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gao_GAO-04-1070 | gao_GAO-04-1070_0 | Decline in Interest Rate Paid by Borrowers Is Primary Reason for Increase in Special Allowance Payments
The primary factor influencing the increase in special allowance payments has been the sharp decline in interest rates paid by borrowers relative to the minimum 9.5 percent government guaranteed yield for lenders. First, after paying costs associated with a pre-October 1, 1993 tax- exempt bond (such as payments of interest and principal to bond investors), lenders can reinvest, or recycle, any remaining money earned from 9.5 percent loans to make or purchase additional loans that, under the law, are also guaranteed a minimum 9.5 percent lender yield. Second, lenders can issue a new bond, called a refunding bond, to repay the principal, interest, and other costs of an outstanding pre- October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bond. Using this method, lenders can maintain their 9.5 percent loan volume. Third, under Education regulations, a lender can significantly increase its 9.5 percent loan volume by issuing a taxable bond and using the proceeds to purchase 9.5 percent loans financed by a pre-October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bond. The lender then uses the cash available from the pre-October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bond to make or buy additional loans, which are guaranteed the minimum 9.5 percent yield. The Administration and some members of Congress have, in fact, already put forth proposals to make such changes. Representatives from a major credit rating agency as well as some lenders who hold 9.5 percent loans told us that eliminating the minimum 9.5 percent yield for loans made or purchased in the future should not affect lenders’ ability to meet their obligations under, and make required payments on, their outstanding tax-exempt bonds, nor should it have long- term negative effects in the student loan bond market. Given that current market interest rates are at or near historic lows, lenders have a significant financial incentive to slow the decrease in, maintain, or increase the volume of loans that yield such a relatively high rate of return unavailable on other FFELP loans. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In light of the rapid increase in special allowance payments for loans guaranteed a minimum 9.5 percent yield and the continuing financial incentive for lenders to originate or purchase additional loans that qualify for a guaranteed yield of 9.5 percent, Congress should consider amending the HEA to address the issues identified by this report, but particularly to change the yield for loans made or purchased in the future with the proceeds of pre-October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bonds, and any associated refunding bonds, to more closely reflect these loans’ financing costs and current market interest rates. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given that lenders are increasing the volume of 9.5 percent loans based on Education regulations that allow lenders to transfer 9.5 percent loans to taxable bonds and tax-exempt bonds issued after October 1, 1993 while retaining the special allowance payment provisions applicable to loans financed with pre-October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bonds, and the resulting increased costs for taxpayers, we recommend that the Secretary of Education promulgate regulations to discontinue the payment of the special allowance applicable to loans financed with pre-October 1, 1993 tax-exempt bonds that are subsequently transferred to taxable bonds or tax-exempt bonds issued on or after October 1, 1993. To encourage lenders to make FFELP loans, the federal government guarantees repayment and provides lenders a guaranteed rate of return. When the borrower rate is less than the lender yield, the government makes subsidy payments, called special allowance payments (SAP), to lenders. Because of these changes, loans that are financed with tax-exempt bonds issued prior to 10/1/93 are guaranteed a minimum 9.5 percent yield, hereafter called 9.5 percent loans. Refunding a pre-10/1/93 tax-exempt bond extends the life of a bond, and loans continue to be guaranteed the minimum 9.5 percent yield Lenders may refund a pre-10/1/93 tax-exempt bond, and the
refunding bond may have a later maturity date than the original bond. | Why GAO Did This Study
To encourage lenders to make student loans under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), the federal government guarantees lenders a statutorily specified rate of return--called lender yield. Some lenders may issue tax-exempt bonds to raise capital to make or purchase loans; loans financed with such bonds issued prior to 10/1/93 are guaranteed a minimum lender yield of 9.5% (hereafter called 9.5% loans). When the interest rate paid by borrowers is less than the lender yield, the government pays lenders the difference--a subsidy called special allowance payments. In light of the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, we examined special allowance payments for 9.5% loans.
What GAO Found
Special allowance payments for 9.5% loans have risen dramatically in recent years, increasing from $209 million in FY 2001 to well over $600 million as of June 30, 2004. A primary reason for the increase is the sharp decline in the variable interest rates paid by borrowers relative to the minimum 9.5% lender yield. Another reason for the increase in special allowance payments is the rising dollar volume of 9.5% loans, which increased from about $11 to over $17 billion from FY 1995 to June 30, 2004. Given that current market interest rates are at or near historic lows, lenders have a financial incentive to maintain or increase their 9.5% loan volume and can do so in three ways. After paying costs, including payments to bond investors, associated with a pre 10/1/93 tax-exempt bond, lenders can use any remaining money to reinvest in more FFELP loans that, by law, are also guaranteed a minimum 9.5% yield. Lenders can issue a new bond, called a refunding bond, to repay an outstanding pre 10/1/93 tax-exempt bond that financed 9.5% loans. Consequently, the refunding bond finances the 9.5% loans and may have a later maturity date than the original bond, allowing lenders to maintain their 9.5% loan volume for a longer time. By issuing a taxable bond and using the funds obtained to purchase 9.5% loans financed by a pre-10/1/93 tax-exempt bond, lenders can significantly increase their loan volume. Lenders can use the proceeds from the sale of loans previously financed by the pre-10/1/93 tax-exempt bond to make or buy additional loans, which are also guaranteed a 9.5% yield. Under Education's regulations, loans previously financed by a pre 10/1/93 tax-exempt bond and subsequently financed by (i.e., transferred to) a taxable bond continue to be guaranteed a 9.5% yield. Some Members of Congress and the Administration have proposed making statutory changes with respect to 9.5% loans, which could save billions of dollars in future special allowance payments. An official representing a leading credit rating agency and some major lenders told us that making changes to the minimum 9.5% yield for loans made or purchased in the future should not affect lenders' ability to make required payments on outstanding tax-exempt bonds. |
gao_GAO-11-223 | gao_GAO-11-223_0 | I&A also has initiatives to identify state and local information needs to ensure that its products provide information of importance to these partners but it has not worked with states to establish milestones for identifying these needs, which could better hold I&A accountable for assisting states in completing this process in a timely manner. Further, I&A has developed a new customer survey intended to gather more detailed feedback on its products, but it could enhance the transparency and accountability of its efforts and provide assurance that partners’ views are informing its products by periodically reporting to its state and local partners on the steps it has taken to assess and respond to this feedback. I&A Is Taking Steps to Identify State Information Needs, but Establishing Milestones for Completing Efforts Could Better Hold I&A Accountable to Assist States and Support Future Product Development
As of August 2010, I&A had worked with 9 of 50 states to collect and validate their definition of the kinds of information they need for their homeland security efforts. As I&A moves forward with its efforts to collect and analyze feedback from state and local partners, developing plans for reporting the results of its feedback analysis—including time frames and level of detail—to these partners and the actions it has taken in response could help I&A demonstrate that the feedback is important and makes a difference. In turn, this could encourage state and local partners to provide more feedback and ultimately make I&A’s products and services more useful. I&A Has Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers and Provided Other Services to State and Local Partners That Generally Have Been Well Received
In addition to intelligence products, I&A provides a number of other services to its state and local partners to enhance information sharing, analytic capabilities, and operational support that generally have been well-received, based on our discussions with officials at 10 fusion centers and published third-party reports on I&A operations. I&A also facilitates access to information-sharing networks, provides training directly to fusion center personnel, and operates a 24- hour service to respond to state and local requests for information and other support. Defining How I&A Intends to Meet Its State and Local Information-Sharing Mission and Establishing Accountability for Results Could Better Position I&A for the Future
Part of I&A’s mission is to share information with state and local partners, but I&A has not defined how it intends to meet this mission or established a framework to hold itself and its divisions accountable for meeting it. Historically, I&A’s state and local programs and activities have been in response to a variety of factors, including its focus on addressing statutory requirements and efforts to leverage and support fusion centers that state and local agencies had established. Defining and Documenting Programs and Activities That Collectively Support I&A’s State and Local Mission Could Help Provide Transparency and Accountability for Results
I&A has begun its strategic planning efforts, but has not yet defined how it plans to meet its state and local information-sharing mission by identifying and documenting the specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this mission. Periodically informing state and local partners of how I&A analyzed the feedback they provided and what actions I&A took in response to this feedback and analyses could help strengthen I&A’s working relationships with these partners and encourage them to continue to provide I&A feedback, which could ultimately make I&A’s products and services more useful. Specifically, DHS agreed with our first recommendation related to the need for I&A to work with states to establish milestones for the timely completion of efforts to identify state information needs and identify and work to resolve any barriers to this timely completion. Finally, DHS agreed with our fourth recommendation that I&A establish plans and time frames for developing performance measures that gauge the results that I&A’s information-sharing efforts have achieved and how they have enhanced homeland security. Appendix III: Additional Initiatives That Support Information Sharing with State and Local Partners
Technical Assistance to Fusion Centers (Workshops, Conferences, Privacy Policy Development)
In support of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’s (I&A) objective to strengthen the national network of fusion centers, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Preparedness Directorate and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance—in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and representatives from the state and local community—partnered in 2007 to develop the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is crucial for preventing acts of terrorism on U.S. soil. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), has lead federal responsibility for such information sharing. GAO was asked to assess (1) actions I&A has taken to enhance the usefulness of intelligence products it provides to state and local partners, (2) other services I&A provides to these partners, and (3) to what extent I&A has defined how it intends to share information with these partners. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant statutes, strategies, best practices, and agency documents; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 10 fusion centerswhere states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharingbased on geographic location and other factors; and interviewed I&A officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2010. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
To enhance the usefulness of intelligence products it provides to state and local partners, I&A has initiatives underway to identify these partners' information needs and obtain feedback on the products, but strengthening these efforts could support the development of future products. As of August 2010, I&A had finalized information needs--which are owned and controlled by the states--for 9 of the 50 states. I&A was working with remaining states to identify their needs, but it had not established mutually agreed upon milestones for completing this effort, in accordance with program management principles. Working with states to establish such milestones and addressing any barriers to identifying their needs could better assist states in the timely completion of this process. In addition, I&A has begun issuing a new customer feedback survey to recipients of its products and plans to begin analyzing this feedback to determine the value of the products, but it has not developed plans to report the results of its analyses to state and local partners. Reporting the results to these partners and actions it has taken in response could help I&A demonstrate that the feedback is important and makes a difference, which could encourage state and local partners to provide more feedback and ultimately make I&As products and services more useful.
In addition to intelligence products, I&A provides a number of other services to its state and local partners--primarily through fusion centers--that have generally been well received by the center officials GAO contacted. For example, I&A has deployed more than 60 intelligence officers to fusion centers nationwide to assist state and local partners in areas such as obtaining relevant intelligence products and leveraging DHS capabilities to support their homeland security missions. I&A also facilitates access to information-sharing networks disseminating classified and unclassified information, provides training directly to center personnel, and operates a 24-hour service to respond to state and local requests for information and other support.
Historically, I&A has focused its state and local efforts on addressing statutory requirements and responding to I&A leadership priorities, but it has not yet defined how it plans to meet its state and local information-sharing mission by identifying and documenting the specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this mission. Best practices show that clearly identifying priorities among programs and activities is important for implementing programs and managing results. Further, I&A's current performance measures do not allow I&A to demonstrate the expected outcomes and effectiveness of programs and activities that support state and local partners, as called for in program management principles. I&A officials said they are planning to develop such measures, but had not established time frames for doing so. Defining and documenting how I&A plans to meet its state and local information-sharing mission and establishing time frames for developing additional performance measures could better position I&A to make resource decisions and provide transparency and accountability over its efforts. GAO recommends that I&A establish milestones for identifying the information needs of state and local partners, report to these partners on how I&A used feedback they provided to enhance intelligence products, identify and document priority programs and activities related to its state and local mission, and establish time frames for developing additional related performance measures. DHS agreed with these recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that I&A establish milestones for identifying the information needs of state and local partners, report to these partners on how I&A used feedback they provided to enhance intelligence products, identify and document priority programs and activities related to its state and local mission, and establish time frames for developing additional related performance measures. DHS agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-908T | gao_GAO-08-908T_0 | FAA Is Making Progress in Hiring Air Traffic Controllers, but New Hires May Have Less Experience Than in Prior Years
During the coming decade, FAA will be challenged to continue hiring thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those who will retire and leave for other reasons. To replace these controllers, FAA started making significant increases in controller hiring in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, when it hired 1,116 and 1,815 controllers, respectively. (By comparison, during fiscal years 2002 through 2005, FAA hired an average of 467 controllers each year.) FAA anticipates hiring 1,877 controllers in fiscal year 2008, which would bring the total number of air traffic controllers to 15,130. According to FAA data, the agency is on track to meet its hiring target for fiscal year 2008. Previously, FAA had generally limited its hiring to individuals with prior FAA or Department of Defense (DOD) air traffic control experience and graduates of FAA’s Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI) program. The agency began looking farther afield, FAA officials said, because fewer military controllers have been seeking civilian employment since DOD established incentives to retain its controllers. For example, in 2007, the Air Force began offering reenlistment bonuses of up to $60,000 for military air traffic controllers, and the Marine Corps offers reenlistment bonuses of up to $40,000. Hiring a Large Number of Controllers Presents a Staffing Challenge for FAA
As FAA brings new controllers on board, it faces the challenge of ensuring that its control facilities are adequately staffed to meet their unique traffic demands. In 2007, the agency established staffing ranges for each facility that considered facility-specific information, such as air traffic operations, productivity trends, expected retirements, and the number of controllers in training. However, the understaffing at some facilities has potential safety and efficiency implications. With such a high percentage of newly hired controllers, fewer experienced controllers will be available to provide on-the-job instruction to trainees and more time may be needed to train and certify newly hired controllers, according to FAA. Managing air traffic safely and effectively while training new controllers will require balancing the numbers of trainees and fully certified controllers at each facility. To the extent that retirement rates and the proportion of trainees at individual facilities leads to greater use of overtime, the potential for fatigue can increase, raising safety concerns. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has cited controller work schedules as contributing to fatigue and raising safety concerns. Since 1990, NTSB has placed efforts to address fatigue on its list of “most wanted” transportation safety improvements, citing safety concerns about the effects of fatigue on air traffic controllers and other persons performing critical functions in the aviation industry. According to FAA’s 2008 controller workforce plan, the agency has been making progress in reducing the amount of time controllers remain in trainee status, which includes time spent at the academy and in a developmental role. It will be important for FAA to monitor the attrition rate, track the reasons for attrition, and release poor performers as soon as possible to avoid unnecessary costs. In addition, because of concern that FAA has not sufficiently examined the costs and benefits of ATCOTS, a provision in FAA’s fiscal year 2008 appropriation legislation prohibits FAA from using any money in fiscal year 2008 for ATCOTS to displace, reassign, reduce the salary of, or take any other action that would result in a reduction in force for employees at FAA’s academy or a discontinuation of the academy as the primary training facility for controllers. Both New and Experienced Controllers Will Need Training for NextGen, and Further Human Factors Research Is Needed to Support the Transition
Further work is needed to develop training for both new hires and fully certified controllers to deal with the paradigm shift that will come with NextGen. Our past work has shown that when human factors are not adequately addressed, delays and cost overruns have occurred in implementing new air traffic control technology. In response to these issues, FAA told us that it is difficult to develop training for systems that are not yet fully defined. However, according to FAA, it is in the early stages of talking to the educational community. The changes in roles and responsibilities for air traffic controllers that will be central to NextGen technology raise significant human factors issues for the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each day, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) controls the take-offs, landings, and flights of over 50,000 aircraft. To accomplish this mission safely and efficiently, FAA must have a sufficient number of adequately trained air traffic controllers working at its air traffic control facilities. Over the next decade, FAA will need to hire and train nearly 17,000 controllers to replace over 15,000 current controllers, most of whom will be retiring. This massive hiring effort will occur as FAA begins to implement the next generation air transportation system (NextGen), which will integrate new technologies and procedures into air traffic operations and fundamentally change the role of air traffic controllers from controlling individual aircraft to managing air traffic flow. Hence, FAA will need to train experienced controllers to use the new technologies at the same time that it hires and trains new controllers to operate both the current and the new technologies. This testimony addresses FAA's progress and challenges in hiring, staffing, and training air traffic controllers in the current air traffic control system and in preparing them for NextGen. It is based on prior GAO work, updated with reviews of FAA documents and interviews with FAA officials, controller union representatives, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
To prepare for the projected departure of over 15,000 air traffic controllers between 2008 and 2017, FAA began significantly increasing the number of new hires in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, when it hired 1,116 and 1,815 controllers, respectively. By contrast, in fiscal years 2002 through 2005, it had hired an average of 467 controllers per year. Retirements are taking place sooner than FAA expected. As a result, FAA has had to adjust its hiring targets upward--from 1,420 in fiscal year 2008 to 1,877, for example. While FAA has met its hiring targets so far and is on track to meet its target for fiscal year 2008, it has had to expand its applicant pool, in large part because fewer military controllers have sought civilian employment since the Department of Defense began to offer reenlistment bonuses of up to $60,000. As FAA brings new controllers on board, it faces the challenge of ensuring that its control facilities are adequately staffed to meet their unique traffic demands. In 2007, FAA established staffing ranges for each facility based on facility-specific information, such as air traffic operations, productivity trends, expected retirements, and number of controller trainees. However, FAA's staffing is not aligned with the new ranges at about half of its facilities. While overstaffing will provide trained replacements as retirements occur, understaffing has potential safety and efficiency implications. As the proportion of new hires increases over time, FAA will face further challenges in balancing the numbers of trainees and fully certified controllers at each facility. Furthermore, with fewer fully certified controllers and greater on-the-job training demands, controllers may work more overtime hours. Overtime can lead to fatigue, and many controllers routinely work overtime, raising safety concerns. Both GAO and the National Transportation Safety Board have found that controllers' work schedules can contribute to fatigue and have made recommendations to mitigate it. FAA is taking steps to address these recommendations. In the training area, FAA faces the dual challenge of certifying its new hires to operate today's air traffic control system as quickly as possible and of preparing to train both experienced controllers and new hires to operate NextGen technologies. Through training improvements, scheduling efficiencies, and greater use of simulators, FAA has, it says, reduced the amount of time controllers remain in trainee status; however, attrition among controllers in developmental training is increasing. It will be important for FAA to monitor the attrition and ensure that performance problems are addressed as early as possible to avoid unnecessary costs. Preparations for NextGen training are still in the early stages--as FAA observes, it is difficult to develop training for systems that have not yet been defined. However, GAO's work has shown that further research is needed to determine what training will be required to support the transition to NextGen--a transition that will involve changes in the roles and responsibilities of air traffic controllers as well as changes in technologies. |
gao_GAO-14-635 | gao_GAO-14-635_0 | Ten bureaus and posts accounted for the majority of federal assistance obligations that State made in fiscal year 2012 (see table 1). State Has Established Policies and Guidance That Provide a Supportive Environment for Administering and Overseeing Grants State’s Policies Incorporate Federal Regulations
State has established a core set of policies and guidance incorporating federal regulations for administering and overseeing grants. In particular, grants officials have not adhered consistently to State’s policies about identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks associated with the grants we reviewed. Furthermore, grants officials do not always document the implementation of key internal controls activities as required. Of the 45 grants that underwent a risk identification process, 28 had risks identified. 2). The grants officials, however, did not reflect these risks in a risk mitigation or monitoring plan. Grants Officials Often Did Not Document Control Activities
Grants officials in the sample of grants we reviewed generally did not adhere to State policies and procedures relating to documenting control activities. 3). Grants Officials Cited Several Reasons for Nonadherence to Risk Analysis and Documentation Requirements, and State Does Not Have Processes for Ensuring Compliance
GOs and GORs we interviewed cited a variety of reasons for not conducting the required risk analysis and documentation, including a misunderstanding of State policies and guidance, a heavy workload, and a lack of staff expertise. However, we found that most of the grant files we reviewed did not contain evidence of an appropriate risk analysis or were missing other required internal control documentation, and State has not developed processes for ensuring that grants officials implement these requirements. As a result, State cannot be certain that its oversight of grants management is adequate or that it is using its limited oversight resources effectively. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that State’s grants officials fully implement grants management policies and internal controls that are in place, and that grant funds are used as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following two actions: Develop processes to help ensure that bureaus and missions conduct appropriate risk assessments, and grants officials complete required documentation for all grants. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following action: follow up systematically on recommendations from State’s internal reviews of its grants management. In addition, State concurred with our recommendation to follow up systematically on recommendations from State’s internal reviews of its grants management. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the policies and guidance that the Department of State (State) has established to administer and oversee grants and cooperative agreements, and (2) the extent to which the implementation of those policies and guidance provides reasonable assurance that funds are being used as intended. To assess the extent to which State’s policies and guidance provide reasonable assurance that funds are being used as intended, we assessed State’s policies and guidance for grants management against the implementation of those policies, as well as reviewing State’s own process for conducting internal assessments of the implementation of those policies. To further determine how State implements these policies, we selected three case study countries —Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Turkey— based on criteria that included total dollar value of grants in a country, geographic diversity, and balance among the bureaus involved in managing the awards. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2012. GAO-11-1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Grants are key tools that State uses to conduct foreign assistance. In fiscal year 2012, State obligated over $1.6 billion worldwide for around 14,000 grants to individuals and organizations for a variety of purposes, such as fostering cultural exchange and facilitating refugee resettlement. However, recent GAO and Inspectors General reports have identified challenges with State's management of these funds. This report examines (1) the policies and guidance that State has established to administer and oversee grants, and (2) the extent to which the implementation of those policies and guidance provides reasonable assurance that funds are being used as intended. GAO analyzed State's policies and guidance, and interviewed cognizant grants officials at 14 bureaus headquartered in Washington, D.C., and three overseas missions (Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Turkey). GAO also conducted file reviews for a sample of 61 grants totaling approximately $172 million. Selection criteria included total dollar value of grants in a country, geographic diversity, and balance among bureaus.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) has established policies and guidance that provide a supportive environment for managing grants and cooperative agreements (grants). In addition, State provides its grants officials mandatory training on these policies and guidance, and routinely identifies and shares best practices. State's policies are based on federal regulations, reflect internal control standards, and cover topics such as risk assessment and monitoring procedures. State's policies also delineate specific internal control activities that grants officials are required to both implement and document in the grant files as a way of promoting accountability (see fig.).
GAO found that inconsistent implementation of policies and guidance weakens State's assurance that grant funds are used as intended.
Inadequate risk analysis . In most of the files GAO reviewed, grants officials did not fully identify, assess, and mitigate risks, as required. For example, officials conducted a risk identification process for 45 of the 61 grants that GAO reviewed. While grants officials identified risk in 28 of those 45 grants, they mitigated risks in only 11.
Poor documentation . Grants officials generally did not adhere to State policies and procedures relating to documenting internal control activities. For example, 32 of the 61 files reviewed did not contain the required monitoring plan. Considerable turnover among grants officials makes documenting internal control activities particularly important. State's periodic management reviews of selected bureaus' and overseas missions' grant operations have also found that key documentation was frequently missing or incomplete and made recommendations to address the problem. However, State has not consistently followed up to ensure the implementation of these recommendations, as internal control standards require.
State does not have processes for ensuring compliance with risk analysis and documentation requirements. Without the proper implementation of its internal control policies for grants management, State cannot be certain that its oversight is adequate or that it is using its limited oversight resources effectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State develop processes for ensuring that (1) bureaus and missions conduct appropriate risk assessments and (2) grants officials complete required documentation. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State (3) follow up systematically on recommendations from State's internal reviews of its grants management. State concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-782T | gao_GAO-08-782T_0 | DOD Has Too Many Acquisition Programs Competing for Limited Resources, while Program Costs and Schedules Continue To Increase
DOD’s portfolio of major acquisition programs has grown at a pace that far exceeds available resources. From 1992 to 2007, the estimated acquisition costs needed to complete the major acquisition programs in DOD’s portfolio increased almost 120 percent, while the funding provided for these programs only increased 57 percent, creating a fiscal bow wave that may be unsustainable (see fig. On average, the current portfolio of programs has experienced a 21-month delay in delivering initial operational capability to the warfighter, and 14 percent are more than 4 years late. At the strategic level, DOD’s processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems—which together define DOD’s overall weapon system investment strategy—are fragmented and broken. Such lengthy cycle times promote program funding instability—especially when considering DOD’s tendency to change requirements and funding as well as frequent changes in leadership. The government’s control over and accountability for decisions is complicated by DOD’s growing reliance on technical, business, and procurement expertise supplied by contractors. Recent Congressional Initiatives and DOD Actions Aim to Promote a More Disciplined, Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach
Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the acquisition process, Congress recently enacted legislation that, if followed, could result in a better chance to spend resources wisely. Likewise, DOD has recently begun to develop several initiatives, based in part on congressional direction and GAO recommendations that, if implemented properly, could also provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced investment strategy and sound, knowledge-based business cases for individual acquisition programs. For example, 2006 and 2008 legislation require decision-makers to certify that specific levels of knowledge have been demonstrated at key decision points early in the acquisition process before programs can enter the technology development phase or the system development phase. Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement
DOD has initiated actions aimed at improving investment decisions and weapon system acquisition outcomes, based in part on congressional direction and GAO recommendations. Concluding Observations on Achieving Successful and Lasting Reform
DOD understands what it needs to do at the strategic and at the program level to improve acquisition outcomes. Past efforts have had similar goals, yet we continue to find all too often that DOD’s investment decisions are service- and program- centric and that the military services overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development programs. More legislation can be enacted and policies can be written, but until DOD begins making better choices that reflect joint capability needs and matches requirements with resources, the acquisition environment will continue to produce poor outcomes. Finally, no real reform can be achieved without a true partnership among all these players and the Congress. § 2433 (as amended) - Unit Cost Reports Amended reporting and certification requirements for major defense programs that exceed baseline costs, by: creating two types of growth thresholds--“significant cost growth” and “critical cost growth”; basing new thresholds on the percentage increases in both the original and current baseline estimate incorporating these thresholds into existing unit cost reporting requirements; and requiring that in the event of a breach of the critical cost growth threshold, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, to (1) assess the reasons for the cost growth, the projected cost to either complete the program with current or reasonably modified requirements, and the rough order of magnitude costs for a reasonable alternative system or capability and (2) certify that the program is essential to national security; no less costly, equally capable alternatives exist; new cost estimates are reasonable; and an adequate management structure is in place to control costs. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes. Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of major weapon system acquisitions a high risk area. DOD has taken some action to improve acquisition outcomes, but its weapon programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer capabilities than originally planned. These persistent problems--coupled with current operational demands--have impelled DOD to work outside of its traditional acquisition process to acquire equipment that meet urgent warfighter needs. Poor outcomes in DOD's weapon system programs reverberate across the entire federal government. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to invest about $900 billion to develop and procure weapon systems--the highest level of investment in two decades. Every dollar wasted on acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other priorities. This testimony describes DOD's current weapon system investment portfolio, the problems that contribute to cost and schedule increases, and the potential impacts of recent legislative initiatives and DOD actions aimed at improving outcomes. It also provides some observations about what is needed for DOD to achieve lasting reform. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes, as well as its most recent annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs.
What GAO Found
DOD's portfolio of weapon system programs has grown at a pace that far exceeds available resources. From 1992 to 2007, the estimated acquisition costs remaining for major weapons programs increased almost 120 percent, while the annual funding provided for these programs only increased 57 percent. Current programs are experiencing, on average, a 21-month delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter--often forcing DOD to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Systemic problems both at the strategic and at the program level underlie cost growth and schedule delays. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems--which together define DOD's overall weapon system investment strategy--are fragmented and broken. At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking such knowledge, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic, exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays. At the same time, frequent turnover of program managers and an increased reliance on contractors increases the government's risk of losing accountability. Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the acquisition process, Congress recently enacted legislation part of which requires decision-makers to certify that programs meet specific criteria at key decision points early in the acquisition process. Likewise, DOD has recently begun to develop several initiatives that are based in part on congressional direction and GAO recommendations. If adopted and implemented properly, these measures could provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced investment strategy, sound business cases for major weapon system acquisition programs, and a better chance to spend resources wisely. While legislation and policy revisions can help guide change, DOD must begin making better choices that reflect joint capability needs and match requirements with resources or the department will continue to experience poor acquisition outcomes. DOD investment decisions continue to be dictated by the services who propose programs that overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development programs. The transitory nature of leadership further undermines successful reform. To better ensure warfighter capabilities are delivered when needed and as promised, incentives must encourage a disciplined, knowledge-based approach, and a true partnership with shared goals must be developed among the department, the military services, the Congress, and the defense industry. |
gao_GGD-99-206 | gao_GGD-99-206_0 | This expenditure plan strategy is a by-product of the Commissioner’s overall approach to the modernization, which is to incrementally invest in modernized systems in accordance with (1) rigorous systems and software life cycle management processes and (2) a revised sequencing plan for migrating from IRS’ legacy systems and master file environment to the target systems and relational database environment specified in the blueprint. The initial plan requests $35 million for IRS modernization initiatives to be delivered by October 31, 1999. Leading public and private sector organizations use an incremental approach to investing in systems modernization efforts. Initial Expenditure Plan Is an Appropriate First Step and Meets Legislative Requirements
IRS’ initial expenditure plan is an appropriate first step to successful systems modernization and, with regard to the $35 million being requested for this increment, satisfies the conditions that the Congress placed on the use of ITIA funds. The key to IRS’ success is now to effectively implement the initiatives described in its initial expenditure plan and fulfill its commitment to incrementally request and expend future modernization funds. Additionally, IRS intends for future expenditure plans to incrementally provide for architectural specificity for future system initiatives. As described above, the initial expenditure plan provides for implementing the ELC on ongoing projects, and, according to IRS officials, future expenditure plans will provide for implementing it on follow-on projects. Initial Expenditure Plan Is Consistent With GAO’s Past Recommendations
In 1995, we first made recommendations to correct serious and pervasive modernization management and technical weaknesses. IRS’ initial expenditure plan is consistent with these recommendations. The result is intended to be a revised, business risk-based sequencing plan that defines the general timing, cost, and benefits of new modernization projects over the next 3 to 5 years. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to the Department of the Treasury’s fiscal year 1998 and 1999 appropriations acts, the Congress limited IRS’ ability to obligate ITIA funds until the service and Treasury submitted to the Congress for approval an expenditure plan that per the acts, (1) implements the IRS Modernization Blueprint, (2) meets OMB’s investment guidelines for information systems, (3) is reviewed and approved by IRS’ Investment Review Board, OMB, and Treasury’s IRS Management Board and is reviewed by GAO, (4) meets the requirements of IRS system life cycle management program, and (5) is in compliance with acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and system acquisition management practices of the federal government. We reviewed the plan to determine whether (1) the plan satisfied the conditions specified in the acts, (2) the plan was consistent with our past modernization recommendations, and (3) we had any other observations on IRS’ systems modernization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) initial Information Technology Investments Account (ITIA) expenditure plan, focusing on whether: (1) the plan satisfies the conditions specified in IRS' fiscal year 1998 and 1999 appropriations acts; (2) the plan is consistent with GAO's past recommendations on IRS' systems modernization; and (3) GAO's observations on the modernization efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' initial expenditure plan is the first in a series of incremental expenditure plans that IRS plans to prepare over the life of the modernization; (2) the initial plan specifies IRS' modernization initiatives through October 31, 1999, and it seeks approval to obligate about $35 million to complete these initiatives; (3) such an incremental approach to investing in systems modernization efforts is a recognized best practice that leading public and private sector organizations use to mitigate the risk of program failure on large, complex, multiyear modernization programs; (4) IRS' initial expenditure plan is an appropriate first step toward successful systems modernization and, with regard to the $35 million being requested for this increment, satisfies the conditions that Congress placed on the use of ITIA funds; (5) the plan is consistent with GAO's past recommendations; (6) the initial expenditure plan provides for additional blueprint precision and specificity; (7) it provides for definition of system infrastructure specifications and a revised plan for sequencing the introduction of the new technology needed to achieve the target systems architecture over the next 3 to 5 years; (8) these initiatives are consistent with GAO's past recommendations for completing the blueprint and collectively they represent the first steps needed to satisfy the legislative condition to implement the blueprint; (9) the initial expenditure plan provides for definition and targeted implementation of an Enterprise Life Cycle, which is consistent with GAO's past recommendations for instituting project management rigor, software process maturity, and investment management discipline; (10) if implemented properly, this effort should satisfy the legislative condition for an IRS system life cycle and investment management program that meets the Office of Management and Budget guidelines; (11) building on its initial expenditure plan, IRS plans to define in subsequent expenditure plans the follow-on efforts and funding requirements needed to incrementally: (a) add needed architectural precision and project-specific management discipline; and (b) implement its Enterprise Life Cycle, and its target systems architecture; and (12) if IRS effectively implements the initiatives described in its initial expenditure plan and fulfills its commitment to incrementally request and expend future modernization funds, IRS would be acting in a manner that is consistent with the legislative conditions and GAO's past recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-447 | gao_GAO-15-447_0 | PPACA Provisions
Several PPACA provisions that became effective January 1, 2014, limited the ability of issuers to deny coverage or charge higher premiums to individuals and small groups based on health risks or certain other factors. As a result, many previously uninsured individuals entered the insurance market, possibly for the first time, and issuers lacked historical information about their health care and use of medical services.uninsured individuals who are most in need of health care may be more likely than others to purchase insurance during the transition, resulting in a pool of enrollees that have unknown and potentially higher medical costs than the broader population. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Each of the risk mitigation programs applies to a different group of issuers. CMS Considered Market Characteristics and Program Duration When Designing PPACA’s Three Risk Mitigation Programs
CMS considered a range of insurance market characteristics—such as demographics and the availability of market data—in making decisions about how to design PPACA’s three risk mitigation programs. CMS’s design decisions also reflected the temporary status of the reinsurance and risk corridors programs. CMS’s Design of the Risk Adjustment Program Reflects Multiple Factors That Influence Cost Variation in the Individual and Small Group Markets under PPACA
While the Medicare risk adjustment programs served as the basis for the PPACA risk adjustment program, CMS’s design of the PPACA program reflects key differences that exist between Medicare and PPACA markets, including differences in demographics, the availability of enrollee data, and each program’s benefit design and premium-setting structure. CMS indicated that “in the unlikely event of a shortfall in the 2016 benefit year, HHS will use other sources of funding, subject to availability of appropriations.”
CMS Considered Privacy and Security in Developing Systems for Collecting Issuer Risk Mitigation Data and Experienced Significant Delays CMS Considered Privacy, Security, and Efficiency When Developing Data Collection Systems for PPACA’s Risk Mitigation Programs
CMS chose data collection systems for the risk mitigation programs that were intended to address privacy and security concerns and maximize efficiencies. CMS delayed implementation of the new data collection system for the risk adjustment and reinsurance programs by nearly a year as it revised its plans for implementing the distributed data approach. This would have allowed issuers to upload enrollment and claims data on a monthly basis starting in January 2014, and CMS planned to use these data to generate issuer reports during 2014:
CMS planned to provide quarterly reports to issuers with the estimated amount of reinsurance program payments they would receive for benefit year 2014. 2). CMS Established Some Processes to Monitor the Accuracy of Issuer Data for the Three Risk Mitigation Programs and Initiated Efforts to Evaluate the Permanent Risk Adjustment Program CMS Established Some Data Verification Processes and Audit Procedures for the Risk Mitigation Programs, and Others Are under Development
To a varying extent, CMS has developed or has plans to develop data verification checks or audit procedures for each of PPACA’s three risk mitigation programs. In addition, CMS has initiated efforts to evaluate the permanent risk adjustment program but has not finalized the details of the evaluation. In November 2014, CMS issued a request for contractors to submit bids to conduct a range of services related to Medicare and the PPACA insurance market reforms, including research and development for the PPACA risk adjustment program. The bid request identified general research and development tasks for the risk adjustment program, such as analysis of the impact of market and enrollee factors on the model, evaluation of the accuracy of the risk adjustment program, and research to support adaptation of the model. As of April 2015, CMS expected to award this contract in the spring of 2015, although the agency had not specified the timing and scope of the evaluation. It is critical that CMS similarly understands whether or not the new PPACA risk adjustment model is accurately reflecting costs, and CMS’s continued effort to carry out this evaluation will be important to the program’s success. Issuers identified design concerns specific to each PPACA risk mitigation program and provided mixed responses regarding the effect of CMS’s implementation delays and technical assistance. Most Issuers Interviewed Said That All Three Risk Mitigation Programs Encouraged Their Participation in the Individual Health Insurance Market, and Two Programs Affected Their Premiums
Most of the 12 issuers we interviewed said that, beginning in 2014, the PPACA risk adjustment program positively influenced their participation in the individual health insurance market and that the PPACA reinsurance and risk corridors programs positively influenced their participation in the market and also led them to set lower premiums than they otherwise would have offered. Issuers Provided Mixed Responses Regarding the Effect of CMS’s Implementation Delays and Technical Assistance
Most of the 12 issuers we interviewed supported CMS’s choice of the distributed data collection approach for the risk adjustment and reinsurance programs, although they offered mixed responses about how they were affected by CMS’s decision to change how it implemented the EDGE servers and the resulting delays in implementation:
Six of the issuers we interviewed said that the delays in implementing the EDGE servers were exceedingly disruptive or significant to them. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA resulted in significant changes to the private individual and small group health insurance markets in 2014 that expanded the availability and affordability of coverage. However, some of these provisions reduced issuers' ability to mitigate the risk of high-cost enrollees by limiting their ability to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on individuals' health risks and other factors. Issuers also faced increased risk starting in 2014 because these provisions were expected to result in the enrollment of many previously uninsured individuals, who have unknown and potentially higher medical costs than the broader population. To limit these risks, PPACA required the establishment of three risk mitigation programs.
GAO was asked to provide information on the design and development of these three programs and on issuer perspectives on them. In this report, GAO describes: (1) the factors that guided CMS's design of these programs, (2) the data collection systems CMS developed for these programs, (3) CMS's plans to monitor and evaluate the programs, and (4) issuer experiences with the programs. GAO reviewed regulations, guidance, and documentation about design and implementation activities and interviewed CMS officials. GAO also interviewed officials from a non-representative sample of 12 issuers that offered individual market coverage in 2014 and were selected based on variation in enrollment, location, and market experience.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) considered market characteristics and program duration in designing the three programs mandated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to mitigate the risks issuers of health insurance faced starting in 2014. Each of the three programs—risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors—was intended to account for a different source of issuer risk, such as enrollee health status or high-cost medical claims. CMS considered a range of market characteristics—including demographics and the availability of data—in making decisions about how to design each of the programs. CMS's design decisions also reflected the temporary status of the reinsurance and risk corridors programs, which are set to expire after 3 years. While CMS considered similar Medicare risk mitigation programs during the design process, key differences in the markets served by Medicare and the PPACA programs resulted in different approaches to their design.
CMS considered privacy and security concerns in developing systems for collecting issuer data for the risk mitigation programs and experienced multiple implementation delays. For example, for the risk adjustment and reinsurance programs, CMS elected to use a system that allows sensitive enrollee claims data to remain with issuers while providing CMS with only summary data. However, CMS delayed implementation of data collection systems for these programs by nearly a year as it revised its plans to reduce administrative burden and accommodate issuer preferences. Therefore, CMS was unable to provide issuers with most of the periodic, interim reports it had originally planned to generate throughout 2014.
CMS developed or had plans to develop data verification or audit procedures for all three programs. CMS had also initiated efforts to evaluate the permanent risk adjustment program but had not finalized the details of the evaluation. In November 2014, CMS issued a request for contractors to submit bids to conduct a range of services, including research and development tasks for the risk adjustment program such as: analyze the impact of market and enrollee factors on the model; evaluate the accuracy of the program; and conduct research to support adaptation of the model. As of April 2015, CMS officials expected to award the contract in the spring of 2015, although the agency had not finalized a date for completing that evaluation. CMS's continued effort to carry out this evaluation will be important to assessing the program's success.
Most of the 12 issuers GAO interviewed said that the three risk mitigation programs encouraged their participation in the individual health insurance market, and two of the programs allowed them to lower their premiums. Issuers identified design concerns specific to each PPACA risk mitigation program and provided mixed responses regarding the effect of CMS's implementation delays and technical assistance.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services described CMS's data collection strategy for these programs and its efforts to ensure the appropriate level of technical support for issuers. |
gao_GAO-04-823 | gao_GAO-04-823_0 | Background
Despite a substantial investment in IT, the federal government’s management of information resources has produced mixed results. Although agencies have taken constructive steps to implement modern strategies, systems, and management policies and practices, our work continues to find that agencies face significant challenges. Enterprise architecture. We then developed and administered a questionnaire to the CIOs of the 27 major departments and agencies requesting information on whether these officials were responsible for each of these areas, their reporting relationships, their professional and educational backgrounds, and their challenges. CIOs Responsible for Most Areas and Generally Reported to Agency Heads
CIOs generally were responsible for most of the 13 key areas we had identified as either required by statute or among those critical to effective information and technology management, and most reported directly to their agency heads. Of the other eight areas, two of them—information disclosure and statistics—were the responsibility of fewer than half of the CIOs. Nevertheless, having these responsibilities performed by multiple officials could make the integration of various information and technology management areas, as envisioned by the law, more difficult to achieve. Given these results, it is clear that questions arise about whether the current statutory framework of roles and responsibilities reflects the most effective assignment of information and technology management responsibilities. CIOs Have Diverse Backgrounds and Generally Remained in Office about 2 Years
At the major departments and agencies included in our review, the current CIOs had diverse backgrounds, and since the enactment of the Clinger- Cohen Act, the median tenure of permanent CIOs whose time in office had been completed was about 2 years. Various mechanisms, such as human capital flexibilities, are available for agencies to use to help reduce CIO turnover or mitigate its affect. Further, virtually all of them had work experience and/or educational backgrounds in IT or IT-related fields. When asked how long a CIO needed to stay in office to be effective, current CIOs and former agency IT executives most commonly responded 3 to 5 years. A high turnover rate is a problem, according to some current CIOs, because it can negatively impact their effectiveness. For example, CIOs may not have time to put their agenda in place or form close working relationships with agency leadership. Matter for Congressional Consideration
As it holds hearings on and introduces legislation related to information and technology management, we suggest that the Congress consider the results of this review and whether the existing statutory requirements related to CIO responsibilities and reporting to the agency heads reflect the most effective assignment of information and technology management responsibilities and reporting relationships. At a majority of agencies, the CIO chaired this IT investment board. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the federal government has invested substantially in information technology (IT), its success in managing information resources has varied. Agencies have taken steps to implement modern strategies, systems, and management policies and practices, but they still face significant information and technology management challenges. Recognizing the key role of the chief information officer (CIO) in helping an agency to achieve better results through IT, congressional requesters asked GAO to study the current status of CIOs at major departments and agencies. Among the topics this report describes are (1) CIOs' responsibilities and reporting relationships, and (2) current CIOs' professional backgrounds and the tenures of all of the CIOs since enactment of the Clinger-Cohen Act.
What GAO Found
GAO administered a questionnaire and interviewed CIOs at 27 major departments and agencies, finding that respondents were responsible for most of the 13 areas we identified as either required by statute or critical to effective information and technology management. All of the CIOs had responsibility for five areas, including enterprise architecture and IT investment management. However, two of these areas--information disclosure and statistics--were outside the purview of more than half of the officers. Although the CIOs generally did not think placing responsibility for some areas in separate units presented a problem, having these responsibilities performed by multiple officials could make the integration of various information and technology management areas, as envisioned by law, more difficult to achieve. Given these results, it may be time to revisit whether the current statutory framework of responsibilities reflects the most effective assignment of information and technology management responsibilities. The law also generally requires that CIOs report directly to their agency heads, and 19 of the 27 said that they did. However, views were mixed among current and former officers on whether such a direct reporting relationship was important. Agency CIOs come from a wide variety of professional and educational backgrounds, but they almost always have IT or IT-related work or educational experience. Since enactment of the Clinger-Cohen Act, the median tenure of a federal CIO has been about 2 years; in contrast, both current CIOs and former agency IT executives most commonly cited 3 to 5 years as the time they needed to become effective. According to some current CIOs, high turnover is a problem because it can limit CIOs' ability to put their agendas in place. Various mechanisms, such as human capital flexibilities, are available for agencies to use to help them try to reduce CIO turnover or mitigate its effect. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-116 | gao_T-AIMD-98-116_0 | In addressing the Year 2000 problem, financial institutions must also consider the computer systems that interface with, or connect to, their own systems. It also directed them to complete programming changes and to have testing of mission-critical systems underway by December 31, 1998. For example, OTS designated about 170 thrifts as being at high risk due to poor performance in conducting awareness and assessment phase activities. These visits are expected to be completed by the end of June 1998. Regulators Face Problems in Ensuring Institutions Are Ready
As noted in our summary, the regulators must successfully address a number of problems to provide adequate assurance that financial institutions will meet the Year 2000 challenge. First, all were behind in assessing individual institution’s readiness due to the fact that they got a late start. Second, we also found that the FFIEC-developed examination work program and guidance for the initial and follow-on assessments were not designed to collect all the data needed to determine where (i.e., in which phase) the institutions are in the Year 2000 correction process. Third, FFIEC is still developing key Year 2000 guidance. This time lag has increased the risk that institutions have taken little or no action on contingency planning and dealing with servicers, vendors, and corporate customers in anticipation of pending regulator guidance. For example, regulators will soon have to pinpoint which, if any, of the thousands of banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not going to meet their Year 2000 deadline. Thus, the regulators will need to ensure that they have the technical capacity to complete their Year 2000 examinations as well as their routine safety and soundness examinations. They need to take several actions to improve their ability to enhance the ability of financial institutions to meet the century deadline with minimal problems and to enhance their own ability to monitor the industry’s efforts and to take appropriate and swift measures against institutions that are neglecting their Year 2000 responsibilities. Accordingly, we have made recommendations to the regulators individually, and collectively via FFIEC, to work together to, among other things, (1) improve their Year 2000 examination and reporting processes, (2) provide additional guidance to the institutions on contingency planning and the latter phases of the Year 2000 correction process, (3) develop a tactical plan that details the results of their on-site assessments, provides a more explicit road map of the actions to be taken based on those results, and includes an assessment of the adequacy of technical resources to evaluate the Year 2000 efforts of institutions and the servicers and vendors that support them, and (4) improve the regulators’ internal system mitigation programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the progress of the federal regulatory agencies in ensuring that the thousands of financial institutions they oversee are ready for the upcoming century date change.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because financial institutions are heavily dependent on information technology, their viability hinges on whether they can successfully remediate systems before the Year 2000 deadline; (2) given this possibility, regulators must take every measure possible to assist banks, thrifts, and credit unions in their Year 2000 efforts as well as to identify and take swift enforcement measures against those in danger of failing; (3) regulators have recognized this responsibility and have begun an intense effort to raise awareness of the problem, develop guidance to facilitate remediation efforts, and determine where individual institutions stand in correcting their systems; (4) in doing so, regulators have initially identified several hundred institutions at high risk of missing the deadline due to their poor performance in conducting awareness and assessment phase activities; (5) despite aggressive efforts, the regulators still face significant challenges in providing a high level of assurance that individual institutions will be ready; (6) they were late in addressing the problem and consequently, are behind in the Year 2000 schedule recommended by both GAO and the Office of Management and Budget; (7) they are also late in developing key guidance on contingency planning and dealing with servicers, vendors, and corporate customers; (8) this guidance is needed by financial institutions to complete their own preparations; (9) in addition, their follow-on assessments to be completed by June 1998 were not in all cases, designed to collect the data required to be defective about the status of individual institutions; (10) furthermore, it is questionable whether all regulators have an adequate level of technical staff to completely evaluate industry readiness; (11) with regard to their own systems, the regulators have generally done much to mitigate the risk to their mission critical systems; and (12) in some areas such as contingency planning, the regulators can do more to provide added assurance that they will be ready for the century date change and any unexpected problems. |
gao_HEHS-99-79 | gao_HEHS-99-79_0 | 1). Significant Differences Between Budget Allocations and Obligations
The Congress appropriated $48.9 billion for DHP O&M expenses between fiscal years 1994 and 1998. During budget execution, DOD obligated about $4.8 billion differently—as either increases or decreases—from its budget allocations for the various subactivities (see table 3). Between 1994 and 1998, DOD allocated $21.2 billion from the final DHP appropriation for purchased care but obligated only $19.1 billion, allowing DOD to reallocate $2.0 billion into such areas as direct patient care, information management, and base operations. At the program element level, the largest adjustments within the purchased care subactivity occurred between 1994 and 1996, when DOD obligated $1.4 billion less than the budget allocation for the CHAMPUS program element (see table I.4 and fig. 3). Because of the delays in starting up these contracts, most of the unobligated MCS contract funds were used to defray higher than anticipated CHAMPUS program obligations. DHP Obligations Differed From Budget Allocations for Several Reasons
According to DOD officials, between 1994 and 1998, DOD-wide budget pressures and major program changes—such as downsizing and the rollout of TRICARE managed care reforms—made it difficult to estimate and allocate resources between direct care and purchased care budgets. DOD officials cited several interrelated reasons why DHP obligations differed from DOD’s budget allocations between fiscal years 1994 and 1998. Decision to Fully Fund Purchased Care Left Less for Other Subactivities
TMA, Health Affairs, and service budget officials made various internal budget policy choices that included a DHP budget strategy to fully fund purchased care activities within available funding levels. This strategy, coupled with general budget pressures, left less money with which to budget direct care and other DHP subactivity requirements (such as information management and base operations). For fiscal years 1997 to 1998, DOD has estimated that CMAC saved $1.5 billion in CHAMPUS and TRICARE contract costs. Thus, funding changes during budget execution are nearly inevitable. Notification or Budget Execution Data Would Enhance Oversight of DHP Funding Changes
The movement of DHP funds between subactivities does not require prior congressional notification or approval. As a result, sizeable funding changes have occurred without specific notification. Conclusions
DOD officials expect future DHP obligations to track more closely with budget requests and allocations, while acknowledging that some movement of funds is inevitable given the lack of a universally enrolled beneficiary population for direct and purchased care. These and other details of the notification procedure could be worked out between congressional committees and DOD to further ensure that DOD’s ability to obligate funds for the timely delivery of health care services was not impaired. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the apparent discrepancies between the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget allocations and the actual obligations for direct and purchased care, focusing on: (1) the extent to which the Defense Health Program (DHP) obligations have differed from DOD's budget allocations; (2) the reasons for any such differences; and (3) whether congressional oversight of DHP funding changes could be enhanced if DOD provided notification or budget execution data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between fiscal years 1994 and 1998, Congress appropriated $48.9 billion for DHP operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses; (2) during that period, DHP obligations at the subactivity level, particularly for direct and purchased care, differed in significant ways from DOD's budget allocations; (3) in total, about $4.8 billion was obligated differently--as either increases to or decreases from the budget allocations DOD had developed for the 7 DHP subactivities; (4) these funding changes occurred because of internal DOD policy choices and other major program changes; (5) according to DOD, its strategy was to fully fund purchased care activities within available funding levels; (6) this strategy left less to budget for direct care and other DHP subactivities; (7) TRICARE Management Activity officials also told GAO that because the DHP has both direct and purchased care components, whereby many beneficiaries can access either system to obtain health care, it is difficult to reliably estimate annual demand and costs for each component; (8) between 1994 and 1996, purchased care obligations were $1.9 billion less than allocated because of faulty physician payment rate and actuarial assumptions; (9) between 1994 and 1998, direct patient care obligations amounted to $1 billion more than DOD had allocated--during a period of base closures and military treatment facility downsizing--largely because DOD understated estimated direct care requirements; (10) also, between 1996 and 1998, DOD overestimated TRICARE managed care support (MCS) contract costs, believing that contract award prices would be higher and implementation would begin sooner than what occurred; (11) thus, most of the unobligated MCS contract funds were used to defray higher than anticipated Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services obligations; (12) the movement of DHP funds from one subactivity to another does not require prior congressional notification or approval; (13) as a result, these sizable funding changes have generally occurred without congressional awareness; (14) now that the MCS contracts are implemented nationwide, DOD officials expect future DHP obligations to track more closely with budget allocations; and (15) current law and regulations will continue to allow DOD the latitude to move funds between subactivities with little or not congressional oversight. |
gao_GAO-03-7 | gao_GAO-03-7_0 | Transition to DTV Will Allow the Return of Valuable Spectrum but Will Require Millions of Americans to Buy New Equipment
One important goal of the DTV transition is to recapture portions of the radiofrequency spectrum currently used for analog broadcasting so this spectrum can be used for public safety needs and auctioned to private companies. Date When DTV Transition Will Be Completed and Spectrum Returned Is Uncertain
FCC established 2006 as the target date for completing the DTV transition, and this was later codified by Congress in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Under the statute, FCC must grant extensions to requesting stations in a television market where it finds that one of the following three conditions exists: 1. at least one television station affiliated with the four largest national networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, or NBC) is not broadcasting a DTV signal; 2. the technology to convert a digital signal for use on an analog television set is not generally available; or 3. fewer than 85 percent of television households in the television market has the ability to receive DTV—a television household would not count as receiving DTV if it (a) did not subscribe to a “multichannel video programming distributor” (such as a cable or satellite service) that carries a digital broadcast channel from each broadcaster in that market and (b) did not have a television receiver or a digital-to-analog converter capable of receiving digital broadcast signals. Consumer Adoption of DTV Has Been Slow, Partly Because Many Americans Are Unaware of the Transition and Are Not Well Informed about DTV Products
In a telephone survey of 1,000 randomly selected American households, we found that many people have little understanding of the DTV transition and its implications. When we posed as consumers during visits to 23 DTV retailers, we found that much of the information provided by sales staff about DTV equipment was correct. For example: Forty percent of respondents said they had never heard about the transition to digital broadcast television, and another 43 percent said they were only “somewhat aware” of the transition. They also were generally accurate in explaining what equipment would be needed to receive digital signals. Carriage of Digital Signals by Cable and Satellite Operators Is Insufficient to Help Achieve 85 Percent Threshold Quickly
On the basis of current plans for digital carriage by cable and satellite companies, it appears unlikely that many households will have access to all of their local digital channels via cable or satellite by December 2006. FCC Has Tentatively Decided Against Mandatory Dual Cable Carriage
Under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, local commercial broadcast stations have the right to require that cable systems in their market carry their analog signal. This completes a circle: with few consumers owning digital television sets, and little digital programming available, few cable systems have any incentive to carry local digital signals. Digital Over-the-Air Tuners Have Been Mandated, but Digital Cable-Ready Capability Has Not
To speed the DTV transition, FCC has adopted an order requiring that by 2007 most new broadcast television sets include a tuner capable of receiving digital signals over the air. Another policy option would be to pair the over-the-air mandate with a requirement that new television sets also be digital cable-ready. Because many more American households receive television via cable than receive it over the air, mandating digital cable-ready capability could be an effective policy for speeding the DTV transition if the marginal cost of this requirement were found to be reasonable. In addition, outstanding cable compatibility issues would need to be resolved before a digital cable-ready mandate could be implemented. Another policy option related to DTV that we have identified is to set a date-certain when broadcast stations’ right to invoke a must-carry status for their stations’ signals would transfer from their analog signals to their digital signals. As such, this policy would need to be evaluated more closely. This report acknowledges FCC’s efforts to resolve issues related to the compatibility between digital television sets and cable systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The transition to broadcast digital television (DTV) will provide new television services and the improved picture quality of "high definition television." It will also allow some portions of the radiofrequency spectrum used for broadcasting to be returned for public safety and commercial uses. The Congress set December 2006 as the target date for completing the DTV transition and turning off the analog broadcast signals. However, this date can be extended if fewer than 85 percent of households in a market are able to receive the digital signals. GAO was asked to assess issues related to the DTV transition.
What GAO Found
Numerous factors are impeding the progress of the DTV transition, making it unlikely that 85 percent of households will be able to receive DTV signals in many markets by December 2006. Few consumers own digital television equipment. Only about 1 percent of television equipment sold in 2001 could receive digital signals. This is largely because digital television sets and tuners are expensive and high definition programming is limited. Many consumers are unaware of the DTV transition. In a random household survey conducted for GAO, 40 percent of respondents had never heard about the transition; only one in five were "very aware" of it. In addition, the quality of information that consumers receive about DTV products at the retail level may be inconsistent. In visits to 23 DTV retailers, GAO found that sales staff sometimes provided inaccurate or incomplete information about DTV equipment and programming. Cable and satellite digital carriage is limited. The great majority of American households receive their television via cable or satellite. However, cable carriage of local digital broadcast channels is very limited. Furthermore, satellite providers currently do not carry any markets' local digital broadcasts. To speed the DTV transition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has required that by 2007 most new television sets be capable of receiving digital signals over the air. Another policy option to speed the transition would be to also require that new sets be capable of receiving digital signals via cable. Because many more American households receive television via cable than receive it over the air, mandating that new sets be "digital cable-ready" could effectively speed the transition. However, the cost to consumers of such a policy would first need to be assessed, and outstanding issues related to the compatibility between cable systems and DTV equipment would need to be resolved. Currently, broadcast stations have the right to require that cable systems in their market carry their analog signals (a right known as "must-carry"). One policy option to facilitate the transition would be to set a fixed date when this must-carry right would transfer from broadcasters' analog signals to digital signals. This option might speed cable carriage of digital broadcasts without requiring cable systems to carry both analog and digital broadcasts simultaneously. Because such a policy could have both advantages and disadvantages, it needs to be carefully evaluated. |
gao_GAO-12-232T | gao_GAO-12-232T_0 | DOD’s Progress in Addressing Challenges in Rebuilding the Capacity of the Acquisition Workforce
DOD has made some progress in rebuilding the capacity of the civilian acquisition workforce and in completing competency assessments, which identify the current skills and capabilities of the workforce and help identify areas that needed further management attention. Included among the workforce issues facing DOD are (1) determining the right size of the acquisition workforce, (2) updating acquisition training based on ongoing competency assessments and measuring the effect of training on acquisition outcomes, and (3) identifying personnel outside the acquisition workforce who have a role in acquisition. Data provided by the USD/AT&L indicate that DOD hired about 5,900 individuals using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Defense Fund as well as through insourcing in fiscal year 2010. The department’s plans for growing the acquisition workforce remain uncertain. DOD Efforts to Identify Competencies and Update Acquisition Workforce Training
Just as important as increasing the size of the acquisition workforce is building workforce skills and expertise. Thus, competency assessments have now been completed in the areas of contracting, life-cycle logistics, and program management. DOD is drafting the final report for another six competency assessments. One area where DOD still faces challenges is determining the effectiveness of its training in improving acquisition outcomes. We reported in 2010 that if DOD is to fully assess performance improvements, it needs to go beyond measuring the size of the workforce. DOD did not concur with the recommendation stating that it believed existing metrics were sufficient to assess the effect of its training efforts on acquisition outcomes. We continue to believe DOD needs to develop additional metrics. DOD Needs to Look Beyond the Formally Defined Acquisition Workforce
To help improve acquisition outcomes, our September 2011 report noted that DOD needed to assess the skills and competencies of and training provided to those people outside what DOD has defined as the acquisition workforce. We recommended that DOD establish criteria for identifying these personnel, assess the critical skills needed to perform their roles in the acquisition process, and designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD’s progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing personnel outside the defined acquisition workforce. DOD concurred with the recommendations. Rebuilding DCMA’s Capacity
The challenges DCMA is experiencing in rebuilding its capacity is illustrative of those faced by DOD. DCMA performs a critical role in helping to manage and oversee contractor performance. Since 2008, DCMA has been rebuilding its workforce, and to do so, has made increasing use of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DCMA reported it hired 1,221 new employees under this authority, a substantial increase from 166 hired in fiscal year 2009. Our November 2011 report noted that by the late 1990s, DCMA had lost the majority of its contract cost/price analysts, which, according to DCMA, meant many of its pricing-related contract administration responsibilities, such as negotiating forward pricing rate agreements and establishing final indirect cost rates and billing rates, were no longer performed to the same level of discipline and consistency as in prior years. As a result, DCMA reported that DOD’s acquisitions were subjected to unacceptable levels of cost risks. Over the last 2 years, DCMA reports it has hired 279 new contract cost/price analysts and cost monitors (bringing the agency’s total number to about 400), extensively using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to do so. DCMA officials said the center has helped to hire contract cost/price analysts for its contract management offices. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the government's largest buying entity and has recognized that rebuilding the acquisition workforce is a strategic priority. The federal government's current budget and long-term fiscal pressures underscore the importance of a capable and well-functioning workforce. GAO and others have long recognized that the size and capabilities of the workforce across the government warrant the attention of the Congress. This statement discusses (1) DOD's progress in addressing challenges faced in rebuilding the capacity of the acquisition workforce, and (2) insights into the efforts by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to rebuild its contract oversight capacity. This statement is drawn from our broad body of work on DOD contract management and acquisition workforce as well as a report issued earlier this month on DCMA's efforts to rebuild capacity. We also obtained updated information from DOD with regard to its acquisition workforce competency assessments and workforce hiring..
What GAO Found
DOD has made some progress in rebuilding the capacity of the acquisition workforce. For example, DOD reported that it hired about 5,900 civilians into the acquisition workforce in fiscal year 2010 using the Defense Acquisition Development Workforce Fund or as a result of decisions to convert functions previously performed by a contractor to performance by government personnel. DOD's plans for further growing the acquisition workforce remain uncertain because of budget issues. Building workforce skills and expertise is just as important, however, as increasing the size of the acquisition workforce. DOD also made progress in completing competency assessments, which identify the current skills and capabilities of the workforce and help identify areas that needed further management attention. DOD officials reported that DOD has completed three assessments, including contracting, life cycle logistics, and program management, and is drafting final reports for another six assessments. One area where DOD still faces challenges is determining the effectiveness of its training in improving acquisition outcomes. GAO recommended in 2010 that if DOD is to fully assess performance improvements, it needs to go beyond measuring the size of the workforce. DOD did not concur with the recommendation, stating that it believed existing metrics were sufficient to assess the impact of its training efforts on acquisition outcomes. GAO continues to believe DOD needs to develop additional metrics. Further, to help improve acquisition outcomes, GAO reported that DOD needed to assess the skills and competencies of and training provided to those people who have a role in acquisition but who are outside what DOD has formally defined as the acquisition workforce. GAO recommended that DOD establish criteria for identifying these personnel, assess the critical skills needed to perform their role in the acquisition process, and designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD's progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing personnel outside the defined acquisition workforce. DOD concurred with these recommendations. The challenges DCMA is experiencing in rebuilding its capacity are illustrative of those faced by DOD. DCMA performs a critical role in helping to manage and oversee contractor performance. GAO's November 2011 report found that DCMA is attempting to rebuild its workforce, making increased use of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DCMA reported it hired 1,221 new employees under this authority, a substantial increase from 166 hired in fiscal year 2009. GAO also noted that by the late 1990s, DCMA had lost the majority of its contract cost/price analysts, which, according to DCMA, meant many of its pricing-related contract administration responsibilities, such as negotiating forward-pricing rate agreements and establishing final indirect cost rates and billing rates, were no longer performed to the same level of discipline and consistency as in prior years. As a result, DCMA reported that DOD's acquisitions were subjected to unacceptable levels of cost risks. Over the last 2 years, DCMA reports it has hired 279 new contract cost/price analysts and cost monitors (bringing the agency's total number to about 400), extensively using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has previously made recommendations to DOD to help address DOD's workforce challenges. DOD generally agreed with most of the recommendations and has efforts under way to implement them. |
gao_GAO-02-291 | gao_GAO-02-291_0 | Progress Requires Strong Host Government Commitment and Sustained U.S. Assistance
Alternative development progress in Bolivia and Peru has required a lasting host government commitment to a broader set of counternarcotics measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance to support these efforts. Alternative development activities in both poppy- and coca-growing areas are just beginning. After funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, USAID began planning for alternative development in Colombia’s coca-growing areas. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru demonstrate the need for host government control and security in project areas; effective interdiction operations; and careful coordination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development efforts. However, the Colombian government does not control large parts of the coca-growing areas, limiting its ability to carry out sustained interdiction operations, and the Colombian government’s ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities remains uncertain. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has funded four alternative development projects in Bolivia since 1983. | What GAO Found
Since the early 1970's, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has helped Bolivian and Peruvian growers of illicit crops find legal ways to earn a living. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru indicate that effective alternative development demands a strong host government commitment to a comprehensive array of counternarcotics measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance. Chief among the specific lessons for Colombia are that progress requires host government control of drug-growing areas and a political will to interdict drug trafficking and forcibly eradicate illicit crops as well as a carefully coordinated approach to these efforts. USAID began targeting Colombia's poppy-growing areas in 2000 and expanded its program to include coca-growing areas in 2001, but most activities will not begin in earnest until 2002. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru suggest that alternative development in Colombia will not be successful unless the Colombian government controls coca-growing areas, has the capacity to carry out sustained interdiction operations, and the ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities. |
gao_GAO-03-1088 | gao_GAO-03-1088_0 | In fiscal year 2003, these costs were incurred preparing for and undertaking GWOT, including the 2003 war against Iraq. Fiscal Year 2003 Funding for the Global War on Terrorism
To support GWOT in fiscal year 2003, Congress appropriated $68.7 billion to DOD in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, and Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003. By the end of June 2003, only one of the services, the Marine Corps, had obligated more than 75 percent of the funds appropriated for operation and maintenance, while the other three services had obligated between 65 and 68 percent, although three-fourths of the fiscal year had already elapsed, raising doubts about whether all the services will be able to obligate their entire fiscal year 2003 GWOT operation and maintenance funds in the remaining 3 months of fiscal year 2003. As can be seen in figure 2, the percentage of directly appropriated operation and maintenance funds that were obligated as of June 30, 2003, ranged from a low of 65 percent for the Army to a high of 78 percent for the Marine Corps. Based on our analysis, we believe that in fiscal year 2003 the services, with the possible exception of the Marine Corps, may not obligate all operation and maintenance funds appropriated to them for GWOT. Since fiscal year 2002, funds for these operations have been included in the services’ base programs. Therefore, the funds requested for these Operations in the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request for DOD may no longer be necessary as requested. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that funds already appropriated, including funds transferred from the Iraqi Freedom Fund, to the military services for GWOT are fully utilized and that additional funds are not transferred to the military services’ operation and maintenance and military personnel accounts from the Iraqi Freedom Fund until they are needed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) monitor the obligation of funds in the services’ operation and maintenance accounts, including the GWOT funds, (2) ensure that all funds transferred to the services’ operation and maintenance accounts that are not likely to be obligated by the end of fiscal year 2003 are transferred back to the Fund as allowed by the Wartime Supplemental Appropriation, and (3) closely review the executability of further funding transfers from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to ensure the funds will be obligated as planned. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Because Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, and Desert Spring were canceled in March 2003, after the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget submission, Congress may wish to delete the funds requested for this purpose from the fiscal year 2004 DOD appropriations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)--principally involving operations in Afghanistan and Iraq--is being funded in fiscal year 2003 by Congress's appropriation of almost $69 billion, including almost $16 billion in a transfer fund called the Iraqi Freedom Fund. To assist Congress in its oversight of funding for GWOT, GAO examined the obligation of GWOT funds and the implications for additional funding in fiscal year 2003 and the President's request for fiscal year 2004 funds for several operations in Southwest Asia that were canceled after the budget was submitted.
What GAO Found
While funds obligated by DOD for GWOT, including the war with Iraq, in fiscal year 2003 are substantial--about $39 billion through June 2003--the funds appropriated by Congress appear to be sufficient for fiscal year 2003, and some of the services may not obligate all of the funds they were appropriated for fiscal year 2003. For example, at the end of June 2003, with 75 percent of the fiscal year completed, the services' percentage of GWOT operation and maintenance funds that had been obligated ranged from a low of 65 percent for the Army to a high of 78 percent for the Marine Corps. In contrast, the percentage of military personnel funds obligated by the three-fourths of-the-fiscal-year mark by the services ranged from 72 to 75 percent of GWOT appropriations. The military services believe they will obligate all the fiscal year 2003 funds appropriated to them. In addition, the services have received billions of dollars more in transfers from the Iraqi Freedom Fund. But GAO's analysis suggests that they may not need all the funds transferred as well as further transfers in fiscal year 2003 for operation and maintenance, since considerable unobligated fiscal year 2003 funds remain in their direct appropriations. Since DOD terminated Operations Desert Spring and Northern and Southern Watch in Southwest Asia in March 2003, the funds ($1.4 billion) that were included in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget to support those operations next year may no longer be necessary. |
gao_GAO-03-536 | gao_GAO-03-536_0 | The Government’s License Has Limited Applicability
Federal agencies and their authorized funding recipients have the right to benefit from the use of a federally funded invention without risk of infringing the patents. Federal contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement funding recipients may use the government’s license if they are authorized to do so. For example, federal agencies can contract with a third party to manufacture products containing such inventions. However, the government’s license to use a federally funded invention does not automatically entitle the government to price discounts when purchasing products that happen to incorporate the invention. The government’s license also does not necessarily extend to later inventions related to or based on the federally funded invention. There are two primary ways in which the government can use its right to practice an invention in which it has retained a license. The Government’s License Is Available to Federal Agencies and Authorized Funding Recipients
The government’s right to practice an invention is limited to federal agencies and their funding recipients specifically authorized to use the invention for federal government purposes. In this regard, the government is not entitled to any different protection than other entities that fund research. For pharmaceuticals, one of the largest sectors of the biomedical market, we found that the government had an interest—either because of its license under the Bayh-Dole Act or as the owner or “assignee” of the patent—in only 6 brand name drugs associated with the top 100 products, by dollar value, that VA procured in fiscal year 2001 and 4 brand name drugs associated with the top 100 products, by dollar value, that DOD dispensed from July 2001 to June 2002. We could not determine the extent to which the government holds rights to other types of biomedical products because (1) no databases exist showing the underlying patents for most of these products and (2) products such as hospital beds and wheelchairs may incorporate numerous components that might not be covered by identifiable patents. The Government Has Used Its Biomedical Licenses Primarily for Research
Officials from VA, DOD, and NIH said that their agencies use the government’s licenses to biomedical inventions primarily in performing research. VA and DOD officials said they do not consider the government’s licenses for procurements because they (1) would not be able to determine readily which products incorporate patented technologies or whether the government helped fund the technology’s development, (2) believe they already receive favorable pricing through the Federal Supply Schedule and national contracts, and (3) are not required by law to do so. According to these officials, the government’s licenses are valuable because they allow researchers to use the inventions without concern about possible challenges alleging that the use was unauthorized. While we agree with NIH that federal agencies and their funding recipients have unrestricted rights to use a federally funded invention for federal government purposes, it is important to recognize that they can use these rights only to meet needs that are reasonably related to the requirements of federal programs. Our objectives were to assess (1) who is eligible to use and benefit from the government’s licenses to biomedical inventions created under federally sponsored research, (2) the extent to which the government has licenses to those biomedical inventions it procures or uses most commonly, and (3) the extent to which those eligible have actually used or benefited from these licenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bayh-Dole Act gives federal contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement funding recipients the option to retain ownership rights to inventions they create as part of a federally sponsored research project and profit from commercializing them. The act also protects the government's interests, in part by requiring that federal agencies and their authorized funding recipients retain a license to practice the invention for government purposes. GAO examined (1) who is eligible to use and benefit from the government's license to federally funded biomedical inventions, (2) the extent to which the federal government has licenses to those biomedical inventions it procures or uses most commonly, and (3) the extent to which federal agencies and authorized federal funding recipients have actually used or benefited from these licenses. GAO focused its work on the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH commented that the report implies that the government's right to use its license is more limited than it actually is. GAO recognizes that the right of federal agencies and their funding recipients to use a federally funded invention is unrestricted. However, GAO believes that these license rights can be used only to meet needs that are reasonably related to the requirements of federal programs.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies and their authorized funding recipients are eligible to use the government's licenses to federally funded inventions for the benefit of the government. Government researchers can use the technology without paying a royalty, and federal agencies can authorize their funding recipients to use the government's licenses for specific contracts, grant awards, or cooperative agreements meeting a federal government need. The government is not entitled to automatic price discounts simply because it purchases products that incorporate inventions in which it happens to hold a license. Furthermore, the government's rights attach only to the inventions created by federally funded research and do not necessarily extend to later inventions based on them. Thus, the government may have no rights in a next-generation invention that builds on federally funded technology if the new invention were not itself created by federally sponsored research. Few of the biomedical products that federal agencies most commonly buy appear to incorporate federally funded inventions. In 2001 the government had licensing rights in only 6 brand name drugs associated with the top 100 pharmaceuticals that VA procured and in 4 brand name drugs associated with the top 100 pharmaceuticals that DOD dispensed. GAO was unable to determine the extent to which the government had rights to other types of biomedical products because there are no databases showing the underlying patents for most of these products and such products may incorporate numerous components that might not be covered by identifiable patents. The federal government uses its licenses to biomedical inventions primarily for research; however, researchers generally do not document such usage. These licenses are valuable because researchers can use the inventions without concerns about possible challenges for unauthorized use. Neither VA nor DOD has used the government's licenses to procure biomedical products because they cannot readily determine whether products use federally funded technologies and they believe they already receive favorable pricing through the Federal Supply Schedule and national contracts. Furthermore, neither VA nor DOD has used the government's license to manufacture a biomedical product for its use. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-267 | gao_T-AIMD-98-267_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. Unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. For example, (1) Illinois’ Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely affect state government operations, (2) Vermont’s Office of Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail, (3) Texas’ Office of the State Auditor reported that many state entities had not finished their embedded systems inventories and, therefore, it is not likely that they will complete their embedded systems repairs before the Year 2000, and (4) Florida’s Auditor General has issued several reports detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various district school boards and community colleges. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_RCED-97-125 | gao_RCED-97-125_0 | The process for formulating park operating budgets is incremental. While headquarters plays a key role in formulating requests for increases to the Park Service’s budget, decisions about spending and operating priorities associated with a park’s base budget are delegated to the park managers. Park personnel costs will increase annually with required pay and benefit increases and other administrative actions. Priority Setting and Accountability Systems Lack a Focus on Results
Although park managers need flexibility to effectively manage their park, accountability for the results achieved with the funds spent is also important. However, the park managers we spoke with indicated that they rarely, if ever, discussed with regional or headquarters staff their park’s operating priorities or the results accomplished with the funds spent. Under this system, key components needed to hold superintendents accountable are missing. Without expectations about the goals that are to be achieved in the parks, a means for measuring progress toward these goals is not in place. The Park Service has an opportunity to employ the basic tenets of GPRA to strengthen its system of accountability. The Park Service has prepared a draft strategic plan that covers the 5-year period from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. Extent of Cutbacks in Services Is Unknown
We attempted to determine the extent of the Park Service’s reductions in visitor services over the past 5 years. All Four Parks Reduced Visitor Services
Over the past 5 years, each of the four parks that we visited reduced visitor services. The rest came from reductions in other park operations. Operating Budget Has Grown More for Park Service Than for Most Other Federal Land Management Agencies
Spending on operations by the Park Service has increased in real terms by about 30 percent since 1985. For example, operations spending by the Bureau of Land Management and the Corps of Engineers increased by 5 and 3 percent, respectively. In contrast, real spending for the Forest Service’s operations has decreased by 24 percent since 1985. Within the Park Service, these choices are delegated to the individual park managers and typically involve trade-offs in funding resource management activities, visitor services, or park maintenance. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the process used by the Park Service to develop budgets and establish operating priorities; (2) determine the limitations, if any, of the agency’s priority-setting processes at a sample of parks; (3) determine what, if any, implications the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has for the Park Service; (4) provide information on trends in cutbacks of visitor services at the parks; and (5) compare funding levels for park operations with those for other federal land management agency operations. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), and the Forest Service (FS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the process used by the National Park Service to develop budgets and establish operating priorities; (2) the limitations, if any, of the agency's priority-setting processes at a sample of parks; (3) what, if any, implications the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has for the Park Service; (4) information on trends in cutbacks of visitor services at the parks; and (5) the funding levels for park operations compared with those for other federal land management agency operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while headquarters plays a key role in formulating requests for increases to the Park Service's operating budget, decisions about spending and operating priorities associated with park operating funds are delegated to the individual park managers; as a result, the individual park managers have broad discretion in deciding how to spend park operating funds; these decisions have been difficult because, while park budgets have been rising, the costs of operating the parks have also been rising in response to factors such as required pay and benefit increases; as a result, spending decisions made by park managers frequently involve trade-offs among competing demands within the parks for activities such as resource management, visitor services, or maintenance; (2) the most significant limitation associated with the Park Service's decentralized priority-setting and accountability systems is that they lack a focus on the results achieved with the funds spent; according to the park managers GAO spoke with, regional or headquarters staff rarely, if ever, discussed with them operating priorities or the results accomplished with the funds provided; key components needed to hold park managers accountable are missing; no expectations have been established for the goals that are to be achieved in the parks, and there is no process for measuring progress toward these goals; (3) GPRA offers the Park Service an opportunity to improve its system of accountability; the Park Service is currently implementing GPRA and plans on issuing its strategic plan, which will extend through fiscal year 2002, in the spring of 1997; (4) information is not available from the Park Service to determine agencywide trends in cutbacks of visitor services; each of the four parks that GAO visited has reduced its visitor services to some degree over the past 5 years; however, it is important to note that the cuts in visitor services were relatively small compared with the reductions in other park activities, such as maintenance and administration; and (5) spending on operations by the Park Service has increased in real terms by about 30 percent since 1985; (15) similarly, the operating budget of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has grown by about 28 percent over the same period; the Bureau of Land Management's and the Army Corps of Engineers' operating budgets have increased by 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively while the Forest Service's operating budget has decreased by 24 percent. |
gao_GAO-05-753 | gao_GAO-05-753_0 | IRS uses such compliance data, along with other data and assumptions, to estimate the dollar amount of taxes not paid accurately and on time. Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the estimated amount that each major type of noncompliance contributed to the 2001 tax gap, we reviewed IRS’s tax gap estimate for 2001. IRS Lacks Approved Plans to Regularly Measure Compliance, Including Underreporting Which Accounts for the Largest Portion of the Tax Gap
IRS estimates that underreporting of taxes accounted for about $250 billion to $292 billion of the $312 billion to $353 billion tax gap for 2001, while underpayment and nonfiling accounted for about $32 billion and $30 billion, respectively. IRS is taking some steps designed to improve portions of its compliance measurement efforts and its preliminary tax gap estimate and plans to release a revised tax gap estimate by the end of 2005. Although IRS is developing a system intended to capture better examination data, IRS does not have firm or specific plans to develop better data on the reasons for noncompliance, even though the lack of such data makes it harder to decide whether it should address specific areas of noncompliance through nonenforcement efforts, such as designing clearer forms or publications, or enforcement efforts. IRS Has Concerns with Its Data on Reasons for Noncompliance
IRS has concerns with its data on the unintentional and intentional reasons for noncompliance. In many of these cases, it is difficult for examiners to determine a taxpayer’s intent– whether the noncompliance is unintentional or intentional. IRS also collected reason data through NRP. IRS’s Approach to Reducing the Tax Gap Focuses on Service and Enforcement but Lacks Long-term, Quantitative Compliance Goals and Measures That Are Consistent with Results-Oriented Management Principles
IRS approaches tax gap reduction through improving service to taxpayers and enforcing tax laws and has established two broad strategic goals and related key efforts that are intended to support this approach. However, IRS has not established long-term, quantitative compliance goals and regularly collected data to track progress in reducing the tax gap, which would complement its current important compliance efforts. Goal 1—Improve Taxpayer Service—is intended to promote voluntary compliance. However, although IRS has recently proposed a schedule for future NRP studies, it has no approved plans to repeat this study or periodically measure compliance across the various components of the tax gap. Although it may not be feasible or necessary to measure compliance for all components of the tax gap at the same frequency or with the same level of investment, where practical methodologies exist, periodic measurements should be taken. Nevertheless, given the difficulty of consistently determining why taxpayers are noncompliant, sustained research on these reasons also would be needed to develop a better understanding. Having compliance goals, coupled with recently collected NRP data, would provide a solid base upon which IRS can develop a more strategic, results-oriented approach to reducing the tax gap. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a gap arises each year between what taxpayers pay accurately and on time in taxes and what they should pay under the law. The tax gap is composed of underreporting of tax liabilities on tax returns, underpaying of taxes due from filed returns, and nonfiling of required tax returns altogether or on time. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the estimated amount that each major type of noncompliance contributed to the 2001 tax gap and IRS's views on the certainty of its tax gap estimates, (2) reasons why noncompliance occurs, and (3) IRS's approach to reducing the tax gap and whether the approach incorporates established results-oriented planning principles.
What GAO Found
IRS estimates that underreporting of taxes accounted for about $250 billion to $292 billion of the $312 billion to $353 billion tax gap for 2001, while underpayment and nonfiling accounted for about $32 billion and $30 billion, respectively. Although IRS has collected recent compliance data, it still has concerns with some outdated methodologies and data used to estimate the tax gap. IRS is taking laudable steps intended to improve the estimate, which it plans to revise by the end of 2005. IRS has also developed a proposed schedule of compliance studies, but it has no approved plans to periodically measure compliance for the tax gap components. While it may not be feasible or necessary to measure compliance for all components at the same frequency or level of investment, periodic compliance studies would support a more data-driven and risk-based approach to reducing the tax gap. IRS recently began to capture data on the reasons why taxpayers are noncompliant. However, IRS has concerns about the data, such as examiners assigning the same reason for noncompliance regardless of situation. Also, it is often difficult for examiners to determine a taxpayer's intent--whether the noncompliance is unintentional or intentional. Collecting better data on reasons can help IRS focus its activities on taxpayer service or enforcement. Although IRS is developing a system intended to capture better examination data, IRS does not have firm or specific plans to develop better reason data. IRS approaches tax gap reduction through improving taxpayer service and enforcing tax laws and has two broad strategic goals and related key efforts that are intended to support this approach. However, IRS has not established long-term, quantitative compliance goals and regularly collected data to track its progress, which would complement its current, important compliance efforts. Establishing clear goals and measuring progress towards them would be consistent with results-oriented management principles. IRS has begun to consider additional goals, but it is not yet clear if they will be compliance related. Long-term, quantitative compliance goals, coupled with updated compliance data, would provide a solid base upon which to develop a more strategic, results-oriented approach to reducing the tax gap. |
gao_GAO-08-665 | gao_GAO-08-665_0 | As shown in table 1, available DOD data indicate that these 20 installations are expecting a combined net growth of over 173,000 military and civilian personnel over fiscal years 2006-2012, not counting family members and nonmission-related contractors who are also expected to relocate to the surrounding communities and generate additional community infrastructure needs. Growth Communities Have Begun to Identify Infrastructure Needs, but Planning Has Been Hampered by a Lack of Consistent and Detailed Information about DOD Personnel Movements
Communities surrounding DOD growth installations have begun to identify infrastructure needs in general terms, but planning efforts have been hampered by a lack of consistent and detailed information about anticipated DOD personnel movements. However, until the military departments begin to disseminate consistent and more detailed information about the defense personnel moves they know about, it will be difficult for community, state, and federal officials to plan for and provide necessary infrastructure and quality-of-life support to members of the armed services, their families, and other community residents. When asked to report their top infrastructure challenges, 16 of the 20 communities cited transportation, principally roads. Further, the directive requires each of the military services to develop implementing guidance for providing planning information to installations, communities, and OEA. Nevertheless, several communities expressed concerns about the lack of information regarding dependents, particularly regarding the number of school-aged children expected to accompany arriving military personnel. OEA and Other Agencies Are Providing Some Assistance to Communities, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense Has Not Provided the High-Level Leadership Necessary to Help Ensure Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination
While OEA, other DOD agencies, and some state, local, and federal government agencies have provided some assistance to DOD growth communities, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided the high-level leadership necessary to help ensure interagency and intergovernmental coordination at levels that can make policy and budgetary decisions to better leverage resources through the EAC. OEA Has Provided Planning and Technical Assistance to Affected Communities
DOD’s efforts to assist communities affected by base closures, realignments, or expansions are consolidated in OEA, which has been proactive in working with communities it believes will be substantially and seriously impacted by DOD activities. To ensure that communities substantially and seriously affected by DOD actions receive assistance, the 22-agency EAC was created by presidential executive order. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to assist communities in planning to provide the infrastructure necessary to support defense-related growth and to ensure quality of life for members of the armed forces, their families, and other members of surrounding communities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the military services and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop and implement guidance, no later than the end of fiscal year 2008, that is consistent with DOD Directive 5410.12 for the timely, complete, and consistent dissemination of DOD planning information such as estimated timelines and numbers of personnel relocating, as well as demographic data such as numbers of school- aged children, and to update this information quarterly. As our review has shown, the full committee has not met since November 2006. While DOD has left the workings of the EAC to the Office of Economic Adjustment, we do not believe that this office can effectively guide interagency operations at a high enough level to promote interagency cooperation and provide priority considerations to defense- affected communities and therefore we reiterate our recommendation to hold regular meetings of the executive-level EAC. We selected all 20 communities that DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) had determined to be growth locations expected to be substantially and seriously impacted based on OEA criteria as of January 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to several simultaneous Department of Defense (DOD) force structure and basing initiatives, 20 installations are expecting a combined net growth of over 173,000 military and civilian personnel, not including family members and all contractors, over fiscal years 2006-2012. Although communities surrounding these installations can expect to realize economic benefits in the long term, DOD has identified these 20 to be substantially and seriously impacted in terms of being able to provide infrastructure to accommodate the growth. In response to the House report to the fiscal year 2007 defense appropriations bill, GAO (1) examined the extent to which communities affected by DOD's actions have identified their infrastructure needs, and (2) assessed DOD's efforts and those of other agencies to assist affected communities. GAO reviewed applicable directives and executive orders, surveyed the 20 growth communities, and met with community and agency officials to discuss growth issues.
What GAO Found
Communities surrounding DOD growth installations have begun to identify infrastructure needs to help support expected personnel growth in general terms, but planning efforts have been hampered by a lack of consistent and detailed information about anticipated DOD personnel movements. When asked to identify their top infrastructure challenges, 16 of the 20 communities identified by DOD as substantially and seriously impacted cited transportation, 11 named school capacity, and 6 said affordable housing. However, communities lack the detailed planning information, such as the growth population demographics, necessary to effectively plan and obtain financing for infrastructure projects. A DOD directive requires the military services to develop guidance for providing planning information to installations, communities, and DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), but GAO found that none had done so. While the consistency of the personnel relocation data DOD provides has improved, over half of the communities we surveyed expressed concerns about the completeness of the personnel data they receive and the lack of detailed demographic data, such as the number and ages of dependent children expected to accompany incoming service members and attend school. Until the military departments begin to disseminate consistent and more detailed information about planned defense personnel moves, it will be difficult for community, state, and federal officials to effectively plan for and provide necessary infrastructure to accommodate DOD personnel and their families relocating to growth-impacted communities. OEA, other DOD agencies, and some state, local, and federal agencies have provided grants and technical assistance to DOD growth communities, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided the high-level leadership critical to achieving effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination. To ensure that DOD-impacted communities receive assistance, the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) was created by executive order over 30 years ago and amended as recently as 2005. The Secretary of Defense, or his designee, chairs the committee that is required to lead efforts to assist communities most affected by its activities and serve as a clearinghouse for sharing information about expected DOD impacts on the communities surrounding military growth installations, as well as information regarding possible government resources that could mitigate some of those impacts. As chair of the EAC, DOD could regularly convene full committee meetings and exercise the high-level leadership needed to help ensure that federal agencies are affording certain priority considerations to defense-affected communities. However, the full committee has not met since November 2006. Instead, DOD has left the workings of the EAC to OEA, which has been proactive in assisting impacted communities but can not guide interagency operations at a high enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation. Consequently, in the absence of high-level DOD leadership, the committee has not developed a clearinghouse for information sharing which could more effectively match government resources with the needs of DOD-impacted communities. |
gao_AIMD-98-228 | gao_AIMD-98-228_0 | Agency Performance Plans Did Not Consistently Provide Clear Pictures of Intended Performance
At the most basic level, an annual performance plan is to provide a clear picture of intended performance across the agency. Defining Expected Performance
Almost all of the annual performance plans that we reviewed contained at least some objective, quantifiable, and measurable annual performance goals—a key expectation of Congress in enacting the Results Act. Overall, however, the annual performance goals and accompanying measures in the plans would need significant development to improve the usefulness of the plans to congressional and other decisionmakers. However, the Act envisions that agencies’ plans would contain goals that focus on the results that programs are intended to achieve, which is particularly important for policymakers. A few performance plans were more useful in that they discussed how agencies expected to coordinate efforts with other agencies that have similar responsibilities. Agency Performance Plans Generally Did Not Relate Strategies and Resources to Performance
In general, the annual performance plans did not provide sufficiently complete discussions of the strategies and resources that agencies will use to achieve their performance goals. The performance plans often provided listings of the agencies’ current array of programs and initiatives but provided only limited perspective on how these programs and initiatives were necessary to or helpful for achieving results. Most of the plans provided descriptions of procedures for verifying and validating performance data, but these descriptions were often superficial. Moreover, these plans generally did not discuss whether agencies had coordinated with their IGs to perform this work. The findings of that report are a major concern because a federal environment that focuses on results—where federal efforts are often but one factor among many that determine whether and if goals are achieved—depends on program evaluations to provide vital information about the contribution of federal efforts. Conclusions
We found that on the whole, future annual performance plans would be more useful if they provide clearer pictures of intended performance across an agency, more fully articulate what strategies and resources will be used to achieve goals and how those strategies and resources will lead to improved performance, and provide much greater confidence that performance information will be credible and useful for decisionmaking. To go beyond the formal requirements of the Results Act to issue annual performance plans and performance reports, and to build a base of experience for how the performance-based approach to management envisioned under the Results Act can be used to improve program results and support congressional and executive branch decisionmaking, we also recommend that the Director of OMB work with Congress and the agencies to identify specific program areas that can be used as best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO summarized its reviews of individual federal agency performance plans, focusing on opportunities to improve the usefulness of future performance plans for decisionmakers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the agencies' first annual performance plans showed the potential for doing performance planning and measurement as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act to provide decisionmakers with valuable perspective and useful information for improving program performance; (2) however, overall, substantial further development is needed for these plans to be useful in a significant way to congressional and other decisionmakers; (3) most of the plans that GAO reviewed contained major weaknesses that undermined their usefulness in that they: (a) did not consistently provide clear pictures of agencies' intended performance, (b) generally did not relate strategies and resources to performance; and (c) provided limited confidence that agencies' performance data will be sufficiently credible; (4) GAO believes that Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the agencies need to build on the experiences of the first round of annual performance planning by working together and targeting key performance issues that will help to make future plans more useful; (5) most of the performance plans had at least some objective, quantifiable, and measurable goals, but few plans consistently included a comprehensive set of goals that focused on the results that programs were intended to achieve; (6) the plans generally did not go further to describe how agencies expected to coordinate their efforts with those of other agencies; (7) most agencies' performance plans did not provide clear strategies that described how performance goals would be achieved; (8) the performance plans generally provided listings of the agencies' current array of programs and initiatives but provided limited perspective on how these programs and initiatives were necessary or helpful for achieving results; (9) most of the plans did not adequately describe the resources needed to achieve their agencies' performance goals; (10) most annual performance plans provided only superficial descriptions of procedures that agencies intended to use to verify and validate performance data; and (11) the absence of program evaluation capacity is a major concern, because a federal environment that focuses on results depends on program evaluation to provide vital information about the contribution of the federal effort. |
gao_GAO-12-235 | gao_GAO-12-235_0 | Holding companies are legally separate entities from their subsidiary banks, are subject to separate capital requirements, and are supervised and regulated by the Federal Reserve. For example, most foreign banks’ operations are conducted through branches, and they generally can engage in the same activities as branches of U.S. banks. The Federal Reserve’s supervisory letter stated that this action was consistent with its treatment of domestic banks and financial holding companies. FDIC and some market participants have noted that the elimination of the exemption enhances the equal treatment of U.S. and foreign-owned holding companies by requiring both types of companies to hold similar capital levels in the United States. Stricter Capital Adequacy Standards Also Will Apply to Foreign and U.S. Holding Companies
In addition to eliminating the capital exemption for certain foreign-owned intermediate holding companies, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that bank and thrift holding companies—domestic or foreign—meet minimum risk- based capital and leverage requirements that are not less than those that apply to insured depository institutions. Overall Effects of Capital Changes for Exempt Foreign- owned Intermediate Holding Companies Likely to Be Limited
The elimination of the Federal Reserve’s capital exemption for foreign- owned intermediate holding companies likely will result in exempt holding companies restructuring or taking other actions, but the overall effects of this change on competition among bank holding companies and cost and availability of credit are likely to be small for various reasons. First, our analysis of loan markets suggests that eliminating the exemption likely would have a limited effect on the price and quantity of credit available because the four banks most affected have relatively small shares of relatively competitive U.S. loan markets. Second, our review of the academic literature and our econometric analysis suggest that changes in capital rules that could affect certain foreign-owned intermediate holding companies would have a limited effect on loan volumes, and the increase in the cost of credit likely will add minimally to the cumulative cost of new financial regulations. These exempt holding companies accounted for about 3.1 percent of the loans on the balance sheets of all bank holding companies in the United States (see table 3). While the impact on the price and quantity of credit available may vary across regions, modeling limitations restrict our ability to estimate potential regional differences. Market Participants Concerned about Differing Capital Regimes and Competitive Effects Abroad
Market participants expressed uncertainty about how changes in capital requirements might affect the competitiveness of U.S. banks operating abroad, partly because the international regulatory landscape remains unsettled. The largest internationally active U.S. banks derive a significant portion of their revenues from their operations abroad and are subject to multiple regulatory regimes. However, bank officials we contacted were uncertain how changes in capital requirements might affect their competitiveness abroad and were monitoring U.S. and international reforms closely to assess any impact on their cost of capital, lending ability, and business competitiveness. Internationally active U.S. banks have varying lines of business. In addition to the specific concerns related to the implementation of Basel III, both U.S. and foreign bank officials we interviewed told us that they were concerned that fragmented or conflicting regulations in the United States and other jurisdictions might restrict banks’ ability to use capital efficiently. Many U.S. banks GAO interviewed expressed concerns about the added costs of compliance with multiple regulatory regimes and the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the global competitiveness of U.S. banks, but these concerns would need to be considered against the potential benefits of a safer and sounder financial system. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the FDIC, the Federal Reserve and OCC for their review and comment. Each of the federal banking regulators provided technical comments that were incorporated in the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of the report were to examine (1) the regulation of foreign- owned intermediate holding companies in the United States, (2) the potential effects of changes in U.S. capital requirements on foreign- owned intermediate holding companies, and (3) banks’ views on the potential effects of changes in U.S. capital requirements on U.S.-owned banks operating abroad. Appendix II: Impact of Reducing the Risk-Weighted Assets of Exempt Holding Companies to Comply with New Requirements
Bank holding companies can take different approaches to comply with the new capital requirement in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. As of the end of 2010, four foreign-owned intermediate holding companies continued to rely on a capital exemption from the Federal Reserve. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated this exemption, and these exempt holding companies must now meet new capital requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many U.S. and international financial institutions lacked capital of sufficient quality and quantity to absorb substantial losses. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) introduced new minimum capital requirements for bank and savings and loan (thrift) holding companiesincluding intermediate holding companies of foreign banks. Intermediate holding companies are the entities located between foreign parent banks and their U.S. subsidiary banks. These companies held about 9 percent of total U.S. bank holding companies assets as of September 2011. The Dodd-Frank Act also required GAO to examine (1) regulation of foreign-owned intermediate holding companies in the United States, (2) potential effects of changes in U.S. capital requirements on foreign-owned intermediate holding companies, and (3) banks views on the potential effects of changes in U.S. capital requirements on U.S. banks operating abroad. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed legal, regulatory, and academic documents; analyzed bank financial data; and interviewed regulatory and banking officials and market participants.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to the federal banking regulators (Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) for their review and comment. They provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Foreign-owned intermediate holding companies can engage in the same activities as and generally are regulated similarly to their U.S. counterparts. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) oversees the regulation, supervision, and examination of foreign and U.S. bank and thrift holding companies. As of the end of 2010, four qualifying foreign-owned intermediate holding companies (exempt holding companies) were relying on a capital exemption, which allowed them to operate with significantly lower capital than U.S. peers. Federal Reserve officials noted that allowing capital to be held at the foreign parent bank (consolidated) level was consistent with its supervision for U.S. bank holding companies and met international standards for home-host supervision. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the capital exemption in order to enhance equal treatment of U.S.- and foreign-owned holding companies by requiring both types of companies to hold similar capital levels in the United States. As a result, these exempt holding companies must meet minimum capital standards that are not less than those applicable to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-insured depository institutions by July 2015.
The four exempt holding companies have been considering various actions to comply with new capital requirements, and the effects of eliminating the capital exemption on competition and credit cost and availability likely would be small. Specifically, these companies are considering raising capital, decreasing their holdings of risky assets, restructuring, or adopting a combination of these actions. GAOs analysis of loan markets suggests that the elimination of the capital exemption likely would have a limited effect on the price and quantity of credit available because the affected banks have relatively small shares of U.S. loan markets, which are competitive. These four companies accounted for about 3.1 percent of the loans on the balance sheets of all bank holding companies in the United States as of year end 2010. In addition, GAOs review of the academic literature and econometric analysis both suggest that changes in capital rules that affect the exempt companies would have a limited effect on loan volumes and the cost of credit and add minimally to the cumulative cost of new financial regulations. Although the impact on the price and quantity of credit available may vary across regions, modeling limitations restricted GAOs ability to identify regional differences.
Market participants expressed uncertainty about how changes in capital requirements might affect the competitiveness of U.S. banks operating abroad, partly because international regulatory capital requirements have yet to be implemented. The largest internationally active U.S. banks derived about one-third of their 2010 revenues from operations abroad. They face a variety of domestic and foreign competitors and are subject to multiple regulatory regimes. Bank officials expressed uncertainty about how changes in capital requirements will affect their cost of capital, lending ability, and competitiveness. Furthermore, they were concerned that fragmented or conflicting regulations across national jurisdictions might restrict banks ability to use capital efficiently. Many U.S. banks GAO interviewed expressed concerns about the added costs of compliance with multiple regulatory regimes and the impact of the Act on the global competitiveness of U.S. banks, but these concerns would need to be considered against the potential benefits of a safer and sounder financial system. |
gao_GAO-08-452 | gao_GAO-08-452_0 | X-rays and other standard imaging services, CT, and certain nuclear medicine services, such as positron emission tomography (PET), use radiation; ultrasound uses sound waves; MRI uses magnets and radio waves. Medicare Spending on Imaging Increased across the Six Imaging Modalities but Grew Faster for Advanced Imaging Services
Medicare spending on imaging services paid for under the Part B physician fee schedule more than doubled from 2000 through 2006, increasing to about $14 billion. 1.) The proportion of Medicare beneficiaries receiving at least one imaging service increased from 63 percent to 66 percent during this period. Several factors account for the rest of the growth in Medicare spending for imaging services. 2). Third, in-office imaging spending per beneficiary varied substantially across geographic regions of the country, suggesting that not all the spending was necessary or appropriate. Physicians Generated an Increasing Share of Revenue from In-Office Imaging Services
Consistent with these trends, physicians in specialties other than radiology who billed Medicare for in-office imaging services obtained an increasing share of their Medicare revenue from imaging services from 2000 to 2006. We found that per beneficiary spending on imaging services provided in physician offices varied almost eight-fold across the states in 2006—from $62 in Vermont to $472 in Florida (see fig. To Manage Imaging Expenditures, Private Health Care Plans in Our Study Use Certain Practices to Constrain Spending Growth
Similar to Medicare, private health plans in recent years have experienced rapid growth in imaging services, particularly in advanced imaging. Officials of the plans or the RBMs they use told us that prior authorization, which requires physicians to obtain some form of plan approval before ordering a service, was the practice most important to managing their physicians’ use of imaging services. This practice was in addition to retrospective payment safeguards commonly used to identify medical claims that do not meet certain billing criteria. Instead, CMS employs, through its claims administration contractors, an array of retrospective payment safeguards, or activities, that occur in the post- delivery phase of monitoring services. With respect to rapidly growing imaging services, the experience of the private plans in our study suggests that the benefits of front-end management of these services exceeded their costs. We believe CMS may be able to improve its prudent purchaser efforts by adopting strategies such as prior authorization and privileging. To examine the relationship between spending growth and the provision of imaging services in physician offices, we analyzed Medicare claims data from 2000 and 2006. To examine the approaches used by private payers that may have lessons for Medicare in managing spending on imaging services, we selected 17 private payers known to be active in managing imaging benefits that included a combination of national and regional payers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--and the Congress, through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), recently acted to constrain spending on imaging services, one of the fastest growing set of services under Medicare Part B, which covers physician and other outpatient services. GAO was asked to provide information to help the Congress evaluate imaging services in Medicare. In this report, GAO provides information on (1) trends in Medicare spending on imaging services from 2000 through 2006, (2) the relationship between spending growth and the provision of imaging services in physicians' offices, and (3) imaging management practices used by private payers that may have lessons for Medicare. To do this work, GAO analyzed Medicare claims data from 2000 through 2006, interviewed private health care plans, and reviewed health services literature.
What GAO Found
From 2000 through 2006, Medicare spending for imaging services paid for under the physician fee schedule more than doubled--increasing to about $14 billion. Spending on advanced imaging, such as CT scans, MRIs, and nuclear medicine, rose substantially faster than other imaging services such as ultrasound, X-ray, and other standard imaging. GAO's analysis of the 6-year period showed certain trends linking spending growth to the provision of imaging services in physician offices. The proportion of Medicare spending on imaging services performed in-office rose from 58 percent to 64 percent. Physicians also obtained an increasing share of their Medicare revenue from imaging services. In addition, in-office imaging spending per beneficiary varied substantially across geographic regions of the country, suggesting that not all utilization was necessary or appropriate. By 2006, in-office imaging spending per beneficiary varied almost eight-fold across the states--from $62 in Vermont to $472 in Florida. Private health care plans that GAO interviewed used certain practices to manage spending growth that may have lessons for CMS. They relied chiefly on prior authorization, which requires physicians to obtain some form of plan approval to assure coverage before ordering a service. Several plans attributed substantial drops in annual spending increases on imaging services to the use of prior authorization. In contrast, CMS employs an array of retrospective payment safeguard activities that occur in the post-delivery phase of monitoring services and are focused on identifying medical claims that do not meet certain billing criteria. The private plans' experience suggests that front-end management of these services could add to CMS's prudent purchaser efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-76 | gao_GAO-08-76_0 | Elements of FAA’s Cost Assignment Methodology Design Are Generally Consistent with Federal Cost Accounting Standards and International Guidance
FAA designed its CAMERA cost methodology so that the resulting cost assignments would be consistent with federal policies on the establishment of user fees, and, to the extent practicable, with international guidance for air navigation service providers on setting fees. Federal cost accounting standards establish a flexible principle for assigning costs, not a specific methodology that agency management must follow. FAA used the three categories of costing methods found in the federal standards to assign costs to users. Further Documentation and Analysis Is Needed to Justify Key Assumptions and Methods
While elements of FAA’s cost assignment methodology design comply with pertinent guidance, we identified matters related to the application of certain assumptions and cost assignment methods underlying the methodology that need further justification to demonstrate that the resulting cost assignments to users are reasonable. However, FAA did not (1) adequately document the basis on which it assigned costs to turbine and piston user groups or (2) conduct sufficient analysis (e.g., econometric analysis) to support its assumption that all types of aircraft with the same type of engine (e.g., smaller jet aircraft versus larger commercial jets) affect costs in the same manner. Because general aviation jet aircraft are included in the turbine user group, FAA’s methodology allocated a portion of these costs, such as those for navigational aids and other equipment, to the general aviation aircraft operators. Use of Facilities and Equipment Budget Authority in the Cost Base Needs to be Monitored
Because the total of ATO’s fiscal year 2005 GAAP-based acquisition, implementation, and depreciation expenses taken from CAS were less than ATO’s budget authority for the F&E account, a user fee based on GAAP expenses would be insufficient to fund the budgeted costs for facilities and equipment. The manner in which these adjustments are assigned may, over time, result in costs being assigned to users who differ from the ultimate users of the new F&E when it becomes operational, leading to unintentional cross-subsidization among users. The design of FAA’s methodology is generally consistent with the principles and methods set forth in federal cost accounting standards and international guidance. However, the lack of sufficient support for certain of the methodology’s underlying assumptions and methods leaves open the possibility that the study should assign costs to commercial, general aviation, and exempt users differently. Notwithstanding the need to balance precision with simplicity and transparency, FAA, Congress, and users of air traffic control services would benefit from additional documentation and analysis for key assumptions impacting the assignment of costs to the different user groups and further evaluation of the reasonableness of FAA’s method of allocating overhead, indirect, and other miscellaneous costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide additional support for the reasonableness of FAA’s cost assignment methodology and to monitor F&E cost assignments to users, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FAA to adequately document the basis on which costs are assigned to user groups; evaluate the methods and basis upon which various overhead, indirect, and other miscellaneous costs are assigned to user groups and document the effect of any changes thereto; determine whether and quantify the extent to which commercial, general aviation, and exempt users who use either single type of aircraft—turbine or piston—impose costs differently on the air traffic control system; and establish a mechanism for monitoring, by user group, any cumulative difference between original cost allocations for budgeted facilities and equipment project costs and actual usage of those assets, and adjusting prospective cost assignments accordingly. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2007 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported the results of its study that assigned the fiscal year 2005 costs of its Air Traffic Organization (ATO) to users. FAA used this study to support the President's proposal to replace many current excise taxes with cost-based fees for commercial aviation users and higher fuel taxes for general aviation users. GAO assessed (1) the consistency of FAA's cost assignment methodology with established standards and guidance, (2) the support for selected cost assignment assumptions and methods, and (3) the impact of including budgeted capital costs in the cost baseline. GAO compared FAA's methodology to federal accounting standards and international guidance, reviewed available documents and analyses supporting FAA's assumptions and methods, and interviewed FAA officials and consultants.
What GAO Found
With the federal government preparing for the next generation of air travel, the President, Congress, and users of the national airspace are considering alternative methods for funding air traffic control in the national airspace. To support a cost-based funding structure such as the current proposal from the President, FAA developed a methodology for assigning costs to users. Federal cost accounting standards and international guidance establish flexible principles for assigning costs and recognize that the selection of methods involves making choices that require balancing the cost of development and implementation with the benefit of precision in the resulting cost assignments. GAO found that the design of key elements of FAA's methodology was generally consistent with federal standards and international guidance. But GAO also identified matters related to the application of certain assumptions and cost assignment methods that need additional documentation and analysis. Because building a methodology for assigning costs to users involves standards, alternative methodologies, and choices, documenting the decisions made and how they were made is important to allow users and others to assess whether the methodology and the structure of cost assignment is reasonable. FAA provided adequate support for its decision to assign costs based on whether the aircraft using air traffic control services are powered by turbine engines, such as jets, or piston engines, such as propeller-driven airplanes. However, FAA did not adequately document the basis on which it assigned costs to the aircraft groups or support its assumption that all types of aircraft with the same engine type affect costs in the same manner, leaving open the possibility that costs should be assigned to users differently. GAO also found that FAA's methodology does not take advantage of allocations already made in its cost accounting system, but instead aggregates the costs and then allocates them to aircraft groups. For some of these costs, such as employee benefit costs, a different method of allocation could have produced a more precise distribution between the groups. A user fee designed to fund new facilities and equipment expenditures must provide funds equal to the annual budget for those expenditures. FAA's methodology includes adjusting current-year actual expenses to equal the budgeted amount for facilities and equipment costs. These adjustments are then assigned to users in the same proportion as are current acquisition, implementation, and depreciation expenses. But users of future facilities and equipment may be different from users of existing facilities and equipment. The manner in which the costs of facilities and equipment are assigned may, over time, result in assigning costs to users who are different from the ultimate users of future facilities and equipment once they become operational. Consequently, the implementation of this method warrants careful monitoring to avoid unintentional cross-subsidization among users. |
gao_GAO-08-45 | gao_GAO-08-45_0 | The sales period for the three semipostals has varied. Semipostals Have Collectively Raised Over $68 Million, but the Breast Cancer Research Semipostal Has Raised the Most
As of June 30, 2007, more than $68 million has been raised through the sale of semipostals. Also, based on our discussions with various agencies, organizations, advocacy groups, and fund-raising experts, we identified a number of factors that affected semipostal sales, including public awareness, stamp design, and confusion about how the proceeds will be used. Breast Cancer Research Stamp
The Breast Cancer Research stamp has raised about $54.6 million, which dwarfs the funds raised by the other semipostals. 1). Several factors affected Breast Cancer Research stamp sales to date. From the stamp sales, the Service transferred about $10.6 million to FEMA for distribution to the families of emergency relief personnel who were either killed or permanently disabled while serving in the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 2). Designated Agencies Have Distributed Semipostal Proceeds, but Only DOD and ACF Have Reported Their Use of the Proceeds to Congress
All of the designated federal agencies have distributed proceeds from the sale of semipostals to their respective causes. ACF Uses Stop Family Violence Stamp Proceeds for Grant Program
ACF is using the proceeds from the Stop Family Violence stamp to fund a discretionary grant program called Demonstration of Enhanced Services to Children and Youth Who Have Been Exposed to Domestic Violence that supports children who have been exposed to domestic violence. FEMA Recently Distributed Proceeds from Heroes of 2001 Stamp
FEMA has received over $10.5 million from Heroes of 2001 stamp proceeds for distribution to the families of emergency relief personnel who were either killed or permanently disabled while serving in the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Some Agencies Report on Use of Stamp Proceeds
In our 2005 report, we recommended that the designated agencies issue reports to Congress on their use of semipostal proceeds. NIH does not have any plans to report to Congress on its use of proceeds from the Breast Cancer Research stamp, but NIH officials noted that information on the breast cancer stamp is available to the public on its website and, occasionally, through the NCI newsletter. However, NIH’s website did not provide detailed information on the amount of proceeds received to date, how the proceeds were used and any related accomplishments resulting from the use of these proceeds. Postal Service (Service) provided to us. The four designated federal agencies are the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Breast Cancer Research semipostal; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the Heroes of 2001 semipostal; and the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) within the Department of Health and Human Services for the Stop Family Violence semipostal. | Why GAO Did This Study
As required by Congress, the U.S. Postal Service (Service) has issued three fundraising stamps--also called semipostals--which are sold at a higher price than First-Class stamps, with the difference distributed to designated federal agencies for specific causes. The proceeds from the three stamps are to fund breast cancer research, assistance to families of emergency relief personnel killed or permanently disabled in the terrorist attacks of September 11, and services to children exposed to domestic violence. Of the three stamps, the Breast Cancer Research stamp is the only semipostal currently being sold. GAO has issued three prior reports on semipostals. To provide Congress updated information, GAO examined (1) the amount of money that has been raised through the sale of semipostals, and (2) how the designated federal agencies have used the proceeds and reported the results.
What GAO Found
As of June 2007, more than$68 million has been raised through semipostal sales. Of the three semipostals, the Breast Cancer Research stamp had proceeds totaling approximately $54.6 million, the Heroes of 2001 stamp had proceeds totaling about $10.6 million, and the Stop Family Violence stamp had proceeds totaling about $3.2 million. The authorized sale period for each semipostal affected the funds raised. In discussions with relevant agencies, advocacy groups and fund-raising organizations, several factors were identified that affected semipostal sales. These factors include public awareness about the charitable cause that a stamp represents, the stamp's design, and confusion about how the proceeds will be used. All four of the designated federal agencies have distributed proceeds from their respective semipostals. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) continue to award grants and fund programs for research with proceeds from the Breast Cancer Research stamp, and have added new programs to distribute the proceeds. The Administration for Children (ACF) within Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) used the proceeds from the Stop Family Violence stamp to award nine grants to programs that support children who have been exposed to domestic violence. Also, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) recently distributed the last of the proceeds from the Heroes of 2001 stamp to the families of emergency relief personnel who were either killed or permanently disabled while serving in the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In September 2005, GAO recommended that the designated federal agencies annually report to Congress on their use of semipostal proceeds. DOD and ACF have submitted reports to Congress, and FEMA plans to report in the near future. NIH does not plan to prepare a report for Congress, but offers information on NIH's use of Breast Cancer Research stamp proceeds on its public website. But, NIH's website did not provide detailed information on proceeds received, how proceeds were used and related achievements. |
gao_GAO-16-335 | gao_GAO-16-335_0 | DOD uses USGS information on materials, in part, to help address its National Defense Stockpile program objectives. USGS data on worldwide tantalum production is the primary production data source used by DOD to support its stockpile analyses. Tantalum Data from Government and Industry Sources Vary Due to Differences in Forms of Tantalum Reported and Data Collection Methods
Government and industry tantalum information differ because the government reports on tantalum ore from mining operations, whereas industry data include not only mining but also data on additional forms of processed tantalum, such as synthetic concentrates and scrap. Having reliable tantalum data is important because DOD uses the information to assess the availability of tantalum supply by country during specific planning scenarios, among other efforts. In contrast, TIC data are provided as a service to its member companies rather than in support of the federal government, and are based on tantalum supply data voluntarily reported by those members. To inform DOD’s stockpile analysis, USGS provides DLA-Strategic Materials with the data it collects and validates, and DLA-Strategic Materials takes steps to ensure that the data are reliable. DLA-Strategic Materials is also taking additional steps to review and analyze industry data sources to address tantalum data challenges and better inform its stockpile analysis. Since 2013, it has recommended stockpiling various amounts of tantalum. A component of this step is to estimate the global supply of tantalum available for United States civilian and defense needs. For example, as discussed above, the TIC’s data is not reported by country, which limits its use in support of the National Defense Stockpile analyses. Neither DOD nor the Department of the Interior provided written comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The House Armed Services Committee Report on a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to examine the global tantalum supply chain. This report addresses (1) how data on tantalum supply reported by government sources differ from data reported by industry and (2) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has assessed the availability of tantalum during national defense emergency planning scenarios. To compare available tantalum data reported by government sources to industry sources, we met with United States Geological Survey (USGS) officials, Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials (DLA-Strategic Materials) and other DOD officials, and tantalum industry officials from the Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (TIC) to identify tantalum data sources and collection methods, and to discuss the availability of tantalum supply data. For the purpose of our review we focused on USGS tantalum production estimates, which are DOD’s primary source for estimated tantalum production in the 2015 Strategic and Critical Materials Report on Stockpile Requirements (Stockpile Report). We assessed the reliability of USGS data by (1) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (2) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We concluded that the data had been collected and used in accordance with principles developed by USGS and DLA-Strategic Materials and were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of obtaining an understanding of the process used to collect the data, the model for determining potential shortfalls of material, and the reports produced by DLA-Strategic Materials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States relies on foreign mine production of tantalum, a corrosion-resistant metal that is used in commercial and defense applications. Having reliable information on the global supply of tantalum is important for defense planning, particularly in determining if it is necessary to stockpile in case of future shortages. The House Armed Services Committee Report on a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to examine the global tantalum supply chain, with a focus on why data reported by the government and by industry vary.
This report addresses (1) how tantalum supply data reported by government sources differ from industry data, and (2) the extent to which DOD has assessed the availability of tantalum during emergency planning scenarios. GAO reviewed data compiled by the USGS—DOD's primary source for tantalum production data—and by a tantalum industry organization that makes its information publicly available. GAO interviewed DOD and industry officials about the reporting and collection methods for the data; examined the data DOD uses to determine potential shortfalls of materials, including data for its biennial Strategic and Critical Materials Reports on Stockpile Requirements; and discussed with DOD officials steps they have taken to assess the reliability of the data used in the analyses.
What GAO Found
Data published by government and industry on the global supply of tantalum vary due to differences in forms of tantalum reported and data collection methods. For example, government data prepared by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) on tantalum production reports information on tantalum ore from mining. Industry data GAO obtained from the Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center includes additional forms of processed tantalum, such as synthetic concentrates and slags and recycled tantalum materials. In collecting data, the USGS employs specialists to estimate production data by country of origin for government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), by conducting annual surveys of foreign governments on mine production and relying on country specialists. In contrast, industry data compiled by the Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center is based on aggregated data voluntarily reported by its member companies as a service to those members rather than in support of the federal government. The table below summarizes the differences in USGS and industry data.
Source: GAO analysis of United States Geological Survey and tantalum industry data and collection methods. I GAO-16-335
DOD assesses the availability of tantalum, among other materials, for selected planning scenarios for the National Defense Stockpile's biennial assessment process. Further, DOD takes steps to help ensure that tantalum supply data used in its stockpile analyses are reliable. For example, USGS provides the Defense Logistics Agency-Strategic Materials (DLA-Strategic Materials)—the stockpile program manager—with the data it collects and validates. Consistent with internal control standards, DLA-Strategic Materials officials said they then verify sources and check calculations to ensure that data are reliable before conducting their stockpile analyses. Since 2013, DLA-Strategic Materials has identified potential shortfalls for tantalum and recommended stockpiling. Given DLA-Strategic Materials' interest in using the most accurate information available, it is taking additional steps to review and analyze existing industry tantalum data sources to better inform its stockpile analyses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. Neither DOD nor the Department of the Interior provided written comments. |
gao_GAO-06-1018 | gao_GAO-06-1018_0 | Background
Contamination from the Hanford site that may threaten the Columbia River includes (1) contamination that resulted from disposal activities during the era in which DOE produced nuclear material; (2) contamination that could occur during cleanup activities, such as from an accidental spill; and (3) possible future migration of contamination from waste that will be permanently disposed of on the Hanford site in accordance with the cleanup actions DOE and the regulators plan to use. DOE is Taking Steps to Better Understand Risks to the Columbia River from Hanford and Is Replacing Ineffective Technologies near the River
DOE is taking steps to better understand the risk to the Columbia River from Hanford site contamination and to replace ineffective cleanup technologies. Specifically, DOE is addressing problems with three main aspects of its Columbia River protection efforts. DOE Has Asked to Extend Regulatory Milestones to Better Understand the Extent and Location of the Contamination in Soil above the Groundwater
While DOE has extensive knowledge of the contaminants in the river and groundwater, and the movement of contaminants in the groundwater and on or near the surface, DOE has only recently developed limited information about the extent and location of the contamination that has migrated from the surface areas into the vadose zone above the groundwater. However, DOE acknowledges that its understanding of contaminants in the vadose zone is limited in many areas of the site. DOE Has Begun To Address Management Weaknesses but Can Further Strengthen Its Management Plan
DOE has begun to address management problems with its Columbia River protection efforts at the Hanford site by proposing management improvements to better oversee and coordinate its groundwater and vadose zone activities. Although DOE is beginning to develop a plan for its new integration initiative, it has yet to implement key elements, such as performance measures or an evaluation strategy. These tools could help measure effectiveness and sustain the benefits of the initiative over time. In response to the congressional direction, in March 2006, DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management developed a new plan to better integrate Hanford’s river protection, vadose zone, and groundwater efforts. Specifically, DOE’s new integration initiative would: Consolidate most groundwater and vadose zone characterization and cleanup activities under a single project. DOE also outlined steps it would take toward its goal, such as (1) consolidating site modeling and risk assessments; (2) consolidating river protection efforts under a single project; and (3) integrating soil and groundwater cleanup decisions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To increase the likelihood that DOE will effectively implement and sustain improvements in its program to protect the Columbia River from contamination at the Hanford site, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy strengthen the management improvement plan by establishing results-oriented performance measures and regular evaluations to gauge the program’s effectiveness. In assessing DOE’s efforts to deploy effective technologies to address contamination near the river, we visited the sites of existing and planned cleanup efforts. We discussed current existing projects with DOE officials, contractor staff, regulators, and stakeholders, and reviewed reports prepared for DOE and others. We reviewed previous work in which we documented strategies used by high-performing organizations to implement improvement initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford site in Washington State is one of the most contaminated nuclear waste sites in North America. The Columbia River flows through about 50 miles of the site. Radioactive and hazardous contamination from decades of producing nuclear materials for the nation's defense have migrated through the soil into the groundwater, which generally flows toward the river. In November 2005, GAO reported on the potential for the Hanford site to contaminate the Columbia River. To address continuing concerns, GAO reviewed the status of DOE's efforts to (1) understand the risk to the Columbia River from Hanford site contamination and to deploy effective technologies to address contamination near the river and (2) strengthen the management of its river protection program. To assess DOE's efforts, GAO reviewed numerous reports by DOE and others, and discussed the problem with federal and state regulators and DOE officials.
What GAO Found
DOE is actively assessing the risk to the Columbia River from Hanford site contamination and is addressing problems with deployed river protection technologies. While DOE has extensive knowledge of contaminants that are currently in the groundwater and river, DOE knows less about contamination in the soil below the surface, known as the "vadose zone." Before proposing a cleanup approach, DOE has agreed with its regulators to take vadose zone samples in many of the contaminated areas of the site. DOE is also improving its computer simulation model that will predict future risk from the contamination, and deploying alternative technologies it believes will more effectively contain the contamination that may threaten the river. DOE has also begun to address concerns about its management of Columbia River protection efforts, particularly the lack of integration between groundwater and vadose zone activities. In March 2006, in response to congressional committee direction, DOE proposed a new initiative to better integrate its river protection activities. The initiative included consolidating most groundwater and vadose zone characterization work under a single project; better integrating vadose zone, groundwater, and surface cleanup decisions; and improving the coordination and control over computer models used to predict movement of contamination in future years. Initiating these management improvements is important, but it is equally important that they be implemented effectively, and past history gives some cause for concern. For example, one attempt by DOE to better integrate these activities was unsuccessful when key elements, such as putting all activities under a single project manager, failed to continue after project and other changes occurred at the site. In past GAO work, we reported that high-performing organizations sustained improvement initiatives when key elements were in place, such as clear goals, results-oriented performance measures, and evaluation strategies. Although DOE is beginning to develop a management plan for its new initiative, DOE has yet to implement some key elements, such as results-oriented performance measures and evaluations to gauge the effectiveness of its improvements, which could also help sustain the benefits of the improvements over time. |
gao_GAO-11-599 | gao_GAO-11-599_0 | 1.) 2.) National Data Likely Underestimate the Number of Children Who Died from Maltreatment and Provide Incomplete Information on Circumstances
More Children Have Likely Died from Maltreatment than Are Counted in National Data
More children have likely died from maltreatment than are reflected in the national estimate of 1,770 child fatalities for fiscal year 2009. Some children may not have been previously maltreated, or their earlier maltreatment may not have been noticed or reported to CPS agencies. The NIS is a congressionally mandated, periodic effort of HHS to estimate the incidence of child abuse and neglect in the United States. HHS Collects but Does Not Report Some Useful Information on the Circumstances Surrounding Child Fatalities
NCANDS collects more data on the circumstances surrounding child fatalities than are reflected in HHS’s annual Child Maltreatment report— information that could be useful for prevention. However, HHS does not report some information it collects on the circumstances surrounding child fatalities. Local Investigative Challenges and Limited Coordination Hinder States’ Efforts to Collect Child Maltreatment Fatality Data and Report to NCANDS
Investigative Difficulties Can Hamper Local Data Collection Efforts
Challenges faced by local investigators, such as law enforcement officials, medical examiners, and CPS staff, in determining whether a child’s death was caused by maltreatment make it difficult for states to collect complete data on child maltreatment fatalities. Lack of definitive medical evidence: Without definitive medical evidence, it can be difficult to determine that a child’s death was caused by abuse or neglect. Inconsistent interpretations and application of maltreatment definitions. HHS Provides Assistance to States in Reporting on Child Maltreatment Fatalities, but States Would Like Additional Help
HHS Provides Technical Assistance to States in Reporting Data on Child Maltreatment
HHS provides assistance to states in several ways to help them report information on child maltreatment to NCANDS. Although NCCDR regularly collaborates with federal organizations to analyze child fatality data and develop strategies to prevent child deaths, there has been little routine information sharing between NCCDR and NCANDS on child maltreatment fatalities. States Would Like Additional Assistance in Collecting and Using Data on Child Fatalities and Near Fatalities from Maltreatment
Although HHS provides a variety of assistance to states on how to report data to NCANDS, state officials indicated a need for additional assistance collecting child fatality as well as near-fatality data to use for prevention efforts. Conclusions
In conclusion, children’s deaths from maltreatment are especially distressing because they involve a failure on the part of adults responsible for protecting them. 3. Estimate the costs and benefits of collecting national data on near fatalities and take appropriate follow-up actions. DOJ and NCCDR provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its comments, HHS also raised concerns about the nationwide Web- based survey of child welfare administrators—one of several methodologies used for this report—noting that it had several limitations. At that time, we will send copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General of the United States, and other interested parties. The survey included questions about state laws related to child maltreatment, child welfare department coordination with other agencies or entities, state challenges related to identifying and collecting information on child maltreatment fatalities and reporting these data to NCANDS, child death review teams, state challenges related to collecting information on child maltreatment near fatalities, and federal assistance from HHS to states on data collection and reporting. Both states and NDACAN take steps to protect confidentiality. NCCDR Data Analysis
To examine the extent to which HHS collects and provides comprehensive information on child fatalities from maltreatment, we requested and obtained state child death review team data from NCCDR’s Child Death Review (CDR) Case Reporting System. Appendix III: Information from States Not Reported in NCANDS
State Data on Child Fatalities Not Reported to NCANDS
Thirty-two states also collected information on child maltreatment fatalities that were not reported to NCANDS in fiscal year 2009, according to our survey of state child welfare officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Children's deaths from maltreatment are especially distressing because they involve a failure on the part of adults who were responsible for protecting them. Questions have been raised as to whether the federal National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), which is based on voluntary state reports to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), fully captures the number or circumstances of child fatalities from maltreatment. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which HHS collects and reports comprehensive information on child fatalities from maltreatment, (2) the challenges states face in collecting and reporting this information to HHS, and (3) the assistance HHS provides to states in collecting and reporting data on child maltreatment fatalities. GAO analyzed 2009 NCANDS data--the latest data available--conducted a nationwide Web-based survey of state child welfare administrators, visited three states, interviewed HHS and other officials, and reviewed research and relevant federal laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
More children have likely died from maltreatment than are counted in NCANDS, and HHS does not take full advantage of available information on the circumstances surrounding child maltreatment deaths. NCANDS estimated that 1,770 children in the United States died from maltreatment in fiscal year 2009. According to GAO's survey, nearly half of states included data only from child welfare agencies in reporting child maltreatment fatalities to NCANDS, yet not all children who die from maltreatment have had contact with these agencies, possibly leading to incomplete counts. HHS also collects but does not report some information on the circumstances surrounding child maltreatment fatalities that could be useful for prevention, such as perpetrators' previous maltreatment of children. The National Center for Child Death Review (NCCDR), a nongovernmental organization funded by HHS, collects more detailed data on circumstances from 39 states, but these data on child maltreatment deaths have not yet been synthesized or published. States face numerous challenges in collecting child maltreatment fatality data and reporting to NCANDS. At the local level, lack of evidence and inconsistent interpretations of maltreatment challenge investigators--such as law enforcement, medical examiners, and child welfare officials--in determining whether a child's death was caused by maltreatment. Without medical evidence, it can be difficult to determine that a child's death was caused by abuse or neglect, such as in cases of shaken baby syndrome, when external injuries may not be readily visible. At the state level, limited coordination among jurisdictions and state agencies, in part due to confidentiality or privacy constraints, poses challenges for reporting data to NCANDS. HHS provides assistance to help states report child maltreatment fatalities, although states would like additional help. For example, HHS hosts an annual NCANDS technical assistance conference, provides individual state assistance, and, through NCCDR, has developed resources to help states collect information on child deaths. However, there has been limited collaboration between HHS and NCCDR on child maltreatment fatality information or prevention strategies to date. State officials indicated a need for additional information on how to coordinate across state agencies to collect more complete information on child maltreatment fatalities. States are also increasingly interested in collecting and using information on near fatalities from maltreatment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of HHS take steps to further strengthen data quality, expand available information on child fatalities, improve information sharing, and estimate the costs and benefits of collecting national data on near fatalities. In its comments, HHS agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-97-156 | gao_AIMD-97-156_0 | We identified safety concerns raised regarding the weather services provided at the Erie airport and obtained NWS’ responses to these concerns through interviews with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association safety representative at Erie International Airport, the manager of the Aviation Weather Requirements Division, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and NWS officials. Under NWS’ restructuring plan, the Erie WSO is slated for closure and has been spun down operationally. This certification must include (1) a description of local weather characteristics and weather-related concerns that affect the weather services provided within the service area, (2) a detailed comparison of the services provided within the service area and the services to be provided after such action, (3) a description of recent or expected modernization of NWS operations that will enhance services in the area, (4) identification of areas within a state that will not receive coverage (at an elevation of 10,000 feet or below) by the modernized radar network, (5) evidence, based upon a demonstration of modernized NWS operations, used to conclude that services will not be degraded from such action, and (6) any report of the Modernization Transition Committee that evaluates the proposed certification. Erie Spin-Down Began Prior to Initiation of Commerce Review
NWS started spinning down the Erie WSO by transferring warning responsibilities to the three assuming WFOs in August 1994 before the Department of Commerce began its review of areas of concern. NWS continued with its plans to spin down the office because officials believed they would be providing the best service to the area by relying on modernized radars in other offices. In February 1995, Erie was identified as 1 of 32 areas of concern. The Department of Commerce reviewed the 32 areas between June and August 1995, and issued its report in October 1995. Types of NWS Services Provided Before and After Spin-Down Are Generally the Same, but Concerns Exist Regarding NWS’ Ability to Serve Distant Areas
The three weather offices that assumed responsibility for the counties formerly served by the Erie WSO provide generally the same types of services that the Erie office had provided, with the exception of the general public’s local or toll-free telephone access to NWS personnel. Concerns Raised About Services to Erie and Crawford Counties and NWS Responses
Many concerns have been raised about the specific services being provided by NWS as well as the quality of the service provided. Concerns About Services at the Erie Airport and Timeliness of Lake Erie Small-Craft Advisories
A few concerns have been raised regarding weather services provided at the Erie International Airport and the timeliness of small-craft advisories for Lake Erie. Concerns surround the issue of whether this ASOS augmentation responsibility is too much for air traffic controllers. No Evidence of Service Degradation, but Detection of Lake-Effect Snow Remains a Concern
There are several sources of evidence that address whether a degradation of service has occurred in the Erie area. NWS is completing a 3-year study of its ability to detect and predict lake-effect snow in the Great Lakes area, which includes northwestern Pennsylvania. Therefore, the Secretary’s team recommended that NWS compare the adequacy of the assuming WFOs’ new radars and other data sources with Erie’s old radar in identifying lake-effect snow over a 2-year period to determine how well the composite weather system could help detect and predict lake-effect snow over the area in question. As a result, the Eastern Region report recommended that a radar be installed to provide better coverage for this severe weather phenomenon in northwestern Pennsylvania. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined how the National Weather Service (NWS) had implemented modernization and restructuring activities in northwestern Pennsylvania, focusing on identifying: (1) why the Erie, Pennsylvania, weather service office (WSO) was spun down prior to the Department of Commerce's October 1995 report on 32 areas of concern; (2) what types of services were provided to the counties served by the Erie office before and after office spin-down, as well as what public concerns have been raised, and how NWS responded to them; (3) what safety concerns have been raised to weather services at the Erie airport and to the timeliness of small-craft advisories for Lake Erie, including how NWS responded to public concerns about these issues; and (4) whether any reliable statistical or other evidence exists that addresses whether a degradation of service in the Erie area has occurred as a result of the modernization and office restructuring.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NWS started spinning down the Erie WSO by transferring warning responsibilities to the three assuming Weather Forecast Offices (WFO) in August 1994 before the Department of Commerce began its review of the 32 areas of concern in June 1995; (2) concerns about the Erie office closure, however, were made known as early as June 1994; (3) NWS continued with its plans to spin down the office because officials believed that they would be providing the best service to the area by relying on modernized radars in other offices; (4) the three WFOs that assumed responsibility for the counties formerly served by the Erie WSO provide generally the same types of services that the Erie office had provided, with the exception of the general public's local or toll-free telephone access to NWS personnel; (5) the major concerns surrounding the transfer of responsibilities relate to whether radar coverage over the counties formerly served by Erie would be adequate, and whether forecasts and warnings are at least equal in accuracy and timeliness to those previously issued by Erie; (6) NWS responses to such concerns include analyzing its ability to detect severe weather phenomena over northwestern Pennsylvania, as well as providing data on how well the assuming offices are issuing forecasts and warnings; (7) a few concerns also have been raised regarding NWS service to the Erie airport and the timeliness of small-craft advisories for Lake Erie; (8) the most commonly voiced concern regarded an automated surface observing system (ASOS) and requirements for air traffic controllers to augment it with human observations; (9) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has sponsored a study of the impact of its augmentation responsibilities at airports such as Erie and will be issuing a report in the fall of 1997; (10) several studies present evidence that a degradation in service has not occurred in northwestern Pennsylvania; however, the ability to detect and predict lake-effect snow remains a concern; (11) NWS is completing a lake-effect snow study to determine the effectiveness of the modernized weather system in detecting and forecasting lake-effect snow; (12) the Director of NWS' Office of Meteorology told GAO that he will recommend a radar for the Erie area; and (13) however, NWS has not yet taken a position on the need for a radar, and the Secretary of Commerce is scheduled to make the final decision on any action to be taken in northwestern Pennsylvania. |
gao_GAO-16-613 | gao_GAO-16-613_0 | The detail design process, as shown in figure 1, begins at a high level for the overall ship. After a lengthy debate with DOT&E over the need for an unmanned self-defense test ship equipped with Aegis and SPY-6 in initial operational test and evaluation plans, the Navy has begun to budget for the test ship at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Table 5 describes changes related to SPY-6 and other upgrades planned for Flight III. The Navy Lacks Sufficient Knowledge to Procure Flight III Ships as Planned and Oversight Opportunities Are Limited by Planned Program Reporting
If the Navy purchases the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016 as planned by issuing a series of modifications to its existing construction contracts, it will do so without sufficient acquisition and design knowledge. In addition, while the Navy did not update its anticipated cost savings under the current (fiscal year 2013- 2017) multiyear procurement to reflect the addition of Flight III ships, doing so would provide Congress a more accurate savings estimate, as well as provide improved information to support future multiyear procurement savings estimates. Further, in February 2017, when the Navy plans to request authority from Congress to award new multiyear procurement contracts for 10 Flight III ships in fiscal years 2018-2022, it will not be positioned to meet the criteria necessary to support the request. Flight III Ships Will Offset Navy’s Estimated Cost Savings for Its Current Contracts and Meeting Criteria for New Multiyear Procurement Will Be Challenging
Congress authorized procurement of up to 10 DDG 51 ships under the Navy’s current multiyear procurement for fiscal years 2013 through 2017; the Navy’s estimated cost savings of $1.54 billion did not take into account the differing costs between Flight IIA and Flight III ships. The Navy Is Using an Incremental Approach to Achieve Full Flight III Capability
The Navy plans to meet key operational performance requirements for Flight III initial operational capability in 2023, as outlined in the Navy’s DDG 51 Flight III Capability Development Document, but is using an incremental approach to deliver the full capability planned for the ships. To ensure sufficient knowledge of Flight III design and enable some Flight III construction history to inform cost expectations for future multiyear procurement decisions, we also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to:
Refrain from seeking authority from Congress for multiyear authority for the procurement of Flight III ships, as currently planned for 2018, until the Navy is able to preliminarily find, relying on DDG 51 Flight III data, that the Flight III configuration will meet criteria for seeking multiyear procurement authority, such as a stable design and realistic cost estimates. DOD partially concurred with our three recommendations. We continue to believe that the improved transparency that would be achieved by formally recognizing Flight III as a major subprogram would be beneficial to Congress and to the taxpayers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report evaluates the Navy’s planned acquisition strategies for the DDG 51-class Flight III ships and the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) programs. Specifically, we assessed (1) the status of the Navy’s efforts to develop, test, and integrate the SPY-6 radar and Aegis combat system in support of DDG 51 Flight III, including plans for operational testing; (2) challenges, if any, associated with the Navy’s plans to design and construct Flight III ships; (3) the Flight III acquisition approach and oversight activities, including reporting on cost, schedule, and performance; and (4) the capabilities that Flight III ships are expected to provide and the extent to which these capabilities fulfill the Navy’s existing and future surface combatant needs. This included discussion of how the Flight III integrated air and missile defense systems— particularly the SPY-6 radar, Aegis, and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile systems—could be effectively tested to demonstrate the ship’s self- defense capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 10 years, the Navy plans to spend more than $50 billion to design and procure 22 Flight III destroyers, an upgrade from Flight IIA ships. Flight III ships will include the new SPY-6 radar system and Aegis (ballistic missile defense) combat system upgrades. The Navy's MYP approach requires the Navy to seek authority to do so from Congress.
House report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to examine the Navy's plans for the DDG 51 Flight III ships and AMDR. This report assesses (1) the status of efforts to develop, test, and integrate SPY-6 and Aegis in support of Flight III; (2) challenges, if any, associated with the Navy's plans to design and construct Flight III ships; and (3) the Flight III acquisition approach and oversight activities, among other issues. GAO reviewed key acquisition documents and met with Navy and other DOD officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program's SPY-6 radar is progressing largely as planned, but extensive development and testing remains. Testing of the integrated SPY-6 and full baseline Aegis combat system upgrade—beginning in late 2020—will be crucial for demonstrating readiness to deliver improved air and missile defense capabilities to the first DDG 51 Flight III ship in 2023. After a lengthy debate between the Navy and the Department of Defense's (DOD) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to fund unmanned self-defense test ship upgrades for Flight III operational testing, but work remains to finalize a test strategy.
Flight III ship design and construction will be complex—primarily due to changes needed to incorporate SPY-6 onto the ship, as shown in the figure.
The Navy has not demonstrated sufficient acquisition and design knowledge regarding its Flight III procurement approach and opportunities exist to enhance oversight. If the Navy procures the lead Flight III ship in fiscal year (FY) 2016 as planned, limited detail design knowledge will be available to inform the procurement. In addition, the Navy's anticipated cost savings under the FY 2013-2017 Flight IIA multiyear procurement (MYP) plan do not reflect the planned addition of Flight III ships. While the Navy did not update its cost savings with Flight III information, doing so would increase transparency and could help inform expected savings under the next MYP. The Navy plans to request authority to award new Flight III MYP contracts (FY 2018-2022) in February 2017. The Navy will be asking Congress for this authority to procure nearly half of Flight III ships before being able to meet the criteria to seek this authority. For example, detail design will not be complete and costs will not be informed by any Flight III construction history. Finally, Flight III cost and schedule performance is not distinguished from that of the overall DDG 51 ship class in annual reports to Congress. Establishing Flight III as a major subprogram would improve reporting and offer greater performance insight.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring an update of estimated savings for the current DDG 51 MYP to reflect the addition of Flight III ships. The Navy should delay procurement of the lead Flight III ship and refrain from seeking authority for a MYP contract until it can meet criteria required for seeking this authority. DOD should also designate Flight III as a major subprogram to improve oversight. DOD partially concurred with all three recommendations but is not planning to take any new actions to address them. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-06-460 | gao_GAO-06-460_0 | To safeguard the assets, agencies can use the Comptroller General’s Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government. The administration released its report, The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, on February 23, 2006. Foreign Countries Donated Millions in Cash, But Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place
In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage the cash donations flowing to the U.S. government from other countries to address Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Through this process, $126 million was donated to the U.S. government which DOS recorded in a designated account at the U.S. Treasury to hold the funds. An NSC-led interagency working group was established to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told us they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. As of March 16, 2006, $60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that does not pay interest. Because DOS expects additional cash donations to be received, it is important that cash management policies and spending plans are in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained. In October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds had been accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant. We were told that the NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held until their ultimate use was determined and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. While the NSC-led interagency working group was reviewing various proposals on the further use of the funds beyond the initial $66 million, the remaining $60 million was being held in a DOS account at the U.S. Treasury that does not pay interest. Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Acceptance and Distribution of in-Kind Donations, Including Foreign Military Donations
The agencies having responsibilities regarding international assistance did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign military donations, received from 43 countries and international organizations. Also, the ad hoc procedures allowed for confusion about which agency—FEMA or DOD—accepted and was responsible for oversight of foreign military donations. Figure 2 below shows the process developed for accepting, receiving, and distributing in-kind donations. Lack of Guidance Resulted in the Arrival of Food and Medical Items that Could Not be Used
The lack of guidance, inadequate information up front about foreign offers of in-kind assistance and insufficient advance coordination before agreeing to receive it, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and medical supplies, that came into the United States and did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the United States. Conclusions
We recognize that since the United States government had never before received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, DOS, FEMA, OFDA, and DOD needed to create ad hoc procedures to manage the acceptance and distribution of the assistance as best they could. Scope and Methodology
To meet our objectives for this report we relied on information gathered through our visits and interviews with key personnel within the Department of State’s (DOS) Hurricane Katrina Task Force; Office of the General Counsel for the DOS; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General; Office of the General Counsel for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); FEMA Response Division; FEMA Recovery Division; Office of the Chief Financial Officer for FEMA; FEMA/Financial and Acquisitions Management Division; FEMA/Grants Management Division; United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); OFDA/Response Alternatives for Technical Services; Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense; Northern Command (NORTHCOM)/ Joint Staff Logistics; NORTHCOM/ Joint Staff Civil Affairs; NORTHCOM/Political Advisor; Department of Treasury (Treasury)/Cash Accounting; Treasury/Chief Systems Integrity Division; Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Food Safety and Inspection Service. To determine the amount of cash that was donated by foreign countries and the extent to which it has been used to assist hurricane victims, we gathered information from interviews with DOS, FEMA, and Treasury. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations donated to the United States government cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military assistance. The National Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the assistance and coordinating its distribution. In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' accountability in receiving and distributing assistance to hurricane victims, this report is one of several initiated under the authority of the Comptroller General to review the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina. It examines (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash, and (2) the extent to which federal agencies have adequate policies and procedures to ensure proper accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that assistance.
What GAO Found
Because the U.S. government had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance before, ad hoc procedures were developed to accept, receive and distribute the cash and in-kind assistance. Understandably, not all procedures would be in place at the outset to provide a higher level of accountability. The Administration recognized the need for improvement in its recent report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. GAO was able to track the cash donations received to designated U.S. Treasury accounts or disbursed. In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage $126 million in foreign cash donations to the U.S. government for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As cash donations arrived, a National Security Council (NSC)-led interagency working group was convened to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told GAO they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those donated funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds were spent on a FEMA case management grant, and as of March 16, 2006, $60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. According to DOS, an additional $400 million in international cash donations could arrive. It is important that cash management policies and spending plan options are considered and in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained for relief and reconstruction. FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries. In-kind donations included food and clothing. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures. However, in the distribution of the assistance to FEMA sites, GAO found that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations. Also, lack of procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the United States and storage costs of about $80,000. The procedures also allowed confusion about which agency was to accept and provide oversight of foreign military donations. DOD's lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD oversight. |
gao_GAO-13-733 | gao_GAO-13-733_0 | More Than 8,000 Individuals Eligible for Security Clearances Owe about $85 Million in Federal Taxes; About Half Are on Payment Plans with the IRS
About 240,000 employees and contractors of civilian executive-branch agencies, excluding known employees and contractors of DOD and intelligence agencies, had a federal security clearance or were approved for secret and top-secret clearances due to a favorable adjudication from April 1, 2006, through December 31, 2011. According to IRS data, about 4,200 of these 8,400 individuals with tax debt had a repayment plan with the IRS to pay back their debt as of June 30, 2012. plan was approximately $35 million. Federal Agencies Have Mechanisms to Detect Tax Debt, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Detection Capabilities
To detect federal tax debt for clearance applicants, consistent with federal law, federal investigators rely primarily on two methods: (1) applicants self-reporting tax debts, and (2) validation techniques, such as the use of credit reports or in-person interviews. Each of these methods has shortcomings in detecting unpaid federal tax debts for clearance applicants. However, credit reports only contain information on tax debts for which the IRS filed a lien on the debtor’s property, both real and personal, for the amount of the unpaid tax. Our analysis found that about 450 of the approximately 8,400 delinquent taxpayers (about 5 percent) who were favorably adjudicated as eligible for security clearances had a tax lien filed on them. Agencies Do Not Routinely Monitor Current Clearance Holders for Tax Debt
Federal agencies generally do not have routine mechanisms to review federal tax compliance for individuals who hold security clearances. Specifically, there is no process to detect unpaid federal tax debts accrued after an individual has been favorably adjudicated as eligible for a security clearance unless it is self-reported, reported by a security manager due to garnishment of wages, or discovered during a clearance reinvestigation (renewal) or upgrade. Opportunities Exist to Improve Detection of Tax Debt Owed by Security- Clearance Applicants and Clearance Holders
Additional mechanisms that provide large-scale detection of federal tax debt could improve federal agencies’ ability to detect tax debts owed by security-clearance applicants and security-clearance holders, but statutory privacy protections limit access to this information. Federal agencies may obtain information on federal tax debts directly from the IRS if the applicant provides consent. The Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program (TOP), or a similar mechanism, may provide an opportunity for federal agencies to perform an automated check of both security-clearance applicants and current clearance holders to determine whether they have unpaid federal debts that would include tax debts, while not violating IRS section 6103 requirements. As part of this effort, exploring the feasibility of investigative agencies routinely obtaining tax-debt information from the Department of the Treasury, for the purposes of investigating and adjudicating clearance applicants, as well as to conduct ongoing monitoring of current clearance holders’ tax-debt status, could help determine how, if at all, mechanisms such as TOP could be leveraged to gain access to this information and enhance OPM’s ability to conduct investigations and federal agencies’ ability to assess clearance eligibility. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that, as part of its working group, the Director of National Intelligence, as the Security Executive Agent, in consultation with OPM and the Department of the Treasury, evaluate the feasibility of federal agencies routinely obtaining federal debt information from the Department of the Treasury’s TOP system, or a similar automated mechanism that includes federal taxes, for the purposes of investigating and adjudicating clearance applicants, as well as for ongoing monitoring of current clearance holders’ tax-debt status. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) how many individuals with unpaid federal taxes, if any, are in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) security-clearance database and what is the magnitude of any unpaid federal tax debt? and (2) to what extent do federal agencies have mechanisms to detect unpaid tax debt during the security-clearance approval process? The OPM CVS database does not maintain information on the denial of security clearances on the basis of an individual’s nonpayment of federal taxes. Thus, we were not able to determine the number of individuals who were denied security clearances for this reason.To determine the extent to which individuals eligible for a security clearance had unpaid federal taxes, we used the taxpayer identification number (TIN) as a unique identifier and electronically matched the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) tax-debt data to the OPM data of individuals eligible for a security clearance. Using these criteria, we identified about 8,400 of these individuals who had unpaid federal tax debt as of June 30, 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of October 2012, about 4.9 million civilian and military employees and contractors held a security clearance. Federal laws do not prohibit an individual with unpaid federal taxes from holding a security clearance, but tax debt poses a potential vulnerability. GAO was requested to review tax-debt detection during the clearance process. GAO examined (1) the number of individuals with unpaid federal taxes, if any, in the OPM security-clearance database and the magnitude of any federal tax debt, and (2) the extent to which federal agencies have mechanisms to detect unpaid tax debt during the security-clearance-approval process.
GAO compared OPM's security-clearance information to the IRS's known tax debts. To provide examples, GAO conducted a detailed review of IRS and security adjudication files of 13 individuals selected, in part, on the basis of tax debt amount and type of security clearance. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and regulations and interviewed officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Treasury, OPM, and three selected federal agencies that represented more than half of the clearance holders in OPM's database.
What GAO Found
About 8,400 individuals adjudicated as eligible for a security clearance from April 2006 to December 2011 owed approximately $85 million in unpaid federal taxes, as of June 2012. This represents about 3.4 percent of the civilian executive-branch employees and contractors who were favorably adjudicated during that period. GAO found that about 4,700 of the approximately 8,400 individuals were federal employees while the remainder was largely federal contractors. Additionally, about 4,200 of these individuals had a repayment plan with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to pay back their debt. For this review, GAO used clearance data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Central Verification System (CVS) database. The CVS database does not maintain information on the denial of security clearances on the basis of an individual's nonpayment of federal taxes. Thus, GAO was not able to determine the number of individuals who were denied security clearances for this reason.
Federal agencies have established mechanisms aimed at identifying unpaid federal tax debt of security-clearance applicants; however, these mechanisms have limitations. To detect federal tax debt for clearance applicants, federal investigators primarily rely on two methods: (1) applicants self-reporting tax debts; and (2) validation techniques, such as the use of credit reports or in-person interviews. Each of these methods has shortcomings in detecting unpaid federal tax debts of clearance applicants. For example, credit reports are the primary method for identifying tax debt that was not self-reported, but these reports only contain information on tax debts for which the IRS filed a lien on the debtor's property. According to GAO's analysis, 5 percent of the 8,400 delinquent taxpayers who were favorably adjudicated as eligible for security clearances had a tax lien filed on them. Additionally, federal agencies generally do not routinely review federal tax compliance of clearance holders. There is no process to detect unpaid federal tax debts accrued after an individual has been favorably adjudicated unless it is self-reported, reported by a security manager due to garnishment of wages, or discovered during a clearance renewal or upgrade. GAO's analysis found that 6,300 individuals (approximately 75 percent) accrued their tax debt after approval of the security clearance.
Additional mechanisms that provide large-scale, routine detection of federal tax debt could improve federal agencies' ability to detect tax debts owed by security-clearance applicants and current clearance holders, but statutory privacy protections limit access to this information. Federal agencies may obtain information on federal tax debts directly from the IRS if the applicant provides consent. In addition, federal agencies do not have a mechanism, such as one that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) uses, to collect delinquent federal debts. Such information could help federal agencies perform routine, automated checks of security-clearance applicants to determine whether they have unpaid federal debts, without compromising statutory privacy protections. Such a mechanism could also be used to help monitor current clearance holders' tax-debt status. Gaining routine access to this federal debt information, if feasible, would better position federal agencies to identify relevant financial and personal-conduct information to make objective assessments of eligibility for security-clearance applicants and continued eligibility of current clearance holders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ODNI study the feasibility of federal agencies routinely obtaining federal debt information from Treasury for the purposes of investigating and adjudicating clearance applicants, as well as for monitoring current clearance holders' tax-debt status. ODNI agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-938 | gao_GAO-06-938_0 | For example, aspects of modeling and data were inadequate in some areas because data were lacking and some of the models used could not simulate all relevant aspects of the missions. Relevant research standards require that models used are adequate for the intended purpose, represent a complete range of conditions, and that data used are properly generated and complete. For example, the MCS modeled hypothetical homeland defense missions rather than homeland defense demands derived from a well defined and approved concept of operations for homeland defense, because the specific details of the missions were still being determined, and DOD acknowledged that the data used are incomplete. The MCS also was unable to model the flexible deterrent options/deployment order process to move units and equipment into theater because of lack of data on how deployment orders have been issued in the past for major combat operations. Exclusive Use of Warfighting Metrics in MCS Analyses Limited Usefulness of Report
While the MCS concluded that combined U.S. and host nation transportation assets were adequate to meet U.S. objectives with acceptable risk, the report, in describing the use of warfighting metrics in its analyses, does not provide a clear understanding of the direct relationship of warfighting objectives to transportation capabilities. The report acknowledged that further analysis is required to understand the operational impact of increased or decreased strategic lift on achieving warfighting objectives. Relevant generally accepted research standards require that conclusions be supported by analyses. Results Are Not Always Complete or Presented Clearly and Are Qualified or Contingent on Further Study or Analysis
In some cases, the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence. Relevant research standards require results to be presented in a complete, accurate, and relevant manner; conclusions to be sound and complete; and recommendations to be supported by analyses. Our analysis of the MCS report found that it contains several recommendations for further studies and assessments, five of which are under way. However, the report does not explain the potential effect of these ongoing studies on the MCS results after the studies are complete, nor does DOD have plans to report the effect of these studies on the MCS results. In addition, the report contains qualified information that is not presented clearly in the report, such as varying assessments of intratheater assets in three different places. Conclusions
The methodological limitations in the MCS that we identified—some of which were acknowledged by DOD in the MCS report—raise questions about the adequacy and completeness of the study and its report. Furthermore, in the absence of an explanation of how identified modeling and data limitations could affect the study results or how such limitations could affect projected mobility capability requirements, the accuracy of the study’s finding that projected capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk during the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2013 is unclear. As a result, we suggest that Congress and other decision makers exercise caution in using the MCS to make programmatic investment decisions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with adequate and complete information concerning mobility capabilities so they are able to clearly understand the operational implications of the study and make fully informed programmatic investment decisions, and to improve the usefulness of future mobility capabilities studies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions, when conducting future mobility capabilities studies beginning with any study currently underway: develop models and data for all critical missions, such as homeland defense, and processes, such as the flexible deterrent options/deployment order process; include in study reports an explanation of how stated limitations might impact the study results and, at a minimum, describe how recommended future studies might be conducted to enhance the results of the original study; and incorporate both mobility and warfighting metrics in determining capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), which was intended to identify and quantify the mobility capabilities needed to support U.S. strategic objectives into the next decade. The MCS found that projected capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk--that is, current U.S. inventory of aircraft, ships, prepositioned assets, and other capabilities are sufficient, in conjunction with host nation support, and assuming planned investments take place. The Senate report accompanying the bill for the fiscal year 2005 Defense Authorization Act required GAO to report on the adequacy and completeness of the MCS. GAO assessed the extent to which the MCS met generally accepted research standards that this type of study would be expected to meet to be considered sound and complete.
What GAO Found
DOD used an innovative approach in conducting the study and acknowledged methodological limitations in its report; however, it did not fully disclose how these limitations could affect the MCS conclusions and recommendations. Therefore, it is not transparent how the analyses done for the study support DOD's conclusions. Measured against relevant generally accepted research standards, GAO has identified limitations in the MCS and its report that raise questions about their adequacy and completeness. GAO suggests that Congress and other decision makers exercise caution in using the MCS to make investment decisions. Among GAO's findings: Aspects of modeling and data were inadequate in some areas because data were lacking and the models used could not simulate all relevant aspects of the missions. The report did not explain how these limitations could affect the study results or what the impact on projected mobility capabilities might be. Generally accepted research standards require that models used are adequate for the intended purpose, represent a complete range of conditions, and that data used are properly generated and complete. For example, the MCS modeled hypothetical homeland defense missions rather than homeland defense demands derived from a well defined and approved concept of operations for homeland defense, because the specific details of the missions were still being determined and the data used may be incomplete. The MCS also was unable to model the flexible deterrent options/deployment order process to move units and equipment into theater because of lack of data, but the study assumed a robust use of this process. In addition, the MCS report contains over 80 references to the need for improved modeling or data. While the MCS concluded that combined U.S. and host nation transportation assets were adequate, in describing the use of warfighting metrics in its analyses, the report does not provide a clear understanding of the direct relationship of warfighting objectives to transportation capabilities. Additionally, the report stated that further analysis is required to understand the operational impact of increased or decreased strategic lift on achieving warfighting objectives. Relevant generally accepted research standards require that conclusions be supported by analyses. The use of both warfighting and mobility metrics would allow decision makers to know whether combat tasks were achieved and how much strategic transportation is needed to accomplish those tasks. In some cases, the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence. Relevant research standards require results to be presented in a complete, accurate, and relevant manner. For example, the report contains recommendations for further studies and assessments, five of which are under way. However, DOD has no plans to report the impact of these studies on the MCS results after the studies are complete. In addition, the report contains qualified information that is not presented clearly, such as varying assessments of intra-theater assets in three different places. |
gao_GAO-04-728 | gao_GAO-04-728_0 | While airport operators, not TSA, retain direct day-to-day operational responsibility for these areas of security, ATSA’s sections 106, 136, and 138 direct TSA to improve the security of airport perimeters and the access controls leading to secured airport areas, as well as measures to reduce the security risks posed by airport workers, as shown in figure 1. Airport operators are responsible for implementing TSA security requirements for airport perimeters, access controls, and airport workers. TSA Has Begun Evaluating Commercial Airport Security but Needs a Better Approach for Assessing Results
TSA has three efforts under way to evaluate the security of commercial airports’ perimeters and the controls that limit unauthorized access into secured areas. TSA acknowledged the importance of conducting these evaluation efforts as an essential step to determine the need for, and prioritization of, additional perimeter security and access control security measures. However, TSA has not yet developed a plan outlining how the results of its compliance inspections will be used to interpret and help analyze the results of airport vulnerability assessments and covert testing. TSA Has Begun Efforts but Has Not Fully Developed Plans to Fund Security Enhancements and Assess Security Technologies
Through funding of a limited number of security enhancements, TSA has helped to improve perimeter and access control security at some airports. Without a plan, TSA could be less able to document, measure, and improve the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to provide funding support for enhancing perimeter and access control security. TSA had not developed such a plan. TSA Has Helped to Reduce Potential Security Risks Posed by Airport Workers but Has Not Determined How to Fully Address Legislative Requirements
TSA has taken steps to increase measures to reduce the potential security risks posed by airport workers, but it has not addressed all of the requirements in ATSA related to background checks, screening, security training, and vendor security programs or developed plans that describe the actions they intend to take to fully address these requirements. For example, TSA required criminal history records checks and security awareness training for most, but not all, the airport workers called for in ATSA (Secs. Despite these challenges, TSA said the agency is considering the costs, benefits, and feasibility of issuing a regulation that would require airport vendors to develop security programs in order to meet the requirements in ATSA. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to (1) evaluate the security of airport perimeters and the controls that limit access into secured airport areas, (2) help airports implement and enhance perimeter security and access controls by providing funding and technical guidance, and (3) implement measures to reduce the potential security risk posed by airport workers, we reviewed pertinent legislation (the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, or ATSA), regulatory requirements, and policy guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 2 years since passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primarily focused its efforts on improving aviation security through enhanced passenger and baggage screening. The act also contained provisions directing TSA to take actions to improve the security of airport perimeters, access controls, and airport workers. GAO was asked to assess TSA's efforts to: (1) evaluate the security of airport perimeters and the controls that limit access into secured airport areas, (2) help airports implement and enhance perimeter security and access controls by providing them funding and technical guidance, and (3) implement measures to reduce the potential security risks posed by airport workers.
What GAO Found
TSA has begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the controls that limit access into secured airport areas. Specifically, TSA is conducting compliance inspections and vulnerability assessments at selected airports. These evaluations--though not complete--have identified perimeter and access control security concerns. While TSA officials acknowledged that conducting these airport security evaluations is essential to identifying additional perimeter and access control security measures and prioritizing their implementation, the agency has not determined how the results will be used to make improvements to the entire commercial airport system. TSA has helped some airport operators enhance perimeter and access control security by providing funds for security equipment, such as electronic surveillance systems. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems. However, TSA has not begun to gather data on airport operators' historical funding of security projects and current needs to aid the agency in setting funding priorities. Nor has TSA developed a plan for implementing new technologies or balancing the costs and effectiveness of these technologies with the security needs of individual airport operators and the commercial airport system as a whole. TSA has taken some steps to reduce the potential security risks posed by airport workers. However, TSA had elected not to fully address all related ATSA requirements. In particular, TSA does not require fingerprint-based criminal history checks and security awareness training for all airport workers, as called for in ATSA. Further, TSA has not required airport vendors to develop security programs, another ATSA requirement. TSA said expanding these efforts would require a time-consuming rulemaking process and impose additional costs on airport operators. Finally, although not required by ATSA, TSA has not developed a plan detailing when and how it intends to address these challenges. |
gao_GAO-12-961T | gao_GAO-12-961T_0 | The Privacy Act requires that when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they must notify the public through a system-of- records notice in the Federal Register that identifies, among other things, the categories of data collected, the categories of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended “routine” uses of data, and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personally identifiable information. Technological Changes Have Made Key Elements of Privacy Laws Outdated
Technological developments since the Privacy Act became law in 1974 have radically changed the way information is organized and shared among organizations and individuals. Such advances have rendered some of the provisions of the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act of 2002 inadequate to fully protect all personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained by the federal government. DHS has taken action to address both of these recommendations. Privacy Laws May Not Consistently Protect Personally Identifiable Information
In 2008, we issued a report on the sufficiency of privacy protections afforded by existing laws and guidance, in particular the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act, and related OMB guidance.that while these laws and guidance set minimum requirements for agencies, they may not consistently protect personally identifiable information in all circumstances of its collection and use throughout the federal government and may not fully adhere to key privacy principles. We identified issues in three major areas: Applying privacy protections consistently to all federal collection and use of personal information. For example, if agencies do not retrieve personal information by identifier, as may occur in data-mining systems, the act’s protections do not apply. Yet current laws and guidance impose only modest requirements for describing the purposes for personal information and limiting how it is used. Establishing effective mechanisms for informing the public about privacy protections. Yet concerns have been raised that Privacy Act notices may not serve this function well. An effective notice can also provide individuals with information they need to determine whether to provide their personal information (if voluntary), or who to contact to correct any errors that could result in an adverse determination about them. Accordingly, we suggested that Congress consider amending applicable laws, such as the Privacy Act and E-Government Act, according to the alternatives we outlined, including revising the scope of the laws to cover all personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained by the federal government; setting requirements to ensure that the collection and use of personally identifiable information is limited to a stated purpose; and establishing additional mechanisms for informing the public about privacy protections by revising requirements for the structure and publication of public notices. In 2006, in the wake of a security breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs resulting in the compromise of personal data on millions of U.S. veterans, we testified on preventing and responding to improper disclosures of personal information in the federal government. In particular, we noted two key steps agencies should take:
Develop PIAs whenever information technology is used to process personal information. These assessments are a tool for agencies to fully consider the privacy implications of planned systems and data collections before implementation, when it may be easier to make critical adjustments. Ensure the implementation of a robust information security program as required by FISMA. Such a program includes periodic risk assessments; security awareness training; security policies, procedures, and practices, as well as tests of their effectiveness; and procedures for addressing deficiencies and for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. Data Breaches Continue to Proliferate in the Public and Private Sectors
Over the last several years, we have continued to report that federal agency systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks and the potential compromise of sensitive information, including personally identifiable For fiscal year 2011, agency inspector general and GAO information.assessments of information security controls revealed that most major federal agencies had weaknesses in most of five major categories of information system controls. 1.) Of the incidents occurring in 2011, 15,560 involved unauthorized disclosure of personally identifiable information, a 19 percent increase over the 13,017 personally identifiable information incidents that occurred in 2010. Information Management: Challenges in Federal Agencies’ Use of Web 2.0 Technologies. Information Security: Federal Agency Efforts to Encrypt Sensitive Information Are Under Way, but Work Remains. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government collects and uses personal information on individuals in increasingly sophisticated ways, and its reliance on information technology (IT) to collect, store, and transmit this information has also grown. While this enables federal agencies to carry out many of the governments critical functions, concerns have been raised that the existing laws for protecting individuals personal information may no longer be sufficient given current practices. Moreover, vulnerabilities arising from agencies increased dependence on IT can result in the compromise of sensitive personal information, such as inappropriate use, modification, or disclosure.
GAO was asked to provide a statement describing (1) the impact of recent technology developments on existing laws for privacy protection in the federal government and (2) actions agencies can take to protect against and respond to breaches involving personal information. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previous work in these areas as well as a review of more recent reports on security vulnerabilities.
What GAO Found
Technological developments since the Privacy Act became law in 1974 have changed the way information is organized and shared among organizations and individuals. Such advances have rendered some of the provisions of the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act of 2002 inadequate to fully protect all personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained by the federal government. For example, GAO has reported on challenges in protecting the privacy of personal information relative to agencies use of Web 2.0 and data-mining technologies.
While laws and guidance set minimum requirements for agencies, they may not protect personal information in all circumstances in which it is collected and used throughout the government and may not fully adhere to key privacy principles. GAO has identified issues in three major areas:
Applying privacy protections consistently to all federal collection and use of personal information. The Privacy Acts protections only apply to personal information when it is considered part of a system of records as defined by the act. However, agencies routinely access such information in ways that may not fall under this definition.
Ensuring that use of personally identifiable information is limited to a stated purpose. Current law and guidance impose only modest requirements for describing the purposes for collecting personal information and how it will be used. This could allow for unnecessarily broad ranges of uses of the information.
Establishing effective mechanisms for informing the public about privacy protections. Agencies are required to provide notices in the Federal Register of information collected, categories of individuals about whom information is collected, and the intended use of the information, among other things. However, concerns have been raised whether this is an effective mechanism for informing the public.
The potential for data breaches at federal agencies also pose a serious risk to the privacy of individuals personal information. OMB has specified actions agencies should take to prevent and respond to such breaches. In addition, GAO has previously reported that agencies can take steps that include
assessing the privacy implications of a planned information system or data collection prior to implementation;
ensuring the implementation of a robust information security program; and
limiting the collection of personal information, the time it is retained, and who has access to it, as well as implementing encryption.
However, GAO and inspectors general have continued to report on vulnerabilities in security controls over agency systems and weaknesses in their information security programs, potentially resulting in the compromise of personal information. These risks are illustrated by recent security incidents involving individuals personal information. Federal agencies reported 13,017 such incidents in 2010 and 15,560 in 2011, an increase of 19 percent.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously suggested that Congress consider amending applicable privacy laws to address identified issues. GAO has also made numerous recommendations to agencies over the last several years to address weaknesses in policies and procedures related to privacy and to strengthen their information security programs. |
gao_GAO-08-35 | gao_GAO-08-35_0 | State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and Characteristics
Established by state and local governments to improve information sharing among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development—from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as of September 2007. The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were primarily led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation. Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance
In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating information sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges that fusion center officials identified in establishing and operating their centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance and training, but fusion center officials cited the need for clearer and more specific guidance in a variety of areas to help address operational challenges. DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Challenges Some Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and Managing Multiple Information Systems
As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted. In these centers, fusion center personnel must rely on federal personnel who are assigned to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant information and share it with them. For example, both DHS and the FBI could each be conducting a separate security clearance investigation and determining eligibility for access to classified information on the same individual. Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent but Have Not Defined Plans for Long- Term Support
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 of the centers reported encountering funding challenges when establishing and operating their centers, challenges which some of these officials also indicated affected their centers’ sustainability. The FBI had assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational fusion centers we contacted. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers said that they encountered challenges related to the sustainability of federal funding, such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal funding, which created concerns for the officials about their centers’ ability to sustain capability for the long term. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts. However, it is also important for fusion center management to understand the federal government’s longer-term role with respect to these centers. Recommendation
To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and the PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government’s role in, and whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the long- term to help ensure their sustainability. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and (2) identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers. Data were not available to determine the total number of local fusion centers. The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to establish a fusion center, including the state’s commitment to support the efforts of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to conduct threat analyses and share information, political concerns about the role of the government in information sharing, local agencies’ lack of interest in participating in a fusion center because they perceive the centers to be intelligence- gathering entities, and local communities do not want law enforcement to be involved in gathering intelligence, the state’s low risk for international terrorism, and difficulties staffing a center because state and local agencies would not have the capacity to provide personnel to work in a fusion center. DHS has assigned a full-time intelligence analyst to the center. However, the center is planning to diversify and focus on all hazards in the future. However, the FBI analyst at STAC has access to them. | Why GAO Did This Study
In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. In response to Congressional request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.
What GAO Found
Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. The officials said that these issues made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long-term. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document was still in draft as of September and had not been issued. |
gao_GGD-95-242 | gao_GGD-95-242_0 | BEA Has Established Steps to Ensure Compliance With Its FDIUS Surveys
BEA obtains information on FDIUS through four survey questionnaires that cover a wide range of financial and operating data for U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. Beginning in 1990, BEA established steps to ensure compliance with its FDIUS surveys by strengthening survey follow-up procedures and increasing the number of staff devoted to survey follow-up. Data-Sharing Efforts Generated New, Detailed FDIUS Data
The BEA-Census and BEA-BLS data link projects, initiated under the 1990 act, have greatly improved the amount and quality of data available about FDIUS. The data have enabled Commerce to produce more detailed analyses of FDIUS and to draw more meaningful comparisons between the activities of U.S. affiliates of foreign firms and those of U.S. firms than previous data allowed. According to Commerce officials, several opportunities exist to improve FDIUS data sharing. Comments From the Department of Commerce
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Foreign Direct Investment and International Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990 directs us to analyze and report on Commerce’s first three annual reports on FDIUS and review government efforts to improve the quality of FDIUS data. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which Commerce’s second and third reports—issued in 1993 and 1995—fulfilled the requirements of the 1990 act and addressed the recommendations in our 1992 review; (2) review the process by which federal agencies collect FDI data; (3) review the status and processes of the data exchanges, or links, initiated by the 1990 act between the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and its Bureau of the Census and between BEA and the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and (4) evaluate the extent to which implementation of the act has brought about the intended improvements in public information on FDI in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Commerce's first three annual reports on foreign direct investment in the United States (FDIUS) and governmental efforts to improve the quality of FDIUS data, focusing on: (1) the extent to which Commerce's reports fulfilled legislative requirements and addressed prior GAO recommendations; (2) how FDIUS data is obtained; (3) the status of data sharing between the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Census and between BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and (4) the extent to which implementing legislation has improved public information on FDIUS.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Commerce's FDIUS reports included all of the applicable data requirements and responded to prior GAO recommendations; (2) the reports' analyses and conclusions relating to FDIUS economic effects were generally thorough and reasonable, but in a few instances, Commerce's conclusions were more definitive than evidence warranted; (3) BEA obtains FDIUS information through survey questionnaires that require U.S. affiliates of foreign firms to report on financial and operating data; (4) BEA has strengthened its survey procedures and increased its staff devoted to survey follow-up in order to ensure compliance with reporting requirements; (5) BEA-Census and BEA-BLS data sharing efforts have generated data on U.S. affiliates of foreign firms at a greater level than was previously available, allowing Commerce to draw more meaningful conclusions in its reports; (6) certain restrictions and factors related to the protection of confidential data continue to limit more extensive data sharing among federal agencies; and (7) Commerce has fulfilled the legislative requirements by improving the quantity and quality of FDIUS data, resulting in both government officials and private sector analysts gaining access to previously unavailable FDIUS data. |
gao_AIMD-97-31 | gao_AIMD-97-31_0 | IRS expects ICP 2.0 to provide improved service to taxpayers. From 1986 through fiscal year 1995, IRS estimated that it had invested about $2.5 billion in TSM. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate IRS’ assessment of ICP costs and benefits and obtain users’ perceptions on the system’s benefits, (2) analyze IRS’ testing of ICP, (3) assess IRS’ ongoing efforts to redesign its customer-service work processes to fully utilize ICP capabilities, and (4) assess IRS’ software development processes being used for ICP. Despite this sizable investment, ICP costs and benefits remain uncertain because the scheduled rollout of ICP and its capabilities continue to change. ICP Has Not Been Thoroughly Tested
The testing of ICP 1.5 was too limited and did not measure ICP’s impact on business operations. IRS officials recognized the limitations of the ICP 1.5 testing and told us that testing of ICP 2.0 would be more comprehensive. However, on July 31, 1996, in a memorandum to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, the Associate Commissioner for Modernization cancelled the September 30, 1996, pilot start date on the recommendation of the Business Site Executive. IRS Is Developing and Deploying ICP Before Work Processes Have Been Determined and Before Desired Capabilities Are Known
According to IRS’ Customer Service Vision, ICP was expected to be the vehicle to provide CSRs access to the information they would need to answer all types of calls coming from taxpayers. Also, IRS planned to combine a phase of the collection process with customer service.However, according to IRS officials, after experimentation at the Nashville customer service center prototype, IRS is now reconsidering the extent to which CSRs will be able to answer the broad range of taxpayer questions, which are anticipated if IRS reduces the current level of employee specialization and combines the customer service and some of the collection functions. As a result, IRS has no assurance that the ICP software is being developed in a quality fashion and will perform as intended. However, the success of ICP may be at risk because IRS has made substantial investments in the system without having (1) validated the costs and benefits by thoroughly testing the ICP system, (2) finalized the redesign of work processes that ICP will support, and (3) achieved the software development maturity needed to successfully build the envisioned capabilities within planned cost and milestones. All projects use an approved, tailored version of the organization’s standard software process for developing and maintaining software. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Integrated Case Processing (ICP) systems development effort, focusing on: (1) IRS' assessment of ICP costs and benefits and users' perceptions of the system's benefits; (2) IRS' testing of ICP; (3) IRS' ongoing efforts to redesign its customer service work processes to fully use ICP capabilities; and (4) the software development processes being used for ICP.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) improving service to taxpayers is an important goal that IRS' Customer Service Vision shows promise in addressing, but the promise anticipated by the vision is unlikely to be fulfilled unless changes are made in the development and deployment of ICP; (2) IRS estimated that about $150 million was spent on ICP from 1993 to 1995 and that an additional $77 million will be spent through 1996; (3) overall, IRS plans to spend about $641 million on ICP through fiscal year 2000; (4) despite this sizable investment, costs and benefits remain uncertain because: (a) the scheduled rollout of ICP workstations continues to change; (b) the ICP capabilities have not been finalized; (c) certain benefits are still to be determined; and (d) the software is still being developed; (5) IRS planned that certain ICP capabilities being developed would be pilot tested beginning on September 30, 1996, but in a memorandum dated July 31, 1996, the Associate Commissioner for Modernization postponed the pilot test indefinitely; (6) IRS developed and initiated a limited deployment of the initial ICP version; (7) the test results provided little insight on the potential benefits of the system, because IRS did not adequately measure ICP's impact on business operations; (8) IRS officials recognized the limitations of the testing and told GAO that testing of the next software release would be more comprehensive; (9) it is unclear how this and future versions will support new work processes that are being designed; (10) according to IRS' Customer Service Vision, ICP was expected to be the vehicle to provide customer service representatives with access to information that would enable IRS to combine a phase of the tax collection process with customer service; (11) IRS is now reconsidering the extent to which the collection process can be combined with customer service and is reconsidering the range of tasks a customer service representative can be expected to perform; and (12) the software development processes in place at IRS organizations responsible for developing ICP software are extremely weak, making the likelihood of their producing quality ICP software on time and within budget very low. |
gao_GAO-04-1062 | gao_GAO-04-1062_0 | Background
Creating effective security in the nation’s ports in the post-September 11 world is a challenging task. Data layers in a GIS can be extremely varied. Our examination of the contractor’s initial assessments identified additional shortcomings in the quality of the work and the assessment approach. Stakeholders, such as port authorities, and owners and operators of facilities and vessels began conducting assessments in order to identify security vulnerabilities of their assets or to meet application requirements for federal grants. In some cases, initial assessments were performed shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and were followed by more comprehensive assessments conducted either on their own or by contractors. Subsequent Revisions Incorporated the Use of a GIS and More Focused Assessments
While considering what changes needed to be made to the assessment program, the Coast Guard also determined that it was essential to provide local Coast Guard officials and certain members of the local Area Maritime Security Committee a means to retrieve maritime security information and display it for planning and response purposes at the ports. First, the centerpiece of the new approach, the GIS component, is being developed without several key project management steps that are critical to success in such projects. These requirements define what the system will be expected to do for its users once it is developed and implemented. The Coast Guard’s approach for addressing these requirements takes three main forms: First, the Coast Guard is using the assessments being conducted at the 55 ports to identify requirements for the GIS it is developing. Adding to an existing system, however, does not obviate the need for careful planning. Once all assessment reports of the 55 strategic ports are completed—a task the Coast Guard expects to be done by February 2005— the Coast Guard currently expects the assessment of assessments component to be an ongoing effort that will be updated by Coast Guard personnel as new assessment information becomes available. However, the Coast Guard risks producing a system that is not as useful as it could be, because its approach lacks a defined management strategy, specific cost estimates, and a clear implementation schedule. Developing the program’s GIS component in this way is of particular concern, given the problems that have resulted when other agencies used the same approach in attempting to develop their information technology systems. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the revised Port Security Assessment Program provides the most effective tool possible for security planning and response, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to (1) define and document the GIS functional requirements and (2) develop a long-term project plan for the GIS and the Port Security Assessment Program as a whole (including cost estimates, schedule, and management responsibilities). Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our two objectives for this report were to (1) discuss why and how the Port Security Assessment Program has changed over time and (2) assess the Coast Guard’s approach for implementing the Port Security Assessment Program as it is currently configured To address why and how the assessment program changed, we reviewed Coast Guard documents, interviewed officials at Coast Guard headquarters responsible for implementing the program, and visited three ports that had been assessed under the previous program assessment approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Port Security Assessment Program was designed to evaluate security at the nation's 55 most economically and militarily strategic ports. Implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, the program focuses on identifying vulnerabilities, suggesting approaches to minimize them, and making the information available to those responsible for developing and implementing portwide security plans. The program has been under way for more than 2 years and has undergone several sets of changes, including the addition of a geographic information system (GIS). GAO was asked to discuss why and how the program changed and assess the Coast Guard's approach for implementing the program in its current form.
What GAO Found
Changes in the Port Security Assessment Program reflect attempts to deal with two main developments since the program's inception: evolving assessment needs at the ports and missteps in how the initial assessments were carried out. The program was designed as a comprehensive assessment of each port and its critical assets, such as passenger terminals, factories, cargo facilities, and bridges. However, the need for comprehensive assessments was diminished when many owners and operators of these critical assets began conducting their own assessments to comply with new regulatory requirements or apply for security grants. The program's assessments also proved more expensive than expected, and a GAO review conducted at the time found shortcomings in their quality and usefulness. The current program's assessments are more targeted in scope and nature, including the opportunity for local Coast Guard officials to request reviews of specific assets they do not know enough about. To help local authorities with security planning and response, the Coast Guard decided to incorporate a GIS. A GIS is a computer mapping system designed to have many information "layers" that can be easily updated and retrieved. The Coast Guard expects to complete the assessments at the 55 ports by February 2005, but no timeline exists for making the GIS component operational. Although the revised program holds promise, the implementation approach is at increased risk because the Coast Guard is not taking sufficient steps in the planning process. Contrary to best practices for technology systems development, the GIS is being developed without sufficient up-front work to identify how the system will be expected to perform. Both the GIS component and the program as a whole also lack a project plan detailing tasks, schedules, and costs. In other federal agencies, GAO has identified similar projects that failed when such steps were not followed. The initial response of local Coast Guard officials to the new, targeted assessments is generally positive. However, the assessments could be of greater benefit if functional requirements for the GIS were more clearly defined, so the Coast Guard could use the assessments to address gaps in security knowledge. |
gao_GAO-09-845T | gao_GAO-09-845T_0 | The Highway Account within the HTF is the principal mechanism for funding federal highway programs. Administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within DOT, it channels about $33 billion in highway user excise taxes annually to states for highway and related spending. The balance of the Highway Account within the HTF has been declining in recent years because, as designed in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), outlays from the account have exceeded expected receipts over the authorization period. In fact, actual Highway Account receipts were lower than estimated, particularly for fiscal year 2008. Consequently, the account balance dropped more precipitously than anticipated and was nearly depleted in August 2008—1 year before the end of the SAFETEA-LU authorization period. In response, Congress approved legislation in September 2008 to provide $8 billion to replenish the account. 1.) 2.) The collection and distribution of taxes through the Highway Account is a complex process, as shown in figure 4. The collection process involves Treasury receiving excise taxes from business entities, estimating how much should be allocated to the Highway Account, and adjusting the estimated allocation after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) certifies the actual amount that should be allocated. The distribution process begins with a multiyear authorization act, such as SAFETEA-LU. Annually, DOT apportions (through formula) and allocates to the states the contract authority provided in the authorization act. DOT then obligates federal funds for approved projects. Principles for Restructuring Transportation Programs, Including Improving Long-term Sustainability of the HTF
While infusing more money into the HTF would help keep the Highway Account solvent, such action would not ensure the long-term sustainability of the HTF nor address the need for improved performance of our nation’s surface transportation programs. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and the selection of any option will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. Improve the efficiency of current facilities. Alter existing sources of revenue. Ensure users are paying fully for benefits. Supplement existing revenue sources. Mechanisms to Help Manage Highway Account Solvency
Improving existing mechanisms that are intended to help maintain Highway Account solvency could help DOT better monitor and manage the account balance, and improve the agency’s ability to identify the potential for a funding shortfall. Under this scenario, the account balance would have been sufficient to reimburse states without the $8 billion infusion from the General Fund of the Treasury. In February 2009, we recommended that DOT identify changes to existing solvency mechanisms designed to make annual adjustments to the Highway Account and communicate to Congress the potential benefits and limitations of these changes. In February 2009, we recommended that DOT monitor additional indicators that can impact the account balance throughout the year to better anticipate sudden changes in the balance, and improve communication with stakeholders—Congress, state agencies, and others— on the status of the account balance and action that may be needed to maintain account solvency. Highway Trust Fund: Improved Solvency Mechanisms and Communication Needed to Help Avoid Shortfalls in the Highway Account. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Highway Account within the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) is the principal means for funding federal highway programs. Administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT), it channels about $33 billion in highway user excise taxes annually to states for highway and related spending. Estimated outlays from the Highway Account under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) exceeded estimated receipts throughout the authorization period--fiscal years 2005 through 2009. Furthermore, actual account receipts were lower than had been estimated and the account balance dropped more rapidly than anticipated, approaching zero in August, 2008. Congress subsequently approved legislation in September 2008 to appropriate $8 billion from the General Fund of the Treasury to replenish the account. Agency officials anticipate the account will reach a critical stage again before the end of fiscal year 2009, and estimate that about $15 billion will be needed to ensure account solvency through the end of fiscal year 2010. This statement summarizes GAO's past work on 1) the collection and distribution process for the Highway Account of the HTF, 2) options for improving long-term sustainability of the HTF, and 3) mechanisms to help manage Highway Account solvency.
What GAO Found
The collection and distribution of funds through the Highway Account is a complex process. Collection involves Treasury receiving excise taxes from business entities, estimating how much should be allocated to the Highway Account, and adjusting the estimated allocation several months later after actual tax receipts are certified. Distribution begins with a multi-year authorization act that provides contract authority and establishes annual funding levels. DOT apportions the contract authority to the states and divides the funding level among federal highway programs and states. DOT then obligates funds for projects and reimburses states as projects are completed. Improving long-term sustainability is one of GAO's key principles for restructuring existing transportation programs, and GAO has reported on options for improving sustainability: (1) improve the efficiency of current facilities, (2) alter existing sources of revenue, (3) ensure users are paying fully for benefits, and (4) supplement existing revenue sources, such as through enhanced private-sector participation. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. Improving existing mechanisms intended to help maintain Highway Account solvency could help DOT better manage the account balance. For example, statutory mechanisms designed to make annual adjustments to the Highway Account have been so modified over time--particularly through changes in SAFETEA-LU--that they either are no longer relevant or are limited in effectiveness. Furthermore, monitoring indicators that could signal sudden changes in revenues could help DOT better anticipate changes in the account balance and communicate with stakeholders on the account's status. DOT is acting on recommendations GAO made in February, 2009 to help improve solvency mechanisms and communication with stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-01-91 | gao_GAO-01-91_0 | IRS Satisfied Some, But Not All, of the Subcommittees’ Conditions
IRS did not fully satisfy all of the conditions that its appropriations subcommittees established in their April 2000 letters releasing modernization investment account funding. Conclusions
Although IRS has not fully met all the conditions specified by the subcommittees, it has moved aggressively and made important progress since March 2000 in advancing many projects and addressing modernization management weaknesses. Nevertheless, until these management weaknesses are fully addressed, key controls will be missing, thereby increasing the risks that projects will not perform as intended and/or cost more and take longer to complete. | What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has tried unsuccessfully to modernize its information systems. To prevent a repeat of past mistakes, Congress legislated explicit controls over IRS spending on systems modernization. Congress did so by creating Senate and House appropriations subcommittees, which specified four conditions. IRS has satisfied some, but not all, of the conditions set out by its appropriations subcommittees; however, it has moved aggressively and made important progress in advancing many projects and addressing modernization management weaknesses. Until these weaknesses are fully addressed, key controls will be missing, thereby increasing the risk that projects will not perform as intended or cost more and take longer to complete. |
gao_AIMD-97-148 | gao_AIMD-97-148_0 | Sections 302 and 303 of the 1994 Act amended the District of Columbia Sales Tax Act and the District of Columbia Compensating Use Tax Act, respectively (1) to decrease the tax rate from 11 percent to 10.5 percent on hotel gross receipts and to add an additional tax of 2.5 percent on hotel gross receipts and (2) to add an additional tax of 1 percent to the 9 percent tax on the gross receipts from the sales of food or drink (including alcohol) to be consumed on the premises and from the rental of vehicles and trailers. Next, WCCA would have to adopt a resolution to issue the revenue bonds (subject to the City Council review). When we last reported in December 1996, WCCA estimated that the project would be completed by December 31, 1999. The estimated completion date is now December 31, 2000. WCCA must obtain NCPC’s and the City Council’s approvals before the project can move forward. Estimated Project Costs
The estimated total predevelopment and construction costs, including contingencies, of the proposed new convention center have increased by a net of $100 million to approximately $650 million from the $550 million that was last reported. Table 2 highlights the total estimated project costs for the new convention center. As of July 31, 1997, WCCA had received about $97 million in dedicated tax revenues. Financing Plans
WCCA plans to issue revenue bonds backed by dedicated taxes to finance the construction cost of the project. Assuming that WCCA receives authority to use the revenues attributable to sections 301-304 of the 1994 Act for constructing the project and that the City Council does not disapprove the bond issuance, current projections of future dedicated tax revenues are not sufficient to support debt service costs for the full amount of the estimated construction cost. WCCA already has sufficient funds from dedicated taxes for predevelopment activities. However, the funding for the construction cost is uncertain at this time. We have projected the estimated shortfall to be about $114 million since WCCA will need an additional $8 million to satisfy a $30 million operation and maintenance reserve, which is required by the rating agencies before WCCA can enter the bond market. The foundation of WCCA’s financing plan is to generate the maximum amount of revenue bond funding for the construction cost of the new convention center project, which, according to the financial advisors, could be accomplished by using a senior lien and junior lien bond structure. Construction Fund Earnings. The bond proceeds would be deposited in a construction fund. As of July 31, 1997, WCCA has on hand approximately $72.9 million in dedicated tax revenues, with $24.4 million earmarked for the remaining predevelopment costs, and about $2.5 million budgeted for additional operating subsidy of the existing convention center for the remainder of fiscal year 1997, leaving $46 million. Thus, assuming currently estimated costs are substantially accurate, WCCA needs about $114 million ($106 million plus an additional $8 million for O&M reserve) if it were to enter the market in October, as originally planned, to obtain bond financing. However, it is uncertain at this time as to the outcome of these options. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on the progress of the proposed new convention center project for Washington, D.C., focusing on the project's: (1) approval process; (2) building design; (3) estimated costs; (4) dedicated revenues; and (5) financing plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Washington Convention Center Authority (WCCA) is faced with the challenge of obtaining sufficient financing for the construction of the new convention center project; (2) the total cost--predevelopment and construction, including contingencies--is now estimated to be about $650 million, excluding $87 million of borrowing costs and certain reserve requirements; (3) WCCA already has sufficient funds from dedicated taxes for the $40 million in projected predevelopment costs of which a reported $15.6 million was expended as of July 31, 1997; (4) however, funding for the entire estimated $610 million in construction costs is uncertain; (5) WCCA plans to issue revenue bonds backed by dedicated taxes to finance a portion of the construction cost of the project; (6) however, WCCA would need to have its authority to use the taxes currently dedicated to the project expanded to include using them for construction and would have to adopt and submit for City Council review a resolution authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds; (7) the current stream of existing annual dedicated tax revenues is not sufficient to support the debt required to fund the project's estimated construction cost; (8) the current earmarked tax collections are estimated to support a revenue bond issuance of $423 million; (9) WCCA estimated that if $51 million of interest earnings from bond proceeds as well as $30 million of cash on hand from dedicated taxes as of July 31, 1997 are added to the estimated $423 million, total estimated revenues would amount to $504 million; (10) however, this would leave a shortfall of approximately $106 million; (11) assuming estimated costs are accurate, WCCA would need about $114 million ($106 million plus an estimated $8 million to satisfy an operation and maintenance reserve) if it were to enter the market in October 1997, as originally contemplated, to obtain bond financing; (12) WCCA, with the assistance of financial advisors, has been exploring options such as additional funds from the District, federal funding, and sale of the existing convention center to supplement the dedicated tax revenues; (13) also, before the project can move forward, the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), the central agency for conducting planning and development activities for federal lands and facilities in the National Capital Region, including the District of Columbia, must approve the concept design as well as address community concerns regarding the project; and (14) since GAO's December 1996 report, WCCA's estimated completion date has slipped 1 year to December 31, 2000, and based on the delays and approvals required, this date is uncertain. |
gao_NSIAD-98-75 | gao_NSIAD-98-75_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 744 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 requires us to assess the effectiveness of DOD’s demonstration program in providing shock trauma care training for military medical personnel through one or more public or nonprofit hospitals. Specifically, we (1) determined the status of the demonstration program and DOD’s actions to meet the legislative provisions, (2) identified other initiatives aimed at training military personnel in trauma care, and (3) identified key issues that DOD should address if it decides to expand its trauma care training program. To assess the effectiveness of DOD’s demonstration program, we (1) monitored the implementation of the program by Naval Medical Center Portsmouth officials, (2) collected data on the program and the rotations through the civilian trauma center at Sentara Norfolk General Hospital, (3) interviewed the program’s trainees and Navy trauma-trained surgeon and medical school officials, and (4) discussed legal issues regarding the program with Navy judge advocate officials from both the Naval Medical Center Portsmouth and the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Second, the program agreement does not include a provision that the civilian center provide health care services to DOD beneficiaries that are at least equal to the value of the services provided by military personnel training in the center. DOD issued its first report to Congress on July 24, 1997. DOD’s second report, due March 1, 1998, had not been issued as of March 13, 1998. Effectiveness of Program Is Not Yet Known
It is still too early to determine the effectiveness of the demonstration program in training medical personnel in trauma care. Few Rotations Have Taken Place
Only four surgeons will have completed their training rotations by the March 1, 1998, congressional reporting date. The collective experiences of these programs, coupled with those of the demonstration program, could provide DOD valuable information in determining the feasibility and effectiveness of training military medical personnel in civilian trauma centers. These issues include (1) military physician licensure requirements, (2) the capacity of civilian trauma centers to train large numbers of military personnel, and (3) concerns that military participation might detract from training civilian or other military medical graduates in civilian centers. If DOD decides to expand its trauma care training, it will need to build on the Combat Trauma Surgical Committee’s report and develop an overall strategy for wartime training capabilities. Other important DOD actions include prioritizing the personnel requiring the training, determining the frequency of refresher training, and devising a means to track trained personnel. However, the biggest challenge DOD may face is determining how best to meet the competing demands within its health care system, which will require balancing the need for providing wartime medical readiness training with the need to deliver peacetime health care services. However, this concern cannot be assessed because DOD has not (1) completed its ongoing reassessment of its medical force structure and (2) determined which personnel will be required to receive such training. DOD has not determined which medical personnel would need to be trained in trauma care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO evaluated the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's (DOD) demonstration program that would provide trauma care training for military medical personnel through one or more public or nonprofit hospitals, focusing on: (1) the status of the demonstration program and DOD's actions to meet the legislative provisions; (2) other initiatives aimed at training military personnel in trauma care; and (3) key issues that DOD should address if it decides to expand its trauma care training program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is too early to assess the effectiveness of DOD's demonstration program because it has only been in place since November 1997; (2) as of March 1, 1998, only four surgeons had completed their training rotations; (3) DOD has not finished the evaluation tool it is developing to assess the program's effectiveness; (4) due in part to the program's late start, DOD's actions to implement the program have not been fully consistent with the legislative provisions; (5) DOD missed the April 1996 implementation milestone and issued a report on its proposed demonstration program to Congress 5 months late; (6) DOD did not seek an agreement with the civilian center to provide health care to DOD beneficiaries that is at least equal in value to the services provided by the military trainees; (7) DOD officials believed that such an arrangement might have jeopardized the willingness of hospital officials to enter into the program; (8) GAO identified several other initiatives that might be used in assessing the feasibility of training military personnel in civilian trauma centers; (9) unlike the current demonstration program, these other initiatives have not limited their training to general surgeons; (10) the collective experiences of these programs, together with those of the demonstration program, could provide DOD valuable information in determining the feasibility and effectiveness of training military personnel in civilian trauma centers; (11) DOD will need to address several issues, none of which appear to be insurmountable, if it decides to expand its trauma care training program; (12) questions have arisen over physician licensure requirements; (13) two issues concern whether: (a) civilian trauma centers have the capacity to train large numbers of military personnel; and (b) military trainees can obtain sufficient experience, since they will compete for training opportunities with the centers' own personnel; (14) the first issue cannot be addressed because DOD has not yet estimated the number and type of medical personnel that might require trauma training; (15) DOD could deal with the second issue by selecting civilian centers that are understaffed because of their large caseloads; (16) in the longer term, better information will be needed on wartime medical requirements, the personnel requiring trauma care training and their priority for such training, and the desired frequency of refresher training; and (17) the biggest challenge DOD may face is determining how best to balance need for wartime medical training with the substantial needs of its peacetime health care system. |
gao_GAO-08-871 | gao_GAO-08-871_0 | PBGC Relies on Contractors to Address Unpredictable Workloads
Contracting plays a central role in helping PBGC achieve its mission and address unpredictable workloads. PBGC’s contracts cover a wide range of services, including the administration of terminated plans, payment of benefits, customer communication, legal assistance, document management, and information technology. Its contract spending has increased steadily along with overall budget and workload, and use of contracted staff has outpaced its hiring of federal employees. PBGC has relied on contractors to supplement its workforce since the mid-1980s as its workloads have grown due to a significant number of pension plan terminations. PBGC acknowledges that it has difficulty anticipating its workloads due to unpredictable economic conditions and relies on contractors to expand or reduce its workforce as necessary. The number of PBGC’s contract employees has grown significantly more than PBGC employees. PBGC Is Taking Steps to Improve Its Acquisition Infrastructure but Has Not Yet Developed a Strategic Approach to Contracting
In 2007, PBGC began to realign its Procurement Department, update contracting policies and processes, upgrade the skills of Procurement Department staff, and better track contracting data. While these efforts provide an improved foundation for the contracting function, they are early steps and a strategic approach to contracting has not yet been developed. PBGC recently issued its strategic plan, but it is not comprehensive. PBGC Has Made Improvements to Contractor Oversight, but Implementation of Performance-Based Contracting May Present Challenges
PBGC has made improvements to contractor oversight by implementing new contract monitoring activities, improving oversight activities for some of its major contracts, and developing comprehensive procedures to direct contracting activities. However, most of PBGC’s current contracts lack performance incentives and methods to hold contractors accountable. PBGC recently began awarding more performance-based contracts, as a means to achieve better contract outcomes, but there are common challenges that arise—from deciding which contracts are appropriate for a performance-based approach to deciding which outcomes to measure and emphasize. PBGC procurement officials acknowledge the benefits and challenges of performance-based contracting, and must provide additional oversight of contracts and a different approach to contract monitoring that focuses on outcomes rather than processes. Field benefit administration office contractors receive feedback on the timeliness and accuracy of benefit payments based on the MCU’s monitoring efforts. To improve PBGC’s contract management as it implements a performance- based approach to contracting, we recommend that the Director of PBGC provide comprehensive training on performance-based contracting for PBGC’s Procurement Department staff, managers, and acquisition-related workforce; develop practices to help ensure accountability for the Procurement Department staff carrying out contract monitoring responsibilities; and ensure that future contracts measure performance in terms of outcomes, provide incentives for the accomplishment of desired outcomes, and ensure payment of award fees only for excellent performance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the role contracting plays in the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) efforts to accomplish its mission, we collected and analyzed data on PBGC contracting activities, as well as on participants, plans, employees, and budget trends. To do this, we reviewed contracting data from fiscal years 2000 through 2007. To assess the steps PBGC has taken to improve its acquisition infrastructure and develop a strategic approach, we compared PBGC’s acquisition infrastructure to standards outlined in GAO’s acquisition framework. To assess the steps PBGC has taken to improve its contract oversight processes to ensure accountability, we reviewed our findings from our 2000 report and followed up on improvements PBGC has made since then to its contract monitoring procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pensions of more than 44 million workers in over 30,000 employer-sponsored defined benefit pension plans. In response to growing workloads, PBGC has come to rely heavily on contractors to conduct its work. GAO was asked to report on (1) the role that contracting plays in PBGC's efforts to accomplish its mission, (2) the steps PBGC has taken to improve its acquisition infrastructure and develop a strategic approach to guide its contracting activities, and (3) the steps PBGC has taken to improve its contract oversight processes to ensure accountability. To address these issues, we interviewed PBGC officials and selected contractors, reviewed data on PBGC's contracting activities; identified changes PBGC is making to contracting procedures; and identified strategies PBGC uses to monitor contracts.
What GAO Found
Contracting plays a central role in helping PBGC achieve its mission and address unpredictable workloads. Since the mid-1980s, PBGC has had contracts covering a wide range of services, including the administration of terminated plans, payment of benefits, customer communication, legal assistance, document management, and information technology. PBGC's workforce currently consists of about 800 federal employees and utilizes the services of about 1,500 contract employees. From fiscal year 2000 through 2007, PBGC's contract spending increased steadily along with its overall budget and workload, and its use of contract employees has outpaced its hiring of federal employees. As its workloads have grown due to a significant number of large pension plan terminations, PBGC has relied on contractors to supplement its workforce, acknowledging that it has difficulty anticipating its workloads due to unpredictable economic conditions. PBGC is taking steps to improve its acquisition infrastructure, but the Procurement Department is not yet part of PBGC's strategic decision-making process. In 2007, PBGC began to take steps to realign its Procurement Department, update contracting policies and processes, upgrade the skills of Procurement Department staff, and better track contracting data. PBGC's efforts begin to provide an improved foundation for the contracting function; however, these efforts are early steps and more remains to be done. PBGC has not fully integrated its contracting function at the corporate level; the Procurement Department is not included in corporate-level strategic planning and does not have a presence on PBGC's relevant strategic teams. PBGC has made improvements to contractor oversight and has begun to implement performance-based contracting that offers the potential for better contract outcomes, but also creates new challenges for contract oversight and monitoring efforts. PBGC has implemented new contract monitoring activities, improved oversight activities for some of its major contracts, and developed comprehensive procedures to direct contracting activities. For its field benefit administration office contracts, PBGC developed performance measures and scorecards, providing feedback about contractor performance in terms of timeliness and accuracy of benefit payments. Despite these improvements, most of PBGC's current contracts still lack performance incentives and methods to hold contractors accountable. PBGC recently began awarding more performance-based contracts, as a means to achieve better outcomes. Although performance-based contracting is recognized as a viable way toward getting better results from contractors, GAO and others have identified common challenges agencies face when implementing this approach--from deciding which contracts are appropriate for a performance-based approach to deciding which outcomes to measure and emphasize. PBGC procurement officials recognize the benefits and challenges of performance-based contracting, and that they must provide additional oversight of contracts and a different approach to contract monitoring that focuses on outcomes rather than processes. |
gao_GAO-06-472 | gao_GAO-06-472_0 | VA Lacks Departmental Criteria to Evaluate Joint Venture Proposals
VA evaluated the joint venture proposals for its facilities in Denver and Charleston on an ad hoc basis because it lacks criteria at the departmental level to evaluate such proposals consistently. VA has decided against a joint facility in Denver, but it is still in the process of considering such a facility in Charleston. Negotiations between VA and the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Services Center and UCH stretched over a number of years, and a number of different options were considered. The task force’s report presented advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. 2.) 3.) Rather, according to the network director, the Secretary envisioned a stand-alone facility adjacent to the UCH complex. This conclusion was based, in part, on the cost estimates for constructing a new medical center. Joint Venture Proposals in Charleston and Denver Pose Multiple Challenges
The joint venture proposals under consideration in Charleston and previously proposed in Denver raise a number of challenges for VA and its medical affiliates. These challenges—which were identified by VA, MUSC, or UCH officials as well as previous studies prepared for or by VA, MUSC, or UCH—include addressing institutional changes for VA and institutional differences between VA and its medical affiliates, identifying legal issues and seeking legislative remedies, and balancing funding priorities. Although addressing these issues will be difficult, it is not insurmountable, as evidenced by the VA-MUSC steering group’s efforts to address some of these challenges, as well as by VA’s past partnerships with some medical affiliates and DOD. These differences would need to be considered in any joint venture between VA and a medical affiliate. VA Could Learn Several Lessons from Its Experiences with Denver and Charleston Joint Venture Proposals
Because VA may explore the possibility of entering into partnerships with other medical affiliates in the future, the lessons learned from VA’s experiences in Charleston and Denver could be instructive. Lack of Criteria at Departmental Level Results in Inconsistent Evaluations
One of the most important lessons from VA’s experiences in Denver and Charleston is that the absence of criteria at the departmental level to evaluate joint venture proposals can result in inconsistent evaluations, misunderstandings, and delays. The joint venture proposals for VA’s medical centers in Denver and Charleston presented VA with a new opportunity—that is, the proposals involved joint construction and service sharing on a scale beyond anything VA had experienced in partnering with its medical affiliates in the past. In Charleston, the steering group has taken steps to improve communication by establishing a plan for VA and MUSC to share information about the potential joint venture with stakeholders such as employees and veterans groups. Another important lesson is that a strategy for communicating with its medical affiliates and stakeholders, including veterans and employees, can help VA avoid the problems that hampered progress in negotiations over the Denver and Charleston joint venture proposals. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) maintains affiliations with medical schools, including the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) and the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Services Center and University of Colorado Hospital (UCH), to obtain enhanced medical care for veterans. As part of their plans for new medical campuses, both UCH and MUSC proposed jointly constructing and operating new medical facilities with VA in Denver and Charleston, respectively. This report discusses (1) how VA evaluated the joint venture proposals for Denver and Charleston and the status of these proposals, (2) the challenges these proposals pose for VA, and (3) the lessons VA can learn from its experiences in Charleston and Denver for future partnerships.
What GAO Found
VA evaluated the joint venture proposals for its medical facilities in Denver and Charleston using criteria developed specifically for each location, and while VA opted to build a stand-alone facility in Denver, it is still considering a joint venture in Charleston. Because the proposals involved joint construction and service sharing on a scale beyond anything VA had experienced with its medical affiliates in the past, VA did not have criteria at the departmental level to evaluate the proposals on a consistent basis in both locations. In both locations, negotiations between VA and its medical affiliates stretched over a number of years, in part because they were hampered by limited collaboration and communication, among other things. While VA decided against a joint venture in Denver, it has made no decision on Charleston. A VA-MUSC steering group, formed last summer to study the joint venture proposal in Charleston, issued a report in December 2005 that outlined the advantages and disadvantages of different options. The joint ventures proposed in Denver and Charleston present a number of challenges to VA, including addressing institutional differences between VA and its medical affiliates, identifying legal issues and seeking legislative remedies, and balancing funding priorities. For example, capital expenditures for a joint venture would have to be considered in the context of other VA capital priorities. Although addressing these issues will be difficult, the VA-MUSC steering group's efforts could provide insight into how to tackle them. VA's experiences with joint venture proposals in Denver and Charleston offer several lessons for VA as it considers similar opportunities in the future. One of the most important lessons is that having criteria at the departmental level to evaluate joint venture proposals helps to improve the transparency of decisions concerning joint ventures and VA's ability to ensure that the decisions are made in a consistent manner across the country. Another key lesson is that having a strategy for communicating with stakeholders, such as employees and veterans, helps VA build understanding and trust among stakeholders. The following table identifies these and other lessons from VA's experiences in Denver and Charleston. |
gao_GAO-02-913 | gao_GAO-02-913_0 | The 1996 Act also instructed Treasury to ensure that individuals have access to an account at a federally insured financial institution, that such an account have the same consumer protections provided to other account holders, and that it be provided at a reasonable cost. Descriptions of these programs follow. In particular, Treasury and SSA initiated and continue activities to advise check recipients of the safety and convenience of receiving their benefits by electronic transfer and to facilitate switching check recipients to direct deposit. In 2001, Treasury made about 186 million check payments to about 14 million benefit recipients. Benefit recipients 65 and older have high direct deposit participation rates. Specifically, we estimated that about 11 million federal beneficiaries, or over half of all federal check recipients in 1998, did not have a bank account (see appendix I for details of our analysis). The ETA Has Had Limited Success
Despite Treasury’s efforts to market the ETA program, since the program was initiated in July 1999, about 36,000, or fewer than 1 percent, of unbanked federal beneficiaries had opened ETAs by June 2002. Second, many banks require that applicants complete at least some of the paperwork in person. Opportunities May Exist to Increase EFT Participation
Based on our discussions with representatives from the federal government, financial institutions, and consumer groups, we identified approaches that the Treasury could consider to further promote the use of EFT, especially by unbanked benefit recipients. These approaches, described below, include increasing cooperation between banks and local SSA offices to enroll beneficiaries for ETAs; exploring other electronic payment options besides the ETA to deliver benefits; partnering with banks to provide information on the general availability of low-cost banking products; and conducting further research to determine why certain states have unusually low direct deposit participation rates. Conclusions
The number of recipients of federal benefits using EFT climbed steadily throughout the 1990s, rising from around one-half to more than three- quarters of all beneficiaries. To meet this objective we (1) provided information on the extent of EFT usage and the steps federal agencies and others have taken to promote it; (2) identified obstacles to greater use of the EFT program and identified characteristics of recipients who do not have bank accounts; (3) provided information on the current status of the electronic transfer account (ETA) program, including steps the government has taken to promote it; and (4) identified options for Treasury to consider to further promote electronic transfers. To determine the number of unbanked beneficiaries, we analyzed data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). | What GAO Found
In 2001, the Department of the Treasury made 764 million payments valued at $549 billion to beneficiaries of federal programs, primarily programs administered by the Social Security Administration. Of these payments, 76 percent were made using electronic funds transfers (EFTs), potentially saving the government millions of dollars in costs associated with disbursing paper checks. In 1996, Congress passed legislation which required that federal payments except tax refunds be made electronically as of January 1999. The act also required that each person affected by this mandate have access to an account at a financial institution at a reasonable cost and with certain consumer protections. To meet this requirement, Treasury developed the Electronic Transfer Account (ETA). Most recipients of federal benefits have their payments deposited electronically. The number of recipients using EFT climbed steadily throughout the 1990s, rising from around half to more than three-quarters of all beneficiaries. Treasury and the Social Security Administration (SSA) have undertaken activities to increase the use of direct deposit, including developing marketing material and directly notifying check recipients of the advantages of using EFT, particularly safety and convenience. Although information describing the characteristics of these EFT users is limited, GAO determined that participation rates are highest for those 65 and older. The primary obstacle to using EFT was that many federal check recipients did not have a bank account. GAO's analysis of the Survey of Income and Program Participation's 1998 data indicated that 11 million benefit recipients, over half of all federal benefit check recipients in 1998, were unbanked. The ETA has not been widely accepted by banks or unbanked beneficiaries despite Treasury's efforts to promote it. Since initiation of the program in 1999, 36,000 ETAs have been opened, representing fewer than 1 percent of unbanked beneficiaries. Based on discussions with representatives from Treasury, SSA, financial institutions, and consumer groups, GAO identified several approaches that Treasury could consider to increase the use of electronic transfers. These approaches include increasing cooperation between banks and local SSA offices to more effectively enroll beneficiaries for ETAs; exploring other electronic payment options besides the ETA to deliver benefits; partnering with banks to provide information on the general availability of low cost banking products, especially in areas with low ETA coverage; and conducting further research to determine why certain states have low direct deposit participation rates. |
gao_GAO-03-347 | gao_GAO-03-347_0 | The 1998-2002 NPIAS provided the basis for fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002 grants. Some airfield maintenance and project planning costs are also allowed. Over half of general aviation airports were apportioned the maximum amount of funding. However, the funds remain available to this airport for up to 3 years. According to FAA officials, states are required to offer eligible general aviation airports their entitlements in the fiscal year it is made available. If an airport has not accepted the funding at the end of the 3-year period, the grant would be reduced by the amount of the funding not accepted. Most Fiscal Year 2001 General Aviation Entitlement Grant Funds Were Accepted
As of October 1, 2002, about 75 percent of the total fiscal year 2001 general aviation entitlement grant funds had been accepted by the airports to which they were apportioned, and about 46 percent of the total fiscal year 2002 general aviation entitlement grant funds had been accepted. The Percentage of General Aviation Entitlement Grant Funds Accepted Varies Widely by State
General aviation airports in some states accepted a larger percentage of funds in both fiscal years 2001 and 2002 than in other states. General Aviation Entitlement Grants Were Used More Than One-Third of the Time to Fund Construction of Landing Areas
According to the results of FAA’s survey, general aviation airports most often used the funds from fiscal year 2001 entitlement grants to construct landing areas (e.g., runways, taxiways, and aprons). These four largest categories comprise over 75 percent of all projects funded with general aviation entitlement grants in fiscal year 2001. Over two-thirds of the selected airport managers said that the grants provided critical funding to undertake projects at their airports. Over two-thirds of the selected general aviation airport managers said that they would not have been able to undertake or complete needed projects without these grant funds, and three-fourths of them said that the categories of projects eligible for funding include most of their capital needs. Most state officials said that because the $150,000 annual amount is not adequate to complete some major projects, some airports rollover the funding to accumulate up to $450,000 of funding over 3 years to complete such projects. Opinions of Some State Aviation Officials and Airport Managers Differ on Increased General Aviation Entitlement Grant Funding
Seven of the state aviation officials expressed concern that, as funding for general aviation entitlement grants increases, funding for unassigned apportionment grants could correspondingly decrease because the amount available for unassigned apportionment is determined by deducting the general aviation entitlement grant funding from a fixed percentage of AIP. After comparing these data with the 1998-2002 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), we found some discrepancies. FAA created 11 categories for the projects. In addition, under the act, individual airports and states do not have to use these funds in the year they are made available. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, Congress created general aviation entitlement grants to provide funding up to $150,000 per fiscal year to individual general aviation airports. These grants fund capital improvements and repair projects. GAO was asked to (1) assess the amount of funding airports used, (2) identify the types of projects undertaken, and (3) convey suggestions made by interested parties to improve the grants in preparation for the reauthorization of the legislation in 2003.
What GAO Found
By the end of fiscal year 2002, most fiscal year 2001 general aviation entitlement grant funds had been accepted by the airports to which they were apportioned. However, less than half of the fiscal year 2002 entitlement grant funds had been accepted by those airports at the end of fiscal year 2002. The remaining portions of unused entitlement funds for the 2 fiscal years were carried over to use in the following years--up to 3 years. In both fiscal years, the percentage of entitlement grant funds accepted varied widely by state. Larger general aviation airports accepted a greater percentage of their entitlement grants than small airports for both fiscal years. In fiscal 2001, general aviation airports used these funds primarily to undertake landing area construction projects--runways, taxiways, and aprons. In addition, the airports used the funds to undertake pavement maintenance; airfield lighting, weather observation systems, and navigational aids; and planning projects. These four categories constituted over 75 percent of all projects undertaken with these funds. While most state aviation officials, selected airport managers, and FAA officials we spoke with indicated these entitlement grants were useful, they also suggested some changes. The most common concerned the amount of funding. Several state aviation officials and some selected airport managers indicated that the $150,000 annual maximum amount per airport was not adequate to complete projects. However, state officials expressed concerns that increasing the entitlement amount could hinder the states' ability to address their own aviation priorities because any increase would proportionately decrease the states' apportionments. The majority of the selected airport managers indicated that, without these grants, their airports would have been unable to undertake the projects. Other suggestions concerned increasing the amount of time to use the grants, broadening the categories of eligible projects, and using an alternative to FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airports Systems as the basis for funding eligible projects. |
gao_GAO-09-884T | gao_GAO-09-884T_0 | VA Facilities Provided Basic and Specialized Gender-Specific Services and Mental Health Services to Women Veterans, though Not All Services Were Provided On Site at Each VA Facility
The VA facilities we visited provided basic gender-specific and outpatient mental health services to women veterans on site, and some facilities also provided specialized gender-specific or mental health services specifically designed for women on site. Among CBOCs, other than the two largest facilities we visited, most offered limited specialized gender-specific care on site. Regarding mental health care, we found that outpatient services for women were widely available at the VAMCs and most Vet Centers we visited, but were more limited at some CBOCs. Basic Gender-Specific Care Services Were Generally Available On site at VA Medical Facilities
Basic gender-specific care services were available on site at all nine of the VAMCs and 8 of the 10 CBOCs that we visited. In general, women veterans had access to female providers for their gender-specific care: of the 19 medical facilities we visited, all but 4 had one or more female providers available to deliver basic gender-specific care. While All VAMCs Offered at Least Some Specialized Gender-Specific Services On site, CBOCs Typically Referred Patients Needing These Services to Other VA or Non-VA Medical Facilities
The provision of specialized gender-specific services for women, including treatment after abnormal cervical cancer screenings and breast cancer treatment, varied by service and by facility. All VA medical facilities referred female patients to outside providers for obstetric care. Some of the VAMCs we visited offered a broad array of other specialized gender-specific services on site, but all contracted or fee-based at least some services. Vet Centers generally offered some counseling services in the evenings. The smaller CBOCs, however, tended to rely on staff from the affiliated VAMC, often through telehealth, to provide mental health services. Medical Facilities Had Not Fully Implemented VA Policies Pertaining to the Delivery of Health Care Services for Women Veterans
The extent to which VA medical facilities we visited were following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans varied, but none of the facilities had fully implemented VA policies pertaining to women veterans’ health care. In particular, none of the VAMCs or CBOCs we visited were fully compliant with VA policy requirements related to privacy for women veterans. Officials at some VA facilities reported that they were unclear about the specific steps they would need to take to meet VA’s definition of comprehensive primary care for women veterans. None of the VAMCs or CBOCs we visited ensured adequate visual and auditory privacy at check-in in all clinical settings that are accessed by women veterans. Medical Facilities Were in Various Stages of Implementing VA’s Initiative on Comprehensive Primary Care for Women Veterans, but Officials at Some Facilities Were Unclear about the Steps Needed to Implement VA’s New Initiative
VA has not set a deadline by which all VAMCs and CBOCs are required to implement VA’s new comprehensive primary care initiative for women veterans, which would allow women veterans to obtain both primary care and basic gender-specific services from one provider at one site. VA Officials Identified Key Challenges Related to Space, Hiring Staff with Specific Experience and Training, and Establishing the WVPM as a Full-time Position
VA officials at medical facilities we visited identified a number of key challenges in providing health care services to women veterans. In particular, officials at 7 of 9 VAMCs and 5 of 10 CBOCs we visited said that space issues, such as the number, size, or configuration of exam rooms or bathrooms at their facilities sometimes made it difficult for them to comply with some VA requirements related to privacy for women veterans. VA facility officials also told us they have struggled with space constraints as they work to comply with VA’s new policy on comprehensive primary care for women and the requirements in the September 2008 Uniform Mental Health Services in VA Medical Centers and Clinics, as well as the increasing numbers of women veterans requesting these services. We also considered whether VAMCs had programs specifically for women veterans, particularly treatment programs for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and for women who have experienced military sexual trauma (MST). For each of the factors listed below, we examined available facility- or market-level data to identify facilities of interest: total number of unique women veteran patients using the VAMC; total number of unique OEF/OIF women veteran patients using the VAMC; proportion of unique women veterans using the VAMC who are OEF/OIF proportion of unique OEF/OIF women veterans using the VAMC who were discharged from the National Guard or Reserves; within the VA-defined market area for the VAMC, the proportion of women veterans who use VA health care and live in rural or highly rural areas; and availability of on-site programs specific to women veterans, such as inpatient or residential treatment programs that offer specialized treatment for women veterans with PTSD or who have experienced MST, including programs that are for women only or have an admission cycle that includes only women; and outpatient treatment teams with a specialized focus on MST. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically, the vast majority of VA patients have been men, but that is changing. VA provided health care to over 281,000 women veterans in 2008--an increase of about 12 percent since 2006--and the number of women veterans in the United States is projected to increase by 17 percent between 2008 and 2033. Women veterans seeking care at VA medical facilities need access to a full range of health care services, including basic gender-specific services--such as cervical cancer screening--and specialized gender-specific services--such as treatment of reproductive cancers. This testimony, based on ongoing work, discusses GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the on-site availability of health care services for women veterans at VA facilities, (2) the extent to which VA facilities are following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans, and (3) key challenges that VA facilities are experiencing in providing health care services for women veterans. GAO reviewed applicable VA policies, interviewed officials, and visited 19 medical facilities--9 VA medical centers (VAMC) and 10 community-based outpatient clinics (CBOC)--and 8 Vet Centers. These facilities were chosen based in part on the number of women using services and whether facilities offered specific programs for women. The results from these site visits cannot be generalized to all VA facilities. GAO shared this statement with VA officials, and they generally agreed with the information presented.
What GAO Found
The VA facilities GAO visited provided basic gender-specific and outpatient mental health services to women veterans on site, and some facilities also provided specialized gender-specific or mental health services specifically designed for women on site. Basic gender-specific services, including pelvic examinations, were available on site at all nine VAMCs and 8 of the 10 CBOCs GAO visited. Almost all of the medical facilities GAO visited offered women veterans access to one or more female providers for their gender-specific care. The availability of specialized gender-specific services for women, including treatments after abnormal cervical cancer screenings and breast cancer, varied by service and facility. All VA medical facilities refer female patients to non-VA providers for obstetric care. Some of the VAMCs GAO visited offered a broad array of other specialized gender-specific services on site, but all contracted or fee-based at least some services. Among CBOCs, the two largest facilities GAO visited offered an array of specialized gender-specific care on site; the other eight referred women to other VA or non-VA facilities for most of these services. Outpatient mental health services for women were widely available at the VAMCs and most Vet Centers GAO visited, but were more limited at some CBOCs. While the two larger CBOCs offered group counseling for women and services specifically for women who have experienced sexual trauma in the military, the smaller CBOCs tended to rely on VAMC staff, often through videoconferencing, to provide mental health services. The extent to which the VA medical facilities GAO visited were following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans varied, but none of the facilities had fully implemented these policies. None of the VAMCs and CBOCs GAO visited were fully compliant with VA policy requirements related to privacy for women veterans in all clinical settings where those requirements applied. For example, many of the medical facilities GAO visited did not have adequate visual and auditory privacy in their check-in areas. Further, the facilities GAO visited were in various stages of implementing VA's new initiative to provide comprehensive primary care for women veterans, but officials at some VAMCs and CBOCs reported that they were unclear about the specific steps they would need to take to meet the goals of the new policy. Officials at facilities that GAO visited identified a number of challenges they face in providing health care services to the increasing numbers of women veterans seeking VA health care. One challenge was that space constraints have raised issues affecting the provision of health care services. For example, the number, size, or configuration of exam rooms or bathrooms sometimes made it difficult for facilities to comply with VA requirements related to privacy for women veterans. Officials also reported challenges hiring providers with specific training and experience in women's health care and in mental health care, such as treatment for women veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder or who had experienced military sexual trauma. |
gao_NSIAD-96-149 | gao_NSIAD-96-149_0 | As shown in figure 1, local reuse authorities generally seek surplus property under one of the public benefit transfer authorities first because these can be no-cost acquisitions, then through economic development conveyances because these can be no-cost or no-initial cost acquisitions, and lastly through negotiated sale because they can negotiate the terms and do not have to compete with other interested parties. At the beginning of the base closure process, DOD expected that land sales would help pay for the costs of closing bases. 2.) Land sales for all BRAC closures totaled $179.2 million as of March 1996. Developing reuse plans and developing and implementing service disposal plans can be a lengthy process. The low percentage of land sold to the public is a result of the disposal process, which allows communities to plan the reuse of most base property. Base Reuse Shifts From the Federal Sector to Communities
Current plans call for the federal government to retain about 16 percent of the land at the 23 closing military bases to satisfy agency requirements or to comply with decisions made by the BRAC Commission or by legislation. Communities have still not determined the reuse of 15 percent of the land. Although the method of conveyance and disposition for about 15 percent of base property remains undetermined, communities are planning to request 32.5 percent under various public benefit conveyances. This compares with 4 percent during the previous two rounds. On closing bases, communities are planning industrial and office complexes, parks and other recreational facilities, residential housing, and correctional facilities. Lease revenues are expected to be used to protect and maintain these properties. To support dislocated workers and help communities plan and implement their redevelopment objectives, the federal government is providing assistance through numerous programs. To determine the amount and type of federal assistance provided to the BRAC 1988, 1991, and 1993 base closure communities, we obtained federal assistance information from the Federal Aviation Administration, the Economic Development Administration, the Department of Labor, and the Office of Economic Adjustment. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 8, 1996). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, focusing on: (1) the status and extent of land sales at closing bases; (2) whether private parties are excluded from purchasing surplus property; and (3) the amount of federal assistance provided to communities to promote economic conversion of closing bases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of March 1996, land sales for the first three BRAC rounds totalled $179.2 million; (2) private parties rarely bid on the purchase of base properties because communities often request these properties under public benefit transfers, economic development conveyances, and noncompetitive negotiated sale authorities; (3) the federal government plans to retain approximately 16 percent of the land from the 23 bases reviewed; (4) although most of the land from these bases will be requested by local reuse authorities, reuse of 15 percent of the land remains undetermined; (5) communities plan to use the land for industrial and office complexes, parks and recreational facilities, residential housing, and correctional facilities; (6) although some bases have been able to generate jobs and revenue by leasing base properties during the conversion process, development and implementation of reuse and disposal plans can be a lengthy process; (7) readily marketable properties require resources for their protection and upkeep; (8) during past BRAC closure rounds, the federal government has provided over $780 million in planning assistance, training, and infrastructure grants to help communities implement their redevelopment objectives; and (9) 21 percent of the 88,433 DOD civilian jobs that were lost as a result of the first three BRAC closure rounds have been replaced. |
gao_GAO-16-434 | gao_GAO-16-434_0 | CFTC Did Not Make Cost-effective Decisions Consistent with Leading Government Guidance when Planning for Additional Space
CFTC began planning to substantially expand leased space prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and then entered into leases that did not make efficient use of limited government resources. CFTC followed some elements of leading government-leasing practices; however, the agency lacked comprehensive policies and procedures to guide efficient and cost- effective decisions for lease procurement. As a result, CFTC currently has lease obligations for unused space that extend to 2021 and beyond. CFTC Did Not Fully Assess the Risk of Not Receiving Requested Funding when Leasing Additional Space
CFTC renewed leases and expanded space in its Washington, D.C., headquarters and three regional office locations, prior to receiving the funding necessary to hire staff to occupy the additional space. Anticipating the increased oversight that would result from regulating and monitoring the swaps market, CFTC began planning for the expansion of its leased space in the fiscal year 2009 time frame—more than a year before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010. CFTC federal employee staffing increased in absolute terms by about 53 percent from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2015, according to CFTC data (see table 2 below). The total space utilization for all four CFTC offices combined was about 78 percent at the end of fiscal year 2015. By comparison, CFTC’s guidance does not include this level of detail. The lack of this type of specificity in CFTC’s guidance may have contributed to not executing its lease procurements consistent with standards for internal control and thereby not making cost-effective decisions. Potential Options for Improving Cost- effectiveness of CFTC’s Leasing Include Relocating, Teleworking, and Consolidating Regional Offices
As noted above, based on an executive branch memo and initiatives, a GSA study, and our own research, we have identified several options that CFTC may pursue now and in the future to increase space utilization and improve the cost-effectiveness of its leasing arrangements: (1) relocating offices to less costly locations, (2) reducing office space required through increased telework, and (3) consolidating two regional offices—Kansas City and Chicago. CFTC officials told us that these options may not be achievable before their current leases expire. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the CFTC makes cost-effective leasing decisions, and considers options for reducing future lease costs, we recommend that the Chairman of the CFTC take the following two actions prior to entering into any new or expanded lease agreements:
Ensure that as CFTC revises its leasing policies and procedures, it includes comprehensive details on lease procurement that are consistent with leading government guidance and standards to assure cost-effective decisions. CFTC generally concurred with the second recommendation, which states that prior to entering into any new or expanded lease agreements, CFTC establish a timeline for evaluating and documenting options to potentially improve space utilization and reduce leasing costs including, but not restricted to, (1) moving offices to less costly locations, (2) implementing enhanced telework, and (3) consolidating the Kansas City and Chicago regional offices. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which CFTC made cost-effective decisions and followed leading government guidance in planning for additional space for fiscal years 2008 through 2015; and (2) what potential options exist to improve the cost-effectiveness of CFTC’s leasing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The CFTC regulates certain financial markets, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) expanded its regulatory responsibilities. Prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, in anticipation of these increased responsibilities, the agency began planning for more space to accommodate additional staff in each of four office locations.
GAO was asked to review CFTC's staffing, leasing practices, and costs. This report examines: (1) the extent to which CFTC made cost-effective decisions and used leading government guidance in planning for additional space in fiscal years 2008 through 2015 and (2) potential options to improve the cost-effectiveness of CFTC's future leasing. GAO (1) reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and guidance that apply to real property leasing and CFTC's space-planning documents and leases for the fiscal years 2008 through 2015; (2) analyzed data and conducted interviews with key officials from CFTC and GSA; and (3) visited all four CFTC offices.
What GAO Found
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) did not make cost-effective decisions consistent with leading government guidance for lease procurement and internal controls when planning for additional space in fiscal years 2008–2015. CFTC began planning for expansion in the fiscal year 2009 time frame—more than a year before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010. CFTC renewed leases and expanded space in its Washington, D.C., headquarters and three regional offices in anticipation of receiving funding to hire additional staff but did not receive the amounts requested. As a result, CFTC has lease obligations for currently unused space some of which extends through 2025. Overall, the total occupancy level for all four offices combined was about 78 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2015, and each office has different occupancy levels, as shown in the figure below. CFTC has independent authority to lease real property, including office space. The two documents CFTC uses to guide the lease procurement process provide some high-level guidance on this process, but the documents do not establish specific policies and procedures to help ensure cost-effective decisions. By comparison, leading government guidance, from the General Services Administration (GSA) includes comprehensive details on lease procurement. The lack of this type of detail may have contributed to CFTC's making decisions that were not cost-effective.
GAO identified several potential options that CFTC may pursue now and in the future to increase space utilization and improve the cost-effectiveness of its leasing arrangements: (1) relocating offices to less costly locations, (2) reducing office space requirements through enhanced telework, and (3) consolidating two regional offices—Kansas City and Chicago. CFTC officials told GAO that these options may not be feasible; however, the officials have not fully assessed these options or their potential for improving cost-effectiveness and do not have a timeline for doing so.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure cost-effective leasing decisions, GAO recommends that CFTC (1) ensure that its revised leasing policies and procedures incorporate leading government guidance and (2) establish a timeline for evaluating and documenting options to potentially improve space utilization and reduce leasing costs. CFTC generally concurred with GAO's recommendations but noted that it would not be able to take actions to reduce lease costs in the near term. |
gao_GAO-02-439T | gao_GAO-02-439T_0 | Using broad standards, the scorecards in the president’s budget grade agencies’ performance regarding five governmentwide initiatives, which are: strategic management of human capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial performance, expanded electronic government, and budget and performance integration. Central to effectively addressing the federal government’s management problems is recognition that the five governmentwide initiatives cannot be addressed in an isolated or piecemeal fashion separate from the other major management challenges and high-risk areas facing federal agencies. The President’s Management Agenda focuses on important challenges for the federal government. Conclusions
In summary, Mr. Chairman, serious and disciplined efforts are needed to improve the management and performance of federal agencies. Highlighting attention through the President’s Management Agenda and the Executive Branch Management Scorecards are steps in the right direction. | What GAO Found
Federal agencies need to work with other governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, both domestically and internationally, to achieve results. By focusing on accountable, results-oriented management, the federal government can use this network to deliver economical, efficient, and effective programs and services to the American people. The administration's plan to use the Executive Branch Management Scorecard to highlight agencies' progress in achieving management and performance improvements outlined in the President's Management Agenda is a promising first step. However, many of the challenges facing the federal government are long-standing and complex and will require sustained attention. Using broad standards, the scorecards in the president's budget grade agencies on the following five governmentwide initiatives: (1) strategic management of human capital, (2) competitive sourcing, (3) improved financial performance, (4) expanded electronic government, and (5) budget and performance integration. These initiatives cannot be addressed in an isolated or piecemeal fashion separate from other management challenges and high-risk areas. |
gao_GAO-06-660T | gao_GAO-06-660T_0 | The national export strategies’ trade promotion program budget authority tables also include the entire budgets of Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the U.S. Trade Representative as well as very small amounts of the budgets of the Departments of Energy, Labor, and the Treasury and SBA. We made similar comments in 1998 and 2002. Total Reported TPCC Agency Budget Authority Has Declined but Implications are Unclear
Since 2002, the budget authority for trade promotion reported in the national export strategies has fallen or remained relatively unchanged at TPCC member agencies, but the implication of these trends for agencies’ trade promotion activities is not clear. At the same time, the trade promotion budget authority for other key TPCC agencies remained relatively flat. The four agencies named in figure 1 account for more than 90 percent of TPCC member agencies’ combined budget authority related to trade promotion, which ranged from $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006 (enacted) and $1.3 (requested) in fiscal year 2007. It is difficult to determine the effect of these budgetary trends on the availability of trade promotion resources. The decline in Ex-Im Bank’s budget authority, shown in figure 1, did not reduce its ability to provide export financing. Similarly, since 2000, the strategies have excluded the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from the program budget authority table, stating that the agency’s activities “support trade promotion indirectly through broad economic growth and reform, unlike other activities that more directly fund trade finance or promotion.” However, the 2002 national export strategy included USAID in a letter from 10 key TPCC agencies and portions of the 2002, 2003, and 2004 strategies were devoted to a possible joint USAID– Ex-Im Bank program to support capital projects in developing countries. TPCC Has Made Some Progress in Improving Coordination
TPCC’s member agencies have pursued a number of efforts to improve coordination of trade promotion activities, responding to recommendations in its 2002 national export strategy. For example: Interagency training. TPCC Strategies Continue to Provide Little Guidance for Export Promotion Activities
As we found in 2002, the TPCC’s annual strategies provide limited information regarding agencies’ export promotion goals and progress. Consequently, the TPCC’s ability to provide in the strategy a plan for coordinating federal trade promotion activities, as directed by Congress, is constrained. Lack of Systematic Data Hampers Assessment of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses’ Participation
Although available data suggest that TPCC member agencies have involved small and medium-sized businesses in trade promotion activities, a lack of systematically collected information makes it difficult to assess progress or trends. For example: Department of Commerce. Department of Agriculture. Department of State. Moreover, the national export strategies provide anecdotal, rather than systematic, reporting on small and medium-sized business participation in trade promotion activities. For example, the TPCC’s annual export strategies do not review or assess agency goals or activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1992, Congress established the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) to provide a unifying interagency framework to coordinate U.S. export promotion activities and to develop a governmentwide strategic plan. TPCC member agencies' activities include providing training, market information, advocacy, trade finance and other services to U.S. companies, especially small- and medium-sized businesses. These U.S. government agencies together have $1.5 billion in budget authority for export promotion programs and activities for fiscal year 2006. Each year, the TPCC submits to Congress a mandated national export strategy, reporting member agencies' activities and trade promotion budget authority and establishing broad priorities. The TPCC secretariat, which has no budget of its own, is housed in the Commerce Department, which chairs the committee. In this testimony, which updates findings from a 2002 report, GAO (1) reports on trends in TPCC member agencies' budget authority; (2) assesses TPCC's coordination of trade promotion and its national export strategies; and (3) discusses small- and medium-sized businesses' participation in trade promotion activities.
What GAO Found
TPCC's national export strategies for fiscal years 2002-2006 show that agencies' trade promotion-related budget authority dropped by about one third. This resulted mainly from budget changes at the Department of Agriculture and Ex-Im Bank, which account for more than half of U.S. trade promotion budget authority. At the same time, budget authority for two other key agencies, the Departments of Commerce and State, remained relatively steady. However, the effect of these trends on the agencies' trade promotion activities is unclear. For example, the decline in Ex-Im Bank's budget authority did not reduce its ability to provide export financing. TPCC member agencies have taken several steps, such as participating in interagency training and outreach to exporters, to improve coordination of trade promotion efforts. However, coordination challenges persist, for example, among the Departments of Commerce, State, and Agriculture regarding the allocation of overseas staff for trade promotion activities. In addition, as GAO found in 2002, the annual national export strategies have several limitations that affect the TPCC's ability to coordinate trade promotion activities. For example, the strategies do not identify or measure agencies' progress toward mutual goals or review their budget allocations. In addition, they focus on different topics each year without evaluating progress in addressing previous years' topics. GAO has made similar comments in several prior reviews of the TPCC. A lack of systematic information makes it difficult to assess progress or trends in small and medium-sized businesses' participation in trade promotion activities across agencies. TPCC agencies track small-business participation in a variety of ways. The national export strategies provide only anecdotal information on these businesses' participation in trade promotion activities. |
gao_RCED-98-47 | gao_RCED-98-47_0 | Our objectives for this report, therefore, were to evaluate the accuracy of HUD’s estimate of its unexpended funds in the Section 8 tenant-based program and the reasonableness of this amount and assess HUD’s budget formulation process for the Section 8 tenant-based program. This is funding that housing agencies received under contracts with HUD but did not expend because the funding was not needed as planned to make housing assistance payments to landlords on behalf of low-income families. After HUD reported this large unexpended balance, the Congress rescinded $4.2 billion, and after other adjustments of about $2.2 billion, the current balance is about $3.5 billion, which remains in a congressionally established Section 8 Reserve Preservation Account. With the results of the reconciliation, HUD updated its Section 8 tenant-based information system and subsequently determined that the unexpended budget authority in the tenant-based program was $20.7 billion and that $9.9 billion of that amount was not needed to meet current program needs. HUD’s revised estimate of $9.9 billion has been verified by an independent accounting firm. Recommendations
To improve HUD’s fiscal responsibility to the Section 8 program and to ensure that the Congress is adequately informed about the amount of excess unexpended budget authority at HUD in the future, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Office of the Chief Financial Officer to modify the agency’s consolidated financial statements so that they (1) identify the portions of the unexpended appropriations for the Section 8 program that accrued during the year and are attributable to the tenant-based and project-based programs, respectively and (2) disclose the amounts of budget authority in each program that are excess to current needs and therefore available for other uses; include in HUD’s annual budget justification documents the amount of unexpended budget authority in the Section 8 assisted housing program that is in excess of current obligations and recapture amounts that accumulate above what is prudently needed to address contingent costs. We found that HUD had problems with its budget submission; but we also found that HUD had corrective actions planned or in process to improve its budgeting process. Subsequently, HUD adjusted its fiscal year 1998 budget request and removed this request for funding. Because of Budget Estimating Errors, HUD Lowered Its Fiscal Year 1998 Contract Renewal Request
As a result of misestimating the unit cost and using cost estimates in its February budget submission that HUD later determined to be unnecessary, in September 1997 HUD proposed—and the Congress accepted—changes in its contract renewal estimate that lowered the average unit cost by approximately 14 percent, from $6,386 to $5,499. In particular, HUD believed that we should recognize that its initial estimate of the impact of welfare reform on fiscal year 1998 budget needs was based on the best information available. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request and a legislative requirement, GAO: (1) reviewed the accuracy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) estimate of unexpended budget authority in the Section 8 tenant-based program; and (2) assessed HUD's budget formulation process for this program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1997, HUD estimated that $20.7 billion in unexpended budget authority existed in the Section 8 tenant-based program and that $9.9 billion of that amount was in excess to known program needs; (2) this is funding that housing agencies received under contracts with HUD but did not expend because the funding was not needed as planned to make housing assistance payments to landlords on behalf of low-income families; (3) because HUD based its estimate largely on the data in its tenant-based program's information system--which HUD's Office of Inspector General and an independent audit firm have tested and determined to be reliable--GAO believes that the estimate is reasonably accurate; (4) after Congress rescinded a total of $4.2 billion in June and October 1997 and HUD set aside $2.2 billion for unanticipated costs and to account for future transactions, the balance of $9.9 billion in excess unexpended budget authority was reduced to about $3.5 billion in October 1997 and placed in a congressionally established Reserve Preservation Account; (5) the budget information process that HUD used to prepare its fiscal year (FY) 1998 budget request for renewing Section 8 tenant-based contracts did not produce an accurate estimate of needs; (6) key HUD offices did not adequately oversee critical steps in the process, and the process did not require reasonable justification for substantial portions of the estimate--including several hundred million dollars proposed for contingency costs; (7) in addition, although at the time of its FY 1998 budget submission HUD had an estimate of the impact of welfare reform on the cost of the Section 8 program, more recent information caused HUD to conclude that including this estimate in the budget request was necessary; (8) as a result, HUD eventually lowered by $1 billion its FY 1998 budget estimate for renewing Section 8 contracts; and (9) to improve its process, HUD has further enhanced its tenant-based program's information system, consolidated its budget development with strategic planning and financial management, and changed its budget process; HUD also plans additional changes in these areas but does not have a timetable for accomplishing them. |
gao_GGD-00-1 | gao_GGD-00-1_0 | Employee Written Evaluations Emphasized Revenue Production and Efficiency More Than Customer Service
Our analysis of evaluations written when IRS’ old mission statement was in effect showed that, overall, written evaluations of enforcement employees emphasized revenue production and efficiency more than customer service. Features of Current Evaluation Process Could Be Used to Reinforce Customer Service
The current IRS evaluation process contains four features that provide supervisors with opportunities to reinforce the customer service orientation reflected in IRS’ new mission statement. The narrative portion of an employee’s written evaluation provides flexibility to supervisors to focus on employees’ customer service skills. Midyear Progress Reviews
Midyear progress reviews provide supervisors with opportunities to provide interim feedback on all aspects of case handling, including any deficiencies, relating to agency customer service (and other) goals. If the features were to be used more, IRS would need to consider the potential implications for the way in which supervisors allocate their time between these and other administrative tasks. IRS Initiatives to Promote Customer Service
IRS has implemented a number of initiatives to promote customer service, setting the stage for the reform of IRS’ entire performance management system over the coming years. Thus far, IRS has revised its strategic goals; aligned them with its new mission statement; and introduced organizational performance measures that are to balance customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and business results. IRS has also taken several interim actions to promote customer service in evaluating enforcement employees. IRS recognizes that revamping its performance management system is a major effort. IRS has incorporated into the evaluation process a new performance standard relating to the fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers that employees must meet at a passing level to retain their jobs. However, because of the magnitude of the changes IRS is undertaking, it is uncertain when such a system will become fully operational and a new employee evaluation process put in place. In the meantime, IRS could take better advantage of opportunities within the current evaluation process to reinforce the importance of customer service among its frontline enforcement employees. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Our objectives in this report are to (1) determine the relative emphasis on revenue production, efficiency, and customer service in enforcement employees’ annual written evaluations; (2) identify features of the evaluation process that might be used to greater advantage to reinforce the importance of customer service; and (3) describe IRS initiatives to promote customer service, including those to encourage enforcement employees to be taxpayer oriented. We reviewed the two latest evaluations for the period ending June 1998 for each employee in a statistically representative sample of 267 of 19,096 examination and collection enforcement employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employee evaluation system can support the new mission statement during the period IRS will need to revamp its performance management system, focusing on: (1) determining the relative emphasis on revenue production, efficiency, and customer service in enforcement employees' annual written evaluations; (2) identifying features of the evaluation process that might be used to greater advantage to reinforce the importance of customer service; and (3) describing IRS initiatives to promote customer service, including those to encourage enforcement employees to be taxpayer oriented.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS could take advantage of opportunities within the evaluation process to reinforce the importance of customer service among its frontline enforcement employees; (2) there are a number of reasons for doing so; (3) most importantly, the evaluation process is not aligned with IRS' new mission statement because it emphasizes revenue production more than customer service; (4) also, it is uncertain when a new performance management system that IRS is planning will become fully operational; (5) enforcement employees' two most recent written evaluations for the period ending June 1998 emphasized their revenue production and efficiency skills more than their customer service skills; (6) available evidence indicates that four features of the evaluation process could be used to greater advantage to reinforce the importance of customer service among enforcement employees; (7) if the features were to be used more, however, IRS would need to consider the potential implications for the way in which supervisors allocate their time between these and other administrative tasks; (8) the narrative portion an employee's written evaluation provides flexibility for supervisors to focus on employees' customer service skills; (9) midyear progress reviews, which are required, provide supervisors with opportunities to give interim feedback on aspects of case handling in relation to customer service (and other) goals; (10) mandatory reviews of sampling of completed cases present another opportunity for supervisors to comment on customer service skills because these are ex post facto examinations of documents prepared by employees to support their case decisions; (11) field visits present an excellent opportunity to reinforce customer service; (12) IRS has implemented a number of initiatives to promote customer service; (13) it has: (a) revised its strategic goals; (b) aligned them with its mission statement; and (c) introduced organizational performance measures that are to balance customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and business results; (14) in the meantime, IRS has taken several interim actions to encourage enforcement employees to be taxpayer oriented; and (15) it has incorporated into the employee evaluation process a new retention standard relating to the fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers that employees must meet at a passing level to retain their jobs. |
gao_GGD-98-53 | gao_GGD-98-53_0 | Federal Agencies Devote Variable but Small Amounts of Resources to Evaluating Program Results, Primarily for Internal Use
The resources allocated to conducting systematic assessments of program results (or evaluation studies) were small and unevenly distributed across the 23 agencies (departments and independent agencies) we surveyed. Program evaluation was reported to be used more often for general program improvement than for direct congressional oversight. Reforms May Increase Interest In, But Complicate The Process of, Obtaining Results
Some of our interviewees thought that recent governmentwide reforms would increase interest in learning the results of federal programs and policies but would also complicate the task of obtaining that information. A few evaluation officials were concerned that a large investment would be required to produce valid and reliable outcome (rather than process) data. While performance measures were seen as useful for program management, some state agency and legislative staff also saw a continuing need for evaluations to assess policy impact or address problems of special interest or “big-picture” concerns, such as whether a government program should be continued or privatized. Agencies Suggested Varied Strategies for Obtaining Program Results Information
Leveraging Limited Resources
Given constraints on federal budgets, some officials we interviewed in general did not expect federal evaluation resources to rise to meet demand, so they described efforts to leverage and prioritize available resources. A few agencies reported that they were adapting the elements of their existing program information systems to yield information on program results. But in other agencies, evaluation officials and external experts thought that their systems were primarily focused on program process, rather than results. The evaluation official said that structural changes to, and a major investment in, their data systems will be required to provide valid and meaningful data on results. Creating New Evaluation Designs and Partnerships
As program responsibility shifts to state and local entities, evaluation officials and others we interviewed described the need for study designs that can handle greater contextual complexity, new ways to measure outcomes, and the need to build partnerships with the programs’ stakeholders. Comparison of current federal program evaluation resources with the anticipated challenges leads us to several conclusions. First, federal agencies’ evaluation resources have important roles to play in responding to increased demand for information on program results, but—as currently configured and deployed—they are likely to be challenged to meet these future roles. Second, in the future, carefully targeting and reshaping the use of federal evaluation resources and leveraging federal and nonfederal resources show promise for addressing the most important questions about program results. “Evaluation in the Federal Government: Changes, Trends, and Opportunities.” Entire issue. New Directions for Program Evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed federal agencies' efforts to provide information on federal program results, focusing on: (1) the current resources and roles for program evaluation in federal agencies; (2) the anticipated effects of governmentwide reforms and other initiatives on evaluation of federal programs; and (3) potential strategies for agencies to respond to the anticipated effects and provide information on program results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) existing federal evaluation resources--at least as currently configured and deployed--are likely to be challenged to meet increasing demands for program results information; (2) agencies reported devoting variable but relatively small amounts of resources to evaluating program results; (3) morever, agencies reported that the primary role of program evaluation was internally focused on program improvement, rather than direct congressional or other external oversight; (4) interest in the program by high-level officials was most often cited as a criterion for initiating evaluation work; a small portion of studies were said to be conducted for a congressional committee or in response to a legislative mandate; (5) some of the evaluation officials and experts that GAO interviewed anticipated not only increased interest in learning the results of federal programs and policies but also additional complications in obtaining that information; (6) some evaluation officials from states with performance measurement experience noted that effectiveness evaluations would continue to be needed to assess policy impact and address problems of special interest or larger policy issues, such as the need for any government intervention at all in an area; (7) to meet the anticipated increase in demand for program results information as well as the associated technical challenges, some evaluation officials GAO interviewed described efforts to leverage both federal and nonfederal resources; (8) however, some agencies anticipated that major investments in their data systems would be required to produce reliable data on program outcomes; and, in a prior study, program officials were concerned that reliance on less rigorous methods would not provide an accurate picture of program effectiveness; (9) moreover, while some federal evaluation officials envisioned providing increased technical assistance to state and local evaluators, a few state evaluation officials suggested an alternative strategy for the federal government; (10) GAO drew several conclusions from its comparison of current federal evaluation resources with the anticipated challenges to meeting increased demand for information on program results; (11) federal evaluation resources have important roles to play in responding to increased demand for information on program results, but--at least as currently configured and deployed--they are likely to be challenged to meet that demand; and (12) in the future, carefully targeting federal agencies' evaluation resources shows promise for addressing key questions about program results. |
gao_AIMD-97-29 | gao_AIMD-97-29_0 | Scope and Methodology
In performing our evaluation of the accuracy and completeness of DOD’s reported inventory of financial management systems, we reviewed DOD guidance related to classifying its systems as financial, mixed financial, and nonfinancial; determined whether systems categorized as nonfinancial contained information needed to produce DOD financial statements and other financial reports; compared DOD’s financial management systems inventory to other DOD systems inventories to determine whether categories of systems not included in financial management systems inventories and reports were properly categorized as nonfinancial (however, we did not test the accuracy of these inventories); interviewed appropriate DOD, OMB, and DFAS staff to obtain information regarding the categorizing and reporting of financial management systems; reviewed federal financial management system guidance and applicable laws, the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program’s (JFMIP) Framework for Federal Financial Management Systems, and OMB Circulars A-123, A-127, and A-130; and reviewed military service audits to identify systems used to prepare financial statements. The act defines financial management systems to include the financial systems and the financial portions of mixed systems necessary to support financial management, including automated and manual processes, procedures, controls, data, hardware, software, and support personnel dedicated to the operation and maintenance of system functions. A mixed system is defined as an information system that supports both financial and nonfinancial functions of the federal government or its components. The number of reported systems has been limited because both DOD regulations and DFAS guidance did not properly define financial management systems, as required. Although we did not identify all of the systems that should have been included, several of the excluded systems account for billions of dollars of DOD assets and are clearly mixed systems that meet the OMB and JFMIP definition of financial management systems. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated January 24, 1997. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) financial management systems, focusing on the accuracy and completeness of DOD's inventory of financial management systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD does not have a comprehensive inventory of the systems it relies on to record, accumulate, classify, and report financial information; (2) the number of systems included in DOD's inventory was limited because the regulations and guidance from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) did not properly define financial management systems; (3) Office of Management and Budget Circular A-127, Joint Financial Management Improvement Program system requirements, and the recently enacted Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 define financial management systems to include the financial systems and the financial portions of mixed systems necessary to support financial management; (4) a mixed system is defined as an information system that supports both financial and nonfinancial functions of the federal government or its components; (5) DOD considers mixed systems that are generally not within the Chief Financial Officer (Comptroller) organization, such as acquisition, logistics, and personnel systems, to be nonfinancial and, therefore, does not include them in its inventory; and (6) although GAO did not identify all of the systems that should have been included, several of the excluded systems account for billions of dollars of assets and clearly meet the required definition of financial management systems. |
gao_GAO-17-79 | gao_GAO-17-79_0 | Framework for Examining Agencies’ Efforts to Manage Declining Resources
The framework that we developed in 2012 for examining agencies’ efforts to effectively manage in an environment of declining resources outlines the following three key themes to guide agency officials in managing declining resources: 1. Data analytics should guide decision making. For example, top management should take actions to ensure the agency maintains the capacity—including the agency’s workforce and physical capital such as infrastructure and IT—to achieve its mission. OMB has initiated a number of efforts to help agencies cut and avoid costs. Opportunities Exist for Selected Agencies to Further Apply the Themes of the Framework to Manage Declining Resources
Opportunities Exist at Selected Agencies for Top Management to Take Additional Actions to Ensure Agencies Maintain Capacity to Achieve Their Missions
While top management at the selected agencies have taken some steps to manage declining resources consistent with our framework, additional actions could address anticipated future challenges and help ensure that agencies continue to have the capacity to achieve their missions. Some actions could help ensure that the agency avoids longer-term costs and maintains capacity to achieve its mission. Finally, it is unclear based on the excerpts that FLETC provided to what extent the revised strategic plan addresses the anticipated surge in training needs. In addition, FLETC is in the process of developing an Online Campus that can provide distance learning opportunities for federal law enforcement officers and supplement the in-person training they receive at FLETC campuses. EPA. As a result, we estimated, in 2010, that EPA had recovered or would recover $42.2 million. These efforts could help the agency identify opportunities to better manage its existing resources through further efficiencies and cost avoidance. For example: ETA. The Timeliness and Level of Service to the Public for Some Programs at Selected Agencies Declined, According to Agency Officials and Stakeholders
Agency Officials and Stakeholders Reported that Declining Resources Affected the Timeliness of Services for Some Programs at Selected Agencies
Despite agencies’ ongoing efforts to manage declining resources through cost avoidance initiatives, improved efficiency, and other strategies, some agency officials and some stakeholder organizations told us that declining resources and the actions that agencies took to manage them, among other factors, affected the timeliness of some services. In some instances, stakeholder organizations commended the selected agencies for their efforts to continue to meet their missions with fewer resources. However, they also noted that it took agencies longer to provide certain services, which negatively affected individuals, businesses, state operations, and other federal agencies. FLETC. ETA’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification. EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs. For example, the Online Campus represents a potential long-term cost avoidance strategy that could help the agency maintain capacity to provide the necessary law enforcement training, potentially at a reduced cost to both FLETC and its partner organizations. However, FLETC has not yet finalized its plan for the Online Campus with steps and timeframes needed to ensure it successfully implements this priority action. To help ensure that ETA continues to have the capacity to achieve its mission and manage changes in demand for services resulting from changes in the broader economy, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Administrator of ETA to systematically gather and evaluate information on the challenges that states faced administering the unemployment insurance program during the recession that began in 2007—such as rapidly ramping up staffing at the start of the recession and ramping down as the economy recovered—and identify and build upon any lessons learned from this experience that could be broadly shared to help the program respond to any changes in workload during a future economic downturn. In written comments, reproduced in appendix V, ETA did not state whether it concurred or not with this recommendation. ETA stated that it believed the recommendation does not fully recognize its work with states to identify lessons learned from the most recent recession. Appendix I: Overview of Employment and Training Administration and Select Programs’ Budget and Performance Measures
New discretionary appropriations for the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) declined by roughly 14 percent from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal discretionary appropriations declined by roughly 12 percent between FY 2010 and 2015. To better understand issues agencies face in an environment of declining resources and how agencies could address them, GAO developed a framework in 2012 for examining agencies' efforts to manage declining resources.
GAO was asked to examine the specific actions agencies are taking to manage declining resources and the effects on services to the public. This report examined (1) to what extent selected agencies' actions to manage in an environment of declining resources aligned with GAO's framework and (2) the effects, if any, declines in discretionary spending after 2009 had on services to the public at selected agencies.
GAO applied its framework to three agencies selected based on budget data from FY 2010 through 2014. For the larger agencies (EPA and ETA), GAO selected two programs within each agency for review. GAO reviewed agency documents; and interviewed agency officials, program partners, and external stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The three selected agencies GAO reviewed for this report—the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—each took a number of different approaches to manage declining resources that aligned with the three key themes outlined in GAO's framework. For example:
Top Management Should Lead Efforts to Manage Declining Resources. ETA's Office of Foreign Labor Certification top management led efforts to ensure the agency maintains capacity to achieve its mission by taking steps to restructure its workforce to better use existing staff to address changes in workload. This includes cross-training its workforce to achieve greater interoperability of employees among its three processing centers.
Data Analytics Should Guide Decision Making. EPA used Lean Six Sigma, a data-driven process-improvement methodology, to evaluate agency processes and identify opportunities to make them more efficient. For example, EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs reported that it reduced the time it takes to post pesticide product labels, which provide critical information about proper use and handling of pesticides.
Agencies Should Develop Cost-Cutting and Cost-Avoidance Strategies. FLETC reported that in FY 2013 and 2014 the agency reviewed its service contracts to identity potential cost avoidance opportunities. As a result, FLETC reported avoiding roughly $8 million out of $81 million in service contracts by reducing or eliminating nonessential services, such as reducing hours for the information technology (IT) service desk support and consolidating security guard services.
However, opportunities exist for top management at selected agencies to take additional actions to ensure they maintain capacity to achieve their missions and avoid costs. For example, FLETC is working to develop an Online Campus initiative, which would provide distance-learning opportunities and represents a potential long-term cost avoidance strategy that could help the agency maintain capacity to provide necessary law enforcement training. However, FLETC has not yet finalized its plan for the Online Campus with steps and timeframes needed to ensure successful implementation. At ETA, the most recent recession tested the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program's capacity, but ETA has yet to systematically identify lessons learned to help ensure UI maintains capacity should workload increase again. Following through on these actions could help agencies better manage limited resources and maintain capacity to achieve their missions.
Some agency officials and stakeholders reported that actions taken by the selected agencies affected timeliness and service level for some programs. While some stakeholder organizations commended the agencies for their efforts to continue to achieve their missions with fewer resources, they also noted that some actions had negative effects on individuals, businesses, states, localities, and others. The effects they cited included delays in receiving unemployment benefits and disruptions to businesses resulting from delays in processing foreign labor applications and pesticide registration applications.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes three recommendations, including that FLETC finalize its plan for the Online Campus and ETA systematically identify lessons learned by the UI program that could help it respond to future economic downturns. FLETC concurred. ETA did not state whether it concurred or not but stated it believed the recommendation does not fully recognize its existing efforts. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-11-182T | gao_GAO-11-182T_0 | PBGC’s insurance programs are in need of urgent congressional attention and agency action. As of September 2010, PBGC’s estimated financial deficit for both programs combined was $23.0 billion—more than double its deficit from 2 years earlier. ERISA specified that PBGC is to have a three-member board of directors consisting of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Labor. PBGC’s governance structure is also vulnerable to disruptive transitions with each administration change. Our prior work has also found that PBGC’s board members often have limited time and resources to dedicate to PBGC matters given their numerous other responsibilities in their roles as cabinet secretaries. The current board has recently begun to meet more frequently, meeting three times since February 2010. However, prior to that time, the board had not met since February 2008, despite pending terminations of several pension plans sponsored by large automakers and congressional investigations into certain procurement practices. To address these weaknesses in PBGC’s governance structure, we believe that Congress should consider expanding the board of directors to include additional members with diverse backgrounds who possess knowledge and expertise useful to PBGC’s mission. PBGC Needs More Strategic Management of Its Contract Workforce and Benefit Determination Process
Although PBGC management has taken steps in recent years to strengthen its operations, our prior work has identified ways that the corporation could be more strategic in its management of its contract workforce and the benefit determination process. The need for a strategic approach in these areas is essential to ensure that PBGC is operating as efficiently and effectively as possible to manage its increasing workload. About two-thirds of PBGC’s workforce consists of contract workers (see fig. Over the years, PBGC has taken steps to improve its workforce management. In this plan, PBGC acknowledges the importance of contracting and the challenges of balancing their workforce between federal and contract workers, but the plan does not provide specific actions to address such challenges and appears to continue to focus primarily on PBGC’s federal workers. Although we commend PBGC for its improvements to contract management, we continue to believe that more should be done to include procurement decision-making in corporate-level strategic planning and to link contractor performance measures with the corporation’s mission. Benefit Determination Process Management
Finally, our prior work has also found that PBGC needs a more strategic approach for determining the benefits for participants in large, complex plans that have been terminated. However, we continue to believe that reporting performance measures that reflect averages across all plans does not provide adequate weight to large versus small plans and does not provide sufficient incentive to improve the processing times for large, complex plans. Its premium base has been eroding over time as fewer sponsors are paying premiums for fewer participants. In addition, as a result of the recession, PBGC is still at risk from the increased underfunding of some large defined benefit plans. Improvements to PBGC’s governance and to its strategic management cannot correct the structural weaknesses of its financial design, but it can put PBGC in a better position to confront the challenges that lie ahead. Companies that pay annual premiums to PBGC and the millions of employees whose retirement benefits are under PBGC’s protection are owed greater stewardship of the corporation and its funds. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Financial Challenges Highlight Need for Improved Governance and Management. Private Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Long- Term Budgetary Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a self-financing government corporation that insures the pensions of 44 million workers in more than 27,000 private sector defined benefit pension plans. Yet, PBGC faces financial instability that could pose a future threat to this source of protection for Americans' retirement income. As fewer sponsors pay premiums for fewer participants in defined benefit plans, and as the underfunding of large defined benefit plans increases, the risks to PBGC's financial future also increase. As of September 2010, PBGC's net accumulated financial deficit was $23 billion. GAO has designated PBGC and the pension insurance programs it administers as "high risk" areas in need of urgent attention and transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness changes. In this testimony, GAO discusses its recent work regarding PBGC. Specifically, this statement focuses on needed improvements to PBGC's governance structure and strategic management based on GAO's prior work in these areas. GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement, but continues to believe that Congress should consider expanding PBGC's board of directors and that PBGC should implement recommendations from prior reports that have not yet been implemented, such as those concerning strategic workforce management and benefit determination process performance measures for large, complex plans.
What GAO Found
PBGC requires a strong governance structure and strategic management to ensure that it can meet its future financial challenges. Companies who pay annual premiums to PBGC and the millions of employees whose retirement benefits are under PBGC's protection are owed greater stewardship of the corporation and its funds. By law, PBGC is governed by a three-member board of directors composed of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Labor. Because of their numerous responsibilities in their roles as cabinet-level secretaries, the board members have historically been unable to dedicate consistent attention to PBGC matters. In fact, since 1980, the board has met only 23 times. During a critical 2-year period between February 2008 and February 2010, amid turbulent economic times and congressional investigations of certain procurement practices, the board did not meet at all. While the current PBGC board is meeting more frequently than in prior years, its members still have little time to devote to PBGC governance and the board remains vulnerable to disruptive transitions during future changes of administration. In addition, although PBGC management has taken steps in recent years to strengthen its operations, recommendations from GAO's prior work concerning how the corporation could improve its strategic workforce management and the benefit determination process have yet to be fully implemented. PBGC's contract workers comprise about two-thirds of its workforce, yet GAO found that workforce management lacked a strategic approach for determining the mix of contract and federal workers, and PBGC did not include procurement decision making in corporate-level strategic planning. Also, GAO found that management of PBGC's benefit determination process did not provide for separate reporting of performance measures for large, complex plans, yet these plans are responsible for most long delays in processing and most cases with overpayments. Measures that reflect averages across all plans do not provide sufficient incentive to improve the processing of these plans. The need for a more strategic approach in managing both the contract workforce and the benefit determination process is essential to ensure that PBGC is operating efficiently and effectively. Improvements to PBGC's governance and strategic management cannot correct structural weaknesses in its financial design, but it can better position PBGC for the challenges that lie ahead. |
gao_GAO-09-270 | gao_GAO-09-270_0 | Survey responses showed that the size of DFE governing bodies ranges from 1 to 24 members. Thirteen of the 31 DFEs had at least one vacancy in their governing body. Based on the responses of the remaining 18 DFEs, the applicability of the 12 statutes varied, with 1 DFE—the Corporation for Public Broadcasting—stating that it is not subject to any of the 12 key governance and accountability statutes. In recent years, Amtrak and the Federal Election Commission have also had significant vacancies. Not All DFEs Said They Are Required to Comply with Key Governance and Accountability Statutes
In order to improve governance and accountability at federal agencies, a variety of laws covering a range of management and administrative practices and processes have been enacted. Since the IG is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud and abuse, conducting audits and investigations, and recommending policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, the work of an IG at an entity can benefit the governing body, particularly governing body and committee efforts to focus on issues and provide oversight of the entity. A Majority of DFEs Have New Member Orientation Programs, While 9 DFEs Have Ongoing Training Programs
Nineteen of the 29 DFEs responding to our survey reported having orientation programs for new governing body members, and at least 15 of the 19 programs reportedly provide key information on oversight and governance issues, such as governing body policies and communications with management. Most of the DFE IGs we surveyed report to the highest levels in their entities, a structure that helps to safeguard IG independence in accordance with the IG Act and generally accepted government auditing standards. The IG surveys also showed that most DFE IGs had limited control over their resources and that their budgets and staffing were not always adequate to perform audits or investigations related to the missions or management challenges of their entities. Only 10 DFEs reported that their governing bodies have written policies for monitoring the implementation of IG recommendations. Nine of those 10 have policies that require the governing body to respond in writing acknowledging the recommendations and to develop a plan to address them. Three DFE IGs have a separate appropriation account or line item in the Budget of the U.S. Government (Legal Services Corporation, National Science Foundation, and Federal Reserve Board). For entities using funding from taxpayers and donors, effective governance, accountability, and internal control are keys to maintaining trust and credibility. We are not making specific recommendations in this report, but are providing this information for consideration in future oversight of DFEs and their IGs. The information on governance structures and practices provided in this report can help inform continuing work to improve the effectiveness of government, such as the new IG Council established under the 2008 Reform Act, which can also use this information in its role of promoting and supporting the effectiveness of the IG community and fostering governmentwide efforts to improve management. Of the entity heads and IGs responding, a number provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to describe (1) the statutory structure of the governing body for each designated federal entity (DFE) organization and (2) the inspector generals’ (IG) roles within the governance structure and management of their respective entities. To obtain the information needed for our two reporting objectives, we reviewed and summarized information from a variety of sources, including the enabling legislation of each DFE; the IG Act, as amended; the 2007 Performance and Accountability Report (PAR) or 2007 Annual Report of each DFE; the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) FY 2007 list of designated federal entities and federal entities; and prior GAO reports on inspectors general, accountability, and governance at the DFEs. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control (rev. 2. 3. 7. 8. 13. 14. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure Needs Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
For entities that rely on others for funding, effective governance, accountability, and internal control are keys to maintaining trust and credibility. In recent years, corporate governance and accountability have received increased scrutiny and emphasis in the nonprofit, federal government, and public company sectors. Governance and accountability problems have also been identified at designated federal entities (DFE) such as the Smithsonian Institution, the Legal Services Corporation, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. This report responds to a congressional request that GAO describe (1) the statutory structure of the governing bodies for each DFE organization and (2) the role of the inspectors general (IGs) in the governance structure. To accomplish this, GAO surveyed the DFE heads and IGs on governance issues and reviewed information from a variety of sources, including the IG Act and subsequent amendments; enabling legislation for the DFEs; and legislative and regulatory standards and requirements for financial reporting and internal control. GAO is not making specific recommendations in this report, but is providing this information for consideration in future efforts to update the governance of DFEs, oversee the entities and their IGs, and continue work to improve the effectiveness of government. GAO received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The DFEs vary in structure and requirements for governance. At the time of GAO's review, the designated size of the governing bodies of the 31 DFEs ranged from 1 to 24 members. Fifteen had at least one vacancy and 2 had more vacancies than sitting members. The frequency of DFE multimember governing-body meetings ranged from daily to rarely or not at all. In GAO's survey of DFEs, 13 indicated that they are required to comply with 12 key statutes that cover management and accountability. The remaining 18 reported varying requirements, with one not subject to any of the statutes. Only 7 DFE governing bodies have a structure that includes governance or oversight committees for ensuring oversight of management decisions, results of operations, and emerging risks. While 19 DFEs reported having orientation programs for new governing body members, only 9 reported ongoing training. IG effectiveness is influenced by an entity's governance structure and practices. Within DFEs, IGs vary in their role and relationship with management. IGs are charged with preventing and detecting fraud and abuse; conducting audits and investigations; and recommending policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. To accomplish these objectives, IGs must be able to establish and maintain independence; have control of their resources to plan and perform work; recruit, retain, and manage sufficient professional staff; and be able to resolve audit and investigation recommendations. GAO's survey of IGs showed that most report to the highest levels in their entities, a legislative requirement that is a key element of independence. At the same time, the IGs had limited control over their resources, and their budgets and staffing were not always adequate to perform needed audits and investigations. Only 3 IGs had the transparency that a separate line item in their entity's budget provides, and 8 needed management approval for spending. Audit resolution varied, with some IGs reporting a lack of entity responsiveness to recommendations. Only 10 DFEs reported that their governing bodies have written policies for monitoring the implementation of IG recommendations. Nine of the 10 have policies that require the governing body to respond in writing and to develop a plan to address recommendations. During the course of GAO's work, Congress passed and the President signed into law on October 14, 2008, the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, which was intended to enhance IG independence. Its implementation may mitigate some of the issues GAO found. |
gao_GAO-14-467T | gao_GAO-14-467T_0 | CPAs, attorneys, and enrolled agents are tax practitioners. Generally, unenrolled preparers are not subject to these requirements. conducted a study of the quality of paid preparers and issued a report recommending increased oversight of paid preparers. new testing and continuing professional education requirements. Although the District Court determined that IRS does not have the authority to regulate unenrolled preparers, the decision did not affect the requirement that all paid preparers obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) and renew their PTIN annually. Use of Paid Preparers Varied by Complexity of Tax Return, but Often Resulted in Larger Refunds
According to IRS’s SOI data, an estimated 81.2 million or 56 percent of approximately 145 million individual tax returns filed for tax year 2011 were completed by a paid preparer. Limited Investigation and IRS Data Reveal Significant Errors in Returns Prepared by Paid Preparers
Taxpayers rely on paid preparers to provide them with accurate, complete, and fully compliant tax returns; however, tax returns prepared for us in the course of our investigation often varied widely from what we determined the returns should and should not include, sometimes with significant consequences. The NRP’s review of tax returns from 2006 through 2009 also found many errors on returns prepared by paid preparers, and some of those errors were more common on paid prepared returns than on self-prepared returns. Only 2 of 19 tax returns showed the correct refund amount. Paid preparer errors generated during our 19 non-generalizeable visits resulted in refund amounts that varied from giving the taxpayer $52 less to $3,718 more than the correct amount. Quality and Accuracy of Tax Preparation Varied Based on the Scenario and Specific Form or Line Number
A majority of the 19 paid preparers we visited made errors on common tax return issues; on some lines of the tax return most paid preparers were correct. Some of the most significant errors involved paid preparers (1) not reporting non-Form W-2 income, such as unreported cash tips, in 12 of 19 site visits; (2) claiming an ineligible child for the EITC in 3 of 10 site visits; and (3) not asking the required eligibility questions for the American Opportunity Tax Credit. Paid preparers completed the correct type of tax return—the Form 1040—for 17 of 19 site visits. Dividend and capital gains income. Earned Income Tax Credit. Errors in this context changed either the tax due or the amount to be refunded. NRP estimates show that both individuals and paid preparers make errors on specific forms and lines of Form 1040, some of which we experienced in our undercover visits. As of March 2014, 55 percent of paid tax preparers are unenrolled preparers, not regulated by IRS. However, IRS data, which more broadly track compliance, show preparers made serious errors, similar to the findings from our site visits. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress agrees that significant paid preparer errors exist, it should consider legislation granting IRS the authority to regulate paid tax preparers. | Why GAO Did This Study
For tax year 2011, an estimated 56 percent of about 145 million individual tax returns were completed by a paid preparer. IRS has long recognized that preparers' actions have an enormous effect on its ability to administer tax laws effectively and collect revenue that funds the government. Likewise, many taxpayers rely on preparers to provide them with accurate, complete, and fully compliant tax returns.
GAO was asked to review the oversight and quality of paid preparers. This testimony examines (1) how preparers are regulated by IRS and (2) the characteristics of tax returns completed by preparers based on products GAO issued from April 2006 through August 2008 and work conducted from November 2013 to April 2014. GAO reviewed laws, regulations and other guidance and interviewed IRS officials. GAO analyzed IRS Statistics of Income data from tax year 2011, the most recent data available, and the NRP database, which broadly tracks compliance. To gain insight on the quality of service provided, GAO conducted 19 undercover site visits to commercial preparers in a metropolitan area. Criteria to select the metropolitan area included whether the state regulates preparers and levies an income tax.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) authority to regulate the practice of representatives before IRS is limited to certain preparers, such as attorneys and certified public accountants. Unenrolled preparers—those generally not subject to IRS regulation—accounted for 55 percent of all preparers as of March 2014. In 2010, IRS initiated steps to regulate unenrolled preparers through testing and education requirements; however, the courts ruled that IRS lacked the authority.
GAO found significant preparer errors during undercover site visits to 19 randomly selected preparers—a sample which cannot be generalized. Refund errors in the site visits varied from giving the taxpayer $52 less to $3,718 more than the correct refund amount. Only 2 of 19 preparers calculated the correct refund amount.
The quality and accuracy of tax preparation varied. Seventeen of 19 preparers completed the correct type of tax return. However, common errors included
not reporting non-Form W-2 income (e.g., cash tips) in 12 of 19 site visits;
claiming an ineligible child for the Earned Income Tax Credit in 3 of 10 site visits where applicable;
not asking the required eligibility questions for the American Opportunity Tax Credit; and
not providing an accurate preparer tax identification number
These findings are consistent with the results of GAO's analysis of IRS's National Research Program (NRP) database. GAO analysis of NRP data from tax years 2006 through 2009 showed that both individuals and preparers make errors on tax returns. Errors are estimated based on a sample of returns, which IRS audits to identify misreporting on tax returns. Tax returns prepared by preparers had a higher estimated percent of errors—60 percent—than self-prepared returns—50 percent. Errors refer to changes either to the tax due or refund amount.
What GAO Recommends
If Congress agrees that significant preparer errors exist, it should consider legislation granting IRS the authority to regulate paid tax preparers. Technical comments from IRS were incorporated into this report. |
gao_GAO-02-1131T | gao_GAO-02-1131T_0 | Within broad federal guidelines, states have considerable flexibility in determining who is eligible and what services to cover in their Medicaid program. Limits may also be placed on the costs of services that will be covered by Medicaid. Medicare spending accounted for 14 percent (about $19 billion) of total long-term care expenditures in 2000. Selected States Varied in Expenditures for and Design of Medicaid Home and Community Services
The four states we reviewed allocated different proportions of Medicaid long-term care expenditures for the elderly to federally required long-term care services, such as nursing facilities and home health, and to state optional home and community-based care, such as in-home personal support, adult day care, and care in alternate residential care settings. The number of hours of in-home care that the case managers offered and the types of residential care settings recommended depended in part on the availability of services and the amount of informal family care available. States differed, however, in how they designed their Medicaid programs to offer home and community-based long-term care options for elderly individuals and the level of resources they devoted to these services. As a result, as demonstrated by the care plans developed by case managers for our hypothetical elderly individuals in four states, the same individual with certain identified disabilities and needs would often receive different types and intensity of home and community-based care for his or her long-term care needs across states and even within the same community. These differences often stemmed from case managers’ attempts to leverage the availability of both publicly-financed long-term care services as well as the informal care and support provided to individuals by their own family members. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the baby boomers age, spending on long-term care for the elderly could quadruple by 2050. The growing demand for long-term care will put pressure on federal and state budgets because long-term care relies heavily on public financing, particularly Medicaid. Nursing home care traditionally has accounted for most Medicaid long-term care expenditures, but the high costs of such care and the preference of many individuals to stay in their own homes has led states to expand their Medicaid programs to provide coverage for home- and community-based long-term care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that a Medicaid-eligible elderly individual with the same disabling conditions, care needs, and availability of informal family support could find significant differences in the type and intensity of home and community-based services that would be offered for his or her care. These differences were due in part to the very nature of long-term care needs--which can involve physical or cognitive disabling conditions--and the lack of a consensus as to what services are needed to compensate for these disabilities and what balance should exist between publicly available and family-provided services. The differences in care plans were also due to decisions that states have made in designing their Medicaid long-term care programs and the resources devoted to them. The case managers GAO contacted generally offered care plans that relied on in-home services rather than other residential care settings. However, the in-home services offered varied considerably. |
gao_GAO-08-92 | gao_GAO-08-92_0 | Uncertain Effectiveness and Limited Availability Would Likely Constrain the Use of Antivirals and Vaccines to Forestall the Onset of a Pandemic
The use of antivirals and vaccines to forestall the onset of a pandemic would likely be constrained by their uncertain effectiveness and limited availability. A targeted vaccine cannot be manufactured until the pandemic strain has emerged and been identified. To achieve timely application, health authorities must be able to detect the virus strain quickly through surveillance efforts and use this information to administer or develop effective antivirals and vaccines. If an individual is diagnosed too late, antivirals may not be effective. According to HHS officials, 20 to 23 weeks are currently required from the detection of a pandemic before a well-matched vaccine can be developed. Consequently, well- matched vaccines are likely to play little or no role in efforts to stop or contain a pandemic, at least in its initial phases. In addition, only the number of outbreaks may be reported rather than more specific information. While WHO has not set a target for national antiviral stockpiles, it stated in 2007 that it is unlikely that sufficient quantities of antivirals will be available in any country at the onset of a pandemic. Some health authorities have suggested that increased seasonal vaccination could play a limited role in forestalling the emergence of a pandemic by limiting the opportunities for human and animal influenza strains to combine and form a pandemic strain, but it is likely that the limited availability of seasonal vaccination would limit its role in forestalling an influenza pandemic. This limited vaccine production capacity would also limit the availability of a pandemic vaccine in the event of a pandemic since the processes used to manufacture seasonal and pandemic vaccines are similar and the manufacturing would take place in the same facilities. Distribution and administration capacities require plans, delivery networks, facilities suitable for administering the drugs, trained personnel, and funding to get antivirals to where they are needed and administer them promptly. Antiviral distribution networks are poor or nonexistent in some countries. U.S. Government and International Partners’ Efforts Are Under Way to Address Constraints on Use of Antivirals and Vaccines, but Certain Efforts Face Limitations
The United States, its international partners, and the pharmaceutical industry are investing substantial resources in efforts to address the uncertain effectiveness and limited availability of antivirals and vaccines. Efforts to make effective antivirals and vaccines more available include (1) improving disease surveillance on an international scale in order to monitor the evolution of influenza strains and the effectiveness of antivirals and vaccines against those strains, (2) increasing global demand for antivirals and vaccines to encourage production and spur research and development, and (3) increasing global distribution and administration capacity. Manufacturers are also working to improve the effectiveness of vaccines to combat pandemic influenza through such activities as developing pre-pandemic vaccines, examining cell-based production technology, studying substances that can be added to vaccines to improve effectiveness, and conducting research on vaccines that would provide protection against multiple influenza strains. Research on and Development of Antivirals Development of new antivirals is particularly important due to concern over the emergence of antiviral-resistant influenza strains that could render existing antivirals ineffective. WHO, countries, and pharmaceutical manufacturers have established global and regional antiviral stockpiles to enhance the availability and quick distribution of antivirals to the site of outbreaks. WHO is working to establish a pre-pandemic vaccine stockpile. Although efforts are under way to increase antiviral and vaccine manufacturers’ production capacity by building new facilities, these new facilities are not expected to be ready to produce antivirals and vaccines for several years. WHO provided comments via e-mail and stated that the report was comprehensive and useful. HHS said that we were assuming that antivirals and vaccines are the only tools necessary to forestall a pandemic. In addition WHO has used the word in describing its efforts to respond to a pandemic and our definition is consistent with WHO’s use of the term. While we believe that these concepts are consistent with our use of the term forestall when describing efforts to respond to a pandemic in such a way as to avert, slow, mitigate, or change the course of a pandemic, we have revised the report and defined forestall to mean containing, delaying, or minimizing the impact of the onset of a pandemic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pandemic influenza poses a threat to public health at a time when the United Nations' World Health Organization (WHO) has said that infectious diseases are spreading faster than at any time in history. The last major influenza pandemic occurred from 1918 to 1919. Estimates of deaths worldwide if a similar pandemic were to occur have ranged between 30 million and 384 million people. Individual countries and international organizations have developed and begun to implement a strategy for forestalling (that is, containing, delaying, or minimizing the impact of) the onset of a pandemic. Antivirals and vaccines may help forestall a pandemic. GAO was asked to examine (1) constraints upon the use of antivirals and vaccines to forestall a pandemic and (2) efforts under way to overcome these constraints. GAO reviewed documents and consulted with officials of the Departments of State and Health and Human Services (HHS), international organizations, and pharmaceutical manufacturers. WHO commented that the report was comprehensive and useful. HHS stressed that vaccines and antivirals must be viewed in a larger context. State and HHS commented that the term "forestall" is ambiguous and misleading. However, GAO has used the word in a way that is consistent with WHO's use of the term.
What GAO Found
The use of antivirals and vaccines, two elements of the international strategy to forestall a pandemic, could be constrained by their uncertain effectiveness and limited availability. To use antivirals effectively, health authorities must be able to detect a pandemic influenza strain quickly through surveillance and diagnostic efforts and use this information to administer antivirals. The effectiveness of antivirals could be limited if they are used more than 48 hours after the onset of symptoms or by the emergence of strains resistant to antivirals. Unlike antivirals, vaccines are formulated to target a specific influenza strain in advance of infection. The effectiveness of vaccines in forestalling a pandemic could be limited because such a targeted pandemic vaccine cannot be developed until that strain has been identified. Due to the time required to identify the virus and develop and manufacture a pandemic vaccine--20 to 23 weeks according to HHS--such vaccines are likely to play little or no role in efforts to forestall a pandemic in its initial phases. The availability of antivirals and vaccines in a pandemic could be inadequate due to limited production, distribution, and administration capacity. WHO has stated that it is unlikely that sufficient quantities of antivirals will be available in any country at the onset of a pandemic. The distribution and administration capacity for antivirals and vaccines is limited in some countries by poor or nonexistent delivery plans and networks, a lack of facilities for administering the drugs, and small numbers of personnel trained to administer them. The United States, its international partners, and the pharmaceutical industry are investing substantial resources to address constraints on the availability and effectiveness of antivirals and vaccines. Efforts are under way to improve influenza surveillance, including diagnostic capabilities, so that outbreaks can be quickly detected. Increased demand and government support has led manufacturers to increase research into more effective antivirals and vaccines. Manufacturers are developing new antivirals to combat influenza. New methods for developing vaccines are being studied in order to reduce the amount of vaccine that is needed and to increase the number of strains against which it is effective. Pre-pandemic vaccines, which are formulated to target influenza strains that have the potential to cause a pandemic, are being developed. However, these vaccines may or may not be effective against the pandemic strain that ultimately emerges. To overcome limitations on the availability of antivirals and vaccines, manufacturers are working to increase production at existing facilities and build new facilities. To address constraints on the distribution and administration of antivirals, stockpiles are being established to allow faster delivery of antivirals to countries experiencing outbreaks. WHO is also working to establish stockpiles of pre-pandemic vaccines. Additionally, other efforts also face limitations. For example, increasing production capacity of vaccines and antivirals will take several years as new facilities are built and necessary materials acquired. |
gao_GAO-17-594T | gao_GAO-17-594T_0 | The programs are currently authorized through fiscal year 2022. In addition to the requirements for the participating agencies, the reauthorization act included requirements for those agencies’ Offices of the Inspectors General (OIG). SBA and Participating Agencies Have Implemented About One-Third of Our Prior Recommendations
SBA has implemented 5 of the 17 recommendations we have made on the SBIR and STTR programs and the participating agencies to which we have made recommendations—the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Defense (DOD)—have implemented 1 of the 3 recommendations we made. The complete list of recommendations and the status of agencies’ implementation of the recommendations is included in appendix I.
HHS Implemented Recommendation on Spending Requirements, and SBA Implemented Half of Recommendations Related to Those Requirements
From September 2013 through April 2017, we made six recommendations to SBA and one to HHS to improve oversight and implementation of the SBIR and STTR spending requirements. In our June 2014 report, we found that SBA did not request that agencies submit data on such spending and recommended that the agency clarify how to submit such data. In response to our recommendation, SBA revised its annual report templates for data reported since fiscal year 2013 to identify obligations for the programs outside of awards, such as funds spent on discretionary technical assistance to small businesses. This change has improved the accuracy of participating agencies’ obligations data that they report to SBA and that SBA, in turn, reports to Congress. We have made five recommendations to SBA to improve compliance with these reporting requirements. SBA has fully implemented one recommendation (see app. For example: In each of our four reports on agencies’ compliance with spending and other reporting requirements, we found that SBA had not submitted timely reports to Congress on the SBIR and STTR programs. SBA issued its most recent required report to Congress on the SBIR and STTR programs for fiscal year 2013 in March 2016. In our September 2013 report, we concluded that without more rigorous oversight by SBA and more timely and detailed reporting on the part of both SBA and participating agencies, it would be difficult for SBA to ensure that intended benefits of the SBIR and STTR programs were being attained and that Congress was receiving critical information to oversee these programs. SBA agreed and stated at the time that it planned to implement the recommendation. We continue to believe that it is important for SBA to provide a timely annual report to Congress to further improve oversight of the programs. SBA has not submitted a report to Congress on the administrative pilot program for fiscal year 2014. SBA and DOD Plan to Implement April 2017 Recommendations on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention Requirements
In our April 2017 report on the SBIR and STTR programs, we reviewed the implementation of fraud, waste, and abuse prevention measures by SBA and the participating agencies and their OIGs. Appendix I: GAO’s Prior Recommendations on Small Business Research Programs
Table 2 lists our prior recommendations to the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, and the status of those recommendations, in four areas: (1) spending requirements, (2) other reporting requirements, (3) the administrative pilot program, and (4) fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements. GAO-14-431. | Why GAO Did This Study
For about 35 years, federal agencies have made awards to small businesses for technology research and development through the SBIR program and, for the last 25 years, through the STTR program, totaling more than $40 billion. Currently, 11 agencies participate in the SBIR program, and 5 of these agencies also participate in the STTR program. The SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011 included provisions for GAO to review aspects of the programs.
This statement addresses GAO's key findings and recommendations related to the SBIR and STTR programs since 2012. This statement is based on GAO reports issued in response to the act's provisions from November 2012 through April 2017. Those reports examined SBA's and agencies' compliance with spending and other reporting requirements for the programs and their implementation of fraud, waste, and abuse prevention measures. For those reports, GAO compared documentation from SBA and participating agencies with the respective requirements. In April 2017, GAO updated the status of its prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA), which oversees the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, and agencies participating in the programs have implemented about one-third of GAO's 20 prior recommendations regarding the programs. From September 2013 through April 2017, GAO made 17 recommendations to SBA and 3 to participating agencies to improve the oversight and implementation of spending requirements; reporting requirements; the administrative pilot program; and fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements. SBA has implemented 5 recommendations, and participating agencies have implemented 1 (see figure), although GAO made 4 of these recommendations to SBA and 2 to participating agencies in April 2017.
SBA and participating agencies have taken some actions to address GAO's recommendations. For example, in June 2014, GAO recommended that SBA clarify how agencies are to submit data on allowable spending. In response, SBA revised its annual report template, requesting that agencies identify obligations for the programs outside of awards. This change has improved the accuracy of the data that agencies report to SBA. However, SBA and the participating agencies have not fully implemented 14 recommendations that, if implemented, could improve the oversight and implementation of the programs. For example, in each of its four reports on agencies' compliance with spending and other reporting requirements, GAO found that SBA had not submitted required annual reports to Congress on the programs. SBA issued its most recent required report on the programs for fiscal year 2013 in March 2016. In a September 2013 report, GAO concluded that without more rigorous oversight by SBA and more timely and detailed reporting, it would be difficult for SBA to ensure that intended benefits of the programs were being attained and that Congress was receiving critical information to oversee these programs. GAO recommended that SBA provide Congress with a timely annual report, as required by the act. SBA agreed and stated that it planned to implement the recommendation. However, SBA has not yet done so and, as of April 2017, SBA did not have an estimated date for submitting its reports for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO continues to believe that it is important for SBA to provide a timely annual report to Congress to further improve oversight of the programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made 17 recommendations to SBA to improve oversight and implementation of the SBIR and STTR programs. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations. SBA has taken or described planned actions to address the recommendations, which GAO will continue to monitor. |
gao_GAO-03-156 | gao_GAO-03-156_0 | FAA Initiated Personnel Changes in Three Broad Areas, Some of Which Required Exemptions from Title 5
Once exempted from most provisions of title 5, FAA initiated a broad set of personnel changes. For example, FAA’s workforce planning initiative did not require an exemption from title 5. Characteristics of FAA’s Workforce and the Need to Negotiate Changes Have Affected the Pace and Extent of Reform Implementation
The variety of skills and areas of technical expertise represented in FAA’s workforce has affected the implementation of the agency’s new compensation plan. FAA Had Little Data on Reform’s Effects, and Views of FAA Officials Often Differed from Views of Managers and Employees We Interviewed
FAA had little or no data on the effects of many of the reform initiatives. FAA Has Not Fully Incorporated Elements Needed for Effective Human Capital Management
FAA’s lack of empirical data on the reform effort’s effects is one indication that it has not fully incorporated elements that we and others have identified as important to effective human capital management into its reform effort. FAA also has not gone far enough in establishing linkage between reform goals and program goals of the organization, another element we have identified as important to effective human capital management. We found that the lack of these elements has been pointed out repeatedly in evaluations of FAA’s human capital reform effort, but FAA has not developed specific steps and time frames by which these elements will be established and used for evaluation. Incorporation of these elements could also help FAA build accountability into its human capital management. FAA’s Human Capital Reform Effort Lacks Needed Data Collection and Analysis, Performance Goals and Measures, and Linkage of Reform Goals to Program Goals of the Organization
The lack of baseline and comparative data for analysis and the lack of performance goals and measures has made it difficult to objectively evaluate the effects or success of FAA’s reform effort. FAA human resource management officials agreed that the agency should have spent more time to develop baseline data and performance measures before implementing the broad range of reforms but said that establishing measures and goals and reaching consensus on their use was a complex and difficult task with which all federal agencies struggle. Challenges, including implementing reform initiatives throughout its workforce with a wide range of skills and negotiating agreements with employee unions, reflect difficulties that may be faced by other federal agencies that seek to implement human capital management flexibilities. FAA is not able to determine the effectiveness of its human capital reform initiatives because it has not incorporated key elements of effective human capital management into its effort thus far. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) undertook a human capital reform effort under one of the most flexible human capital management environments in the federal government, including broad exemptions from title 5 laws governing federal civilian personnel management. GAO was asked (1) to examine the changes FAA initiated in its reform effort, including whether they required an exemption from title 5 and their implementation status; (2) determine the effects of the reform effort according to available data and the views of FAA officials, managers, and employees; and (3) assess the extent to which FAA's reform effort incorporated elements that are important to effective human capital management.
What GAO Found
In 1996, FAA initiated human capital reform initiatives in three broad areas, some of which required exemption from title 5, and some of which have been fully implemented. FAA has not yet completed implementation of some key initiatives. For example, FAA's new compensation system remains unimplemented for about one-quarter of the agency's workforce--those staff whose unions have not reached agreements with FAA. FAA's need to implement initiatives among a workforce with a wide range of skills and to negotiate changes with multiple unions were among factors that affected the pace and extent of reform implementation. FAA had little data with which to assess the effects of its reform effort. While FAA human capital officials cited positive effects of FAA's reform effort, the views of managers and employees GAO interviewed were generally less positive. FAA's lack of empirical data on the effects of its human capital initiatives is one indication that it has not fully incorporated elements that are important to effective human capital management into its overall reform effort. These elements include data collection and analysis, performance goals and measures, and linkage of reform goals to program goals. FAA human resource management officials said that the agency should have spent more time to develop baseline data and performance measures before implementing the broad range of reforms but that establishing these elements was a complex and difficult task. FAA has also not gone far enough to establish linkage between reform goals and overall program goals of the organization. GAO found that the lack of these elements has been pointed out repeatedly in evaluations of FAA's human capital reform effort, but FAA has not developed specific steps and time frames by which these elements will be established and used for evaluation. Incorporation of these elements could also help FAA build accountability into its human capital management. |
gao_RCED-98-88 | gao_RCED-98-88_0 | Control techniques are the mechanisms that an agency uses to achieve its control objectives. Specifically, we determined whether the Forest Service (1) maintains an appropriate system of internal control over contracting activities to minimize the agency’s vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse and (2) manages contracting effectively by preparing adequate acquisition plans and by incorporating performance factors into the contracting process. To assess whether the Forest Service manages contracting effectively, we determined if offices prepared advance acquisition plans and incorporated performance factors into the contracting process. Internal Control Weaknesses Increase Vulnerability to Contracting Abuses
The lack of an effective internal control system for contracting leaves the Forest Service highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. The Forest Service is not complying with many critical internal control standards. Namely, the Forest Service (1) has no written plan defining the objectives of and techniques for control, (2) lacks complete documentation in contract files of critical contract award and administration actions, (3) does not routinely supervise contracting staff, (4) inconsistently monitors contractors’ progress, and (5) has significant errors and omissions in its management information systems for contract actions. To improve compliance with FMFIA and our standards for internal control, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to prepare and implement a written internal control plan for contracting that includes methods for ensuring (1) the complete documentation of critical actions in contract files, (2) the routine supervisory review of contracting activities, (3) more consistent monitoring of contractors’ progress on service contracts through the implementation of a training and certification program for contracting officers’ representatives, (4) improved summary management information, and (5) clarification of how to determine adequate warrant authority for various types of contracts; establish a system to periodically monitor and assess compliance with internal control standards; and ensure that the Forest Service’s internal control system for contracting is identified as a material weakness in the Department’s FMFIA report. Opportunities Exist to Enhance Effectiveness and Reduce Contracting Costs Through Best Management Practices
The Forest Service has not effectively implemented four established management practices that could increase the effectiveness and lower the costs of contracting: acquisition planning, performance-based service contracting, contractor evaluations, and performance measures for the procurement system. The Forest Service’s Offices Are Not Complying With Acquisition Planning Requirements
Two of the six offices we visited did not have acquisition plans for fiscal year 1996. Even in the three offices that had complete plans, the plans’ usefulness was limited because they were not completed on time. According to a USDA official, without, at a minimum, baseline data and specific performance goals, the Forest Service does not yet have an adequate plan to effectively implement procurement performance measures. If the Forest Service is to improve its procurement planning, it must hold staff accountable for preparing and using acquisition plans. Aggressive Leadership and Enhanced Accountability Are Needed to Overcome Obstacles to Reform
Three fundamental obstacles stand in the way of correcting the weaknesses in the Forest Service’s procurement system: (1) the lack of aggressive leadership to implement internal control and contracting reforms, (2) an organizational structure that impedes direct accountability within the contracting function, and (3) a long-standing culture of local independence and autonomy. The Forest Service is a decentralized organization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether: (1) the Forest Service maintains an appropriate system of internal control over contracting activities to minimize the agency's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) the Forest Service manages contracting effectively by preparing adequate acquisition plans and by incorporating performance factors into the contracting process; and (3) there are any obstacles to improving the contracting system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Forest Service is highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because it does not have an effective system of internal control for its contracting activities; (2) the agency's internal control system is lacking in two key respects; (3) the Forest Service is not complying with many critical internal control standards; (4) namely, the agency: (a) has no written plan defining control objectives and techniques; (b) lacks complete documentation in the contract files of critical contract award and administration actions; (c) does not routinely supervise contracting staff; (d) inconsistently monitors contractors' progress; and (e) has significant errors and omissions in its management information system for contract actions; (5) the Forest Service's primary internal control techniques are not effectively implemented; (6) the Forest Service is not preparing adequate acquisition plans or incorporating performance factors into its contracting process; (7) the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires agencies to prepare acquisition plans to enhance contracting's effectiveness and lower costs; (8) the six Forest Service offices that GAO visited either had no acquisition plans for fiscal year 1996 or could not make effective use of the ones that they had because the plans were incomplete or not completed on time; (9) also, the Forest Service's contracts for services seldom require contractors to meet preestablished performance goals, a technique that other federal agencies have used to save costs; (10) furthermore, the Forest Service does not routinely evaluate contractors' performance or effectively store past performance information so it can be used in negotiating future contracts; (11) finally, the Forest Service has not implemented procurement performance measures to evaluate and improve the procurement system; (12) three primary obstacles stand in the way of improving the Forest Service's procurement system; (13) Forest Service officials have not been aggressive in establishing an effective internal control system or implementing information management initiatives that could improve their contracting's effectiveness; (14) when the Forest Service tries to improve its contracting practices, the organizational structure of the contracting function impedes these efforts by limiting direct accountability; and (15) the Forest Service's long-standing culture of local independence and autonomy appears to make contracting managers hesitant to provide the close oversight of contracting activities needed to hold staff accountable for performance improvement. |
gao_GAO-17-267 | gao_GAO-17-267_0 | In fiscal year 2016, CNCS received appropriations totaling more than $787.9 million and used $783.9 million to fund approximately 2,300 grants. The agency did not comment on this recommendation and has not yet addressed it. CNCS’s IT Modernization Projects Are Aligned with Business and Management Needs of the Existing Grant Monitoring Process, but Are Not Defined for a Future Risk- based Approach
To define system requirements that meet users’ business needs, key practices identified by SEI call for, among other things, ensuring that the business needs are understood and that supporting system requirements are defined and agreed upon by system stakeholders, including system developers and users. As currently planned, CNCS’s projects to develop and deliver the modernized grant monitoring system align with the agency’s business and management needs for its existing process, but are not yet defined for a future risk-based process. However, in March 2017, we reported that CNCS had not evaluated its monitoring efforts to identify opportunities to improve its assessment of, and response to, risks related to grant management. Because business needs for a risk-based monitoring process have not been determined, OIT officials and system stakeholders cannot begin to define requirements for the second version of the system to align with business and management needs for a future process, as intended by CNCS’s IT modernization plans. CNCS Has Made Limited Progress Toward Successfully Delivering a Modernized Grant Monitoring System, but Has Taken Steps to Help Avoid Continued Delays
Although the agency and its development contractor took steps to align the first version of the system with changing business needs, CNCS has made limited progress toward developing and delivering the modernized system capabilities to support grant monitoring. After subsequent delays, officials and the contractor then planned to deliver the system in September 2016. However, as of July 2017, the system still had not been delivered to support the agency’s existing monitoring process. Further, as part of its modernization program, CNCS initially planned to deliver the second version of the system in October 2017. Weaknesses in Software Development Practices Introduced Risks to Successful Delivery of the First Version of the Grant Monitoring System
In the development of the first version of the system, CNCS and the development contractor did not follow all established software development practices. Likewise, unless OIT officials and the development contractor develop a schedule that can be used to monitor and measure progress of the development and delivery of the second version of the system against baseline and actual dates, the agency will remain at risk that it will not be able to successfully execute all activities needed to deliver system capabilities that could support a future risk- based monitoring process. However, the program experienced halts and re- starts of testing activities, along with delays in system implementation, in part because the agency and its contractor did not conduct all stages of testing for the system. However, although the agency conducted alpha testing according to plans, it did not include the grant monitoring system in that phase of testing. Figure 6 depicts the timeline of CNCS’s corrective action plan requirements and the contractor’s delivery of the plans. According to CNCS’s CIO and documented results of status reviews held with IT management officials, since the last corrective action plan was delivered by the contractor in December 2016, performance has improved and the project is on track to deliver the first version of the grant monitoring system in October 2017. This version of the system was to be delivered in April 2016, but weaknesses in schedule and testing management practices have introduced risks to the successful delivery of a modernized system. Unless CNCS officials make needed improvements in system development practices, successful delivery of system functionality necessary to support grant monitoring will remain at risk. Meanwhile, CNCS’s grant monitoring officers continue to rely on the agency’s outdated legacy system to support an inefficient and ineffective process for monitoring the use of hundreds of millions of dollars in grants awarded each year. After assessing the additional documentation, we revised the report to incorporate this information and modified the conclusion and recommendation regarding project schedule management practices. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) to what extent the Corporation for National and Community Service’s (CNCS) planned information technology (IT) modernization projects align with business and management needs for grant monitoring and (2) what progress CNCS has made toward ensuring the successful and timely delivery of a new system to support its grant monitoring process. | Why GAO Did This Study
CNCS engages more than five million Americans yearly in national volunteer service by awarding grants to programs such as AmeriCorps and Senior Corps. In fiscal year 2016, CNCS received almost $800 million in appropriations to fund approximately 2,300 grants. The agency is taking steps to modernize its outdated IT infrastructure, including developing and delivering systems to replace its legacy grant management system and improve IT support of the agency's grant monitoring program. In a March 2017 report, GAO noted system deficiencies that resulted in usability, data quality, and other technical issues.
This report examines (1) the extent to which CNCS's IT modernization projects align with business and management needs for grant monitoring and (2) progress CNCS has made toward ensuring the successful and timely delivery of new systems to support grant monitoring. GAO assessed agency planning and IT project management documents against key practices and conducted interviews with agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Corporation for National and Community Service's (CNCS) information technology (IT) modernization projects are currently planned to align with the agency's business and management needs for its existing process, but are not yet defined for a future risk-based process. The projects include the development of a modernized system in two versions. The first version was planned to provide support for business needs of the agency's existing grant monitoring process. The second version is to provide additional functionality to support monitoring within a yet-to-be-defined risk-based process. CNCS officials and the development contractor responsible for delivering the first version of the system agreed to a set of requirements that address business needs for improving outcomes of the existing monitoring process. However, because business needs for a risk-based monitoring process have not been determined, OIT officials and system stakeholders have not defined requirements for the second version of the future system, as intended by CNCS's IT modernization plans.
CNCS has taken steps to help avoid continued delays, but progress toward delivering the system has been limited. In July 2015, CNCS initiated a project that was to deliver the first version of the system in April 2016. After subsequent delays, agency officials updated plans to reflect a September 2016 delivery. However, as of July 2017, this version had not been delivered, and the delivery date was changed to October 2017. Successful development and delivery of IT systems relies on adherance to key practices for managing project schedules and testing. However, weaknesses in CNCS's practices introduced risks to successful delivery of the system. In particular, the system development project schedules could not be used to track progress because they did not include actual dates when activities were started and finished. In addition, although CNCS and its contractor conducted testing according to plans, the grant monitoring system was not included in all phases of testing. Agency officials used other tools to track progress, and plans did not require them to conduct all stages of testing for the system. However, unless CNCS officials improve system development practices for managing project schedules and testing, they will continue to introduce risks to successful delivery of system functionality that supports grant monitoring.
The grant monitoring system development project experienced delays when CNCS did not initially conduct oversight needed to ensure that the contractor took corrective actions as planned. In monitoring the contractor's performance during system development and testing, agency officials enhanced oversight to avoid continued delays. In ongoing management reviews of the project, CNCS officials reported that, since the last corrective action plan was provided by the contractor in December 2016, performance has improved and the project is on track to deliver the first version of the grant monitoring system in October 2017.
However, successful delivery of system functionality that supports the agency's grant monitoring process will remain at risk unless CNCS takes steps to correct weaknesses in system development practices for managing project schedules and testing. Further, CNCS's grant monitoring officers will continue to rely on an outdated legacy system to support the processes they follow for monitoring the use of millions of dollars of grant funds awarded each year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending three actions to improve CNCS's practices for defining requirements and developing schedules and test plans for grant monitoring system development. In comments on a draft of this report, CNCS did not fully agree with the recommendations. Based on additional documentation that CNCS provided, GAO revised the report, as appropriate, and modified the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-182T | gao_GAO-06-182T_0 | State and local government agencies are not required to obtain an explosives license to use and store explosives. Thefts Reported at State and Local Explosives Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported
According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local government thefts is relatively small when compared with the total number of thefts that have occurred nationwide. During a recent 3-year period (January 2002—February 2005), ATF received reports of 205 explosives thefts from all sources nationwide. By comparison, during this same period, only 9 thefts were reported that involved state and local government storage facilities—5 involving state and local law enforcement agencies, 3 involving state government entities (all universities), and 1 involving a county highway department. Reported losses in these cases were about 1,000 pounds of explosive materials, and in 10 of the incidents less than 50 pounds of explosives was reported stolen or missing. Based on these findings, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage facilities nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF data. ATF Lacks Authority to Regulate and Oversee State and Local Explosives Storage Facilities Nationwide
There is no ATF oversight mechanism in place to ensure that state and local government facilities comply with federal explosives regulations. However, state and local government entities are not required to obtain a federal license to use and store explosives. In addition, ATF has no specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and local government storage facilities. ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location of state and local government explosives storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in these facilities. Since data collection is a function of the licensing process and state and local facilities are not required to be licensed, no systematic information about these facilities is collected. With respect to private sector licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning explosive storage facilities as part of the licensing process. ATF also collects information about licensed private sector storage facilities during mandatory inspections, through examination of explosives inventory and sales records and verification that storage facilities meet the standards of public safety and security as prescribed in the regulations. At each of the 14 state and local storage entities we visited, we observed the types of security measures in place at their explosives storage facilities. Electronic security. Thefts and compliance issues. However, one of these incidents did not appear in ATF’s nationwide database of reported thefts and missing explosives. However, these circumstances appeared to be related to storage safety issues, rather than storage security. ATF has no authority to oversee state and local government storage facilities as part of the federal licensing process, nor does it have specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of these facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States by private sector companies and government entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a local government storage facility, concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. This testimony provides information about (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's authority to regulate and oversee state and local government storage facilities, and (3) security measures in place at selected state and local government storage facilities. This information is based on a report GAO is releasing today on these issues.
What GAO Found
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts reported from all sources nationwide during this same period. During the course of the audit, GAO found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database of thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect state and local government explosives storage facilities. State and local agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees--such as private sector explosives storage facilities--are subject to mandatory oversight. Thus, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local facilities comply with federal regulations. Further, ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location of state and local storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in these facilities. Because this data collection is a function of the licensing process and state and local facilities are not required to be licensed, no systematic information about these facilities is collected. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information about their facilities--including location and security measures in place--to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. At the 18 state and local government storage facilities GAO visited, a variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, and in some cases electronic surveillance. All the facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most of the state and local government entities GAO visited were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. GAO identified several instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, but these were related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security. |
gao_GGD-97-110 | gao_GGD-97-110_0 | First, the percentage of offenders sentenced directly to community supervision (probation) decreased, and the percentage of offenders sentenced to prison terms with required supervised release increased. The inmates released from BOP prisons in fiscal years 1997 through 2001 may include a greater number of higher risk offenders than the population released through fiscal year 1996. Figure 4 shows that, in fiscal years 1991 through 1995, the number of offenders sentenced in the three most serious criminal history categories—IV, V, and VI—grew at greater rates than did the number of offenders with less serious criminal histories. Figure 5 shows that, between fiscal years 1992 and 1996, the number of offenders with special conditions remained relatively stable. Figure 6 shows that, between fiscal years 1990 and 1996, the number of offenders removed from supervision for violating the terms of their supervision increased from 7,360 to 8,922 (about 21 percent). As shown in more detail in table 4, in fiscal years 1990 through 1996, from 9 to 10 percent of the total federal supervision population were removed from their supervision annually because they had violated their terms. Specifically, we determined trends in (1) the growth of the total supervision population and any changes in the composition of that population by type of supervision; (2) the number of offenders who had special conditions imposed on their term of supervision, such as home confinement or drug treatment; and (3) the number of persons who were removed from supervision for violating the terms of their supervision. Offender serves term of supervised release violates conditions? Changes in the Federal Community Supervision Population
As shown in table III.1, the federal community supervision population rose by about 10 percent between fiscal years 1990 and 1996. Overall, the postprison population increased 94 percent during the same period. Offenders on supervised release are supervised by probation officers. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the trends in the number of federal offenders serving terms of community supervision during fiscal years 1990 through 1996, focusing on: (1) the growth of the total supervision population and any changes in the composition of that population by type of supervision; (2) the number of offenders who had special conditions imposed on their terms of supervision, such as home confinement or drug treatment; and (3) the number of persons who were removed from supervision for violating the terms of their supervision.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the total population of federal offenders under community supervision rose 10 percent during fiscal years 1990 and 1996; (2) the most notable change in the mix of this population occurred in the percentage of offenders serving a term of community supervision following a prison term; (3) specifically, the probation population decreased about 35 percent, while those on postprison supervision rose 94 percent; (4) the increase in the postprison supervision population is entirely due to the large increase in the number of offenders on supervised release; (5) during fiscal years 1991 through 1995, the number of offenders sentenced with serious criminal histories grew at a significantly greater rate than did those with less serious criminal histories; (6) further, available data suggest that inmates released from the Bureau of Prisons prisons in fiscal years 1997 through 2001 may include a greater number of high-risk offenders than did the population released through fiscal year 1996; (7) the total number of offenders with special conditions remained relatively stable between fiscal years 1992 and 1996; (8) in addition, the total number of offenders removed from supervision for violating their terms of supervision increased by nearly 18 percent between fiscal years 1990 and 1996; (9) to the extent that the trends continue in the: (a) mix of offenders under federal supervision; (b) number of offenders sentenced with more serious criminal histories; and (c) number of offenders removed from supervision due to violations, the workload of probation officers would likely increase; and (10) if the trend in the number of offenders with special conditions remains stable, it would not likely affect the workload of probation officers. |
gao_GAO-17-49 | gao_GAO-17-49_0 | Information Technology Delays Have Hampered Full Implementation of CSA Interventions and Limited the Quality of Available Information
FMCSA Has Delayed Implementing Two New CSA Intervention Types Nationwide Until It Develops Information Technology Software
Although FMCSA implemented all four new CSA intervention types in pilot test states, the agency chose to delay implementing two of the new intervention types in the remaining states until it develops information technology (IT) software. However, FMCSA has faced longstanding delays in developing SENTRI software as part of its broader IT modernization effort. As part of this effort, FMCSA plans to complete its development of SENTRI by April 2017. To evaluate the effectiveness of CSA interventions specifically, FMCSA developed a statistical model intended to annually evaluate the combined effects of all of its interventions. III for our complete assessment). This specific information could help FMCSA identify the circumstances under which different types of interventions are effective and help managers optimize their choice of interventions on a day-to-day basis as the agency implements the program. Although officials told us that FMCSA designed the model to measure the cumulative effect of FMCSA contact with carriers through CSA interventions and not to analyze individual intervention types, FMCSA used the model to draw conclusions about the safety benefits of warning letters, one of the most common intervention types used according to FMCSA estimates. By not matching the measurement period, FMCSA’s use of a comparison group was limited in its ability to account for external factors, as intended. The evaluation concluded that cooperative safety plans and notices of violation had the lowest average estimated costs—ranging from $95 to $118 respectively. For example, in April 2013, FMCSA implemented a substantial change to the way investigators conduct investigations, called EIT, which is intended to help identify the root cause of motor carriers’ safety problems. The evaluation’s estimates do not represent costs in all states. However, without cost estimates for CSA interventions that are current and representative of all states, FMCSA lacks information it needs to understand the most efficient methods of conducting CSA interventions in all states. FMCSA Took Some Steps Intended to Improve CSA Intervention Outcomes, but Lacks Measures to Monitor Progress
FMCSA has taken steps intended to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of CSA interventions—strategic outcomes—principally by establishing a working group to address these issues and implementing some of the group’s recommendations. Without establishing measures for both outcomes, FMCSA is and will be limited in its ability to monitor program performance and to balance these two priorities, as needed. FMCSA headquarters officials told us that effectiveness and efficiency are complementary outcomes that FMCSA strives to balance. Because FMCSA does not have a complete set of measures that reflects both its effectiveness and efficiency outcomes for CSA interventions, FMCSA managers lack benchmarks needed to regularly monitor progress toward achieving the outcomes. FMCSA aims to reduce such fatalities by using a data-driven approach that identifies and intervenes with the highest-risk motor carriers early. In addition, we found that although FMCSA has established some performance measures for its effectiveness outcomes, the agency has not established measures to monitor progress toward achieving its efficiency outcome. To understand the efficiency of CSA interventions the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to:
Update FMCSA’s cost estimates to determine the resources currently used to conduct individual intervention types and ensure FMCSA has cost information that is representative of all states. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine: (1) the extent to which the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has implemented Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) interventions and how it has applied them; (2) the extent to which FMCSA has evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of CSA interventions; and (3) any steps that FMCSA has taken to improve and monitor progress toward achieving its intended outcomes for CSA interventions. In addition, we interviewed FMCSA division officials in eight states that we selected based upon their participation in FMCSA’s Operational Model Test of the CSA program, geographic location, and program size, among other factors. Similarly, we selected two states from each service center. Specifically, we reviewed:
The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test (August 2011);
FMCSA, FMCSA Safety Program Effectiveness Measurement: Carrier Intervention Effectiveness Model, Version 1.0: Summary Report for Fiscal Years 2009, 2010, 2011 (January 2015);
FMCSA, Analysis Brief: Effectiveness of Onsite Focused Investigations (March 2016); and
FMCSA, Effectiveness of Offsite Investigations: Preliminary Analysis (March 2016)
We conducted a more detailed assessment of the second report on FMCSA’s annual effectiveness evaluation model because, according to FMCSA headquarters officials, it is the primary method FMCSA uses to evaluate intervention effectiveness and FMCSA intends to use it on a recurring basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its mission to reduce crashes and fatalities involving large commercial trucks and buses, FMCSA seeks to use a data-driven approach to identify the highest-risk motor carriers and address safety problems by applying a range of eight CSA program enforcement tools, called interventions, ranging from warning letters to placing carriers out of service.
A provision in a Senate report requires GAO to periodically assess FMCSA's implementation of the CSA program. This report examines the extent to which FMCSA has (1) implemented CSA interventions, (2) evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of CSA interventions, and (3) monitored progress toward achieving outcomes.
GAO reviewed FMCSA data and documentation on all eight CSA intervention types from fiscal years 2010–2015, including FMCSA's strategic planning documents, guidance, and program evaluations. GAO interviewed industry stakeholders and FMCSA officials in headquarters, in each of FMCSA's service centers, and in eight states selected for their participation in FMCSA's CSA pilot test, location, and program size, among other factors.
What GAO Found
In July 2010, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) chose to delay nationwide implementation of two of the eight interventions that FMCSA uses to address motor carrier safety concerns under its Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program. This delay is linked to continuing delays in developing software needed to support the two interventions, offsite investigations and the use of cooperative safety plans. The software under development is intended to help FMCSA overcome some of the information challenges it faces due to its reliance on legacy information systems. FMCSA estimates that the software development project will be completed by April 2017.
FMCSA has conducted evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency outcomes it established for the CSA program. However, GAO identified several limitations in FMCSA's approaches that impact the usefulness of the evaluations:
Intervention effectiveness: FMCSA has developed a statistical model to annually evaluate the combined effectiveness of interventions. Although the model has some key strengths, such as accounting for a broad range of external factors, GAO identified a number of design and methodology limitations that reduce the usefulness of its results. For example, the model does not include an assessment of individual intervention types. Without this type of specific information, FMCSA is hampered in its ability to identify the circumstances under which different types of interventions are effective. Similarly, these types of limitations affect FMCSA's ability to accurately draw conclusions about intervention effectiveness across all intervention types.
Intervention efficiency: To assess the efficiency of CSA interventions, FMCSA has relied on a study that it sponsored and that was published in 2011. This study estimated the average cost of conducting interventions in four states from October 2008 through May 2009. However, FMCSA has not taken steps to update its cost estimates for interventions since the 2011 evaluation, despite changes since that time in the resources needed to conduct CSA interventions; nor has it taken steps to develop additional information that is representative of the costs in other states. Without current cost estimates that are representative of all states, FMCSA cannot appropriately assess the efficiency of its interventions.
FMCSA has taken some actions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of CSA interventions, but lacks measures to monitor progress. In April 2014, FMCSA established a working group to assess CSA interventions and make recommendations for improvement. As of April 2016, the group had made 20 recommendations, of which 12 had been implemented. However, GAO found that while FMCSA has established some performance measures for its effectiveness outcome that are appropriate, it has not established similar measures for its efficiency outcome. FMCSA headquarters officials told GAO that effectiveness and efficiency are complementary outcomes that FMCSA strives to balance. Without a complete set of measures for both outcomes, FMCSA lacks benchmarks needed to regularly measure progress to achieve these outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA evaluate the effectiveness of individual intervention types, update cost estimates so that they are current and representative of all states, and establish complete performance measures.
The Department of Transportation concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-282 | gao_GAO-11-282_0 | Background
Declining letter mail volumes and increasing electronic substitution, which have accelerated with the recent recession, have reduced postal revenues for both the foreign posts and USPS. Some posts have been experiencing increases in the number of delivery points every year, at the same time that mail volumes overall have been declining. Pick Up at Retail Store Counter
Several of the posts we spoke with have partnered with major retailers as well as individual stores and shops, such as grocery and drug stores, to provide a number of postal products and services to their customers, including parcel pick up. Packstations are typically located in high-traffic, public locations such as train stations. Swiss Post also offered a parcel locker-style delivery option for its customers. Foreign Posts’ Modernized Retail Networks Have Increased Access to Products and Services, Improved Customer Service, and Reduced Costs
All of the foreign posts we met with have modernized their legacy brick and mortar retail networks in response to customers’ changing use of the mail. Posten AB in Sweden has dramatically changed its postal retail network since 2001, replacing all traditional brick and mortar post-owned and -operated post offices with partner-owned and -operated retail facilities. All of the posts we interviewed reported positive results as a result of retail modernization in one or both of two key areas: (1) customer service, which has improved because, for example, the retail partner is open for more hours during a day and open on a weekend versus a traditional post office, and (2) savings in operating and labor costs achieved by closing post-owned and -operated facilities. Strategies Used by Foreign Posts to Modernize Delivery and Retail Networks Could Help Inform USPS Modernization Efforts
Foreign posts have faced resistance to change and challenges similar to those USPS faces, and they have developed communication, outreach, and labor transition strategies to address stakeholder concerns and address resistance to changes. In some cases, such as in Australia, when closures or relocation were planned, the affected community first had an opportunity to propose an alternative. Strategies Used by Foreign Posts Could Help USPS Gain Critically Needed Support as It Plans and Implements Network Modernization Efforts
USPS has taken steps to modernize its retail and delivery networks, but, as we have previously reported, it faces ongoing challenges related to legislative restrictions and stakeholder resistance to changes. As USPS moves forward with its modernization efforts, the experiences of foreign posts suggest that outreach and communication strategies will be critically important to help it address concerns raised by the public, Congress, postal unions, and the Postal Regulatory Commission. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 placed requirements on delivery and retail access standards by mandating that the USPS provide “prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to all communities” as well as “…a maximum degree of effective and regular postal services to rural areas, communities, and small towns where post offices are not self-sustaining.”
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to describe (1) what major initiatives foreign postal operators (foreign posts) have implemented to improve or enhance mail delivery, and what have been the results; (2) what key initiatives foreign posts have implemented to improve or enhance their retail network and what have been the results and (3) what strategies used by foreign posts in their modernization efforts can help U.S. Postal Service (USPS) as it tries to improve its financial condition and customer service. In addition, we observed a number of demonstrations of foreign posts’ innovations, toured their retail facilities, and received briefings on their retail and delivery networks, strategic planning, innovation strategies, and other areas. We reviewed foreign post documentation including annual reports from 2006 to 2010, strategic plans related to retail and delivery network changes and innovations, reports on postal services and products, fact sheets on foreign post innovations and initiatives, and sustainability reports and strategic reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The foreign postal operators (foreign posts) in industrialized countries in GAO's review have been experiencing declining letter mail volumes and have modernized their delivery and retail networks to address this challenge. As requested, GAO reviewed the innovations and initiatives that foreign posts are using and the lessons the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) might learn to help it address plummeting mail volumes and record financial losses. This report examines initiatives foreign posts have implemented to improve mail delivery and retail networks and related results, and modernization strategies used by foreign posts that can inform consideration of proposals to improve USPS's financial condition and customer service. GAO selected foreign posts in Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland as case studies based on characteristics, such as delivery and retail changes and country size and location. GAO reviewed foreign posts' documents, including annual reports and strategic plans related to delivery and retail network changes and innovations. GAO met with foreign post officials, toured their retail facilities, received briefings on their delivery and retail networks and other areas, and met with regulators, labor unions, and mailers to obtain their views on the effects of their posts' modernization efforts. USPS generally agreed with GAO's findings and mentioned both its own modernization efforts and the barriers it faces.
What GAO Found
The foreign posts GAO reviewed have developed alternative delivery choices for customers that, according to the posts, have reduced costs and improved customer satisfaction and service. All of these posts now offer digital (purely electronic) or hybrid mail (a blend of physical and digital) options. Some posts offer parcel pick up at retail facilities like grocery stores, which are open longer than post offices, and are often owned and operated by businesses that partner with the posts, thus reducing costs. One post allows customers to pick up parcels from a publicly-located machine, or parcel locker, that is available 24 hours a day. The selected foreign posts have modernized their legacy brick and mortar retail networks in response to customers' changing use of the mail. For example, they have expanded retail access through alternatives such as Internet sales and partnerships with retail businesses such as grocery stores or pharmacies, while reducing the number of post-owned and -operated facilities. According to all of the posts, retail modernization has either (1) improved customer service, in some cases because the partner stays open longer, or (2) reduced operating and labor costs, by closing post-owned and -operated facilities, or both. The foreign posts faced resistance to change and challenges similar to those USPS faces, and they have used strategies that could be helpful to USPS as it moves forward with plans to modernize its own delivery and retail networks. In particular, they relied on outreach and communication strategies to inform public officials and customers of increased access to products and services and help gain acceptance for retail network changes. A few posts also developed labor transition plans or strategies under which they provided training, relocation and job search services, and financial incentives to support employees who were negatively affected by the modernizations. While USPS has taken steps in the past year to generate ideas for modernizing its retail and delivery networks, the experiences of foreign posts suggest that it will be critically important for USPS to fully develop and implement similar outreach, communication, and labor transition strategies. |
gao_RCED-97-229 | gao_RCED-97-229_0 | The Department of Energy (DOE) and its facilities, especially its nuclear weapons laboratories, are key targets of foreign intelligence interest. Situations of concern are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which performs counterintelligence operations or investigations as necessary. This report completes our work on DOE’s controls over foreign visitors and, as agreed with Committee staff, addresses DOE’s (1) procedures for reviewing the backgrounds of foreign visitors and for controlling the dissemination of sensitive information to them, (2) security controls for limiting foreign visitors’ access to areas and information within its laboratories, and (3) counterintelligence programs for mitigating the potential threat posed by foreign visitors. DOE has not effectively implemented two of the key procedures at the three laboratories we reviewed. Background Checks Are Intended to Help DOE Mitigate the Risks of Visits
As part of its process to approve foreign visitors, DOE requires that national security background checks (termed indices checks by DOE) be conducted on certain foreign visitors to its laboratories. Our review of DOE’s records of foreign visitors showed that, during the 3-year period from 1994 through 1996, background checks were obtained on only 5 percent of the visitors from sensitive countries to Los Alamos and Sandia. As a result, sensitive information could be discussed or otherwise disclosed to foreign nationals without DOE’s knowledge and approval. However, the security controls that exist in the laboratories’ controlled areas—the areas most often visited by foreign nationals—may not provide effective protection. Protection of Sensitive Information in Controlled Areas Has Not Been Fully Assessed
Neither the laboratories nor DOE has fully assessed the controls over unclassified, but sensitive information. However, according to a counterintelligence official at headquarters, DOE has not developed any performance measures or expectations to evaluate the laboratories’ counterintelligence programs because DOE’s contracts with the laboratories do not obligate their counterintelligence programs to follow any such measures DOE may develop. In these places, DOE needs a more sophisticated security strategy that is consistent with the laboratories’ more open missions and includes a greater role played by DOE and laboratory counterintelligence programs. This assessment will help ensure that procedures for these areas are consistent from laboratory to laboratory and security vulnerabilities and/or problems are identified and corrected. Revise DOE’s foreign visitor order to (1) clarify to all DOE and laboratory contractor personnel the specific types of unclassified, but sensitive, subjects that require protection from compromise by foreign nationals and (2) require that the subjects of visits be independently reviewed by experts with appropriate technical backgrounds—such as laboratory individuals involved in export control issues—to verify that visits involving sensitive subjects are adequately identified for DOE’s review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over foreign visitors to its three nuclear weapons laboratories, focusing on DOE's: (1) procedures for reviewing the backgrounds of foreign visitors and for controlling the dissemination of sensitive information to such visitors; (2) security controls for limiting foreign visitors' access to areas and information within its laboratories; and (3) counterintelligence programs for mitigating the potential threat posed by foreign visitors.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE's procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective; (2) DOE has procedures that require obtaining background checks, but these procedures are not being enforced; (3) at two of the laboratories, background checks are conducted on only about 5 percent of the foreign visitors from countries that DOE views as sensitive; (4) GAO's review of available data from DOE and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed that some of the individuals without background checks have suspected foreign intelligence connections; (5) furthermore, DOE's procedures lack clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive subjects and process controls to help ensure that these visits are identified; (6) as a result, sensitive subjects may have been discussed with foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval; (7) DOE's security controls, such as access restrictions, in the areas most visited by foreign nationals do not preclude their obtaining access to sensitive information, and problems with the control of this information--such as sensitive information being left in an open hallway accessible to foreign visitors--have occurred at the laboratories; (8) furthermore, DOE has not evaluated the effectiveness of the security controls over this information in those areas most frequented by foreign visitors; (9) the DOE headquarters and laboratory counterintelligence programs are key activities for identifying and mitigating foreign intelligence efforts, but these programs have lacked comprehensive threat assessments, which identify likely facilities, technologies, and programs targeted by foreign intelligence; (10) such assessments are needed as a critical component of a more sophisticated security strategy that is consistent with the laboratories' more open missions; (11) furthermore, DOE could use these assessments to develop the performance measures needed to guide the laboratories' counterintelligence programs and to gauge their effectiveness; and (12) currently, DOE has not developed such performance measures or evaluated the effectiveness of its counterintelligence programs. |
gao_GAO-16-543 | gao_GAO-16-543_0 | Industrial Operations performed less work because it reduced personnel by more than 5,000 over the 2-year period for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 due to budgetary uncertainty based on the continuing resolution that extended throughout much of fiscal year 2013 and across-the-board spending reductions referred to as sequestration. We also found that the Army’s calculations of the allowable carryover amounts for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 were incorrect as specified by DOD’s Financial Management Regulation because it did not use data from the most recent DOD Financial Summary Tables to perform the calculations. Based on our calculations, Industrial Operations exceeded the allowable amounts by $44 million less in fiscal year 2013 and $27 million more in fiscal year 2014 than reported in its budgets. Work Performed by Industrial Operations Was Less Than Orders Accepted for Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014, Resulting in Adjusted Carryover Exceeding the Allowable Amounts
Our analysis of Industrial Operations reports showed that Industrial Operations actual adjusted carryover amounts for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 exceeded the allowable amounts for each fiscal year because Industrial Operations performed significantly less work than orders accepted in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. If the Army had used the most recent DOD Financial Summary Tables issued at the time of its calculations, our analysis determined that (1) the fiscal year 2013 allowable carryover amount would have been $44 million higher and correspondingly the amount of actual adjusted carryover that exceeded the allowable carryover amount in fiscal year 2013 would be lower by the same amount and (2) the allowable carryover amount would have been $27 million lower for fiscal year 2014 and correspondingly the amount of actual adjusted carryover that exceeded the allowable carryover amount in fiscal year 2014 would be higher by the same amount. This occurred because Industrial Operations accepted more orders than budgeted and performed less work (and thus earned less revenue) than budgeted all 3 years. Industrial Operations budgeted for adjusted carryover to fall below the allowable carryover amounts by $174 million and $1.2 billion in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, respectively, and to exceed the allowable carryover amount by $186 million in fiscal year 2015. The Army Has Actions Under Way to Improve Budgeted Information, but Problems Remain
To address budgeting concerns, the Army has implemented actions intended to improve budget information. Reliable budget estimates on carryover are critical because decision makers use this information when reviewing Industrial Operations’ budgets. These were (1) orders for work that was scheduled to carry over at the end of the fiscal year, (2) orders for work on crash-damaged aircraft, (3) orders for work that did not have a well-defined scope of work for repairing the assets, and (4) orders affected by parts shortages that delayed the performance of work. Parts were not always available to perform the work because the DOD supply system did not maintain sufficient parts in the right mix to meet demand. Parts. Requirements. Funding. However, the draft AMC regulation, which aims to provide such policies and procedures, has not been completed. Conclusions
The Army’s 13 Industrial Operations activities provide crucial depot maintenance and ordnance services to support a wide range of military assets and programs. The ongoing development of a new regulation on Industrial Operations will be key to improving the management of carryover. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, DOD concurred with the four recommendations and cited actions planned or under way to address them. To determine the extent to which Industrial Operations’ budgeted carryover differed from actual carryover from fiscal years 2013 through 2015, reasons for any differences, and the actions the Army is taking to improve related budgeting, we obtained and analyzed Industrial Operations reports and Army Working Capital Fund budget estimates submitted to Congress that contained information on budgeted and actual new orders, revenue, and carryover data for fiscal years 2013 through 2015. To determine the key drivers for orders with large carryover balances for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 and the extent to which the Army is taking actions to reduce carryover, we met with responsible officials from Army headquarters, Army Materiel Command, and Army depots to identify contributing factors that led to carryover. | Why GAO Did This Study
Industrial Operations' activities support combat readiness by providing depot maintenance and ordnance services to keep Army units operating worldwide. To the extent that these activities do not complete work ordered and funded by fiscal year-end, the work and related funding will be carried over into the next fiscal year. DOD established a formula based on new orders from customers for determining the allowable carryover as defined by DOD's Financial Management Regulation. GAO was asked to review issues related to carryover.
GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which Industrial Operations' actual carryover differed from allowable amounts and reasons for differences; (2) the extent to which Industrial Operations' budgeted carryover differed from actual carryover, reasons for differences, and actions Army is taking to improve related budgeting; and (3) the key drivers for orders with large carryover balances and the extent to which the Army is taking actions to reduce carryover. GAO reviewed carryover guidance, analyzed carryover and related data, and interviewed Army officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Army Industrial Operations (Industrial Operations) reports showed that Industrial Operations actual adjusted carryover exceeded its allowable carryover amount from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 by $195 million, $1.1 billion, and $854 million, respectively. This occurred because Industrial Operations performed less work (i.e., earned less revenue) than orders accepted due to staff reductions of more than 5,000 over the 2-year period for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 caused by budgetary uncertainty and the across-the-board spending reductions referred to as sequestration. GAO also determined that the Army did not correctly calculate the allowable carryover amounts for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 as specified by the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation because the Army did not use the most recent data available to perform the calculations. Based on GAO's calculations, Industrial Operations exceeded the allowable amounts by $44 million less in fiscal year 2013 and $27 million more in fiscal year 2014 than reported.
Industrial Operations' actual adjusted carryover also significantly exceeded budgeted adjusted carryover from fiscal years 2013 through 2015. While its budgeted adjusted carryover would have been under the allowable amount by $174 million and $1.2 billion for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, respectively, and over the allowable amount by $186 million for fiscal year 2015, the actual adjusted carryover amount exceeded the allowable amounts all 3 fiscal years because Industrial Operations (1) accepted more new orders than budgeted and (2) performed less work (earned less revenue) than budgeted.
To address budget concerns, the Army has implemented actions intended to improve budget information. However, Industrial Operations has not been able to provide reliable budget information on carryover to decision makers from fiscal years 2013 through 2015.
GAO identified four key drivers for large Industrial Operations carryover balances: (1) work was scheduled to carry over at the end of the fiscal year as part of the normal course of business, (2) work on crash-damaged aircraft was difficult to predict and required nonstandard repairs that necessitated long lead time parts to perform the work, (3) work did not have a well-defined scope of work for repairing the assets, and (4) parts were not available to perform work. The Army is taking actions to reduce carryover. One of those actions is to develop a regulation that consolidates and updates guidance for Industrial Operations. However, this regulation has not yet been completed, issued, and implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve the budgeting and management for carryover by establishing procedures for correctly calculating the allowable carryover, improving budget estimates on carryover, and addressing in its draft regulation scope of work and parts issues that affect carryover. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited related actions planned or under way. |
gao_GAO-10-693 | gao_GAO-10-693_0 | Safeguards to Protect Sensitive Information Not Always Available in Agency Guidance or Included in Contract Actions
Our analysis of guidance and contract actions at three agencies found areas where sensitive information is not fully safeguarded and thus may remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse. DHS, DOD, and HHS FAR supplements include some guidance and standard contract provisions—for example that address contractor safeguards for personal information. At the contract level, almost half of the 42 contract actions reviewed did not include solicitation and contract provisions that safeguarded against unauthorized contractor disclosure and inappropriate use of sensitive information contractors may access in program offices during the course of contract performance. Additionally, DOD and HHS lack guidance on the use of nondisclosure agreements, while DHS has found that these help improve accountability by informing contractors of their responsibilities and the consequences that may result from their failure to meet those responsibilities. Almost Half of Contract Actions Reviewed Lack Contract Provisions That Fully Safeguard Sensitive Information
For our analysis of contract documents for 42 contract actions at DHS, DOD, and HHS that involved contractor employees supporting mission- critical tasks, in order to be considered to fully safeguard all types of sensitive information, a contract had to contain provisions that specifically required contractors to refrain from (1) disclosing sensitive information to anyone except as needed for contract performance and (2) using such sensitive information for any purpose other than contract performance. In the absence of such safeguards, there is higher risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of sensitive information by contractors. While the FAR establishes governmentwide guidance on certain contractor sensitive-information safeguards prescribed in statute—for example, to require contractor protection of individual privacy—FAR guidance does not address certain key areas relating to contractor access to sensitive information. Such changes to the FAR could provide agencies clear guidance on the use of contractor nondisclosure agreements as a condition of access to sensitive information and could include requirements for contractors to promptly notify agencies of unauthorized disclosure and misuse of sensitive information to enable timely decisions regarding an agency’s response when use of sensitive information is compromised. Rather than having agencies develop their own guidance and clauses individually, several amendments are pending to improve guidance and contract clauses in the FAR. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the need for clearly defining contractor responsibilities in governmentwide guidance in the FAR, we recommend that the Administrator of OFPP ensures that the FAR Council incorporates changes in the FAR that address safeguards for contractor access to sensitive information by providing guidance to agency acquisition policy officials, in coordination with IT security and privacy officials, chief information officers, and other affected parties, on agency development and use of contractor nondisclosure agreements as a condition of access to sensitive information; and establishing a requirement for prompt notification to appropriate agency officials of a contractor’s unauthorized disclosure or misuse of sensitive information so that timely agency responses are facilitated and appropriate contractor accountability mechanisms can be enforced. In oral comments, OFPP generally concurred with our recommendations. To assess the extent to which agency guidance contains safeguards for contractor protection of sensitive information, we analyzed applicable guidance available in the respective Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) supplements of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
In performing agency tasks, contractor employees often require access to sensitive information that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure or misuse. This report assesses the (1) extent to which agency guidance and contracts contain safeguards for contractor access to sensitive information, and (2) adequacy of governmentwide guidance on how agencies are to safeguard sensitive information to which contractors may have access. To conduct this work, GAO identified key attributes involving sensitive-information safeguards, analyzed guidance and met with officials at three agencies selected for their extensive reliance on contractor employees, analyzed 42 of their contract actions for services potentially requiring contractor access to sensitive information, and analyzed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and pending FAR changes regarding governmentwide guidance on contractor safeguards for access to sensitive information.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of guidance and contract actions at three agencies found areas where sensitive information is not fully safeguarded and thus may remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse. The Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) have all supplemented the FAR and developed some guidance and standard contract provisions, but the safeguards available in DOD's and HHS's guidance do not always protect all relevant types of sensitive information contractors may access during contract performance. Also, DOD's, DHS's, and HHS's supplemental FAR guidance do not specify contractor responsibilities for prompt notification to the agency if unauthorized disclosure or misuse occurs. Almost half of the 42 contract actions analyzed lacked clauses or provisions that safeguarded against disclosure and inappropriate use of all potential types of sensitive information that contractors might access during contract performance. Additionally, DOD and HHS lack guidance on the use of nondisclosure agreements, while DHS has found that these help accountability by informing contractors of their responsibilities to safeguard confidentiality and appropriate use and the potential consequences they face from violations. There have been numerous recommendations for improved governmentwide guidance and contract provisions in the FAR, such as prohibiting certain types of contractor personnel from using sensitive information for personal gain. To address some of these areas, regulatory changes are pending to develop standardized approaches and contract clauses in the FAR that agencies could use to safeguard sensitive information, rather than developing such safeguards individually. However, similarly to issues identified in agency guidance, GAO found two key areas the FAR does not yet address. These include (1) agency use of nondisclosure agreements as a condition of contractor access to sensitive information, and (2) the need to establish clear requirements for contractors to promptly notify agencies of unauthorized disclosure and misuse of sensitive information. The ongoing rulemaking process provides an opportunity to address the need for additional FAR guidance in both areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) ensure pending changes to the FAR address two additional safeguards for contractor access to sensitive information: the use of nondisclosure agreements and prompt notification of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of sensitive information. In oral comments, OFPP agreed with the recommendations. DHS also concurred with the recommendations, while DOD and HHS had no comment. |
gao_NSIAD-96-48 | gao_NSIAD-96-48_0 | In November 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced plans to buy an additional 80 C-17 aircraft. Initial spares for the C-17 are being procured under two contracts. Higher Costs for Parts Made In-House
The Air Force paid higher prices for 33 spare parts than appears reasonable when compared to McDonnell Douglas’ historical costs. The St. Louis Division’s estimated costs were from 4 to 56 times greater than the prices that Long Beach had paid outside vendors several years earlier. McDonnell Douglas refunded that amount in December 1995. Data for Pricing Spare Parts
Our review of the data submitted to support the pricing of selected spare parts orders showed that McDonnell Douglas’ St. Louis Division used outdated pricing information when proposing costs under intercompany work orders with the Long Beach Division for the C-17 spares. We found that the selected items were overpriced by $117,000, or about 34 percent of the negotiated value of the items reviewed. Profit Under Spare Part Orders
Our review indicated that the profits awarded for some orders under contract-2109 appear higher than warranted. For example, the profit objective for a fixed-price contract normally would be higher than that for a cost-type contract because the cost risk to the contractor is greater under the former. However, rather than calculate separate profit objectives and negotiate profit rates for individual orders, DPRO and McDonnell Douglas negotiated two predetermined profit rates, documented in a memorandum of agreement, that would apply to subsequent pricing actions. The profit rates were 10 percent for parts that McDonnell Douglas purchased from subcontractors, and 15 percent for spare parts that McDonnell Douglas manufactured. Based on profit rates of 6 percent for purchased parts and 13 percent for parts made in-house, both of which could have been justified according to our calculations, McDonnell Douglas would have received less profit. Using one order as an example, McDonnell Douglas (1) negotiated spare parts prices with its subcontractor on January 25, 1993; (2) negotiated prices with the government on April 11, 1994; and (3) scheduled the parts for delivery on May 27, 1994. The contracting officer’s use of the alternate range for performance risk, combined with the use of a fixed-price value for contract type, led to the negotiation of a profit rate of 10 percent for the buy orders; in contrast, we calculated that using a cost-type contract risk factor, the standard range for performance risk, and McDonnell Douglas’ estimate of facilities capital employed would have resulted in an overall profit objective of 6 percent for the buy orders. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said that it had taken appropriate action to address our finding of overpricing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the pricing of certain spare parts for the C-17 aircraft, focusing on those spare parts that experienced significant price increases when McDonnell Douglas decided to produce them in-house rather than purchase them from outside vendors.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GAO's review indicates that the Air Force paid higher prices for spare parts than is justified; (2) for 33 selected spare parts formerly procured under subcontracts, costs are from 4 to 56 times higher after McDonnell Douglas moved the work in-house; (3) for example, McDonnell Douglas paid an outside vendor $389 to machine a door hook that it subsequently machined in-house at its St. Louis Division at an estimated cost of $8,842; (4) costs for some spare parts are higher than justified because McDonnell Douglas used outdated pricing data that overstated its proposed prices; (5) in developing the proposed costs of selected spare parts, McDonnell Douglas used outdated labor variance factors, which resulted in prices being overstated by 34 percent ($117,000) for 37 parts; (6) the profits awarded on some orders under contract-2109 appear higher than warranted; (7) the contracting officer used Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement guidelines to calculate profit objectives and negotiate profit rates with the contractor that are documented in a memorandum of agreement; (8) the contracting officer developed the government's objectives based on the risks of a fixed-price contract; (9) however, most costs were known when the order prices were negotiated; therefore, the contractor's risks were lower than in a fixed-price environment; (10) also, the contracting officer used a higher performance risk factor than appears appropriate when McDonnell Douglas is buying spare parts from subcontractors; and (11) based on profit rates that GAO's calculations suggest could have been justified, McDonnell Douglas would have received less profit. GAO also found that: (1) as GAO discussed its findings with Department of Defense (DOD) officials during GAO's review, they began taking actions to address those findings; (2) for example, the Defense Contract Management Command's Defense Plant Representative Office at McDonnell Douglas calculated that the overpricing of spare parts was $182,000 and recovered that amount from McDonnell Douglas in December 1995; and (3) DOD stated that other actions are being taken to prevent these overpricing problems on other spare parts. |
gao_GAO-12-129T | gao_GAO-12-129T_0 | Because VA maintains administrative control of the program, we recommended that the Secretary of VA direct the FRCP to take actions to address management issues related to FRC enrollment decisions, FRCs’ caseloads, and program staffing needs and placement decisions. Staffing needs and placement decisions. Although our recommendations to improve the management of the FRCP were directed to the Secretary of VA, both DOD and VA were asked to provide a response to this subcommittee about how the departments could jointly implement the recommendations. DOD has provided limited assistance to VA with the implementation of our recommendation regarding enrollment. Specifically, according to DOD and VA officials, an e-mail communication was sent on June 30, 2011, to the commanders of the military services’ wounded warrior programs stating that they should refer all severely wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers who could benefit from the services of an FRC to the program for evaluation. Despite this effort, VA officials stated that they have not noticed any change in referral numbers or patterns from DOD since the e-mail was sent. DOD and VA Have Made Little Progress Reaching Agreement on Options to Better Integrate Care Coordination Programs
DOD and VA have made little progress reaching agreement on options to better integrate the FRCP and RCP, although they have made a number of attempts to address this issue. Most recently, DOD and VA experienced difficulty jointly providing potential options for integrating these programs in response to this subcommittee’s May 26, 2011, request to the deputy secretaries, who co-chair the DOD and VA Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior Oversight Committee (Senior Oversight Committee). On September 12, 2011, the co-chairs of the Senior Oversight Committee issued a joint letter that stated that the departments are considering several options to maximize care coordination resources. However, these options have not been finalized and were not specifically identified or outlined in the letter. The two departments have made prior attempts to jointly develop options for improved collaboration and potential integration of the FRCP and RCP. Despite these efforts, no final decisions to revamp, merge, or eliminate programs have been agreed upon. The lack of progress to date in reaching agreement on options to better integrate the FRCP and the RCP illustrates DOD’s and VA’s continued difficulty in collaborating to resolve care coordination program duplication and overlap. Additionally, as we have previously reported, there are numerous programs in addition to the FRCP and RCP that provide similar services to recovering servicemembers and veterans—many of whom are enrolled in more than one program and therefore have multiple care coordinators and case managers. We found that inadequate information exchange and poor coordination between these programs has resulted in not only redundancy, but confusion and frustration for enrollees, particularly when care coordinators and case managers duplicate or contradict one another’s efforts. Consequently, the intended purpose of these programs—to better manage and facilitate care and services—may actually have the opposite effect. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of services for recovering servicemembers, veterans, and their families, we recommend that the Secretaries of DOD and VA direct the Senior Oversight Committee to expeditiously develop and implement a plan to strengthen functional integration across all DOD and VA care coordination and case management programs that serve this population, including the FRCP and RCP, to reduce redundancy and overlap. Agency Comments
We obtained oral comments on the content of this statement from both DOD and VA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
In a May 2011 testimony before this subcommittee (GAO-11-572T), based on a March 2011 report (GAO-11-250), GAO highlighted challenges for the Federal Recovery Coordination Program (FRCP), developed by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) to assist some of the most severely wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers, veterans, and their families. Specifically, GAO reported on challenges in FRCP enrollment, staffing needs, caseloads, and placement locations. GAO also cited challenges faced by the FRCP when coordinating with other VA and DOD programs, including DOD's Recovery Coordination Program (RCP), which can result in duplication of effort and enrollee confusion. In this statement, GAO examines the status of DOD and VA's efforts to (1) implement GAO's March 2011 recommendations and (2) identify and analyze potential options to functionally integrate the FRCP and RCP. This statement is based on GAO's March 2011 report and updated information obtained in September 2011.
What GAO Found
VA has made progress addressing each of the recommendations from GAO's March 2011 report on program management issues related to enrollment decisions, caseloads, and program staffing needs and placement decisions for the Federal Recovery Coordinators (FRC) the FRCP uses to coordinate care. These recommendations were directed to the Secretary of VA because VA maintains administrative control of the program, and DOD and VA were asked to provide a response to this subcommittee about how the departments could jointly implement these recommendations. DOD has provided limited assistance to VA with the implementation of GAO's recommendation about enrollment through an e-mail communication about referrals to the FRCP to the commanders of the military services' wounded warrior programs. Despite this effort, however, VA officials stated that they have not noticed any change in referral numbers or patterns from DOD since the e-mail was sent. DOD and VA have made little progress reaching agreement on options to better integrate the FRCP and RCP, although they have made a number of attempts to address this issue. Most recently, DOD and VA experienced difficulty jointly providing potential options for integrating these programs in response to this subcommittee's May 26, 2011, request to the deputy secretaries, who co-chair the DOD and VA Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior Oversight Committee (Senior Oversight Committee). On September 12, 2011--almost 3 months after the subcommittee requested a response--the co-chairs of the Senior Oversight Committee issued a joint letter that stated that the departments are considering several options to maximize care coordination resources. However, these options have not been finalized and were not specifically identified or outlined in the letter. The two departments have made prior attempts to jointly develop options for improved collaboration and potential integration of the FRCP and RCP, but despite the identification of various options, no final decisions to revamp, merge, or eliminate programs have been agreed upon. This lack of progress illustrates DOD's and VA's continued difficulty in collaborating to resolve duplication and overlap between care coordination programs. Furthermore, as we have previously reported, there are numerous programs in addition to the FRCP and RCP that provide similar services to recovering servicemembers and veterans-- many of whom are enrolled in more than one program and therefore have multiple care coordinators and case managers. We found that inadequate information exchange and poor coordination between these programs has resulted in not only redundancy, but confusion and frustration for enrollees, particularly when care coordinators and case managers duplicate or contradict one another's efforts. Consequently, the intended purpose of these programs--to better manage and facilitate care and services--may actually have the opposite effect. We recommend that the Secretaries of DOD and VA direct the Senior Oversight Committee to expeditiously develop and implement a plan to strengthen functional integration across all DOD and VA care coordination and case management programs, including the FRCP and RCP, to reduce redundancy and overlap. We obtained oral comments on the content of this statement from both DOD and VA officials, and we incorporated their comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-584 | gao_GAO-02-584_0 | Background
The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 (P.L. The act stated that, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment, the chief judge of the Superior Court shall submit to the president and Congress a transition plan for the Family Court of the Superior Court and shall include in the plan the following: The chief judge’s determination of the role and function of the presiding judge of the Family Court. However, the plan does not (1) include a request for judicial nomination, (2) indicate the number of nonjudicial staff needed for the Family Court, (3) indicate if the 12 judges who volunteered for the Family Court meet all of the qualifications outlined in the act, and (4) state how the number of magistrate judges to hire under the expedited process was determined. The Transition Plan Includes a Description of the Court’s Plan for Transferring Abuse and Neglect Cases to the Family Court
The transition plan establishes criteria for transferring cases to the Family Court and states that the Family Court intends to have all child abuse and neglect cases pending before judges serving in other divisions of the Superior Court closed or transferred into the Family Court by June 2003. However, evaluation measures listed in the plan are oriented more toward the court’s processes, such as whether hearings are held on time, than on outcomes. In addition, the plan does not include a request that the Judicial Nomination Commission recruit and the president nominate the additional three individuals to serve on the Superior Court, as required by the Family Court Act. However, although specifically required by the act, the transition plan does not state how the court determined the number of magistrate judges to be hired under the expedited process. | What GAO Found
The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 was enacted to (1) redesignate the Family Division of the Superior Court as the Family Court of the Superior Court, (2) recruit trained and experienced judges to serve in the Family Court, and (3) promote consistency and efficiency in the assignment of judges and the courts actions and proceedings. The act requires the chief judge of the Superior Court to submit a transition plan outlining the proposed operation of the Family Court. The plan shows that the Superior Court has made progress transitioning its Family Division to a Family Court, but challenges remain. The transition plan addresses most, but not all, of the act's required elements. For example, the plan identifies the number of judges and magistrate judges needed and outlines an approach for closing or transferring cases from other divisions to the Family Court. However, the plan does not include (1) a request that the Judicial Nomination Commission recruit and the president nominate the additional judges the court believes are necessary, (2) the number of nonjudicial staff needed for the Family Court, (3) information on the qualifications of the judges selected for the court, and (4) information on how the court determined the number of magistrate judges to hire under the expedited process provided for in the act. Although not specifically required by the act, the plan includes information on performance management and enumerates performance measures that are oriented more toward the court's processes than on outcomes. Measures that focus on outcomes for children and families could help to optimize the court's performance. This testimony is based on a May report (GAO-02-534). |
gao_GAO-05-795T | gao_GAO-05-795T_0 | Four Housing Assistance Programs Require That Supportive Services Be Made Available to Elderly Residents
Generally, HUD and USDA’s housing assistance programs are not required to provide supportive services to the elderly. Of the 23 housing assistance programs that target or include the elderly among potential beneficiaries, only 4 require the owners of properties developed under the programs to ensure that supportive services are available. Appendix II provides summaries of the four programs, which include: HUD’s Section 202 program, which subsidizes the development and operating costs of multifamily properties for elderly households with very low incomes. HUD’s Assisted Living Conversion Program, which provides private nonprofit owners of eligible properties with grants to convert some or all of their units into assisted living facilities for the frail elderly. All insured facilities must provide supportive services, but these services vary according to the type of facility. Other HUD Programs Can Assist the Elderly in Obtaining Supportive Services
HUD administers four service-related programs that can be used in conjunction with subsidized housing programs: two programs that provide supportive services to residents of public and multifamily properties developed under HUD programs, and two that link residents to supportive services. The Congregate Housing Services Program provides grants for the delivery of meals and nonmedical supportive services to elderly and disabled residents of public and multifamily housing, including USDA’s Section 515 housing. The Neighborhood Networks program encourages property owners, managers, and residents of HUD-insured and -assisted housing to develop computer centers. The ROSS grant program links public housing residents with appropriate services. Private Partnerships and Federal Health Care Programs May Provide Some Supportive Services
Elderly residents of public and federally subsidized multifamily housing can also receive supportive services through partnerships between property owners and local organizations and through programs provided by HHS. Although GAO did not obtain data on the extent to which such services are made available at all public and federally subsidized multifamily housing, in site visits to HUD and USDA multifamily properties, we found several examples of such partnerships: In Greensboro, North Carolina, Dolan Manor—a Section 202 housing development—has established a relationship with a volunteer group from a local church. For example, HHS’s Public Housing Primary Care Program provides public housing residents with access to affordable comprehensive primary and preventive health care through clinics that are located either within public housing properties or in immediately accessible locations. In addition, eligible elderly residents of federally subsidized housing may receive health care through the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), which is also administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Section 515 program’s Congregate Housing subprogram requires properties to provide supportive services. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to a congressionally established bipartisan commission, decreased investment in affordable housing and an elderly population that is projected to grow from about 12 percent of the population in 2002 to 20 percent by 2030 are likely to increase the number of elderly who must spend large portions of their incomes on housing. Moreover, according to this commission, more than one-third of the elderly tenants of government-subsidized housing require assistance with some type of activity of daily living, such as making a meal or getting in and out of bed. This testimony, which is based on a report issued in February 2005, discusses (1) the federal housing assistance programs requiring that supportive services be made available to elderly residents, (2) other Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs that assist the elderly in obtaining supportive services, and (3) private partnerships and federal health care programs that may provide supportive services to elderly beneficiaries of federal housing assistance.
What GAO Found
Of the 23 housing assistance programs GAO reviewed, only 4 require the owners of participating properties to ensure that services such as meals or transportation are available to residents. Three are HUD programs: the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program, which subsidizes multifamily properties for elderly households with very low incomes; the Assisted Living Conversion Program, which subsidizes the conversion of HUD-subsidized multifamily properties into assisted living facilities; and the Section 232 Mortgage Insurance Program, which insures mortgages for licensed facilities that provide varying levels of skilled care and services. USDA's Section 515 Rural Rental Housing Loan program, which makes loans for the construction and rehabilitation of rural multifamily properties, has a Congregate Housing Services subprogram that requires the provision of supportive services. HUD administers four programs that can be used with various housing programs to help the elderly with supportive services: Congregate Housing Services Program, which provides grants for the delivery of meals and nonmedical supportive services to elderly and disabled residents of public and multifamily housing; Neighborhood Networks Program, which encourages the development of computer centers in HUD-supported housing; Resident Opportunities and Self Sufficiency (ROSS) Program, which links public housing residents with services; and Service Coordinator Program, which funds coordinators who help elderly residents access services such as transportation and health care at some multifamily properties. Supportive services may also be available to elderly residents of subsidized housing through partnerships between individual properties and local organizations and through Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) programs. For example, HHS's Public Housing Primary Care Program provides public housing residents with access to affordable primary and preventive health care through clinics that are located in or near the properties. GAO did not obtain data on the extent to which such services are made available. |
gao_GAO-06-810 | gao_GAO-06-810_0 | TVA’s management has also recognized the need to reduce its debt and other financing obligations to increase its flexibility to meet competitive challenges. To identify the impact that growth in demand for power in the Tennessee Valley may have on TVA’s ability to meet its debt reduction plan, we (1) interviewed officials from TVA, TVA’s Office of Inspector General, the Tennessee Valley Public Power Association, and the Knoxville Utilities Board; (2) reviewed prior GAO reports on issues confronting TVA; (3) reviewed TVA’s fiscal years 2004 and 2005 annual reports, information statements, and audited financial statements to determine the types of revenue and costs TVA had reported; and (4) interviewed an official from CBO with expertise in issues pertaining to TVA. This includes reducing statutory debt by $6.7 billion and alternative financing obligations by $0.4 billion. TVA plans to meet this goal by increasing revenue, controlling the growth of its operating expenses, and limiting capital expenditures. TVA Used a Reasonable Approach to Developing Its Plan to Reduce TFOs
Overall, we found TVA’s approach to developing its TFO reduction goal was reasonable. To assess these outside risks, TVA performed detailed competitive analyses and modeled different market scenarios to estimate its future competitive environment. As part of its annual internal budget process, TVA used an accounting model to project annual cash flows and refine its goal. Assuming that this net cash flow is applied to reducing financing obligations, the model provides an estimate of the level of obligations at the end of the simulation, which can then be used to refine projections used in coming up with its goals. Other sources may also provide reasonable estimates for key variables in the model, however. Several Key Factors Could Impact TVA’s Ability to Successfully Carry out Its Plan for Reducing TFOs
We identified several key factors that could impact TVA’s ability to successfully carry out its plan. The timing of electricity industry restructuring, potential increases in interest rates, and costs associated with meeting potential new environmental regulations are factors outside TVA’s control. Future rate increases and a fuel-cost adjustment clause are factors that will help TVA cover unforeseen costs, which will help TVA meet its TFO reduction goal. Limiting the Growth of Operating and Maintenance Expenses Will Be Difficult for TVA to Achieve
TVA will be challenged to meet its goal of reducing projected O&M expenses by $1.1 billion from fiscal year 2007 through 2015. Building New Generating Capacity Could Require Capital Expenditures Not Included in the Plan
Building new generating capacity during the current TFO reduction period to meet the projected demand for power beginning in 2015 would likely cause TVA to incur new debt and use cash that is currently projected to be available to reduce TFOs. Growing Demand for Power Could Affect TVA’s Ability to Meet Its TFO Reduction Goal
The growing demand for power could affect TVA’s ability to meet its goal since TVA’s current projections assume that it will not invest in any new generation through 2015, other than restarting BFN 1. TVA’s plan includes the capital expenditures needed to expand generating capacity in existing generating facilities to meet projected increases in demand for power through 2015. By 2015, however, TVA estimates that it will need more baseload generation to meet growth in demand. TVA officials are considering a number of options to meet this projected increase in demand for power, including partnering with outside parties. Specifically, we are recommending that: TVA consider incorporating the variability surrounding certain assumptions that are now held fixed, such as the starting date for Browns Ferry Nuclear Unit 1 or possible new environmental legislation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition in the electricity industry is expected to intensify, and restructuring legislation may dramatically change the way electric utilities do business in the future. To be competitive, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) needs to reduce fixed costs and increase its flexibility in order to meet market prices for power. TVA plans to reduce its financing obligations, which include statutory debt and other financing arrangements, by $7.1 billion by the end of fiscal year 2015. GAO was asked to (1) describe how TVA plans to meet its goal for reducing financing obligations, (2) assess the reasonableness of TVA's approach in developing its plan, (3) identify key factors that could impact TVA's ability to successfully carry out its plan, and (4) identify how TVA's plans for meeting the growing demand for power in the Tennessee Valley may impact its ability to reduce financing obligations. To fulfill these objectives, GAO interviewed TVA officials and others, and reviewed budget submissions, financial projections, and other documentation supporting the plan.
What GAO Found
TVA plans to reduce its financing obligations by about $7.1 billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2015 by increasing revenue, controlling the growth of its operating expenses, and limiting capital expenditures. TVA's financing obligations include statutory debt, which it plans to reduce by $6.7 billion, and alternative financing obligations such as energy prepayments, which it plans to reduce by $0.4 billion. Overall, GAO's review found TVA's approach to developing its plan to reduce financing obligations reasonable. TVA performed detailed competitive analyses and modeled different market scenarios to estimate its future competitive environment, then used its internal budget process to project annual cash flows and refine its goal with a cash-based accounting model. Many of the variables used in the models were based on recognized data sources. Augmenting these sources with prices from options markets could provide more accurate estimates in volatile markets. TVA also made fixed assumptions about actions it would take, such as building new power generation, and events, such as the advent of new environmental regulations. While these assumptions are reasonable, they carry uncertainty that is not reflected in the model. Modeling them as variables might better reflect that uncertainty and provide broader information for planning purposes. GAO identified several key factors that could impact TVA's ability to successfully carry out its plan. Factors such as the timing of electricity industry restructuring, potential increases in interest rates, and costs associated with meeting potential new environmental requirements, are key factors that are difficult for TVA to control. TVA has more control over other key factors, such as its decisions on whether or not to construct new power generating facilities before 2015 and to limit operating and maintenance expenses, but these are also affected by outside forces and contain an element of uncertainty. Future rate increases and a fuel-cost adjustment clause are factors that should help cover any unforeseen costs, capital expenditures, or revenue shortfalls. TVA's plan includes the capital expenditures it believes will be needed to expand capacity of existing generating facilities to meet the growing demand for power in its service area through 2015; however, any new or unplanned expenditures prior to 2015 could lessen TVA's ability to achieve the $7.1 billion goal. By 2015, TVA has estimated that it will need more baseload generation to meet growth in demand. TVA officials are considering a number of options to meet this projected increase in demand for power, including partnering with outside parties to build new generation. TVA's current projections assume that it will not invest in any new generation through 2015 other than restarting Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1; however, any new or unplanned capital expenditures could use cash otherwise intended to be used to reduce financing obligations. |
gao_GAO-08-679 | gao_GAO-08-679_0 | Today, an estimated 10 percent of American Indian children attend the 174 schools and 12 dormitories that receive funding from the Department of the Interior’s BIE. BIE and BIE-Funded Schools Have Generally Used State Definitions of AYP, but BIE Has Not Taken Steps to Ensure Continued Access to All State Assessments
Almost all of the BIE schools adopted the definition of AYP, content standards, and assessments of the state in which the school is located. BIE Lacked Completed Agreements with about Half of the States with BIE Schools, Which Can Affect Access to State Assessments
BIE uses MOUs with states to delineate the terms of BIE-funded schools’ access to the states’ assessment systems; however it had not completed MOUs with 12 of the 23 states, including 5 we visited—Arizona, California, Florida, Mississippi, and New Mexico. Three Tribal Groups Have Officially Begun Developing AYP Alternatives in Part to Integrate Culture or Language, While Other Tribal Groups Have Chosen Not to Do So, in Part Because of Substantial Potential Challenges
Officials from three tribal groups—the Navajo Nation, OSEC, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians—have informed BIE officials that they wish to pursue alternatives to state AYP definitions for a variety of reasons, including the desire to ensure that standards and assessments include components of native culture. Three Tribal Groups, Representing about 44 Percent of BIE Students, Have Begun to Develop Alternatives to State Definitions of AYP, in Part to Ensure That Content Standards and Assessments Reflect Native Culture
As of March 2008, three tribal groups—Navajo Nation, OSEC, and Miccosukee—had formally notified the BIE of their intent to develop alternatives to state definitions of AYP. Tribal Groups Considering Alternatives and School Officials Reported a Lack of Federal Guidance and Communication, but BIE and Education Have Recently Begun Providing Some Initial Assistance
Most tribal groups, school officials, and ELOs we spoke with said they had little guidance about the process BIE uses to help tribal groups develop alternatives. During the course of our review, 19 of the 21 ELOs we interviewed also stated they had not received any training or written guidance on the BIE’s policy for approving a tribal groups’ request for an alternative, even though providing technical assistance to tribal groups developing an alternative is included in their job responsibilities. Officials from BIE and Education Have Recently Begun to Offer Technical Assistance
To address tribal groups’ requests for technical assistance, BIE assigned a staff person as the primary BIE contact for tribal groups that are requesting technical assistance or seeking to develop alternatives. Developing alternatives requires clear and timely communication between BIE and tribal groups, as well as between BIE and Education. I); Education did not. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Education and the Interior; the Director of the Bureau of Indian Education; representatives of tribal groups identified in the report, relevant congressional committees, and other interested parties. No Child Left Behind Act: States Face Challenges Measuring Academic Growth That Education’s Initiatives May Help Address. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires states and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) to define and determine whether schools are making adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward meeting the goal of 100 percent academic proficiency. To address tribes' needs for cultural preservation, NCLBA allows tribal groups to waive all or part of BIE's definition of AYP and propose an alternative, with technical assistance from BIE and the Department of Education, if requested. GAO is providing information on the extent of (1) BIE schools' adoption of BIE's definition of AYP; (2) tribal groups' pursuit of alternatives and their reasons as well as reasons other tribal groups have not done so; and (3) federal assistance to tribal groups developing alternatives. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed tribal groups, federal officials, and state education officials; conducted site visits to BIE schools; and reviewed laws, regulations, and other relevant documents.
What GAO Found
Although almost all of the 174 BIE schools have officially adopted BIE's definition of AYP--the definition of AYP of the state where the school is located--BIE had not yet completed memoranda of understanding (MOU) to delineate BIE and state responsibilities concerning BIE schools' access to the states' assessment systems for 12 of the 23 states with BIE schools. Without MOUs, states could change their policies regarding BIE schools' access to assessments and scoring services. Officials from the Navajo Nation, the Oceti Sakowin Education Consortium, and the Miccosukee Tribe have begun to develop alternatives to state AYP definitions, in part to make standards and assessments reflect their culture, while officials of other tribal groups have cited various reasons for not developing alternatives. The three tribal groups developing alternatives, representing about 44 percent of the 48,000 BIE students, have requested technical assistance in developing their alternatives. Other tribal officials cited a desire to maintain compatibility with public schools and/or cited challenges, such as a lack of expertise, as reasons not to pursue alternatives. The three tribal groups pursuing alternatives reported a lack of federal guidance and communication, although they have recently received some initial technical assistance from BIE and Education officials. These tribal groups reported receiving little guidance from BIE and difficulties in communicating with BIE because the Bureau did not always have internal response timelines or meet the ones it had. Moreover, BIE education line officers--the primary points of contact for information on the alternative provision--generally indicated that they had received no guidance or training on the provision. During the course of this review, BIE and Education officials began offering technical assistance to the tribal groups working to developalternatives |
gao_RCED-99-35 | gao_RCED-99-35_0 | Concerning organizational structure, we have reported that the number and diversity of USDA’s responsibilities create fundamental management problems for the Department. For example, food inspection services are provided by both USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service and HHS’ Food and Drug Administration; land management activities are carried out by the Forest Service and three agencies within the Department of the Interior; and statistical activities are carried out by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics and Economic Research Services and at least nine other federal agencies. Because these agencies perform numerous similar activities and have complex and sometimes conflicting laws governing their land management activities, we have concluded that these activities could be carried out more efficiently and effectively either by combining the agencies or by streamlining the existing structure through the coordination and integration of functions, activities, and field locations. GPRA Provides Framework for USDA and Other Federal Departments to Identify and Coordinate Similar Activities
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 seeks to focus government decision-making and accountability on the results of activities. The act requires federal agencies to prepare annual performance plans, including an explanation of how similar activities will be coordinated with other agencies. As we reported in June 1998, while the plans of most of USDA’s component agencies at least partially discussed the need to coordinate with agencies having related strategic or performance goals, many of these fiscal year 1999 annual performance plans did not explain how this coordination would be accomplished. The Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service—all within the Department of the Interior—perform some land management activities that have become similar over time to those conducted by FS, as we have reported. The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation performs some activities similar to NRCS’. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Agriculture (USDA) activities that are similar to the activities conducted by other federal agencies and discussed USDA's efforts to comply with the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) many of USDA's activities appear to be similar to those of other federal agencies; (2) for example, food inspection services are provided by both USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service and the Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration; (3) GAO has reported on the fundamental management problems some of these similarities create for USDA and has, in some cases, recommended organizational changes; (4) for example, some of the land management activities of USDA's Forest Service and of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service are similar; (5) GAO has reported that land management activities could be carried out more efficiently and effectively either by combining these agencies or by coordinating and integrating their functions, activities, and field locations; (6) the Results Act was designed in part to help address apparent similarities in agencies' activities by requiring federal agencies to prepare annual performance plans; and (7) however, as GAO reported in June 1998, while most of USDA's component agencies' plans at least partially discussed the need to coordinate with the agencies having related strategic or performance goals, the Department's fiscal year 1999 annual performance plan did not explain how USDA agencies are coordinating crosscutting issues both within and outside the Department. |
gao_GAO-05-858 | gao_GAO-05-858_0 | The pilots, costing over $1 billion in total, were limited in scope and were not intended to provide corporate solutions to any of the Navy’s long-standing financial and business management problems. Because of the various inconsistencies in the design and implementation, the pilots were stovepiped and could not operate with each other, even though they performed many of the same business functions. Assuming that the project continues to effectively implement the processes it has adopted, the planned functionality of the Navy ERP has the potential to address at least some of the weaknesses identified in the Navy’s financial improvement plan. Since the program is still in a relatively early phase—it will not be fully operational until fiscal year 2011, at a currently estimated cost of $800 million—the project team must be continually vigilant and held accountable for ensuring that the disciplined processes are followed in all phases to help achieve overall success. Considering that the project is in a relatively early phase and DOD’s history of not implementing systems on time and within budget, the projected schedule and costs estimates are subject to, and very likely will, change. The Navy determined that the pilots would not meet its overall requirements and concluded that the best alternative was to develop a new ERP system—under the leadership of a central program office—and use efforts from the pilots as starting points by performing a review of their functionality and lessons learned, eliminating redundancies, and developing new functionalities that were not addressed by the pilots. Requirements Management Process Following Best Practices
Our review found that the ERP development team has so far followed an effective process for managing its requirements development. Requirements represent the blueprint that system developers and program managers use to design, develop, test, and implement a system. However, the currently planned ERP is not intended to provide an all-inclusive end-to-end corporate solution for the Navy. Going forward, the Navy faces very difficult challenges and risks in the areas of developing and implementing 44 system interfaces with other Navy and DOD systems, and accurately converting data from the existing legacy systems to the ERP. As previously noted, financial management is a high-risk area in the department and has been designated as such since 1995. For example, we found that the Navy does not have a mechanism in place to capture the data that can be used to effectively assess the project management processes. Additionally, although the Navy ERP program has a verification and validation function, it relies on in-house subject matter experts and others who are not independent to provide an assessment of the Navy ERP to DOD and Navy management. Given DOD’s long-standing inability to implement business systems that provide users with the promised capabilities, an independent assessment of the ERP’s performance is warranted. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Navy’s and DOD’s oversight of the Navy ERP effort, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to require that the Navy ERP Program Management Office (1) develop and implement the quantitative metrics needed to evaluate project performance and risks and use the quantitative metrics to assess progress and compliance with disciplined processes and (2) establish an IV&V function and direct that all IV&V reports be provided to Navy management and to the appropriate DOD investment review board, as well as the project management. We characterized the pilots as failures because the department spent $1 billion on systems that did not result in marked improvement in the Navy’s day-to-day operations. Scope and Methodology
To obtain a historical perspective on the planning and costs of the Navy’s four Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) pilot projects, and the decision to merge them into one program, we reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget justification materials and other background information on the four pilot projects. To determine if the Navy has identified lessons learned from the pilots, how they are being used, and the challenges that remain, we reviewed program documentation and interviewed Navy ERP program officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) difficulty in implementing business systems that are efficient and effective continues despite the billions of dollars that it invests each year. For a decade now--since 1995--we have designated DOD's business systems modernization as "high-risk." GAO was asked to (1) provide a historical perspective on the planning and costs of the Navy's four Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) pilot projects, and the decision to merge them into one program; (2) determine if the Navy has identified lessons from the pilots, how the lessons are being used, and challenges that remain; and (3) determine if there are additional best business practices that could be used to improve management oversight of the Navy ERP.
What GAO Found
The Navy invested approximately $1 billion in four ERP pilots without marked improvement in its day-to-day operations. The planning for the pilots started in 1998, with implementation beginning in fiscal year 2000. The four pilots were limited in scope and were not intended to be corporate solutions for any of the Navy's long-standing financial and business management problems. Furthermore, because of the various inconsistencies in the design and implementation of the pilots, they were not interoperable, even though they performed many of the same business functions. In short, the efforts were failures and $1 billion was largely wasted. Because the pilots would not meet its overall requirements, the Navy decided to start over and develop a new ERP system, under the leadership of a central program office. Using the lessons learned from the pilots, the current Navy ERP program office has so far been committed to the disciplined processes necessary to manage this effort. GAO found that, unlike other systems projects it has reviewed at DOD and other agencies, Navy ERP management is following an effective process for identifying and documenting requirements. The strong emphasis on requirements management, which was lacking in the previous efforts, is critical since requirements represent the essential blueprint that system developers and program managers use to design, develop, test, and implement a system and are key factors in projects that are considered successful. While the Navy ERP has the potential to address some of the Navy's financial management weaknesses, as currently planned, it will not provide an all-inclusive end-to-end corporate solution for the Navy. For example, the current scope of the ERP does not include the activities of the aviation and shipyard depots. Further, there are still significant challenges and risks ahead as the project moves forward, such as developing and implementing 44 system interfaces with other Navy and DOD systems and converting data from legacy systems into the ERP system. The project is in its early phases, with a current estimated completion date of 2011 at an estimated cost of $800 million. These estimates are subject to, and very likely will, change. Broader challenges, such as alignment with DOD's business enterprise architecture, which is not fully defined, also present a significant risk. Given DOD's past inability to implement business systems that provide the promised capability, continued close management oversight--by the Navy and DOD--will be critical. In this regard, the Navy does not have in place the structure to capture quantitative data that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the overall effort. Also, the Navy has not established an independent verification and validation (IV&V) function. Rather, the Navy is using in-house subject matter experts and others within the project. Industry best practices indicate that the IV&V activity should be independent of the project and report directly to agency management in order to provide added assurance that reported results on the project's status are unbiased. |
gao_GAO-05-811T | gao_GAO-05-811T_0 | Schedule Milestones and Management
AOC and its major construction contractors have made progress since the Subcommittee’s May 17 hearing. The sequence 2 contractor also continued work on the utility tunnel. AOC’s sequence 2 contractor completed 3 of the 11 activities listed in appendix 1 as scheduled for completion by today. According to AOC, the delays in 8 of these activities were caused by a number of factors, such as unforeseen site conditions, a design problem, and delays in completing certain masonry work that had to be completed before other work could be done. AOC does not expect these delays to postpone the project’s scheduled September 2006 completion date because it believes that the sequence 2 contractor can recover the lost time. A brief discussion follows of the issues that need AOC’s priority attention and the current status of AOC’s actions to address these issues. We will have a more complete assessment for the Subcommittee by its next CVC oversight hearing. Furthermore, as we said during the May 17 hearing, we continue to believe that AOC’s scheduled September 2006 completion date is optimistic and that the project is more likely to be done in the December 2006 to March 2007 time frame, largely because of past problems, the risks to the schedule identified during our assessment of it in early 2004, and future risks and uncertainties facing the project. Aggressive monitoring and managing contractors’ adherence to the schedule, including documenting and addressing the causes of delays, and reporting accurately to Congress on the status of the project’s schedule. On June 9, the construction management contractor told us that a project control engineer who had been assigned temporarily to help manage the project’s schedule would be working full time on the project starting June 13. Developing and implementing risk mitigation plans. Preparing a master schedule that integrates the major steps needed to complete CVC construction and the steps necessary to prepare for operations. Although AOC has started to plan and prepare for CVC operations, as we indicated in our May 17 testimony, it has not yet developed a schedule that integrates the construction activities with those activities necessary to prepare for operations. Project Costs and Funding
As we said during the Subcommittee’s May 17 hearing, we estimate that the cost to complete the construction of the CVC project, including proposed revisions to its scope, will range from about $522 million without provision for risks and uncertainties to about $559 million with provision for risks and uncertainties. For several reasons, we believe that AOC may need additional funds for CVC construction in the next several months. Thus, while AOC may not need all of the remaining $37 million we have suggested be allowed for risks and uncertainties, we believe AOC is likely to need more funds in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 than it has already received and has requested to complete the construction of CVC’s currently approved scope, although the exact amount and timing are not clear at this time. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given the development of a new project schedule, the pace at which sequence 2 change orders are being proposed, and the risks and uncertainties that continue to face the project, we recommend that, in the September to November 2005 time frame, the Architect of the Capitol update the estimated cost to complete the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in achieving selected project milestones and in managing the project's schedule since Congress's May 17 hearing on the project. We will also discuss the project's costs and funding, including the potential impact of schedule-related issues on the project's costs. Our observations today are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with CVC project staff, including AOC, its construction management contractor, and representatives of an AOC schedule consultant, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP). We did not perform an audit; rather we performed our work to assist Congress in conducting its oversight activities.
What GAO Found
In summary, AOC's sequence 2 contractor, Manhattan Construction Company, has met 3 of 11 significant milestones scheduled for completion by today's hearing. The sequence 2 contractor missed the other 8 milestones for several reasons, such as unforeseen site conditions and a design problem. AOC does not expect these delays to affect the CVC project's scheduled September 2006 completion date because AOC believes that the contractor can recover the lost time. Furthermore, certain utility tunnel work is scheduled for completion about 5 months later than previously reported, but AOC does not expect this delay to postpone the project's completion date because AOC plans to use temporary equipment that will allow the project to move forward but will also increase its costs. However, largely because of past problems and risks and uncertainties that face the project, we continue to believe that the project is more likely to be completed in the December 2006 to March 2007 time frame than in September 2006, as shown in AOC's schedule. AOC and its construction management contractor have continued their efforts to address two of the areas we identified during Congress's May 17 CVC hearing as requiring priority attention--having a realistic, acceptable schedule and aggressively monitoring and managing adherence to the schedule. But AOC has not yet developed risk mitigation plans or, as the Subcommittee requested, prepared a master schedule that integrates the major steps needed to complete construction with the steps needed to prepare for operations. Until recently, AOC did not have funding to continue contractual support it had been receiving to help plan and prepare for CVC operations. We continue to believe that these areas require AOC's priority attention and that the project's estimated cost at completion will be between $522 million and $559 million, and that, as we indicated during the May 17 hearing, AOC will likely need as much as $37 million more than it has requested to cover risks and uncertainties to complete the project. We believe that most of these additional funds will be needed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, although exactly how much will be needed at any one time is not clear. We are recommending that this fall AOC update its estimate of the cost to complete the project. |
gao_GAO-15-516 | gao_GAO-15-516_0 | Poverty Measurement
The official measure used today to provide information on how many people are “in poverty” in the United States was developed in the 1960s, based on the cost of food at that time. HHS uses the official poverty thresholds to update the “federal poverty guidelines” each year, which are the basis for determining financial eligibility or funding distribution for certain low- income programs. About 80 Programs Provide an Array of Supports for Low- Income Individuals and Households
Over $700 Billion in Federal Obligations in Fiscal Year 2013 Was Concentrated in Large Programs Aimed at Meeting Basic Needs
We identified 82 federal programs, including several tax expenditures, that target low-income individuals, families, and communities to help them meet basic needs or provide other assistance. In addition to the $742 billion in obligations reported in our survey, in fiscal year 2013, the federal government incurred $14 billion in reduced tax revenues for the nonrefundable portion of the EITC and four other tax expenditures, according to estimates from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (see table 3). Some of these recommendations have been addressed. Based on the SPM, About One-Sixth of the U.S. Population Lived in Poverty in 2013, When Considering Certain Government Benefits and Living Expenses
SPM Provides Information on the Economic Well- Being of the U.S. Population by Taking into Account Certain Government Assistance and Living Expenses and Other Factors
In 2013, 48.7 million people in the United States (15.5 percent of the population) lived in poverty according to the SPM, based on our analysis of Census data (see fig. The SPM threshold in 2013 for two adults and two children ranged from $21,397 to $25,639, depending on their housing situation, according to Census. We found that the highest rates of poverty (SPM) were among single parent households (30 percent) and households headed by However, the largest numbers of a person with a disability (29 percent).people below the SPM poverty line were in other types of households. Because program definitions and eligibility requirements vary, these categories may not be used to determine eligibility for programs. Poverty rates were much higher for those who did not work or worked less during the year. Program Recipients’ Income Levels and Household Characteristics Reflected Differences in Program Purpose and Design
An Estimated One-Third of the U.S. Population Received a Low-Income Benefit at Some Time in 2012
An estimated 106 million people, or about one-third of the U.S. population, received benefits from at least one of eight selected federal low-income programs at some point during 2012 (see fig. Program Recipients Were Often in Households with Children and Households with Earnings
Almost two-thirds of the recipients of the eight programs combined were in households with children, including married, cohabiting, and single parent households (see table 6). SNAP and EITC Moved the Most People above Poverty; However, All Selected Programs Had a Majority of Recipients with Incomes above the SPM Threshold after Accounting for Benefits
Each of the eight programs lifted a number of recipients above the SPM threshold, ranging from 340,000 (LIHEAP) to nearly 8.7 million (SNAP) (see fig. Research Suggests Selected Programs Have Generally Encouraged Labor Force Participation and Had Mixed Effects on Hours Worked
The receipt of benefits from means-tested low-income programs (i.e., those with financial eligibility tests for individuals or families) may affect an individual’s willingness to seek and accept employment in two key ways. The EITC, in particular, has increased incentives for people with children to join the labor force, based on our review of studies. Additionally, a worker is not necessarily able to control the number of hours he or she works in response to different marginal tax rates, given constraints in work schedules or other factors such as child care. For example, not all labor supply behavior can be found in data. Research also shows that inherent policy trade-offs exist for means- tested benefit programs attempting to meet multiple objectives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine: (1) what federal programs (including tax expenditures) are targeted to low-income individuals; (2) what are the number and selected household characteristics of people in poverty based on the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM); (3) what are the incomes (as a percent of the SPM) and household characteristics of people receiving benefits from selected programs; and (4) what is known about how selected low-income programs affect work incentives? Specifically, we: reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance; and interviewed agency officials; collected information on 82 federal low-income programs by surveying 13 federal agencies that administer these programs; analyzed 2013 data from Census Bureau’s (Census) Current Population Survey (CPS) to describe low-income households; analyzed 2012 data, the most recent available, from the Transfer Income Model, version 3 (TRIM3) microsimulation model maintained by the Urban Institute to describe recipients of eight large federal low- income programs; and conducted an economic literature review on work incentives and disincentives related to assistance from selected federal low-income programs. These criteria were developed by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which has maintained a list of low-income programs for many years. States may supplement the federal benefit. Nutrition assistance benefits. The Additional Child Tax Credit is the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government provides assistance aimed at helping people with low-incomes who may earn too little to meet their basic needs, cannot support themselves through work, or who are disadvantaged in other ways. With fiscal pressures facing the federal government and the demands placed on aid programs, GAO was asked to examine federal low-income programs.
This report (1) describes federal programs (including tax expenditures) targeted to people with low incomes, (2) identifies the number and selected household characteristics of people in poverty, (3) identifies the number, poverty status, and household characteristics of selected programs' recipients, and (4) examines research on how selected programs may affect incentives to work. For a list of low-income programs that were $100 million in obligations or more in fiscal year 2013, GAO consulted with the Congressional Research Service; surveyed and interviewed officials at relevant federal agencies; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance. GAO also conducted analyses on low-income individuals using Census data on the SPM and official poverty measure and microsimulation data from the Urban Institute that adjusts for under-reporting of benefit receipt in Census survey data. To examine labor force effects, GAO reviewed economic literature. Selected low-income programs were large in dollars and helped meet a range of basic needs.
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report. GAO clarified portions in response to comments from one agency.
What GAO Found
More than 80 federal programs (including 6 tax expenditures) provide aid to people with low incomes, based on GAO's survey of relevant federal agencies. Medicaid (the largest by far), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) comprised almost two-thirds of fiscal year 2013 federal obligations of $742 billion for these programs. Aid is most often targeted to groups of the low-income population, such as people with disabilities and workers with children. Survey responses showed that criteria used to determine eligibility vary greatly; most common were variants of the federal poverty guidelines, based on the Census Bureau's official poverty measure.
In 2013, 48.7 million people (15.5 percent), including many households with children, lived in poverty in the United States, based on Census's Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). This measure takes into account certain expenses and federal and state government benefits not included in the official poverty measure. The SPM is not used to determine program eligibility; however, it does provide more information than the official measure on household resources available to meet living expenses. In 2013, the SPM poverty threshold ranged from $21,397 to $25,639 for a family of four, depending on housing situations. Based on six mutually exclusive household types GAO developed, individuals in a household headed by a person with a disability or a single parent had the highest rates of poverty using the SPM, while childless or married parent households had larger numbers of people in poverty using the SPM.
In 2012, the most recent year of data available, GAO estimated that 106 million people, or one-third of the U.S. population, received benefits from at least one or more of eight selected federal low-income programs: Additional Child Tax Credit, EITC, SNAP, SSI, and four others. Almost two-thirds of the eight programs' recipients were in households with children, including many married families. More than 80 percent of recipients also lived in households with some earned income during the year. Without these programs' benefits, GAO estimated that 25 million of these recipients would have been below the SPM poverty threshold. Of the eight programs, EITC and SNAP moved the most people out of poverty, however, the majority of recipients of each of the programs were estimated to have incomes above the SPM threshold, after accounting for receipt of benefits.
Research suggests that assistance from selected means-tested low-income programs can encourage people's participation in the labor force, but have mixed effects on the number of hours they work. Changes in certain low-income programs through the years, including the EITC, have enhanced incentives for people to join the labor force, according to studies. While workers who receive means-tested benefits face benefit reductions as their earnings rise, research shows that various factors limit how much people change their work behavior in response. For example, people may not be aware of such changing interactions in a complex tax and benefit system or be able to control the number of hours they work, according to studies. Research also shows that enhancing work incentives can create difficult policy trade-offs, including raising program costs or failing to provide adequate assistance to those in need. |
gao_NSIAD-96-201 | gao_NSIAD-96-201_0 | Although still evolving, Army plans for allocating some workloads from realigned depots to remaining depots will likely achieve some excess capacity reduction and savings at two activities. However, in the context of the Army’s overall depot maintenance operations, there are opportunities for achieving greater efficiencies and cost-effectiveness. Consequently, these plans do not appear to be cost-effective. Additionally, since private-sector contractors also have significant excess capacity in existing manufacturing and repair facilities, privatization-in-place at either the Letterkenny or Red River depot would also aggravate excess capacity conditions in the private sector. Army Privatization Plans Without Further Downsizing May Not Be Cost-Effective
The Army maintains that its tentative privatization plans will be more cost-effective than transferring workloads to one of the remaining DOD depots. Excess Depot Capacity Will Remain in Army Depot System
Despite movement of some workloads to remaining Army depots, implementation of the BRAC Commission’s recommendations, as reflected in DOD’s report to Congress, will likely result in excess capacity at the four remaining government-owned and operated depots, increasing from 42 percent to 46 percent. This increase is caused by a number of factors, including (1) a forecasted decrease in future year depot-level maintenance workload; (2) the Army’s tentative decision to establish a GOCO facility at Letterkenny for tactical missile and Paladin combat vehicle work rather than transfer the work to another DOD depot; (3) the BRAC recommendation, for readiness reasons, to downsize, rather than close, the Red River depot; and (4) the Defense Depot Maintenance Council’s decision supporting the Air Force’s plan to delay transfer of the ground communications-electronics workload from the Sacramento Air Logistics Center to the Tobyhanna Army Depot until the year 2001. This table does not reflect the Army’s tentative workload transfer and privatization plans. Major Excess Capacity Reductions Through Joint Public-Private Ventures Are Uncertain
In April 1996, we testified that privatizing DOD depot maintenance activities, if not effectively managed, including the downsizing of remaining depot infrastructure, will exacerbate existing excess capacity problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underuse of depot maintenance capacity. While these initiatives have some potential, it is doubtful whether they will significantly reduce excess capacity in the Army. 2469 provides that DOD-performed maintenance and repair workloads valued at not less than $3 million cannot be changed to performance by another DOD activity without the use of “merit-based selection procedures for competitions” among all DOD depots and that such workloads cannot be changed to contractor performance without the use of “competitive procedures for competitions among private and public sector entities.”
While each statute has some impact on the allocation of DOD’s depot-level workload, 10 U.S.C. Use competitive procedures, where applicable, to assure the cost-effectiveness of privatizing Army depot maintenance workloads. For DOD compliance with statutory requirements, we identified the applicable requirements and determined their impact on DOD’s plans to privatize depot-level maintenance workloads. 8, 1996). 5, 1996). 17, 1995). 12, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's plans to reallocate depot maintenance workloads from depots recommended for closure or realignment by the Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, focusing on the: (1) impact on excess depot capacity and operating costs at the remaining defense depots; (2) cost-effectiveness of planned privatization options; and (3) Army's compliance with statutory requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) deciding the future of the Department of Defense (DOD) depot system is difficult; (2) depot maintenance privatization should be approached carefully, allowing for evaluation of economic, readiness, and statutory requirements that surround individual workloads; (3) privatizing depot maintenance activities, if not effectively managed, including the downsizing of remaining DOD depot infrastructure, could exacerbate existing capacity problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underuse of depot maintenance capacity; (4) privatization-in-place does not appear to be cost-effective given the excess capacity in DOD's depot maintenance system and the private sector; (5) tentative plans to transfer some workloads from realigned depots to remaining depots should improve capacity use and lower operating costs to some extent, but they will not resolve the Army's extensive excess depot capacity problems; (6) since the Army is not effectively downsizing its remaining depot maintenance infrastructure, privatization initiatives outlined in DOD's March 1996 workload analysis report to Congress will increase excess capacity in Army depots from 42 percent to 46 percent and increase Army depot maintenance costs; (7) privatizing-in-place will also aggravate excess capacity conditions in the private sector; (8) it is not clear how the Army intends to comply with statutory requirements such as 10 U.S.C. 2469, which requires the use of competitive procedures before privatizing depot maintenance workloads valued at not less than $3 million; (9) the Army's plans for reallocating depot workloads are still evolving; (10) the Army has not demonstrated that depot privatization initiatives relating to the 1995 depot closure and realignment decisions are cost-effective; (11) the Army's use of a privatization savings assumption of 20 percent is not supported; (12) in the absence of further downsizing, opportunities exist to significantly reduce Army depot maintenance costs by transferring, rather than privatizing-in-place, workloads from closing and downsizing depots; and (13) workload transfers will improve utilization and decrease costs of operations at remaining facilities. |
gao_GAO-15-520 | gao_GAO-15-520_0 | BLM’s National Renewable Energy Coordination Office oversees wind and solar development on federal land. However, the agency has issued a proposed rule that would, among other things, establish consistent requirements for the bonding of the two types of projects. Specifically, in contrast to the wind policy, the solar policy sets no minimum bond amount for solar energy development rights-of-way. BLM Has About $100 Million in Bonds for Wind and Solar Projects, but the Systems for Tracking These Bonds Are Not Reliable
BLM has about $100 million in bonds—primarily in the form of letters of credit and surety bonds—for the reclamation of wind and solar rights-of- way on federal land. Because information in these two data systems was missing, inaccurate, or out of date, BLM has limited assurance that either system is reliable for tracking wind and solar bonds to ensure that bonding policies are being followed and that all projects have the required bonds. BLM also implemented this recommendation. BLM has taken some limited steps to improve its bonding data. Specifically, we found that 14 wind and solar development rights-of-way were underbonded by as much as $15 million in total. Since BLM accepted a bond amount that was lower than the $10,000-per- turbine minimum, BLM officials acknowledged that BLM was put at financial risk. Without accurate documentation that clearly shows how the bond decision was made, officials have limited assurance that the bonds in place will be adequate to cover reclamation costs if the right-of-way holder does not meet their obligations. BLM Does Not Consistently Follow Its Policy for Periodic Reviews of Bond Amounts
BLM inconsistently adheres to its policies for the periodic review of wind and solar bonds to verify their adequacy. Specifically, BLM has no policies in place to ensure that wind and solar bond instruments are properly handled and stored, and in one office, a staff member told us that someone mistakenly shredded some bonds. For two-thirds of the wind projects we reviewed, there was little or no documentation to support the bond amount. BLM does not have policies that require bond decisions to be documented in the project files. Specifically, we found instances in both systems where information was missing, inaccurate, or had not been updated. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that bonds are adequate to cover reclamation costs for wind and solar projects on federal land, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Bureau of Land Management to take the following five actions: develop detailed policies for processing wind and solar bonds to ensure bonds are properly secured, handled, and stored; develop policies that detail how information related to bonding decisions should be documented in project files; develop a policy that all data for wind and solar energy projects be entered in LR2000 and the Bond and Surety System within 10 business days; establish data standards for the Bond and Surety System; and develop an LR2000 action code to automatically notify BLM staff that a right-of-way is due for a bond adequacy review. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) policies for the bonding of wind and solar projects on federal land; (2) the amount and types of bonds held by BLM for the reclamation of wind and solar projects, and how BLM tracks these bonds; and (3) the extent to which BLM ensures that bonds for wind and solar rights-of-way are adequate to cover reclamation costs. To determine the extent to which BLM ensures that bonds for wind and solar rights-of-way are adequate to cover reclamation costs, we conducted an in-depth file review of all 45 wind and solar energy development project rights-of-way (33 wind and 12 solar) authorized, and for which BLM held a bond, as of April 15, 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Renewable energy projects can affect thousands of acres of federal land and involve significant infrastructure. BLM directs renewable energy developers to obtain bonds to cover the costs of returning the land to its pre-developed condition when the project terminates, a process called reclamation. Reclamation can cost millions and take years to complete.
GAO was asked to review the bonding policies for renewable energy projects on federal land. This report examines (1) BLM's policies for the bonding of wind and solar projects on federal land; (2) the amount and types of bonds held by BLM for the reclamation of these projects, and how BLM tracks the bonds; and (3) the extent to which BLM ensures that bonds for wind and solar rights-of-way are adequate to cover reclamation costs. GAO conducted a file review of all 45 wind and solar development project rights-of-way with a bond as of April 15, 2014; analyzed data from BLM data systems; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and BLM policies and procedures; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has different policies for the bonding of wind and solar projects on federal land. For example, BLM's 2008 wind policy established minimum bond amounts, but BLM's 2010 solar policy set no minimum. However, the agency has issued a proposed rule that would establish consistent requirements for the bonding of the two types of projects in several areas, including minimum bond amounts.
BLM has about $100 million in bonds for the reclamation of wind and solar projects on federal land. These bonds are primarily letters of credit and surety bonds. BLM has two data systems for tracking bonds, but GAO found that neither system is reliable for this purpose. Specifically, GAO found instances in both systems where information was missing or inaccurate, or had not been updated. The agency does not have a timeliness standard for wind and solar data entry, contrary to having such a standard for its mining program. Without accurate or complete information, BLM has limited assurance that its data systems are reliable for tracking wind and solar bonds to ensure that bonding policies are being followed and that projects have the required bonds.
BLM has limited assurance that bonds for wind and solar rights-of-way will cover reclamation costs, leaving the federal government potentially at financial risk if developers do not complete reclamation. GAO found about one-third of the wind and solar rights-of-way were underbonded by as much as $15 million in total. Also, BLM did not clearly document how it made its bond decisions, contrary to government standards that call for documentation of significant events. Specifically, GAO found that for about two-thirds of the wind rights-of-way, there was little or no documentation to support the bond amount. In addition, BLM does not adequately ensure that wind and solar bond instruments are properly secured, handled, and stored and does not have policies related to this. In one BLM field office, a staff member told GAO that someone mistakenly shredded several bonds. BLM also does not consistently adhere to its policies calling for periodic review of wind and solar bond amounts to verify their adequacy. GAO found about half of the bonds were at least 4 months overdue for review. BLM officials acknowledged that automatic notifications could be established in their data system as to when reviews are due. Without policies to document decisions and properly secure bonds, and steps to ensure bond adequacy reviews, BLM has limited assurance that bonds in place will be adequate to cover reclamation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that BLM develop policies on documenting bonding decisions, the proper handling and storage of bonds, and timely data entry. GAO also recommends that BLM take steps to ensure projects are periodically reviewed to ensure bond adequacy. Interior generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-823 | gao_GAO-05-823_0 | Although no U.S. emissions requirements apply to these plants, Sempra and Intergen required a presidential permit to construct and connect the new transmission lines needed at the U.S.-Mexican border to export electricity into the United States. Emissions from the Mexicali Plants Are Comparable to New Plants in California, but Offset Requirements Would Apply in Imperial County
The emissions from the Sempra and Intergen power plants in Mexicali are comparable to emissions from similar plants recently permitted in California and are low relative to emissions from the primary sources of pollution in Imperial County, which are various forms of dust and motor vehicles. However, if the plants were located in Imperial County, they would be required, among other things, to offset their emissions by reducing emissions from other pollution sources in the region. Emissions Generated by the Sempra and Intergen Power Plants May Contribute to Various Adverse Health Impacts in Imperial County, but the Extent of Such Impacts Is Unknown
Emissions from the Sempra and Intergen power plants may contribute to adverse health impacts in Imperial County, but the extent of those impacts is unknown for several reasons. DOE Did Not Analyze All the Likely Asthma-Related and Other Health Impacts of Increased Pollution from the Sempra and Intergen Power Plants
calculated that emissions from the power plants would be expected to increase asthma hospitalizations in the county by less than one case per year. In addition, the DOE study did not address the extent to which increased emissions of particulate matter would cause other adverse health impacts, such as other respiratory or cardiovascular problems. However, if the modeling is not accurate, then the health impacts could be larger than DOE estimated. Because these data were not available, DOE used surrogate values from Phoenix, Arizona. In addition, relevant agreements among the United States, Canada, and Mexico may not provide adequate mechanisms to address adverse health impacts resulting from emissions from these plants. While this action would have benefits to air quality and health, it would also have costs, such as possibly reducing energy supplies available to southern California. Finally, another potential option is the development of a binational clean air trust fund that could provide grants and loans to support projects that would improve the air quality of U.S. and Mexican cities that share air basins in the border region. Nevertheless, the plants emit some pollutants into an air basin that already does not meet some air quality standards and is home to many asthmatic children and a low-income population that may be particularly susceptible to adverse health consequences from any level of pollution increase. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) how emissions from the Sempra and Intergen power plants compare to emissions from recently permitted plants in California and emissions from sources in Imperial County, and what emissions standards the plants would be subject to if they were located in Imperial County; (2) the health impacts of emissions from the power plants on Imperial County residents; and (3) what options exist for U.S. policymakers to ensure that emissions from these power plants do not adversely affect the health of Imperial County residents. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Power plants emit pollutants that have been linked to various negative health effects. In 2003, two new power plants, owned by Sempra Energy and Intergen, began operations 3 miles south of the U.S.-Mexico border near Imperial County, California. The county does not meet some federal and state air quality standards and may be further impacted by the emissions from these plants. Although these plants export most of the electricity they produce to the United States, they are not currently required to meet any U.S. or California emissions standards. GAO was asked to determine (1) how emissions from the two plants compare with emissions from recently permitted plants in California and emissions from sources in Imperial County, and what emissions standards they would be subject to if they were located in Imperial County; (2) the health impacts of emissions from the plants on Imperial County residents; and (3) options available to U.S. policymakers to ensure that emissions from these plants do not adversely affect the health of Imperial County residents. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE disagreed with our characterization of the limitations of their assessment of the health impact of pollution from the Sempra and Intergen power plants. We believe we have portrayed the limitations of this assessment accurately.
What GAO Found
The estimated emissions from the Sempra and Intergen power plants near Mexicali are comparable with similar plants recently permitted in California and are low relative to emissions from the primary sources of pollution in Imperial County, California, which are dust and vehicles. However, if the plants were located in Imperial County, they would be required to take steps to improve air quality by reducing emissions from other pollution sources in the region, such as paving dirt roads, because the county is not meeting certain U.S. air quality standards. Although emissions generated from the Sempra and Intergen plants may contribute to various adverse health impacts in Imperial County, the extent of such impacts is unknown. The Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that emissions from these plants may increase asthma hospitalizations by less than one per year. However, DOE did not quantify any other asthma-related impacts, such as emergency room visits or increased use of medications, which, although less severe, are likely to occur more often. In addition, DOE did not determine whether increased emissions would cause other respiratory or cardiovascular problems and the impact of particulate matter on particularly susceptible populations. Finally, the potential health impacts associated with ozone could be greater than DOE estimated because some important data needed for modeling were not available. Existing laws and international agreements may not provide adequate mechanisms to address adverse health impacts resulting from power plant emissions. Policymakers could take some actions, such as requiring plants that seek to export electricity to the United States to use specified emission controls. While this action would have benefits, it would also have costs, such as possibly reducing energy supplies available to Southern California. Long-term policy options include the development of a binational pollution reduction program or a trust fund to provide grants and loans to support air quality improvement projects. However, substantial efforts on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border would be required to establish the legal and management framework necessary for such programs to be effective. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-302 | gao_T-AIMD-98-302_0 | The department currently maintains 11 major systems for administering student financial aid programs. Education’s Year 2000 Program Started Very Slowly
Education was very slow to establish a comprehensive, timely Year 2000 program. The fourth manager, during his 4-month tenure, initiated many awareness and assessment activities. Education Has Recently Accelerated Its Progress
With its slow start, Education has been playing catch up and working to accelerate its progress. Key Issues Remain That Threaten Education’s Delivery of Student Financial Aid
While there has been recent progress, the Department of Education must mitigate critical risks that affect its ability to award and track billions of dollars in student financial aid. Education officials stated that they are working on these plans and intend to have them completed shortly, pending discussion with the student financial aid community. Business Continuity and Contingency Planning: A Necessary Safety Net
Given the challenges Education faces in making sure that all of its mission-critical systems are adequately tested and in addressing the complexities of the massive number of data exchanges, it will be difficult for the department to enter the new century without some problems. Therefore, it is critical that Education initiate the development of realistic contingency plans to ensure continuity of core business processes in the event of Year 2000-induced failures. According to department officials, Education is committed to developing business continuity and contingency plans for each mission-critical business process and supporting systems. While the department has made progress in preparing its systems for the year 2000, initial delays have left it with significant risks—risks that must be effectively managed. Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52, February 27, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed year 2000 (Y2K) computing crisis risks to the Department of Education, focusing on: (1) student financial aid systems; (2) actions the department has taken in recent months to address these risks; and (3) key issues the department must deal with if its systems are to be ready for the century change: testing of systems, exchanging data with internal and external partners, and developing business continuity and contingency plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Education faces major risks that Y2K failures could severely disrupt the student financial aid delivery process, including delaying disbursements and application processing; (2) further, because of systems interdependencies, repercussions from Y2K-related problems could be felt throughout the student financial aid community--a network including students, institutions of higher educations, financial organizations, and other government agencies; (3) the department was very slow in implementing a comprehensive Y2K program to address these risks--basic awareness and assessment tasks were not completed until recently; (4) Education is now accelerating its program, but with the slow start, it remains in a position of playing catch up; (5) accordingly, the department has major challenges ahead but limited time remaining to adequately deal with them; and (6) therefore, it must also focus on developing appropriate contingency plans to ensure business continuity in the event of key systems failures. |
gao_GAO-12-779 | gao_GAO-12-779_0 | It is maintained by GSA on behalf of the FRPC, although FRPC controls access to the data. Owned and Leased Space
GSA and USPS are the largest civilian holders of federally owned property. 1.) Underutilized Owned Federal Space Exists, but Size, Location, and Condition Affect Colocation Potential
Underutilized Owned Space
The federal government owns facilities that are underutilized in locations where it also leases space for different purposes. This is particularly true for USPS, as declining mail volume and changes in operations have freed space in many owned facilities. 2.) In some cases, spaces within these underutilized owned properties could be used by other government agencies. Federal officials also said that, under certain circumstances, colocation could result in cost savings or avoidance for the federal government. For example, USPS could share underutilized floor and retail window space with other government agencies, generating revenue to offset some building costs. Greater Inter-Agency Collaboration Could Mitigate Some Challenges to Colocation
Agency officials said that greater collaboration—through strategic partnerships among federal agencies targeted to meet specific needs and a formal local coordination mechanism—could mitigate some administrative, financial and data challenges to colocation. Officials from a few agencies suggested that structured local or regional coordination could best identify opportunities where the missions of various agencies could be “matched” to appropriate space because of local and regional federal officials’ more detailed knowledge of local needs, conditions, and opportunities. For example, GSA, as the federal government’s property manager, already possesses the capability to market and price properties and manage leases on a large scale. As such, the scope of FRPC’s mission does not include managing the local-level negotiations that colocation would require. However, various officials noted that the lack of a systematic mechanism to share information hinders any efforts to colocate. GSA officials said that local councils were an effective method for sharing information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote colocation across agencies, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should work with the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to implement GAO’s three recommendations: Establish a mechanism, which includes USPS, for local coordination in markets with large concentrations of federal agencies to identify, on a case by case basis, specific opportunities to share space and improve coordination of real property use across agencies. Develop strategic partnerships and a coordinated strategy with assigned roles and tasks between the General Services Administration (GSA) and other federal landholding agencies (USPS specifically) with less experience sharing real property. To accomplish this, we addressed (1) if the potential for cross-agency colocation exists, what factors can affect that potential; (2) the potential benefits of colocation; and (3) the challenges associated with colocation, and what solutions, if any, can mitigate these challenges. We also reviewed relevant GAO and other reports and documents, including USPS Office of Inspector General reports, and laws, regulations, and guidance. § 3125a note The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to establish a pilot program and lease nonexcess real property at the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center and the National Agricultural Library to any individual or entity, including agencies or instrumentalities of State or local governments, if the Secretary determines that the lease is consistent with, and will not adversely affect, the mission of the agency administering the property; will enhance the use of the property; will not permit any portion of the property or facility to be used for the public retail or wholesale sale of merchandise or residential development; will not permit the construction or modification of facilities financed by nonfederal sources to be used by an agency, except for incidental use; and will not include any property or facility required for any agency purpose without prior consideration of the needs of the agency. Related GAO Products
Federal Real Property: National Strategy and Better Data Needed to Improve Management of Excess and Underutilized Property. Federal Real Property: Overreliance on Leasing Contributed to High-Risk Designation. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated the federal governments management of its nearly 400,000 real property assets as high-risk in part because of overreliance on leasing and the retention of excess facilities. Real property management is coordinated nationally by the FRPCan association of landholding agencies chaired by the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). To explore the potential to reduce leasing by better utilizing owned properties, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the potential for collocation and the factors that can affect that potential, (2) the possible benefits of collocation, and (3) the challenges associated with collocation, and what solutions, if ny, can mitigate these challenges. GAO reviewed property data and documents from eight of the largest propertyholding agencies; laws, regulations and guidance; and prior GAO reports. GAO also analyzed eight case study markets of varying size and federal agency presence, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The federal government owns facilities that are underutilized in locations where it also leases space. In some cases, space within these government-owned properties could be occupied by other government agencies. This is particularly true for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), for which declining mail volume and operational changes have freed space in many facilities. However, this potential for collocation of federal agencies is affected by such factors as the size, location, and condition of the available space.
Officials from various agencies said that, in some cases, collocation could result in more efficient service delivery and cost savings or avoidance. For example, underutilized USPS floor and retail window space could be used by other federal agencies, generating space-use efficiencies for USPS and expanding citizen access to government services. Collocation could also help achieve agency synergies, such as shared technology infrastructure.
Agency officials said that strategic partnerships among federal agencies targeted to meet specific needs and a formal local coordination mechanism could mitigate certain challenges to collocation, including administrative and data challenges. Agencies have varying authorities to share available space in their properties and differing capabilities to handle the administrative tasks associated with sharing space. The General Services Administration (GSA), as the federal governments property manager, possesses the capability and experience to market properties and manage leases on a large scale. Officials from other agencies suggested that partnerships with GSA or a private entity could address some administrative challenges and improve collocation efforts. However, the ability to identify collocation opportunities is hindered by the lack of a formal information-sharing mechanism. The Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) is a national, policyoriented body and, as such, does not manage the local-level negotiations that collocation would require. The FRPC established a database describing all executive branch properties, but it was not designed to identify and manage collocation opportunities, nor does it include USPS data. In contrast, local federal officials indicated that they possess detailed knowledge of specific properties owned by their respective agencies and, with more structured local coordination, could share that knowledge to support collocation efforts. GSA officials said that local councils were an effective method for sharing information
What GAO Recommends
OMB should work with FRPC and USPS to, among other things, (1) lead the creation of strategic partnerships between GSA and other property-owning federal agencies with less experience sharing real property, and (2) establish a mechanism (including USPS) for local coordination to improve coordination and identify specific opportunities to share space. OMB, GSA, and USPS generally agreed with the recommendations. The details of agencies comments and GAOs response are addressed more fully within the report. |
gao_RCED-96-216 | gao_RCED-96-216_0 | Stockpile Surveillance Tests Are Behind Schedule
DOE is currently behind schedule in conducting some flight tests, nonnuclear systems laboratory tests, and nuclear and nonnuclear components laboratory tests. These schedule slippages are the result of a variety of factors, including an unapproved safety study, suspension of testing at some facilities, and the transfer of testing functions to new facilities. According to DOE officials, in November 1992, DOE reduced its plan for testing Air Force InterContinental Ballistic Missiles from three tests per year to two—or eight tests over a 4-year period. DOE’s Ability to Conduct Some Future Tests Is Uncertain
DOE has taken actions to increase the number of stockpile surveillance tests but has not prepared detailed plans for returning the stockpile surveillance program to its schedule. To get nonnuclear laboratory systems tests on schedule, DOE plans to consolidate 3 years of testing into 2 years. However, DOE does not have formal contingency plans for continuation of stockpile surveillance tests in the event that one or more of the testing facilities experienced serious operational problems and could not perform testing for an extended period of time. Most recently, as discussed previously, Y12 was unable to conduct surveillance tests because of procedural safety problems. DOE has a draft report that discusses alternate locations for conducting weapons-related activities. Depending on the nature of the problem at the original facility, the length and nature of the outage, and the specific weapon(s) involved, DOE would determine the best course of action. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Surveillance program, focusing on DOE efforts to get the testing program on schedule.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE is behind schedule in conducting flight tests, nonnuclear system laboratory tests, and nuclear and nonnuclear component laboratory tests; (2) these schedule slippages are a result of unapproved safety studies, suspended testing at certain nuclear facilities, and inappropriate transfer of testing functions; (3) DOE has reduced its plan for testing the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles from three tests per year to two tests per year; (4) flight testing of W88 warheads is suspended until a safety study plan is approved; (5) DOE has taken actions to increase the number of stockpile surveillance tests, but DOE does not have formal contingency plans for continuous stockpile testing; (6) one DOE facility is unable to conduct surveillance tests due to procedural safety problems; (7) DOE uses the Stockpile Management Preferred Alternative Report to determine alternative locations for weapons testing depending on the nature of the problem at the original testing facility, length and time of the outage, and particular weapon involved; and (8) DOE prefers to develop a specific plan of action after testing problems occur to confront the wide range of problems and variables involved in the surveillance testing process. |
gao_GAO-02-736 | gao_GAO-02-736_0 | In 1988, the Congress enacted the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act. The Committee Investigates in Only Limited Circumstances
The Committee has initiated investigations under only limited circumstances, namely, when it could not identify potential mitigation measures in the review period that would resolve national security issues arising from the acquisitions or when it needed more time than the 30-day review period to complete its work and the companies involved were not willing to request withdrawal of their notification. Provisions to assist agencies in monitoring agreements were also lacking. The objective of the case reviews was to understand and document the Committee’s process for reviewing foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies. Exon-Florio authorized the President to investigate the impact of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies on national security and to suspend or prohibit an acquisition if credible evidence exists that a foreign controlling interest may threaten national security and no legislation, other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, can adequately protect national security. The President delegated the authority to conduct investigations under Exon-Florio to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. 2. 3. | What GAO Found
The Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of U.S. companies if (1) there is credible evidence that a foreign controlling interest might threaten national security and (2) legislation, other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, does not adequately or appropriately protect national security. The President delegated the authority to review foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies to an interagency group, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The Committee initiates investigations only when it cannot identify potential mitigation measures in the review period to resolve national security issues arising from the acquisitions or when it needs time beyond the 30-day review to negotiate potential mitigation measures and the companies involved are not willing to request withdrawal of their notification. The Committee's process for implementing Exon-Florio contains the following weaknesses that may have limited effectiveness: (1) the Committee has not established interim protections before allowing withdrawal when concerns were raised and the acquisition had already been completed (2) agreements between the Committee and companies contained nonspecific language that may make them difficult to implement and (3) agreements did not specify responsibility for overseeing implementation and contained few provisions to assist in monitoring compliance. |
gao_GAO-02-863T | gao_GAO-02-863T_0 | However, we found that the Army's delinquency rate is higher than any other DOD component or executive branch agency in the federal government. Potentially Fraudulent and Abusive Travel Card Activity
Our work also identified numerous instances of potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card. We found that during fiscal year 2001 at least 200 Army employees wrote three or more nonsufficient funds (NSF) or “bounced” checks to Bank of America as payment for their travel card bills—a potentially fraudulent act. Abusive Travel Card Activity Not Effectively Linked to Disciplinary Action and Security Clearances
We found little evidence of documented disciplinary action against Army personnel who misused the card, or that Army travel program managers or supervisors were even aware that Army personnel were using their travel cards for personal use. Key Internal Control Breakdowns
For fiscal year 2001, the Army had significant breakdowns in key internal controls over individually billed travel cards. The breakdowns stemmed from a weak overall control environment, flawed policies and procedures, and a lack of adherence to valid policies and procedures. These breakdowns contributed to the significant delinquencies and charge-offs of Army employee account balances and potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel cards. Corrective Actions
DOD has taken a number of actions focused on reducing delinquencies. As a result of these actions, Army experienced a significant drop in charged-off accounts in the first half of fiscal year 2002. | What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2001, the Army had 430,000 individually billed travel card accounts, and about $619 million in related charges. Most Army cardholders properly used their travel cards and promptly paid amounts owed. However, the Army's delinquency rate is higher than any other Department of Defense (DOD) component or executive branch agency. GAO also identified numerous instances of potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel cards. During fiscal year 2001, at least 200 Army employees wrote three or more nonsufficient funds or "bounced" checks to Bank of America as payment for their travel bills--potentially fraudulent acts. GAO found little evidence of documented disciplinary action against Army personnel who misused the card, or that Army travel program managers or supervisors were even aware that travel cards were being used for personal use. For fiscal year 2001, the Army had significant breakdowns in key internal controls over individually billed travel cards that stemmed from a weak overall environment, flawed policies and procedures, and a lack of adherence to valid policies and procedures. These breakdowns contributed to the significant delinquencies and charge-offs of Army employee account balances and potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel cards. DOD has taken a number of actions focused on reducing delinquencies. As a result of these actions, Army experienced a significant drop in charged-off accounts in the first half of fiscal year 2002. |
gao_GAO-02-339 | gao_GAO-02-339_0 | In 11 states, laws require that individuals with mental disorders or other health conditions be guaranteed access to coverage, regardless of health status. In the remaining 3 states only certain carriers, such as health maintenance organizations (HMO) or Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, guarantee access to coverage to all applicants. In 9 of the 11 states in which carriers are required to guarantee access to individual market coverage, carriers must also limit the extent to which premium rates vary between healthy and unhealthy applicants and thereby improve the affordability of coverage for high-risk individuals. In Other States, Applicants with Mental Disorders May be More Likely to be Denied Coverage
In the 34 states where individual market carriers are not required to guarantee access to coverage, carriers may deny coverage to any high-risk applicant, but may be more likely to deny coverage to those with mental disorders than other chronic health problems. In addition, carriers’ underwriting practices relating to applicants with a history of treatment for mental disorders can vary considerably. For 52 percent of the 42 underwriting decisions related to applicants with the selected mental disorders, the carriers in our study indicated that they would likely decline the applicants. High-risk pool coverage typically costs 125 to 200 percent of standard rates for healthy individuals, and the risk pools’ mental health benefits are generally comparable to those available in the individual market, including more restrictions on mental health benefits than other benefits. Health benefits contained in state high-risk pool plans are generally comparable to those available in the individual market; however, benefits for mental disorders or other health conditions are not permanently excluded as they can be in the individual insurance market. States generally subsidize their pools through various funding sources, including surcharges on private health insurance premiums (individual and group) and state general revenue funds. | What GAO Found
Five percent of adults suffer from serious mental disorders. Although health insurance carriers in a few states guarantee coverage for mental health treatment, in most states individuals with mental disorders face restrictions in purchasing private health insurance for themselves and their families. Eleven states require carriers to accept all applicants regardless of health status, but coverage options vary. Eight of these 11 states require all carriers to guarantee access to coverage sold in this market. In three states, laws apply only to some carriers, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield, or certain periods of the year. Carriers in nine of the 11 states are also required to limit the extent to which premium rates vary between healthy and unhealthy individuals. In states without guaranteed coverage in the individual market, the seven carriers GAO reviewed would likely deny coverage more frequently for applicants with mental disorders than for applicants with other chronic health conditions. Specifically, for six mental disorders of generally moderate severity, carriers said that they would likely decline applicants 52 percent of the time. State-sponsored high-risk pools are the primary coverage option available to rejected applicants in most states. In 27 of the 34 states where carriers may deny coverage to applicants with mental disorders or other health conditions, high-risk pools offer coverage to applicants denied individual market coverage. The pools are subsidized--generally through assessments on carriers or state tax revenues--and premium rates are generally capped at 125 to 200 percent of standard rates for healthy individuals. Health benefits available under the pools are generally comparable to those available in the individual market, including similar restrictions on mental health benefits; however, benefits for mental disorders or other health conditions are not permanently excluded as they may be in the individual insurance market. |
gao_GGD-99-54 | gao_GGD-99-54_0 | Also, as mentioned earlier, Senate Report 105-251 (July 1998) on the Treasury and General Government Appropriations bill for fiscal year 1999 directs the Commissioner of Customs to enter into negotiations with the private sector to conduct a field test of PFNA technology at no cost to the federal government. Status of Plans for a PFNA Field Test
Customs, DOD, and FAA are making plans to comply with their respective congressional guidance on PFNA. Specifically, Ancore proposed that a 4-month Customs/DOD field test be conducted at a U.S. sea or land port of entry, at an estimated cost ranging from $5 million to $5.5 million, including the cost of a site facility. In this regard, recognizing the no- federal-cost language of Senate Report 105-251, in February 1999, Customs officials told us that they were working closely with applicable congressional committees and subcommittees. Further, the FAA official said that, if a three-agency field test is conducted, most of FAA’s funds would be used for engineering modifications to PFNA components to allow the system to detect small amounts of target materials. These sites are two seaports in California (Long Beach and Oakland) and two land ports in El Paso, Texas. Differing Views on the Operational Viability of a PFNA System
There is general agreement that PFNA’s technical feasibility has been proven in the laboratory. However, citing cost, size, and other operational concerns, the three prospective users—Customs, DOD, and FAA—do not foresee using a PFNA system in their missions or operations and, therefore, question the value of further testing. Similarly, the estimated $1 million annual cost per system for operations and maintenance is excessive. ONDCP officials noted that the technology has successfully passed laboratory tests, which proved the physics of neutron interrogation. Any field implementation of the current PFNA system should be in an operational test bed environment.”
ONDCP recommended that a test bed at a port of entry be procured to facilitate gathering data and making a more informed, analytical decision. According to the Director, PFNA warrants field testing to provide a sound basis for decisionmaking. The prospective users—Customs, DOD, and FAA—seriously question whether a PFNA system has operational merit and, thus, also question the need for field testing. Also, Ancore believes a field test of PFNA will demonstrate its operational effectiveness. We received either written or oral comments during the period March 9-15, 1999, from the Director, Applied Technology Division, Office of Information and Technology, the Customs Service; the Assistant for Science and Technology, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts, the Department of Defense; the Scientific Advisor, Office of Civil Aviation Security, the Federal Aviation Administration; the Director, Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, the Office of National Drug Control Policy; and the President/Chief Executive Officer of the Ancore Corporation. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information about (1) the status of plans for field testing a pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) inspection system for counterterrorism and/or counterdrug purposes and (2) federal agency and vendor views on the mission viability of such a system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the operational viability of pulsed fast neutron analysis technology (PFNA), which is designed to directly and automatically detect and measure the presence of specific materials by exposing their constituent chemical elements to short bursts of subatomic particles called neutrons, focusing on: (1) the status of plans for field testing a PFNA inspection system for counterterrorism and counterdrug purposes; and (2) federal agency and vendor views on the operational viability of such a system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Customs Service, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Ancore Corporation recently began planning to field test PFNA; (2) because they are in the early stage of planning, they do not expect the actual field test to begin until mid to late 1999 at the earliest; (3) generally, agency and vendor officials estimate that a field test covering Customs' and DOD's requirements will cost at least $5 million and that the cost could reach $8 million if FAA's requirements are included in the joint test; (4) Customs officials told GAO they are working closely with applicable congressional committees and subcommittees to decide whether Customs can help fund the field test, given that Senate Report 105-251 directs the Commissioner of Customs to enter into negotiations with the private sector to conduct a field test of PFNA technology at no cost to the federal government; (5) generally, a complete field test would include: (a) preparing a test site and constructing an appropriate facility; (b) making any needed modifications to the only existing PFNA system and its components; (c) disassembling, shipping and reassembling the system at the test site; and (d) conducting an operational test for about 4 months; (6) according to agency and Ancore officials, test site candidates are two seaports in California (Long Beach and Oakland) and two land ports in El Paso, Texas; (7) federal agency and vendor views on the operational viability of PFNA vary; (8) while Customs, DOD, and FAA officials acknowledge that laboratory testing has proven the technical feasibility of PFNA, they told GAO that the current Ancore inspection system would not meet their operational requirements; (9) among other concerns, Customs, DOD, and FAA officials said that a PFNA system not only is too expensive (about $10 million to acquire per system) but also is too large for operational use in most ports of entry or other sites; (10) accordingly, these agencies question the value of further testing; (11) Ancore disputes these arguments, believes it can produce an operationally cost-effective system, and is proposing that a PFNA system be tested at a port of entry; and (12) the Office of National Drug Control Policy has characterized neutron interrogation as an emerging or future technology that has shown promise in laboratory testing, and, thus, warrants field testing to provide a more informed basis for deciding if PFNA has operational merit. |
gao_GAO-13-589 | gao_GAO-13-589_0 | Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 required DOD to develop a strategy for improving contractor past performance information to include standards for timeliness and completeness, assigning responsibility and accountability for completing assessments, and ensuring assessments are consistent with award fee evaluations. DOD’s Past Performance Strategy Relies on Workforce Training, Enhanced Oversight, and Existing Guidance
DOD’s strategy to improve reporting of contractor past performance information and respond to section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 is to provide training on past performance to acquisition officials, develop tools and metrics to track compliance and enhance oversight, and continue to rely on the CPARS Guide. Training on Past Performance Requirements
In order to improve compliance with past performance reporting requirements and the quality of assessments, the CPARS program office provides training opportunities and assessment tools for acquisition officials. We did not assess the quality of assessment narratives in this review. Tools and Metrics Allow for Increased Oversight
To increase management oversight of contractor performance assessments, the CPARS program office in 2010, in conjunction with OFPP, developed system tools and metrics within PPIRS to track compliance with the reporting requirements. Officials at DOD components told us that having the ability to track completion of required assessments through PPIRS has greatly improved the ability to effectively oversee and manage compliance, and has also improved accountability for completing assessments. Senior procurement executives at DOD components have required reporting of actions taken by individual contracting activities, set goals for compliance, and encouraged or required training. DOD Increased the Number of Assessments Completed, but Still Faces Challenges in Completing Assessments on Time
PPIRS compliance metrics show the percentage of required assessments completed increased from 56 percent in 2011 to 74 percent in 2013. In addition, the number of assessments completed overall more than doubled from 2010 to 2012. For example, as of April 2013, more than half of federal agencies had no required contractor assessments in PPIRS. DOD officials told us that department-wide acquisition workforce shortages and turnover, as well as difficulty obtaining contractor performance information remain as challenges to completing contractor performance assessments on time. DOD is currently working with the rest of the FAR Council to implement this change. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DOD and OFPP for their review and comment. DOD informed us by email that it concurred with our findings and the information presented in this report and would not be providing written comments. OFPP informed us by email that the office had no comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on contractors to perform a broad array of activities. Having complete, timely, and accurate information on contractor performance is critical so officials responsible for awarding new federal contracts can make informed decisions. Agencies are required to document contractor performance for contracts exceeding certain dollar thresholds.
In 2009, GAO found that contractor past performance information was incomplete, citing low priority and lack of system tools and metrics to track compliance. In 2011, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) reported that DOD assessments often lacked sufficiently detailed narratives. Section 806 of the NDAA for 2012 required DOD to develop a strategy to ensure that contractor performance assessments are complete, timely, and accurate. Section 806 also required GAO to report on DOD's actions and their effectiveness. GAO (1) identified actions taken by DOD to improve the quality and timeliness of past performance information and implement provisions of the act, and (2) assessed the effectiveness of those actions. GAO reviewed DOD policy and guidance, and interviewed DOD and OFPP officials. GAO also reviewed available data on compliance with reporting requirements from 2011-2013 and timeliness data for fiscal years 2010-2012. GAO did not independently assess the quality of assessment narratives.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD concurred with GAO's findings and OFPP had no comments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for improving the reporting of contractor past performance information consists of providing additional training to its acquisition workforce and developing tools and metrics to improve oversight. The number of personnel trained more than doubled since 2010 to more than 7,000, and DOD oversight officials now have the ability to track compliance with reporting requirements down to the level of individual contracting offices. DOD continues to utilize existing past performance guidance, which generally aligns with requirements specified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012.
Compliance metrics show that the submission of required assessments has increased. Specifically, the percentage of required assessments submitted increased from 56 to 74 percent from October 2011 to April 2013. Officials at DOD said the ability to track completion of assessments has greatly improved oversight and accountability. Despite this progress, DOD faces challenges completing assessments on time.
DOD officials attribute the lack of timeliness to acquisition workforce shortages, turnover, and the difficulty in obtaining needed information. DOD is working with other agencies on a regulatory change, consistent with a requirement in the NDAA for 2012, that would reduce the time allowed for contractors to submit comments on draft assessments. This change should help officials submit final assessments on a more timely basis. |
gao_RCED-99-181 | gao_RCED-99-181_0 | Its Board of Directors approved Amtrak’s most recent strategic business plan in October 1998. These adjustments allow us to better compare Amtrak’s net loss and working capital positions over time. 1.) This amount is the largest net loss in the last 10 years. While an increase in depreciation—which reflects the amount of capital equipment that is consumed and must be replaced in future years—increases net loss, Amtrak points out that investments resulting in increased depreciation expenses are expected to have positive effects in the future, such as increasing revenues, reducing costs, and eliminating the need for federal operating support. Working capital measures a corporation’s ability to pay its bills when due. Amtrak’s Prospects for Achieving Operating Self-Sufficency Are Clouded by Uncertainties in Its Business Plan and by Past Performance
Amtrak’s October 1998 strategic business plan does not anticipate that the corporation will use any federal subsidies for operating expenses (other than for excess railroad retirement expenses) in fiscal year 2002—1 year earlier than requested by the administration and specified in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997. 3.) Amtrak estimates that its business plan initiatives will result in net financial improvements of $1.6 billion for fiscal years 1999-2002. Overall, Amtrak projects that if it achieves the financial benefits associated with these initiatives, including 100 percent of the $631 million in financial improvements it projects for fiscal year 2002, it will gradually reduce its reliance on federal operating assistance, and achieve operating self-sufficiency in 2002. Amtrak intends to achieve this net impact primarily through cost savings that it will identify on an ongoing basis. Amtrak has made some initial steps in this area. Federal Funding and Reform Legislation Will Likely Have Little Short-Term Impact on Improving Amtrak’s Overall Financial Condition
Current and planned annual federal funding and reforms contained in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 are likely to have little short-term impact on improving Amtrak’s overall financial condition. This $1 billion represents nearly two-thirds of the $1.6 billion Amtrak expects to receive through annual federal capital appropriations. However, in fiscal year 1999, Amtrak has plans to use $758 million of the $2.2 billion it received through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 for capital improvements in addition to the $558 million its Board of Directors approved for capital investments in fiscal year 1998. On the other hand, if Amtrak is not permitted to continue to use appropriated funds for maintenance, then it would have to look for additional ways to increase revenues and reduce expenses. First, regarding labor protection arrangements, after 10 negotiating sessions, Amtrak and its unions agreed to submit the matter to binding arbitration. Second, Amtrak has a history of not meeting its financial goals, and the current 4-year plan anticipates achieving about 5 times as much in financial improvements as Amtrak was able to achieve through its business plans over the previous 4 years. As a result, in Amtrak’s view, the costs of progressive overhauls would be excluded from the calculation of Amtrak’s progress toward achieving operational self-sufficiency by 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO followed up on its report on Amtrak's financial performance, focusing on: (1) Amtrak's overall financial performance in fiscal year (FY) 1998; (2) the prospects for Amtrak to meet its financial goals for operating self-sufficiency outlined in its most recent strategic business plan; and (3) the extent to which current and anticipated federal funding and recently enacted legislative reforms aimed at helping Amtrak better control its costs are likely to help improve its financial condition.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's overall losses increased in FY 1998 after several years of improvement; (2) in FY 1998, Amtrak's net loss was $930 million, the largest loss in the last 10 years; (3) by comparison, Amtrak's net loss in FY 1997 was $762 million; (4) Amtrak has made progress in reducing its reliance on federal operating support; (5) however, between now and 2002, it needs to achieve about 5 times as much in financial improvements as it has been able to achieve over the past 4 years to reach operational self-sufficiency; (6) Amtrak's strategic business plan, approved by its Board of Directors in October 1998, estimates that ongoing and planned initiatives will result in a cumulative net impact of $1.6 billion from FY 1999 through FY 2002, primarily through increases in revenues as a result of taking business plan actions; (7) however, uncertainty surrounds Amtrak's ability to achieve this net impact and to reach operational self-sufficiency by FY 2002; (8) furthermore, Amtrak's expectations to increase revenues through other initiatives are based on critical assumptions that have yet to be tested in the marketplace; (9) current and anticipated annual federal funding and recently enacted reforms aimed at helping Amtrak better control its costs will likely have little short-term impact on improving its overall financial condition; (10) Amtrak plans to use nearly $1 billion of the $1.6 billion its expects to receive in federal capital appropriations over the next 3 fiscal years for maintenance rather than capital improvements; (11) while maintenance is important for preserving assets and Amtrak's FY 1999 capital appropriation could be used for equipment maintenance, Amtrak's plans to continue to use capital appropriations in this way means it will forgo or delay capital investment projects that could increase future revenues and reduce future costs; (12) however, Amtrak's Board of Directors has approved plans for $1.3 billion of capital improvements from the $2.2 billion made available to it through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997; (13) in addition, while the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 provided Amtrak greater flexibility in its business operations, the reforms provide few financial benefits in the short term; and (14) GAO found this condition continues to exist largely because Amtrak and its unions have not completed negotiations over labor protection arrangements and reforms for contracting out work. |
gao_GAO-02-158 | gao_GAO-02-158_0 | Of the five major federal land management agencies, only the Bureau of Land Management has fully complied with the fire policy requirement that all burnable acres have fire management plans. Agencies Have Not Yet Obtained All of the Additional Fire- Fighting Personnel and Equipment to Meet Needs They Identified
While the agencies don’t have a clear sense of the total resources they need to effectively conduct their fire-fighting activities, the Forest Service and Interior have nonetheless made progress in acquiring more fire- fighting personnel and equipment with the additional funding received under the National Fire Plan. The Forest Service’s performance measure is designed to provide information on the amount of personnel and equipment it has to respond to a fire. They are now working together to develop a common set of wildland fire management performance measures that will be results- oriented, measurable, valid, and connected to the goals contained in the National Fire Plan. Forest Service and Interior Use Different Methods for Reporting Fire- Fighting Personnel Costs
Until the implementation of the National Fire Plan in 2001, both the Forest Service and the Interior agencies used a similar method to account for their fire-fighting personnel costs. The agencies plan to have consistent, results-oriented performance measures in place by fiscal year 2004. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The overall objective of this review was to determine how the federal land management agencies the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior prepare for wildland fires while meeting key objectives of the National Fire Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, fires on federal lands burn millions of acres and federal land management agencies spend hundreds of millions of dollars to fight them. Wildland fires also threaten communities adjacent to federal lands. The Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and the Interior, the lead federal agencies in fighting wildfires, jointly developed a long-term fire-fighting strategy in September 2000. Five federal land management agencies--the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service--are working together to accomplish the plan's objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Forest Service and Interior have not effectively determined the amount of personnel and equipment needed to respond to and suppress wildland fires. Although the agencies have acquired considerably more personnel and equipment than were available in 2000, they have not acquired all of the resources needed to implement the new strategy. Despite having received substantial additional funding, the two agencies have not yet developed performance measures. The Forest Service simply measures the amount of fire-fighting resources it will be able to devote to fire fighting at each location, regardless of risk. Without results-oriented performance measures, it is difficult to hold the Forest Service accountable for the results it achieves. The Forest Service and the Interior agencies use different methods to report fire-fighting personnel costs--an approach that is not in keeping with policies requiring coordination and consistency across all aspects of fire management, including accounting for fire-related costs. |
gao_GAO-04-88 | gao_GAO-04-88_0 | In accordance with the FTR, DOD restricts premium class travel to the following eight circumstances: regularly scheduled flights between origin and destination provide only premium class accommodations, and this is certified on the travel voucher; coach class is not available in time to accomplish the purpose of the official travel, which is so urgent it cannot be postponed; premium class travel is necessary to accommodate the traveler’s disability or other physical impairment, and the condition is substantiated in writing by competent medical authority; premium class travel is needed for security purposes or because exceptional circumstances make its use essential to the successful performance of the mission; coach class accommodations on authorized/approved foreign carriers do not provide adequate sanitation or meet health standards; premium class accommodations would result in overall savings to the government because of subsistence costs, overtime, or lost productive time that would be incurred while awaiting coach class accommodations; transportation is paid in full by a nonfederal source; or travel is to or from a destination outside the continental United States, and the scheduled flight time (including stopovers) is in excess of 14 hours. Extent of Premium Class Travel Is Significant
For fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD spent nearly $124 million on over 68,000 airline tickets containing at least one leg of premium class travel.Since DOD did not maintain centralized data on premium class travel, we extracted this information from Bank of America’s fiscal years 2001 and 2002 databases of DOD centrally billed account travel, which included over 5.3 million transactions for airline tickets valued at over $2.4 billion. The difference between a premium class ticket and a comparable coach class ticket can range from negligible—particularly if the traveler traveled within Europe—to thousands of dollars. We consider travel by high-ranking officials, in particular senior-level executives, to be a sensitive payment area because of its susceptibility to abuse or noncompliance with laws and regulations. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1999)
Significant breakdowns in key internal control activities resulted in a significant level of improper premium class travel and increased DOD travel cost. Specifically, we estimated, based on our statistical sample, that 72 percent of the DOD centrally billed travel transactions containing premium class travel for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were not properly authorized, and 73 percent were not properly justified. GAO’s Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool (GAO-01-1008G, August 2001)
DOD and the services performed no monitoring and oversight activities to obtain assurance that premium class travel was authorized in accordance with regulations. Further, during fiscal years 2001 and 2002, control environment weaknesses exacerbated already weak key internal controls described in the previous section. We also found that DOD did not obtain or maintain centralized data on premium class travel other than first class, that is, business class. They also provide examples of when premium class travel should not be authorized. Provide training to travelers and supervisors/managers that identifies DOD’s premium class policies and procedures. DOD’s oversight and monitoring of the use of premium travel and key elements of the control environment, including the (1) consistency of premium class travel procedures among the services and (2) adequacy of documentation to justify the additional cost of premium class travel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ineffective oversight and management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) travel card program, which GAO has previously reported on, have led to concerns about DOD's use of first and business class airfares. GAO was asked to (1) identify the magnitude of premium class travel, (2) determine if DOD's key internal control activities operated effectively and provide examples of control breakdowns, and (3) assess DOD's monitoring and key elements of the control environment.
What GAO Found
Breakdowns in internal controls and a weak control environment resulted in improper first and business class travel and increased costs to taxpayers. Based on extensive analysis of records obtained from Bank of America, GAO found that DOD spent almost $124 million on about 68,000 premium class related tickets--primarily business class--during fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Each premium class ticket costs the government up to thousands of dollars more than a comparable coach class ticket. GAO's work also indicated that civilian supervisors, managers, and executives and senior military officers accounted for almost 50 percent of the premium class transactions, and for 27 of the 28 most frequent premium class travelers. GAO considers travel by high-ranking officials to be a sensitive payment area because of its susceptibility to abuse. Breakdowns in key internal controls resulted in a significant level of improper premium class travel. GAO estimated that 72 percent of DOD's fiscal year 2001 and 2002 premium class travel was not properly authorized, and 73 percent was not properly justified. Further, DOD did not have accurate and complete data on the extent of premium class travel and performed little or no monitoring of this travel. In regard to the control environment, GAO found that DOD (1) issued policies that were inconsistent with General Service Administration governmentwide travel regulations, (2) did not require military services to issue and update premium class policies to implement DOD's travel regulations consistently, and (3) did not issue guidance on how to document the authorization and justification of premium class travel. As a result of GAO's audit, DOD has begun updating its travel regulations to more clearly state when premium class travel can be authorized and to emphasize that it must only be used when exceptional circumstances warrant the additional cost. |
gao_GAO-09-723 | gao_GAO-09-723_0 | At the federal level, CMS oversees Medicaid, which provides health care coverage for low-income families and aged, blind, and disabled people. CMS oversight includes monitoring state Medicaid programs, issuing guidance to states, and facilitating communication and collaboration among stakeholders. CMS did not complete this initiative. State Medicaid Programs Reported They Employ Multiple Strategies to Monitor and Improve Access to Medicaid Dental Services, but Problems Persist
In response to our survey, most states reported using multiple strategies to monitor and improve access to Medicaid dental services, but they also reported that persistent barriers hinder improvements. All 21 states that provided Medicaid dental services under managed care arrangements reported that they set measurable access standards for MCOs, however more than half also reported that MCOs in their state do not meet any, or only meet some, of the state’s dental access standards. Almost all states described initiatives to recruit dental providers and enhance outreach to beneficiaries’ families, but barriers persist and access rates remain low. State Medicaid Programs Reported Efforts to Improve Access, but Also Reported That Persistent Barriers Hinder Further Improvement in Children’s Access to Dental Care
Many of the 51 states we surveyed reported efforts to improve children’s access to dental care, including efforts to provide outreach to the families of children in Medicaid and recruit dental providers. For example, one state Medicaid program implemented an initiative that included simplifying claims processing, increasing reimbursement rates, educating and recruiting providers, and educating beneficiaries. CMS Has Taken Action to Improve Federal Oversight of State Medicaid Dental Services for Children, but Gaps Remain
Responding to congressional concern about CMS oversight of state Medicaid dental services, CMS has taken a number of actions since May 2007 to strengthen its oversight of Medicaid dental services for children, but gaps remain in the agency’s efforts. At the time of our review, some of these initiatives had been completed, while others were still under way. Although CMS and states have taken steps to address long-standing barriers, continued attention and action is needed to ensure children’s access to Medicaid dental services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen monitoring of state Medicaid dental services for children and help states improve children’s access to Medicaid dental services, we are recommending that the Administrator of CMS take the following four actions: Develop a plan to review dental services for Medicaid children in all states with low utilization rates, such as those not meeting HHS’s Healthy People 2010 targets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Children's access to Medicaid dental services is a long-standing concern. The tragic case of a 12-year-old boy who died from an untreated infected tooth that led to a fatal brain infection renewed attention to this issue. He was enrolled in Medicaid--a joint federal and state program that provides health care coverage, including dental care, for 30 million low-income children--but, like many children in Medicaid, he experienced difficulty finding a dentist who would treat him. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees Medicaid. In this report, GAO examined (1) state strategies to monitor and improve access to dental care for children in Medicaid and (2) CMS actions since 2007 to improve oversight of Medicaid dental services for children. GAO surveyed all state Medicaid programs and interviewed state and federal officials, and dental researchers and associations
What GAO Found
State Medicaid programs reported that they use multiple strategies to monitor and improve access to dental services for children, but problems persist. Most states responding to our survey use a variety of tools, such as examining claims and utilization data, to monitor the provision of dental services to children in Medicaid. Although all 21 states that provide Medicaid dental services through managed care organizations (MCO) reported that they set measurable access standards for MCOs, 14 states reported that MCOs do not meet all of the state's dental access standards. Almost all states described initiatives to improve access to dental services, including simplifying claims processing, increasing reimbursement rates, recruiting providers, and educating beneficiaries. Nonetheless, access rates remain low and states reported that long-standing barriers hinder further improvement. Since May 2007, CMS has taken steps to strengthen its oversight of Medicaid dental services for children, but gaps remain. For example, CMS reviews of Medicaid dental services in 17 states identified a number of concerns and made recommendations for improvement. Nonetheless, at the time of our review CMS did not plan to perform more reviews, even though other states had utilization rates well below HHS's 2010 target for low-income children receiving a preventive dental service. CMS also provided guidance to states and facilitated collaboration among stakeholders, but states reported needing more CMS support, including guidance on setting dental payment rates, on quality initiatives, and on promoting outreach. States also reported wanting more information on other states' efforts to improve dental utilization. |
gao_GAO-06-458T | gao_GAO-06-458T_0 | SSNs are routinely issued to U.S. citizens, and they are also available to noncitizens lawfully admitted to the United States with permission to work. SSA Individual Records and Earnings Reports Can Identify Some Unauthorized Work
SSA has two types of data useful to identifying unauthorized work— individual Social Security records and earnings reports. Its individual records, which include name, date of birth, and SSN, among other things, can be used to verify that a worker is providing the SSN that was assigned to a person of that name. SSA Records Provide Verification Services to Improve Wage Data
SSA uses individual Social Security records in its Employee Verification Service (EVS) and the Web-based SSN Verification Service (SSNVS), which employers can use to assure themselves that the names and SSNs of their workers match SSA’s records. Employer use is voluntary. SSA also uses its records in a work eligibility verification system developed by DHS called the Basic Pilot, which offers electronic verification of work authorization for newly hired workers. There are two sets of data that are relevant to unauthorized work. Both could help identify some unauthorized work. SSA’s Nonwork Alien File
SSA is required by law to provide its Nonwork Alien File to DHS since it suggests a group of people who are in the United States legally but may be working without authorization. Earnings Suspense File
Another SSA earnings file, referred to as the Earnings Suspense File, contains earnings reports in which the name and SSN do not match SSA’s records, suggesting employer or worker error or, potentially, identity theft and unauthorized work. We have reported that this file, which contained 246 million records as of November 2004, appears to include an increasing number of records associated with unauthorized work. In addition, because the ESF contains privileged taxpayer data, SSA cannot share this information with DHS without specific legislative authorization. Closer Coordination by SSA, IRS, and DHS Could Improve Usefulness of SSA Earnings Data
Improving the usefulness of the data could help ensure that limited enforcement resources are targeted effectively. SSA data could help identify areas of unauthorized work, but closer collaboration among SSA, IRS, and DHS can help to ensure that the most useful data are available in a form that can be used efficiently for enforcement. We have reported previously that the IRS program of employer penalties is weak, because of limited requirements on employers to verify and report accurate worker names and SSNs; we have recommended that IRS consider strengthening employer requirements, a course that could over time improve the accuracy of wage data reported to SSA. The Earnings Suspense and the Nonwork Alien files have potential, but even the best information will not make a difference if the relevant federal agencies do not have credible enforcement programs. To address unauthorized work more meaningfully, IRS, DHS and SSA need to work together to improve employer reporting, develop more usable and useful data sets for suspicious earnings reports, and better target limited enforcement resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
To lawfully work in the United States, individuals must have a valid Social Security number (SSN) and, if they are not citizens, authorization to work from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Noncitizens seeking work must provide both an SSN and evidence of work authorization to their employer. Yet individuals without these required authorizations have gained employment with false information. How these instances of unauthorized work can be identified or prevented challenges the federal agencies involved. Congress asked GAO to discuss how federal agencies can better share reported earnings data to identify unauthorized work. Specifically, this testimony addresses two issues: (1) the Social Security data that could help identify unauthorized employment and (2) coordination among certain federal agencies to improve the accuracy and usefulness of such data.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has two types of data that could be useful to reducing unauthorized work--individual Social Security records and earnings reports. Individual Social Security records, which include name, date of birth, and SSN, are used by SSA to provide verification services to employers wishing to assure themselves that the names and SSNs of their workers match SSA's records. SSA also uses Social Security records in a work authorization verification system developed by DHS called the Basic Pilot that offers electronic verification of worker status. These services are voluntary, and none are widely used by employers. SSA's earnings records provide additional information, which could be used as an enforcement tool to identify unauthorized work. Currently, SSA uses such records to produce two relevant files based on earnings records, which are the Nonwork Alien File and the Earnings Suspense File (ESF). The Nonwork Alien File contains earnings information posted to SSNs issued for nonwork purposes, suggesting that these individuals are working without authorization. The ESF contains earnings reports for which SSA is unable to match the name and SSN of the worker, suggesting employer error, SSN misuse, or unauthorized work activity. In addition, we have reported that the ESF, which contained roughly 250 million records as of December 2004, appears to include an increasing number of records associated with probable unauthorized work, but because of statutory constraints, the ESF is not available to DHS as an enforcement tool. Improving the usefulness of SSA data could help identify unauthorized work and ensure that limited enforcement resources are targeted effectively. Ensuring that the most useful data are available requires close coordination among the three federal agencies involved in collecting and using the data--SSA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and DHS. We have previously recommended that IRS work with DHS and SSA as it considers strengthening its employer wage reporting regulations, as such action could improve the accuracy of reported wage data, and that DHS, with SSA, determine how best to use such wage data to identify potential illegal work activity. Efforts to improve data will only make a difference, however, if agencies work together to improve employer reporting and ensure they can conduct effective worksite enforcement programs. |
gao_NSIAD-96-67 | gao_NSIAD-96-67_0 | Moreover, the legislation required that DOD submit annual budgets estimating the cost and savings of each closure or realignment, as well as the period in which savings were to be achieved. Furthermore, our analysis of operations and maintenance costs at nine closing installations indicates that actual base support costs have been reduced at those installations and therefore savings should be substantial. However, the DOD FYDP and service accounting systems are not configured to provide information concerning actual BRAC savings, and failure to achieve them would affect the quality of base support services or DOD’s ability to fund other programs. Additionally, estimated implementation costs do not include economic assistance costs to the area affected by the closure or other costs not reported in DOD’s budget submission. For example, at the three Air Force bases we reviewed, the Air Force estimated military personnel savings at $669.6 million over the implementation period and $156.6 million annually thereafter. Limitations on DOD’s Cost and Savings Estimates
DOD’s savings estimates are inconsistent because the services used different estimating methodologies, and are unreliable because the services excluded some savings and did not update some estimates to reflect revised closure schedules. Unlike the Navy, however, the Army eliminated CHAMPUS savings from its estimates. We believe that eliminating the inconsistencies in the preparation of savings estimates for future BRACs would enhance the usefulness of the budget submissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) cost and savings estimates for past base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions, focusing on the: (1) extent to which DOD is achieving actual savings from BRAC; and (2) adequacy of the DOD process for developing the cost and savings estimates reported in its annual budget submissions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) its analysis of base support costs in the Future Years Defense Plan and at nine closing installations indicates that BRAC savings should be substantial; (2) however, DOD's systems do not provide information on actual BRAC savings; (3) therefore, the total amount of BRAC savings is uncertain; (4) if DOD does not fully achieve estimated BRAC savings, it will affect DOD's ability to fund future programs at planned levels; (5) DOD has complied with the legislative requirement for submitting annual cost and savings estimates, but there are limitations to the submissions' usefulness; (6) for example, the Air Force's savings estimates were not based on budget-quality data, and the Army's estimates excluded reduced military personnel costs that the Navy and the Air Force included in their estimates; (7) further, BRAC cost estimates excluded more than $781 million in economic assistance to local communities as well as other costs; and (8) consequently, the Congress does not have an accurate picture of the savings achieved by the BRAC process. |
gao_GAO-06-555T | gao_GAO-06-555T_0 | NRC also conducts baseline inspections at nuclear power plants. NRC’s Process for Revising the DBT Was Generally Logical and Well Defined, but Some Changes Were Not Clearly Linked to an Analysis of the Terrorist Threat
The process by which NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants was generally logical and well defined in that trained threat assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an analysis of demonstrated terrorist capabilities. For example, one of the key elements in the revised DBT, the number of attackers, is based on NRC’s analysis of the group size of previous terrorist attacks worldwide. The DOE DBT includes a number of weapons not included in the NRC DBT. Inclusion of such weapons in the NRC DBT for nuclear power plants would have required plants to take substantial additional security measures. Changes to the Threat Assessment Staff’s Initial Recommendations Were Not Clearly Linked to an Analysis of the Terrorist Threat
While NRC followed a generally logical and well-defined process to revise the DBT for nuclear power plants, two aspects of the process raised a fundamental question—the extent to which the DBT represents the terrorist threat as indicated by intelligence data compared with the extent to which it represents the threat that NRC considers reasonable for the plants to defend against. These two aspects were (1) the process NRC used to obtain stakeholder feedback on a draft of the DBT and (2) changes made by the commissioners to the NRC staff’s recommended DBT. NRC specifically sought and received feedback from the nuclear industry on what is reasonable for a private security force to defend against and the cost of and time frame for implementing security measures to defend against specific adversary characteristics. Nuclear Power Plants Made Substantial Changes to Their Security to Address the Revised DBT, but NRC Inspections Have Uncovered Problems
The four nuclear power plant sites we visited made substantial changes in response to the revised DBT, including measures to detect, delay, and respond to the increased number of attackers and to address the increased vehicle bomb size. These security enhancements were in addition to other measures licensees implemented—such as stricter requirements for obtaining physical access to nuclear power plants—in response to a series of security orders NRC issued after September 11, 2001. Despite the substantial security improvements we observed at the four sites we visited, it is too early to conclude, either from NRC’s force-on- force or baseline inspections, that all nuclear power plant sites are capable of defending against the revised DBT for the following two reasons: First, as of March 30, 2006, NRC had completed force-on-force inspections at 27 of the 65 sites, and it is not planning to complete force-on-force inspections at all sites until 2007, in accordance with its 3-year schedule. NRC officials told us that plants have generally performed well during force-on-force inspections. For example, we recommended that NRC conduct the inspections more frequently at each site, use laser equipment to better simulate attackers’ and security officers’ weapons, and require the inspections to make use of the full terrorist capabilities stated in the DBT. Based on our observations of three force-on- force inspections, other areas where NRC may be able to make further improvements included the following: ensuring the proper use of laser equipment; varying the timing of inspection activities, such as the starting times of the mock attacks, in order to minimize the artificiality of the inspections; ensuring the protection of information about the planned scenarios for the mock attacks so that security officers do not obtain knowledge that would allow them to perform better than they otherwise would; and providing complete feedback to licensees on NRC inspectors’ observations on the results of the force-on-force exercises. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's commercial nuclear power plants are potential targets for terrorists seeking to cause the release of radioactive material. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency headed by five commissioners, regulates and oversees security at the plants. In April 2003, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC revised the design basis threat (DBT), which describes the threat that plants must be prepared to defend against in terms of the number of attackers and their training, weapons, and tactics. NRC also restructured its program for testing security at the plants through force-on-force inspections (mock terrorist attacks). This testimony addresses the following: (1) the process NRC used to develop the April 2003 DBT for nuclear power plants, (2) the actions nuclear power plants have taken to enhance security in response to the revised DBT, and (3) NRC's efforts to strengthen the conduct of its force-on-force inspections. This testimony is based on GAO's report on security at nuclear power plants, issued on March 14, 2006 (GAO-06-388).
What GAO Found
NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants using a process that was generally logical and well-defined. Specifically, trained threat assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an analysis of demonstrated terrorist capabilities. The resulting DBT requires plants to defend against a larger terrorist threat, including a larger number of attackers, a refined and expanded list of weapons, and an increase in the maximum size of a vehicle bomb. Key elements of the revised DBT, such as the number of attackers, generally correspond to the NRC threat assessment staff's original recommendations, but other important elements do not. For example, the NRC staff made changes to some recommendations after obtaining feedback from stakeholders, including the nuclear industry, which objected to certain proposed changes, such as the inclusion of certain weapons. NRC officials said the changes resulted from further analysis of intelligence information. Nevertheless, GAO found that the process used to obtain stakeholder feedback created the appearance that changes were made based on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than on what an assessment of the terrorist threat called for. Nuclear power plants made substantial security improvements in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the revised DBT, including security barriers and detection equipment, new protective strategies, and additional security officers. It is too early, however, to conclude that all sites are capable of defending against the DBT because, as of March 30, 2006, NRC had conducted force-on-force inspections at 27, or less than half, of the 65 nuclear power plant sites. NRC has improved its force-on-force inspections--for example, by conducting inspections more frequently at each site. Nevertheless, in observing three inspections and discussing the program with NRC, GAO noted potential issues in the inspections that warrant NRC's continued attention. For example, a lapse in the protection of information about the planned scenario for a mock attack GAO observed may have given the plant's security officers knowledge that allowed them to perform better than they otherwise would have. A classified version of GAO's report provides additional details about the DBT and security at nuclear power plants. |
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