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gao_T-RCED-98-176 | gao_T-RCED-98-176_0 | We found, in fact, that since deregulation, substantial regional differences had existed in fare and service trends, particularly among small- and medium-sized-community airports. In particular, we noted that most low-fare airlines that began interstate air service after deregulation, such as Southwest Airlines and Reno Air, had decided to enter airports serving communities of all sizes in the West and Southwest because of these communities’ robust economic growth. Airline Barriers to Entry Continue to Affect Competition
We reported in October 1996 that operating barriers at key hub airports in the upper Midwest and the East, combined with certain marketing strategies of the established carriers, had two effects on competition. The operating barriers and marketing strategies deterred new entrant airlines and fortified established carriers’ dominance of those hub airports and routes linking those hubs with nearby small- and medium-sized-community airports. In the upper Midwest, there is limited competition in part because two airlines control over 80 percent of the takeoff and landing slots at O’Hare, and one airline controls the vast majority of gates at the airports in Minneapolis and Detroit under long-term, exclusive-use leases. Slots
To reduce congestion, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has limited since 1969 the number of takeoffs and landings that can occur at O’Hare, National, LaGuardia, and Kennedy. These exemptions can help to enhance service in the East and upper Midwest. Long-Term, Exclusive-Use Gate Leases
Our reports have also identified restrictive gate leases as a barrier to establishing new or expanded service at some airports. Range of Initiatives Will Likely Be Needed to Address Air Service Problems
Because a variety of factors has contributed to the higher fares and poorer service that some small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest have experienced since deregulation, a coordinated effort involving federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives may be needed. On April 6, 1998, DOT issued draft guidelines that define anticompetitive behavior by major airlines in response to new entry and could lead to an investigation and possible fines by DOT. Attendees at the October conference endorsed concepts that included (1) holding periodic slot lotteries to provide new entrant airlines with access to airports with slot controls and (2) allowing new entrants and other small airlines to serve points beyond the distance established by National’s perimeter rule. There are no simple solutions to these problems. However, the recent initiatives by DOT, legislative proposals to remove some operating barriers and enhance competition in underserved markets, as well as local efforts to improve service provide steps toward increasing competition and improving air service for some communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on the effects of airline deregulation, focusing on: (1) fare and service trends; (2) factors contributing to service problems; and (3) the initiatives by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and others to address these problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) not all communities have benefited from airline deregulation; (2) certain airports--particularly those serving small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest--have experienced higher fares or poorer service since deregulation; (3) there are several reasons for the substantial regional differences in fare and service trends, including the dominance of routes to and from these airports by one or two traditional hub and spoke airlines and operating barriers, such as long-term, exclusive-use gate leases at hub airports; (4) in contrast, the more widespread entry of new airlines at airports in the West and Southwest since deregulation--and the resulting geographic differences in fare and service trends--has stemmed from the greater economic growth in these regions as well as from the absence of dominant market positions of incumbent airlines and barriers to entry; (5) operating barriers--slot controls, restrictive gate leases, and perimeter rules--continue to block entry at key airports and contribute to fare and service problems in the East and upper Midwest; (6) to minimize congestion and reduce flight delays, the Federal Aviation Administration has set limits since 1969 on the number of takeoffs or landings--referred to as slots--that can occur during certain periods of the day at four congested airports--Chicago O'Hare, Ronald Reagan Washington National, and New York's Kennedy and LaGuardia; (7) a few airlines control most of the slots at these airports, which limits new entrants; (8) these operating barriers, combined with certain marketing strategies by established carriers, have deterred new entrant airlines while fortifying established carriers' dominance at key hubs in the East and upper Midwest; (9) similarly, marketing and business alliances between major carriers may affect competition in markets where they dominate; (10) increasing competition and improving air service at airports serving communities that have not benefited from deregulation will likely entail a range of federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives; (11) DOT has recently undertaken several efforts designed to enhance competition, such as granting slots to new entrants at two airports with slot controls and issuing draft guidelines that define anticompetitive behavior by airlines that could lead to an investigation and possible fines by DOT; and (12) in addition, recently proposed legislation would seek to increase air service in underserved markets and address barriers to competition and predatory behavior by air carriers. |
gao_GAO-01-718 | gao_GAO-01-718_0 | The Securities Act of 1933 requires that, prior to the offering or sale of securities, the issuer must register the securities offering with the SEC by filing a registration statement. The registration statement must contain financial and other material information concerning the securities and the issuer. The SEC’s DCF oversees the disclosure of information, which is required by federal securities laws, to the investing public. OCA encourages registrants to consult on those financial reporting and auditing issues that involve unusual, complex, or innovative transactions for which no clear authoritative guidance exists. We also interviewed representatives from SEC registrant companies to obtain their views on the SEC’s process for handling accounting issues. FEI advised us that they did not have official comments on this report. Examples of the type of accounting issues frequently reviewed include business combination issues, such as the application of the pooling versus purchase methods of accounting and complex issues surrounding revenue recognition and financial instruments. Representatives of registrants and the accounting profession expressed a need for additional information regarding the following: general status information, including time estimates for resolving issues and status of the review; how accounting issues are assigned to SEC staff members; how OCA consults with standard-setting bodies and other large accounting firms, including how OCA ensures that information presented in these consultations is unbiased and how the results of consultations are used in resolving issues; the SEC’s approval processes for determining whether registrant restatements are necessary; how OCA coordinates with DCF, including how OCA and DCF minimize duplication of information requested from the registrants and auditors; and OCA’s final position on accounting issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) resolution of accounting issues submitted by companies that have or are contemplating publicly traded securities.
What GAO Found
Companies are required by law to register their securities with SEC by filing a registration statement. This statement must contain financial and other information on the securities and the issuer. SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) is responsible for providing guidance to companies to ensure that they comply with the reporting requirements of the law. Generally, registrants submit issues to OCA for which there is no authoritative guidance. These issues tend to involve unusual, complex, or innovative transactions. Some of the accounting issues frequently reviewed include business mergers and issues surrounding revenue recognition and financial instruments. Representatives of registrants and the accounting profession have had both positive and negative experiences with SEC's handling of accounting issues. Several representatives expressed concerns over the transparency of SEC's decision making process and SEC's use of accounting sources outside of generally accepted accounting procedures. |
gao_RCED-98-169 | gao_RCED-98-169_0 | Specifically, we determined (1) what conditions need to be present in order to successfully use fixed-price contracting for EM privatization cleanup projects, (2) what alternative financing approaches could be used for EM privatization contracts, and (3) how alternative financing methods for EM privatization projects might affect budget scoring. To evaluate how alternative financing and contracting approaches might affect budget scoring of EM’s privatization projects, we analyzed the scoring guidelines in the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-11. Certain Key Conditions Need to Be Present in Order to Use Fixed-Price Contracting
Fixed-price contracts can be used for cleanup projects, including privatization projects, when certain conditions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation are met. However, private financing increases the performance risk borne by the contractor, and as a result, private financing costs can be significant. Other financing options exist that would leave some performance risk with the government by increasing the use of government financing. Other Construction Financing Options Are Available
Total private financing represents only one end of a continuum of construction financing options. Total government financing, as traditionally used in EM’s cost-reimbursement management contracts, represents the opposite end of the continuum. In between these two extremes, other financing options exist that attempt to strike a balance between financing cost and performance risk. However, as the amount of government financing increases, the amount of performance risk assumed by the government also increases. The consideration of the cost of added risk under a progress payment option is similar to the partial payment aspect of the option discussed above. Changing How EM’s Privatization Projects Are Financed Could Affect the Interpretation of the Scoring Guidelines
Currently, OMB scores EM’s privatization projects as service contracts. For this option, EM also would need additional budget authority upfront for the subsidy cost. Under all of the alternative financing scenarios we analyzed, except possibly full-government financing, scorekeeping guidelines could result in EM needing more budget authority earlier in the projects and incurring outlays sooner than under OMB’s current method of scoring privatization projects as service contracts. With respect to scoring, how these projects are scored will depend on how certain key aspects of the scoring rules are interpreted. As our analysis shows, a complex matrix of decision factors needs to be considered when deciding how to contract for and finance a cleanup. Once a contract type and financing method are chosen, DOE and the contractor would need to carefully develop a contract that clearly defines each party’s roles and accountability through provisions that allocate project risk between the parties, define DOE’s oversight role, and identify appropriate measures against which the contractor’s performance will be judged. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether privatization will achieve the nuclear weapons waste clean-up goals expected by the Department of Energy (DOE), focusing on: (1) what conditions need to be present in order to successfully use fixed-price contracting for the Office of Environmental Management's privatized clean-up projects; (2) what alternative financing approaches could be used for Environmental Management's privatization contracts; and (3) how alternative financing methods for Environmental Management's privatization projects might affect budget scoring.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) fixed-price contracting, one key aspect of Environmental Management's privatization program, can successfully be used for environmental clean-up projects when certain conditions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation are met; (2) when these conditions exist, GAO found that the Office of Environmental Management has successfully used fixed-price contracts for a variety of activities ranging from cleaning up contaminated soils to decontaminating workers' uniforms; (3) however, when these conditions do not exist, GAO found instances in which clean-up projects being performed under fixed-price contracts encountered cost increases and schedule delays; (4) in addition, risks and issues that could affect the eventual performance of the contract must be clearly defined; (5) total private financing represents one end of a continuum of construction financing options; (6) private financing transfers performance risk from the government to the private contractor, but costs for this approach are significant because of the increased risk assumed by the contractor; (7) total government financing represents the other end of the continuum of options; (8) with government financing, financing costs are minimized, but performance risk which has also proven to be costly, remains with the government; (9) in between these two extremes, other financing options exist that attempt to strike a balance between performance risk and financing costs; (10) how Environmental Management's privatization projects are scored for budget purposes depends on the way certain key aspects of the scoring rules are interpreted; (11) Environmental Management's privatization projects are currently scored as service contracts; (12) the use of alternative financing methods may change the interpretation of the scoring guidelines for these projects; (13) as a result, under all of the alternative financing options that GAO analyzed, the Office of Environmental Management would need more budget authority earlier in the projects and would also incur outlays sooner than under the Office of Management and Budget's method; (14) a complex matrix of decision factors needs to be considered when deciding who to contract for and finance a cleanup project; and (15) once a contract type and financing method are chosen, DOE and the contractor would need to carefully develop a contract that clearly defines each party's roles and accountability through provisions that allocate the project's risks between parties. |
gao_GAO-03-379 | gao_GAO-03-379_0 | Further, the commission noted that no single service had been assigned statutory responsibility to “organize, train, and equip” for space operations. The commission provided 13 recommendations to DOD intended to improve the focus and accountability within the national security space organization and management. As we reported in our June 2002 assessment, the Secretary of Defense decided to implement 10 of the Space Commission’s 13 recommendations while opting to take alternative actions for the remaining 3. DOD has now completed action on three more, with actions on the remaining recommendation still in progress. To address some of the Space Commission’s specific recommendations as well as additional opportunities that the department identified for improving the organization and management of its space activities, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in October 2001 that directed actions to: assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director, NRO; designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space; delegate program milestone decision authority for DOD space major defense acquisition programs and designated space programs to the Under Secretary through the Secretary of the Air Force; realign the Office of the National Security Space Architect to report to the Director, NRO (who is also the Under Secretary of the Air Force) and make the Architect responsible for ensuring that military and intelligence funding for space is consistent with policy, planning guidance, and architectural decisions; designate the Secretary of the Air Force as DOD executive agent for space with redelegation to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; assign the Air Force the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces as necessary for the effective prosecution of offensive and defensive military operations in space; realign Air Force headquarters and field commands to more closely integrate space acquisitions and operations functions; and assign responsibility for the Air Force Space Command to a four-star officer other than the Commander of the U.S. Space Command (now merged with U.S. Strategic Command) and North American Aerospace Defense Command to provide dedicated leadership to space activities. It is too early to assess the effects of DOD’s organizational changes for its space programs because new institutional roles, processes, and procedures are still evolving, and key documents are not yet finalized. Under current plans, DARPA will receive most of these funds. Space Program Lacks Results-Oriented Management Framework
The Department of Defense has produced some policies and guidance to implement its space program, but it has not completed a comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide the program and monitor its results. Therefore, we could not determine the extent to which these documents contain all the key elements of a results-oriented management framework. Conclusions
DOD has charged the Air Force with leadership responsibilities for space activities and has taken some actions that have the potential to improve its management ability. Furthermore, the department does not have a complete results-oriented management framework to assess the results of the changes in its organization and processes and gauge its progress toward achieving its long-term goals in the future. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve the management of national security space activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: require the executive agent for DOD space, in conjunction with the services, to establish a departmentwide space human capital strategy that includes goals and time lines to develop and maintain a cadre of military and civilian space professionals; require the executive agent for DOD space to develop a comprehensive management framework for space activities that includes a results- oriented national security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals, time lines, and performance measures to assess space activities’ progress in achieving national security space goals; include performance goals and measures for space activities in DOD’s next departmentwide performance report; and designate an oversight entity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to periodically assess the progress of DOD’s executive agent in achieving goals for space activities. Given time and resource limitations, we focused our work on three of the many long-term management challenges to DOD’s space program—investing in science and technology, improving the timeliness and quality of space acquisitions, and building and maintaining a cadre of space professionals. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2001, the congressionally chartered Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization--known as the Space Commission--reported that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacked the senior-level focus and accountability to provide guidance and oversight for national security space operations. Congress mandated that GAO provide an assessment of DOD's actions to implement the Space Commission's recommendations. Thus, GAO (1) updated its June 2002 assessment of DOD's actions to address the Space Commission's recommendations, (2) ascertained progress in addressing other long- term management concerns, and (3) assessed the extent to which DOD has developed a results-oriented management framework for space activities.
What GAO Found
Since June 2002 when we reported that DOD intended to implement 10 of the Space Commission's 13 recommendations to improve the management and organization of space activities and had completed implementation of 6, DOD has completed action on 3 more recommendations. The only action intended but not completed at the conclusion of our work is designation of the Air Force as the executive agent for DOD space programs. Most of the changes represent organizational actions to improve DOD's ability to manage space. For example, DOD has: (1) created a focal point for integrating DOD space activities by appointing the Under Secretary of the Air Force also as Director, National Reconnaissance Office; (2) realigned Air Force space activities under one command; and (3) created a separate position of Commander, Air Force Space Command, to provide increased attention to the organization, training, and equipping for space operations. It is too early to assess the effects of these organizational changes because new institutional roles, processes, and procedures are still evolving. DOD still faces challenges in addressing long-term management problems, such as increasing its investment in innovative space technologies, improving the timeliness and quality of acquisitions, and developing a cadre of space professionals. DOD has initiated some actions to address these concerns, such as increasing resources for research on space technology and developing a new acquisition process, and the services have begun some plans for developing space professionals. However, most planned actions are not fully developed or implemented. Further, DOD has not developed an overarching human capital strategy for space that would guide service plans to ensure all requirements for space professionals are met. DOD does not have a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework for space activities. The Air Force is developing some policies and guidance that could be part of a management framework for space activities. However, we did not have access to the draft documents to determine whether they will contain results-oriented elements--such as a strategy, performance goals and measures, and timelines--that will enable DOD to better focus its efforts and assess its progress in attaining its space goals. Further, no single department-level entity has been charged with providing oversight of the Air Force's management of its executive agent for space responsibilities to assess its progress in achieving space goals while ensuring that all services' requirements for space capabilities are fairly considered. |
gao_GAO-09-976 | gao_GAO-09-976_0 | IRS’s process for collecting identified unpaid debt has three phases. According to IRS officials, the phases and routing of tax debt-collection cases result from IRS’s designing the collection process to effectively and efficiently use resources to resolve taxpayer debt at the earliest possible time and using the least costly resources. These rules are to determine the number and types of notices as well as whether IRS defers collection action or sends the debt to other phases for further collection action. As shown in figure 1, IRS annually has sent millions of notices (across the four types) to collect billions of dollars in unpaid debt from individual taxpayers. Internal control should provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the agency are being achieved through, among other things, effective and efficient use of the agency’s resources. How well do IRS’s business rules for sending notices to individuals help assure that the collection notice phase is achieving desired results at the lowest costs? To assess IRS’s objectives, performance measures, and responsibility for reviewing notice-phase performance, we reviewed information on how IRS has organized the work flow of the notice phase, including its objectives and related measures of performance as well as assignments of responsibility for notice activities such as reviewing the results. To determine how well IRS’s business rules help assure that the collection notice phase achieves desired results at the lowest costs, we asked IRS collection officials who were the most knowledgeable about the business rules to identify the key business rules that affect most individual taxpayers in the notice phase. The five rules IRS identified were based on (see app. Although the notice phase affects millions of taxpayers and is a key part of IRS’s strategy for resolving billons of dollars of unpaid debt, IRS has not established written objectives for the notice phase. However, IRS has not established this percentage as a performance measure or defined how it is to be consistently calculated. As noted earlier, IRS officials said that generally business rules were established to make the best use of IRS resources. IRS also lacked data supporting the rationales for the rules. Even though IRS officials estimated that the business rules had been established for years, IRS had documentation for an evaluation of only one of the five business rules we reviewed (the minimum dollar rule). Recommendations
To better ensure the notice phase is achieving desired results at the lowest costs, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue: establish objectives and performance measures to reflect the desired results for the notice phase; establish responsibilities for reviewing the performance of the notice phase to help ensure accountability throughout IRS; document the rationales for the key notice-phase business rules in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, or other desired results; provide IRS collection managers and executives accessible, reliable information on what the business rules are; and periodically and regularly evaluate the business rules in terms of efficiency and effectiveness or other results and ensure the results are available to managers so the data and methodologies can be used or considered in future evaluations. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), $23 billion in unpaid individual income tax debt existed in 2001, its most recent estimate. The notice phase is the first of IRS's three-phase process to collect unpaid debt. IRS annually sends notices to millions of individual taxpayers about billions of dollars of unpaid tax debt. Congress and others have questioned IRS's collection process's effectiveness. As requested, GAO is reporting on (1) how well IRS has established objectives, performance measures, and responsibility for reviewing notice-phase performance, and (2) how well IRS's business rules for sending notices to individuals help assure that the collection notice phase is achieving desired results at the lowest costs. To address these objectives, GAO compared the evidence obtained from IRS documents and responsible IRS collection officials to applicable guidance for internal control standards.
What GAO Found
Although the notice phase is a key part of IRS's approach and strategy for resolving billions of dollars of individuals' unpaid tax debt, IRS lacks certain internal controls to assure that notices to individuals are achieving the most benefits--such as debt collected or unpaid debt cases otherwise resolved-- with the resources being used. Management controls like clearly defined objectives, performance measures, and clear responsibility for reviewing program performance help provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of an agency are being achieved effectively and efficiently. However, IRS has no documented objectives for the notice phase and no performance measures to indicate how well the phase is performing in resolving debt cases or achieving other potential desired results. Further, IRS has not established responsibility for reviewing the performance of the complete notice phase. IRS lacks documentation for and evaluations of its business rules for notices to individuals to assure that the collection notice phase is achieving desired results. According to IRS officials, to make the best use of collection resources, IRS uses its business rules to--based on certain dollar thresholds and individual tax debt case characteristics--vary the number and types of notices sent to taxpayers and determine whether unresolved cases will be sent for further collection action or further action will be deferred. However, as shown in the table, in almost all cases, for the five business rules that IRS identified as affecting the most taxpayers, IRS did not have information on the date the rules were established, the rationale for the rule, or data supporting the rationale. IRS collection officials also lacked documentation describing the business rules and how they operate. Further, even though IRS officials estimated that the business rules had been established for years, IRS had documentation for an evaluation of only one of the five business rules. Without relevant evaluations IRS lacks assurance that the notice phase achieves desired collection results at the least cost. |
gao_GAO-15-315 | gao_GAO-15-315_0 | Specifically, strategic planning for IT was not linked directly to the overall Library strategic plan and did not have a “forward-looking” view; strategic planning was not linked to the IT investment process; the organizational structure of the ITS directorate did not foster strategic planning and good IT governance; areas of overlap existed in support services and systems, including a number of service units that maintained their own technology offices and help desk functions; the Library was missing an enterprise architecture program, which should be coupled with a strategy for implementing future technology; and ITS customer service needed improvement, to include the use of service-level agreements. The Library agreed with the recommendation. Congress has also recognized the Library’s IT management challenges. At the conclusion of our review in January 2015, the Library’s Chief of Staff stated that the agency plans to draft a new IT strategic plan within 90 days. These processes focus on the agency’s ability to select, oversee, and review IT projects. The Library’s information resource management policy also gives the ITSC responsibility for formalizing the policies and procedures for selecting and managing IT investments. Additionally, the Library’s investment management process is not fully coordinated with its IT strategic plan and enterprise architecture. Consequently, the Library does not know how much it spends In the absence of this information, we estimated that the Library obligated at least $119 million on IT for fiscal year 2014. For example, the system lists over 18,000 “active” personal computers, even though, according to Library officials, it actually has fewer than 6,500 personal computers in use. However, the Library has not developed policies in these areas that address key practices. Specifically, while the Library did establish and implement a process for handling security incidents, it did not (1) have a complete inventory of its systems for purposes of monitoring security controls, (2) fully outline security controls in system security plans, (3) conduct complete security testing of its systems, (4) develop and complete in a timely fashion plans for remediating identified security weaknesses, (5) establish contingency plans for its systems, (6) fully document security training policies or ensure that all users had taken required training, (7) include security-related requirements in all applicable contracts for IT services, or (8) fully assess risks to the privacy of personal information in its systems. Until it addresses these weaknesses, the Library’s systems and the information they contain will be at increased risk of compromise. The Library has established and implemented an incident handling process. Additionally, the Library did not always follow its policy. Additionally, the Library’s security testing did not always identify control weaknesses. These three organizations also maintain separate e-mail environments. However, the Library has not performed such a review. However, the Library does not have the leadership needed to address the IT management weaknesses identified in this report. Conclusions
As information is increasingly created, shared, and preserved digitally, effectively managing its IT resources will be even more critical for the Library to carry out its mission of preserving and making available the knowledge and creative output of the American people. More basically, because the Library does not have accurate data on what it spends on IT each year or an accurate inventory of IT assets, it is limited in its ability to make informed investment decisions or ensure that it does not waste money on IT. While, to its credit, the Library has established roles and responsibilities and policies and procedures for information security and privacy, significant weaknesses in implementing key security management controls call into serious question whether the information and systems at the Library are being adequately protected. While ITS—as the central IT organization within the Library—is responsible for providing IT-related services to the Library’s other units, the lack of satisfaction with these services has contributed to the other units pursuing their own IT activities, potentially resulting in duplicative investments and wasted resources. If it follows through on plans to appoint such an official and invests the position with the appropriate authority, the Library will be in a stronger position to address the IT management challenges we have identified and make a more effective and efficient use of technology to support its mission. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2015 legislative branch appropriations bill required GAO to review the Library of Congress’s management of information technology (IT). Our specific objectives for this review were to assess the extent to which the Library of Congress (1) addressed in its strategic planning the IT and related resources required to meet its goals and objectives; (2) established an IT governance structure to manage the selection, control, and evaluation of IT investments; (3) used IT acquisition and development best practices; (4) established programs for ensuring the information security and privacy protection of its information and information systems; (5) used best practices for managing IT services; and (6) has a chief information officer (CIO) with authority to exercise control and oversight of IT management functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Library of Congress is the world's largest library, whose mission is to make its resources available and useful to Congress and the American public. In carrying out its mission, the Library increasingly relies on IT systems, particularly in light of the ways that digital technology has changed the way information is created, shared, and preserved.
The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the 2015 legislative branch appropriations bill required GAO to conduct a review of IT management at the Library. GAO's objectives focused on the extent to which the Library has established and implemented key IT practices and requirements in, among other areas: (1) strategic planning, (2) governance and investment management, (3) information security and privacy, (4) service management, and (5) leadership. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed Library regulations, policies, procedures, plans, and other relevant documentation for each area and interviewed key Library officials.
What GAO Found
The Library of Congress has established policies and procedures for managing its information technology (IT) resources, but significant weaknesses across several areas have hindered their effectiveness:
Strategic planning: The Library does not have an IT strategic plan that is aligned with the overall agency strategic plan and establishes goals, measures, and strategies. This leaves the Library without a clear direction for its use of IT.
Investment management: Although the Library obligated at least $119 million on IT for fiscal year 2014, it is not effectively managing its investments. To its credit, the Library has established structures for managing IT investments—including a review board and a process for selecting investments. However, the board does not review all key investments, and its roles and responsibilities are not always clearly defined. Additionally, the Library does not have a complete process for tracking its IT spending or an accurate inventory of its assets. For example, while the inventory identifies over 18,000 computers currently in use, officials stated that the Library has fewer than 6,500. Until the Library addresses these weaknesses, its ability to make informed decisions will be impaired.
Information security and privacy: The Library assigned roles and responsibilities and developed policies and procedures for securing its information and systems. However, its implementation of key security and privacy management controls was uneven. For example, the Library's system inventory did not include all key systems. Additionally, the Library did not always fully define and test security controls for its systems, remediate weaknesses in a timely manner, and assess the risks to the privacy of personal information in its systems. Such deficiencies also contributed to weaknesses in technical security controls, putting the Library's systems and information at risk of compromise.
Service management: The Library's Information Technology Services (ITS) division is primarily responsible for providing IT services to the agency's operating units. While ITS has catalogued these services, it has not fully developed agreements with the other units specifying expected levels of performance. Further, the other units were often not satisfied with these services, which has contributed to them independently pursuing their own IT activities. This in turn has resulted in units purchasing unnecessary hardware and software, maintaining separate e-mail environments, and managing overlapping or duplicative IT activities.
Leadership: The Library does not have the leadership needed to address these IT management weaknesses. For example, the agency's chief information officer (CIO) position does not have adequate authority over or oversight of the Library's IT. Additionally, the Library has not had a permanent CIO since 2012 and has had five temporary CIOs in the interim.
In January 2015, at the conclusion of GAO's review, officials stated that that the Library plans to draft an IT strategic plan within 90 days and hire a permanent CIO. If it follows through on these plans, the Library will be in a stronger position to address its IT management weaknesses and more effectively support its mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Library expeditiously hire a permanent CIO. GAO is also making 30 other recommendations to the Library aimed at establishing and implementing key IT management practices. The Library generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and described planned and ongoing actions to address them. |
gao_RCED-95-259 | gao_RCED-95-259_0 | The costs of O&M are borne by the federal government, states, and responsible parties. The federal government also pays for O&M activities at federal facilities that have sites on their property on the National Priorities List (NPL). Long-Term O&M Activities Are Required at a Majority of These Sites
Almost two-thirds, or 173, of the 275 sites we reviewed where the cleanup remedy is in place will require long-term O&M activities to ensure that the cleanup remedy continues to protect human health and the environment. EPA is responsible for two types of monitoring: (1) reviewing actions that the states and responsible parties have taken to comply with the sites’ O&M plan and (2) evaluating, at least every 5 years, the condition of certain sites where waste remains on-site. Although O&M has been ongoing at some sites for several years, EPA is just now developing guidance to monitor how the states and responsible parties perform O&M activities. EPA currently has no guidance for site project managers on monitoring O&M, but the agency plans to issue a new directive in December 1995. Despite the benefits of the 5-year reviews, EPA’s Inspector General found that EPA has a significant backlog of such reviews. As a result of this backlog, the agency may not be aware of problems that may be occurring at other Superfund sites. As a result, the states and responsible parties have not always performed the operations and maintenance activities required. We obtained EPA’s database of the O&M estimates to make additional cost projections, including (1) the O&M costs that the federal government will be expected to pay, (2) the O&M costs that the responsible parties will be expected to pay, (3) the average O&M costs for those sites with and without groundwater contamination, and (4) the proportions of the total forecast O&M costs that are for current Superfund sites and sites EPA anticipates adding to the NPL in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed operations and maintenance (O&M) activities at former or current National Priorities List (NPL) Superfund sites where remediation construction has been completed, focusing on the: (1) extent to which O&M activities are necessary at Superfund sites; (2) costs to the federal government, states, and responsible parties to perform these activities now and in the future; and (3) Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) actions to help ensure that O&M activities continue to protect human health and the environment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the federal government, states, and responsible parties must perform long-term O&M activities at almost two-thirds of the 275 NPL sites reviewed; (2) these O&M activities include controlling erosion of landfill covers, treating contaminated groundwater, and implementing and enforcing land and water use restrictions; (3) the nationwide cost of current and future O&M activities will be about $32 billion through fiscal year 2040, much of which will be borne by the states and responsible parties; (4) the cost of a given site remedy will depend mainly on what remedy type EPA selects and the duration of the O&M activities; (5) until recently, EPA has focused on the evaluation and cleanup of Superfund sites, but EPA monitoring of O&M activities is crucial because states and responsible parties do not always follow their O&M plans and site conditions can deteriorate; (6) EPA is just now developing guidance for site project managers on monitoring O&M activities to ensure that O&M plans are followed; and (7) EPA has a significant backlog of 5-year reviews and may not be aware of deteriorating conditions at some sites. |
gao_GAO-02-818 | gao_GAO-02-818_0 | Agency officials note that the reason for this may be attributable to a number of factors, including agency efforts to improve data collection and volunteer reporting. The Peace Corps has used its data analyses to gain insight into the characteristics of assaults against volunteers and to shape volunteer training programs. To address this commitment, the agency has adopted policies for monitoring and disseminating information on the security environments in which the agency operates, training volunteers, developing safe and secure volunteer housing and work sites, monitoring volunteers, and planning for emergencies such as evacuations. Monitoring sites and volunteers and responding to safety concerns and criminal incidents. Planning for emergencies. Volunteers are generally satisfied with the safety and security information and training they receive. Peace Corps Showed Mixed Performance in Developing Safe and Secure Housing and Work Sites for Volunteers
Although many volunteers are provided with housing that meets Peace Corps standards and well-defined work assignments, some volunteers do not have this experience. (Appendix IV describes Peace Corps provisions for responding to criminal incidents.) Peace Corps Initiatives May Enhance Volunteer Safety and Security
In May 2002, the Peace Corps informed us of a number of initiatives that the agency had already taken or intended to take to improve its current safety and security practices. Moreover, the Peace Corps has not indicated what action, if any, it intends to take in addressing the issue of staff turnover. Reported rates of nonassault crimes, in contrast, have remained essentially unchanged since 1990. | What GAO Found
About 7,000 Peace Corps volunteers now serve in 70 countries, often living in areas with limited access to reliable communications, police, or medical services. Moreover, as Americans, they may be viewed as relatively wealthy and hence good targets for criminal activity. The Peace Corps has reported rising numbers of assaults against its volunteers since it began collecting data in 1990. However, the Peace Corps' record is mixed when it comes to developing safe and secure housing and worksites for volunteers, monitoring volunteers and responding to security concerns or criminal incidents, and preparing for emergencies. To reduce risks to its volunteers, the Peace Corps has adopted policies that address monitoring and disseminating information on the security environment; volunteer training; development of safe and secure housing and work sites for volunteers; monitoring volunteers and responding to incidents and concerns; and planning for emergencies, such as evacuations. Volunteer surveys and GAO visits to five overseas ports indicate that volunteers are generally satisfied with agency training programs and other efforts designed to emphasize safety and security awareness. The agency is not certain, but officials have stated that efforts to improve its system for collecting crime data may have led to higher reported rates. In May 2002, the Peace Corps told GAO of several initiatives to improve current safety and security practices. Although these initiatives are directed at many of the obstacles to improved performance, they do not address staff turnover. |
gao_GAO-13-637T | gao_GAO-13-637T_0 | FEMA Has Taken Actions to Enhance Management of Four Preparedness Grant Programs to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication, but Challenges Remain
In February 2012, we identified multiple factors that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects across four of the largest grant programs—the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the State Homeland Security Program, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. Specifically, we found that FEMA made award decisions with differing levels of information and lacked a process to coordinate application reviews. To better identify potential unnecessary duplication, we recommended that FEMA (1) take steps to ensure that it collects project information at the level of detail needed to better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the four grant programs, and (2) explore opportunities to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the programs. Since we issued our February 2012 report, FEMA officials have identified actions they believe will enhance management of the four grant programs we analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges to enhancing preparedness grant management. First, the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 President’s budgets proposed the establishment of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a consolidation of 16 grant programs (including the 4 grants we analyzed in our February 2012 report) into a comprehensive single program. However, Members of Congress raised questions about the consolidation of the 16 grant programs and Congress did not approve the proposal in fiscal year 2013. The fiscal year 2014 President’s budget again proposed NPGP and, according to the fiscal year 2014 DHS Budget-in-Brief, FEMA improved the proposal by incorporating stakeholder views, as directed by Congress. If approved, and depending on its final form and execution, the consolidated NPGP could help reduce redundancies and mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication, and may address the recommendation in our February 2012 report to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the programs. Second, in March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency intends to start collecting and analyzing project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014; however, FEMA has not yet finalized specific data requirements and has not fully established the vehicle to collect these data—a new data system called the Non-Disaster Grants Management System (ND Grants). FEMA Has Made Progress in Establishing National Preparedness Capabilities, but Challenges Remain in Establishing Performance Measures That Could Assist in Prioritizing Grant Funding
FEMA Has Faced Challenges Developing a National Assessment of Preparedness
We have previously found that DHS and FEMA have faced challenges in developing and implementing a national assessment of preparedness. In March 2011, we reported that FEMA’s efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive, measurable national preparedness assessment were not yet complete. FEMA Has Made Progress in Establishing and Assessing Preparedness Capabilities, but Has Not Yet Developed Capability Requirements and Performance Measures That Could Assist in Prioritizing Grant Funding
While FEMA has taken steps to establish and assess capabilities, the agency has not yet developed clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures that are needed to identify capability gaps in a national preparedness assessment, as recommended in our March 2011 report. For example, FEMA required state and local governments receiving homeland security funding to complete Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) by December 31, 2012. As part of the process, state and local governments are to develop their own capability requirements. FEMA uses the State Preparedness Reports, in addition to other sources, to develop the National Preparedness Report. The outcome of the THIRA process is intended to be a set of national capability performance requirements and measures, which FEMA officials stated they intend to incorporate into future National Preparedness Reports. Second, because states develop their own capability requirements, and use individual judgment rather than a quantitative standard to assess preparedness capabilities, it may be difficult to identify differences and compare capability levels across states. As a result, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist, including at the federal level, and what level of resources will be needed to close such gaps through prioritized preparedness grant funding. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s efforts to develop capability requirements and performance measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2012, Congress appropriated about $41 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state and local governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters. DHS allocated more than $22.3 billion through four of the largest preparedness programs-- the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the State Homeland Security Program, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program.
In February 2012, GAO identified factors that contribute to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects across the four grant programs. In March 2011, GAO reported that FEMA faced challenges in developing and implementing a national preparedness assessment, a fact that inhibits its abilities to effectively prioritize preparedness grant funding. This testimony updates GAO's prior work and describes FEMA's progress in (1) managing preparedness grants and (2) measuring national preparedness by assessing capabilities. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2005 to March 2013 and selected updates in June 2013. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed agency documents, such as the National Preparedness Reports , and interviewed FEMA officials.
What GAO Found
Officials in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--have identified actions they believe will enhance management of the four preparedness programs GAO analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges. In February 2012, GAO found that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews and made award decisions with differing levels of information. To better identify potential unnecessary duplication, GAO recommended that FEMA collect project-level information and enhance internal coordination and administration of the programs. DHS concurred and has taken steps to address GAO's recommendations. For example, the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 President's budgets proposed the establishment of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a consolidation of 16 FEMA grant programs into a single program. Members of Congress raised questions about the NPGP and did not approve the proposal for fiscal year 2013. FEMA incorporated stakeholder views, as directed by Congress, and the fiscal year 2014 President's Budget again proposed the NPGP. If approved, and depending on its final form and execution, the NPGP could help mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication and address GAO's recommendation to improve internal coordination. In March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency intends to start collecting and analyzing project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014; but has not yet finalized data requirements or fully implemented the data system to collect the information. Collecting appropriate data and implementing project-level enhancements as planned would address GAO's recommendation and better position FEMA to identify potentially unnecessary duplication.
FEMA has made progress addressing GAO's March 2011 recommendation that it develop a national preparedness assessment with clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures, but continues to face challenges in developing a national preparedness system that could assist the agency in prioritizing preparedness grant funding. For example, FEMA required state and local governments receiving homeland security funding to complete Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) and, as a part of this process, develop their own capability requirements by December 31, 2012. State officials are to use the capability requirements they identified to self-assess capabilities in their future State Preparedness Reports , which FEMA uses along with other sources to develop the annual National Preparedness Reports . However, FEMA faces challenges that may reduce the usefulness of these efforts. For example, because states develop their own capability requirements, and use individual judgment rather than a quantitative standard to assess preparedness capabilities, it may be difficult to identify differences and compare capability levels across states. Further, while FEMA officials stated that the THIRA process is intended to develop a set of national capability performance requirements and measures, such requirements and measures have not yet been developed. Until FEMA develops clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist and what level of federal resources will be needed to close such gaps. GAO will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts to develop capability requirements and performance measures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports. DHS and FEMA concurred with these recommendations and have actions under way to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-358T | gao_GAO-16-358T_0 | DHS Faces Long- Standing Challenges in Planning for and Developing a Biometric Exit System and Reporting Overstay Estimates
As we reported in July 2013, DHS had not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement a biometric exit capability or the statutory requirement to report overstay estimates, and as of January 2016, DHS has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these requirements. Planning for and Developing a Biometric Exit System
Development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, with regard to an exit capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according to DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be implemented without incurring a major impact on land facilities. The report also included nine recommendations to help inform DHS's planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is economically justified. However, as of January 2016, the department has not yet fully addressed the May 2012 report recommendations. For example, as discussed in more detail below, DHS has not completed an evaluation framework to guide its assessment efforts. Moreover, in July 2013, we reported that DHS officials told us the department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air exit. However, as of January 2016, DHS is working to develop such a report, and CBP officials told us they were unable to estimate when the report would be completed. We concluded in our July 2013 report that, without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be able to provide an assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, because any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of biometric exit options. In January 2016, CBP officials stated that they were continuing to refine metrics for measuring performance and effectiveness, which they planned to incorporate into the evaluation framework. DHS has implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air exit technologies since our July 2013 report. In July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign national travelers at 10 selected airports. Finalizing the evaluation framework consistent with our recommendation would help guide DHS’s efforts to assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options. Reporting Reliable Overstay Data
As we have previously reported, challenges in developing and implementing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS’s data on overstays. Because of concerns about the reliability of the department’s overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay rates to Congress since 1994. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS planned to report overstay estimates by December 2013. As of January 2016, DHS has not reported overstay estimates. Our July 2013 report found that, although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not yet validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. Therefore, we recommended that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that it was establishing a working group that would include representation from DHS component agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and analyzing entry and exit data. However, as of January 2016, DHS could not provide a timeframe for when they would report overstay data or address our recommendation. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. Overstays are individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure. Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals' entries into the United States, and since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully operational at all ports of entry. However, GAO has identified a range of challenges that DHS has faced in its efforts to deploy a corresponding biometric exit capability. DHS's CBP is primarily responsible for implementing a biometric exit program.
This statement discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing a biometric exit system and reporting overstay estimates. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in July 2013 ( GAO-13-683 ), with selected updates conducted in January 2016 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces long-standing challenges in developing a biometric exit system and reporting reliable overstay data. In July 2013, GAO reported that DHS had not fulfilled statutory requirements to implement a biometric exit capability and report data on overstays. As of January 2016, DHS has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these statutory requirements. Specifically, in May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support planning for a biometric exit capability at airports. However, as of January 2016, the department has not yet fully addressed those recommendations. For example, DHS has not completed an evaluation framework that, among other things, assesses the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data, as it recommended in May 2012. In July 2013, GAO recommended that DHS establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework to help guide its assessment efforts. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and has actions planned or underway to address it. Specifically, in January 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials stated that they were continuing to develop an evaluation framework by developing metrics for measuring the performance and effectiveness of biometric air exit technologies.
Moreover, in July 2013, GAO reported that, according to DHS officials, the department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric air exit and report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding the benefits and costs associated with a biometric air exit system. GAO found that, without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be able to provide an assessment to Congress as planned. As of January 2016, DHS is working to develop this report for Congress, and CBP officials told GAO they were unable to estimate when it would be completed. Since GAO's 2013 report, DHS has also implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air exit technologies. For example, in July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign national travelers at 10 selected airports. Finalizing the evaluation framework consistent with GAO's recommendation would help guide DHS's efforts to assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options.
GAO also reported in July 2013 that challenges in developing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS's data on overstays. Because of concerns about the reliability of the department's overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay data to Congress since 1994. In July 2013, GAO found that, although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. GAO recommended that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data, and DHS concurred with the recommendation. However, as of January 2016, DHS has not yet reported overstay data or documented its reliability, and DHS officials could not provide a time frame for when they would address GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework and assess the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendations, and has actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-01-772 | gao_GAO-01-772_0 | Despite years of efforts to resolve its inventory problems, the Department still has spare parts shortages. Parts Shortages Have Resulted in Cannibalizations That Have Lowered Morale of Maintenance Personnel
To compensate for the lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel use cannibalizations or substitutions of parts from one aircraft to another. Key Reasons for Shortages Were Unanticipated Demands and Delays in Obtaining Parts From Contractors
Our review showed that the primary reasons for shortages of spare parts for the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters were demands not anticipated for parts and delays in obtaining parts from a contractor. Also, problems concerning overhaul and maintenance of spare parts created shortages. Overall Initiatives May Address Parts Shortages
The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency have initiatives under way or planned to revolutionize and integrate logistics processes, upgrade aging aircraft, and improve the supply of aviation parts. These initiatives are separate from those in the Army’s Strategic Logistics Plan. To determine the impact of parts shortages on maintenance practices and personnel, we reviewed the Army regulation on materiel policy and retail maintenance operations and an Army study on cannibalizations. | What GAO Found
The military's ability to carry out its mission depends on its having adequate supplies of spare parts on hand for maintenance and repairs. Shortages are a key indicator that the billions of dollars being spent on these parts are not being used effectively, efficiently, and economically. Despite additional funding from Congress, the Army still has concerns about spare parts shortages. Spare parts shortages for the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters have harmed operations and lowered morale among maintenance personnel. Cannibalization of parts from one aircraft to another is an inefficient practice that results in double work for the maintenance personnel, masks parts shortages, and lowers morale. Parts were unavailable for various reasons, including higher-than-expected demand for parts, delays in obtaining parts from contractors, and problems with overhaul and maintenance. Another factor contributing to the shortage was the Army's inability to obtain parts for these aging aircraft from the original manufacturers, which sometimes had gone out of business. The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency have efforts planned or underway to improve the availability of aviation spare parts. Once these initiatives are further along, GAO will review them to determine whether they can be enhanced. |
gao_GAO-15-666 | gao_GAO-15-666_0 | However, DOD’s most serious scenario requires a full and prolonged—a period longer than 6 months—activation of the reserve sealift fleet as well as the use of commercial vessels. Cargo Preference Requirements Increase Food Aid Shipping Costs, Especially for USDA
CPFA requirements increased the cost of shipping food aid for USAID and USDA by about 23 percent, or $107 million, over what it would have been had CPFA requirements not been applied during the time period April 2011 through fiscal year 2014. The country-by-country basis is a more narrow interpretation of the geographic area requirement associated with CPFA than what USAID applies. Following the July 2012 reduction in the minimum percentage of food aid to be carried on U.S.-flag vessels from 75 percent to 50 percent, USAID was able to substantially increase the proportion of food aid awarded to foreign-flag vessels, helping to reduce its average shipping rate. In contrast, USDA was only able to increase the proportion of food aid awarded to foreign-flag vessels by a relatively small amount such that it utilized foreign-flag vessels far below the 50 percent allowed by the 2012 law, and its average shipping rate did not decrease. USAID and USDA continue to differ in how they implement CPFA, and they, together with MARAD, have not fully updated guidance for or agreed on a consistent method for agencies to implement CPFA based on geographic area. Thus, USDA is required to meet the minimum percentage of food aid carried on U.S.-flag vessels by individual country and for each of its food assistance programs, which are Food for Progress and McGovern-Dole, regardless of the price of U.S. shipping, according to USDA officials. CPFA’s Contribution to Sealift Capacity Is Uncertain, and MARAD Has Not Fully Considered Available Mariner Supply
Despite cargo preference, the number of vessels carrying food aid and U.S. mariners required to crew them has declined. Furthermore, MARAD has not fully assessed the sufficiency of mariners available under a full and prolonged activation. CPFA supports some sealift capability by ensuring that a portion of U.S.- flag vessels carry some food aid cargo. We found that without CPFA, most food aid cargo would not be transported on U.S.-flag vessels. The Number of U.S. Mariners Qualified and Available to Serve DOD’s Needs under a Full and Prolonged Activation Is Uncertain
Estimated Number of Mariners Needed
MARAD has estimated the number of mariners required to fully crew both the reserve sealift fleet and commercial operations for shorter- and longer-duration surge scenarios as required by DOD. MARAD officials expect all commercial vessels to continue operations during the same period during which the reserve surge fleet is activated and estimated that 9,148 mariners would be needed to crew such vessels. Maritime industry stakeholders. Matter for Congressional Consideration
While recognizing that cargo preference serves policy goals established by Congress with respect to the U.S. merchant marine, including maintenance of a fleet capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, Congress should consider clarifying cargo preference legislation regarding the definition of “geographic area” to ensure that agencies can fully utilize the flexibility Congress granted to them when it lowered the CPFA requirement. Recommendation for Executive Action
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of MARAD to study the potential availability of all qualified mariners needed to meet a full and prolonged activation of the reserve sealift fleet. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix V, DOT concurred with our recommendation to study the potential availability of all qualified mariners needed to meet a full and prolonged activation of the reserve sealift fleet. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) cargo preference for food aid’s (CPFA) impact on food aid shipping cost and U.S. agencies’ implementation of CPFA requirements, (2) the extent to which the implementation of CPFA requirements contributes to sufficient sealift capacity, and (3) stakeholder views on options to improve the sustainability of the oceangoing U.S.-flag fleet. To address our objectives, we analyzed cargo preference legislation as well as documents, guidance, and data on CPFA provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD). The data covered USAID’s packaged food aid and all of USDA’s food aid shipments from April 2011 through fiscal year 2014. For example, the overall commercial shipping rates could have declined during the period of our data from April 2011 through fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cargo preference laws require that a percentage of U.S. government cargo, including international food aid, be transported on U.S.-flag vessels according to geographic area of destination and vessel type. One intention is to ensure a merchant marine—both vessels and mariners—capable of providing sealift capacity in times of war or national emergency, including a full, prolonged activation of the reserve fleet. The CPFA percentage requirement has varied over the years, and was reduced from 75 to 50 percent in 2012. Among other objectives, this report examines (1) CPFA's impact on food aid shipping cost and U.S. agencies' implementation of CPFA requirements and (2) the extent to which the implementation of CPFA requirements contributes to sufficient sealift capacity. GAO analyzed agency documents and bid data from April 2011 (when the food procurement database was implemented) through fiscal year 2014, and interviewed agency officials as well as maritime industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Cargo preference for food aid (CPFA) requirements increased the overall cost of shipping food aid by an average of 23 percent, or $107 million, over what the cost would have been had CPFA requirements not been applied from April 2011 through fiscal year 2014. Moreover, differences in the implementation of CPFA requirements by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) contributed to a higher shipping rate for USDA. Following the July 2012 reduction in the minimum percentage of food aid to be carried on U.S.-flag vessels, USAID was able to substantially increase the proportion of food aid awarded to foreign-flag vessels, which on average have lower rates, helping to reduce its average shipping rate. In contrast, USDA was able to increase the proportion of food aid awarded to foreign-flag vessels by only a relatively small amount because it is compelled by a court order to meet the minimum percentage of food aid carried on U.S.-flag vessels by individual country, a more narrow interpretation of the geographic area requirement than what USAID applies. Despite GAO's past recommendations, U.S. agencies have not fully updated guidance or agreed on a consistent method for agencies to implement CPFA, which would allow USDA to administer CPFA using a method other than country-by-country.
U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) and U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Cost of Cargo Preference for Food Aid (CPFA) Requirements, April 2011 through Fiscal Year 2014 (Dollars in millions)
CPFA's contribution to sealift capacity is uncertain, and available mariner supply has not been fully assessed. While CPFA has ensured that a portion of U.S.-flag vessels carry some food aid cargo, the number of vessels carrying food aid and U.S. mariners required to crew them has declined. The available pool of sealift capacity has always met all of the Department of Defense's (DOD) requirements, without the full activation of the reserve sealift fleet. DOD's most serious scenario would require a full and prolonged—a period longer than 6 months—activation of the reserve sealift fleet as well as the use of commercial vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) estimated that 3,886 mariners would be needed to crew the reserve surge fleet and 9,148 mariners to crew commercial vessels. MARAD estimated that at least 1,378 additional mariners would be needed to satisfy a full and prolonged activation, including the crewing of commercial vessels. However, the actual number of U.S. mariners qualified and available to fulfill DOD's most serious scenario is unknown and MARAD has not fully assessed the potential availability of all qualified mariners to satisfy a full and prolonged activation.
What GAO Recommends
Recognizing that cargo preference serves statutory policy goals, Congress should consider clarifying CPFA legislation to define “geographic area” in a manner that ensures agencies can fully utilize the flexibility Congress granted to them when it lowered the CPFA requirement. The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of MARAD to study the potential availability of all qualified mariners needed to meet a full and prolonged activation of the reserve sealift fleet; DOT agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-499 | gao_GAO-17-499_0 | We have previously reported that the challenge is finding the right balance between developing breakthrough or “disruptive” technologies—those considered to be innovative—and investing in moderate, “incremental” technology enhancements. Leading Companies Foster Innovation by Investing in Both Near- and Long-Term R&D and Taking Steps to Prove New Technologies Work
Selected leading companies that we reviewed follow six key practices that together reflect a disciplined approach to managing their R&D activities— those akin to DOD’s S&T activities. 2. Technology and product development teams at Honeywell Aerospace, for example, complete an annual roadmapping process to align incremental technology development activities with the company’s product plans. DOD Implements Some Practices Used by Leading Companies, but Policy Limitations and Culture Hinder Adopting Others
While some DOD S&T practices closely mirror those of the selected leading companies we reviewed, DOD’s funding policies and culture limit its ability to adopt other practices for managing its S&T investments. Unlike the companies we reviewed, DOD does not organize and fund incremental and disruptive innovation separately. Nor does its leadership provide guidance on or assess how these innovation investments should be or are mixed. As a result of DOD funding policies, projects are planned 2 years in advance, which can slow innovation and limit lab directors’ autonomy to initiate work. While Congress has provided authority that, as implemented, has enabled the military department lab directors to initiate work outside of the normal lengthy process, DOD has not fully utilized these flexibilities. Additionally, we found that divided responsibilities for technology versus product development contribute to a culture that does not encourage collaboration between DOD’s S&T and acquisition communities and limits the S&T community’s ability to conduct advanced prototyping. These issues are not insurmountable, however, as demonstrated in pockets of each military department. In recognition of these and other issues, Congress has required that DOD create a new Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering charged with advancing defense technology and innovation and establishing policies on technology development, prototyping, and experimentation, among other responsibilities, by February 2018. Military Departments Do Not Define in Strategy or Assess the Mix of Investments in Incremental and Disruptive Innovation
Although our review of selected leading companies found that they define in strategy their annual mix of investments in incremental and disruptive innovation, the military departments do not do this, nor do they assess such a mix. The fiscal year 2017 NDAA requires this position to be created by February 2018. To ensure that DOD is positioned to more comprehensively implement leading practices for managing science and technology programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the new Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to define, in policy or guidance, an S&T management framework that includes the three following actions: emphasizes greater use of existing flexibilities to more quickly initiate and discontinue projects to respond to the rapid pace of innovation; incorporates acquisition stakeholders into technology development programs to ensure they are relevant to customers; and promotes advanced prototyping of disruptive technologies within the labs so the S&T community can prove these technologies work to generate demand from future acquisition programs. Below are descriptions of the eight companies featured in this report. To identify the extent to which DOD can employ these leading commercial practices, we interviewed officials responsible for the management, execution, and oversight of DOD’s S&T enterprise. We compared and contrasted those practices with the practices identified through our meetings with leading commercial companies to determine the extent to which DOD is employing these practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on innovative technologies to ensure the superiority of its weapon systems and planned to invest about $12.5 billion in fiscal year 2017 to achieve this aim. Recently, DOD's leadership role in fostering innovation has been supplanted by the commercial sector. This has changed DOD's approach to technology development by relying more on commercial innovation.
Conference Report 112-329 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's S&T enterprise. This report assesses (1) the practices leading companies employ to manage technology development and (2) the extent to which DOD can incorporate these practices into its own. GAO interviewed eight large, profitable, leading technology companies (Amazon, Dow Chemical, Honeywell, General Motors, IBM, Qualcomm, Siemens AG, and Valvoline) to identify practices they used to manage, prioritize, and assess their technology portfolios. GAO also met with DOD organizations that manage and execute S&T funds to identify their practices.
What GAO Found
The eight leading companies whose practices GAO assessed take a disciplined approach to organizing and executing their technology development activities by grouping them into two portfolios: incremental and disruptive, as shown in the figure. Incremental development improves product lines whereas disruptive development is for riskier innovative and potentially market-shifting technologies.
By separating these two portfolios, companies reported that they could promote existing product lines in the short term while exploring opportunities to remain competitive in the long term, and mitigate the financial risk associated with disruptive technology development. Moreover, GAO found that leading companies also ensure technologies will be relevant in the marketplace by engaging a wide range of internal stakeholders. These companies also reported that they gain leadership buy-in by prototyping technologies before committing to further development and product integration.
While some Department of Defense (DOD) practices closely mirror those of the companies GAO reviewed, DOD's ability to adopt leading commercial practices in its approach to managing science and technology (S&T) investments is limited by its funding policies and culture. Unlike the companies GAO reviewed, DOD leadership does not provide guidance on or assess the mix of incremental and disruptive innovation. As a result, officials reported that DOD labs struggle to find the right balance between these investment areas. Under DOD's budget policy, projects are planned up to 2 years in advance, which can slow innovation and limit lab directors' autonomy as compared to companies. Congress has provided a means for lab directors to initiate work outside of this lengthy process, but it has not been fully utilized. Additionally, responsibilities for technology versus product development also contribute to a culture that discourages collaboration and limits labs' ability to prototype. Yet these issues are not insurmountable, as pockets of each military department have demonstrated, such as through recent efforts to expand advanced prototyping in the labs. Further, Congress has required that by February 2018 DOD create a new Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), which will be charged with developing policies to improve innovation. This position creates an opportunity to develop policies that further promote adoption of leading commercial practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD annually define and assess the mix of innovation investments and define, in policy or guidance, an S&T management framework that comprehensively employs leading commercial practices. DOD did not agree with the recommendations, citing its ongoing deliberations on the new USD R&E's role, but did identify some planned actions. GAO believes its recommendations are valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-17-448 | gao_GAO-17-448_0 | Accordingly, we recommended that the agencies take actions to complete their cost savings targets and improve optimization progress. Agencies Are Reporting Limited Progress against OMB’s Data Center Optimization Targets
As mentioned earlier, FITARA required OMB to establish metrics to measure the optimization of data centers, including server efficiency, and ensure that agencies’ progress toward meeting the metrics is made publicly available. More specifically, of the 24 agencies, 5—the Department of Commerce (Commerce), EPA, NSF, the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—reported plans to fully meet their applicable targets by the end of fiscal year 2018; 13 reported plans to meet some, but not all, of the targets; 4 reported that they do not plan to meet any targets; and 2 do not have a basis to report planned optimization milestones because they do not report having any agency- owned data centers. Agencies Reported Successes and Challenges in Optimizing Data Centers
The 24 DCOI agencies reported successes in optimizing their data centers—notably, the benefits of key technologies, such as virtualizing systems to improve performance, and increased energy efficiency. However, agencies also reported operational, technical, and financial challenges related to, for example, improving the utilization of their data center facilities, measuring server utilization, and obtaining funding within their agency for optimization efforts. It will be important for agencies to take action to address their identified challenges—as we previously recommended—in order to improve data center optimization progress. Most Agencies Still Cannot Effectively Measure Server Utilization
As noted earlier, FITARA required OMB to establish data center consolidation and optimization metrics, including a metric specific to measuring server efficiency; it also required agencies to report on progress in meeting the metrics. As of February 2017, 4 of the 22 agencies reporting agency-owned data centers in their inventory—NASA, NSF, SSA, and USAID—reported that they had implemented automated monitoring tools at all of their data centers. The remaining 12 agencies did not document plans to implement automated monitoring tools. Considering that OMB established a DCOI-wide savings goal of $2.7 billion, the ability of agencies to meet the optimization targets will be critical to achieving these savings. The lack of a formal OMB requirement to establish detailed plans in this area and report them to OMB further increases the likelihood that agencies will continue to lack them. Moreover, with automated monitoring tools not required by OMB to be fully implemented by agencies until the end of fiscal year 2018, extending the time frame of FITARA’s data center consolidation and optimization provisions could also better ensure that server utilization is effectively measured and reported beyond fiscal year 2018, after the necessary monitoring tools are implemented. In order to provide agencies with additional time to meet OMB’s data center optimization targets and achieve the related cost savings, Congress should consider extending the time frame for the data center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA beyond their current expiration date of October 1, 2018. Of the 19 agencies to which we made recommendations, 10 agencies agreed with our recommendations, 3 (Defense, Interior, and OPM) partially agreed, and 6 (including OMB) did not state whether they agreed or disagreed. In addition, 6 agencies to which we did not make recommendations stated that they had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess agencies’ progress against the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) data center optimization targets, (2) identify agencies’ notable optimization successes and challenges, and (3) evaluate the extent to which agencies are able to effectively measure server utilization. To assess agencies’ progress against OMB’s data center optimization targets, we analyzed the February 2017 data center optimization progress information of the 24 department and agencies (agencies) that participate in OMB’s Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI). As a result of these efforts, we determined that the agencies’ strategic plan information was sufficiently reliable for reporting on plans to meet or not meet OMB’s fiscal year 2018 optimization targets. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2014, FITARA was enacted and included a series of provisions related to improving the performance of data centers, including requiring OMB to establish optimization metrics and agencies to report on progress toward meeting the metrics. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer subsequently launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation and optimization efforts.
GAO was asked to review data center optimization. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess agencies' progress against OMB's data center optimization targets, (2) identify agencies' notable optimization successes and challenges, and (3) evaluate the extent to which agencies are able to effectively measure server utilization. To do so, GAO evaluated the 24 DCOI agencies' progress against OMB's fiscal year 2018 optimization targets, interviewed officials, and assessed agencies' efforts to implement monitoring tools for server utilization.
What GAO Found
Of the 24 agencies required to participate in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI), 22 collectively reported limited progress against OMB's fiscal year 2018 performance targets. Two agencies did not have a basis to report on progress as they do not have agency-owned data centers. For OMB's five optimization targets, five agencies or less reported that they met or exceeded each of the targets (see figure).
Further, as of April 2017, 17 of the 22 agencies were not planning to meet OMB's targets by September 30, 2018. This is concerning because the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act's (FITARA) data center consolidation and optimization provisions, such as those that require agencies to report on optimization progress and cost savings, expire a day later on October 1, 2018. Extending the time frame of these provisions would increase the likelihood that agencies will meet OMB's optimization targets and realize related cost savings. Additionally, until agencies improve their optimization progress, OMB's $2.7 billion initiative-wide cost savings goal may not be achievable.
All 24 agencies reported successes in optimizing their data centers—notably, the benefits of key technologies, such as virtualizing systems to improve performance, and increased energy efficiency. However, agencies also reported challenges related to, for example, improving the utilization of their data center facilities and competing for labor resources. It will be important for agencies to take action to address their identified challenges—as GAO previously recommended—in order to improve data center optimization progress.
Of the 24 agencies required by OMB to implement automated monitoring tools to measure server utilization by the end of fiscal year 2018, 4 reported in their data center inventories as of February 2017 that they had fully implemented such tools, 18 reported that they had not, and 2 did not have a basis to report on progress because they do not have agency-owned data centers. Collectively, agencies reported that these tools were used at about 3 percent of their centers. Although federal standards emphasize the need to establish plans to help ensure goals are met, of the 18 agencies, none fully documented plans, 6 agencies had partially documented them, and 12 did not document them. Agencies provided varied reasons for this, including that they were still evaluating available tools. In addition, the lack of a formal requirement from OMB to establish the plans also contributed to agencies not having them. Until these plans are completed, agencies may be challenged in measuring server utilization.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider extending the time frame for the data center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA to provide agencies with additional time to meet OMB's targets and achieve cost savings. GAO is also recommending that 18 agencies complete their plans to implement data center monitoring tools and that OMB require agencies to complete their plans and report them to OMB. Ten agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, three agencies partially agreed, and six (including OMB) did not state whether they agreed or disagreed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-826 | gao_GAO-06-826_0 | In addition to CMS requirements, JCAHO, AOA, and states can establish additional requirements for hospitals and nursing homes. Facility Administrators Faced Several Challenges Related to Evacuation, Including Deciding Whether to Evacuate, Securing Transportation, and Maintaining Communication
Hospital and nursing home administrators faced several challenges related to evacuation during recent hurricanes, including deciding whether to evacuate or stay in their facilities and “shelter in place”, obtaining transportation necessary for evacuations, and maintaining communication outside of their facilities. When evacuations were needed, facility administrators said that they had problems with transportation. In addition, communication was impaired by damage to local infrastructure as a result of the hurricanes. For example, a nursing home in Florida was unable to communicate with local emergency managers. Although facility administrators reported having contracts with transportation companies, competition for the same pool of vehicles created supply shortages. The first limitation of NDMS is that it is designed to move patients from a mobilization center, such as an airport, to other locations where they can receive necessary medical care, but it is not designed to move patients or residents out of hospitals or nursing homes to mobilization centers. They do not indicate how the federal government is to assist state and local authorities in moving hospital patients and nursing home residents from their facilities. The second limitation is that NDMS was not designed nor is it currently configured for people who do not need hospital care, including nursing home residents. NDMS reception areas had to make special arrangements for people in need of nursing home care, because NDMS lacked preexisting agreements with nursing homes equipped to handle people with nonhospital health care needs. Federal Requirements for Hospitals and Nursing Homes Include Provisions for Having Disaster Plans and Transferring Patients Out of Hospitals
At the federal level, CMS has requirements related to hospital and nursing home disaster and evacuation planning as a condition of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For hospitals, a CMS requirement states that the overall hospital environment must be maintained to assure the safety and well-being of patients. For nursing homes, a CMS regulation states that facilities must have plans to meet all potential emergencies and disasters, although the interpretative guidelines do not specifically mention transfer of residents. However, the challenges faced by hospitals and nursing homes during hurricanes Charley and Katrina also revealed two limitations in the federal government’s support to health care facilities that have to evacuate—the lack of assistance to states and localities to move people out of health care facilities to a mobilization point for federal transportation support and the lack of attention to nursing home residents needing evacuation. We also noted that reliance on state and local resources was inadequate when multiple facilities in a community had to evacuate simultaneously. To examine the extent to which limitations exist in the design of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) or other federal programs to assist state and local governments with patient evacuations, we reviewed federal documents such as the National Response Plan, including Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services— and the Catastrophic Incident Annex. We interviewed emergency preparedness officials from the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation, and the VA. To obtain additional information on NDMS, we reviewed program documents, including the memorandum of agreement that governs NDMS and an after- action report on the use of NDMS due to Hurricane Katrina. We reviewed documents provided by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and by accrediting organizations that assess compliance with CMS requirements—the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the American Osteopathic Association. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated difficulties involved in evacuating communities and raised questions about how hospitals and nursing homes plan for evacuations and how the federal government assists. Due to broad-based congressional interest, GAO assessed the evacuation of hospital patients and nursing home residents. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO examined (1) the challenges hospital and nursing home administrators faced, (2) the extent to which limitations exist in the design of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to assist with patient evacuations, and (3) the federal requirements for hospital and nursing home disaster and evacuation planning. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed federal officials, and interviewed hospital and nursing home administrators and state and local officials in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi and Hurricane Charley in Florida.
What GAO Found
Hospital and nursing home administrators faced several challenges related to evacuations during recent hurricanes, including deciding whether to evacuate or stay in their facilities and "shelter in place", obtaining transportation necessary for evacuations, and maintaining communication outside of their facilities. Administrators took steps to ensure that their facilities had needed resources--including staff, supplies, food, water, and power--to provide care during the hurricane and maintain self-sufficiency immediately after. However, when evacuations were needed, facility administrators said that they had problems with transportation, such as securing the vehicles needed to evacuate patients. Although facility administrators had contracts with transportation companies, competition for the same pool of vehicles created supply shortages when multiple facilities in a community had to be evacuated. In addition, communication was impaired by hurricane damage. For example, a nursing home in Florida was unable to communicate with local emergency managers. NDMS is a partnership of four federal agencies, and has two limitations in its design that constrain its assistance to state and local governments with patient evacuation. The NDMS partners are the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs; DHS is the lead agency. The first limitation is that NDMS evacuation efforts begin at a mobilization center, such as an airport, and do not include short-distance transportation assets, such as ambulances or helicopters, to move patients out of health care facilities to mobilization centers. The second limitation is that NDMS supports the evacuation of patients needing hospital care; the program was not designed nor is it currently configured to move people who do not require hospitalization, such as nursing home residents. Although NDMS moved nursing home residents due to Hurricane Katrina who were brought to mobilization centers, NDMS officials had to make special arrangements for people in need of nursing home care because NDMS lacked preexisting agreements with nursing homes. Neither of these limitations is addressed in other documents GAO reviewed, including DHS's National Response Plan (NRP). At the federal level, HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has requirements related to hospital and nursing home evacuation planning as a condition of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. CMS requires that hospitals maintain the overall hospital environment to assure patient safety, including developing plans that consider the transfer of patients to other health care settings. For nursing homes, CMS requires that plans meet all potential emergencies and disasters; however, requirements do not specifically mention the transfer of residents. In addition to assessing compliance with CMS requirements, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the American Osteopathic Association, and states can also have additional emergency management requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-455 | gao_GAO-09-455_0 | FEMA Does Not Systematically Consider WYOs’ Actual Expenses When Setting Payment Rates
FEMA does not systematically consider actual flood insurance expense information when it determines the amount it pays WYOs for selling and servicing flood insurance policies and adjusting claims. Since the inception of the WYO program, FEMA has used proxies to determine the rates at which it pays WYOs. We found that FEMA’s payments exceeded the companies’ actual expenses by $327.1 million, or 16.5 percent of total payments made. FEMA Has Not Aligned Its Bonus Structure with Its Long-Term Goals for NFIP
FEMA has not aligned its bonus structure for WYOs with its goals for NFIP, such as increasing penetration in low-risk flood zones, among homeowners without federally-related mortgages in all zones, and in geographic areas with repetitive losses and low penetration rates. This formula primarily rewards companies that are new to NFIP, when it is easiest to increase the percentage of net policies from a small base. Further, we found that most WYOs generally offered flood insurance when requested but did not strategically market the product as a primary insurance line. When program results could be influenced by external factors, agencies can use intermediate goals to identify the program’s discrete contribution to a specific result. FEMA Followed Some but Not All of Its Internal Control Requirements and Procedures
FEMA has explicit financial control requirements and procedures for overseeing the WYO program. FEMA’s Control Plan provides guidance for WYOs that is intended to ensure compliance with the statutory requirements for NFIP and that contains several checks and balances to help ensure that taxpayers’ funds are spent appropriately. For the 10 WYOs in our sample, FEMA followed some but not all of the requirements and procedures of the Control Plan and did not systematically track the outcomes of the various audits, inspections, and reviews. Biennial audits and underwriting and claims triennial reviews were also mostly implemented. Other audits, including audits for cause, state insurance department audits, and marketing, litigation, and customer service triennial operation reviews, were rarely or never implemented. Because FEMA does not implement all aspects of the Control Plan, it cannot ensure that the WYOs are fully complying with program requirements. We examined three alternative administrative structures that could replace NFIP’s payment arrangement with a competitively awarded contract that could lower costs for selling and servicing flood insurance policies and administering claims: contracting with one or more insurance companies, contracting with a single vendor (similar to the NFIP Direct program), or contracting with multiple vendors and maintaining the WYO network. Each of these alternatives has advantages and disadvantages in terms of the potential impact on the basic operations of administering flood insurance policies and adjusting claims, as well as on FEMA’s oversight of the program and its contractors. As a result, FEMA does not have the information it needs to determine whether its payments to WYOs are reasonable. FEMA has not tied its bonus structure to the long-term strategic goals for the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide transparency and accountability over the payments FEMA makes to WYOs for expenses and profits, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to determine in advance the amounts built into the payment rates for estimated expenses and profit; annually analyze the amounts of actual expenses and profit in relation to the estimated amounts used in setting payment rates; consider the results of the analysis of payments, actual expenses, and profit in evaluating the methods for paying WYOs; and in light of the findings in this report, immediately reassess the practice of paying WYOs an additional 1 percent of written premiums for operating expenses. To improve oversight of the WYO program and compliance with program requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to consistently follow the Control Plan and ensure that each component is implemented; ensure that any revised Control Plan include oversight of all functions of participating WYOs, including customer service and litigation expenses; and systematically track insurance companies’ compliance with and performance under each component of the Control Plan and ensure centralized access to all the audits, reviews, and data analyses performed for each participating insurance company under the Control Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2004, private insurance companies participating in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Write-Your-Own (WYO) program have collected an average of $2.3 billion in premiums annually and, of this amount, have been paid or allowed to retain an average of $1 billion per year. Questions have been raised about FEMA's oversight of the program in light of the debts FEMA has incurred since the 2005 hurricanes. GAO placed NFIP on its high-risk list and issued several reports addressing the challenges the program faces. This report addresses the methods FEMA uses for determining the rates at which WYOs are paid, its marketing bonus system for WYOs, its adherence to financial control requirements for the WYO program, and alternatives to the current system. To do this work, we reviewed and analyzed FEMA's data and policies and procedures and obtained the views of select WYOs and flood insurance experts.
What GAO Found
FEMA does not systematically consider actual flood insurance expense information when it determines the amount it pays the WYO for selling and servicing flood insurance policies and adjusting claims. Rather, since the inception of the WYO program, FEMA has used various proxies for determining the rates at which it pays the WYOs. Consequently, FEMA does not have the information it needs to determine (1) whether its payments are reasonable and (2) the amount of profit to the WYOs that are included in its payments. When GAO compared expense payments FEMA made to six WYOs to the WYOs' actual expenses for calendar years 2005 through 2007, we found that the payments exceeded actual expenses by $327.1 million, or 16.5 percent of total payments made. Considering actual expense information would provide transparency and accountability over payments to the WYOs. FEMA has not aligned its bonus structure with its long-term goals for the program. The WYOs generally offered flood insurance when requested but did not strategically market the product as a primary insurance line. FEMA has not set explicit marketing goals beyond a 5 percent goal of increasing policy growth each year, and the WYO program primarily rewards companies that are new to NFIP for sales increases that may result from external factors, including flood events. The Government Performance and Results Act states that when results could be influenced by external factors, agencies can use intermediate goals to measure contributions to specific goals. Paying bonuses based on such intermediate targeted goals could bring the bonus structure more in line with FEMA's goals for the NFIP program. FEMA has explicit financial control requirements and procedures for the WYO program but has not implemented all aspects of its Control Plan. FEMA provides guidance for WYOs that is intended to ensure compliance with the statutory requirements for the NFIP and contains checks and balances to help ensure that taxpayer funds are spent appropriately. FEMA did most of the required biennial audits and underwriting and claims reviews but did not do most of the required audits for cause; state insurance department audits; and marketing, litigation, and customer service operational reviews. In addition, FEMA did not systematically track the outcomes of the various audits, inspections, and reviews that it performed for the 10 WYOs included in this review of FEMA's oversight of the program. Because FEMA does not implement all aspects of the Control Plan, it cannot ensure that the WYOs are fully complying with program requirements. Three alternative administrative structures could replace NFIP's payment arrangement with a competitively awarded contract that could lower costs for selling and servicing flood insurance policies and administering claims: (1) contracting with one or more insurance companies, (2) contracting with a single vendor, or (3) contracting with multiple vendors and maintaining the WYO network. Each alternative involves trade-offs in terms of the impact on the program's basic operations that would have to be considered. |
gao_GAO-10-781 | gao_GAO-10-781_0 | For the purposes of this report, the term “value capture” generally refers to strategies that allow local governments or transit agencies to dedicate to transit either a portion of the increased tax revenue, or additional revenue through assessments or fees based on value expected to accrue as a result of public improvements or investments. Most transit agencies with extensive joint development experience also have formal joint development or transit-oriented development policies and in-house real estate expertise. Joint Development Revenue Is Generally Small Relative to a Transit Agency’s Annual Operating Expenses
Although several transit agencies have generated millions of dollars in annual revenue from joint development, this annual revenue is generally small when compared with an agency’s annual operating expenses. Other Value Capture Strategies Have Not Been Widely Used to Fund or Finance Transit
According to transit agencies that we collected data from and relevant literature that we reviewed, special assessments, tax increment financing, and development impact fees (other value capture strategies) have not been widely used as a source of funding for transit. Revenue Generated by Other Value Capture Strategies Has Varied, and in Some Cases Has Been Critical to Projects’ Feasibility
Based on our review of financial data for several major transit infrastructure projects and transit-oriented developments that have been (or are being) funded in part by other value capture strategies, these strategies have generated—or are projected to generate—between $20 million and $1.7 billion—or between 4 percent and 61 percent of the total project costs—for nine major transit infrastructure projects; and between $14 million and $750 million for the construction of parking garages, parks, and other place-making and basic infrastructure at five transit-oriented developments. For instance, when tax increment financing is involved, transit agencies—which generally do not have taxing authority— often have to coordinate with local taxing authorities to help establish a tax increment financing district and dedicate a portion of the tax increment toward a transit project. According to several transit agency and local government officials, the support of private property owners in the vicinity of their transit project was critical to the establishment of a special assessment district, which in turn was critical to the financial feasibility of the project. By contrast, some states do not have laws authorizing the use of certain value capture strategies, which effectively precludes their use of these strategies. Stakeholders Report That Uncertainty over FTA Policy Can Hinder the Use of Joint Development
Transit Agencies Say FTA’s Joint Development Policy Is Confusing and Impedes Joint Development
A number of transit agency officials told us that following FTA’s joint development guidance and requirements is confusing, burdensome, and time consuming, which can impede the transit agency’s use of joint development. Some transit agency officials stated tha FTA’s requirement to use joint development revenue for capital transit purposes precludes the use of these funds for operations or maintenance, or to acquire land for future transit-oriented joint development. This rulemaking follows FTA’s change to consider economic development separate from land use. Recommendation for Executive Action
To facilitate transit agencies use of joint development, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration to issue additional guidance on federal joint development requirements including at a minimum, further clarification on the types of developments and structures that are eligible under current law, and further clarification on any requirements or conditions for parking replacement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address the use of value capture strategies to fund or finance transit, we reviewed (1) the extent to which transit agencies and state and local governments use joint development and other value capture strategies to fund or finance transit; (2) what selected stakeholders and literature identified as facilitators of, or hindrances to, the use of joint development and other value capture strategies to fund or finance transit; and (3) stakeholders’ views about the effects of federal policies and programs on the use of joint development and other value capture strategies to fund or finance transit. | Why GAO Did This Study
State and local governments are looking for alternative strategies to help fund transit systems. Value capture strategies--joint development, special assessment districts, tax increment financing, and development impact fees--are designed to dedicate to transit either a portion of increased tax revenue or additional revenue through assessments, fees, or rents based on value expected to accrue as a result of transit investments. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which transit agencies and local governments use joint development and other value capture strategies to fund or finance transit; (2) what stakeholders have identified as facilitators of, or hindrances to, the use of these; and (3) what stakeholders have said about the effects of federal policies and programs on the use of these strategies. GAO analyzed data from 55 of the 71 transit agencies that responded to its information request; reviewed literature, and statutes and regulations; and interviewed transit agency, local government, and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) officials; developers; and experts.
What GAO Found
More than half of the transit agencies from which GAO collected data (32 of 55) reported that joint development--in which a transit agency and a private entity partner to create development at a transit station--has been used as a source of funding for transit, while about a third (19 of 55) reported that special assessment districts, tax increment financing, and development impact fees have been used. Transit agencies that have extensively used joint development typically share characteristics, such as having formal joint development policies and in-house real estate expertise. Financial data collected from several transit agencies indicate that revenue generated annually through joint development is generally small when compared with an agency's annual operating expenses. Revenue generated by the other three value capture strategies has varied, but in some cases has been critical to the financial feasibility of the transit project or to improvements that support transit-oriented development. Several factors can facilitate or hinder transit agencies' and state and local governments' use of value capture strategies, such as coordination and support from public- and private-sector entities, transit project location and design, and state laws. For example, transit agencies, which generally do not have taxing authority, often have to coordinate with local taxing authorities to help establish a tax increment financing district. Also, according to several stakeholders, value capture strategies have the potential to generate more revenue when a project is designed with land-use zoning that allows for high-density development. However, some states do not authorize the use of certain strategies or may limit their use. For example, tax increment financing is currently not authorized under Arizona state law. Several transit agency officials told GAO that FTA's joint development guidance is confusing, which can hinder their use of joint development when federal funding is involved. For example, transit agencies are sometimes unclear about which types of developments and structures are eligible for joint development sites and the extent to which FTA requires replacement of parking spaces when surface parking lots are converted to structured parking garages that support transit-oriented development. This confusion can delay final federal approval of a project. Transit agency officials also told GAO that federal requirements, such as limitations on the use of joint development revenue for operations, maintenance, or acquisition of land for future joint development, can be burdensome. Transit agency officials also said the strict cost-effectiveness requirement for federal New Starts funding limited the competitiveness of some transit projects designed to use value capture strategies. Recent changes to the New Starts program, including amending the current cost-effectiveness measure and increasing the significance of economic development along with other factors, may affect transit projects, yet it is unclear how these changes will ultimately affect the use of value capture strategies. The FTA should issue additional guidance on federal joint development requirements to clarify the types of developments eligible under current law, and requirements and conditions for parking replacement. FTA agreed to consider GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-73 | gao_GAO-16-73_0 | CMS’s Policies and Procedures Do Not Sufficiently Minimize the Potential for Coverage Gaps and Duplicate Coverage in Federal Exchange States
Information from CMS and selected states and issuers indicates that individuals transitioning from Medicaid to exchange coverage may experience coverage gaps, and that duplicate coverage is occurring under several scenarios. Scenario 1: Individuals who are completing the transition from subsidized exchange to Medicaid coverage. This transitional period of duplicate coverage is permitted under the law; that is, individuals are permitted to be enrolled in both types of coverage through the end of the month of the Medicaid eligibility determination. However, evidence suggests that some states may face challenges identifying exchange coverage. If the state is not aware of an individual’s exchange coverage, the federal government could be paying twice—that is, subsidizing exchange coverage and reimbursing states for Medicaid spending for the same individual. CMS and States Had Policies and Procedures That Minimize the Potential for Coverage Gaps and Duplicate Coverage, but Additional Controls Are Needed in Federal Exchanges
CMS and our selected states had policies and procedures that minimize the potential for coverage gaps or duplicate coverage when individuals transition between Medicaid and the exchanges. Control Weaknesses Related to Coverage Gaps
With regard to coverage gaps, we found that CMS’s controls do not provide reasonable assurance that the accounts of individuals transitioning from Medicaid to exchange coverage in FFE states are transferred by states in near real time, which puts individuals in these states at greater risk of experiencing such gaps. Specifically, federal regulations require that state Medicaid agencies should transfer accounts to CMS promptly and without undue delay. CMS officials told us that account transfers are not happening in real time, but their understanding was that states typically send transfers at least daily. Officials from three of our four selected FFE states reported that account transfers were occurring at least daily, while officials from the remaining state reported that transfers were sent to CMS three times per week. Given the number of steps involved in the transition from Medicaid to exchange coverage, individuals may be more likely to have gaps in coverage to the extent account transfers from states to CMS are not happening in a timely fashion. With regard to duplicate coverage, we found weaknesses in CMS’s controls for preventing, detecting, and resolving duplicate coverage in FFE states. As of July 2015, CMS did not have procedures to detect and resolve cases of duplicate coverage in FFE states. Specifically, CMS has plans to implement periodic checks for duplicate coverage starting in the summer of 2015, and CMS officials told us in July 2015 that the first check would occur later that month. Without such thresholds, it will be difficult for the agency to provide reasonable assurance that its procedures are sufficient or whether additional steps are needed. Federal and state Medicaid and exchange policies and procedures influence the extent to which individuals are able to seamlessly transition between coverage types, including whether they are able to transition without a gap in coverage and whether they end up enrolled in both Medicaid and subsidized exchange coverage for extended periods of time. However, as per federal internal control standards, those plans do not sufficiently address the risks. Additionally, CMS has not determined the frequency of its planned checks for duplicate coverage, a factor that will be critical to their effectiveness, and does not have a plan—including target levels of duplicate coverage the agency deems acceptable—for monitoring the checks and other procedures. Establish a schedule for regular checks for duplicate coverage and ensure that the checks are carried out according to schedule. Develop a plan, including thresholds for the level of duplicate coverage it deems acceptable, to routinely monitor the effectiveness of the checks and other planned procedures to prevent and detect duplicate coverage, and take additional actions as appropriate. IRS had no comments on the draft report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to changes in income and other factors, it is likely that under PPACA many low-income individuals will transition between Medicaid and subsidized exchange coverage. Federal regulations require that state Medicaid agencies and exchanges coordinate to facilitate these transitions, including transferring individuals' accounts to the appropriate form of coverage when eligibility changes occur. However, given the complexity of coordinating policies and procedures for both coverage types, challenges could arise during the transition process resulting in individuals experiencing coverage gaps or duplicate coverage. GAO was asked to review information related to transitions between Medicaid and exchange coverage.
In this report, among other objectives, GAO examines the extent to which the federal government had policies and procedures that minimize the potential for coverage gaps and duplicate coverage. GAO reviewed relevant federal regulations, guidance, FFE documentation, and federal internal controls standards, and interviewed CMS officials. GAO also collected information from eight states selected, among other factors, to include four FFE states.
What GAO Found
CMS's policies and procedures do not sufficiently minimize the potential for coverage gaps and duplicate coverage in federal exchange states. GAO found that individuals transitioning from Medicaid to exchange coverage—that is, private health insurance purchased through the exchanges created under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—may experience coverage gaps, for example, if they lose Medicaid eligibility toward the end of a month. Individuals who experience coverage gaps may decide to forgo necessary care. In addition, GAO found that some individuals had duplicate coverage, that is, were enrolled in Medicaid while also receiving federal subsidies for exchange coverage. While some amount of duplicate coverage may be expected during the transition from exchange to Medicaid coverage and is permissible under federal law, GAO found that duplicate coverage was also occurring under other scenarios. Individuals may be held liable for repaying certain exchange subsidies received during the period of duplicate coverage. Further, the federal government could be paying twice, subsidizing exchange coverage and reimbursing states for Medicaid spending for those enrolled in both.
While the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that operates a federally facilitated exchange (FFE) in 34 states, has implemented policies and procedures that help minimize the potential for coverage gaps and duplicate coverage, GAO identified weaknesses in CMS's controls for FFE states based on federal internal control standards. Specifically:
GAO found that CMS's controls do not provide reasonable assurance that accounts—that is, records—for individuals transitioning from Medicaid to exchange coverage in FFE states are transferred in near real time. CMS regulations require that such transfers occur promptly to facilitate eligibility determinations and enrollment. However, as of July 2015, CMS was not monitoring the timeliness of transfers. CMS officials told GAO that transfers are not happening in real time, but their understanding was that states typically send transfers at least daily. Officials from three of the four selected FFE states reported that account transfers were occurring at least daily; officials from the remaining state reported that transfers were sent to CMS three times per week. To the extent transfers are not happening in a timely fashion, individuals may be more likely to have gaps in coverage.
GAO found weaknesses in CMS's controls for preventing, detecting, and resolving duplicate coverage in FFE states. For example, as of July 2015, CMS did not have procedures to detect cases of duplicate coverage. According to CMS officials, CMS planned to implement periodic checks for duplicate coverage beginning later that month. However, CMS had not yet determined the frequency of the checks, a key to their effectiveness. In addition, CMS had no specific plan for monitoring the effectiveness of the checks and other planned procedures, making it difficult for the agency to provide reasonable assurance that its procedures are sufficient or whether additional steps are needed to protect the federal government and individuals from duplicative and unnecessary expenditures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take three actions, including routinely monitoring the timeliness of account transfers from states, establishing a schedule for regular checks for duplicate coverage, and developing a plan to monitor the effectiveness of the checks. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-307 | gao_GAO-17-307_0 | BLM’s policy identifies four key practices that should be considered as lease or permit requirements in nearly all circumstances: (1) painting of facilities to blend with the surrounding environment, (2) design and construction of roads in accordance with BLM guidance, (3) interim reclamation, and (4) final reclamation. In August 2013, we reviewed BLM’s processing of drilling permit applications and other efforts to protect the environment. The Extent to Which BLM Approves Exception Requests Is Unknown, and BLM Field Office Processes for Considering These Requests and Documenting Decisions Vary
The extent to which BLM approves requests for exceptions to environmentally related lease and permit requirements is unknown because BLM does not have comprehensive or consistent data on these requests. The Extent to Which BLM Approves Requests for Exceptions to Lease and Permit Requirements Is Unknown
BLM does not have consistent data on requests for exceptions to lease and permit requirements. These officials further stated that BLM does not have a policy requiring its field offices to consistently track these exception data. BLM Field Office Processes for Considering Exception Requests and Documenting Decisions Vary
BLM field office processes for considering exception requests and documenting decisions on them varied from fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and the reasons for the decisions were not always clear from the documentation. BLM Consistently Involved the Public in Developing Lease Requirements
In 2010, BLM introduced bureau-wide reforms to the oil and gas leasing process, and since the implementation of these changes, it has consistently involved the public in the development of lease requirements, as part of the lease sale process. We reviewed 35 lease sales that occurred from calendar years 2012 through 2015 at the 6 field offices we visited. In all cases the field offices provided the public with an opportunity to review and comment on the environmental assessment associated with parcels to be offered for sale, and some of the comments provided by the public pertained to proposed lease requirements. According to BLM’s policy, public notification is not required unless granting an exception would result in a substantial modification or waiver of a lease requirement. BLM Has Generally Implemented Its Best Management Practices Policy but Has Not Consistently Documented Inspections or Used Data to Assess the Policy’s Effectiveness
BLM has generally implemented its best management practices policy by including key practices as permit requirements. Our review of 109 randomly selected well files at six BLM field offices found that at least one of the four key practices had been included as a permit requirement in nearly all of the files we reviewed. Our file review found that the narrative format, in some cases, resulted in inspection documents that did not contain sufficient detail to indicate whether permit requirements had been verified. In addition, without a policy requiring employees responsible for conducting environmental inspections to complete formal training, BLM may be unable to ensure that its employees receive the training. BLM Has Not Effectively Used Monitoring Inspection Data to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Best Management Practices Policy
BLM field offices conduct monitoring inspections but have not effectively used data collected during these inspections to assess the effectiveness of mitigation activities, such as those carried out under BLM’s best management practices policy. Conclusions
BLM is responsible for managing oil and gas development on federal lands while also mitigating the environmental impacts of such development. Operators can request exceptions to these requirements, and BLM can decide to approve requests if certain criteria are met. Additionally, BLM staff across field offices are not using a consistent process for considering and clearly documenting exception decisions. Develop a policy to ensure that field offices consistently track exception data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to assess the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) efforts to mitigate environmental impacts from oil and gas activities. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which BLM (1) approved requests for exceptions from lease and permit requirements intended to mitigate environmental impacts, and how these decisions were made and documented; (2) involved the public in the development of lease and permit requirements and in the approval of exception requests; and (3) implemented its best management practices policy and assessed its effectiveness in mitigating environmental impacts. | Why GAO Did This Study
BLM is responsible for managing oil and gas development on federal lands while mitigating related environmental impacts. BLM seeks to do so, in part, by applying requirements to the leases and drilling permits it issues to operators. These requirements may include environmental mitigation practices outlined in BLM's best management practices policy. In some cases, operators may request exceptions to lease and permit requirements. GAO was asked to examine BLM's efforts to mitigate environmental impacts from oil and gas development.
This report examines the extent to which BLM (1) approved requests for exceptions to lease and permit requirements and how these decisions were made and documented, (2) involved the public in the development of lease and permit requirements and in the approval of exception requests, and (3) implemented and assessed the effectiveness of its best management practices policy. GAO examined laws, regulations, and BLM policies and documents; surveyed and visited BLM field offices; and conducted interviews with BLM officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved requests for exceptions to oil and gas lease and permit requirements is unknown, primarily because BLM's process for considering these requests and documenting decisions varied across field offices. Oil and gas operators may request exceptions to a permit requirement, such as prohibition of drilling in an area during times of the year when certain wildlife are present. BLM may approve such a request—allowing the operator to continue to drill during a portion of the normally prohibited time—if, for instance, no wildlife are present. GAO's survey of 42 BLM offices found that fewer than half tracked data on exception requests. Additionally, GAO found that the process for considering these requests and documenting decisions varied. BLM does not have a policy requiring field offices to consistently track exception data or documented procedures specifying how requests should be considered and documented. Because BLM does not consistently track exception request data or have a consistent process for considering requests and clearly documenting decisions, BLM may be unable to provide reasonable assurance that it is meeting its environmental responsibilities.
BLM has consistently involved the public in developing lease requirements and, to a lesser extent, permit requirements. For example, GAO reviewed 35 lease sales that occurred from calendar years 2012 through 2015 at the six field offices visited and found that in all cases the field offices provided the public an opportunity to review and comment on lease parcels to be offered for sale. BLM has not generally involved the public in the approval of exception requests. According to BLM's policy, public notification of an exception is not required unless granting it would result in a substantial modification or waiver of a lease requirement, which, according to BLM officials, rarely occurs.
BLM has generally implemented its best management practices policy by including key practices as permit requirements, but it has not consistently documented inspections or used inspection data to assess the policy's effectiveness. The policy identifies four key practices that should be considered for inclusion as permit requirements in nearly all circumstances: (1) painting facilities to blend with the environment, (2) constructing roads to certain BLM standards, (3) implementing interim reclamation, and (4) completing final reclamation. During file reviews at six BLM field offices, GAO found that at least one of the four key practices was included as a permit requirement in almost all of the 109 files reviewed. However, in reviewing documentation of inspections, GAO found that documents were not consistent and not always sufficient to determine whether BLM had verified key practices. GAO further found that BLM generally does not use data collected from inspections to assess the effectiveness of permit requirements in mitigating environmental impacts. BLM does not have guidance specifying how inspections should be documented and how inspection data should be used. Without sufficiently detailed documentation of inspections and effective use of data from inspections, BLM is unable to fully assess the effectiveness of its best management practices policy to mitigate environmental impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that BLM develop a policy for tracking and documenting exceptions. Interior generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-964 | gao_GAO-04-964_0 | According to the Convention’s preamble, the member countries recognized that the conservation of wild fauna and flora was of global importance and that international cooperation was essential for the protection of certain species against overexploitation through international trade. What Is Wildlife Trade? In October 2004, the thirteenth conference of the member countries will take place in Bangkok, Thailand. 2). How Is the Convention Implemented in the United States? The Convention’s Implementation Has Become More Complex and Controversial
In several ways, implementing the Convention is currently more complex and controversial than it was in 1975, when it took effect. Workload has increased along with increases in the Convention membership. Such support includes information on the species’ distribution, habitat, population, and role in the ecosystem; the nature, intensity, and extent of threats to the species, such as competitors, pathogens, predators, toxins, and habitat loss; the purpose and level of use, including trends if possible, as well as the level and nature of national and international trade, along with the source of statistics used, such as Customs statistics, Convention annual report data, and industry reports; national legislation related to the conservation of the species, the nature of legal protection, and the effectiveness of this legislation; measures in place to manage populations of the species in question, such as captive breeding or artificial propagation, ranching, or quota systems, including details such as planned harvest rates and planned population sizes; and consultation undertaken with, and comments received from, other countries in which the species exists and any organizations that also manage the species, such as intergovernmental bodies that act through international agreements other than the Convention. 9). In these cases, Convention protection can make a difference. Although considerable tension and concern remain over the relationship between the Convention and regional and international fisheries organizations, discussions have recently moved toward rapprochement. The United States Has Spent More than $50 Million on Convention- Related Activities Since 1995
The United States spent more than $50 million, or about $6 million annually, on Convention-related activities from 1995 through 2003; data are not available for expenditures between 1975—when the Convention entered into force—and 1995 because Convention activities were not tracked separately from other species protection programs. The $50 million spent since 1995 includes about $37 million spent by the Fish and Wildlife Service on activities aimed at implementing the Convention and about $13 million spent by the Department of State for voluntary contributions to help administer the Convention internationally (see fig. In 2003, the U.S. contribution was about $1 million. The Convention and U.S. Laws Identify Protected Species Differently and Allow Different Uses
The Convention and U.S. laws share a common goal of protecting species, but they extend protection based on different criteria that reflect different underlying purposes. For example, U.S. laws sometimes afford stricter protections to species than the Convention does; as a result, some U.S. interests such as small businesses, aquariums, individual consumers, and big game hunters cannot participate in activities allowed by other member countries in accordance with the Convention. The criteria for identifying a species for protection by the Endangered Species Act are different from those employed by the Convention and reflect the act’s intent to protect species that are at risk of extinction for any reason—not just trade—and to conserve their habitats. Another species for which the United States imposes stricter trade measures than the Convention is the Asian arowana, also known as the Asian bonytongue. For example, the European Union requires import permits for appendix II species. Concluding Observations
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora has changed significantly since its inception in the early 1970s—in size, complexity, and the number and type of species it protects. With these changes have come an increase in member countries’ workload pertaining to permitting, enforcement, and reporting. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of the Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provided written comments on a draft of this report. The department noted, however, that the U.S. “preference” to provide stricter protections is reflected in law and that the department is required to implement the legislated responsibilities under its jurisdiction, including the implementation of the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, as written. | Why GAO Did This Study
International trade in wildlife is a multibillion-dollar industry that, in some cases, has taken species to the brink of extinction. To address the problem, several countries, including the United States, created an international treaty--the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora--that took effect in 1975. The United States also has domestic laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, that protect species. The protections provided by the Convention and domestic laws can differ. For example, in some cases, U.S. laws afford more stringent protections to species than the Convention does; such stricter protections can prevent U.S. interests from participating in trade that is permitted by the Convention. The Convention's member countries meet periodically to discuss implementation of the Convention and are scheduled next to meet in Thailand in October 2004. In anticipation of this meeting, GAO was asked to report on (1) how implementation of the Convention has changed over the years, (2) U.S. funding and other resources spent on Convention-related activities, and (3) the relationship between the Convention and some domestic laws. The Department of the Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration generally agreed with the information in the GAO report.
What GAO Found
Implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora has become increasingly complex and controversial since its inception. Complexity has increased in part because of the sheer number of member countries (166) and species protected (more than 33,000) and because the criteria for identifying protected species have become more scientific and specific, resulting in heavier data-gathering, permitting, enforcement, and reporting requirements for member countries. Controversy, in turn, has increased because the Convention membership has recently contemplated, and in some cases approved, protection of commercial species such as sharks and Patagonian toothfish (commonly marketed as Chilean seabass)--species that in some cases are already managed under regional fisheries agreements. Over the 9-year fiscal period 1995 through 2003, the United States spent more than $50 million on Convention-related activities. As the agency primarily responsible for U.S. implementation of the Convention, the Fish and Wildlife Service spent the largest portion of these funds--about $37 million over the period. Other agencies have roles as well, including the Department of State, which makes U.S. contributions to help administer the Convention internationally. The Convention and the Endangered Species Act protect species differently. In some cases, the act prohibits imports that are allowed by the Convention. For example, the act generally prohibits the import of a popular exotic fish, the Asian arowana, although the Convention allows some commercial trade in the species. The Convention establishes mandatory requirements and recognizes countries' rights to establish stricter protections. However, such protections have generated heated debates among affected parties. Those in favor say that the United States should impose stricter protections than the Convention, when needed to protect endangered species or their habitats. Opponents say that U.S. actions should be consistent with the agreements reached by a majority of the Convention's members. |
gao_GAO-11-89 | gao_GAO-11-89_0 | For example, unlike traditional public schools that are part of a larger LEA, consisting of multiple schools, some states establish charter schools as their own LEA. There are two types of federal grants—formula and discretionary—which differ in their grant application and award process. Charter schools that are part of a larger school district receive federal discretionary grant payments from their school district, if the school district wins a grant competition and if the school district has made provision for charter schools in the grant application. Few Charter Schools Apply For Federal Discretionary Grants Despite Being Potentially Eligible
In School Year 2008-2009, Approximately 7 Percent of Charter Schools Applied for Federal Discretionary Grants
Although charter schools were potentially eligible for a variety of federal discretionary grants administered across several agencies in school year 2008-2009, most did not apply for them. According to our survey, approximately 8 percent of charter schools designated as their own LEA applied for grants, compared to an estimated 2 percent for schools that are part of a larger LEA. On the other hand, charter schools that are part of a larger LEA may not have applied for discretionary grants because they were not eligible to apply if the grant did not designate a public school or a nonprofit organization as an eligible applicant. We identified 47 federal discretionary grant programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible. With respect to a lack of resources, our survey results were often supported by comments from charter school officials. Moreover, approximately 45 percent of the charter school officials that indicated that a lack of awareness about federal programs was a major reason they did not apply for grants, also reported that they periodically receive information about discretionary grant opportunities from the U.S. Department of Education. Several charter school officials we surveyed expressed a desire for an improved means of learning about grant opportunities that address their school’s needs. Education Has Taken Steps to Encourage Charter Schools to Apply For Grants, But All Charter Schools May Not Be Reached
Education Has Clarified Charter Schools’ Eligibility in some Grant Announcements
According to our review of Federal Register notices, Education has inserted language clarifying charter school LEA eligibility into grant announcements for 17 of the 33 discretionary grant programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible. However, none of the officials we interviewed reported that Education has taken steps to clarify grant eligibility for charter schools that are part of a larger LEA and wish to apply for grants for which individual public schools are eligible. Most of the other agencies with programs for which charter schools may be eligible did not take any actions that would assist charter school applicants, such as including language in grant announcements that explicitly identifies charter school LEAs as eligible applicants, according to agency officials. Education’s primary mechanisms for publicizing grant opportunities include the Federal Register, http://grants.gov, and Education’s Forecast of Grant Opportunities. Education also prepared Accessing Federal Programs: a Guidebook for Charter School Operators and Developers for charter schools but the guidebook is not posted on the CSP’s Web page on Education’s Web site, http://www.ed.gov. Specifically, to ensure that all discretionary grant notices for programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible explicitly recognize charter schools’ eligibility, Education intends to add text to all of the department’s pertinent discretionary grant announcements stating that charter schools meeting the relevant eligibility criterion are eligible to apply for the grant. The study was framed around two questions: (1) To what extent do charter schools apply for federal discretionary grant programs and what challenges do they face, if any, in doing so? (2) What role has the U.S. Department of Education played in helping charter schools establish their eligibility for federal programs? We used separate sources of data for each study question, including a survey of a stratified random sample of 640 charter school officials; site visit interviews with officials in school districts, charter schools, charter school associations, and state education agencies in New York, Ohio, and Florida; two lists of governmentwide K-12 education programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible; a survey of federal officials responsible for the K-12 education programs; and interviews with Department of Education officials having oversight responsibility for the K-12 education programs and their counterparts in 9 other federal agencies. Open-ended questions were used to guide discussions and topics included actions, if any, taken to assist charter school applicants in applying for the program(s); the number of charter schools that have applied for the program(s), if any, and the outcome of their applications; identified challenges that charter schools face when applying for the program(s) and reasons charter schools may not apply for the program(s); mechanisms used to notify charter schools about grant opportunities; and actions, if any, taken to follow up on then-Secretary Spellings’ 2006 letter to federal department and agency heads concerning a governmentwide initiative to ensure charter schools’ eligibility for federal programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of charter schools is growing, spurred by demand for innovation and federal incentives, such as the Race to the Top Fund, which favors states supportive of charter schools. However, states often define charter schools differently than traditional public schools. Some charter schools operate as a school district, while others are part of a school district and some are for-profit entities. These differences could complicate eligibility determination for federal administrators. GAO was asked: (1) To what extent do charter schools apply for federal discretionary grant programs and what challenges do they face, if any, in doing so? (2) What role has the U.S. Department of Education played in helping charter schools establish their eligibility for federal discretionary grant programs? GAO identified grant programs governmentwide for which charter schools are eligible to apply, surveyed a stratified random sample of charter school officials, and interviewed federal agency officials. We also visited charter schools, school districts, charter school associations, and state educational agencies in 3 states.
What GAO Found
Based on our survey of charter schools, approximately 7 percent of all charter schools applied for federal discretionary grants during school year 2008-2009, the most recent information about grant applications available at the time of our survey. The types of charter schools that applied differed. For example, 8 percent of charter schools designated as their own local educational agency (LEA) applied for grants compared to 2 percent of schools that are part of a larger school district or LEA. Based on their responses to our survey, some of the schools that are part of a larger school district believed they needed an LEA designation to be eligible for federal discretionary grants and did not apply because of their charter school status. We identified 47 discretionary grant programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible. Both charter schools designated as their own LEA and individual charter schools were potentially eligible for the majority of the 47 programs. The Department of Education administered 33 of the 47 programs. Given the range of application rates in 2008-2009, some charter schools may be unaware that they can apply directly for these grant programs. On the other hand, charter schools that are part of a larger LEA were not eligible to apply for grants that did not designate a public school or a nonprofit organization as an eligible applicant and may not have applied for that reason. In addition to a lack of resources and a lack of experienced and knowledgeable staff available to prepare competitive grant applications, officials also indicated their lack of awareness about the grant opportunities available to charter schools was a major reason their school infrequently applied for discretionary grants. Several officials we surveyed expressed a desire for an improved means of learning about grant opportunities that address their school's needs. While the Department of Education has taken steps to encourage charter schools to apply for grants, information about opportunities may not reach all charter schools. Education has inserted language into grant announcements of 17 of the department's 33 grant programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible in order to explicitly alert those charter schools authorized as LEAs of their eligibility to apply for grants. Of the programs for which surveyed charter schools applied, most included such language in their grant announcements. Education has not taken steps to clarify grant eligibility for charter schools that are part of a larger LEA. As public charter schools, these schools could apply for grants for which individual public schools are eligible. Although Education uses multiple methods to publicize grant opportunities, such as the Federal Register, http://grants.gov , and Education's Forecast of Grant Opportunities, these mechanisms are directed toward all schools and do not target outreach to charter schools. Furthermore, for 16 of the 33 grant programs for which charter schools are potentially eligible, grant announcements sent to potential applicants through these mechanisms do not explicitly identify charter schools as eligible applicants Education has published a guidebook to accessing federal programs for charter schools, but charter schools cannot access it through the Charter School Program's Web page on Education's Web site.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education clarify grant opportunities for charter schools, highlight charter schools' eligibility in relevant grant announcements, and post its grant application guidance for charter schools on its Web site. Education agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-528 | gao_GAO-13-528_0 | 1 for the locations of Corps civil works divisions and districts. Administrative offices, such as resource management, security, and general counsel, provide general administrative support. Technical offices, such as engineering, construction, and real estate, provide technical services to customers on specific projects. Corps districts vary widely in the number of full-time equivalents they employ for civil works activities. Only district overhead is charged to projects; headquarters and division overhead is not. The Corps Uses a MultiStep Process to Build Overhead Costs into Its Projects
The Corps uses a multistep process to build overhead costs into projects. Second, the Corps calculates annual overhead rates for the two cost categories as part of its annual budget process. Third, the Corps bills projects for overhead costs based on the number of hours its staff charge to projects. Finally, the Corps monitors overhead costs and makes any necessary adjustments to overhead rates. Corps Policy Establishes Two Categories of Costs to Calculate Overhead
Corps policy establishes two categories of costs to calculate overhead— general and administrative (G&A) overhead expenses associated with district administrative offices and technical overhead expenses associated with district technical offices. These two categories serve as the foundation for building district overhead into projects. 2. Overhead charges are applied to each project based on the hours charged by Corps staff; overhead charges are not applied to hours worked by contracted labor, which can represent a substantial amount of work. The Corps reports that it contracts out most of its design work and all of its construction work to private sector entities, such as architectural and engineering firms and construction companies. Based on these reviews, division commanders are responsible for ensuring that appropriate action is taken, such as adjusting overhead rates, reducing expenditures, or providing rebates to customers. The Corps is able to monitor overhead because it tracks overhead costs separately from other project costs in its financial management system by using specific accounting codes to identify overhead. Half of the 16 highest paying customers we interviewed said overhead information is generally accessible and understandable; 1 of the 16 said overhead information is not accessible and understandable; and the remaining 7 had no opinion on accessibility and/or understandability. For those customers who offered no opinion on one aspect of overhead information, such as accessibility, they generally offered a positive opinion on the other aspect of information, understandability. In addition, customers we interviewed provided some common views on overhead information, stating that overhead information is important, but that overall project costs are more important than overhead costs. Customers’ Views Varied on Whether Overhead Information Is Accessible and Understandable
Customers’ views fell into three broad categories: (1) overhead information is generally accessible and understandable, (2) overhead information is not accessible and understandable, and (3) no opinion on whether overhead information is accessible and/or understandable. For example, one nonfederal customer said overhead information is accessible and easy to understand because the information is included in its project agreement with the Corps, which is signed prior to the start of a project. Another federal customer we interviewed said that the Corps provides overhead information in monthly bills and that this information was also understandable. Three of the seven highest paying customers stated that overhead information is accessible but had no opinion on whether the information is understandable. Another nonfederal customer told us that he has requested and received overhead information from the Corps, but he offered no opinion on understanding overhead information. For example, one federal customer said that while he has not requested overhead information, the Corps explained how it builds overhead into its projects during project meetings and that he understood this information. Good communication is important to understanding overhead information. Because the report does not contain any recommendations, the department did not provide written comments. We received a demonstration on how the Corps’ financial management system is designed to track overhead separately from other project costs, reviewed examples of Corps billings to customers provided by the Corps and some Corps customers, reviewed Corps financial management system documentation, interviewed selected Corps customers, and interviewed Corps officials knowledgeable about how the Corps tracks and bills overhead costs. Appendix II: Structured Interview Administered to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Customers
We conducted structured interviews with 16 Corps customers that the Corps identified as the highest paying federal and highest paying nonfederal customers in fiscal year 2012—one in each category from all eight Corps divisions. 4. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps spends billions of dollars annually on projects in its Civil Works program. Part of the cost of doing business with the Corps involves paying for overhead--costs that do not directly relate to a specific project or activity but more generally support agency operations. Overhead costs are included in the amount that Congress appropriates for specific Corps projects and the amount that customers pay for Corps' services. The Corps provides services to customers including other Department of Defense units, federal agencies, state and local governments, Indian tribes, and foreign governments. The Corps' Civil Works program is organized around its headquarters, 8 divisions, and 38 districts nationwide. Only district overhead is charged to projects; overhead for headquarters and divisions is not.
GAO was asked to review the Corps' process for building overhead costs into projects. This report examines (1) how the Corps builds overhead costs into its projects and (2) customers' views on overhead information. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed Corps' documentation of its overhead and billing processes, interviewed officials at Corps headquarters, 2 divisions, and 4 districts based on geographic location, and interviewed 16 of the highest paying federal and nonfederal Corps' customers in fiscal year 2012. The results of these interviews cannot be generalized to all customers but provided insights.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) uses a multistep process to build overhead costs into projects. At the foundation of this process, Corps policy establishes two categories of costs to calculate overhead--general and administrative overhead expenses associated with district administrative offices, such as resource management, and technical overhead expenses associated with district technical offices, such as engineering. Using these two categories as a starting point, the Corps next calculates overhead rates as part of its annual budget process. Specifically, each district administrative and technical office develops operating budgets with overhead estimates, which are then consolidated and routed through district and division management, resulting in a final division-wide operating budget and overhead rates. The Corps then bills projects for overhead costs based on the number of hours its staff charge to projects. Overhead charges are not applied to hours worked by contracted labor, which represent a substantial amount of work. The Corps reports that it contracts out most of its design work and all of its construction work to private sector entities, such as architectural and engineering firms and construction companies. Finally, the Corps periodically monitors overhead costs and makes any necessary adjustments such as changing overhead rates, reducing expenditures, or providing rebates to customers. The Corps is able to monitor overhead because it tracks overhead costs separately from other project costs in its financial management system through specific overhead accounting codes.
Corps customers' views varied on whether overhead information is accessible and understandable. Half of the 16 highest paying customers GAO interviewed said overhead information is generally accessible and understandable. For example, one federal customer said that the Corps provides overhead information in monthly bills, and the information is understandable. One of the 16 highest paying customers said overhead information is not accessible and understandable. For example, this nonfederal customer and the Corps could not agree on whether overhead information requested by the customer had been provided, leaving the customer unable to understand Corps costs, including overhead information. The remaining 7 highest paying customers had no opinion on accessibility and/or understandability. While offering no opinion on one aspect of overhead information, such as accessibility, they generally offered a positive opinion on the other aspect, understandability. For example, one federal customer had no opinion on whether the information was accessible but said that the information was understandable because the Corps explains how it builds overhead into its projects during project meetings. Conversely, a nonfederal customer told GAO that he has requested and received overhead information from the Corps--stating that overhead information is accessible, but he offered no opinion on understanding it. Among customers GAO interviewed, there were common views about overhead information. Specifically, some customers indicated that overhead information is important, but that overall project costs are more important than overhead costs. They also said that good communication is important to understanding overhead information. |
gao_GAO-13-428T | gao_GAO-13-428T_0 | Overall, since 2009, the funding status of multiemployer plans has improved, but a sizeable number of plans are still critical or endangered. In addition to the difficulties many multiemployer plans face, the challenges that PBGC faces have led us to designate its insurance programs as a “high-risk” federal program. Plans in Poor Funded Status Have Taken Steps to Cut Benefits to Current Employees and Increased Employer Contributions, and the Financial Outlook for Some Plans Remains Bleak
According to a 2011 survey of 107 critical status plans conducted by the Segal Company, the large majority of critical status plans have developed rehabilitation plans that both increase required employer contributions and reduce participant benefits in an effort to improve plans’ financial positions. Plan officials explained that these changes can have a range of effects and, in some cases, may severely affect employers and participants. While most critical status plans expect to recover from their current funding difficulties, about 25 percent do not and instead seek to delay eventual insolvency. Funding Improvement Efforts Sometimes Require Significant Sacrifices by Employers and Participants
While the data are informative, they do not get to the heart of the issue— what impact will these changes have on employers, participants, and plans themselves? At the same time, some plans also eliminated or imposed limitations on disability retirement so workers who have developed physical limitations will have to either continue to work or retire on substantially reduced benefits. Importantly, while most plans expected to emerge from critical status eventually, a significant number did not and instead project eventual insolvency. Total Financial Assistance Increased More Rapidly in Recent Years, and Current and Projected Insolvencies Will Exhaust Multiemployer Insurance Fund
Total PBGC Financial Assistance to Plans Increased More Rapidly in Recent Years, and Current and Projected Plan Insolvencies Will Exhaust Insurance Fund
Increases in PBGC Loans and Other Financial Assistance
In recent years, the total amount of financial assistance PBGC has provided to insolvent plans has increased markedly. For example, the present value of PBGC’s liability associated with “probable” plans increased from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2008 to $7.0 billion in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. By contrast, for fiscal year 2012, PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund only had $1.8 billion in total assets, resulting in net liability of $5.2 billion, as reported in PBGC’s 2012 annual report. Importantly, the PBGC’s projection of program insolvency by 2023 does not account for the impact of these two plans because their projected insolvency is more than 10 years in the future. When a multiemployer plan becomes insolvent and relies on PBGC loans to make benefit payments to plan retirees, retirees will most likely see a reduction in their monthly benefits. In the event that the multiemployer insurance fund is exhausted, participants relying on the guarantee would receive a small fraction of their already-reduced benefit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiemployer pension plans--created by collective bargaining agreements including more than one employer--cover more than 10 million workers and retirees, and are insured by the PBGC. As a result of investment market declines, employers withdrawing from plans and demographic challenges in recent years, many multiemployer plans have had large funding shortfalls and face an uncertain future. Also, both PBGC's single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs have been on GAO's list of high-risk federal programs for a number of years.
This testimony provides information on (1) recent actions that multiemployer plans in the worst financial condition have taken to improve their funding levels; and (2) the extent to which plans have relied on PBGC assistance since 2009, and the financial condition of PBGC's multiemployer plan insurance program.
GAO analyzed government and industry data, interviewed representatives of selected pension plans, and a wide range of industry experts and stakeholders and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and documentation from plans.
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony. GAO will soon release a separate report on multiemployer pension issues.
What GAO Found
The most severely distressed multiemployer plans have taken significant steps to address their funding problems and, while most plans expected improved financial health, some did not. A survey conducted by a large actuarial and consulting firm serving multiemployer plans suggests that the majority of the most severely underfunded plans--those designated as being in critical status--developed plans to increase employer contributions or reduce certain participant benefits. In some cases, these measures will have significant effects on employers and participants. For example, one plan representative stated that contribution increases had damaged some firms' competitive position in the industry. Similarly, reductions or limitations on certain benefits--such as disability benefits--may create hardships for some older workers, such as those with physically demanding jobs. Most of the 107 surveyed plans expected to emerge from critical status, but about 26 percent did not and instead seek to delay eventual insolvency.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) financial assistance to multiemployer plans continues to increase, and plan insolvencies threaten PBGC's multiemployer insurance fund. As a result of current and anticipated financial assistance, the present value of PBGC's liability for plans that are insolvent or expected to become insolvent within 10 years increased from $1.8 to $7.0 billion between fiscal years 2008 and 2012. Yet PBGC's multiemployer insurance fund only had $1.8 billion in total assets in 2012. PBGC officials said that financial assistance to these plans would likely exhaust the fund in or about 2023. If the fund is exhausted, many retirees will see their pension benefits reduced to a small fraction of their original value because only a reduced stream of insurance premium payments will be available to pay benefits. |
gao_GAO-10-962T | gao_GAO-10-962T_0 | Key Areas for Interagency Collaboration
Our body of work on interagency collaboration has identified several key areas that are essential for collaboration among U.S. federal agencies in addressing security challenges. Three are particularly important for SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM: (1) developing and implementing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, and (3) building a well- trained workforce. Interagency Practices and Challenges at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and with U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts
Our work on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM found that both commands have demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. Interagency Partners Have Helped Develop Strategies and Plans, but Some Remain Unfinished at AFRICOM and for Counterpiracy Efforts
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies in developing overarching strategies and plans, but AFRICOM has not yet completed many specific plans to guide activities and ensure a U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. One key requirement for the country work plans, for example, is to align them with embassy strategic plans to ensure unity of effort. U.S. Government Has Action Plan to Counter Piracy, but Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Clearly Defined
Our preliminary work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa shows that the United States has an action plan that serves as an overarching strategy and provides a framework for interagency collaboration, but roles and responsibilities have not been clearly assigned. Our preliminary work indicates that the National Security Council, which authored the plan, has not assigned the majority of tasks outlined in the plan to specific agencies. In addition to a deputy military commander who oversees military operations, each command has a civilian deputy to the commander from State who oversees civil-military activities. Both commands have also embedded interagency officials throughout their organizations. However, limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency personnel from participating in the numbers desired. While SOUTHCOM’s organizational structure was designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation. Our report made recommendations aimed at improving SOUTHCOM’s ability to conduct the full range of military missions that may be required in the region, while balancing its efforts to support interagency partners in enhancing regional security and cooperation. AFRICOM Staff Could Benefit from More Comprehensive Training or Guidance on Working with Interagency Officials in Africa
AFRICOM, as a relatively new command engaged in capacity-building efforts, has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners (see fig. In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, we found that some AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, and the training or guidance available to augment personnel expertise in these areas is limited. While ou work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on workforce training, comm personnel have expressed the need for more opportunities to improve th eir understanding of working in an interagency environment. GAO-10-794. Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801. Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command. Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recognizing the limits of military power in today's security environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal agencies to achieve its missions around the world. DOD's combatant commands, such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort. Both aim to build partner nation capacity and perform humanitarian assistance, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. As DOD's newest command, AFRICOM works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities such as maritime security and pandemic response efforts. Today GAO issued reports that the subcommittee requested on SOUTHCOM (GAO-10-801) and AFRICOM (GAO-10-794), which in part evaluated how each collaborates with U.S. interagency partners. This testimony summarizes that work and provides observations from ongoing work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts by focusing on 3 key areas essential for interagency collaboration.
What GAO Found
GAO's work has shown that developing overarching strategies, creating collaborative organizations, and building a workforce that understands how to fully engage partners are key areas where agencies can enhance interagency collaboration on national security issues. GAO found that DOD's SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. (1) Overarching strategies: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies in creating their theater campaign plans, which outline command priorities, and for other strategies and plans. However, AFRICOM has not completed plans that detail its activities by country and that align with embassy strategic plans to ensure U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. Also, GAO's preliminary work indicates that a U.S. action plan provides a framework for interagency collaboration to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa region, but the plan does not assign agencies their roles or responsibilities for the majority of tasks in the plan. (2) Collaborative organizations: Both commands have organizational structures that encourage interagency involvement in their missions. Each has a military deputy commander to oversee military operations and a civilian deputy to the commander from the State Department to oversee civil-military activities. Both commands also embed interagency officials within their organizations, but limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency personnel from participating at the numbers desired. However, AFRICOM has struggled to fully leverage the expertise of embedded officials. Moreover, while SOUTHCOM's organizational structure was designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation. (3) Well-trained workforce: AFRICOM has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners. In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, some AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, which has resulted in some cultural missteps. Further, limited training is available to enhance personnel expertise. While GAO's work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on training, personnel from the command also expressed the need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an interagency environment. GAO made recommendations to the commands aimed at improving their capabilities to perform their missions through the development of plans and training. DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-777 | gao_GAO-04-777_0 | An enterprise architecture is a key tool for effectively and efficiently overcoming the kinds of transformational challenges that face DHS. Within the Management directorate is the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), which has primary responsibility for addressing departmentwide information technology integration issues. The CIO released an initial version of the enterprise architecture in September 2003 and plans to issue the next version in September 2004. Other frameworks also exist. Our experience with federal agencies has shown that investing in IT without defining these investments in the context of an architecture often results in systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface. In our view, such descriptions of the agency enterprise architecture/FEA relationship are not clear, in part because definitions of such key terms as alignment, mapping, and consistency are not apparent in the FEA. Initial Version of DHS’s Architecture Provides a Partial Foundation upon Which to Build, but Not a Sufficient Basis to Guide Investment Decisions
The initial version of DHS’s enterprise architecture is missing many of the key elements of a well-defined architecture. Instead, the architecture is largely the result of combining the architectures and ongoing IT investments that several of the 22 agencies brought with them when the department was formed. According to DHS senior architecture officials, including the chief architect, Version 1.0 was developed in this manner because it pre-dated completion of the department’s first strategic plan, only had limited staff assigned to it, and needed to be done in only 4 months in order to meet OMB’s deadline for submitting the department’s fiscal year 2004 IT budget. More specifically, a well-defined “To Be” architecture should provide, among other things, a description of the enterprise’s business strategy, including its desired future concept of operations, its strategic goals and objectives, and the strategic direction to be followed to achieve the desired future state; future business processes, functions, and activities that will be performed to support the organization’s mission, including the entities that will perform them and the locations where they will be performed; a logical database model that identifies the primary data categories and their relationships, which are needed to support business processes and to guide the creation of the physical databases where information will be stored; the systems to be acquired or developed and their relative importance in supporting the business operations; the enterprise application systems and system components and their the policies, procedures, processes, and tools for selecting, controlling, and evaluating application systems; the technical standards to be implemented and their anticipated life the physical infrastructure (e.g., hardware and software) that will be needed to support the business systems; common policies and procedures for developing infrastructure systems throughout their life cycles; security and information assurance-related terms; the organizations that will be accountable for implementing security and the tools to be used to secure and protect systems and data; a list of the protection mechanisms (e.g., firewalls and intrusion detection software) that will be implemented to secure the department’s assets; and the metrics that will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of mission operations and supporting system performance in achieving mission goals and objectives. We have previously reported that OMB’s expected relationship between the FEA and agency enterprise architectures has not been clearly articulated, in part because OMB has not defined key terms, such as architectural alignment. Semantic alignment means that the department’s architecture and the FEA reference models use similar terms and/or definitions that can be mapped to one another. DHS recognizes this and has produced an initial architecture in a short time with limited resources and is working on its next version. Nevertheless, the department is in the midst of transforming itself and investing hundreds of millions of dollars in supporting systems without a well-defined architecture to effectively guide and constrain these activities. It is also important for DHS to ensure that its architecture includes the necessary content. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the initial version of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) enterprise architecture (1) provides a foundation upon which to build and (2) is aligned with the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA). Element satisfied? Element satisfied? However, it does list technologies, products, and standards for EAI. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is attempting to integrate 22 federal agencies, each specializing in one or more interrelated aspects of homeland security. An enterprise architecture is a key tool for effectively and efficiently accomplishing this. In September 2003, DHS issued an initial version of its architecture. Since 2002, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued various components of the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA), which is intended to be, among other things, a framework for informing the content of agencies' enterprise architectures. GAO was asked to determine whether the initial version of DHS's architecture (1) provides a foundation upon which to build and (2) is aligned with the FEA.
What GAO Found
DHS's initial enterprise architecture provides a partial foundation upon which to build future versions. However, it is missing, either in part or in total, all of the key elements expected to be found in a well-defined architecture, such as descriptions of business processes, information flows among these processes, and security rules associated with these information flows, to name just a few. Moreover, the key elements that are at least partially present in the initial version were not derived in a manner consistent with best practices for architecture development. Instead, they are based on assumptions about a DHS or national corporate business strategy and, according to DHS, are largely the products of combining the existing architectures of several of the department's predecessor agencies, along with their respective portfolios of system investment projects. DHS officials agreed that their initial version is lacking key elements, and they stated that this version represents what could be done in the absence of a strategic plan, with limited resources, and in the 4 months that were available to meet an OMB deadline for submitting the department's fiscal year 2004 information technology budget request. In addition, they stated that the next version of the architecture, which is to be issued in September 2004, would have much more content. As a result, DHS does not yet have the necessary architectural blueprint to effectively guide and constrain its ongoing business transformation efforts and the hundreds of millions of dollars that it is investing in supporting information technology assets. Without this, DHS runs the risk that its efforts and investments will not be well integrated, will be duplicative, will be unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and will not optimize overall mission performance. The department's initial enterprise architecture can be traced semantically with the FEA, which means that similar terms and/or definitions of terms can be found in the respective architectures. However, traceability in terms of architecture structures and functions is not apparent. Because of this, it is not clear whether the substance and intent of the respective architectures are in fact aligned, meaning that, if both were implemented, they would produce similar outcomes. This is due at least in part to the fact that OMB has yet to clearly define what it expects the relationship between agencies' enterprise architectures and the FEA to be, including what it means by architectural alignment. |
gao_GAO-14-743T | gao_GAO-14-743T_0 | 1). In fiscal year 2012, about 240 of the 566 federally recognized tribes operated more than 420 Indian gaming establishments across 28 states. These establishments included a broad range of operations, from tribal bingo to multimillion dollar casino gaming facilities. IGRA is the primary federal statute governing Indian gaming.provides, among other things, a statutory basis for the regulation of Indian gaming to shield it from corrupting influences, assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operators and the players, and ensure that tribes are the primary beneficiaries of gaming operations. Interior Uses a Multistep Review Process to Help Ensure That Compacts Comply with IGRA
Interior has a multistep review process that helps to ensure that compacts comply with relevant IGRA provisions and other applicable laws. While compacts approved by Interior share similar provisions, they do vary in some respects, such as the terms of “revenue sharing” arrangements between states and tribes and the extent to which the compact addresses tribal interactions with local governments. Variety of Provisions Contained in Compacts Approved by Interior
The compacts approved by Interior share similar provisions but vary in some respects. In contrast, some compacts require the tribe to share significant portions of revenue with the state. Based on our preliminary observations of ongoing work, we found that the approaches of the three states we have visited to regulating Indian gaming vary, as seen through differences in their regulatory agencies’ organization, staffing levels, and funding. For the seven tribes we have visited, each has established tribal gaming regulatory agencies that govern the day-to-day operations of their gaming facilities. Compacts and Tribal Gaming Ordinances Establish the Roles of States and Tribes
The roles of states and tribes in regulating Indian gaming vary and are established in two key documents: (1) compacts for Class III gaming and (2) tribal ordinances for both Class II and Class III gaming. Each of the seven tribes we visited in Arizona, California, and Oklahoma for our preliminary observations have established tribal gaming regulatory agencies—also called tribal gaming commissions or tribal gaming agencies—that perform various regulatory functions to ensure that their gaming facilities are operated in accordance with tribal laws and regulations and, for Class III operations, the compact. The Commission’s Regulation and Oversight of Indian Gaming and Impacts of Recent Reorganization
The Commission plays an important role in regulating Class II gaming and overseeing Class III gaming to ensure compliance with IGRA and applicable federal and tribal regulations. Among other things, the Commission monitors Class II gaming, inspects Class II gaming premises, and takes enforcement actions when necessary. In 2011, the Commission implemented its Assistance, Compliance, and Enforcement (ACE) initiative, which emphasizes providing assistance to tribes to achieve compliance with IGRA. Through this initiative, the Commission has sought to provide technical assistance and training to tribes so that compliance issues may be resolved early and voluntarily without the need for a Notice of Violation, which we refer to as an enforcement action. According to Commission officials, this merger was deemed necessary, in part, to better support the Commission’s emphasis on compliance assistance under its ACE initiative. The Commission also tracks tribal compliance with what it defines as eight primary obligations under IGRA, which are obtaining a compact approved by Interior prior to conducting Class III submitting investigative reports and suitability determinations on each key employee and primary management official, summarizing the results of the tribal background investigation; submitting fingerprint cards to the Commission for processing; submitting gaming employee applications to the Commission at the commencement of employment; adopting a gaming ordinance for Class II or Class III gaming that has been approved by the Commission; paying a fee assessment to the Commission based on gaming issuing a separate license for each facility where gaming is conducted; and submitting an annual independent audit of each Class II gaming operation to the Commission. We are continuing to collect and analyze data related to the Commission’s regulations and oversight of Indian gaming, and we will present that information in our final report. The Commission’s Reorganization Appears to Align with Its Emphasis on Compliance Assistance
In 2011, as part of a broader organizational realignment, the Commission merged its Enforcement and Audits divisions into one Compliance Division. According to Commission officials, this merger was deemed necessary, in part, to better support the Commission’s emphasis on compliance assistance through its ACE initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 25 years, Indian gaming has become a significant source of revenue for many tribes, reaching $27.9 billion in 2012. At that time, about 240 of the 566 federally recognized tribes operated more than 420 gaming establishments ranging from bingo halls to multimillion dollar casinos across 28 states. IGRA, the primary federal statute governing Indian gaming, provides, among other things, a statutory basis for the regulation of Indian gaming to assure that it is conducted fairly and honestly. Tribes, states, Interior, and the National Indian Gaming Commission have roles in regulating or overseeing Indian gaming.
This testimony is based on GAO's preliminary observations from ongoing work that examines (1) the process Interior uses to ensure compliance with IGRA through its review of tribal-state compacts and the types of provisions contained in these compacts; (2) how states and selected tribes regulate Indian gaming; and (3) how the Commission regulates and oversees Indian gaming and how, if at all, recent organizational changes have affected its regulatory or oversight approach.
In its ongoing work, GAO analyzed compacts; visited three states and seven tribes (selected for geographic representations and revenue generation) to discuss the oversight of Indian gaming; reviewed Commission data on technical assistance and enforcement actions; and interviewed Interior and Commission officials. GAO will continue to collect information on these topics and produce a final report.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior (Interior) has a multistep review process designed to help ensure that compacts comply with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Such compacts are agreements between a tribe and state that governs the conduct of the tribe's Class III (or casino) gaming activities. Based on GAO's preliminary review, Interior has approved 78 percent (382) of the tribal-state compacts submitted since 1998. While the provisions in compacts approved by Interior are largely similar, they do vary in some respects, such as the terms of “revenue sharing” arrangements established between states and tribes. For example, some compacts do not provide for revenue sharing with states, while some require tribes to share significant portions of revenue with states. The remaining 22 percent (106) of compacts reviewed were either (1) considered approved without action by the Secretary of the Interior, (2) withdrawn, or (3) disapproved by Interior for various reasons, such as when they were not consistent with IGRA.
The roles of states and tribes in regulating Indian gaming vary and are established in two key documents: (1) compacts for Class III gaming and (2) tribal gaming ordinances, which provide the general framework for day-to-day tribal regulation of Class II (including bingo) and Class III gaming facilities. Based on GAO's preliminary observations of ongoing work, GAO found that the three states visited—Arizona, California, and Oklahoma—varied in their approaches to regulating Indian gaming, as seen through differences in their regulatory agencies' organization, staffing levels, and funding. For the seven tribes GAO visited, each has established tribal gaming commissions that perform various regulatory functions to help ensure that their gaming facilities are operated in accordance with tribal laws and regulations and, for Class III operations, the compact.
The National Indian Gaming Commission (Commission), an independent commission created by IGRA within Interior, plays an important role in regulating and overseeing Indian gaming by ensuring that Class II and Class III gaming facilities comply with IGRA and applicable federal regulations and tribal ordinances or resolutions. Among other things, the Commission monitors tribal gaming activities, inspects gaming premises, and takes enforcement actions when necessary. In 2011, the Commission implemented its Assistance, Compliance, and Enforcement initiative, which emphasizes providing assistance to tribes to achieve compliance with IGRA. Through this initiative, the Commission has sought to provide technical assistance and training to tribes so that compliance issues may be resolved early and voluntarily without the need for enforcement actions. According to Commission officials, in part, as a result of this initiative, the number of enforcement actions has decreased significantly. Also in 2011, as part of a broader organizational realignment, the Commission merged its Enforcement and Audits divisions into one Compliance Division. According to Commission officials, this merger was deemed necessary, in part, to better support the Commission's emphasis on compliance assistance under its initiative. |
gao_AIMD-98-17 | gao_AIMD-98-17_0 | Background
CBSX provides worldwide asset visibility over the Army’s reportable equipment items, including the Army’s most critical war fighting equipment. As part of the validation process, CBSX compares these SPBS-R balances to CBSX balances, identifies discrepancies, and adjusts the CBSX balances to agree with SPBS-R. CBSX is adjusted to agree with SPBS-R because SPBS-R is the Army’s official accountable record. Scope and Methodology
To determine the primary causes for adjustments to correct discrepancies between CBSX and SPBS-R, we analyzed a statistically projectable sample of 150 adjustments from our sample universe of 32,649 adjustments. To determine if the Army’s improvement efforts adequately address the causes of CBSX errors, we reviewed and analyzed the Army’s plans and related documentation. Because of these software errors, CBSX (1) posted incorrect adjustments, (2) posted invalid transactions, or (3) did not post valid transactions. At the same time, the modifications being made under this improvement effort will not correct many of the causes of adjustments to CBSX that we identified. In particular, adjustments caused by transactions not received by CBSX, the largest problem, will not be corrected unless additional efforts are made. The CBSX Compatibility Rate Is an Incomplete Performance Indicator
The Army’s initiatives to improve CBSX discussed in the previous section are intended to help the Army achieve its management goal of a 98-percent compatibility rate, which the Army uses to measure the extent that CBSX and property book records agree. In addition, even if the compatibility rate measured all current differences between CBSX and unit property books, it does not serve as a complete indicator of CBSX accuracy. However, these changes do not address the primary cause of CBSX adjustments—transactions not received by CBSX. To improve the transaction audit trail and enhance unit understanding of CBSX reporting, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army ensure that
LOGSA update Army Regulation 710-3, Asset and Transaction Reporting System, to require units to (1) verify their confirmations of receipt and research and resolve any differences, (2) reconcile differences between property books and CBSX and investigate reasons for adjustments, (3) retain property book transaction records (including receipt confirmations) relating to CBSX to determine the causes of adjustments and support the reconciliation, (4) review the monthly reports they receive from LOGSA, and (5) follow up on transactions that were rejected by CBSX; the major commands require that all property book officers using SPBS-R, including those assigned to medical and Reserve units, successfully complete SPBS-R training; the Army Quartermaster Center and School revise the SPBS-R training to include how to analyze CBSX confirmations and monthly reports; the major commands enhance property book officer training by requiring ongoing and up-to-date CBSX training such as that provided by LOGSA’s annual CBSX conference or, alternatively, LOGSA videotape its annual CBSX conference and provide on-site training using this tape at Army units to train those unable to attend the CBSX conference; and
LOGSA establish a formal site visit program to conduct periodic assistance/training for property management personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's Continuing Balancing System-Expanded (CBSX) logistics system, focusing on: (1) the primary causes for the numerous adjustments to correct discrepancies between the Army's CBSX system and its primary property book system; (2) whether the Army's ongoing improvement efforts will correct the causes of these discrepancies; and (3) whether the Army's current method of assessing CBSX accuracy, referred to as the rate, is adequate.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while the Army ensures that CBSX equipment balances accurately reflect the balances in its primary property book system twice a year, the Army does not identify the causes of adjustments made to CBSX balances to correct discrepancies; (2) GAO's analysis of the causes of CBSX adjustments has identified opportunities to correct process weaknesses and computer software problems that would reduce the number of adjustments and, consequently, increase the accuracy of CBSX throughout the year; (3) the Army does not have an effective process to ensure that equipment transactions from Army units are received by CBSX; (4) GAO's statistically projectable sample of adjustments made to CBSX to bring it into agreement with the Army's primary property book system, showed that over 40 percent of the adjustments were due to transactions not received by CBSX; (5) other reasons for adjustments included software errors and incorrectly posted transactions; (6) the lack of reconciliations performed between CBSX and unit property books, an outdated regulation, and incomplete training also were underlying factors that contributed to differences between CBSX and the primary property book system; (7) the Army's ongoing efforts to improve CBSX address some of the causes of adjustments such as those related to certain software errors and incorrectly posted transactions; (8) however, these efforts do not fully address property book transactions that were not received by CBSX, the largest cause of adjustments; (9) the Army also does not have an effective mechanism to measure CBSX performance; and (10) the Army-wide CBSX compatibility rate, the factor used to measure the extent to which CBSX and property book records agree, is overstated because it does not count all adjustments made to CBSX balances to correct discrepancies. |
gao_GAO-15-64 | gao_GAO-15-64_0 | Bulk drug substances—usually raw powders—are generally not approved by FDA for marketing in the United States. Drug Benefits under Federal Health Care Programs
TRICARE offers pharmacy and medical benefits to active duty personnel and their dependents, military retirees and their dependents and survivors, as well as reservists and members of the National Guard and their dependents. TRICARE Paid for 465,000 Compounded Drug Prescriptions through Its Pharmacy Benefit in Fiscal Year 2013 Costing $259 Million, but Could Not Identify Such Prescriptions Paid for through Its Medical Benefit
TRICARE Paid for 465,000 Prescriptions for Compounded Drugs through its Pharmacy Benefit in Fiscal Year 2013, and They Were Mostly Dispensed in Retail Pharmacies and to Retirees and Dependents
In fiscal year 2013, TRICARE paid for about 465,000 compounded drug prescriptions through its pharmacy benefit, representing 0.3 percent of all prescription drugs paid for through its pharmacy benefit in that year. 2.) Compounded Drug Prescriptions Paid for through TRICARE’s Pharmacy Benefit Cost $259 Million in Fiscal Year 2013, and Most Contained Bulk Drug Substances
Compounded drug prescriptions paid for through TRICARE’s pharmacy benefit cost about $259 million in fiscal year 2013—representing about 3 percent of the total cost of prescription drugs paid for through its pharmacy benefit—up from about $5 million in fiscal year 2004. TRICARE’s Payment Practices for Compounded Drugs Provided through Its Pharmacy and Medical Benefit Are Inconsistent with Regulations and Generally More Generous than Those of Medicare and VA
TRICARE’s Payment Practices for Compounded Drugs Provided through Its Pharmacy Benefit Are Inconsistent with Regulations and More Generous than Those of Medicare and VA
TRICARE pays for all ingredients that make up a compounded drug— both FDA-approved products and bulk drug substances—inconsistent with its regulations, which stipulate that TRICARE is to pay for FDA- approved drugs only. DHA officials told us that they are considering denying payment for certain compounded drug prescriptions that include bulk drug substances, and are waiting to review the lists of bulk drug substances that may be used to make compounded drugs—and the lists of drugs that may not be compounded because they present demonstrable difficulties for compounding—that FDA is required to develop under the DQSA. In contrast to TRICARE, Part D’s payment practices for compounded drugs are more restrictive. TRICARE’s Payment Practices for Compounded Drugs Provided through Its Medical Benefit May Be Inconsistent with Regulations and Are Similar to Medicare’s but More Generous than VA’s
Through its medical benefit, TRICARE generally pays for compounded drugs administered in outpatient and inpatient settings, and it may have paid for bulk drug substances used to make these drugs in a manner that is inconsistent with its regulations stipulating payment for FDA-approved drugs only. The majority of these costs were for compounded drugs containing bulk drug substances, the payment for which is inconsistent with TRICARE regulations that authorize payment for FDA-approved drugs only. Moreover, because TRICARE does not track compounded drugs administered in outpatient settings and its contractors do not determine whether each drug ingredient listed on a claim is FDA-approved, TRICARE may have also paid for compounded drugs containing bulk drug substances in outpatient settings in a manner that is inconsistent with its regulations, which may have also resulted in TRICARE incurring additional costs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure TRICARE’s payment practices for compounded drugs are consistent with its regulations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense align TRICARE’s payment practices for compounded drugs with applicable regulations governing the TRICARE program. In its written comments, VA generally agreed with our conclusions. VA and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs. None of these drugs contained a product approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD offers comprehensive health care coverage—pharmacy and medical benefits—to eligible beneficiaries through its TRICARE program. As part of its benefits package, TRICARE pays for compounded drugs. Traditionally, a drug is compounded through the process of mixing, combining, or altering ingredients, to create a customized drug tailored to the medical needs of an individual patient upon receipt of a prescription. Concerns exist about the safety and the rising costs of compounded drugs.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated that GAO review TRICARE's payment for compounded drugs. For this report, GAO examined (1) the number and cost of compounded drugs paid for by TRICARE in fiscal year 2013, and (2) TRICARE's payment practices for compounded drugs and how they compare to other federal health care programs. GAO reviewed and analyzed TRICARE data on compounded drugs and reviewed, analyzed, and compared federal laws, regulations, and other documents pertaining to pharmacy and medical benefits under TRICARE, Medicare, and the VA health care system. GAO also interviewed program and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE program paid for about 465,000 compounded drug prescriptions through its pharmacy benefit in fiscal year 2013; these prescriptions represented 0.3 percent of all prescription drugs paid for through TRICARE's pharmacy benefit in that year. Most of these compounded drug prescriptions were dispensed in retail pharmacies and to retirees and their family members. Compounded drug prescriptions paid for by TRICARE's pharmacy benefit cost $259 million in fiscal year 2013—accounting for about 3 percent of the total cost of all prescription drugs paid for through TRICARE‘s pharmacy benefit—up from $5 million in fiscal year 2004, and were largely driven by compounded drug prescriptions containing bulk drug substances. Bulk drug substances are typically raw powders that are generally not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for assuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs and approving them for marketing in the United States. TRICARE could not identify compounded drug prescriptions paid for through its medical benefit, which pays for drugs administered to patients in outpatient or inpatient settings, because claim forms for outpatient and inpatient drugs lack specific billing codes.
TRICARE's payment practices for certain compounded drugs under its pharmacy and medical benefit are inconsistent with TRICARE regulations and are typically more generous than those of Medicare and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Through its pharmacy benefit, TRICARE pays for compounded drugs that contain bulk drug substances in a manner that is inconsistent with its regulations, which stipulate that TRICARE is to pay for FDA-approved drugs only. In contrast, Medicare and VA have more restrictive payment practices for compounded drugs provided through their pharmacy benefits. By paying for compounded drugs containing bulk drug substances, TRICARE incurred additional costs. DOD officials told us that they are considering denying payment for compounded drugs that include bulk drug substances. TRICARE also pays for compounded drugs administered to patients through its medical benefit but does not determine whether these drugs contain bulk drug substances, in which case payment practices may be inconsistent with TRICARE's regulations. TRICARE's payment practices for these drugs are similar to Medicare's, but more generous than VA's.
Though compounded drugs represent a small share of TRICARE's overall drug costs, its costs for these drugs have risen significantly in recent years. Moreover, because most of these drugs contain bulk drug substances generally not approved by FDA, TRICARE's practice of paying for them is inconsistent with its regulations and results in added costs for the program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD align TRICARE's payment practices for compounded drugs with applicable regulations governing the TRICARE program. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation and VA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions. HHS and VA provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-799 | gao_GAO-06-799_0 | Donor-advised funds are generally separate accounts operated by tax- exempt public charities to receive contributions from a single donor or group of donors. IRS oversight of tax-exempt entities generally relies on two activities. To describe the types of noncompliance and promotion methods involving donor-advised funds and supporting organizations, we reviewed IRS summaries of examination cases. Federal Laws and Regulations Impose Fewer Requirements on Donor-Advised Funds and Supporting Organizations and Their Donors, but Allow Donors Less Control Compared to Private Foundations
In recent years, donor-advised funds have become popular charitable- giving vehicles, and the number of supporting organizations has also continued to increase. Supporting organizations are public charities that are to support one or more public charities or certain other tax-exempt organizations. Donor-Advised Funds, Supporting Organizations, and Private Foundations Hold Billions of Dollars in Assets, but Some Organizational Characteristics Cannot Be Reliably Determined from Form 990 Data
Donor-advised funds hold billions of dollars in assets, and supporting organizations and private foundations hold hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. Using 2003 data from Forms 990 and 990-PF, we found differences between supporting organizations and private foundations. Limited Data Are Available for Donor-Advised Funds
Data on donor-advised funds are limited because, unlike supporting organizations and private foundations, the funds usually are not entities that file a Form 990 to report their activities. Being able to make these comparisons is important in order to address concerns, such as how much and how often supporting organizations pay out to charities, since, like private foundations, supporting organizations can be used to accumulate contributions prior to distributing the money to charity, but, unlike private foundations, they do not have a minimum payout requirement to support charities that must be annually reported. In addition to financial characteristics such as payout rate and executive compensation, organizational characteristics about supporting organizations are difficult to determine from the Form 990. Some of these cases demonstrate clear noncompliance, allowing IRS to propose appropriate corrective actions. Additionally, IRS contends with activities involving donor- advised funds and supporting organizations that do not violate laws or regulations, yet do not seem to benefit charities. Some abusive schemes are organized or participated in by professionals or entities who work in concert with the donor. IRS’s donor-advised fund and supporting organization teams have investigated nine promoters involved in potentially abusive schemes, according to IRS managers. However, IRS will not have data that separate the fund activity from other activity. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better understand the characteristics of donor-advised funds and supporting organizations and to better identify possible noncompliance, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should, as part of the Form 990 revision process, (1) require more comprehensive reporting of donor- advised fund activity, (2) require supporting organizations to report their supported organizations’ EINs, and (3) require that the TINs for recipients of large loans be reported, if IRS is granted authority to protect the TINs from public disclosure. Charitable giving accounts that are held by a public charity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Donor-advised funds and supporting organizations are two charitable-giving options that have received attention from Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for their potential to facilitate noncompliance with tax law. As requested, GAO is providing information on donor-advised funds and supporting organizations related to (1) federal laws and regulations, compared to private foundations; (2) financial and organizational characteristics; and (3) types of noncompliance and promotion methods and challenges identifying them.
What GAO Found
Donor-advised funds, supporting organizations, and private foundations are all tax-exempt charitable-giving vehicles. Donor-advised funds are separate accounts held by a public charity to receive contributions from donors who may recommend, but not control, charitable distributions from the account. Supporting organizations are public charities that are to carry out their tax-exempt purpose by supporting one or more tax-exempt organizations, usually other public charities. Compared with private foundations, donor-advised funds and supporting organizations give donors less control over how their donation will be used but provide donors more favorable tax deductions, lower administration costs, less IRS oversight, and fewer reporting requirements. Donor-advised funds hold billions of dollars in assets, and supporting organizations and private foundations hold hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. Public charities and private foundations must annually file an IRS Form 990 or Form 990-PF, respectively, to report their activities. However, donor-advised fund data are limited because organizations that maintain the funds are not required to separately report fund data from other financial data on Form 990. Although some supporting organization characteristics can be determined from Form 990 data, other characteristics, such as the rate at which payments are made to charities and details about the recipients of loans from the organization, cannot be reliably determined. Concerns have arisen about the "payout" rate to charities, and Congress is considering a minimum payout requirement, similar to the one for private foundations. Further, supporting organizations are not required to report their supported organizations' identification numbers, making it more difficult to track the relationship between organizations. To collect additional data, IRS revised Form 990 for 2003 and 2005 and is considering further revisions, but no firm plans have been determined. According to IRS managers, examinations reveal that some donor-advised funds and supporting organizations are used in abusive schemes to unallowably benefit donors or related parties or give donors excess control of charitable assets and operations. In some cases, IRS is able to clearly determine noncompliance and assign appropriate corrective actions. However, in other cases, IRS faces challenges gathering evidence or addressing activities that do not seem to benefit charities, but do not violate any law or regulation, such as when a supporting organization loans money, at market rate, to a donor, director, or officer of the organization. Promoters, who are individuals or entities who facilitate abusive schemes, further complicate IRS's examination efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-150 | gao_GAO-06-150_0 | On the basis of our review of the draft plan and discussions with DHS officials, the final plan will present background information on the sector, including a description of (1) the types of assets that are considered part of the chemical sector; (2) the regulatory authority of key federal agencies relative to the chemical industry and the key stakeholders in the sector; (3) the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder; and (4) DHS’s coordination with federal, state, and local agencies, such as law enforcement and emergency management departments, and with the private sector on efforts that include sharing intelligence and security information; describe the process DHS will use to develop a comprehensive inventory of assets in the chemical sector, including plans for working with the private sector to develop this inventory, since the critical infrastructure in the chemical sector is predominantly privately owned and operated; describe DHS’s efforts to identify and assess the vulnerabilities of chemical facilities and how DHS plans to prioritize these efforts on the basis of the vulnerability assessments; outline the protective programs that will be created to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical facilities, and describe how DHS will work with private sector and government entities to implement these programs; explain the performance metrics DHS will use to measure the effectiveness of DHS and industry security efforts and ensure that DHS meets its overall critical infrastructure goals, including (1) identifying and assessing the vulnerability of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources; (2) ensuring the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist attack; (3) establishing a collaborative environment across all levels of government and with the private sector to better protect the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources; and (4) coordinating and integrating, as appropriate, with other federal emergency management and preparedness activities, including the National Response Plan; document DHS’s plans to work with stakeholders to review current federal research and development initiatives for prioritization and to identify gaps between the chemical sector’s requirements and current projects in order to identify research and development needs; and outline challenges the department faces in coordinating the efforts of the chemical sector, such as collecting information about facilities from a large number of owners; communicating with chemical facility owners who do not belong to industry associations; coordinating the roles of sector stakeholders; and working without federal regulatory authority. DHS is also distributing threat information to the industry and coordinating sector activities with the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, an industry-led working group that acts as a liaison for the chemical sector. DHS Is Identifying High-Priority Sites
DHS has identified approximately 3,400 chemical facilities that it believes pose the greatest hazard to human life and health in the event of a terrorist attack. Some industry associations require member companies to assess their facilities’ vulnerabilities and make security enhancements. For example, ACC requires, as a condition of membership, that companies conduct vulnerability assessments, develop and implement plans to mitigate vulnerabilities, and have a third party verify that the security enhancements identified in the plans were implemented. Other industry associations have encouraged their members to address security by developing security guidelines, best practices, and other tools. The Chemical Industry Faces Challenges in Securing Facilities against Terrorism
Chemical industry officials told us they face a number of challenges in preparing facilities against a terrorist attack. DHS Needs Additional Authority to Ensure That Chemical Facilities Are Addressing Security Issues
Existing laws provide DHS with only limited authority to address security concerns at U.S. chemical facilities, and additional legislation is needed to place federal security requirements on these facilities. DHS Has Concluded That It Needs Additional Authority to Address Chemical Facility Security
DHS has concluded that its existing patchwork of authorities does not permit it to regulate the chemical industry effectively, and that the Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. However, the extent of security preparedness at these facilities remains largely unknown. However, unlike other federal agencies—such as EPA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which require drinking water and nuclear facilities, respectively, to take actions to improve their security—DHS does not currently have the authority to require the chemical industry to take such actions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) actions to develop an overall strategy for protecting the chemical industry; (2) DHS’s efforts to identify high-risk chemical facilities, assess their vulnerabilities, ensure that facilities are addressing security, and coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in these efforts; (3) chemical industry security initiatives and challenges; and (4) DHS’s existing authorities, and whether additional legislative authority is needed to ensure that chemical facilities take action to address vulnerabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities could damage public health and the economy. While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) formerly led federal efforts to ensure chemical facility security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the lead federal agency coordinating efforts to protect these facilities from terrorist attacks. GAO reviewed (1) DHS's actions to develop a strategy to protect the chemical industry, (2) DHS's actions to assist in the industry's security efforts and coordinate with EPA, (3) industry security initiatives and challenges, and (4) DHS's authorities and whether additional legislation is needed to ensure chemical plant security. GAO interviewed DHS, EPA, and industry officials, among others.
What GAO Found
As part of a national framework for protecting the chemical sector, DHS is developing a Chemical Sector-Specific Plan. The plan is intended to, among other things, describe DHS's ongoing efforts and future plans to coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector; identify chemical facilities to include in the sector, assess their vulnerabilities, and prioritize them; and develop programs to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical facilities. DHS did not estimate when the plan will be completed. To date, DHS has taken a number of actions aimed at protecting the chemical sector from terrorist attacks. DHS has identified 3,400 facilities that, if attacked, could pose the greatest hazard to human life and health and has initiated programs to assist the industry and local communities in protecting chemical facilities. For example, the Buffer Zone Protection Program assists facility owners and local law enforcement with improving the security of areas surrounding plants. DHS also coordinates with the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, an industry-led group that acts as a liaison for the chemical sector, and with EPA and other federal agencies. The chemical industry is voluntarily addressing plant security, but faces challenges in preparing against terrorism. Some industry associations require member companies to assess plants' vulnerabilities, develop and implement plans to mitigate vulnerabilities, and have a third party verify that security measures were implemented. Other associations have developed security guidelines and other tools to encourage their members to address security. While voluntary efforts are under way, industry officials said that they face challenges in preparing facilities against terrorism, including high costs and limited guidance on how much security is adequate. Because existing laws provide DHS with only limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it has relied primarily on the industry's voluntary security efforts. However, the extent to which companies are addressing security is unclear. Unlike EPA, for example, which requires drinking water facilities to improve their security, DHS does not have the authority to require chemical facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and implement security measures. Therefore, DHS cannot ensure that facilities are taking these actions. DHS has stated that its existing authorities do not permit it to effectively regulate the chemical industry, and that the Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. Many stakeholders agreed--as GAO concluded in 2003--that additional legislation placing federal security requirements on chemical facilities is needed. However, stakeholders had mixed views on the contents of any legislation, such as requirements that plants substitute safer chemicals and processes that potentially could reduce the risks present at these facilities. |
gao_RCED-97-48 | gao_RCED-97-48_0 | We agreed to provide information on (1) Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western, including their similarities and differences, and their interactions with the agencies that operate federal water projects (mostly, the Bureau and the Corps); (2) the main objectives and general decisions involved in divesting federal assets, along with how these objectives and decisions apply to the PMAs; and (3) the specific issues related to hydropower that should be addressed before a divestiture of the PMAs. These customers vary in size and in the quantity of electricity they purchase. The PMAs have a close working relationship with the Corps and the Bureau because, with a few exceptions, the Bureau and the Corps are responsible for operating the hydropower plants and for ensuring that electricity is generated subject to the other multiple purposes of each federal water project. This relationship is based in part on written documents and also on flexible arrangements that recognize the variability associated with water. Because the PMAs have a limited quantity of power for sale that must be allocated among many preference customers, these customers must obtain most of their electricity from other sources. The PMAs market power subject to the parameters of these written agreements and flexible arrangements. The flexible arrangements allow the operating agencies to balance a project’s multiple purposes, even if this reduces power production. In reviewing domestic and international divestiture experiences, we found a successful divestiture begins with a definition of the sale’s objectives, which typically include (1) reducing or eliminating the government’s presence in an activity that some view as best left to the private sector and (2) improving the government’s fiscal situation. In particular, they will shape the general decisions about which specific assets are sold, what conditions and liabilities will transfer with those assets, and how to implement the sale. For example, as an “aid to irrigation,” power revenue is counted on to repay about 70 percent of the federal government’s (nominal) capital investment in irrigation facilities at federal water projects in the West. The Specific Assets to Be Sold Would Need to Be Identified
As we found in our review of divestitures in other nations, an important, initial decision in a divestiture involves determining which assets to sell. (2) Sales of significant electricity-generating assets are not unusual. These issues include the multiple purposes of federal water projects; the existing contractual obligations and liabilities of the PMAs, the Bureau, and the Corps; the future responsibility for environmental liabilities and protecting endangered species, which already constrain the operations of many projects; the rights and concerns of Native Americans; and the future regulatory treatment of the hydropower assets. The potential effects on wholesale and retail electric rates, including potential regional economic effects, would also need to be considered. The Rights and Concerns of Native Americans Would Affect a Divestiture
Various rights and concerns of Native Americans would have to be addressed in a proposal to divest federal hydropower assets. 2.) Changes in Wholesale Power Rates and Water Allocations Would Determine the Regional Economic Impact
The degree to which a regional economy would be affected by the divestiture of a PMA would depend mostly on several factors—the regional economy’s reliance on that PMA’s power, the amount of change in overall retail electric rates, the importance of electricity in the regional economy, and the extent to which water allocations from the former federal water projects would be changed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) profiles of three power marketing administrations, including their similarities and differences and how they interact with the agencies that operate federal water projects; (2) general parameters of the process by which federally owned assets can be sold; and (3) factors that would have to be addressed in a divestiture of federal hydroelectric assets, such as the relationship between power generation and the other purposes of federal water projects.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western Power Administrations all market the hydropower generated at federal water projects, but they serve different geographical areas and have different assets; (2) their customers vary in size and in their electric energy purchases; (3) PMAs are not the main source of electricity for most of their customers--in total the three PMAs in GAO's report supply about 7 percent of the electricity requirements of their customers; (4) the PMAs have a close working relationship with the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers--these interactions are based in part on written agreements and on flexible arrangements that recognize the operating agencies' role in managing water releases in a way that balances a project's multiple purposes. GAO also noted that: (1) two principal objectives have typically been cited by other nations and by the United States for selling government assets: (a) eliminating or reducing the government's presence in an activity that some view as best done by the private sector; and (b) improving the government's fiscal situation; and (2) these two objectives will affect many subsequent decisions needed to implement a sale, including: decisions about such concerns as what specific assets to sell, how to group these assets, what conditions and liabilities to transfer to the buyer, and what sales mechanism to employ. Finally, if, based on a broad policy evaluation of the pros and cons of privatization, a decision to divest federal hydropower assets is reached, several key issues specifically related to hydropower would need to be addressed, including: (1) balancing how water is used among the multiple purposes of federal water projects; (2) determining how to repay or otherwise address the federal capital investment in irrigation facilities of the affected projects; (3) assigning the numerous contractual obligations and liabilities of the Bureau, the Corps, and the PMAs; (4) handling Native Americans' claims to water, property and tribal artifacts; (5) determining the future responsibility for protecting the environment and endangered species--a commitment that already constrains the operations of many projects; (6) deciding the future regulatory treatment of divested hydropower assets; (7) the potential effects of a divestiture on wholesale and retail electric rates, and the regional economies; and (8) these impacts, to a large degree, would be determined by the prevailing wholesale electric rates of the local utilities in the region in which power from the PMA is sold, the region's reliance on this power, and the availability of other sources of power. |
gao_GAO-09-782 | gao_GAO-09-782_0 | Treasury Has Been Providing Financial Support to the Enterprises during Their Conservatorships
As authorized by HERA, the Secretary of the Treasury entered into agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008, to provide substantial financial support to the enterprises and thereby minimize potential systemic financial risks associated with their deteriorating financial condition. The Enterprises Had a Mixed Record on Achieving Housing Mission Objectives, and Risk-Management Deficiencies Compromised Their Safety and Soundness
To help inform the forthcoming congressional consideration of the enterprises’ future purposes and structures, this section discusses key aspects of their histories and performance in achieving key housing mission and safety and soundness objectives. Second, the 1992 Act expanded the enterprises’ previous housing mission responsibilities by requiring them to meet specific annual goals for the purchase of mortgages serving targeted groups. For example, the rapid growth in the enterprises’ retained mortgage portfolios in the late 1990s, and in 2003 through 2004, occurred during periods of strong economic growth when mortgage markets did not necessarily require the enterprises to be robust portfolio lenders. According to some commenters, the 2004 increase in housing goals provided the enterprises with incentives to purchase mortgage assets, such as Alt-A mortgages and private-label MBS collateralized by subprime and Alt-A mortgages,that in large degree served targeted groups. Options to Revise the Enterprises’ Structures Aim to Help Ensure Housing Mission Achievement, While Mitigating Safety and Soundness Risks
The enterprises’ mixed records in achieving their housing mission objectives and the losses and weaknesses that resulted in the conservatorships reinforce the need for Congress and the Executive Branch to fundamentally reevaluate the enterprises’ roles, structures, and business activities in mortgage finance. These options generally fall along a continuum with some overlap among key features and advocate (1) establishing a government corporation or agency, (2) reconstituting the enterprises as for-profit GSEs in some form, or (3) privatizing or terminating them (see table 4). Under one proposal, a government corporation would assume responsibility for purchasing conventional mortgages from primary lenders and issuing MBS. The government corporation or agency also would focus its activities on middle-income borrowers, and the mortgage credit needs of targeted groups would be served by an expansion of FHA’s mortgage insurance programs. However, as for-profit corporations, significant concerns remain about how well the reconstituted enterprises would be able to support financial markets during stressful economic periods without substantial financial support from Treasury or the Federal Reserve. While converting the enterprises into multiple GSEs could mitigate safety and soundness and systemic risk concerns by minimizing concentration risks, it also likely would involve trade-offs. As discussed earlier, the enterprises, through their secondary mortgage market activities, have been credited with facilitating the development of a liquid national mortgage market and establishing standardized underwriting practices for mortgage lending. Federal Efforts to Support Housing Markets during the Conservatorships and Certain Terms of Treasury Agreements Could Increase the Costs and Challenges Associated with the Transition to New Enterprise Structures
Since the beginning of the FHFA conservatorships, the enterprises have been tasked to initiate a range of programs, such as assisting homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments to refinance or modify their mortgage terms, to respond to the current crisis in housing markets. Finally, any transition to a new structure would need to take into consideration the enterprises’ dominant position within housing finance, even during the conservatorships, and, therefore, should be carefully implemented— perhaps in phases—to help ensure its success. In particular, (1) the draft report is organized in such a way that makes it easy for the reader to conclude that the safety and soundness benefits of the government entity option outweigh the added risks; (2) the table in the draft report’s Highlights page states that the lack of a “profit motive” for a government entity may mitigate risk should be rephrased to state that the option “addresses the conflict between private profits and public sector risk bearing;” and (3) the discussion in the draft report on the potential elimination of the enterprises’ mortgage portfolios fails to recognize that such an action is a component of some but not all proposals to reconstitute the enterprises as GSEs or to establish a government entity, and therefore, mentioning the benefit of doing so under one option (the government entity option) and not the other (the reconstituted GSE option) is a significant inconsistency. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) discuss how the enterprises’ roles, structures, and activities have changed over time and their performance in achieving key housing mission objectives; (2) identify various options for revising the enterprises’ eventual structure; (3) analyze these options in terms of their potential capacity to achieve key housing mission and safety and soundness objectives; and (4) discuss how the federal government’s management of the conservatorships and response to the housing crisis could affect any transition. We met with representatives from FHFA, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Federal Reserve, HUD, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), CBO, the enterprises, bank and mortgage organizations, and trade and community groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) with two key housing missions: (1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages (also in periods of economic stress) and (2) serve the mortgage credit needs of targeted groups such as low-income borrowers. To accomplish these goals, the enterprises issued debt and stock, purchased mortgages from lenders with the proceeds, and retained them in portfolio or pooled them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) sold to investors. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed the enterprises into conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition ($5.4 trillion in outstanding obligations) would destabilize the financial system. With estimates that the conservatorship will cost taxpayers nearly $400 billion, GAO initiated this report under the Comptroller General's authority to help inform the forthcoming congressional debate on the enterprises' future structures. It discusses the enterprises' performance in meeting mission requirements, identifies and analyzes options to revise their structures, and discusses key transition issues. GAO reviewed studies and data, and interviewed housing finance experts and officials from the enterprises, FHFA, Departments of the Treasury (Treasury) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Reserve, lenders, and community groups.
What GAO Found
The enterprises have a mixed record in meeting their housing mission objectives, and both capital and risk management deficiencies have compromised their safety and soundness as follows: (1) The enterprises' secondary market activities are credited with helping create a liquid national mortgage market, lowering mortgage rates somewhat, and standardizing mortgage underwriting processes. However, their capacity to support housing finance during periods of economic stress has not been established, and they only have been able to do so during the current recession with substantial financial assistance from Treasury and the Federal Reserve. (2)There is limited evidence that a program established in 1992 that required the enterprises to meet annual goals for purchasing mortgages serving targeted groups materially benefited such groups. (3) The enterprises' structures (for-profit corporations with government sponsorship) undermined market discipline and provided them with incentives to engage in potentially profitable business practices that were risky and not necessarily supportive of their public missions. For example, the enterprises' retained mortgage portfolios are complex to manage and expose them to losses resulting from changes in interest rates. Further, the enterprises' substantial investments in assets collateralized by subprime and other questionable mortgages in recent years generated losses that likely precipitated the conservatorship. It will be necessary for Congress to reevaluate the roles, structures, and performance of the enterprises, and to consider options to facilitate mortgage finance while mitigating safety and soundness and systemic risk concerns. These options generally fall along a continuum with some overlap in key areas: (1)Reconstitute the enterprises as for-profit corporations with government sponsorship but place additional restrictions on them. While restoring the enterprises to their previous status, this option would add controls to minimize risk. As examples, it would eliminate or reduce mortgage portfolios, establish executive compensation limits, or convert the enterprises from shareholder-owned corporations to associations owned by lenders. (2) Establish the enterprises as government corporations or agencies. Under this option, the enterprises would focus on purchasing qualifying mortgages and issuing MBS but eliminate their mortgage portfolios. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which insures mortgages for low-income and first-time borrowers, could assume additional responsibilities for promoting homeownership for targeted groups. (3) Privatize or terminate them. This option would abolish the enterprises in their current form and disperse mortgage lending and risk management throughout the private sector. Some proposals involve the establishment of a federal mortgage insurer to help protect mortgage lenders against catastrophic mortgage losses. During the conservatorship, the federal government has tasked the enterprises to implement a variety of programs designed to help respond to the current housing crisis, such as helping borrowers forestall foreclosures. While these efforts may be necessary to help mitigate the effects of the housing crisis, they also might significantly affect the costs of the conservatorship and transition to a new structure. For example, investors might be unwilling to invest capital in reconstituted enterprises unless Treasury assumed responsibility for losses incurred during their conservatorship. Finally, any transition to a new structure would need to consider the enterprises' still-dominant position in housing finance and be implemented carefully (perhaps in phases) to ensure its success. |
gao_GAO-12-449T | gao_GAO-12-449T_0 | 2012 Annual Report Identified 51 Opportunity Areas
Our 2012 annual report identified 51 areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists as well as additional opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues. We found instances where multiple government programs or activities have led to inefficiencies, and we determined that greater efficiencies or effectiveness might be achievable. In many cases, the existence of unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation can be difficult to determine with precision due to a lack of data on programs and activities. In some instances of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation, it may be appropriate for multiple agencies or entities to be involved in the same programmatic or policy area due to the nature or magnitude of the federal effort. These limitations have diminished and HUD programs can be used in all areas of the country. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 also envisions such an approach for selected cross-cutting areas. We plan to track the extent to which progress has been made to address our recommendation. The agencies agreed with our recommendation. Since 2005, when we first reported on this issue, we have found that the majority of programs have not conducted comprehensive evaluations of how well their programs are working. The Office of Science and Technology Policy said it would address our recommendations in the 5-year Federal STEM Education Strategic Plan, which will be released in spring 2012. In addition, in February 2012, we suggested DHS work with federal agencies to determine their reasons for duplicating the activities included in FPS’s risk assessments and identify measures to reduce this duplication. Our 2012 annual report also summarized 19 areas—beyond those directly related to duplication, overlap, or fragmentation—describing other opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection for the Treasury. These cost saving and revenue- enhancing opportunities also span a wide range of federal government agencies and mission areas (see table 2). We found that better informed decisions were needed to ensure a more cost- effective acquisition approach for the Navy’s NGEN program. Status of Actions Taken to Address the Areas Identified in 2011 Annual Report
In our 2011 annual report, we suggested a wide range of actions for the Congress and the executive branch to consider such as developing strategies to better coordinate fragmented efforts, implementing executive initiatives to improve oversight and evaluation of overlapping programs, considering enactment of legislation to facilitate revenue collection and examining opportunities to eliminate potential duplication through streamlining, collocating, or consolidating efforts or administrative services. As of February 10, 2012, the majority of 176 actions needed within the 81 areas identified by GAO have been partially addressed. In addition to the actions reported above, Congress has held a number of hearings and OMB has provided guidance to executive branch agencies on areas that we identified that could benefit from increased attention and ongoing oversight. Since the issuance of our March 2011 report, we have testified numerous times on our first annual report and on specific issues highlighted in the report. Both Congress and the executive branch have recognized this, and in January 2011, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (the Act) was enacted, updating the almost two-decades-old Government Performance and Results Act. The Act requires OMB to coordinate with agencies to establish outcome- oriented goals covering a limited number of crosscutting policy areas as well as goals to improve management across the federal government, and to develop a governmentwide performance plan for making progress toward achieving those goals. The performance plan is to, among other things, identify the agencies and federal activities—including spending programs, tax expenditures, and regulations—that contribute to each goal, and establish performance indicators to measure overall progress toward these goals as well as the individual contribution of the underlying agencies and federal activities. The President’s budget for fiscal year 2013 includes 14 such crosscutting goals. Aspects of several of these goals—including Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math Education, Entrepreneurship and Small Businesses, Job Training, Cybersecurity, Information Technology Management, Procurement and Acquisition Management, and Real Property Management—are discussed in our 2011 or 2012 annual report. GAO’s Approach to Identifying Potential Areas for Examination
The areas identified in our annual reports are not intended to represent the full universe of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation within the federal government, but we have conducted a systematic examination across the federal government to ensure that we have identified major instances of potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation governmentwide by the time we issue our third annual report in 2013. Our examination involved a multiphased approach. In conclusion Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Committee, opportunities exist for the Congress and federal agencies to continue to address the identified actions needed in our 2011 and 2012 annual reports. Collectively, these reports show that, if the actions are implemented, the government could potentially save tens of billions of dollars annually. Appendix I: Overall Progress Made in Each of the 81 Areas Identified in GAO’s 2011 Annual Report
This appendix presents a summary of GAO’s assessment of the overall progress made in each of the 81 areas that we identified in our March 2011 report in which the Congress and the executive branch could take actions to reduce or eliminate potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation or achieve other potential financial benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our 2012 annual report, which presents 51 areas where programs may be able to achieve greater efficiencies or become more effective in providing government services by reducing potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation in federal programs and activities. We have also continued to monitor developments in the 81 areas that we identified a year ago in the first report we issued in this series. Our 2011 follow-up report released today describes the extent to which progress has been made to address these areas.
This testimony is based on our 2012 annual and 2011 follow-up reports. Specifically, it addresses: (1) federal programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists, as well as other opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues; (2) status of actions taken by Congress and the executive branch to address the areas we identified in our 2011 report; (3) aspects of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 that may contribute to addressing and preventing duplication, overlap and fragmentation among federal programs; and (4) our approach to identifying duplication or cost savings in federal programs and activities. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards or with our quality assurance framework, as appropriate. For issues where information is being reported on for the first time in this report, we sought comments from the agencies involved, and incorporated those comments as appropriate. In updating the actions we identified in the 2011 annual report, we asked the agencies involved and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for their review and incorporated comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
We identified 51 areas in our 2012 annual report, including 32 areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation as well as 19 opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. These areas involve a wide range of government missions including agriculture, defense, economic development, education, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, science and the environment, and social services. Within and across these missions, the 2012 annual report touches on virtually all major federal departments and agencies. We expanded the scope of our work for this years report to focus on areas where a mix of federal approaches is used, such as tax expenditures, direct spending, and federal grant or loan programs.
In our 2011 follow-up report, we assessed the extent to which Congress and the executive branch addressed the 81 areasincluding a total of 176 actionsto reduce or eliminate unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation or achieve other potential financial benefits. As of February 10, 2012, Congress and the executive branch have made some progress in addressing the majority of the 81 areas we identified; however, additional steps are needed to fully implement the remaining actions. Specifically, our assessment found that all actions had been addressed in 4 areas, partially addressed in 60 areas, and not addressed in 17 areas. In addition, OMB has instructed agencies to consider areas of duplication or overlap identified in our 2011 report and by others in their fiscal year 2013 budget submissions and management plans. The OMB guidance also advised agencies to take a number of other steps to enhance efficiency, such as identifying and including in their budget submissions cost-saving efforts that will improve operational efficiency and taxpayers rate of return, including program integration, reorganizations within and between agency components, and resource realignment to improve public services.
Under requirements established by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (the Act). OMB is also required to coordinate with agencies to establish outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of crosscutting policy areas as well as goals to improve management across the federal government, and develop a governmentwide performance plan for making progress toward achieving those goals. The Presidents budget for 2013 includes 14 such crosscutting policy goals. Aspects of several of these goalsincluding Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math Education, Entrepreneurship and Small Businesses, Job Training, Cybersecurity, Information Technology Management, Procurement and Acquisition Management, and Real Property Managementare discussed in our March 2011 and February 2012 reports. The Acts requirements provide a much needed basis for more fully integrating a wide array of potentially duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented federal activities as well as a cohesive perspective on the long-term goals of the federal government focused on priority policy areas.
Opportunities exist for the Congress and federal agencies to continue to address the needed actions identified in our March 2011 and February 2012 reports. Collectively, these reports show that, if the actions are implemented, the government could potentially save tens of billions of dollars annually. Cost savings related to reducing or eliminating duplication, overlap, and fragmentation can be difficult to estimate because the portion of agency budgets devoted to certain programs or activities is often unclear, or needed information on program performance or costs is not readily available. In some cases, there is sufficient information to estimate potential savings or other benefits if actions are taken to address individual issues. In other cases, estimates of cost savings or other benefits would depend upon what congressional and executive branch decisions were made, including how certain of our recommendations are implemented. Nevertheless, considering the amount of program dollars involved in the issues we have identified, even limited adjustments could result in significant savings. Additionally, we have found that agencies can often realize other kinds of benefits, such as improved customer service and decreased administrative burdens. |
gao_GAO-14-234 | gao_GAO-14-234_0 | Repayment periods under these plans may be up to 25 years. Costs to manage and collect payments on defaulted loans are also included in administrative costs. For Direct Loans, subsidy costs represent the estimated long- term cost to the government of extending credit over the life of the loan, excluding administration costs. Loan Cohort: A group of loans made in a particular fiscal year. Total Direct Loan Administrative Costs Grew from $314 Million to $864 Million in Recent Years, but Costs per Borrower Have Generally Remained Steady or Fallen
Total Direct Loan Administrative Costs Grew by $550 Million from Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012, Largely Driven by an Increase in the Number of Direct Loans
The Department of Education reported that full administrative costs (i.e. These Direct Loan administrative costs represent 65 percent of the $1.3 billion in new budget authority made available to the Student Aid Administration account in fiscal year 2012, while administrative costs for other loan, grant, and loan guarantee programs and activities made up the Loan servicing, which includes activities related to remainder.processing loan payments and maintaining borrower information, is the largest category of reported administrative costs, comprising 63 percent of total administrative costs in fiscal year 2012. Several factors contributed to the increase in the number of Direct Loans. Costs per Borrower and Other Unit Costs Have Generally Remained Stable or Fallen
While total reported administrative costs increased from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012, cost per borrower and other unit cost measures remained stable or fell. According to Education officials, increased loan volume resulted in a decrease in many unit costs. Recent changes in loan servicing contracts, combined with other factors, have increased uncertainty about what servicing costs per borrower will be in coming years. The new contracts use a different pricing structure to encourage servicers to keep more borrowers in a repayment status. Estimated Subsidy Costs Differ across Loan Cohorts and Fluctuate over Time
Subsidy Costs Vary by Loan Cohort, and Current Estimates Show the Government is Expected to Generate Subsidy Income from Recent Cohorts
Reestimate: Annual recalculation of estimated lifetime loan subsidy costs for each cohort, incorporating updated information on actual loan performance and revised assumptions about future cash flows. However, current estimates for this group of loan cohorts are based predominantly on forecasted cash flow data derived from assumptions about future loan performance.on actual cash flows for these loans becomes available, subsidy cost estimates will change. This will not be known with certainty until all cash flows have been recorded after As more information loans have been repaid or discharged—which may be as many as 40 years from when the loans were originally disbursed. Past GAO work has found that the difference, or “spread,” between the borrower interest rate and government’s cost of borrowing was a key factor in determining whether there is a positive or negative subsidy for Direct Loans. During this time, the government’s cost of borrowing fell more sharply than borrower interest rates. Subsidy Cost Estimates Fluctuate over Time Due to Regularly-Updated Data
Education’s estimates of lifetime loan subsidy costs have varied over time based on updated information recognized during the reestimate process. Through the reestimate process, subsidy cost estimates are updated for each loan cohort to account for information on actual loan performance and the government’s cost of borrowing.2012 have experienced both downward and upward adjustments to the estimated subsidy costs over time due to these reestimates. For example, the 2008 loan cohort was estimated to generate as much as $9.09 in subsidy income per $100 of loan disbursements based on the reestimate information published in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget. This represents a swing of $9.33 per $100 of loan disbursements. Volatility in subsidy cost estimates for a given cohort is generally expected to decrease over time. Because Direct Loan Costs Are Sensitive to Certain Variables, Borrower Interest Rates Cannot Be Set in Advance to Consistently Balance Government Revenue with Costs
Direct Loan Costs Are More Sensitive to Changes in Government Borrowing Costs than to Other Selected Variables
Direct Loan costs fluctuate according to changes in certain variables, with varying levels of sensitivity. In particular, Direct Loan costs are sensitive to changes in the government’s cost of borrowing, which changes for each cohort of loans depending on economic conditions and the characteristics of the cohort.information on loan performance that results in fluctuations in the cost estimates themselves, means that total Direct Loan costs cannot be known with certainty until actual data are available at the end of the loans’ life cycle—a process which takes decades. Borrower Interest Rates Cannot Be Set in Advance to Consistently Balance Government Revenue with Direct Loan Costs
Since the total costs associated with Direct Loans, including administrative and subsidy costs, are in flux until actual data are recorded through the end of the loans’ life cycle, the point at which the government covers loan costs without generating additional revenue—known as the breakeven point—may also change throughout the life cycle of the loans until actual information is available. As a result, borrower interest rates that are needed to cover Direct Loan costs at one time may not cover costs at another time. To determine whether or not the conditions that would break even for one cohort would also break even for another cohort under different circumstances, we experimented with certain aspects of the borrower interest rate for two separate cohort years. Specifically, we altered the index (the base market rate that student loan interest rates are pegged to), the mark-up rate (the percentage-point increase over the base rate that students are charged), and the differences in the mark-up rates among loan types. We looked at how these changes to the borrower rates would affect total Direct Loan costs, taking into account both administrative and subsidy costs. Importantly, while changing the index and mark-up rates helped achieve a temporary breakeven point for the 2014 cohort, the same borrower rate scenarios did not yield the same results when applied to the 2019 cohort. A difference in outcome for these two cohorts emerges because Direct Loan costs are sensitive to variables that are projected to look very different for 2019 than they did for 2014. Indeed, when we changed the index and mark-up rates for the 2019 cohort in the same manner that approximated a breakeven point for the 2014 cohort, the resulting estimates show the government incurring costs that would not be covered by revenues from Direct Loans. However, available information illustrates the difficulties of accurately predicting what these program costs will be, and how much borrowers should ultimately be charged to achieve a particular outcome. Specifically, fluctuations in the actual and expected costs of the student loan program over time make it impractical to establish a particular borrower interest rate that would consistently break even. Similarly, making frequent changes to the borrower interest rate could help program costs more closely match revenue in the short term, but it may confuse potential borrowers and complicate efforts to make the program transparent to students. In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, Education agreed with our findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) how the costs of administering the Direct Loan program have varied in recent years, (2) how estimated subsidy costs associated with the Direct Loan program have varied in recent years, and (3) how changes in different variables influence the overall cost of the Direct Loan program and the borrower interest rate needed to cover those costs. This is referred to as a breakeven analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal student loans issued under the Direct Loan program play a key role in ensuring access to higher education for millions of students. The costs of the program to the government include administrative costs like loan servicing. They also include subsidy costs, which are the estimated long-term costs to the government of providing loans, such as the government’s cost of borrowing and defaults on loans. Some have questioned whether borrower interest rates can be more precisely set to cover these costs without generating excess federal income. The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013 required GAO to provide information on issues related to the cost of federal student loans.
This report addresses (1) how the costs of administering the Direct Loan program have varied in recent years, (2) how estimated subsidy costs have varied in recent years, and (3) how changes in different variables influence the overall cost of the program and the borrower interest rate needed to cover those costs.
GAO reviewed Direct Loan administrative cost data and analyzed subsidy cost data from Education for fiscal years 2007 through 2012, which are presented in nominal dollars throughout the report. In addition, GAO worked with Education to illustrate how changes in variables such as government borrowing costs could affect Direct Loan subsidy costs. GAO also examined whether borrower rates could be set so the government could cover Direct Loan costs without generating excess revenue (known as a breakeven analysis). GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, guidance, and reports; and interviewed Education and other agency officials.
GAO does not make recommendations in this report. The Department of Education agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
Total Direct Loan administrative costs grew from $314 million to $864 million from fiscal years 2007 to 2012, but federal costs per borrower have generally remained steady or fallen. The increase in total administrative costs largely results from an increase of over 300 percent in the number of Direct Loans during that same time period. One key factor contributing to this loan volume increase was a law that ended student loan originations under a federally guaranteed loan program resulting in new originations being made under the Direct Loan program. Loan servicing--which includes activities like counseling borrowers on selecting repayment plans, processing payments, and collecting on loans in delinquent status--is the largest category of administrative costs, comprising 63 percent of total Direct Loan administrative costs in fiscal year 2012. While total administrative costs have increased, costs per borrower and other unit costs have remained steady or declined. For example, the servicing cost per borrower has remained roughly $25 over the six-year period we examined. However, a number of factors, including a new payment structure for loan servicing contracts to reward servicers for keeping more borrowers in repayment status, have created some uncertainty about the servicing cost per borrower in coming years.
Separate from administrative costs, estimated subsidy costs vary by loan cohort--a group of loans made in a single fiscal year--and change over time. Based on the Department of Education's (Education) recent estimates, the government would generate subsidy income for the 2007 to 2012 Direct Loan cohorts as a group. However, estimates will change, because current subsidy cost estimates for these cohorts are based predominantly on assumptions about future revenue and costs. Actual subsidy costs will not be known until all cash flows have been recorded, generally after loans have been repaid. This may be as many as 40 years from when the loans were originally disbursed, because many borrowers do not begin repayment until after leaving school, and some face economic hardships that extend their payment periods. Subsidy cost estimates fluctuate over time due to the incorporation of updated data on actual loan performance and the government's cost of borrowing, as well as revised assumptions about future revenue and costs, through the annual reestimate process. As a result, there can be wide variations in the estimated subsidy costs for a given cohort over time. For example, the 2008 loan cohort was estimated to generate $9.09 of subsidy income per $100 of loan disbursements in one year, but in the next year that same cohort had an estimated subsidy cost of 24 cents per $100 of loan disbursements, a swing of $9.33. Volatility in subsidy cost estimates for a given cohort is generally expected to decrease over time as more actual loan performance data become available.
Because Direct Loan costs fluctuate with changes in certain variables, borrower interest rates cannot be set in advance to balance government revenue with costs consistently over the life of the loans. In a simulation of how loan costs respond to changes in selected variables, the costs were highly sensitive to changes in the government's cost of borrowing. This, coupled with cost estimates regularly updated to reflect loan performance data, means the total costs associated with Direct Loans are in flux until updates are recorded through the end of the loans' life cycle, which takes several decades. Therefore, the borrower interest rates that would generate revenue to exactly cover total loan costs—known as breaking even—would change over time. To determine whether or not a set of conditions that would break even for one cohort would also break even for another cohort under different circumstances, GAO used data forecasted for future years to experiment with certain aspects of the borrower interest rate for two separate cohort years.
• GAO selected cohort years 2014 and 2019 because economic conditions may be different several years apart.
• For these cohorts, the following three aspects of the borrower interest rate were altered: the index (the base market rate to which student loan interest rates are pegged), the mark-up rate (the percentage-point increase over the base rate that students are charged), and the differences in the mark-up rates among loan types, including undergraduate, graduate student, and parent loans.
• GAO looked at how these changes to the borrower rates would affect total government costs, taking into account both administrative and subsidy costs.
• Changing the index and mark-up rates helped achieve a breakeven point based on current cost estimates for the 2014 cohort; however, cost estimates for this cohort will change as updated data become available over the life of the loans.
• When GAO applied the same index and mark-up rates that temporarily resulted in a breakeven point for the 2014 cohort to the 2019 cohort, it resulted in a net cost to the government.
• The difference in outcome for these two cohorts is because Direct Loan costs are sensitive to variables, such as government borrowing costs, that are projected to look very different for 2019 than they did for 2014.
• As illustrated in the simulation, the borrower interest rates that are needed to cover costs at one point in time may not be effective at another point in time and cannot be precisely determined in advance to enable the government to break even consistently.
Available information on Direct Loan costs illustrates the difficulties of accurately predicting what these program costs will be, and how much borrowers should ultimately be charged to achieve a particular outcome. Specifically, fluctuations in the actual and expected costs of the student loan program over time make it challenging to target a particular borrower interest rate that would consistently break even. Making frequent changes to the borrower interest rate could help program costs more closely match revenues in the short term, but it could confuse potential borrowers and complicate efforts to make the program transparent to students. |
gao_GAO-04-277 | gao_GAO-04-277_0 | Fishery managers may also help protect communities by adopting program rules aimed at protecting certain groups of fishery participants. For facilitating new entry into IFQ fisheries, the methods principally fall into three categories: (1) adopting quota transfer rules that promote new entry, (2) setting aside quota for new entrants, and (3) providing economic assistance to potential new entrants. Allowing communities to hold quota is the easiest and most direct way under an IFQ program to help protect fishing communities. According to fishery experts and participants, fishery managers can give each community control over how to use the quota in ways that protect the community’s economic viability, such as selling or leasing quota to fishermen who reside in the community. Requiring quota holders to be on their vessels. Community Protection and New Entry Methods Raise a Variety of Issues That Require Consideration
In considering methods to protect communities and facilitate new entry into IFQ fisheries, fishery managers face issues about efficiency, fairness, and design and implementation. Community protection and new entry methods are designed to achieve social objectives, but achieving these objectives may undermine economic efficiency, one of the primary benefits of an IFQ program, and raise questions of equity. However, given the particular circumstances of the fishery and the goals of the IFQ program overall, it is unlikely that any single method can protect every type of fishing community or facilitate new entry into every IFQ fishery. Therefore, fishery managers have to decide how much economic efficiency they are willing to sacrifice to protect communities or facilitate new entry. Furthermore, methods that propose allocating quota to communities or adopting rules aimed at making quota more available or affordable to a certain group of fishermen can appear unfair to those who did not benefit and could result in legal challenges. Defining community can be challenging because communities can be defined in many ways. Economic assistance methods are designed to provide new entrants with the capital needed to purchase quota and are the most direct method of helping new entrants. Evaluations of Community Protection and New Entry Methods Would Enable Managers to Determine Their Effectiveness
Fishery managers have not conducted comprehensive evaluations of how IFQ programs protect communities or facilitate new entry, because few IFQ programs were designed with community protection or new entry as objectives. In comparing the key features of IFQ programs and these U.S. fishery cooperatives, we identified the advantages and disadvantages of each approach in key areas. IFQ Programs and Fishery Cooperatives Differ in Several Respects
While both IFQ programs and fishery cooperatives can vary widely, the general characteristics of IFQ programs and fishery cooperatives differ in the areas of regulatory and management framework, number of participants, quota allocation and transfer, and monitoring and enforcement. IFQ programs have greater stability than fishery cooperatives because they are established and terminated by federal regulations, while cooperatives are established and terminated by voluntary contractual agreements. Finally, regarding monitoring and enforcement, IFQ programs are viewed as being more difficult for NMFS to administer than fishery cooperatives, because NMFS must monitor individual participants for compliance with program rules, such as quota accumulation and catch limits. In contrast, cooperatives are viewed as being simpler for NMFS to monitor and enforce, because NMFS monitors one entity—the cooperative—and the cooperative is responsible for monitoring the actions of its members. For this report, we reviewed foreign and domestic quota programs and fishery cooperatives to determine (1) the methods available for protecting the economic viability of fishing communities and facilitating new entry into IFQ fisheries, (2) the key issues raised by community protection and new entry methods, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the IFQ system and the fishery cooperative approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist in deliberations on individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs, GAO determined (1) the methods available for protecting the economic viability of fishing communities and facilitating new entry into IFQ fisheries, (2) the key issues faced by fishery managers in protecting communities and facilitating new entry, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the IFQ system and the fishery cooperative approach.
What GAO Found
Several methods are available for protecting the economic viability of fishing communities and facilitating new entry into IFQ fisheries. The easiest and most direct way to help protect communities under an IFQ program is to allow the communities themselves to hold quota. Fishery managers can also help communities by adopting rules aimed at protecting certain groups of fishery participants. Methods for facilitating new entry principally fall into three categories: (1) adopting transfer rules on selling or leasing quota that help make quota more available and affordable to new entrants; (2) setting aside quota for new entrants; and (3) providing economic assistance, such as loans and subsidies, to new entrants. In considering methods to protect communities and facilitate new entry into IFQ fisheries, fishery managers face issues of efficiency and fairness, as well as design and implementation. Community protection and new entry methods are designed to achieve social objectives, but realizing these objectives may undermine economic efficiency and raise questions of equity. For example, allowing communities to hold quota may result in a loss of economic efficiency because communities may not have the knowledge and skills to manage the quota effectively. Similarly, rules to protect communities or facilitate new entry may appear to favor one group of fishermen over another. Furthermore, community protection and new entry methods raise a number of design and implementation challenges. For example, according to fishery experts, defining a community can be challenging because communities can be defined in geographic and nongeographic ways. Similarly, loans or grants may help provide new entrants with the capital needed to purchase quota, but they may also contribute to further quota price increases. Given the various issues that fishery managers face in developing community protection and new entry methods, it is unlikely that any single method can protect every type of fishing community or facilitate new entry into every IFQ fishery. Deciding which method(s) to use is made more challenging because fishery managers have not conducted comprehensive evaluations of how IFQ programs protect communities or facilitate new entry. In comparing the key features of IFQ programs and U.S. fishery cooperatives, we found that each approach has advantages and disadvantages in terms of regulatory and management framework, number of participants, quota allocation and transfer, and monitoring and enforcement. Specifically, in terms of regulatory and management framework, IFQ programs have greater stability than cooperatives because they are established by federal regulations, while cooperatives are voluntary contractual arrangements. In terms of quota allocation and transfer, IFQ programs are open in that they allow the transfer of quota to new entrants, whereas cooperatives are exclusive by contractual arrangement among members. In terms of monitoring and enforcement, IFQ programs are viewed as being more difficult to administer, because NMFS must monitor individual participants, while cooperatives are viewed to be simpler for NMFS to administer, because NMFS monitors only one entity--the cooperative. For some fisheries, a combined approach may be beneficial. For example, a cooperative of IFQ quota holders can combine an IFQ program's stability with a cooperative's collaboration to help manage the fishery. |
gao_GAO-03-741T | gao_GAO-03-741T_0 | As a result, from a conceptual standpoint, we strongly support the need to expand broad banding approaches and pay for performance-based systems in the federal government. However, moving too quickly or prematurely at DOD or elsewhere can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Thus, while it is imperative that we take steps to better link employee pay to performance across the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether or not such efforts are successful. In our view, one key need is to modernize performance management systems in executive agencies so that they are capable of adequately supporting more performance-based pay and other personnel decisions. Unfortunately, based on GAO’s past work, most existing federal performance appraisal systems, including a vast majority of DOD’s systems, are not designed to support a meaningful performance-based pay system. Specifically, an agency would have to demonstrate, and OPM would have to certify, that a modern, effective, credible, and, as appropriate, validated performance management system with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms, is in place to support more performance-based pay and related personnel decisions, before the agency could implement a new system. Defense civilian personnel, among other things, develop policy, provide intelligence, manage finances, and acquire and maintain weapon systems. NSPS is intended to be a major component of DOD’s efforts to more strategically manage its workforce and respond to current and emerging challenges. The NSPS would include provisions intended to ensure collaboration with employee representatives in the planning, development, and implementation of a human resources management system. As discussed at the Civil Service and Agency Organization Subcommittee, Committee on Government Reform hearing on Tuesday, direct employee involvement in the development of the NSPS legislative proposal has thus far been limited. The NSPS proposal would provide DOD with a number of broad authorities related to rightsizing and organizational alignment. Concluding Observations
In summary, many of the basic principles underlying DOD’s civilian human capital proposals have merit and deserve serious consideration. The DOD proposal has significant precedent-setting implications for the human capital area in government in general, and for OPM in particular. The DOD civilian human capital proposal raises several critical questions both for DOD as well as for governmentwide policies and approaches. Should DOD and/or other federal agencies be granted broad-based exemptions from existing law, and if so, on what basis? Does DOD have the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of the new authorities? Our work has shown that while progress is being made, additional efforts are needed by DOD to integrate its human capital planning process with the department’s program goals and mission. As I have suggested, Congress should consider providing governmentwide broad banding and pay for performance authorities that DOD and other federal agencies can use provided they can demonstrate that they have a performance management system in place that meets certain statutory standards and can be certified to by a qualified and independent party, such as OPM. Congress should also consider establishing a governmentwide fund whereby agencies, based on a sound business case, could apply for funds to modernize their performance management systems and ensure that those systems have adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. This would serve as a positive step to promote high- performing organizations throughout the federal government while avoiding further fragmentation within the executive branch in critical human capital policies and approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is in the midst of a major transformation effort including a number of initiatives to transform its forces and improve its business operations. DOD's legislative initiative would provide for major changes in civilian and military human capital management, make major adjustments in the DOD acquisition process, affect DOD's organization structure, and change DOD's reporting requirements to Congress, among other things. DOD's proposed National Security Personnel System (NSPS) would provide for wide-ranging changes in DOD's civilian personnel pay and performance management, collective bargaining, rightsizing, and a variety of other human capital areas. The NSPS would enable DOD to develop and implement a consistent DOD-wide civilian personnel system. This testimony provides GAO's preliminary observations on aspects of DOD's legislative proposal to make changes to its civilian personnel system and discusses the implications of such changes for governmentwide human capital reform. This testimony summarizes many of the issues discussed in detail before the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives on April 29, 2003.
What GAO Found
Many of the basic principles underlying DOD's civilian human capital proposal have merit and deserve serious consideration. The federal personnel system is clearly broken in critical respects--designed for a time and workforce of an earlier era and not able to meet the needs and challenges of our current rapidly changing and knowledge-based environment. DOD's proposal recognizes that, as GAO has stated and the experiences of leading public sector organizations here and abroad have found, strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious government transformation effort. More generally, from a conceptual standpoint, GAO strongly supports the need to expand broad banding and pay for performance-based systems in the federal government. However, moving too quickly or prematurely at DOD or elsewhere, can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Thus, while it is imperative that we take steps to better link employee pay and other personnel decisions to performance across the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done, can make all the difference in whether or not we are successful. One key need is to modernize performance management systems in executive agencies so that they are capable of supporting more performance-based pay and other personnel decisions. Unfortunately, based on GAO's past work, most existing federal performance appraisal systems, including a vast majority of DOD's systems, are not currently designed to support a meaningful performance-based pay system. The critical questions to consider are: should DOD and/or other agencies be granted broad-based exemptions from existing law, and if so, on what basis? Do DOD and other agencies have the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of any new authorities? This institutional infrastructure includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that integrates the agency's human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its program goals and mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and, importantly, a set of adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation of a new system. In GAO's view, as an alternative to DOD's proposed approach, Congress should consider providing governmentwide broad banding and pay for performance authorities that DOD and other federal agencies can use provided they can demonstrate that they have a performance management system in place that meets certain statutory standards, that can be certified to by a qualified and independent party, such as OPM, within prescribed timeframes. Congress should also consider establishing a governmentwide fund whereby agencies, based on a sound business case, could apply for funding to modernize their performance management systems and ensure that those systems have adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. This approach would serve as a positive step to promote high-performing organizations throughout the federal government while avoiding further human capital policy fragmentation. |
gao_NSIAD-96-60 | gao_NSIAD-96-60_0 | To determine whether DOD is providing cost-effective and efficient transportation and to identify what factors drive transportation costs, we analyzed data on the current USTRANSCOM and component command structure including costs and number of DOD transportation personnel. To determine whether any actions are necessary to ensure a successful reengineering of defense transportation that will improve efficiency and reduce costs, we reviewed data and reports on USTRANSCOM and Office of the Secretary of Defense reengineering efforts, plans, and status; reviewed and analyzed reports regarding successful reengineering techniques and guidelines for assessing reengineering efforts; contacted and interviewed various defense transportation system commercial cargo carriers and customers, including representatives of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Air Force-Europe, the U.S. Army-Europe, the U.S. Central Command USTRANSCOM Liaison Officer, and the Army-Air Force Exchange Service. However, it is the total cost that the customer pays that is of concern. Major Factors That Drive High Defense Transportation Costs
Major factors that drive USTRANSCOM’s defense transportation costs higher are (1) USTRANSCOM’s fragmented and inefficient organizational structure and management processes and (2) the need to maintain a mobilization capability. Much of DOD cargo today moves intermodally, by air, land, and sea transport. However, USTRANSCOM retains an outdated and inefficient, modally oriented, organizational structure, with many collocated facilities. Moreover, the fragmentation adds more people to the organizational structure than needed. Customers receive a bill from each component command for each mode of transportation, rather than a single intermodal bill from only one component. Separate billing systems are inefficient, adding people and cost, and confusing to customers who pay for the inefficiencies. Table 3.1 shows a breakdown by component command. As discussed earlier, MTMC operates an extensive port structure, supported by more than 1,200 staff and costing over $70 million for salaries and wages alone in fiscal year 1994. While this structure may be needed to provide a mobilization capability, it may not be necessary to move cargo during peacetime. These ports are largely unused during peacetime because cargo moves by commercial carriers through commercial ports, although many of the personnel are actively engaged in documenting shipments and other management areas. However, resulting contributed revenue does not cover the costs of operations due to the mobilization requirement. The study found that the defense transportation system continued to be replete with redundant organizational structure and inefficient and costly processes. However, both efforts postpone any actions related to organizational structure issues until after process changes are completed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing cost-effective and efficient transportation operations, focusing on: (1) the factors that increase DOD transportation costs; and (2) DOD efforts to reengineer its transportation operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) defense transportation costs are substantially higher than necessary; (2) DOD customers frequently pay prices for transportation services that are double or triple the cost of the basic transportation; (3) key factors driving these costs are the U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) fragmented and inefficient organizational structure and management processes, and the need to maintain a mobilization capability; (4) much of defense cargo today moves intermodally, by air, land, and sea transport, but USTRANSCOM retains an outdated and inefficient, modally oriented, organizational structure, with many collocated facilities; (5) each separate component command incurs operational and support costs, and customers receive bills from each component command for each mode of transportation, rather than a single intermodal bill from only one component; (6) separate billing systems are inefficient, adding people and costs, and confusing to customers who pay for the inefficiencies; (7) USTRANSCOM maintains an extensive water port structure, employing more than 1,200 people, at a cost in fiscal year 1994 of over $70 million; (8) the ports are largely unused during peacetime because most cargo moves commercially, but the port facilities do provide capacity that may be needed for a wartime surge; (9) DOD's guidance for handling the cost of maintaining a mobilization capability doe not cover all situations in which USTRANSCOM components charge their customers for costs that appear to be for mobilization requirements; (10) while DOD has recently begun reengineering the defense transportation system to improve its processes and reduce costs, it is not concurrently looking at how the organizational structure should be redesigned; (11) DOD will address organizational structure only after the process changes have been completed; and (12) GAO's work shows that the inefficiency of the organizational structure has been a long-standing issue in addressing the effectiveness of defense transportation, and waiting to address this issue until process improvements are made will likely represent a significant barrier to achieving the full benefits of the reengineering efforts. |
gao_GAO-16-550T | gao_GAO-16-550T_0 | Palau Compact
The U.S. and Palau governments concluded their Compact of Free Association in 1986, and the compact entered into force on October 1, 1994. In addition, U.S. agencies—the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Interior, among others—provided assistance to Palau through discretionary federal programs as authorized by U.S. legislation and with appropriations from Congress. FSM and RMI Compacts
1986 Compact
The 1986 Compact of Free Association between the United States, the FSM, and the RMI provided a framework for the United States to work toward achieving its three main goals: (1) to secure self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency, and (3) to ensure certain national security rights for all of the parties. Compact Migration
The compacts provide for FAS citizens to enter and reside indefinitely in the United States, including its territories, without regard to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s visa and labor certification requirements. In the 2003 amended compacts’ enabling legislation, Congress authorized and appropriated $30 million annually for 20 years for grants to Guam, Hawaii, the CNMI, and American Samoa, which it deemed affected jurisdictions, and authorized additional appropriations. Proposed Legislation Would Change Palau Assistance Schedule and Improve Prospects for Compact Trust Fund
If enacted, S. 2610 would approve, provide funding for, and make modifications to the September 2010 agreement between the governments of the United States and Palau regarding their compact. This increase would be in line with the lower than scheduled amount of annual U.S. assistance that has been provided to Palau since 2011. Specifically, Congress has not passed legislation to approve the agreement, and Interior has provided Palau with a total of $78.88 million in direct economic assistance from annual appropriations— $13.147 million in each fiscal year from 2011 through 2016. S. 2610 would make the following changes to the contribution schedule:
Rescheduling U.S. contributions to Palau’s trust fund, with a $20 million contribution in fiscal year 2017, $2 million annually through fiscal year 2022, and $250,000 in fiscal year 2023. Lack of reliable performance data. According to Census enumerations of migrants in three affected jurisdictions—Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI—the total number of compact migrants in those jurisdictions increased from about 21,000, estimated in the 2003 enumeration, to about 35,000, estimated in the 2013 enumeration (see fig. Three Affected Jurisdictions Report That Cost Impacts Far Exceed Compact Impact Grants
In fiscal years 2004 through 2016, affected jurisdictions received approximately $409 million in compact impact grants to aid in defraying their costs due to the residence of compact migrants. 5 shows the affected jurisdictions’ reported annual costs of services to compact migrants.) We have previously found that the three affected jurisdictions’ cost estimates contained a number of limitations with regard to accuracy, adequate documentation, and comprehensiveness. Compact Trust Fund Contributions and Grants to the Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands
Figure 6 shows the annually decreasing U.S. grant funding to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and increasing U.S. contributions to the FSM’s and the RMI’s compact trust funds in fiscal years 2004 through 2023. Appendix III: U.S. Assistance to Palau as Outlined in 2010 Agreement and Proposed in Senate Bill 2610
Senate Bill 2610 (S. 2610) would modify the schedule of U.S. assistance to Palau specified in the 2010 agreement between the U.S. and Palau governments, which has not been implemented. Table 4 shows the assistance schedule for fiscal years 2011 through 2024 outlined in the 2010 agreement. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. compacts with the FSM and the RMI entered into force in 1986 and were amended in 2003. A compact with Palau entered into force in 1994. Legislation pending before the Senate would approve, provide funding for, and make modifications to a 2010 agreement between the U.S. and Palau governments regarding their compact.
Under the compacts, the United States provides each country with, among other things, economic assistance—including grants and contributions to a trust fund; access to certain federal services and programs; and permission for citizens of the three countries to migrate to the United States and its territories without regard to visa and labor certification requirements. Guam, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, which are designated in law as jurisdictions affected by compact migration, receive grants to aid in defraying the cost of services to migrants.
This testimony examines (1) the potential impact of the proposed legislation approving the 2010 Palau agreement, (2) challenges affecting implementation of the FSM and RMI compacts, and (3) migration from the FSM, RMI, and Palau and its impacts on U.S. areas. For this statement, GAO summarized previous reports issued in 2007 through 2013 and incorporated updated information from Palau, the Department of the Interior, and affected jurisdictions. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. GAO has made recommendations in its prior reports, some of which have not yet been addressed.
What GAO Found
If enacted, Senate Bill 2610 (S. 2610) would change the schedule for U.S. assistance to the Republic of Palau and improve prospects for Palau's compact trust fund. S. 2610 would approve a 2010 agreement between the U.S. and Palau governments and provide annual assistance to Palau through 2024. Congress has not approved legislation to implement the 2010 agreement, which scheduled $216 million in U.S. assistance for fiscal years 2011 through 2024. Since 2011, the United States has provided $79 million in economic assistance to Palau through annual appropriations. However, this amount was less than anticipated under the agreement and has not included trust fund contributions. S. 2610 would modify the agreement schedule to provide the remaining $137 million in fiscal years 2017 through 2024, including a $20 million trust fund contribution in 2017 and smaller contributions in later years (see fig.).
U.S. Assistance to Palau Provided in Fiscal Years 2011-2016 and Proposed by Senate Bill 2610 for Fiscal Years 2017-2024
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) face challenges to achieving the compact goals of economic growth and self-sufficiency. GAO previously found that neither country has made significant progress on reforms and compact implementation has been characterized by unreliable performance data and by accountability and oversight challenges.
GAO has previously reported on the growth of migrant populations from Palau, the FSM, and RMI in U.S. areas as well as the reported impacts of these compact migrants. In Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands—areas Congress has deemed affected jurisdictions—compact migrants increased from about 21,000 in 2003 to about 35,000 in 2013. In fiscal years 2004 through 2016, the Department of the Interior provided approximately $409 million to affected jurisdictions to aid in defraying costs, such as for education and health services, attributable to compact migrants. In contrast, affected jurisdictions estimated costs of $2.1 billion for these services in 2003 through 2014. However, GAO has noted that these estimates have limitations related to accuracy, documentation, and comprehensiveness. |
gao_GAO-07-652 | gao_GAO-07-652_0 | The strategy identified four lead agencies, each responsible for developing a plan to implement a component of the strategy: USDA is responsible for the veterinary response, HHS is responsible for the medical response, the Department of State is responsible for international activities, and DHS is responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination. For example, the department has put mechanisms in place to prevent the importation of infected poultry and poultry products. In addition, it has developed several surveillance programs to detect AI. Moreover, in the event outbreaks do occur, USDA is developing written response plans and has begun preliminary exercises to test aspects of these plans with federal, state, local, and industry partners. For example, the Agricultural Research Service is testing currently available poultry AI vaccines to determine if they are protective against highly pathogenic H5N1; developing new vaccines to protect against AI viruses that can be efficiently administered to large number of birds at once, such as through aerosol; enhancing diagnostic tools to allow for rapid testing of wild bird samples; sequencing the genomes—a complete set of hereditary factors— of 1,000 AI viruses in order to better understand the epidemiology, or causes, of the diseases; and conducting experiments in birds to better understand how the virus causes disease and death in some domestic poultry and wild birds but not in others. Currently, USDA is not planning for the lead coordinating role that DHS would assume in certain outbreak emergencies. Our prior work has shown that roles and responsibilities at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making during an emergency. USDA Has Not Identified Response Capabilities for Highly Pathogenic AI
DHS and state officials have expressed concern that USDA’s plans for highly pathogenic AI do not identify the capabilities needed to carry out the tasks associated with an outbreak scenario—that is, the entities responsible for carrying out the tasks, the specific resources needed, and the source of those resources (as described in fig. Incomplete State Plans Could Slow Response
USDA officials told us, and our own review corroborated, that some state plans for addressing outbreaks of highly pathogenic AI are lacking important components that could facilitate rapid containment of the virus (see table 2). USDA and state officials told us there are several reasons why planning at the state level is not more complete. Unresolved Issues Could Delay Response
We have identified several unresolved issues that, if not addressed, could hinder response efforts. According to USDA, state, and industry officials from all five states that we visited, containing an outbreak among backyard birds remains a challenge because their numbers and location are still unknown. Antiviral medication. USDA has not estimated the amount of antiviral medication that it would need in the event of an outbreak of highly pathogenic AI or resolved how to provide such supplies within the first 24 hours of an outbreak. Scope and Methodology
To describe the steps that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken to prepare for outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) in domestic poultry, we reviewed statutes, regulations, directives, and national planning documents that broadly define USDA’s role in an animal health or other national emergency. | Why GAO Did This Study
A highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza (AI) has spread to nearly 60 countries over the past few years, killing millions of birds and more than 170 humans. Controlling the virus in poultry is key to reducing the risk of a human pandemic. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for planning for AI outbreaks in poultry, with states' assistance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating the federal response for certain emergencies and developing policy documents that serve as a basis for national emergency planning. GAO described the steps USDA is taking to prepare for highly pathogenic AI and identified key challenges. GAO reviewed response plans, statutes, and regulations; visited poultry operations; interviewed federal, state, and industry officials in five states that experienced outbreaks; and reviewed 19 state plans.
What GAO Found
USDA is taking important steps to prepare for highly pathogenic AI. For example, the department has established mechanisms to prevent infected poultry and products from being imported and has developed several surveillance programs to detect AI. In addition, USDA is developing response plans specific to highly pathogenic AI and has begun conducting exercises to test these plans. Moreover, USDA is building a National Veterinary Stockpile to maintain critical supplies, including equipment to protect responders. Finally, USDA has launched various AI research projects, including one to explore why the virus causes disease and death in some domestic poultry and wild birds but not in others. While USDA has made important strides, incomplete planning at the federal and state levels, as well as several unresolved issues, could slow response. First, USDA is not planning for the lead coordinating role that DHS would assume if an outbreak among poultry occurred that is sufficient in scope to warrant various federal disaster declarations. GAO's prior work has shown that roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined and understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Moreover, USDA response plans do not identify the capabilities needed to carry out the critical tasks associated with an outbreak scenario--that is, the entities responsible for carrying them out, the resources needed, and the provider of those resources. Furthermore, some state plans lack important components that could facilitate rapid AI containment, which is problematic because states typically lead initial response efforts. Finally, there are several unresolved issues that, absent advance consideration, could hinder response. For example, controlling an outbreak among birds raised in backyards, such as for hobby, remains particularly difficult because federal and state officials generally do not know the numbers and locations of these birds. In addition, USDA has not estimated the amount of antiviral medication that it would need during an outbreak or resolved how to provide such supplies in a timely manner. According to federal guidance, poultry workers responding to an outbreak of highly pathogenic AI should take antiviral medication to protect them from infection. |
gao_GAO-10-857T | gao_GAO-10-857T_0 | Considerable Work Remains at Most Nonfederal NPL Sites with Unacceptable or Unknown Human Exposure, and Some Site Cleanups Have Not Been Funded at the Most Efficient Level
As detailed in our report, over 60 percent of the 75 nonfederal NPL sites with unacceptable human exposure have all or more than half of the work remaining to complete remedial construction. According to EPA regional officials’ responses to our survey, EPA has plans to control human exposure at all of the 75 sites with unacceptable human exposure; however, our survey results also show that EPA regional officials expect 41 of the sites to continue to have unacceptable exposure until fiscal year 2015 or later. Similarly, over 60 percent of the 164 nonfederal NPL sites with unknown human exposure have all or more than half of the work remaining to complete remedial construction, according to EPA regional officials’ responses to our survey. The majority of the sites with unknown human exposure that have all of the work remaining to complete construction are in the remedial investigation phase, which is when EPA usually determines a site’s human exposure status, according to EPA guidance. EPA may also designate a site as having unknown human exposure during the construction phase of work, or after a site has met the construction complete milestone, if new information suggests that there may be risk at the site, or if an investigation is under way to assess a potential exposure pathway not previously analyzed. Since CERCLA was passed in 1980 through the end of fiscal year 2009, EPA expended a total of $3 billion in constant 2009 dollars on the 75 sites with unacceptable exposure and $1.2 billion in constant 2009 dollars on the 164 sites where exposure is unknown, based on EPA data. EPA’s Costs for Conducting Remedial Construction at Nonfederal NPL Sites Will Likely Exceed Recent Funding Levels for These Activities
As we noted in our report, EPA’s annual costs to conduct remedial construction in the most efficient manner at nonfederal NPL sites for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may range from $335 million to $681 million, according to EPA regional officials’ estimates (see table 1). These estimates include EPA’s costs to conduct remedial actions at 142 of the 416 nonfederal sites that are not construction complete. For the remaining 274 sites, EPA regional officials were unable to provide cost estimates for 57 sites, expect responsible parties to fully fund remedial actions at 206 sites, and do not expect to incur additional costs to complete construction at 11 sites because these sites are already fully funded. These annual cost estimates for remedial construction at these sites exceed past annual funding allocations for such actions. For example, EPA regional officials’ cost estimates for remedial construction for the next 2 years—fiscal years 2011 and 2012—are $253 million to $414 million greater than the $267 million in annual funding that EPA allocated for remedial actions in fiscal year 2009. From fiscal years 2000 through 2009, EPA allocated $220 million to $267 million in annual funding for remedial actions. According to EPA headquarters officials, however, funds from additional sources—such as prior year funds, settlements with responsible parties, and state cost share agreements—may also be available to fund remedial construction from year to year. While the amount of funding available through these sources may vary substantially from year to year, according to EPA headquarters officials, approximately $123 to $199 million was available from additional sources for remedial actions in fiscal years 2007 through 2009. However, if these sites are not assessed and, if needed, listed on the NPL, some seriously contaminated hazardous waste sites with unacceptable human exposure may not be cleaned up. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the findings of our report on funding issues related to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund program. To protect human health and the environment from the effects of hazardous substances, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980, which established the Superfund program. Since 1980, EPA has identified more than 47,000 hazardous waste sites potentially requiring cleanup. As of the end of fiscal year 2009, 1,269 of the most seriously contaminated sites were included on EPA's National Priorities List (NPL): 1,111 nonfederal sites and 158 federal facilities. At the time of listing, EPA had determined that these sites posed relatively high risks to human health or the environment from releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, such as lead and polychlorinated biphenyl. These substances can cause a variety of health effects--such as birth defects, cancer, and developmental disorders--in people exposed to them. Of the nonfederal sites listed on the NPL at the end of fiscal year 2009, EPA identified 75 that have "unacceptable human exposure"--actual or reasonably expected exposure of an individual to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants at levels that present an unacceptable risk--to contaminants for people living, recreating, and/or working in the surrounding areas. In addition, another 164 of the sites listed on the NPL at the end of fiscal year 2009 may potentially pose serious risks since EPA is in the process of determining if there is unacceptable human exposure at these sites.
What GAO Found
Over 60 percent of the 75 nonfederal NPL sites with unacceptable human exposure have all or more than half of the work remaining to complete remedial construction. According to EPA regional officials' responses to our survey, EPA has plans to control human exposure at all of the 75 sites with unacceptable human exposure; however, our survey results also show that EPA regional officials expect 41 of the sites to continue to have unacceptable exposure until fiscal year 2015 or later. Similarly, over 60 percent of the 164 nonfederal NPL sites with unknown human exposure have all or more than half of the work remaining to complete remedial construction, according to EPA regional officials' responses to our survey. The majority of the sites with unknown human exposure that have all of the work remaining to complete construction are in the remedial investigation phase, which is when EPA usually determines a site's human exposure status, according to EPA guidance. EPA may also designate a site as having unknown human exposure during the construction phase of work, or after a site has met the construction complete milestone, if new information suggests that there may be risk at the site, or if an investigation is under way to assess a potential exposure pathway not previously analyzed. EPA's annual costs to conduct remedial construction in the most efficient manner at nonfederal NPL sites for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may range from $335 million to $681 million, according to EPA regional officials' estimates. These estimates include EPA's costs to conduct remedial actions at 142 of the 416 nonfederal sites that are not construction complete. For the remaining 274 sites, EPA regional officials were unable to provide cost estimates for 57 sites, expect responsible parties to fully fund remedial actions at 206 sites, and do not expect to incur additional costs to complete construction at 11 sites because these sites are already fully funded. These annual cost estimates for remedial construction at these sites exceed past annual funding allocations for such actions. For example, EPA regional officials' cost estimates for remedial construction for the next 2 years--fiscal years 2011 and 2012--are $253 million to $414 million greater than the $267 million in annual funding that EPA allocated for remedial actions in fiscal year 2009. From fiscal years 2000 through 2009, EPA allocated $220 million to $267 million in annual funding for remedial actions. According to EPA headquarters officials, however, funds from additional sources--such as prior year funds, settlements with responsible parties, and state cost share agreements--may also be available to fund remedial construction from year to year. While the amount of funding available through these sources may vary substantially from year to year, according to EPA headquarters officials, approximately $123 to $199 million was available from additional sources for remedial actions in fiscal years 2007 through 2009. |
gao_GAO-06-315 | gao_GAO-06-315_0 | The NDAA, passed in December 2002, required that VA and DOD implement two programs—JIF and DSS—to increase the amount of health care resource sharing taking place between VA and DOD. Although JIF and DSS Programs Experienced Start-up Challenges, More Than Half of the Projects Are Operational
While JIF projects experienced challenges caused by delays resulting from the initial absence of funding mechanisms and, in some cases, the need for additional acquisition and construction approvals, as of December 2005, 7 of 11 selected 2004 projects were operational. DSS also experienced challenges as some sites reported difficulty putting together project submission packages, noting confusion over the timelines and approval process as well as frustration with the amount of paperwork and rework required. Nonetheless, as of December 2005, 7 of the 8 DSS projects were operational. VA and DOD Have Taken Actions to Strengthen Health Care Resource Sharing, but Important Opportunities Remain
VA and DOD have taken steps to create interagency councils and workgroups to facilitate the sharing and collaboration of information, establish working relationships among their leaders, and develop communication channels to further health care resource sharing. However, JEC and HEC have not seized upon a number of opportunities to further collaboration and coordination. The two departments have also worked together to develop a Joint Strategic Plan outlining six goals. For example, during the course of our audit work, we found that JEC and HEC have not developed a system for jointly collecting, tracking, and monitoring information on the health care services that VA and DOD contract for from the private sector; directed that a joint nationwide market analysis be conducted that contains information on what the departments’ combined future workloads will be in the areas of services, facilities, and patient needs; disseminated in a timely manner the information or the tools developed by a congressionally required study (the Joint Assessment Study) for assessing collaboration and sharing opportunities; or established standardized inpatient reimbursement rates—initiatives that would be useful for maximizing health care resource-sharing opportunities and promoting systemwide cost savings and efficiencies. Such an approach could help VA and DOD achieve systemwide cost savings and efficiencies, as has been demonstrated at the local level where officials at certain sites compare their analyses and seek to exchange services from one another or possibly obtain better contract pricing through joint purchasing of services. However, the plan does not contain performance measures that are useful for evaluating how well the departments are achieving their health care resource-sharing goals. For example, the plan mentions 30 measures that could be used to assess the departments’ progress in sharing health care resources. We found there was variation in the rigor or specificity in the types of data to be collected or the analysis to be performed. However, while VA and DOD, through JEC and HEC, have created mechanisms that support the potential to increase collaboration, sharing, and coordination of management and oversight of health care resources and services, more can be done to capitalize on this relationship throughout the departments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further advance health care resource sharing within VA and DOD, the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense should direct JEC and HEC to take the following two actions: develop an evaluation plan for documenting and recording the reasons for the advantages and disadvantages of each DSS project, an activity that will assist VA and DOD in replicating successful projects systemwide, and develop performance measures that would be useful for determining the progress of their health care resource-sharing goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required that the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) implement programs referred to as the Joint Incentive Fund (JIF) and the Demonstration Site Selection (DSS) to increase health care resource sharing between the departments. The act requires GAO to report on (1) VA's and DOD's progress in implementing the programs. GAO also agreed with the committees of jurisdiction to report on (2) the actions taken by VA and DOD to strengthen resource sharing and opportunities to improve upon those actions and (3) whether VA and DOD performance measures are useful for evaluating progress toward achieving health care resource-sharing goals.
What GAO Found
VA and DOD are making progress in implementing two programs required by legislation in December 2002 to encourage health care resource sharing and collaboration--JIF and DSS. While JIF projects experienced challenges because of delays resulting from the initial absence of funding mechanisms and, in some cases, the need for additional acquisition and construction approvals, as of December 2005, 7 of 11 selected 2004 projects were operational. The DSS program also experienced challenges as some sites reported difficulty putting together project submission packages, noting confusion over the timelines and approval process as well as frustration with the amount of paperwork and rework required. Nonetheless, as of December 2005, 7 of the 8 DSS projects were operational. However, the Joint Executive Council (JEC) and Health Executive Council (HEC), VA and DOD entities established to facilitate collaboration and health care resource sharing between the departments, have not established a plan to measure and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of DSS projects--information that will be useful for determining if projects that produce cost savings or enhance health care delivery efficiencies can be replicated systemwide. VA and DOD are creating mechanisms that support the potential to increase collaboration, sharing, and coordination of management and oversight of health care resources and services. The departments have taken steps to create interagency councils and workgroups to facilitate collaboration and sharing of information, establish working relationships among their leaders, and develop communication channels to further health care resource sharing. In addition, the departments developed a Joint Strategic Plan outlining six goals. However, JEC and HEC have not seized upon a number of opportunities to further collaboration and coordination. For example, JEC and HEC have not developed a system for collecting and monitoring information on the health care services that each department contracts for from the private sector--such as individual VA medical center or military treatment facility contracts for dialysis, laboratory services, or magnetic resonance imaging. If such a system were in place, the departments could use it to identify services that could be exchanged from one another or possibly obtain better contract pricing through joint purchasing of services, thus promoting systemwide cost savings and efficiencies. Furthermore, JEC and HEC have not directed that a joint nationwide market analysis be conducted to obtain information on what their combined future workloads will be in the areas of services, facilities, and patient needs. VA and DOD lack performance measures that would be useful for evaluating how well they are achieving their health care resource-sharing goals. For example, of the 30 measures contained in the departments' joint strategic plan, 5 were not developed at the time the plan was issued and 11 lacked longitudinal information. For the remaining 14 that require periodic measurement, there was variation in the rigor or specificity in the types of data to be collected or the analysis to be performed. |
gao_GAO-04-571T | gao_GAO-04-571T_0 | If Energy determines that the worker was not employed by one of its facilities or did not have an illness that could be caused by exposure to toxic substances, the agency finds the claimant ineligible. Energy had begun processing of nearly 35 percent of cases, but processing had not yet begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. Energy Has Fully Processed about 6 Percent of Its Cases
During the first 2 ½ years of the program, ending December 31, 2003, Energy had fully processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 claims it received. However, the rate of increase in cases filed was not uniform across the 9 states with facilities that account for more than three-quarters of all cases. A Shortage of Qualified Physicians To Issue Determinations Delays Filing of Workers’ Compensation Claims And Claimants May Receive Inadequate Information To Prepare Them To Pursue These Claims
Energy was slow in implementing its initial case processing operation, but it is now processing enough cases so that there is a backlog of cases awaiting physician panel review. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce the backlog of cases. Energy and NIOSH officials have taken steps to expand the number of physicians who would qualify to serve on the panels and to recruit more physicians, including some willing to work full-time. Workers’ Compensation Claims For a Majority of Cases Are Not Likely to be Contested
The workers’ compensation claims for the majority of cases associated with major Energy facilities in 9 states are likely to have no challenges to their claims for state workers’ compensation benefits. Specifically, based on additional analysis of workers’ compensation programs and the different types of workers’ compensation coverage used by the major contractors, it appears that slightly more than half of the cases will potentially have a willing payer—that is, contractors that will not contest the claims for benefits as ordered by Energy. Another 25 percent of the cases, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers’ compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims and is currently processing several workers’ compensation claims without contesting them. The remaining 20 percent of cases in the 9 states we analyzed are likely to be contested. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. The estimates are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. In particular, the cost implications of these options for the federal government should be carefully considered in the context of the current federal fiscal environment. Options for Changing the Current Program
We identified four possible options for improving the likelihood of willing payers, some of which have been offered in proposed legislation. While not exhaustive, the options range from adding a federal benefit to the existing program for cases that lack a willing payer to addressing the willing payer issue as part of designing a new program that would allow policymakers to decide issues such as the eligibility criteria and the type and amount of benefits without being encumbered by existing program structures. Table 2 arrays the relevant issues to provide a framework for evaluating the range of options in a logical sequence. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (Energy) and its predecessor agencies and contractors have employed thousands of people in the nuclear weapons production complex. Some employees were exposed to toxic substances, including radioactive and hazardous materials, during this work, and many subsequently developed illnesses. Subtitle D of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 allows Energy to help its contractor employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to be caused by exposure to toxic substances in the course of employment at an Energy facility. Congress mandated that GAO study the effectiveness of the benefit program under Subtitle D of this Act. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work on this issue and focuses on four key areas: (1) the number, status, and characteristics of claims filed with Energy; (2) the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for these state benefits; (3) the extent to which there will be a "willing payer" of workers' compensation benefits, that is, an insurer who--by order from or agreement with Energy--will not contest these claims; and (4) a framework that could be used for evaluating possible options for changing the program.
What GAO Found
During the first 2 1/2 years of the program, ending December 31, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 cases that had been filed. Energy had begun processing of nearly 35 percent of cases, but processing had not yet begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. While Energy got off to a slow start in processing cases, it is now processing enough cases that there is a backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce this backlog, such as reducing the number of physicians needed for some panels. Nonetheless, a shortage of qualified physicians continues to constrain the agency's capacity to decide cases more quickly. Consequently, claimants will likely continue to experience lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers' compensation claims. GAO estimates that more than half of the cases associated with Energy facilities in 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of all Subtitle D cases filed are likely to have a willing payer of benefits. Another quarter of the cases in these 9 states, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers' compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims. However, the remaining 20 percent of cases lack willing payers and are likely to be contested, which means that many of these cases may be less likely to receive compensation. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. The estimates are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. In this testimony, GAO also provides a framework for evaluating potential options for changing the program to address the willing payer issue. This framework includes a range of issues that would help the Congress assess options if it chooses to change the current program. One of these issues in particular--the federal cost implications--should be carefully considered in the context of the current federal fiscal environment. |
gao_GGD-96-101 | gao_GGD-96-101_0 | 2)? • What evidence exists for and against establishing a centralized health care fraud database to enhance information sharing and support enforcement efforts (see ch. However, there are some related immunity provisions on the federal level. Immunity Protects Persons Who Report Suspected Fraud
Broadly viewed, public policy supports both encouraging private entities to participate in the investigation and prosecution of fraud and providing protection to innocent people against unsubstantiated allegations made in bad faith or with malice. For that reason, the Department of Health and Human Services will ordinarily request, and the Department of Justice will ordinarily agree, that the Department of Justice will defend, at its own expense, any Medicare contractor or employee of a contractor, who is sued in connection with activities undertaken within the scope of the Medicare contract.”
Further, the federal statutory immunity provision does not protect persons who report suspected fraud involving private sector insurance plans, even if the suspected fraud is reported to a federal agency such as the FBI or the U.S. 1320c-6(a) to provide immunity for, among other things, “health plans sharing information in good faith and without malice with any other health plan with respect to matters relating to health care fraud detection, investigation and prosecution.”
Industry and Law Enforcement Officials Generally Favor Broad Federal Immunity Legislation With Appropriate Safeguards
Industry organizations, such as NHCAA and the Health Insurance Association of America, have stated that due to the potential for civil lawsuits, private insurers are concerned about sharing fraud-related information with law enforcement agencies. This piecemeal state legislation simply does not protect insurers and other payers in many states or in multi-state investigations. Also, federal officials at four of the field offices said that S. 1088 should be expanded to provide immunity for insurers sharing fraud-related information with other insurers. Currently, there is no federal immunity protection for persons who report fraud-related information to law enforcement agencies. While most states have enacted immunity laws that provide some immunity protection to insurers, these laws vary from state to state. The proposed database would contain information about final adverse actions—such as license revocations, administrative sanctions, civil judgments, and criminal convictions—involving health care system participants. Recent Proposals Would Create a National Database of Health Care Fraud-Related Information
To address the issue of access to health care fraud-related information, recent proposals (see table 3.1) have supported the establishment of a centralized repository for health care fraud information. In addition to the issues noted above, centralized databases also pose uncertainties about development and operating costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the extent of federal and state immunity laws protecting persons who report health care fraud; and (2) evidence for and against establishing a centralized health care fraud database.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there are no federal immunity protections for persons who report alleged health care fraud to law enforcement agencies; (2) the only federal provision that could protect such persons applies to persons reporting Medicare and Medicaid fraud; (3) private insurers and health care claims processors are also not provided any federal immunity protection if they report suspected fraud; (4) many states have enacted immunity protection, but the amount of protection varies by state; (5) Congress is considering legislation that would protect persons providing health care fraud information to the Departments of Health and Human Services or Justice; (6) most federal and state officials support the proposed immunity provisions and safeguards to protect against persons who make unsubstantiated allegations in bad faith; (7) many federal officials believe that the legislation should be expanded to provide immunity to persons sharing fraud-related information with any state or federal enforcement entity and insurers sharing information with other insurers; (8) the proposed legislation would create a central database to track criminal activity in the health care system; (9) the database would provide information on criminal convictions, civil judgments, and negative licensing actions and be accessible to federal and state agencies and health insurers; and (10) most law enforcement officials support the database's establishment and believe that enforcement benefits would accrue, but many are concerned about the potential for unauthorized disclosure of information and high development and operating costs. |
gao_GAO-08-199T | gao_GAO-08-199T_0 | HUD officials and contract administrators said that delays on HUD’s part—stemming from a renewal process HUD officials agreed could be cumbersome and paper intensive—could cause (or exacerbate) late payments that resulted from the lack of a renewed contract. According to project owners with whom we met, delays in HUD’s housing assistance payments had negative financial effects and may have compromised owners’ ability to operate their properties, but the delays were unlikely to cause owners to opt out of HUD’s programs or stop providing affordable housing. Background
HUD operates a variety of project-based rental assistance programs through which it pays subsidies, or housing assistance payments, to private owners of multifamily housing that help make this housing affordable for lower-income households. From Fiscal Years 1995 through 2004, HUD Made Three- fourths of Its Housing Assistance Payments on Time
Overall, from fiscal years 1995 through 2004, HUD disbursed by the due date 75 percent of the 3.2 million monthly housing assistance payments on all types of contracts (see fig. The timeliness of housing assistance payments varied over the 10-year period (see fig. Further, HUD-administered contracts were more likely to have chronically late payments. Therefore, an owner cannot receive a monthly voucher payment on a contract that HUD has not renewed. HUD’s contract renewal process was largely manual and paper driven and required multiple staff in the PBCAs and HUD to complete (see fig. HUD’s Difficulties in Assessing Rate of Funding Use and Monitoring Funding Levels
The methods HUD used to estimate the amount of funds needed for the term of each of its project-based assistance contracts and the way it monitored the funding levels on those contracts also affected the timeliness of housing assistance payments. HUD’s Payment Delays Caused Difficulties for Project Owners, but Were Unlikely to Be a Significant Factor in Owners Opting Out of HUD Contracts
In preparing our 2005 report, some owners reported that they had not been able to pay their mortgages or other bills on time as a result of HUD’s payment delays. According to owners as well as industry group and HUD officials, owners who were heavily reliant on HUD’s subsidy to operate their properties were more severely affected by payment delays than other owners. Project owners, industry group officials, contract administrators, and HUD officials we interviewed generally agreed that market factors, not late payments, primarily drove an owner’s decision to opt out of HUD programs. Most of the owners with whom we spoke reported that they received no warning from HUD that their payments would be delayed. To mitigate the effects on owners when payments were delayed, we recommended in our 2005 report that HUD notify owners if their monthly housing assistance payments would be late and include in such notifications the date by which HUD expected to make the monthly payment to the owner. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides subsidies, known as housing assistance payments, under contracts with privately owned, multifamily projects so that they are affordable to low-income households. Project owners have expressed concern that HUD has chronically made late housing assistance payments in recent years, potentially compromising owners' ability to pay operating expenses, make mortgage payments, or set aside funds for repairs. This testimony, based primarily on a report issued in 2005, discusses the timeliness of HUD's monthly housing assistance payments, the factors that affected payment timeliness, and the effects of delayed payments on project owners.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, HUD disbursed three-fourths of its monthly housing assistance payments on time, but thousands of payments were late each year, affecting many property owners. Over the 10-year period, 8 percent of payments were delayed by 2 weeks or more. Payments were somewhat more likely to be timely in more recent years. The process for renewing HUD's subsidy contracts with owners can affect the timeliness of housing assistance payments, according to many owners, HUD officials, and contract administrators that HUD hires to work with owners. HUD's renewal process is largely a manual, hard-copy paper process that requires multiple staff to complete. Problems with this cumbersome, paper-intensive process may delay contract renewals and cause late payments. Also, a lack of systematic internal processes for HUD staff to better estimate the amounts that HUD needed to obligate to contracts each year and monitor contract funding levels on an ongoing basis can contribute to delays in housing assistance payments. Although HUD allows owners to borrow from reserve accounts to lessen the effect of delayed housing assistance payments, 3 of 16 project owners told GAO that they had to make late payments on their mortgages or other bills--such as utilities, telephone service, or pest control--as a result of HUD's payment delays. Owners who are heavily reliant on HUD's subsidy to operate their properties are likely to be more severely affected by payment delays than other, more financially independent, owners. Owners reported receiving no warning from HUD when payments would be delayed, and several told GAO that such notification would allow them to mitigate a delay. Nonetheless, project owners, industry group officials, and HUD officials generally agreed that late housing assistance payments by themselves would be unlikely to cause an owner to leave HUD's housing assistance programs, because such a decision is generally driven primarily by local market factors. |
gao_GAO-11-220 | gao_GAO-11-220_0 | However, the department faces three key management challenges—lack of clear guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule—that may result in inefficient planning and execution, increased cost and performance risks, and limited oversight of EPAA. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. DOD and the State Department Have Taken Multiple Steps to Implement EPAA
Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD—including U.S. European Command (EUCOM), MDA, and the military services—as well as the State Department, have taken steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in Europe. U.S. DOD’s Guidance for EPAA Is Not Yet Complete
DOD has initiated many efforts to implement EPAA, but the department has not yet established clear guidance to help direct and align its efforts. According to DOD, effective planning requires clear guidance on desired end states. Further, key BMD stakeholders, including those from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and military services believe that additional guidance is needed for EPAA. DOD Has Not Established EPAA Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA and therefore is missing an important management tool for preparing budgets, monitoring progress and assessing long-term affordability of its revised approach to BMD in Europe. Further, according to the GAO cost estimating guide, a credible cost estimate is required in order to assess a program’s affordability and cost-effectiveness and to serve as a basis for a budget. Furthermore, the EPAA phase schedule is not yet integrated with key infrastructure activities and therefore is also exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost. Although Combatant Commands’ Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased, Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans
DOD has not yet established key performance metrics that would provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ, creating potential challenges for EUCOM as it integrates BMD into its operational plans. The combatant commands recognize this issue and are currently attempting to establish these metrics; however, they have yet to be finalized and implemented. As such, this metric is designed to allow assessment of BMD system effectiveness against multiple ballistic missile threats. Finally, without incorporating operationally quantifiable metrics—such as how long the system can defend (durability) and how well the system can defend (effectiveness)—into its test program, DOD will not be able to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system and EUCOM will not have the most relevant performance data it needs to thoroughly assess the extent to which BMD capabilities support its mission objectives and judge how to best plan for and employ BMD assets. Direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate the life-cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are needed, and an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation risks that need to be considered. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance on EPAA that describes desired end states in response to concerns raised by key stakeholders. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
During our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans for implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we reviewed relevant documentation and met with representatives from numerous agencies and offices. Related GAO Products
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges. Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and near-term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four phases as threats mature and new BMD technologies become available. Although the approach will include capabilities such as radars and landand sea-based BMD assets, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established EPAA life-cycle costs. EPAA is DOD's first implementation of its new, regional approach to BMD. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's plans for implementing EPAA. GAO reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and addressed management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance data. GAO reviewed key legislation, policy and guidance, and initial plans for implementation and asset allocation.
What GAO Found
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but faces three key management challenges--the lack of clear guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule--which may result in inefficient planning and execution, limited oversight, and increased cost and performance risks. Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD--including U.S. European Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military services--as well as the State Department, have taken steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, and analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires clear guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders, including the combatant commands and military services, believe that such guidance is not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions over the short-term as well as to assess long-term affordability. DOD has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if corrective actions are needed. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities that will need to be synchronized. As a result, DOD is at risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost as it implements the phases of EPAA. DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet established key operational performance metrics that would provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ. DOD is incorporating some combatant commands' requirements into BMD testing, in part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the test design process. However, the system's desired performance is not yet defined using operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as how long and how well it can defend. The combatant commands are attempting to define operational performance metrics to enable credible assessment of operational performance gaps. However, these metrics have yet to be finalized and implemented. Without a more complete understanding of BMD operational capabilities and limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in EPAA operational planning.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD provide guidance on EPAA end states; develop EPAA life-cycle cost estimates; and integrate its phase schedule with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. GAO also recommends that DOD adopt operational performance metrics and include them in the BMD test program. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-491 | gao_GAO-09-491_0 | Table 1 outlines the TSGP allocations for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009. DHS Uses Elements of Risk to Allocate and Award Funds to Transit Agencies, but the Risk Model Can Be Strengthened and Transit Stakeholders Expressed Concerns about Funding Flexibility
DHS has established an approach for allocating and awarding TSGP funds using a risk model that incorporates the elements of risk and is intended to allocate funding to the highest-risk regions and transit agencies; however, the model could be strengthened to measure variations in vulnerability across regions. DHS’s TSGP Risk Model Incorporates Elements of Risk, but Could Be Strengthened to Measure Variations in Vulnerability
DHS uses a model to assess the risk to each transit agency region that includes the three elements of risk––threat, vulnerability, and consequence; however, the model does not measure variations in vulnerability, which limits the model’s overall ability to assess risk. As a result, officials reported that they were considering using transit agency vulnerability assessment results as a source of vulnerability information. TSA and FEMA Lack Documented Roles and Responsibilities for Administering the TSGP, and Although Statutory Timeline Requirements Were Met, Little Money Has Been Expended
DHS has met the statutory timeline requirements in allocating and awarding grants. However the two agencies that manage the TSGP—TSA and FEMA—lack defined roles and responsibilities, and the approval of grant projects and completion of administrative requirements for grants awarded in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 took many months. TSA and FEMA have attempted to address these delays by approving projects earlier in the grant process, issuing guidance, and adding resources. However, there is no documentation articulating the working arrangement between the two agencies. DHS Met Statutory Requirements to Release Grant Guidance and Act on Grant Applications, Although Some Projects Were Approved Months after the Award
DHS met the requirements of the TSGP to release grant guidance and act on grant applications as defined by DHS; however, additional agency actions are to be completed before specific transit agency projects and funding levels are approved and transit agencies can begin projects. A Small Amount of Grant Funds Has Been Spent Because of the Length of Time to Make Funds Available
From fiscal years 2006 through 2008, DHS awarded about $755 million in transit security grants; however, as of February 2009, only about $21 million, or 3 percent, of this total had been expended by transit agencies largely because of TSA’s lengthy cooperative agreement process, the EHP backlog, and delays in receiving disbursement approval from FEMA. Despite the concerns over funding delays, FEMA has not established or communicated time frames for providing grant funding to transit agencies once projects have been approved by TSA. In April 2004, we reported that timely awarding of grant funds is imperative to provide the intended benefit of the grant program. However, despite this role, FEMA does not have a mechanism for systematically collecting data on the status of individual grant projects throughout this review process, including tracking the status of the reviews it conducts and the release of funds to transit agencies. Although FEMA has systems to track financial information related to all of its grant programs, these systems do not allow FEMA to track the status of grant reviews, such as EHP reviews. Until TSA and FEMA collaborate to develop a plan with related milestones for jointly measuring the effectiveness of TSGP, it will be difficult for the agencies to provide reasonable assurance that measures are being developed to ensure that the program is achieving its stated purpose of protecting critical surface transportation infrastructure and that accountability and effective stewardship of public resources exist. Collaborate to develop a plan and milestones for measuring the effectiveness of the TSGP and its administration. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funds are allocated and awarded based on risk, and grant requirements have changed since 2006; (2) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has allocated, awarded, and distributed TSGP grants in accordance with statutory deadlines and leading practices for collaborating agencies; and (3) DHS has evaluated the effectiveness of the TSGP as well as investments made using funds awarded through the TSGP. We obtained the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) risk analysis model for the TSGP for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has allocated about $755 million dollars to transit agencies through its Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to protect transit systems and the public from terrorist attacks. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) TSGP funds are allocated and awarded based on risk; (2) DHS has allocated, awarded, and distributed TSGP grants in accordance with statutory deadlines and leading practices for collaborating agencies; and (3) DHS has evaluated the effectiveness of the TSGP and its investments. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the TSGP risk model, fund allocation methodology and program documents, such as TSGP guidance, and interviewed DHS and transit officials, among other steps.
What GAO Found
DHS has used a risk analysis model to allocate TSGP funding and award grants to higher-risk transit agencies, although transit agency officials have expressed concerns about changes that have occurred since the TSGP's inception, such as revised priorities. The TSGP risk model includes all three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--but can be strengthened by measuring variations in vulnerability. DHS has held vulnerability constant, which limits the model's overall ability to assess risk and more precisely allocate funds. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) allocated about 90 percent of funding to the highest-risk agencies, lower-risk agency awards were based on other factors in addition to risk. In addition, TSA has revised the TSGP's approach, methodology and funding priorities each year since 2006. These changes have raised predictability and flexibility concerns among transit agencies because they make engaging in long-term planning difficult. DHS met the statutory timeline requirements for allocating and awarding grants, but the two agencies that manage the TSGP--TSA and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--lack defined roles and responsibilities, and only 3 percent of the funds awarded for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 have been spent as of February 2009. There is no documentation articulating the roles and responsibilities of the agencies, and grant information has not been passed between the two agencies which affected TSA's ability to share grant status information with transit agencies. DHS met statutory deadlines for releasing grant guidance and acting upon applications, but management and resource issues have resulted in delays in approving projects and making funds available, including (1) lengthy project negotiations between transit agencies and TSA; (2) a backlog of required environmental reviews; and (3) a reported lack of personnel to conduct required reviews. As a result, according to FEMA records, as of February 2009, transit agencies have spent about $21 million of the $755 million that has been awarded for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. This spending rate is, in part, caused by agencies receiving authorization to spend grant dollars late in the grant period. Despite concerns over delays, FEMA has not communicated time frames for providing funding. In April 2004, GAO reported that timely grant awards are imperative to provide intended benefits. DHS has reported taking some actions to address delays, including shortening project approval times and hiring staff, but the effectiveness of these efforts is unknown. Although FEMA has taken initial efforts to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, TSA and FEMA lack a plan and related milestones for developing measures specifically for the TSGP, and thus DHS does not have the capability to measure the effectiveness of the program or its investments. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA and FEMA to provide reasonable assurance that measures are being developed to assess the effectiveness of the program as intended. While FEMA is responsible for the financial controls and audits of the TSGP, it does not have a mechanism to systematically collect data and track grant projects throughout the grant process. As a result, FEMA cannot assess whether awards are timely or funds are being used effectively to reduce risk and increase transit system security |
gao_GAO-03-1173 | gao_GAO-03-1173_0 | Background
ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure security for all modes of transportation, to include aviation. Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed
TSA developed basic and remedial screener training programs, but has not fully developed or deployed a recurrent or supervisory training program to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. Recurrent Training
TSA has not fully developed or deployed a recurrent training program, but has recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis is critical to maintaining and enhancing screener skills. As a result of the task force’s suggestions, TSA is developing six recurrent training modules—the first of which TSA plans to deploy to all airports beginning in October 2003. FSDs and TSA headquarters officials recognize the need to enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory training.TSA is currently working with USDA to tailor its off- the-shelf supervisory course to the specific needs of TSA’s screening supervisors. Little Information Exists to Measure Screeners’ Performance in Detecting Threat Objects
Currently, the results of TSA’s OIAPR’s operational, or covert, testing is the only indication of screener performance in detecting threat objects. In addition to conducting operational testing, TSA plans to fully activate the Threat Image Projection system and implement a screener certification program in October 2003 to collect additional information on screener performance. TSA does not view the results of OIAPR’s covert testing as a measure of screener performance, but rather a “snapshot” of a screener’s ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time and as an indicator of systemwide screener performance. TIP places images of threat objects on x-ray screens during actual operations and records whether screeners identify the threat object. Screener Performance Improvement Study
TSA is taking steps to improve screener performance. An Assessment of the Contract Screening Pilot Program Has Not Yet Begun
TSA has implemented a pilot program using contract screeners at 5 airports, but has not determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening companies rather than federal screeners. While TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports, it plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare the performance of pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine the reasons for any differences. Although ATSA allows airports to apply to opt-out of using federal screeners beginning in November 2004, TSA has not begun to plan for the possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening company. Airports Council International officials said that numerous airports have contacted them expressing an interest in obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding opting-out. We plan to review TSA’s efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for passenger screeners during the remainder of our evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Passenger screening is critical to the security of our nation's aviation system, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is tasked with securing all modes of transportation, including the screening of airline passengers. TSA has met numerous requirements in this regard, such as deploying more than 50,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial airports nationwide. To determine whether TSA's passenger screening program is achieving its intended results, GAO is conducting an ongoing evaluation of TSA's efforts to (1) ensure that passenger screeners are effectively trained and supervised, (2) measure screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (3) implement and evaluate the contract screening pilot program.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was tasked with the tremendous challenge of building a large federal agency responsible for securing all modes of transportation, while simultaneously meeting ambitious deadlines to enhance the security of the nation's aviation system. Although TSA has made significant progress related to its passenger screening program, challenges remain. TSA recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis, and effective supervisory training, is critical to maintaining and enhancing skills. However, TSA has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs. Although TSA has not yet deployed these programs, it has taken steps in establishing recurrent and supervisory training, including developing six recurrent training modules that will soon be deployed to all airports, as well as working with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course to the specific training needs of TSA's screening supervisors. TSA currently collects little information regarding screener performance in detecting threat objects. The primary source of information collected on screener's ability to detect threat objects is covert testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these tests as a measure of screener performance, but rather a "snapshot" of a screener's ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time. Additionally, TSA does not currently use the Threat Image Projection system, which places images of threat objects on x-ray screens during actual operations and records whether screeners identify the threat. However, TSA plans to fully activate the Threat Image Projection system with significantly more threat images than previously used, as well as implement an annual screener certification program in October 2003. TSA also recently completed a screener performance improvement study and is taking steps to address the deficiencies identified during the study. As required by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract screeners in lieu of federal screeners at 5 commercial airports. However, TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports, or prepare for airports potentially applying to opt-out of using federal screeners, as allowed by the act, beginning in November 2004. Although TSA has not begun evaluating the performance of the pilot program airports, it plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare the performance of pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine the reasons for any differences. Numerous airport operators have contacted TSA to express an interest in obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding opting-out of using federal screeners. |
gao_GAO-14-675 | gao_GAO-14-675_0 | Furthermore, VHA’s Caregiver Support Program office does not have ready access to the type of data that would allow it to monitor and manage the program’s workload due to the limited capabilities of its data system, which was designed to manage a much smaller program. VHA officials originally estimated that approximately 4,000 caregivers would be approved for the program by the end of fiscal year 2014. This estimate was based on the number of expected post-9/11 veterans and servicemembers who have serious medical or behavioral conditions involving impairment in at least one activity of daily living or who require supervision or protection, using available data from the Veterans Benefits However, the number of individuals approved Administration and DOD.for the Family Caregiver Program far exceeded the original estimate: by May 2014, almost 30,400 caregivers had applied and about 15,600 had been approved. As of May 2014, 98 VAMCs had more than 50 approved caregivers. Staffing Shortages Impeded Timeliness of Key Functions and Negatively Affected Services to Caregivers Despite Actions Taken to Address Them
Timelines for key functions of the caregiver program, such as those for adjudicating applications within 45 days or making quarterly home visits to family caregivers, are not being met because CSCs at some VAMCs were not able to obtain sufficient support from medical facility staff. As a result, some caregivers have had to wait longer for an eligibility determination and to receive program benefits. As a result, according to VAMC officials, some facilities have not been able to overcome the workload problems that developed upon program implementation. This is consistent with federal internal control standards, which emphasize the need for effective and efficient operations, including the use of agency resources such as human capital. VHA’s Oversight of the Family Caregiver Program Is Impeded by IT System Limitations
The Caregiver Support Program office does not have ready access to the workload data that would allow it to monitor the effect of the Family Caregiver Program on VAMCs’ resources due to limitations with the Caregiver Application Tracker—the IT system that was established for the program. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should identify, capture, and distribute pertinent information in a form and time frame that permits officials to perform their duties efficiently.However, the Caregiver Support Program office is not able to easily retrieve data that would allow it to better assess workload trends at individual VAMCs—such as the length of time applications are delayed or the timeliness of home visits—even though these data are already captured in the Caregiver Application Tracker. Consequently, Caregiver Support Program officials only retrieve these data on an ad hoc, as- needed basis, which limits their ability to assess the scope and extent of workload problems comprehensively at individual VAMCs and on a system-wide basis. Caregiver Support Program officials told us that they take steps to validate the data they obtain from the system because they have observed some inconsistencies—particularly with ad hoc data—and as a result, they have concerns about its reliability. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should conduct monitoring activities to assess the quality of performance over time and should use the results to correct identified deficiencies and make improvements. However, this official was not sure how long it would take to obtain another IT system and whether this effort would be displaced by higher priorities. Although it will be difficult to identify changes needed to improve the program’s efficiency and effectiveness without these data, VAMCs’ workload problems will persist—and caregivers will not get the services they need—unless the program office begins taking steps towards identifying solutions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Family Caregiver Program is able to meet caregivers’ demand for its services, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs expedite the process for identifying and implementing an IT system that fully supports the program and will enable VHA program officials to comprehensively monitor the program’s workload, including data on the status of applications, appeals, home visits, and the use of other support services, such as respite care. We also recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs direct the Undersecretary for Health to identify solutions in advance of obtaining a replacement IT system to help alleviate VAMCs’ workload burden, such as modifications to the program’s procedures and timelines, including those for application processing and home visits, as well as the identification of additional ways to provide staffing support, and use data from the IT system, once implemented, as well as other relevant data to formally reassess how key aspects of the program are structured and to identify and implement modifications as needed to ensure that the program is functioning as envisioned so that caregivers can receive the services they need in a timely manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2010, Congress required VA to establish a program to support family caregivers of seriously injured post-9/11 veterans. In May 2011, VHA implemented its Family Caregiver Program at all VAMCs across the country, offering caregivers an array of services, including a monthly stipend, training, counseling, referral services, and expanded access to mental health and respite care. In fiscal year 2014, VHA obligated over $263 million for the program.
GAO was asked to examine VA's implementation of the Family Caregiver Program. This report examines how VHA is implementing the program, including the types of issues that have been identified during initial implementation. GAO obtained and reviewed relevant policy documents and program data and interviewed officials from VHA's Caregiver Support Program office. GAO also met with officials from five VAMCs and their corresponding Veterans Integrated Service Networks to obtain information on program implementation at the medical facility level.
What GAO Found
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA)—within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—significantly underestimated caregivers' demand for services when it implemented the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers (Family Caregiver Program). As a result, some VA medical centers (VAMCs) had difficulties managing the larger-than-expected workload, and some caregivers experienced delays in approval determinations and in receiving program benefits. VHA officials originally estimated that about 4,000 caregivers would be approved for the program by September 30, 2014. However, by May 2014 about 15,600 caregivers had been approved—more than triple the original estimate. The program's staffing was based on VA's initial assumptions about the potential size of the program and consisted of placing a single caregiver support coordinator at each VAMC to administer the program. In addition, each VAMC was to provide clinical staff to carry out essential functions of the program, such as conducting medical assessments for eligibility and making home visits. This led to implementation problems at busy VAMCs that did not have sufficient staff to conduct these program functions in addition to their other duties. As a result, timelines for key program functions, such as those for completing applications within 45 days and making quarterly home visits to caregivers, are not being met. VHA has taken some steps to address staffing shortages; however, some VAMCs have not been able to overcome their workload problems because the program continues to grow at a steady rate—about 500 approved caregivers are being added to the program each month. Federal internal control standards emphasize the need for effective and efficient operations, including the use of agency resources.
The Caregiver Support Program office, which manages the program, does not have ready access to the type of workload data that would allow it to routinely monitor the effects of the Family Caregiver Program on VAMCs' resources due to limitations with the program's information technology (IT) system—the Caregiver Application Tracker. Program officials explained that this system was designed to manage a much smaller program, and as a result, the system has limited capabilities. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should identify, capture, and distribute information that permits officials to perform their duties efficiently. However, outside of obtaining basic aggregate program statistics, the program office is not able to readily retrieve data from the system that would allow it to better assess the scope and extent of workload problems at VAMCs. Program officials also expressed concern about the reliability of the system's data, which they must take steps to validate. The lack of ready access to comprehensive workload data impedes the program office's ability to monitor the program and identify workload problems or make modifications as needed. This runs counter to federal standards for internal control which state that agencies should monitor their performance over time and use the results to correct identified deficiencies and make improvements. Program officials told GAO that they have taken initial steps to obtain another IT system, but they are not sure how long it will take. However, unless the program office begins taking steps towards identifying solutions prior to obtaining a new system, VAMCs' workload problems will persist and caregivers will not be able to get the services they need.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) expedite the process for implementing a new IT system that will enable officials to obtain workload data; and that VHA (2) identify solutions to alleviate VAMCs' workload burden in advance of obtaining a new IT system, and (3) use data from the new IT system, once implemented, and other relevant data, to re-assess the program and implement changes as needed. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-106 | gao_GAO-15-106_0 | Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. Agency CIOs Are to Address 36 IT Management Reporting Requirements for OMB
OMB directs agency CIOs to respond to 36 IT management reporting requirements. In terms of reporting frequency, agency CIOs are largely required by OMB to report on the 36 requirements on a quarterly or annual basis. Accordingly, it is concerning that CIOs do not always see value in these reporting requirements. Consequently, effectively addressing proposed changes and aligning CIOs’ priorities to OMB’s (i.e., establishing a common understanding of what the priorities are) is important to, among other things, the success of OMB’s reforms and its goal of improving federal IT. As part of these activities, OMB uses the information reported by agencies to inform policy decisions. Specifically, a majority of 24 CIOs surveyed that responded reported that addressing 4 reporting requirements helped their agency to manage IT to a very great extent or great extent and 8 helped the agency to manage their IT to a moderate extent. According to comments from a number of CIOs, they did not always find that these requirements were useful because addressing them did not always clearly support departmental priorities. Although these OMB efforts aim to streamline reporting, agency CIOs identified additional challenges with tracking what reporting requirements are currently in place, using multiple online tools to report required information, and using capital planning and investment reporting requirement information to make effective investment decisions, which are not addressed by OMB’s efforts. This is in part to the fact that OMB has not solicited feedback in these areas because its priority has been on streamlining reporting in other areas (e.g., changing report formatting and others discussed below). By not addressing these CIO-identified challenges, OMB is missing opportunities to help CIOs improve the requirements reporting process and to improve its use of information collected as part of this process to effectively manage IT. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of OMB streamlining efforts and ensure agency CIOs are better able to carry out their responsibilities in managing IT, including implementing OMB’s IT reform initiatives, we recommend the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO, in collaboration with agency CIOs, to take the following four actions:
Ensure there is a common understanding with agency CIOs on the priority of the current reporting requirements and related IT reform initiatives. According to OMB, it chose to take no position on the recommendations due to its concerns that: (1) our draft report’s count of reporting requirements was not currently accurate, (2) our survey approach did not fully support the report’s findings and recommendations, (3) the second objective to solicit CIO views did not allow for sufficient context setting, and (4) OMB has taken steps to solicit feedback and streamline requirements that are not reflected in the draft report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the current information technology (IT) reporting requirements that agency chief information officers (CIO) are to address for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); (2) evaluate the extent to which OMB and agency CIOs use the required information to manage IT, including CIOs’ views on the utility of the requirements; and (3) assess any OMB efforts to streamline this reporting. We categorized the requirements based on their best fit in the following areas that are typically identified as key CIO IT management responsibilities: IT strategic planning; capital planning and investment management; IT security; and system acquisition, development, and integration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies annually invest over $80 billion on IT. As part of overseeing this spending, OMB directs federal CIOs to report on their management of IT in such areas as capital planning and investment management, security, and strategic planning.
GAO was asked to review the usefulness of such CIO reporting requirements. Its objectives were to (1) identify the current IT reporting requirements that agency CIOs are to address for OMB, (2) evaluate the extent to which OMB and agency CIOs use the required information to manage IT, including CIOs' views on the utility of the requirements, and (3) assess any OMB efforts to streamline this reporting. To do so, GAO analyzed OMB memorandums and other guidance to develop a list of CIO requirements and surveyed 24 major agency CIOs on how they used the required information to manage IT. Further, it analyzed OMB documentation and interviewed officials to identify plans to streamline reporting.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directs agency chief information officers (CIO) to respond to 36 information technology (IT) management reporting requirements, largely on a quarterly or annual basis, that address several areas key to effective IT management (see figure).
OMB uses the information reported by CIOs to help it oversee the federal government's use of IT, including implementation of OMB's IT reform initiatives such as consolidating data centers and eliminating duplication. A majority of 24 CIOs surveyed that responded reported that 24 of the 36 reporting requirements help only to some to no extent in managing IT and that meeting them took significant effort and cost approximately $150 million to $308 million annually. A number of CIOs further noted that these requirements were not always helpful because, among other things, addressing them did not support agency priorities. Nonetheless, GAO has previously emphasized the importance of OMB's reforms and their associated reporting requirements to improving federal IT management and producing savings. Thus it is concerning that CIOs do not always see value in reporting information essential to these reforms. Establishing a common understanding between OMB and CIOs on the priority of these initiatives and their related reporting requirements will help ensure their success.
OMB has taken steps to streamline CIO reporting requirements, such as changing reporting formats from narratives to performance data. Nonetheless, OMB's efforts do not address challenges identified by CIOs, such as tracking all current requirements and having to use multiple online tools to report information. This is partly because OMB has not solicited feedback in these areas, due to its focus on streamlining reporting in other areas. By not addressing these challenges, OMB is missing opportunities to help CIOs improve the requirements reporting process and its use of information collected to effectively manage and oversee federal IT.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB, in collaboration with CIOs, ensure a common understanding of priority IT reforms and their reporting requirements and address proposed reporting improvements and challenges. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, citing concerns with, among other things, GAO's survey methodology, stating it did not fully support the report's findings and recommendations. GAO believes these concerns are largely unfounded and that its recommendations are still valid. |
gao_GAO-05-730 | gao_GAO-05-730_0 | Background
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 provided DOD with authority to establish (1) a pay and performance management system, (2) an appeals process, and (3) a labor relations system—which together comprise NSPS. The legislation permits significant flexibility for designing NSPS, allowing for a new framework of rules, regulations, and processes to govern how defense civilian employees are hired, compensated, promoted, and disciplined. NSPS Design Process Evolved Into a Phased Approach
DOD’s current process to design NSPS is divided into four stages: (1) development of options for the personnel system, (2) assessment of the options and translation into recommended proposals, (3) issuance of proposed regulations, and (4) a statutory public comment period, a meet and confer period with employee representatives, and a congressional notification period. The design process generally reflects the following four practices. First, DOD and OPM have developed a process to design the new personnel system that is supported by top leadership in both organizations. Second, from the outset, a set of guiding principles have guided the NSPS design process. Third, DOD has a dedicated team in place to design and implement NSPS and manage the transformation process, to include program managers from DOD components. Fourth, DOD has established a timeline, albeit ambitious, and implementation goals for implementing its new personnel system. The design process, however, does not fully reflect two other key practices. First, DOD developed and implemented a written communication strategy document, but it is not comprehensive. Second, while the NSPS design has involved employees through town hall meetings and other mechanisms, it has not included employee representatives on the working groups that drafted the design options for the new system. As previously discussed, DOD’s initial process to design NSPS was unrealistic and inappropriate; however, after a strategic reassessment, DOD adjusted its approach to reflect a more cautious, deliberative process that involved top DOD and OPM leadership. In recent hearings on the NSPS proposed regulations, we testified that DOD’s new personnel management system will have far-reaching implications for the management of the department and for civil service reform across the federal government. However, if not properly designed and implemented, NSPS could impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Specifically, the strategy does not identify all key internal stakeholders and their concerns. Experience shows that failure to adequately consider a wide variety of people and cultural issues can lead to unsuccessful transformations. A successful transformation must provide for meaningful involvement by employees and their representatives to, among other things, gain their input into and understanding of the changes that are occurring in the organization. DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Implementing NSPS
As DOD implements its new personnel management system, it will face multiple implementation challenges in both the early and later stages of implementation. The communications strategy must include the active and visible involvement of a number of key players, including the Secretary of Defense, and a variety of communication means and mediums for successful implementation of the system. Involving employees and other stakeholders in implementing the system. Later Implementation Challenges
Ensuring sustained and committed leadership. DOD may face a future leadership challenge when the NSPS Senior Executive and the PEO transition out of existence once NSPS is fully implemented. In addition, evaluating the impact of NSPS will be an ongoing challenge for DOD. For example, the written communication strategy document does not identify employee representatives as a key stakeholder but, instead, characterizes union leadership as “NSPS’ biggest detractor.” Since the development and implementation of the written communication strategy document, DOD notes that specific plans were developed to identify key internal and external stakeholders and provided key messages and communications products to inform those groups. Although there are a total of nine key practices of successful transformations, our evaluation focused on six key practices: (1) ensure top leadership drives the transformation, (2) focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, (3) set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one, (4) dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process, (5) establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, and (6) involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. Post-hearing Questions Related to the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) new personnel system--the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)--will have far-reaching implications not just for DOD, but for civil service reform across the federal government. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 gave DOD significant authorities to redesign the rules, regulations, and processes that govern the way that more than 700,000 defense civilian employees are hired, compensated, promoted, and disciplined. In addition, NSPS could serve as a model for governmentwide transformation in human capital management. However, if not properly designed and effectively implemented, it could severely impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. This report (1) describes DOD's process to design its new personnel management system, (2) analyzes the extent to which DOD's process reflects key practices for successful transformations, and (3) identifies the most significant challenges DOD faces in implementing NSPS.
What GAO Found
DOD's current process to design its new personnel management system consists of four stages: (1) development of design options, (2) assessment of design options, (3) issuance of proposed regulations, and (4) a statutory public comment period, a meet and confer period with employee representatives, and a congressional notification period. DOD's initial design process was unrealistic and inappropriate. However, after a strategic reassessment, DOD adjusted its approach to reflect a more cautious and deliberative process that involved more stakeholders. DOD's NSPS design process generally reflects four of six selected key practices for successful organizational transformations. First, DOD and OPM have developed a process to design the new personnel system that is supported by top leadership in both organizations. Second, from the outset, a set of guiding principles and key performance parameters have guided the NSPS design process. Third, DOD has a dedicated team in place to design and implement NSPS and manage the transformation process. Fourth, DOD has established a timeline, albeit ambitious, and implementation goals. The design process, however, is lacking in two other practices. First, DOD developed and implemented a written communication strategy document, but the strategy is not comprehensive. It does not identify all key internal stakeholders and their concerns, and does not tailor key messages to specific stakeholder groups. Failure to adequately consider a wide variety of people and cultural issues can lead to unsuccessful transformations. Second, while the process has involved employees through town hall meetings and other mechanisms, it has not included employee representatives on the working groups that drafted the design options. It should be noted that 10 federal labor unions have filed suit alleging that DOD failed to abide by the statutory requirements to include employee representatives in the development of DOD's new labor relations system authorized as part of NSPS. A successful transformation must provide for meaningful involvement by employees and their representatives to gain their input into and understanding of the changes that will occur. DOD will face multiple implementation challenges. For example, in addition to the challenges of continuing to involve employees and other stakeholders and providing adequate resources to implement the system, DOD faces the challenges of ensuring an effective, ongoing two-way communication strategy and evaluating the new system. In recent testimony, GAO stated that DOD's communication strategy must include the active and visible involvement of a number of key players, including the Secretary of Defense, for successful implementation of the system. Moreover, DOD must ensure sustained and committed leadership after the system is fully implemented and the NSPS Senior Executive and the Program Executive Office transition out of existence. To provide sustained leadership attention to a range of business transformation initiatives, like NSPS, GAO recently recommended the creation of a chief management official at DOD. |
gao_GAO-12-705T | gao_GAO-12-705T_0 | Background
GSA estimated that federal agencies spent about $1.6 billion during fiscal year 2009 purchasing office supplies from more than 239,000 vendors. Alternatively, agencies can use the Federal Supply Schedule program (schedules program), a simplified process for procuring office supplies where GSA awards contracts to multiple vendors for a wide range of commercially available goods and services to take advantage of price discounts equal to those that vendors offer their “most favored customers.” The schedules program can leverage the government’s significant aggregate buying power. The GSA report estimated that during fiscal year 2009, the 10 agencies the highest spending on office supplies accounted for about $1.3 billion, or about 81 percent, of the total $1.6 billion spent governmentwide in the 14 categories of office supplies. Further, it stated that about 58 percent of office supply purchases were made outside of the GSA schedules program, mostly at retail stores. Additionally, GSA reported that agencies paid an average of 75 percent more (a price premium) than schedule prices and 86 percent more than OS II prices, for their retail purchases. GSA Report Had Data and Other Limitations
While the GSA report acknowledged some limitations with the data, we identified additional data and other limitations that lead us to question the magnitude of some of GSA’s reported price premiums. We were not able to fully quantify the impact of these limitations. Additionally, other agencies questioned the study’s specific findings related to price premiums, but their own studies of price premiums support GSA’s conclusion that better prices can be obtained through consolidated, leveraged purchasing. For example, it removed duplicate purchases and items that did not meet its definition of office supplies. We also identified additional data and other limitations in GSA’s study, including:
GSA may not have been able to properly control for purchases of different quantities of the same item. Two different formulas were used for calculating price premium estimates. However, the study only described one of these specific formulas. GSA concluded that purchase cardholders compared costs at some level prior to making a purchase based on its interviews with senior-level acquisition officials. New Strategic Sourcing Initiative for Office Supplies Shows Potential for Generating Savings
According to initial available data, GSA’s OS II blanket purchase agreements have produced savings. The OS II initiative, more so than past efforts, is demonstrating that leveraged buying can produce greater savings and has provided improvements for managing ongoing and future strategic sourcing initiatives. GSA’s Analysis of OS II Data Shows Savings Are Being Achieved
On the basis of the sales data provided by OS II vendors, GSA estimates the federal government saved $39.2 million between June 2010 and March 2012 by using the 15 blanket purchase agreements established for this program. In addition to the savings from the blanket purchase agreements, GSA representatives told us that they are also seeing prices decrease on schedules program contracts as vendors that were not selected for the OS II program react to the additional price competition created by the OS II initiative. GSA is capturing lessons learned from OS II and is attempting to incorporate these lessons into other strategic sourcing initiatives. Additional savings are expected as more government agencies participate in the OS II initiative and further leverage the government’s buying power. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GSA estimated that federal agencies spent about $1.6 billion during fiscal year 2009 purchasing office supplies from more than 239,000 vendors. Concerned that federal agencies may not be getting the best prices available, Congress directed GSA to study office supply purchases by the 10 largest federal agencies. GSA delivered the results of its study in November 2010. The study also discussed GSAs efforts to implement an initiative focused on leveraging the governments buying power to realize savings when buying office supplies, known as OS II. Congress directed GAO to assess the GSA study, with particular attention to the potential for savings.
This testimony is based on the findings and conclusions of GAOs December 2011 report, G AO-12-178, and focuses on (1) the support for the findings and conclusions in GSAs study, and (2) how GSA's new office supply contracts support the goal of leveraging the governments buying power to achieve savings.
What GAO Found
In 2010, the General Services Administrations (GSA) pricing study found that during fiscal year 2009, the 10 largest federal agencies accounted for about $1.3 billion, or about 81 percent, of the total $1.6 billion spent governmentwide in 14 categories of office supplies. About 58 percent of their office supply purchases were made outside of the GSA schedules programa simplified process to take advantage of price discounts equal to those that vendors offer most favored customers. Most of these purchases were made at retail stores. GSA also reported that agencies paid an average of 75 percent more (a price premium) than schedule prices for their retail purchases and 86 percent more compared to Office Supplies II (OS II) prices.
While the GSA acknowledged some limitations with the study data, we identified additional data and other limitations that lead us to question the magnitude of some of GSAs reported price premiums and assertions. More specifically, we determined that the study may not have properly controlled for quantities, used two different formulas to calculate price premium estimates, and relied on interviews with senior level acquisition officials instead of purchasers to determine whether buyers compared prices before making purchases. We were not able to fully quantify the impact of these limitations. Additionally, other agencies questioned the studys specific findings related to price premiums, but their own studies of price premiums support GSAs conclusion that better prices can be obtained through consolidated, leveraged purchasing.
Available data show that the OS II initiative has produced savings of $39.2 million from June 2010 through March 2012. According to GSA, the OS II initiative is demonstrating that leveraged buying can produce greater savings and has provided improvements for managing ongoing and future strategic sourcing initiatives. For example, GSA reports that OS II allowed it to negotiate discounts with vendors who were selected for the initiative. As governmentwide sales surpass certain targets, additional discounts are applied to purchase prices. Further, OS II has spurred competition among schedule vendors that were not selected for OS II, resulting in decreased schedule prices. The initiative is also expected to lower governmentwide supply costs through more centralized contract management. Another key aspect of the initiative is that participating vendors provide sales and other information to GSA to help monitor prices, savings, and vendor performance. Finally, GSA is capturing lessons learned from OS II and is attempting to incorporate these lessons into other strategic sourcing initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO did not make any recommendations in its report, and is not making any in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-01-676 | gao_GAO-01-676_0 | Customs’ responsibilities include (1) collecting revenue from imports and enforcing Customs and other U.S. laws and regulations, (2) preventing the smuggling of drugs into the United States, and (3) overseeing export compliance and money-laundering issues. In addition, MID is to conduct independent verification and validation inspections of the completed self- inspection worksheets to ensure that they are correct and accurate. SIP Shows Promise as a Useful Mechanism for Oversight and Accountability
Our visits to eight Customs’ entities and review of 127 MID verification and validation inspection reports found SIP to be a useful mechanism for managers and supervisors to identify and correct problems at the local level and to obtain more control over activities they oversee. Conclusions
SIP is a work in progress; a program under continuous change and refinement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Customs Service's responsibilities include collecting revenue from imports and enforcing U.S. laws and regulations, preventing the smuggling of drugs into the United States, and overseeing export compliance and money laundering issues. Customs recently began a self-inspection program (SIP) to aid in its diverse responsibilities. This report discusses (1) SIP's use as a mechanism for oversight and accountability, (2) problems related to SIP implementation, and (3) improvements and refinements underway to enhance the value of the program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that SIP is a useful mechanism for managers to identify and correct problems at the local level and to obtain more control over activities that they oversee. Implementation problems included a lack of detailed instructions on how to complete self-inspection worksheets and inadequate worksheet review by responsible officials. Customs is trying to correct deficiencies in key internal control areas. |
gao_GAO-11-769 | gao_GAO-11-769_0 | Although the effects of centralization on employees varied, cumulatively they have negatively affected the ability of these employees to carry out their mission work. Centralization Has Improved Financial Accountability and Led to More-Informed Management Decisions and More-Consistent Policy Implementation
By consolidating and standardizing the Forest Service’s financial systems and procedures, centralization helped alleviate some of the agency’s long-standing problems with financial accountability. By consolidating and standardizing its finance, accounting, and budget processes through the centralization of budget and finance, the agency was able to improve its financial management and sustain clean financial statement audit opinions more easily and at a lower cost than before centralization, according to agency officials. Centralization Shifted How Business Services Were Delivered in Ways That Largely Increased Responsibilities for Field- Unit Staff
Even with these improvements, we found that centralization—particularly of human resources management and information technology—has had significant and widespread negative repercussions for field-unit employees. Centralization of human resources management and information technology entailed greater reliance on numerous automated systems, yet through our interviews, focus groups, and reviews of recent internal agency assessments, we found widespread agreement among field-unit staff that many of the agency’s systems are not user-friendly and have not helped employees carry out their work. The Forest Service Assesses Its Delivery of Centralized Business Services in Multiple Ways, but It Is Unclear Whether Proposed Remedies Will Fully Address Identified Shortcomings
The Forest Service has undertaken a number of actions to assess its delivery of centralized business services, in part because of the significant change centralization brought to employees across the Forest Service. Specifically: Budget and finance. Efforts to Address Shortcomings Include Initiatives to Improve Human Resources Management and Information Technology, but It Is Unclear to What Extent Problems Will Be Resolved
In part following recommendations made in various assessments of its business services, the Forest Service has taken, and continues to take, steps to improve performance in each of these services. Because some of these initiatives are relatively new, their impact on field-unit employees has not yet been assessed. The Forest Service Could Not Reliably Demonstrate Cost Savings Resulting from Centralization but Estimated That Anticipated Savings May Have Been Achieved by One Business Service
Achieving significant cost savings was one of the key goals of the Forest Service’s centralization effort, with the agency estimating it would save about $100 million annually across the three business services—budget and finance, human resources management, and the ISO component within information technology. But because of limitations with the agency’s documentation supporting the data, assumptions, and methods used in developing its cost information both before and after centralization, we were unable to fully ascertain the reliability of its cost estimates for (1) baseline costs of providing each of the business services before centralization, (2) projected costs for providing those same business services after centralization was complete, or (3) actual costs of providing the business services after centralization. The Forest Service Estimated That Centralization Achieved Intended Cost Savings in One of the Three Business Services
Despite limitations in the information it provided, the Forest Service estimated that, through fiscal year 2010, it achieved intended annual savings in budget and finance but was not able to achieve intended savings for human resources management or the ISO component within information technology. Recommendations for Executive Action
To maintain and strengthen the Forest Service’s delivery of business services and help ensure customer satisfaction and cost-effectiveness, and in conjunction with its current initiatives to redesign and reorganize the agency’s approach to delivering human resources management and information technology services, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to take the following three actions: Complete a systematic examination of the tasks associated with these two business services to determine (1) which tasks can be efficiently and effectively carried out under a self-service approach and (2) which tasks may require more direct support by specialists. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) types of effects centralization has had on the Forest Service and its employees, particularly in field units; (2) actions the Forest Service has taken to assess its delivery of centralized business services and to address identified shortcomings; and (3) extent to which the Forest Service can demonstrate that it achieved centralization’s intended cost savings. Budget reviews by the agency’s Operations Customer Service Board. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the early 2000s, the Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, centralized the operations of three major business services: (1) budget and finance, (2) human resources management, and (3) information technology. The agency's goals in centralizing these services, which were previously delivered by staff in field units throughout the country, were to streamline and improve operations and reduce costs. Congressional committees directed GAO to independently analyze whether centralization had achieved intended efficiencies and cost savings. Accordingly, this report examines the (1) types of effects centralization has had on the Forest Service and its employees, particularly in field units; (2) actions the agency has taken to assess its delivery of its centralized business services and to address identified shortcomings; and (3) extent to which the agency can demonstrate that it achieved intended cost savings. GAO examined agency reports, performance studies, cost estimates, and other documentation and interviewed and conducted focus groups with employees across the agency.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service's centralization of business services contributed to several agencywide improvements, but it has also had widespread, largely negative effects on field-unit employees. For example, centralization consolidated and standardized agency financial systems and procedures, which helped alleviate some of the agency's long-standing problems with financial accountability, and helped it sustain clean financial statement audit opinions more easily, according to agency officials. Nevertheless, GAO found that centralization of human resources management and information technology services had many negative repercussions for field-unit employees. Under centralization, the agency relies on a self-service approach whereby employees are generally responsible for independently initiating or carrying out many related business service tasks. According to field-unit employees, these increased administrative responsibilities, coupled with problems with automated systems and customer support, have negatively affected their ability to carry out their mission work and have led to widespread employee frustration. The Forest Service has undertaken a number of actions to assess its delivery of centralized business services, but it is unclear whether proposed remedies will fully address identified shortcomings. For example, the agency established a customer service board to continually monitor service delivery and recommend improvements. The agency has also undertaken initiatives to redesign and reorganize its human resources management and information technology services to improve service delivery in these areas. For example, human resources management hired additional staff and established regional service teams, and information technology developed a strategic framework and is in the early stages of a significant reorganization. Nevertheless, the agency has not yet systematically assessed which types of services are best suited to a self-service approach, and because many of the agency's other initiatives are in their early stages, it is unclear to what extent they will address identified shortcomings. The Forest Service could not reliably demonstrate cost savings resulting from centralization, but the agency estimated that anticipated savings may have been achieved in budget and finance. Achieving significant cost savings was one of the key goals of the agency's centralization effort, and the agency estimated it would save about $100 million annually across the three business services. (This estimate applied to budget and finance, human resources management, and a component within information technology known as the Information Solutions Organization, which was established to provide technology support services.) But because of limitations with the agency's documentation supporting the data, assumptions, and methods used in developing its cost information both before and after centralization, GAO was unable to fully ascertain the reliability of the cost estimates for (1) baseline costs of providing each of the business services before centralization, (2) projected costs for delivering those same business services after centralization was complete, or (3) actual costs of providing the business services after centralization. Nevertheless, the Forest Service estimated that anticipated annual savings through fiscal year 2010 may have been achieved in budget and finance but not in human resources management or the Information Solutions Organization, where the agency estimated that savings fell far short of its cost-savings goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Forest Service systematically examine business service tasks to determine which ones can best be carried out under a self-service approach, take related steps to improve service delivery, and adequately document and assess the costs of current initiatives and business service delivery. The Forest Service generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-877 | gao_GAO-04-877_0 | Disease Surveillance Comprises a Variety of Efforts at the State and Federal Levels
Disease surveillance comprises a variety of efforts at the state and federal levels. State public health departments verify cases of notifiable diseases, monitor disease incidence, and identify possible outbreaks within their state. Some federal agencies and departments also support their own national surveillance systems and laboratory networks and have several means of sharing surveillance information with local, state, and international public health partners. States Collect and Report Data on Notifiable Diseases, Although the Diseases Considered Notifiable and the Reporting Requirements Vary by State
To conduct disease surveillance at the state level, state public health officials collect reports on cases of notifiable diseases from health care providers and others. Federal agencies and departments collect and analyze national disease surveillance data and maintain disease surveillance systems. CDC, for example, analyzes the reports it receives from state health departments on cases of notifiable diseases in humans. CDC uses the reports from the states to monitor national health trends, formulate and implement prevention strategies, and evaluate state and federal disease prevention efforts. For example, FDA officials told us they analyze state information from CDC on outbreaks of infectious diseases that originate from foods that FDA regulates. Other systems, known as syndromic surveillance systems, monitor the frequency and distribution of health-related symptoms—otherwise known as syndromes—among people within a specific geographic area. Public Health Officials Have Implemented Initiatives Intended to Enhance Disease Surveillance, but Challenges Remain
Public health officials at the state and federal level have undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance disease surveillance capabilities. Finally, federal officials have also expanded training programs for epidemiologists and other public health experts. Although syndromic surveillance systems are used by federal agencies and departments and in all 11 of the states whose officials we interviewed, concerns about this approach to surveillance have been raised. Relative to traditional methods of surveillance, syndromic surveillance systems are costly to maintain and still largely untested. Public Health Officials Are Implementing Initiatives Designed to Enhance Public Health Communications and Disease Reporting, but Some Initiatives Are Incomplete
CDC is taking steps to enhance its two public health communications systems, HAN and Epi-X, which are used in disease surveillance and response efforts. For example, CDC is working to increase the number of HAN participants who receive assistance with their communication capacities. Federal Public Health Officials Have Enhanced Federal Coordination on Zoonotic Disease Surveillance and Expanded Training Programs, but Surveillance Efforts Still Face Challenges
CDC, USDA, and FDA have made recent efforts to enhance their coordination of zoonotic disease surveillance. In its written comments, HHS stated that the draft captures many important issues in surveillance. In this report, we defined surveillance activities to include detecting and reporting cases of disease, analyzing and confirming this information to identify possible outbreaks or longer-term trends, and applying the information to inform public health decision-making; and the programs and surveillance systems discussed in this report fit within that definition. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe how state and federal public health officials conduct disease surveillance, we reviewed state documents—such as state policy manuals, reports, cooperative agreements with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and various other documents—from 11 states. We also conducted structured interviews of state public health officials from these states. We also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Homeland Security; CDC, and the Food and Drug Administration. List of Nationally Notifiable Infectious Diseases for 2004 as well as other selected worldwide emerging infectious diseases. A number of vaccines for rubella are also available. National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS)
CDC’s NEDSS is an initiative that is designed to make the electronic reporting of disease surveillance data to CDC by state and local health departments more timely, accurate, and complete. West Nile Virus: Preliminary Information on Lessons Learned. | Why GAO Did This Study
The threat posed by infectious diseases has grown. New diseases, unknown in the United States just a decade ago, such as West Nile virus and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), have emerged. To detect cases of infectious diseases, especially before they develop into widespread outbreaks, local, state, and federal public health officials as well as international organizations conduct disease surveillance. Disease surveillance is the process of reporting, collecting, analyzing, and exchanging information related to cases of infectious diseases. In this report GAO was asked to examine disease surveillance efforts in the United States. Specifically, GAO described (1) how state and federal public health officials conduct surveillance for infectious diseases and (2) initiatives intended to enhance disease surveillance. GAO reviewed documents, such as policy manuals and reports related to disease surveillance, and interviewed officials from selected federal departments and agencies, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), Agriculture (USDA), and Homeland Security (DHS) as well as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). GAO conducted structured interviews of state public health officials from 11 states.
What GAO Found
Surveillance for infectious diseases in the United States comprises a variety of efforts at the state and federal levels. At the state level, state health departments collect and analyze data on cases of infectious diseases. These data are required to be reported by health care providers and others to the state. State public health departments verify reported cases of diseases, monitor disease incidence, identify possible outbreaks within their state, and report this information to CDC. At the federal level, agencies and departments collect and analyze disease surveillance data and maintain disease surveillance systems. For example, CDC uses the reports of diseases from the states to monitor national health trends, formulate and implement prevention strategies, and evaluate state and federal disease prevention efforts. FDA analyzes information on outbreaks of infectious diseases that originate from foods that the agency regulates. Some federal agencies and departments also fund and operate their own disease surveillance systems and laboratory networks and have several means of sharing surveillance information with local, state, and international public health partners. State and federal public health officials have implemented a number of initiatives intended to enhance disease surveillance, but challenges remain. For example, officials have implemented and expanded syndromic surveillance systems, which monitor the frequency and distribution of health-related symptoms among people within a specific geographic area. Although syndromic surveillance systems are used by federal agencies and departments and in all of the states whose officials GAO interviewed, concerns have been raised about this approach to surveillance. Specifically, syndromic surveillance systems are relatively costly to maintain compared to other types of surveillance and are still largely untested. Public health officials are also implementing initiatives designed to enhance public health communications and disease reporting. For example, CDC is working to increase the number of participants using its public health communication systems. In addition, state public health departments and CDC are implementing an initiative designed to make electronic disease reporting more timely, accurate, and complete. However, the implementation of this initiative is incomplete. Finally, federal public health officials have enhanced federal coordination on disease surveillance and expanded training programs for epidemiologists and other public health experts. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) said the report captures many important issues in surveillance. HHS also provided suggestions to clarify the discussion. |
gao_GAO-05-113 | gao_GAO-05-113_0 | However, Congress directed FTC to amend its regulation to require telemarketers to access information at least once a month. Fees Collected for the National Registry Did Not Cover Costs in Fiscal Year 2003 But Did in Fiscal Year 2004
FTC collected about $5.2 million in fees in fiscal year 2003 and incurred costs of about $14.6 million to implement, operate, and enforce the national registry. This is a shortfall of about $9.4 million. FTC uses funds from its salaries and expenses account to cover costs of implementing, operating, and enforcing the national registry and is required to reduce its general fund appropriations by the amount of fees collected. In fiscal year 2004, FTC collected about $14 million in fees. First are the actual contract costs along with associated agency costs to develop and operate the national registry. FTC Reported Three Objectives to Measure Whether the National Registry Was Successful
According to FTC staff, the commission had three objectives to measure whether the national registry was successful. These were to (1) have the system up and running during calendar year 2003, (2) to ensure that the system could enroll about 60 million telephone numbers in the national registry in the first year of operation, and (3) reduce unwanted calls to consumers who sign up for the national registry, approximating Missouri’s experience of reducing telemarketing calls by about 80 percent. FTC began receiving consumer registration of telephone numbers in June 2003, and, as of June 2004, 62 million telephone numbers had been registered on the national registry. As an alternative, FTC has cited polls taken by Harris Interactive® and the Customer Care Alliance as evidence that the national registry has resulted in a reduction of unwanted telemarketing calls. Specifically, in January 2004, Harris Interactive® found that about 90 percent of those who signed up for the national registry had fewer telemarketing calls, and 25 percent of those registered indicated they had received no telemarketing calls since signing up. The two surveys may provide indications of the national registry’s overall performance; however, we are uncertain about how representative the results of each actually are of the opinions and experiences of adults nationwide because, for example, the Harris survey did not use a probability sample that can be projected nationwide and the Customer Care survey had a low response rate, among other things. The Implementation Act required FTC and FCC to each provide an annual written report for fiscal years 2003 through 2007 on the national registry to include (1) an analysis of the effectiveness of the national registry; (2) the number of consumers who have placed their telephone numbers on the national registry; (3) the number of persons paying fees for access to the national registry and the amount of such fees; (4) an analysis of the progress of coordinating the operation and enforcement of the national registry with similar registries established and maintained by the various states; (5) an analysis of the progress of coordinating operation and enforcement of the national registry with the enforcement activities of the FCC pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act; and (6) a review of the enforcement proceedings under the Telemarketing Sales Rule in the case of FTC and Telephone Consumer Protection Act in the case of FCC. FTC and FCC agreed with the contents of our report and provided informal technical comments on the draft, which we have incorporated where appropriate. Appendix I: FTC Lawsuits and FCC Enforcement Actions Related to the National Do-Not-Call Registry
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) identified ten lawsuits related to the National Do-Not-Call Registry (the national registry) since enforcement of the national registry became effective October 1, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to consumer frustration and dissatisfaction with unwanted telemarketing calls, Congress has passed several statutes directing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate intrusive and deceptive telemarketing practices, authorizing both agencies to establish the National Do-Not-Call Registry (the national registry), and authorizing FTC to collect fees to fund this national registry. The objective of the national registry is to limit the numbers of unwanted telemarketing calls that registered consumers receive. The Conference Report for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, mandated that GAO evaluate the implementation of the national registry. Specifically, this report addresses (1) how FTC and FCC have implemented and operated the national registry, (2) fees collected to cover costs to operate the national registry, and (3) how FTC has measured the success of the national registry.
What GAO Found
FTC and FCC have done several things to implement the national registry, including issuing regulations and coordinating with each other on the development of regulations and enforcement efforts. FTC has contracted out management of the operational aspects of the registry. Fees for the national registry were less than costs incurred in fiscal year 2003 but covered costs in fiscal year 2004, the first full year of operation. Fees collected by FTC in fiscal year 2003 fell short of actual costs incurred by about $9.4 million. However, fees collected in fiscal year 2004 covered FTC's $14 million in costs incurred. FTC uses appropriated funds to cover costs associated with the national registry and, as required, reduces its appropriations by the amount of fees collected. FCC uses appropriated funds to cover its costs associated with the national registry. FTC established three objectives to measure whether the national registry was successful--(1) having the system operational in calendar year 2003, (2) having the system capable of enrolling about 60 million telephone numbers within the first 12 months of operation, and (3) reducing by 80 percent unwanted calls to consumers who sign up for the registry. The national registry was operational in calendar year 2003, and 62 million telephone numbers had been registered by consumers as of June 2004, within 12 months after registration opened. FTC cannot measure how much unwanted calls have been reduced because it does not know how many calls were being received before the establishment of the registry. However, as an alternative, FTC relied upon two surveys. The results of one survey showed that respondents had an 80 percent reduction in unwanted telemarketing calls since registering on the national registry. However, this result is questionable because, among other problems, the survey relied on respondents' recall of the number of telemarketing calls received at least three months prior. The two surveys found that about 90 percent and 87 percent of registered consumers surveyed reported receiving fewer calls. The surveys may provide indications of the national registry's overall performance; however, GAO is uncertain how representative the results are because, for example, one survey did not use a probability sample that can be projected nationwide. FTC and FCC provided informal technical comments to our report, which we incorporated where appropriate. According to FTC, there is no evidence that the national registry is not working. |
gao_GAO-02-1106T | gao_GAO-02-1106T_0 | Long-term Demographic Trends Drive the Fiscal Future and Frame Current Debates
Any discussion about the role of the federal government, about the design and performance of federal activities, and about the near-term federal fiscal outlook takes place in the context of two dominating facts: a demographic tidal wave is on the horizon, and it combined with rising health care costs threatens to overwhelm the nation’s fiscal future. Absent structural reforms in these programs, budgetary flexibility will continue to shrink and eventually disappear. In addition, the failure to reprioritize other claims in the budget will make it increasingly difficult to finance the rest of government, let alone respond to compelling new priorities and needs. Metrics and mechanisms need to be developed to facilitate consideration of the long-term implications of existing and proposed policies or programs. There is also a need to reexamine existing programs, policies, and activities. We must strive to maintain a government that is effective and relevant to a changing society—a government that is as free as possible of outmoded commitments and operations that can inappropriately encumber the future. Any review of the base of existing policy should address this broader picture of federal involvement. Public Education Is Critical
Good information—which is more than just budget numbers—helps to inform debate. In the 10 years since GRPA was enacted, agencies have improved the focus of their planning and the quality of their performance information. In attempting to link resources to results, it also will be important to measure the full costs of the resources associated with performance goals using a consistent definition of costs between and among programs. OMB arrives at a profile for each program by reviewing information from budget submissions, agency strategic and annual performance plans, program evaluations, and other sources. In such areas as low-income housing or health care, the outcomes achieved by federal policy are the result of the interplay of a complex array of tools including those on the spending side of the budget as well as the tax code and regulations. The PART may be used to facilitate this kind of cross-cutting perspective. Such an effort requires fundamental shifts in current human capital policies, organizational structures, governmental tools, and performance and financial accountability approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses efforts to link resources to results--also known as "performance budgeting." During the past decade, Congress and several administrations have put in place a structure for increasing the focus on and accountability for government performance.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have been working to carry out the Government Performance Act, which requires the development of periodic strategic and annual performance plans and reports. Absent structural change in a number of major entitlement programs, budgetary flexibility will continue to decline and eventually disappear--while demands for new federal resources to address such emerging challenges as homeland security and other issues become more compelling and pressing. Given the country's longer-range fiscal imbalance, there is also a need to broaden the measures and focus of the federal budget process to accommodate these goals. The nation's fiscal challenges escalate rapidly just beyond the 10-year budget projection period. As a result, new metrics and mechanisms are needed to better highlight the longer-term implications of existing programs and proposed new fiscal commitments. Furthermore, in order to address emerging challenges, it is necessary to address both retirement and health programs encumbering the nation's fiscal future, in addition to reexamining the base of existing programs--both discretionary programs and other entitlements--to free up resources to address new needs in a rapidly changing society. Such an examination should be cross-cutting and comprehensive in nature--all relevant policy tools and federal programs, including tax preferences, should be "on the table" in addressing such policy areas as low-income housing or health care financing and delivery. Although such a comprehensive reassessment will take time and may have to be addressed in phases, it is critically important that it occur. An extensive public education effort will be required to fully inform the American people about a long-term outlook under current policy portfolio as well as the alternative choices that are available. |
gao_HEHS-98-14 | gao_HEHS-98-14_0 | Nevertheless, most of the studies we analyzed used many different measures of access and found that insured children were more likely to have access to both preventive and acute or chronic health care. Having a primary care connection made it easier for children to get regular preventive care, acute care when ill, and more complex care as needed. Uninsured and lower-income children were more likely to be hospitalized for conditions that could have been treated through primary care. Health Insurance Increases Children’s Access to Preventive and Primary Care
Most of the studies we reviewed showed that children who had health insurance had better access to preventive and primary health care than uninsured children. Using regression analysis to isolate the effect of insurance from race, income, and ethnicity, this study found that uninsured children were twice as likely to lack a usual source of care as insured children. Uninsured children were also more likely to lack after-hours care and to spend more time traveling and more time waiting to receive care. 1.) Contact with a primary care provider, not insurance status, was the key to differing rates of this complication, but having private insurance did increase the likelihood that a child would have a relationship with a primary care physician. 2.) Their finding that families that had Medicaid coverage for their children would seek health care for them, while families of uninsured children would not, is consistent with the findings from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment that families of poor children in cost-sharing plans were less likely to seek care for diagnoses related to trauma or accidents than families of poor children with free care. 3.) 4.) An analysis that went even further to separate insurance status from other factors that could affect children’s access to care found that children who had chronic conditions and special health care needs were more than twice as likely to be hospitalized if they had public or private insurance than if they were uninsured, adjusting for differences in need for hospitalization based on their conditions. Expanding Public Insurance Improves Access
Since providing uninsured children with publicly funded insurance improves their access to preventive and acute health services, families are more likely to report that their children’s health needs are being met. 5.) Lack of Health Insurance Is Only One Barrier to Care
Getting appropriate health care when it is needed can be difficult for children. Personal barriers can include parents’ lack of knowledge that care is needed and language differences between parents and providers. Children who have no insurance—even those who are sick or chronically ill or have special health care needs—get less health care than children who have insurance. But having health insurance is no guarantee that children will get appropriate, high-quality care. Having a stable source of insurance can help families use the health system for their children optimally over time. 1-8. 2. “Reconsidering the Effect of Medicaid on Health Care Services Use.” Health Services Research, Vol. “Race, Health, and Health Services.” American Journal of Public Health, Vol. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on the relationship between health insurance and health care access, focusing on: (1) what effect health insurance has on children's access to health care; (2) whether expanding publicly funded insurance improves their access; and (3) barriers besides lack of insurance that might deter children from getting health care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) health insurance increased children's access to health care services in almost all the studies GAO analyzed; (2) most of the evaluations showed that insured children were more likely to have preventive and primary care than uninsured children; (3) insured children were also more likely to have a relationship with a primary care physician and to receive required preventive services, like well-child checkups, than uninsured children; (4) differences in access between insured and uninsured children held true even for children who had chronic conditions and special health care needs; (5) when ill, insured children were more likely to receive a physician's care for their health problems, such as asthma or acute earache; (6) in contrast, lack of insurance can inhibit parents from trying to get health care for their children and can lead providers to offer less-intensive services when families seek care; (7) several studies found evidence that low-income and uninsured children were more likely to be hospitalized for conditions that could have been managed with appropriate outpatient care; (8) two studies found that uninsured children sometimes received less-intensive hospital care than insured children; (9) while health insurance benefits differed and some excluded coverage for some basic health care needs, increasing the number of insured children increased the likelihood that more children would receive care; (10) although health insurance can considerably increase access, it does not guarantee entry into the health care system; (11) low family income and education levels, limited availability of neighborhood primary health care facilities, lack of transportation, and language differences are among the barriers to obtaining and appropriately using health care services; (12) both children who have no health insurance and those who have Medicaid coverage are more likely than privately insured children to face such barriers; and (13) to ensure access to high-quality care, public health and clinical experts recommend that children have a stable source of health insurance benefits that cover their health care needs, a relationship with a primary care provider that helps them obtain more complex care as needed, primary care facilities that are conveniently situated, and outreach and education for their families. |
gao_NSIAD-98-86 | gao_NSIAD-98-86_0 | We reviewed these items to determine if the Navy had valid requirements to support inventory purchases, what caused purchases to exceed requirements, and what the Navy was doing to cancel purchases that were beyond what was needed. Inventory Purchases Were Not Always Supported by Valid Needs
Our analysis of 200 judgmentally selected items showed that the Navy duplicates some inventory requirements, resulting in unnecessary purchases and inventory that exceeds needs. Recurring demands had decreased, engineering estimates for requirements had not materialized, nonrecurring demands had slipped or were not needed, and parts had become obsolete. In some cases, the changes could not have been anticipated. However, in other cases, better management could have eliminated or minimized the accumulation of inventory that exceeded needs. The effectiveness of using planned program requirements to satisfy future needs was not measured, and purchase decisions did not adequately take into account broken parts to be returned for repair. However, more cancellations could have been made. Additional opportunities to cancel purchases were missed because item managers did not exercise their responsibility to direct cancellation of contracts, economic analyses were not made, and inventory and contracting records did not agree. The amount of a contract that is canceled is the portion that exceeds the protection level. In other words, the 2-year usage protected nearly four times the amount of inventory that the Navy supply system would recommend buying. While we cannot precisely quantify the overall extent of the problems discussed in this report, we do know that the problems affect the decision-making process for purchasing billions of dollars of inventory. Inventory purchases often were not based on valid needs. Changing requirements was a major cause of the excess inventory on contract. The Navy also could do a better job of canceling purchases that exceed requirements. Improve the process for canceling contracts where items are excess to needs by (1) eliminating 1- and 2-year protection levels when considering purchases for cancellation, (2) reemphasizing to item managers that they have the responsibility and authority to direct cancellation of contracts, (3) requiring economic analyses to determine if it is economical to cancel contracts for excess material, and (4) automatically adjusting item manager cancellation recommendations when the recommended quantities exceed the quantities available to cancel. We did not recommend that the Navy adjust procurements on the basis of one quarter of demand. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the excess inventory the Navy had on order, focusing on whether the Navy: (1) had valid requirements to support inventory purchases; (2) had purchased items that exceeded needs and the causes of this condition; and (3) was cancelling purchases that exceeded needs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it identified several problems that affect the decisionmaking process for billions of dollars of inventory; (2) however, GAO cannot precisely quantify the overall extent of the problems; (3) specifically, its work shows that in some cases purchases: (a) were not based on valid needs; (b) were excess to needs because the requirements changed after orders were placed; and (c) occurred even though contracts could have been cancelled; (4) the Navy did not always have valid requirements to support inventory purchases; (5) GAO previously recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) revise policies and procedures to eliminate this duplication of requirements; (6) while DOD has acted on many of GAO's past recommendations, it has not taken corrective action on this one; (7) several factors contributed to the excess inventory on contract; (8) recurring demands for certain items had decreased, engineering estimates for requirements had not materialized, nonrecurring demands were delayed or were not needed, and parts had become obsolete; (9) although some of these factors could not have been anticipated, in other cases better management could have eliminated or minimized the accumulation of inventory that exceeded needs; (10) the Navy did not know if planned program requirements accurately reflected needs; (11) also, broken parts to be returned for repair were not adequately considered when making purchase decisions; (12) the Navy cancelled some contracts for excess inventory but could have cancelled more; (13) a major reason for not cancelling more purchases was that the Navy adds protection levels, representing as much as 2 years of usage, to requirements before considering cancellation and cancels only the amount of the purchases that exceeds the protection levels; (14) the 2-year usage represented nearly four times the amount of inventory that the Navy would normally buy; (15) the Navy missed additional opportunities to cancel purchases because item managers did not exercise their responsibility to direct the cancellation of contracts, economic analyses were not made, and inventory and contracting records did not agree; and (16) collectively, these problems contribute to the Navy having inventory in excess of needs. |
gao_GAO-14-580 | gao_GAO-14-580_0 | Insurers must pay rebates when their MLRs do not meet or exceed the minimum applicable PPACA MLR standards. The markets include large group, small group, and individual. The MLR data that insurers report to CMS include the following components, as required by law. Expenses for quality improvement (QI) activities. The remaining amount of premiums that an insurer does not spend on the components of medical claims, QI activities, taxes and fees, and non- claims costs, will be referred to as the insurer’s “premium surplus” in this report. Some insurers, such as those with a small number of enrollees, are permitted certain adjustments to their MLRs. Specifically, the applicable PPACA minimum MLR standard is based on one of the following:
85 percent in the large group market, 80 percent in the small group market, and 80 percent in the individual market; a higher MLR standard if specified by law in the state in which the a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-approved, adjusted MLR standard for a particular state’s individual market. The Role of, and Insurer Payments to, Agents and Brokers
Agents and brokers sell plans for insurers and perform a variety of functions on behalf of individuals and employers. Most Insurers Met or Exceeded the PPACA MLR Standards in 2011 and in 2012 and Median PPACA MLRs among All Insurers Were 88 Percent
Most insurers met or exceeded the PPACA MLR standards established for the markets and state in which they operated, but group market insurers were more likely to meet or exceed the standards than individual In 2011, about 76 percent of insurers met or exceeded market insurers.the minimum PPACA MLR standards and, in 2012, 79 percent of insurers met or exceeded the standards. The Percentage of Premiums Insurers Spent on Medical Claims and Non-Claims Costs in 2011 and 2012 Varied by Market
In 2011 and 2012, the percentage of net premiums that insurers spent on their enrollees’ medical claims varied across insurance markets. We found that insurers’ spending on non-claims costs as a percent of their net premiums varied by insurance market, with insurers in the individual and small group markets spending more than insurers in the large group market on non-claims costs in 2011 and in 2012. Insurers in the small group market spent a higher share on agents’ and brokers’ fees and commissions than insurers in the individual and large group markets. Insurers Paid $1.1 Billion in Rebates in 2011 and $520 Million in 2012, and Would Have Paid About 75 Percent Less with Agents’ and Brokers’ Fees and Commissions Excluded, Absent Other Changes in Business Practices
Insurers paid about $1.1 billion in total rebates to enrollees and policyholders who paid premiums in 2011, the first year that insurers were subject to the PPACA MLR requirements, and about $520 million in rebates in 2012. These amounts would each have decreased by about 75 percent had agents’ and brokers’ fees and commissions been excluded from the MLR and rebate calculations, assuming insurers made no other changes that could affect their MLRs. Specifically, we found that the rebates paid by insurers to enrollees and policyholders who paid premiums in 2011 would have fallen from $1.1 billion to about $272 million, and in 2012 would have fallen from $520 million to about $135 million. There was variation in the impact of the recalculated MLRs across the three markets. These rebate calculations are based on the assumption that insurers did not make other changes during this time that would have affected their MLRs. However, if the formula had been different, insurers might have made different business decisions in those years. Most Insurers We Interviewed Reported Factors Other than PPACA MLR Requirements as Affecting their Business Practices
All eight insurers that we interviewed reported that they increased their premium rates since 2011 due to a variety of factors, and most (five of the eight) reported that the factors were largely unrelated to PPACA MLR requirements. Three of the eight insurers reported that the PPACA MLR requirements were one factor among a variety of factors that influenced their decisions regarding premium rates, and two of these insurers told us that the MLR requirements have generally moderated their premium increases. All eight insurers we interviewed told us that the PPACA MLR requirements have not affected where they do business and have had no effect, or a very limited effect, on their spending on QI activities since 2011. Two of the eight insurers we interviewed stated that they exited certain insurance markets since the PPACA MLR requirements began, but they did not attribute those decisions to the MLR requirements. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to HHS for comment. HHS responded that it had no general or technical comments. Appendix IV: Rebates Insurers Would Have Paid with Agent and Broker Payments Excluded from 2011 and 2012 Calculations
This appendix presents information on the amount of rebates that insurers would have paid to enrollees and policyholders who paid premiums with agents’ and brokers’ commissions and fees excluded from the PPACA medical loss ratio and rebate calculations (absent other changes in business practices), compared to the actual amounts that insurers paid, by state for 2011 (see table 12) and for 2012 (see table 13). | Why GAO Did This Study
Private insurers are required to meet minimum PPACA MLR standards— expressed as the percent of premium dollars spent on patient care and related activities—and beginning in 2011 they must pay rebates back to enrollees and policyholders who paid premiums if they do not meet these standards. GAO was asked to review the effects of the PPACA MLR requirements on insurers and enrollees and how rebates would change if agent and broker payments were excluded from the MLR formula. This report examines (1) the extent to which insurers met the PPACA MLR standards, and how much they spent on the MLR components of claims, quality improvement activities, and non-claims costs; (2) the amount of rebates insurers paid and how this amount would have changed with agents' and brokers' commissions and fees excluded from the MLR; and (3) the perspectives of insurers on the effects of the MLR requirements on their business practices.
To do this work, GAO analyzed the MLR data that insurers reported to CMS for 2011 and 2012 (the most recent data available) at the national level for each insurance market—large group, small group, and individual. GAO also interviewed eight insurers, selected based on variation in their size, concentration of business in the individual market, geography, whether they paid rebates, and profit status. In 2012 the number of enrollees covered by these insurers ranged from about 70,000 to 7 million. GAO's finding on insurers' perspectives is limited to those insurers interviewed and is not representative of the perspectives across all insurers reporting MLR data.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) established federal minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) standards for the percentage of premiums private insurers must spend on their enrollees' medical care claims and activities to improve health care quality, as opposed to what they spend on administrative (“non-claims”) costs. Insurers report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) annually on their PPACA MLRs. More than three quarters of insurers met or exceeded the standards in 2011 and in 2012, and the median MLRs among all insurers were 88 percent. Insurers' MLRs and their spending on claims and non-claims costs varied across different insurance markets. Specifically, insurers in the large group market had higher median MLRs and spent a higher share of their premiums on enrollees' claims and less on non-claims costs, compared to insurers in the individual and small group markets.
Insurers that did not meet or exceed the PPACA MLR standards in 2011 and 2012 paid rebates in the amounts of $1.1 billion and $520 million (respectively) back to enrollees and policyholders who paid premiums in those years. These amounts would have decreased by about 75 percent had the commissions and fees insurers paid to agents and brokers been excluded from the MLRs. Agents and brokers sell insurance products and provide various services to consumers and groups related to their insurance needs and the commissions and fees charged for these services are included in the MLRs. Insurers in the large group market paid the highest rebate amount ($405 million) across insurance markets in 2011 and insurers in the small group market paid the highest amount ($207 million) in 2012. Insurers in the individual market were more likely to pay rebates than insurers in the small and large group markets. GAO found that rebates would have fallen from $1.1 billion to $272 million in 2011 if the commissions and fees insurers paid to agents and brokers had been excluded from the MLRs, and rebates would have similarly fallen from $520 million to $135 million in 2012. GAO's calculations assumed that insurers did not make other changes in their business practices in response to a different method for calculating MLRs.
GAO found that most of the eight insurers it interviewed reported that factors other than the PPACA MLR requirements affected their business practices since 2011. All eight insurers reported that they increased their premium rates since 2011 and that they based these decisions on a variety of factors, such as trends in medical care claims, competition with other insurers, and other requirements. Three of the eight insurers stated that the MLR requirements were one among several factors that influenced their decisions about premium rates. Four of the eight insurers stated they had recently made changes to their payments to agents and brokers, and one reported the MLR requirements were a primary driver behind its business decision. All eight insurers GAO interviewed stated that the MLR requirements did not affect their decisions to stop offering health plans in certain markets and have had no effect or a very limited effect on their spending on quality improvement activities.
GAO provided a draft of this product to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comment. HHS responded that it had no general or technical comments. |
gao_GAO-04-847 | gao_GAO-04-847_0 | From 1993 to 2002, EDA provided funding for 63 enterprise projects intended to generate revenues but these have had mixed success in producing economic development. EDA also provided grants to 18 tribal organizations or Alaska Native entities. The remaining $26 million was awarded to 30 Native entities in Alaska, including grants to 25 federally recognized Native entities and 5 Alaska Native organizations representing more than one entity. As shown in figure 8, of the 31 completed projects with results, tribal officials reported about half were either profitable or were earning enough to cover their operating costs. However, the remaining projects were either requiring subsidies or had ceased operations. Their criteria also emphasize projects more likely to attract private sector investment. Based on our analysis of the relationship between contracting and changes in tribes’ economic profiles, we found that self-governance tribes and those that had contracted to operate a high proportion of their programs and services generally experienced greater growth in their employment levels but had not generally shown greater gains in income levels. Most Tribes Entered Into Contracting Arrangements with the Federal Government
The Indian Self-Determination Act allows tribes to enter into various arrangements with BIA or the Indian Health Service to assume the operation of many of the programs and services previously provided by the agencies. According to BIA information, 43 of the 219 were tribes that had entered into self-governance arrangements with BIA. As shown in figure 21, tribes with greater amounts of revenue from gaming generally experienced greater growth in their total populations, employment rates, per capita income, and in the percentage with incomes above the poverty level. Scope and Methodology
To review all grant funds made available to Indian tribes and tribal organizations by the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration (EDA), we analyzed data from EDA on all grants awarded to tribes during the years 1993 to 2002. Therefore, for the purposes of our analysis, we grouped the various grants into the following categories according to type of project or activity funded: Enterprise projects: grants used to develop projects designed to generate income for the tribe, such as a cannery, a resort, or a sawmill; Infrastructure projects: grants used for the design and construction of public works infrastructure, such as roads, highways, and sewers, that would serve as the foundation for general economic development activities; Business development projects: grants used to fund loan funds, training, and other business development projects, including those for business incubators, revolving loan funds (RLFs), training and capacity building, and other assistance that enhances the tribes’ economic development activities; and Planning/feasibility grants: grants used for general planning purposes such as paying for staff salaries or the broad administration of the tribes’ planning departments, as well as for developing plans, analyses of projects’ environmental impact, and feasibility studies for specific economic development projects. Our analysis of EDA grants was limited to grants provided to Indian tribes. We did not analyze EDA’s preapplication process. Methodology for Analyzing Relationship between Contracting and Economic Profile
To determine whether there exists a relationship between the degree to which an Indian tribe operates federal programs and services under contracting or self-governance and that tribe’s economic profile, we used data from the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Single Audit Act database to group all tribes we analyzed into three separate groups. Our analysis of this data indicated that 143 Indian tribes and tribal organizations received a total of $112 million in EDA grants during this 10-year period. On average, the high-contracting and self-governance tribes showed greater growth in employment levels, but differences in the other indicators were not statistically significant. We also analyzed the relationship between variations in tribes’ grants to income ratio and the extent to which they were contracting or self- governance. GAO Comments
1. 3. This criteria favors projects that result in higher- wage, higher skill jobs and private investment. | Why GAO Did This Study
American Indians and Alaska Natives generally face worse economic conditions than the rest of the U.S. population. The Economic Development Administration (EDA) within the Department of Commerce provides grants to distressed communities, including to American Indian tribes and Alaska Native entities, to generate employment and stimulate economic growth. Because data on how these EDA grants helped tribes was not publicly available, GAO analyzed all EDA grants made to Indian tribes from 1993-2002 and determined what economic development resulted. Tribes also enter into self-governance and other contracting arrangements with two federal agencies--the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health Service--to assume the management of individual services, including law enforcement, education, social services, and road maintenance. GAO also analyzed the relationship between changes in tribes' economic profile and the extent to which they had self-governance or contracting arrangements to perform their own services. BIA and EDA provided comments on a draft of this report. BIA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions. EDA took issue with GAO's characterization of the relative success of EDA grant programs.
What GAO Found
Indian tribes have used EDA grants to create businesses, build roads and other infrastructure, and create economic development plans, but these grants have had mixed success in generating jobs, income, and private sector investment. From 1993 to 2002, 143 Indian tribes and tribal organizations received $112 million in EDA grants, but this represented a small portion of EDA's awards to all organizations. Of the total amount awarded to Indian tribes or Alaska Native entities, $54 million was used to fund 63 enterprise projects designed to create income and jobs. Of the 59 projects GAO collected data on, 25 had not yet begun operating, and 3 others had just been completed and no results were available. Of the 31 operational projects, tribal officials reported that about half were profitable or were covering their costs, and the remainder were being subsidized or had failed. Most had resulted in the creation of 10 or fewer jobs, and few had attracted private sector investment. EDA also provided $22 million in grants to tribes for infrastructure projects, such as roads and sewer systems, $30 million in grants to assist tribes with economic planning, and $5 million for loan funds and business development. Almost all of the 219 federally recognized tribes with available data had entered into either contracts or self-governance compacts to operate their own tribal programs and services. Based on GAO's analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data, tribes that had self-governance arrangements or were engaging in higher levels of contracting showed greater gains on average in employment levels from 1990 to 2000 compared with tribes that were contracting less. However, the change in per capita income or the percentage of tribal individuals with incomes above poverty levels over this period was not statistically different for self-governance or high-contracting tribes compared with low-contracting tribes. |
gao_GAO-07-1198 | gao_GAO-07-1198_0 | Background
By way of providing context for our examination of U.S. trade policy as it relates to TPA guidance and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, the following is an overview of ongoing U.S. government efforts to address the wider issue of access to medicine and public health both related and unrelated to IP, as well as how the WTO first became involved in public health issues, and the origin of IP and public health in TPA. Patents are considered to be especially valuable for innovations in pharmaceuticals. The United States Has a Narrower Interpretation of the Doha Declaration Than Some Other WTO Members
To help address public health problems affecting many developing countries, WTO members adopted the Doha Declaration (reprinted in full below) to stress the importance of implementing the TRIPS agreement in a manner supportive of public health. The United States interprets the declaration as a political statement recognizing public health crises and affirming the importance of IP protection that neither changes existing TRIPS obligations nor creates new obligations, and does not assign public health greater priority than IP protection. Significantly, the declaration clarifies certain flexibilities explicit in TRIPS that allow WTO members to address public health crises. Some developing countries, however, believe these flexibilities provide broad discretion to ensure access to medicines when IP regulations present barriers to addressing not only health issues, but also social welfare. 2. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines. USTR Has Maintained Its Pursuit of High IP Standards and Made Some Allowances for Doha Flexibilities in Negotiating FTAs
In negotiating FTAs, USTR said it balances respect for the Doha Declaration with its other two IP negotiating objectives in TPA by consistently promoting high standards of IP protection similar to U.S. law, while making allowances for the two specific flexibilities mentioned in the declaration. However, USTR has continued to pursue other pharmaceutical-related IP provisions that it does not see as relevant or contrary to the Doha Declaration in all of its FTAs, such as data exclusivity, patent term extensions, and patent linkage. Reactions to USTR’s approach have been mixed. Finally, certain Members of Congress have expressed concern over the pharmaceutical-related IP provisions in FTAs with developing countries, and this concern was recently addressed through a bipartisan compromise between Congress and the administration. The Trade Act of 2002, which granted the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), contains guidance from Congress on U.S. negotiating objectives for trade agreements, including three goals on IP rights:1. to further promote adequate and effective protection of IP rights, including through ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing IP rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law; 2. to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon IP protection; and 3. to respect the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO). These NGOs, academics, and generic pharmaceutical producers believe that these provisions limit generic competition, thereby maintaining high prices for pharmaceutical products, ultimately impairing access to medicines. Although U.S. agencies generally support USTR’s negotiations approach, interagency input on U.S. trade negotiations has not addressed the public health implications of IP pharmaceutical provisions negotiated under TPA and has been primarily technical in nature. Within the formal private sector advisory system, two public health representatives were recently added to two private sector Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs) after USTR had concluded nine trade agreements. The Departments of Health and Human Services and State Endorse the View that IP Protection Supports Access to Medicine
HHS officials told us they support the USTR position concerning the Doha Declaration and agree with USTR’s view that strong IP protection promotes innovation and access to medicines. In order to evaluate the extent of formal and informal IP and public health input into USTR’s trade agreement negotiations, we examined the formal interagency advisory process, the formal industry advisory committee process, and several informal means for providing input to USTR. | Why GAO Did This Study
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) requires all 151 World Trade Organization (WTO) members to provide baseline protections, including 20-year patents for innovative pharmaceuticals. The Trade Act of 2002 granting Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to the President outlined three negotiating objectives related to intellectual property (IP). The first two aim to strengthen IP rights and enforcement abroad. The third calls for respect of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which addresses access by developing countries to patented medicines, particularly in epidemic and emergency situations. This report (1) describes the Declaration and its interpretation by the United States and other nations; (2) analyzes how U. S. Trade Representative (USTR) has balanced respect for the Doha Declaration with the other two IP objectives in negotiating free trade agreements; and (3) evaluates the extent of public health input by agencies and the private sector. We reviewed official WTO and U.S. government documents, interviewed U.S. and foreign government officials, and obtained private sector views.
What GAO Found
The 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was adopted by WTO members to stress the importance of implementing the TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive of public health. The U.S. interprets the Declaration as a political statement that recognizes the severity of public health crises while affirming the importance of IP protection. It maintains that the Declaration neither changes existing TRIPS obligations, nor creates new rights and does not assigns public health greater priority than IP protection. U. S. Trade Representative (USTR) says the Declaration clarifies flexibilities already in TRIPS, including the flexibility to compulsorily license patents under certain circumstances. USTR recognizes these as being allowed for WTO members, including those facing public health crises, but only in a fashion that will not unduly harm patent holders. Some developing countries assert they provide broad discretion to ensure access to medicines when IP regulations present barriers to affordable care. USTR balances respect for the Doha Declaration with TPA's other two IP negotiating objectives by actively promoting high levels of IP protection for pharmaceuticals while making targeted allowances for developing country partners. USTR believes that this longstanding U.S. pursuit of high IP protections for pharmaceuticals creates incentives for investment in research and development of new treatments, ultimately enhancing public health. With regard to the TPA objective of respecting the Doha Declaration, USTR's key policy change was to not insist upon two provisions it sees as relevant to the Declaration in FTAs with developing country trading partners. Otherwise, USTR has continued to pursue other pharmaceutical related IP protections that it does not consider related to the Doha Declaration. Reactions to USTR's record are mixed. The pharmaceutical industry considers these types of FTA provisions critical for preserving incentives for research and innovation. However, some academics, experts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and generic producers have expressed concerns that these provisions may delay entry by cheaper generic products. In response to similar concerns in Congress, a bipartisan agreement was reached with the Administration to revise four recent FTA's prior to their submission for Congressional approval. U.S. interagency and private sector input into trade negotiations related to public health have remained limited since Congress enacted TPA. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other agencies generally endorse USTR's view that strong IP protection promotes public health and access to medicines, and interagency input has been primarily technical in nature. Within the formal private sector trade advisory system, a public health representative was recently added to 2 of the 16 private sector advisory committees, but not until USTR had concluded nine trade agreements. USTR did obtain some public health views through other formal and informal means during this period. |
gao_GAO-07-244 | gao_GAO-07-244_0 | Rising fuel prices—particularly for gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and natural gas—have been the primary driver of the Service’s recent transportation and facility fuel costs increases. The Service remains highly vulnerable to fuel price fluctuations, due in part to its fuel purchasing process, which involves buying fuel as it is needed, typically at retail locations. The Service is challenged by the need to meet its universal service requirements and its inability to use fuel surcharges. Rising transportation costs accounted for roughly 18 percent of the operating expense increase in 2006—largely due to rising fuel costs— while compensation and benefit growth accounted for 68 percent of this increase. The Service was able to absorb these cost pressures through cost containment efforts inside and outside of the fuel program, as well as from increased revenues from the January 2006 rate increase, allowing it to achieve a positive net income from operations. The Service’s Actions to Improve Fuel Costs Are Generally Consistent With Leading Practices and Legal Requirements, but Issues Remain
The Service has taken actions in certain areas, such as implementing its Voyager fuel card program, bulk purchasing, and SES contracts, that have improved its fuel procurement and consumption, as well as its ability to manage fuel cost and risks. We also identified areas where more actions could be taken to identify further cost-saving opportunities and meet updated federal fuel consumption requirements related to reducing reliance on petroleum-based fuels. Postal Service officials stated these issues made operating its fleet on alternative fuels cost prohibitive. For example, the Service converted some of its vehicles to operate on CNG in the early 1990s. Taking immediate actions to address the lack of consumption data will be important, even as the Service is developing a new energy strategy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this report, our objectives were to review (1) how the Service’s fuel costs changed recently and the impact of these cost changes on the Service’s financial and operating conditions and (2) how the Service’s actions to control fuel costs and mitigate risk compare to leading practices and federal requirements. To describe how the U.S. To assess the effectiveness of the Service’s actions to control fuel costs and mitigate risk, we compared these actions against practices advocated by leading organizations that could be applied to the Service’s fuel-related activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service (the Service) is dependent on fuel to support its mail delivery and transportation networks, as well as to heat and operate the over 34,000 postal facilities it occupies. The Service has been challenged by recent fuel price fluctuations, and the Postmaster General stated that gas prices were a primary reason for the proposed 2007 postal rate adjustment. Based on this challenge, Congress asked GAO to review (1) how the Service's fuel costs changed recently and the impact of these cost changes on the Service's financial and operating conditions, and (2) how the Service's actions to control fuel costs and mitigate risk compare to leading practices and federal requirements. GAO collected fuel cost and price information; interviewed Service fuel officials; and compared the Service's actions against leading practices and federal requirements.
What GAO Found
The Service's transportation and facility fuel costs have grown in recent years as fuel prices, particularly for gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel have increased. For example, fuel cost growth for its vehicle fleet was due to rising prices rather than consumption. While fuel costs have directly pressured its financial condition, increasing compensation and benefits were the primary driver of the $3.4 billion operating expense increase in fiscal year 2006. The Service absorbed fuel cost increases through costcontainment efforts and increased revenues from the January 2006 rate increase, allowing it to achieve net income for the year. Nevertheless, the Service remains vulnerable to fuel price fluctuations, due in part to its purchasing process, which involves buying fuel as needed, often at retail locations. The Service is challenged to control fuel costs due to its expanding delivery network and inability to use surcharges. GAO found some of the Service's actions to control fuel costs to be generally consistent with procurement and consumption practices advocated by leading organizations and federal requirements for purchasing alternative fuel vehicles. However, GAO also identified areas where more actions could be taken. Taking actions to address data inconsistencies will be important, even as the Service develops a new energy strategy. These inconsistencies will limit the Service's ability to understand consumption changes and impacts and where to target potential cost-saving opportunities. Furthermore, additional progress is needed in reducing reliance on petroleum-based fuels because of the more stringent federal fuel consumption requirements that were recently passed. |
gao_GAO-09-1050T | gao_GAO-09-1050T_0 | Importantly, the weights were designed to be descriptive not prescriptive—that is, the weights were designed to develop a measure of the national average amount of time that judges actually spent on specific cases, not to develop a measure of how much time judges should spend on various types of cases. 1993 Case Weights Reasonably Accurate, But Accuracy of 2004 Case Weights Cannot Be Statistically Determined
In our 2003 report, we found the district court case weights approved in 1993 to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time demands a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that court. The design for the new case weights relied on three sources of data for specific types of cases: (1) data from automated databases identifying the docketed events associated with the cases; (2) data from automated sources on the time associated with courtroom events for cases, such as trials or hearings; and (3) consensus of estimated time data from structured, guided discussion among experienced judges on the time associated with noncourtroom events for cases, such as reading briefs or writing opinions. First, the design assumed that judicial time spent on a given case could be accurately estimated by viewing the case as a set of individual tasks or events in the case. Information about event frequencies and, where available, time spent on the events would be extracted from existing administrative data bases and report and used to develop estimates of the judge-time spent on different types of cases. For event data, the research design proposed using data from two data bases (one of which was new and had not been implemented in all district courts) that would have to be integrated to obtain and analyze the event data. Second, the research design did not require judges to record time spent on individual cases. However, a majority of district judges’ time is spent on case-related work outside the courtroom. The time required for noncourtroom events would be derived from structured, guided discussion of groups of 8 to 13 experienced district court judges in each of the 12 geographic circuits (about 100 judges in all). Thus, the planned methodology did not make it possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are—weights whose accuracy the Judicial Conference relies upon in assessing judgeship needs. Accuracy of Courts of Appeals Case-Related Workload Measure Cannot Be Assessed
The principal quantitative measure the Judicial Conference uses to assess the need for additional courts of appeals judgeships is adjusted case filings. The adjusted filings workload measure is not based on any empirical data regarding the time that different types of cases required of appellate judges. Various Proposals Have Been Considered for Changing the Court of Appeals Workload Measure
In the past decade the Judicial Conference has considered a number of proposals for developing a revised case-related workload measure for the courts of appeals judges, but has been unable to reach a consensus on any approach. Our 2003 Recommendations and the Judiciary’s Response
In our 2003 report we recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States update the district court case weights using a methodology that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting weights; and develop a methodology for measuring the case-related workload of courts of appeals judges that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting workload measures and that addressed the special case characteristics of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. With regard to our 2003 recommendation for updating the district court case weights, the FJC agreed that the method used to develop the new case weights would not permit the calculation of standard errors, but that other methods could be used to assess the integrity of the resulting case weight system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biennially, the Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary's principal policymaking body, assesses the need for additional judges. The assessment is based on a variety of factors, but begins with quantitative case-related workload measures. This statement focuses on (1) whether the judiciary's quantitative case-related workload measures from 1993 were reasonably accurate; and (2) the reasonableness of any proposed methodologies to update the 1993 workload measures. This statement is based on work completed and reported in 2003 and discussed in testimony on June 17, 2008.
What GAO Found
In 2003, GAO reported that the 1993 district court case weights were reasonably accurate measures of the average time demands that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that district. At the time of GAO's 2003 report, the Judicial Conference was using case weights approved in 1993 to assess the need for additional district court judgeships. The weights were based on data judges recorded about the actual in-court and out-of-court time spent on specific cases from filing to disposition. This methodology permitted the calculation of objective, statistical measures of the accuracy of the final case weights. In 2003, GAO reviewed the research design the Judicial Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics had approved for updating the 1993 district court case weights, and had two concerns about the design. First, the design assumed that the judicial time spent on a case could be accurately estimated by viewing the case as a set of individual tasks or events in the case. Information about event frequencies and, where available, time spent on the events would be extracted from existing databases and used to develop estimates of the judge-time spent on different types of cases. However, for event data, the research design proposed using data from two data bases that had yet to be integrated to obtain and analyze the data. Second, unlike the methodology used to develop the 1993 case weights, the design for updating the case weights included limited data on the time judges actually spent on specific types of cases. Specifically, the proposed design included data from judicial databases on the in-court time judges spent on different types of cases, but did not include collecting actual data on the noncourtroom time that judges spend on different types of cases. Instead, estimates of judges' noncourtroom time were derived from the structured, guided discussions of about 100 experienced judges meeting in 12 separate groups (one for each geographic circuit). Noncourtroom time was likely to represent the majority of judge time used to develop the revised case weights. The accuracy of case weights developed on such consensus data cannot be assessed using standard statistical methods, such as the calculation of standard errors. Thus, it would not be possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are--weights on whose reasonable accuracy the Judicial Conference relies in assessing judgeship needs. The case-related workload measure for courts of appeals judges is adjusted case filings in which all cases are considered to take an equal amount of judge time except for pro se cases--those in which one or more of the parties is not represented by an attorney--which are discounted. In our 2003 review, we found no empirical basis on which to assess the accuracy of this workload measure. Although a number of alternatives to the adjusted filings measure have been considered, the Judicial Conference has been unable to agree on a different approach that could be applied to all courts of appeal. |
gao_GAO-15-200 | gao_GAO-15-200_0 | Guidance for Review and Justification of Pass-through Contracts Is Incomplete and Oversight Processes Are Not Updated
USAID, State, and DOD varied in their implementation of Section 802. More recently, State issued a procurement bulletin that restated Section 802 requirements, but has not taken further steps to update tools to assist its contracting officers. For example,
USAID issued a policy directive and State issued a procurement bulletin in June 2013 and July 2014, respectively, that each restate the requirements of Section 802. Federal government internal control standards state that control activities, such as policies and procedures, help to ensure that management directives are carried out and actions are taken to address risks. Neither USAID nor State has provided its contracting officers additional guidance to help them implement these new requirements. DOD, having the highest level of obligations for contracts that may be potentially subject to Section 802 requirements, has not taken any actions and is waiting for the issuance of a final FAR rule before deciding what, if any, revisions to its guidance are needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Administrator of USAID take the following two actions to help ensure contracting officers carry out the requirements of Section 802: issue guidance to assist contracting officers by identifying approaches for or examples of how to assess alternative contracting approaches to include the feasibility of contracting directly with proposed subcontractors, and documenting a determination that the approach selected is in the best interests of the government; and revise the processes and guidance governing management reviews of procurements to ensure that such reviews assess whether contracting officers are complying with the provisions of Section 802. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 directed the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to issue guidance and regulations as may be necessary to ensure that when an offeror notifies the contracting officer of its intent to subcontract more than 70 percent of the total cost of the work to be performed on certain contracts or orders, contracting officers consider alternative contracting arrangements and make a written determination that the contracting approach selected is in the best interest of the government and document the basis for the determination. The conference report that accompanied the act mandated GAO to report on the implementation of this provision. We assessed the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and USAID revised their guidance and regulations to address pass-through contracting issues consistent with Section 802. To conduct our work, we compared the provisions of Section 802 to current DOD, State and USAID acquisition policies, guidance, and regulations. To determine how agencies identify or monitor pass-through contracts, we interviewed acquisition officials at DOD, State, and USAID and reviewed guidance available to contracting officers and supporting agencies, such as DCAA and DCMA. We used the government’s procurement database—Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG)—to identify DOD, State, and USAID total obligations for fiscal year 2013 on contracts that by type and value could be subject to Section 802 requirements and reported having a plan to use subcontractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD, State, and USAID collectively spent approximately $322 billion on goods and services in fiscal year 2013. Nearly two-thirds of this dollar amount was awarded to prime contractors reportedly having a plan for using subcontractors. Concerns remain that the government could overpay contractors that provide no, or little, added value for work performed by lower-tier subcontractors. Section 802 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2013, mandated DOD, State, and USAID to issue guidance and regulations as necessary to ensure that contracting officers take additional steps prior to awarding pass-through contracts.
The accompanying conference report mandated that GAO evaluate the implementation of these requirements. This report assesses the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID issued guidance and regulations consistent with Section 802. GAO reviewed policies, guidance, and regulations at the three agencies and interviewed acquisition officials.
What GAO Found
Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to issue guidance and regulations as necessary to ensure that contracting officers complete additional analyses prior to awarding pass-through contracts—contracts meeting certain criteria and in which prime contractors plan to subcontract 70 percent or more of the total cost of work to be performed—by July 2013. (See figure.)
DOD, State, and USAID varied in their implementation of Section 802. Specifically, GAO's analysis of the agencies' policies and regulations found the following:
USAID issued a policy directive in June 2013 restating Section 802 requirements and is updating checklists used by contracting officers.
State issued a procurement bulletin in July 2014 that restated Section 802 requirements but has not taken further steps.
Neither USAID nor State has provided its contracting officers additional information to help them implement these new requirements, such as by identifying how to assess alternative contracting arrangements or how to document their decisions.
DOD has not taken any actions and is waiting for revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation—expected to be completed by March 2015—before deciding what, if any, changes to its guidance are needed.
As of November 2014, none of the agencies have updated their management review processes to reflect Section 802 requirements.
Federal government internal control standards state that control activities, such as policies and procedures, help to ensure that management directives are carried out and actions are taken to address risk. The lack of guidance and updated management review processes limits the agencies' ability to minimize the potential risk of paying excessive pass-through costs.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure contracting officers carry out Section 802 requirements, GAO recommends that DOD, State, and USAID take two actions: issue guidance to help contracting officers perform the additional steps required, and revise management review processes and guidance to verify implementation. DOD and State agreed with GAO's recommendations but USAID did not, stating that additional guidance might limit its contracting officers' discretion. GAO maintains that both recommended actions are still warranted for USAID. |
gao_GAO-13-117 | gao_GAO-13-117_0 | In fiscal year 2011, 5 of DOT’s 11 OAs with procurement spending accounted for 92 percent of the department’s $5.6 billion in procurements. DOT submitted acquisition workforce plans to OFPP in 2010, 2011, and 2012 that reported progress in increasing department-wide acquisition workforce staff levels and certification rates, but did not maintain the supporting data in 2010 and 2011, and lacked internal controls to ensure the quality of the data. By contrast, we obtained the data DOT used to prepare the 2012 plan, compared it with data from the OAs, and interviewed OA officials about the sources and methods they used to report the data. We found inconsistencies in how the OAs reported their data that would affect the reliability of the department’s aggregate data, but determined that the OA-level data were sufficiently reliable to make observations about staffing and certification rates at the individual OAs. Based on our analysis of this data, we found that four OAs would potentially need to replace from 50 percent to over 80 percent of their contract specialists by the end of fiscal year 2013 to meet staffing targets. In addition, some OAs have low certification rates particularly for program/project managers and contracting officer’s representatives, which increases the risk that DOT acquisition programs are not being effectively managed and that contractors are not receiving appropriate oversight. However, the Office of the Senior Procurement Executive did not retain the underlying data it used to prepare the 2010 and 2011 plans and in some cases, the data were also not available from the OAs. Although the data we obtained and reviewed were not sufficient to assess DOT’s progress in improving certification rates over time, DOT reported that the number of people certified increased substantially between fiscal years 2010 and 2011 and that a focus on certification programs is central to DOT’s strategy to strengthen the skills and capabilities of the acquisition workforce. Federal policy requires agencies to conduct strategic planning to identify short- and long-term agency needs. However, officials stated that their capacity to direct planning efforts is limited because the OAs have their own budget authorities and that the office does not have the staff or resources needed to perform oversight of strategic planning efforts. The Office of the Senior Procurement Executive Has Taken Steps to Align Its Workforce Plans with Strategic Goals, but Faces Challenges to Assess Progress
The Office of the Senior Procurement Executive has recently taken steps to align its workforce plans with the department’s strategic goals, but given challenges with maintaining reliable data, lacks a sound baseline for assessing progress toward reaching these goals or for making a business case for directing resources or management attention to OAs which may face the greatest workforce risks. Conclusions
DOT relies on its acquisition workforce to negotiate and administer contracts and manage large-scale acquisition programs, but lacks the reliable data and strategic focus needed to fully understand its workforce needs over time and to ensure that the department can hire, develop, and retain the acquisition professionals needed to perform the agency’s current and future missions. Further, the Office of the Senior Procurement Executive relies on the OAs to collect and compile acquisition workforce data and conduct strategic planning but has not provided guidance on how to collect and report workforce data, established internal controls to ensure that data provided are accurate and complete, or established specific responsibilities for maintaining the data, or for using it for management purposes. This exposes the department to substantial risk that the workforce does not have the capacity or skills needed to effectively manage the department’s current and future acquisition missions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve DOT’s ability to effectively address workforce needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following five actions:
Direct the Senior Procurement Executive to define data the department needs to meet OFPP and DOT workforce planning and oversight requirements;
Provide standards for internal controls or other guidance to ensure the OAs collect, report, and maintain consistent and reliable data for workforce planning and in FAITAS;
Establish specific responsibilities for the Office of the Senior Procurement Executive and the OAs to maintain workforce data, develop strategies and metrics, and monitor progress toward addressing workforce gaps and certification deficiencies;
Assess whether the Office of the Senior Procurement Executive has sufficient resources to effectively oversee the acquisition workforce; and
Direct the Senior Procurement Executive and Chief Human Capital Officer to establish a coordinated process for future acquisition workforce planning. Our report assessed: (1) the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation and DOT’s OAs to identify acquisition workforce needs, and (2) the Office of the Secretary’s role in providing oversight and support for acquisition workforce planning and management. For example, DOT’s 2010 plan includes conflicting information on the size of the acquisition workforce for fiscal year 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
With $5.6 billion in procurement spending in fiscal year 2011, DOT relies on its acquisition workforceincluding contracting and program management staffto negotiate and administer contracts and manage large-scale acquisition programs. Having sufficient numbers of adequately trained acquisition professionals is critical to ensuring maximum value and benefit to the department.
In a fiscal year 2012 Senate appropriations bill report, GAO was directed to assess (1) DOTs efforts to identify acquisition workforce needs, and (2) the Office of the Secretary of Transportations role in providing oversight and support for acquisition workforce planning and management. GAO reviewed DOTs acquisition workforce plans for 2010, 2011, and 2012 along with supporting documentation, and interviewed agency officials on how the data were collected and used. The primary focus was on five OAs that accounted for 92 percent of DOT procurement spending in fiscal year 2011.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation (DOT) lacks sufficient and reliable data to fully identify its acquisition workforce needs and assess progress in addressing shortfalls over time. Over the last 3 years, the Office of the Senior Procurement Executivethe office within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation responsible for department-wide acquisition workforce managementhas submitted acquisition workforce plans that reported progress in increasing the size of the workforce and the number of personnel certified to meet education, training, and experience requirements. However, GAO identified data limitations due to a lack of internal controls to maintain, compare, and reconcile the data compiled from DOTs 11 operating administrations (OA), and determined that the department-level data were not sufficient to assess progress over time. For example, DOT did not maintain the data it used to prepare the 2010 and 2011 plans and in some cases the data were also not available from the OAs. By contrast, GAO obtained the data DOT used to prepare the 2012 plan, compared it with data from the OAs, and interviewed OA officials about the sources and methods they used to report the data. GAO found inconsistencies in how the OAs reported their data that affect the reliability of the departments aggregate data, but determined that the OA-level data were sufficiently reliable to make observations about staffing challenges and certification shortfalls at the individual OAs. Specifically, GAO found that 4 of the 11 OAs would need to replace 50 percent or more of their contract specialists by the end of fiscal year 2013 to meet staffing targets. In addition, some OAs reported low certification rates for program/project managers and contracting officers representatives, which increases the risk of DOT programs not receiving appropriate oversight.
DOT lacks the strategic focus and oversight needed to ensure that the department can meet its acquisition workforce goals. Federal policy requires agencies to conduct strategic planning to identify short- and long-term needs and plans to address them. The Office of the Senior Procurement Executive relies on the OAs to conduct acquisition workforce planning, but has not provided oversight or support to help ensure that they collect and maintain consistent data or use it to develop strategies to address workforce goals. Officials from the Senior Procurement Executives office stated that they do not monitor the OAs acquisition workforce data throughout the year and that their capacity to direct planning efforts is limited in part because they do not have the staff needed to perform oversight. Instead, officials stated that the office provides a focal point for coordination among the OAs, approves certifications, and provides information on training opportunities. According to leading practices identified in prior GAO work, agencies should link workforce goals to budget formulation to ensure that requests are adequate to implement workforce strategies. The Office of the Senior Procurement Executive has taken steps to align workforce plans with its strategic goals and budget, but given the challenges with maintaining reliable data, lacks a sound baseline for assessing progress or for making a business case for directing resources or management attention to OAs that may face the greatest workforce risks. Until DOT addresses these issues, the department faces substantial risk that the workforce will not have the capacity or skills needed to effectively manage the departments acquisitions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation take steps to improve DOTs ability to address workforce needs, such as improving internal controls for acquisition workforce data and providing guidance to ensure that the OAs collect and report workforce data consistently. DOT acknowledged past data and coordination challenges and generally concurred with our recommendations. DOT also stated it now has the management framework needed to effectively monitor and develop the acquisition workforce. |
gao_GAO-06-863T | gao_GAO-06-863T_0 | Federal policy also recognizes the need to be prepared for the possibility of debilitating disruptions in cyberspace and, because the vast majority of the Internet infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, tasks DHS with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. In the event of a major Internet disruption, multiple organizations could help recover Internet service. Although Cyber and Physical Incidents Have Caused Disruptions, the Internet Has Not Yet Suffered a Catastrophic Failure
The Internet’s infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions in service due to terrorist and other malicious attacks, natural disasters, accidents, technological problems, or a combination of the above. Recent physical and cyber incidents have caused localized or regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of recovery planning. Existing Laws and Regulations Apply to the Internet, but Numerous Uncertainties Exist in Using Them for Internet Recovery
Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet infrastructure, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption because some do not specifically address Internet recovery and others have seldom been used. Pertinent laws and regulations address critical infrastructure protection, federal disaster response, and the telecommunications infrastructure. However, this law and regulation do not specifically address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. DHS Initiatives Supporting Internet Recovery Planning Are under Way, but Much Remains to Be Done and the Relationship Between Initiatives Is Not Evident
DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high- level plans for infrastructure protection and national disaster response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, DHS has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation’s ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. As a result, the nation is not prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Multiple Challenges Exist to Planning for Recovery from Internet Disruptions
Although DHS has various initiatives under way to improve Internet recovery planning, it faces key challenges in developing a public/private plan for Internet recovery, including (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to a disruption difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS’s role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS’s ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until it addresses these challenges, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as focal point for recovering the Internet from a major disruption. As a result, the exact role of the government in helping to recover the Internet infrastructure following a major disruption remains unclear. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet originated as a U.S. government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today--Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). This report (1) identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.
What GAO Found
A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a physical incident (such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects key facilities), a cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a malicious virus), or a combination of both physical and cyber incidents. Recent physical and cyber incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina, have caused localized or regional disruptions but have not caused a catastrophic Internet failure. Federal laws and regulations that address critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the telecommunications infrastructure provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption. Specifically, key legislation on critical infrastructure protection does not address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws and regulations governing disaster response and emergency communications have never been used for Internet recovery. DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, the department has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. However, progress to date on these initiatives has been limited, and other initiatives lack time frames for completion. Also, the relationships among these initiatives are not evident. As a result, the government is not yet adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet disruptions include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a focal point for helping the Internet to recover from a major disruption. |
gao_GAO-15-257 | gao_GAO-15-257_0 | The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense is responsible for Chemical and Biological Defense Program oversight activities, acquisition policy guidance, and interagency coordination. 3. CBDP Enterprise officials acknowledge the importance, validity, and necessity of addressing the 2008 recommendation and recognized these points in their 2012 CBDP Business Plan. However, the CBDP Enterprise has made limited progress in achieving this infrastructure goal because CBDP Enterprise officials told us that they were focused on higher priorities and had no CBDP Enterprise-wide impetus to address the infrastructure recommendations. The CBDP Enterprise Does Not Have an Entity to Achieve Infrastructure Transformation and Has Not Established Timelines and Milestones to Identify Required Infrastructure Capabilities
The limited progress in fully achieving the CBDP Enterprise goal to identify required infrastructure capabilities, and transform the way infrastructure is managed, is because OASD (NCB) has not identified and designated an entity that has the responsibility and authority needed to lead the effort to ensure the achievement of this and other CBDP Enterprise goals (e.g., the other three 2008 PAIO recommendations, as identified in the Background section of this report, and the goal established in the 2012 CBDP Business Plan—an assessment of the CBDP Enterprise’s required infrastructure capabilities), and no timelines or milestones have been established for their completion. The CBDP Enterprise Plans to Identify Potential Duplication in Its Chemical and Biological Defense Infrastructure but Does Not Plan to Consider Information from Existing Studies from Other Federal Agencies
The CBDP Enterprise has taken some actions to identify, address, and manage potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. By identifying, requesting, and considering information from existing infrastructure studies from other federal agencies working in this area, PAIO will be better positioned to meet DOD’s goal to avoid duplication by having more information about existing infrastructure across the federal government for use by the CBDP Enterprise to support its work. PAIO Does Not Plan to Identify, Request, or Consider Information from Existing Infrastructure Studies from Other Federal Agencies as Part of Its Duplication Study
PAIO plans to identify potential duplication within the CBDP Enterprise; however, PAIO does not plan to identify, request, or consider information from existing studies about infrastructure capabilities of other federal agencies with research and development or test and evaluation infrastructure to study chemical and biological threats. The CBDP Enterprise Used Threat Data and Plans to Use Data on Threats and Results of Risk Assessments to Support Future Research and Development Planning but Has Not Updated Its Guidance and Planning Process
The CBDP Enterprise used data on chemical and biological threats from the intelligence community and plans to use threat data and the results from risk assessments first conducted in 2014 by the Joint Requirements Office and ODASD (CBD) to support planning for its future portfolio planning process for research and development. The standards also call for written procedures, to better ensure leadership directives are implemented. As of March 2015, ODASD (CBD) and Joint Requirements Office officials had not formally committed to updating such guidance or established a time frame for doing so to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments. Going forward, addressing internal control standards by updating its guidance and the planning process to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments would support planning, help ensure that the CBDP Enterprise leadership directives are implemented, and end dependence upon any particular agency official to request risk assessments to support future investment planning. Fully institutionalizing the use of risk assessments would support CBDP Enterprise planning and may provide new information about chemical and biological defense capabilities to further prioritize the CBDP Enterprise’s future research and development investments. To help ensure that the CBDP Enterprise’s infrastructure is properly aligned to address current and emerging chemical and biological threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate DOD officials to take the following two actions: identify and designate an entity within the CBDP Enterprise with the responsibility and authority to lead the effort to ensure achievement of the infrastructure goals (e.g., the four 2008 PAIO recommendations, including the recommendation that the CBDP Enterprise identify its required infrastructure capabilities, and the goal established in the 2012 CBDP Business Plan), and establish timelines and milestones for achieving identified chemical and biological infrastructure goals, including implementation of the 2008 PAIO recommendation that the CBDP Enterprise identify its required infrastructure capabilities. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Enterprise has achieved its goal to identify required infrastructure capabilities to address current and emerging chemical and biological threats, we reviewed the Program Analysis and Integration Office’s (PAIO) 2008 study, Chemical and Biological Defense Program’s Non-Medical Physical Infrastructure Capabilities Assessment, which assessed the physical infrastructure capabilities of the CBDP Enterprise to support the CBDP mission. Security. Public Health Preparedness: Developing and Acquiring Medical Countermeasures Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Agents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States faces current and emerging chemical and biological threats, and defenses against these threats enable DOD to protect the force, preclude strategic gains by adversaries, and reduce risk to U.S. interests.
GAO was asked to review DOD efforts to manage its chemical and biological defense infrastructure capabilities. This report examines the extent to which the CBDP Enterprise has: (1) achieved its goal to identify required infrastructure capabilities to address current and emerging chemical and biological threats; (2) identified, addressed, and managed potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in its chemical and biological defense infrastructure; and (3) used and plans to use threat data and the results of risk assessments to support its investment planning for chemical and biological defense. GAO analyzed CBDP infrastructure policies, plans, and studies from organizations across the CBDP Enterprise from fiscal years 2008 through 2014.
What GAO Found
A key component of the 26 Department of Defense (DOD) organizations that constitute the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Enterprise is the chemical and biological defense research and development and test and evaluation infrastructure. After nearly 7 years, the CBDP Enterprise has not fully achieved its goal to identify required infrastructure capabilities. The Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Program Analysis and Integration Office (PAIO), CBDP's analytical arm, recommended in 2008 that the CBDP Enterprise identify required infrastructure capabilities, such as laboratories to research chemical and biological agents, to ensure alignment of the infrastructure to its mission. CBDP Enterprise officials recognize the importance, validity, and necessity of addressing the 2008 recommendation. The CBDP Enterprise has made limited progress in achieving this infrastructure goal because CBDP Enterprise officials told GAO that they were focused on higher priorities and had no CBDP Enterprise-wide impetus to address the infrastructure recommendations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs previously identified the need for an entity that has the responsibility and authority needed to ensure achievement of this goal, but DOD has not designated such an entity. By identifying and designating an entity with the responsibility and authority to lead infrastructure transformation, the CBDP Enterprise would be better positioned to achieve this goal.
The CBDP Enterprise has taken some actions at its laboratories to identify duplication in its chemical and biological defense infrastructure. DOD directives outline goals, such as to avoid duplication by using existing DOD and other federal agencies' facilities. As part of an ongoing study to identify required infrastructure, in July 2015 PAIO plans to inventory and analyze CBDP Enterprise infrastructure for potential duplication. However, study officials stated that they do not plan to identify, request, or consider information about infrastructure capabilities from existing studies of other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, because their office does not have the authority or resources to require such information. By considering existing information, which would not necessarily require new authority, PAIO will have more information about existing infrastructure inventory across the federal government, such as its capability and potential availability for use.
The CBDP Enterprise used threat data and plans to use threat data and the results from risk assessments piloted in 2014 to support its future portfolio planning process to prioritize research and development investment. However, the CBDP Enterprise has not updated its guidance and planning process to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should have written procedures to better ensure leadership directives are implemented. According to CBDP Enterprise officials, while updating the guidance would be beneficial, they had not committed to updating such guidance or established a time frame for doing so. By updating its guidance to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments, the CBDP Enterprise would be better positioned to prioritize future research and development investments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD (1) designate an entity to lead the effort to identify required infrastructure; (2) identify, request, and consider any information from chemical and biological infrastructure studies of other federal agencies to avoid potential duplication; and (3) update the CBDP Enterprise's guidance and planning process to fully institutionalize the use of risk assessments. DOD concurred with all five of GAO's recommendations and discussed actions it plans to take. |
gao_GAO-03-988T | gao_GAO-03-988T_0 | Background
The 1986 Compact of Free Association between the United States, the FSM, and the RMI provided a framework for the United States to work toward achieving its three main goals: (1) to secure self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency, and (3) to ensure certain national security rights for all of the parties. Further, the U.S., FSM, and RMI governments provided little accountability over Compact expenditures. In the fall of 1999, the United States and the two Pacific Island nations began negotiating economic assistance and defense provisions of the Compact that were due to expire. Immigration issues were also addressed. According to the Department of State, the aims of the amended Compacts are to (1) continue economic assistance to advance self-reliance, while improving accountability and effectiveness; (2) continue the defense relationship, including a 50-year lease extension (beyond 2016) of U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI; (3) strengthen immigration provisions; and (4) provide assistance to lessen the impact of Micronesian migration on Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI. If the trust funds established in the amended Compacts earn a 6 percent rate of return, the FSM trust fund would be insufficient to replace expiring annual grants. Amended Compacts Could Cost the U.S. Government $6.6 Billion
Under the amended Compacts with the FSM and the RMI, new congressional authorizations of approximately $6.6 billion could be required for U.S. payments from fiscal years 2004 to 2086, of which $3.5 billion would be required for the first 20 years of the Compacts (see table 1). This new authorized funding would be provided to each country in the form of (1) annual grant funds targeted to priority areas (such as health, education, and infrastructure); (2) contributions to a trust fund for each country such that trust fund earnings would become available to the FSM and the RMI in fiscal year 2024 to replace expiring annual grants; (3) payments the U.S. government makes to the RMI government that the RMI transfers to Kwajalein landowners to compensate them for the U.S. use of their lands for defense sites; and (4) an extension of federal services that have been provided under the original Compact but are due to expire in fiscal year 2003. Nevertheless, the RMI trust fund would become insufficient for replacing grant funding by fiscal year 2040. In sum, most of our recommendations regarding future Compact assistance have been addressed with the introduction of strengthened accountability measures in the signed amended Compacts and related agreements. The United States could withhold payments if either country fails to comply with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require a sustained commitment by the three governments to fulfill their new roles and responsibilities. Appropriate resources from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI represent one form of this commitment. While the U.S. government had already secured access to Kwajalein until 2016 through the 1986 MUORA, the newly revised MUORA would grant the United States access until 2066, with an option to extend for an additional 20 years to 2086. In addition, the Attorney General would have the authority to issue regulations that specify the time and conditions of a Compact nonimmigrant’s admission into the United States (under the original Compact, regulations could be promulgated to establish limitations on Compact nonimmigrants in U.S. territories or possessions). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1986, the United States entered into a Compact of Free Association with the Pacific Island nations of the Federated States of Micronesia, or FSM, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or RMI. The Compact provided about $2.1 billion in U.S. funds, supplied by the Department of the Interior, over 17 years (1987-2003) to the FSM and the RMI. These funds were intended to advance economic development. In a past report, GAO found that this assistance did little to advance economic development in either country, and accountability over funding was limited. The Compact also established U.S. defense rights and obligations in the region and allowed for migration from both countries to the United States. The three parties recently renegotiated expiring economic assistance provisions of the Compact in order to provide an additional 20 years of assistance (2004-2023). In addition, the negotiations addressed defense and immigration issues. The House International Relations and Resources Committees requested that GAO report on Compact negotiations. This testimony discusses negotiated changes to the levels and structure of future assistance, including the potential cost to the U.S. government. Further, it reviews accountability, defense, and immigration changes brought about by the amended Compacts and related agreements.
What GAO Found
The amended Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the FSM and the RMI to renew expiring U.S. assistance could potentially cost the U.S. government about $6.6 billion in new authorizations from the Congress. Of this amount, $3.5 billion would cover payments over a 20-year period (2004-2023), while $3.1 billion represents payments for U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI for the years 2024 through 2086. While the level of annual grant assistance to both countries would decrease each year, contributions to trust funds--meant to eventually replace grant funding--would increase annually by a comparable amount. Nevertheless, at an assumed annual 6 percent rate of return, earnings from the FSM trust fund would be unable to replace expiring grant assistance in 2024, while earnings from the RMI trust fund would encounter the same problem by 2040. The amended Compacts strengthen reporting and monitoring measures that could improve accountability over assistance, if diligently implemented. These measures include the following: assistance grants would be targeted to priority areas such as health and education; annual reporting and consultation requirements would be expanded; and funds could be withheld for noncompliance with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI. Regarding defense, U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI would be extended from 2016 through 2066, with an option to extend through 2086. Finally, Compact provisions addressing immigration have been strengthened. For example, FSM and RMI citizens entering the United States would need to carry a passport, and the U.S. Attorney General could, through regulations, specify the time and conditions of admission to the United States for these citizens. |
gao_HEHS-98-92 | gao_HEHS-98-92_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the factors contributing most to reducing funding gaps nationwide, we conducted state-level comparative analyses of states’ equalization efforts (the state share of funding and how this funding was targeted to poor school districts), the local tax effort of poor and wealthy districts, and the size of the income-related funding gap between poor and wealthy districts in the 1991-92 school year, the most recent year for which a national data set of districts was available. Extra Tax Effort of Poor Districts and State Equalization Effort Reduce Funding Gaps
Two key factors help reduce states’ funding gaps between poor and wealthy districts: (1) the extent to which a state’s poor districts make a greater tax effort than its wealthy districts and (2) a state’s effort to reduce funding gaps through its equalization policies. The most equalized school finance system would enable districts’ per pupil funding to be 100 percent of the state’s average per pupil funding for an equal tax effort in all districts. The average state equalization effort was 62 percent, according to our analysis, suggesting that states could have more impact on the funding gap if they were to strengthen their equalization policies. Poor districts in most states were making a greater tax effort than wealthy districts. Of these two, state share has a larger impact on state equalization policies. In effect, equalization policies determine the extent to which a state enables its districts to provide the state average funding level when all districts make an equal tax effort. Other states’ equalization efforts in school year 1991-92 ranged from 87 percent (Arkansas and Kentucky) to about 13 percent (New Hampshire). The increase in Rhode Island’s equalization effort reflects the relatively small increase in the state share of education funding. Which policy tools a state may choose to implement depends upon the outcomes it wants to achieve. Increasing State Share and Targeting Effort
A state’s equalization effort can provide more funding to poorer districts in two ways: by increasing the state share of total funding so that differences in local funding will have proportionately less effect on overall student expenditures and by increasing its targeting effort; that is, a state can adjust its approach so that aid goes more exclusively to poor districts. These policy options assume that a state would increase its equalization effort by increasing its share of total education funding, increasing its effort to target funding to poor districts, or increasing both. Neither program considers the extent to which a state’s equalization effort–-rather than the extraordinary tax effort of poor districts—contributes to reducing funding gaps among districts. 3.) 4.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how well state funding is targeted to poor school districts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two key factors help reduce the size of the funding gap between poor and wealthy districts: (a) the extent to which a state's poor districts make a greater tax effort than the wealthy districts; and (b) a state's effort to compensate for differences in district wealth through its equalization policies; (2) poor districts in most states made a greater tax effort than the wealthy districts, according to GAO's research; (3) characterizing state equalization efforts is much more complex, however, than analyzing districts' tax efforts; (4) a state's equalization effort consists of two parts: (a) the proportion of education funding financed by the state government; and (b) the degree to which states target funds to poor districts; (5) of these two, state share has more impact on state equalization policies; (6) in effect, equalization policies determine the extent to which a state enables its districts to provide the state average funding level when all districts make an equal tax effort; (7) the most equalized school finance system would enable districts' per pupil funding to be 100 percent of the state's average per pupil funding for an equal tax effort in all districts; (8) the average state equalization effort was 62 percent, according to GAO's analysis; (9) states ranged from a high of 87 percent in Arkansas and Kentucky to a low of about 13 percent in New Hampshire; (10) increased equalization effort in the four states GAO reviewed in detail showed mixed results in reducing funding gaps between poor and wealthy districts; (11) to more successfully address funding gaps, most states would have to increase state equalization effort and impose some constraints on local tax efforts; (12) the amount of money required to reduce these funding gaps and the type of constraints needed depend on the degree to which a state may want to reduce the gap and the degree to which a state wants to equalize the local tax burden among districts; (13) GAO found that without constraints on local funding, districts in Louisiana and Rhode Island adjusted their tax effort in a way that undermined increases in the state's equalization effort; (14) regarding equalization effort, a state could choose to increase its share of total education funding, increase its targeting effort so that state aid would favor poor districts to a greater extent, or increase both; and (15) relying mainly on increasing its share of total funding would allow a state to bear most costs involved with increasing equalization effort. |
gao_GAO-12-434 | gao_GAO-12-434_0 | In this report, we assess GSA and FPS’s processes against GAO’s collaboration key practices and internal control standards. These include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Police, National Park Service (NPS) law enforcement within the Department of the Interior, and Smithsonian Institution (SI) Police. Protection and security services at Smithsonian Institution facilities are provided by the Smithsonian Police. FPS Uses Various Approaches to Collaborate with State and Local Law Enforcement, but Jurisdictional Data on Federal Facilities Are Incomplete
FPS’s Approach Involves a Variety of MOUs, Reliance on Long-standing Relationships, Guidance, and Other Initiatives
FPS uses a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local law enforcement, ranging from establishing MOUs to document agreement on roles and responsibilities with some, to relying on long-standing working relationships with others. More specifically, FPS reported that it had 21 signed MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies across the United States as of September 2011.usage in Alabama; MOUs for arrest authority on properties adjacent to federal property in California and Florida; and MOUs for mutual aid in the District of Columbia and Georgia, such as FPS’s reciprocal support agreement with Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority. For example, in some jurisdictions such as the suburbs surrounding the District of Columbia, FPS has no MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies but has regular contact and longstanding mutual aid relationships. Like FPS, Other Federal Agencies Use a Variety of Methods to Collaborate with State and Local Law Enforcement
Other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS also used a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local law enforcement. State and Local Law Enforcement Generally Willing to Assist with Protecting Federal Facilities
Our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement agencies and follow-up discussions showed a general willingness of those that replied to respond to incidents at federal facilities. Four state and local law enforcement agencies stated that they would decline to respond to an incident at a federal building in their jurisdiction. Overall, the variety of efforts FPS has under way reflects a reasonable approach to collaboration, especially when combined with results we found from our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement agencies. At the end of our review, GSA officials informed us that they had made significant progress addressing this issue. Nonetheless, given that facilities of exclusive jurisdiction are unique because state and local law enforcement agencies generally have no law enforcement authority on these properties, incomplete data leaves FPS less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities with regard to state and local law enforcement collaboration. An additional effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that, in relying on state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal facilities, it is not creating a situation where these entities may be exercising police authority where they lack such authority as in the case of exclusive jurisdiction properties. For example, in 2011, GSA and FPS held working groups to begin to improve the building property list, and established a permanent GSA liaison in FPS’s headquarters to improve data coordination. State and local law enforcement agencies we contacted were generally willing to assist FPS with incidents at federal facilities. Related to the quality of data exchanged between FPS and GSA on buildings and their locations, FPS and GSA had taken action to address data inconsistency issues. However, as of the end of our review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on whether the jurisdictions of about one-third of the buildings FPS protects are exclusive, concurrent, or proprietary. Having these data is important because state and local law enforcement generally have no authority to enforce state and local law on properties of exclusive jurisdiction. Recommendations for Executive Action
In conjunction with the revised MOU that is being developed between GSA and FPS, we recommend the Administrator of GSA ensure that efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed and that these data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to manage jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings. Appendix I: Objective, Scope and Methodology
To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) efforts to collaborate with state and local law enforcement for assistance in responding to incidents at federal facilities, we reviewed FPS data on buildings protected, staffing, procedures, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2007, FPS adopted an inspector-based workforce approach and indicated it would increase its reliance on state and local law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents at these facilities. These facilities range from facilities of proprietary or concurrent jurisdictionwhere authority is shared by federal and state and local policeto facilities of exclusive jurisdiction, where only federal law enforcement has authority. As requested, this report assesses FPSs efforts to collaborate with state and local law enforcement for assistance in responding to incidents at these federal facilities. GAO reviewed documents on collaboration, GSA and FPS facility data, and GAOs work on key collaboration practices and internal control standards. GAO also contacted 73 selected state and local law enforcement agencies from geographic jurisdictions of varying population sizes and FPS buildings throughout the United States and interviewed FPS and GSA officials.
What GAO Found
To collaborate with state and local law enforcement, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) uses memorandums of understanding (MOU), long-standing working relationships, written guidance to FPS staff, joint operations, and other initiatives. For example, FPS has MOUs ranging from sharing radio frequency usage in Alabama, to a mutual aid agreement with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority in Georgia. In some jurisdictions, such as the suburbs of the District of Columbia, FPS has no MOUs but has regular contact and long-standing mutual aid relationships with state and local law enforcement. To collaborate with state and local law enforcement, FPS has guidance that addresses issues such as the scope of law enforcement authorities on federal property and information sharing among jurisdictions. FPS established regional staff positions intended to improve collaboration with other organizations and has engaged in joint operations with state and local law enforcement. By comparison, other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS also use a variety of methods, ranging from the Department of Veterans Affairs policy to seek MOUs with state and local law enforcement to the Smithsonian Institutions established relationships with the Metropolitan D.C. Police and others.
GAO found that state and local law enforcement organizations it contacted are generally willing to assist with incidents at federal facilities. For example, 48 of 52 respondents from state and local law enforcement agencies GAO contacted about this issue said that they would respond to a call at a federally owned facility; 27 said they had done so since 2007. Overall, the variety of efforts FPS has under way is consistent with the key collaboration practices GAO has previously identified and reflects a reasonable approach to collaboration, especially when combined with the willingness of state and local law enforcement to assist.
Although FPS has a reasonable approach to state and local collaboration, GAO found issues related to the quality of data exchanged between GSA and FPS on buildings and their locations. Through working groups, GSA is working with FPS to address these data inconsistency issues and is establishing a permanent GSA liaison at FPSs headquarters to improve data coordination. But as of the end of GAOs review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on the jurisdiction of about one third of the buildings it protects. GSA officials informed GAO that they are making progress with identifying building jurisdictions but were not yet in a position to provide complete information to FPS. These data are important because state and local law enforcement generally has no authority to enforce state and local law on properties of exclusive federal jurisdiction. An additional effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that in relying on state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal facilities, it is not creating a situation where these entities may be exercising police authority where they lack such authority. As a result, incomplete jurisdictional data leaves FPS and state and local law enforcement less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities when there are incidents at federal facilities.
What GAO Recommends
In conjunction with the revised MOU that is being developed between GSA and FPS, GAO recommends the administrator of GSA ensure that efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed and that these data are provided to FPS. GSA concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-96-146 | gao_AIMD-96-146_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review at the L.A. Bank were to determine the nature of the problems that may have occurred in reporting currency activity for Federal Reserve note receipts, payments, and amount on hand and review and comment on corrective actions planned or taken by the Federal Reserve to resolve those problems. However, our efforts to perform limited reviews of these 6 days were hindered because the L.A. Bank could not locate some of the requested data. Finally, the report preparer incorrectly included about $2 million in coin receipts on the currency report. The December 1995 through March 1996 currency activity reports were revised using the new procedures but have not yet been submitted to the Board of Governors. Balance Sheet and Currency Activity Report Ending Balances Share the Same Sources and Should Agree
The L.A. Bank prepares the monthly currency activity report primarily using its Cash Automation System files (its cash inventory system, which provides a perpetual inventory file that tracks currency by denomination); Integrated Accounting System (its general ledger); and manual records (for transactions recorded in the general ledger that are not recorded in the cash inventory system). Accounting Practices and Internal Controls Over Currency
We attempted to perform a comprehensive review of the L.A. Bank’s internal controls and accounting practices over the money flowing through the Bank. This is consistent with what we found. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. In fact, the most troublesome aspect of how the reports were prepared was that Bank management directed staff to force the number for receipts from circulation to ensure that the currency activity report agreed with the daily balance sheet for the last day of the month. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed currency activity reports prepared by the Los Angeles Federal Reserve Bank, focusing on: (1) problems in reporting currency activity for Federal Reserve System (FRS) note receipts, payments, and amount on hand; and (2) corrective actions planned or taken by FRS to resolve those problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Los Angeles Bank: (1) incorrectly prepared and filed monthly currency activity reports for October, November, and December 1995; (2) did not comply with FRS guidance to independently determine cash receipts, since it adjusted the amount reported on the currency activity reports to ensure that it agreed with the daily balance sheet for the end of the month; (3) has been forcing the amount of receipts reported, which has resulted in significant underreporting of receipts, for some time; (4) has attempted to revise the reports but has not sent them to the FRS Board of Governors; (5) uses a cash inventory system to prepare its monthly reports, but system limitations hinder the Bank's ability to track all detailed activities; and (6) could not timely provide all of the information needed to perform a comprehensive review of internal controls and accounting practices because of information storage and retrieval problems. GAO also found that: (1) a limited review of the Bank's currency accounts identified several internal control weaknesses that could affect general ledger entries and reconciliation attempts; and (2) other Federal Reserve Banks that use the same cash inventory system could also be affected. |
gao_GAO-02-346 | gao_GAO-02-346_0 | Background
Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals who have limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. SSA has estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits payments totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million individuals. Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the Fugitive Felon Program
In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its processing of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients. In addition, both OIG’s and ITC’s program activities are supported by distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further preventing the efficient exchange of information. However, a number of these states have been reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always abided by them, largely because of SSA’s and the states’ concerns regarding the lack of information technology and adequate resources to support the program. SSA officials acknowledged that the additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program’s data- matching activities. According to SSA systems officials, SSA currently has a direct, dedicated on-line connection with every state’s department of social services. In addition, we recommend that the commissioner direct the program management office and manager to conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to administer the program, a full accounting of the program’s costs, estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload requirements; identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient operation; continue to examine and propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of this information, including assessing alternatives to using data-matching agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining whether on-line connections with state and local law enforcement agencies and/or direct telecommunications connections with the FBI’s NCIC database could offer viable and more efficient means of sharing warrant information; and assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these benefits recipients’ files. In addition, regarding our statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials are able to explain the process in its entirety. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the technological aspects of the fugitive felon program in order to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a) data matching between the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments
SSA reports that, since its inception in August 1996, the fugitive felon program has been instrumental in helping identify approximately 45,000 fugitives who improperly collected at least $82 million in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. | What GAO Found
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash assistance program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more than six million financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to locate and and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the program's operations. Certain information systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use in processing matched data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon program. Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and matching process. Largely because of the SSA's and states' limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually transmitting the information created additional resource requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice. However, the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's Information Technology Center. SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA currently has direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners. |
gao_GAO-17-570 | gao_GAO-17-570_0 | We define IoT for the purposes of our report as the concept of connecting and interacting with a wide array of objects through a network. In this report, we focus on the application of IoT within a community setting—often referred to as a “smart city” or “smart community”—with the aim to generally improve the livability, management, or service delivery of that community. We identified at least 11 federal agencies that have a key role in supporting IoT in communities, either because they support research or communities, oversee privacy or security protections and threats, or have direct authority over IoT issues. In Addition to Broad IoT Research and Oversight, Federal Agencies More Directly Support Communities by Funding IoT Projects and Fostering Collaboration
Broad Federal IoT Research and Oversight Provide Underlying Support for IoT in Communities
Research
Many of the federal agencies we reviewed are conducting or funding broad research in IoT-related technologies. As communities increasingly deploy IoT devices, they are more dependent on the underlying communications systems—both wired and wireless network systems— that enable those devices to communicate with each other and with other systems. EPA awarded $40,000 each to Baltimore, Maryland, and Lafayette, Louisiana, to develop innovative strategies for deploying sensor platforms and managing the data collected from 300 sensors, as well as sharing lessons learned with other communities. Federal Government Also Supports Communities’ IoT Projects by Fostering Interagency and Community Collaboration
Interagency Collaboration
Issues related to IoT in communities cut across multiple sectors and government agencies—that is, no single government agency addresses all aspects of IoT or communities’ IoT efforts. To promote government-wide collaboration in supporting deployment of IoT in communities, the White House created an interagency Smart Cities and Communities task force in July 2016—co-chaired by representatives from DOT, NIST, and NSF—that is coordinated through the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program. According to federal officials who are chairing the efforts, the public comments will help inform a revised federal strategic plan, which, as of April 2017, is anticipated for publication in the summer of 2017. Community Collaboration
Some federal agencies have undertaken efforts to support collaboration at the community level, across local governments, academia, and the private sector. Also, at the country level, Sweden announced in June 2016 a formal program that supports collaboration among government, private, and academic stakeholders to create innovative solutions for specific societal challenges, one of which is “smart cities.”
Selected Communities Use Federal Funds with Other Resources to Deploy IoT Projects but Face Various Challenges Integrating Projects
Communities Are Using Federal Funds in Conjunction with Other Funding and Expertise to Deploy IoT Projects
Financial Support
In planning and deploying IoT projects, all of the communities we reviewed are using federal funds with other direct funding and in-kind support. For example, according to City of Columbus representatives, it used its $50 million award from DOT’s Smart City Challenge to leverage about an additional $90 million in support from community partners. A variety of representatives that we spoke with—representatives from three of the domestic communities and two of the foreign governments, as well as seven academic and industry representatives— highlighted that local government departments and federal grants tend to be focused on one sector (e.g., transportation, energy, public safety) of a community, inhibiting IoT project integration. For example, NIST recognized that IoT projects are generally based on custom systems that are not interoperable, portable across cities, or cost- effective. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this product from Commerce, DOE, HHS, DHS, DOJ, DOT, EPA, FCC, FTC, NSF, and OSTP. Commerce, DOE, FTC, NSF, and OSTP provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. HHS, DHS, DOJ, DOT, EPA, and FCC did not provide comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Communities are increasingly deploying IoT devices generally with a goal of improving livability, management, service delivery, or competitiveness. GAO was asked to examine federal support for IoT and the use of IoT in communities. This report describes: (1) the kinds of efforts that selected federal agencies have undertaken to support IoT in communities and (2) how selected communities are using federal funds to deploy IoT projects.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from 11 federal agencies identified as having a key role in supporting IoT in communities, including agencies that support research or community IoT efforts or that have direct authority over IoT issues. GAO interviewed a non-generalizeable sample of representatives from multiple stakeholder groups in four communities, selected to include a range of community sizes and locations and communities with projects that used federal support. GAO also reviewed relevant literature since 2013 and discussed federal efforts and community challenges with 11 stakeholders from academia and the private sector, selected to reflect a range of perspectives on IoT issues.
GAO requested comments on a draft of this product from 11 federal agencies. Five agencies provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. Six agencies did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
The internet of things (IoT) generally refers to the technologies and devices that allow for the network connection and interaction of a wide array of devices, or “things.” Federal agencies that GAO reviewed are undertaking two kinds of efforts that support IoT in communities:
Broad federal research and oversight of IoT-related technologies and issues: For example, 8 of the 11 agencies GAO reviewed are involved in broad research efforts, often on communication systems—both wired and wireless network systems. In addition, nine agencies have oversight efforts that include providing IoT-related guidance, often on data security and privacy.
More direct efforts to support communities, including funding community IoT projects (see figure) and fostering collaboration among the agencies and communities: For example, DOT recently awarded $40 million in federal funds to a community for a suite of “smart” projects related to improving surface transportation performance, and EPA awarded $40,000 each to two communities to develop strategies for deploying air quality sensors and managing the data collected from them. To foster such collaboration, in July 2016, the White House formed an interagency task force that has developed a draft Smart Cities and Communities Federal Strategic Plan . A final plan will be released in summer of 2017, according to federal officials.
All four of the communities that GAO reviewed are using federal funds in combination with other resources, both financial and non-financial, to plan and deploy IoT projects. For example, one community used the $40 million DOT award to leverage, from community partners, more than $100 million in additional direct and in-kind contributions, such as research or equipment contributions. Communities discussed four main challenges to deploying IoT, including community sectors (e.g., transportation, energy, and public safety) that are siloed and proprietary systems that are not interoperable with one another. |
gao_GAO-14-5 | gao_GAO-14-5_0 | In 2010, NMB changed its rules for certifying a union. NMB Is Missing Key Elements of Successful Performance Planning and Reporting
NMB Lacks a Robust Strategic Planning Process for Meeting Federal Requirements
NMB lacks a robust strategic planning process, with formal mechanisms for gathering congressional and stakeholder input, and as a result, the agency has not met some federal requirements for performance planning. Strategic planning should provide the basis for everything an organization does. (See sidebar for key strategic planning requirements.) Federal agencies are required to develop annual performance plans. NMB Lacks Some Key Management Controls
NMB Has Most Key Controls for Financial Accountability but Lacks a Formal Mechanism to Address Deficiencies
NMB is following most key practices for financial accountability and control, an integral part of an organization’s management that should reach throughout all departments and programs as well as financial management and reporting functions. NMB Has Not Fully Implemented Key Information Security and Privacy Controls
NMB relies on information technology to carry out its mission. NMB Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Human Capital Program but Does Not Follow Key Planning Practices
NMB has taken steps to improve its human capital program, such as increasing oversight of mediators and providing additional training opportunities to its staff. NMB also did not follow its own procurement procedures in purchasing the iPads. Sharing voting materials and voting in groups violates federal law, NMB officials said. Disagreement during Past Rulemaking on Union Elections Created Challenges
NMB in 2010 changed its rules for certifying a union in an election, and several stakeholders told us and a former NMB board member wrote at the time that this process harmed the perception of NMB as a nonpartisan arbiter and caused disagreement. Despite concerns, NMB officials reported that the percentage of elections resulting in certification of a union has remained relatively constant in the years before and after NMB’s 2010 rulemaking. Conclusions
The National Mediation Board is a small agency with a vital role in facilitating labor relations and helping avoid work stoppages in two key transportation sectors: the railroads and airlines. Develop a strategic workforce plan that (1) involves input from top management, employees, and other stakeholders; (2) identifies critical skills and competencies needed by NMB; (3) identifies strategies, such as training, to address any gaps; and (4) provides for cost-effective evaluations of these strategic workforce planning efforts. This plan should also address succession for the significant proportion of NMB staff and senior managers who are eligible to retire in the next few years. Although our matter for congressional consideration was not directed to NMB, the agency suggested that having another federal agency’s Office of Inspector General provide oversight of NMB would be redundant with GAO’s biennial audits and evaluations, which were mandated by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. NMB noted, with respect to our second recommendation to develop performance goals and measures, that it will include such goals and measures in its new February 2014 strategic plan. For example, NMB should ensure that it completes its draft policies and procedures, provides information security training to its users and contractors, and updates its disaster recovery and continuity of operations plans and procedures. Thus we believe our recommendation is still valid. Finally, in commenting on recommendation seven to analyze data on the types and disposition of rail grievance arbitration cases to better inform its management of those processes, NMB officials stated that they plan to collect additional data on the types of cases they receive from all arbitration boards and make the information available on the agency’s website. We also assessed NMB’s management plans, policies, and practices in financial management, information management and security, human capital, and procurement using GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and other criteria developed by GAO in prior work for these management areas, as described later in this appendix. In addition, we reviewed but did not duplicate the work performed by NMB’s independent auditors in the six most recently issued internal control reviews of NMB program areas:
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Representation Functions (fiscal year 2005)
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Services (fiscal year 2006)
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Mediation Services (October 2006-September 2007)
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Personnel/Payroll (April 2008-March 2009)
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Arbitration Services Functions (April 2009-March 2010)
Report on Review of Internal Controls Over Procurement (October 2010-September 2011)
To gain additional perspectives on NMB’s program and management functions, we interviewed officials at the two primary federal labor relations agencies that cover labor relations in the private sector. We did not independently assess the findings in these financial statement audits and internal control reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
A small federal agency, NMB facilitates labor relations in two key transportation sectors--railroads and airlines-- through mediation and arbitration of labor disputes and overseeing union elections. Established under the Railway Labor Act, NMB's primary responsibility is to prevent work stoppages in these critical industries. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 required GAO to evaluate NMB programs and activities. GAO examined NMB's (1) strategic planning and performance measurement practices; (2) controls for key management areas; and (3) challenges, if any, in overseeing elections. GAO assessed NMB's management practices using internal control standards and other GAO criteria; interviewed NMB officials, current and former board members, and key stakeholders from rail and air labor and management groups; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and NMB policies.
What GAO Found
The National Mediation Board (NMB) recently updated its strategic plan but is not meeting some federal strategic planning and performance measurement requirements. NMB missed deadlines for updating its strategic plan and lacks performance measures to assess its progress in meeting its goals, even though an agency's strategic plan should form the basis for everything an agency does.
NMB also lacks some controls in key management areas that could risk its resources and its success:
Financial accountability: NMB contracts for annual financial statement audits and internal control reviews. However, it lacks a formal process for addressing identified deficiencies, a key internal control.
Information technology: NMB recently transitioned to new information technology systems but is missing key management and security controls, including an information security program that fully implements federal requirements.
Human capital: NMB has taken steps to improve its human capital program but improvements are still needed. Although all NMB senior managers are eligible for retirement, NMB has not engaged in formal workforce planning to identify gaps in staff skills, and strategies, such as training, to address them.
Procurement: NMB has established some key procurement policies and controls but weaknesses remain. For example, in a recent purchase of tablet computers for some staff, NMB did not follow its own procedures to assess the need for the devices or solicit competition.
Other management issues: NMB does not have an Inspector General (IG), and oversight by other federal agencies is limited. NMB also has a significant number of pending rail arbitration cases, and it lacks complete data on the types of cases filed to help it address the backlog and the costs.
NMB has adapted to challenges presented by large union elections resulting from airline mergers and has implemented improvements such as online voting. In 2010, NMB changed its rules for determining a majority in union elections. While this process caused disagreement among some stakeholders, NMB data suggest that the percentage of elections in which a union was certified has, thus far, remained relatively constant in the years before and after the rule change.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider authorizing an appropriate federal agency's IG to provide oversight of NMB. NMB should implement a formal strategic planning process and develop performance goals and measures to meet federal requirements, develop a process to address audit findings, implement key components of an information security and privacy program, and engage in strategic workforce planning. NMB should also collect and analyze data on the types of rail grievances filed to help improve efficiency in its arbitration process. In commenting on a draft of this report, NMB said it would address our recommendations and described actions it plans to take. |
gao_GAO-01-917 | gao_GAO-01-917_0 | Interests Outweighed Directive 25 Shortfalls
Executive branch officials extensively considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of the U.N. operations. At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the operation’s duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending the operation. As before, factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor. This information described how the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests, the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address, and other related considerations. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations for East Timor and Sierra Leone. In contrast, our analysis showed that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Toward this end, Directive 25 stated that the “Congress must…be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping” and that the “Congress and the American people must…be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.” Directive 25 recognized that the executive branch traditionally “has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to U.N. peacekeeping.” It concluded that this “lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become numerous, complex, and expensive.” Directive 25 instructed executive branch officials to undertake six specific initiatives “to improve and regularize communication and consultation” with the Congress about U.N. peacekeeping to ensure that sufficient public and congressional support existed for proposed operations. | What GAO Found
Presidential Decision Directive 25 states that U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping operations must be selective and effective. Toward this end, the directive established guidance that U.S. officials must consider before deciding whether to support proposed operations, including whether the operations advanced U.S. interests, had realistic criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces and financing to accomplish their missions. The directive established these factors as an aid for executive decision-making and not as criteria for supporting particular operations. Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential Decision Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time the decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Executive branch officials nonetheless decided to support the operations because they believed that these shortfalls were outweighed by the presence of other Directive 25 factors and various other factors, including U.S. interests in the region. Executive branch officials provided Congress with considerable information about the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address. However, GAO found no evidence that Congress was informed about most Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone or about U.S. plans to address the risks posed by these shortfalls. Congress was informed, about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. operations in the Congo. |
gao_GAO-06-993 | gao_GAO-06-993_0 | A number of factors contributed to cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls. GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase on its GOES-R program and plans to award a contract for the system’s development in August 2007; however, because of concerns with potential cost growth, NOAA’s plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near future. In May 2006, program officials estimated that the life cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the program could be made by the end of September 2006. The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons Learned, but Significant Actions Remain
NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems encountered on other satellite programs to the GOES-R procurement. Key lessons include (1) establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the system’s components prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans designed to mitigate the problems faced in past acquisitions; however, many activities remain to fully address these lessons. The delivery of the first satellite was delayed by 5 years. Conclusions
Procurement activities are under way for the next series of geostationary environmental satellites, called the GOES-R series—which is scheduled to launch its first satellite in September 2012. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the GOES-R procurement have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of and plans for the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R) procurement and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the project management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite programs are not repeated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the program management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite programs are not repeated.
What GAO Found
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system--which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expects to award a contract in August 2007 to develop this system. However, according to program officials, NOAA's plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near future. Recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the program could be made by the end of September 2006. NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. |
gao_GAO-08-194T | gao_GAO-08-194T_0 | In other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening agency and other law enforcement agencies—such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—to respond and collect information. Figure 1 presents a general overview of the process used to resolve encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list. In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information about individuals “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.” In implementing this directive, the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. Because individuals can be added to the list based on reasonable suspicion, inclusion on the list does not automatically prohibit an individual from, for example, obtaining a visa or entering the United States when the person is identified by a screening agency. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism
From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times, according TSC data. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others entry into the United States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and information gathering. Potential Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes and Agency Efforts to Address Them
The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all records in TSC’s consolidated watch list because screening against certain records (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency’s mission, (2) may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records, or (3) may not be operationally feasible. Rather, each day, TSC exports applicable records from the consolidated watch list to federal government databases that agencies use to screen individuals for mission-related concerns. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. Also, TSC has ongoing initiatives to help reduce instances of individuals on the watch list passing undetected through agency screening, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs. However, many critical infrastructure components are not using watch list records. A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan— supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with presidential directives. These plan elements, which were prescribed by presidential directives, are crucial for coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. Such optimization should include development of guidelines to support private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as well as development of an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for using terrorist-related information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. This statement is based on GAO's report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
What GAO Found
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-11-5 | gao_GAO-11-5_0 | The Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), as amended, provides the legal foundation for the federal executive branch IG offices. USITC IG Conducted Limited Oversight Activities during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009
The IG Act requires IGs to provide independent audits and investigations of the programs, offices, and activities of their respective federal entities. The IG office’s oversight of USITC consisted primarily of monitoring and reviewing the work of independent public accountants (IPA) who conducted mandatory audits of USITC’s financial statements and information security as required by specific statutes. The most recent peer review of the IG office’s audit quality, performed by the National Archives and Records Administration IG, concluded in a May 12, 2010, report that an opinion could not be expressed on the audit organization because no audits had been conducted in the past 5 years. The USITC IG office also did not provide audits or perform follow-up in areas with weaknesses identified by the IPAs’ audits. USITC Lacked an Appointed IG and Adequate Staff Resources Prior to Fiscal Year 2010
The IG Act requires designated entity heads to appoint an IG and provide adequate budgetary resources and sufficient staff for the IG’s office to conduct independent audits and investigations. This contributed significantly to the IG office’s limited oversight of USITC and the lack of audits and investigations. However, in fiscal year 2010, the USITC Chairman appointed an IG and provided additional resources to the IG office due, in part, to the requirements of the IG Reform Act. The USITC IG Position Was Filled by Acting and Temporary IGs for an Extended Period before Appointment of the Current IG
For over 4 years, between November 2005 and December 2009, the USITC relied on acting IGs and a temporary IG to provide oversight. In addition, for a period of 17 months during this time—from March 2006 until August 2007—the USITC IG position was vacant. Despite increases in the overall USITC budget, the IG office’s budget resources remained relatively flat and its staffing remained below its authorized levels. The acting and temporary IGs had not prepared comprehensive audit plans over the 5-year period with a staffing analysis to justify additional budget and staffing resources and effectively communicate their resource needs. The current IG stated that future oversight may require additional resources. In addition, the IG is required to refer cases with potential violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General. During our review period, we found instances where USITC’s governance structure did not fully support the acting and temporary IGs’ responsibilities due to USITC’s lack of clear policies surrounding IG access to information and the lack of coordination with the IG office when referring an investigative case to the Department of Justice (DOJ). We recommend that the Chairman of USITC revise the policies and procedures for all offices and programs to recognize the authorities and responsibilities of the IG under the IG Act, including procedures for recognizing the IG’s authority for access to USITC documents, records, and information; revise the formal written orientation information provided to the Commissioners to include sections on the overall authorities and responsibilities of the IG; the IG’s authority and USITC’s policies for IG access to USITC documents, records, and information; and the responsibilities of the Chairman to maintain an appointed IG; and work with the IG to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or similar mechanism to ensure that all USITC investigative matters that may cover areas also investigated by the IG are coordinated with the IG’s office. The Chairman concurred with our recommendations and identified actions taken to implement them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent of oversight provided by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Inspectors General (IG) during fiscal years 2005 through 2009, we obtained and reviewed the results of the IGs’ audit reports and investigative activity as reported in the IGs’ semiannual reports to Congress for the 5-year period. To determine how the role of the IG is addressed in the governance and management of USITC, we reviewed existing policies and procedures regarding the governance and management of USITC for accountability and regarding the IG; interviewed the Commissioners; and obtained information from the former acting and temporary IGs as well as the current IG. | Why GAO Did This Study
Inspectors general (IG) are to provide independent and objective oversight; however, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) has relied on acting and temporary IGs for an extended period of time. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent of oversight provided by the USITC IG, (2) the budget and staffing resources available for oversight, and (3) how the role of the IG is addressed in the governance of USITC. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed USITC IG reports and budgets for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, and relevant policies and procedures regarding governance and accountability. GAO also interviewed the USITC Chairman, Commissioners, current and former acting and temporary IGs, and office directors.
What GAO Found
The IG Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), requires IGs to provide independent audits and investigations of the programs, offices, and activities in their respective federal entities. However, during the 5-year period reviewed, the USITC IG office conducted no audits and had no investigative case files or investigative reports of USITC. The IG office's oversight activities consisted primarily of monitoring and reviewing the work of independent public accountants (IPA) who conducted annual mandatory audits of USITC's financial statements and information security programs and practices. The most recent peer review of the USITC IG office's audit quality concluded that an opinion could not be rendered on the audit organization because no audits had been conducted by the IG in the past 5 years. The IG Act requires the designated federal entity heads to appoint an IG and provide adequate budgetary resources and sufficient staff. Both the lack of an appointed IG and constrained IG office budgets and staffing resources contributed to the limited oversight of USITC. From November 1, 2005, through December 5, 2009, USITC relied on acting IGs and a temporary IG to provide oversight. During this period the IG position was vacant for 17 months with no acting or temporary IG while USITC relied on the Assistant IG for Audits to provide oversight. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2009, the USITC budget increased about 23 percent, but the IG office budget resources remained relatively flat with funds only available for IPA-conducted audits and two staff during the last 4 years reviewed. The lack of comprehensive audit plans by the acting and temporary IGs to fully communicate their resource needs to USITC contributed to inadequate IG office resources and resulted in limited oversight. In fiscal year 2010, USITC appointed a Senior Executive Service-level IG to address requirements of the IG Reform Act of 2008. Also, consistent with the act, USITC provided a fiscal year 2010 IG office budget based on discussions with the current IG, which increased staffing and was certified by the IG as adequate. The IG stated that future oversight may require additional resources, which we believe can be communicated and justified by a staffing analysis as part of IG audit planning. The IG Act provides each IG with protections of independence including the authority for access to all entity documents and records. In addition, the IG is required to refer cases with potential violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General. We found instances where the governance structure did not fully support the temporary USITC IG's responsibilities. Specifically, during 2009, the temporary IG was unable to obtain timely access to sensitive contract documents because USITC's policies and procedures did not clearly provide for IG access to such documents. The orientation book for the Commissioners, who may not have prior federal service, does not contain information about the USITC IG's authorities and responsibilities. In another instance, due to the lack of a formal policy or other agreement with the IG office, the Chairman referred the results of a possible criminal investigation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) without coordinating with the temporary IG, resulting in the potential for duplication of investigative efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a recommendation to the USITC IG to prepare a staffing analysis as part of audit planning to determine the resources needed for effective oversight of USITC. GAO is also making recommendations to the USITC Chairman aimed at clarifying and communicating the authorities and responsibilities of the IG. In comments on a draft of the report, the USITC Chairman concurred with GAO's recommendations and stated corrective actions had been implemented. GAO agrees that one recommendation was fully implemented; however, additional actions are required to implement the remaining recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-492T | gao_GAO-14-492T_0 | Background
SSA administers two disability programs that provide monthly cash benefits to eligible individuals: DI, enacted in 1956, and SSI, enacted in 1972. If SSA determines that an individual is disabled, the agency is required to conduct periodic CDRs to ensure that only recipients who remain disabled continue to receive benefits. SSA Has a Backlog of More Than 1 Million DI and SSI Benefit Eligibility Reviews
SSA reported in January 2014 that it is behind schedule in assessing the continued eligibility of DI and SSI recipients and has accumulated a backlog of 1.3 million CDRs. In recent years, SSA has cited resource limitations and a greater emphasis on processing initial claims and requests for hearings appeals as reasons for the decrease in the number of CDRs conducted. 1). Children make up about one fifth of all SSI recipients, and we reported in 2012 that a large proportion of their CDRs were overdue. We also identified several cases which exceeded their scheduled date by 13 years or more. Of the 24,000 childhood CDRs pending 6 years or more, we found that about 70 percent (over 17,000) were for children who had been categorized as “medical improvement possible” at initial determination, while 25 percent (over 6,000) of these pending CDRs were for those children deemed medically expected to improve within 6 to 18 months of their initial determination (see fig. 2). When CDRs are not conducted as scheduled, the potential for improper payments may increase as some recipients can receive benefits for which they are no longer eligible. In September 2011, SSA’s Office of the Inspector General estimated that SSA had paid about $1.4 billion in SSI benefits to approximately 513,000 recipients under age 18 who should have not received them—some of whom were pending reviews for 5 or more years. In our 2012 report, we recommended that SSA eliminate the existing CDR backlog of cases for children with impairments who are likely to improve and, on an ongoing basis, conduct CDRs at least every 3 years for all children with impairments who are likely to improve, as resources are made available for these purposes. Several Factors Associated with the Medical Improvement Standard Have Challenged the Assessment of Recipients’ Continued Eligibility
During CDRs, disability recipients that SSA determines have improved medically may cease receiving benefits; however, several factors may hinder SSA’s ability to make this determination. In 2006, our analysis of SSA data showed that 1.4 percent of all the people who left DI and SSI between fiscal years 1999 and 2005 did so because SSA found that they had improved medically; however, more recipients left for other reasons, including conversion to regular Social Security retirement benefits or death. At that time, we identified a number of factors that challenged SSA’s ability to assess DI and SSI recipients using the medical improvement standard. Guidance limitations—Limitations in the SSA guidance then in effect for applying the medical improvement standard may have resulted in inconsistent disability decisions. Inadequate documentation—If a prior disability determination was inadequately documented, it can be challenging for the disability examiner to demonstrate medical improvement in a CDR. We reported that this practice is contrary to the law as well as SSA regulations and policy, which require that CDR decisions be made on a “neutral basis.”
Reliance on judgment—The judgmental nature of the process for assessing medical improvement likely hinders its reliability. These issues have implications for the consistency and fairness of SSA’s medical improvement decision-making process, and in 2006, we recommended that SSA clarify policies for assessing medical improvement. Since then, SSA has taken some steps that may help address the issues we raised but has not fully implemented the actions we recommended. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA administers DI and SSI, two disability programs that provided $189 billion in cash benefits to eligible adults and children in 2012. Both the numbers of DI and SSI recipients, as well as program costs, have grown in recent years and are poised to grow further in the future. Both the initial determination of an individual's medical eligibility at the time of application and CDRs after benefits have been granted are key to ensuring the integrity of these programs. CDRs also provide a check on program growth in a time of constrained federal resources. Since 1984, federal law has generally required SSA to find substantial evidence demonstrating medical improvement during a CDR before ceasing a recipient's benefits—known as the medical improvement standard.
In this statement, GAO describes (1) SSA's efforts to monitor DI and SSI beneficiaries' continued eligibility, and (2) factors associated with the medical improvement standard that affect these efforts. This testimony is primarily based on GAO products related to these issues from 2006 and 2012. GAO also updated selected information related to SSA's CDR backlog, budget requests, and guidance for assessing medical improvement as of 2014.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) reported in January 2014 that it is behind schedule in assessing the continued eligibility of recipients in its two disability programs, Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI),and has accumulated a backlog of 1.3 million continuing disability reviews (CDRs). From fiscal years 2000 to 2011, the numbers of adult and child CDRs conducted fell about 70 percent. Children make up about one fifth of all SSI recipients, and GAO reported in 2012 that many of their CDRs were overdue. For example, more than 24,000 CDRs for children with mental impairments were overdue by 6 or more years, including over 6,000 CDRs for children who were expected to medically improve within 6 to 18 months of their initial determination. GAO also identified several cases which exceeded their scheduled review date by 13 years or more. When CDRs are not conducted as scheduled, the potential for improper payments increases as some recipients receive benefits for which they are no longer eligible. In September 2011, SSA's Office of the Inspector General estimated that SSA had paid about $1.4 billion in SSI benefits to children who should have not received them. SSA attributes delays in performing CDRs to resource limitations and other factors; SSA also generally gives lower priority to conducting CDRs for children receiving SSI. In 2012, GAO recommended that SSA eliminate the existing CDR backlog for children with impairments who are likely to improve, and regularly conduct reviews for this group. While SSA generally agreed with GAO's recommendation, the CDR backlog remains.
During CDRs, disability recipients that SSA determines to have improved medically may be removed from the program; however, several factors may hinder SSA's ability to make this determination. In 2006, GAO reported that 1.4 percent of people who left the disability programs did so because SSA found that they had improved medically. At that time, GAO identified several factors that hindered SSA's ability to assess whether DI and SSI recipients met the medical improvement standard. These included: (1) limitations in SSA guidance for applying the standard; (2) inadequate documentation of prior disability determinations; (3) failure to abide with the requirement that CDR decisions be made on a neutral basis—without a presumption that the recipient remained disabled; and (4) the judgmental nature of the process for assessing medical improvement. Since 2006, SSA has taken some steps to address these issues; however, the agency has not fully clarified policies for assessing medical improvement, as GAO recommended.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-11-743 | gao_GAO-11-743_0 | True Cost and Schedule of Deepwater Program Is Not Known
The Deepwater Program as a whole continues to exceed the cost and schedule baselines approved by DHS in May 2007, but several factors preclude a solid understanding of the true cost and schedule of the program. The Coast Guard has developed baselines for some assets, most of which have been approved by DHS, that indicate the estimated total acquisition cost could be as much as $29.3 billion, or about $5 billion over the $24.2 billion baseline. But additional cost growth is looming because the Coast Guard has yet to develop revised baselines for all the Deepwater assets, including the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)—the largest cost driver in the Deepwater Program. In addition, the Coast Guard’s most recent 5-year budget plan, included in DHS’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, indicates further cost and schedule changes not yet reflected in the asset baselines. The reliability of the cost estimates and schedules for selected assets is also undermined because the Coast Guard did not follow key best practices for developing these estimates. Coast Guard and DHS officials agree that the annual funding needed to support all approved Deepwater baselines exceeds current and expected funding levels in this fiscal climate. The Coast Guard’s acquisition directorate has developed several actionitems to help address this mismatch by prioritizing acquisition program needs, b ut these action items have not been adopted across the Coast Guard. Execution of the Deepwater Program Is Progressing, but Key Decisions Remain for the Design and Testing of Deepwater Assets
The Coast Guard continues to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities. As lead systems integrator, the Coast Guard is faced with several decisions to help ensure that the promised capabilities of assets still in design are achieved. For example, whether or not the planned system-of-systems design is achievable largely depends on the Coast Guard’s ability to make important decisions regarding the design of the C4ISR program, as the Coast Guard has continued to define and redefine its strategy for this program since 2007. For those assets already under construction and operational, preliminary tests have yielded mixed results and identified issues that need to be addressed prior to upcoming test events. As part of its role as lead systems integrator, the Coast Guard is gaining a better understanding of each asset’s cost, schedule, and technical risks, but this information is not always fully conveyed in the Coast Guard’s quarterly reports to Congress. Coast Guard Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Trade-Off Analysis for the Deepwater Assets
To support its role as systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis in July 2009 to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and to produce a baseline for the Deepwater acquisition. Because the first phase of the fleet mix analysis was not cost constrained, it does not address our July 2010 recommendation that the Coast Guard present to Congress a comprehensive review of the Deepwater Program that clarifies the overall cost, schedule, quantities, and mix of assets required to meet mission needs, including trade-offs in light of fiscal constraints given that the currently approved Deepwater Program is no longer feasible. A DHS official responsible for this study stated that this analysis and the Coast Guard’s fleet mix analysis will provide multiple data points for considering potential changes to the program of record, including reductions in the quantities planned for some of the surface assets. However, as noted above, Coast Guard capabilities directorate officials have no intention of examining fleet mixes smaller than the current, planned Deepwater program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide Congress with information needed to make decisions on budgets and the number of assets required to meet mission needs within realistic fiscal constraints, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a working group that includes participation from DHS and the Coast Guard’s capabilities, resources, and acquisition directorates to review the results of multiple studies—including fleet mix analysis phases 1 and 2 and DHS’s cutter study—to identify cost, capability, and quantity trade-offs that would produce a program that fits within expected budget parameters. To help the Coast Guard address the churn in the acquisition project budgeting process and help ensure that projects receive and can plan to a more predictable funding stream, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following two actions: Implement GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide’s best practices for cost estimates and schedules as required by the Major Systems Acquisition Manual, with particular attention to maintaining current cost estimates and ensuring contractor’s schedules also meet these best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deepwater Program includes efforts to build or modernize ships and aircraft, including supporting capabilities. In 2007, the Coast Guard took over the systems integrator role from Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) and established a $24.2 billion program baseline which included schedule and performance parameters. Last year, GAO reported that Deepwater had exceeded cost and schedule parameters, and recommended a comprehensive study to assess the mix of assets needed in a cost-constrained environment given the approved baseline was no longer feasible. GAO assessed the (1) extent to which the program is exceeding the 2007 baseline and credibility of selected cost estimates and schedules; (2) execution, design, and testing of assets; and (3) Coast Guard's efforts to conduct a fleet mix analysis. GAO reviewed key Coast Guard documents and applied criteria from GAO's cost guide.
What GAO Found
The Deepwater Program continues to exceed the cost and schedule baselines approved by DHS in 2007, but several factors continue to preclude a solid understanding of the program's true cost and schedule. The Coast Guard has developed baselines for some assets that indicate the estimated total acquisition cost could be as much as $29.3 billion, or about $5 billion over the $24.2 billion baseline. But additional cost growth is looming because the Coast Guard has yet to develop revised baselines for all assets, including the OPC--the largest cost driver in the program. In addition, the Coast Guard's most recent capital investment plan indicates further cost and schedule changes not yet reflected in the asset baselines, contributing to the approved 2007 baseline no longer being achievable. The reliability of the cost estimates and schedules for selected assets is also undermined because the Coast Guard did not follow key best practices for developing these estimates. Coast Guard and DHS officials agree that the annual funding needed to support all approved Deepwater baselines exceeds current and expected funding levels, which affects some programs' approved schedules. The Coast Guard's acquisition directorate has developed action items to help address this mismatch by prioritizing acquisition program needs, but these action items have not been adopted across the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard continues to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, but is faced with several near-term decisions to help ensure that assets still in design will meet mission needs. For example, whether or not the planned system-of-systems design is achievable will largely depend upon remaining decisions regarding the design of the command and control system. Important decisions related to the affordability, feasibility, and capability of the OPC also remain. For those assets under construction and operational, preliminary tests have yielded mixed results and identified concerns, such as design issues, to be addressed prior to initial operational test and evaluation. The Coast Guard is gaining a better understanding of cost, schedule, and technical risks, but does not always fully convey these risks in reports to Congress. As lead systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and produce a baseline for Deepwater. This analysis, which the Coast Guard began in 2008, considered the current program to be the "floor" for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose cost constraints on the various fleet mixes. Consequently, the results will not be used for trade-off decisions. The Coast Guard has now begun a second analysis, expected for completion this summer, which includes an upper cost constraint of $1.7 billion annually--more than Congress has appropriated for the entire Coast Guard acquisition portfolio in recent years. DHS is also conducting a study to gain insight into alternatives that may include options that are lower than the program of record for surface assets. A DHS official stated that this analysis and the Coast Guard's fleet mix analysis will provide multiple data points for considering potential changes to the program of record, but Coast Guard officials stated they have no intention of examining fleet mixes smaller than the current, planned Deepwater program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that include identifying trade-offs to the planned Deepwater fleet and ensuring the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) design is achievable and to the Coast Guard that include identifying priorities, incorporating cost and schedule best practices, increasing confidence that assets will meet mission needs, and reporting complete information on risks to Congress in a timely manner. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-630T | gao_GAO-07-630T_0 | To oversee its implementation of privacy protections, DHS has established a Chief Privacy Officer, as directed by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. According to the act, the Chief Privacy Officer is responsible for, among other things, “assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information,” and “assuring that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974.”
Privacy Considerations Need Continuing Attention As Programs and Systems Are Developed
As it develops and participates in important homeland security activities, DHS faces challenges in ensuring that privacy concerns are addressed early, are reassessed when key programmatic changes are made, and are thoroughly reflected in guidance on emerging technologies and uses of personal data. Our reviews of DHS programs have identified cases where these challenges were not fully met, including data mining, airline passenger prescreening, use of data from commercial sources, use of personal identification technologies (especially RFID), and development of an information sharing environment. Our recent report notes that early attention to privacy in developing a data mining tool known as ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement) could reduce risks that personal information could be misused. ADVISE is a data mining tool under development intended to help DHS analyze large amounts of information. The intended benefit of the ADVISE tool is to help detect threatening activities by facilitating the analysis of large amounts of data. DHS did not conduct a PIA as it developed the ADVISE tool, as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. Because privacy had not been assessed and mitigating controls had not been implemented, the department faced the risk that systems based on ADVISE that also contained personal information could require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting to add the needed controls. In accordance with a requirement set forth in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA has been working since 2003 to develop a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system to be used to evaluate passengers before they board an aircraft on domestic flights. In July 2005, we reported on privacy problems associated with testing of Secure Flight. The privacy problems faced in developing Secure Flight arose not because it was prohibitively difficult to protect privacy while prescreening airline passengers, but because TSA had not reassessed privacy risks when key programmatic changes were made and taken appropriate steps to mitigate them. Officials also stated that they have added privacy experts to the system development teams to address privacy issues as they arise. As with its own programs and systems, it will be important for DHS to ensure that privacy has been thoroughly considered and guidelines clearly established as it participates in the emerging information sharing environment. As directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the administration has taken steps, beginning in 2005, to establish an information sharing environment to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information. However, the guidelines as issued provide only a high-level framework for addressing privacy protection and do not include all of the Fair Information Practices. While DHS is only one participant in the governmentwide information sharing environment, it has the responsibility to ensure that the information under its control is shared with other organizations in ways that adequately protect privacy. Privacy: Key Challenges Facing Federal Agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advances in information technology make it easier than ever for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies to obtain and process information about citizens and residents in many ways and for many purposes. The demands of the war on terror also drive agencies to extract as much value as possible from the information available to them, adding to the potential for compromising privacy. Recognizing that securing the homeland and protecting the privacy rights of individuals are both important goals, the Congress has asked GAO to perform several reviews of DHS programs and their privacy implications over the past several years. For this hearing, GAO was asked to testify on key privacy challenges facing DHS. To address this issue, GAO identified and summarized issues raised in its previous reports on privacy and assessed recent governmentwide privacy guidance.
What GAO Found
As it develops and participates in important homeland security activities, DHS faces challenges in ensuring that privacy concerns are addressed early, are reassessed when key programmatic changes are made, and are thoroughly reflected in guidance on emerging technologies and uses of personal data. GAO's reviews of DHS programs have identified cases where these challenges were not fully met. For example, increased use by federal agencies of data mining--the analysis of large amounts of data to uncover hidden patterns and relationships--has been accompanied by uncertainty regarding privacy requirements and oversight of such systems. As described in a recent GAO report, DHS did not assess privacy risks in developing a data mining tool known as ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement), as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. ADVISE is a data mining tool under development intended to help the department analyze large amounts of information. Because privacy had not been assessed and mitigating controls had not been implemented, DHS faced the risk that uses of ADVISE in systems containing personal information could require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting at a later date to add the needed controls. GAO has also reported on privacy challenges experienced by DHS in reassessing privacy risks when key programmatic changes were made during development of a prescreening program for airline passengers. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been working to develop a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, to be used to evaluate passengers before they board an aircraft on domestic flights. GAO reported that TSA had not fully disclosed uses of personal information during testing of Secure Flight, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974. To prevent such problems from recurring, TSA officials recently said that they have added privacy experts to Secure Flight's development teams to address privacy considerations on a continuous basis as they arise. Another challenge DHS faces is ensuring that privacy considerations are addressed in the emerging information sharing environment. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the establishment of an environment to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information, as well as the issuance of privacy guidelines for operation in this environment. Recently issued privacy guidelines developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence provide only a high-level framework for privacy protection. While DHS is only one participant, it has the responsibility to ensure that the information under its control is shared with other organizations in ways that adequately protect privacy. Accordingly, it will be important for the department to clearly establish departmental guidelines so that privacy protections are implemented properly and consistently. |
gao_GAO-02-138 | gao_GAO-02-138_0 | For example, hunting and birdwatching are important as both recreational and income-generating activities. For example, mammals and birds can damage crops and forestry resources, deplete aquaculture stock, destroy livestock, and despoil property. Wildlife damage to U.S. agriculture alone (including crops and livestock) has been estimated at between $600 million and $1.6 billion annually, with over half of all farmers and ranchers experiencing some type of wildlife-related damage each year. Program Operations and Research Activities Benefit Resources and People
Working with state and local agencies, associations, and individuals, Wildlife Services conducts many wildlife control activities. However, we found no independent studies that rigorously assessed the costs and benefits of the Wildlife Services program; the only studies that we found were conducted by or in collaboration with Wildlife Services scientists and researchers. Wildlife Services’ EIS, prepared by the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, addressed its ongoing program of wildlife damage management. In light of the controversy surrounding lethal controls, Wildlife Services devotes most of its research efforts toward this end. Considerable opportunity exists for developing more effective nonlethal means of controlling predators on farms and ranches—for example, through wildlife contraceptives or through the use of scare devices triggered by motion sensors. Specifically, we agreed to determine (1) the nature and severity of threats posed by wildlife, (2) the actions the program has taken to reduce such threats, (3) the studies Wildlife Services and others have done to assess the specific costs and benefits of program activities, and (4) the opportunities that exist for developing effective nonlethal methods of predator control on farms and ranches. Fish and Wildlife Service. Wildlife Services’ total fiscal year 2000 expenditures were $80.6 million. The examples do not include the risk to human health and safety posed by birds at airports. | What GAO Found
Birdwatching, hunting, and wildlife photography provide important recreational, aesthetic, and income-generating benefits to the American public. In addition, wildlife help maintain ecosystems, and the mere knowledge that wildlife exist is viewed as beneficial by many people. At the same time, however, some wildlife destroy crops, kill livestock, damage property, and pose risks to public health and safety. Further, as the U.S. population has grown and impinged upon wildlife habitats, conflicts between wildlife and humans and their property have become increasingly common. Wildlife Services, a program within the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, is tasked with controlling damage by wildlife. Mammals and birds damage crops, forestry seedlings, and aquaculture products each year, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. In fiscal year 2000, predators killed half a million livestock--mostly lambs and calves--valued at $70 million. To reduce such threats, Wildlife Services conducts operational and research activities with federal, state, and local agencies; agricultural producers and ranchers; private homeowners; and others. In carrying out these activities, Wildlife Services applies the most appropriate methods, whether lethal or nonlethal, of prevention and control. Considerable opportunity exists for developing effective nonlethal means of controlling damage by wildlife on farms and ranches--for example, through wildlife contraceptives or through the use of scare devices triggered by motion sensors. In view of the growing controversy surrounding the use of lethal controls, Wildlife Services scientists are focusing most of their research on developing improved nonlethal control techniques. GAO identified no independent assessments of the costs and benefits associated with Wildlife Services' program. |
gao_GAO-11-457 | gao_GAO-11-457_0 | 1.) 2.) 3.) At Least 130 Products Have Been Studied in Numerous Therapeutic Areas under PREA and BPCA, but FDA Does Not Know If Additional Products Have Been Studied
At least 130 products—80 products under PREA and 50 under BPCA— have been studied for use in children since the 2007 reauthorization. In addition, few drugs have been studied when sponsors have declined written requests. FDA does not track and aggregate data about applications submitted under PREA until the PeRC has completed its review of information from the application. Therefore, FDA was unable to provide information about some applications that had been submitted to the agency that were subject to PREA. This lack of data during the review process about applications subject to PREA, hampers FDA’s ability to manage the review process, including whether FDA is meeting statutory requirements and whether the sponsor has complied with PREA’s requirements for pediatric studies. FDA officials said that they could not provide any details about these applications without locating each application individually within the agency and reviewing it to determine whether it included pediatric studies or requests for waivers or deferrals, but stated that it is likely that most of the approximately 381 applications are for products that sponsors plan to market in adult indications and, therefore, would include a request for a deferral of the pediatric studies rather than completed pediatric studies. 50 Products Have Been Studied under BPCA since Its 2007 Reauthorization
Fifty products have been studied under BPCA from the 2007 reauthorization through June 30, 2010; FDA has reviewed applications for 50 of these products, none of which were biological products. According to FDA officials, FDA granted pediatric exclusivity to the sponsors of 44 of the 50 drugs. All Products with Completed Pediatric Studies Had Labeling Changes, and FDA’s Goals Often Differ from the PREA Requirement for Reaching Agreement on Labeling Changes
All of the drug and biological products with pediatric studies completed and applications reviewed since the 2007 reauthorization had labeling changes that included important pediatric information. Since the 2007 reauthorization, the most commonly implemented labeling change expanded the pediatric age groups for which a product was indicated. Therefore, the drug’s labeling was changed to describe the study conducted and indicate that safety and effectiveness were not established in pediatric populations. One challenge stakeholders, including sponsors, identified was confusion about how to comply with PREA and BPCA due to a lack of current guidance from FDA. FDA has not provided guidance for changes to the laws from the 2007 reauthorization for PREA or BPCA. FDA explained that officials can discuss study timelines and questions or concerns sponsors may have regarding their study submissions throughout the process. Another challenge identified by stakeholders is complying simultaneously with the U.S. laws, PREA and BPCA, and the European Union’s (EU) Paediatric Regulation. III for a description of the Paediatric Regulation.) Because of the timing of this review, FDA staff managing the review process cannot be certain how many applications that have been submitted to the agency are subject to PREA, how many of those applications include pediatric studies, or how many applications include requests for waivers or deferrals, until FDA has almost completed its review of the entire application. However, our recommendation is not based on FDA’s ability to determine the status of individual applications, but rather its lack of aggregate data on applications that are subject to PREA during its review of the applications so as to be able to better manage its review process. HHS states that the improvement will allow FDA to better track future applications that are subject to PREA. We also describe the number of products with completed and ongoing studies in neonates since the 2007 reauthorization of the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA). FDA and NIH officials described how they maintained data on pediatric studies, and the resulting labeling changes conducted under PREA and BPCA. BPCA authorizes FDA to provide an incentive of an additional 6 months of market exclusivity, known as pediatric exclusivity, to product sponsors that conduct pediatric studies requested by FDA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, Congress reauthorized two laws, the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA). PREA requires that sponsors conduct pediatric studies for certain products unless the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) grants a waiver or deferral. Sponsors submit studies to FDA in applications for review. BPCA is voluntary for sponsors. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 required that GAO describe the effect of these laws since the 2007 reauthorization. GAO (1) examined how many and what types of products have been studied; (2) described the number and type of labeling changes and FDA's review periods; and (3) described challenges identified by stakeholders to conducting studies. GAO examined data on the studies from the 2007 reauthorization through June 2010, reviewed statutory requirements, and interviewed stakeholders and agency officials.
What GAO Found
At least 130 products--80 products under PREA and 50 under BPCA--have been studied for use in children since the 2007 reauthorization. However, FDA cannot be certain how many additional products may have been studied because FDA does not track and aggregate data about applications submitted under PREA that would allow it to manage the review process. FDA was unable to provide information about some applications that had been submitted to the agency that were subject to PREA. Recent improvements to FDA's data system might assist the agency in tracking future applications. Under PREA, FDA has granted most of the study waivers and deferrals requested by sponsors since the 2007 reauthorization. Under BPCA, FDA granted pediatric exclusivity--an additional 6 months of market exclusivity, which generally delays marketing of generic forms of the product--to the sponsors of 44 of the 50 drugs in exchange for conducting pediatric studies. Because BPCA is voluntary, sponsors may decline FDA's request for pediatric studies. Although BPCA includes provisions to encourage the study of drugs when sponsors have declined FDA's request, few drugs have been studied under these provisions. Since the 2007 reauthorization, all of the 130 products with pediatric studies completed and applications reviewed under PREA and BPCA had labeling changes that included important pediatric information. The most commonly implemented labeling change expanded the pediatric age groups for which a product was indicated. The next most common type of labeling change indicated that safety and effectiveness had not been established in pediatric populations and provided a description of the study conducted. Additional labeling changes were recommended for products as a result of FDA's monitoring of adverse events associated with products after they had been approved for marketing. FDA officials said they need to complete their review of the application, including all studies, before they can reach agreement with the sponsor on labeling changes. Stakeholders, including sponsors, pediatricians, and health advocacy organizations, described challenges faced by sponsors that could limit the success of PREA and BPCA. Those challenges included confusion about how to comply with PREA and BPCA due to a lack of guidance from FDA for changes to the laws from the 2007 reauthorization of PREA or BPCA. FDA officials explained that they mitigate this lack of guidance by discussing questions or concerns that sponsors have regarding their pediatric studies with sponsors throughout the process. An additional challenge sponsors described was a lack of economic incentives to study products with no remaining market exclusivity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of FDA track applications during its review process and maintain aggregate data on applications subject to PREA. HHS agreed that better tracking of information is needed but disagreed with GAO's finding that it does not track applications. While FDA is able to identify the status of individual applications during its review, it has not maintained data that would allow it to better manage its review process. |
gao_GAO-09-50 | gao_GAO-09-50_0 | The C- 17 is more modern, has a higher mission capable rate, and is more flexible in that it also provides tactical (intratheater) airlift to austere, forward- deployed bases. C-17 procurement began in 1988 and the Air Force’s current plan is to acquire a total of 205 C-17s for $66 billion. The Air Force is now engaged in a new mobility capabilities study, the results of which will be briefed in May 2009. While officials believe this mix will allow DOD to meet its strategic airlift requirement, the number of C-5s DOD modernizes and C-17s it procures may change again, pending the results of ongoing mobility studies, potential C-5 retirements, and the eventual cost estimates of C-5 modernization. At this time, DOD officials have not determined what metrics it will use to make strategic airlift decisions. Further, the cost estimate does not include the costs for a new modernization upgrade program slated to begin in fiscal year 2010 that would fix AMP deficiencies and add new capabilities. Alternatively, some future modification costs may be avoided should the Air Force justify retirement of some older C-5s. The Air Force Must Make a Decision Soon Regarding C-17 Acquisition and Eventual Shutdown of the Production Line
Results from the two mobility studies, potential C-5 retirements, and future modernization cost increases could lead to a decision to extend C- 17 production beyond the 205 now authorized. Careful Planning Needed to Avoid Shutting Down and Restarting the Production Line
Two alternatives to completely shutting down the C-17 production line would be to slow down the rate of production or to close out current production while preserving some ability to restart the line should conditions change and additional C-17s are needed. Analysis indicates that, once closed, it would not be feasible or cost effective to restart production due to costs for hiring and training a new workforce, reinstalling tooling, and reestablishing the supply base. Air Force Has Not Budgeted Sufficient Funds for the C-17 Production Shutdown
At this writing, the Air Force has allocated $37 million in its outyears budget for C-17 production shutdown, far less than what is believed to be needed. In 2006, Boeing and the Air Force developed considerably different estimates of about $1 billion and $465 million, respectively, for the cost of shutting down production completely. Differences between the two estimates can largely be attributed to the underlying assumptions used. Therefore, they included costs to demolish facilities and for environmental remediation in their estimate. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better inform decision makers and provide improved and quantifiable projections of airlift mobility requirements and investment needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) and U.S. Transportation Command to take the following action: Ensure that the new mobility capabilities study specifies the ton-mile per day metric and other relevant metrics to support sound strategic airlift decisions, including (1) the cost-effective mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft consistent with national security strategy; (2) the number of C-5s required to airlift equipment that can only be carried by that aircraft; (3) C-5A retirement schedules, if warranted by analysis; (4) the number of C-17s needed to accomplish both its strategic and tactical roles; and (5) future procurement and modernization needs. Specifically, we (1) identify the impact C- 5 modernization cost increases have had on the mix of aircraft DOD needs to meet its strategic airlift requirement, (2) assess the current C-5 modernization cost estimate, and (3) identify C-17 production plans and issues related to a production line shutdown. We collected information on the 14 options DOD considered to meet its strategic airlift requirements following the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) cost breach notification to Congress. We identified issues related to DOD’s 2005 mobility study and discussed DOD’s efforts to address these same issues in the current study with DOD officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III aircraft play key roles in transporting weapons and other cargo. Since September 2001, these aircraft have delivered over 2.4 million tons of cargo to staging and operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet determining the number and mix to meet current and future airlift requirements has become increasingly challenging given distinct differences between the two aircraft. While the C-5 can carry more cargo, the newer C-17 is more flexible since it can deliver to forward-deployed bases and has a higher mission capable rate. GAO was asked to identify the impact C-5 modernization cost increases have had on the mix of aircraft; assess the current C-5 modernization cost estimate; and identify C-17 production plans and issues related to production line shutdown. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed options DOD considered to meet its current and future strategic airlift requirements, and evaluated C-5 modernization and C-17 production line shut down cost estimates.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has cut the number of C-5s it plans to fully modernize by more than half because of substantial cost increases in the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) and plans to acquire more C-17s, with additional congressional funding. Currently, the Air Force plans to provide avionics upgrades to all 111 C-5s, limit RERP to 52 C-5s, and acquire 205 C-17s. However, this mix may change again, based in part on the results of a new mobility capabilities study, the findings of which DOD plans to release in May 2009. While the new study is expected to consider transport needs for the future force, DOD has not identified specific metrics it will use to make strategic airlift decisions--a concern GAO raised about DOD's previous mobility capabilities study and one DOD agreed to address in future studies. The Air Force currently estimates it will spend $9.1 billion on upgrading the C-5s. However, this estimate may be understated because DOD did not apply risk or uncertainty analyses to its RERP major cost drivers. Moreover, the current RERP is underfunded by almost $300 million and may be unachievable if the engine production schedule is not met. At the same time, the Air Force has not priced or budgeted for a new upgrade program it plans to begin in fiscal year 2010 to address certain modernization deficiencies and to add new capabilities. Some future costs, however, may be avoided should the Air Force justify retirement of some older C-5s and forego planned modifications. Careful planning is needed to ensure C-17 production is not ended prematurely and later restarted at substantial cost. Current production plans call for shutting down the C-17 production line in September 2010. However, results from the new mobility capabilities studies and potential C-5 retirements could lead to decisions to extend C-17 production beyond the 205 now authorized. Both the manufacturer and Air Force agree that shutting down and restarting production would not be feasible or cost effective due to the costs to reinstate a capable workforce, reinstall tooling, and reestablish the supplier base. At some point, the C-17 production line will shut down, and DOD will have to pay substantial costs that have not yet been budgeted. The manufacturer and Air Force shutdown estimates differ significantly--about $1 billion and $465 million, respectively--in large part because the manufacturer's estimate included assumptions about demolishing facilities and environmental remediation, while the Air Force's did not. |
gao_GAO-03-847 | gao_GAO-03-847_0 | DHS assumed formal administration of Plum Island from USDA on June 1, 2003, as provided by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. ARS scientists at Plum Island are responsible for research on foreign livestock diseases, while APHIS scientists are responsible for diagnosing livestock diseases. On August 13, 2002, 71 of these employees went on strike. However, Plum Island remains vulnerable to security breaches because its security arrangements are incomplete and limited. This also allows armed guards to remain in the building while the other armed guards go to the harbor to inspect vehicles unloaded from the ferry and ensure that individuals departing the ferry onto Plum Island have permission to be there; conducting a background check for government staff and contractors working on the island and performing more rigorous checks for individuals with access to the pathogens; installing some video cameras to (1) increase the probability of timely detection of an intruder and (2) monitor the activities of those inside the biocontainment area when they remove pathogens from the storage area—or the repository; installing intrusion detection alarms in the administrative building and the biocontainment area; limiting access to pathogens by installing certain access control devices; and improving pathogen control and accountability by completing and maintaining an inventory of pathogens at the facility, submitting names of those with access to pathogens to the U.S. Attorney General, and creating security and incident response plans, as required by law. Despite Improvements, Security Arrangements at Plum Island Are Incomplete and Have Serious Limitations
Although security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved over the past few years, fundamental concerns remain. For example, the continued operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is dependent on its infrastructure, which has limited protection. Access to Pathogens Is Not Adequately Controlled
Access to pathogens at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is not adequately controlled. This is a critical shortcoming because, according to DHS, the nation faces a significant risk of a terrorist attack. Plum Island’s Security Plan Does The risk that an adversary might try to steal pathogens is, in our opinion, Not Address All Risks and Threats higher than USDA believed it to be in 2001, when it defined the same risks for all of its laboratories, including Plum Island. USDA Concluded Its Contractor’s Performance Declined during the Strike but Operations Continued and Overall Performance Was Superior
Regarding the contractor’s performance, despite a decline from the previous rating period, USDA rated LB&B Associates’ performance as superior for the rating period during which the strike occurred. Finally, because we believe the level of risk at Plum Island is higher than USDA originally determined, and because USDA did not validate threats with intelligence agencies or local law enforcement officials, DHS cannot be assured that Plum Island’s security, including its physical security system and response plans, is sufficient to address the full range of events that could occur on the island. Consult with other laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the inherent difficulty of securing pathogens. While we agree that armed guards are necessary for security on Plum Island, our concern is that the guard force did not have authority from USDA to carry firearms and make arrests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Scientists at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center are responsible for protecting the nation against animal diseases that could be accidentally or deliberately introduced into the country. Questions about the security of Plum Island arose after the 2001 terrorist attacks and when employees of the contractor hired to operate and maintain the Plum Island facilities went on strike in August 2002. GAO reviewed (1) the adequacy of security at Plum Island and (2) how well the contractor performed during the strike. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed the administration of Plum Island from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) on June 1, 2003. While DHS is now responsible for Plum Island, USDA is continuing its research and diagnostic programs.
What GAO Found
Security at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has improved, but fundamental concerns leave the facility vulnerable to security breaches. First, Plum Island's physical security arrangements are incomplete and limited. Second, Plum Island officials have been assuming unnecessary risks by not adequately controlling access to areas where pathogens are located. Controlling access is particularly important because pathogens are inherently difficult to secure at any facility. Although this risk may always exist, DHS could consult with other laboratories working with pathogens to learn different approaches to mitigate this risk. Third, Plum Island's security response has limitations. For example, the guard force has been armed but has not had the authority from USDA to carry firearms or make arrests. Moreover, Plum Island's incident response plan does not consider the possibility of a terrorist attack. Fourth, the risk that an adversary may try to steal pathogens is, in our opinion, higher at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center than USDA originally determined because of hostilities surrounding the strike. Also, when USDA developed its security plan for Plum Island, it did not review their defined threats with the intelligence community and local law enforcement officials to learn of possible threats--and their associated risks--relevant to the Plum Island vicinity. Although these reviews did not occur, USDA subsequently arranged to receive current intelligence information. Despite a decline in performance from the previous rating period, USDA rated the contractor's performance as superior for the rating period during which the strike occurred. |
gao_GAO-12-718T | gao_GAO-12-718T_0 | The process involves four main phases: the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB), the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), transition out of military service (transition), and VA benefits. This phase involves four stages: (1) the servicemember is counseled by a DOD board liaison on what to expect during the IDES process; (2) the servicemember is counseled by a VA caseworker on what to expect during the IDES process and medical exams are scheduled; (3) medical exams are conducted according to VA standards for exams for disability compensation, by VA, DOD, or contractor physicians; and (4) exam results are used by the MEB to identify conditions that limit the servicemember’s ability to serve in the military. PEB phase: In this subsequent phase, decisions are made about the servicemember’s fitness for duty, disability rating and DOD and VA disability benefits, and the servicemember has opportunities to appeal those decisions. DOD and VA established timeliness goals for the IDES process to provide VA benefits to active duty servicemembers within 295 days of being referred into the process, and to reserve component members within 305 days (see fig. IDES Processing Times Increased over Time, While Measures of Servicemember Satisfaction Have Shortcomings
Overall IDES Case- Processing Times Steadily Increased Since the Start of IDES
Overall IDES timeliness has steadily worsened since the inception of the program. Since fiscal year 2008, the average number of days for servicemembers cases to be processed and to receive benefits increased from 283 to 394 for active duty cases (compared to the goal of 295 days) and from 297 to 420 for reserve cases (compared to the goal of 305 days). Relatedly, the proportion of cases meeting timeliness goals decreased from more than 63 percent of active duty cases completed during fiscal year 2008 to about 19 percent in fiscal year 2011 (see table 1). However, it is too early to tell the extent to which these results will continue to hold. Several factors may contribute to delays in this final phase. Officials could not provide data on the extent to which these factors had an impact on processing times for pending cases, but said that once errors are detected and addressed, reported processing times are also corrected. However, shortcomings in how DOD measures and reports satisfaction limit the usefulness of these data for making IDES management decisions. DOD suspended the survey in December 2011 because of financial constraints, but officials told us they plan to resume collecting satisfaction data in fiscal year 2013. Recent Actions and Ongoing Initiatives May Improve IDES Performance, but It Is Too Early to Assess Their Overall Impact
DOD and VA Took Steps to Address Previously Identified IDES Challenges
DOD and VA have undertaken a number of actions to address IDES challenges—many of which GAO identified in past work. Some actions— such as increased oversight and staffing—represent important steps in the right direction, but progress is uneven in some areas. The secretaries of DOD and VA have met several times since February 2011 to discuss progress in improving IDES timeliness and have tasked their agencies to find ways of streamlining the process so that the goals can be reduced. Improving local IDES reporting capability: DOD and VA are implementing solutions to improve the ability of local military treatment facilities to track their IDES cases, but multiple solutions may result in redundant work efforts. Meanwhile, DOD has also been piloting its own tracking system at 9 IDES sites. As a result, staff at IDES sites we visited reported having to enter the same data into multiple systems. The agencies have begun a business process review to better understand how IDES is operating and identify best practices for possible piloting. Ultimately, according to DOD officials, this business process review could lead to short- and long-term recommendations to improve IDES performance, potentially including changes to the different steps in the IDES process, performance goals, and staffing levels; and possibly the procurement of a new information system to support process improvements. Concluding Observations
By merging two duplicative disability evaluation systems, IDES has shown promise for expediting the delivery of DOD and VA benefits to injured servicemembers and is considered by many to be an improvement over the legacy process it replaced. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may have at this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, the DOD and VA have operated the IDESwhich combines what used to be separate DOD and VA disability evaluation processes and is intended to expedite benefits for injured servicemembers. Initially a pilot at 3 military treatment facilities, IDES is now DODs standard process for evaluating servicemembers fitness for duty and disability worldwide. In previous reports, GAO identified a number of challenges as IDES expanded, including staffing shortages and difficulty meeting timeliness goals.
In this statement, GAO discusses initial observations from its ongoing review of the IDES, addressing two key topics: (1) the extent to which DOD and VA are meeting IDES timeliness and servicemember satisfaction performance goals, and (2) steps the agencies are taking to improve the performance of the system. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed IDES timeliness and customer satisfaction survey data, visited six IDES sites, and interviewed DOD and VA officials. This work is ongoing and GAO has no recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue its final report later in 2012.
What GAO Found
Case processing times under the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) process have increased over time, and measures of servicemember satisfaction have shortcomings. Each year, average processing time for IDES cases has climbed, reaching 394 and 420 days for active and reserve component members in fiscal year 2011well over established goals of 295 and 305 days, respectively. Also in fiscal year 2011, just 19 percent of active duty servicemembers and 18 percent of guard or reserve members completed the IDES process and received benefits within established goals, down from 32 and 37 percent one year prior. Of the four phases comprising IDES, the medical evaluation board phase increasingly fell short of timeliness goals and, within that phase, the time required for the militarys determination of fitness was especially troubling. During site visits to IDES locations, we consistently heard concerns about timeframes and resources for this phase of the process. With respect to servicemember satisfaction with the IDES process, GAO found shortcomings in how these data are collected and reported, such as unduly limiting who is eligible to receive a survey and computing average satisfaction scores in a manner that may overstate satisfaction. Department of Defense (DOD) officials told us they are considering alternatives for gauging satisfaction with the process.
DOD and Veterans Affairs (VA) have taken steps to improve IDES performance, and have other improvement initiatives in process, but progress is uneven and it is too early to assess their overall impact. VA increased resources for conducting disability ratings and related workloads. The Army is hiring additional staff for its medical evaluation boards, but it is too early to see the impact of these additional resources. DOD and VA are pursuing system upgrades so that staff and managers at IDES facilities can better track the progress of servicemembers cases and respond to delays more quickly; however, multiple upgrades may be causing redundant work efforts. DOD officials also told us they have been working with the military services to correct case data that were inaccurately entered into VAs IDES tracking system, but have not yet achieved a permanent solution. Finally, DOD is in the early stages of conducting an in-depth business process review of the entire IDES process and supporting IT systems, in order to better understand how each step contributes to overall processing times and identify opportunities to streamline the process and supporting systems. |
gao_GAO-11-418 | gao_GAO-11-418_0 | s)
More Than Half of OSDBU Directors Reviewed Reported Only to Their Agen or Dep uty Agency Head
We found that 9 of the 16 agencies we reviewed were in compliance with the Small Business Act’s requirement that OSDBU directors be responsible only to and report directly to the agency or deputy agency head (se e table 1). The OSDBU directors at the compliant agencies cited benefit the reporting relationship. Ongoing noncompliance with section 15(k)(3) undermines the intent of the act and may prevent some OSDBU directors from having direct access to top agency management. Given how long these agencies have not been in compliance with the requirement, at a minimum they have an obligation to explain their noncompliance to Congress and provide support for their need, if any, for greater statutory flexibility in establishing a reporting structure for their OSDBU director. Directors who did not view a section 15(k) function as their responsibility generally reported that contracting, acquisition, or program staff performed it. The number ranged from 1 who did not view maintaining supervisory authority over OSDBU personnel as a function to 11 who did not view assisting small businesses to obtain payments from prime contractors as a responsibility. However, 7 of the 16 federal agencies that we reviewed were not in compliance with the act. However, we did not find that these arguments justified noncompliance with section 15(k)(3). Recommendation for Executive Action
Given the ongoing requirement in the Small Business Act that OSDBU directors report to agency heads or deputy heads, we recommend that the heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Interior, Justice, State, and the Treasury and the Social Security Administration take steps as necessary to comply with the requirement or report to Congress on why they have not complied. However, we concluded that the agency was not in compliance with section 15(k)(3) because the Assistant Secretary had delegated his OSDBU responsibilities to a lower-level official who did not report to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. Using these data, we determined that seven agencies each procured more than $15 billion in goods and services in fiscal year 2009. Assessment of Compliance with Section 15(k)(3) of the Small Business Act
To assess whether the OSDBU director reports directly to the agency head or the deputy head as required by section 15(k)(3) of the Small Business Act, we focused on the seven agencies with major contracting activity and nine additional agencies that we reported in September 2003 were not complying with this requirement. The 20 agencies were responsible for more than 98 percent of civilian agency obligations in fiscal year 2009. Appendix II: Reporting Relationships at Seven Agencies Not in Compliance with Section 15(k)(3)
Appendix II: Re Agen 15(k)(3)
As discussed in the body of our report, seven agencies were not in compliance with section 15(k)(3) of the Small Business Act, which requires that the director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) be responsible only to and report directly to the agency head or deputy head. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 15(k) of the Small Business Act requires that all federal agencies with procurement powers establish an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) to advocate for small businesses. Section 15(k)(3) requires that OSDBU directors be responsible only to and report directly to agency or deputy agency heads. GAO was asked to assess agencies' compliance with the reporting structure and identify the functions OSDBUs performed. GAO reviewed compliance with section 15(k)(3) at 16 agencies--the 7 agencies that each procured more than $15 billion in goods and services in 2009 and 9 that it had previously reported were not complying with this requirement. GAO also surveyed the OSDBU directors at 25 agencies that represented more than 98 percent of civilian obligations and 90 percent of DOD obligations in 2009.
What GAO Found
Nine of the 16 federal agencies that GAO reviewed were in compliance with section 15(k)(3) of the Small Business Act, which requires OSDBU directors to be responsible only to and report directly to the agency or deputy agency head. The remaining seven agencies were not in compliance with the provision, and their OSDBU directors reported to lower-level officials or had delegated OSDBU responsibilities to officials who did not meet the reporting requirement. These agencies were not in compliance when GAO last examined them in 2003. During GAO's current review, directors who reported to agency heads cited benefits to the relationship, while those who did not had mixed views. GAO concluded that the views expressed by the directors at noncompliant agencies did not justify noncompliance and that these agencies should comply or provide support to Congress of their need, if any, for statutory flexibilities. Ongoing noncompliance with section 15(k)(3) undermines the intent of the act and may prevent some OSDBU directors from having direct access to top agency management. Consistent with its 2004 report, GAO's current work found that the 25 OSDBU directors surveyed focused their procurement activities on certain functions listed in section 15(k). At least 19 directors listed the five functions related to contract bundling, maintaining supervisory authority over staff, and helping small businesses obtain payments from agencies as among their duties. Fewer directors viewed the remaining three functions, such as reviewing acquisitions for small business set-asides and assisting small businesses to obtain payments from prime contractors, as duties. Directors who did not view these functions as their responsibility generally noted that contracting or program staff performed them. Whether OSDBU directors who do not perform certain functions listed in 15(k) are complying with the statute is not clear.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that agencies not in compliance with section 15(k)(3) take steps to comply with this statutory requirement or report to Congress on why they have not complied, including any requests for statutory reporting flexibility as appropriate. SSA agreed with the recommendation, and Interior agreed to reevaluate its reporting structure. Commerce, Justice, State, and the Treasury disagreed, believing they were in compliance. GAO maintains its position on agencies' compliance status, as discussed further in the report. Agriculture did not comment. |
gao_RCED-95-126 | gao_RCED-95-126_0 | To alleviate these problems and facilitate epidemiological research on the health effects of exposure to radiation and other hazards, the Secretarial Panel recommended that DOE continue developing CEDR as a comprehensive repository of data on its workers. The Secretarial Panel cautioned DOE that retrospective data would have limited value for future research. Few Researchers Are Using CEDR
Despite the system’s accessibility, few independent researchers have sought approval from DOE to become authorized CEDR users. Data as Originally Recorded at DOE’s Facilities Are Often Unavailable
It is difficult to conduct research beyond DOE’s initial studies or to fully validate the results, according to many of the researchers we spoke with, because CEDR may not contain data as they were originally recorded at DOE’s facilities. Moreover, DOE has not attempted the long-range planning needed to achieve this vision. Even with increased usage, however, it is not clear whether CEDR is the most cost-effective and practical means of accomplishing the more limited objective of providing access to DOE’s epidemiological data and data gathered under the memorandum of understanding with HHS. The current system has removed the “wall of secrecy” surrounding DOE’s epidemiological research by making some of the data available to outside researchers. Consequently, CEDR appears to be at a crossroad, and an overall assessment of the system would help DOE better ensure that it is spending its limited funds wisely. Regarding the need to include data on current workers and residents in CEDR, the Acting Director agreed that the information is vital and will be included as new studies are completed. Scope and Methodology
To determine how well CEDR meets its intended objective of being a comprehensive resource, we (1) reviewed recommendations from reports by the Secretarial Panel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research Activities and National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on designing and implementing CEDR; (2) interviewed officials at DOE headquarters—including the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health; the Acting Director of the Office of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance; and the CEDR Program Coordinator—and contractor staff at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory concerning the current status of CEDR; (3) reviewed relevant DOE directives, program plans, progress reports, and documentation on CEDR; (4) interviewed eight of the nine members (attempts to contact the ninth member were unsuccessful) of the NAS committee responsible for monitoring and reporting on DOE’s progress on CEDR; and (5) interviewed the officials from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the National Center for Environmental Health who were responsible for the studies conducted under the memorandum of understanding between DOE and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) epidemiological database, focusing on: (1) whether the database functions as a comprehensive repository of epidemiological data about DOE workers and the communities surrounding DOE facilities; (2) whether the system is accessible to outside researchers; and (3) DOE future plans for the system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the current DOE epidemiological database is not as comprehensive as originally envisioned because it lacks uniform data on laboratory workers' exposure to radiation and other hazardous substances and the health of these workers and residents near DOE facilities; (2) although DOE is trying to standardize its data and develop a more comprehensive employee health surveillance program, it will be at least three years before these goals are reached; (3) although the database is easily accessible, few independent researchers have used it because the data are of limited value for new research; (4) data problems include the lack of raw or updated data, missing and inconsistent data elements, and inadequate research documentation; (5) researchers often have to examine original records, which may be difficult to obtain, to get complete information; (6) DOE is uncertain whether the database will ever be as comprehensive as originally envisioned and it has not undertaken specific long-range plans to make it a comprehensive system; and (7) DOE has not assessed whether the current database or an alternative system would be the most cost-effective and practical means of providing researchers with needed data. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-20 | gao_T-AIMD-98-20_0 | NCUA Has Developed a Strategy and Has Initiated Action to Address the Year 2000 Problem
NCUA has developed a three-pronged approach for ensuring that credit unions are aggressively addressing the Year 2000 problem, which encompasses (1) incorporating the Year 2000 issue into its examination and supervision program, (2) disseminating information about the problem to credit unions, and (3) assessing Year 2000 compliance on the part of credit union data processing vendors. Concerns With NCUA’s Year 2000 Efforts
While NCUA has initiated actions to build the Year 2000 issue into examinations and to raise awareness about the issue among credit unions and their vendors, our work to date has identified four issues that must be addressed to provide greater assurance that NCUA efforts will be successful. First and foremost of our concerns is that NCUA still does not have a complete picture of where credit unions and their vendors stand in resolving the Year 2000 problem, and current efforts to determine credit union compliance are behind the schedule established by OMB and GAO. However, as of the time of our work, NCUA had not yet queried 20 percent of the credit unions and had only received 29 of the 87 vendor responses. In addition, of the credit union and vendor responses received, NCUA has not yet analyzed the information to determine which credit unions and vendors are at high risk of not correcting their systems on time. The questionnaires also did not include system interface issues. A second concern we have with NCUA’s efforts is that the agency does not yet have a formal contingency plan. NCUA guidance directs credit unions to conduct contingency planning, and NCUA officials told us that they have developed numerous contingency options and have discussed among the staff what steps to take should a credit union not be compliant by January 1, 2000. Audits are an integral management control and expanding their scope to include important and high-risk Year 2000 issues is critical since it would provide credit union management with greater assurance and understanding about where their institution stands in addressing the problem. Our fourth concern is that NCUA does not have enough staff qualified to conduct examination work in complex technical areas. At present, NCUA is the process of hiring one EDP auditor to help examine thousands of credit unions. However, these personnel additions may still not suffice given the tremendous workload and the short time frame for getting it done. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA) progress in making sure that the automated information systems belonging to the thousands of credit unions it oversees have adequately mitigated the risks associated with the year 2000 date change.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NCUA has taken steps to address the Year 2000 problem; (2) these involve incorporating the Year 2000 issue into its examination and supervision program, disseminating information about the problem, and assessing Year 2000 compliance on the part of data processing vendors; (3) concerns exist that must be resolved if the NCUA is to achieve greater certainty that credit unions will meet their Year 2000 deadline; (4) NCUA still does not have a complete picture of where credit unions and their vendors stand in resolving the Year 2000 problem, and current efforts to determine credit union compliance are behind the schedule established by GAO and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); (5) while NCUA sent questionnaires to credit unions and data processing vendors about the problem, it has not yet queried 20 percent of credit unions and has only received 29 of 87 vendor responses; (6) of the credit union and vendor responses received, NCUA has not yet analyzed this information to identify high-risk credit unions and vendors; (7) further, the surveys did not specifically ask about the status of corrective efforts and whether interface issues were appropriately being addressed; (8) NCUA has directed credit unions to conduct contingency planning and its staff have discussed what steps they should take should a credit union not be compliant by January 1, 2000; (9) however, the agency still lacks a formal contingency plan; (10) NCUA must take prompt action to ensure that these discussions are formally documented so that it will be well-positioned to handle unforeseen problems; (11) as potentially damaging as the Year 2000 problem is, NCUA has not yet ensured that the issue is addressed by credit union auditors; (12) doing so would provide credit union management with a greater assurance and understanding about where their institution stands in addressing the problem; (13) NCUA does not have enough staff qualified to conduct examination work in complex system areas; (14) at present, NCUA is in the process of hiring an electronic data processing (EDP) auditor and is requesting authority to hire 2 more; and (15) these personnel additions may not suffice given the tremendous workload and short time frame for getting it done. |
gao_RCED-98-197 | gao_RCED-98-197_0 | Advisory Groups Cite Continuing Mission and Management Concerns at the National Laboratories
Over the past several years, many government advisory groups have raised concerns about how DOE manages its national laboratory system. The laboratories are not operating as an integrated system. The reports include the following: In 1982, DOE’s Energy Research Advisory Board reported that the national laboratories duplicate private-sector research and that while DOE could take better advantage of the national laboratories’ capabilities, it needed to address its own management and organizational inefficiencies, which hamper the achievement of a more effective laboratory system.In 1983, a White House Science Council Panel found that while DOE’s laboratories had well-defined missions for part of their work, most activities were fragmented and unrelated to the laboratories’ main responsibilities.In 1992, DOE’s Secretary of Energy Advisory Board found that the laboratories’ broad missions, coupled with rapidly changing world events, had “caused a loss of coherence and focus at the laboratories, thereby reducing their overall effectiveness in responding to their traditional missions as well as new national initiatives. But while DOE has made progress—principally by reducing paperwork burdens on its laboratories—most of its actions are still in process or have unclear expectations and deadlines. Furthermore, the Department cannot demonstrate how its actions have resulted, or may result, in fundamental change. To analyze progress in laboratory management reform, we talked to DOE and laboratory officials and asked DOE to document the actions it has taken, is taking, or has planned to address the recommendations from several advisory groups. The actions DOE said it is taking include creating various internal working groups; strengthening the Energy R&D Council to facilitate more effective planning, budgeting, management, and evaluation of the Department’s R&D programs and to improve the linkage between research and technology development; increasing the use of private-sector management practices; adopting performance-based contracting and continuous improvement concepts; improving the oversight of efforts to enhance productivity and reduce overhead costs at the laboratories; expanding the laboratories’ work for other federal agencies; evaluating the proper balance between laboratories and universities for basic research; improving science and technology partnerships with industry; reducing unnecessary oversight burdens on laboratories; developing the Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan in July 1996 that identified laboratory activities in mission areas; creating the Laboratory Operations Board, which includes DOE officials and experts from industry and academia, to provide guidance and direction to the laboratories; and developing “technology roadmaps,” a strategic planning technique to focus the laboratories’ roles. Nor does the plan tie DOE’s or the laboratories’ missions to the annual budget process. Officials told us that the roadmaps are used to connect larger departmental goals and are a way to institutionalize strategic planning within the Department. These reports have also concluded that DOE has made some progress in addressing the problems noted by the Galvin Task Force but that progress has been slow and many of the recommendations need further actions. DOE did not strengthen this office. . . there is no DOE leadership to implement changes.”
We believe these organizational weaknesses are a major reason why DOE has been unable to develop long-term solutions to the recurring problems reported by advisory groups. Other actions DOE is taking are focused more on process than on results, and most are still incomplete, making it difficult to show how DOE intends to direct the laboratories’ missions and manage them more effectively as an integrated system—a major recommendation of past advisory groups. The Department’s complex organizational structure creates unclear lines of authority that dilute accountability and make reforms difficult to achieve. 9, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in making needed management reforms in its national laboratories, focusing on: (1) the recommendations made by various advisory groups for addressing management weaknesses at DOE and the laboratories; and (2) how DOE and its laboratories have responded to these recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for nearly 20 years, many advisory groups have found that while DOE's national laboratories do impressive research and development, they are unfocused, micromanaged by DOE, and do not function as an integrated national research and development system; (2) weaknesses in DOE's leadership and accountability are often cited as factors hindering fundamental reform of the laboratories' management; (3) as a result, advisory groups have made dozens of recommendations ranging from improving strategic planning to streamlining internal processes; (4) several past advisory groups have also suggested major organizational changes in the way the laboratories are directed; (5) to address past recommendations by advisory groups, DOE, at GAO's request, documented the actions it has taken, from creating new task forces to developing strategic laboratory plans; (6) while DOE has made some progress--principally by reducing paperwork burdens on its laboratories--most of its actions are still under way or have unclear outcomes; (7) furthermore, these actions lack the objectives, performance measures, and milestones needed to effectively track progress and account for results; (8) consequently, the Department cannot show how its actions have resulted, or may result, in fundamental change; (9) for example, its Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan, which was developed to give more focus and direction to the national laboratories, does not set priorities and is not tied to the annual budget process; (10) few experts and officials GAO consulted could show how the plan is used to focus missions or integrate the laboratory system; (11) DOE's latest technique for focusing the laboratories' missions is the technology roadmap; (12) roadmaps are plans that show how specific DOE activities relate to missions, goals, and performers; (13) roadmaps are a promising step but have been used in only a few mission areas and are not directly tied to DOE's budget process; (14) moreover, several laboratory directors questioned both the accuracy of the actions DOE has reported taking and their applicability at the laboratory level; (15) DOE's organizational weaknesses, which include unclear lines of authority, are a major reason why the Department has been unable to develop long-term solutions to the recurring problems reported by advisory groups; and (16) although DOE created the Laboratory Operations Board to help oversee laboratory management reform, it is only an advisory body within DOE's complex organizational structure and lacks the authority to direct change. |
gao_GAO-04-7 | gao_GAO-04-7_0 | The United States administered the islands under this trusteeship until 1986, when it entered into a Compact of Free Association with the FSM and the RMI, both of which are located in the Pacific Ocean. For the 15-year period from 1987 through 2001, it provided funding at levels that decreased every 5 years. While these reports did not specifically identify any findings as instances of misuse of Compact funds, they did identify problems that could leave Compact funds susceptible to misuse, including poor control over cash and equipment. In addition, we reviewed the audit findings to determine if they recurred in successive single audits over the 5-year period. Pervasive Audit Findings Demonstrate Poor Accountability over Compact Funds
Single audits of the FSM, the four FSM states, and the RMI identified pervasive audit findings involving noncompliance with Compact requirements and financial statement problems in areas that we consider highly susceptible to misuse. In addition, the independent auditor performing the single audits issued qualified opinions or disclaimers of opinion on the financial statements in all 30 single audit reports reviewed and for 60 percent of the Schedules of Expenditures of Federal Awards. In total, they contained 458 audit findings relevant to Compact funds and significant numbers of findings for each of the auditees for which we reviewed single audit reports. This is an example of an equipment problem. Amended Compact Agreements Contain Improved Accountability Measures
In responding to our previous reviews of the original Compact program, Interior officials expressed concerns about the U.S. government’s limited ability to enforce accountability over Compact funds due to certain provisions of the original Compact and the related FPA. Interior officials expressed frustration with the lack of tools available to them to administer or track this assistance in a manner that could reasonably ensure that such assistance was having its intended effect. The amended Compacts strengthen reporting and monitoring measures that could improve accountability over assistance, if diligently implemented. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help promote compliance with Compact requirements and sound financial management, the Secretary of the Interior should delegate responsibility to the Office of Insular Affairs and hold appropriate officials in that office accountable for ensuring the adequacy of staff dedicated to Compact oversight and monitoring FSM and RMI progress in addressing Compact-related single audit report findings, reporting on the FSM and RMI actions to correct Compact-related compliance and financial management findings identified in single audit reports to the Secretary of the Interior or other appropriate high-level Interior official, initiating appropriate actions when the FSM or the RMI do not undertake adequate actions to address Compact-related single audit findings in a timely manner, and investigating single audit findings that indicate possible violations of grant conditions or misuse of funds and taking appropriate actions when such problems are verified. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1986, the United States entered into a Compact of Free Association (Compact) that provided about $2.1 billion in U.S. assistance from 1987 through 2003 to the Pacific Island nations of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). GAO has issued a number of reports raising concerns about the effectiveness of this assistance. GAO was asked to review possible FSM and RMI misuse of Compact funds. We reviewed single audits for 1996 through 2000 and this report summarizes the audit results.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of 30 single audit reports for the FSM, 4 FSM states, and the RMI for the years 1996 through 2000 identified pervasive and persistent noncompliance with Compact requirements and financial statement-related audit findings. These single audit reports identified 458 audit findings relevant to the Compact. Significant numbers of these audit findings occurred during each year of the 5-year period and at each of the auditees. In addition, successive single audits identified recurring audit findings over the 5-year period despite corrective action plans prepared by the auditees. While none of the audit findings specifically discussed misuse of Compact funds, they did describe noncompliance with Compact requirements and financial management problems in areas that GAO considers highly susceptible to misuse, such as poor control over cash and equipment. When considered in conjunction with the qualified opinions or disclaimers of opinion on the financial statements in all 30 reports and for 60 percent of the Schedules of Expenditure of Federal Awards required by the Single Audit Act, the audit findings reveal one thing: overall poor accountability of Compact funds. In responding to GAO's previous reviews of the original Compact, Interior officials expressed concerns about the U.S. government's limited ability to enforce accountability over Compact funds due to certain provisions of the Compact and the related fiscal procedures agreement (FPA). Recently, an Interior official noted that departmental officials have been frustrated with the lack of tools to administer or track federal assistance in a manner that could reasonably ensure that such assistance is having its intended effect. GAO found that the amended Compacts and related FPAs, which are scheduled to become effective upon legislative approval in the three countries, include many strengthened reporting and monitoring measures that could improve accountability, if diligently implemented. For example, funds could be withheld for noncompliance with Compact terms and conditions. In addition, joint economic committees and an Interior oversight team will focus on monitoring and overseeing Compact funds. |
gao_GAO-12-622 | gao_GAO-12-622_0 | DOD Considered Beneficiary Data, Contingency Operations, and Posture Changes in Sizing Its Replacement Medical Center but Has Not Assessed More Recent Posture Changes
In planning for the proposed replacement medical center, DOD officials considered beneficiary population data, contingency operations, and changes or expected changes in troop strength known at the time. A majority of the beneficiaries expected to receive health care from the replacement medical center are located within a 55-mile radius of it. DOD officials told us that because the replacement medical center was designed for peacetime operations—with the capacity to expand to meet the needs of contingency operations—reductions in ongoing contingency operations in Afghanistan would not have an impact on facility DOD posture in Europe has been reduced over the past requirements.few years, and DOD had previously announced that one of four brigade combat teams currently stationed in Europe would be removed by 2015. At the time of our review, DOD officials told us that they were in the process of assessing these proposed changes in posture to better understand their ramifications for DOD’s medical facility needs. Today, LRMC is DOD’s only remaining tertiary care medical center in Europe. They used DOD’s military hospital construction checklists to ensure that they incorporated updated patient quality of care standards, such as evidence-based design and world-class standards, when determining the size of the replacement medical center. However, our review of the planning documentation DOD provided in support of its facility requirements showed that there were (1) inconsistencies in how DOD projected patient workload and applied the planning criteria, (2) some areas where the planning documentation did not clearly show how DOD officials had applied the formulas provided in the criteria to generate requirements, and (3) calculation errors throughout. Without clear documentation of key analyses, and of how adjustments to facility requirements were made, stakeholders lack reasonable assurances that the proposed replacement medical center will be able to provide the appropriate health care capacity to meet the needs of the beneficiary population it is expected to serve. DOD’s Cost Estimate Was Not Well Documented and Cost Elements for Associated Facilities Have Yet to Be Developed
In developing the cost estimate for the replacement facility, DOD followed many of the best practices in developing estimates of capital projects, but DOD minimally documented the data sources, calculations, and estimating methodologies used in developing the cost estimate. Further, it is anticipated that the replacement medical center will become the hub of a larger medical-services-related campus, for which neither cost estimates nor time frames have yet been developed. Furthermore, our review of DOD’s process for developing the cost estimate does not reflect an assessment of how facility requirements were developed or their quality, but only a determination of whether they are described in technical documentation and reflected in the estimate.However, as discussed previously in this report, during our assessment of DOD’s process for determining facility requirements for the replacement medical center, we found some calculation errors in the facility requirements. The remaining components that make up the current 86th MDG clinic will be transferred to Ramstein Air Base. However, the documentation DOD provided in support of its cost estimate did not clearly demonstrate how facility requirements had been factored into cost elements. In addition, DOD and Congress may not have the information they need to make fully informed decisions about the facility. Without clear documentation of how key requirements were developed and how they factored into the development of facility requirements and cost, DOD cannot fully demonstrate that the proposed replacement medical center will provide adequate health care capacity at the current estimated cost. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the replacement medical center is appropriately sized to meet the health care needs of beneficiaries in a cost-effective manner, we recommend that as part of the facility’s recertification process, the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take the following two actions: provide sufficient and clear documentation on how medical planners applied DOD criteria to determine the facility’s requirements, including how and why medical planners made adjustments to the criteria, and correct any calculation errors and show what impact, if any, these errors had on the sizing of the facility. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe how DOD officials considered potential changes to DOD’s posture in Europe—and their possible effect on the beneficiary population—when developing facility requirements for the replacement medical center, we obtained available posture planning documentation, including population estimates, and compared it with the beneficiary population data used in planning assumptions for the replacement medical center. | Why GAO Did This Study
Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) is DODs only tertiary medical center in Europe that provides specialized care for servicemembers, retirees, and their dependents. Wounded servicemembers requiring critical care are medically evacuated from overseas operations to the 86th Medical Group clinic at Ramstein Air Base to receive stabilization care before being transported to LRMC for intensive care. According to DOD, both facilities were constructed in the 1950s and are undersized to meet current and projected workload requirements. DOD plans to consolidate both facilities into a single medical center at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion. In this report, GAO (1) describes how DOD considered changes in posture and the beneficiary population when developing facility requirements, (2) assesses DODs process for determining facility requirements, and (3) reviews DODs process to develop the facilitys cost estimate. GAO examined posture planning documentation, beneficiary demographic data, plans for the replacement medical center, and relevant DOD guidance, as well as interviewed relevant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Department of Defense (DOD) officials considered current beneficiary population data, contingency operations, and most of the expected changes in troop strength when planning for the replacement medical center. However, recently announced posture changes in January 2012 have yet to be assessed for their impact on the facility. DOD estimates that the replacement medical center will provide health care for nearly 250,000 beneficiaries. A majority of those who are expected to receive health care from the center come from within a 55-mile radius of the facility. DOD officials told us that because the replacement medical center was designed for peacetime operationswith the capacity to expand to meet the needs of contingency operationsreductions in ongoing contingency operations in Afghanistan would not have an impact on facility requirements. At the time of this review, DOD officials said they were in the process of assessing proposed changes in posture to better understand their possible impact on the sizing of the replacement medical center.
DOD officials incorporated patient quality of care standards as well as environmentally friendly design elements in determining facility requirements for the replacement medical center. DOD also determined the size of the facility based on its projected patient workload. Internal control standards require the creation and maintenance of adequate documentation, which should be clear and readily available for examination to inform decision making. However, GAOs review of the documentation DOD provided in support of its facility requirements showed (1) inconsistencies in how DOD applied projected patient workload data and planning criteria to determine the appropriate size for individual medical departments, (2) some areas where the documentation did not clearly demonstrate how planners applied criteria to generate requirements, and (3) calculation errors throughout. Without clear documentation of key analysesincluding information on how adjustments to facility requirements were madeand without correct calculations, stakeholders and decision makers lack reasonable assurances that the replacement medical center will be appropriately sized to meet the needs of the expected beneficiary population in Europe.
DODs process for developing the approximately $1.2 billion cost estimate for the replacement medical center was substantially consistent with many cost estimating best practices, such as cross-checking major cost elements to confirm similar results. However, DOD minimally documented the data sources, calculations, and estimating methodologies it used in developing the cost estimate. Additionally, DOD anticipates that the new facility will become the hub of a larger medical-services-related campus, for which neither cost estimates nor time frames have yet been developed. Without a cost estimate for the facility that includes detailed documentation, DOD cannot fully demonstrate that the proposed replacement medical center will provide adequate health care capacity at the current estimated cost. Further, DOD and Congress may not have the information they need to make fully informed decisions about the facility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD provide clear and thorough documentation of how it determined the facilitys size and cost estimate, correct any calculation errors, and update its cost estimate to reflect these corrections and recent posture changes. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations and stated that it has conducted a reassessment of the project that will be released once approved by the Secretary of Defense. |
gao_GAO-01-944 | gao_GAO-01-944_0 | National data are not adequate to describe the nature and extent of these potential nurse workforce shortages, nor are data sufficiently sensitive or current to allow a comparison of the adequacy of the nurse workforce size across states, specialties, or provider types. Multiple Obstacles to Increasing Supply of Nurses
Current problems with the recruitment and retention of nurses are related to multiple factors. The nurse workforce is aging, and fewer new nurses are entering the profession to replace those who are retiring or leaving. Demand for Nurses Will Continue to Grow As the Supply Dwindles
A serious shortage of nurses is expected in the future as pressures are exerted on both demand and supply. Concluding Observations
Providers’ current difficulty recruiting and retaining nurses may worsen as the demand for nurses increases with the aging of the population. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's hospitals and nursing homes rely heavily on the services of nurses. Concerns have been raised about whether the current and projected supply of nurses will meet the nation's needs. This report reviews (1) whether evidence of a nursing shortage exists, (2) the reasons for current nurse recruitment and retention problems, and (3) what is known about the projected future supply of and demand for nurses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that national data are not adequate to describe the nature and extent of nurse workforce shortages, nor are data sufficiently sensitive or current to compare nurse workforce availability across states, specialties, or provider types. Multiple factors affect recruitment and retention problems, including the aging of the nurse workforce fewer younger people are entering the profession. A serious shortage of nurses is expected in the future as demographic pressures influence both demand and supply. |
gao_GAO-07-490T | gao_GAO-07-490T_0 | FAA is moving to a system safety approach to oversight and has established risk-based, data- driven safety programs to oversee the industry and a workforce that includes approximately 4,500 safety inspectors and engineers to implement those programs, about 15,420 air traffic controllers, and nearly 7,200 technicians responsible for maintaining FAA’s air traffic control equipment and facilities. Our recent work has identified data limitations and human resource challenges facing the agency that affect its ability to implement these programs and oversee aviation safety. While FAA has developed risk-based processes for monitoring and inspecting the aviation industry, in some cases, the implementation of those processes is hampered by the lack of reliable and complete data, which are important for identifying and mitigating safety risks. FAA Faces Workload Challenges for its Safety Inspectors
Changes to FAA’s oversight programs, such as the planned rapid expansion of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), from 16 air carriers in 2005 to approximately 115 air carriers by the end of 2007, will pose workload challenges for FAA’s safety inspector workforce of about 3,600. FAA estimated it will lose 10,291 controllers, or about 70 percent of the controller workforce, during fiscal years 2006 through 2015, primarily due to retirements. FAA Faces Challenges in Furthering and Institutionalizing Management Improvements While Moving Toward Implementing NextGen
FAA has made significant progress in implementing management processes that use leading practices of private sector businesses, but further work remains to fully address past problems. FAA has taken steps to improve its software acquisition and investment management processes and for the last 3 years has reported meeting its cost and schedule targets for the acquisition of major systems, including air traffic control systems. In addition, the agency has yet to implement its cost estimating methodology. Progress Continues to Be Made in Planning for NextGen, but Challenges to Successful Implementation Remain
Work to determine the capabilities and requirements that will be needed for NextGen and to produce a comprehensive vision for that system is nearing completion; however, given the staggering complexity of this ambitious effort to modernize and transform the air traffic control system over the next two decades, it will not be easy to move from planning to implementation. In November, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition to NextGen. Funding Issues May Affect Airports’ Investment and Other FAA Programs
As it modernizes the national airspace system to meet the nation’s future air transportation needs, FAA must not only transform the air traffic control system, but also work with airport operators to provide increased capacity at airports to safely handle the projected growth in the demand for air travel. Airports are an integral part of the nation’s transportation system and maintaining their safety and efficiency is an important FAA responsibility. The Administration has proposed cuts in AIP funding and is considering possible changes to the AIP allocation formula as well as increasing the cap on passenger facility charges for airport development projects. Any change in the level or allocation of these funds could have implications for funding airport capital projects. Without a continued flow of funds to the trust fund, FAA’s ability to carry out AIP and other programs during fiscal year 2008 may be in jeopardy. FAA’s Recent Estimate of Planned Capital Development Similar to Past Estimate
FAA estimates the total cost for planned airport projects that are eligible for AIP funding, including runways, taxiways, and noise mitigation and reduction efforts, will be about $42 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. FAA and the Congress Will Face a Challenge Funding FAA Programs in Fiscal Year 2008 if Reauthorization is Not Timely
With the excise taxes that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007, Congress will need to act if there is to be no lapse in revenue to the trust fund to fund FAA. Most of FAA’s funding comes from the trust fund—the fiscal year 2008 budget request for FAA proposes about 80 percent of the agency’s funding from the trust fund with the remainder from the general fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under strain. The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. FAA faces the daunting task of safely integrating a growing influx of passengers and aircraft into the system and simultaneously leading the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a complicated effort to modernize the system. FAA's broad responsibilities to maintain and modernize the nation's air transportation system must be met in an uncertain budgetary and long-term fiscal environment. GAO's concerns about financing the nation's transportation system, including aviation, led GAO to designate this issue as high-risk.
What GAO Found
To ensure continued safety within the national airspace system, FAA is using risk-based, data-driven safety programs to oversee the industry; however, the agency faces data and human resource challenges that affect its ability to fully implement these programs. GAO has previously recommended that FAA improve the accuracy and completeness of the safety data and analysis of that data needed to monitor safety trends, fully implement its safety programs, and assess their effectiveness to determine if they are focused on the greatest safety risk. FAA has made progress in this area but more remains to be done. FAA's ability to oversee the aviation industry will be further affected by its ability to hire, train, and deploy its primary workforce of safety inspectors, engineers, and air traffic controllers. The expansion of FAA's oversight program for air carriers will result in workload shifts for its inspectors that will make it important for FAA to improve its staffing process. In addition, the agency estimates that it will lose about 70 percent of the air traffic controller workforce over the next 10 years, primarily due to retirements. FAA has made significant progress in implementing management processes and systems that use leading practices of private sector businesses; however, further work remains to institutionalize these efforts. For example, new and improved acquisition processes and oversight have contributed to FAA meeting its acquisition cost and schedule goals for the last three years. Additional work remains, though--FAA received a qualified opinion on its most recent financial audit as a result of lack of support for the accuracy of about $4.7 billion for equipment. Moreover, GAO has previously recommended that FAA should undertake additional efforts to consolidate its facilities and outsource some of its services to further cut costs. Some key challenges for the transition to NextGen include completing the design and cost estimates for NextGen and proposing how that cost will be funded. FAA will also need to assess its capacity to handle the technical and contract management expertise that will be required to oversee the implementation of NextGen. FAA estimates that the total cost for planned airport development that is eligible for funding from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) will be about $42 billion for 2007 through 2011. FAA's budget request for fiscal year 2008 proposes significant cuts in AIP. These cuts, along with changes to the way AIP is allocated among airports and possible increases in the cap on passenger ticket charges for airport projects, could have implications for the amount of funding available for planned airport development, especially at small airports. Additionally, the taxes that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund are scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. Until Congress reauthorizes those taxes, FAA's ability to carry out programs related to airport development as well as some other programs throughout the agency may be in jeopardy, compounding the safety and management challenges facing FAA. |
gao_RCED-96-215 | gao_RCED-96-215_0 | According to FEMP, the benefits of performance contracting for the federal government generally include (1) reducing energy costs, (2) improving energy efficiency and helping agencies meet their energy savings requirements, (3) eliminating the costs of maintaining and repairing aging or obsolete energy-consuming equipment, (4) making contractors rather than the government responsible for operating and maintaining energy-saving equipment, and (5) creating an incentive for contractors to develop highly efficient improvements by linking their compensation to the savings achieved through their work. This contract, for about $2.3 million in energy conservation measures at the Statue of Liberty National Monument and Ellis Island, was awarded on July 25, 1995. The contractor is to reduce energy consumption at both Ellis and Liberty islands by installing energy-efficient interior and exterior lighting, highly efficient motors for the air handling and pumping systems, and an energy management control system. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contract
On February 13, 1996, the Bureau awarded a 20-year performance contract for about $700,000 for a solar hot water system at a federal prison in Phoenix, Arizona. Consequently, the Park Service’s evaluation board, after reviewing each of three offerors’ proposals, selected the firm whose technical proposal represented the best value to the government. Costs of the Park Service’s Contract
The Park Service was unable to provide exact data on the administrative costs associated with its performance contract. As agreed with congressional staff, we provided information on the number of performance contracts awarded by civilian agencies, from April 10, 1995, to April 10, 1996, under DOE’s final performance contracting procurement regulations; the characteristics of the firms on DOE’s list of the firms qualified for performance contracting; the firms that submitted project proposals but were not awarded contracts and the reasons why; and the responsibilities of the federal civilian agencies involved in performance contracting activities and the administrative costs they incurred through their involvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the implementation of energy savings performance contracting by two federal civilian agencies, focusing on the: (1) characteristics of the firms that the Department of Energy (DOE) deemed qualified for performance contracts; (2) firms that submitted project proposals but were not awarded contracts; and (3) civilian agencies' responsibilities and administrative costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the National Park Service and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded energy savings performance contracts in 1995 and 1996; (2) the Park Service awarded a contract for about $2.3 million to a firm whose technical expertise and contracting experience was determined to be the best value; (3) energy savings improvements at the Park Service's Ellis Island and Statue of Liberty included new lighting, more efficient motors for air handling and pumping systems, and an energy management control system; (4) BOP awarded a contract for about $700,000 for a solar hot water system to the only firm qualified by DOE to provide such a service; (5) the benefits of performance contracting included reducing energy costs, helping agencies meet their energy savings requirements, and creating an incentive for contractors by linking their compensation to the savings achieved through their work; and (6) the Park Service spent about $246,000 and BOP spent about $70,500 in administrative costs associated with the performance contracts. |
gao_GAO-05-73 | gao_GAO-05-73_0 | DOD’s Quality Assurance Oversight for Contracts Is Provided Primarily by DCMA
DCMA is DOD’s primary organization for performing quality assurance oversight for contracts and this oversight responsibility typically only covers prime contractors. During fiscal year 2003, DCMA was responsible for government source inspection for approximately 273,000 contracts. DCMA Provided Quality Assurance Oversight and Enforcement over Contractors
In our review of 15 contracts awarded to 11 contractors, DCMA provided quality assurance oversight and enforcement over these spare parts prime contractors. DCMA Adhered to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Contract Quality Requirements, and DCMA Guidance in Providing Quality Assurance Oversight over Prime Contractors
DCMA’s quality assurance oversight over the 11 spare parts prime contractors in our review was in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, contract quality requirements, and DCMA’s One Book guidance. Enforcement of Spare Parts Quality and Safety during the Production Process Was Achieved through Corrective Action Requests
During the production process, when a prime contractor’s processes or spare parts did not meet contract requirements, DCMA used an enforcement system that involved issuing requests for corrective action by the prime contractor. Based on industry standards, prime contractors performed at least two or up to four methods to provide quality assurance oversight over their subcontractors, as shown in table 2. The primary methods of oversight used were evaluating subcontractors for placement on an Approved Supplier List and requiring certifications of parts and processes. The purpose of establishing an Approved Supplier List is to identify qualified subcontractors capable of producing needed parts or processes in accordance with industry standards and contractual specifications. DCMA Held Prime Contractors Accountable by Requiring Adherence to Contract Clauses
In our review of the 15 contracts, DCMA held prime contractors accountable for overseeing their subcontractors’ work by requiring that prime contractors adhered to contract clauses concerning oversight responsibility. When instances of nonconformance were reported through product quality deficiency reports, the DCMA quality assurance personnel and the prime contractor determined if the deficiency was due to contractor nonconformance and assigned responsibility for corrective action. The processes included conducting physical inspections of parts produced by contractors, reviewing prime contractor’s processes, evaluating potential subcontractors for placement on an Approved Supplier List, requiring certifications of parts and processes, testing parts and processes, and tracking and monitoring subcontractor’s performance. For example, while we did not identify any major deficiencies from the contracts and practices we reviewed, service officials provided examples of nonconforming parts related to contracts not included in our review that reached end users for various reasons. Furthermore, given the vast number of contracts and contractors involved in providing spare parts to the government, we recognize that the risk of nonconforming spare parts reaching end users exists. Compliance by contractors, DCMA, and other DOD agencies with established internal controls helps mitigate against this risk. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD provided one technical comment, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency; the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency; and other interested parties. To assess whether prime contractors provided quality assurance oversight over their subcontractors’ work related to producing spare parts and followed industry standards and contract requirements, we identified prime contractor quality assurance oversight actions performed over subcontractors. To assess how DCMA held prime contractors accountable for the work of their subcontractors, we reviewed the 15 contracts to determine if the contracts included clauses holding the prime contractor responsible for the spare parts provided to the government and whether instances of nonconformance had occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 2004 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress mandated that GAO examine and report on the oversight of prime contractors by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the oversight of subcontractors by the prime contractors. Contract quality assurance oversight is intended to assess whether contractors are capable of and are providing supplies or services that meet contract quality and technical requirements. Providing effective oversight is challenging. DCMA recognizes that the risk of nonconforming parts reaching end users exists, given the diversity of contracts, parts, and products used to meet weapon systems requirements and uses a risk management process to guide its efforts. For fiscal year 2003, government quality assurance oversight was required for approximately 273,000 contracts. GAO determined (1) whether DOD provided quality assurance oversight and enforcement over its spare parts prime contractors, (2) if prime contractors provided quality assurance oversight over their subcontractors, and (3) how DOD held prime contractors accountable for overseeing the subcontractors' work. To address these objectives, GAO judgmentally selected and reviewed 15 contracts awarded to 11 prime contractors by the services and the Defense Logistics Agency. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD provided one technical comment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of the 15 contracts showed that quality assurance personnel within the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)--DOD's primary organization for providing quality assurance oversight--generally followed established policies, guidance, regulations, and contract requirements in performing oversight and enforcement over spare parts prime contractors. This oversight ranged from conducting physical inspection of parts, such as testing the measurements and functions of a part to evaluating contractor production processes to observing the outer appearance and counting the number of parts for compliance with contract requirements. When one of the prime contractor's processes and another contractor's parts did not meet contract requirements, DCMA used its enforcement system by issuing requests for corrective action by the prime contractors. GAO found that the 11 prime contractors reviewed provided quality assurance oversight over their subcontractors' work in accordance with industry standards and contract requirements. The contractors used at least two and up to four methods in providing quality assurance oversight over their subcontractors. These methods included evaluating potential subcontractors for placement on an Approved Supplier List, requiring certifications of parts and processes, testing parts and processes, and tracking and monitoring subcontractor's performance. The primary methods of oversight were evaluating subcontractors for placement on an Approved Supplier List and requiring certifications that parts and processes conform to contractual specifications. Establishing an Approved Supplier List served to identify subcontractors capable of producing needed parts or processes in accordance with industry standards and contractual specifications. In GAO's review of the 15 contracts, DCMA held prime contractors accountable for their subcontractors' work by requiring that the prime contractors adhere to contract clauses concerning oversight responsibility. Most of the contracts included either clauses stating that the prime contractor shall provide supplies that conform to contract requirements or clauses related to other quality requirements. When nonconformance was reported, DCMA quality assurance personnel and the prime contractor determined if the deficiency was due to contractor nonconformance and assigned responsibility for corrective action. GAO identified one deficiency from the 15 contracts that the prime contractor was responsible for and DCMA held the prime contractor accountable for the part. While GAO did not identify any major deficiencies from the contracts and practices it reviewed, GAO recognizes that the risk of nonconforming spare parts reaching end users exists. Compliance by contractors, DCMA, and other DOD agencies with established internal controls helps mitigate against this risk. |
gao_GAO-11-460 | gao_GAO-11-460_0 | Diplomatic Security’s Training Development Process Generally Adheres to Standards, but Evaluation Component Has Weaknesses
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation standards, along with other statutory and State standards. In 2005, Diplomatic Security incorporated the FLETA standards into its standard operating procedures, using a course design framework tailored for the organization. To meet the combination of FLETA and other standards, DSTC integrates both formal and informal feedback from evaluations and other sources into its courses. DSTC’s Systems Do Not Have the Capability to Obtain Comprehensive Feedback on All Training
Because of difficulties obtaining satisfactory response rates for some evaluations, identifying users of its distributed learning efforts, and contacting non-State students, DSTC officials acknowledged that their systems do not have the capability to obtain a comprehensive evaluation of all of their training as required by their training framework. Diplomatic Security Generally Ensures That Personnel Follow Established Career Training Paths, but DSTC’s Systems Do Not Have the Capability to Track All Its Training
Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel that identify the training required for each major job position at different career levels. DSTC Uses Various Systems to Track Participation in Its Training
DSTC uses various systems to track participation in its training. DSTC Faces Significant Challenges to Carrying Out Its Expanded Mission
DSTC faces several challenges that affect its operations. In particular, DSTC is faced with training Diplomatic Security personnel to meet their new roles and responsibilities in Iraq as the U.S. military transfers to State many of its protective and security functions for the U.S. diplomatic presence. Moreover, several of the facilities do not meet DSTC’s training needs and/or are in need of refurbishment. To meet some of its current needs, in 2007 DSTC developed an Interim Training Facility, and in 2009 State allocated funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and other acts to begin the process of building a consolidated training facility. State is in the process of identifying a suitable location for the facility. Without this feedback, DSTC will be less able to ensure the effectiveness of and improve the training it provides. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State 1. develop or improve the process to obtain participant evaluations for all of DSTC required training, including distributed learning efforts; 2. develop or improve the process to track individual DSTC training requirements and completion of DSTC training; and 3. develop an action plan and associated time frames needed to carry out the QDDR recommendation to increase the number of posts at which FACT is required. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of State. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We (1) evaluated how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) examined Diplomatic Security’s training strategies for its personnel and other U.S. government personnel and how Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and (3) assessed the challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in meeting its training mission. We also reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related to Diplomatic Security-provided training efforts, such as standard operating procedure, planning, performance, course development, course evaluation, accreditation, and career development documents; information and data on recent Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC)- and other Diplomatic Security-provided course offerings; and overall funding for training from 2006 to 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) protects people, information, and property at over 400 locations worldwide and has experienced a large growth in its budget and personnel over the last decade. Diplomatic Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC). GAO was asked to examine (1) how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) the extent to which Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and (3) any challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out its training mission. GAO examined compliance with accreditation processes; analyzed data and documentation related to the agency's training efforts; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and five overseas posts.
What GAO Found
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards, along with other standards. Diplomatic Security incorporated FLETA standards into its standard operating procedures, using a course design framework tailored for DSTC. To meet standards, DSTC also integrates both formal and informal feedback from evaluations and other sources to improve its courses. However, GAO found DSTC's systems do not have the capability to obtain feedback for some required training, including distributed learning efforts (interactive online course content). Without feedback, DSTC is less able to ensure the effectiveness of these efforts. Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel that identify the training required for selected job positions at different career levels. It uses various systems to track participation in its training, but DSTC's systems do not have the capability to track whether personnel have completed all required training. DSTC systems also are not designed to track training delivered through distributed learning. Diplomatic Security faces significant challenges to carrying out its training mission. DSTC must train Diplomatic Security personnel to perform new missions in Iraq as they take on many of the protective and security functions previously provided by the U.S. military. DSTC also faces dramatic increases in high-threat training provided to State and non-State personnel, but State does not have an action plan and time frames to manage proposed increases. These expanded training missions constrain DSTC's ability to meet training needs. In addition, many of DSTC's training facilities do not meet its training needs, a situation that hampers efficient and effective operations. To meet some of its needs, in 2007, DSTC developed an Interim Training Facility. In 2009, State allocated funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and other acts to develop a consolidated training facility; State is in the process of identifying a suitable location.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State enhance DSTC's course evaluation and tracking capabilities. GAO also recommends that State develop an action plan and time frames to address proposed increases in high-threat training. State reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-658T | gao_GAO-14-658T_0 | 1). Today, those monies come from Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants. General aviation flights also contribute to the trust fund through a tax on noncommercial jet fuel. Airports in the national airport system may receive AIP entitlement grants based on the number of passengers and amount of cargo carried and may also compete for AIP discretionary grants. AIP grants can only be used for eligible projects, generally those that enhance capacity, safety, or environmental concerns, such as runway construction and rehabilitation, airfield lighting, and airplane noise mitigation. In addition, according to the most recent FAA forecast, air traffic demand is projected to increase 2.7 percent per year from 2014 through 2034. Similarly, airport-generated revenues are also tied to aviation activity and the number of passengers who use airport-related services. Aviation Activity at Airports Has Slowed or Declined Since 2007
Since 2007, economic pressures—including record-high fuel prices and the recession of 2007 through 2009—helped spark a wave of consolidation across the airline industry. FAA attributed the decline to several factors, including airport sponsors choosing to defer projects due to reductions in aviation activity, having identified other funding sources for projects, and projects’ having been completed. ACI-NA also estimated airports’ costs of planned development for the fiscal years 2013–2017 period for projects eligible for federal funding as well as those not eligible. The total estimated costs of planned development for fiscal years 2013–2017 are $68.2 billion (2012 dollars) or approximately $13.6 billion per year on average. First, while FAA’s estimates cover projects for every airport in the national system, ACI-NA surveyed its member airports in the U.S. (117 of which responded, consisting mostly of large, medium, and small hub airports) and then extrapolates a total based on cost-per-boarding calculations for large, medium, and small hub airports that did not respond. ACI-NA’s estimates for these categories of airports are drawn directly from FAA’s estimate. Federal Support for Airport Development Declined, While Alternative Revenue Sources at Airports Have Grown
Federal Support for Airport Development Has Declined
Regarding AIP grants, annual appropriations decreased from about $3.5 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 to about $3.4 billion for fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Therefore, the extent to which the gap between airport funding and planned airport development costs has changed since we last reported on this in 2007 is unknown. As discussed above, for the 2013 through 2017 period, the total estimated annual costs for airports’ planned development projects is about $13.1 billion, $8.5 billion of which is eligible for AIP grants and PFCs. FAA also allows airports with excess available land to use the land for certain types of commercial Airport operators must development, pending approval by the FAA.obtain FAA’s concurrence prior to leasing airport land or facilities to private developers to help ensure, among other things, that the developer’s plans will be compatible with airport operations and that the airport receives fair market value for the use of its property. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. airports are important contributors to the U.S. economy, providing mobility for people and goods both domestically and internationally and often contributing to the economic success of the communities served. Since 2007 when GAO last reported on airport funding and its sufficiency to meet planned development of airport infrastructure, there have been significant changes in the aviation industry. During this time, federal support for airport development has declined. As deliberations begin in advance of FAA's reauthorization in 2015, Congress will consider the most appropriate type, level, and distribution of federal support for development of the national airport system.
This testimony discusses trends in (1) aviation activity at airports since 2007, (2) costs of airports' planned development, and (3) federal funding and airport revenues that may be available to finance development costs. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports on aviation from June 2007 through June 2014, updated through June 2014 with interviews with key FAA and trade association officials and FAA airport funding data from 2005-2013. GAO shared the information it used to prepare this statement with FAA and incorporated its comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, economic pressures—including high fuel prices, the financial crisis, and the ensuing recession of 2007–2009—contributed to airline restructuring which has resulted in reductions in the number of commercial flights at airports, especially at medium- and smaller-sized airports. General aviation activity, which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military, has also declined over the last decade. Because many sources of airport funding, including federal support and locally generated revenue, are tied to aviation activity, for many airports these trends mean less funding available for infrastructure development.
According to Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) estimates, airports' total costs of planned infrastructure development eligible for federal support from FAA's Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants are about $42.5 billion for the 2013 through 2017 period, or about $8.5 billion per year on average which was down 18 percent from $52.2 billion for the 2011 through 2015 period. FAA attributed the decline to airports' choosing to defer projects due to reductions in aviation activity or having identified other funding sources, among other factors. Airports in the national airport system receive AIP entitlement grants for eligible projects, generally those that enhance capacity, safety, or environmental conditions. The U.S. airport association, Airports Council International—North America, estimated costs of other planned development not eligible for federal support, such as parking structures, totaled $4.6 billion per year for the 2013 through 2017 period. Therefore, the total costs of planned development for the most current period are estimated to be approximately $13.1 billion per year. |
gao_GGD-96-8 | gao_GGD-96-8_0 | These pricing mechanisms could help minimize mail volume losses due to competitive forces and help keep rates lower for most mail classes over the long run. The Postal Service and the Commission also disagreed on the resulting rate increases among the competitive mail categories. Resolving this situation may require that Congress clarify the ratemaking criteria set forth in the 1970 Act. The Current Postal Ratemaking Process
Postal ratemaking is a complex process that usually takes 10 months—the statutory deadline established by Congress in 1976. This period does not include the time the Postal Service spends preparing a rate case, nor the time it takes for an appeal when the Board of Governors and the Commission do not agree. These recommendations include accelerated review procedures for marketing new products and services and multi-year cost recovery for new service introductions. In addition, the Postal Service has filed a proposal with the Commission to establish a market-based classification schedule that, among other things, restructures First-Class and bulk regular third-class mail. The proposals that we and others have offered—to improve the effectiveness of the postal ratemaking process, ensure financial accountability, and give the Postal Service more flexibility to price and compete in the marketplace—provide the Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, and the Subcommittee with a variety of ideas to consider in reforming the ratemaking process. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the U.S. Postal Service's proposals for modifying the postal ratemaking process, focusing on: (1) how the current ratemaking process could be improved; and (2) the effects of the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act on postal rates.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Postal Service has petitioned the Postal Rate Commission to give it more flexibility in pricing postal products and establish a market-based mail classification schedule; (2) new Postal Service pricing mechanisms could minimize mail volume losses and keep rates lower for most mail classes; (3) Congress may have to clarify the 1970 ratemaking criteria because the Postal Service and Commission disagree on the extent that market forces impact postal rates; (4) postal ratemaking usually takes 10 months to complete and it does not include the time the Postal Service spends preparing rate cases and appeals; (5) proposed postal ratemaking reforms include developing accelerated procedures for market testing new products, establishing rate bands for competitive products, and allowing volume-based rates for high volume shippers; and (6) the Postal Service needs to be able to control labor costs and resolve workforce issues to remain competitive in the postal marketplace. |
gao_GAO-11-319 | gao_GAO-11-319_0 | As also directed by OPA, the interagency committee was to develop a research plan that: identified member agencies’ roles and responsibilities; assessed the current status of knowledge on oil pollution prevention, response and mitigation technologies, and effects of oil pollution on the environment; identified significant oil pollution research gaps, including an assessment of major technological deficiencies in responses to past oil discharges; established research priorities and goals for oil pollution technology development related to prevention, response, mitigation, and environmental effects; estimated the resources needed for federal agencies to conduct the oil pollution research and development program and timetables for completing research tasks; and identified, in consultation with the states, regional oil pollution research needs and priorities for a coordinated, multidisciplinary program of research at the regional level. The interagency committee prepared the original research plan and, in 1992, submitted it to Congress and the National Research Council—created under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and through which the academy provides most of its advice—for their review and comment. Federal Agencies Have Conducted Oil Pollution Research, but with a Limited Coordination Role by the Interagency Committee
According to our analysis of interagency committee reports, federal agencies have conducted at least 144 research projects on oil pollution prevention and response since 2003, but the interagency committee had a limited role in facilitating the coordination of agency efforts. The interagency committee established a joint research plan in 1997 that identified oil pollution risks and research priorities, but it has not updated that plan in light of changes in the oil production and transportation sector. According to the interagency committee’s documentation, the committee conducted a 2-year voluntary interagency effort to address the National Research Council’s recommendations. For example, after reviewing the interagency committee’s first draft research plan, the National Research Council noted the interagency committee should, as part of its activities, comprehensively review and evaluate past and present oil pollution research to help guide federal research efforts and avoid duplication. The interagency committee followed this recommendation, in part, by capturing the results of some member agencies’ oil pollution research in its biennial reports to Congress, but it did not assess whether completed research contributed to advancing the 1997 research priorities; rather, the reports provided only summaries of research projects. Without such an assessment, Congress may be less able to provide oversight on the contributions of federal research to prevent and respond to oil spills. Specifically, according to Coast Guard documents, in September 2010, the interagency committee chair began to inventory research projects and categorize them according to the 1997 plan’s research priorities. In addition, while OPA did not require the interagency committee to revise its research and technology plan, the National Research Council noted in its review that a comprehensive research plan should be continually reassessed. However, the interagency committee has not revised its 1997 research plan. Interagency Committee Has Taken Limited Actions to Foster Communication and Coordination among Member Agencies and Nonfederal Stakeholders
As directed by OPA, the interagency committee was to coordinate a comprehensive program of oil pollution research among the member agencies, in cooperation and coordination with industry, universities, research institutions, state governments, and other nations, as appropriate. According to some member agency officials, however, the interagency committee had taken limited action to foster communication among member agencies between 1997 and 2009, when the interagency committee chair proposed updating the 1997 plan. Although the interagency committee’s meetings have occurred once or twice annually for the past 2 years, they occurred irregularly before then, according to some agency officials. Additionally, member agencies were not consistently represented in the interagency committee. In October 2010, to better communicate with interagency committee member agencies, among others, the Coast Guard launched the interagency committee’s Web site, which includes transcripts from past public meetings and biennial reports to Congress. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendations and provided a formal response, which we reprinted in appendix II. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act in 1990 (OPA). Among other things, OPA established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (interagency committee) to coordinate an oil pollution research program among federal agencies, including developing a plan, having the National Academy of Sciences review that plan, and reporting to Congress on the interagency committee's efforts biennially. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and fire led to the largest oil spill in U.S. history, raising new concerns about the effects of oil spills. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the interagency committee has facilitated the coordination of federal agencies' oil pollution research. (The Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, House Committee on Science and Technology, now retired; and Representative Woolsey initiated this request.) In part, GAO analyzed committee documents and biennial reports and interviewed agency officials and nonfederal research entities.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have conducted at least 144 research projects on oil pollution since 2003, but the interagency committee has played a limited role in coordinating this research, according to GAO's analysis of interagency committee reports and documents. For example, agencies conducted research on identifying the toxicity of nonpetroleum oils recovering oil from the sea floor. The interagency committee issued a research plan mandated by OPA in 1997 that set research priorities. This plan, however, did not fully address the recommendations on a draft plan made by the National Research Council, the organization through which the National Academy of Sciences provides most of its advice. For example, the National Research Council noted that the interagency committee should review and evaluate past and present oil pollution research to help guide federal efforts and to avoid duplication. The interagency committee has captured some member agencies' oil pollution research in its biennial reports to Congress, but it has not evaluated whether past research has advanced the 1997 research priorities; instead, the reports summarized projects. Without such an assessment, Congress may be less able to oversee the contributions of federal research to preventing and responding to oil spills. In addition, although OPA did not require that the interagency committee revise its 1997 plan, the National Research Council noted the need to continually reassess a comprehensive research plan. However, the interagency committee has not done so; consequently, the plan does not reflect changes in the oil production and transportation sectors since 1997, such as a significant increase in deepwater drilling. In September 2010, the interagency committee chair began to inventory completed research and categorize research projects according to the 1997 plan's research priorities, and the chair told GAO that the interagency committee will begin to update the 1997 plan in 2011. OPA also directed the interagency committee to coordinate a comprehensive research program of oil pollution research among the member agencies, in cooperation with external stakeholders, such as industry, research institutions, state governments, and universities. An interagency member official told GAO that the committee helped foster interagency cooperation between two agencies comparing two types of testing to determine the effectiveness of certain chemicals in dispersing oil in sea water; However, more generally, the interagency committee took limited action to foster communication among member agencies between 1997 and 2009, when the chair proposed updating the 1997 plan, according to some member agency officials. Although the interagency committee's meetings have occurred once or twice annually for the past 2 years, they occurred irregularly before then. Additionally, member agencies were not consistently represented in the interagency committee. In October 2010, to better communicate with interagency committee member agencies, among others, the interagency committee launched a Web site, which provides transcripts from its past public meetings and biennial reports to Congress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the interagency committee coordinate efforts to evaluate the contributions of completed research and provide, in its 2012 biennial report to Congress, an update of its efforts to revise its research plan. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendations. |
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