviation activity, current and planned FAA investments in air-traffic-control modernization, and airport investments in infrastructure, such as new runways, to determine which airports are likely to be congested or capacity constrained in future years.with previous studies in 2004 and 2007 following a similar methodology. 4). However, in the 2015 report, FAA projected that 6 airports will be capacity constrained in 2020. Estimated AIP-Eligible Development Costs for Next 5 Years Are Lower, Though Estimates of Overall Development Costs Have Increased
In the September 2014 NPIAS, FAA estimated that airports have roughly $33.5 billion in planned development projects for the period 2015 through 2019 that are eligible for federal support in the form of AIP grants.estimate is roughly 21 percent less than FAA’s previous estimate of $42.5 billion for the period 2013 through 2017 (see fig. The ACI-NA also estimated airports’ planned development for the 2015 through 2019 period for projects both eligible and not eligible for AIP funding. According to ACI-NA, the total estimated planned-development cost for 2015 through 2019 is $72.5 billion, more than twice FAA’s estimate for just AIP eligible projects.percent over its prior estimate of $68.7 billion for the prior 2013–2017 ACI-NA’s estimate increased 6.2 estimating period. Federal Support for Airport Development Has Decreased, While Debt Levels May Leave Little Room for New Development at Some Airports
Federal Funding for Airport Development Has Declined in Recent Years
In Fiscal Year 2015, Congress made $3.35 billion available in appropriations acts for AIP funding, a reduction from the annual appropriations of $3.52 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. For example, at least 50 airports have leveraged their PFCs through 2030 or later, according to FAA data. The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget proposal and airports have called for increasing the PFC cap to $8—which is intended to account for inflation since 2000, when the maximum PFC cap was last raised—and eliminate AIP entitlements for large-hub airports. Some examples include:
Non-aviation development on airport property: Airports have turned to an increasing range of unique developments on airport property, including high-end commercial retail and leisure activities, hotels and business centers, and medical facilities for non-aviation revenues. Public-private partnerships: Airports can fund airport improvements with private sector participation. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. airports are key contributors to the national and regional economies, providing mobility for people and goods, both domestically and internationally. Since 2007 when GAO last reported on airport funding, airports of all sizes have experienced significant changes in aviation activity. Financing for airport capital improvements is based on a mix of federal AIP grants, federally authorized but statutorily-capped PFCs, and locally generated aviation-related and non-aviation-related revenues. As deliberations begin in advance of FAA's 2015 reauthorization, Congress is faced with considering the most appropriate type, level, and distribution of federal support for development of the National Airspace System.
This testimony discusses trends in (1) aviation activity at airports since 2007, (2) forecasted airport capacity needs and airports' planned development costs, and (3) financing for airport development. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from June 2007 through December 2014, with selected updates conducted through April 2015. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed recent information on FAA's program activities and analyses outlined in FAA reports, including the 2015 aviation forecast, and the 2015–2019 planned airport-development estimates.
What GAO Found
Economic factors, since 2007, have led to fewer scheduled commercial flights, a trend more pronounced for some types of airports. These economic factors include not just the volatile fuel prices and the 2007 to 2009 recession but also evolving airline practices, such as airline mergers and the adoption of business models that demonstrate capacity management. For example, as GAO reported in June 2014, the number of scheduled flights at medium- and small-hub airports has declined at least 20 percent from 2007 to 2013, compared to about a 9 percent decline at large-hub airports. General Aviation (GA) has also declined in activity, as measured by the number of GA aircraft operations and hours flown, due to similar economic factors. In recent years, however, passenger growth has rebounded. According to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) projections, U.S. airline passenger growth is predicted to grow 2 percent per year through 2035—a growth rate that is slightly lower than that of past forecasts.
According to FAA estimates, the number of airports that require additional capacity to handle flight operations to avoid delays has declined since 2004. Similarly, the future cost of planned airport development has also declined in recent years. Earlier this year, FAA projected that 6 airports will be capacity constrained in 2020 compared to 41 in the 2004 projection. Even with this improvement, some airports—like those in the New York City area region—will remain capacity constrained, according to FAA. The overall improved capacity situation is also reflected in reduced estimates of future airport-development costs that are eligible for federal grants. In September 2014, the FAA estimated that for the period 2015 through 2019, airports have about $33.5 billion in planned development projects eligible for federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants—a 21 percent reduction from the $42.5 billion estimate for the time period 2013 through 2017. The biggest decline in planned development costs among project categories is in capacity projects such as new runway projects. However, an airport industry association estimated planned airport capital project costs, both those eligible and not eligible for AIP, of $72.5 billion for 2015 through 2019, an increase of 6.2 percent from the association's prior 5-year estimate for 2013 through 2017.
As traditional funding sources for airport development have generally declined, airports have increasingly relied on other sources of financing. Specifically, federal AIP grants and Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) are two primary sources of federally authorized funding for airports. The amount made available for AIP decreased from over $3.5 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 to less than $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2015. Further the President's 2016 proposed budget calls for additional reductions in AIP, though it would be offset with a proposed increase in the PFC cap, which is currently $4.50 per flight segment. Airports have sought additional opportunities to collect non-aviation revenues. As a result, according to FAA, non-aviation revenue has increased each year from 2008 through 2014. For example, airports have 1) partnered with the private sector to fund airport improvements; 2) identified new business ventures on airport property including the development of commercial retail, leisure activities, and medical facilities; and 3) explored options for privatization. |
gao_GAO-04-541 | gao_GAO-04-541_0 | In 1967, the Congress chartered the Foundation as the official national, nonprofit fund-raising partner of the Park Service. Foundation revenues more than doubled from about $24 million in fiscal year 1999 to about $52 million in fiscal year 2003. Corporations Contributed to Significant Rise in Private Support
For fiscal years 1999 through 2003, private contributions more than doubled, from approximately $18 million in 1999 to just over $41 million in 2003. Corporations Are a Major Source for Private Donations
The Foundation has made a concerted effort to direct its fund-raising efforts primarily at corporations. In instances where the donors decide to support systemwide projects, the Foundation requests that all interested parties submit grant proposals, indicating how they would use these donations. The Foundation may use various means to distribute general donations to support park activities. Bulk of Donations to the Foundation Is Restricted for a Specific Use
The bulk of the private donations received by the Foundation is restricted or targeted for specific uses. For example, one corporation agreed to raise $5 million to support the restoration of the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C.—a project that was on the Park Service’s priority list in anticipation of future federal funding. The Foundation’s approach to fund-raising for systemwide programs has led some Park Service officials to contend that the Foundation’s support is not being focused where it could do the most good—to better support individual higher priority projects at local parks. Some Park Service officials are concerned that the Foundation has not fulfilled its commitments to provide fund-raising support. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the confusion and misunderstanding and improve communication between the National Park Foundation and the Park Service, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Interior require the Director of the National Park Service to take the following five steps: work collaboratively with the Foundation to develop an overall written agreement that, among other things, articulates the Foundation’s fund- raising strategy and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the Foundation and the Park Service in their partnering relationship; identify and document all current and future fund-raising agreements made with the Foundation, specifying the terms of work agreed to by each party; provide a list of individual park project priorities, including those potentially fundable by nonprofits, and communicate them to the Foundation for consideration in fund-raising; develop and implement internal controls such that fund-raising agreements are documented in writing and subsequent performance is tracked against the agreement; and clarify whether the exclusivity terms in Foundation agreements with Proud Partners apply to park-based cause-related marketing arrangements and communicate this information to all of the Park Service’s fund-raising partners. Recommendations to the National Park Foundation
To improve its communication with the Park Service and improve management controls, we are making four recommendations to the National Park Foundation, namely that it take the following four steps: enter into an overall written agreement with the Park Service that includes its fund-raising strategy and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the Foundation and the Park Service in their partnering relationship; identify and document all current and future fund-raising agreements made with the Park Service, specifying the terms of work agreed to by each party; develop a process, either through training or briefings, to help ensure complete and consistent understanding of its fund-raising strategy and roles and responsibilities with the Park Service headquarters, regional, and local park officials; and in developing its fund-raising approach, consider the list of individual park priorities compiled and provided by the Park Service—this list could be used for identifying patterns of park needs for systemwide projects as well as for identifying specific needs that may be of interest to potential donors. To determine the extent that contributions assisted the Park Service in addressing park priorities, we reviewed the Foundation’s grant awards and available discretionary funds and interviewed Foundation officials about how these funds are raised and used to fulfill individual park requests. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1967, the Congress created the National Park Foundation (Foundation)--a nonprofit organization with the sole purpose of providing private support to the National Park Service (Park Service). However, some Park Service officials have raised concerns that the Foundation's support is not meeting parks' priority needs. In this context, congressional requesters asked GAO to review the activities of the Foundation by determining the (1) Foundation's roles and responsibilities for raising funds to support the Park Service, (2) amount and kinds of donations the Foundation has raised between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, and (3) extent to which the contributions obtained by the Foundation assisted the Park Service in addressing park priorities.
What GAO Found
In accordance with its legislative charter, the Foundation raises private donations from a variety of sources and has broad discretion in how it distributes these donations to support the Park Service. In general, the Foundation's policy is to support systemwide projects that serve the Park Service and are not otherwise federally funded, such as supporting temporary transportation advisors to help alleviate congestion at national parks. Overall, annual private donations to the Foundation have more than doubled--from $18 million in fiscal year 1999 to $41 million in fiscal year 2003. Much of this increase has stemmed from the Foundation's concerted effort to target corporate donations, which accounted for the bulk of the donations received. Most of the corporate donations are noncash or "inkind," such as providing expertise to renovate the red bus fleet in Glacier National Park or providing electric vehicles to parks in California. Corporate donors typically specify how their donations are to be used. For example, one corporation donated funds to renovate a national monument in the District of Columbia. The Foundation, in consultation with the Park Service, decided to use these funds to renovate the Washington Monument. Because the majority of the Foundation's donations are restricted by the donors for a specific use, there are limited funds available to respond to some parks' requests, such as for fund-raising assistance or support for local nonprofit groups. Consequently, some park officials question the usefulness of Foundation donations and believe support should be directed at park priorities. In an effort to raise more discretionary funds and possibly better support individual park needs, the Foundation is expanding its fund-raising approach to attract more donations from individuals. The Foundation's efforts to assist the Park Service are hampered by poor communication and documentation problems. First, unlike most other partner relationships with the Park Service, the Foundation and the Park Service do not have a comprehensive written agreement that clearly describes the Foundation's fund-raising strategy and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each partner. Second, the Foundation and the Park Service sometimes enter into verbal rather than written fund-raising agreements, thereby making it more difficult to determine the responsibilities of each party and whether commitments were met. Third, Foundation and Park Service officials disagree about the fund-raising strategy as well as the objectives for one of the Foundation's key fundraising programs. Both parties have taken initial steps to address these and other communication problems. |
gao_GAO-09-149 | gao_GAO-09-149_0 | DDSs generally pay providers for records and SSA pays the DDSs to cover these expenses. In addition to medical evidence, DDSs review statements from the claimant or others about the claimant’s impairment and ability to perform daily activities. DDSs pay providers to perform these examinations and SSA pays them to cover these costs. 2.) DDSs Face Challenges Obtaining Medical Records from Claimants’ Providers
Determining eligibility for disability benefits is a complex, challenging task. DDSs have responded to these challenges by conducting additional follow-up contacts with medical providers and claimants, and more than half of the 51 DDSs we surveyed reported adjusting their payment methods. Medical Providers Do Not Respond Consistently to DDS Requests for Records
DDS officials identified provider response to medical records requests as a challenge in our survey of 51 DDSs. As a result, the volume of records requested is high: 13 DDSs reported sending over 200,000 requests in fiscal year 2007. Responses to these challenges include scheduling consultative exams with medical providers whose practices focus primarily on performing disability evaluations and adjusting payments, for example, by paying providers for the time they spend preparing for a consultative exam that a claimant fails to attend. For example, 41 of the 51 DDS directors we surveyed reported that their offices routinely ask claimants’ treating providers if they are willing to perform a consultative exam if needed, but 34 of these directors reported that claimants’ treating providers are never or almost never willing to perform these exams. One reason why the DDSs may face difficulty recruiting and retaining consultative exam providers is the frequency with which disability claimants miss their consultative exam appointments. Current payment rates also may contribute to the DDSs’ challenges recruiting and retaining consultative exam providers who submit high- quality reports. SSA Has Made Progress in Moving to Electronic Collection of Medical Records, but Faces Challenges Shifting to the Use of Electronic Medical Records
SSA’s transition from paper medical records to the use of electronic images of medical records has increased opportunities for program efficiencies and agency collaboration. SSA Has Made Progress in Developing Options for Submitting Records Electronically, but More than Half Are Still Submitted on Paper
One of SSA’s goals is to receive all medical records electronically. In some cases, providers may find this too time consuming to be feasible. One large provider accounts for most of the records SSA receives online. We found variation among the DDSs in the percentages of records received online. SSA, however, currently lacks some important data necessary to evaluate these approaches and identify promising practices, which might be shared to promote more timely and complete collection of relevant medical evidence by all DDSs. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how Disability Determination Services (DDS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) collect medical evidence, we used four primary sources of information: (1) a survey of the 51 DDSs including all 50 states and the District of Columbia; (2) in-depth interviews and site visits with 5 states; (3) a review of 100 randomly selected initial claims files and 50 claim files at the appeals level; and (4) analysis of SSA data concerning disability determinations. GAO Survey of DDS Directors on Collection of Medical Evidence for Initial DDS Disability Decisions
Our survey of DDSs addressed the timeliness of provider responses to DDS requests for medical records, practices and challenges associated with collecting medical records, practices and challenges associated with obtaining consultative exams, outreach to the medical provider community, and SSA and DDS initiatives associated with medical evidence collection. These included data for initial and reconsideration filings received, decided, and pending at year end; filings approved and denied; filings for which one or more medical evidence of record was purchased; filings for which one or more consultative exam was requested; expenditures for purchase of medical records and consultative exams; errors in DDS initial determinations identified by SSA quality assurance the results of evaluations of medical records collected and consultative exam reports by SSA quality assurance reviewers; and responses to medical records obtained via methods, including paper and faxed submissions, and online submission options such as SSA’s Electronic Records Express Web site. GAO-04-14. | Why GAO Did This Study
The timely collection of relevant medical evidence from providers, such as physicians and psychologists, is key to the Social Security Administration (SSA) process for deciding whether an estimated 2.5 million new claimants each year have impairments that qualify them to receive disability benefits. The initial determinations are generally made by state agencies called Disability Determination Services (DDSs). We evaluated: (1) the challenges, if any, in collecting medical records from the claimants' own providers and ways SSA and the DDSs are responding to these challenges; (2) the challenges, if any, in obtaining high-quality consultative exams and ways SSA and the DDSs are responding to these challenges; and (3) the progress SSA has made in moving from paper to electronic collection of medical evidence. We surveyed 51 DDS directors, visited 5 state DDSs, reviewed sample case files, and interviewed officials with SSA, DDSs, and associations for claimants and providers.
What GAO Found
Obtaining timely and complete medical records is a challenge to DDSs in promptly deciding disability claims, and DDSs have responded with additional provider contacts and adjustments to their payment procedures. Although DDSs pay most medical providers for medical records and SSA pays the DDSs to cover these expenses, 14 of 51 DDSs reported the percentage of requests for which they did not receive records was 20 percent or more in fiscal year 2007. In response to this challenge, all DDSs conduct follow-up with providers and claimants to urge them to provide records. Over half of the DDSs (34 of 51) have also implemented more timely payments for records and six increased the amount they pay. Although SSA evaluates DDS collection of medical records, it does not compile key data necessary to identify and share promising collection practices. Recruiting and retaining qualified providers is a challenge to obtaining consultative exams needed to supplement insufficient medical records. For example, 41 of 51 DDSs reported routinely asking claimants' own providers to perform these exams; yet 34 reported providers never or almost never agree to do so. DDSs directors in our survey believe that current payment rates account for some of the difficulty recruiting and retaining consultative exam providers. In response to these challenges, 32 DDSs rely on medical providers who specialize in performing disability evaluations, and 20 pay providers for time spent preparing for appointments claimants fail to attend. SSA evaluates evidence from consultative exams, but these evaluations and the data they yield are too limited to identify and share promising DDS practices. SSA has made progress moving to electronic collection of medical records, but faces challenges in fully implementing electronic retrieval and analysis of medical evidence. SSA now uses electronic images instead of paper copies of new claimants' records. Though SSA seeks to obtain all records electronically and provides options for online submission of records, only one large provider accounts for most of the records submitted online, and about half of all records received are on paper. To date, SSA has taken only limited action to identify and analyze the barriers providers face in using current electronic record submission options, and has not developed a strategy to address them. In the long run, SSA is participating in an advanced prototype to collect medical records in formats that can be searched and analyzed by electronically querying a hospital's records database and directly retrieving the claimants' records. |
gao_GAO-05-278 | gao_GAO-05-278_0 | DOD and FFRDC Facilities Receiving DOD Funding Have Varying Microelectronics Research and Production Focuses
At the time of our review, eight DOD and FFRDC facilities that received funding from DOD were involved in microelectronics research prototyping or production. Three military facilities focused solely on research; three primarily focused on research but had limited production capabilities; and two focused solely on production (see fig. For example, the Naval Research Laboratory facility is conducting basic research on the potential application of nonsilicon materials in microelectronic devices. Through its applied research, the Air Force Research Laboratory facility developed a process to improve the performance and reliability of microwave devices needed for military radar and communications systems. When production of these devices was transferred to a commercial supplier, the facility maintained capability to produce microelectronics as a back-up to the commercial supplier. NSA’s microelectronics facility focuses on producing cryptographic microelectronics—devices not readily obtainable on the commercial market because of their unique and highly classified requirements. DMEA fills a unique role within DOD by providing solutions to microelectronics that are no longer commercially available. DMEA acquires process lines that commercial firms are abandoning and, through reverse-engineering and prototyping, provides DOD with these abandoned devices. Officials from the facility told us that without funds from the Trident program, operating the facility became cost prohibitive. Further, NSA’s microelectronics facility is slated for closure in 2006. NSA estimated that it would cost $1.7 billion to upgrade its equipment and facility to produce the next generation of integrated circuits. DOD Has Several Mechanisms for Coordinating Research
DOD has several mechanisms in place aimed at coordinating and planning research conducted by the Air Force, Army, Navy, and defense agencies. In electronics and microelectronics research, DOD works with industry to review special technology areas and make recommendations about future research. DOD’s goal is to have about half of the investment in service and agency efforts represented in defense technology objectives. Defense technology objectives are intended to guide the focus of DOD’s science and technology investments by identifying the following objectives, the specific technology advancements that will be developed or payoffs, the specific benefits to the warfighter resulting from the challenges, the technical barriers to be overcome; milestones, planned dates for technical accomplishments, including the anticipated date of technology availability; metrics, a measurement of anticipated results; customers sponsoring the research; and funding that DOD estimates is needed to achieve the technology advancements. There are 40 defense technology objectives in this area; five were identified as microelectronics (see fig. To provide an independent assessment of the planned research, DOD uses Technology Area Review and Assessment panels. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify and describe DOD and FFRDC facilities that receive funding from DOD for microelectronics production or research prototyping, we visited all eight facilities identified by DOD as having capability to produce or prototype microelectronics. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide superior capabilities to the warfighter is dependent on its ability to incorporate rapidly evolving, cutting-edge microelectronic devices into its defense systems. While many commercial microelectronics advances apply to defense systems, DOD has some unique microelectronics needs not met by industry. Therefore, to maintain military superiority, DOD has the challenge of exploiting state-of-the-art commercial microelectronics technology and focusing its research investments in areas with the highest potential return for defense systems. Given the importance of advanced microelectronics to defense systems and the rapid changes in these technologies, Congress asked GAO to (1) identify and describe DOD and federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) facilities that receive funding from DOD for microelectronics production or research prototyping and (2) describe how DOD coordinates investments in microelectronics research.
What GAO Found
At the time of our review, eight DOD and FFRDC facilities that received funding from DOD were involved in microelectronics research prototyping or production. Three of these facilities focused solely on research; three primarily focused on research but had limited production capabilities; and two focused solely on production. The research conducted ranged from exploring potential applications of new materials in microelectronic devices to developing a process to improve the performance and reliability of microwave devices. Production efforts generally focus on devices that are used in defense systems but not readily obtainable on the commercial market, either because DOD's requirements are unique and highly classified or because they are no longer commercially produced. For example, one of the two facilities that focuses solely on production acquires process lines that commercial firms are abandoning and, through reverse-engineering and prototyping, provides DOD with these abandoned devices. During the course of GAO's review, one facility, which produced microelectronic circuits for DOD's Trident program, closed. Officials from the facility told us that without Trident program funds, operating the facility became cost prohibitive. These circuits are now provided by a commercial supplier. Another facility is slated for closure in 2006 due to exorbitant costs for producing the next generation of circuits. The classified integrated circuits produced by this facility will also be supplied by a commercial supplier. DOD has several mechanisms in place aimed at coordinating and planning research conducted by the military services and defense agencies. One key mechanism is identifying defense technology objectives--the specific technology advancements that will be developed or demonstrated across multiple joint capabilities and technology areas. As of February 2004, there were almost 400 defense technology objectives; five of these were identified as microelectronics. DOD also collaborates with industry to review and assess special technology areas and make recommendations about future electronics and microelectronics research. |
gao_GAO-03-320 | gao_GAO-03-320_0 | Background
Our work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. In either situation, implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence of efforts of related activities. To identify the agencies involved in each area we relied on our previous work and confirmed the agencies involved by reviewing the fiscal year 2001 Results Act performance report and fiscal year 2003 Results Act performance plans for each agency identified as contributing to the crosscutting program area. We did not independently verify or assess the information we obtained from agency performance reports and plans. For fiscal year 2001, all the agencies we reviewed—Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury—discussed coordination with other agencies in the area of drug control, although the level of detail varied. Data that did not meet this standard were not included in the report and plan. The agencies we reviewed generally discussed in their performance reports and plans their efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies on programs that address family poverty. The agencies we reviewed reported varied progress in achieving their fiscal year 2001 goals and measures. In addition, these agencies generally provided strategies that appeared reasonably linked to achieving the unmet goals in the future. However, each of the three agencies provided a reasonable explanation for not achieving the goal. On the basis of their fiscal year 2003 performance plans, three of the five federal depository institution regulators designed strategies to achieve their performance goals that appear to be reasonable. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. Implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence and efforts of related activities. GAO has in the past offered possible approaches for managing crosscutting programs, and has stated that the Government Performance and Results Act could provide a framework for addressing crosscutting efforts. GAO was asked to examine the actions and plans agencies reported in addressing the crosscutting issues of drug control, family poverty, financial institution regulation, and public health systems. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2003 performance plans for the major agencies involved in these issues.
What GAO Found
GAO did not independently verify or assess the information it obtained from agency performance reports and plans. On the basis of the reports and plans, GAO found the following: (1) Most agencies involved in the crosscutting issues discussed coordination with other agencies in their performance reports and plans, although the extent of coordination and level of detail provided varied considerably; (2) Most of the agencies we reviewed reported mixed progress in achieving their fiscal year 2001 goals--meeting some goals, missing others, or not reporting on progress. Some of the agencies that did not meet their goals provided reasonable explanations and/or strategies that appeared reasonably linked to meeting the goals in the future; and (3) The agencies GAO reviewed generally planned to pursue goals in fiscal year 2003 similar to those in 2001, although some agencies added new goals, dropped existing goals, or dropped goals altogether. Many agencies discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. |
gao_GAO-17-103 | gao_GAO-17-103_0 | To address this base erosion and profit shifting, OECD issued a plan in October 2015 with 15 separate action items that would address different areas of potential weakness in international tax enforcement. OECD’s revised guidance emphasizes that the transfer price should reflect actual economic activities, such as who controls decisions related to risk and who has the financial capacity to bear risk. Prior OECD guidelines included risk analysis based on functions performed. Therefore, risk can be used as part of a contract for the transfer price of an intangible asset to shift profits from one party in a high-tax jurisdiction to a related party in a lower-tax jurisdiction, resulting is base erosion. According to OECD and other subject matter specialists, the revised guidelines are likely to be an improvement over prior guidelines in reducing BEPS if it encourages MNEs and tax authorities to ensure that transfer prices are set based on real economic activity. The guidelines underscore the focus on supporting contractual agreements with economic activity. As we noted earlier, the arm’s length price is based on treating transactions between related parties as if they were unrelated. Unrelated parties can isolate this risk while related parties cannot and this difference in the ability to transfer risk makes the application of the ALP more difficult. Treasury and IRS officials stated that among the factors relevant to determining whether a purported risk allocation has economic substance are (1) whether the pattern of the taxpayer’s conduct over time is consistent with the risk allocation, (2) whether the taxpayer has the financial capacity to assume the risk, and (3) the extent to which the parties exercise managerial or operational control over the business activities that directly influence the amount of income or loss realized. In addition, the revised guidance may be less likely to be effective in helping to reduce BEPS because, without considering risk incidence, an uncertainty about the correct transfer prices remains that could allow profit shifting. The Revised Guidelines Effect on IRS Administrative Costs is Likely Small, But The Effect on Compliance Costs for U.S. MNEs is Uncertain
OECD revisions to the transfer pricing guidelines are currently being implemented so no data are available to estimate prospective administrative and compliance costs for IRS and U.S. MNEs. According to Treasury officials, the revised guidance would not have a significant effect on U.S. tax administration because current U.S. regulations already embody both the arm’s length standard and the role of functions performed, assets employed, and risks assumed in determining arm’s length prices between related entities. Though evidence on how corporations shift profits in response to tax rates varies by study, the amount is generally low. Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting
Country-by-Country Reporting Will Improve Transparency For Tax Authorities but May Have Unintended Consequences
One factor contributing to base erosion and profit shifting has been a lack of consistent information on MNEs’ business activities across tax jurisdictions. According to OECD, the new transfer pricing documentation addresses this deficiency and benefits tax authorities by providing information on MNEs’ business activities that can be used to assess the risk of profit shifting and improve the deployment of audit resources. While Treasury officials said their current documentation and reporting requirements are sufficient for transfer pricing administration, they will be implementing one tier of the transfer pricing documentation. Administrative and Compliance Costs of Country-by-Country Reporting Are Uncertain, but Could Be Mitigated. IRS Costs to Implement and Administer CbC Reporting Are Likely to Be Similar to Costs of Other Regulatory Changes of Comparable Scope and Complexity
Because IRS does not intend to require the master file or local file reporting of the OECD approach, its cost of adopting BEPS transfer pricing documentation is essentially the cost of adopting CbC reporting. These operational costs will be affected by the number of CbC Reports IRS receives from U.S. and non- U.S. MNEs in addition to the number of CbC Reports from U.S. MNEs that IRS will need to transmit to other tax authorities. The arm’s length principle (ALP) is widely accepted for evaluating transfer prices and is applicable in many transactions. However, this principle has limitations that make its application to risk allocation problematic. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury for comment. IRS and Treasury also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Globalization has increased incentives for multinational corporations to shift profits from country to country to use differences in the countries' corporate tax systems to reduce taxes. This profit shifting can lead to the erosion of U.S. and other countries' corporate tax bases, reducing tax revenues. OECD did a comprehensive analysis of corporate base erosion and profit shifting and, in the fall of 2015, issued 15 action plans to address the problem. GAO was asked to analyze the effects on the U.S. economy of adopting OECD actions.
GAO analyzed the potential effects of the two actions furthest along in implementation: revised transfer pricing guidelines and new transfer pricing documentation, including country-by-country reporting. For these actions, GAO examined (1) how likely it is that the action would reduce BEPS, (2) what is known about the potential administrative and compliance costs of the action, and (3) what is known about the potential effects the actions could have on the U.S. economy. GAO reviewed documents, conducted a literature review, and interviewed officials from IRS, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, OECD, and trade groups of industries likely to be affected by the actions.
What GAO Found
In 2015, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) issued revised guidelines, including 15 actions to help reduce base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) of multinational enterprises (MNEs). One action focuses on transfer pricing guidance with the intent of aligning MNE profits with the location of economic activity, and preventing corporations from shifting and assigning profits to lower-taxed related corporations by artificially setting below-market transfer prices of property and services. Another action makes MNE activities more transparent, through documentation and reporting shared among countries.
Transfer Pricing Guidance : OECD's guidance emphasizes that transfer price analysis should reflect actual economic activities, such as who controls decisions related to risk and who has the financial capacity to bear the risk. This clarifies prior guidelines, which also included risk analysis based on functions, but that now focus on the parties' ability to control and finance risk. GAO found that
OECD's revised guidance may reduce BEPS if it encourages MNEs and tax authorities to ensure that transfer prices are based on real economic activity. U.S. regulations consider risk as part of the analysis of transfer prices. The arm's length principle, which treats transactions between related parties as if they were unrelated, is widely accepted for evaluating transfer prices. However, its application to risk is problematic because related parties cannot transfer risk the way unrelated parties can. Without addressing the application of the arm's length principle under these situations, uncertainty about the correct transfer prices may allow for continued BEPS.
Administration costs of implementing the guidelines will be minor according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials because IRS's transfer price reviews are consistent with the revised guidance. However, taxpayer compliance costs are uncertain because they will depend on how MNEs respond to the revisions.
According to stakeholders and industry literature, U.S. employment and investment are unlikely to be significantly affected because the transfer pricing guidance affects a relatively narrow area of the tax code.
Transfer Pricing Documentation and Reporting : OECD's guidance includes new country-by-country (CbC) documentation and reporting actions where information on MNEs activities in different countries will be shared among the countries' tax authorities. GAO found that
CbC reporting may decrease BEPS because more consistent information will be available to tax authorities on the worldwide activities of MNEs.
According to IRS officials, CbC implementation costs are uncertain at this time, but can be mitigated by using existing systems and processes. However, MNE compliance costs would likely increase due to new data system needs, according to stakeholders.
The economic effect of CbC reporting is uncertain because it depends on the extent to which MNEs move business functions to low-tax countries in response to the potential increased scrutiny of BEPS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO does not make recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to IRS and Treasury for review and comment. IRS provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-795 | gao_GAO-04-795_0 | When names of suspected terrorists are added to TIPOFF, this information may originate from the FBI. Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate
Following our June 2003 report, State and DHS took some actions to address weaknesses we identified in the visa revocation process, but these actions did not adequately address all of the weaknesses we found. Finally, outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation. We attempted to determine how long it took Consular Affairs to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so for our sample of 35. However, this information only existed for 6 of the 35 cases. CBP’s primary responsibility is to post lookouts to prevent individuals from entering the country. ICE May Not Have Been Informed of Aliens with Revoked Visas Who May Be in the Country
Once they receive notification of a visa revocation from State, DHS personnel at CBP should notify ICE if they determine that the individual whose visa was revoked may be in the country. ICE Initiated Field Investigations More Than 2 Months after Receiving Notification of Visa Revocation
Our review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds from October through December 2003 shows that ICE forwarded requests for field offices to initiate investigations of individuals who may be in the United States more than 2 months after receiving notification of the visa revocation. Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process
Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken additional actions to address identified weaknesses in the process. In addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential vulnerability that could compromise homeland security and developed an informal process for coordinating actions and sharing information relating to visa revocations. However, we identified some weaknesses that still need to be addressed. State Revised Its Procedures and Formalized Its System for Tracking Cases
In April and May 2004, State took several actions to improve its performance in the visa revocation process, including revising its procedures and formalizing its tracking of visa revocations. State’s and DHS’s written procedures also lack specific time frames for completing individual steps in the process. DHS and State believe that these actions will avoid the delays that were experienced in the past. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen and improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the following two actions: Develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation process, including TSC. It should incorporate performance standards (e.g., time frames for completing each step in the process) and periodic interagency assessments to determine whether information is being shared among the agencies involved and appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data differences if they occur; and Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of aliens with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the United States at the time of the revocation. In addition, we interviewed officials from State, DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s letter dated June 17, 2004. 3. We acknowledge that the Department of State should appropriately deliberate over visa revocation cases. 3. This report includes a review of all 330+ visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October through December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report were addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For example, delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration investigators to request field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process, including revising procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators are aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames, for completing each step of the process. Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation. |
gao_GAO-14-160 | gao_GAO-14-160_0 | 1). FEMA Has Made Improvements in Its Process for Monitoring NFIP Contracts That Incorporate Best Practices
FEMA has improved its contract management process since our prior reports. FEMA Updated Policies and Procedures for Contract Management
FEMA has made progress in establishing or revising its guidance on contract management and oversight since we reported on these issues in 2008 and 2011. To address weaknesses in its oversight and management of acquisitions, we recommended in 2011 that FEMA complete the development and implementation of its revised acquisition process to be consistent with a DHS directive that sets overall policy and structure for acquisition management for DHS agencies. DHS and FEMA Developed Guidance for CORs for Performance Reporting
DHS and FEMA have developed guidance to implement federal requirements to report their assessment of contractor performance in a government-wide database—the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). FEMA periodically compared and analyzed actual performance data against goals for each of the three contracts through operating reports, which would allow management to review the status of deliverables and milestones and be aware of inaccuracies or exceptions that could indicate internal control problems. 3). For example, in 2010 and 2011, FEMA identified persistent issues with the BSA contractor’s deliverables, including quality and timeliness, and faced challenges in resolving those issues, which may have been avoidable if a quality assurance surveillance plan had been developed and used. Performance Assessments Not Reported for Two of the Contracts Reviewed
FEMA did not report performance assessments in CPARS for two of the three contracts we reviewed. Receiving a positive CPARS assessment can enhance a contractor’s reputation when bidding on future contracts, and as such, the assessments provide an incentive for the contractor to perform as expected. Regulations and agency guidance direct that such plans be used. FEMA officials stated that they are considering various options to ensure that the plans are in place for future contracts. However, without detailed surveillance plans, the expectations of the COR and contractor can be misaligned during performance evaluations and may not focus on the quality, quantity, and timeliness of performance outputs. As with the surveillance plan, by determining the extent to which this situation exists, identifying the root cause, and implementing steps to address the root cause, as appropriate, FEMA can help ensure that its—and other agencies’—contracting decisions and management draw on complete, relevant, and timely performance information. To help ensure FEMA’s contract monitoring provides a consistent, structured, and transparent method to assess contractor services, the FEMA Administrator should determine the extent to which quality assurance surveillance plans have not been developed for FEMA contracts; identify the reasons why quality assurance surveillance plans were not developed; and develop additional actions as needed to address the reasons to help ensure that quality assurance surveillance plans are developed for its future awards. To help ensure that federal contracting officials have complete and timely information about the performance of contractors, the FEMA Administrator should determine the extent to which CPARS assessments have not been completed for FEMA contracts; identify the reasons why CPARS assessments were not completed; and develop additional actions as needed to address the reasons to help ensure that assessments (ratings) for FEMA contractors are reported in CPARS on a timely and consistent basis. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 100231 of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 mandates GAO to review the three largest contractors used in administering the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). We examined (1) FEMA’s progress in updating its process for monitoring NFIP contractors since our prior reports, and (2) the extent to which FEMA followed its monitoring process for the largest NFIP contractors. Using data provided by the FEMA Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, we identified the 10 largest contractors for NFIP based on the amount of funds obligated to NFIP contractors over the previous 5 fiscal years (from 2008 through 2012). To assess the extent to which FEMA followed best practices and procedures for contract management, we compared FEMA’s contract management practices to criteria outlined in the following sources:
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government;
A Guide to Best Practices for Contract Administration;
FEMA, Contracting Officer’s Representative Handbook;
FEMA Risk Insurance Division, Contracts Management Reference
FEMA Risk Insurance Division, Discrepancy Report Procedures; and
FEMA Risk Analysis Division, Risk MAP Award Fee Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
In operating NFIP, FEMA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on contractors that perform critical functions. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 mandates GAO to review the three largest contractors used in administering NFIP. In prior reports, GAO found problems with FEMA's oversight of contractors responsible for performing key NFIP functions. This report examines (1) FEMA's progress in updating its process for monitoring NFIP contractors since GAO's prior reports, and (2) the extent to which FEMA followed its monitoring process for the largest NFIP contractors. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed FEMA data on funds obligated to contractors from fiscal years 2008 through to 2012, reviewed information from FEMA on contract management policies and procedures, and assessed data covering fiscal years 2011 to 2013 on the implementation of these policies and procedures as they pertained to the three largest contractors. GAO also interviewed FEMA contracting staff and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has made progress in improving its processes for monitoring NFIP contracts since GAO last reported on these issues in 2008 and 2011. For example, GAO recommended in 2011 that FEMA complete the development and implementation of its revised acquisition process to be consistent with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directive. FEMA updated its contract management guidance and revised its handbook for contracting officer's representatives to be consistent with DHS directives. The updated handbook also contained many of the elements identified in a federal guide to best practices for contract administration. Furthermore, the FEMA division that manages the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) developed a contract management reference guide that followed FEMA's handbook and federal best practices guidance.
With some exceptions, FEMA largely followed its contract monitoring procedures for the three largest NFIP contractors GAO reviewed. For example, FEMA ensured that relevant staff overseeing selected contracts received appropriate training. Also, FEMA periodically compared and analyzed actual performance data against goals for each of the three contracts through operating reports, which would allow management to review the status of deliverables and milestones and be aware of inaccuracies or exceptions that could indicate internal control problems. However, FEMA did not develop a quality assurance surveillance plan for one of the contractors--a best practice and a key requirement identified in regulations and guidance. In 2010 and 2011, FEMA identified persistent issues with the contractor's deliverables, including quality and timeliness, and faced challenges in resolving those issues, which might have been avoidable if a quality assurance surveillance plan had been developed and used. FEMA officials stated that they are considering options to ensure that the plans are in place for future contracts, but did not provide specifics on those options or when they plan to implement them. Without detailed quality assurance surveillance plans, the expectations of the agency and the contractor can be misaligned during performance evaluations. Separately, for two of the contracts FEMA staff did not enter performance evaluations in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), a database DHS uses to record assessments of performance of government contractors. Federal and DHS regulations and FEMA contract management guidance require entry of contract performance information in CPARS within certain time frames. By not reporting such information, FEMA disadvantaged the contractors and the government by not providing data that could be used in evaluating the contractors for future contract awards. For instance, receiving a positive CPARS assessment can enhance a contractor's reputation when bidding on future contracts, and as such, the assessments provide an incentive for the contractor to perform as expected. FEMA officials have acknowledged the issue. By determining the extent to which performance evaluations have not been entered into CPARS for its contracts, identifying the reasons why, and addressing those reasons, as needed, FEMA can help ensure that its--and other agencies'--contracting decisions and management draw on complete, relevant, and timely performance information.
What GAO Recommends
To improve monitoring and reporting of contractor performance, we are recommending that FEMA (1) determine the extent to which quality assurance surveillance plans and CPARS assessments have not been prepared, (2) identify the reasons why, and (3) take steps, as needed, to address those reasons. FEMA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-306 | gao_GAO-14-306_0 | As an innovation tool, labs are based on the idea that the competencies needed for systematic innovation—such as intelligent risk-taking to develop new services, products and processes—are not the same as those required for daily operations. OPM Lab Activities Are Intended to Build Capacity for Innovation and Support Project- Based Problem Solving
Based on OPM documents, the innovation lab’s start-up costs totaled approximately $1.1 million including facility upgrades and construction, equipment, and training and other personnel costs. OPM’s Lab Is Similar in Mission and Design to Other Innovation Labs, but OPM Needs to Systematically Evaluate the Lab’s Performance
We identified a common set of challenges that can undermine organizations’ efforts to use innovation labs and a set of prevalent practices that the organizations employ to address these challenges and support their labs’ success and sustainability. OPM documents state that the goal of OPM’s innovation lab is to provide federal workers with 21st century skills in design-led innovation, and the intended purpose of the lab is to provide a physical space for project- based problem solving. Starting in March 2013, a year after the lab opened, OPM lab staff began work on a program evaluation framework to more systematically measure the lab’s progress toward meeting their overarching goals. The evaluation framework being developed by OPM does not include interim performance targets or measures. To demonstrate that the lab is operating as originally intended, evaluation plans will be needed for specific immersion projects that can help track cost-benefits and performance improvement outcomes. Studies show that information sharing and interorganizational networks can be a powerful driver supporting innovation. While labs provide a physical space where innovators can convene, federal agencies are not fully aware of their growing community. As of June 2013, OPM was unaware that other agencies such as Census, HUD, and NASA were pursuing a lab approach to promote innovation. OPM’s lab staff also reported that they host weekly trainings in the lab on best practices, including webinars about measuring the success of enterprise-level design efforts and the value of visualizing information. In addition, OPM has shared best practices with other public sector design labs across the globe by participating in a number of conferences. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of OPM take the following actions to help substantiate the lab’s original goals of enhancing skills in innovation and supporting project-based problem solving:
Direct lab staff to develop a mix of performance targets and measures to help them monitor and report on their progress toward lab goals. Direct lab staff to build on existing efforts to share information and knowledge within the federal innovation community. In summary, OPM generally concurred with our recommendations and described ongoing and planned steps to refine evaluation efforts and further leverage other federal innovation labs. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to (1) describe the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) innovation lab’s start-up and operating costs, staffing and organization, activities, and policies governing the lab’s use, and (2) assess how OPM’s innovation lab compares to other organizations’ innovation labs, including how it uses benchmarks and associated metrics and how it addresses potential challenges to innovation. We used the findings from our literature review to identify organizations with innovation facilities having a dedicated physical space and using problem-solving methods similar to OPM’s lab. Capacity building—lab hosts classes and workshops. | Why GAO Did This Study
Organizations from around the globe are emphasizing that strategies promoting innovation are vital to solving complex problems. To try to instill a culture of innovation in its agency, OPM followed the lead of a number of private sector companies, nonprofit organizations, and government bodies by creating an innovation lab. GAO was asked to examine the lab.
Specifically, GAO 1) described the lab's start-up costs, staffing and organization, activities, and policies governing the lab's use, and 2) assessed how OPM's innovation lab compares to other organizations' innovation labs, including how it uses benchmarks and metrics and how it addresses challenges to innovation. GAO reviewed cost, staffing, and performance information. GAO also reviewed relevant literature on innovation and interviewed officials from public, private, and nonprofit organizations with innovation facilities similar to OPM's lab.
What GAO Found
In March 2012, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) opened its innovation lab, a distinct physical space with a set of policies for engaging people and using technology in problem solving. The goals of OPM's innovation lab are to provide federal workers with 21st century skills in design-led innovation, such as intelligent risk-taking to develop new services, products, and processes. OPM's lab was built at a reported cost of $1.1 million, including facility upgrades and construction, equipment and training, and other personnel costs. The lab employs approximately 6 full-time equivalents, including a director, and in fiscal year 2013, the lab's operating costs were approximately $476,000, including salaries.
OPM's innovation lab is similar in mission and design to other innovation labs GAO reviewed, and OPM has incorporated some of the prevalent practices that other labs use to sustain their operations. Specifically, OPM is using its lab for a variety of projects, including as a classroom for building the capacity to innovate in the federal government. Lab staff indicated that they plan to begin long-term immersion projects—complex projects with diverse users—within a few months. OPM plans to develop and implement evaluation plans specific to each immersion project that will help them track cost benefits or performance improvement benefits associated with the projects.
Starting in March 2013, OPM lab staff began work on a program evaluation framework to more systematically measure the lab's progress toward meeting its overarching goals. In addition, lab staff members are tracking lab activities, such as classes and workshops, and are surveying lab users about the quality of their experience in the lab. However, they have not developed performance targets or measures related to project outcomes, and without a rigorous evaluation framework that can help OPM track the lab's performance, it will be hard to demonstrate that the lab is operating as originally envisioned.
While labs provide a physical space where innovators can convene, federal agencies are not fully aware of their growing community. However, OPM is taking steps to ensure work done in the lab is shared across OPM and with other federal innovators—for example, by hosting weekly training sessions in the lab on best practices. Studies show that information sharing and interorganizational networks can be a powerful driver supporting innovation.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that the Director of OPM should direct lab staff to 1) develop a mix of performance targets and measures to help them monitor and report on progress toward lab goals, and 2) build on existing efforts to share information with other agencies that have innovation labs. OPM generally concurred with GAO's recommendations; in addition, they described the steps being taken and planned to refine their ongoing evaluation efforts and to further leverage other federal innovation labs. |
gao_GAO-11-115 | gao_GAO-11-115_0 | Conclusions
VA deployed the first two of four releases of its long-term system solution by its planned dates, therefore providing improved claims-processing functionality to all regional processing offices, such as the ability to calculate original and amended benefit claims. In addition, the Agile process allowed the department the flexibility to accommodate legislative changes and provide functionality according to business priorities, such as housing rate adjustments. Due to these delays, VA planned to reprioritize what functionality would be included in its third release. Until VA improves these areas, management does not have the visibility it needs to clearly communicate progress to stakeholders and estimate when future system capabilities will be delivered. Additionally, reduced visibility and unresolved issues in its development processes may result in the department continuing to remove functionality that was expected in future releases, thus delivering a system that does not fully and effectively support the implementation of education benefits as identified in the Post- 9/11 GI Bill. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help guide the full development and implementation of the Chapter 33 long-term solution, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to take the following five actions: establish performance measures for goals and identify constraints to provide better clarity in the vision and expectations of the project; establish bidirectional traceability between requirements and legislation, policies, and business rules to provide assurance that the system will be developed as expected; define the conditions that must be present to consider work “done” in adherence with agency policy and guidance; implement an oversight tool to clearly communicate velocity and the changes to project scope over time; and improve the adequacy of the unit and functional testing processes to reduce the amount of system rework. This act amended Title 38 United States Code to include Chapter 33, which provides educational assistance for veterans and members of the armed forces who served on or after September 11, 2001. To develop the system for its long-term solution, VA is relying on contractor assistance and is using an incremental development approach, called Agile software development, which is to deliver software functionality in short increments before the system is fully deployed. Given the importance of delivering education benefits to veterans and their families, we were asked to review the long-term solution to determine the status of VA’s development and implementation of its information technology (IT) system to support the implementation of education benefits identified in the Post-9/11 GI Bill and evaluate the agency’s effectiveness in managing its IT project for this initiative. In doing so, VA provided its regional processing offices with key automated capabilities to prepare original and amended benefit claims. While VA did not previously estimate costs for these releases and, as such, could not track estimated to actual costs, it has reported that about $84.6 million has been obligated through July 2010. However, VA did not ensure that certain critical tasks were performed that were expected to be part of the second release. Specifically, it did not complete the conversion of data from systems in the interim solution to the systems developed for the long-term solution and did not complete the development of interfaces between the new system and legacy systems. However, VA intends to provide this capability after its fourth release or under a separate initiative. VA has established a vision that captures the project purpose and goals; however, it has not established metrics for the project’s goals or prioritized project constraints. VA has also established a plan that identifies how to maintain requirements traceability within an Agile environment; however, the traceability between legislation, policy, business rules, and test cases was not always maintained. However, VA has not yet established criteria for work that is considered “done” at all levels of the project. In October 2008, VA established its Chapter 33 initiative to develop the capability to process the new education benefit. The long-term solution was expected to be complete enough to replace the interim solution by June 2010 and to include additional capabilities to provide a fully automated end-to-end system to support the delivery of education benefits by December 2010. To provide effective management for an Agile project, such as the development of the Chapter 33 long-term solution, a key component for success is demonstrating effective use of the Agile practices: working as one team, focusing on business priorities, delivering functionality in short increments, and inspecting and adapting the project as appropriate. While VA has taken an important step to effectively manage its development of the system for processing Chapter 33 educational benefits by establishing a cross-functional team, it has not yet fully ensured business priorities are a focus, demonstrated that it is delivering quality functionality in short increments, or provided mechanisms to enable inspection and adaptation of the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Post-9/11 GI Bill was signed into law in June 2008 and provides educational assistance for veterans and members of the armed forces who served on or after September 11, 2001. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for processing claims for these new education benefits. VA concluded that its legacy systems and manual processes were insufficient to support the new benefits and, therefore, began an initiative to modernize its benefits processing capabilities. The long-term solution was to provide a fully automated end-to-end information technology (IT) system to support the delivery of benefits by December 2010. VA chose an incremental development approach, called Agile software development, which is intended to deliver functionality in short increments before the system is fully deployed. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of VA's development and implementation of its IT system to support the implementation of education benefits identified in the Post-9/11 GI Bill and (2) evaluate the department's effectiveness in managing its IT project for this initiative.
What GAO Found
VA has made important progress in delivering key automated capabilities to process the new education benefits. Specifically, it deployed the first two of four releases of its long-term system solution by its planned dates, thereby providing regional processing offices with key automated capabilities to prepare original and amended benefit claims. In addition, the Agile process allowed the department the flexibility to accommodate legislative changes and provide functionality according to business priorities. While progress has been made, VA did not ensure that certain critical tasks were completed that were initially expected to be included in the second release by June 30, 2010. For example, the conversion of data from systems in the interim solution to systems developed for the long-term solution was not completed until August 23, 2010. Because of the delay, VA planned to reprioritize the functionality that was to be included in the third release. Further, while VA plans to include full self-service capabilities to veterans, it will not do so in the fourth release as scheduled; instead it intends to provide this capability after the release or in a separate initiative. VA reported obligations and expenditures for these releases, through July 2010, to be approximately $84.6 million, with additional planned obligations of $122.5 million through fiscal year 2011. VA has taken important steps by demonstrating a key Agile practice essential to effectively managing its system development--establishing a cross-functional team that involves senior management, governance boards, key stakeholders, and distinct Agile roles. In addition, VA made progress toward demonstrating three other Agile practices--focusing on business priorities, delivering functionality in short increments, and inspecting and adapting the project as appropriate. Specifically, to ensure business priorities are a focus, VA established a vision that captures the project purpose and goals and established a plan to maintain requirements traceability. To aid in delivering functionality, the department established an incremental testing approach. It also used an oversight tool, which was intended to allow the project to be inspected and adapted by management. However, VA could make further improvements to these practices. In this regard, it did not (1) establish metrics for the goals or prioritize project constraints; (2) always maintain traceability between legislation, policy, business rules, and test cases; (3) establish criteria for work that was considered "done" at all levels of the project; (4) provide for quality unit and functional testing during the second release, as GAO found that 10 of the 20 segments of system functionality were inadequate; and (5) implement an oversight tool that depicted the rate of the work completed and the changes to project scope over time. Until VA improves these areas, management will lack the visibility it needs to clearly communicate progress and unresolved issues in its development processes may not allow VA to maximize the benefits of the system. To help guide the full development and implementation of the long-term solution, GAO is recommending that VA take five actions to improve its development process for its new education benefits system. VA concurred with three of GAO's five recommendations and provided details on planned actions, but did not concur with the remaining two. |
gao_GAO-10-131 | gao_GAO-10-131_0 | Departmental Documents Address Aspects of Management Integration, but DHS Has Not Yet Developed a Comprehensive Strategy
The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to develop a strategy for management integration as part of the department’s integration and transformation to create a more efficient and orderly consolidation of functions and personnel in the department. According to DHS’s USM, the department has not yet developed a comprehensive management integration strategy because, in part, the Management Directorate has focused on building the management operations capacity within the functional areas, such as financial management and information technology. In the absence of a comprehensive management integration strategy, DHS’s USM, Chief of Staff, and department and component management chiefs stated that various departmental documents collectively contribute to the department’s strategy for implementing and achieving management integration. Management Directorate Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014. However, among the documents cited by DHS officials as being part of the department’s management integration strategy, DHS has not yet looked across the management initiatives within management functional areas to identify the critical links that must occur among these initiatives to integrate the department’s management functions both within and across functional areas. In addition to these functional area and departmentwide documents, DHS officials identified three other documents that are related to management integration: (1) the DHS Strategic Plan; (2) the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR); and (3) the Business Operations Manual. A comprehensive strategy for management integration that clearly sets implementation goals and time lines could help the department establish measures for assessing its management integration. DHS’s Management Directorate Has Taken Actions to Communicate and Consolidate Management Policies, Processes, and Systems
Through various management councils, the Management Directorate shares information related to the implementation of management initiatives, solicits feedback from the components, and provides a forum for coordination between component management offices. In reviewing performance management linkages at the USM’s level, we found that the Deputy Secretary provided input into the USM’s performance plan in October 2007, and conducted a performance evaluation in 2008 based on this agreement. Five department chiefs report directly to the USM, and the CFO has a dual reporting relationship to the Secretary and the USM. Without ensuring that the management chiefs provide input into component chiefs’ performance plans and evaluations as required, the Management Directorate cannot be sure that component chiefs are fully implementing management integration. Moreover, while DHS has been implementing management initiatives and processes across the department, in the absence of a comprehensive management integration strategy, it is unclear how these efforts are being prioritized and sequenced, and trade-offs between them are being recognized. Although the department has developed certain management measures, these measures do not allow the department to assess the extent to which it is making progress in implementing and achieving management integration both within and across functional areas. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen its management integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management, working with others, to take the following four actions: Once a comprehensive management integration strategy is developed, consistent with statute and as we previously recommended, establish performance measures to assess progress made in achieving departmentwide management integration; Ensure that department management chiefs provide written objectives for component management chiefs’ performance plans at the beginning of each performance cycle, and that the objectives are representative of determined priorities and milestones for the management functions during that period; Ensure that department management chiefs provide input into component management chiefs’ annual performance evaluations; and Ensure that component management chiefs’ individual performance plans are reflective of and include linkages to the goals and objectives for the Management Directorate and relevant department management function. | Why GAO Did This Study
Significant management challenges exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as it continues to integrate its varied management processes, policies, and systems in areas such as financial management and information technology. These activities are primarily led by the Under Secretary for Management (USM), department management chiefs, and management chiefs in DHS's seven components. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine: (1) the extent to which DHS has developed a comprehensive strategy for management integration that includes the characteristics recommended in GAO's 2005 report; (2) how DHS is implementing management integration; and (3) the extent to which the USM is holding the department and component management chiefs accountable for implementing management integration through reporting relationships. GAO reviewed DHS plans and interviewed management officials in DHS's headquarters and in all components.
What GAO Found
DHS has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy for management integration as required by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and with the characteristics GAO recommended in a 2005 report. Although DHS stated in response to the 2005 report that it was developing an integration strategy, it has not yet done so, in part because it has focused on building operations capacity within functional management areas. In the absence of a comprehensive management integration strategy, DHS officials stated that documents such as management directives and strategic plans address aspects of a management integration strategy and can help the department to manage its integration efforts. However, they do not generally include all of the strategy characteristics GAO identified, such as identifying the critical links that must occur among management initiatives and time lines for monitoring the progress of these initiatives. In addition, DHS has increased the number of performance measures for the Management Directorate, but has not yet established measures for assessing management integration across the department, although DHS officials stated that the department intends to do so. Without these measures DHS cannot assess its progress in implementing and achieving management integration. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy, DHS's Management Directorate has implemented management integration through certain initiatives and mechanisms to communicate and consolidate management policies, processes, and systems. The directorate uses councils to communicate information related to the implementation of management initiatives, among other things. The directorate has also established governance boards and processes to manage specific activities. Further, the directorate is in the process of consolidating certain management systems. However, without a documented management integration strategy, it is difficult for DHS, Congress, and other key stakeholders to understand and monitor the critical linkages and prioritization among these various efforts. The USM and department and component management chiefs are held accountable for implementing management integration through reporting relationships at three levels--between the Secretary and the USM, the USM and department chiefs, and the department and component chiefs--in which, among other things, the Secretary of Homeland Security, USM, and department chiefs are required to provide input into performance plans and evaluations. The Deputy Secretary--through delegation from the Secretary--and the USM have provided input into the USM's and department chiefs' plans and evaluations, respectively. Although department chiefs are required by management directives to provide component chiefs with written objectives at the start of the annual performance cycle, in fiscal year 2009 only two out of six department chiefs provided such input to component chiefs. Without ensuring that the management chiefs provide input into component chiefs' performance plans and evaluations as required, the directorate cannot be sure that component chiefs are fully implementing management integration. |
gao_GAO-13-479 | gao_GAO-13-479_0 | Congress updated the statutory framework for performance management in the federal government, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). Both acts require agencies to set goals and measure and report the performance of their programs. Although IRS is the federal agency responsible for administering tax expenditures, it is not responsible for the program areas targeted by many tax expenditures. The information available at IRS is generally limited by the Paperwork Reduction Act to data used for tax administration, not for performance evaluation. Information for Almost $500 Billion of Tax Expenditures Is Not Collected on Tax Forms
Of the 163 tax expenditures identified by Treasury for tax year 2011, 102, or 63 percent, were not on a tax return, information return, or other tax form; or they were on these tax forms but did not have their own line item, as shown in table 1. For these tax expenditures, the tax forms do not capture information on who claimed the tax expenditures and how much they claimed. An example of a tax expenditure not on a tax form is the exclusion of interest on life insurance savings where the taxpayer is not asked to report the amount of the exclusion anywhere on a tax form, while an example of a tax expenditure without its own line item is the credit for holding clean renewable energy bonds where the credit is aggregated with other credits on a single line item. For some tax expenditures, IRS data limitations can be remedied to some extent by information available from other federal agencies. Case Studies of Comparable Outlay and Tax Expenditure Programs Show Differences in Data Available for Measuring Performance
After reviewing the GPRAMA-mandated cross-agency priority (CAP) goals established by OMB and federal agencies, we chose four outlay programs—three addressing energy efficiency and one addressing job training—that we considered to be comparable to certain tax expenditures based on their similar purposes. Table 2 provides descriptions of these tax expenditures and comparable outlay programs. As shown in table 4, DOE and DOL produced performance measures and goals for outlay programs in their annual reports but did not do so for the comparable tax expenditures. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The IRS provided technical comments after viewing a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data are available for evaluating tax expenditures, we used 173 tax expenditures for fiscal year 2011 that were developed by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and reported by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2012. During our matching, we identified 10 tax expenditures that we did not include in our analysis because (1) they were not available in tax year 2011, such as the Hope Tax Credit which was temporarily replaced by the American Opportunity Tax Credit; (2) some but not all parts of the tax expenditure were on a tax form, such as the Exclusion of Benefits and Allowances to Armed Forces Personnel where only the combat pay portion was reported on a tax form—Form W-2 (Wage and Tax Statement); and (3) where reporting of the tax expenditure was optional, such as Employer Plans on Form W-2. We identified their performance measures and goals, as well as the data they used to evaluate and assess these outlay programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
By one measure, tax expenditures resulted in an estimated $1 trillion of revenue forgone by the federal government in fiscal year 2011. GAO has recommended greater scrutiny of tax expenditures, as periodic reviews could help determine how well specific tax expenditures achieve their goals and how their benefits and costs compare to those of other programs with similar goals. To assist with this, GAO recently issued a guide ( GAO-13-167SP ) for evaluating the performance of tax expenditures. GAO was asked to identify data needed for evaluating tax expenditures and its availability. This report: (1) determines the information available from IRS for evaluating tax expenditures; and (2) compares, for a few case studies, the information identified by federal agencies for evaluating outlay programs with similar purposes to tax expenditures. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed 173 tax expenditures, and information from IRS tax forms, federal agency performance reports, and prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data are not sufficient for identifying who claims a tax expenditure and how much they claim for $492 billion or almost half the dollar value of all tax expenditures that GAO examined. Such basic data are not available at IRS for tax expenditures because they do not have their own line item on a tax form. This included $102 billion of tax expenditures that were not on tax forms, such as the exclusion of interest on life insurance savings, and $390 billion of tax expenditures that were on tax forms but did not have their own line items, such as the credit for holding clean renewable energy bonds which is aggregated with other credits on a single line item.
In four cases in which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) identified outlay programs and comparable tax expenditure programs that shared similar purposes, the related agencies produced performance measures and goals only for the outlay programs and not for the comparable tax expenditures. For example, OMB identified the Alternative Technology Vehicle Credit as having a comparable purpose to the Department of Energy (DOE) Vehicle Technologies outlay program--both are intended to create more fuel efficient modes of transportation. DOE produced a performance measure and goal for the outlay program--petroleum consumption reduced by 570 million gallons per year by 2011--as required under the provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010. However, DOE did not produce measures and goals for the comparable tax expenditure as neither act requires DOE or other federal agencies to do so. Although IRS is responsible for administering these tax expenditures, it is required by law, unless otherwise directed by Congress, to collect only data which are required for administration of the tax code. GAO has recommended that the agencies responsible for tax expenditures be identified and the lack of credible performance data be addressed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made no recommendations in this report. IRS provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-665 | gao_GAO-09-665_0 | Most Programs Have Not Conducted a Robust Assessment of Alternatives
Most of the programs we reviewed either did not conduct an AOA or conducted an AOA that focused on a narrow scope of alternatives and did not adequately assess and compare technical and other risks of each alternative. While many factors can affect program cost and schedule outcomes, we found that programs that conducted a limited assessment of alternatives before the start of system development tended to experience poorer outcomes than the programs that conducted more robust AOAs. Many AOAs Have Not Adequately Assessed Risks for the Alternatives
DOD acquisition policy requires that AOAs assess the technical risk of alternatives, but it does not provide criteria and guidance for how and to what extent technical risks should be addressed and it does not specify that other types of risks should be assessed. We found that programs with AOAs that conducted a more comprehensive assessment of risks tended to have better cost and schedule outcomes than those that did not (see table 5). Choosing an Alternative Too Early and Conducting AOAs under Compressed Time Frames and without Effective Guidance Limit the Scope and Quality of AOAs
We identified several factors that may have limited the effectiveness of AOAs and their ability to identify the most promising option and contribute to a sound business case for starting a weapon system program: (1) service sponsors lock into a solution early on when a capability need is first validated through DOD’s requirements process and before an AOA is conducted; (2) AOAs are conducted under compressed time frames in order to meet a planned milestone review or fielding date and their results come too late to inform key trade off decisions; and (3) DOD does not always provide guidance for conducting individual AOAs. The identification of a potential concept is intended to provide a general approach for addressing the gap and set the stage for a more in-depth assessment of alternatives to be conducted in the AOA. In 9 of the 22 programs we reviewed that had AOAs, the timing of the AOAs was compressed or concurrent with other planning activities. Ultimately, the Future Combat Systems AOA was completed 1 month after the operational requirements were validated and the same month that the program was approved to begin system development, which precluded trade off discussions among cost, performance, and risks from taking place. The guidance is intended to ensure that the services are examining a sufficient number of alternatives that take into consideration joint plans and interoperability, but to also ensure that AOAs are analyzing key risks such as technology, cost, and schedule. Recent DOD Policy Changes Could Improve AOA Effectiveness
In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition policy and introduced several initiatives based in part on direction from Congress that could provide a better foundation for establishing knowledge-based business cases for initiating weapon system programs. Improving the effectiveness of AOAs will depend on DOD’s ability to ensure that its policy changes are consistently implemented and reflected in decisions on individual weapon system programs. DOD’s revised policies, for example, may help mitigate service sponsors from locking into a solution too early in the process by eliminating the functional solutions analysis in a capability proposal, which identified a preferred solution and influenced the scope of alternatives in an AOA. Many of these problems could be avoided if programs started with sound, knowledge-based business cases. The revisions, for example, should help ensure that DOD direction is provided before AOAs are started and that AOAs are conducted at an early point in the acquisition process where their results can inform key decisions affecting program initiation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether analyses of alternatives (AOA) have been effective in identifying the most promising options and providing a sound rationale for program initiation, we analyzed data and documents for Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs that have been initiated between fiscal years (FY) 2003 and 2008 and were in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) FY 2008 Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) list. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs often experience significant cost and schedule problems because they are allowed to start with too many technical unknowns and not enough knowledge about the development and production risks they entail. GAO was asked to review the department's Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process--a key first step in the acquisition process intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of alternative weapon system solutions for addressing a validated warfighting need. This report (1) examines whether AOAs have been effective in identifying the most promising options and providing a sound rationale for weapon program initiation, (2) determines what factors have affected the scope and quality of AOAs, and (3) assesses whether recent DOD policy changes will enhance the effectiveness of AOAs. To meet these objectives, GAO efforts included collecting information on AOAs from 32 major defense acquisition programs, reviewing guidance and other documents, and interviewing subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
Although an AOA is just one of several inputs required to initiate a weapon system program, a robust AOA can be a key element to ensure that new programs have a sound, executable business case. Many of the AOAs that GAO reviewed did not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for addressing a warfighting need or assess technical and other risks associated with each alternative. For example, the AOA for the Future Combat System program, one of DOD's large and most complex development efforts, analyzed the operational performance and cost of its alternatives but failed to compare the technical feasibility and risks, assuming that the technologies would perform as forecasted. Without a sufficient comparison of alternatives and focus on technical and other risks, AOAs may identify solutions that are not feasible and decision makers may approve programs based on limited knowledge. While many factors can affect cost and schedule outcomes, we found that programs that had a limited assessment of alternatives tended to have poorer outcomes than those that had more robust AOAs. The narrow scope and limited risk analyses in AOAs can be attributed in part to program sponsors choosing a solution too early in the process, the compressed timeframes that AOAs are conducted under, and the lack of guidance for conducting AOAs. While AOAs are supposed to provide a reliable and objective assessment of viable weapon solutions, we found that service sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution or a narrow range of solutions early on, before an AOA is conducted. The timing of AOAs has also been problematic. Some AOAs are conducted under compressed timeframes in order to meet a planned milestone or weapon system fielding date and are conducted concurrently with other key activities required to become a program of record. This can short-change a comprehensive assessment of risks and preclude effective cost, schedule, and performance trade offs from taking place prior to beginning development. Furthermore, while DOD has an opportunity to influence the scope and quality of AOAs, it has not always provided guidance for conducting individual AOAs. Recognizing the need for more discipline in weapon systems acquisition, DOD recently revised its overall acquisition and requirements policies. If implemented properly, the revised policies could provide a better foundation for planning and starting new programs with sound, knowledge-based business cases. Included in the revised acquisition policy are several mechanisms to improve the AOA process. For example, the policy revisions should help ensure that DOD direction is provided before AOAs are started and that they are conducted at an early point in the acquisition process where their results can inform decisions affecting program initiation. While these policy changes are promising, DOD must ensure that they are consistently implemented and reflected in decisions on individual programs. Furthermore, more specific criteria and guidance for how AOAs should be conducted may need to be developed to ensure they meet their intended objectives and provide an in-depth assessment of alternatives. |
gao_GAO-15-190 | gao_GAO-15-190_0 | Several Federal Departments Fund HCBS and Related Supports for Older Adults
Five federal agencies across four departments have one or more programs that operate within a system of HCBS and related supports that older adults often require to live as independently as possible in their homes and communities (see table 1). In Selected Localities, Area Agencies on Aging and Community-Based Organizations Planned and Delivered Services to Older Adults, Using a Mix of Funding Sources
Community-Based Organizations Collaborated to Plan and Deliver HCBS Funded Through a Mix of Federal, State, and Local Programs
In San Francisco, California; Montgomery County, Maryland; and the Atlanta, Georgia region, similar steps were taken to plan HCBS and related supports for the growing population of older adults in their communities. Each locality’s system of HCBS and related supports for older adults provided information and referral, nutrition and in-home services, as well as affordable housing and transportation services. There were some differences, however, in how these services and supports were funded and delivered in each locality. The San Francisco village, one of two we spoke with, also provided companionship visits and assistance with errands. In Montgomery County, for example, the Senior Care program provided in-home services funded by the state. CBO officials also reported waiting lists for affordable senior housing. Further, HHS budget documents note that states, tribes, and localities that depend on federal funds for these services have limited options to offset losses of federal funding. AoA Has Reported Collaboration on Certain Projects
The Older Americans Act directs AoA to facilitate, in coordination with CMS and other federal agencies as appropriate, the provision of services and supports in the home and community. Collaboration to develop mutually reinforcing or joint strategies could help ensure that federal resources for HCBS and supports are used efficiently and effectively. Each of the five agencies that fund home and community-based services and supports for older adults, however, for the most part does so independently. While AoA is well-positioned to lead federal agencies in planning a cross-agency federal strategy for the provision of home and community-based services and supports for older adults, an AoA representative indicated that the many competing priorities it has for its limited resources prevent it from doing so. Recommendation for Executive Action
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should facilitate development of a cross-agency federal strategy to help ensure that federal resources from ACL, CMS, USDA, HUD, and DOT are effectively and efficiently used to support a comprehensive system of HCBS and related supports for older adults. We continue to encourage HHS to engage all five agencies—the Administration on Aging and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in HHS, HUD, DOT and USDA--in development of a cross agency federal strategy for administering home and community-based services for older adults. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research has shown that many older adults want to age in their homes and communities, and their ability to do so often depends on the availability of home and community-based services and other supports. GAO was asked to review the availability of such services.
This report addresses (1) federal programs that fund these services and supports for older adults, (2) how these services and supports are planned and delivered in selected localities, and (3) agencies' efforts to promote a coordinated federal system of these services and supports. GAO reviewed federal program documents and interviewed federal officials. It also visited programs in the Atlanta, Georgia region, Montgomery County, Maryland, and San Francisco California, chosen based on efforts made to enhance their system of HCBS and supports, recommendations from federal agencies and experts, varied governmental jurisdiction, and geographic dispersion.
What GAO Found
Five federal agencies within four departments fund home and community-based services and supports that older adults often require to continue living independently in their own homes and communities. The Administration on Aging (AoA) and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and Agriculture (USDA) provide funds, often through state agencies, to local governments and community-based organizations.
The Older Americans Act of 1965 (the Act) requires AoA to promote and support a comprehensive system of services.
In the three localities GAO visited, local area agencies on aging, assisted by other community-based organizations, took the lead in planning and delivering services and supports for older adults, paid for with a mix of federal, state, and local funding. An Atlanta organization employed home-care aides for older adults and delivered meals. Senior housing developments across the three localities connected more frail residents to in-home services. In San Francisco and Montgomery County, grassroots organizations known as villages provided help with errands. Officials in two localities reported that flat funding of certain state funds, combined with the growing number of older adults, has resulted in waiting lists for affordable housing and in-home services.
The Act requires AoA to facilitate collaboration among federal agencies; however, the five agencies that fund these services and supports for older adults do so, for the most part, independently. GAO's work on interagency collaboration has found that collaboration is important for federal efforts that involve more than one agency. HHS, through AoA, has indicated that competing priorities for its limited resources prevent it from leading development of a cross-agency federal strategy. However, developing such a strategy could help ensure that the five agencies' resources for HCBS and supports are used efficiently and effectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS facilitate development of a cross agency federal strategy to ensure efficient and effective use of federal resources for HCBS. HHS concurred and HUD, DOT, and USDA did not comment. |
gao_HEHS-96-160 | gao_HEHS-96-160_0 | Specifically, it discusses the evolution of the VA health care system and VA eligibility; the problems that VA’s current eligibility and health care contracting provisions create for veterans and providers; the extent to which VA provides veterans with health care services for which they are not eligible; legislative proposals to reform VA eligibility and contracting rules and their potential effect on the ease of administration, equity to veterans, costs to VA, and clarity of eligibility for veterans’ health benefits; and • approaches that could be used to limit the budgetary effects of eligibility reforms. We focused on the extent to which the proposals would (1) change VA health care funding from discretionary to mandatory, (2) expand eligibility for VA health care services, (3) create a uniform benefit package(s), (4) guarantee availability of covered services, and (5) provide new sources of funding for expanded benefits. The problems created by these provisions include the following: • Veterans are often uncertain about which services they are eligible to receive and what right they have to demand that VA provide them. • Physicians and administrative staff find the eligibility provisions hard to administer. Specifically, VA hospitals and clinics cannot, under current law, sell veterans those services not covered under their veterans’ health care benefits even if the veterans (1) have public or private health insurance that would pay for the care or (2) agree to pay for the services out of their own funds. As a result, it has important implications for veterans. Specifics follow: • Four of the proposals would retain the discretionary funding of VA health care. Other Improvements in VA Health Care System Could Heighten Increased Demand
If concurrent changes are made in the accessibility of VA health care services, in VA customer service, and in the extent to which veterans are allowed to use private providers under contract to VA, the effect of eligibility reforms on demand for VA care will likely be heightened. • Expanded outpatient eligibility could result in a corresponding increase in demand for hospital care. The American Legion proposal would require VA to establish both comprehensive and basic packages as well as a supplemental benefit package to cover specialized services. The American Legion proposal is the only major proposal that would specifically limit the number of veterans, and the number of services, covered under VA’s medical care appropriation. Another limitation is that the American Legion proposal would deem VA facilities to be Medicare providers without requiring them to meet Medicare quality, utilization, and reporting requirements. Conclusions and Agency Comments
The VA health care system was neither designed nor intended to be the primary source of health care services for most veterans. For those veterans who do not have public or private health insurance, however, eligibility reform is more important. It could improve their access to comprehensive health care services, including preventive health care services. These approaches generally involve placing limits on the number of veterans given expanded benefits, narrowing the range of benefits added, or increasing cost sharing to offset the costs of added benefits. A significant reduction in the number of veterans covered by the entitlement would be needed if the proposal was to be budget neutral. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various proposals that would simplify and expand eligibility for veterans' health care benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the VA health care system was neither designed nor intended to be the primary source of health care services for most veterans; (2) as the eligibility requirements for VA health care have evolved over the years, they have become increasingly complex and a source of frustration to veterans who are often uncertain about which services they are eligible to receive and to VA physicians and administrators who find them difficult to administer; (3) unlike private health insurance, VA health care does not have a defined, uniform benefit package and cannot guarantee the availability of covered services, and VA is limited to providing only those services covered by an individual veteran's VA benefits; (4) a VA facility is not permitted to provide a noncovered service even if it has the resources to provide the service and the veteran is willing to pay for it; (5) GAO recognizes the need for eligibility reform, which, for most veterans, might result in additional health care services not covered under their public or private insurance; (6) for veterans who do not have other insurance to meet their health care needs, eligibility reform is more important and could result in access to comprehensive health care services, including preventive care; (7) four legislative proposals would simplify and expand veterans' eligibility for VA care, and a fifth proposal, by the American Legion, has not yet been introduced as a legislative proposal; (8) each of the proposals has significant implications regarding the number of eligible veterans as well as the cost of providing care; (9) four of the proposals, which retain the discretionary funding of VA health care, could more than double demand for VA outpatient services, forcing VA to either ration care or seek larger appropriations; (10) the American Legion proposal, which would create an entitlement, would likely require significantly increased appropriations; (11) other issues in the proposal include provisions to exempt VA from most federal contracting laws and to deem VA as a Medicare provider; (12) GAO's work suggests that eligibility reforms could be developed to both strengthen VA's safety net mission and preserve its ability to provide specialized services; (13) among the approaches that could be pursued are placing limits on the number of veterans given expanded benefits, narrowing the range of benefits added, or increasing cost sharing to offset the costs of added benefits; and (14) the American Legion proposal provides a good starting point for developing future reform proposals, but changes would be needed to reduce the number of veterans covered by the entitlement if significant increases in VA appropriations are to be avoided. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.