id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-02-26 | gao_GAO-02-26_0 | on a sample of areas across the country to estimate the number of people and housing units missed or counted more than once in the census and to evaluate the final census counts. Person Interview Operation Generally Completed on Schedule
The Bureau appears to have generally completed person interviewing according to its operational schedule. Although the sites of the dress rehearsal were not representative of the whole nation, they provide a reasonable benchmark for the 2000 census. Programming Errors Temporarily Hindered Management of Person Interviewing
Early in the person interviewing operation, the Bureau experienced and resolved problems with a critical function in its automated work management system that was to allow supervisors to selectively reassign work among interviewers. officials, the Bureau addressed the underlying programming error within 2 weeks, and the operation proceeded without a reported recurrence of this problem. Person Interviewing Address List Quality Appeared to Be Better Than the Census
An accurate address list avoids unnecessary and costly efforts to locate nonexistent residences. estimates. person interviewing in 2000; determines whether sufficient overlap may have occurred to violate the determines whether increasing the flow of status data on specific decennial follow-up operations to the managers of independent surveys can help ensure the independence of such surveys, particularly when such operations are scheduled to overlap in the field; and determines what additional steps or controls to preserve the independence of census follow-up and person interviewing, if any, could be implemented for other census follow-up operations that collect enumeration data and are scheduled contemporaneously with person interviewing. results. The basis for this new recommendation centered on our finding that the Bureau’s quality assurance program did not report fully on the percentage of the interview workload replaced by the quality assurance interviews. 1. 3. 4. 5. The Bureau's St. Louis, Missouri, office should be deleted from the list of Census Bureau regional offices and replaced with Kansas City, Kansas. | What GAO Found
As part of its Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (ACE), the U.S. Census Bureau interviewed people across the country to develop an estimate of the number of persons missed, counted more than once, or otherwise improperly counted in the 2000 census. In conducting the interviews, which took place in person or over the phone, Census faced several challenges, including (1) completing the operation on schedule, (2) ensuring data quality, (3) overcoming unexpected computer problems, (4) obtaining a quality address list, and (5) keeping the interviews independent of census follow-up operations to ensure unbiased estimates of census errors. The Bureau completed the interviews largely ahead of schedule. On the basis of the results of its quality assurance program, the Bureau assumes that about one-tenth of one percent of all cases nationally would have failed the program because they were believed to have been falsified. Early on, the Bureau dealt with an unexpected problem with its automated work management system, which allows supervisors to selectively reassign work among interviewers. According to the Bureau officials, the Bureau addressed the underlying programming error within two weeks, and the operations proceeded on schedule. The address list used for interviews had fewer nonexistent listings than did the lists used by the major census questionnaire delivery operations. An accurate address list is important to prevent unnecessary and costly efforts to locate nonexistent addresses. Although the Bureau implemented controls to keep the nonresponse operation separate from the interviews, the assumed independence of the census and ACE was put at risk because another follow-up operation intended to improve census coverage overlapped with the interviews. |
gao_GAO-06-434 | gao_GAO-06-434_0 | More specifically, the act requires creditors to print on the billing statements of revolving credit products (of which credit cards are a form) a generic disclosure that “making only the minimum payment will increase the interest you pay and the time it takes to repay your balance.” In addition to the generic disclosure, the law requires creditors to choose from two options for providing additional information to cardholders: (1) providing a toll-free telephone number that cardholders could use to obtain the actual number of months that it would take to repay their outstanding balance if they made only minimum payments or (2) providing an example of the length of time required to pay off a sample balance at an interest rate of 17 percent and a toll-free telephone number cardholders could call to get an estimate of the time required to repay their balances. For example, regulation could establish parameters for the calculations, such as how to treat accounts with multiple interest rates. Estimates of Total Implementation Cost Varied Widely
Perhaps reflecting the uncertainties and range of assumptions noted above, the estimates that we obtained of total first-year costs ranged from $9 million to $57 million for large issuers. Revolvers generally preferred to receive a customized disclosure about the consequences of making minimum payments. Many of the cardholders who preferred the customized disclosure or thought that it was more useful than a generic disclosure said they did so because the information provided would be specific to their account and change each month, based on their transactions. Rather than providing customized disclosures, some suggested that government agencies, issuers, financial educators, and consumer groups expand general financial education efforts on the consequences of making minimum payments. A second alternative that issuers and others identified would be to place the disclosure in a location other than the first page of the billing statement. In addition, the consumers we interviewed generally greatly preferred receiving minimum payment disclosures in their billing statements. This alternative could reduce both postage and paper costs for issuers because additional pages to print the disclosure would be needed less frequently. Observations
Our work indicates that credit card issuers and processors have the necessary data and systems capabilities to provide customized minimum payment disclosures—that is, to include customized information in billing statements that would show the length of time required to pay off each cardholder’s actual balance and the additional interest that would be incurred if only the minimum payment is made each month, as well as the monthly payment required to pay off an outstanding balance in a given time period. While providing cardholders with additional disclosures about the consequences of making only minimum payments on their credit cards would appear to provide them with useful information, such disclosures would raise issuer costs and whether the impact on consumer behavior would be large or small is not known. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the feasibility and cost of requiring credit card issuers (issuers) to provide cardholders with customized minimum payment information, (2) assess the usefulness of providing customized information to cardholders, and (3) identify options for providing cardholders with customized or other information about the financial consequences of making minimum payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires that credit card issuers (issuers) include in all cardholder billing statements a generic warning, or "disclosure," about the potential financial consequences of consistently making only the minimum payment due on a credit card. However, some have urged that consumers should instead receive "customized" disclosures in their billing statements that use cardholders' actual balances and the applicable interest rates on their accounts to show the consequences of making only minimum payments, such as estimates of the time required to repay balances and the total interest amount resulting from continual minimum payments. In response to a congressional request, this report assesses the (1) feasibility and cost of requiring issuers to provide cardholders with customized minimum payment information, (2) usefulness of providing customized information to cardholders, and (3) options for providing cardholders with customized or other information about the financial consequences of making minimum payments.
What GAO Found
Representatives of credit card issuers and processors that handle billing and other operations for issuers said they have the technological capability to provide cardholders with customized minimum payment information. The calculations that would be included in such disclosures require various assumptions, including that no more charges are made on the account, and decisions on how to address other issues, such as balances subject to multiple interest rates, that would affect the estimates' precision. Issuers and processors estimated that the most significant costs of providing customized disclosures would be for additional postage, computer programming, and customer service. Although uncertain about exactly what calculations would be required, the estimates that issuers provided for total implementation costs ranged from $9 million to $57 million. In GAO's interviews with 112 cardholders, most who typically carry credit card balances (revolvers) found customized disclosures very useful and would prefer to receive them in their billing statements. These consumers liked that customized disclosures would be specific to their accounts, would change based on their transactions, and would provide more information than generic disclosures. However, cardholders who pay their balances in full each month were generally satisfied with receiving generic disclosures or none at all. Consumer groups, financial educators, and others indicated that customized disclosures could reduce cardholders' tendency to make minimum payments; conversely, issuers foresaw limited impact because few cardholders make minimum payments and not all can afford to pay more. Alternatives for providing customized disclosures include providing them only to revolvers, providing them less frequently, or in a location other than the first page of billing statements. While such alternatives could lower issuer costs, they could also decrease the customized disclosures' potential impact. |
gao_GAO-08-87 | gao_GAO-08-87_0 | Under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary has authority to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements and authorize otherwise unallowable expenditures for “experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects” that are likely to promote Medicaid objectives. Since the early 1980s, HHS has required that states show that their proposed section 1115 demonstrations will be budget neutral to the federal government—that is, federal expenditures under a state’s demonstration will not be greater than if the state had continued its existing Medicaid program. HHS Did Not Adequately Ensure the Budget Neutrality of Medicaid Demonstrations in Florida and Vermont before Approving Them
HHS approved 5-year demonstration spending limits for Florida and Vermont based on projections of cost and beneficiary enrollment growth rates that exceeded HHS’s own benchmarks—that is, the lower of the state’s recent historical experience or estimates of Medicaid growth nationwide—without adequate support for these deviations. HHS approved a spending limit of $4.7 billion for Vermont’s 5-year demonstration. It also shows the limit that would apply if HHS benchmarks had been used and the limit that HHS and state officials explained and supported in documentation. For beneficiary enrollment, however, HHS approved growth rates that were higher than benchmark levels. A 2005 HHS financial management review found several problems with the earlier financing arrangement that involved supplemental payments to certain hospitals and other health care providers. In Vermont, HHS allowed the state to operate a managed care organization and, through this arrangement, retain excess revenue from payments to the organization for previously state-funded programs. In July 2007, we raised concerns about this demonstration’s consistency with federal law. Vermont Allowed to Use Medicaid Funds to Supplant State Funding for Certain Purposes
Under Vermont’s demonstration, HHS authorized the state to operate its own managed care organization and, through this arrangement, to apply federal Medicaid matching funds to programs that were previously funded by the state and that do not exclusively benefit those eligible for Medicaid. Matters for Congressional Consideration
The Congress should consider requiring increased attention to fiscal responsibility in the approval of section 1115 Medicaid demonstrations by requiring the Secretary of HHS to improve the demonstration review process through steps such as (1) clarifying criteria for reviewing and approving states’ proposed spending limits, (2) better ensuring that valid methods are used to demonstrate budget neutrality, and (3) documenting and making public material explaining the basis for any approvals. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Florida demonstration will maintain the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS ensure that the level of supplemental payments for which the state could have obtained federal Medicaid funds in the absence of the proposed demonstration is calculated using appropriate methods and accurate data sources, and adjust the approved spending limit appropriately. In 2002 and 2004, we recommended that HHS undertake these changes. We disagree that Florida’s calculations were not relevant to the Florida demonstration, since Florida’s historical payments were used as a basis for the low-income pool spending limit under the demonstration, and as a result, the spending limit allows for continuation of spending that a HHS review suggests should not have been allowed. With regard to HHS’s approval of the Vermont demonstration, HHS disagreed with our concerns and prior recommendation to reexamine the terms of the demonstration and, where appropriate, to either modify its terms or seek statutory authority for the demonstration to continue in its current form. Finally, we base our finding that HHS agreed to reimburse Vermont at a rate higher than what the state received prior to its demonstration in part on our review of the independent actuary’s report. Meeting HHS’s definition of comprehensive, that is, those that affect a broad range of services for Medicaid populations statewide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a joint federal and state program, finances health care for 60 million low-income people. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements and allow demonstration projects that are likely to promote Medicaid objectives. Under federal policy, states must show that federal spending for proposed demonstrations will be no greater than if the state's existing Medicaid program were continued. GAO examined the extent to which HHS ensured that recent comprehensive 1115 demonstrations--affecting a broad range of services for beneficiaries statewide--will (1) be budget neutral to the federal government and (2) maintain Medicaid's fiscal integrity. For demonstrations approved in 2005 (Florida and Vermont), GAO obtained information from federal and state officials and also relied on past reviews of other demonstrations.
What GAO Found
HHS did not adequately ensure that Florida's and Vermont's Medicaid demonstrations will be budget neutral to the federal government before approving them. HHS approved spending limits that were higher than the limits that would have been granted if HHS had held the states to limits based on benchmark growth rates, that is, the lower of the state's historical spending growth or nationwide estimates of Medicaid growth. Although HHS allows states to deviate from these benchmarks if states can show that using them would not provide accurate projections, HHS's basis for approving the higher spending limits was not fully supported by documentation. In Florida, HHS approved a $52.6 billion spending limit for the 5 year demonstration-- $6.9 billion more than the documentation supported. In Vermont, HHS approved a $4.7 billion spending limit--$246 million higher than supported. HHS also did not ensure that the two demonstrations maintain Medicaid's fiscal integrity. In Florida, HHS allowed the state to establish a spending limit using a historical spending base that included payments HHS had previously identified as problematic. In 2005, an HHS review found several problems with the payment arrangement--problems that potentially resulted in inflated and inaccurate payments. In Vermont, where the state proposed operating a managed care organization, HHS agreed to an administrative reimbursement rate higher than what the state received prior to the demonstration. Under this arrangement, the state can use excess revenues to pay for health-related programs that were previously funded by the state and that do not exclusively benefit Medicaid beneficiaries, such as a grant to the University of Vermont medical school. A July 2007 GAO letter to the Secretary discussed concerns about this approval's consistency with federal law and recommended that the Secretary reexamine Vermont's demonstration and, where appropriate, either modify its terms or seek statutory authority for it to continue in its current form. Concerns about HHS's demonstration approval process in this report are consistent with those GAO has raised in past reviews of other states' demonstration proposals. In 2002 and 2004, GAO recommended that HHS take steps to strengthen its fiscal oversight of Medicaid by improving the Medicaid demonstration review and approval process, in part by (1) clarifying criteria for reviewing and approving states' demonstration spending limits, (2) better ensuring that valid methods are used to demonstrate budget neutrality and (3) documenting and making public material explaining the basis for any approvals. HHS has not taken action on these recommendations and maintains that its process is sufficient. Because HHS continues to disagree with these recommendations and with the need to reexamine the Vermont demonstration, GAO is elevating these issues to the Congress for consideration. |
gao_GAO-10-79 | gao_GAO-10-79_0 | FCC’s Current Structure and Informal Coordination Processes Can Limit FCC’s Ability to Efficiently Address Crosscutting Issues
Despite Changes to Modernize FCC’s Bureau Structure, Market and Technological Changes Have Created Issues That Span FCC’s Bureaus
Although FCC has established some function-based bureaus and reorganized its bureaus to reflect some changes in the telecommunications market, further evolutions and the growth of new technologies have continued to create crosscutting issues that span several bureaus. In addition, the absence of written policies allows interbureau collaboration and communication to vary from chairman to chairman. Current and former FCC officials told us that such policies limited interbureau collaboration and staff-to-staff communication. FCC Relies on Its Functional Offices to Address Some Aspects of Convergence, but the Chairman’s Influence Over These Offices Raises Independence Issues That Can Affect FCC’s Ability to Rely on Them
FCC’s functional offices, such as the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP), provide a broader scope than the platform-based bureaus and address some of the issues posed by convergence, but the chairman’s influence can affect FCC’s ability to use these offices to address crosscutting issues. One proposal is to replace industry-based bureaus with bureaus divided along functional goals. Weaknesses in FCC’s Processes for Collecting and Using Information Can Undermine the Transparency and Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Process
Inconsistent Policies Regarding Commissioner Access to Bureau and Office Analyses Raise Concerns about the Transparency and Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Process
FCC chairmen have varied in their policies regarding commissioner access to bureau and office analyses during the decision-making process. Stakeholders Have Raised Concerns about FCC’s Collection of Information during the Rulemaking Process
FCC Typically Does Not Include the Text of a Proposed Rule in Its NPRMs, Which May Limit the Effectiveness of the Public Comment Process
When issuing an NPRM to gather public input before adopting, modifying, or deleting a rule, FCC rarely includes the text of the proposed rule in the notice, which may limit the effectiveness of the public comment process. Stakeholders told us that vague ex parte summaries reduce transparency and public discourse in FCC’s decision-making process by limiting stakeholders’ ability to determine what information was provided in the meeting and to discuss or rebut tha information. However, FCC’s Strategic Human Capital Plan does not establish specific targets for these needs or measures for evaluating its progress in meeting these skill needs. However, we identified several challenges in these areas. At the bureau and office level, FCC’s lack of written procedures for facilitating the flow of information within the agency has in some cases led to ineffective interbureau coordination and allowed prior chairmen to limit internal communication among staff. Second, although FCC has developed rules intended to protect the fairness of ex parte proceedings, FCC neither provides detailed guidance on what constitutes a sufficient ex parte summary, nor has a process for proactively ensuring that ex parte summaries are complete. Finally, at a time when the telecommunications industry has become increasingly complex, a large percentage of FCC’s economists and engineers will be eligible for retirement by 2011, and FCC has faced challenges in recruiting new staff. However, continued focus on identifying and instituting additional methods that improve its flexibility to meet its expertise needs, and developing measures for tracking its progress toward meeting its needs, will help to ensure that FCC is well-positioned to anticipate and address its current and future workforce and expertise needs. Regarding the public comment process, FCC stated that it has worked to include the text of proposed rules in recently issued NPRMs. In particular, the report provides information on (1) the extent to which FCC’s bureau structure presents challenges for the agency in adapting to an evolving marketplace; (2) the extent to which FCC’s decision-making processes present challenges for FCC, and what opportunities, if any, exist for improvement; and (3) the extent to which FCC’s personnel management and workforce planning efforts ensure that FCC has the workforce needed to achieve its mission. In addition, we reviewed FCC documents, as well as relevant legislation, federal regulations, and GAO reports on the FCC and areas of focus for this review such as internal controls and workforce planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rapid changes in the telecommunications industry, such as the development of broadband technologies, present new regulatory challenges for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to determine (1) the extent to which FCC's bureau structure presents challenges for the agency in adapting to an evolving marketplace; (2) the extent to which FCC's decision-making processes present challenges for FCC, and what opportunities, if any, exist for improvement; and (3) the extent to which FCC's personnel management and workforce planning efforts face challenges in ensuring that FCC has the workforce needed to achieve its mission. GAO reviewed FCC documents and data and conducted literature searches to identify proposed reforms, criteria, and internal control standards and compared them with FCC's practices. GAO also interviewed current and former FCC chairmen and commissioners, industry stakeholders, academic experts, and consumer representatives.
What GAO Found
FCC consists of seven bureaus, with some structured along functional lines, such as enforcement, and some structured along technological lines, such as wireless telecommunications and media. Although there have been changes in FCC's bureau structure, developments in the telecommunications industry continue to create issues that span the jurisdiction of several bureaus. However, FCC lacks written procedures for ensuring that interbureau collaboration and communication occurs. FCC's reliance on informal coordination has created confusion among the bureaus regarding who is responsible for handling certain issues. In addition, the lack of written procedures has allowed various chairmen to determine the extent to which interbureau collaboration and communication occurs. This has led to instances in which FCC's final analyses lacked input from all relevant staff. Although FCC stated that it relies on its functional offices, such as its engineering and strategic planning offices, to address crosscutting issues, stakeholders have expressed concerns regarding the chairman's ability to influence these offices. Weaknesses in FCC's processes for collecting and using information also raise concerns regarding the transparency and informed nature of FCC's decision-making process. FCC has five commissioners, one of which is designated chairman. FCC lacks internal policies regarding commissioner access to staff analyses during the decision-making process, and some chairmen have restricted this access. Such restrictions may undermine the group decision-making process and impact the quality of FCC's decisions. In addition, GAO identified weaknesses in FCC's processes for collecting public input on proposed rules. Specifically, FCC rarely includes the text of a proposed rule when issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to collect public comment on a rule change, although some studies have noted that providing proposed rule text helps focus public input. Additionally, FCC has developed rules regarding contacts between external parties and FCC officials (known as ex parte contacts) that require the external party to provide FCC a summary of the new information presented for inclusion in the public record. However, several stakeholders told us that FCC's ex parte process allows vague ex parte summaries and that in some cases, ex parte contacts can occur just before a commission vote, which can limit stakeholders' ability to determine what information was provided and to rebut or discuss that information. FCC faces challenges in ensuring it has the expertise needed to adapt to a changing marketplace. For example, a large percentage of FCC's economists and engineers are eligible to retire in 2011, and FCC faces difficulty recruiting top candidates. FCC has initiated recruitment and development programs and has begun evaluating its workforce needs. GAO previously noted that strategic workforce planning should include identifying needs, developing strategies to address these needs, and tracking progress. However, FCC's Strategic Human Capital Plan does not establish targets for its expertise needs, making it difficult to assess the agency's progress in addressing its needs. |
gao_GAO-02-682T | gao_GAO-02-682T_0 | Principles for a Budget Process
In the past, we have suggested four broad principles or criteria for a budget process. A process should provide information about the long-term impact of decisions, both macro—linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook—and micro—providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of government commitments; provide information and be structured to focus on important macro trade-offs—e.g., between investment and consumption; provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between missions (or national needs) and between the different policy tools of government (such as tax provisions, grants, and credit programs); and be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent, using clear, consistent definitions. Discussions on the future of the budget process have primarily focused on revamping the current budget process rather than establishing a new one from scratch. This is critical for making the caps realistic. You must balance the need to respond not only to those demands that existed last year—demands kept in abeyance during many years of fighting deficits—but also demands imposed on us by the events of September 11. | What GAO Found
The events of September 11 imposed new demands on the federal budget, while pent-up demands from years of fighting deficits remain. In the past, GAO has suggested four broad principles for a budget process. That process should (1) provide information on the long-term impact of decisions, both macro--linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook--and micro--providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of government commitments; (2) provide information and focus on important macro trade-offs--e.g., between investment and consumption; (3) provide information to make informed trade-offs between missions and between the different policy tools of government; and (4) be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent, using clear, consistent definitions. New rules and goals will be necessary to ensure fiscal discipline and to focus on long term implications of decisions. The federal government still needs a decision-making framework to evaluate choices between today's and future needs. Amending the current Budget Enforcement Act without setting realistic caps and addressing mandatory programs is unlikely to be successful because the original act used limited actions to achieve a balanced budget. A budget process appropriate for the early 21st century needs a broader framework for thinking about near- and long-term fiscal goals. |
gao_GAO-09-195 | gao_GAO-09-195_0 | As the administrator of the BSA, FinCEN, a bureau within Treasury, is tasked with the mission of safeguarding the U.S. financial system from money laundering, terrorist financing, and other abuses. Inappropriate disclosure, modification, or misuse of this information could undermine the ability of the federal government, financial institutions, and law enforcement agencies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. FinCEN, TCS, and IRS Had Not Fully Implemented Appropriate Security Controls and Practices to Protect Information and Systems Supporting FinCEN’s Mission
Although FinCEN, TCS, and IRS had implemented many information security controls to protect the information and systems supporting FinCEN’s mission, weaknesses existed in several critical areas. As a result, BSA data—containing highly sensitive personal and financial information about private individuals that is used by the law enforcement community to identify and prosecute illegal activity—are at an increased risk of unauthorized use, modification, or disclosure. Although FinCEN and TCS had employed controls to segregate sensitive areas of their networks and protect them from intrusion, the organizations did not always adequately control the logical and physical boundaries protecting information and systems supporting FinCEN’s mission, as the following examples indicate: FinCEN had not fully implemented controls to protect the boundaries of its network. IRS did not restrict the processing of sensitive data on its systems that support FinCEN. FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; and a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices. Further, the bureau did not have detailed implementation guidance for securely configuring its virtual private network. As we have previously reported, IRS’s verification process for determining whether remedial actions were implemented was not always effective. Conclusions
FinCEN, TCS, and IRS have taken important steps in implementing numerous controls to protect the information and systems that support FinCEN’s mission. However, significant weaknesses in access controls and other information security controls existed at all three organizations that impaired their ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether information security controls have been implemented that effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and information systems supporting the mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). We focused our evaluation on the controls for the applications, databases, and network infrastructure that directly or indirectly support the processing and storage of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) data on behalf of FinCEN at the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), FinCEN, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau within the Department of the Treasury, relies extensively on its own computer systems, as well as those at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Communications System (TCS), to administer the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and fulfill its mission of safeguarding the U.S. financial system from financial crimes. Effective information security controls over these systems are essential to ensuring that BSA data, which contains sensitive financial information used by law enforcement agencies to prosecute financial crime, is protected from inappropriate or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. GAO evaluated whether security controls that effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support FinCEN's mission have been implemented. To do this, GAO examined security policies and controls for systems at three organizations.
What GAO Found
FinCEN, TCS, and IRS have taken important steps in implementing numerous controls to protect the information and systems that support FinCEN's mission; however, significant information security weaknesses remain in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these systems and information. The three organizations implemented many information security controls to protect the information and systems that support FinCEN's mission. For example, IRS controlled changes to a key application and FinCEN segregated areas of its network. Nonetheless, the organizations had inconsistently applied or not fully implemented controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to this information and these systems. For example, the organizations did not always (1) implement user and password management controls for properly identifying and authenticating users, (2) restrict user access to data to only what was required for performing job functions, (3) adequately encrypt data, (4) protect the external and internal boundaries on its systems, and (5) log user activity on databases. Furthermore, weaknesses in which systems were insecurely configured and patches were not applied to critical systems also existed. As a result, sensitive information used by the federal government, financial institutions, and law enforcement agencies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing is at an increased risk of unauthorized use, modification, or disclosure. A key reason for many of the weaknesses was that FinCEN and IRS had not fully implemented key information security program activities. For example, FinCEN did not always include detailed implementation guidance in its policies and procedures and adequately test and evaluate information security controls. Furthermore, GAO has previously reported that IRS did not sufficiently verify whether remedial actions were implemented or effective in mitigating vulnerabilities and recommended that it implement a revised remedial action verification process. |
gao_GAO-09-774T | gao_GAO-09-774T_0 | The Viability of the IRIS Program Is at Risk
In March 2008, we reported that the IRIS program is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to complete timely, credible chemical assessments or decrease its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments. In addition, assessment process changes EPA had recently made, as well as other changes EPA was considering at the time of our review, would have further reduced the timeliness, credibility, and transparency of IRIS assessments. We also found that EPA’s efforts to finalize IRIS assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors. These factors include (1) the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) requiring two additional reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies with an interest in the assessments, such as the Department of Defense, and (2) EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await the results of new research. The two new OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments involve other federal agencies in EPA’s IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility and transparency of, and hinders EPA’s ability to manage, IRIS assessments. Moreover, the input these agencies provide to EPA is treated as “deliberative” and is not released to the public. In April 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process. As we testified before this subcommittee in May 2008, the new process was largely the same as the draft we had evaluated during our review and did not respond to the recommendations in our March 2008 report. Moreover, some key changes were likely to further exacerbate the credibility and productivity concerns we had identified. EPA’s Latest IRIS Process Reforms Appear Largely Responsive to Our Recommendations, but Their Success Will Depend on Effective Management
Overall, EPA’s May 2009 IRIS assessment process reforms represent significant improvements and, if implemented effectively, would be largely responsive to the recommendations made in our March 2008 report. Under EPA’s prior process, these two interagency reviews were required and managed by OMB—and EPA was not allowed to proceed with assessments at various stages until OMB notified EPA that it had sufficiently responded to comments from OMB and other agencies. The independence restored to EPA under the new process is critical in ensuring that EPA has the ability to develop transparent, credible IRIS chemical assessments that the agency and other IRIS users, such as state and local environmental agencies, need to develop adequate protections for human health and the environment. While these broad reforms provide a sound general framework for conducting IRIS assessments, the manner in which EPA implements the new process will determine whether the agency will be able to overcome its long-standing productivity problems and complete credible and transparent assessments. Specifically, management attention is warranted on certain aspects of the new process that are incomplete or lack clarity. As a result, EPA has likely understated the time required to complete an assessment. In prior IRIS assessment processes, EPA provided time frames for these steps. In addition to addressing these issues, the viability of the IRIS program will depend on effective and sustained management and oversight. These include the following: Unlike a number of other EPA programs with statutory deadlines for completing various activities, no enforceable deadlines apply to the IRIS program. We believe the absence of statutory deadlines may contribute to EPA’s failure to complete timely IRIS assessments. An overarching factor that affects EPA’s ability to complete IRIS assessments in a timely manner is the compounding effect of delays—even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science. We believe that the agency’s ability to produce timely, credible, and transparent assessments will also depend in large measure on clear implementation procedures and rigorous management oversight, given the numerous factors that can impede EPA’s ability to complete timely IRIS assessments and the lack of clarity on some aspects of the new process. Chemical Assessments: EPA’s New Assessment Process Will Further Limit the Productivity and Credibility of Its Integrated Risk Information System. Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. Toxicity assessments in the IRIS database constitute the first two critical steps of the risk assessment process, which in turn provides the foundation for risk management decisions. Thus, IRIS is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental decisions, policies, and regulations. GAO's 2008 report on the IRIS program identified significant concerns that, coupled with the importance of the program, caused GAO to add EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals as a high-risk area in its January 2009 biennial status report on governmentwide high-risk areas requiring increased attention by executive agencies and Congress. This testimony discusses (1) the findings from GAO's March 2008 report Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System and related testimonies and (2) GAO's preliminary evaluation of the revised IRIS assessment process EPA issued on May 21, 2009. For this testimony, GAO supplemented its prior audit work with a preliminary review of the new assessment process and some IRIS productivity data.
What GAO Found
In March 2008, GAOreported that the viability of the IRIS program is at risk because EPA has been unable to complete timely, credible chemical assessments or decrease its backlog of ongoing assessments. In addition, assessment process changes EPA had recently made, and other changes itwas considering at the time of GAO's review, would have further reduced the timeliness, credibility, and transparency of IRIS assessments. Among other things, GAO found that EPA's efforts to finalize IRIS assessments have been impeded by a combination of factors, including the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) requiring two additional reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies with an interest in the assessments, such as the Department of Defense. Moreover, the two OMB/interagency reviews involved other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that hindered EPA's ability to manage its assessments and limited their credibility and transparency. For example, the input these agencies provided to EPA was treated as "deliberative" and was not released to the public. In April 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process. As GAO testified before this subcommittee in May 2008, the new process did not respond to GAO's March 2008 recommendations, and some key changes were likely to further exacerbate the credibility and productivity concerns GAO had identified. Overall, EPA's May 2009 IRIS assessment process reforms represent significant improvements and, if implemented effectively, would be largely responsive to GAO's March 2008 recommendations. For example, under the new process EPA is to manage the entire assessment process, including the interagency reviews. Under EPA's prior process, these reviews were required and managed by OMB--and at various stages, EPA was not allowed to proceed with assessments until OMB notified EPA that it had sufficiently responded to comments from OMB and other agencies. The independence restored to EPA under the new process will be critical to ensuring that EPA has the ability to develop transparent, credible IRIS chemical assessments. While the broad reforms provide a sound general framework for conducting IRIS assessments, the manner in which EPA implements the new process will determine whether the agency will be able to overcome its long-standing productivity problems and complete credible and transparent assessments. Specifically, certain aspects of the new process are incomplete or lack clarity and thus warrant management attention. For example, EPA has likely understated the time required to complete an assessment because its estimated time frames do not include the time required to complete two key steps. Overall, the viability of the IRIS program will depend on effective and sustained management and oversight, especially given the number of factors that can impede the progress of IRIS assessments. For example, even one delay in an assessment can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science. In addition, unlike some other EPA programs with statutory deadlines for completing various activities, the IRIS program is discretionary. GAO believes the absence of legal consequences for delays in completing assessments may contribute to EPA's failure to complete timely IRIS assessments. |
gao_RCED-95-1 | gao_RCED-95-1_0 | 1.2). DOE has acknowledged that its cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex is subject to regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. Cleanup of DOE’s Weapons Complex Has Been Limited
Although DOE has spent significant sums on environmental activities, it has confined most of its efforts to preassessment or assessment actions, such as preparing reports, investigating sites, and submitting documents to regulators. Over 90 percent of the missed milestones were delayed by 30 days or more. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE officials also noted that although the Department has not completed all of its milestones on schedule, it has performed a number of interim actions that were not part of its agreements with regulators. 4). Reliance on Milestones Discourages Strategic Focus
When DOE has been unable to renegotiate or has not sought to change unrealistic agreements or milestones, it has sometimes focused more on compliance than on cleanup. As DOE has found from past efforts, developing a cleanup strategy based on national priorities is a complicated process. At that time, we testified that “information and recommendations developed by the commission could help to clarify issues and form the basis for a national consensus in developing a comprehensive approach to cleaning up DOE’s facilities.”
Conclusions
Cleaning up contamination at DOE’s facilities will not be easy because the risks to public health and the environment are large, the solutions to some problems are as yet unknown, the relationships between DOE and its stakeholders are often strained, and the gaps between the costs of the cleanups and the funds available for them are wide. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in cleaning up its nuclear weapons complex, focusing on: (1) its use of environmental agreements with state and federal regulators; and (2) the effectiveness of its cleanup strategy.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE has focused on collecting data and investigating sites, rather than the actual cleanup of sites; (2) DOE has only put a small amount of effort into physically cleaning up its nuclear weapons complex and has yet to complete the cleanup of a major facility; (3) although DOE is improving its timeliness, it missed over 20 percent of the milestones it agreed to complete through 1994; (4) DOE is likely to fall further behind schedule as funding tightens, costs increase, and more milestones come due; (5) DOE has had difficulty meeting some milestones because it signed unrealistic agreements with regulators; (6) DOE has been unable to renegotiate milestones due to past delays in meeting its commitments; and (7) future progress of DOE cleanup activities depends on the adoption of a national risk-based strategy that will maximize the limited resources available for cleanup. |
gao_GAO-07-152 | gao_GAO-07-152_0 | States Reported That They Expect to Spend an Estimated $12 Billion in Public Funds to Complete the Cleanup of about 54,000 Known Releases
States reported that cleaning up known releases from leaking underground storage tanks would cost an estimated $12 billion in public funds from state and federal sources. We asked states to exclude from their estimates any money spent prior to September 30, 2005, to clean up these releases. Tank owners or operators will pay the entire costs to clean up another 34 percent of these 117,000 releases, according to state officials. The Number of Releases from Tanks without a Viable Owner and the Public Cost of Such Releases Are Not Fully Known
The full extent of releases from tanks without a viable owner is unknown. The remaining states generally reported that they checked this coverage less often or not at all (see fig. 4). 5). States Primarily Rely on Financial Assurance Funds to Clean Up Releases and Limit Cleanup Based on Funding Availability
Most states use financial assurance funds to pay for cleaning up releases from underground storage tanks, with most of the revenues coming from state gasoline taxes. States Clean Up Releases from Leaking Underground Storage Tanks Primarily Using Financial Assurance Funds
States reported that they primarily use financial assurance funds to pay the costs of cleaning up leaks from underground storage tanks. These funds accounted for $1.032 billion, or 96 percent, of the estimated $1.076 billion from all state sources to clean up tank releases in 2005, according to our survey results. Some State Funds Do Not Have Sufficient Resources to Ensure Timely Cleanups
While state financial assurance funds can provide substantial amounts of funding for cleaning up releases, funds in some states may not have sufficient resources to ensure that these cleanups are performed in a timely manner. Although EPA estimates that releases cost about $125,000 to clean up, on average, most state financial assurance funds charge a deductible of $25,000 or less, according to our survey. In fiscal year 2005, EPA distributed about $58 million of LUST Trust Fund money to the states, or about $1.2 million per state. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator, EPA, take the following four actions: Ensure that states verify, on a regular basis, that tank owners and operators are maintaining adequate financial responsibility coverage, as required by RCRA; Improve the agency’s oversight of the solvency of state assurance funds to ensure that they continue to provide reliable financial responsibility coverage for tank owners; Assess, in coordination with the states, the relative effectiveness of public and private options for financial responsibility coverage to ensure that they provide timely funding for the cleanup of releases; and Better focus how EPA distributes program resources to states, including LUST Trust Fund money, by ensuring that states are reporting information in their semiannual activity reports that is consistent with EPA’s definitions; encouraging states to review their databases to ensure that only data on the appropriate universe of underground storage tanks are being reported in their semiannual activity reports; and gathering available information from states on releases attributed to tanks without a viable owner and taking this information into account in distributing LUST Trust Fund money to states. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to provide information on (1) states’ estimates of the cost in public funding from state and federal sources to clean up known releases from underground storage tanks, (2) states’ primary sources of funding for addressing these releases and their future viability, and (3) the funding available from federal sources to address these releases. To obtain further information about the federal funding to address these releases, we interviewed Department of the Treasury officials responsible for managing the LUST Trust Fund, interviewed EPA headquarters and regional officials to determine the process by which EPA distributes LUST Trust Fund money, and gathered documentation regarding appropriations of money from the fund to EPA, states’ expenditure of fund money, and the balance of the fund and its annual revenues. How many of these new releases over the next five years do you estimate will require at least some amount of public funding to clean up? groundwater .................................... a. 16. What was the overall balance of your state’s financial assurance fund as of September 30, 2005? What was the status of your state’s fund dedicated to tanks without a viable owner as of September 30, 2005? . $ 43. | Why GAO Did This Study
Underground storage tanks that leak hazardous substances can contaminate nearby groundwater and soil. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean up releases from their tanks. They can demonstrate their financial responsibility by using, among other options, publicly funded state financial assurance funds. Such funds function like insurance and are intended to ensure timely cleanup. These funds also pay to clean up releases from tanks without a viable owner, as does the federal Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund. GAO was asked to report on (1) states' estimates of the public costs to clean up known releases, (2) states' primary sources of cleanups funding and their viability, and (3) federal sources to address these releases. GAO surveyed all states and discussed key issues with EPA and selected state officials.
What GAO Found
States estimated that fully cleaning up about 54,000 of the approximately 117,000 releases (leaks) known to them as of September 30, 2005, will cost about $12 billion in public funds. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that it costs an average of about $125,000 to fully clean up a release. State officials said that tank owners or operators will pay to clean up most of the remaining 63,000 releases. However, an unknown number of releases lack a viable owner, and the full extent of the cost to clean them up is unknown. A tank owner may not be viable because the owner fails to maintain adequate financial responsibility coverage, which is intended to provide some assurance that the owner has access to funds to pay for cleanups. While 16 states require annual proof of coverage, 25 states check owners' coverage less often or not at all. Furthermore, 43 states expect to confirm about 16,700 new releases in the next 5 years that will require at least some public funds for cleanup. States reported that they primarily use financial assurance funds to pay the costs of cleaning up leaks. States reported that they spent an estimated $1.032 billion from financial assurance funds to clean up tank releases in 2005. Overall, fund revenues totaled about $1.4 billion in 2005, of which about $1.3 billion came from state gasoline taxes. The assurance funds in the 39 states for which GAO has information held an estimated $1.3 billion as of September 30, 2005, according to state officials. However, many states also use these funds to clean up releases from sources other than underground tanks. Several state assurance funds may lack sufficient resources to ensure timely cleanups. While EPA monitors the status of state funds, its method of monitoring the soundness of these funds has limitations. Furthermore, there are concerns that, by paying the bulk of the cleanup costs, state financial assurance funds may provide disincentives for tank owners--who pay only a relatively small deductible--to prevent releases. In addition to their own funds, states employ resources from the LUST Trust Fund, the primary federal source of funds for cleaning up releases from underground storage tanks. As of September 30, 2005, the fund balance was about $2.5 billion. For fiscal year 2005, the Congress appropriated about $70 million from the fund to help EPA and the states clean up releases and to oversee cleanup activities. EPA distributed about $58 million of this amount to the states to investigate and clean up releases and conduct enforcement efforts, among other actions. To distribute LUST Trust Fund money among the states, EPA uses a formula that includes a base amount for each state and factors to recognize states' needs and past cleanup performance. However, although the LUST Trust Fund provides funds to states to assist in addressing releases from tanks without a viable owner, EPA has not incorporated this factor into its formula. Furthermore, EPA's information on states' performance comes from state reports; however, GAO found that some of the information in these reports is inaccurate and inconsistent. |
gao_GAO-15-522T | gao_GAO-15-522T_0 | Twenty-four Areas Identified to Improve Efficiency and Effectiveness across the Federal Government
In our 2015 annual report, we identify 12 new areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, and we present 20 actions to executive branch agencies and Congress to address these issues. An example of duplicative federal efforts is the US Family Health Plan (USFHP)—a statutorily required component of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Health System—and TRICARE Prime, which offers the same benefits to military beneficiaries. To eliminate this duplication within DOD’s health system and potentially save millions of dollars, we suggested that Congress terminate the statutorily required USFHP. In addition to areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, our 2015 report identified 46 actions that the executive branch and Congress can take to reduce the cost of government operations and enhance revenue collections for the U.S. Treasury in 12 areas. These opportunities for executive branch or congressional action exist in a wide range of federal government missions (see table 2). Examples of opportunities to reduce costs or enhance revenue collections from our 2015 annual report include updating the way Medicare pays certain cancer hospitals, rescinding unobligated funds, and re-examining the appropriate size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Congress and Executive Branch Agencies Continue to Make Progress toward Addressing Our Identified Actions
In addition to the 66 new actions identified for this year’s annual report, we have continued to monitor the progress that executive branch agencies or Congress have made in addressing the issues we identified in our 2011-2014 annual reports. In total, as of March 6, 2015, the date we completed our audit work, we found that overall 169 (37 percent) were addressed, 179 (39 percent) were partially addressed, and 90 (20 percent) were not addressed. Executive branch and congressional efforts from fiscal years 2011 through 2014 have resulted in over $20 billion in realized cost savings to date, with another approximately $80 billion in additional benefits projected to be accrued through 2023.the progress that has been made over the last 4 years. This level of spending suggests that by using smarter buying practices the government could realize billions of dollars in savings. These recommendations, if effectively implemented, could improve program management, help reduce improper payments in these programs, and achieve cost savings. Existing and New Tools Can Assist in Identifying, Evaluating, and Addressing Fragmentation, Overlap, or Duplication
For GAO’s most recent work on GPRAMA, see GAO, Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories, GAO-15-83 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 31, 2014); Managing for Results: Selected Agencies Need to Take Additional Efforts to Improve Customer Service, GAO-15-84 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 24, 2014); and Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of Performance Information to Make Decisions, GAO-14-747 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 26, 2014). To help analysts and decision makers better assess the extent of fragmentation, overlap and duplication, GAO has developed an evaluation and management guide (GAO-15-49SP), which is being released concurrently with our 2015 annual report. Part one provides four steps for analysts—including federal, state, and local auditors; congressional staff; and researchers—to identify and evaluate instances of fragmentation, overlap or duplication. In recognition that the pervasiveness of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication may require attention beyond the program level, the guide also includes information on a number of options Congress and the executive branch may consider to address these issues government- wide. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the government continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Such opportunities exist throughout government.
To bring these opportunities to light, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to annually identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives (both within departments and government-wide) that are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative. As part of this work, GAO also identifies additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhanced revenue collection. GAO's 2015 annual report is its fifth in this series ( GAO-15-404S P).
This statement discusses (1) new opportunities GAO identifies in its 2015 report; (2) the status of actions taken to address the opportunities GAO identified in its 2011-2014 reports; and (3) existing and new tools available to help executive branch agencies and Congress reduce or better manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. To identify what actions exist to address these issues and take advantage of opportunities for cost savings and enhanced revenues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2015 annual report identifies 66 new actions that executive branch agencies and Congress could take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 24 areas. GAO identifies 12 new areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO suggests that Congress repeal the statutorily required US Family Health Plan—a decades-old component of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Health System—because it duplicates the efforts of DOD's managed care support contractors by providing the same benefit to military beneficiaries. GAO also identifies 12 areas where opportunities exist either to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections. For example, GAO suggests that Congress update the way Medicare has paid certain cancer hospitals since 1983, which could save about $500 million per year.
The executive branch and Congress have made progress in addressing the approximately 440 actions government-wide that GAO identified in its past annual reports. Overall, as of March 6, 2015, 37 percent of these actions were addressed, 39 percent were partially addressed, and 20 percent were not addressed. Executive branch and congressional efforts to address these actions over the past 4 years have resulted in over $20 billion in financial benefits, with about $80 billion more in financial benefits anticipated in future years from these actions. Although progress has been made, fully addressing all the remaining actions identified in GAO's annual reports could lead to tens of billions of dollars of additional savings.
Addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication within the federal government is challenging due to, among other things, the lack of reliable budget and performance information. If fully and effectively implemented, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 and the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 could help to improve performance and financial information. In addition, GAO has developed an evaluation and management guide ( GAO-15-49SP ), which is being released concurrently with the 2015 annual report. This guide provides a framework for analysts and decision makers to identify and evaluate instances of fragmentation, overlap and duplication and consider options for addressing or managing such instances. |
gao_GAO-03-508 | gao_GAO-03-508_0 | The federal government pays the interest costs on the loan while the student is in school. An Estimated 22 Percent of Federal Aid Recipients Received Aid above Their Federally Defined Need
In school year 1999-2000, an estimated 732,000 out of 3.4 million full- time/full-year federal aid recipients (22 percent) received $2.96 billion in financial aid greater than their federally defined financial need, either because they or their parents received substitutable loans or because they received nonfederal financial aid, such as scholarships, in addition to federal aid. We estimate this to be $2.72 billion with an average amount of about $4,300. In addition, there was no pattern in terms of the types of schools they attended. We found, however, that only 17 percent of the students in this group received Pell grants. Savings from Limiting Aid Greater Than Federally Defined Need Would Likely Be Modest, but Substitutable Loans to Students Could Affect Their Indebtedness
Changing the Higher Education Act to limit the receipt of aid that is greater than students’ federally defined financial need is not likely to achieve significant federal savings. However, the use of substitutable loans could increase overall student indebtedness. For guaranteed loans, the government incurs costs—primarily insurance claims payments to lenders for defaulted loans and special allowance payments made to lenders to ensure a guaranteed return on the loans they make. The widespread use of substitutable loans might also affect Education’s ability to help students and their families maintain their loan indebtedness at manageable levels. This could increase the average debt burden of these students above that of other students. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine how often students who were federal financial aid recipients received aid that was greater than their federally defined financial need, identify the student, school, and financial aid package characteristics associated with receiving such aid, and determine what the implications might be, if any, of changing the Higher Education Act to limit the receipt of aid that is greater than a student’s federally defined need. To meet their EFC under Title IV, families can obtain non-need-based loans, which we refer to as substitutable loans. Majority from Non-Need-Based Federal Loans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over half of the $80.4 billion in financial aid provided to college students in the 2000-01 school year came from the federal government in the form of grants and loans provided under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA). To help finance their education, students and families may have received other funds from states, private groups or lenders, and/or the schools themselves. We initiated this study to, among other things, determine how often federal financial aid recipients received aid that was greater than their federally defined need and what cost or other implications might result from changing HEA to limit such aid.
What GAO Found
We found that in school year 1999-2000, of the 3.4 million full-time/full-year federal aid recipients, 22 percent (732,000) received a total of $2.96 billion in financial aid that was greater than their federally defined financial need. Of these, 628,000 received an estimated $2.72 billion in such aid by obtaining non-need-based loans--which we identify as substitutable loans--that families borrow to meet their expected family contribution. Title IV allows for students and families to obtain these non-need-based loans to meet their expected family contribution. Another 104,000 federal aid recipients received an estimated $238 million in such aid as a result of receiving a combination of aid from federal and nonfederal sources. Changing the HEA to limit the receipt of aid that is greater than students' federally defined financial need is not likely to achieve significant federal savings, although, the use of substitutable loans may increase overall student indebtedness. In terms of cost implications, limiting those instances where federal aid recipients receive substitutable loans--which is the main reason why students received aid greater than their federally defined need--will not likely result in significant savings. While the government will not have to pay default claims or special allowance payments on loans it guarantees, it would forego any interest earnings on loans it makes directly. Any savings from limiting these loans would be substantially less than the total amount of the loans made--the $2.72 billion. However, the widespread use of substitutable loans may increase the average debt of borrowers and may affect Education's ability to help students and their families maintain their loan debt at manageable levels. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-220 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-220_0 | I would like to emphasize that GAO does not take a position on what action the Congress should take on the executive branch’s request. The most important of these, according to IMF, are the currency holdings provided through quota subscriptions that underpin most of IMF’s operating funds. Availability of IMF’s Currency Holdings
IMF’s determination of available currency holdings, its primary source of readily available funding for carrying out its operations, is based on its judgment concerning the level of usable currency and the level of reserves needed for contingencies. IMF officials have stated that reserves are necessary for two reasons: (1) to maintain sufficient working balances in various currencies to execute foreign exchange transactions and (2) to have available for use in the event that some currencies become unusable and can no longer be used to finance IMF transactions due to a deterioration in members’ balance of payments and external reserve positions. First, IMF calculates the amount of currency holdings from quotas, which was estimated to be about $195 billion as of July 20, 1998. Of the $195 billion of currency holdings, IMF estimates that, before taking into consideration IMF extended credit, about $130 billion, or 67 percent, is usable. The remaining $65 billion is unusable. Estimated undrawn commitments total about $17 billion. In order not to drop below this 30-percent threshold, IMF would have to retain about $30 billion to $35 billion of its $43 billion in usable and uncommitted resources, which would leave only about $8 billion to $13 billion of resources that IMF could use. July 20, 1998)
Other Potential Resources Available to IMF
In addition to its permanent, quota-based resources, IMF’s Articles of Agreement permit it to borrow funds for use in its operations and transactions. In 1995, IMF’s Executive Board adopted a policy on gold. However, these documents are not publicly available. According to IMF, these documents contain information that could be market sensitive because they include judgment calls about which members’ currencies are strong or weak. IMF and U.S. Treasury officials told us that few people outside of IMF use or rely on IMF’s public financial statements for information about IMF’s financial condition or liquidity, and IMF and Treasury officials indicated that most potential users of financial statements do not consider them to be very useful for decisionmaking purposes. The International Monetary Fund’s Current Lending
You asked us to provide information on IMF’s current lending. Indonesia’s November 1997 IMF financing arrangement for about $10.1 billion, which was augmented by an additional $1.3 billion on July 15, 1998, now totals about 557 percent of its quota. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) financial operations and financial reporting, focusing on: (1) what resources IMF currently has available to carry out its operations; and (2) whether IMF's financial condition can be determined from publicly available information. GAO did not take a position on what action the Congress should take on the executive branch's request for about $17.5 million for IMF.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IMF has a total of about $195 billion in currency holdings in its general resources account that has been provided through quota subscriptions by its 182 members; (2) however, as of July 20, 1998, IMF estimates that only about $130 billion of these funds represent resources that could be used; that is, are from members that are sufficiently strong economically to permit their currencies to be used for IMF operations; (3) of this amount, about $70 billion has already been used to finance credit to IMF members and about $17 billion has been committed for their use; (4) therefore, according to IMF's estimate, only about $43 billion of its $195 billion in currency holdings remain for operations, including lending; (5) further, IMF and Department of the Treasury officials have indicated in public statements that only about $10 billion to $15 billion of the available $43 billion could be used for additional credit to IMF members without leaving IMF seriously short of funds due to IMF's need to maintain certain reserves; (6) these IMF estimates do not take into account the $11.4 billion IMF financing arrangement for Russia that was approved by IMF's Executive Board on July 20, 1998; (7) about $2.9 billion of this $11.4 billion will come from IMF's remaining general currency holdings, and IMF will borrow the other $8.5 billion from 11 member governments that participate in the General Arrangements to Borrow; (8) IMF's available funds are reported in its annual report; however, the report is released six months after IMF's fiscal year ends and, according to IMF and Treasury officials, is of limited use for decisionmaking purposes; and (9) instead, decisionmaking requires the use of IMF's quarterly operational budgets, which are nonpublic. |
gao_NSIAD-98-4 | gao_NSIAD-98-4_0 | RM Program’s Implementation Progress
The Navy has made substantial progress in implementing the infrastructure streamlining objective of the RM Program through such efforts as establishing a management structure, a phased execution plan, and a process for realigning and reducing its maintenance infrastructure. Savings Have Not Been Achieved at Projected Levels
Through fiscal year 1996, 102 initiatives with projected savings of $944 million had been identified for the program. Of the 102, the Navy estimated that it would achieve net savings of $198 million through implementation of 55 initiatives during fiscal years 1994-97 and that these projects would continue to provide savings in fiscal years 1998-2001 amounting to $272 million, or a total of about $470 million (see table 1). It planned to implement 47 more between 1998 and 2001. The Navy’s accounting system, like all Department of Defense (DOD) accounting systems, tracks expenses and disbursements but not savings, and the Navy did not establish an independent system to track RM costs and related savings. Additional Opportunities for Future Substantial Savings
The Navy has many opportunities to build on its maintenance infrastructure streamlining progress. 2); that is, of the estimated $944 million its 102 initiatives are projected to save, $746 million would accrue during that period. The Navy has identified other potential regional maintenance opportunities that need to be studied. In addition, the Mid-Atlantic region, in its 1997 update to the fleet business plans, identified 29 new savings initiatives. 3.) The Navy recognizes that parochial and institutional resistance to the RM Program’s objectives and other issues will be difficult to resolve. The biggest barrier to overcome may be resistance to initiatives that eliminate organizations, reduce jobs and promotions, or reduce control over resources. Other barriers to integrating intermediate- with depot-level capabilities are (1) the lack of management visibility over all maintenance-related costs; (2) multiple, unconnected management information systems that do not provide adequate data for regional maintenance planning and decision-making; and (3) the large number of shore duty intermediate-level maintenance positions needed to support the Navy’s sea-to-shore rotation program compared to a lesser number needed to perform the work. Therefore, visible commitment by the CNO is critical to implementing the RM Program, as this involvement accelerates the provision of resources and the coordination needed for efficient and effective program implementation. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to annually report on the RM Program initiatives identified, savings achieved that have been verified in Navy budget and accounting records, and the progress made to overcome the barriers to achieving infrastructure reductions and savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy Regional Maintenance (RM) Program, focusing on the: (1) progress made in implementing the program; (2) savings that have been achieved; (3) opportunities for additional savings; and (4) barriers that inhibit full implementation of the program and achievement of projected savings.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy has made progress in achieving its infrastructure streamlining objective, but it has not been as great as anticipated and challenges remain for accomplishing future plans; (2) to implement the infrastructure streamlining objective, the Navy established steering committees, initiated a phased execution plan, identified a regional structure, and developed business plans; (3) through fiscal year (FY) 1996, the Navy identified 102 initiatives, 55 of which had been started by the end of FY 1997, and 47 of which are to be implemented between FY 1998 and 2001; (4) the Navy projected that its 102 initiatives would save about $944 million, of which $198 million was expected to accrue during FY 1994 to 1997 and $746 million was expected to accrue during FY 1998 to 2001; however, some of the initiatives are not progressing as projected; (5) the Navy cannot identify actual savings achieved because its accounting system does not track RM Program costs and related savings, and the Navy did not establish an independent system to track these costs and related savings; (6) the Navy has opportunities to build on its progress by working to achieve the $746 million in expected savings during FY 1998 to 2001, moving more quickly to implement savings initiatives, and pursuing other opportunities with high potential for significant savings; (7) the Navy identified many of its savings initiatives as high risk because of barriers to implementation; (8) the Navy faces parochial and institutional resistance to the RM Program's objectives and has other complex issues to resolve; (9) the biggest hurdle to overcome may be resistance to initiatives that eliminate organizations, reduce jobs and promotions, or reduce a command's or organization's control over resources; (10) other barriers are: (a) the lack of management visibility over all maintenance related costs; (b) multiple, unconnected management information systems that do not provide adequate data for regional maintenance planning and decisionmaking; and (c) the large number of shore positions desired to support the sea-to-shore rotation program compared to the smaller number needed to perform the intermediate maintenance workload; and (11) visible commitment by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is critical to overcome resistance, accelerate decisionmaking, and provide the necessary resources and coordination needed for efficient and effective program implementation. |
gao_GGD-95-120 | gao_GGD-95-120_0 | To achieve this shift, GPRA requires federal agencies and programs to implement results-oriented management reforms, such as strategic planning, performance planning, and performance measurement and reporting. Overview of Results-Oriented Management Reforms in the Four Countries
During the past 10 to 15 years, each of the countries implemented results-oriented management reforms, such as requiring departments and agencies to define their program mission and goals, measure the progress they made in achieving their goals, and report on their actual progress made compared to goals. Studies Provided Key Performance Measurement Lessons
The government studies and performance reports we reviewed suggested a variety of performance measurement lessons learned for departments in the four countries. These lessons, discussed in detail below, focused on enhancing the usefulness of performance measurement systems to the recipients of the performance information for improving program performance and decisionmaking. These performance agreements focused on the program performance factors that were within the control of program managers. These reforms were aimed at providing departments with more flexibility to allocate resources and to adapt to changing priorities while controlling the growth of expenditures. Operating Budgets. (See table 4.2.) Investment Approaches Supported Results-Oriented Management Reforms
The experiences of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in attempting to bring about a results-oriented management culture provide insights about investment approaches that U.S. agencies may wish to consider as they implement results-oriented management under GPRA. First, the countries had to invest significantly in accounting and performance information systems and training. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the experiences of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in implementing management reforms that U.S. federal agencies may wish to consider during their implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the four countries' reform approaches included establishing and communicating a clear direction by defining agency missions and goals through strategic planning, linking annual objectives to missions and goals through operating plans, measuring output-oriented results, and reporting progress; (2) program outcomes were difficult to measure accurately because conditions beyond managers' control affected the outcomes; (3) key lessons learned focused on enhancing the usefulness of performance measures, making performance measures selective and balanced, including qualitative and quantitative information in performance measurement systems, and providing aggregate detailed information to upper management and program managers; (4) the countries held managers accountable for program results through published performance standards and public surveys, performance goal agreements, and reports to their parliaments; (5) to give managers more flexibility to achieve reforms, the countries eliminated central control of departments' operating expenditures and staffing levels and provided departments with more authority and incentives to manage resources within overall budget ceilings; and (6) changing the government culture in the four countries required that agencies be held accountable for program results. |
gao_GAO-06-23 | gao_GAO-06-23_0 | In addition, 2 million retirees receive pay and benefits from the department. In terms of income, this report found that 87 percent of junior enlisted personnel had total monthly family incomes of $3,000 or less. Although they combine insurance with a savings component promising high returns, many military personnel did not benefit because any savings accumulated on these products can be used to extend the insurance coverage if service members ever stop making payments and fail to request a refund of their savings. A number of financial regulators are also investigating the claims that these companies have been using inappropriate sales practices when soliciting military members, including examining allegations that agents have been inappropriately marketing the insurance products as “investments.” Some of these companies have also been subject to past disciplinary actions by insurance regulators and for violations of DOD regulations governing commercial solicitation on military installations. We also found evidence that large numbers of these products were being sold. Under the basic terms of these products, most of the service members’ first year’s payments would be applied to the life insurance premium and the remainder allocated to the savings fund. Many military members that purchased these products only made their payments for a short period of time. A Unique Securities Product with High Sales Charges Sold to Military Members Has Also Raised Sales Practice Concerns
A few broker-dealers have marketed a unique securities product, often referred to as a contractual plan, to military service members that has proven to be more costly than other commonly available products. Contractual Payment Plans Feature High Up-Front Sales Charges that Are Not Typical of Other Securities Products Available
Under the terms of the contractual plans being sold to military service members, the purchaser enters into a contract to make periodic investments for a set term (such as 10 to 15 years). Even with such limitations, sales charges associated with contractual plans can still be much higher than those of other mutual fund products and industry norms. However, regulators found that it was being sold as an integral part of the entire product, not as an optional feature to a life insurance policy. In addition, regulators in Virginia have also ordered that some companies that target military members to cease selling certain products in their state However, regulators in the other states that are currently conducting investigations of the companies targeting military members were not generally aware of such sales until recent press reports because DOD personnel were not generally sharing information about any service member complaints or concerns they received. Securities regulators’ ability to detect problems was also hampered by the lack of standardized data on the extent to which customers were completing contractual plans. Given that military members move frequently and often leave the service within a few years, many did not continue their payments and failed to request refunds, and as a result, few likely amassed any savings from their purchase. In addition, having insurance regulators and DOD work cooperatively to develop suitability or appropriateness standards could ensure that companies offer only products that address actual service member needs for insurance and that take into account service members’ itinerant lifestyles, income levels, and likely inability to make payments for extended periods of time. Recommendations
To better protect service members from unscrupulous sales of financial products, the Secretary of Defense should take the following two actions: Issue a revised DOD solicitation policy requiring that information on service member complaints related to financial product sales be provided to relevant state and federal financial regulators. We also interviewed officials from the largest broker-dealer firm that markets to military members, which represents 90 percent of the military market segment, and two of the investment management firms that manage mutual funds underlying the contractual plans sold to service members. To assess how financial regulators and DOD were overseeing financial product sales to military members, we interviewed state insurance and federal, state, and other securities regulators. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, a series of press articles alleged that financial firms were marketing expensive and potentially unnecessary insurance or other financial products to members of the military. To assess whether military service members were adequately protected from inappropriate product sales, GAO examined (1) features and marketing of certain insurance products being sold to military members, (2) features and marketing of certain securities products being sold to military members, and (3) how financial regulators and the Department of Defense (DOD) were overseeing the sales of insurance and securities products to military members.
What GAO Found
Thousands of junior enlisted service members have been sold a product that combines life insurance with a savings fund promising high returns. Being marketed by a small number of companies, these products can provide savings to service members that make steady payments and have provided millions in death benefits to the survivors of others. However, these products are much more costly than the $250,000 of life insurance--now $400,000--that military members already receive as part of their government benefits. In addition, the products also allow any savings accumulated on these products to be used to extend the insurance coverage if a service member ever stops making payments and fails to request a refund of the savings. With most military members leaving the service within a few years, many do not continue their payments and, as a result, few likely amassed any savings from their purchase. Several of the companies selling these products have been sanctioned by regulators in the past and new investigations are underway to assess whether these products were being properly represented as insurance and whether their terms were legal under existing state laws. Thousands of military members were also purchasing a mutual fund product that also requires an extended series of payments to provide benefit. Known as contractual plans, they expect the service member to make payments for set periods (such as 15 years), with 50 percent of the first year's payments representing a sales charge paid to the selling broker-dealer. If held for the entire period, these plans can provide lower sales charges and comparable returns as other funds. However, with securities regulators finding that only about 10 to 40 percent of the military members that purchased these products continued to make payments, many paid higher sales charges and received lower returns than had they invested in alternatively available products. Regulators have already taken action against the largest broker-dealer that marketed this product and are investigating the few remaining sellers for using inappropriate sales practices. With the wide availability of much less costly alternative products, regulators also question the need for contractual plans to continue to be sold. Financial regulators were generally unaware of the problematic sales to military members because DOD personnel rarely forwarded service member complaints to them. Insurance products also usually lacked suitability or appropriateness standards that could have prompted regulators to investigate sales to military members sooner. Securities regulators' examinations of contractual plan sales were also hampered by lack of standardized data showing whether customers were benefiting from their purchases. Although recognizing a greater need for sharing information on violations of its solicitation policies and service member complaints, DOD has not revised its policies to require that such information be provided to financial regulators nor has it coordinated with these regulators and its installations on appropriate ways that additional sharing can occur. |
gao_RCED-95-143 | gao_RCED-95-143_0 | Coast Guard Enforcement Has Increased, but Problems Remain
The Coast Guard intensified its enforcement of MARPOL V following congressional criticism in 1990 and 1992 of the Coast Guard’s lack of progress in implementing MARPOL V. More aggressive enforcement, according to Coast Guard officials, has resulted in a steady increase in the number of MARPOL V violations found by enforcement personnel. Accordingly, the number of enforcement cases involving violations of MARPOL V has increased from 16 in 1989, the first year of implementation, to 311 during 1994 (see fig. However, whether the Coast Guard’s success in obtaining penalties is improving over time is not yet known because so many 1993 and 1994 cases are still being processed. Utilization of MARPOL Billets Is Uncertain
For fiscal year 1991, the Senate Committee on Appropriations provided for 100 positions for pollution prevention activities. Therefore, the Coast Guard has embarked on an education and outreach effort to improve compliance. Just how the program is contributing to MARPOL V enforcement is unknown, however, because no good measure of this has been developed. The Coast Guard agreed with the report’s recommendations and has revised its strategy for SeaPartners in fiscal year 1995. It is also important that the Coast Guard continue its efforts to improve its education and outreach program for MARPOL V and its management information system used to monitor the performance of field units in achieving MARPOL V enforcement. We will make copies available to others on request. The first are enforcement data from cases initiated by marine safety offices (MSO). I.1). I.2). I.3). I.7). To describe the Coast Guard’s educational and outreach efforts pertaining to MARPOL V, we met with Coast Guard officials in headquarters and in the field. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on U.S. participation in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL V), which provides for the mitigation of uncontrolled ocean dumping of garbage and plastics, focusing on: (1) the Coast Guard's progress in implementing MARPOL V; (2) whether enforcement personnel are being utilized for MARPOL-related purposes; and (3) the Coast Guard's educational and outreach efforts to improve compliance with MARPOL V.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Coast Guard stepped up its MARPOL V enforcement efforts after congressional criticism in 1990 and 1992; (2) the number of cases involving MARPOL V violations has steadily increased from 16 in 1989 to 311 in 1994; (3) fewer than 10 percent of all cases have resulted in any penalties assessed to the violator, although many cases are still being processed; (4) although there are no accurate means to determine whether the Coast Guard is fully utilizing the additional resources that Congress provided for enforcing MARPOL V, nearly all the designated enforcement positions are filled; (5) in 1994, the Coast Guard's education and outreach efforts for MARPOL V expanded from targeting commercial shippers to other groups, such as boaters and fishermen; (6) the Coast Guard initiated the SeaPartners program to provide marine education to various participants, but it is unknown how the program will contribute to MARPOL V; and (7) the Coast Guard has revised its strategy for SeaPartners in fiscal year 1995 to clarify its mission. |
gao_GAO-12-203T | gao_GAO-12-203T_0 | However, after the initial inspection, the Coast Guard has authorized Interior’s inspectors to conduct such safety inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard and enforce Coast Guard regulations applicable to those facilities as a means to avoid duplicating functions, reduce federal costs, and increase oversight for Coast Guard compliance without increasing the frequency of inspections. Also in accordance with the MOU between the two agencies, Interior conducts both “full” and “limited” inspections of fixed offshore energy facility on behalf of the Coast Guard. Coast Guard’s Security Inspection Program Has Faced Challenges and Could Be Improved
Coast Guard OCS facility guidance provides that Coast Guard personnel are to conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but our analysis of inspections data show that the Coast Guard has not conducted such inspections for most of these OCS facilities. For example, the Coast Guard conducted about one-third of the required annual inspections of OCS facilities from 2008 through 2010 (see table 1). Further, other Coast Guard officials stated that it is easier to arrange for security inspections of floating OCS facilities because marine inspectors visit those facilities more frequently for other types of inspections, such as hull or safety inspections, whereas for fixed OCS facilities, the Coast Guard is required to conduct an initial safety inspection of each new facility and then is solely responsible for conducting annual security inspections of fixed OCS facilities once a year for annual security inspections. The Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to help ensure that its field units conduct annual security inspections of OCS facilities annually in accordance with its guidance. For example, the Coast Guard’s OCS facility guidance does not describe specific procedures for the way in which Coast Guard staff should track whether annual security inspections have been conducted. Coast Guard officials from five of the six Coast Guard field units that conduct annual security inspections of OCS facilities told us that they do not maintain a spreadsheet or other management tool to track whether annual security inspections had been conducted. In our October 2011 report, we made a recommendation, among others, that the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections are consistently conducted. The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and stated that it is planning to update its OCS facility policy guidance for field units to monitor and track annual security inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections are consistently conducted. In March 2010, we found that Interior had not routinely met its oil and natural gas production inspection goals. Specifically, we reported that Interior met its inspection goals only once—in 2008—during fiscal years 2004 through 2008, for four district offices we reviewed in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific. We reported that this difficulty in attracting and retaining key staff contributed to challenges in meeting its responsibilities to conduct inspections, thereby, reducing its oversight of oil and gas development on federal leases, potentially placing the environment at risk. Although Interior has not consistently met its internal targets for production inspections, it has exceeded its target for Coast Guard compliance inspections. For fiscal year 2010, Interior reported that it more than met this goal by conducting such inspections on 169 of the 1,021 staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities—about 17 percent. Further, Interior reported that it has met internal targets for these inspections for the previous 5 years. After the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010, Interior initiated a reorganization of its bureau responsible for overseeing offshore oil and natural gas activities. We stated that while this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective operations, organizational transformations are not simple endeavors. We also expressed concern with Interior’s ability to undertake this reorganization while meeting its oil and natural gas oversight responsibilities. As part of the inspections program reform, Interior plans to hire additional staff with expertise in oil and natural gas inspections and engineering and develop new training programs for inspectors and engineers involved in its safety compliance and enforcement programs. As a result, Interior reported that it was difficult to determine how many inspections would be conducted in fiscal year 2012. The Coast Guard Has Limited Authority over the Security of MODUs Registered to Foreign Countries
While the Deepwater Horizon incident was not the result of a breakdown in security procedures or the result of a terrorist attack, the loss of the Deepwater Horizon, a foreign-flagged MODU, and the resulting oil spill have raised concerns about U.S. oversight over MODUs that are registered to foreign countries. part 104, or (2) they meet production or personnel levels specified in 33 C.F.R. Whereas the Coast Guard may physically inspect a U.S.-flagged MODU to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, the Coast Guard’s oversight of foreign-flagged, self-propelled MODUs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, is more limited. Additionally, the Coast Guard is conducting a study designed to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. Further, the Coast Guard has implemented a new risk-based oversight policy for MODUs, including foreign-flagged MODUs, to address safety and environmental protection issues. Although this policy does not directly address security, increased oversight resulting from this new policy could help mitigate some of the ways in which a MODU might be at risk of a terrorist attack. GAO-10-940T. | Why GAO Did This Study
The April 2010 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), showed that the consequences of an incident on an offshore energy facility can be significant. A key way to ensure that offshore energy facilities are meeting applicable security, safety, and production standards is through conducting periodic inspections of the facilities. The Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior (Interior) share oversight responsibility for offshore energy facilities. The Coast Guard is to conduct security inspections of such facilities, whereas based on an agreement between the two agencies, Interior is to conduct safety compliance inspections on some offshore facilities on behalf of the Coast Guard as well as its own inspections to verify production. This testimony addresses: (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard has conducted security inspections of offshore energy facilities, and what additional actions are needed; (2) the extent to which Interior has conducted inspections of offshore energy facilities, including those on behalf of the Coast Guard, and challenges it faces in conducting such inspections; and (3) the Coast Guard's oversight authority of MODUs. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from September 2008 through October 2011.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard conducted about one-third of its required annual security inspections of offshore energy facilities from 2008 through 2010 and does not have procedures in place to help ensure that its field units conduct such inspections in accordance with its guidance. The Coast Guard's guidance does not describe specific procedures for the way in which Coast Guard staff should track whether annual inspections have been conducted. For example, Coast Guard field unit supervisors and marine inspectors GAO interviewed from five of the six Coast Guard field units that are to conduct annual security inspections said that they do not maintain any tool to track whether such inspections had been conducted. GAO recommended in October 2011 that, among other things, the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections. The Coast Guard concurred and stated that it is planning to update its guidance for field units to address these issues. Interior's inspection program has not consistently met its internal targets for production inspections, and faces human capital and reorganization challenges, but has met its limited target for compliance inspections conducted for the Coast Guard. In March 2010, GAO found that for four district offices it reviewed, Interior only met its production inspection goals once during fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Further, GAO reported that difficulties in hiring, training, and retaining key staff had contributed to challenges in meeting its inspections goals. However, in recent years, Interior reported that it met its 10 percent target to conduct compliance inspections of staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities on behalf of the Coast Guard. In fiscal year 2010, Interior reported that it exceeded its target and conducts such inspections on 169 of the 1,021 staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities and has met this target for such inspections for the previous 5 years. In May 2010, Interior reorganized its bureau responsible for overseeing offshore energy activities. In June 2011, GAO reported that while this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective operations, GAO is concerned with Interior's ability to undertake this reorganization while meeting its oversight responsibilities. Among other things, Interior plans to hire additional staff with expertise in inspections and engineering. Amidst these changes, Interior reported that it was difficult to determine how many inspections it would conduct in fiscal year 2012. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of MODUs registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. MODUs are subject to Coast Guard security regulations if (1) they are self-propelled or (2) they meet specific production or personnel levels. Whereas the Coast Guard may physically inspect a U.S.-flagged MODU to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, the Coast Guard's oversight of foreign-flagged, self-propelled MODUs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, is more limited. The Coast Guard is conducting a study designed to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy facilities, including MODUs. Further, the Coast Guard has implemented a risk-based oversight policy for all MODUs to address safety and environmental protection issues. Although this policy does not directly address security, increased oversight resulting from this policy could help mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack to a MODU. GAO has previously recommended that the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections for offshore energy facilities and that Interior address its human capital challenges. The Coast Guard and Interior agreed. |
gao_GAO-10-213 | gao_GAO-10-213_0 | VA’s Disability Claims and Appeals Processing Has Improved in Some Aspects and Worsened in Others
Over the past several years, the number of disability compensation claims has increased, and VA’s performance in processing such claims has improved in some areas and worsened in others. VA Has Increased Its Output of Claims Decisions but Continues to Experience Some Challenges with Timeliness and Accuracy
From fiscal years 2000 to 2008, the number of claims completed annually by VA has increased but not by enough to keep pace with the increasing number of compensation claims it has received, and, as a result, the number of pending claims has grown. However, VA has also received significantly more claims in recent years. VA has also experienced mixed results in improving the timeliness of its claims decisions. Since then, this average has increased, and in fiscal year 2008, VA took about the same amount of time—196 days—to complete a claim as it did in fiscal year 2000. One factor that has contributed to VA’s lack of significant improvement in claims processing performance is the substantial increase in VA’s disability workloads. VA Has Reduced the Number of Pending Appeals and Improved the Accuracy of Some Appellate Work, but Appeals Processing Timeliness Has Worsened in Recent Years
Since fiscal year 2000, the number of pending appeals has declined, and the accuracy of appeals processing has improved in some areas. Several factors have contributed to the worsening trend in appeals timeliness. received (in thousand)
VA Has Taken Some Actions That Have the Potential to Improve Claims Processing, but Their Impact Is Not Yet Known
VA has taken several steps to improve claims processing, including increasing claims processing staff, redistributing certain workloads, piloting alternative approaches to processing certain claims, and increasingly leveraging information technology to process claims. For example, over the past few years, VA has hired a significant number of disability claims staff to process disability workloads. Although this expansion could improve the timeliness of its decisions, VBA has not collected data to evaluate the effect of this practice. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) trends in the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) disability compensation claims processing at the claims and appellate levels and (2) actions that VA has taken to improve its disability claims process. To examine these actions, we analyzed VBA and Board staffing data; reviewed VA’s budget submissions, internal processing guidance, and other documents such as external studies and VA’s Office of Inspector General reports; and interviewed VA officials and veteran service organization representatives. In addition, the calculation methods differed. Veterans Benefits Administration: Problems and Challenges Facing Disability Claims Processing. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, the disability compensation claims process has been the subject of concern and attention by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Congress, and veteran service organizations (VSO), due in part to long waits for decisions and the large number of claims pending a decision. As GAO and other organizations have reported over the last decade, VA has also faced challenges in improving the accuracy and consistency of disability decisions. GAO was asked to examine (1) trends in VA's disability compensation claims processing at the initial claims and appeals levels and (2) actions that VA has taken to improve its disability claims process. To do this, GAO reviewed and analyzed VA performance data, budget submissions, program documents, and external studies and interviewed VA officials and VSO representatives.
What GAO Found
VA's disability claims and appeals processing has improved in some aspects and worsened in others. In recent years, the number of claims completed annually by VA has increased but not by enough to keep pace with the increasing number of compensation claims received, resulting in more claims awaiting a decision. In addition, the average days that VA took to complete a claim--196 days in fiscal year 2008--has varied over time, but was about the same in fiscal years 2000 and 2008. Several factors have challenged claims processing improvements, such as the increase in the number and complexity of claims submitted to VA, laws, and regulatory changes. VA has reduced the number of pending appeals and improved the accuracy of some appellate work, but the time that it takes to resolve appeals has worsened in recent years. For example, in fiscal year 2008, VA took on average 776 days to process appeals; 78 days longer than in fiscal year 2004. One factor that has contributed to worsening appeals timeliness is the increase in the number of appeals received by VA. VA has taken several steps to improve claims and appeals processing, but their impact is not yet known. VA has hired a significant number of disability claims staff to process disability workloads. VA's Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) has also expanded its practice of workload redistribution, which could improve the timeliness and quality of its decisions. VA is also testing new claims processing approaches--such as shortening response periods for certain claims and appeals through Expedited Claims Adjudication (ECA) and reorganizing its claims processing units. However, VBA has not established plans to evaluate the effect of some initiatives. In addition, VA has taken other steps to improve claims and appeals processing, such as expanding its quality assurance program; upgrading claims processing software; and moving toward paperless processing, which remains elusive in part due to technical challenges. |
gao_GAO-11-750 | gao_GAO-11-750_0 | As new instruments are developed, IRS and taxpayers attempt to fit them into existing tax categories by comparing the new instrument to the most closely analogous instruments for which tax rules exist. While the tax rules for each tax category represent Congress’s and Treasury’s explicit policy decisions, some of these decisions were made long before today’s complex financial derivative products were created. In certain instances, financial derivative transactions can be used to produce equivalent economic outcomes that have different tax results because one financial derivative can fall under numerous tax rules. The current tax treatment is not the only possible method of taxing financial derivatives, and experts have suggested a number of alternatives that they believe would adopt a more consistent view of financial derivatives and potentially reduce abuse. When application of the law is complex or uncertain, as is often the case for financial derivatives, guidance is an important tool for addressing tax compliance and emerging abusive tax schemes. However, Treasury and IRS face a number of challenges that are discussed below that may delay the completion of guidance. This example and others have made Treasury and IRS aware of the importance of weighing the need for guidance with the potential that new guidance may also provide new opportunities for taxpayers to aggressively reduce their tax liability by altering the structure of a transaction. Opportunities Exist for IRS to Leverage Information from SEC and CFTC on Financial Derivatives
IRS Does Not Systematically or Regularly Communicate with SEC or CFTC on Financial Derivatives
Currently, IRS does not systematically or regularly communicate with SEC or CFTC on financial derivatives. IRS’s 2009-2013 Strategic Plan lists strengthening partnerships across government agencies to gather and share additional information as key to enforcing the law in a timely manner to ensure taxpayers meet their obligations to pay taxes. According to IRS officials, such a process could help IRS ensure they are fully using all available information to identify and address compliance issues and abuses related to financial derivatives. These best practices suggest that agencies should look for opportunities to enhance collaboration in order to achieve results that would not be available if they were to work separately. Conclusions
Although financial derivatives enable companies and others to manage risks, some taxpayers have used financial derivatives to take advantage of the current tax system, sometimes in ways that courts have later deemed improper or Congress has disallowed. Because of their unique role in defining policy and administering the tax code, Treasury and IRS are best positioned to study and recommend an alternative approach to the taxation of financial derivatives. However, challenges that IRS and Treasury face in developing guidance for financial derivatives, including the risk of adverse economic effects of guidance changes and the complexity of financial derivative products, have resulted in some PGP projects taking longer than the 12-month period established in the plan. IRS sometimes identifies new financial derivative products or new uses of existing products long after they have been introduced into the market. To provide more useful and timely information to taxpayers on the status of financial derivative guidance projects, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should consider additional, more frequently updated reporting to the public on ongoing projects listed in the PGP, including project status, changes in priorities, and target completion dates both within and beyond the 12-month PGP period. To more quickly identify new financial derivative products and emerging tax issues, IRS should work to improve information-sharing partnerships with SEC and CFTC to better ensure that IRS is fully using all available information to identify and address compliance issues and abuses related to the latest financial derivative product innovations. IRS agreed with our third recommendation to improve information-sharing partnerships with the SEC and CFTC. We reviewed the projects included on the PGP from 1996 to 2010, the years for which IRS had electronic records available. For each of the four case studies, we interviewed IRS and Treasury officials and other tax experts, and analyzed research on the taxation of derivatives, to discuss the identification and progression of these transactions as guidance projects, the challenges IRS and Treasury face issuing guidance on these transactions, and the consequences IRS and taxpayers face from a lack of guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recently, concerns have arisen about the use of certain financial derivatives to avoid or evade tax obligations. As requested, this report (1) identifies and evaluates how financial derivatives can be used to avoid or evade tax liability or achieve differing tax results in economically similar situations, (2) evaluates Internal Revenue Service (IRS) actions to address the tax effects of investments in financial derivatives through guidance, and (3) evaluates IRS actions to identify financial derivative products and trends through information from other agencies. GAO reviewed research and IRS documents and interviewed IRS and, Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials and other experts. GAO analyzed the completion of financial derivative projects on the agencies' Priority Guidance Plans (PGP) from 1996 to 2010.
What GAO Found
Taxpayers have used financial derivatives to lower their tax liability in ways that the courts have found improper or that Congress has disallowed. Taxpayers do this by using the ease with which derivatives can be redesigned to take advantage of the current patchwork of relevant tax rules. As new products are developed, IRS and taxpayers attempt to fit them into existing "cubbyholes" of relevant tax rules. This sometimes leads to inconsistent tax treatment for economically similar positions, which violates a basic tax policy criterion. While the tax rules for each cubbyhole represent Congress's and Treasury's explicit policy decisions, some of these decisions were made long before today's complex financial derivative products were created. Some experts have suggested alternate methods to the current approach for taxing financial derivatives. IRS and Treasury, because of their unique position to define policy and administer the tax code, are best positioned to study and recommend a new approach. When application of tax law is complex or uncertain, as is often the case for financial derivatives, guidance to taxpayers is an important tool for IRS to address tax effects and potential abuse. However, between 1996 and 2010, Treasury and IRS did not complete 14 out of 53 guidance projects related to financial derivatives that they designated as a priority on their annual PGP. While completing guidance is important in providing certainty to taxpayers and IRS and reducing the potential for abuse, challenges like the risk of adverse economic impacts of guidance changes and the transactional complexity of financial derivatives may delay the completion of guidance. Since challenges may prevent IRS from finalizing guidance within a 12-month PGP period, taxpayers need to be aware of ongoing guidance projects' status, some of which may span a number of years. IRS sometimes identifies new financial derivative products or new uses of them long after they have been introduced and gained considerable use. This slows its ability to address potential abuses. IRS's 2009-2013 Strategic Plan lists strengthening partnerships across government agencies to gather and share information as key to identifying and addressing new products and emerging tax schemes more quickly. Through their oversight roles for financial derivative markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may have information on financial derivatives that is relevant to IRS. Similarly, bank regulators may gain relevant knowledge of derivatives' use. IRS officials said such routine communications in the early 1990s did provide relevant information. Although IRS communicates with SEC and CFTC on derivatives, it does not do so systematically or regularly. Strengthening partnerships would increase opportunities for IRS to gain information on new financial derivative products and uses. Studies of interagency coordination suggest that agencies should look for opportunities to enhance collaboration in order to achieve results that would not be available if they were to work separately, and a number of best practices exist to help agencies meet this goal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) Treasury determine whether alternatives to the current approach to taxing financial derivatives would promote consistent treatment of economically similar positions and be beneficial, that (2) Treasury and IRS provide more public information on the status of PGP projects, including those related to financial derivatives, and that (3) IRS strengthen information-sharing partnerships with relevant agencies. IRS agreed with the third recommendation and disagreed with the second; Treasury disagreed with the first two recommendations. GAO continues to believe its recommendations would be beneficial. |
gao_RCED-97-51 | gao_RCED-97-51_0 | STARS Schedule Is Attainable Only If FAA Is Successful in Its Efforts to Mitigate Risks
To achieve the implementation schedule approved by the Joint Resources Council in January 1996, FAA will have to obtain commitment from key stakeholders, resolve scheduling conflicts between STARS and other terminal modernization efforts, and overcome difficulties in developing the system. FAA is aware that these issues pose a risk for STARS and has begun several risk mitigation initiatives. While such actions are encouraging, it is too early to tell how effective they will be. Milestones Call for Initial Implementation by December 1998
FAA’s schedule for developing and implementing STARS by its January 1996 approved baseline is shown in table 1. Cost Estimates for STARS Have the Potential to Increase
FAA’s life-cycle cost baseline has the potential to increase—from $2.23 billion, the level approved by the Joint Resources Council in January 1996, to as much as $2.76 billion. This possible increase is attributable to expected higher costs for operating and maintaining STARS equipment. However, based on a September 1996 analysis, FAA staff identified a potential $529 million increase that could revise the baseline to $1.82 billion. The officials could not, however, provide us with an updated cost estimate or detailed support for their views. Separate and distinct from STARS life-cycle costs are two additional costs that FAA will incur to make STARS operational. The agency is continuing to refine these cost estimates, and it expects to decide later this year on which option to select. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) acquisition planning to date, focusing on the extent to which: (1) the schedule estimate for the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) is attainable; and (2) cost estimates to make STARS operational are likely to change.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the STARS schedule, which calls for implementation of 171 air traffic control facilities between December 1998 and February 2005, is attainable only if FAA is successful in its efforts to mitigate certain risks; (2) specifically, FAA will need to obtain commitment by key stakeholders to the STARS schedule, resolve schedule conflicts between STARS and other modernization efforts, and overcome difficulties in developing system software that could delay implementing STARS; (3) FAA is aware that these issues pose a risk for STARS and has begun several risk mitigation initiatives; (4) while such actions are encouraging, it is too early to tell how effective they will be; (5) FAA's cost estimate for STARS has the potential to increase; (6) FAA's total cost estimate for STARS is $2.23 billion; (7) FAA approved this estimate in January 1996, however, a September 1996 analysis by agency officials pointed to potential cost increases that could drive the total cost estimate to as much as $2.76 billion; (8) this possible increase is attributable to expected higher costs for operating and maintaining STARS equipment; (9) FAA officials are continuing to revise the STARS cost estimate and now believe that cost increases may be significantly lower; and (10) at this time, however, FAA could not provide GAO with an updated estimate. |
gao_GAO-11-886 | gao_GAO-11-886_0 | In the reports, DOD, State, and USAID are to provide the following for each 12-month reporting period: total number and value of contracts and assistance instruments awarded, total number and value of active contracts and assistance instruments, the extent to which such contracts and assistance instruments used competitive procedures, total number of contractor and assistance personnel at the end of each quarter of the reporting period, total number of contractor and assistance personnel performing security functions at the end of each quarter of the reporting period, and total number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or wounded. The joint reports are also to include the sources of information and data used to compile the required information; a description of any known limitations of the data reported, including known limitations of the methodology and data sources used; and plans for strengthening collection, coordination, and sharing of information on contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan through improvements to common databases. The reporting requirements in the NDAA for FY2011 build upon prior national defense authorization act requirements. Agencies Relied on Sources Other Than SPOT, but Data Used Had Significant Limitations
Variety of Data Sources Used to Prepare Joint Report
DOD, State, and USAID’s joint report cited a number of limitations associated with SPOT’s implementation, and as a result, the agencies relied on a variety of other data sources to develop the report. The data presented in the agencies’ joint report had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. As a result, the data should not be used to draw conclusions about contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 or to identify trends over time. While the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, the joint report understates the three agencies’ obligations on contracts and assistance instruments with work performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by at least $4 billion, nearly all for DOD contracts. As we reported last year, SPOT cannot be used to reliably distinguish personnel performing security functions from other contractor personnel, as each of the three available methods has limitations. For example, while contractors and assistance recipients in Iraq report their personnel numbers on a regular basis, a USAID official informed us that only about 70 percent of their contractors and assistance recipients in Afghanistan provide personnel information; a USAID official told us they have a limited ability to verify the accuracy or completeness of the data that are reported, especially for Afghanistan where they operate far more projects than in Iraq; the USAID official responsible for preparing the joint report raised concerns about possible inconsistent reporting of security personnel that could result in double counting; and the data provided to us by USAID for our 2010 report did not include personnel working under several contracts and assistance instruments, such as four cooperative agreements for food security programs in Afghanistan. For example, DOD officials from the SPOT program management office told us that SPOT has been used in conjunction with information from other systems to identify contractors that should be billed for the use of government services, including medical treatment and dining facilities. DOD and State officials also identified instances of using SPOT data to inform operational planning for contractor support. Data and Reporting Limitations Affect Opportunities for Using SPOT to Manage, Oversee, and Coordinate
DOD, State, and USAID officials informed us that shortcomings in SPOT data and reporting capabilities limit their ability to use the system in managing, overseeing, and coordinating contracts with work performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In some cases, officials have relied on other data sources for such purposes. The agencies’ ability to use SPOT for interagency coordination purposes has been limited by the fact that they cannot easily access each other’s data. DOD and State officials informed us that they have increased efforts to validate SPOT data. Additional measures have been undertaken to help address the challenge of tracking local nationals in SPOT. Practical and Technical Challenges Continue to Affect SPOT’s Ability to Track Statutorily Required Data
In 2009, we recommended that the three agencies develop a joint plan with associated time frames to address SPOT’s limitations, but agencies responded that a plan was not needed as their ongoing coordination efforts were sufficient. SPOT program management officials and the agencies have identified plans for further modifications and new guidance needed to address some but not all of these limitations. SPOT is not being used to track the number of personnel killed and wounded. Concluding Observations
In 2008, DOD, State, and USAID designated SPOT as their system of record for tracking statutorily required information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, a designation they reaffirmed in 2010 when the requirement was expanded to include assistance instruments and personnel. Yet the agencies still do not have reliable sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies disagreed with the need for the plan, citing ongoing coordination efforts as sufficient. Based on our review of the agencies’ joint report, we continue to have this concern and are uncertain when SPOT will be fully implemented and serve as a reliable source of data for management, oversight, and coordination. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD, State, and USAID have relied extensively on contracts and assistance instruments (grants and cooperative agreements) for a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the last 3 years, GAO has provided information on the agencies' contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in the two countries, detailing the agencies' challenges tracking such information. Amendments from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 now require the agencies to provide this and other information to Congress through annual joint reports. They also direct GAO to review those reports. In response, GAO reviewed the first joint report and assessed (1) data and data sources used to prepare the report; (2) use of data from the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for management, oversight, and coordination; and (3) efforts to improve SPOT's tracking of statutorily required information. GAO compared data in the joint report to agency data GAO previously obtained, reviewed supporting documentation, and interviewed agency officials, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, on how the data were collected and used.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT's implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies' data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions or identify trends over time. DOD, State, and USAID have used SPOT to a limited extent, primarily to manage and oversee individual contracts and personnel. Agency officials cited instances of using SPOT to help identify contractors that should be billed for the use of government services, including medical treatment and dining facilities. State and DOD officials also identified instances of using SPOT to help inform operational planning, such as preparing for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. Officials from the three agencies indicated that shortcomings in data and reporting capabilities have limited their use of SPOT and, in some cases, led them to rely on other data systems to help manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments. Further, the agencies cannot readily access each other's data in SPOT, which limits interagency coordination opportunities. Recent efforts have been made to improve SPOT's tracking of contractor and assistance personnel. SPOT now allows users to enter aggregate, rather than individual personal information into SPOT, which may overcome resistance to using the system based on security concerns. In addition, DOD and State report increased efforts to validate personnel data in SPOT. However, practical and technical challenges continue to affect SPOT's ability to track other statutorily required data. For example, SPOT cannot be used to reliably distinguish personnel performing security functions from other contractors. Also, while SPOT has the capability to record when personnel have been killed or wounded, such information has not been regularly updated. The agencies have identified the need for further modifications and new guidance to address some but not all of these limitations. It is unclear when SPOT will serve as a reliable source of data to meet statutory requirements and be used by the agencies for management, oversight, and coordination. As a result, the agencies still do not have reliable sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, GAO recommended that DOD, State, and USAID develop a plan for addressing SPOT's limitations. The agencies disagreed, citing ongoing coordination as sufficient. GAO continues to believe such a plan is needed and is not making new recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-769 | gao_GAO-14-769_0 | Background
State has authority to acquire, manage, and dispose of real property abroad. State’s Overseas Real Property Inventory Has Increased, but Data Do not Allow for Comparisons across Years
Our analysis of State’s real property portfolio indicated that the overall inventory has increased. State reported its leased properties, which make up approximately 75 percent of the inventory, increased from approximately 12,000 to 14,000 between 2008 and 2013. However, comparing the total number of owned properties between years can be misleading because State’s method of counting these properties has been evolving over the past several years. For example, OBO has focused on separately capturing structural assets previously recorded as part of another building asset, such as perimeter walls, guard booths, and other ancillary structures. State Officials Said That They Consider Many Factors in Managing Their Overseas Real Property, but Data and Documentation Are Limited
State’s officials said that they consider many factors in managing their real property portfolio, specifically in terms of identifying and disposing of unneeded property, as well as in purchasing and leasing property. As a result, this raises questions about the extent to which posts worldwide are using the code as State intends, and the extent to which State is receiving accurate and comprehensive cost information about its properties. We requested to review 202 files from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 on acquisitions, disposals, and leases, but were only provided 90 files since, according to State officials, the files were not centrally located and too time consuming to find and provide within the time frame of our review. For example, State provided all 36 of the requested lease files, but some documentation that FAM and OMB directs State to retain, and that State agreed to provide, was missing for 30 of the 36 lease files provided. We found that the four posts we visited did not use this code consistently. State’s Foreign Affairs Handbook instructs posts to use the code to record costs related to the disposal of unneeded real property, but does not describe in detail the types of costs that can be charged to this account. Specifically, the Foreign Affairs Handbook includes the following information on this accounting code: “7541 Real Estate-Program Costs: Costs in support of the acquisition and disposal of State real property.” OBO officials told us costs for unneeded properties that should be charged to this code include disposal costs for government-owned buildings, such as guard, maintenance, utility, and other building operating costs of vacant/unneeded property until sold. Although State relies on this account to monitor costs associated with disposal of unneeded properties, on our site visits we found that officials at one post did not know they could use this account for costs related to properties identified for disposal, such as utility bills and condominium fees while marketing the property. We found posts in other countries with unneeded properties identified for disposal in fiscal year 2013 had not charged expenses to this account during that fiscal year such as posts in Jamaica, Ukraine, Tunisia, and Namibia. For example, State may not have the information it needs to make a decision to accept or decline an offer for a property when attempting to maximize revenue for a property disposal. In addition, posts may not have sufficient funding for routine property maintenance because they are using their designated routine maintenance funds on unneeded properties, which could reduce the amount of funding they have available for maintenance of other properties. Without the missing files and documentation, it is unclear how efficiently and effectively State is managing its overseas real property. Clarify accounting-code guidance to the posts for tracking expenses related to disposal of unneeded properties. 2. Take steps to ensure that documents related to real property disposals are prepared and retained in accordance with FAM and OMB guidance. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, State concurred with the report’s recommendations. To determine what factors State considers in managing its real property portfolio and the extent to which it documents its decision-making process, we reviewed sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) applicable to property management overseas and documents prepared by State officials in response to our questions. To evaluate the completeness of these files we compared State’s documentation of real property disposals, acquisitions, and leases to the documentation directives listed in FAM and relevant Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars. We selected these posts because they had (1) ongoing or recently completed embassy construction or renovation projects without disposing of properties, (2) properties reported as identified for disposal for multiple years without being disposed of, and (3) a mix of owned and leased properties. The results of the case studies provide insight into State’s management and decision-making practices but cannot be generalized for the purposes of this review. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State (State) holds or leases about 70-million square feet of real estate in about 275 posts worldwide and has the authority to construct, acquire, manage, and dispose of real property abroad.
GAO was asked to review State's management of overseas real property. This report examines: (1) what is known about State's overseas real property inventory, and (2) what factors State considers in managing its overseas real property portfolio and to what extent it documents its decision-making process pertaining to real property.
GAO requested 202 files for all acquisitions, disposals, and major leases pertaining to State's management of its real property abroad for the period from 2008-2013. In addition, GAO interviewed State officials in headquarters and at four posts abroad, selected because they had (1) ongoing or recently completed embassy construction or renovation projects without property disposals, (2) properties reported as identified for disposal for multiple years without being disposed, and (3) both owned and leased properties. The results of the four case studies cannot be generalized for the purpose of this review.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of the overseas real property portfolio of the Department of State (State) indicates that the overall inventory has increased in recent years. State reported that its leased properties, which make up about 75 percent of its inventory, increased from approximately 12,000 to 14,000 between 2008 and 2013. State's numbers of federally owned properties increased, but comparing the total number of owned properties from year to year can be misleading because State's method of counting these properties has been evolving over the past several years. Specifically, according to State officials, they have been revising their method for counting properties to produce more precise counts and to meet reporting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), among others. For example, State began counting separately structural assets previously included as part of another building's assets, such as guard booths or perimeter walls, and consequently reported approximately 650 additional structural assets in fiscal year 2012 than in 2011, and approximately 900 more structures in 2013.
State officials told GAO that they consider many factors in managing real property; however, GAO found State's available data and documentation on management decisions were limited. State officials said that they work with overseas posts to identify and dispose of unneeded properties, primarily using factors in State's Foreign Affairs Manual ( FAM ) guidance. Such factors include identifying properties deemed obsolete or with excessive maintenance costs. State collects data on costs associated with unneeded properties identified for disposal, relying on posts to charge all such costs to a specific accounting code. The four posts GAO visited did not use this code consistently. For example, officials at one post charged some disposal costs to a routine maintenance account. Officials at the other posts with properties for sale used the code to charge all related disposal costs. GAO also found that other posts with unneeded properties identified for disposal in fiscal year 2013 had not charged expenses to this account. The guidance provided in the FAM for using this code does not detail the types of costs that can be charged. This omission raises questions about the extent to which posts use the code as State intends and the extent to which State receives accurate and comprehensive cost information about its unneeded properties. State, without accurate data on unneeded property, may not have the information it needs to make a decision about property offers when attempting to maximize revenue for property sales. Also, posts may not have sufficient funding for routine property maintenance if they use funds designated for this type of maintenance on unneeded property. GAO requested to review 202 files between fiscal year 2008 through 2013 on acquisitions (72), disposals (94), and leases (36), but was provided 90, as State told GAO that these files were not centrally located and too time consuming to find and provide during the time frame of our review. State provided most of what it considers “core” documents for the acquisition and disposal files, but these documents do not constitute all of the documentation listed in the FAM and OMB guidance. In addition, although State provided all 36 of the requested lease files, some documentation that State agreed to provide was missing for 30 of the 36 files. Without the missing files and documentation, it is unclear how efficiently and effectively State is managing its overseas real property.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State (1) clarify accounting code guidance for tracking expenses related to disposal of unneeded properties, and (2) take steps to collect and retain documents related to real property purchases, disposals, and leases in accordance with the FAM and OMB's guidance. State concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-274 | gao_GAO-12-274_0 | Background
U.S. USCIS Has Developed and Implemented Programs to Support Immigrant Integration but Could Strengthen Assessment of Its Grant Program
USCIS Conducts Outreach and Develops Resources for Citizenship and Naturalization
From 2008 to 2011, OoC reported conducting more than 300 significant outreach events to promote citizenship awareness and civic integration and establish partnerships with governmental and nongovernmental organizations to help encourage immigrants’ civic integration. With funding in fiscal years 2009 through 2011, OoC provided grants to a myriad of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including public school systems, community colleges, community and faith-based organizations, adult education organizations, public libraries, and literacy organizations, under the following grant categories:
Direct Services Grant – Citizenship Instruction Only. In addition to these outputs, OoC has collected some information on outcome measures to demonstrate the extent to which grantees’ programs are helping program participants complete the naturalization process, such as collecting data on participants’ naturalization examination results and the proportion of participants who received grantees’ services and self-reported that they naturalized during the year of the grant program. Specifically, USCIS reported that its data on the number of participants who received naturalization application services and passed the naturalization examination, and who ultimately became naturalized, were incomplete in part because grantees relied on data that were self-reported by program participants, and not all program participants reported to grantees whether they passed the naturalization examination and naturalized. However, USCIS has not yet conducted such an evaluation. In January 2011, USCIS drafted a statement of work for a contractor to refine the strategic plan for the grant program and develop an evaluation plan that would allow USCIS to measure the grant program’s performance and long-term impact, and which may provide options to help address these limitations. According to USCIS, it did not complete this statement of work or award a contract for an evaluation plan because, at that time, the agency was uncertain whether it would receive appropriations in fiscal year 2011 to continue the grant program. DHS’s fiscal year 2011 appropriations act, enacted in April 2011, allowed the use of appropriated funds for the grant program. USCIS has also established relationships with a number of nongovernmental organizations involved in immigrant integration through OoC’s outreach efforts and its grant program. Establishing interim milestones for such evaluations, including milestones for initiating and completing the evaluations, could help USCIS strengthen its planning efforts for the program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen USCIS’s plans for evaluating the Citizenship and Integration Grant Program, we recommend that to the extent that USCIS receives program funding in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the Director of USCIS establish interim milestones for conducting the planned internal and external evaluations of the grant program. DHS stated that to the extent that USCIS receives appropriated program funding and is allowed to use the funding for evaluation purposes, it would establish interim milestones for conducting an internal evaluation of the grant program in fiscal year 2012 and an external evaluation of the grant program in fiscal year 2013. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has taken to implement immigrant integration programs and the extent to which it has assessed the effectiveness of its grant program and (2) the federal mechanism to coordinate governmental and nongovernmental immigrant integration efforts. In some cases, local officials serve as liaisons between city offices on activities that foster immigrant integration. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, about 39 million foreign-born people lived in the United States. Immigrant integration is generally described as a process that helps immigrants achieve self-sufficiency, political and civic involvement, and social inclusion. The Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for a key activity that fosters political and civic involvementthe naturalization and citizenship process. USCISs Office of Citizenship (OoC) supports this process mainly through grants to immigrant-serving entities, but also with outreach activities and education materials. Other governmental and nongovernmental entities play a role in immigrant integration as well. GAO was asked to determine (1) the steps USCIS has taken to implement its integration programs and the extent to which it has assessed its grant program in particular, and (2) what federal mechanism exists to coordinate integration efforts. Among other things, GAO examined documentation on mission objectives and performance measures on immigrant integration and conducted interviews with officials in a nongeneralizable sample of cities and community-based organizations as well as senior USCIS officials about their immigrant integration efforts.
What GAO Found
USCIS has implemented immigrant integration efforts through outreach activities, educational materials, and a grant program, and established various measures for assessing its grant program, but has not yet set interim milestones for planned evaluations of the program. From 2008 to 2011, OoC reported conducting more than 300 significant outreach events to promote citizenship awareness and civic integration. Further, nearly half of OoCs funding over the past 3 fiscal yearsabout $19.8 millionwas spent on grants aimed at preparing immigrants for the naturalization process. The grants were made to a myriad of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including public school systems and community and faith-based organizations. OoC has established various measures for assessing grantees performance under its grant program. These measures include, for example, the number of participants enrolled in grantees citizenship instruction and naturalization preparation programs, the number of participants who passed their naturalization examinations, and the proportion of participants who received grantees services and self-reported that they naturalized during the year of the grant program. However, USCIS has identified inherent limitations with these measures, such as that its data were incomplete in part because data were self-reported by program participants, and not all program participants reported to grantees whether they passed the naturalization examination and naturalized. In January 2011, USCIS drafted a statement of work for a contractor to develop an evaluation plan that would allow USCIS to measure the grant programs performance and long-term impact, and this may help address these limitations. According to USCIS, it did not complete this statement of work or award a contract for an evaluation plan because, at that time, the agency was uncertain whether it would receive appropriations in fiscal year 2011 to continue the grant program, and the program has no authorizing statute. The final fiscal year 2011 law, enacted in April 2011, did allow the use of appropriations to fund the grant program, but USCIS did not proceed with developing an evaluation plan. In November 2011, USCIS reported that it plans to conduct an internal and external evaluation of the program in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, respectively, contingent on appropriations for the grant program. However, USCIS has not yet set interim milestones for these evaluations. Setting such milestones, contingent on the receipt of funding, could help USCIS strengthen its planning for conducting those evaluations, consistent with program management standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USCIS set interim milestones for an internal and external evaluation of its immigrant integration grant program, to the extent that it receives fiscal years 2012 and 2013 appropriations for the program. DHS concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-674 | gao_GAO-16-674_0 | Generally, SSI recipients are eligible to receive up to a maximum benefit rate, with married couple recipients eligible for a lower maximum benefit rate approximately equal to 75 percent of the benefit rate for nonmarried individuals. Medicaid and SNAP are not the only other federal assistance programs available to aged, blind, or disabled individuals with limited means. Multiple SSI Recipient Households Represented an Estimated 15 Percent of All SSI Households in May 2013
Households with Multiple SSI Recipients Represented an Estimated 15 Percent of All Households with SSI Recipients and Typically Included Two Nonmarried Recipients
In May 2013, an estimated 15 percent of all households with SSI recipients included more than one SSI recipient (1.1 million households), according to our analysis of matched administrative and survey data. The vast majority of multiple recipient households reported having a one-family household (an estimated 86.7 percent or 941,000 households), with “family” defined as a group of two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption who reside together. 2). Most Multiple Recipient Households Included Adult Recipients Who Did Not Have Any Earned Income
An estimated 695,000 of 1.1 million multiple recipient households included at least one working-age adult recipient in May 2013 (see fig. 4). For multiple recipient households with SSI recipient children in May 2013, most included only one child recipient, and it was rare for these households to have three or more child recipients. Because the total amount of SSI benefits received by a household includes benefits for all recipient residents, households with multiple recipients received higher monthly average SSI benefit payments (an estimated $1,131) compared to households with one recipient (an estimated $507). Households with nonmarried multiple recipients received a higher estimated average monthly benefit payment than married recipient households (see table 2). The Effects of Changing Benefits for Multiple SSI Recipient Households Are Largely Unknown, and SSA Has Limited Ability to Electronically Manage Claims for Some of These Households
Options for Restructuring Benefits for Multiple SSI Recipient Households Have Been Discussed, but the Effects on SSI Program Costs, Households, and Other Programs Are Largely Unknown
Since the 1990s, members of Congress, SSA officials, and some advocacy groups have discussed alternative benefit structures for individuals living in multiple recipient households. Potential Effects on Benefit and Administrative Costs If the maximum benefit rate for additional multiple SSI recipient households was reduced, SSI benefit costs would likely decrease, according to analyses we reviewed. For example, if a mother lives with two of her children who are both SSI recipients, and the mother reports a change in her earned income, SSA’s system does not automatically adjust both children’s benefit amounts to account for the mother’s change in income. Without the ability to automatically connect and adjust the claim records for individuals living in multiple recipient households whose benefits are inter-related, SSA is at increased risk for improper payments because staff may not adjust benefits for all recipients in a multiple recipient household after a relevant change. Furthermore, SSA staff reported that processing claims for SSI recipients who marry another recipient or separate from another recipient are not possible in the claims management system. Although an SSA official told us that improper payments made in married couple claims in fiscal year 2014 were attributed to recipient errors, staff from 3 of the 5 SSA field offices with whom we spoke said processing claims outside of the claims management system is time consuming and error prone. Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should identify and address risks to achieving their objectives, including significant changes to both external and internal conditions, as well as design their information systems to support the completeness, accuracy, and validity of information needed to achieve objectives. However, SSA has not assessed the risks these systems limitations pose, despite its plans to make changes to its data systems. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure the agency has sufficient information about risks to SSI program integrity when making decisions about efforts to address them, we recommend that the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration conduct a risk assessment of the current manual process for connecting and adjusting claim records of SSI recipients who live in households with other SSI recipients, and, as appropriate, take steps to make cost-effective improvements to SSA’s claims management system to address identified risks. However, we continue to believe that the manual processing currently used to connect and adjust claim records of SSI recipients who live in households with other SSI recipients leaves the agency at risk. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To better understand multiple Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipient households and the potential effects of implementing a change in the amount of benefits received by these households on program administration and other factors, we employed several methods, including: analysis of matched data from Social Security Administration (SSA)
Supplemental Security Record (SSR) and U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) review of relevant program laws, regulations, and other reports for other federal programs for low-income individuals and families interviews with SSA staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA administers SSI, which provides cash benefits to eligible aged, blind, and disabled individuals with limited financial means. Generally, SSI recipients are eligible to receive up to a maximum benefit amount, though the maximum is lower for married couple recipients. Other households with multiple SSI recipients are not subject to this benefit reduction. GAO was asked to review households that include multiple SSI recipients.
GAO examined what is known about (1) SSI recipients who live in households with other SSI recipients, (2) SSI benefits received by households with multiple SSI recipients, and (3) potential effects of implementing a change in the benefits received by households with multiple SSI recipients. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, and regulations; analyzed May 2013 SSA administrative data on SSI recipients that was matched with U.S. Census survey data, the most recent matched data available; and interviewed researchers, disability advocates, and SSA officials in headquarters and five field offices selected for geographic dispersion, a higher concentration of multiple SSI recipient households, and overall population density.
What GAO Found
In May 2013, an estimated 15 percent of the 7.2 million households with blind, aged, and disabled individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash benefits included more than one SSI recipient, according to GAO's data analysis. Of the estimated 1.1 million households with multiple SSI recipients, most included two recipients (953,000) and at least one adult recipient between ages 18 and 64 (695,000). Most households with multiple recipients did not have any child recipients, though an estimated 190,000 had one child recipient, 111,000 had two, and 30,000 had three or more. Few households reported having married couple recipients (an estimated 90,000). Most multiple recipient households reported that members of one family—those related by birth, marriage, or adoption—lived in the household (an estimated 941,000). GAO was unable to determine the specific relationships of recipients in these households.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided households with multiple SSI recipients almost 30 percent, or an estimated $1.2 billion, of the total $4.3 billion paid in SSI benefits in May 2013, according to GAO's data analysis. In that month, multiple recipient households received an estimated average of $1,131 in SSI benefits, compared to $507 for single recipient households. Further, consistent with federal law that applies a lower maximum benefit rate to married couple recipients, GAO's analysis found that households with nonmarried multiple recipients received a higher estimated average monthly benefit payment than married recipient households.
Since the 1990s, several alternative benefit structures for households with multiple SSI recipients have been discussed, but the potential effects of any such change on program costs and recipients are largely unknown. Specifically, reducing the maximum benefit limit for these households would likely decrease benefit costs, according to analyses GAO reviewed; however, the potential effects of such a change on program administrative costs and SSI recipients have not been studied. Further, according to SSA staff, SSA's claims management system lacks the ability to automatically connect and adjust claim records of those living in households with other SSI recipients, as it is structured around providing benefits to individuals. For example, if a mother lives with two of her children who are both SSI recipients, and the mother reports changes to her income, SSA's system does not automatically adjust both children's benefit amounts to account for this change in income. In addition, the system is unable to automatically process claims when two SSI recipients marry or separate, so staff must manually complete forms and calculate benefits outside the claims management system, which is time consuming and error prone, according to staff GAO spoke with in three of five selected field offices. SSA officials said the agency has not assessed the risks associated with the system's limited ability to automatically process claims for multiple recipient households, and has no plans to improve the claims management system to address related issues. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should design their information systems to support the completeness, accuracy, and validity of information needed to achieve objectives. Without assessing risks and making changes to address the issues related to households with multiple SSI recipients, SSA is at increased risk of making improper payments to recipients who live with, marry, or separate from other recipients.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA assess risks associated with the manual process for adjusting claim records for SSI multiple recipient households, and, as appropriate, take steps to make system improvements. SSA disagreed, based in part on its prior payment and accuracy reviews, but GAO continues to believe an assessment is warranted, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-672T | gao_GAO-07-672T_0 | The Army expects FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to provide significant warfighting capabilities to DOD’s overall joint military operations. The Congress required the Secretary of Defense to review specific aspects of the program, including the maturity of critical technologies, program risks, demonstrations of the FCS concept and software, and a new cost estimate and affordability assessment and to submit a report of the findings and conclusions of the review to Congress. This statement is based on work which was conducted between March 2006 and March 2007 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. By early 2009, enough knowledge should be available about the key elements of the FCS business case to make a well- informed decision on whether and how to proceed with the program. Requirements Definition
The Army has made considerable progress in defining system-of-systems level requirements and allocating those requirements to the individual FCS systems. This does not assure that these capabilities will actually perform as needed in a realistic environment, as required by best practices for a sound business case. Even if setting requirements and maturing technologies proceed without incident, FCS design and production maturity are not likely to be demonstrated until after the production decision is made. While the Army’s current estimate of $163.7 billion is essentially the same, an independent estimate from the Office of the Secretary of Defense puts the acquisition cost of FCS between $203 billion and $234 billion. Based on this estimate, the Army must ensure that adequate funding exists in its current budget and future years to fully fund the FCS program of record including the development of the complementary systems deemed necessary for the FCS as well as to procure the FCS capabilities planned to be spun out to the current forces. FCS Business Arrangements
To achieve the Army’s goals for the FCS program, in 2003 the Army decided to employ a lead systems integrator (LSI) to assist in defining, developing, and integrating FCS. For example, FCS is not the first system-of-systems program DOD has proposed, but it is arguably the most complex. Army Use of an LSI Framed by Scope of Program and Workforce Limitations
The Army’s decision to employ a lead systems integrator for the FCS program was framed by two factors: (1) the ambitious goals of the FCS program and (2) the Army’s capacity to manage it. On the one hand, the LSI plays the traditional role of developing a product for its customer, the Army, and on the other hand the LSI acts like a partner to the Army in ensuring the design, development, and prototype implementation of the FCS network and family of systems. In forging a partner-like relationship with the LSI, the Army sought to gain managerial advantages such as maintaining flexibility to deal with shifting priorities. Depending on the closeness of the working relationship, the government’s ability to provide oversight can be reduced compared with an arms-length relationship; more specifically, the government can become increasingly vested in the results of shared decisions and runs the risk of being less able to provide oversight compared with an arms-length relationship, especially when the government is disadvantaged in terms of workforce and skills. OSD is in a position to provide this oversight, but thus far has largely accepted the program and its changes as defined by the Army, even when they are at wide variance from the best practices embodied in OSD’s own acquisition policies. In the fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that DOD hold a formal go/no-go decision meeting on the FCS in 2009. Contract Provides Incentives for Best Effort but Cannot Assure Success
The Army has structured the FCS contract consistent with its desire to incentivize development efforts and make it financially rewarding for the LSI to make such efforts. As with many cost-reimbursable research and development contracts, the contractor is responsible for putting forth its best effort to ensure a successful FCS. By the time the FCS critical design review is completed in 2011, the Army will have paid out over 80 percent of the costs of the LSI contract and the LSI will have had the opportunity to earn more than 80 percent of its total fee. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS) is a program characterized by bold goals and innovative concepts--transformational capabilities, system-of-systems approach, new technologies, a first-of-a-kind information network, and a total investment cost of more than $200 billion. As such, the FCS program is considered high risk and in need of special oversight and review. Today's testimony is based on work conducted over the past year in response to (1) the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which requires GAO to report annually on the FCS acquisition; and (2) the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which requires GAO to report on the role of the lead systems integrator in the Army's FCS program. Accordingly, this statement discusses (1) the business case for FCS to be successful and (2) the business arrangements for the FCS program.
What GAO Found
The Army has far less knowledge about FCS and its potential for success than is needed to fulfill the basic elements of a business case. Those elements are not new to the Army, nor to the Department of Defense (DOD), which addresses such criteria in its weapon system acquisition policy. The Army has made improvements to the program, such as lengthening time frames for demonstrating capabilities and for providing capabilities to current forces. While the Army has also made progress, what it still lacks in knowledge raises doubts about the soundness of the FCS business case. The Army has yet to fully define FCS requirements; FCS technologies that should have been matured in 2003, when the program started, are still immature; key testing to demonstrate FCS performance will not be completed and maturity of design and product will not be demonstrated until after production starts in 2013; and an independent cost estimate from the Office of the Secretary of Defense is between $203 billion and $234 billion, a far higher figure than the Army's cost estimate. To achieve its goals for the FCS program, the Army decided to employ a lead systems integrator (LSI) to assist in defining, developing, and integrating the FCS. This decision reflected the fact that not only were FCS goals ambitious, but also that the Army had limited capacity to manage the undertaking. Boeing Corporation is the LSI. Its relationship with the Army on FCS breaks new ground for collaboration between the government and a contractor. The close working relationship has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that such a relationship allows flexibility in responding to shifting priorities. A disadvantage is an increase in risks to the Army's ability to provide oversight over the long term. The contract itself is structured in such a way as to enable the LSI to be paid over 80 percent of its costs and fees by completion of the critical design review in 2011--a point after which programs typically experience most of their cost growth. This is consistent with the Army's desire to provide incentives for the development effort. On the other hand, this contract, as with many cost-reimbursable research and development contracts, makes the contractor responsible for providing its best efforts, but does not assure a successful FCS. The foregoing underscores the important role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in providing oversight on the FCS program. To date, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has largely accepted the Army's approach to FCS, even though it runs counter to DOD's policy for weapon system acquisition. GAO believes the Office of the Secretary of Defense needs to hold the FCS program accountable to high standards at the congressionally directed decision in 2009 on whether to proceed with FCS. Financial commitments to production will grow rapidly after that point. The Office of the Secretary of Defense should also be mindful of the department-wide implications of the future use of LSIs as well as the system-of-systems approach to developing weapon acquisitions. |
gao_GAO-06-53 | gao_GAO-06-53_0 | Many of the YO program components were based on practices that experts have identified as effective for working with at-risk youth, and the design of the program supported flexibility and invention at the local level. The Department contracted for a $24 million evaluation study that included plans to estimate the impact of the program by comparing key characteristics in the YO communities and comparable areas that did not receive YO grants. Most grantees used a combination of approaches to provide youth services, including collaborating with other organizations and, when they deemed it necessary, developing services of their own. To reach hard- to-serve target population, grantees used a variety of recruiting techniques, ranging from the conventional to the innovative. Grantees Used Program Design to Address Major Challenges, but Found Start-up Time to be Short
Grantees were able to address a variety of challenges in setting up the program and delivering services to youth using local discretion, flexible enrollment rules, and other aspects of the program’s design, but they and others said a longer start-up period would have been beneficial. Conditions in the communities such as violence and lack of jobs presented a challenge to most grantees, but they took advantage of the local discretion built into the program to develop strategies to address them. Grantees Felt Challenged to Set Up Program in Time Allotted, and More Planning Time Would Have Been Beneficial
The majority of grantees reported that finding or renovating centers was a challenge. Grantees and Others Reported That Participants and Their Communities Made Progress, but the Program’s Impact Is Still under Study
Grantees and others reported that the participants and their communities made advancements in education and employment; however, a formal assessment of the program’s impact is still under study. In addition, the majority of grantees reported that they made improvements in the youth service delivery systems in their communities. This type of comparative analysis would be necessary to determine if the events reported by grantees and others would have occurred in the absence of the program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To continue to improve efforts to serve at-risk youth and in order that researchers can evaluate the quality of information and determine possible impact of the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor take the actions necessary to complete the impact analysis of the Youth Opportunity Grant program and release the data and all related research reports from the program’s evaluation. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Survey of Youth Opportunity Grant Program Directors
To learn about the implementation of the Youth Opportunity Grants, we conducted a Web-based survey of all Youth Opportunity Grant Program Directors. To view selected results of the survey, go to GAO-06-56SP. Department of Labor Management Information System (MIS)
We used electronic data collected on the program by the Department of Labor in a management information system (MIS) to describe the number of youth in the program who achieved the Department’s goals for the program, such as high school completion, college enrollment, and long- term education and employment placements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Youth Opportunity Grant program (YO) represented an innovative approach to improving education and employment opportunities for at-risk youth by targeting resources in high poverty areas and incorporating strategies that experts have identified as effective for serving this population. The Department of Labor (the Department) awarded 36 grants in 2000, and the program continued for 5 years. The Department had used a similar approach on a smaller scale in previous programs, but little information is available on the impact of these other programs. In order to understand what can be learned from the Youth Opportunity Grant program, GAO examined the grantees' implementation of the program, challenges they faced, and what is known about the program's outcomes and impact. To view selected results from GAO's Web-based survey of the Program Directors, go to GAO-06-56SP (http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-56SP).
What GAO Found
Grantees used a variety of approaches to build the infrastructure of the YO program, provide services to at-risk youth, and conduct outreach efforts. While grantees set up centers and trained core staff to deliver services, they differed somewhat in their approaches, depending on circumstances within their communities. In addition, grantees employed a combination of strategies to provide youth services, including collaborating with other providers and inventing unique programming. To recruit this hard-to-serve target population, grantees used a range of techniques, from partnering with juvenile justice agencies, to combing malls for eligible youth. Fast program start up, conditions in their communities, and the characteristics and needs of the youth challenged the grantees;however they used features of the program design to address some of these difficulties. Many grantees struggled to set up the program, especially within the Department's time frame. In addition, grantees felt encumbered by the drugs, violence, and a lack of jobs in their communities as well as the obstacles facing their clients, such as low academic achievement and lack of family support. Grantees used the discretion and other components built into the program design to address many of these challenges. For example, in response to safety concerns, an urban grantee elected to provide transportation for youth attending evening events. However, grantees and others said more planning time would have been beneficial. Grantees and others reported that the youth and their communities made progress toward the YO program goals, but the program's impact is still under study. Grantees reported that they had enrolled about 91,000 youth nationwide, many of whom completed high school, entered college, or found employment after enrolling in the program. In addition, grantees and others said that the grants had benefited their communities. However, without an impact analysis, it is not known whether these events would have occurred in the absence of the program. The Department contracted for a $24 million evaluation of the program that included plans for an impact analysis; however, agency officials are unsure if the analysis will be completed. |
gao_GAO-12-888 | gao_GAO-12-888_0 | In fiscal year 2011, more than 2.1 million nonimmigrant visa applicants worldwide were denied visas for entry into the United States. Obtaining an immigrant visa is one part of a four part process for aliens outside of the United States to become a permanent resident of the United States. Certain Countries and Visa Categories Experience High Levels of Fraud, but Trends Evolve over Time
Certain countries, such as Brazil, China, the Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico, had high numbers of suspected fraud cases in fiscal year 2010, and certain visa categories, such as work visas, student visas, and diversity visas, had high levels of fraud. Almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) were referred to Fraud Prevention Units in Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico in fiscal year 2010. According to State officials, some visitor visa applicants provide fraudulent statements or documents, such as a false bank statement, to demonstrate strong ties with their home country and therefore overcome the presumption that they intend to use their temporary visitor visa to illegally immigrate to the United States. State Has a Variety of Tools and Resources to Combat Fraud, but Does Not Have a Policy for Systematically Utilizing Domestic Anti-Fraud Resources
Consular officers rely on State’s advanced information technology, fraud reports, and domestic and overseas fraud prevention resources to improve their ability to detect and deter fraud. Any post may request KCC assistance in conducting research and analysis on visa applications, either on an ad-hoc basis for individual cases, or on a pilot basis for larger-scale projects. Overseas Anti-Fraud Staffing Levels and Workload Vary by Post
Anti-fraud staffing levels in Fraud Prevention Units vary widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. For example, a Fraud Prevention Manager in a high-fraud post that we visited told us that the post would like additional KCC prescreening of certain visa categories, but was unaware of how to request KCC assistance. Although State Offers a Variety of Anti- Fraud Training Courses, Fraud Prevention Managers Are Not Required to Take Them
Although State offers anti-fraud courses in a classroom setting and online, State does not require Fraud Prevention Managers to take them. For example, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers we met with had not been trained in MATRIX. Additionally, between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up approximately 22 percent (489 of 2,252) of the total number of students who registered for Detecting Imposters (PC128) and 21 percent (486 of 2,246) of the total number of students who registered for Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544). Entry-level officers are required to take only limited fraud prevention training that does not include new anti-fraud technologies. However, State does not have a policy that specifies how to systematically utilize the center’s resources, based on post workload and fraud trends. Recommendations
To further improve the visa fraud prevention process, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following two actions: (1) Formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at the Kentucky Consular Center, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the department; and (2) Establish standardized training requirements for Fraud Prevention Managers, to include training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met. State concurred with our recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the most visa fraud; (2) technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. To assess State’s use of technologies and resources to combat fraud, we met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems and Technology to review State’s major data systems as well as the latest technological tools available to consular officers and Fraud Prevention Managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign nationals may apply for entry into the United States under dozens of different visa categories, depending on circumstances. States Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security share responsibility for the prevention of visa fraud, which is a serious problem that threatens the integrity of the process. Some documents through illegal means, such as using counterfeit identity documents or making false claims to an adjudicating officer. Visa fraud may facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, human trafficking, and terrorism. This report examines (1) countries and visa categories that are subject to the most fraud; (2) State's use of technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. GAO examined State's reports and data on fraud trends and statistics, examined resources and technologies to counter fraud, and observed visa operations and fraud prevention efforts overseas and domestically.
What GAO Found
Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time.
State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use. For example, State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity. Overseas posts have Fraud Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC assistance.
Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs enrollment. Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. In addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or rotational. Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them. Four out of the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case management system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State (1) formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at KCC, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the Department and (2) establish requirements for FPM training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met. State concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-232 | gao_GAO-13-232_0 | The CAA amended sections of the Children’s Health Act of 2000—which required HHS to conduct activities related to autism research, surveillance, and coordination—by revising some sections and repealing other sections of that law as well as establishing new requirements.CAA authorized, but did not appropriate, federal funding to carry out these activities in fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011. HHS Agencies Responded to the CAA by Establishing New Autism Activities and Continuing Others
HHS agencies responded to the CAA with new or continuing autism activities. In fiscal year 2008, HRSA created the Combating Autism Act Initiative in response to specific directives included in the CAA. Through this initiative, HRSA expanded its existing training programs to include an autism-specific component and established new autism research and state grants. NIH and CDC continued the autism activities each implemented prior to the enactment of the CAA, but did not create new programs as a direct result of the CAA. Since the enactment of the CAA, NIH continued to fund, expand, and coordinate autism research through its Autism Centers of Excellence and autism-specific grants and contracts. According to agency officials, NIH awards these grants and contracts under its general Public Health Service Act authorities and not under the specific authorities provided in the CAA.fund its regional centers of excellence for autism epidemiology and other activities, such as an awareness campaign on autism and other developmental disabilities. As required by the CAA, the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC)—initially established under the Children’s Health Act— restructured its membership and assumed additional responsibilities to coordinate autism efforts within HHS. IACC membership expanded to include 11 nonfederal members that represented individuals with autism and parents of children with autism. Since fiscal year 2007, the IACC issued several reports as a means to coordinate HHS autism efforts and monitor federal autism activities, some of which were specifically required by the CAA, such as the development of an autism strategic plan and a summary of advances in autism research.appendix II for a description of the documents produced by the IACC. In addition to the changes to the IACC, in 2008, NIH created the Office of Autism Research Coordination (OARC) within the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) to coordinate and manage the IACC and related cross-agency activities, programs, and policies. While the CAA authorized appropriations for HRSA, NIH, and CDC autism activities, the CAA did not appropriate funds for this purpose. Reinvestment Act of 2009. The IACC’s funding increased significantly from fiscal year 2006 to 2011. From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011, the IACC also received funds from the annual NIH appropriation. HRSA Routinely Collects and Reviews Information to Oversee CAA Grantees
HRSA, the only HHS agency that awarded grants specifically as a result of the CAA, regularly collects and reviews information from grantees to oversee individual CAA grantees as well as to provide oversight to its CAA programs. HRSA awarded approximately $164 million in grants to 110 CAA grantees from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. As part of the agency’s oversight of its CAA grantees, HRSA requires periodic reports from these grantees, which are reviewed by HRSA staff. Semiannual progress reports. In addition to reports, HRSA also requires grantees to submit written requests before making certain changes to the grant project, known as prior-approval requests. For example, a change in the director of the grant project requires prior approval, as does a request to carry over unobligated funds to the next budget period or a request for a no-cost extension—an extension for a limited period beyond the end of the project period so that the grantee can complete project activities. Generally, grantees submitted required reports and HRSA staff documented their review of these reports. Specifically, the 22 grantees in our unbiased random sample submitted all of the 106 reports they were required to submit and most of these reports were submitted on time. Our review confirmed that HRSA has conducted a number of site visits to monitor CAA grantees. For example, nine of the grantees in our review had documentation indicating that a site visit had been conducted, with only two of these being required site visits. Besides overseeing specific grantees, HRSA monitors its CAA activities at the program level by regularly collecting performance reports from grantees. Finally, to further help oversee CAA programs and consolidate information on its monitoring approach for these programs, in December 2012 HRSA released a grant-management operations manual to outline its overall approach for monitoring these programs. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. HHS provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix III: Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Funding for Autism Activities for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
HHS component Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
HRSA’s totals include autism grant awards, as well as, for example, funding used for HRSA’s personnel expenses, travel, supplies, and overhead related to reviewing these grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
CDC considers autism to be an important public health concern. In 2012, CDC reported that an estimated 1 in 88 children in the United States has been identified as having autisma 23 percent increase from its estimate of 1 in 110 reported in 2009. Autism is a developmental disorder involving communication and social impairment. Symptoms usually become evident in early childhood. There are many suspected causes and no known cure.
HHS agencies fund educational and support services for individuals diagnosed with autism and fund research in a variety of areas, such as identifying the causes of autism and intervention options. The CAA amended sections of the Childrens Health Act of 2000 related to autism and established new requirements. The CAA, enacted in December 2006, authorized the expansion of HHSs activities related to autism research, surveillance, prevention, intervention, and education through fiscal year 2011. The CAA authorized, but did not appropriate, federal funding to carry out these activities.
In this report, GAO (1) describes the actions that HHS agencies have taken as a result of the CAA, and (2) examines the oversight of CAA grantees. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed CAA and HHS documents and interviewed agency officials to identify the autism activities resulting from the CAA. GAO also determined the amount certain HHS agencies spent on autism activities from fiscal year 2006prior to the CAAthrough fiscal year 2011. In addition, GAO reviewed files for a random sample of CAA grantees to examine oversight from 2008 to 2011.
What GAO Found
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies responded to the Combating Autism Act of 2006 (CAA) by establishing some new autism activities and continuing others. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) created a new initiative to address specific directives in the CAA. Through this initiative, HRSA expanded its existing training programs by requiring grantees to include training specific to autism. It also established new autism research grants and funded new state grants to improve services for children with autism. HRSA awards its autism grants under the authority of the CAA. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continued their autism activities--some of which were undertaken in response to the Children's Health Act of 2000--but did not create new programs as a direct result of the CAA. NIH continued to fund, expand, and coordinate autism research through its Autism Centers of Excellence and autism-specific grants and contracts. CDC continued to fund its regional centers of excellence for autism epidemiology and other activities, such as an awareness campaign. HHS's Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC)--reauthorized by the CAA--assumed additional responsibilities to coordinate autism efforts within HHS and restructured its membership to include more nonfederal members. NIH created the Office of Autism Research Coordination to coordinate and manage the IACC. The CAA did not appropriate funds to any HHS agency. Nevertheless, overall spending on HRSA, NIH, CDC, and IACC autism activities increased from approximately $143.6 million in fiscal year 2006 to approximately $240.4 million in fiscal year 2011.
HRSA, the only HHS agency that has awarded grants specifically as a result of the CAA, regularly collects and reviews information from grantees to oversee individual CAA grantees and programs. HRSA awarded approximately $164 million in grants to 110 CAA grantees from fiscal years 2008 to 2011; though, some of these grantees were already receiving funds prior to the CAA. To oversee these grantees, HRSA requires they regularly submit progress reports and financial reports. The agency also requires grantees to obtain prior approval before making certain changes to their projects. GAO reviewed documentation for an unbiased random sample of 22 grantees, which were representative of the 110 CAA grantees. GAO found that CAA grantees submitted all required reports. Many grantees submitted prior-approval requests for changes to their projects. Most frequently, grantees requested to carry over unobligated funds from the current year to the next budget period. GAO found that HRSA staff routinely collected and reviewed information submitted by the grantees and appropriately documented their review and approval of these submissions. HRSA also conducted site visits and provided technical assistance as a means of overseeing grantees. HRSA conducted site visits with 9 of the grantees in our sample during the period of our review, while only 2 of these were required sites visits. Besides overseeing grantees, HRSA monitors its overall CAA programs by regularly collecting performance reports from grantees. In addition, in December 2012, HRSA released a grant-management operations manual to outline its overall approach for monitoring its CAA programs.
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. In response, HHS provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-364 | gao_GAO-12-364_0 | Division offices partner with state agencies to conduct a variety of motor carrier oversight activities carried out by certified auditors, inspectors, and investigators. The interstate commercial motor carrier industry is large and dynamic. After a carrier registers for a USDOT number, FMCSA uses the new entrant safety assurance program to examine all new entrants registered to operate in interstate commerce—including all for-hire and private passenger, household goods, and freight carriers—and intrastate hazardous materials carriers. FMCSA Does Not Determine the Prevalence of Chameleon Carriers; Our Analysis Found More than 1,100 New Applicant Carriers with Chameleon Attributes in 2010
FMCSA Cannot Readily Determine the Number of Chameleon Carriers
FMCSA does not determine the prevalence of chameleon carriers because doing so would require extensive investigation of the tens of thousands of new applicants that register with FMCSA each year and, in some cases, the completion of a legal process. While FMCSA’s exclusive focus on passenger and household goods carriers limits the vetting program to a manageable number, it does not account for the risk presented by chameleon carriers in the other groups that made up 98 percent of new applicants in 2010. As we have previously reported, federal agencies need to assess the risks they face to determine the most effective allocation of federal resources, including how best to distribute resources for investigative and enforcement-related activities. As table 2 shows, 18 percent of carriers with chameleon attributes were involved in a severe crash at some point between their time of registration and the end of 2010, compared with 6 percent of new applicant carriers without these attributes. FMCSA’s Investigative Programs Are Not Well Designed to Identify Chameleon Carriers across All New Applicants
Vetting Program Is Designed to Identify Chameleon Carriers but Is Neither Comprehensive nor Risk-Based
FMCSA’s vetting program, established in August 2008 immediately following the Sherman, Texas, bus crash, is designed to assess the ability of an applicant for new operating authority to comply with FMCSA motor carrier safety regulations and, in part, to determine whether the new The program—which is FMCSA’s applicant may be a chameleon carrier.primary effort to identify chameleon carriers—is labor-intensive, according to officials, requiring detailed reviews of each application, national consumer complaint database queries, and outreach to division offices to obtain additional information about new applicants. However, FMCSA officials stated they do not have the resources to vet all for-hire carriers that apply for new operating authority. Specifically, crashes involving unsafe passenger carriers, such as the Sherman bus crash, may have multiple fatalities. As discussed, freight carriers made up 94 percent of the carriers we identified with chameleon attributes from 2005 through 2010, and carriers with chameleon attributes were about three times more likely than all other new applicants to be involved in a severe crash or to be assessed a fine by FMCSA for a safety violation. 3). New Entrant Safety Assurance Program Audit Includes Questions Designed to Help Identify Chameleon Carriers but Does Not Provide Related Guidance
Newly registered motor carriers, including those that were vetted, are required to enter the new entrant safety assurance program and undergo a safety audit. The representatives told us the lack of guidance on how to use the questions made it difficult to distinguish chameleon from legitimate carriers. As a result of a 2010 decision by an FMCSA Assistant Administrator, it is not clear whether a state or a federal legal standard should be used by FMCSA to demonstrate that a carrier is a chameleon. This uncertainty can lead to differing enforcement actions across states and has increased the time necessary to pursue chameleon carrier cases. Other constraints include a resource-intensive legal process and limitations in FMCSA’s enforcement authorities. FMCSA is pursuing options to address these constraints. Specifically, FMCSA cannot preclude carriers, including suspected chameleon carriers, from acquiring a new USDOT number. In addition, FMCSA is pursuing two other means to achieve a single federal legal standard. FMCSA generally concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the prevalence of chameleon carriers, how well the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) investigative programs are designed to identify suspected chameleon carriers, and what constraints, if any, FMCSA faces in pursuing enforcement actions against suspected chameleon carriers. Assessing FMCSA’s Investigative Programs
To determine how FMCSA’s investigative programs are designed to identify chameleon carriers, we reviewed federal motor carrier laws and safety regulations; federal internal control standards; related reports and statements published by GAO, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General; documentation about FMCSA’s vetting processes and procedures, which FMCSA refers to as the vetting program; FMCSA policy memorandums on the new entrant safety assurance program and the monitoring of potential chameleon new entrant motor carriers; and the Field Operations Training Manual. Identifying Constraints on Taking Enforcement Action
To identify the constraints FMCSA faces in pursuing enforcement action against suspected chameleon carriers and how it is addressing them, we reviewed federal motor carrier safety laws and regulations related to FMCSA enforcement actions (Notice of Claims and Notice of Violations); an FMCSA summary of State Successor Liability Case Law (July 2010), which describes corporate successor liability law for all 50 states; two key decisions related to corporate successor liability—the Williamson Transport decisions of January 2009 and July 2010; a multipage, corporate successor liability worksheet used to gather evidence against a suspected chameleon carrier; and a legislative proposal provided to congressional reauthorization committees in 2011 that is intended to help address FMCSA constraints. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrations (FMCSA) mission is to ensure motor carriers operate safely in interstate commerce. FMCSA partners with state agencies to conduct a variety of motor carrier oversight activities, which are carried out by certified auditors, inspectors, and investigators. Some motor carriers have registered under a new identity and begun to operate in interstate commerce, violating federal law in an effort to disguise their former identity and evade detection by FMCSA. Such carriers are known as chameleon carriers.
GAOs objectives were to examine (1) the prevalence of chameleon carriers; (2) how well FMCSAs investigative programs are designed to identify suspected chameleon carriers; and (3) what constraints, if any, FMCSA faces in pursuing enforcement actions against suspected chameleon carriers.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data on new applicants; reviewed investigative program guidance, federal motor carrier laws and regulations, GAO and other reports, and selected state corporate successor liability laws; observed two new entrant safety audits; and interviewed FMCSA headquarters and field officials, state officialsincluding law enforcement agenciesand motor carrier stakeholders.
What GAO Found
FMCSA does not determine the total number of chameleon carriers within the motor carrier industry. Such a determination would require FMCSA to investigate each of the tens of thousands of new applicants that register annually and then complete a legal process for some of these suspected chameleon carriers, an effort for which FMCSA does not have sufficient resources. Rather, FMCSAs attempt to identify chameleon carriers among new applicants, referred to as the vetting program, is limited to bus companies (passenger carriers) and movers (household goods carriers). These two relatively small groups, representing only 2 percent of all new applicants in 2010, were selected because they present consumer protection and relatively high safety risks. Through the vetting program, FMCSA conducts electronic matching of applicant registration data against data on existing carriers and investigates each application from these two small groups, but does not determine whether all other new applicants, including freight carriers, may be attempting to assume a new identity. Federal internal control standards direct agencies to assess the risks they face to determine the most effective allocation of federal resources, including how best to distribute resources for activities such as investigations and enforcement. GAO demonstrated how analysis of registration data can be used to assess risk by targeting all new applicant carriers that have attributes similar to those of chameleon carriersfor example, company registration data that match data for another carrier with a history of safety violations. Using FMCSA data, GAO found an increasing number of carriers with chameleon attributes, from 759 in 2005 to 1,136 in 2010. GAO also found that 18 percent of the applicants with chameleon attributes were involved in severe crashes compared with 6 percent of new applicants without chameleon attributes.
FMCSAs investigative programsthe vetting and new entrant safety assurance programsare not well designed to identify suspected chameleon carriers. The vetting program assesses all passenger and household goods carriers applying for operating authority, but it does not cover other groups of carriers, including freight truck carriers, which represented 98 percent of all new motor carrier applicants in 2010 and were more likely to be involved in fatal crashes than passenger carriers. The new entrant safety assurance programwhich involves a safety audit for all new entrants, including freight carriersentails a brief assessment of whether a carrier may be chameleon, but is primarily designed to educate new entrants about federal motor carrier safety regulations. The safety audit includes questions to elicit information on connections between new and previous carriers, but auditors lack necessary guidance on how to interpret the responses to distinguish chameleon carriers from legitimate carriers.
FMCSA faces several constraints in pursuing enforcement actions against suspected chameleon carriers. For example, as a result of a 2010 decision by an FMCSA Assistant Administrator, it is unclear whether FMCSA should use a state or a federal legal standard to demonstrate that a carrier is a chameleon. Thus, evidence is gathered to meet both a state and federal legal standard, which can lead to differing enforcement actions across states and has increased the time necessary to pursue chameleon carrier cases. FMCSA is pursuing several options to achieve a single standard, including providing input to Congress on a legislative proposal, monitoring chameleon carrier cases that could clarify the 2010 decision, and pursuing a separate rulemaking. Other constraints on FMCSA enforcement actions include a resource-intensive legal process, the inability to preclude carriers from obtaining multiple registration numbers, and low maximum fines.
What GAO Recommends
FMCSA should expand the vetting program using a data-driven approach; and provide guidance to improve the new entrant program. FMCSA generally concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-104 | gao_GAO-14-104_0 | In fiscal year 2012, the federal government spent $11.6 billion on the National School Lunch Program, which served lunches to 31.6 million children on average each month. 2.) USDA is required to review state administration of the program, and states are required to review SFA administration of the program. Specifically, to ensure that state agencies provided training and technical assistance to help SFAs implement the changes to the content of lunches, USDA allowed states to postpone administrative reviews until school year 2013-2014.during school year 2012-2013, states were required to review documentation submitted by SFAs and certify those SFAs determined to be in compliance with the new lunch requirements. School Lunch Participation Declined by 1 Million Students in Recent Years, Likely Due to the Changes to Lunch Requirements and Other Factors
Total School Lunch Participation Declined by 1 Million Students from School Years 2010-2011 through 2012-2013
Nationwide, participation in the National School Lunch Program declined in recent years after having increased steadily for more than a decade. The decrease in the total number of students eating school lunches during the last 2 school years was driven primarily by a decrease of 1.6 million students paying full price for meals, despite increases in the number of students eating school lunches who receive free meals. 7.) Almost all states reported that student acceptance of the changes was challenging for at least some of their SFAs during school year 2012-2013, a factor that likely affected participation. Nationwide, SFAs Faced Challenges Implementing Lunch Changes, Though Some Challenges Will Likely Diminish Over Time
Addressing Plate Waste, Managing Food Costs, and Planning Menus Challenged Many SFAs as They Implemented School Lunch Changes
As SFAs began implementing the new lunch requirements in school year 2012-2013, they faced several challenges implementing the lunch changes. For example, most states reported that their SFAs faced challenges with plate waste—or foods thrown away rather than consumed by students—and food costs, as well as planning menus and obtaining foods that complied with the new portion size and calorie requirements. While USDA generally agreed with the recommendation, the department has not yet taken action to address that issue. For example, fewer states reported that they expect menu planning, including the required portion sizes for lunch components and calorie ranges for lunches, to challenge their SFAs in school year 2013-2014 than reported these areas as challenges in school year 2012-2013. USDA’s Assistance Efforts Were Substantial, but Certain Aspects of USDA’s Guidance May Hinder State Oversight of Compliance
USDA Provided a Substantial Amount of Guidance and Training in a Short Time, Which Was Both Useful and Challenging for States and SFAs
USDA provided a substantial amount of guidance and training to assist states and SFAs in complying with the required changes to school lunch, which states indicated was useful. In addition, the documentation of issues has also provided federal and state officials with information on areas for which additional assistance may be needed across SFAs. In another state, we obtained evidence that some of the lunch menus in an SFA we visited may not have been fully in compliance with the new requirements, though the SFA was certified and validated, and in two additional certified SFAs we visited, we observed practices in schools that were inconsistent with the new requirements.SFAs we visited had been certified to be in compliance with the new requirements at the time of our site visits, the possible noncompliance issues in three of these five SFAs indicate the difficulty of ensuring proper implementation of the lunch changes in all of an SFA’s schools, particularly during the first year that changes were required. Further, because the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 included two new provisions that relate to SFA financial management— those addressing paid lunch prices and revenue from foods sold outside of the school meals programs—without effective oversight of SFA financial management by states, neither states nor the federal government will have assurance that SFAs are correctly implementing these requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve program integrity, as USDA moves forward with its new administrative review process, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator for the Food and Nutrition Service to take the following actions: clarify to states the importance of documenting compliance issues found during administrative reviews and requiring corrective actions to address them, and continue efforts to systematically assess all states’ needs for information to improve their ability to oversee SFA financial management and provide assistance to meet identified needs. Survey of States
To obtain information on state efforts related to implementation of the new school lunch content and nutrition requirements, we conducted a national survey of state child nutrition directors who oversee the National School Lunch Program in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. We selected the pretest states to provide variation in state school lunch program characteristics and geographic location. We also interviewed the eight state child nutrition program directors overseeing these districts to gather information on statewide lunch participation trends; SFA challenges, if any; and USDA and state assistance with implementation of the changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National School Lunch Program served more than 31 million children in fiscal year 2012, in part through $11.6 billion in federal supports. The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 required USDA to update nutrition standards for lunches. USDA issued new requirements for lunch components--fruits, vegetables, grains, meats, and milk--and for calories, sodium, and fats in meals. USDA oversees state administration of the program, and states oversee local SFAs, which provide the program in schools. The changes were generally required to be implemented in school year 2012-2013. GAO was asked to provide information on implementation of the lunch changes.
GAO assessed (1) lunch participation trends, (2) challenges SFAs faced implementing the changes, if any, and (3) USDA's assistance with and oversight of the changes. To address these areas, GAO used several methods, including review of federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analysis of USDA's lunch participation data; a national survey of state child nutrition program directors; and site visits to eight school districts selected to provide variation in geographic location and certain school district and food service characteristics.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, student participation in the National School Lunch Program declined by 1.2 million students (or 3.7 percent) from school year 2010-2011 through school year 2012-2013, after having increased steadily for many years. This decrease was driven primarily by a decline of 1.6 million students eating school lunch who pay full price for meals, despite increases in students eating school lunch who receive free meals. State and local officials reported that the changes to lunch content and nutrition requirements, as well as other factors, influenced student participation. For example, almost all states reported through GAO's national survey that obtaining student acceptance of lunches that complied with the new requirements was challenging during school year 2012-2013, which likely affected participation in the program. Federal, state, and local officials reported that federally-required increases to lunch prices, which affected many districts, also likely influenced participation.
School food authorities (SFA) faced several challenges implementing the new lunch content and nutrition requirements in school year 2012-2013. For example, most states reported that SFAs faced challenges with addressing plate waste--or foods thrown away rather than consumed by students--and managing food costs, as well as planning menus and obtaining foods that complied with portion size and calorie requirements. SFAs that GAO visited also cited these challenges. However, both states and SFAs reported that they expect many of these areas will become less challenging over time, with the exceptions of food costs, insufficient food storage and kitchen equipment, and the forthcoming limits on sodium in lunches.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided a substantial amount of guidance and training to help with implementation of the lunch changes and program oversight, but certain aspects of USDA's guidance may hinder state oversight of compliance. Starting in school year 2012-2013, USDA allowed states to focus their oversight of the lunch changes on providing technical assistance to SFAs rather than documenting instances of noncompliance and requiring corrective actions to address them. This assistance likely helped many SFAs move toward compliance with the new lunch requirements and become certified to receive increased federal reimbursements for lunches. However, evidence suggests this approach may have also resulted in some SFAs that were not fully meeting requirements being certified as in compliance. Without documentation of noncompliance and requirements for corrective actions, SFAs may not have the information needed to take actions to address these issues, and USDA may lack information on areas that are problematic across SFAs. Moving forward, USDA has been developing a new process for conducting program oversight, in part because of new statutory requirements. This new process adds requirements for reviewing SFA financial management, and many states reported a need for more guidance and training in this area. USDA has acknowledged that states' processes for reviewing this area have been inconsistent and sometimes inadequate in the past. While USDA has provided some assistance to states on the new requirements related to SFA financial management, until USDA has collected information from all states on their needs in this area, the department will not know if all states are fully prepared to oversee SFA financial management.
What GAO Recommends
To improve program integrity, GAO recommends that USDA clarify the need to document noncompliance issues found during state reviews of SFAs and complete efforts to assess states' assistance needs related to oversight of financial management. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-175 | gao_GAO-04-175_0 | 2). Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and UAVs Poses a Growing Threat to U.S. National Security Interests
The proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs poses a growing threat to U.S. national security. Multilateral Export Control Regimes Increased Focus on Cruise Missiles and UAVs, but Are Limited in Their Effectiveness
The United States and other governments have used the MTCR, and, to some extent, the Wassenaar Arrangement, as the key tools to address the proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs. License requirements for items not listed are based on the exporter’s knowledge of the end user or end uses to which the item would be applied. The case of a New Zealand citizen obtaining unlisted dual-use items to develop a cruise missile illustrates this gap in U.S. export controls. Compliance with Conditions on Exports of Cruise Missiles, UAVs, and Related Dual-use Items Seldom Verified through End-use Monitoring
Post-shipment verification (PSV) is a key end-use monitoring tool used by U.S. agencies to confirm that authorized recipients of U.S. technology both received transferred items and used them in accordance with conditions of the transfer. Based on State licensing data, we identified 786 licenses for cruise missiles, UAVs, or related items from fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Because some key dual-use components can be acquired without an export license, it is difficult for the export control system to limit or even track their use. Furthermore, the U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with the conditions placed on items that could be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. Thus, the U.S. government does not have sufficient information to know whether recipients of these exports are effectively safeguarding equipment and technology in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests. Recommendations for Executive Action
A gap in dual-use export control regulations could enable individuals in most countries of the world to legally obtain without any U.S. government review U.S. dual-use items not on the Commerce Control List to help make a cruise missile or UAV. It said that our report was misleading and inaccurate to suggest that State does not monitor exports to verify compliance with export authorizations. GAO Comments
1. 2. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. national security interests as accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. GAO assessed (1) the tools the U.S. and foreign governments use to address proliferation risks posed by the sale of these items and (2) efforts to verify the end use of exported cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technology.
What GAO Found
The growing threat to U.S. national security of cruise missile and UAV proliferation is challenging the tools the United States has traditionally used. Multilateral export control regimes have expanded their lists of controlled technologies, but key countries of concern are not members. U.S. export control authorities find it increasingly difficult to limit or track unlisted dual-use items that can be acquired without an export license. Moreover, a gap in U.S. export control authority enables American companies to export certain dual-use items to recipients that are not associated with missile projects or countries listed in the regulations, even if the exporter knows the items might be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. American companies have in fact legally exported dualuse items with no U.S. government review to a New Zealand resident who bought the items to build a cruise missile. The U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise missile, UAV, or related technology exports. For example, State officials do not monitor exports to verify compliance with license conditions on missiles or other items, despite legal and regulatory requirements to do so. Defense has not used its end-use monitoring program initiated in 2002 to check the compliance of users of more than 500 cruise missiles exported between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Commerce conducted visits to assess the end use of items for about 1 percent of the 2,490 missile-related licenses we reviewed. Thus, the U.S. government cannot be confident that recipients are effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests. |
gao_GAO-16-549 | gao_GAO-16-549_0 | Before the end of the U.S. underground nuclear testing program in 1992, developing and maintaining the nuclear stockpile were largely accomplished by a continual cycle of weapon design, weapon testing, and the incorporation of lessons learned in the next design. In contrast, the Enhanced Surveillance Program was established in the mid-1990s to assist in surveillance and evaluation of the stockpile primarily by identifying aging signs, developing aging models to predict the impact of aging on the stockpile, and developing diagnostic tools. Component and Material Testing. Finally, NNSA uses information from the aging studies in the national security laboratory directors’ annual assessment of the condition of the stockpile. Computational modeling. On the basis of its aging studies and other data, the Enhanced Surveillance Program develops computational models to predict the impacts of aging on weapons components and materials. In addition, the 2007 initiative project plan stated that the Enhanced Surveillance Program would continue to assess the viability of diagnostic tools in support of Core Surveillance. NNSA Did Not Fully Implement Its 2007 Vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and Has Not Developed a Long- Term Strategy for the Program
NNSA implemented some aspects of its 2007 initiative but did not fully implement its envisioned role for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. NNSA has substantially reduced the program’s funding since 2007 and recently refocused some of its RDT&E programs on multiple weapon life- extension efforts and supporting efforts. Funding dropped to approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2015, a reduction of more than 50 percent from fiscal year 2007. NNSA also delayed some key Enhanced Surveillance Program activities during this time. These evaluations—which NNSA viewed as an important part of the Enhanced Surveillance Program when it was being managed as a campaign, according to an NNSA official—were initiated in fiscal year 2007 and originally estimated to be completed by 2012. Enhanced Surveillance Program officials continue to focus on year-to-year management of the program under reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities, such as supporting Core Surveillance activities, the annual assessment process, and LEPs. Specifically, our April 2013 report found that for technology-related efforts, without a long-term strategy that provides an overall picture of what an agency is investing in, it is difficult for Congress and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding and what benefits they can expect. Our body of work has shown that these requirements also can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as NNSA, to assist with planning for individual programs or initiatives that are particularly challenging. The Enhanced Surveillance Program has general long-term goals, such as “developing tools and information useful to ensure the stockpile is healthy and reliable.” However, the program’s long-term goals do not provide outcomes that are measurable or that encompass the entirety of the program. For example, the program’s goals for fiscal year 2015 included “develop, validate and deploy improved predictive capabilities and diagnostics to assess performance and lifetime for nuclear and non-nuclear materials.” By managing work on an annual basis, longer-term work—such as technology development projects extended over several years—may receive a lower priority and thus, according to NNSA officials, may not be funded. For example, rather than expanding the program, NNSA budgeted reduced funding for it, and the program did not complete the proposed evaluations of the effects of aging on nonnuclear components and materials. This includes the Enhanced Surveillance Program. A new long-term strategy for the program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to better inform long-term planning and management decision making for the program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that NNSA can better inform long-term planning and management decision making as well as to ensure that the Enhanced Surveillance Program complements NNSA’s other efforts to assess the nuclear weapons stockpile, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving these goals. The Administrator noted that the agency estimated completing a long-term strategy for the program by June 2017. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE participates in the annual process to assess the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, which is now made up largely of weapons that are beyond their original design lifetimes. In 2007, faced with a mounting backlog of required tests, DOE's NNSA announced plans to use its Enhanced Surveillance Program for a more cost-effective surveillance approach under its 2007 Surveillance Transformation initiative. Under this initiative, predictive models were to assess the impact of aging on weapons in the stockpile without having to dismantle them as the agency has done in the past.
The Senate Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO review the status of the Enhanced Surveillance Program. This report assesses the extent to which NNSA implemented the vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program from its 2007 initiative and developed a long-term strategy for the program. GAO reviewed NNSA plans and budget and other documents; interviewed agency officials; and discussed surveillance issues with members of a group of nationally known scientists who advise the government and who reviewed the program in September 2013.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not fully implement the Enhanced Surveillance Program as envisioned in the agency's 2007 Surveillance Transformation Project (2007 initiative) and has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. Surveillance is the process of inspecting a weapon through various tests of the weapon as a whole, the weapon's components, and the weapon's materials to determine whether they are meeting performance expectations, through dismantling the weapon or through the use of diagnostic tools. As called for in its 2007 initiative, NNSA took steps to improve the management of the overall surveillance program, which primarily tests dismantled weapons and their components, but the agency did not increase the role of the Enhanced Surveillance Program, as envisioned. The program develops computational models to predict the impact of stockpile aging; identifies aging signs; and develops diagnostic tools. Under the 2007 initiative, NNSA was to conduct more Enhanced Surveillance Program evaluations using computer models to predict the impacts of aging on specific weapon components—especially nonnuclear components and materials—and to assess the validity of more diagnostic tools. Instead of expanding the program's role, NNSA reduced program funding by more than 50 percent from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2015. NNSA also delayed some key activities and reduced the program's scope during this time. For example, NNSA did not complete its proposed evaluations of the impact of aging on nonnuclear components and materials. These evaluations, originally estimated to be completed by 2012, were dropped as program goals in fiscal year 2016, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives.
In fiscal year 2016, NNSA broadly refocused the Enhanced Surveillance Program on multiple nuclear weapon life-extension efforts and supporting activities but has not developed a corresponding long-term strategy for the program. Instead, program officials have focused on developing general long-term goals and managing the program on a year-to-year basis under reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities. These general goals, however, do not provide measureable outcomes or encompass the entirety of the program. In addition, as GAO's previous work has shown, managing longer term work, such as multiyear technology development projects, on an annual basis makes it difficult for Congress and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding and what benefits they can expect. As a result, these projects may receive a lower priority and may not be consistently funded. GAO's body of work has identified a number of leading practices in federal strategic planning that include defining strategic goals, defining strategies and resources for achieving these goals, and developing and using performance measures to track progress in achieving these goals and to inform management decision making. A new strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to better inform long-term planning and management decision making for the program as well as help ensure that it complements NNSA's other efforts to assess the nuclear weapons stockpile.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the NNSA Administrator develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates leading practices. NNSA concurred with GAO's recommendation and estimated completion of a long-term strategy by June 2017. |
gao_GAO-05-712 | gao_GAO-05-712_0 | Background
FAA is an agency of the Department of Transportation (DOT); one of its central missions is to ensure safe, orderly, and efficient air travel in the national airspace system. The air traffic control systems are very complex and highly automated. Although Progress Has Been Made, Air Traffic Control Systems Remain Vulnerable
Although FAA has made progress in implementing information security for its air traffic control systems by establishing an agencywide information security program and addressing many of its previously identified security weaknesses, significant control weaknesses threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of those systems and information. As a result, FAA’s air traffic control systems remain vulnerable to unauthorized access, use, modification, and destruction that could disrupt aviation operations. Agency officials also pointed out that because major portions of air traffic control systems consist of custom-built, older equipment with special-purpose operating systems, proprietary communication interfaces, and custom-built software, the possibilities for unauthorized access are limited and therefore mitigate the risks. In addition, the systems’ proprietary features do not provide protection from attack by disgruntled current and former employees who understand them, or from more sophisticated hackers. These weaknesses increase the risk of unauthorized access to and modification of FAA’s information systems and of disruption of service. Information Security Program Is Not Yet Fully Implemented
A key reason for the information security weaknesses that we identified in FAA’s air traffic control systems was that the agency had not yet fully implemented its information security program to help ensure that effective controls were established and maintained. FISMA requires agencies to implement an information security program that includes periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel—including contractors and other users of information systems—of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system that is identified in the agencies’ inventories; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. If continuity of operations controls are inadequate, even a relatively minor interruption could result in significant adverse nationwide impact on air traffic. These include weaknesses in electronic access controls, for example, in managing networks, system patches, user accounts and passwords, and user rights and in logging and auditing security-relevant events. Weaknesses in physical security, background investigations, segregation of duties, and application change controls increase the level of risk. Although FAA has initiatives under way to address these areas, further efforts are needed to fully implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) performs critical functions that contribute to ensuring safe, orderly, and efficient air travel in the national airspace system. To that end, it operates and relies extensively on an array of interconnected automated information systems and networks that comprise the nation's air traffic control systems. These systems provide information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to help ensure the safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. Interruptions of service by these systems could have a significant adverse impact on air traffic nationwide. Effective information security controls are essential for ensuring that the nation's air traffic control systems are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disruption, or destruction. Accordingly, GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which FAA has implemented information security controls for these systems.
What GAO Found
FAA has made progress in implementing information security for its air traffic control information systems; however, GAO identified significant security weaknesses that threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of FAA's systems--including weaknesses in controls that are designed to prevent, limit, and detect access to these systems. The agency has not adequately managed its networks, software updates, user accounts and passwords, and user privileges, nor has it consistently logged security-relevant events. Other information security controls--including physical security, background investigations, segregation of duties, and system changes--also exhibited weaknesses, increasing the risk that unauthorized users could breach FAA's air traffic control systems, potentially disrupting aviation operations. While acknowledging these weaknesses, agency officials stated that the possibilities for unauthorized access were limited, given that the systems are in part custom built and that they run on older equipment that employs special-purpose operating systems, proprietary communication interfaces, and custom-built software. Nevertheless, the proprietary features of these systems cannot fully protect them from attacks by disgruntled current or former employees who are familiar with these features, nor will they keep out more sophisticated hackers. A key reason for the information security weaknesses that GAO identified in FAA's air traffic control systems is that the agency had not yet fully implemented its information security program to help ensure that effective controls were established and maintained. Although the agency has initiatives under way to improve its information security, further efforts are needed. Weaknesses that need to be addressed include outdated security plans, inadequate security awareness training, inadequate system testing and evaluation programs, limited security incident-detection capabilities, and shortcomings in providing service continuity for disruptions in operations. Until FAA has resolved these issues, the information security weaknesses that GAO has identified will likely persist. |
gao_GAO-10-999 | gao_GAO-10-999_0 | As of July 31, 2010, the 16 states and the District had drawn down $43.9 billion in increased FMAP funds, which is 75 percent of the total $58.9 billion in increased FMAP that we estimated would be allocated to these states and the District through December 31, 2010. If current spending patterns continue, we estimate that the 16 states and the District will draw down $56.2 billion by December 31, 2010—about 95 percent of the initial estimated allocation. As part of this review, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of local educational agencies (LEA)—generally, school districts—about their uses of Recovery Act funds for each of these programs. An estimated 87 percent of LEAs across the country reported that Recovery Act funding allowed them to retain or create jobs. States Vary in the Rate at Which They Draw Down Recovery Act Funds for Education Programs
As of August 27, 2010, states covered by our review had drawn down 72 percent ($18.2 billion) of the awarded SFSF education stabilization funds; 46 percent ($3.0 billion) of Recovery Act funds for ESEA Title I, Part A; and 45 percent ($3.4 billion) of Recovery Act funds for IDEA Part B. Obligations for State Transportation Projects Are Nearly Complete, but Spending from Other Federal Transportation Sources Has Slowed
Use of Transportation Funds
Nationwide, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) obligated $25.6 billion in Recovery Act funds for over 12,300 highway projects and reimbursed $11.1 billion as of August 2, 2010. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) obligated $8.76 billion of Recovery Act funds for about 1,055 grants and reimbursed $3.6 billion as of August 5, 2010. Recovery Act public transportation funds were used primarily for upgrading transit facilities and improving bus fleets (see fig. The EECBG program provides about $3.2 billion in grants to develop, promote, implement, and manage projects to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy use and fossil fuel emissions in local communities. Of this amount, approximately $2.8 billion has been allocated through formula grants to about 2,150 state, local, and tribal governments (recipients) as of August 23, 2010. DOE Has Obligated Most Funds to Grant Recipients, Who Have Obligated about Half to Subrecipients; Overall Spending Rates Are at 11 Percent
The Recovery Act requires that DOE obligate $2.8 billion in formula EECBG funds by September 30, 2010. As of July 28, 2010, as shown in table 9, more than 60 percent of EECBG funds have been obligated for three purposes: energy-efficiency retrofits (35.3 percent), such as replacement of heating and cooling systems in fire stations and libraries in the District; financial incentive programs, such as the rebate program in New Jersey that pays for energy-efficiency retrofits not already covered by existing incentives (15.6 percent); and building and facilities (11.1 percent), such as a geothermal system at a new corrections facility. As discussed above, HUD officials expect that some housing agencies may not meet the September 2010 competitive grant obligation deadline. Officials in Ohio credit the over $7.9 billion in Recovery Act funds they have received as of August 1, 2010, with helping to protect jobs and continue services in their state. New and Open Recommendations; Matters for Congressional Consideration
For this report, GAO both updates the status of agencies’ efforts to implement GAO’s 25 open recommendations and makes 5 new recommendations to the Departments of Transportation (DOT), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services, and Treasury, and to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). States’ and Localities’ Uses of Recovery Act Funds
Using criteria described in our earlier bimonthly reports, we selected the following streams of Recovery Act funding flowing to states and localities for review during this report: Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards; the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF); Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA); Parts B and C of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); the Federal-Aid Highway Surface Transportation and Transit Capital Assistance programs; the State Energy Program (SEP); the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program (EECBG); the Weatherization Assistance Program; the Public Housing Capital Fund; the Tax Credit Assistance Program (TCAP); and Grants to States for Low- Income Housing Projects in Lieu of Low-Income Housing Credits Program under Section 1602 of the Recovery Act (Section 1602 Program). Recipient Reporting
The recipient reporting section of this report responds to the Recovery Act’s mandate that we comment on the estimates of jobs created or retained by direct recipients of Recovery Act funds. This guidance directed federal agencies to not grant any requests made to extend the Single Audit reporting deadlines for fiscal years 2009 to 2011. Unemployment Insurance Measures Included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, as of July 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to two ongoing GAO mandates under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). It is the latest in a series of reports on the uses of and accountability for Recovery Act funds in 16 selected states, certain localities in those jurisdictions, and the District of Columbia (District). These jurisdictions are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental assistance available through the Recovery Act. This report also responds to GAO's mandate to comment on the jobs estimated in recipient reports. GAO collected and analyzed documents and interviewed state and local officials and other Recovery Act award recipients. GAO also analyzed federal agency guidance and interviewed federal officials.
What GAO Found
As of September 3, 2010, about $154.8 billion of the approximately $282 billion of total funds made available by the Recovery Act in 2009 for programs administered by states and localities had been paid out by the federal government. Of that amount, over 65 percent--$101.9 billion--had been paid out since the start of federal fiscal year 2010 on October 1, 2009. As of July 31, 2010, the 16 states and the District had drawn down $43.9 billion in increased FMAP funds. If current spending patterns continue, GAO estimates that these states and the District will draw down $56.2 billion by December 31, 2010--about 95 percent of their initial estimated allocation. Most states reported that, without the increased FMAP funds, they could not have continued to support the substantial Medicaid enrollment growth they have experienced, most of which was attributable to children. Congress recently passed legislation to extend the increased FMAP through June 2011, although at lower rates than provided by the Recovery Act. As of August 27, 2010, the District and states covered in GAO's review had drawn down 72 percent ($18.2 billion) of their awarded State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) education stabilization funds; 46 percent ($3.0 billion) for Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title I, Part A; and 45 percent ($3.4 billion) for Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Part B. In the spring of 2010, GAO surveyed a nationally representative sample of local educational agencies (LEA) and found that job retention was the primary use of education Recovery Act funds in school year 2009-2010, with an estimated 87 percent of LEAs reporting that Recovery Act funds allowed them to retain or create jobs. Nationwide, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) obligated $25.6 billion in Recovery Act funds for over 12,300 highway projects, andreimbursed $11.1 billion as of August 2, 2010. The Federal Transit Administration obligated $8.76 billion of Recovery Act funds for about 1,055 grants, and reimbursed $3.6 billion as of August 5, 2010. Highway funds were used primarily for pavement improvement projects, and public transportation funds were used primarily for upgrading transit facilities and improving bus fleets. The EECBG program provides about $3.2 billion in grants to implement projects that improve energy efficiency; of this amount, approximately $2.8 billion has been allocated directly to recipients. As of August 2010, DOE has obligated about 99 percent of the $2.8 billion in direct formula grants to recipients, who have in turn, obligated about half to subrecipients. The majority of EECBG funds have been obligated for three purposes: energy efficiency retrofits to existing facilities, financial incentive programs, and buildings and facilities. As of August 7, 2010, housing agencies had obligated about 46 percent of the nearly $1 billion in Recovery Act Public Housing Capital Fund competitive grants allocated to them for projects such as installing energy-efficient heating and cooling systems in housing units. HUD officials anticipate that some housing agencies may not meet the September 2010 obligation deadline, resulting in those funds being recaptured. GAO believes HUD should continue to closely monitor agencies' progress in obligating remaining funds. As of July 31, 2010, HUD had outlayed about $733 million (32.6 percent) of TCAP funds and Treasury had outlayed about $1.4 billion (25.5 percent) of Section 1602 Program funds. GAO updates the status of agencies' efforts to implement GAO's 58 previous recommendations and makes 5 new recommendations to improve management and strengthen accountability to the Departments of Transportation (DOT), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). |
gao_GAO-16-170T | gao_GAO-16-170T_0 | Most Veterans in Our Review Received Care within 30 Days of Their Preferred Dates, but VHA’s Method of Calculating Wait Times Does Not Always Reflect Overall Wait Times
The 100 veterans included in our review received a full mental health evaluation in an average of 4 days of the date they preferred to be seen (known as the preferred date). The full mental health evaluation is the primary entry point to mental health care. At the five VAMCs we visited, the average time in which a veteran received this full evaluation ranged from 0 to 9 days from the preferred date. However, we identified conflicting VHA policies regarding how long it should take a new veteran to receive a full mental health evaluation: (1) a 14-day policy established by VHA’s Uniform Handbook for Mental Health Services, and (2) a 30-day policy set by VHA in response to the Choice Act. Because VHA uses a veteran’s preferred date as the basis for its wait-time calculations, rather than the date that the veteran initially requests or is referred for mental health care, these calculations only reflect a portion of a veteran’s overall wait time. On average, our review of 100 new veteran medical records found that a veteran’s preferred date was 26 days after his or her initial request or referral for mental health care, though this varied by VAMC. VHA Monitors Access to Mental Health Care, but Current Policies Cannot Ensure Reliable Data, Which Precludes Effective Oversight
VHA monitors access to mental health care, but the lack of clear policies may contribute to unreliable wait-time data and precludes effective oversight. Among other reasons contributing to the potential unreliability of VHA wait-time data, we found VHA’s wait-time data may not be comparable over time or between VAMCs. Data may not be comparable over time. VHA has not clearly communicated the definitions used or changes made to these definitions used in its wait-time calculations, which is contrary to federal internal controls standards that call for management to communicate reliable and relevant information in a timely manner. This limits the reliability and usefulness of these data in determining progress in meeting stated objectives for veterans’ timely access to mental health care. Data may not be comparable between VAMCs. When VAMCs use open-access appointments, data may not be comparable across VAMCs. Open-access appointments are typically blocks of time for veterans to see providers without a scheduled appointment. Without guidance on how appointment scheduling for open-access clinics is to be managed, VAMCs can continue to implement these appointments inconsistently, and place veterans on lists outside of VHA’s scheduling system, potentially posing serious risks to veterans needing mental health care. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's October 2015 report, entitled VA Mental Health: Clearer Guidance on Access Policies and Wait-Time Data Needed ( GAO-16-24 ).
What GAO Found
The way in which the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) calculates veteran mental health wait times may not always reflect the overall amount of time a veteran waits for care. VHA uses a veteran’s preferred date (determined when an appointment is scheduled) to calculate the wait time for that patient’s full mental health evaluation, the primary entry point for mental health care. Of the 100 veterans whose records GAO reviewed, 86 received full mental health evaluations within 30 days of their preferred dates. On average, this was within 4 days. However, GAO also found
veterans’ preferred dates were, on average, 26 days after their initial requests or referrals for mental health care, and ranged from 0 to 279 days. Further, GAO found the average time in which veterans received their first treatment across the five VA medical centers (VAMC) in its review ranged from 1 to 57 days from the full mental health evaluation.
conflicting access policies for allowable wait times for a full mental health evaluation—14 days (according to VHA’s mental health handbook) versus 30 days (set in response to recent legislation) from the veteran’s preferred date—created confusion among VAMC officials about which policy they are expected to follow. These conflicting policies are inconsistent with federal internal control standards and can hinder officials’ ability to ensure veterans are receiving timely access to mental health care.
VHA monitors access to mental health care, but the lack of clear policies on wait-time data precludes effective oversight. GAO found VHA’s wait-time data may not be comparable over time and between VAMCs. Specifically
data may not be comparable over time. VHA has not clearly communicated the definitions used, such as how a new patient is identified, or changes made to these definitions. This limits the reliability and usefulness of the data in determining progress in meeting stated objectives for veterans’ timely access to mental health care.
data may not be comparable between VAMCs. For example, when open-access appointments are used, data are not comparable between VAMCs. Open-access appointments are typically blocks of time for veterans to see providers without a scheduled appointment. GAO found inconsistencies in the implementation of these appointments, including one VAMC that manually maintained a list of veterans seeking mental health care outside of VHA’s scheduling system. Without guidance stating how to manage and track open-access appointments, data comparisons between VAMCs may be misleading. Moreover, VAMCs may lose track of patients referred for mental health care, placing veterans at risk for negative outcomes. |
gao_GAO-06-762 | gao_GAO-06-762_0 | Background
Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN), which includes the services Radio Sawa and Alhurra, is an independent nonprofit grantee overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). However, MBN has not developed a long- term strategic plan that fully addresses its operational and competitive challenges. MBN operates in the competitive Middle Eastern satellite television market that has over 140 channels. Although MBN has conducted some planning exercises, it lacks a long-term strategic plan and a strategic approach that outlines (1) a shared vision of operations for Alhurra and Radio Sawa, (2) detailed implementation strategies to achieve measurable outcomes for its goals, and (3) the competitive challenges it faces and how it plans to address its key challenges to broadcasting in the Middle East. Further, BBG officials have said MBN is still learning about the Middle Eastern media market. However, MBN has not fully implemented several of the Grant Thornton review’s key recommendations related to its control environment, including (1) establishing an internal control board to formally develop its controls and coordinate audits, (2) preparing an internal control plan, (3) conducting a risk assessment to address potential risks to its operation, and (4) developing a training program for its staff. MBN faced some initial challenges in establishing its internal control structure. MBN Lacks Comprehensive, Regular Program Reviews to Determine Compliance with Mission and Journalistic Standards
The BBG’s main mechanism to determine whether its broadcasting services comply with its mission and journalistic standards is a regular program review, which is designed to improve programming and ensure quality control. BBG Has Developed Several Performance Indicators, Although Weaknesses in Audience Surveys Call into Question Whether MBN Audience Size and Credibility Targets Have Been Met
The BBG has established several standard performance indicators and targets for MBN programs, including measures of audience size and credibility; however, it has not implemented some performance indicators fully, including a program quality measure. Additionally, we were unable to determine the accuracy of MBN’s audience size and program credibility estimates due to weaknesses in MBN’s methodology and documentation. Therefore, it is not clear whether the Radio Sawa and Alhurra performance targets have been met. Although MBN has developed a number of financial and administrative controls, it could take additional steps to ensure its system of internal control is fully implemented. In particular, the BBG did not take certain steps that could have explained and increased the reliability of its estimates, such as by fully documenting its research methods, measuring the level of uncertainty surrounding its estimates, disclosing significant limitations, limiting the scope of its projections to areas actually covered by its surveys, and developing and consistently implementing policies and procedures for verifying data. We did not test MBN’s editorial procedures. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) broadcasting services, Radio Sawa, and the Alhurra satellite television networks--collectively known as the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN)--currently aim to reach Arabic speakers in 19 countries and areas throughout the Middle East. Annual spending for current activities amounts to about $78 million. GAO reviewed MBN's (1) strategic planning to address competition in the Middle Eastern media market, (2) implementation of internal control, (3) procedures MBN has developed to ensure compliance with its journalistic standards, and (4) performance indicators and whether targets have been met.
What GAO Found
MBN faces a number of competitive challenges in carrying out its mission of broadcasting in the Middle Eastern media market and has taken some steps to address them. However, MBN lacks a comprehensive, long-term strategic plan. As MBN emerges from its start-up mode and faces future challenges, a long-term strategic plan will be important. While MBN has developed financial and administrative controls to manage and safeguard its financial resources, it could take additional steps to strengthen its system of internal control. For example, the MBN has not (1) convened a meeting of its internal control board to formally develop its controls and coordinate audits, (2) completed an internal control plan, (3) completed a risk assessment to address potential risks to its operation, or (4) developed a comprehensive training program for its staff. MBN has procedures in place to help ensure its programming meets its journalistic standards. However, MBN lacks regular editorial training and has not fully implemented a comprehensive, regular program review process to determine whether its programming complies with those standards or with MBN's mission. While the BBG calls for its broadcasters to undergo an annual program review, Radio Sawa has only held one such review, and Alhurra has not completed one to date. The BBG has developed several performance indicators and targets for MBN's Radio Sawa and Alhurra services, including measures of audience size and program credibility. However, it is not clear whether the Radio Sawa and Alhurra performance targets have been met because of weaknesses in MBN's survey methodology and documentation. The BBG did not take certain steps that could have explained and increased the reliability of its estimates, such as by fully documenting its research and estimation methods, measuring the level of uncertainty surrounding its estimates, disclosing significant limitations, and consistently implementing policies and procedures for verifying data. |
gao_GAO-08-218T | gao_GAO-08-218T_0 | Taken together, these acts anchor the federal government’s role in the freight rail industry by establishing numerous goals for regulating the industry, including to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail; minimize the need for federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system and require fair and expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required; promote a safe and efficient rail transportation system by allowing rail carriers to earn adequate revenues, as determined by STB; ensure the development and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among rail carriers and with other modes to meet the needs of the public and the national defense; foster sound economic conditions in transportation and ensure effective competition and coordination between rail carriers and other modes; maintain reasonable rates where there is an absence of effective competition and where rail rates provide revenues that exceed the amount necessary to maintain the rail system and attract capital; prohibit predatory pricing and practices to avoid undue concentrations of market power; and provide for the expeditious handling and resolution of all proceedings. Rail Rates Have Increased Recently But Have Generally Declined Since 1985, While Railroads Have Shifted Other Costs To Shippers
Rail rates have generally declined since 1985, but experienced a 9 percent annual increase between 2004 and 2005—the largest annual increase in 20 years. However, despite these increases, rates for 2005 remain below their 1985 levels and below the rate of inflation for the 1985 through 2005 period, and rates overall have declined since 1985. In 2005, rates increased for all 13 commodities that we reviewed. Rates for coal increased by 7.9 percent while rates for grain increased by 8.5 percent. 3). Reported Miscellaneous Revenue, Including Fuel Surcharges, Increased Ten- Fold Since 2000
In 2005 the amount of industry revenue reported as miscellaneous increased ten-fold over 2000 levels, rising from about $141 million to over $1.7 billion (see fig. Captive Shippers Are Difficult to Identify But Concerns Remain and Past STB Actions Have Led to Little Effective Relief
In October 2006 and August 2007, we reported that captive shippers are difficult to identify and STB’s efforts to protect captive shippers have resulted in little effective relief for those shippers. We also reported that economists and shipper groups have proposed a number of alternatives to address remaining concerns about competition – however, each of these alternative approaches have costs and benefits and should be carefully considered to ensure the approach will achieve the important balance set out in the Staggers Act. Captive Shippers Remain Difficult to Identify, but Some Measures Indicate Captivity Is Dropping in the Railroad Industry
It remains difficult to determine precisely how many shippers are “captive” to one railroad because the proxy measures that provide the best indication can overstate or understate captivity. One measure of potential captivity—traffic traveling at rates equal to or greater than 180 percent R/VC—is part of the statutory threshold for bringing a rate relief case before STB. Since our report in October 2006, STB has taken steps to refine the rate relief process. These groups view these approaches as more effective than the rate relief process in promoting a greater reliance on competition to protect shippers against unreasonable rates. 8). STB Has Taken Steps to Address Problems, but Actions Are Too Recent to Be Evaluated
STB has taken some actions to address our past recommendations, but it is too soon to determine the effect of these actions. In October 2006 we reported that the continued existence of pockets of potential captivity at a time when the railroads are, for the first time in decades, experiencing increasing economic health, raises the question whether rail rates in selected markets reflect justified and reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power by the railroads. It will be important that these analysts have the ability that STB has through its statutory authority to inquire into railroad practices as well as sufficient access to information to determine whether rail rates in selected markets reflect justified and reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power by the railroads. The Chairman of the STB has recently testified that these analysts would have that authority and access. We also recommended that STB review its method of data collection to ensure that all freight railroads are consistently and accurately reporting all revenues collected from shippers, including fuel surcharges and other costs not explicitly captured in all railroad rate structures. While these are positive steps, these rules did not address how surcharges are reported in the Carload Waybill Sample. As stated earlier, STB has also taken steps to refine the rate relief process since our 2006 report. Related GAO Products
Freight Railroads: Updated Information on Rates and Competition Issues. Shipper Rail Rates: Interstate Commerce Commission’s Handling of Complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 largely deregulated the freight railroad industry, encouraging greater reliance on competition to set rates. The act recognized the need for railroads to recover costs by setting higher rates for shippers with fewer transportation alternatives but also recognized that some shippers might be subject to unreasonably high rates. It established a threshold for rate relief and granted the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) the authority to develop a rate relief process for "captive" shippers. Since 1980 GAO has issued several reports on the freight railroad industry and issued the most recent report in October 2006 and, at the request of this Subcommittee, issued an updated report in August 2007. This statement is based on these recent reports and discusses (1) recent changes that have occurred in railroad rates and how those changes compare to changes in rail rates since 1985, (2) the extent of captivity in the industry and STB's efforts to protect captive shippers, and (3) STB's actions to address GAO's recent recommendations.
What GAO Found
While railroad rates have generally declined and declined for most shippers since 1985, in 2005 rates experienced a 9 percent annual increase over 2004 --the largest annual increase in twenty years--and rates increased for all 13 commodities that GAO reviewed. For example, rates for coal increased by nearly 8 percent while rates for grain increased by 8.5 percent. However, despite these increases, rates for 2005 remain below their 1985 levels and below the rate of inflation over the 1985 through 2005 period. Revenues that railroads report as "miscellaneous"--a category that includes some fuel surcharges--increased more than ten-fold from about $141 million in 2000 to over $1.7 billion in 2005. It is difficult to precisely determine how many shippers are "captive" because available proxy measures can overstate or understate captivity. However some data indicate that the extent of potentially captive traffic appears to have decreased, while at the same time, data also indicates that traffic traveling at rates significantly above the threshold for rate relief has increased. In October 2006, GAO reported that STB's rate relief process to protect captive shippers have resulted in little effective relief for those shippers. GAO also reported that economists and shipper groups have proposed a number of alternatives to address remaining concerns about competition--however, each of these alternative approaches have costs and benefits and should be carefully considered. STB has taken some actions to address our past recommendations, but it is too soon to determine the effect of these actions. Our October 2006 report noted that the continued existence of pockets of potentially "captive" shippers raised questions as to whether rail rates in selected markets reflected reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power. GAO recommended that the Board undertake a rigorous analysis of competitive markets to identify the state of competition. STB has awarded a contract to conduct this study. It will be important that these analysts have STB's authority and access to information to determine whether rail rates in selected markets reflect reasonable pricing practices--the Chairman of the STB recently testified that these analysts would have that authority and access. GAO also recommended that STB ensure that freight railroads are consistently reporting all revenues, including miscellaneous revenues. While STB has revised its rules on fuel surcharges, these rules did not address how fuel surcharges are reported and STB has not yet taken steps to accurately collect data on other miscellaneous revenues. STB has also taken a number of steps to revise its rate relief process. While these appear to be promising steps, it is too soon to tell what effect these changes will have. |
gao_GAO-17-613 | gao_GAO-17-613_0 | Stafford Act employees include CORE and Reservists hired specifically to support disaster-related activities on a temporary or intermittent basis. Surge Capacity Force volunteers include employees of other DHS components who augment FEMA’s workforce in the event of a catastrophic disaster. FEMA Has Developed and Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Most Employees, but Not its Entire Workforce
FEMA Has Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Most of its Employees, and Is Taking Steps to Offer Misconduct Training to Supervisors
FEMA has developed a policy outlining procedures regarding investigations of misconduct as documented in FEMA’s Administrative Investigations Policy directive. The directive applies to all FEMA personnel. Aspects of FEMA’s Data Limit Their Usefulness for Identifying and Addressing Trends in Employee Misconduct
OCSO, LER, and PLB collect data on employee misconduct and outcomes, but limited standardization of fields and entries within fields, limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry restricts their usefulness for identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. FEMA also provides DHS OIG with information on employee misconduct cases on a regular basis. We reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of employee misconduct complaints DHS OIG referred to FEMA for review and found that FEMA did not adequately track all referred complaints and therefore could not ensure that all complaints in the sample we selected were reviewed and addressed at the time of our inquiry. We found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of our inquiry. As a result of our review, FEMA subsequently took action to review the complaints. The AID Committee recommended that OCSO open inquiries in 3 of the 6 cases to determine whether the allegations were against FEMA employees, assigned 2 cases to LER for further review, and closed 1 case for lack of information. The remaining 2 cases were open as of April 2017. The results from our sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA; however, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. Conclusions
Employee misconduct can detract from FEMA’s mission and negatively impact public perceptions of the agency, particularly when associated with disaster response efforts. Because the Reservist disciplinary action options and appeals currently in practice are not documented, FEMA supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of the process. Clearly documented policies and procedures for all workforce categories and communication about offenses and penalties could help to better prepare management to address misconduct and to mitigate any perceptions that misconduct is handled inconsistently across FEMA’s workforce. Addressing these limitations by implementing quality control measures could improve FEMA’s ability to track misconduct cases and to identify potential problem areas and opportunities for targeted training. Moreover, developing reconciliation procedures to track cases referred from DHS OIG to FEMA could help reduce the risk that FEMA does not address all misconduct complaints. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve employee misconduct policies and procedures, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to take the following three actions: document policies and procedures to address potential Surge document Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies and procedures that are currently in practice at the agency; and communicate the range of penalties for specific misconduct offenses to all employees and supervisors. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed policies and procedures for addressing employee misconduct; (2) what data are available on FEMA employee misconduct cases and their outcomes, and the extent to which FEMA uses these data to identify and address trends in employee misconduct; and (3) the extent to which information regarding misconduct cases is shared within FEMA’s personnel management offices and with the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG). To address objective one, we reviewed, where available, FEMA’s policies and procedures for reporting, investigating, and adjudicating allegations of misconduct across all of the agency’s workforce categories, including: Title 5 employees, Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (CORE), Reservists, Surge Capacity Force members, and FEMA Corps members. We selected these three regions based on factors such as geographic dispersion and regions that typically respond to different types of disasters, as well as those with the highest number of misconduct allegations reported to OCSO from January 2014 through September 30, 2016. Finally, we used fiscal year 2016 data from DHS OIG’s Enforcement Data System to randomly select a non-generalizable sample of 20 FEMA employee misconduct complaints which were referred from DHS OIG to FEMA. | Why GAO Did This Study
FEMA is responsible for coordinating government-wide efforts in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural or man-made disasters, including acts of terror. The agency relies on permanent and disaster-related temporary employees and has a total workforce of over 22,000. Employee misconduct incidents can detract from FEMA's mission, damage the agency's reputation, and hamper its ability to respond to disasters and maintain public trust.
GAO was asked to review employee misconduct at FEMA. This report examines: (1) the extent to which FEMA developed policies and procedures for addressing misconduct; (2) available data on FEMA misconduct cases and the extent to which FEMA uses the data to identify and address trends; and (3) the extent that misconduct cases are shared within FEMA and with DHS OIG. GAO reviewed FEMA procedures, analyzed misconduct data, and interviewed officials from FEMA HQ and three regions (selected based on geographic dispersion and number of misconduct allegations). GAO also analyzed a random, non-generalizable sample of 20 complaints referred from DHS OIG to FEMA to determine whether they were addressed.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed and documented misconduct policies and procedures for most employees, but not its entire workforce. Specifically, FEMA has developed policies and procedures regarding misconduct investigations that apply to all FEMA personnel and has also documented options to address misconduct and appeal rights for Title 5 (generally permanent employees) and Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (temporary employees who support disaster related activities). However, FEMA has not documented misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity Force members, who may augment FEMA's workforce in the event of a catastrophic disaster. Additionally, FEMA's Reservist (intermittent disaster employees) policies and procedures do not outline disciplinary actions or the appeals process currently in practice at the agency. As a result, supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of the process. Clearly documented policies and procedures for all workforce categories could help to better prepare management to address misconduct and mitigate perceptions that misconduct is handled inconsistently.
FEMA records data on misconduct cases and their outcomes; however, aspects of this data limit their usefulness for identifying and addressing trends. GAO reviewed misconduct complaints recorded by FEMA's Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) from January 2014 through September 30, 2016, and identified 595 complaints involving 799 alleged offenses, the most common of which were integrity and ethics violations. FEMA reported 546 disciplinary actions related to misconduct from calendar year 2014 through 2016. In addition to OCSO, two other FEMA offices involved in investigating and adjudicating misconduct also record data. However, limited standardization of data fields and entries within fields, limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry across all three offices restricts the data's usefulness for identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. Improved quality control measures could help the agency use the data to better identify potential problem areas and opportunities for training.
FEMA shares misconduct case information internally and with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) on a regular basis; however, FEMA does not have reconciliation procedures in place to track DHS OIG referred cases to ensure that they are reviewed and addressed. GAO reviewed a random sample of 20 cases DHS OIG referred to FEMA in fiscal year 2016 and found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of GAO's inquiry. As a result of GAO's review, FEMA took action to review the complaints and opened inquiries in 5 of the 6 cases (1 case was closed for lack of information). In 3 of these cases, officials determined that the complaints did not involve FEMA employees. The 2 remaining cases were open as of April 2017. While the results from this review are not generalizable to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. Procedures to ensure reconciliation of referred cases across FEMA and DHS OIG records could help ensure that FEMA accounts for all complaints.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations with which DHS concurred, including that FEMA document policies and procedures for addressing Surge Capacity Force and Reservist misconduct, improve the quality and usefulness of its misconduct data, and develop reconciliation procedures to consistently track referred cases. |
gao_GAO-16-167 | gao_GAO-16-167_0 | FCC regulations include procedures for carriers to discontinue, reduce, or impair service. Carriers Face Challenges Preserving Services on IP Networks during Times of Crisis
As the nation’s telecommunications systems transition to IP networks, carriers can face challenges during times of crisis that affect end users’ ability to call 911 and receive emergency communications. These challenges include (1) preserving consumer service and (2) supporting existing emergency communications services and equipment. When these rules become effective, FCC will require that telecommunications carriers communicate information to consumers regarding backup power, such as the availability of backup power sources, service limitations with and without backup power, and purchase options. Supporting Existing Emergency Communication Services and Equipment
IP networks may not support existing communication services that key government officials and others rely on during times of crisis. Agencies and Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Ensure IP Networks Are Reliable, but FCC Has Little Information to Assess the Effect of the IP Transition
Efforts to Ensure the Reliability of IP Networks
FCC Efforts
In addition to addressing the specific challenges affecting IP networks during times of crisis described above, FCC has taken a variety of other actions to help ensure the overall reliability of IP networks, including the following:
Proposed criteria in August 2015 to evaluate and compare the replacement of legacy services. The plan provides a framework for industry and government partners to establish a coordinated strategy to protect the nation’s critical communications infrastructure. Coordinated the development of the 2014 National Emergency Communications Plan. Telecommunications Carrier’s Efforts
In the private sector, telecommunications carriers have also worked to ensure their IP networks are functional during times of crisis in the following ways:
Built resiliency and reliability into IP networks as part of business operations and planning for emergencies. Although FCC Has Data Collection Efforts Under Way, It Has Limited Information about the Effect of the IP Transition
FCC is collecting data on the IP transition and sought comment on collecting additional data on the transition’s effect on consumers, but could do more to ensure it has the information it needs to make data- driven decisions about the IP transition. Furthermore, in its January 2014 order, FCC noted that one of its statutory responsibilities is to ensure that its core values, including public safety and consumer protection, endure as the nation transitions to modernized communications networks. In the order, FCC noted that fulfilling this responsibility requires that FCC learn more about how the modernization of communications networks affects consumers. However, it is unclear if FCC will be able to make data-driven decisions about the IP transition because of the limited number and scale of the proposed experiments. Furthermore, FCC’s solicitation of comments about the data-gathering process may not necessarily result in a change in FCC’s existing policies. Although FCC’s efforts to collect data represent a good start, we found FCC lacks a detailed strategy that outlines how it will address its remaining information needs, including determining what information from states and localities is available to be leveraged, a methodology for obtaining that information, and the resources required. Nevertheless, at the time of our review, FCC had little information on the effect of the transition, namely because the service-based experiments— FCC’s primary method for collecting data on the transition—were very limited in number and scale, did not cover consumer services in urban areas, and did not include critical national security or public safety locations. Developing a strategy for collecting information about how the IP transition affects public safety and consumers would help FCC address these areas of uncertainty as it oversees the IP transition and enable FCC to make data-driven decisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the reliability of the nation’s communications networks in an Internet Protocol (IP) environment. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the potential challenges affecting IP networks during times of crisis and how the challenges affect end users, and (2) the actions FCC, DHS, and other stakeholders have taken to ensure the reliability of IP communications during times of crisis. To identify challenges affecting IP networks and how the challenges affect end users, we reviewed relevant documents from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) including orders, notices and proposed rulemakings, reports, and risk assessments, as well as relevant statutes and regulations. We reviewed comments filed with FCC regarding the IP transition and emergency communications. We interviewed officials from FCC and DHS and representatives from AT&T, Verizon, and CenturyLink. | Why GAO Did This Study
The communications sector is essential to the nation's economy and government operations and for the delivery of public safety services, especially during emergencies. As the sector transitions from legacy networks to IP-based networks, consumer and public safety groups and others have raised concerns about how the communications networks will function during times of crisis.
GAO was asked to examine the reliability of the nation's communications network in an IP environment during times of crisis. GAO examined (1) the potential challenges affecting IP networks in times of crisis and how the challenges may affect end users, and (2) the actions FCC, DHS, and other stakeholders have taken to ensure the reliability of IP communications. GAO reviewed FCC and DHS documents as well as FCC proceedings and comments filed with FCC on the IP transition and emergency communications. GAO assessed FCC's efforts to collect data on the effect of the IP transition. GAO interviewed officials from FCC and DHS, and representatives from the three largest telecommunications carriers, industry associations, and public interest and consumer advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
As the nation's telecommunications systems transition from legacy telephone networks to Internet Protocol (IP)-based networks, telecommunications carriers can face challenges during times of crisis that affect end users' ability to call 911 and receive emergency communications. These challenges include (1) preserving consumer service and (2) supporting existing emergency communications services and equipment. For example, during power outages, consumers with service provided over IP networks and without backup power can lose service. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is working to address this issue by adopting rules that will require carriers to provide information to consumers on backup power sources, among other things. Another challenge is that IP networks may not support existing telecommunications “priority” services, which allow key government and public-safety officials to communicate during times of crisis.
FCC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and telecommunications carriers have taken various steps to ensure the reliability of IP communications, for example:
FCC proposed criteria—such as support for 911 services, network security, and access for people with disabilities—to evaluate carriers' replacement of legacy services when carriers seek to discontinue existing service.
DHS coordinated the development of the Communications Sector Specific Plan to help protect the nation's communications infrastructure.
Carriers told GAO they build resiliency and reliability into their IP networks as part of business operations and emergency planning.
FCC is also collecting data on the IP transition, but FCC could do more to ensure it has the information it needs to make data-driven decisions about the transition. FCC has emphasized that one of its statutory responsibilities is to ensure that its core values, including public safety capabilities and consumer protection, endure as the nation transitions to modernized networks. FCC stated that fulfilling this responsibility requires learning more about how the transition affects consumers. FCC plans on collecting data on the IP transition primarily through voluntary experiments proposed and run by telecommunications carriers. However, it is unclear if FCC will be able to make data-driven decisions about the IP transition because of the limited number and scale of the proposed experiments. In particular, there are only three proposed experiments that cover a very limited number of consumers; none of the experiments covers consumer services in high-density urban areas or includes critical national-security or public-safety locations. FCC also sought comment on how to supplement its data-gathering process; however, soliciting comments may not necessarily result in a change in FCC's existing policies. GAO found FCC lacks a detailed strategy that outlines how it will address its remaining information needs. Developing a strategy for collecting information about how the IP transition affects public safety and consumers would help FCC make data-driven decisions and address areas of uncertainty as it oversees the IP transition.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should strengthen its data collection efforts to assess the IP transition's effects. FCC did not agree or disagree with the recommendation and stated it has a strategy in place to oversee the IP transition. However, GAO continues to believe FCC should strengthen its data collection efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-253T | gao_GAO-04-253T_0 | First, before a product development is started, a match must be made between the customers’ needs and the available resources—technical and engineering knowledge, time, and funding. In applying the knowledge-based approach, the most-leveraged investment point is the first: matching the customer’s needs with the developer’s resources. Decisions on Space Programs Have Not Been Sufficiently Grounded in Knowledge
Our past work has shown that space programs have not typically achieved a match between needs and resources before starting product development. However, it has not launched a single satellite to perform this capability. In other words, the new policy does not alter DOD’s practice of committing major investments before knowing what resources will be required to deliver promised capability. Similar tools are also being adopted by other weapon system programs. After this study, the team is to conclude its work with recommendations to the Under Secretary of the Air Force, as DOD’s milestone decision authority for all DOD major defense acquisition programs for space, on whether or not to allow the program to proceed, typically using the traditional “red,” “yellow”, and “green” assessment colors to indicate whether the program has satisfied key criteria in areas such as requirements setting, cost estimates, and risk reduction. By contrast, the space acquisition policy increases the risk that significant problems will be discovered late in development because programs are expected to go into development with many unknowns about technology. Making tradeoff decisions between alternative investments is difficult at best. Changing the new space acquisition policy to clearly separate technology development from product development is an essential first step toward optimizing DOD’s space investment and assuring more timely delivery of capability since it enables a program to align customer expectations with resources, and therefore minimize problems that could hurt a program in its design and production phase. In our reviews of numerous DOD programs, including many satellite developments, it has been clear that committing to major investments in design, engineering, and manufacturing capacity without knowing a technology is mature and what resources are needed to ensure that the technology can be incorporated into a weapon system has consistently resulted in more money, time, and talent spent than either was promised, planned for, or necessary. Therefore, we continue to recommend that DOD modify its policy to separate technology development from product development so that needs can be matched with available technology, time, and money at the start of a new development program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense is spending nearly $18 billion annually to develop, acquire, and operate satellites and other spacerelated systems. The majority of satellite programs that GAO has reviewed over the past 2 decades experienced problems that increased costs, delayed schedules, and increased performance risk. In some cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. DOD has recently implemented a new acquisition policy, which sets the stage for decision making on individual space programs. GAO was asked to testify on its assessment of the new policy.
What GAO Found
Similar to all weapon system programs, we have found that the problems being experienced on space programs are largely rooted in a failure to match the customer's needs with the developer's resources--technical knowledge, timing, and funding--when starting product development. In other words, commitments were made to satellite launch dates, cost estimates, and delivering certain capabilities without knowing whether technologies being pursued could really work as intended. Time and costs were consistently underestimated. DOD has recognized this problem and recently revised its acquisition policy for non-space systems to ensure that requirements can be matched to resources at the time a product development starts. The space community, however, in its newly issued policy for space systems, has taken another approach. As currently written, and from our discussions with DOD officials about how it will be implemented, the policy will not result in the most important decision, to separate technology development from product development to ensure that a match is made between needs and resources. Instead, it allows major investment commitments to be made with unknowns about technology readiness, requirements, and funding. By not changing its current practice, DOD will likely perpetuate problems within individual programs that require more time and money to address than anticipated. More important, over the long run, the extra investment required to address these problems will likely prevent DOD from pursuing more advanced capabilities and from making effective tradeoff decisions between space and other weapon system programs. |
gao_GAO-12-925 | gao_GAO-12-925_0 | NRC Requirements and Implementation by Licensees Do Not Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radiological Sources
At the 26 selected hospitals and medical facilities we visited, NRC’s requirements did not consistently ensure the security of high-risk radiological sources. One reason for this is that the requirements, which are contained in NRC security controls (i.e., the two security orders and implementation guidance) are broadly written and do not prescribe specific measures that licensees must take to secure their equipment containing high-risk radiological sources. Rather, the security controls and their requirements provide a general framework for what constitutes adequate security practices. At a hospital in a major U.S. city, we observed that the interior door to the hospital blood bank, which had a cesium-137 blood irradiator of approximately 1,500 curies, had the combination to the lock written on the door frame. In the past, he said, the hospital had as many as 800 people with unescorted access to sources. NNSA Completed Security Upgrades in More Than 300 Medical Facilities, but Some Hospitals Do Not Participate in the Voluntary Program
As of April 2012, NNSA had completed security upgrades at 321, or one- fifth, of the 1,503 U.S. hospital and medical facilities it had identified as having high-risk radiological material but does not expect to complete all such upgrades until 2025. According to NNSA officials, as of March 2012, the Domestic Material Protection program had spent approximately $105 million to provide security upgrades to radiological sources at the 321 facilities. Of the 26 hospitals and medical facilities that we visited in seven states and the District of Columbia, 13 had received NNSA upgrades, and 3 were in the process of receiving upgrades. We observed a number of security upgrades at these facilities, including remote monitoring systems, surveillance cameras, enhanced security doors, iris scanners, motion detectors, and tamper alarms. These 14 facilities contain over 41,000 curies of high-risk radiological material. Specifically, we found the following:
According to police department officials in a major U.S. city, one hospital with a blood irradiator of approximately 1,700 curies has declined the NNSA upgrades, even though the police department considers it to be a high-risk facility. As a result, 14 hospitals and medical facilities, with a combined 41,000 curies of high-risk radiological material, have declined to participate in the program, and several of these facilities are located in or in close proximity to populated urban areas. For example, we were told that an irradiator stored on a wheeled pallet located down the hall from a loading dock had not raised inspectors’ concerns during the facility’s most recent NRC security inspection. Because the security of radiological sources in hospitals and medical facilities has national security implications, and many potentially vulnerable medical facilities with high-risk sources have not received security upgrades, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA, in consultation with the Chairman of NRC and Agreement State officials, take the following action: Increase outreach efforts to promote awareness of and participation in NNSA’s security upgrade program. In addition, to help address the security vulnerabilities at U.S. hospitals and medical facilities that contain high-risk radiological materials, we recommend that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission take the following three actions:
Strengthen NRC security requirements by providing hospitals and medical facilities with specific measures they must take to develop and sustain a more effective security program, including specific direction on the use of cameras, alarms, and other relevant physical security measures. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our other recommendations that it (1) strengthen its security requirements by providing hospital and medical facilities with specific measures they must take to develop and sustain a more effective security program; (2) ensure that NRC and Agreement State inspectors receive more comprehensive training to improve their security awareness and ability to conduct related security inspections; and (3) train facility officials who may be responsible for implementing NRC security controls in how to adequately secure equipment and conduct trustworthiness and reliability determinations. Consequently, we found that some of the medical equipment in the facilities we visited was more vulnerable to potential tampering or theft than that of other facilities, even though all the facilities we visited had implemented NRC’s security controls and undergone inspections by either NRC or Agreement State inspectors. For these reasons, we continue to believe our recommendation that NRC strengthen its security requirements is appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the hands of terrorists, radiological material, such as cesium-137, could be used to construct a "dirty bomb." Such material--encapsulated in steel or titanium and called a sealed source--is commonly found in equipment used by U.S. medical facilities to treat, among other things, cancer patients. NRC is responsible for regulating the commercial use of sealed sources and has relinquished its regulatory authority to 37 states, known as Agreement States. In 2008, NNSA established a program to provide security upgrades to U.S. hospitals and medical facilities that use radiological sources. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which NRC's requirements ensure the security of radiological sources at U.S. medical facilities and (2) the status of NNSA's efforts to improve the security of sources at these facilities. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed federal agency and state officials; and visited 26 hospitals and medical facilities in 7 states and Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) requirements do not consistently ensure the security of high-risk radiological sources at the 26 selected hospitals and medical facilities GAO visited. One reason for this is that the requirements are broadly written and do not prescribe specific measures that hospitals and medical facilities must take to secure medical equipment containing sealed sources, such as the use of cameras or alarms. Rather, the requirements provide a general framework for what constitutes adequate security practices, which is implemented in various ways at different hospitals. Some of the medical equipment in the facilities visited was more vulnerable to potential tampering or theft than that of other facilities because some hospitals developed better security controls than others. Some examples of poor security GAO observed included: an irradiator, used for medical research and containing almost 2,000 curies of cesium-137, was stored on a wheeled pallet down the hall from, and accessible to, a loading dock at one facility; at a second facility, the combination to a locked door, which housed an irradiator containing 1,500 curies of cesium- 137, was clearly written on the door frame; and at a third facility, an official told GAO that the number of people with unescorted access to the facility's radiological sources was estimated to be at least 500. In addition, some NRC and Agreement State inspectors said the training NRC requires is not sufficient.
As of March 2012, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had spent $105 million to complete security upgrades at 321 of the 1,503 U.S. hospitals and medical facilities it identified as having high-risk radiological sources. Of the 26 hospitals and medical facilities that GAO visited, 13 had volunteered for the NNSA security upgrades and had received security upgrades, such as remote monitoring systems, surveillance cameras, enhanced security doors, iris scanners, motion detectors, and tamper alarms; three others were in the process of receiving upgrades. However, NNSA does not anticipate completing all such security upgrades until 2025, leaving a number of facilities potentially vulnerable. In addition, the program's impact is limited because, among other things, it is voluntary, and facilities can decline to participate. To date, 14 facilities, including 4 in large urban areas, have declined to participate in the program. Combined, those 14 facilities have medical equipment containing over 41,000 curies of high-risk radiological material. According to police department officials in a major city, one hospital with a blood irradiator of approximately 1,700 curies has declined the NNSA upgrades due in part to cost concerns, even though the police department considers it to be a high-risk facility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NRC strengthen its security requirements by providing medical facilities with specific measures they must take to develop and sustain a more effective security program. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation and stated that its existing security requirements are adequate. GAO continues to believe that implementing its recommendation would contribute to increased security at U.S. hospitals and medical facilities. |
gao_GAO-16-187T | gao_GAO-16-187T_0 | U.S. weapons are the best in the world, but the programs to acquire them frequently take significantly longer and cost more money than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for time and money to be underestimated by 20 to 50 percent. Considering that DOD is investing $1.4 trillion to acquire over 75 major weapon systems as of March 2015, cost increases of this magnitude have sizeable effects. Typically, when costs and schedules increase, the buying power of the defense dollar is reduced. Consequences associated with this history of acquisition include: the warfighter gets less capability than promised; weapons perform well, but not as well as planned and are harder to trade-offs made to pay for cost increases—in effect, opportunity costs—are not explicit. This state of weapon acquisition is not the result of inattention. Key to Better Acquisition Outcomes: Better Business Cases
The decision to start a new program is the most highly leveraged point in the product development process. Establishing a sound business case for individual programs depends on disciplined requirements and funding processes. A solid, executable business case provides credible evidence that (1) the warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. A program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made. Establishing a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case and invites failure. Rather, it is more accurate to view the problem as a sophisticated process whose consistent results are indicative of its being in equilibrium. There are strong incentives within the acquisition culture to overpromise a prospective weapon’s performance while understating its likely cost and schedule demands. Thus, a successful business case—one that enables the program to gain approval—is not necessarily the same as a sound one. These incentives, coupled with a marketplace that is characterized by a single buyer (DOD), low volume, and limited number of major sources, create a culture in weapon system acquisition that encourages undue optimism about program risks and costs. What to Do
Since 1990, GAO has identified a number of reforms aimed at improving acquisition outcomes. Several of those are particularly relevant to changing the acquisition culture and will take the joint efforts of Congress and DOD. Decision makers must ensure that new programs exhibit desirable principles before funding is approved. Identify significant program risks upfront and resource them: Weapon acquisition programs by their nature involve risks, some much more than others. But, DOD and Congress need to explore ways to bring funding decisions closer in alignment with program decisions. Program managers are essential to the success of any program. Concluding Remarks
Describing the current acquisition process as “broken” is an oversimplification, because it implies that it can merely be “fixed”. The current process, along with its outcomes, has been held in place by a set of incentives—a culture—that has been resistant to reforms and fixes. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's acquisition of major weapon systems has been on GAO's high risk list since 1990. Over the years, Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes, including reforms that have championed sound management practices, such as realistic cost estimating, prototyping, and systems engineering. Too often, GAO reports on the same kinds of problems today that it did over 20 years ago.
This testimony discusses (1) the performance of the current acquisition system; (2) the role of a sound business case in getting better acquisition outcomes; (3) systemic reasons for persistent problems; and (4) thoughts on actions DOD and Congress can take to get better outcomes from the acquisition process. This statement draws from GAO's extensive body of work on DOD's acquisition of weapon systems and the numerous recommendations GAO has made on both individual weapons and systemic improvements to the acquisition process.
What GAO Found
U.S. weapon acquisition programs often take significantly longer, cost more than promised and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for time and money to be underestimated by 20 to 50 percent. As the Department of Defense (DOD) is investing $1.4 trillion to acquire over 75 major weapon systems as of March 2015, cost increases of this magnitude have sizeable effects. When costs and schedules increase, the buying power of the defense dollar is reduced. Beyond the resource impact, consequences include the warfighter receiving less capability than promised, weapons performing not as well as planned and being harder to support, and trade-offs made to pay for cost increases—in effect, opportunity costs—not being made explicit.
GAO's work shows that establishing a sound business case is essential to achieving better program outcomes. A program should not go forward without a sound business case. A solid, executable business case provides credible evidence that (1) the warfighter's needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—such as technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time. Establishing a sound business case for individual programs depends on disciplined requirements and funding processes, and calls for a realistic assessment of risks and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case and makes the above consequences likely.
Yet, business cases for many new programs are deficient. This is because there are strong incentives within the acquisition culture to overpromise a prospective weapon's performance while understating its likely cost and schedule demands. Thus, a successful business case is not necessarily the same as a sound one. Competition with other programs for funding creates pressures to overpromise. This culture is held in place by a set of incentives that are more powerful than policies to follow best practices. Moreover, the budget process calls for funding decisions before sufficient knowledge is available to make key decisions. Complementing these incentives is a marketplace characterized by a single buyer, low volume, and limited number of major sources. Thus, while it is tempting to describe the acquisition process as broken, it is more instructive to view it as in equilibrium: one in which competing forces consistently lead to starting programs with slim chances of being delivered on time and within cost.
Over the years, GAO has identified a number of reforms aimed at improving acquisition outcomes. Several of those are particularly relevant to changing the acquisition culture and will take the joint efforts of Congress and DOD:
Ensure that new programs exhibit desirable principles before funding is approved.
Identify significant program risks up front and allot sufficient resources.
More closely align budget and program decisions.
Mature technology before including it in product development.
Develop system engineering and program manager capacity—sufficient personnel with appropriate expertise and skills. |
gao_GAO-08-186T | gao_GAO-08-186T_0 | NASA is now implementing the recommendations from this study within the Constellation Program, which includes three major development projects—the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle as shown in figure 1. To reduce cost and minimize risk in developing these projects, NASA planned to maximize the use of heritage systems and technology. NASA has completed the system requirements review for each project and is in the midst of finalizing the system definition reviews. NASA is using its Web-based Integrated Risk Management Application to help monitor and mitigate the risks with the Ares I and Orion development efforts and for the overall Constellation Program. Requirements Setting is a Primary Challenge for Both the Ares I and Orion Projects
Although project level requirements were baselined at both systems requirements reviews, continued uncertainty about the systems’ requirements have led to considerable unknowns as to whether NASA’s plans for the Ares I and Orion vehicles can be executed within schedule goals, as well as what these efforts will ultimately cost. Such uncertainty has created knowledge gaps that are affecting many aspects of both projects. Both the Orion and Ares I vehicles have a history of weight and mass growth, and NASA is still defining the mass, loads, and weight requirements for both vehicles. With regard to the Orion project, there is currently no industry capability for producing a thermal protection system of the size required by the Orion. The table 1 describes these and other examples of knowledge gaps in the development of the Ares I and Orion vehicles. NASA is working under a self-imposed deadline to deliver the new launch vehicles no later than 2015 in order to minimize the gap in human spaceflight between the Space Shuttle’s retirement in 2010 and the availability of new transportation vehicles. Orion
Cost and schedule reporting on the Orion project indicates that the Orion project’s efforts to mature requirements and design and to resolve weight issues is placing pressure on the Orion schedule. Test Facilities for Ares I and Orion Insufficient
According to NASA, at this time, existing test facilities are insufficient to adequately test the Ares I and Orion systems. To address this issue, NASA is in the process of constructing a new altitude test facility at Stennis Space Center for the J-2X. Also, current facilities are inadequate to replicate the Orion vibration and acoustic environment. Our prior work has shown that investment decisions of this magnitude need to be based on an established and executable business case and that there are several key indicators that Congress could be informed of to assess progress throughout development. Our previous work on government-funded space systems has shown that weight growth is often not anticipated even though it is among the highest drivers of cost growth for space systems. The complexity of software development on a system, often denoted by the number of lines of code on a system, can also be used as an indicator to monitor whether a program will meet cost and schedule goals. Indicators that Can be Used to Assess Knowledge Gap at Key Junctures Additionally, since the mid-1990s, GAO has studied the best practices of leading commercial companies. We have highlighted the three critical junctures at which developers must have knowledge to make large investment decisions—the preliminary design review, the critical design review, and the production review—and the numerous key indicators that can be used to increase the chances of successful outcomes. One approach to ensure that technology readiness is reliably assessed is to use independent testing; Project requirements are defined and informed by the systems Cost and schedule estimates established for the project are based on knowledge from the preliminary design using systems engineering tools; Additional resources are in place, including needed workforce, and a decision review is conducted following completion of the preliminary design review. A critical enabler for success in this phase of development is performance and requirements flexibility. To provide oversight at this juncture, NASA could provide Congress with information to verify that the following indicators have been met: At least 90 percent of engineering drawings are complete; All subsystem and system design reviews have been completed; The design meets requirements demonstrated through modeling, simulation, or prototypes; Stakeholders’ concurrence that drawings are complete and producible Failure modes and effects analysis have been completed; Key system characteristics are identified; Critical manufacturing processes are identified; Reliability targets are established and a growth plan based on demonstrated reliability rates of components and subsystems is developed; and A decision review is conducted following the completion of the critical design review. In addition, we have reported that this type of approach is being embraced by the Ares I project. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of two new development efforts as part of the Constellation Program--the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. These projects are critical to the success of the overall program, which will return humans to spaceflight after Space Shuttle retirement in 2010. To reduce the gap in human spaceflight, NASA plans to launch Ares I and Orion in 2015--5 years after the Shuttle's retirement. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies that touch on various aspects of NASA's Constellation Program, particularly the development efforts underway for the Orion and Ares I projects. These reports and testimonies have questioned the affordability and overall acquisition strategy for each project. NASA has revised the Orion acquisition strategy and delayed the Ares I preliminary design review based on GAO's recommendations in these reports. In addition, GAO continues to monitor these projects on an ongoing basis at the request of members of Congress. Based on this work, GAO was asked to testify on the types of challenges that NASA faces in developing the Ares I and Orion vehicles and identify the key indicators that decision makers could use to assess risks associated with common trouble spots in development. The information in this testimony is based on work completed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
NASA is currently working toward preliminary design reviews for the Ares I and Orion vehicles. While this is a phase for discovery and risk reduction, there are considerable unknowns as to whether NASA's plans for these vehicles can be executed within schedule goals and what these efforts will ultimately cost. This is primarily because NASA is still in the process of defining many performance requirements. Such uncertainties could affect the mass, loads, and weight requirements for the vehicles. NASA is aiming to complete this process in 2008, but it will be challenged to do so given the level of knowledge that still needs to be attained. The challenges NASA is facing pose risks to the successful outcome of the projects. For example: both vehicles have a history of weight issues; excessive vibration during launch threatens system design; Uncertainty about how flight characteristics will be impacted by a fifth segment added to the Ares I launch vehicle; Ares I upper stage essentially requires development of a new engine; no industry capability currently exists for producing the kind of heat shields that the Orion will need for protecting the crew exploration vehicle when it reenters Earth's atmosphere; and existing test facilities are insufficient for testing Ares I's new engine, for replicating the engine's vibration and acoustic environment, and for testing the thermal protection system for the Orion vehicle. All these unknowns, as well as others, leave NASA in the position of being unable to provide firm cost estimates for the projects at this point. Meanwhile, tight deadlines are putting additional pressure on both the Ares I and Orion projects. Future requirements changes raise risks that both projects could experience cost and schedule problems. GAO's past work on space systems acquisition and the practices of leading developers identifies best practices that can provide decision makers with insight into the progress of development at key junctures, facilitate Congressional oversight, and support informed decision making. This work has also identified common red flags throughout development, which decision makers need to keep in mind when assessing the projects. They include: Key indicators: Weight growth is often among the highest drivers of cost growth. Unanticipated software complexity, often indicated by increases in the number of lines of code, can portend cost and schedule growth. Key junctures: The preliminary design review, critical design review, and production review are key junctures that involve numerous steps and help focus the agency on realistic accomplishments within reachable goals. A disciplined approach aligned with key indicators can provide the knowledge needed to make informed investment decisions at each review. |
gao_GAO-01-707T | gao_GAO-01-707T_0 | NRC Faces Challenges to Implement a Risk-Informed Regulatory Approach for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
NRC’s implementation of a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory approach for commercial nuclear power plants is complex and will require many years to fully implement. It requires basic changes to the regulations and NRC’s processes to ensure the safe operation of these plants. NRC Needs to Overcome Inherent Difficulties to Apply a Risk-Informed Approach to Nuclear Material Licensees
NRC is facing a number of difficulties inherent in applying a risk-informed regulatory approach for nuclear material licensees. NRC Faces Challenges in Demonstrating Increased Levels of Public Confidence— One of Its Goals Under the Government Performance and Results Act
Another challenge NRC faces is to demonstrate that it is meeting one of its performance goals under the Government Performance and Results Act— increasing public confidence in NRC as an effective regulator. In January 2001, NRC staff provided a suggested action plan for maintaining core competencies to the Commission. In this regard, NRC has taken the initiative and identified options to attract new employees with critical skills, developed training programs to meets its changing needs, and identified legislative options to help resolve its aging staff issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the challenges facing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as it moves from its traditional regulatory approach to a risk-informed, performance-based approach.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NRC's implementation of a risk-informed approach for commercial nuclear power plants is a complex, multiyear undertaking that requires basic changes to the regulations and processes NRC uses to ensure the safe operation of these plants. NRC needs to overcome several inherent difficulties as it seeks to apply a risk-informed regulatory approach to the nuclear material licensees, particularly in light of the large number of licensees and the diversity of activities they conduct. NRC will have to demonstrate that it is meeting its mandate (under the Government Performance and Results Act) of increasing public confidence in NRC as an effective regulator. NRC also faces challenges in human capital management, such as replacing a large percentage of its technical staff and senior managers who are eligible to retire. NRC has developed a five-year plan to identify and maintain the core competencies it needs and has identified legislative options to help resolve its aging staff problem. |
gao_GAO-07-851 | gao_GAO-07-851_0 | DOD’s Estimated Costs to Implement NSPS Do Not Fully Represent Its Total Resource Needs
DOD’s estimate that it will cost $158 million to implement NSPS between 2005 and 2008 does not include the full cost that the department expects to incur as a result of implementing the new system. Federal financial accounting standards state that reliable information on the costs of federal programs and activities is crucial for effective management of government operations and recommend that full costs of programs be reported so that decision makers have information necessary to make informed decisions on resources for programs, activities, and outputs, and to ensure that they get expected and efficient results. According to the standards, the full cost of a program or activity includes both those costs that are specifically identifiable to carry them out, or direct costs, and those costs that are common to multiple programs or activities but cannot be specifically identified with any particular program or activity, or indirect costs. While the standards emphasize that cost information is essential for managing federal programs, their activities, and outputs, the standards also provide that items may be omitted from cost information if that omission would not change or influence the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the cost information. However, before calculating its estimate, DOD had not fully defined what direct and indirect costs should be included for it to effectively manage NSPS. For example, PEO and component officials agreed that the estimate does not include the full salary costs of all civilian and military personnel who directly support NSPS activities departmentwide and any of the direct costs that the various organizations and defense agencies expect to incur to implement the system, such as salaries and benefits for employees who work directly on NSPS activities and materials and supplies used in NSPS activities. Without a cost estimate that includes all costs that the department expects to incur as a result of implementing the new system, decision makers—within DOD and Congress—will not have the complete cost information they need to make decisions about whether adequate resources are being provided for implementing NSPS. While the PEO issued general instructions to the military services and the Washington Headquarters Services for estimating the costs associated with the design and implementation of NSPS, this office did not provide a description of the specific types of direct and indirect costs to be included in the estimate or a cost-estimating methodology containing assumptions and approaches. Total Funds Expended or Obligated to Design and Implement NSPS Cannot Be Determined
The total amount of funds DOD has expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS during fiscal years 2005 through 2006 cannot be determined because DOD has not established an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that all these costs are fully captured. In May 2005, the NSPS Senior Executive established guidance intended to provide the PEO with visibility over NSPS expenditures. This guidance does not, however, define the direct and indirect costs that DOD requires the components to capture. GAO first designated DOD financial management as high risk in 1995. Based on discussions with PEO and component officials and our review of the quarterly reports of NSPS implementation costs submitted for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the components’ official appropriation accounting systems do not capture the total amount of funds reported expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS. Without an effective oversight mechanism, DOD and Congress do not have adequate visibility over the actual cost to design and implement NSPS. Questions for the Record Regarding the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given a large-scale organizational change initiative, such as the Department of Defense's (DOD) National Security Personnel System (NSPS), is a substantial commitment that will take years to complete, it is important that DOD and Congress be kept informed of the full cost of implementing NSPS. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO analyzed the extent to which DOD has (1) fully estimated total costs associated with the implementation of NSPS and (2) expended or obligated funds to design and implement NSPS through fiscal year 2006. GAO interviewed department officials and analyzed the NSPS Program Executive Office's (PEO), and the military services' and the Washington Headquarters Services' (hereafter referred to as the components) cost estimates and reports of expended and obligated funds.
What GAO Found
DOD's November 2005 estimate that it will cost $158 million to implement NSPS does not include the full cost that the department expects to incur as a result of implementing the new system. Federal financial accounting standards state that reliable information on the costs of federal programs and activities is crucial for effective management of government operations and recommend that full costs of programs and their outputs be provided to assist Congress and executives in making informed decisions on program resources and to ensure that programs get expected and efficient results. The full cost includes both those costs specifically identifiable to carry out the program, or direct costs, and those costs that are common to multiple programs but cannot be specifically identified with any particular program, or indirect costs. While the standards emphasize that full cost information is essential for managing federal programs, their activities, and outputs, the standards also provide that items may be omitted from cost information if that omission would not change or influence the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the cost information. Based on GAO's review of documentation provided by DOD and discussions with department officials, GAO found that DOD's estimate includes some direct costs, such as the start-up and operation of the NSPS PEO and the development and delivery of new NSPS training courses, but it does not include other direct costs such as the full salary costs of all civilian and military personnel who directly support NSPS activities departmentwide. Before developing its estimate, DOD had not fully defined all the direct and indirect costs needed to manage the program. Without a better estimate, decision makers--within DOD and Congress--will not have complete information about whether adequate resources are being provided for implementing NSPS. The total amount of funds DOD has expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS during fiscal years 2005 through 2006 cannot be determined because DOD has not established an oversight mechanism to ensure that these costs are fully captured. In May 2005, the NSPS Senior Executive established guidance for tracking and reporting NSPS implementation costs that requires the components to develop mechanisms to capture these costs and to report quarterly their costs to the NSPS PEO. However, this guidance does not define the direct and indirect costs DOD requires that the components capture. DOD's pervasive financial management deficiencies have been the basis for GAO's designation of this as a high-risk area since 1995. GAO's review of submitted reports from the components found that their official accounting systems do not capture the total funds expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS. Without an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that the official accounting systems capture all appropriate costs, DOD and Congress do not have visibility over the actual cost to design and implement NSPS. |
gao_GAO-14-222 | gao_GAO-14-222_0 | Since then, State has taken steps to explore access to such databases. Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport Issuances Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified
Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as applicants with active felony warrants. Since fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. However, State officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases for various reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN. State’s subsequent review of these cases indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four cases, and that five of the cases should be referred to DS for further investigation. We provided information on all our matches, including the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, to State for review. Figure 5 summarizes our matching analysis and sample of 15 cases. From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in their passport application. State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements and issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal limitations. Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases with warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. In the other 3 of the 13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications that State was aware of or alerted to the individuals’ warrants at the time they applied for passports, even though it appeared that CLASS should have included the We referred all passport issuances we identified from our warrant data.matching analysis, including our sample cases, to State for further review and investigation. State’s Records Contained Erroneous SSNs for Thousands of Passport Issuances as a Result of Applicant or State Data- Entry Error
Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with a deceased individual, but where the name used in the passport application did not match the name of the deceased individual. We randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases from the population of unique, likely invalid SSNs for additional review (see fig. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State’s (State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we matched State’s passport-issuance data for approximately 28 million passport issuances to databases containing information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of an active warrant at the time of the passport We conducted this matching on the basis of common data issuance.elements including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN that had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had a high risk of misuse. The results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the SSN and name of a deceased person. From this population, we selected 15 cases for additional analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to conceal the true identity of the user and potentially facilitate other crimes, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking. State issued over 13.5 million passports during fiscal year 2013.
GAO was asked to assess potential fraud in State's passport program. This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010—the most recently available data at the time GAO began its review. GAO matched State's passport data from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for approximately 28 million issuances to databases with information about individuals who were deceased, incarcerated in state and federal prison facilities, or who had an active warrant at the time of issuance. GAO also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided a likely invalid SSN, which had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had been publically disclosed. From each of these five populations, GAO selected nongeneralizable samples for additional review. GAO also randomly selected a generalizable sample from a population of passport issuances to applicants who used only the SSN of a deceased individual. GAO reviewed State's adjudication policies, and examined passport applications for these populations to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State provided technical comments and generally agreed with our findings. This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, had active felony warrants, or used an incorrect Social Security number (SSN); however, GAO did not identify pervasive fraud in these populations. The Department of State (State) has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO referred, and State is reviewing, matches from this analysis. The following summarizes GAO's findings:
Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at least 1 case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as likely data errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and indicated fraud could likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State plans to further review 6 cases.
State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the sample of 14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be ruled out in 10 of the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional reviews of 4 cases.
Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud indicators, since all individuals were not actually in prison when applying for passports.
Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the figure shows, GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State was not aware of or alerted to, but should have been in State's system for detection during adjudication.
In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 24,278 issuances to applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO reviewed a 140-case generalizable sample and a 15-case nongeneralizable sample for these two populations, respectively, and determined the cases were likely data errors. State has taken steps to capture correct SSN information more consistently. |
gao_GAO-06-201T | gao_GAO-06-201T_0 | The “One VA” vision is to create versatile new ways for veterans to obtain services and information by streamlining interactions with customers and integrating IT resources to enable VA employees to help customers more quickly and effectively. Table 1 shows a breakdown of VA’s approximately $2.1 billion IT budget request for fiscal year 2006. However, fully exploiting this potential presents challenges to agencies. One of the ways in which the Congress has addressed this issue was to establish the CIO position; an agency’s CIO is to serve as the focal point for information and technology management within an agency. At the major departments and agencies included in our review, the median time in the position of permanent CIOs whose time in office had been completed was about 23 months. Success Factors and Challenges of CIOs
To allow CIOs to serve effectively in the key leadership role envisioned by the Congress, federal agencies should use the full potential of CIOs as information and technology management leaders and active participants in the development of the agency’s strategic plans and policies. ● Effective IT management. The CIO Position in the Private Sector Has Similarities to the Federal CIO Position
In September 2005, we reported the results of our study of CIOs at leading private-sector organizations, in which we described the CIOs’ responsibilities and major challenges, as well as private-sector approaches to information and technology governance. In most areas, there was little difference between the private and federal sectors in the percentage of CIOs who had or shared a particular responsibility. Improving various IT management processes was mentioned by several private-sector CIOs (e.g., IT investment decision making) as well as by federal CIOs, as was developing IT leadership and skills. In technology-related areas, both private-sector and federal CIOs mentioned working with enterprise architectures and ensuring the security of systems as challenges. Roles and Responsibilities of the CIO Position at VA Have Evolved over Time
Since enactment of the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1996, the roles and responsibilities of VA’s Chief Information Officer have evolved. In August 2001, VA filled the CIO position. VA Proposed to Realign its IT Organization in Response to IT Management Challenges
Our prior work highlighted some of the challenges that the CIO faced as a result of the way the department was organized to carry out its IT mission. Among these challenges was that information systems and services were highly decentralized, and the VA administrations and staff offices controlled a majority of the department’s IT budget. Although we have not reviewed the current status of this proposed realignment or VA’s current organizational structure, it remains our view that the proposed realignment held promise for building a more solid foundation for investing in and improving the department’s accountability over IT resources. In our view, the realignment of VA’s IT organization proposed in 2002 held promise for improving accountability and enabling the department to accomplish its mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out its mission of serving the nation's veterans and their dependents, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) relies extensively on information technology (IT), for which it is requesting about $2.1 billion in fiscal year 2006. VA's vision is to integrate its IT resources and streamline interactions with customers, so that it can provide services and information to veterans more quickly and effectively. Fully exploiting the potential of IT to improve performance is a challenging goal for VA, as it is throughout government. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 addressed this challenge by, among other things, establishing the position of chief information officer (CIO) to serve as the focal point for information and technology management within departments and agencies. As agreed with Congress, GAO will discuss the role of CIOs in the federal government and in the private sector, as well as provide a historical perspective on the roles and responsibilities of VA's CIO. In developing this testimony, GAO relied on its previous work at VA and on the CIO role, including a 2004 review of CIOs at major departments and agencies and a 2005 review of CIOs at leading private-sector organizations.
What GAO Found
In the federal government and in the private sector, the responsibilities and challenges of CIOs are largely similar. In most management areas, the federal and private-sector organizations reviewed showed little difference in the percentage of CIOs who had or shared a particular responsibility. The challenges cited by private-sector CIOs were also similar to those of federal CIOs: both groups cited improving IT management processes, developing IT leadership and skills, working with enterprise architectures, and ensuring the security of systems. Over time, VA has increased its attention to the CIO position and to information and technology management. After several years with CIOs whose primary duty was not information and technology management or who were serving in an acting capacity, the department appointed a full-time permanent CIO in August 2001. VA also recognized that its decentralized computing environment presented challenges, with a large proportion of the department's IT budget controlled by its administrations and staff offices. As a result, in 2002, the department proposed a realignment to strengthen the department-level CIO position and centralize IT management under this official. GAO has not reviewed the current status of this proposed realignment or VA's current organizational structure, but its view is that the realignment held promise for improving accountability and helping to accomplish VA's mission by increasing the CIO's oversight over IT management and spending. |
gao_RCED-96-199 | gao_RCED-96-199_0 | Railroad Management and Labor Differ Over Continued Need for FELA
Railroad management and labor disagree over how well FELA is working and whether it should be replaced or changed. Cost Savings From Replacing FELA With a Nationwide No-Fault Compensation System Depend on Many Factors
Railroad management advocates replacing FELA with a no-fault compensation system, in part because of a belief that a no-fault system would be less costly. Prime among these is the number of railroad workers who are permanently disabled and are unable to return to work at their preinjury wages. Some injured railroad workers leave the railroad after receiving their FELA settlement, but railroad management believes that some of these workers are capable of returning to work and, therefore, would not receive permanent disability payments under a no-fault compensation system. The higher the proportion of this group of injured workers that can return to work at their preinjury wages, the higher the probability that railroads’ injury compensation costs would be reduced under a no-fault system. A no-fault system could reduce railroads’ administrative costs by eliminating the need to investigate negligence and to assess noneconomic damages. 2.1. Other workers’ compensation systems limit attorneys’ fees. Modifying FELA could reduce the amount of compensation they receive or limit the availability of legal counsel. Our survey found that small freight railroads experienced lower FELA costs than the large freight railroads. Data on injuries from the Federal Railroad Administration showed that the passenger and small freight railroads generally average fewer lost workdays per injury than the large freight carriers. Conclusion
FELA does not appear to be any more burdensome for passenger and small freight railroads than it is for the large freight railroads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined how replacing the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) with a no-fault compensation system would affect the railroad industry.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the cost of replacing FELA with a nationwide no-fault compensation system depends on the number of injured railroad workers permanently disabled and the number of workers unable to return to work at preinjury wages; (2) the costs under a no-fault compensation system would be the same as or lower than FELA costs; (3) overall injury compensation costs would be lower under a no-fault system if fewer than 70 percent of injured rail workers are able to return to work; (4) railroads would save an average of $100 per employee if injured workers continue to work after receiving settlement; (5) a no-fault compensation system would reduce railroads' administrative costs, but limit the amount of compensation and legal counsel that injured workers receive; (6) small railroads have fewer lost workdays and lower injury rates than large railroads; (7) small railroads have lower FELA costs than large railroads and rely on insurance payments to avoid high FELA payouts; (8) railroads could reduce their administrative costs by placing a cap on compensation for noneconomic losses and limiting plaintiff's legal fees; (9) railroad management and labor disagree over how well FELA is working and whether it should be replaced or changed; and (10) FELA is no more burdensome for passenger and small freight railroads than it is for large freight railroads. |
gao_GAO-05-690 | gao_GAO-05-690_0 | Tax Expenditures Have Represented a Substantial Federal Commitment over Time
Whether gauged in absolute numbers, by revenues forgone, or in comparison to federal spending or the size of the economy, tax expenditures have been substantial over the last three decades. As a share of the U.S. economy, the sum of tax expenditure outlay-equivalent estimates remained relatively stable at about 7.5 percent of GDP since the last major tax reform legislation. The sum of the revenue loss estimates declined to approximately $728 billion in 2004. Trends in the sum of tax expenditures are due, at least in part, to legislation affecting the number or scope of tax expenditures or modifying tax rates or other basic structural features of the tax code. While Tax Expenditures Have Exceeded Discretionary Spending in Some Years, They Have Remained Relatively Stable as a Share of the U.S. Economy
The sum of tax expenditure outlay-equivalent estimates exceeded the amount of discretionary spending for most years during the last decade, as shown in figure 8. The income tax exclusion for employer-provided health care—the largest single tax expenditure—accounted for 12 percent of the sum of tax expenditure outlay-equivalent estimates and represented about 27 percent of total federal support in the health function, which includes Medicaid. The entire set of tools the federal government can use to address national objectives—including discretionary and mandatory spending, tax provisions, loans and loan guarantees—should be subject to periodic reviews and reexamination to ensure that they are achieving their intended purposes and designed in the most efficient and effective manner. The nation’s current and projected fiscal imbalance provides an additional impetus for engaging in such a review and reassessment. Periodic reviews of tax expenditures could help to establish whether these programs are relevant to today’s needs; if so, how well tax expenditures have worked to achieve their objectives; and whether the benefits from particular tax expenditures are greater than their costs. The Executive Branch Has Made Little Progress Since 1994 to Improve Scrutiny of Tax Expenditures
Although OMB and Treasury in 1994 supported expanding federal reviews of tax expenditures, the Executive Branch made little progress over the past decade to integrate tax expenditures in the budget presentation and to incorporate tax expenditures under review processes that apply to spending programs, as we recommended in 1994. At the same time, our current and projected fiscal imbalance serves to reinforce the need for reassessing all activities. Specifically, this report describes (1) how tax expenditures have changed over the past three decades in reported number and aggregate size and in comparison to federal spending, revenue, and the economy; and (2) the progress that has been made since 1994 in how the Executive Branch scrutinizes tax expenditures. We also considered activities to include tax expenditures under OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool process. As described in app. 21st Century Challenges: Performance Budgeting Could Help Promote Necessary Reexamination. | Why GAO Did This Study
Numerous federal programs, policies, and activities are supported through the tax code. As described in statute, tax expenditures are reductions in tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions, such as tax exclusions, credits, and deductions. They result in revenue forgone. This report, done under the Comptroller General's authority, is part of an effort to assist Congress in reexamining and transforming the government to meet the many challenges and opportunities that we face in the 21st century. This report describes (1) how tax expenditures have changed over the past three decades in number, size, and in comparison to federal revenue, spending, and the economy, and (2) the amount of progress made since our 1994 recommendations to improve scrutiny of tax expenditures.
What GAO Found
Whether gauged in numbers, revenues forgone, or compared to federal spending or the size of the economy, tax expenditures have represented a substantial federal commitment over the past three decades. Since 1974, the number of tax expenditures more than doubled and the sum of tax expenditure revenue loss estimates tripled in real terms to nearly $730 billion in 2004. The 14 largest tax expenditures, headed by the individual income tax exclusion for employer-provided health care, accounted for 75 percent of the aggregate revenue loss in fiscal year 2004. On an outlay-equivalent basis, the sum of tax expenditure estimates exceeded discretionary spending for most years in the last decade. For some budget functions, the sum of tax expenditure estimates was of the same magnitude as or larger than federal spending. As a share of the economy, the sum of tax expenditure outlay-equivalent estimates has been about 7.5 percent of gross domestic product since the last major tax reform legislation in 1986. All federal spending and tax policy tools, including tax expenditures, should be reexamined to ensure that they are achieving their intended purposes and designed in the most efficient and effective manner. The nation's current and projected fiscal imbalance serves to reinforce the importance of engaging in such a review and reassessment. Although data and methodological challenges exist, periodic reviews of tax expenditures could establish whether they are relevant to today's needs; if so, how well they have worked to achieve their objectives; and whether the benefits from specific tax expenditures are greater than their costs. Over the past decade, however, the Executive Branch made little progress in integrating tax expenditures into the budget presentation, in developing a structure for evaluating tax expenditure outcomes or in incorporating them under review processes that apply to spending programs, as we recommended in 1994. More recently, the Administration has not used its Program Assessment Rating Tool process to systematically review tax expenditures or promote joint reviews of tax and spending programs sharing common goals. |
gao_GAO-02-579 | gao_GAO-02-579_0 | As with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder can impair a patient’s ability to function. VA Prescribing Guideline for Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs Is Sound
VA’s guideline for prescribing atypical antipsychotic drugs is consistent with published clinical practice guidelines commonly used by public and private health care systems. Like most other practice guidelines, VA’s guideline recommends that physicians use their best medical judgment, based on clinical circumstances and patients’ needs, when choosing among the atypical drugs. In addition, formulary leaders, psychiatrists, and pharmacists in five VISNs told us that several facilities require physicians to follow additional policies and procedures for prescribing atypical antipsychotic drugs. This policy conflicts with the prescribing guideline, because cost has greater weight than physicians’ clinical judgment. While these procedures help the facility manage pharmaceutical use, they have the potential to overemphasize cost-containment if they put pressure on physicians to prescribe the less expensive drugs. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides health care services to veterans who have been diagnosed with psychosis--primarily schizophrenia, a disorder that can substantially limit their ability to care for themselves, secure employment, and maintain relationships. These veterans also have a high risk of premature death, including suicide. Effective treatment, especially antipsychotic drug therapy, has reduced the severity of their illnesses and increased their ability to function in society. VA's guideline for prescribing atypical antipsychotic drugs is sound and consistent with published clinical practice guidelines used by public and private health care systems. VA's prescribing guideline, recommends that physicians use their best clinical judgment, based on clinical circumstances and patients' needs, when choosing among the atypical drugs. Most Veterans Integrated Service Networks and facilities use VA's prescribing guideline; however, five VISNs have additional policies and procedures for prescribing atypical antipsychotic drugs. Although these procedures help manage pharmaceutical cost, they also have the potential to result in more weight given to cost than clinical judgment which is not consistent with the prescribing guideline. |
gao_GAO-06-849T | gao_GAO-06-849T_0 | 1.) The Big Bend Dam is 95 feet high and was completed in September 1966. Each reservation includes about 225,000 acres. Consultant’s Compensation Analysis Differs from the Approach GAO Previously Used for Other Tribes
The approach used by the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ consultant differed from the approach we used in our prior reports. In addition, the consultant provided only the highest additional compensation value, rather than a range of possible additional compensation from which the Congress could choose. Consultant Used Various Settlement Proposals Rather Than Consistently Using the Tribes’ Final Asking Prices
To arrive at an additional compensation estimate, the consultant did not consistently use the tribes’ final asking prices when calculating the difference between what the tribes asked for and what they finally received. In contrast, the consultant used figures from a variety of settlement proposals—several of which were not the tribes’ final asking prices—to estimate additional compensation for damages (including direct and indirect damages), administrative expenses, and rehabilitation. Lastly, the consultant did not use the tribes’ final asking prices for the rehabilitation component of the settlement payment. In our view, the consultant should have used the final rehabilitation figures proposed by the tribes in 1961—that is, $4 million for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and $2.7 million for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. Consultant Developed a Single Compensation Estimate for Each Tribe, Rather Than a Range of Estimates
In our two prior reports, we suggested that, for the tribes of Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and Cheyenne River, the Congress consider a range of possible compensation based on the current value of the difference between the final asking price of each tribe and the amount that it received. In calculating the current value, we used two different rates to establish a range of additional compensation. Amounts Calculated by GAO Are Similar to the Amounts Received by the Tribes in the 1990s
Using the approach we followed in our prior reports, which was based on the tribes’ final asking prices, we found that the additional compensation the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes received in the 1990s was either at the high end or above the range of possible additional compensation. Rather than bringing the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes into parity with the other tribes, the two bills under consideration in the 109th Congress—H.R. 109 and S. 374—would have the opposite effect. As such, should the Congress rely on our analysis in this report and not provide these two tribes a third round of compensation, then the additional compensation provided to five of the seven tribes affected by Pick-Sloan dam projects on the Missouri River would generally be within the ranges we have calculated. Providing a third round of compensation to the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, in the amounts proposed in the bills, would catapult them ahead of the other tribes and set a precedent for the other tribes to seek a third round of compensation. Our analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374. Notwithstanding the results of our analysis, the Congress will ultimately decide whether or not additional compensation should be provided, and if so, how much it should be. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1946 to 1966, the government constructed the Fort Randall and Big Bend Dams as flood control projects on the Missouri River in South Dakota. The reservoirs created behind the dams flooded about 38,000 acres of the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Indian reservations. The tribes received compensation when the dams were built and additional compensation in the 1990s. The tribes are seeking a third round of compensation on the basis of a consultant's analysis. The Congress provided additional compensation to other tribes after two prior GAO reports in 1991 and 1998 (GAO/RCED-91-77 and GAO/RCED-98-77). For those reports, GAO proposed that one recommended approach to providing additional compensation would be to calculate the difference between the tribe's final asking price and the amount that was appropriated by the Congress and then adjust that difference using the inflation rate and an interest rate to reflect a range of current values. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Indian Issues: Analysis of the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux Tribes' Additional Compensation Claims ( GAO-06-517 , May 19, 2006). Specifically, this testimony notes that the tribes' consultant did not follow the approach in GAO's 1991 and 1998 reports. The additional compensation amounts calculated by the tribes' consultant are contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374.
What GAO Found
The approach the tribes' consultant used differed from the approach used in prior GAO reports by (1) not using the tribes' final asking prices as the starting point of the analysis and (2) not providing a range of additional compensation. First, in calculating additional compensation amounts, GAO used the tribes' final asking prices, recognizing that their final settlement position should be the most complete and realistic. In contrast, the consultant used selected figures from a variety of tribal settlement proposals. For example, for the rehabilitation component of the tribes' settlement proposals, the consultant used $13.1 million from proposals in 1957, rather than $6.7 million from the tribes' final rehabilitation proposals in 1961. Second, the tribes' consultant calculated only the highest additional compensation dollar value rather than providing the Congress with a range based on different adjustment factors, as in the earlier GAO reports. Based on calculations using the tribes' final asking prices, GAO's estimated range of additional compensation is generally comparable with what the tribes were authorized in the 1990s. GAO determined that the tribes' final asking prices were a reasonable starting point for the calculations, as was the case for the tribes GAO reviewed in two prior reports. By contrast, the consultant estimated about $106 million and $186 million for additional compensations for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, respectively (in 2003 dollars). Rather than bringing the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes into parity with the additional compensation provided to other tribes, GAO believes that the two bills under consideration in the 109th Congress--H.R. 109 and S. 374--would have the opposite effect. The bills would catapult the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes ahead of the other tribes and set a precedent for the other tribes to seek a third round of compensation. While our analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374, the Congress will ultimately decide whether or not additional compensation should be provided, and if so, how much it should be. |
gao_GGD-00-31 | gao_GGD-00-31_0 | We recommended that the Service use a risk-based approach for selecting mailings to receive presort ensure that required presort verifications and supervisory reviews of those verifications are performed and documented; provide supervisors and staff with updated procedures, training, and tools; develop and use valid information for evaluating the adequacy of business mail acceptance controls, procedures, staffing, and training; and develop methodologies for measuring systemwide revenue losses. Scope and Methodology
To determine the actions taken by the Service in response to our 1996 recommendations, we discussed with Service officials changes made to the Service’s business mail acceptance controls and obtained and reviewed program procedures and guidelines for the new process. The results of our work cannot be projected to the Service’s other business mail processing facilities. We reviewed a number of Inspection Service audit reports for the last several years relating to Service business mail operations. In our latest review, we found that the Service had updated business mail acceptance control procedures, provided training designed to help ensure that acceptance work is done correctly, and makes tools available to its employees to help them determine customers’ eligibility for discounted postage rates. Evaluations of Acceptance Controls and Operations
In 1996, we reported that the Service lacked key data needed to assess the adequacy of its business mail acceptance controls and related risks. Conclusions
Since our last review, the Service has changed its business mail acceptance process generally along the lines that we recommended in our 1996 report, and the Service’s business mail acceptance control procedures, overall, appear to have improved. However, the Service still lacked comprehensive information on how well its business mail acceptance controls are working and thus cannot ensure that it is collecting all the revenue due from its business mail operations. Information providing such assurances is not available. Accordingly, we do not believe that the Service has fully addressed our 1996 recommendations that it ensure that required supervisory reviews are performed and that it develop information for evaluating the adequacy of its business mail acceptance controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Postal Service's acceptance controls for business mail, focusing on whether the Service had made the changes GAO recommended previously and whether those changes were working.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Service made changes to its controls over the acceptance of business mail; (2) those changes are generally along the lines that GAO recommended in 1996 and its controls overall appear to have improved; (3) however, the Service lacks information on how well its controls are working Servicewide and thus cannot ensure that it is collecting all the revenue due from its business mail operations; (4) since GAO's 1996 report, the Service has: (a) developed and implemented a risk-based approach for verifying the eligibility of high-risk customers to receive discounted postage rates; (b) made changes to its presort verification, supervisory review, and documentation requirements to help provide more assurance that these functions are performed; (c) changed its business mail acceptance-control procedures and training guidelines to help supervisors and staff perform their tasks properly and made key tools available to help them more accurately determine customers' eligibility for specific postage discounts; (d) developed information sources for managers to use in evaluating business mail acceptance controls, procedures, staffing, and training; and (e) incorporated reviews of its business mail operations into a Servicewide effort to protect revenue and obtain all compensation due for its services and products; (5) on the basis of GAO's evaluation of the Service's new business mail acceptance control process, discussions with Service officials, observations of acceptance procedures at eight business mail facilities, and review of Postal Inspection Service audit reports, GAO believes that the changes the Service made to its business mail procedures and operations help to prevent revenue losses; (6) however, GAO could not determine whether all of these changes are working Servicewide because data needed to make such a determination were not available; (7) neither the results of GAO's work or the work of the Inspection Service that GAO reviewed can be projected to the universe of Service business mail facilities; and (8) however, there is sufficient evidence that the Service has not fully addressed GAO's 1996 recommendations that it ensure that required supervisory reviews are performed and that it develop information for evaluating the adequacy of its business mail acceptance controls. |
gao_GAO-01-555T | gao_GAO-01-555T_0 | H.R. 525 Would Address Key Actions Needed to Combat Terrorism
To improve federal efforts to assist state and local personnel in preparing for domestic terrorist attacks, H.R. 525 would create a single focal point for policy and coordination—the President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness—within the Executive Office of the President. The new council would include the President, several cabinet secretaries, and other selected high-level officials. An Executive Director with a staff would collaborate with executive agencies to assess threats; develop a national strategy; analyze and prioritize governmentwide budgets; and provide oversight of implementation among the different federal agencies. H.R. The other related bills and proposals would also create a single focal point for programs to combat terrorism, and some would have the focal point perform many of the same functions. 525) or in a Lead Executive Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R.
What GAO Found
525). To improve federal efforts to help state and local personnel prepare for domestic terrorist attacks, H.R. 525 would create a single focal point for policy and coordination--the President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness--within the White House. The new council would include the President, several cabinet secretaries, and other selected high-level officials. H.R. 525 would (1) create an executive director position with a staff that would collaborate with other executive agencies to assess threats, (2) require the new council to develop a national strategy, (3) require the new council to analyze and review budgets, and (4) require the new council to oversee implementation among the different federal agencies. Other proposals before Congress would also create a single focal point for terrorism. Some of these proposals place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President and others place it in a lead executive agency. Both locations have advantages and disadvantages. |
gao_GAO-01-632 | gao_GAO-01-632_0 | Background
Friendly fire is a serious problem confronting DOD and the military services. Conclusions
Preventing friendly fire is a complex and challenging endeavor. It encompasses the development of new technologies as well as new training, tactics, and warfighting techniques. It involves a range of equipment and systems that have historically not been able to effectively interact as well as a variety of military operations. And it’s a concern among each of the services as well as our allies. Clearly, it is essential to have a blueprint that ties together these elements and provides a comprehensive map for long-term improvements as well as a management framework that is strong enough to implement the blueprint. While DOD has taken some concrete steps toward both ends, it needs to strengthen these efforts and ensure that they are supported by the services. Without doing so, it may well continue to contend with problems leading to friendly fire incidents. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense | What GAO Found
Friendly fire incidents, or fratricide, accounted for about 24 percent of U.S. fatalities during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Since then, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have been working to find new ways to avoid friendly fire in joint and coalition operations. Preventing friendly fire is a complex and challenging endeavor. It encompasses the development of new technologies as well as new training, tactics, and warfighting techniques. It involves a range of equipment and systems that have historically not been able to effectively interact as well as various military operations. It is a concern among each of the services as well as U.S. allies. Clearly, it is essential to have a blueprint that ties together these elements and provides a comprehensive map for long-term improvements as well as a management framework that is strong enough to implement the blueprint. Although DOD has taken some concrete steps toward both ends, it needs to strengthen these efforts and ensure that they are supported by the services. Otherwise, it may continue to contend with problems leading to friendly fire incidents. |
gao_GAO-06-523T | gao_GAO-06-523T_0 | The F-22A and JSF, along with the F/A-18E/F, are the central elements of DOD’s overall recapitalization strategy for its tactical air forces. F-22A and JSF Acquisition Business Cases Still Include Considerable Risks
The future of DOD’s tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs—which represent about $245 billion in investments to be made in the future. Currently, there is a significant mismatch between the Air Force’s stated need for F-22A aircraft and the resources the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is willing to commit. The business case for the JSF program, which has 90 percent of its investments still in the future, significantly overlaps production with development and system testing—a strategy that often results in cost and schedule increases. A 198-aircraft gap between what the Air Force needs and what is affordable raises questions about what additional capabilities need to be included in the F-22A program. JSF Business Case Still Contains Cost and Schedule Risks
The JSF program appears to be on the same path as the F-22A program. The JSF program expects to begin low-rate initial procurement in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed and no production representative prototypes built for the three JSF variants. 2). DOD’s Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Goals Are Not Being Met
DOD has not been able to achieve its recapitalization goals for its tactical aircraft forces. 3). The delivery of these new aircraft has also been delayed past original plans. Further delays or changes in the F-22A or JSF programs could require additional funding to keep legacy aircraft in the inventory and relevant to the warfighter’s needs. In February 2006, the Secretary of Defense testified that recapitalization of DOD’s tactical aircraft is important to maintain America’s air dominance. Despite this continued declaration about recapitalizing tactical aircraft, DOD’s 2006 QDR report did not present a detailed investment strategy that addressed needs and gaps, identified alternatives, and assessed costs and benefits. DOD Has an Opportunity to Set Its Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Efforts on Track
As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft force, it has the opportunity to reduce operating costs and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. Specifically, the department must change how it selects weapon systems to buy, and how it establishes and executes the business case. In conclusion, despite DOD’s repeated declaration that recapitalizing its aging tactical aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department continues to follow an acquisition strategy that consistently results in escalating costs that undercut DOD’s buying power, forces DOD to reduce aircraft purchases, and delays delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter. GAO Related Products
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356 (Washington D.C.: March 15, 2006). Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs aim to replace many of the Department's aging tactical fighter aircraft--many of which have been in DOD's inventory for more than 20 years. Together, the F-22A and JSF programs represent a significant investment for DOD--currently estimated at almost $320 billion. GAO has reported on the poor outcomes in DOD's acquisitions of tactical aircraft and other major weapon systems. Cost and schedule overruns have diminished DOD's buying power and delayed the delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Last year, GAO testified that weaknesses in the F-22A and JSF programs raised questions as to whether DOD's overarching tactical aircraft recapitalization goals were achievable. GAO is providing updated testimony on (1) the extent to which the current F-22A and JSF business cases are executable, (2) the current status of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts, and (3) potential options for recapitalizing the air forces as DOD moves forward with its tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts.
What GAO Found
The future of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs--which represent about $245 billion in investments to be made in the future. Both programs continue to be burdened with risk. The F-22A business case is unexecutable in part because of a 198 aircraft gap between the Air Force requirement and what DOD estimates it can afford. The JSF program, which has 90 percent of its investments still in the future, plans to concurrently test and produce aircraft thus weakening DOD's business case and jeopardizing its recapitalization efforts. It plans to begin producing aircraft in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed. DOD's current plan to buy about 3,100 new major tactical systems to replace its legacy aircraft represents a 33-percent reduction in quantities from original plans. With reduced buys and delays in delivery of the new systems, costs to keep legacy aircraft operational and relevant have increased. While the Secretary of Defense maintains that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a recapitalized force, DOD has not presented an investment strategy for tactical aircraft systems that measures needs, capability gaps, alternatives, and affordability. Without such a strategy, DOD cannot reasonably ensure it will recapitalize the force and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter within cost and schedule targets. As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft, it needs to rethink the current business cases for the F-22A and JSF programs. This means matching needs and resources before more F-22A aircraft are procured and ensuring the JSF program demonstrates acceptable aircraft performance before it enters initial production. |
gao_GAO-12-349 | gao_GAO-12-349_0 | Estimates of the national prevalence of bullying ranged from approximately 20 to 28 percent of youth reporting they had been bullied during the survey periods, which ranged from a couple of months to a year. However, differences in definitions and survey methods make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding trends and affected demographic groups. While it is clear that bullying is a serious problem, it is unclear from the surveys the extent to which bullying affects certain groups of youths relative to other groups. For example, none of the surveys collected demographic information for youths by sexual orientation or gender identity. To better understand the prevalence of bullying, and given the different definitions used by bullying research instruments, CDC is leading an interdepartmental project to develop a uniform definition of bullying for research purposes. Selected State Legislatures and Educational Agencies Are Taking Various Approaches to Reduce Bullying
State Laws Vary in How They Address Bullying
According to Education, 49 states had school bullying laws as of April 2012, including the 8 states that we reviewed. These 8 states’ laws vary in several ways, including who is covered and the requirements placed on state agencies and school districts. Some states also prohibit bullying of other protected classes. Virginia and Massachusetts do not include protected classes in their state bullying laws. Table 2 provides information about commonly required school district provisions in state bullying laws. Among other components of the bullying policies and rules, each prohibits bullying and describes potential consequences for the behavior. School district officials explained that they have developed several approaches to prevent and respond to bullying. According to Education’s Office of Special Education Programs, PBIS steps to addressing bullying behavior at school include the following: examining discipline data to determine, for example, the frequency, location, and timing of specific bullying behaviors; examining the extent to which staff members have, for example, actively and positively supervised all students across all school settings, had high rates of positive interactions and contact with all students, and arranged their instruction so all students are actively engaged, successful, and challenged ; and teaching students and staff common strategies for preventing and responding to bullying behavior, such as intervening and responding early and quickly to interrupt bullying behavior, removing what triggers and maintains bullying behavior, and reporting and recording when a bullying behavior incident occurs. State and Local Officials Cited Concerns That Hinder Antibullying Efforts
Both state and local officials expressed concerns about various issues associated with implementing state bullying laws, regulations, and local policies and codes of conduct. For example, federal agencies lack authority to pursue discrimination cases based solely on sexual orientation. State Civil Rights Protections
We found that some states’ civil rights laws extend beyond the protections afforded at the federal level, but information about the possibility of pursuing claims at the state level was not always provided to federal complainants. Coordinated Federal Antibullying Efforts Are Under Way, but Assessment of Legal Remedies Is Incomplete
Federal Coordination Efforts
Education, HHS, and Justice have established coordinated efforts to carry out research and broadly disseminate information on bullying. Education has also provided key information about how federal civil rights laws can be used to address bullying and is conducting a study of state bullying laws and how selected school districts are addressing bullying. No Assessment of State Civil Rights Laws and Procedures Has Been Performed
While Education, HHS, and Justice have initiated several efforts to better inform the public about how to utilize federal, state, and other resources to better address bullying, none of these efforts include an assessment of state civil rights laws and procedures for filing complaints. Many of the states’ civil rights laws we reviewed extend protections to classes of individuals beyond the groups protected at the federal level, but states vary in the groups that are explicitly protected; therefore, whether bullying victims have any recourse through civil rights laws can depend on the state in which they live or go to school. To address gaps in knowledge about targets of bullying and discrimination, we recommend that the Secretaries of Education and HHS and the Attorney General work together to develop information in their future surveys of youths’ health and safety issues on the extent to which youths in various vulnerable demographic groups are bullied. Such an assessment, to be comprehensive, should make use of information federal agencies have already compiled on state bullying laws and federal civil rights laws together with information from our recommendations above to compile information on state civil rights laws and collect more information on demographic groups in federal surveys of youth health and safety issues. Justice chose not to provide a written response. Education disagreed with our recommendation that it compile information about state civil rights laws and procedures as they pertain to bullying. Regarding our second recommendation, Education indicated that they are considering whether to develop procedures that would inform complainants whose complaints are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction that they may have possible recourse under state or local laws. Both HHS and Education agreed with our recommendation that they develop additional information in their surveys about youths in various vulnerable groups who are bullied. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Analysis of Surveys and Literature Review
To obtain information on the prevalence of school bullying of victims in the United States, we primarily compared estimates and methodologies of available data on being bullied in four nationally representative surveys by federal statistical agencies conducted from 2005 to 2009. Review of Laws and Discrimination Complaint Processes
To identify legal options that federal and selected state governments have in place when bullying leads to allegations of discrimination, we reviewed relevant federal and state anti-discrimination laws and regulations, selected federal court decisions, as well as guidance and other documents of the federal government and the eight states selected for review. Interviews with Federal Officials and Document Review
To address how key federal agencies are coordinating their efforts to combat school bullying, we interviewed officials from Education, HHS, and Justice and reviewed relevant documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of youths are estimated to be subject to bullying in U.S. schools. GAO was asked to address (1) what is known about the prevalence of school bullying and its effects on victims, (2) approaches selected states and local school districts are taking to combat school bullying, (3) legal options federal and selected state governments have in place when bullying leads to allegations of discrimination, and (4) key federal agencies coordination efforts to combat school bullying. GAO reviewed research on the prevalence and effects on victims; analyzed state bullying laws, and school district bullying policies; and interviewed officials in 8 states and 6 school districts. States were selected based on various characteristics, including student enrollment, and their definitions of bullying. Also, GAO reviewed selected relevant federal and state civil rights laws, and interviewed officials from Education, HHS, and Justice.
What GAO Found
School bullying is a serious problem, and research shows that it can have detrimental outcomes for victims, including adverse psychological and behavioral outcomes. According to four nationally representative surveys conducted from 2005 to 2009, an estimated 20 to 28 percent of youth, primarily middle and high school-aged youths, reported they had been bullied during the survey periods. However, differences in definitions and questions posed to youth respondents make it difficult to discern trends and affected groups. For example, the surveys did not collect demographic information by sexual orientation or gender identity. The Departments of Education (Education) and Health and Human Services (HHS) are partially addressing the issue of inconsistent definitions by collaborating with other federal departments and subject matter experts to develop a uniform definition of bullying that can be used for research purposes. However, gaps in knowledge about the extent of bullying of youths in key demographic groups remain.
According to Education, as of April 2012, 49 states have adopted school bullying laws. The laws in the 8 states that GAO reviewed vary in who is covered and the requirements placed on state agencies and school districts. For example, 6 of the states cover a mix of different demographic groups, referred to as protected classes, such as race and sex or gender, in their bullying laws, while 2 states do not include any protected classes. With respect to school districts, each of the 6 districts GAO studied adopted policies that, among other things, prohibit bullying and describe the potential consequences for engaging in the behavior. Also, school district officials told GAO that they developed approaches to prevent and respond to bullying. For example, several school officials said they implemented a prevention-oriented framework to promote positive school cultures. Both state and local officials expressed concerns about various issues, including how best to address incidents that occur outside of school.
Federal civil rights laws can be used to provide protections against bullying in certain circumstances, but certain vulnerable groups are not covered and therefore have no recourse at the federal level. For example, federal agencies lack jurisdiction under civil rights statutes to pursue discrimination cases based solely on socioeconomic status or sexual orientation. While some state civil rights laws provide protections to victims of bullying that go beyond federal law, federal complainants whose cases are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction are not always informed about the possibility of pursuing claims at the state level.
Three federal departmentsEducation, HHS, and the Department of Justice (Justice)have established coordinated efforts to carry out research and broadly disseminate information on bullying to the public, including establishment of a central website and an informational campaign to raise awareness about bullying. In addition to these efforts, Education has issued information about how federal civil rights laws can be used to address bullying of protected classes of youths and is conducting a comprehensive study of state bullying laws and how selected school districts are implementing them. However, no similar information is being gathered on state civil rights laws and procedures that could be helpful in assessing the adequacy of legal protections against school bullying.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education compile information about state civil rights laws and procedures that relate to bullying, and inform complainants about state legal options; Education, HHS, and Justice develop information about bullied demographic groups in their surveys; and assess whether legal protections are adequate for these groups. Education disagreed with our first recommendation and we clarified it to address some of their concerns. Education is considering our second recommendation, agreed with our third, and provided information on efforts related to the last. HHS agreed with our recommendations. Justice did not provide a written response. |
gao_GAO-08-823 | gao_GAO-08-823_0 | Voluntary Organizations Are a Major Source of Mass Care and Other Services in Disasters and Have Significant Support Roles under the National Response Framework
As private service providers fulfilling their humanitarian missions, the voluntary organizations in our review have historically served as significant sources of mass care and other services in large-scale disasters and play key roles in national response—in coordination with local, state, and federal governments—under the National Response Framework. However, with regard to its ESF-6 responsibilities, Red Cross officials also said that while the organization will continue to fulfill its ESF-6 responsibilities, it is changing the way it staffs FEMA’s regional offices during disasters by assigning these responsibilities, among others, to state disaster officers and using trained volunteers to assist in this role. Under the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Red Cross Is Still Described as the Lead Agency for Mass Care, Which Is Inconsistent with Changes Made to ESF-6
While the Red Cross’s role for ESF-6 has been changed from that of a primary agency under the National Response Plan to that of a support agency under the new Framework, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement still reflects its earlier role, requiring the Red Cross to direct federal mass care resources. Voluntary Organizations Have Taken Steps to Expand Coverage and Strengthen Their Service Delivery Structures
In response to weaknesses in service delivery that became evident during Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities have acted to expand their service coverage and strengthen key aspects of their structures. The Red Cross has reorganized its chapters and established new partnerships with local community and faith-based organizations, particularly in rural areas with hard-to-reach populations. Meanwhile, all four organizations, to varying degrees, have made changes to strengthen their ability to coordinate services by collaborating more on feeding and case management and improving their logistical and communications systems. While Voluntary Organizations’ Resources Are Substantial, Their Sheltering and Feeding Capabilities Would Likely Fall Short of Estimated Needs in a Worst-Case Large-Scale Disaster without Government and Other Assistance
Although systematic assessments of mass care capabilities are limited, it is evident that in large-scale, especially worst-case, catastrophic disasters, the three mass care voluntary organizations would not likely be able to fulfill the need for sheltering and feeding in the four metropolitan areas in our review without government and other assistance, according to voluntary organization officials we interviewed as well as our review of federal and other data. The Red Cross is working with its local chapters to develop action plans to address personnel shortages. In New York and Los Angeles, officials from Catholic Charities confirmed that the lack of personnel capable of responding to disasters is an ongoing challenge for their organization. Currently, NVOAD has few resources to support state and local VOADs. However, this broad assessment effort has yet to fully include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and has not yet begun to address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement reflects the American Red Cross’s current role under ESF-6 as a support agency for mass care, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a time frame for updating the mass care section of the Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in the ESF-6 under the new Framework, and no longer requires the Red Cross to direct federal government resources. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to provide information on (1) what the roles of major national voluntary organizations are in providing mass care and other human services in response to large-scale disasters requiring federal assistance, (2) what steps these organizations have taken since Katrina to strengthen their capacity for service delivery, (3) what is known about these organizations’ current capabilities for responding to mass care needs in such a large-scale disaster, and (4) what the remaining challenges are that confront voluntary organizations in preparing for such large-scale disasters. Since the United Way of America does not provide direct services in disasters, we did not include it in our analysis of recent improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining challenges. Washington, D.C.: September 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
Voluntary organizations have traditionally played a major role in the nation's response to disasters, but the response to Hurricane Katrina raised concerns about their ability to handle large-scale disasters. This report examines (1) the roles of five voluntary organizations in providing mass care and other services, (2) the steps they have taken to improve service delivery, (3) their current capabilities for responding to mass care needs, and (4) the challenges they face in preparing for large-scale disasters. To address these questions, GAO reviewed the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and United Way of America; interviewed officials from these organizations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); reviewed data and laws; and visited four high-risk metro areas--Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The five voluntary organizations we reviewed are highly diverse in their focus and response structures. They also constitute a major source of the nation's mass care and related disaster services and are integrated into the 2008 National Response Framework. The Red Cross in particular--the only one whose core mission is disaster response--has a federally designated support role to government under the mass care provision of this Framework. While the Red Cross no longer serves as the primary agency for coordinating government mass care services--as under the earlier 2004 National Plan--it is expected to support FEMA by providing staff and expertise, among other things. FEMA and the Red Cross agree on the Red Cross's role in a catastrophic disaster, but it is not clearly documented. While FEMA recognized the need to update the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement to conform with the Framework, it does not yet have a time frame for doing so. Since Katrina, the organizations we studied have taken steps to strengthen their service delivery by expanding coverage and upgrading their logistical and communications systems. The Red Cross, in particular, is realigning its regional chapters to better support its local chapters and improve efficiency and establishing new partnerships with local community-based organizations. Most recently, however, a budget shortfall has prompted the organization to reduce staff and alter its approach to supporting FEMA and state emergency management agencies. While Red Cross officials maintain that these changes will not affect improvements to its mass care service infrastructure, it has also recently requested federal funding for its governmental responsibilities. Capabilities assessments are preliminary, but current evidence suggests that in a worst-case large-scale disaster, the projected need for mass care services would far exceed the capabilities of these voluntary organizations without government and other assistance--despite voluntary organizations' substantial resources locally and nationally. Voluntary organizations also faced shortages in trained volunteers, as well as other limitations that affected their mass care capabilities. Meanwhile, FEMA's initial assessment does not necessarily include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and does not yet address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. In addition, the ability to assess mass care capabilities and coordinate in disasters is currently hindered by a lack of standard terminology and measures for mass care resources, and efforts are under way to develop such standards. Finding and training more personnel, dedicating more resources to preparedness, and working more closely with local governments are ongoing challenges for voluntary organizations. A shortage of staff and volunteers was most commonly cited, but we also found they had difficulty seeking and dedicating funds for preparedness, in part because of competing priorities. However, the guidance for FEMA preparedness grants to states and localities was also not sufficiently explicit with regard to using such funds to support the efforts of voluntary organizations. |
gao_GAO-06-285 | gao_GAO-06-285_0 | Background
Currently, U.S. workers rely primarily on their employers to provide both wages and benefits (such as paid leave, retirement, and health insurance) as part of a total compensation package, with wages comprising approximately 70 percent of total compensation. It also excludes the value of the premiums from the calculation of Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes for both employers and employees. Average Compensation Costs Grew by 12 Percent between 1991 and 2005, with Benefits Outgrowing Wages by 8 Percentage Points
Private employers’ average cost of total compensation (comprised of wages and benefits) for current workers grew by 12 percent between 1991 and 2005, but benefit costs outpaced wages in the most recent years after controlling for inflation. The overall real costs of benefits grew by 18 percent, while real wages grew by 10 percent. 1). Paid leave had traditionally been the most costly benefit to employers, but by 2005, the cost of health insurance equaled that of paid leave. Employers’ Costs for Health Insurance and Retirement Income Increased over 27 Percent between 1991 and 2005
The increase in the real cost of a total benefits package from 1991 to 2005 was largely composed of increases in the real cost of providing health insurance and retirement income. 2.) Of the three benefits, retirement income was the least costly, even though it grew by an estimated 47 percent during the period, largely between 2004 and 2005. Employees’ Access to Benefits Remained Generally Stable, but Employees Face Greater Costs and Assume More Investment Risk
During the time under review, employees’ access to benefits has remained stable, but participation rates declined for health benefits, some costs have shifted to employees, and they have assumed more investment risk. Also, employers continued to pay approximately the same share of the premium for employee health insurance, but a smaller percentage of employees participated as the real dollar amount of the premiums increased. With regard to paid leave, holidays and vacations were generally available to all workers between 1990 and 2003, but a smaller percentage of workers had access to personal leave and sick leave. 3). 4). Roughly half of all workers participated in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and closer to 60 percent of those who were full-time employees did so. Experts Agreed That Rising Benefit Costs Are Forcing Private Employers and Their Employees to Make Trade-Offs between Wages and Benefits
Experts who reviewed our data found it reflected their experience and asserted that rising benefit costs have been leading employers and employees to make increasingly difficult trade-offs between wages and benefits. In addition, employers are considering changing the way they offer compensation. Aside from such different viewpoints, most panelists noted that the employer-sponsored system of benefits in its current form may not be sustainable, largely because productivity growth is unlikely to support rising benefit costs. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the departments of Labor and Health and Human Services. To determine the possible implications of changes for private systems, we convened a panel of 17 experts representing the human resources field, industries, unions, and academia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because most workers rely primarily on their employers to provide both wages and benefits as part of a total compensation package, the trends in the costs and availability of employer-sponsored compensation have a significant bearing on workers' well-being. Through tax preferences and payroll taxes, federal government policy also has a bearing on employees' access to benefits and on the costs carried by employers. The federal government provides significant tax subsidies for both health insurance plans and qualified retirement plans. In addition, workers and employers are required to pay taxes that fund Social Security and Medicare, programs intended to help provide for workers' economic security and peace of mind in retirement. In this report, GAO examined federal data on private employers' costs for active workers and sought perspectives from 17 experts to identify (1) recent trends in employers' total compensation costs; (2) composition of the trends; (3) whether employees' costs, participation, or access to benefits changed; and (4) possible implications of the changes for private systems. GAO received technical comments from the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services and from some of the experts GAO consulted. These comments were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Private employers' average real cost of total compensation (comprising wages and benefits) for current workers grew by 12 percent between 1991 and 2005. The real costs of benefits grew by close to 18 percent, while real wages grew by 10 percent. Wages and benefits increased by about the same percentage for most of the period until 2002, after which time real wages began to stagnate and real benefit costs continued to grow. The increase in the cost of a total benefits package from 1991 to 2005 was largely composed of increases in health insurance and retirement income costs. Paid leave had been the most costly benefit to employers, but by 2005, the cost of health insurance equaled that of paid leave. In comparison to paid leave and health insurance, retirement income was the least costly, but it grew by an estimated 47 percent. During the time under review, employees' access to most benefits remained stable, but participation rates declined for health benefits as the real dollar amount of the premiums increased. Between 1991 and 2003, roughly half of all workers participated in employer-provided retirement plans. Holidays and vacations were generally available to most workers, but a smaller percentage of workers had access to personal and sick leave. A panel of experts from a variety of backgrounds agreed that rising benefit costs are forcing private employers and their employees to make increasingly difficult trade-offs between wages and benefits. They noted that the employer-sponsored system of benefits in its current form may be unsustainable, largely because productivity growth is unlikely to support the rising costs of some benefits, especially escalating health insurance costs. |
gao_GAO-01-883 | gao_GAO-01-883_0 | The Congress created SCHIP in 1997 as a means of providing health benefits coverage to children living in families whose incomes exceed the eligibility limits for Medicaid. In addition, families may need to apply to both Medicaid and SCHIP to obtain health care coverage for all of their children because Medicaid eligibility standards can vary according to the age of the child. While Similarities Often Exist, Enrollment Differences Can Affect Ability to Obtain and Keep Coverage
Differences in Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment requirements—particularly application requirements and eligibility determination practices—can affect beneficiaries’ ability to obtain and keep coverage. To help simplify the process for applicants, 8 of the 10 states we reviewed used joint applications that had similar—but not always identical—requirements for Medicaid and SCHIP applicants. When application requirements differed, Medicaid applicants had to provide additional information or documentation. However, different application requirements for Medicaid and SCHIP, as well as poor coordination between the programs could delay coverage for families. Health Plan and Physician Participation, and Payment Differences Can Affect Access to Care
Differences in the plans and physicians that participate in Medicaid and SCHIP and in payments the programs make to these plans and physicians have implications for beneficiaries’ choices and access to care. In the 10 states we reviewed, SCHIP often required enrollees to join a managed care plan and sometimes did not provide a choice of plans. In contrast, Medicaid beneficiaries had a choice of at least two capitated plans in locations offering managed care or could receive care on a FFS basis, including through PCCM. However, having such choices did not necessarily mean greater access to providers. Similarly, one program may have a number of smaller plans, while larger plans with more extensive provider networks may not participate in the program. Medicaid’s capitation rate included both adults and children, while SCHIP’s rate was limited to children. States’ Design Choices Under SCHIP
States are allowed three options in designing SCHIP: expand their Medicaid program, develop a separate child health program that functions independently of the Medicaid program, or combine both approaches. | What GAO Found
States provide health care coverage to low-income uninsured children largely through two federal-state programs--Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Medicaid was established in 1965 to provide health care coverage to low-income adults and children. Medicaid expenditures for health services to 22.3 million children totaled $32.4 billion in 1998. Congress established SCHIP in 1997 to provide health care coverage to children living in poor families whose incomes exceed the eligibility requirements for Medicaid. SCHIP expenditures for health services to nearly 2 million children totaled $2 billion in 1999. In implementing SCHIP, states could opt to expand their Medicaid programs or establish a separate child health program distinct from Medicaid that uses specified public or private insurance plans offering a minimum benefit package. Thirty-five states have chosen SCHIP approaches that are, to varying degrees, separate from their Medicaid programs. Because eligibility for Medicaid and SCHIP can vary with a child's age, children may, at different ages, need to move from one program to the other. Access to care, therefore, is affected by the extent to which health plans and providers are available and participate in Medicaid and SCHIP. Differences in Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment requirements--particularly application requirements and eligibility determination practices--can affect beneficiaries' ability to obtain and keep coverage. To help simplify the process for applicants, eight of the 10 states GAO reviewed used joint applications that had similar--but not always identical--requirements for Medicaid and SCHIP applicants. When application requirements differed, Medicaid applicants had to provide additional information or documentation, such as proof of income or assets, or participate in interviews. Differences in the health plans and providers that participate in Medicaid and SCHIP, as well as differences in the payments they receive, have implications for beneficiaries' access to care. In the 10 states GAO reviewed, SCHIP often required enrollees to join a managed care plan and sometimes did not offer a choice of plans, while Medicaid offered families a choice of two or more plans or of care on a fee-for-service basis, including primary care case management. However, such choices did not necessarily give beneficiaries greater access to providers because plan choices may be limited to several smaller plans and may exclude larger plans with more extensive networks. |
gao_GGD-99-94 | gao_GGD-99-94_0 | NARA’s Challenges
As stated in NARA’s 10-year strategic plan covering the period of 1997 to 2007, NARA’s goals are to determine how to (1) preserve electronic records that the nation will need, (2) manage change, (3) stay abreast of technologies in federal agencies, and (4) use technologies to safeguard valuable information and make it more readily accessible. Agencies’ ERM efforts are competing for attention and resources with other information technology priorities, particularly in those agencies dealing with the Year 2000 problem. Agencies’ and NARA’s Actions to Implement ERM
On the basis of our discussions with NARA officials and officials of the four previously mentioned selected agencies and discussions at governmentwide conferences on the subject of records management, we learned that agencies vary in their records management programs and in their capabilities to implement ERM. This BPR effort should take 18 to 24 months. In addition to NARA’s planned BPR, NARA is taking some immediate action to revise its guidance to be more appropriate in today’s workplace environment. ERM Activities of Selected State and Foreign Governments
Our review of the ERM activities in four states and three foreign governments showed that approaches to ERM differ. The recommendations to the Texas State Library and Archives Commission and the Department of Information Resources included establishing administrative procedures and training to ensure that all staff work together to identify and manage electronic records to meet retention and archival preservation requirements, making library and archives standards applicable to all state records maintained in electronic format, seeking a legislative change in the Local Government Records Act so that the rules for managing electronic records can be amended to make these standards applicable to all local government records maintained in electronic format, jointly establishing and publishing guidelines for using standard functional requirements for electronic recordkeeping systems, studying the issues of retaining electronic records of enduring value for historical and research purposes to identify available options and associated costs with the intent of proposing legislative action, developing cost models for providing information to the public on-line, and working with the Office of the Attorney General to jointly establish rules and guidelines for providing and managing access to publicly available government information without compromising the privacy of citizens. For instance:
Policies and Procedures. Guidance. When paper or microfilm records are no longer needed at the agency level, those of archival value are transferred to a central storage facility. Conclusion
NARA and federal agencies are being challenged to effectively and efficiently manage electronic records in an environment of rapidly changing technology and increasing volume of electronic records. On the basis of our discussions with officials from NARA and four judgmentally selected agencies, we determined that ERM programs vary greatly across agencies. NARA had planned to conduct a baseline survey intended to obtain governmentwide information on agencies’ ERM programs, but NARA has now postponed the survey because it believes that it should first complete a BPR effort to improve guidance and assistance to agencies. Given that this effort is expected to take 18 to 24 months after it is started and the baseline survey is expected to take about 2 years, the baseline of governmentwide records management programs may not be established until perhaps sometime in calendar year 2003. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the challenges that confront the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and federal agencies as a result of their increased reliance on electronic media, we interviewed NARA and agency officials from four judgmentally selected agencies—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the General Services Administration (GSA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the preservation of electronic records, focusing on the: (1) challenges that confront the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and federal agencies as a result of their increased reliance on electronic media; (2) status of selected agencies' and NARA's implementation of electronic records management (ERM); and (3) ERM policies and procedures of selected other governments (state and foreign).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NARA and federal agencies are faced with the substantial challenge of preserving electronic records in an era of rapidly changing technology; (2) in addition to handling the burgeoning volume of electronic records, NARA and the agencies must address several hardware and software issues to ensure that electronic records are properly created, permanently maintained, secured, and retrievable in the future; (3) also, NARA's and the agencies' ERM efforts are competing with other information technology priorities, particularly the need to ensure that their computers are year 2000 compliant; (4) NARA is responsible for providing guidance and assistance to agencies on how to maintain their official government records and for archiving those records once they are transferred to NARA; (5) the agencies are responsible for ensuring that records are created and preserved in accordance with the Federal Records Act; (6) no centralized source of information exists to document the extent to which agencies are fulfilling their ERM responsibilities under the act; (7) on the basis of GAO's discussions with officials from NARA and four judgmentally selected agencies, GAO found that plans and capabilities for ERM vary greatly across agencies; (8) NARA has recently postponed a planned baseline survey that was intended to obtain governmentwide information on agencies' ERM programs because NARA believes that it should first complete a business process reengineering (BPR) effort; (9) this BPR effort, which is intended to assess and potentially alter NARA's guidance to and interaction with agencies, is expected to take 18 to 24 months; (10) GAO believes that the baseline survey information is critical to ensuring that the BPR results are relevant to the ERM situations at agencies and the survey should not be postponed; (11) these baseline data are needed to meet one of NARA's stated strategic planning goals to stay abreast of technologies in the agencies; (12) even while planning its BPR effort, NARA is taking some immediate action to address the agencies' needs for ERM guidance and direction; (13) state and foreign governments are addressing similar ERM challenges; and (14) from GAO's limited judgmental sample of state and foreign governments, it is clear that these governments and the federal government often differ in: (a) the organization of their archival activities; (b) their philosophies on centralization versus decentralization of recordkeeping responsibilities; and (c) their computer hardware and software capabilities. |
gao_GAO-01-302 | gao_GAO-01-302_0 | Conclusions
EPA’s and GAO’s reviews have shown that the agency has made significant progress over the past decade in addressing the weakness of its cost- estimating processes. EPA regional work assignment managers are currently developing independent estimates, which contracting officers are using to negotiate the prices for cleanup work. The agency’s current initiatives should help the agency successfully address the Corps’ and our remaining concerns by providing the managers with the training and tools they need to develop better estimates. By incorporating some relatively simple additional steps to more fully implement and better scrutinize the effectiveness of the initiatives, the agency can better ensure that its efforts improve cost estimates agencywide. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which manages the cleanup of the nation's most hazardous abandoned sites through the Superfund program, relies heavily on contractors to conduct its cleanup activities. Currently, EPA spends about 50 percent of its approximately $1.5 billion annual Superfund budget on contractors. With so much at stake, it is critical that the government get the best contract price for this cleanup work. EPA's and GAO's reviews have shown that the agency has made significant progress during the past decade in addressing the weakness of its cost-estimating processes. EPA regional work assignment managers are currently developing independent estimates, which contracting officers are using to negotiate the prices for cleanup work. The agency's current initiatives should help the agency successfully address the Army Corps of Engineers' and GAO's remaining concerns by providing the managers with the training and tools they need to develop better estimates. By incorporating some relatively simple additional steps to more fully implement and better scrutinize the effectiveness of the initiatives, the agency can better ensure that its efforts improve cost estimates agencywide. |
gao_GAO-04-957T | gao_GAO-04-957T_0 | The Congress has assigned a number of responsibilities to the CIOs of federal agencies. CIOs’ Responsibilities, Reporting Relationships, Tenure, and Challenges
The agency CIOs were generally responsible for most of the 13 key areas we identified as either required by statute or among those critical to effective information and technology management, and most of these CIOs reported directly to their agency heads. Their median tenure was about 2 years—less than the 3 to 5 years that CIOs and former senior agency IT executives said were necessary for a CIO to be effective; this gap could be problematic because it could inhibit CIOs’ efforts to address major challenges, including IT management and human capital. The views of current CIOs and former agency IT executives about whether it is important for the CIO to report to the agency head were mixed. CIOs Have Diverse Backgrounds and Generally Remained in Office about 2 Years
At the major departments and agencies included in our review, the current CIOs had diverse backgrounds, and since the enactment of the Clinger- Cohen Act, the median tenure of permanent CIOs whose time in office had been completed was about 2 years. When asked how long a CIO needed to stay in office to be effective, the most common response of current CIOs and former agency IT executives was 3 to 5 years. In particular, two challenges were cited by over 80 percent of the CIOs: implementing effective information technology management and obtaining sufficient and relevant resources. Actions Can Be Taken to Improve Agencies’ Information and Technology Management
The Congress and agencies can take various actions to assist CIOs in fulfilling their vital roles. Also, the report we are releasing today contains a Matter for Congressional Consideration in which we suggest that, as you hold hearings on and introduce legislation related to information and technology management, you consider whether the existing statutory requirements related to CIO responsibilities and reporting to the agency head reflect the most effective assignment of information and technology management responsibilities and the best reporting relationship. Agencies, too, can take action to improve their information and technology management. However, views were mixed as to whether CIOs could be effective leaders without having responsibility for each individual area. Agencies’ use of various mechanisms, such as human capital flexibilities, could help reduce the turnover rate or mitigate its effect. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies rely extensively on information technology (IT) to effectively implement major government programs. To help agencies manage their substantial IT investments, the Congress has established a statutory framework of requirements, roles, and responsibilities relating to IT management. GAO was asked to summarize its report, being issued today, on federal chief information officers' (CIO) responsibilities, reporting relationships, and tenure and on the challenges that CIOs face ( Federal Chief Information Officers: Responsibilities, Reporting Relationships, Tenure, and Challenges, GAO-04-823 , July 21, 2004) and to offer suggestions for actions that both the Congress and the agencies can take in response to these findings.
What GAO Found
In looking at 27 agencies, GAO found that CIOs generally were responsible for most of the 13 areas that had been identified as either required by statute or critical to effective information and technology management and that about 70 percent reported directly to their agency heads. Among current CIOs and former agency IT executives, views were mixed on whether it was important for the CIO to have responsibility for each of the 13 areas and a direct reporting relationship with the agency head. In addition, current CIOs come from a wide variety of professional and educational backgrounds and, since the enactment of the legislation establishing this position, the permanent CIOs who had completed their time in office had a median tenure of about 2 years. Their average time in office, however, was less than the 3 to 5 years that both current CIOs and former agency IT executives most commonly cited as the amount of time needed for a CIO to be effective. Too short of a tenure can reduce a CIOs' effectiveness and ability to address major challenges, including implementing effective IT management and obtaining sufficient and relevant resources. Both the Congress and the federal agencies can take various actions to address GAO's findings. First, as the Congress holds hearings on and introduces legislation related to information and technology management, there may be an opportunity to consider the results of this review and whether the existing statutory framework offers the most effective structure for CIOs' responsibilities and reporting relationships. Second, agencies can use the guidance GAO has issued over the past few years to address, for example, agencies' IT management and human capital challenges. Finally, agencies can also employ such mechanisms as human capital flexibilities to help reduce CIO turnover or to mitigate its effect. |
gao_GAO-07-759 | gao_GAO-07-759_0 | As can be seen in figure 3, many events took place at the same time. From our review, the documentation from the APS source selection process shows that (1) no officials from the offering companies participated in the source selection process, and (2) all offerors were evaluated based on the same criteria contained in the request for proposals. In response to this request for proposals, four proposals were received. Trade Study Used Consistent Method in Reaffirming Vertical Launch Concept
The APS development contract required the winner of the source selection to perform a trade study identifying and assessing competing APS alternatives. The trade study used a methodology consistent with Army guidance to evaluate all alternatives, ultimately selecting Raytheon’s vertical launch as the best design. Since the trade study was not a source selection, FAR contract provisions regarding organizational conflicts of interest did not apply and Raytheon was free to participate in the study as the responsible contractor. The stakeholders made the final selection. The Army expects the vertical launch concept to be available for prototype delivery to current force combat vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and for testing on a FCS vehicle in 2011. Also, the FCS vehicles have not been fully developed yet. Army and Lead Systems Integrator Had Extensive Roles in APS Subcontractor Selection and Trade Study
The Army and the lead systems integrator were both extensively involved in preparing for and conducting the APS subcontractor selection and the trade study. Similarly, Army FCS officials, as well as technical experts from Army research centers, were members of the trade study technical team and also concurred in the choice of the vertical launch concept. OFT Process for Evaluating APS Was More Test-Based and Near-Term Oriented
The process followed by OFT to meet the urgent needs of the Central Command was characterized by a simpler evaluation of active protection systems with potential for near term fielding, followed by actual physical testing of the APS candidate system that the OFT considered most technically mature, the Trophy. The Army’s Program Manager’s Office for Close Combat Systems was also involved in this evaluation. While the testing of Trophy had a high success rate, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell decided to defer fielding the Trophy based, at least in part, on the recommendations of the Army that the testing was not realistic and the Trophy’s integration on the platform would delay fielding of other useful capabilities. These systems were evaluated because the OFT and Navy and Army officials considered them to be the most promising APS solutions available within the required schedule. Conclusions
The FCS lead systems integrator, with support from the Army, followed a consistent and disciplined process in both selecting Raytheon to develop the APS for FCS and in conducting the trade study and followed the lead systems integrator subcontract and FAR provisions for avoiding organizational conflicts of interest. While the role played by Raytheon in the trade study was in accordance with its contract and thus not improper, the rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not entirely clear. The purpose of the trade study was to select the best concept; yet, the source selection process that preceded it had, in fact, chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical merits of its vertical launch design concept. OFT officials believed that the Trophy should be tested further to answer the questions raised by the Army and to provide insight into its capabilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To develop the information on the U.S. Army’s decision to pursue a new APS system under the FCS program, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology); the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command; the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell; the Office of Force Transformation; the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren Division); the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and the Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator. | Why GAO Did This Study
Active Protection Systems (APS) protect vehicles from attack by detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions. In 2005, the lead systems integrator for the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program sought proposals for an APS developer and design and to deliver APS prototypes on vehicles by fiscal year 2009. Raytheon was chosen the APS developer. At the same time, the Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT) evaluated near-term APS for potential use in Iraq. GAO was asked to review the Army's actions on APS/FCS: (1) the process for selecting the subcontractor to develop an APS for FCS and if potential conflicts of interest were avoided; (2) the timing of the trade study and if it followed a consistent methodology to evaluate alternatives, and the results; (3) the role the Army and Boeing played in selecting the developer; and (4) the process followed to provide a near-term APS solution for current forces.
What GAO Found
In selecting the APS developer, the Army and Boeing--the FCS lead systems integrator--followed the provisions of the FCS lead systems integrator contract, as well as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in addressing organizational conflicts of interest. No officials from the offering companies participated in the evaluation and all offerors were evaluated based on the same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated and three were determined to be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. The winner--Raytheon--was chosen on technical merit, as being more likely to meet APS requirements although its design had less mature technology. The APS development contract required the source selection winner to perform a trade study to assess alternatives and select the best design for development, and the Raytheon design was chosen. The trade study applied a consistent methodology to all alternatives before selecting Raytheon's vertical launch design. While the role played by Raytheon in the trade study was in accordance with its contract, the rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not entirely clear. The purpose of the trade study was to select the best concept; yet the source selection process that preceded it had, in fact, chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical merits of its vertical launch design concept. Although the vertical launch technology is not mature, the Army estimated that it could be available for prototype delivery to current force vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and tested on a FCS vehicle in 2011. This may be an optimistic estimate, as the FCS vehicle is yet to be fully developed. The Army and Boeing were extensively involved in APS source selection and the trade study. FCS officials actively participated and concurred in the final selection of the APS developer. FCS officials and technical experts from Army research centers took part in the trade study and helped choose the vertical launch design. Boeing officials took part in various ways and, with the Army's concurrence, selected Raytheon as the APS developer, participated in the trade study, and recommended the vertical launch approach. In its pursuit of a different APS concept, OFT was responding to an urgent need statement issued by the Central Command with potential for near-term fielding. This evaluation centered on the results of physical testing of the most technically mature candidate system, the Trophy. Decisions on how to proceed with Trophy involved disagreement between OFT and the Army. While the Trophy tests were successful, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell decided to defer fielding the APS system, based in part on the recommendation of Army officials, who believed that testing had not been realistic and integrating it on the platform would delay fielding other useful capabilities. OFT officials proposed additional testing of Trophy to answer these questions, but funding for further OFT testing of this system was discontinued after the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's decision. |
gao_GAO-08-578 | gao_GAO-08-578_0 | Instances in which a State contracting officer directly places an order on another agency’s contract are not subject to the policy. State Has Limited Insight into Its Use of Interagency Contracting
The Department of State has limited insight into the extent to which it uses interagency contracting. While State reported to us over $800 million in direct and assisted interagency contract actions in fiscal year 2006, these data were incomplete, and reported data were missing basic information in many cases. While State officials told us that the most reliable way to identify interagency contract actions would be to request a list of these actions from each bureau and overseas post, several bureaus and posts had difficulty responding to our request for such information. State-Reported Data on Interagency Contract Actions Were Incomplete, and Reported Actions Were Missing Information in Many Cases
In the absence of a data system that reliably identifies State’s interagency contracts, we requested information on all interagency contract actions of at least $25,000 conducted in fiscal year 2006 from 53 State bureaus and overseas posts. A Lack of Comprehensive and Reliable Information Inhibits Agencies from Making Sound Contracting Decisions and Engaging in Good Management Practices
We have previously reported that agencies may not be able to make sound contracting decisions or engage in good management practices without comprehensive and reliable data on interagency contracting and the related costs and fees. State Cannot Ensure That Decisions to Use Assisted Interagency Contracting Are Being Made by the Appropriate Acquisition Officials
Due to the way the State First policy has been implemented, State cannot ensure that decisions to use assisted interagency contracts are being made by OPE and AQM officials as called for by the policy. These acquisition officials often lack awareness of or involvement in decisions to use assisted interagency contracts for three main reasons. Second, State’s bureaus have varying interpretations of when they need to obtain waivers for proposed assisted interagency contracting activities. OPE issued guidance in 2005 stating that the State First policy does not apply to proposed funds transfers conducted under the Foreign Assistance Act. As a result of a series of decisions, acquisition officials have also exempted a potentially large amount of DS’s assisted interagency contracting activity from review under the State First policy. Some bureaus request State First waivers for individual contract actions related to specific requirements, such as issuing a new task order. According to the acquisition officials, they do not monitor compliance and are reliant on bureaus to voluntarily request waivers before using assisted interagency contracts. State’s Policies Do Not Ensure Contract Oversight for Assisted Interagency Contracts
State’s policies do not ensure that responsibilities for overseeing contractor performance on its assisted interagency contracts are assigned to appropriately trained individuals. Because State does not have requirements in place to ensure the assignment of appropriately trained oversight personnel, effective oversight depends on factors outside of State’s direct control. However, servicing agency practices differed regarding COR designation and training. We and others have previously reported on problems with oversight of interagency contracting, including the risks of not clearly designating individuals responsible for providing oversight of contractor performance and of not ensuring that these individuals are properly trained to perform their duties. For instance, we reported that when the Army purchased interrogation support services through the Department of the Interior (Interior), Army personnel in Iraq responsible for overseeing contractor performance were not adequately trained to exercise their responsibilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the extent to which State has insight into its use of interagency contracting; (2) State’s policies and procedures for deciding when to use assisted interagency contracting; and (3) State’s ability to ensure oversight of assisted interagency contracting. For the purposes of this review, we defined interagency contracting as including both direct actions (orders placed by one agency’s contracting officers on another agency’s contracts) and assisted actions (obtaining contract support services from other agencies). Our 10 cases represented 8 State bureaus and 5 servicing agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interagency contracting--using another agency's contracts or contracting services--can provide agencies with opportunities to streamline the procurement process and achieve savings. However, GAO designated the management of interagency contracting a high-risk area in 2005 due, in part, to a lack of reliable data on its use and of clarity regarding contract management responsibilities. In 2002, the Department of State (State) issued the State First policy, requiring domestic bureaus to obtain approval from State acquisition officials before paying other agencies for contract support services. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO evaluated State's 1) insight into its use of interagency contracts, 2) policies on deciding when to use assisted interagency contracts, and 3) ability to ensure oversight. GAO's work included reviewing regulations, analyzing interagency contracting data, and conducting 10 case studies of direct and assisted interagency contracts that represented a range of State bureaus and servicing agencies.
What GAO Found
State officials have limited insight into the extent to which the department has used both methods of interagency contracting--direct by placing their own orders on another agency's contract and assisted by obtaining contract support services from another agency. State officials cannot rely on the federal government's primary data system for tracking procurements to readily identify instances when State has used interagency contracts. Further, State's central procurement and accounting systems do not reliably and comprehensively identify when interagency contracts have been used. While State officials told GAO the most reliable way to identify interagency contract actions would be to request data on these actions from bureaus and overseas posts, several bureaus and posts had difficulty responding to such a request. State reported to GAO over $800 million in interagency contract actions in fiscal year 2006, but these data were incomplete. For example, State did not report $144 million in assisted contracting performed on its behalf by the Department of Defense. GAO has previously reported that the lack of reliable information on interagency contracts inhibits agencies from making sound contracting decisions and engaging in good management practices. Due to the way the State First policy has been implemented, State cannot ensure that decisions to use assisted interagency contracting are made by the appropriate acquisition officials. These officials often lack awareness of or involvement in decisions to use assisted interagency contracts. First, State acquisition officials have created exemptions limiting the assisted contract actions subject to their review under the policy. For example, State's guidance exempts funds transfers under the Foreign Assistance Act, under which bureaus conducting large amounts of interagency contracting operate. Second, bureaus have varying interpretations of when approvals are needed under the policy. Some bureaus seek approvals for individual contract actions related to specific requirements. Another bureau interprets the policy as only requiring approval for a new overarching interagency acquisition agreement, which can encompass multiple contract actions and fiscal years. Third, State acquisition officials do not monitor State First compliance, so they are not positioned to know whether the five approval requests received in fiscal year 2006 fully reflected the extent of that year's assisted interagency contracting. State's policies do not ensure that responsibilities for overseeing contractor performance on assisted interagency contracts are assigned to appropriately trained individuals. State acquisition regulations do not require trained oversight personnel to be assigned when using assisted interagency contracting. As a result, effective oversight depends on factors outside of State's control, such as the rigor of servicing agencies' oversight requirements, which vary. GAO identified cases where State personnel were given responsibility for overseeing contractor performance but had not received related training. GAO and others have reported that agencies' interests are put at risk when the individuals responsible for overseeing contractor performance are not clearly designated and have not been properly trained. |
gao_GAO-12-677 | gao_GAO-12-677_0 | We recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with those agencies that administer programs that support employment for people with disabilities, take two actions to improve coordination and program effectiveness and efficiency: (1) consider establishing measurable, governmentwide goals for employment of people with disabilities, and (2) continue to work with executive agencies that administer overlapping programs to determine whether program consolidation might result in administrative savings and more effective and efficient delivery of services. OMB officials stated that their approach to responding to this requirement will address fragmentation among federal programs. At least 13 congressional committees are responsible for oversight of the 45 programs, which are administered by nine federal agencies. All 45 programs overlapped with at least one other program in that they provided one or more similar employment service to people with disabilities. Overlap was greatest in programs serving two distinct groups; specifically, we identified 19 programs that provided employment services to veterans and servicemembers (see fig. At the same time, any veteran or servicemember could receive these services from 5 of the 7 programs that did not limit eligibility to any particular population. For a list of programs, populations they serve, and the services they reported providing, see appendix V.
While many programs reported providing similar services to similar populations, some programs have less potential for duplication— providing the same services to the same beneficiaries—than others. Some overlapping programs have specific eligibility requirements that make duplication less likely. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these different strategies reduce or prevent potential duplication in services among these programs. Even when the potential for duplication of services is low, there may be inefficiencies associated with operating two or more separate programs that provide similar services to similar populations. Officials Surveyed Reported Limited Coordination across All Programs
Coordination could help mitigate the potential for duplication among fragmented programs, but officials we surveyed reported limited coordination among the 45 programs in our scope. Programs Tracked Varying Outcome Measures, and Little Is Known About Program Effectiveness
Programs Reported Tracking Varying Employment Outcomes for People with Disabilities
Coordination efforts can be enhanced when agencies work toward a common goal, yet outcome measures varied across programs and not all programs reported outcomes specifically for people with disabilities. Given a list of typical employment measures, 32 of the 45 programs reported tracking at least one employment measure specifically for people with disabilities.measures most commonly tracked were “participants who enter employment” (28 programs) and “participants’ employment retention” (18 programs). Despite some similarities in programs’ outcome measures, it can be difficult to compare relative performance due to variation across programs in the type and severity of participants’ disabilities. However, this study did not determine whether other factors may have contributed to participants’ positive outcomes. The Departments of Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, and SSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. We held follow-up meetings with agency officials to clarify criteria, as appropriate. To identify areas of potential overlap among programs that support employment for people with disabilities, we reviewed survey responses from agency officials. In addition, we evaluated the methodology section of 11 of those studies, which were identified as impact studies by 7 programs, to determine if they met our criteria for an impact study—that is, the study provides an assessment of the net effect of a program by comparing program outcomes with an estimate of what would have happened in the absence of the program. Appendix III: Reported Program Obligations and Number of People with Disabilities Served
Department of Agriculture Assistive Technology Program for Farmers with Disabilities: AgrAbility Project Army Warrior Care and Transition Program Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Intern Program Recovery Coordination Program – Operation Warfighter (Internships)
Local Veterans’ Employment Representatives program Registered Apprenticeship for Youth and Young Adults with Disabilities Initiative Community Service Employment for Older Americans/Senior Community Service Employment Program Veterans’ Workforce Investment Program Work Opportunity Tax Credit (joint with the Internal Revenue Service)
Workforce Investment Act Youth Activities Workforce Recruitment Program (joint with the Department of Defense)
Some programs were not able to identify obligations related to providing employment supports to people with disabilities. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many federal programswithin the Departments of Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs; the Social Security Administration; and other agencieshelp people with disabilities overcome barriers to employment. Section 21 of Pub. L. No. 111-139 requires GAO to identify and report annually on programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives that have duplicative goals or activities. GAO examined the extent to which programs that support employment for people with disabilities (1) provide similar services to similar populations and (2) measure effectiveness. GAO identified programs by searching the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and consulting agency officials. GAO surveyed and interviewed agency officials to determine program objectives and activities. Nine agencies reviewed the draft report and five provided comments. Labor was concerned that GAO characterized its programs as fragmented and potentially duplicative. While multiple programs may be appropriate, GAO maintains that additional review and coordination may reduce inefficiencies and improve effectiveness among overlapping programs.
GAO is not recommending executive action at this time. In a recent report, GAO suggested the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) consider establishing governmentwide goals for employment of people with disabilities, and working with agencies that administer overlapping programs to determine whether consolidation might result in more effective and efficient delivery of services. GAO continues to believe these actions are needed and will follow up with OMB to determine their status.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 45 programs that supported employment for people with disabilities in fiscal year 2010, reflecting a fragmented system of services. The programs were administered by nine federal agencies and overseen by even more congressional committees. All programs overlapped with at least one other program in that they provided one or more similar employment service to a similar populationpeople with disabilities. The greatest overlap occurred in programs serving veterans and servicemembers (19 programs) and youth and young adults (5 programs). In addition, GAO identified seven programs that did not limit eligibility to any particular population and were potentially available to veterans and servicemembers or youth. Some overlapping programs, such as those with specific eligibility requirements, have less potential for duplicationproviding the same services to the same beneficiariesthan others. However, even when the potential for duplication of services is low, there may be inefficiencies associated with operating multiple programs that provide similar services to similar populations. Coordination across programs may help address fragmentation and potential duplication, but officials that GAO surveyed reported only limited coordination. However, among six selected programs that only serve people with disabilitiesincluding the Department of Educations Vocational Rehabilitation program and the Social Security Administrations Ticket to Work programofficials cited more consistent coordination.
Most (32) of the 45 programs surveyed tracked at least one employment-related outcome measure for people with disabilities, but overall little is known about the effectiveness of these programs. The most commonly tracked outcomes for people with disabilities were entered employment (28 programs) and employment retention (18 programs). However, it may be difficult to compare outcomes across programs, in part, because of variation in the type and severity of participants disabilities. In addition, only 10 of the 45 programs reported that an evaluation had been conducted in the last 5 years. Just one of the 45 programs (Job Corps) reported conducting an impact studya study that would most clearly show whether the program (and not other factors) was responsible for improved employment outcomes for people with disabilities. However, additional studies are underway for at least two other programs. |
gao_GGD-98-39 | gao_GGD-98-39_0 | Under its 1997 compliance initiative proposal (CIP), IRS is attempting to link IGPs to a larger research framework and better manage IGPs to make them more useful for doing compliance research. IGPs Nationwide and in Georgia
IRS Examination staff can run IGPs in IRS’ National Office, its 33 district offices, and its 10 service centers. Recent IGP Results in IRS’ Georgia District
For fiscal years 1994 through 1996, IRS provided information on 76 IGPs that were open at some time during these years in the Georgia District. Over half of these IGPs (44) focused on four types of taxpayers: (1) businesses that potentially underreported income or overreported expense deductions; (2) businesses that potentially did not properly report or pay taxes, such as excise taxes on fuel, chemicals, or heavy vehicle use; (3) individual taxpayers who potentially claimed an improper exemption for dependents, a filing status (e.g., head of household), or earned income credit; and (4) businesses and individual taxpayers who potentially did not file required tax returns. Of the 76 IGPs, 41 were closed as of June 1997. The audit results for the 41 IGPs also varied widely. Of the 32 projects involving audits, 23 were closed after auditing fewer than 50 returns each. The additional recommended tax plus penalty amounts per IGP ranged from $0 (in the 9 IGPs closed without any audits) to $269 million; of the 32 IGPs with audits, 11 recommended total additional tax amounts that exceeded $500,000, and 7 recommended total amounts exceeding $1 million. Table I.3 reports the audit results of projects that were closed as of June 1997. IGP Controls and Procedures
For years, IRS has had various controls and procedures in using IGPs as audit selection tools, including the approval and review of proposed projects, independence in the selection of returns, and limits on the duration of the audit phase. To identify the number of IGPs open both nationwide and in Georgia in fiscal years 1994 through 1996, we reviewed available records from IRS’ National Office and Georgia District. According to officials, IRS began a total restructuring in fiscal year 1994 that reduced the number of district offices from 63 to 33 and shifted the responsibility for maintaining IGP records. We focused our efforts on all IGPs that were open at any time during fiscal years 1994 through 1996. To determine whether the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code contributed to the level of noncompliance among business taxpayers who prepared their own tax returns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Services's (IRS) use of Information Gathering Projects (IGP), focusing on: (1) the number of IGPs nationwide and in IRS' Georgia District during fiscal years 1994 through 1996; (2) descriptions and results of IGPs in Georgia during fiscal years 1994 through 1996; and (3) controls and procedures IRS has in place for IGPs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS reported that it had about 1,000 IGPs open nationwide during both fiscal year (FY) 1995 and FY 1996; (2) data on the nationwide number of IGPs in FY 1994 were not readily available; (3) according to IRS officials, nationwide tracking records were discarded or lost during IRS' reorganization efforts, which involved consolidating 63 districts into 33 and shifting responsibility for IGP records; (4) of the 76 IGPs that were open in Georgia during fiscal years 1994 through 1996, over half focused on: (a) business taxpayers that potentially underreported their income or overreported expenses; (b) business taxpayers that potentially did not properly report or pay taxes, such as the excise tax on fuels; (c) individual taxpayers who potentially claimed an improper exemption, filing status, or earned income credit; and (d) business and individual taxpayers who potentially did not file required tax returns; (5) of these 76 Georgia IGPs, 41 had closed as of June 1997; (6) the duration of these closed audits varied from several months to several years; (7) the audit results, such as additional taxes recommended plus penalties, also varied, with the additional tax amounts ranging from $0 to $269 million; (8) for most of these IGPs, IRS audited relatively few tax returns; (9) IRS closed about three-quarters of these IGPs after auditing fewer than 50 returns, including 9 that closed without any audits being done; (10) for years, IRS has had several controls and procedures designed to limit the vulnerability of IGPs to misuse as an audit selection technique; (11) IRS has always required that proposed IGPs undergo review and approval processes at high levels within the Examination Division in each of the districts; (12) to oversee IGPs, IRS has a unit at each of its 33 district offices; (13) these units monitor how returns were selected for audit and whether the audit results justified continuance of the project; (14) further, IRS recently has started adding processes to enhance the contribution of IGPs to compliance research; (15) in 1997, IRS began implementing compliance initiative proposal processes; and (16) IRS is involving its Research Division in the processes for approving and overseeing IGPs in the hope of making IGPs more useful for research purposes. |
gao_GAO-02-53 | gao_GAO-02-53_0 | Background
The Medicare physician fee schedule has three components. The resource-based payments were required to be budget neutral with respect to the former payment method, meaning that Medicare’s aggregate payments to physicians could not change as a result of the implementation of the new methodology. Oncology’s practice expense payments in 2001 are 8 percent higher than they would have been had the charge-based fee schedule continued in 2001. Medicare payments to oncologists equal about the same share of estimated practice expenses as the average for all specialties. As a result, payments for some physician services increased. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that practice expense payments for all services under the fee schedule better reflect the costs of providing services, we are recommending that the Administrator of CMS: examine the effects of adjustments made to the basic methodology across specialties and types of services and validate the appropriateness of these adjustments, including the adjustment made to oncologists’ reported medical supply expenses, giving priority to those having larger impacts on payment levels; change the allocation of indirect expenses so that all services are allocated the appropriate share of indirect expenses; and calculate payments for all services without direct physician involvement under the basic method, using information on the resources required for each service, and, if deemed necessary, validate the underlying resource- based estimates of direct practice expenses required to provide each service. Appendix II: Overview of Medicare’s Basic Practice Expense Method and Adjustments
This appendix details how the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) developed resource-based practice expense payments. | What GAO Found
Medicare's physician fee schedule establishes payments for more than 7,000 different services, such as office visits, surgical procedures, and treatments. Before 1992, fees were based on charges physicians billed for these services. Since then, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which runs Medicare, has been phasing in a new fee schedule on the basis of the amount of resources used to provide that service relative to other services. The development of the resource-based practice expense component was a substantial undertaking. The implementation of the resource-based methodology has been the subject of considerable controversy, partly because of HCFA's adjustments to the underlying data and basic method and partly because payment changes were required to be budget-neutral--which means that total Medicare spending for physician services was to be the same under the new payment method as it was under the old one. As a result, Medicare payments to some specialties have increased while payments to other specialties have decreased. Oncologists claim that their practice expense payments are particularly inadequate for some office-based services, such as chemotherapy. Oncology practice expense payments in 2001 are eight percent higher than they would have been had charged-based payments continued. Oncology practice expense payments compared to their estimated practice expenses are about the same as the average for all physicians. |
gao_GAO-04-918 | gao_GAO-04-918_0 | State has supported foreign governments throughout the world to locate and eradicate illicit drug crops. The aerial eradication program operates in an often-hostile environment that requires helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each aerial eradication mission. Eradication spray planes and the supporting helicopters are often shot at from the ground. In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. The number of hits peaked at 73 in January 2003, and 46 hits were reported in March 2003. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and accompanying helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire; although other factors also came into play, such as the proximity of eradication areas to insurgent locations. According to the Office of Aviation, spray aircraft flew about 5,450 hours in 2001, nearly 9,400 hours in 2002, and more than 11,300 in 2003. State Has Taken Several Actions to Address Operational Safety Concerns
State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to reduce the risk to the aircraft on aerial eradication missions. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits on aerial eradication aircraft in late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission, and the NAS Director directed spray operations away from areas where the hits were occurring. In addition, throughout 2003 and early 2004, State/INL and NAS took several actions to make greater use of intelligence information regarding the ground threats to the eradication aircraft. Funding for the aerial eradication program in Colombia increased from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $100 million in fiscal year 2003. NAS funds for the aerial eradication program increased more than fivefold, from about $11 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $58 million in fiscal year 2003. Number of Aircraft Increased
From the end of fiscal year 2001 through May 2004, the number of spray aircraft and helicopters supporting aerial eradication in Colombia increased from 22 to 35, with 12 additional spray aircraft and 1 additional helicopter assigned. State/INL’s Planning and Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All of the Office of Aviation’s Needs
State/INL does not develop a specific budget for the Office of Aviation addressing all of its programs and does not plan for the long-term costs of the Office of Aviation’s programs, such as providing for replacement aircraft. As a result, the Office of Aviation has to request those funds from the respective NAS Director, which may adversely affect those programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State's Office of Aviation has maintained aircraft and provided support for the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police. However, eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground requiring helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each mission. In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record amount. GAO examined (1) how the threat to the spray planes has changed since 2001, (2) what actions State has taken to address any operational safety concerns, and (3) what resources State provided for the expanding program during fiscal years 2001-04 and how it planned and budgeted for the program's growth.
What GAO Found
In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the number of hits increased--peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more than 26 per month--and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were forced to land because of ground fire. Moreover, the number of flying hours for spray aircraft more than doubled--from about 5,450 hours in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other factors came into play. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission. Also, since January 2003, State has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents' proximity to spray targets. Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program doubled from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for fiscal year 2003. In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. However, State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. In addition, State does not plan for the longterm costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new aircraft. |
gao_GAO-05-308 | gao_GAO-05-308_0 | Progress Made in Federal Public Health IT Applications, But More Work Remains
CDC and DHS have made progress on federal public health IT initiatives, including CDC’s PHIN initiative, which is intended to provide the nation with integrated public health information systems to counter national civilian public health threats, and two major initiatives at DHS—primarily focused on signal interpretation and biosurveillance—one of which is associated with three other programs. PHIN communications systems are being used, and improvements to surveillance systems (disease, syndromic, and environmental monitoring) are still being developed. Other PHIN applications are available for optional use by state and local public health officials, but they are not widely used because of system limitations. However, as initially deployed, BioWatch required modification, because its three IT components did not communicate with each other, requiring redundant data entry. Although CDC uses BioSense for a number of federal bioterrorism preparedness activities, BioSense is not extensively used by the state and local public health officials with whom we spoke, primarily because of limitations in the data and its presentation. Most DHS Biosurveillance IT Initiatives Are Still in Their Early Stages
DHS is also pursuing two major biosurveillance IT initiatives—the National Biosurveillance Integration System and the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization System (BWICS). The BWICS initiative, in addition, is associated with three other biosurveillance programs. Of these five, one is operational, but it has interoperability and other limitations, one is a demonstration project, and three are in development. Challenges Need to Be Overcome to Strengthen the Information Technology That Supports the Public Health Infrastructure
Despite federal, state, and local government efforts to strengthen the public health infrastructure and improve the nation’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to public health emergencies, important challenges continue to constrain progress. First, the national health care IT strategy and federal health architecture are still being developed; CDC and DHS will face challenges in integrating their public health IT initiatives into these ongoing efforts. Second, although federal efforts continue to promote the adoption of data standards, developing such standards and then implementing them are challenges for the health care community. Third, these initiatives involve the need to coordinate among federal, state, and local public health agencies, but establishing effective coordination among the large number of disparate agencies is a major undertaking. Finally, CDC and DHS face challenges in addressing specific weaknesses in IT planning and management that may hinder progress in developing and deploying public health IT initiatives. Federal agencies face many challenges in improving the public health infrastructure. Until agencies address all these challenges, progress toward building a stronger public health infrastructure will be limited, as will the ability to share essential information concerning public health emergencies and bioterrorism. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the development and implementation of major public health IT initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following two actions: ensure that the federal initiatives are (1) aligned with the national health IT strategy, the federal health architecture, and ongoing public health IT initiatives and (2) coordinated with state and local public health initiatives and ensure federal actions to encourage the development, adoption, and implementation of health care data and communication standards across the health care industry to address interoperability challenges associated with the exchange of public health information. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess the progress of major federal information technology (IT) initiatives designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the public health infrastructure and describe the key IT challenges facing federal agencies responsible for improving the public health infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for, among other things, protecting the United States against terrorist attacks. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
It has been almost 4 years since the anthrax events of October 2001 highlighted the weaknesses in our nation's public health infrastructure. Since that time, emerging infectious diseases have appeared--such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and human monkeypox--that have made our readiness for public health emergencies even more critical. Information technology (IT) is central to strengthening the public health infrastructure through the implementation of systems to aid in the detection, preparation for, and response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Congress asked us to review the current status of major federal IT initiatives aimed at strengthening the ability of government at all levels to respond to public health emergencies. Specifically, our objectives were to assess the progress of major federal IT initiatives designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the public health infrastructure and describe the key IT challenges facing federal agencies responsible for improving the public health infrastructure.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have made progress on major public health IT initiatives, although significant work remains to be done. These initiatives include one broad initiative at CDC--the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) initiative--which is intended to provide the nation with integrated public health information systems to counter national civilian public health threats, and two major initiatives at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which are primarily focused on biosurveillance. CDC's broad PHIN initiative encompasses a number of applications and initiatives, which show varied progress. Currently, PHIN's basic communications systems are in place, but it is unclear when its surveillance systems and data exchange applications will become fully deployed. Further, the overall implementation of PHIN does not yet provide the desired functionality, and so some applications are not widely used by state and local public health officials. For example, CDC's BioSense application, which is aimed at detecting early signs of disease outbreaks, is available to state and local public health agencies, but according to the state and local officials with whom we spoke, it is not widely used, primarily because of limitations in the data it currently collects. DHS is also pursuing two major public health IT initiatives--the National Biosurveillance Integration System and the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization System (BWICS). Both of these initiatives are still in development. The BWICS initiative, in addition, is associated with three other programs, one of which--BioWatch--is operational. This early- warning environmental monitoring system was developed for detecting trace amounts of biological materials and has been deployed in over 30 locations across the United States. Until recently, its three IT components were not interoperable and required redundant data entry in order to communicate with each other. As federal agencies work with state and local public health agencies to improve the public health infrastructure, they face several challenges. First, the national health IT strategy and federal health architecture are still being developed; CDC and DHS will face challenges in integrating their public health IT initiatives into these ongoing efforts. Second, although federal efforts continue to promote the adoption of data standards, developing such standards and then implementing them are challenges for the health care community. Third, these initiatives involve the need to coordinate among federal, state, and local public health agencies, but establishing effective coordination among the large number of disparate agencies is a major undertaking. Finally, CDC and DHS face challenges in addressing specific weaknesses in IT planning and management that may hinder progress in developing and deploying public health IT initiatives. Until all these challenges are addressed, progress toward building a stronger public health infrastructure will be impeded, as will the ability to share essential information concerning public health emergencies and bioterrorism. |
gao_NSIAD-99-65 | gao_NSIAD-99-65_0 | The program areas are (1) tax policy and administration, which is to help countries establish tax systems that are fair and objective and that generate necessary revenues for government operations; (2) financial institutions, policy, and regulation, which is to develop policies and activities relating to privatization of state-owned commercial banks and improve their management; (3) budget policy, formulation, and execution, which is intended to help strengthen ministries of finance by helping introduce modern budget processes; (4) government debt issuance and management, which is to provide advice to host-government officials on developing markets for the sale of government securities; and (5) law enforcement, which is to enhance enforcement capabilities of the government to address crimes that can undermine privatization, developing financial systems, and other economic reforms. OTA Oversight of the Program
The advisor program has been carried out with little formal structure. We noted that other documents that OTA officials told us they used for program oversight, such as country agreements, work plans, and reports of supervisor visits, were not available. OTA’s oversight of its advisor financial disclosure reporting requirements was also lax. OTA officials told us they frequently used informal means, such as electronic mail and telephonic communication, to oversee the work of resident advisors. Conclusions and Recommendation
Treasury advisors in Romania and Russia have provided advice on a variety of economic reform efforts. Treasury Advisor Qualifications
The Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) requires general personnel qualifications for the advisors in its program. 2. Comments From the Department of the Treasury
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of the Treasury’s letter dated February 5, 1999. GAO’s Comments
1. 3. 4. In addition, we provided information on advisor qualifications, program cost, fund transfers between USAID and the Treasury, and the location of the Treasury’s senior advisors to its program. In completing our review, we examined in detail advisor activities in Russia and Romania and visited OTA’s advisors working in these countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) foreign aid program, focusing on: (1) the types of technical assistance OTA advisors have provided to Russia and Romania; (2) oversight by OTA of advisors' activities; (3) advisor qualifications, program cost, fund transfers between the Agency for International Development and the Treasury; and (4) the location of the Treasury's senior advisors to its program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Treasury's technical assistance advisors in Russia and Romania have assisted in efforts to reform tax and budget systems, improve banking and debt management policies, and enhance law enforcement; (2) in support of these initiatives, Treasury advisors have helped countries devise new systems and approaches to management of their finances, drafted legislation and procedures, and developed economic models; (3) host-government officials for the most part indicated that the advice received from the Treasury's advisors was beneficial to their reform efforts; (4) the advisor program has been carried out with little formal structure; (5) the only clear mandatory requirement is the filing of monthly reports, and reports of varying content were generally filed on a regular basis; (6) however, other documents OTA officials say they use in their oversight, such as host-country agreements, work plans, and the results of supervisory trips, were not available; (7) OTA has also been lax in enforcing advisors' financial disclosure requirements; and (8) in response to GAO's observations, OTA told GAO that they use informal means such as electronic mail and telephone calls to carry out their oversight of advisor activities. |
gao_GAO-05-388 | gao_GAO-05-388_0 | The appropriations are in specified amounts for each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 for transfer to FBI to carry out its health care fraud investigations. FBI’s Monitoring Approach for HIPAA Transfers Provided Little Assurance of Transfers’ Proper Use
FBI used a limited approach to monitoring its use of HIPAA transfers, which might have been sufficient when it clearly used more agent FTEs for health care fraud investigations than it had budgeted. But this approach was insufficient when some of the agent FTEs previously devoted to health care fraud investigations were shifted to counterterrorism activities, causing actual FTEs to fall below budgeted FTEs. As a result, FBI had minimal assurance that all of the transferred HIPAA funds were properly spent. DOJ is currently planning to implement the new DOJ-wide Unified Financial Management System, but it has yet to develop the specific systems requirements to enable it to accurately capture all of the costs of its health care fraud investigations and therefore to help monitor compliance with HIPAA and other relevant laws and regulations. These direct costs consisted of payroll and benefits for agents and certain other personnel involved in health care fraud investigations, plus related costs such as rent and supplies. For the 4 years we reviewed, the agent FTEs represented about 42 percent of the budgeted amounts for work on health care fraud investigations, while the other direct program costs represented about 58 percent of the budgeted amounts. FBI officials told us that prior to September 11, 2001, reported agent FTEs charged to the health care fraud investigations were historically far in excess of those budgeted and they were satisfied that the resources expended on health care fraud investigations exceeded the HIPPA transfers. Therefore, in years when reported agent FTEs were close to or below budgeted FTE amounts, FBI had no effective mechanism in place to monitor compliance with HIPAA. FBI’s Cost Estimates of Health Care Fraud Investigations Were Not Adequately Supported
In the absence of system-generated program costs and upon our request for cost schedules, FBI began developing an estimate of its health care fraud investigation costs incurred for fiscal years 2000 through 2003 in an attempt to determine the propriety of its use of the HIPAA transfers. However, we found that the estimates were either directly or indirectly based on data from FBI’s time utilization system, which had not been properly validated, and various other data that were not adequately supported. As a result, despite a good-faith effort by FBI to estimate these costs, neither we nor FBI could reliably determine whether the HIPAA transfers were spent solely on health care fraud investigations for the 4-year period. With the addition of these indirect costs, FBI ultimately estimated that it spent more on health care fraud investigations than was funded by the HIPAA transfers for all 4 years. Conclusions
FBI’s monitoring approach for determining the proper use of HIPAA funding was limited and did not provide the level of assurance needed when agent FTEs devoted to health care fraud investigations were close to or below budgeted amounts. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the internal controls related to the use of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) transfers and the cost estimates of health care fraud investigations for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provided, among other things, funding by transfer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to carry out specific purposes of the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program. Congress expressed concern about a shift in FBI resources from health care fraud investigations to counterterrorism activities after September 11, 2001. Congress asked GAO to review FBI's accountability for the funds transferred under HIPAA for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. GAO determined (1) whether FBI had an adequate approach for ensuring the proper use of the HIPAA transfers and (2) the extent to which FBI had expended these transferred funds on health care fraud investigations in fiscal years 2000 through 2003.
What GAO Found
FBI used a limited approach to monitoring its use of HIPAA transfers, which might have been sufficient during times when it clearly used more agent full time equivalents (FTEs) for health care fraud investigations than budgeted but was insufficient when some of the agent FTEs previously devoted to health care fraud investigations were shifted to counterterrorism activities. FBI's budgeted FTEs (agent and other personnel) and related costs (such as rent and utilities) were equivalent to the amount of the HIPAA transfers. However, FBI's approach to monitoring the use of HIPAA transfers considered only agent FTEs, which made up about 42 percent of the budgeted health care fraud costs, but did not consider other personnel FTEs or related costs. According to FBI officials, they did not monitor these other budgeted amounts to determine compliance with HIPAA because the actual agent FTEs were historically far in excess of those budgeted. However, once FBI began to shift agent resources away from health care fraud investigations, agent FTEs charged to health care fraud investigations fell below the budgeted amounts, and FBI could no longer rely on this limited approach to ensure that the transferred HIPAA funds were properly used. Furthermore, FBI did not have a system in place to capture its overall health care fraud investigation costs, and therefore, was not in a position to determine whether or not all transferred HIPAA funds were properly expended. In response to GAO's review, FBI engaged in extensive manual efforts to develop cost estimates related to health care fraud investigations for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. The final estimate provided to GAO showed that FBI spent more on health care fraud investigations than was funded by transfers for each of the 4 years. However, GAO found that, overall, FBI's estimates of its health care fraud investigation costs were based on data that had not been or could not be fully validated. Therefore, even though FBI made a good-faith effort to estimate these costs, because of data limitations, neither GAO nor FBI could reliably determine whether all of the HIPAA transfers were spent solely for health care fraud investigations and related activities for the 4-year period. DOJ is currently planning the implementation of a new DOJ-wide UFMS, but it has yet to develop the specific systems requirements that would enable FBI to accurately capture all of its health care fraud-related costs and therefore to help monitor compliance with HIPAA and other relevant laws and regulations. |
gao_GAO-09-103 | gao_GAO-09-103_0 | A Significant Portion of the Navy’s Secondary Inventory Exceeded Current Requirements
Our analysis of Navy secondary inventory data for the 4-year period we examined showed that, on average, about $11.3 billion (60 percent) of the average annual total inventory value of $18.7 billion was needed to meet current requirements and $7.5 billion (40 percent) exceeded current requirements. A large proportion of items that exceeded current requirements had no projected demand. Inventory Excess to Current Requirements Was Retained for Anticipated Future Needs
Of the nearly $7.5 billion in Navy secondary inventory that exceeded current requirements in the time frame we examined, about half was being retained for demands anticipated within 2 years, while the remainder was being retained either as economic retention inventory, contingency retention inventory, or potential excess (see fig. Excess Inventory Was Sufficient to Meet Many Years of Projected Demands
The Navy’s forecasts for items with a recurring demand in fiscal years 2004 and 2007 showed that inventory for some items exceeded the current requirements necessary to meet many years and sometimes decades of demand. As of the September 30 stratification report date for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the Navy had insufficient on-hand inventory to meet reorder-level requirements for an average of about 15,000 items annually, totaling about $570 million in inventory deficits each year. Several Factors Contributed to the Navy’s Having Large Inventory Levels in Excess of Current Requirements
Our review identified several factors that contributed to the Navy’s having secondary inventory that did not align with current requirements, including significant levels of inventory that were in excess of these requirements over the 4-year period. In addition, although changes in demand account for much of the inventory in excess of current requirements, the Navy has not systematically evaluated why demand forecasting is unpredictable and how to better manage it. These new designations provide an opportunity to enhance oversight of such efforts. Navy Has Not Established Metrics and Goals for Tracking and Assessing the Cost Efficiency of Inventory Management
Although the Navy has emphasized the need to meet warfighter needs as measured by supply support performance metrics and goals, it has not established metrics and goals to track and assess the cost efficiency of its inventory management practices. DOD’s supply chain management regulation requires the military services to take several steps to provide for effective and efficient end-to-end materiel support. They cited problems, including a lack of communication and coordination among key personnel. As a result, some items that are purchased based on the initial provisioning estimates are ultimately not needed to meet requirements. Initial provisioning demand was based on engineering estimates that proved to be inaccurate. On-Order Management Practices Limit Flexibility in Modifying Purchases
The Navy’s inventory management practices for on-order items limit flexibility in modifying purchase decisions in cases where demand has changed. Navy Has Not Adjusted Retention Practices in Response to Prior Recommendations
Although prior studies by our office and LMI have identified weaknesses in DOD components’ inventory retention practices, the Navy has not implemented corrective actions recommended in these reports. Much of the inventory that exceeded current requirements or had inventory deficits resulted from inaccurate demand forecasts, which the Navy attributed to unpredictability of demand. Finally, since inventory management is part of the Navy’s broader business operations and transformation, it is reasonable to expect the newly established chief management officer and deputy chief management officer to exercise some level of oversight of the Navy’s inventory management improvement efforts. Strengthening the Navy’s inventory management—while maintaining high levels of supply availability and meeting warfighter needs—could reduce support costs and free up funds for other needs. To determine the extent to which the Navy’s on-hand and on-order secondary inventory reflects the amount of inventory needed to support requirements, we reviewed DOD and Navy inventory management policies, past GAO products on DOD and Navy inventory management practices for secondary inventory items, and other related documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory management as a high-risk area. It is critical that the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency effectively and efficiently manage DOD's secondary inventory to ensure that the warfighter is supplied with the right items at the right time. It is also imperative that they maintain good stewardship over the billions of dollars invested in their inventory. GAO reviewed the Navy's management of secondary inventory and determined (1) the extent to which on-hand and on-order secondary inventory reflected the amount needed to support current requirements and (2) causes for the Navy's having secondary inventory in excess of current requirements or, conversely, for having inventory deficits. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Navy secondary inventory data (spare parts such as aircraft and ship engines and their components and accessories) from fiscal years 2004 through 2007.
What GAO Found
For the 4-year period GAOexamined, the Navy had significantly more inventory than was needed to support current requirements. The Navy also experienced some inventory deficits, though to a far lesser extent. GAO's analysis of inventory data identified an annual average of about $18.7 billion of Navy secondary inventory for fiscal years 2004 to 2007, of which about $7.5 billion (40 percent) exceeded current requirements. About half of the $7.5 billion of inventory exceeding current requirements was retained to meet anticipated future demands, and the remainder was retained for other reasons or identified as potential excess. Based on Navy demand forecasts, inventory that exceeded current requirements was sufficient to satisfy several years, or even decades, of anticipated supply needs. Also, a large proportion of items that exceeded current requirements had no projected demand. The Navy also had an annual average of about $570 million of inventory deficits over this 4-year period. Some items experienced persistent deficits for the 4 years covered in GAO's review. Navy inventory did not align with current requirements over this 4-year period because (1) the Navy has not established the cost efficiency of its inventory management, (2) its demand forecasting effectiveness is limited and requirements for items may change frequently after purchase decisions are made, and (3) it has not adjusted certain inventory management practices in response to the unpredictability in demand. As a result, the Navy had billions of dollars in excess inventory against current requirements each year. DOD's supply chain management regulation requires the military services to take several steps to provide for effective and efficient end-to-end materiel support. For example, the regulation directs the components to size secondary item inventories to minimize DOD investment while providing the inventory needed. However, while the Navy has performance measures related to meeting warfighter needs, it lacks metrics and targets for tracking and assessing the cost efficiency of its inventory management. In addition, although Navy managers most frequently attributed the accumulation and retention of inventory exceeding current requirements to changes in demand, the Navy has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its demand forecasting. Problems with demand forecasting that contribute to excess inventory include incomplete and inaccurate data and a lack of communication and coordination among key personnel. Finally, the Navy has not adjusted certain management practices--in areas such as initial provisioning, modifying purchase decisions for inventory that is on order and not yet in its possession, and retention--to provide flexibility for responding to changes in demand. First, initial provisioning of spare parts based on engineering estimates can result in the purchase of unneeded stock when these estimates prove to be inaccurate. Second, the Navy's management practices for on-order items limit flexibility in modifying purchase decisions in cases where demand has changed. Third, although prior studies have identified weaknesses in inventory retention practices, the Navy has not implemented recommended corrective actions. Also, the Navy's designation of new chief and deputy chief management officer positions provides an opportunity for enhanced oversight of inventory management improvement efforts. Strengthening the Navy's inventory management--while maintaining high levels of supply availability and meeting warfighter needs--could reduce support costs and free up funds for other needs. |
gao_GAO-17-50 | gao_GAO-17-50_0 | VHA Uses a Multi- Step Strategic Planning Process to Identify Strategic Goals and Objectives
VHA conducts a strategic planning process annually and through this process also established its current strategic plan. According to VHA officials, VHA’s strategic planning process includes two key steps—(1) assessing the environment, which VHA refers to as environmental scanning, and (2) holding the annual NLC Strategic Planning Summit. VHA conducts environmental scanning to identify and assess factors that may affect its future health care delivery. VHA officials told us that they leverage VA’s environmental scanning results in making decisions regarding VHA’s strategic goals and objectives. VISNs and VAMCs Are Responsible for Operationalizing VHA’s Strategic Goals and Objectives, but VHA Has Not Developed Adequate Strategies or an Effective Oversight Process to Ensure Operationalization
VISNs and VAMCs Have Responsibility for Operationalizing VHA’s Strategic Goals and Objectives, but VHA Has Not Defined VAMCs’ Role
VISNs and VAMCs have responsibility for operationalizing VHA’s strategic goals and objectives, including its strategic plan, according to VHA officials. First, VHA has not clearly identified VAMCs’ responsibilities in operationalizing its strategic goals and objectives as it has for VISNs. Second, in FY 2013, VHA provided VISNs with a strategic planning guide for operationalizing the current strategic plan, but did not provide a similar guide for VAMCs. According to the guide, its purpose was to assist VISNs in outlining a multi-year plan that aligned with VHA’s current strategic plan and provide relevant information regarding the development of strategies, the process for conducting a strategic analysis, and the time frame for providing strategic planning information, such as strategies, to VHA central office. Specifically, VISNs and VAMCs lack consistently developed strategies for operationalizing VHA’s strategic goals and objectives, and existing performance assessments are limited in measuring progress towards meeting these goals and objectives. VHA has not consistently developed strategies for VISNs and VAMCs to use in operationalizing its strategic goals and objectives. Strategies should describe how a strategic plan’s goals and objectives are to be achieved, and should include a description of the operational processes, staff skills, use of technology, as well as the resources— such as, human, capital, and information—required. In September 2014, VHA published the Blueprint for Excellence to provide strategies for transforming VHA health care service delivery in response to concerns regarding the VHA wait-time crisis that year. No process for ensuring and assessing progress in meeting all of VHA’s strategic goals and objectives. One method is VISN and VAMC directors’ individual annual performance plans. Veterans’ satisfaction with VA’s health care system is the second method for assessing VHA’s performance towards meeting strategic goals and objectives, according to VHA officials. According to VHA officials, for the veterans’ access goal, there is a large degree of alignment between the department-wide goal and how VHA measures its progress towards meeting some of its access goals and objectives in its strategic plan. VHA has established a strategic planning process to identify strategic goals and objectives for accomplishing its mission, and VISNs and VAMCs are expected to operationalize these goals and objectives. This may result in VHA not being able to determine if it is adequately addressing top management concerns or department-wide strategic goals. Define the roles and responsibilities of VAMCs in operationalizing VHA’s strategic goals and objectives; this could be accomplished by establishing roles and responsibilities for VAMCs similar to how VHA defines roles and responsibilities for VISNs in VHA Directive 1075 and by developing guidance for VAMCs similar to guidance developed for VISNs. 2. 3. Develop an oversight process to assess progress made in meeting VHA’s strategic goals and objectives, including feedback on how well activities and programs are contributing to achieving these goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans' health care needs may change due to changes in veteran demographics and other factors. Strategic planning, including identifying mission, vision, goals, and objectives, and operationalizing strategies to achieve those goals and objectives are essential for VHA to establish its strategic direction to respond to these changing demands and provide care in a dynamic environment.
GAO was asked to review VHA's strategic planning. This report examines (1) VHA's strategic planning process and (2) the extent to which VHA operationalizes its strategic goals and objectives. GAO reviewed VHA strategic planning documents; and interviewed officials from VA and VHA central office, three VISNs selected to provide variation in geographic location, and nine VAMCs within these VISNs selected to provide variation in factors such as geographic location and facility complexity. GAO evaluated VHA's actions against federal standards for internal control and leading practices for strategic planning.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) uses a multi-step strategic planning process to develop its strategic goals and objectives, which includes two key steps—(1) identifying and assessing factors that may affect health care delivery, which is referred to as environmental scanning, and (2) holding the annual National Leadership Council (NLC) Strategic Planning Summit—according to officials. VHA officials told GAO that they leverage VA's environmental scanning results in making decisions regarding VHA's strategic goals and objectives and that VA's central office has historically had a role in aspects of VHA's strategic planning process—such as participating in the NLC summit.
VHA relies on the VA medical centers (VAMC) that directly provide care to veterans and the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), regional entities to which the VAMCs report, to operationalize its strategic goals and objectives. However, certain limitations in VHA's processes hinder VISNs' and VAMCs' efforts in operationalizing these goals and objectives. Specifically,
VHA has not specified VAMCs' role and responsibilities in its strategic planning guidance, as it has for VISNs. For example, VHA's directive for VISNs clearly states how VISN directors are to operationalize VHA's operational plans; no such directive exists for VAMC officials. Similarly, VHA provided VISNs a strategic planning guide for operationalizing its current strategic plan, but did not provide a similar guide to the VAMCs.
VHA has not developed detailed strategies for VISNs and VAMCs to use in operationalizing all of its strategic goals and objectives. According to leading practices for strategic planning, strategies should describe how strategic goals and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, staff skills, technology and other resources required. In September 2014, VHA published the Blueprint for Excellence to provide strategies for transforming VHA health care service delivery in response to concerns regarding the VHA wait-time crisis that year. However, it did not develop similar strategy documents for other years or for the other goals and objectives in its strategic plan.
VHA does not have an effective oversight process for ensuring and assessing the progress of VISNs and VAMCs in meeting VHA's strategic goals and objectives. According to VHA officials, VHA relies on two methods for assessing performance towards meeting selected strategic goals and objectives. Specifically, VHA uses VISN and VAMC directors' individual annual performance plans, as well as veteran survey information, to assess VHA's performance towards meeting certain metrics, such as improving veterans' access. However, it is unclear how these specific metrics are linked to assessing overall progress towards VHA's strategic goals and objectives. As a result, VHA may not know to what extent VISNs' and VAMCs' efforts to operationalize its goals and objectives are adequately addressing top management concerns or department-wide strategic goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA (1) specify VAMCs' roles and responsibilities in operationalizing its strategic goals and objectives, (2) develop detailed strategies to operationalize its goals and objectives, and (3) develop an oversight process to assess progress made. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-277T | gao_GAO-02-277T_0 | RHS excluded $182 million of this delinquent debt from referral to FMS for TOP and cross-servicing. Support for Not Referring a Significant Amount of Delinquent Direct SFH Loans Not Maintained
DCIA requires federal agencies to refer all legally enforceable and eligible non-tax debts that are more than 180 days delinquent to Treasury for collection through administrative offset and cross-servicing. FMS officials told us that it is their expectation that agencies would retain the applicable data needed to justify not referring delinquent debt for collection action. As of September 30, 2000, neither RHS nor FSA treated such losses resulting from the SFH program and the Farm Loan Program, respectively, as non-tax federal debts. Agriculture and Most Other Agencies Have Not Used AWG to Collect Delinquent Debt
DCIA authorizes both federal agencies that administer programs that give rise to delinquent non-tax debts and federal agencies that pursue recovery of such debts, such as FMS, to administratively garnish up to 15 percent of a debtor’s disposable pay until the debt is fully recovered. Agencies, including Agriculture, identified various reasons for the delay in implementing AWG, including the need to focus priorities on the mandatory provisions of DCIA and develop the required regulations or administrative hearing procedures to implement AWG. This is disappointing in light of the large population in the country’s labor force and the fact that debt collection experts testified before this Subcommittee in 1995, prior to the enactment of DCIA, that AWG can be an extremely powerful debt collection tool, as the mere threat of AWG is often enough to motivate debtor repayment. An important consideration is that much of the delinquent debt reported by agencies as eligible for cross-servicing is not currently being promptly referred to FMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The testimony discusses debt collection efforts by two major components at the Department of Agriculture--the Rural Housing Service (RHS) and the Farm Service Agency (FSA). The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 requires agencies to (1) notify the Department of the Treasury of debts more than 180 days delinquent for the purposes of administrative offset against any amounts that might otherwise be due and (2) refer such debts to Treasury for centralized collection. To facilitate collection, agencies can administratively garnish the wages of delinquent debtors throughout government.
What GAO Found
GAO found that agencies are excluding most reported debt more than 180 days delinquent from referral requirements. To more fully realize the benefits of debt collection, agencies need to improve their implementation of the act. The Financial Management Service is making steady progress in collecting delinquent federal non-tax debt through the Treasury Offset Program--a mandatory governmentwide debt collection program that compares delinquent debtor debt to federal payment data. Agriculture and other agencies still have not used administrative wage garnishment to collect delinquent non-tax debt even though experts have testified that it can be an extremely powerful tool for debt collection. If the government is going to make significant progress in collecting the billion of dollars its owned in delinquent non-tax debt, federal agencies have to make implementation of the act's debt collection provisions a top priority. |
gao_GAO-04-287 | gao_GAO-04-287_0 | Improving productivity by changing processes is a strategy SB/SE is using to address these declining trends. Enforcement Process Improvement Projects Included Many Key Steps but SB/SE Lacked a Planning Framework
The planning for each of the four projects we reviewed included most of the key steps in our process improvement framework, but none of the projects included all of the steps. For example, in the Collection Taxpayer Delinquent Account Support project, SB/SE did not consider alternatives to achieving the project’s goal of identifying the best cases to assign to collections staff. Two projects had completed plans for outcome assessments at the time of our review. In the course of our discussions with SB/SE managers about the steps that their projects did and did not include, we learned that SB/SE does not have its own guidance or framework that describes the steps to be followed in planning process improvement projects. This, in turn, exacerbates the risk of projects not addressing appropriate process problems, developing a less than optimal target process, ineffectively implementing the project, inaccurately assessing project outcomes, or mismanaging the change to the new process. IRS Enforcement Productivity Data Only Partially Adjusted for Complexity and Quality
The data available to SB/SE managers to assess the productivity of their enforcement activities, identify processes that need improvement, and assess the success of their process improvement efforts are only partially adjusted for complexity and quality of cases worked. Existing statistical methods could be used in the short term, with currently available data on case complexity and quality to improve productivity measurement. To the extent that IRS succeeds in improving enforcement productivity through these projects, resources will be made available for providing additional services to taxpayers and addressing the declines in tax enforcement programs. The 20-step framework that we developed for this report is an example of such guidance. A measure of productivity like cases closed per staff year that shows an increase may not indicate a real gain in efficiency if the mix of cases has shifted to less difficult cases or the quality of the work has declined. GAO’s Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide recognizes that the steps for planning process improvement need to be adapted for the magnitude of the projects and the particular circumstances of an organization. We selected one project each in the audit and compliance support areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has experienced declines in most of its enforcement programs, including declines in audits and in efforts to collect delinquent taxes. Increasing enforcement productivity is one strategy that can help reverse these declines. To this end, IRS is currently planning and has begun implementing enforcement process improvement projects. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the planning for the projects followed steps consistent with both published GAO guidance and the experiences of private sector and government organizations. Specifically, GAO assessed the extent to which four judgmentally selected projects followed the 20 planning steps.
What GAO Found
Planning for the four enforcement process improvement projects GAO reviewed included most of the 20-step framework developed to assess the projects. This increases the likelihood that projects target the right processes for improvement, choose the best target process from among alternatives, effectively implement the project, accurately assess project outcomes, and properly manage the change to the new process. However, none of the projects completed all of the steps. For example, some projects did not fully identify the causes of productivity shortfalls, leaving a risk that the project did not fix the right problem. In the course of this work, GAO found that IRS managers do not have guidance about the steps to follow in planning process improvement projects, increasing the possibility of omitting steps. A recurring issue in the four projects was that IRS's enforcement data only partially adjust for the complexity and quality of cases worked. This issue is also a problem for IRS enforcement productivity data generally. Failing to adjust for both complexity and quality increases the risk that trends in productivity will be misunderstood. For example, a decline in the number of cases closed per employee at the same time that case complexity is increasing may not be a real decline in productivity. GAO recognizes that some options for improving productivity data could be costly. However, costs could be mitigated by using existing statistical methods and IRS complexity and quality data. |
gao_GAO-11-83 | gao_GAO-11-83_0 | We found that DOD did not have such a strategy. Upon completion of the ongoing TWV studies by the Army and Marine Corps, and the Analysis of Alternatives for Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, DOD will unite these efforts into a comprehensive strategy that dovetails with the services’ equipping strategies. DOD’s Rapid Acquisition of M-ATVs Is Ahead of Schedule and No Major Performance Issues Have Been Identified to Date
DOD has acquired and fielded the M-ATV as quickly as possible in response to an urgent need. No major issues have been identified in subsequent testing and the vehicles appear to be performing well in their operational environments. As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been delivered to the government and 4,379 vehicles had been fielded to units in Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. M-ATV Acquisition Cost
As of June 2010, the cost to acquire the M-ATV is estimated to be about $12.5 billion through fiscal year 2024. JLTV Expected to Feature More Balanced Payload, Protection, and Performance Than Other Vehicles, but Transportability and Reliability Are Recognized Risks
A comparison of JLTV’s capabilities with those of the M-ATV and HMMWV indicates the JLTV is expected to offer protection levels comparable to the M-ATV at a weight nearer to the HMMWV. During the remainder of the technology development phase, the task for the JLTV program will be to determine, through the system engineering process, whether the proposed requirements can be met with the resources expected to be available including existing technologies. Such knowledge would include a completed preliminary design review, evidence of robust system engineering analyses, and a technology readiness assessment. If similar costs apply to JLTV, its procurement unit cost could be in excess of $800,000. However, those assumptions could be affected by several forthcoming decisions and events, including those related to (1) the development of revised plans for continued production of new HMMWVs or recapitalization of older HMMWVs; (2) the availability of sufficient funds in the base budgets for the operation and support of those MRAP vehicles to be integrated into the service fleets; and (3) the extent to which the JLTV program can meet cost, schedule, and performance expectations. Long-term Funding for MRAP and M-ATV Operations and Support
The second underlying tenet of the services’ TWV strategies involves the planning for the integration of MRAP vehicles (including the M-ATV) into the fleet mixes. Conclusions
The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing vehicles early and at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. JLTV is a well-structured program with desirable features, such as a competitive technology development phase with an incremental approach to fielding increasingly capable vehicles. Unlike the M-ATV and MRAP, JLTV has demanding requirements—to provide MRAP-like protection at HMMWV-like weight— that necessitate technological and engineering advances. The knowledge of what is achievable with JLTV should be in hand by late fiscal year 2011. In so doing, the DOD-wide strategy can help reconcile the aggregate affordability and other implications of these programs with the competing demands of the department. Specifically, any potential offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent they are supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition and support costs. Stage the timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures the knowledge gained during the year from the JLTV technology development phase, as well as from the decisions made on the HMMWV and MRAP programs. Include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could minimize the collective acquisition and support costs of the various TWV programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. On our recommendation that the JLTV program clearly demonstrate that it has achieved a match between its requirements and available resources, DOD concurred and noted that this is a Milestone B requirement. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategy for and progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), we obtained and reviewed program documents and held discussions with system developers, acquisition officials, and contractor representatives. Using comparison data provided by Army officials, we prepared a table comparing JLTV’s expected features and cost with those of the M-ATV and current generation High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle. To determine the extent to which current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with Army and Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicle investment strategies, we obtained and reviewed updated strategies and held discussions with DOD, Army, and Marine Corps officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is acquiring two new tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV): the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The $12.5 billion M-ATV is for use in Afghanistan; JLTV is the future replacement for vehicles like the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). GAO was asked to assess (1) DOD's progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding M-ATVs, (2) JLTV's expected features and cost compared to other TWV, and (3) the extent to which the current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with the services' TWV investment strategies. GAO reviewed documents and held discussions with key officials to determine program strategies, costs, performance, and anticipated features; and compared M-ATV and JLTV plans with service strategies.
What GAO Found
The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing vehicles ahead of schedule at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. No major issues have been identified in testing and early fielding. In developing the M-ATV acquisition strategy, lessons learned from the acquisition of MRAPs in Iraq were applied. Like the earlier MRAPs, the M-ATVs did not require technology development, a key factor in the program's success. As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been delivered to the government and 4,379 had been fielded to units in Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. The urgent need for these vehicles resulted in their fielding and testing at the same time; however, source selection testing was conducted, and no vehicles were fielded until their safety was verified. Jointly managed by the Army and Marine Corps, JLTV is expected to provide protection levels that are comparable to the M-ATV but without loss of payload or automotive performance. JLTV's acquisition costs are yet to be determined but are expected to be substantial. Unit costs could be over $800,000--somewhat less than M-ATV, with mission equipment making up more than half of the costs. Unlike M-ATV and earlier MRAPs, JLTV has demanding projected requirements that necessitate technological and engineering advances. Key challenges are whether the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability required yet stay within the weight limits for helicopter transport. Difficult tradeoffs in requirements may be necessary. At this point, it is a well-structured program with desirable features like a competitive technology development phase. This phase is scheduled to be completed by late fiscal year 2011, when DOD will decide if the program should enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase. That is the point where JLTV should clearly demonstrate that its projected requirements can be met with available resources. Evidence of that match would include a completed preliminary design review and a technology readiness assessment that shows all technologies to be fully mature. Current plans for M-ATV and JLTV dovetail with the objectives of the most recent Army and Marine Corps investment strategies. The implementation of those strategies, however, will be influenced by (1) the decision to continue producing new HMMWVs, recapitalize the existing HMMWV fleet, or both; (2) long-term funding for MRAP and M-ATV sustainment, and (3) specific cost and capabilities of JLTV. The departmentwide strategy for TWVs that DOD plans to prepare would benefit greatly from the resolution of these issues. To the extent this strategy captures the knowledge gained by the services, the strategy can reconcile the aggregate affordability and other implications of the various tactical wheeled vehicle programs with the competing demands of the department. For example, at this point, the service strategies consider MRAP vehicles to be additive to the force structure, not offsetting quantities of HMMWVs or JLTVs. Any potential offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent they are supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition and support costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) ensure that the JLTV program clearly demonstrates a match between requirements and resources; (2) stage the timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures key knowledge; and (3) include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could minimize the collective acquisition and support costs of the various TWV programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. DOD concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-126 | gao_GAO-14-126_0 | OMB, GSA, and Selected Agencies Have Taken Steps to Consider Small Businesses in Their Strategic Sourcing Efforts
OMB and GSA have developed guidance on strategic sourcing that emphasizes the importance of including small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses. Our review of agency-wide strategic sourcing initiatives at each of five agencies showed that the agencies also generally considered the inclusion of small and disadvantaged businesses. GSA Has Taken Steps to Consider Small Businesses in Selected Government-wide Strategic Sourcing Initiatives
Our review of documentation for three ongoing government-wide strategic sourcing initiatives—office supplies II, print management functional areas I and II, and domestic delivery services—showed that GSA considered the inclusion of small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses in the strategic sourcing process. For example, when developing the office supplies II and print management initiatives, GSA identified the current market share for small businesses and specific opportunities that could be set aside for socioeconomic categories, such as service-disabled veteran-owned businesses. Agency Data and Measures on Inclusion of Small Businesses in Strategic Sourcing Are Limited, and OMB Has Not Monitored Agencies’ Efforts
While our review of agency documentation indicates that agencies do generally consider small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses in their strategic sourcing initiatives, agency data and performance measures that would provide a more precise understanding of the inclusion of small businesses in strategic sourcing are limited. Although GSA has collected baseline data on proposed government-wide initiatives, it has not developed a performance measure to determine changes in small business participation going forward. Further, DHS has collected some data on contracts awarded to small businesses under strategic sourcing initiatives, but it and the other agencies in our review generally did not have baseline data and performance measures to determine how small businesses were affected by strategic sourcing. In addition, federal internal control standards state that operating information is needed to, among other things, determine whether the agency is achieving its compliance requirements under various laws and regulations. OMB has monitored the implementation of strategic sourcing by having agencies submit annual strategic sourcing reports from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007 and prepare information for acquisition status sessions from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2012. (There was no reporting in place for fiscal years 2008 or 2009.) Virtually none of this information included baseline data or measures of the effect of strategic sourcing on small businesses. Federal internal control standards state that However, the current template does not link strategic monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time.effective monitoring, it will be difficult for OMB to help ensure that agencies are tracking the impact of strategic sourcing on small businesses. Recommendations for Executive Action
Consistent with OMB guidance and to track the effect of strategic sourcing on small businesses, we recommend that (1) the Administrator of GSA establish performance measures on the inclusion of small businesses in strategic sourcing initiatives and (2) the Secretaries of DOD, DHS, HUD, and the Interior, and the Administrator of NASA collect baseline data and establish performance measures on the inclusion of small businesses in strategic sourcing initiatives. DOD, DHS, HUD, GSA, and OMB agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. Interior partially agreed, and NASA disagreed. As we noted in the report, from fiscal year 2005 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, DHS implemented 72 strategic sourcing initiatives, and 43 percent of the spending went to small businesses. Interior suggested that a more effective approach would be to work with OMB and other agencies similar to Interior to develop common approaches for collecting baseline data and setting performance measures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to discuss (1) the ways in which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) have considered small businesses in their strategic sourcing guidance and GSA and selected agencies have considered small businesses in their strategic sourcing initiatives and (2) the extent to which data and performance measures are available on the inclusion of small businesses in government-wide and selected agencies’ internal strategic sourcing initiatives. Small businesses include those unconditionally owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals (small disadvantaged businesses). The selected agencies included in our review were the Departments of Defense (DOD), specifically the Department of the Army (Army) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); Homeland Security (DHS); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and the Interior (Interior) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2005, OMB has emphasized using strategic sourcing to improve efficiency in federal procurement. Strategic sourcing is a process that moves an organization away from numerous individual procurements toward a broader aggregate approach. GAO was asked to review how strategic sourcing affects small businesses, including small disadvantaged businesses. This report discusses (1) how OMB, GSA, and selected agencies have considered small businesses in their strategic sourcing efforts and (2) the extent to which data and performance measures are available on the inclusion of small businesses in strategic sourcing initiatives. GAO reviewed guidance and documentation from OMB, GSA, and five other agencies selected based on factors such as dollars awarded to small businesses. GAO also reviewed GSA data as of 2013, DHS data from fiscal year 2005 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, and agency reports from fiscal years 2005 to 2012.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the General Services Administration (GSA), and selected agencies have taken steps to consider small businesses, including small disadvantaged businesses, in their strategic sourcing efforts. (Small disadvantaged businesses are those unconditionally owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.) OMB and GSA have developed guidance on strategic sourcing that stresses the importance of including small businesses. GAO's review of documentation for three ongoing government-wide strategic sourcing initiatives showed that GSA considered the inclusion of small businesses in the strategic sourcing process. For example, when developing strategic sourcing initiatives for office supplies and print management, GSA identified the current market share of small businesses with these products and also set aside specific contracts for various categories of small businesses, such as service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. In addition, GAO's review of agency-wide strategic sourcing initiatives at each of five agencies--Departments of Defense (DOD), specifically Army and the Defense Logistics Agency; Homeland Security (DHS); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and the Interior and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--showed that the agencies generally considered the inclusion of small businesses.
Data and performance measures that would provide a more precise understanding of the inclusion of small and disadvantaged businesses in strategic sourcing initiatives are limited. Although GSA has collected baseline data on proposed government-wide initiatives, it has not developed a performance measure to determine changes in small business participation going forward. Further, DHS has collected some data on contracts awarded to small businesses under strategic sourcing initiatives, but it and the other agencies in GAO's review generally did not have baseline data and performance measures to determine how small businesses were affected by strategic sourcing. OMB guidance requires agencies to establish baselines for small business participation prior to implementing strategic sourcing and set goals for small business participation. In addition, federal internal control standards state that information is needed to determine whether the agency is achieving its compliance requirements under various laws and regulations. Without baseline data and performance measures, the effect of strategic sourcing initiatives on small businesses will be difficult to determine. Moreover, OMB has not monitored agencies' compliance in reporting baseline data and performance measures on the inclusion of small businesses in government-wide and agency-wide strategic sourcing initiatives. OMB required agencies to submit annual reports on the implementation of strategic sourcing from fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and prepare information for acquisition status sessions from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. (No reporting was in place for fiscal years 2008 or 2009.) However, virtually none of this information included baseline data or measures of the effect of strategic sourcing on small businesses. Federal internal control standards state that effective monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time. Without effective monitoring, it will be difficult for OMB to help ensure that agencies are tracking the impact of strategic sourcing on small businesses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes recommendations to GSA, selected agencies, and OMB to improve data collection and performance measures related to the inclusion of small businesses in strategic sourcing. DOD, DHS, GSA, HUD, and OMB agreed with GAO’s recommendation. Interior partially agreed, suggesting that a more effective approach would be to work with OMB and other agencies to develop common approaches. NASA disagreed, stating it already tracks related spending for the agency. GAO believes its recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-686T | gao_GAO-15-686T_0 | DOD Continues to Take Action to Strengthen Its DSCA Strategy, Plans, and Guidance
Since 2010, DOD has taken action to address many of
DOD updated its strategy and doctrine for civil support. Based on our recommendation that DOD should update its strategy, in February 2013 DOD issued an updated Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In September 2013, we found that DOD did not have a clear command-and-control structure for federal military services during complex catastrophes. We found that DOD had not identified the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple states. DOD established the dual-status commander structure—active-duty military or National Guard officers who command state and federal responses to civil-support incidents and events—and has used this structure for certain events. In October 2012, we reported that DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dual-status commanders for incidents affecting multiple states and territories. For example, DOD had not developed specific criteria and conditions for when and how state governors and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander. DOD Has Taken Action to Strengthen Interagency Coordination for Support of Civil Authorities
DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior recommendations to strengthen the department’s interagency coordination for support of civil authorities. We found that DOD’s series of civil-support policies and guidance, such as a 1997 DOD directive on military assistance to civil authorities, were outdated and did not reflect changes that occurred subsequent to their issuance. Similarly, we found that roles and responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task Force-North, which provides defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies along U.S. borders—were unclear as were the roles and responsibilities between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. DOD has issued an interagency partner guide. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in November 2011, issued its Defense Support of Civil Authorities Interagency Partner Guide. DOD has taken action to implement key practices for managing some liaisons the department exchanges with its federal partners. For example, DOD did not have complete situational awareness of all the liaisons detailed to its interagency partners. DOD Has Taken Action to Identify Needs and Address Capability Gaps Regarding Its Support of Civil Authorities
In response to our prior recommendations, DOD has taken action to identify needs and address capability gaps for its DSCA mission. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD notes that the key pillar of protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural disasters. By updating this guidance, DOD addressed our recommendation and DOD is in a better position to address remaining capability gaps. We recommended that the commanders work through the defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA completes its plans. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in May 2014, according to DOD officials, Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to incorporate complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities that would be available to the lead federal agency during such an event. Under the National Response Framework, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers serves as the coordinator for the ‘Public Works and Engineering’ emergency support function—1 of 14 emergency support functions that serve as the federal government’s primary coordinating structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response capabilities.The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in its emergency support function coordinator role, is responsible for engaging in appropriate planning and preparedness activities, which could include establishing capability requirements, cataloguing current capabilities, and conducting capability gap analyses that might be needed if the federal government is asked to support local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area government response operations during a disaster. In conclusion, threats to the homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such as cyber attacks and earthquakes, frequently are unpredictable or occur with little or no notice. DOD has made significant progress in improving strategy, plans, and guidance; interagency coordination; and capabilities needed for DSCA. Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe. Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Threats to the homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such as hurricanes and wildfires, are frequently unpredictable or occur with little or no notice. DOD is often expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities and must be prepared to provide rapid response when called upon during disasters and declared emergencies (both natural and man-made). DOD also must provide support for restoring public health and services and civil order; support for national special security events; and periodic planned support. DOD provides this support to the American people through its defense support of civil authorities mission.
In this statement, GAO describes progress DOD has made in implementing recommendations to strengthen (1) DOD's strategy, plans, and guidance; (2) interagency coordination; and, (3) capabilities to support civil authorities. This testimony is primarily based on GAO products issued from March 2010 through December 2014 that examined DOD's support of civil authorities mission. In June 2015 GAO obtained selected updates about DOD's support of civil authorities mission.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen its strategy, plans and guidance for support of civil authorities. As GAO has reported, clear, current, and complete strategies, plans, and guidance are important for reflecting the direction of the department's leadership, defining DOD policies and responsibilities, and sharing practices that could facilitate effective support of civil authorities. In October 2012, GAO found DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dual-status commanders (active-duty military or National Guard officers who were authorized to command both state and federal personnel) for incidents affecting multiple states and territories. For example, DOD had no specific criteria and conditions for when and how state governors and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander. In September 2013, GAO found that DOD did not have a clear command-and-control structure for managing complex catastrophes across multiple states because DOD had not identified roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements. GAO recommended in both reports that DOD update and implement better guidance. DOD has partially addressed GAO's recommendations by updating its strategy and guidance, and the department is drafting an instruction on dual-status commanders.
DOD also has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen the department's interagency coordination. It is critical that DOD proactively and regularly engage with a broad range of interagency partners it may need to support, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Customs and Border Protection. Previously, GAO has reported on three areas DOD can focus on to enhance interagency coordination: clearly defining roles and responsibilities, communicating DOD's approach toward interagency partners, and implementing key practices for managing liaisons with partners. GAO found that roles and responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task Force-North, which provides civil support along U.S. borders—were unclear. GAO also found that DOD did not have complete situational awareness of 110 liaisons detailed to the Department of Homeland Security headquarters. To improve interagency coordination, GAO recommended that DOD issue and update civil-support guidance. Subsequently, DOD addressed GAO's recommendations by issuing a series of guidance and other documents, such as the 2011 Interagency Partner Guide.
Additionally, DOD has taken action to address GAO's prior recommendations to improve its identification of capabilities for support of civil authorities. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review , DOD notes that the key pillar of protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities. In 2013, GAO found two combatant commands had not identified civil-support capabilities because they were waiting until FEMA completed planning efforts in 2018. GAO recommended that DOD develop an interim set of specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation and DOD officials reported in June 2015 that Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to incorporate complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities that would be available to the lead federal agency during such an event.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made recommendations to help DOD address management challenges or gaps in guidance regarding support of civil authorities. In response, the agency has taken some steps and plans to do more. |
gao_GAO-13-212 | gao_GAO-13-212_0 | 1). OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services Have Taken Steps to Integrate Operational Contract Support, but Most of the Military Services Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance
OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into departmental planning, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service’s planning efforts. Working with the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy completed revisions in April 2011 to the Guidance for the Employment of the Force requiring that the combatant commands, together with their service components and relevant combat support agencies, plan for the integration of contracted support and contractor management in all phases of military operations. It describes responsibilities, policy, and implementing procedures for operational contract support. DOD and service officials told us that they do not need to plan for operational contract support in advance because the Army has been the lead service in recent conflicts. However, according to DOD, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force spent over a billion dollars combined for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011, and therefore contracted support has been utilized for which planning should have occurred. Without specific service-wide guidance to help institutionalize operational contract support, the other services may not fully understand their role in operational contract support and may not be prepared to execute operational contract support in the future—when it is possible that one of these services, instead of the Army, will play a leading role. We found that DOD’s efforts to fully integrate operational contract support at the command and component levels are hindered by not training all planners about new operational contract support requirements, a lack of focus of operational contract support planners on areas beyond logistics, and not providing operational contract support planning expertise at the commands’ components. Combatant Commands and Components Did Not Plan for the Potential Use of Contractors in All Areas Where They Might Be Needed, and Have Recently Been Issued Guidance
While the combatant commands and their components have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into contingency planning, mostly in the area of logistics, they are not planning for such support across all areas—such as intelligence and communications—that are likely to use contractors in future contingencies. In a briefing document on changes and anticipated changes to strategic and planning guidance, the Joint Staff suggested that, among other things, planners would be required to include assumptions for the use of contractor support in paragraph one of the base plan and provide estimates of contractors in the Annex W. Although the combatant commands and their components have integrated operational contract support in the base plans and Annex Ws we reviewed, they did not, at the time we reviewed their plans, have more-specific and comprehensive guidance within the key operations planning system manual for integrating planning for operational contract support across all functional areas where contractors might be used. However, the Joint Staff only recently issued in October 2012 the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area alone to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. Although the Joint Staff has developed new training for planning for operational contact support, this training is not focused on training officials from functional areas other than logistics. As a result, the components may not be able to fully integrate operational contract support into their planning for contingency operations; therefore, they may be unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and provide the necessary oversight. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further the integration of operational contract support into all of the services’ planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide comprehensive service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that describes how each service should integrate operational contract support into its respective organization to include planning for contingency operations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is integrating planning for operational contract support through efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and military services, we collected and analyzed documentation such as planning guidance and policies related to the integration of operational contract support into DOD’s planning for contingency operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in Afghanistan. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum noting the risk of DOD's level of dependency on contractors and outlined actions to institutionalize changes necessary to influence how the department plans for contracted support in contingency operations. The memorandum also called for leveraging the civilian expeditionary workforce to reduce DOD's reliance on contractors, but this workforce is not yet fully developed. GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in planning for operational contract support. Our review determined how DOD is integrating operational contract support into its planning through efforts of the (1) OSD, Joint Staff, and military services, and (2) combatant commands and their components. To conduct its work, GAO evaluated DOD operational contract support guidance and documents and met with officials at various DOD offices.
What GAO Found
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations. For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support. The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight.
The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning for contingencies, but they have not fully integrated operational contract support in all functional areas. We found that the combatant commands and components are not planning for the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed beyond logistics such as communications. Recognizing the problem, DOD, in October 2012, issued guidance that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. GAO also found that officials involved with logistics planning at the commands receive training from the Joint Staff and assistance from embedded operational contract support planners to help integrate operational contract support into logistics planning. However, officials involved in planning for other areas--such as intelligence--that have used contractors in past operations, do not receive such training. Further, the embedded operational contract support planners do not focus on areas beyond logistics. Moreover, while the combatant commands have embedded experts to assist with operational contract support planning, the military service components do not have such expertise. Without training for all planners, a broader focus beyond logistics for embedded planners, and expertise offered at the military service components, DOD risks being unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel and may not be able to provide the necessary oversight during future contingencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy , Marine Corps and Air Force provide guidance on planning for operational contract support; that the Joint Staff provide training for all planners; that the planners broaden their focus to include areas beyond logistics; and that expertise is offered to service components to further integrate operational contract support into plans. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-937 | gao_GAO-10-937_0 | The federal government reimburses both direct and indirect costs associated with federally funded research. Another source of variation was that schools eligible for a rate increase of 1.3 percent to account for the cost of utilities, known as the utility cost adjustment, both proposed and negotiated higher rates than those not receiving the adjustment. The Difference between Proposed and Negotiated Rates was Larger for Schools Negotiating with HHS Than Schools Negotiating with DOD
The difference between a school’s proposed and negotiated rates varied significantly based on the cognizant rate-setting agency with which a school negotiated. The cap was established in 1991 with the intent of limiting federal reimbursement for schools’ indirect costs. OMB has not formally reexamined this cap since its implementation in 1991. For example, unlike for the administrative cap, the DOD basic research cap’s impact cannot be determined up front on an institution-wide basis because its limitation on indirect costs depends on the types of costs included in each individual award. The Cap on Indirect Costs for DOD Basic Research May Limit Reimbursement for Some Schools, but the Extent That Reimbursement Is Limited Is Difficult to Determine
Approximately 22 percent of schools had a fiscal year 2008 indirect cost rate high enough for awards to be potentially limited by the 35 percent cap on indirect costs of DOD basic research awards. The Three Methods DOD Uses to Oversee Reimbursement of Indirect Costs to Schools Have Weaknesses
DOD identified three methods it uses to oversee indirect cost reimbursement for research grants awarded to schools: the annual single audit, the award closeout process, and agency audits, performed by DCAA or by cognizant agencies for audit. At least one of the three methods was used in fiscal year 2008 at 25 of the 32 schools we reviewed. However, 4 schools were not covered by any of the three methods, indicating a gap in coverage (see table 3). In our discussions with cognizant agencies for audit, we learned that HHS has increased the audits of research awards to schools in recent years, which have led to some significant findings of improper billings of indirect costs. Conclusions
Inconsistencies in the rate-setting and reimbursement processes lead to perceived and actual differences in the treatment of schools performing DOD basic research. As a result, DOD lacks assurance that it is reimbursing indirect costs appropriately. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to examine the following issues related to higher education institutions performing basic research for the Department of Defense (DOD): (1) the variation in proposed and negotiated indirect cost rates and factors that may contribute to variations; (2) how and to what extent the administrative cap and the DOD basic research cap limit reimbursement of indirect costs; and (3) the methods DOD uses for overseeing compliance with indirect cost reimbursement for grants and the extent to which each method was used. To identify the proposed and negotiated indirect cost rates of schools performing basic research for DOD and factors that may contribute to variation in the rates, we collected and analyzed information from a probability sample of schools that performed basic research for DOD in fiscal year 2007, according to DOD-provided data. We also interviewed officials at DOD, OMB, HHS, the National Science Foundation and the Department of Education, as well as independent public accounting firm representatives and higher education representatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2007, the majority of the Department of Defense's (DOD) basic research obligations were provided to higher education institutions. DOD reimburses these institutions for both direct and indirect costs for research. Two federal agencies, DOD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), negotiate indirect cost rates used to reimburse higher education institutions for indirect costs on federally funded research awards, including DOD awards. GAO was asked to examine the following issues related to higher education institutions performing basic research for DOD: (1) the variation in proposed and negotiated indirect cost rates and factors that may contribute to variations; (2) how and to what extent the administrative cap and the DOD basic research cap limit reimbursement of indirect costs; and (3) the methods DOD uses for overseeing compliance with indirect cost reimbursement for grants. GAO surveyed a generalizable sample of higher education institutions performing basic research for DOD; reviewed agency guidance and policies; and interviewed officials from federal agencies, independent public accounting firms, and higher education institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO identified wide variation in indirect cost rates at schools receiving DOD funding in fiscal year 2007, which may be related to a number of factors. For example, the average difference between a school's proposed and its negotiated rate was much larger for schools with HHS as the cognizant rate-setting agency than for those with DOD, in part due to the agencies' differing approaches to negotiation. GAO also found that schools receiving a 1.3 percent add-on to their rate to assist with the cost of utilities both proposed and negotiated higher rates than those without the adjustment. Contrary to guidance to periodically review school eligibility, the fixed list of schools eligible to receive this add-on has not been revisited since established in 1998. The cap on the administrative portion of the indirect cost rate limited fiscal year 2007 reimbursement for about 83 percent of schools. The cap was established nearly 20 years ago with the intent of limiting federal reimbursement for schools' administrative costs, and OMB has not reexamined this cap since its implementation. We estimate the DOD basic research cap might have limited fiscal year 2008 reimbursement for some awards at about 22 percent of schools, but the limitation depends on the types of costs included in each individual award and is difficult to determine up front on a schoolwide basis until total costs for each award are tallied. GAO identified weaknesses in the three methods DOD says it uses to oversee that indirect costs for research grants are reimbursed appropriately: the single audit, the closeout process, and audits by DOD's Defense Contract Audit Agency or by cognizant agencies for audit. At least one of the three methods was used at most of the schools we reviewed, but four schools were not covered by any of the methods, indicating a gap in coverage. In our discussions with cognizant agencies for audit, we learned that recent audits of research awards to schools at HHS have led to some significant findings of improper billings of indirect costs. Inconsistencies in rate-setting and reimbursement processes lead to perceived and actual differences in the treatment of schools. Moreover, because of the weaknesses in its oversight methods, DOD lacks assurance that it is reimbursing indirect costs appropriately.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to address consistency in rate-setting and to improve oversight of indirect cost reimbursement. The agencies generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-619T | gao_GAO-03-619T_0 | However, under the PRA, federal agencies are required to minimize the paperwork burden they impose. Governmentwide Paperwork Burden Estimate Has Increased
At the end of fiscal year 1995—just before the PRA of 1995 took effect— federal agencies estimated that their information collections imposed about 7 billion burden hours on the public. One such change required OIRA to set a goal of at least a 10-percent reduction in the governmentwide burden- hour estimate for each of fiscal years 1996 and 1997, a 5 percent governmentwide burden reduction goal in each of the next 4 fiscal years, and annual agency goals that reduce burden to the “maximum practicable opportunity.” Therefore, if federal agencies had been able to meet each of these goals, the 7-billion burden-hour estimate in 1995 would have decreased about 35 percent to about 4.6 billion hours by September 30, 2001. As of September 20, 2002, IRS accounted for about 99 percent of the Department of the Treasury’s burden-hour estimate—nearly 6.7 billion burden hours. For example, DOT indicated in its summary table that virtually all of the department’s 165 million burden- hour increase in its estimate was driven by program changes—specifically, an “agency action.” However, the narrative that the department submitted to OMB indicated that almost all of this change was driven by the reinstatement of a collection that had been in violation (“Driver’s Records of Duty Status”) and an adjustment to the collection’s burden estimate. Reasons for Changes in IRS Burden Estimate
The increase in the IRS burden-hour estimate during fiscal year 2002 (about 330 million burden hours) was more than the increase in the rest of the government combined. An IRS official told us that this adjustment was largely driven by an increase in the number of taxpayers using Form 1040. Number of Violations Has Declined in Recent Years
As figure 5 shows, the number of PRA violations that the agencies identified has fallen markedly during the past 5 fiscal years—from 872 violations during fiscal year 1998 to 244 during fiscal year 2002. OIRA Efforts to Reduce Violations
OIRA deserves a great deal of the credit for the reduction in the number of PRA violations during the past year. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Paperwork Reduction Act requires federal agencies to minimize the paperwork burden they impose on the public. The act also requires agencies to obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before collecting covered information. GAO examined changes during the past fiscal year in federal agencies' paperwork burden estimates and their causes, focusing on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). GAO also examined changes in the number of violations of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
What GAO Found
As of September 30, 2002, federal agencies estimated that there was about 8.2 billion "burden hours" of paperwork governmentwide. IRS accounted for about 6.7 billion burden hours (81 percent) of this estimate. The federal paperwork estimate increased by about 570 million burden hours during fiscal year 2002--nearly double the previous record increase for a 1-year period. IRS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) accounted for almost 90 percent of the increase. IRS increased its paperwork estimate by about 330 million burden hours during fiscal year 2002, which the agency said was primarily caused by growth in the number of taxpayers using Form 1040. DOT's burden estimate rose by about 165 million burden hours, an increase that the department said was almost entirely attributable to the reintroduction and reestimation of one information collection. Federal agencies identified 244 violations of the PRA during fiscal year 2002--a significant reduction from the number of violations reported during the previous fiscal year. OMB deserves a great deal of credit for this decrease in violations. However, 244 violations of the law during a single fiscal year are still troubling and should not be tolerated. Also, although some longstanding violations have been resolved, others remained open at the end of the fiscal year and, in some cases, had been open for 2 years or more. |
gao_GAO-15-259 | gao_GAO-15-259_0 | The United States has provided Egypt with almost $64 billion in assistance since 1979, including about $40 billion in security assistance and $24 billion in economic assistance. While U.S. strategic objectives and overall levels of assistance generally did not change during this period, the U.S. government did increase its focus on particular objectives and adjusted some aspects of its assistance in response to Egypt’s political transitions. After the removal of President Morsi, the U.S. government adjusted its assistance again by suspending some assistance, including holding the delivery of several large military systems, and focusing its economic assistance more on programs that directly benefit the Egyptian people and its security assistance more on shared interests. U.S. Government’s Strategic Objectives for Egypt Have Generally Remained Constant since Fiscal Year 2009
U.S. strategic objectives for Egypt have generally remained constant since fiscal year 2009, according to senior U.S. officials and State documents. Egypt upholds the peace treaty with Israel and is a partner for regional stability. After Egypt’s 2011 Revolution, U.S. Government Increased Its Focus on Economic Growth and Democracy and Governance Initiatives
Though overall U.S. strategic objectives and amounts of economic assistance to Egypt have largely remained unchanged since fiscal year 2009, the prioritization of particular economic assistance efforts, and the amount of funding allocated for them, changed after Egypt’s January 2011 revolution. The U.S. government also has resumed some of its security assistance. State and USAID Disbursed or Committed Almost $7.5 Billion of the Assistance Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014
Of the $9.3 billion in funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, State and USAID had disbursed or committed almost $7.5 billion, or 80 percent, as of the end of fiscal year 2014 (see table 2). As of the end of fiscal year 2014, USAID had approximately $460 million in unobligated ESF balances—equal to about 230 percent of its fiscal year 2015 ESF budget request of $200 million. The $260 million in unobligated funds was originally allocated for a cash transfer to the Egyptian government, but the administration decided not to use the funds for that purpose after President Morsi’s According to State officials, the fiscal removal from power in July 2013.year 2011 funding allocated for a cash transfer has been transferred into a no-year ESF account and is available for obligation until expended, and the fiscal year 2012 funding allocated for a cash transfer has been transferred into an extended-life ESF account and is available for obligation until September 30, 2017.that although the administration had decided not to move forward with the cash transfer, these funds had not been reprogrammed for other purposes. Since fiscal year 2009, USAID has completed 15 evaluations covering more than $600 million in economic assistance and has completed all of the evaluations required under its policy. These evaluations highlighted various achievements and challenges with USAID-funded projects, and USAID officials noted that they have used the results of these evaluations to inform decisions about their assistance. Although State officials said that they remain committed to evaluating security assistance to Egypt and are considering alternate approaches, State has not established a time frame for completing the required security assistance evaluation. According to officials in State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which manages security assistance through FMF, the bureau identified security assistance to Egypt as a large program in February 2013, making it subject to evaluation requirements.Accordingly, State commissioned an external evaluation of security assistance to Egypt, including assistance provided through both FMF and The Statement of Work for the proposed evaluation noted that IMET.examining the impact of security assistance to Egypt was critical given the recent transitions in the Egyptian government and the role the Egyptian Armed Forces played in those transitions. Standard practices in program management include, among other things, developing a plan to execute projects within a specific time frame. Given the resource constraints the U.S. government faces, it is important that U.S. agencies have plans for using existing resources in an effective and timely manner. In particular, U.S. officials noted that it is difficult to determine the extent to which security assistance has contributed to strategic objectives, such as promoting regional stability, upholding the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, countering terrorism and extremism, and maintaining key strategic benefits. State has stated its commitment to completing such an evaluation but has not established specific time frames for doing so. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the extent to which (1) U.S. strategic objectives and assistance for Egypt evolved, (2) the U.S. government disbursed funds allocated for assistance to Egypt, and (3) the U.S. government evaluated the results of its assistance. We conducted audit work in Cairo, Egypt, and interviewed U.S. officials from State, USAID, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice who manage assistance programs for Egypt. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979, Egypt has been a key strategic partner of the United States and the recipient of almost $64 billion in U.S. security and economic assistance, including an annual average of about $1.3 billion in security assistance and $245 million in economic assistance since fiscal year 2009. State outlines strategic objectives for Egypt, State and USAID are primarily responsible for funding and managing assistance provided to Egypt, and the Department of Defense implements most security assistance. Since the January 2011 revolution that ended the almost 30-year presidency of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has experienced a series of tumultuous political transitions that have raised concerns about how U.S. assistance is supporting strategic objectives.
This report examines, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the extent to which (1) U.S. strategic objectives and assistance evolved, (2) the U.S. government disbursed funds allocated for assistance to Egypt, and (3) the U.S. government evaluated the results of its assistance. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed U.S. government documents; interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt.
What GAO Found
U.S. strategic objectives and levels of assistance to Egypt have generally remained constant since fiscal year 2009, though the U.S. government adjusted some aspects of its assistance in response to events in Egypt. According to documents and senior U.S. officials, U.S. strategic objectives are to assist Egypt to be stable, democratic, and prosperous; uphold the peace treaty with Israel and advance regional stability; counter terrorism and extremism; and continue to provide strategic benefits to the U.S. government. After Egypt's 2011 revolution, the U.S. government increased its emphasis on democracy and economic growth initiatives. After President Morsi's removal in July 2013, the U.S. government suspended some assistance and adjusted its economic assistance to focus more on directly benefitting the Egyptian people and its security assistance to focus more on shared interests. The administration has now resumed some assistance, enabled in part by new legal authorities provided by Congress.
As of September 30, 2014, the U.S. government had disbursed or committed almost $7.5 billion (about 80 percent) of over $9.3 billion in assistance allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. The U.S. government allocated 98 percent of this funding from the Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts. The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported $460 million in unobligated ESF balances for Egypt—equal to about 230 percent of their fiscal year 2015 budget request of $200 million. This included $260 million in prior year funding allocated for a cash transfer to Egypt that the administration announced in October 2013 that it would not carry out. According to U.S. officials, these funds have not been reprogrammed for other purposes. Given U.S. government resource constraints, it is important that U.S. agencies have plans for using existing resources.
While USAID has evaluated some economic assistance, State has not evaluated the results of billions of dollars in security assistance to Egypt. Since fiscal year 2009, USAID has evaluated 15 projects in Egypt totaling over $600 million and has completed all of the evaluations required under its policy. USAID officials noted that they have used evaluations to inform decisions about assistance. In May 2014, State attempted to commission a first-ever evaluation of results of security assistance to Egypt but received no proposals in response to its solicitation. State officials said that the agency remains committed to completing such an evaluation and is considering alternate approaches, although State has not established specific time frames for doing so. Standard practices in program management include a plan to execute projects within a specific time frame.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) State and USAID develop a plan for other uses for $260 million previously allocated for a cash transfer and (2) State establish specific time frames for completing a required evaluation of security assistance. State and USAID generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-95-152 | gao_NSIAD-95-152_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed the lessons learned programs in the military services and the Joint Staff to determine their effectiveness in (1) collecting all significant lessons learned information, (2) analyzing lessons to identify recurring weaknesses, (3) disseminating lessons to all potential users, and (4) implementing corrective action and validating results. Most Services Do Not Perform Trend Analyses or Prioritize Recurring Deficiencies
The Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Joint Staff do not analyze their lessons learned information to identify trends in performance weaknesses. The Army has recently made excellent use of trend analyses. For example, the Army analyzed the extent of friendly fire incidents at its National Training Center from 1990 to 1993 and developed a corrective action plan to address this serious deficiency. Dissemination of Lessons Learned Information Is Generally Adequate
The Air Force does not disseminate lessons learned information to its units on a routine basis because it does not have a centralized lessons learned program. Services’ Use of Available Lessons Learned Information Is Limited
Regardless of the availability and widespread distribution of lessons learned information, most services have used this information only on a limited basis. The principal reason for not making greater use of the information is the lack of training in how to easily access the databases. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the military's lessons learned programs in: (1) collecting all significant lessons learned information; (2) analyzing the information to identify recurring weaknesses; (3) disseminating the information to all potential users; and (4) implementing corrective actions and validating results.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy do not: (1) include all significant information from training exercises and operations in their lessons learned programs; and (2) analyze their lessons learned information to identify trends in performance weaknesses. In addition, GAO found that: (1) Marine Corps lessons learned data continue to highlight recurring deficiencies during major combined arms exercises in such areas as maneuver, fire support, engineering, chemical threat, intelligence, communications, and electronic countermeasures; (2) although the dissemination of lessons learned information is adequate, the Air Force does not make its information readily available to all potential users; (3) regardless of the availability and widespread distribution of lessons learned information, most services use this information on a limited basis because they lack the training in how to access the databases; and (4) the Army has made excellent use of trend analysis to develop a corrective action plan to address the highest priority areas. |
gao_GAO-15-365 | gao_GAO-15-365_0 | Although regulators often identified these risky practices early on in each crisis, the regulatory process was not always effective in correcting the underlying problems before the banks became undercapitalized and failed. They found that generally, examiners had identified the underlying issues that eventually led to the failures but did not press management hard enough to deal with those issues. Past Crises Revealed Limitations in Existing Tools for Monitoring and Addressing Emerging Risks
PCA Reliance on Capital Triggers Limited Its Effectiveness
As discussed earlier, in the aftermath of the thrift and commercial bank crises regulators were criticized for failing to take timely and forceful action to address the causes of thrift and bank failures and prevent losses to taxpayers and the deposit insurance fund. However, in prior crises, regulators did not always assign management component ratings that were reflective of weaknesses in management, and staff from one regulator said that there was a tendency to use the rating more as a point in-time snapshot of a bank’s condition, rather than a reflection of long-term risk factors that may cause losses several years later. Bank Supervision Did Not Consider the Impact of Risks from the Broader Financial System on Banks
The financial crisis also highlighted the need for regulators to consider the impact of risks in the broader financial system on individual banks. Regulators Have Taken Steps Intended to Improve Their Ability to Identify and Respond to Emerging Risks
Federal banking regulators have taken steps to incorporate the lessons learned from the 2007-2009 financial crisis and improve their ability to identify and respond to emerging risks. As such, they have been working to include more forward-looking elements into examinations, such as bank-performed stress test processes and results, and to reflect such forward-looking information in the CAMELS ratings and other risk assessment tools. We and others have begun to review some of these regulatory initiatives, but further work is needed to fully evaluate their effectiveness in improving regulators’ ability to identify and respond to emerging risks in a timely manner. Framework for Monitoring Regulatory Efforts Could Identify Issues Requiring Additional Attention
Ongoing monitoring of banking regulators’ efforts to identify and respond to emerging threats to the banking system can provide a starting point for identifying opportunities for more targeted and frequent assessments of these efforts. Bank Financial Condition
The framework includes financial indicators that reflect bank condition and performance that can provide insight into emerging risks at banks (and bank holding companies, in the case of the largest SIFIs), such as credit risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. In monitoring regulatory responses to emerging risks, it is important to identify the full range of tools regulators might employ to address such risks, the goals of these tools, and their potential tradeoffs. Once the crisis began, and banks began suffering losses, the level of informal and formal enforcement actions surged as did the number of problem banks and failed banks. The 2013 OCC peer review noted that delays in the issuance of guidance or regulation to address emerging risks can be demoralizing for examiners who may perceive that agency management has not acted on their risk identification and warnings.guidance or regulation, users of the framework would monitor quantitative and qualitative sources for trend information on the identified problem area for evidence that risk was increasing, flagging potentially harmful delays in regulatory action for further follow up. Lessons learned from past banking-related crises identified the need for federal banking regulators to respond proactively to problems developing in the banking system. This report (1) examines regulatory lessons learned from the 1980s thrift and commercial bank crises and the 2007-2009 financial crisis, focusing on the efforts of federal banking regulators to identify and address emerging risks to the solvency of insured banks before the onset of these crises; and (2) offers a strategy that we and other oversight bodies, such as inspectors general (IGs) and the international auditing community (hereafter, oversight bodies) can use to provide continuous future oversight of regulatory responses to emerging risks. To identify regulatory lessons learned from the crises we reviewed and analyzed studies by GAO, federal banking regulator IGs, the federal banking regulators, and academics. To incorporate the regulatory lessons learned into a strategy that oversight bodies and others can use to monitor regulatory responses to emerging risks, we established a framework for monitoring (1) known emerging risks to the safety and soundness of the banking system, and (2) regulatory responses to these risks, including detecting trends in regulatory responses that might signal a weakening of regulatory oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Weakness in federal oversight was one of many factors that contributed to the size of federal losses and the number of bank failures in banking-related crises over the past 35 years—including the 1980s thrift and commercial bank crises and the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Resolving the failures of banks and thrifts due to these crises resulted in estimated costs to federal bank and thrift insurance funds over $165 billion, as well as other federal government costs, such as taxpayer-funded assistance during the financial crises.
Ongoing monitoring of banking regulators' efforts to identify and respond to emerging threats to the banking system can provide a starting point for identifying opportunities for more targeted and frequent assessments of these efforts. This report (1) discusses regulatory lessons learned from these past crises and (2) offers a framework that GAO and other oversight bodies, such as inspectors general, can use to provide continuous future oversight of regulatory responses to emerging risks.
To do this work, GAO reviewed its prior studies and those of federal banking regulators, the regulators' inspectors general, and academics that evaluated regulators' efforts to identify and respond to risks that led to bank failures in past crises. In developing an oversight framework, GAO reviewed frameworks for monitoring domestic and global financial systems to identify key areas in which risks to banks can arise. GAO interviewed regulators to identify supervisory actions that can be used to respond to emerging risks.
What GAO Found
Past banking-related crises highlight a number of regulatory lessons learned. These include the importance of
Early and forceful action. GAO's past work on failed banks found that regulators frequently identified weak management practices that involved the banks in higher-risk activities early on in each crisis, before banks began experiencing declines in capital. However, regulators were not always effective in directing bank management to address underlying problems before bank capital began to decline and it was often too late to avoid failure. For example, examiners did not always press bank management to address problems promptly or issue timely enforcement actions.
Forward-looking assessments of risk. The crises revealed limitations in key supervisory tools for monitoring and addressing emerging risks. During examinations, examiners did not always incorporate forward-looking information when assigning supervisory ratings based on banks' exposure to risk. For example, ratings did not consistently reflect factors such as poor risk-management practices that while not causing losses in the short term, caused losses in the long term.
Considering risks from the broader financial system. The 2007–2009 financial crisis demonstrated that risks to bank safety and soundness could not be assessed by looking only at the performance and activities of individual banks or groups of banks. Rather, regulators must look across the financial system to identify emerging risks.
In response to these lessons learned, regulators said they have taken a number of steps intended to improve their ability to identify and respond to emerging risks—including instituting more granular tracking of bank compliance with examination recommendations to address emerging problems in a timely manner; incorporating more forward-looking elements into supervisory tools; and participating in systemic risk-monitoring efforts as members of Financial Stability Oversight Council. GAO and others have begun to review some of these initiatives.
GAO has incorporated the regulatory lessons learned into a two-part framework for monitoring regulators' efforts to identify and respond to emerging risks to the banking system. First, the framework incorporates quantitative information in the form of financial indicators that can help users of the framework track and analyze emerging risks and qualitative sources of information on emerging risks—such as regulatory reports and industry and academic studies. Second, the framework monitors regulatory responses to emerging risks, such as agency guidance, with the goal of flagging issues for further review when questions arise about the effectiveness of these responses. Users—oversight bodies such as inspectors general—can analyze regulatory actions taken to address emerging risks and gain insights into regulators' ability to take forceful actions to address problematic behavior at banks. Such ongoing monitoring can provide a starting point for identifying opportunities for more targeted and frequent assessments of these efforts. GAO plans to implement this framework in its future work. |
gao_GAO-01-1171T | gao_GAO-01-1171T_0 | Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. Historically, the federal government has maintained that providing security is the responsibility of air carriers and airports as part of their cost of doing business. With the events of the last week, concerns have arisen again as to who should be responsible for security and screening passengers at our nation’s airports. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. Our agents could thus have carried weapons, explosives, chemical/biological agents, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. Concerns have long existed about screeners’ ability to detect and prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Many aviation stakeholders agreed that a stable, highly trained, and professional workforce is critical to improving screening performance. These criteria are to establish accountability for screening performance; ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines, airports, FAA, efficiently move passengers to flights; and minimize legal and liability issues. | What GAO Found
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions of dollars and countless programs and policies have gone into developing such a system. Although many of the specific factors contributing to the terrible events of September 11 are still unclear, it is apparent that our aviation security system is plagued by serious weaknesses that can have devastating consequences. Last year, as part of an undercover investigation, GAO special agents used fake law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports. They were also issued tickets and boarding passes, and could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items onto the aircraft. GAO tests of airport screeners also found major shortcomings in their ability to detect dangerous items hidden on passengers or in carry-on luggage. These weaknesses have raised questions about the need for alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, five outcomes should be considered: improving screener performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues. |
gao_GAO-09-35 | gao_GAO-09-35_0 | Background
During 2006, about 43,000 traffic fatalities occurred on the nation’s roads and 290,000 people were seriously injured. Second, the plan must define areas of safety emphasis through an analysis of state fatality and serious injury data. The 25 state plans that we reviewed generally addressed the 4 key elements added by SAFETEA-LU. State Plans Included Strategies and Projects to Address Multidisciplinary Safety Emphasis Areas and Goals to Measure Overall Progress, but Generally Did Not Include Set-aside Programs
Since SAFETEA-LU, states have been required in their strategic highway safety plans to develop strategies to reduce roadway hazards and identify programs of projects to address all aspects of highway safety, including (1) infrastructure (engineering, management, and operations); (2) behavior (education and enforcement); and (3) emergency medical services. Of the 6 states we visited, 2 states lacked roadway inventory data for all state-owned roads and 5 states lacked roadway inventory data for locally owned roads. Most states have not developed roadway inventory data for locally owned roads because they do not operate and maintain those roads, according to state transportation officials we interviewed. It Is Too Soon to Evaluate Project Results Since SAFETEA-LU, but Two of the Program’s Funding Provisions May Not Be Aligned with States’ Safety Priorities Identified in Strategic Highway Safety Plans
Because states were not required to submit their strategic highway safety plans to FHWA until October 2007, they have not yet had time to select and build infrastructure projects under these plans. For example, according to our review of 25 state strategic highway safety plans and reports on the program, few states reported having roadway inventory data for all public roads (3 of 25) or complete, high-quality crash data for rural roads (5 of 25), leaving a significant number of states without data on rural roads and, therefore, without the means to effectively implement the program. In developing guidance on the new 5 percent report adopted by SAFETEA-LU, FHWA gave states latitude in defining the methodology and scope of their reports, and consequently, although these reports generally are consistent with SAFETEA-LU, they may not be as useful to the public as intended. FHWA Provided Comprehensive Guidance and Technical Assistance, and FHWA Officials Participated in States’ Planning Processes
FHWA’s Office of Safety provided programmatic guidance to the states through eight memorandums that introduced new HSIP features. SAFETEA-LU did not specify criteria or a methodology for states to use in defining the hazardous locations (e.g., the universe of roads that would be used to select the locations and the definition of severe or hazardous safety needs) or determining the exact percentage of hazardous locations states should identify—beyond specifying that the report should include “at least five percent” of the most severe hazardous locations in the state—nor did the legislation include a prescribed format for the 5 percent reports, except to say that the report must be “clearly understandable.” FHWA officials told us that, consistent with the changes made by SAFETEA-LU, they did not define a methodology and left it to the states to set criteria for selecting locations. Although FHWA expects every state to have the crash location data and a system to locate crashes on all public roads by August 2009, many states will likely take longer to obtain the roadway inventory data needed to identify remedies for hazardous locations and to estimate the costs of those remedies, as required. FHWA has not set a deadline for states to obtain these data, nor has it required states to submit schedules to FHWA for achieving compliance with this requirement. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To improve HSIP’s effectiveness, Congress should consider taking the following two actions: To better align HSIP funding with states’ top safety priorities, restructure two of HSIP’s statutory funding provisions by modifying HSIP’s flexible funding provision to either revise or eliminate the certification requirement so that states can more freely direct HSIP funds to behavioral and emergency medical services projects—rather than infrastructure improvement projects—when data analysis indicates more fatalities and serious injuries could be prevented by doing so and revising the rail-highway crossing set-aside program to ensure that its funding level is more closely and appropriately tied to the number of fatalities and serious injuries that such improvements can be expected to prevent in the states, and to ensure that any resulting additional funds be directed to highway safety projects that promise greater benefits. For the 25 states we selected, we analyzed their strategic highway safety plans; annual HSIP, high-risk rural road, and rail-highway crossing program 5 percent reports. Appendix II: HSIP Apportionments for States, Including Equity Bonus and Other Adjustments
Formulas in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) govern the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) apportionments to states for the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP). | Why GAO Did This Study
About 43,000 people died and another 290,000 were seriously injured on the nation's roads in 2006. To reduce these numbers, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) nearly doubled funding for the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP). SAFETEA-LU added requirements for states to develop strategic highway safety plans that include four key elements and to publicly report on at least the top 5 percent of hazardous locations on all of their public roads. The act also set aside funds for a legacy rail-highway crossing program and a new high-risk rural road program. As requested, GAO examined (1) states' implementation of HSIP following SAFETEA-LU, (2) HSIP results to date, and (3) FHWA's guidance and assistance to states. GAO analyzed plans from 25 states, including 19 randomly selected states and 6 states that GAO visited. GAO also interviewed FHWA and state safety officials.
What GAO Found
All states adopted strategic highway safety plans, and the 25 state plans that GAO analyzed addressed the 4 key elements added by SAFETEA-LU, although states lacked some of the crash data and analysis capabilities described in the law. GAO's analysis showed that the 25 states (1) involved multidisciplinary safety stakeholders; (2) defined areas of safety emphasis through analyses of state fatality data using crash data analysis systems; (3) identified strategies and projects to address these emphasis areas through infrastructure improvements, behavioral approaches, and emergency medical services; and (4) provided for overall and individual project evaluations. However, many of the 25 states lacked components of the prescribed crash data analysis systems, such as a system for locating crashes and roadway data for local roads. FHWA is developing such a system for the states, but many states lack necessary data for local roads because they do not maintain or operate them. Without the prescribed components, states cannot conduct some of the safety analysis defined by SAFETEA-LU or report to FHWA on their most hazardous locations on all public roads, determine appropriate remedies, and estimate costs--all requirements added by SAFETEA-LU. While FHWA has set a deadline for states to develop the capability to locate crashes on all public roads, it has not done so for roadway data. Because states were not required to submit their strategic highway safety plans to FHWA until October 2007, they have not had sufficient time to implement and evaluate their HSIP strategies and projects; hence, it is too soon to evaluate HSIP results carried out after SAFETEA-LU. However, two of HSIP's statutory funding provisions may not be aligned with some states' safety priorities contained in their strategic plans. First, FHWA data show that most states have not used a new flexible funding provision that allows states to allocate some HSIP funds for behavioral approaches or emergency medical services. Some states may be reluctant to use this provision, according to state officials we interviewed, partly due to an HSIP certification requirement that all state highway safety infrastructure needs have been met. Second, the rail-highway crossing set-aside program does not target a key safety priority ofsome states and provides significant funding to some crossing areas that have relatively few fatalities. Better alignment of federal funding with state priorities in their strategic plans could help ensure that HSIP funding best addresses those priorities. Lastly, as states implement the high-risk rural roads program, they are hindered by limited data on rural roads and crashes, which are needed to identify qualifying roadways and appropriate remedies. FHWA provided comprehensive guidance and training to assist states in preparing their strategic highway safety plans, and participated in states' strategic safety planning processes. FHWA's guidance to states on reporting their most hazardous locations took states' data limitations into account and gave states latitude in defining the methodology and scope of their 5 percent reports. Consequently, these reports vary in content and format and may not increase public awareness of highway safety as intended. |
gao_GAO-13-15 | gao_GAO-13-15_0 | Although psychosocial therapies may be effective for many children, the Institute of Medicine and others have reported that a shortage of mental health providers in general is a major factor affecting access to services, especially for children. Children in Medicaid Took Psychotropic Medications at a Higher Rate Than Those with Private Insurance, and Most Children in Medicaid with a Potential Mental Health Need Did Not Receive Services
On average, 6.2 percent of noninstitutionalized children in Medicaid nationwide took psychotropic medications during a calendar year from 2007 through 2009, and 21 percent of those children took an antipsychotic medication. CMS and states have made efforts to ensure that children receive appropriate mental health services, but CMS’s ability to monitor their receipt of services for which they were referred is limited because CMS does not collect information from states on whether children in Medicaid have received services for which they were referred. The comparable rate for privately insured children was lower—4.8 percent. About 14 Percent of Children in Medicaid Had a Potential Mental Health Need, but Most Did Not Receive Mental Health Services
Our analysis of national survey data from 2007 through 2009 indicated that 14 percent of noninstitutionalized children in Medicaid and 9 percent of noninstitutionalized privately insured children had a potential mental health need. CMS has initiated activities to help ensure that children in Medicaid receive appropriate mental health services. For example, CMS has begun working with states to improve their monitoring of the prescribing of psychotropic medications, and in August 2012 the agency issued an Informational Bulletin to states titled, “Collaborative Efforts and Technical Assistance Resources to Strengthen the Management of Psychotropic Medications for Vulnerable Populations.” The bulletin provided a link to additional information on the CMS website that discusses practices some states have employed to enhance the ability of their Drug Utilization Review programs to monitor psychotropic medication prescribing, such as using Drug Utilization Reviews to identify and contact providers whose prescribing patterns vary significantly from recommended standards of care for children.Measures Program, CMS is working with states to collect data on three In addition, through its voluntary Pediatric Quality quality measures related to mental health, including receipt of follow-up care for children prescribed ADHD medication. HHS is taking several steps to promote appropriate mental health treatment for foster children. ACF Reported That 18 Percent of Foster Children Took Psychotropic Medications
ACF reported that 18 percent of foster children were taking one or more psychotropic medications at the time they were surveyed, although utilization varied widely by living arrangement.children who lived in group homes or residential treatment centers had much higher rates of psychotropic medication use than foster children ACF reported that foster living in nonrelative foster homes or formal kin care—48 percent versus 14 percent and 12 percent, respectively. ACF Reported That 30 Percent of Foster Children with a Potential Mental Health Need Did Not Receive Mental Health Services
ACF reported that 30 percent of foster children with a potential mental health need had not received any mental health services within the previous 12 months or since the start of the child’s living arrangement, if less than 12 months. 1.) Most NIH Funding for Children’s Mental Health Research Was Spent by NIMH
During fiscal years 2008 through 2011, NIH spent about $1.2 billion to support over 1,200 children’s mental health research projects, most of NIMH accounted for 81 percent—about which were supported by NIMH.$956 million—of NIH’s funding for children’s mental health research. 2.) About half of NIMH-sponsored research projects (482) examined mental health treatments for children, with more projects studying psychosocial therapies than psychotropic medications. Other HHS Agencies Spent an Estimated $16 Million on Children’s Mental Health Research Projects
Together, FDA, AHRQ, and CDC spent about $16 million on research projects on children’s mental health in fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Children in Medicaid and in foster care are prescribed these medications at higher rates than other children. Agency Comments
HHS did not comment on our findings but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology Used to Analyze the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
To provide information on the use of psychotropic medications and other mental health services by children covered by Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private insurance, we analyzed nationwide data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 2007 through 2009. Medicaid and CHIP: Reports for Monitoring Children’s Health Care Services Need Improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Experts have concerns that children with mental health conditions do not always receive appropriate treatment, including concerns about appropriate use of psychotropic medications (which affect mood, thought, or behavior) and about access to psychosocial therapies (sessions with a mental health provider). These concerns may be compounded for low-income children in Medicaid and children in foster care (most of whom are covered by Medicaid)--populations who may be at higher risk of mental health conditions. Within HHS, CMS oversees Medicaid, and ACF supports state child welfare agencies that coordinate health care for foster children.
GAO was asked to provide information on children's mental health. This report examines (1) the use of psychotropic medications and other mental health services for children in Medicaid nationwide, and related CMS initiatives; (2) HHS information on the use of psychotropic medications and other mental health services for children in foster care nationwide, and related HHS initiatives; and (3) the amount HHS has invested in research on children's mental health.
GAO analyzed data from HHS's MEPS --a national household survey on use of medical services--from 2007 through 2009 for children covered by Medicaid and private insurance. GAO reviewed two recent ACF foster care reports with data from a national survey conducted during 2008 through 2011. GAO analyzed data from HHS agencies that conduct or fund research and interviewed HHS officials and children's mental health providers, researchers, and advocates.
What GAO Found
An annual average of 6.2 percent of noninstitutionalized children in Medicaid nationwide and 4.8 percent of privately insured children took one or more psychotropic medications, according to GAO's analysis of 2007-2009 data from the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). MEPS data also showed that children in Medicaid took antipsychotic medications (a type of psychotropic medication that can help some children but has a risk of serious side effects) at a relatively low rate--1.3 percent of children--but that the rate for children in Medicaid was over twice the rate for privately insured children, which was 0.5 percent. In addition, MEPS data showed that most children whose emotions or behavior, as reported by their parent or guardian, indicated a potential need for a mental health service did not receive any services within the same year. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and many states have initiatives under way to help ensure that children receive appropriate mental health treatments. However, CMS's ability to monitor children's receipt of mental health services is limited because CMS does not collect information from states on whether children in Medicaid have received services for which they were referred. GAO recommended in 2011 that CMS identify options for collecting such data from state Medicaid programs. Findings in this report underscore the continued importance of CMS's monitoring of children's receipt of mental health services.
HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF) reported that 18 percent of foster children were taking psychotropic medications at the time they were surveyed, although utilization varied widely by the child's living arrangement. ACF also reported that 30 percent of foster children who may have needed mental health services did not receive them in the previous 12 months. HHS agencies are taking steps to promote appropriate mental health treatments for foster children, such as by sending information to states on psychotropic medication oversight practices.
HHS's National Institutes of Health spent an estimated $1.2 billion on over 1,200 children's mental health research projects during fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Most of the funding--$956 million--was awarded by the National Institute of Mental Health, with more research projects studying psychosocial therapies than psychotropic medications. Other HHS agencies spent about $16 million combined on children's mental health research during this period.
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-715T | gao_GAO-01-715T_0 | Reporting: No Clear Picture of Complaint Activity
The federal government lacks a clear picture of the volume of discrimination and whistleblowing reprisal cases involving federal employees. The NoFEAR Act would require agencies to report the number of discrimination and whistleblower reprisal cases. Caseload data can be a starting point for agency managers to understand the nature and scope of issues in the workplace involving discrimination, reprisal, and other conflicts and problems, and can help in developing strategies for dealing with these issues. The NoFEAR Act would require agencies to report the number of employees disciplined for discrimination, retaliation, or harassment.Published statistical data can be important for agencies to send a message to their employees that individuals will be held accountable for their actions in cases involving discrimination, retaliation, or harassment. Notification: Making Employees Aware of Their Protections
The NoFEAR Act provides that agencies notify employees of the rights and protections available to them under the antidiscrimination and whistleblower statutes in writing and post this information on their Internet sites. This provision reinforces existing requirements that employees be notified of rights and remedies concerning discrimination and whistleblower protection. | What GAO Found
Federal employees who report waste, fraud, and abuse shouldn't have to fear discrimination and retaliation. Despite laws designed to protect whistleblowers, some have experienced or believed that they have experienced reprisals. Proposed legislation--the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2001--would provide additional protections for federal employees and would provide important data to decisionmakers. First, the act would require agencies to report the number of discrimination and whistleblower reprisal cases. Because of a lack of data, the federal government currently doesn't have a clear picture of the volume of discrimination and whistleblowing reprisal cases involving federal employees. Such data could be a starting point for agency managers to understand the nature and scope of issues in the workplace involving reprisals and discrimination. Second, the act would make agencies and their leaders accountable for providing fair and equitable workplaces. In addition, individuals would be held accountable for their actions in cases in which discrimination has occurred. Finally, the act would require agencies to notify employees in writing of their rights and protections. This provision reinforces existing requirements that employees be notified of the rights and remedies concerning discrimination and whistleblower protection. |
gao_GAO-16-144 | gao_GAO-16-144_0 | Federal Agencies Provide Resources to Support School Emergency Management Planning, but Some Resources Are Often Underutilized and Efforts Are Not Strategically Coordinated
Federal Agencies Provide Various Resources to Help Schools Prepare for Emergencies, but Most School Districts Reported Not Using Federal Guidance and Other Non- Financial Resources
Education, DHS, HHS, and Justice each provide assistance to school districts and schools with preparing for emergencies. 3). Education, DHS, HHS, and Justice also separately develop and provide resources such as guidance, training, technical assistance, and funding, in line with their respective missions, to help districts and schools prepare for emergencies. We found:
Not all relevant federal agencies are included in collaboration efforts. Relevant agency officials are not always aware of each other’s efforts and resources, including within their own agency. Agencies that collaborate offer different interpretations of the same federal guidance. According to these officials, the presidential plan that required development of the Federal Guide did not designate a lead agency going forward or give any agency direct authority or responsibility to convene an interagency working group or require the participation of other federal agencies. However, they said that the Department of Education Organization Act provides the agency the general authority to collaborate with other federal agencies to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs and, where warranted and agreed upon, to serve as the lead agency in such collaborations. Most States Reported Requiring Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises, and Providing Training or Other Support
Most States Reported Requiring District or School Emergency Operations Plans, and Many Also Allowed Districts and Schools to Determine Plan Specifics
According to our survey of state educational agencies in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 32 states reported requiring that districts have emergency operations plans and 34 states reported requiring that schools have plans, and 25 states reported requiring plans for both (see fig. 5). Our state survey also asked about requirements that district or individual school plans address the needs of specific populations of students, including those with disabilities, and found that fewer than half of states reported having such requirements; however, our district survey shows that most districts included these procedures in their plans. Nearly All States Provided Support to Plan for Emergencies, and Fewer Than Half Reported Requiring States or Districts to Review Emergency Operations Plans
Based on our survey of 51 state educational agencies, nearly all states provided training, technical assistance, or guidance to districts to assist in developing or implementing emergency operations plans. In contrast, our district survey estimates that about half of districts specified how they would maintain continuous operations or recover after an incident. Most Districts Conducted Emergency Exercises and Many Did So Regularly with First Responders
Our survey estimated that most school districts recently completed a variety of emergency exercises, such as drills and group discussions, and many did so regularly with first responders (see fig. 12). Majority of Districts Reported Difficulty Balancing Emergency Management Planning with Other School Priorities
Based on our survey, an estimated 59 percent of districts reported difficulty balancing emergency management planning with higher priorities, such as instructional time. Although individual agencies continue to work on a range of emergency preparedness issues, and, in some cases, have continued to collaborate with other agencies in doing so, current collaboration efforts are insufficient to comprehensively address the complex and unique needs of schools. Moreover, in the absence of a well-coordinated federal strategy for school emergency preparedness planning, federal agencies’ piecemeal approaches to school emergency management planning contribute to the gaps we identified in timely, continued, and most importantly, strategic coordination, and risk wasting limited federal resources on efforts that may be overlapping, duplicative, or fragmented. Recommendation for Executive Action
Using its general authority to collaborate with other federal agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Education convene its federal interagency partners to develop a strategic approach to interagency collaboration on school emergency preparedness. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (Justice) for review and comment. In light of Education’s response, which we agree is consistent with leading practices on federal interagency collaboration that, among other things, include identifying leadership for the collaborative mechanism and all relevant participants, we modified the recommendation and report accordingly. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addressed the following questions: (1) how do federal agencies support school emergency management planning and to what extent do they coordinate their efforts; (2) to what extent do states require and support efforts to plan for school emergencies; and (3) what have school districts done to plan and prepare for emergencies and what challenges, if any, have they faced? In total, we interviewed officials from 12 schools. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2012 school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut and the 2013 tornado in Moore, Oklahoma stress the need for schools to prepare for emergencies to help protect the 50 million students in K-12 public schools. In 2007, GAO found that most districts developed emergency operations plans and GAO made recommendations to improve school emergency planning. In 2013, the President directed Education, DHS, HHS, and Justice to help schools with their plans. GAO was asked to report on these efforts.
This report examines (1) how federal agencies support school emergency management planning and the extent to which they coordinate efforts; (2) the extent to which states require and support efforts to plan for school emergencies; and (3) what districts have done to plan and prepare for school emergencies and challenges faced. GAO interviewed federal officials and surveyed relevant state agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. GAO also surveyed a generalizable random sample of 573 districts (70 percent response rate), and visited 5 districts and 12 schools in 3 states selected to reflect diverse locations and characteristics.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (Justice) support K-12 schools in preparing for emergencies with various resources, including training, technical assistance, and funding, but their efforts are not strategically coordinated. Since jointly issuing a Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans in 2013 in response to a presidential plan, individual agencies have continued to work on a range of emergency preparedness initiatives, sometimes collaboratively; however, with the guide completed and no strategic coordination of agency efforts particular to schools, federal agencies have taken a piecemeal approach to their efforts. GAO found gaps in coordination that suggest recent efforts are insufficient: not all relevant agencies and officials are included in collaborative efforts or are aware of related efforts and resources, and agencies are offering different interpretations of the same federal guidance—all of which risks wasting limited federal resources on duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented efforts. Education officials said that although agencies discussed the need to continue coordinating following the guide, the presidential plan did not designate a lead agency going forward, nor give any agency direct authority or responsibility over an interagency effort, or require agency participation. However, these officials said Education has general authority to collaborate with other federal agencies to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs and to serve as the lead agency, where warranted and agreed upon. Leading practices on federal interagency collaboration include identifying leadership, relevant participants, and resources, and agreeing on outcomes. Absent a well-coordinated effort, agencies will continue to determine their priorities individually, which may hinder assistance to schools.
In GAO's survey of 51 state educational agencies, 32 states reported that they require districts to have emergency operations plans, 34 reported they require schools to have plans, and almost all states reported providing training, technical assistance, or guidance to support districts in developing or implementing plans. GAO's survey also found that 32 states reported requiring districts to conduct emergency exercises, such as drills, and 40 states reported requiring individual schools to do so. In addition, many states reported allowing districts and schools to determine specific plan content, with fewer than half reporting that they required districts or states to review district or school plans.
GAO's generalizable survey of school districts estimates that most districts updated and practiced their emergency operations plans with first responders, but struggled to balance emergency planning with other priorities. GAO's survey results also found that most districts had plans addressing multiple hazards and emergency procedures, such as evacuation. However, GAO estimates about half of districts included procedures on continuing operations or recovering after an incident. GAO also found most districts conducted emergency exercises, such as fire drills, and about half did so annually with police and fire department officials. However, an estimated 59 percent of districts had difficulty balancing emergency planning with higher priorities, such as classroom instruction time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education convene its federal interagency partners to develop a strategic approach to interagency collaboration on school emergency preparedness, consistent with leading practices. Education agreed that such improved federal coordination will better assist schools in preparing for emergencies. |
gao_GAO-03-708 | gao_GAO-03-708_0 | Navy Logistics Strategic Plans Do Not Specifically Focus on Mitigating Spare Parts Shortages
The Navy’s servicewide strategic plans do not specifically address means to mitigate critical spare parts shortages. In fiscal year 2001, the Navy published a servicewide strategic plan—the High Yield Logistics Transformation Plan—that identified initiatives undertaken by its major support commands to improve the service’s logistics overall and to address objectives listed in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2000 Logistics Strategic Plan. While some of these initiatives have improved the overall supply availability and reliability of some spare parts, we cannot measure their potential for mitigating critical parts shortages and their impact on weapon system readiness because they were not designed to specifically address this problem. Performance Based Logistics Contracts Have Improved Availability of Spare Parts
Performance based logistics contracts have generally improved supply support to the fleet, but the Navy does not assess the extent to which better supply availability mitigates critical spare parts shortages or enhances the fleet’s combat readiness. However, the Navy has yet to establish such a plan. Impact of Additional Spare Parts Funding on Supply Availability and Readiness Estimated but Not Reported
The Navy has analyzed how additional wholesale supply funding would affect the availability of spare parts as well as equipment readiness rates, and has determined that an additional investment of $1.2 billion would be necessary to support readiness objectives established by the Chief of Naval Operations. However, the Navy did not ask for this funding as part of its fiscal year 2004 budget request, nor did its budget estimates link planned spending to individual weapon system readiness, as recommended by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in an August 2002 study. DOD has an 85 percent supply availability goal, which means that 85 percent of the requisitions sent to wholesale supply system managers can be immediately filled from on-hand inventories. Navy supply system models are focused on achieving this goal in the aggregate. However, the Navy’s overall wholesale supply system performance has fallen short of expectations in each of the last 3 fiscal years for both aviation- and ship- related repairable spare parts. Supply availability ranged between approximately 69 percent and 71 percent for aviation-related items, and between 79 percent and 84 percent for ship-related parts. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy develop a framework for mitigating critical spare parts shortages that includes long-term goals; measurable, outcome-related objectives; implementation goals; and performance measures as a part of either the Navy Sea Enterprise strategy or the Naval Supply Systems Command Strategic Plan, which will provide a basis for management to assess the extent to which ongoing and planned initiatives will contribute to the mitigation of critical spare parts shortages, and implement the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to report, as part of budget requests, the impact of funding on individual weapon system readiness with a specific milestone for completion. To determine the likelihood that key supply system initiatives will mitigate critical spare parts shortages and improve weapon system readiness, we obtained and analyzed service documentation on six of the initiatives that Navy officials believe are key to the future economy and efficiency of the service’s supply operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has identified DOD inventory management as high risk because of long-standing management weaknesses. In fiscal years 2001 and 2002, Congress provided the Navy with more than $8 billion in operations and maintenance funds to purchase spare parts in support of the service's operations. Nevertheless, spare parts availability has fallen short of the Navy's goals in recent years. GAO examined the extent to which Navy strategic plans address mitigation of critical spare parts shortages, the likelihood that key supply system improvement initiatives will help mitigate spare parts shortages and enhance readiness, and the Navy's ability to identify the impact on readiness of increased spare parts investments.
What GAO Found
The Navy's servicewide strategic plan does not specifically address means to mitigate critical spare parts shortages. Its 2001 plan contained strategic goals, objectives, and performance measures, but the service did not use it to systematically manage implementation of logistics reform initiatives. The Navy is developing a new logistics strategic plan, but this document has not yet been published. Consequently, the service presently lacks an effective top-level plan that integrates a specific focus on mitigating spare parts shortages into its logistics transformation initiatives. Without such a plan, the Navy lacks guidance necessary to ensure its logistics initiatives mitigate critical spare parts shortages. GAO examined six of the key initiatives that the Navy has undertaken to improve the economy and efficiency of its supply system. While some of these initiatives have increased availability of select spare parts, GAO cannot determine their potential to mitigate critical spare parts shortages because they were not designed specifically to remedy this problem. For example, the Performance Based Logistics initiative aims to improve supply support at equal or lower cost by outsourcing a broad range of services. Though the initiative has increased availability of certain items, GAO could not measure the extent to which Performance Based Logistics contracts have mitigated critical spare parts shortages. The Navy has determined that an additional investment of $1.2 billion would be necessary to achieve supply availability levels that support the service's readiness objectives. However, the Navy did not ask for this funding in its fiscal year 2004 budget request, nor did it report linkages between resource levels and readiness rates for individual weapon systems, as recommended by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2002. The Navy did provide aggregate readiness data to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but officials stated that they lacked information technology necessary to link readiness rates by weapon system to budget categories. DOD has an 85 percent supply availability goal, which means that 85 percent of the requisitions sent to wholesale supply system managers can be immediately filled from on-hand inventories. Navy supply system models are focused on achieving this goal in the aggregate. However, the Navy's overall wholesale supply system performance has fallen short of expectations in each of the last 3 fiscal years for both aviation- and ship-related repairable spare parts. Supply availability ranged between approximately 69 percent and 71 percent for aviation-related items, and between 79 percent and 84 percent for ship-related parts. |
gao_GAO-06-418T | gao_GAO-06-418T_0 | GAO’s Fiscal Year 2007 Request to Support the Congress
Our fiscal year 2007 budget request will provide us the resources necessary to achieve our performance goals in support of the Congress and the American people. This request will allow GAO to improve productivity and maintain progress in technology and other transformation areas. We continue to streamline GAO, modernize our policies and practices, and leverage technology so that we can achieve our mission more effectively and efficiently. These continuing efforts allow us to enhance our performance without significant increases in funding. Our fiscal year 2007 budget request represents a modest increase of about $25 million (or 5 percent) over our fiscal year 2006 revised funding level— primarily to cover uncontrollable mandatory pay and price level increases. This request reflects a reduction of nearly $5.4 million in nonrecurring fiscal year 2006 costs used to offset the fiscal year 2007 increase. This request also includes about $7 million in one-time fiscal year 2007 costs, which will not recur in fiscal year 2008, to upgrade our business systems and processes. As the Congress addresses the devastation in the Gulf Coast region from Hurricane Katrina and several other major 2005 hurricanes, GAO is supporting the Congress by assessing whether federal programs assisting the people of the Gulf region are efficient and effective and result in a strong return on investment. In order to address the demands of this work; better respond to the increasing number of demands being placed on GAO, including a dramatic increase in health care mandates; and address supply and demand imbalances in our ability to respond to congressional interest in areas such as disaster assistance, homeland security, the global war on terrorism, health care, and forensic auditing, we are seeking your support to provide the funding to rebuild our staffing level to the levels requested in previous years. We believe that 3,267 FTEs is an optimal staffing level for GAO that would allow us to more successfully meet the needs of the Congress. In preparing this request and taking into account the effects of the fiscal year 2006 rescission, we revised our workforce plan to reduce fiscal year 2005 hiring and initiated a voluntary early retirement opportunity for staff in January 2006. These actions better support GAO’s strategic plan for serving the Congress, better align GAO’s workforce to meet mission needs, correct selected skill imbalances, and allow us to increase the number of new hires later in fiscal year 2006. Our revised hiring plan represents an aggressive hiring level that is significantly higher than in recent fiscal years, and it is the maximum number of staff we could absorb during fiscal year 2006. These actions will also position us to more fully utilize our planned FTE levels of 3,217 and 3,267 in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the changes we are requesting in our fiscal year 2007 budget. Our fiscal year 2007 budget request supports three broad program areas: Human Capital, Engagement Support, and Infrastructure Operations. See table 2 for examples of how GAO assisted the nation in fiscal year 2005. See figure 2 for additional examples of GAO’s other benefits in fiscal year 2005. We are proud of the positive impact we have been able to affect in government over the past year and believe an investment in GAO will continue to yield substantial returns for the Congress and the American people. | Why GAO Did This Study
We are pleased to appear before the Congress today in support of the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). This request will help us continue our support of the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and will help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Budget constraints in the federal government grew tighter in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In developing our fiscal year 2007 budget, we considered those constraints consistent with GAO's and Congress's desire to "lead by example." In fiscal year 2007, we are requesting budget authority of $509.4 million, a reasonable 5 percent increase over our fiscal year 2006 revised funding level. In the event Congress acts to hold federal pay increases to 2.2 percent, our requested increase will drop to below 5 percent. This request will allow us to continue making improvements in productivity, maintain our progress in technology and other transformation areas, and support a full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing level of 3,267. This represents an increase of 50 FTEs over our planned fiscal year 2006 staffing level and will allow us to rebuild our workforce to a level that will position us to better respond to increasing supply and demand imbalances in areas such as disaster assistance, the global war on terrorism, homeland security, forensic auditing, and health care. This testimony focuses on our budget request for fiscal year 2007 to support the Congress and serve the American people and on our performance and results with the funding you provided us in fiscal year 2005.
What GAO Found
Our fiscal year 2007 budget request will provide us the resources necessary to achieve our performance goals in support of the Congress and the American people. This request will allow GAO to improve productivity and maintain progress in technology and other transformation areas. We continue to streamline GAO, modernize our policies and practices, and leverage technology so that we can achieve our mission more effectively and efficiently. These continuing efforts allow us to enhance our performance without significant increases in funding. Our fiscal year 2007 budget request represents a modest increase of about $25 million (or 5 percent) over our fiscal year 2006 revised funding level--primarily to cover uncontrollable mandatory pay and price level increases. This request reflects a reduction of nearly $5.4 million in nonrecurring fiscal year 2006 costs used to offset the fiscal year 2007 increase. This request also includes about $7 million in one-time fiscal year 2007 costs, which will not recur in fiscal year 2008, to upgrade our business systems and processes. As the Congress addresses the devastation in the Gulf Coast region from Hurricane Katrina and several other major 2005 hurricanes, GAO is supporting the Congress by assessing whether federal programs assisting the people of the Gulf region are efficient and effective and result in a strong return on investment. In order to address the demands of this work; better respond to the increasing number of demands being placed on GAO, including a dramatic increase in health care mandates; and address supply and demand imbalances in our ability to respond to congressional interest in areas such as disaster assistance, homeland security, the global war on terrorism, health care, and forensic auditing, we are seeking Congress's support to provide the funding to rebuild our staffing level to the levels requested in previous years. We believe that 3,267 FTEs is an optimal staffing level for GAO that would allow us to more successfully meet the needs of the Congress. In preparing this request and taking into account the effects of the fiscal year 2006 rescission, we revised our workforce plan to reduce fiscal year 2005 hiring and initiated a voluntary early retirement opportunity for staff in January 2006. These actions better support GAO's strategic plan for serving the Congress, better align GAO's workforce to meet mission needs, correct selected skill imbalances, and allow us to increase the number of new hires later in fiscal year 2006. Our revised hiring plan represents an aggressive hiring level that is significantly higher than in recent fiscal years, and it is the maximum number of staff we could absorb during fiscal year 2006. These actions will also position us to more fully utilize our planned FTE levels of 3,217 and 3,267 in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively. |
gao_GAO-02-140 | gao_GAO-02-140_0 | As shown in figure 5, the reported total direct cost to plan and stage the 1984 Games was approximately $707 million. As shown in figure 7, the total direct cost for planning and staging these Games was about $2.4 billion. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As discussed in this report, the objectives of this assignment were to determine: the total direct cost of planning and staging the Winter Olympic Games held in 1980 at Lake Placid, NY; and the Winter Olympic Games and Paralympic Games planned for 2002 at Salt Lake City, UT; the Summer Olympic Games held in 1984 at Los Angeles, CA; and the Summer Olympic Games and Paralympic Games held in 1996 at Atlanta, GA; the total direct government funding and support at the local, state, and federal levels, where available, for each of these Games; how the federal funding and support were used; a complete roster of all the reported projects and activities for each of the Games; and the amount of federal funds and support specifically designated by Congress for Olympic-related purposes, and the amount of federal funding and support approved by the agencies and provided through their normal funding procedures for each of these Games. | What GAO Found
Since 1980, the Winter and Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games hosted in the United States have increased in size and magnitude, as have the total direct costs to plan and stage them. The reported direct costs to plan and stage the games discussed in this report ranged from $363 million to more than $2.4 billion. Although the total dollar amount of federal funding and support has increased, the total federal share of the reported total direct costs to plan and stage the games has decreased. Since 1980, the amount of funding and support provided by state and local governments has increased. Generally, federal funding and support for the total direct costs of each of these games was either specifically designated by Congress or approved by the federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-13-384 | gao_GAO-13-384_0 | CHIPRA required that these new demonstrations be budget neutral, and required HHS to use a defined process of identifying the spending base and growth rates for demonstration spending limits. HHS’s Approvals Allowed Two States to Establish Funding Pools to Make New Types of Supplemental Payments
Two states we reviewed—Arizona and Texas—obtained the authority under their section 1115 demonstrations to establish funding pools for purposes of making supplemental payments and to receive federal matching funds for these payments. States Were Approved to Implement Different Coverage Strategies and New Cost Sharing on Certain Populations through the Demonstrations
All 10 states we reviewed were approved to implement new ways of expanding coverage or imposing cost sharing requirements on different Medicaid populations. For 4 of 10 Reviewed Demonstrations, HHS’s Policy and Process for Approving Spending Limits Did Not Provide Assurances That Demonstrations Will Not Increase Federal Costs
For 4 of 10 demonstrations we reviewed, HHS approved spending limits that were based on assumptions of cost growth that were higher than those reflected by the state’s historical spending and the President’s budget. In addition, in some cases the approved spending limits included costs in the base year that were hypothetical. If HHS had held spending limits in the four demonstrations to levels suggested by its policy, we estimate that the spending limits would have been $32 billion lower over the 5-year term of the demonstrations. We also found that HHS’s budget neutrality policy is out-dated, because it does not reflect HHS’s current processes or provide assurances that data used for spending limits are reliable. HHS Approved Spending Limits for Four States Based on Growth Projections That Exceeded Benchmarks and Included Hypothetical Costs, with Limited Support
HHS approved spending limits for the Arizona, Indiana, and Rhode Island demonstrations that used growth rates that exceeded benchmark rates and, in the case of Texas, included hypothetical costs in the base year spending. Our estimates show that, had HHS used benchmark growth rates and actual base year costs, the 5-year spending limits would have been almost $32 billion dollars lower than what was actually approved. The federal share of the $32 billion reduction would constitute an estimated $21 billion. HHS officials said that the agency was not able to estimate the cost of the Arizona Medicaid program without the demonstration using recent actual expenditure data, because the state’s Medicaid program had operated under a demonstration since 1982. This approach helps provide assurances that the federal government will spend no more under the demonstrations than what it would have spent without them. In 2008, because HHS disagreed that changes to the budget neutrality policy and review process were needed, we suggested that Congress consider requiring increased attention to fiscal responsibility in the approval of section 1115 Medicaid demonstrations and require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to improve the demonstration review process by, for example, clarifying the criteria for approving spending limits and documenting and making public the basis for such approvals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the transparency of the process for reviewing and approving spending limits for comprehensive section 1115 demonstrations, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following two actions: 1. update the agency’s written budget neutrality policy to reflect actual criteria and processes used to develop and approve demonstration spending limits, and ensure the policy is readily available to state Medicaid directors and others; and 2. reconsider adjustments and costs used in setting the spending limits for the Arizona and Texas demonstrations, and make appropriate adjustments to spending limits for the remaining years of each demonstration. They told us that this document was the most recent document capturing the budget neutrality policy. Appendix II: A Summary of Key Features of Recent Demonstrations
This appendix summarizes key information on 10 new comprehensive section 1115 demonstrations approved from January 2007 through May 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a $436 billion federal and state health care program for low-income individuals and families, is a significant and growing expenditure. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain Medicaid requirements and allow otherwise uncovered costs for demonstration projects that are likely to promote Medicaid objectives. By HHS policy, these demonstrations should be budget neutral, that is, not increase federal spending over what it would have been if the state's existing program had continued. States estimate what their spending would have been without the demonstration, and HHS approves a spending based on projected spending.
GAO was asked to review HHS approval of recent Medicaid section 1115 demonstrations. GAO examined (1) the purpose of new demonstrations, and (2) the extent to which HHS's policy and process for reviewing proposed demonstration spending provide assurances that federal costs will not increase. For 10 new comprehensive demonstrations approved from January 2007 through May 2012, GAO reviewed application, approval, and budget neutrality documents provided by HHS; calculated estimated spending limits; and interviewed HHS officials.
What GAO Found
The 10 new demonstrations GAO examined expanded states' use of federal funds and implemented new coverage strategies. Arizona and Texas established funding pools to make new supplemental payments beyond what they could have made under traditional Medicaid requirements and receive federal matching funds for the payments. All 10 demonstrations were approved to use different coverage strategies or impose new cost sharing requirements, including limiting benefits or imposing deductibles for certain populations.
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) budget neutrality policy and process did not provide assurances that all recently approved demonstrations will be budget neutral. For 4 of 10 demonstrations GAO reviewed, HHS approved spending limits that were based on assumptions of cost growth that were higher than its benchmark rates, and that, in some cases, included costs states never incurred in their base year spending. HHS's benchmark growth rates are the lower of the state's recent growth rates or projections for Medicaid program growth nationwide. For example, HHS approved a spending limit for Arizona's demonstration using outdated information on spending--1982 data that was projected forward--that reflected significantly higher spending than what the state's Medicaid program had actually cost. For Texas, HHS approved a spending limit using a base year that included billions in costs the state had not incurred. GAO found limited support and documentation for the higher-than-benchmark limits HHS approved. If HHS had held the 4 demonstrations' spending to levels suggested by its policy, the 5-year spending limits would have been an estimated $32 billion lower than what was approved; the estimated federal share of this reduction would be about $21 billion.
For 6 other demonstrations, the approved spending limits reflected the states' actual historical costs or criteria that were specified in law, which HHS followed. In examining HHS's current written budget neutrality policy, GAO found that the policy is outdated and does not include a process for assuring the reliability of the data used to set spending limits. GAO has previously suggested that Congress require HHS to improve its budget neutrality process, in part, by improving the review criteria and methods, and by documenting and making clear the basis for approved limits. In addition to these suggestions, GAO believes HHS needs to take further actions to address the findings in this report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS update its budget neutrality policy and reexamine spending limits for the Arizona and Texas demonstrations. HHS disagreed with GAO's recommendations. GAO believes these steps are needed to improve the budget neutrality process. |
gao_GAO-07-551T | gao_GAO-07-551T_0 | The CAFE program is generally considered to have contributed to increasing the nation’s fuel economy. In addition to CAFE standards administered by NHTSA, Congress and other federal agencies have established programs to reduce oil consumption in the transportation sector. In addition to NHTSA, other federal entities contribute to the nation’s efforts to reduce oil consumption. NHTSA Recently Raised and Restructured Light Truck CAFE Standards and Has Not Raised the Car CAFE Standard Since 1990, but Has Requested Authority to Make Changes
NHTSA has recently raised the light truck CAFE standard and reformed the program using a method that categorizes light trucks based on their size, doing so in part to address potential safety concerns. CAFE standards for cars have not changed since 1990. Second, although NHTSA officials state that the agency has the legislative authority to raise CAFE standards for cars above 27.5 mpg, as specified by the Energy Act, these officials stated the Energy Act prevents NHTSA from restructuring the program, for example, by developing a size-based standard as it recently did for light trucks. In addition to this proposed legislation, several Members of Congress have submitted bills that have some similarities to the Secretary’s proposal but, if enacted, would set a specific fuel economy mpg standard for manufacturers to meet, rather than allow NHTSA to determine the maximum feasible level. A Majority of Industry Stakeholders and Experts Support NHTSA’s Recent CAFE Revisions, While Recommending Further Refinements to the CAFE Program and Ways for NHTSA to Improve Its Capability to Revise Standards
The majority of industry stakeholders and experts with whom we spoke supported NHTSA’s revisions to the light truck standards, and many of them specifically stated that NHTSA should consider further refinements to the CAFE program, such as restructuring the car CAFE standards based on the size of the vehicle. For example the model that NHTSA uses to estimate the impact that changes in CAFE standards will have on oil consumption does not currently place a dollar value on the reduction of carbon emissions. Furthermore, many experts indicated that the agency would benefit from some additional expertise, for example, on automotive engineering to, among other duties, review product plans automakers submit in the CAFE rule-making process. In addition to increasing fuel efficiency standards to reduce oil consumption, further refinements may help address safety concerns and improve the efficiency of the CAFE program. Harmonizing light truck and passenger vehicle standards: Currently, light truck and car standards are separate. Other Federal Programs Also Seek to Reduce Oil Consumption in the Transportation Sector
While the CAFE program is an important program in the nation’s efforts to reduce oil consumption, other policies and programs currently exist to help the nation reduce oil consumption in the transportation sector. We will be reporting in July 2007 on the extent to which these programs complement or contradict the goals of the CAFE program. We will also report on other proposals to reduce oil consumption by cars and light trucks and their potential effects. However, many of the experts with whom we spoke have pointed out that the program granting manufacturers a maximum of 1.2 mpg CAFE credit toward meeting fuel economy standards for flex-fuel vehicles, currently may be actually increasing oil consumption among passenger vehicles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns over national security, environmental stresses, and economic pressures from increased fuel prices have led to the nation's interest in reducing oil consumption. Efforts to reduce oil consumption will need to include the transportation sector. For example, several Members of Congress have introduced bills proposing changes to the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) program. This program includes mile per gallon standards for light trucks and cars that manufacturers must meet for vehicles sold in this country. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this committee. This testimony describes (1) recent and proposed changes to CAFE standards; (2) observations about the recent changes, the existing CAFE program, and NHTSA's (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) capabilities to further restructure CAFE standards; and (3) initial observations about how the CAFE program fits in the context of other approaches to reduce oil consumption. To address these issues, we reviewed program legislation, rule makings, and operational documents. Also, we interviewed officials from NHTSA, the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, the auto industry, labor unions, and the insurance industry. Finally, we contacted several recognized experts in fuel economy and safety. Our report will be issued in July 2007.
What GAO Found
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the agency responsible for setting CAFE standards for cars and light trucks--such as sport utility vehicles, minivans and pickup trucks--recently raised CAFE standards for light trucks to reduce oil use and restructured this part of the program to help address safety, among other issues. However, the CAFE standard for cars has changed little over the past 2 decades. In 1975, Congress established CAFE standards for cars rising to 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) by 1985 but did not allow NHTSA to restructure how car standards are applied. As part of the administration's plan to meet the President's recently stated goal to reduce oil use by 20 percent over the administration's projected levels by 2017, the NHTSA Administrator submitted a plan to Congress that would allow NHTSA to reform the car CAFE program in a manner similar to NHTSA's recent changes to the light truck program. The majority of experts with whom we spoke stated that CAFE standards are an important approach to reducing oil consumption and NHTSA's recent reform of light truck standards addresses previous safety and competitive concerns, among others. However, they also identified some ways to further refine the CAFE program such as considering harmonizing light truck and car standards. Further, NHTSA officials identified ways to improve the agency's capabilities to administer the program. For example, the agency would benefit from some additional expertise on automotive engineering. Finally, several experts observed that the model that NHTSA uses to help set CAFE standards does not fully account for the impact of greenhouse gas emissions. While the CAFE program is an important program in the nation's efforts to reduce oil consumption, other policies and programs exist to help the nation reduce oil consumption in the transportation sector. We will report on how these programs align with the CAFE program in our report to be issued in July 2007. For example, according to experts with whom we spoke, CAFE's effectiveness in reducing oil consumption is hampered by a provision granting manufacturers a 1.2 mpg CAFE credit toward meeting its fuel economy standard for selling flexible fuel vehicles, even though these vehicles are not often run on fuel other than gas. |
gao_NSIAD-99-18 | gao_NSIAD-99-18_0 | Historically, government-owned surplus ships have been scrapped both domestically and overseas. Factors Contributing to the Backlog of Ships
A number of factors have caused the current backlog of federal surplus ships awaiting scrapping. They include (1) reductions in the Navy’s force structure following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; (2) unavailability of overseas scrapping; (3) difficulties experienced by some domestic scrappers in complying with environmental, worker safety, and other contract performance provisions; and (4) a shortage of qualified domestic bidders. Despite the agreement with EPA, Navy officials decided in December 1997 to temporarily suspend any export of ships for scrapping due to (1) continuing concerns regarding environmental pollution and worker safety in foreign ship scrapping countries and (2) potential impacts on the domestic ship scrapping industry. Some of these repossessions were costly. Shortage of Qualified Bidders
The domestic ship scrapping industry has historically been small. Both the MARAD and Navy awards were made to the same firm. Agencies’ Efforts to Address the Backlog
In 1996, the Navy and MARAD identified and began implementing a number of initiatives to address domestic ship scrapping performance problems. It is too early to assess the impact of the 1996 initiatives, and the agencies are still reviewing the extent to which they will implement the panel’s recommendations. Actions taken to improve the general management of the ship scrapping program and to address contractor concerns about the profitability of ship scrapping included advertising and selling ships by lot and allowing contractors to remove the ships from government storage as they are ready to be scrapped, holding periodic industry workshops to inform contractors of what is expected of them in the scrapping of federal surplus ships and obtain feedback from the contractors on their concerns and desires, evaluating the potential for removing more of the hazardous materials before the ships are advertised for sale, and notifying state and local regulators where the ship scrapping will be performed after contracts are awarded. Further, the process for deciding whether to accept and ultimately implement the panel’s recommendations is informal. Also, no procedures have been established for implementing the recommendations that are accepted. Scope and Methodology
To identify the factors contributing to the backlog of federal ships available for scrapping, we performed relevant work at the principal agencies identified to possess and dispose of federal surplus ships for scrapping—the Departments of Defense, Navy, and Army; the Defense Logistics Agency and its Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS); the Department of Transportation, including the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Coast Guard; the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the General Services Administration. Furthermore, we asked for feedback from members of the domestic industry on the potential impact of the foreign scrapping on the domestic industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of federal ship scrapping programs, focusing on: (1) the factors contributing to the backlog of about 200 surplus ships waiting to be scrapped; and (2) federal agencies' efforts to address the backlog.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) key factors contributing to the current backlog of surplus ships awaiting scrapping are the Navy's downsizing following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the unavailability of overseas scrapping, and a shortage of qualified domestic scrappers; (2) as a result, the backlog of Navy ships to be scrapped has increased since 1991 from 25 to 127; (3) overseas scrapping has been suspended because of legal constraints on the export of polychlorinated biphenyls for disposal; (4) a 1997 agreement to resume overseas scrapping has been temporarily suspended largely because of concerns about environmental and worker safety problems in foreign countries and the impact of foreign scrapping on the domestic industry; (5) progress in reducing the backlog using domestic scrappers has been limited; (6) one reason has been domestic contractor performance difficulties; (7) a second reason has been a shortage of qualified domestic bidders; (8) between the beginning of 1996 and the end of 1997, the Navy and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) requested scrapping bids on 19 ships, but only 4 were actually sold--all to the same domestic bidder--because of the limited number of qualified bidders; (9) since then, MARAD has sold an additional 11 ships for scrapping; (10) federal agencies have identified and begun implementing a number of initiatives to address some of the specific performance issues associated with domestic scrapping; (11) since a key performance issue was contractor noncompliance with environmental and worker safety requirements, several of the initiatives provide for increased screening of contractors prior to award and increased oversight of the performing contractor after award; (12) other initiatives are intended to help attract more qualified domestic bidders; (13) it is too early to assess the impact of these initiatives because few ships have been scrapped since their implementation; (14) additional recommendations for addressing both domestic and overseas scrapping issues were made in April 1998 by an interagency panel; (15) the panel's recommendations expand on the actions to address contracting and oversight problems; (16) however, they only generally address key issues relating to government actions to expand the domestic industry and the scrapping of federal ships in foreign countries; (17) the process for deciding whether to accept and ultimately implement the panel's recommendations is informal; and (18) also, no procedures have been established for implementing the recommendations that are accepted. |
gao_GAO-14-705T | gao_GAO-14-705T_0 | We Obtained Coverage in 11 of 12 Applications Made through Undercover Testing
The federal Marketplace approved coverage for 11 of our 12 fictitious applicants who initially applied online, or by telephone. Applicants for coverage are required to attest that they have not intentionally provided false or untrue information. For each of the approved applications, we were ultimately directed to submit supporting documentation to the Marketplace, such as proof of income, identity, or citizenship. However, we subsequently were able to obtain coverage for all 6 of these applications begun online by completing them by phone. The contractor was unable to resolve the identity issues. For our 6 phone applications, we successfully completed the application process, with the exception of one applicant who declined to provide a Social Security number and was not allowed to proceed. Preliminary Results of Back-End Controls Testing
The Marketplace is required to seek postapproval documentation in the case of certain application “inconsistencies”—instances in which information an applicant has provided does not match information contained in data sources that the Marketplace uses for eligibility verification at time of application, or such information is not available. As of July 17, 2014, we had received notifications indicating the Marketplace had reviewed portions of the counterfeit documentation sent for two applications. However, according to contractor executives, due to system limitations, processing of income and citizenship/immigration status inconsistencies—which together account for 75 percent of inconsistency volume—began in May and June 2014.cannot be matched to their respective applications, and become “orphans.” As of mid-July 2014, the contractor said, there had been about 227,000 such documents. According to CMS officials, its document processing contractor is not required under its contract to authenticate documentation or to conduct forensic analysis. Executives of the contractor concurred, and told us the review standard the contractor uses is that it accepts documents as authentic unless there are obvious alterations. We will continue to assess CMS’s management of the application and approval process through our ongoing work and consider any recommendations needed to address these issues. We Were Unable to Obtain In-Person Assistance in Five of Six Undercover Attempts to Test Income-Verification Controls
We attempted six in-person applications, in order to test income- verification controls only. Specifically, we sought to determine the extent to which, if any, in-person assisters would encourage our applicants to misstate income in order to qualify for either of the income-based PPACA subsidies. During our testing, we visited one in-person assister and obtained information on whether our stated income would qualify for subsidy. One of the three non-Navigators initially said it provides assistance only after people already have an application in progress. The non- Navigator did offer to assist us with an application, but the HealthCare.gov website was down. After we did so, this non-Navigator did not respond to three follow-up phone calls. The third non-Navigator did not provide assistance, telling us it handles only applications for Medicaid. In these follow-up attempts, we again encountered difficulty in obtaining assistance for our applicants, including the following:
For one test, we visited two additional locations beyond the initial location before finding an in-person assister at a third who correctly told us our income was insufficient to qualify for subsidy. CMS Does Not Yet Have the Capability to Identify Those Who Have Paid for Policies, Limiting Our Ability to Analyze Enrollment
The federal government, in administering the two income-based subsidies, makes payments to issuers of health insurance on behalf of eligible consumers who have enrolled in a qualified health plan. Thus, a key factor in analyzing enrollment in Marketplace coverage—and federal expenditures and subsidies that follow—is the ability to identify which applicants approved for coverage have subsequently paid premiums and put policies in force. Issuers have reported this information to CMS, but the agency has not yet created a system to process the information, according to CMS officials. In May 2014, CMS officials told us that work is underway to implement such a system. However, CMS does not have a timeline for completing and deploying this work. As a result, under current operations, CMS must rely on health insurance issuers to self-report enrollment data reflecting individuals for whom CMS owes the issuers the income-based subsidies arising from obtaining coverage through the Marketplace. Appendix I: Legal Appendix
This appendix provides background on certain requirements related to the submission of applications and eligibility-verification procedures to enroll in qualified health plans and qualify for income-based subsidies under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereafter PPACA). These verification steps include validating an applicant’s Social Security number, if one is provided; verifying an applicant’s citizenship, status as a national, or lawful presence with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and/or the Department of Homeland Security; verifying household income and family size against the most recent tax-return data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as well as data on Social Security benefits from the SSA; and verifying whether the applicant is eligible for health coverage under another qualifying plan or program that would preclude eligibility for subsidy purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health insurance exchanges, or marketplaces, where consumers can compare and select private health insurance plans. The act also expands the availability of subsidized health care coverage. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the net federal cost of coverage provisions at $36 billion for fiscal year 2014, with subsidies and related spending accounting for a large portion. PPACA requires marketplaces to verify application information to determine enrollment eligibility and, if applicable, eligibility for subsidies.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to controls for application and enrollment for coverage through the federal marketplace. This testimony discusses preliminary observations on (1) results of undercover testing in which we obtained health care coverage; (2) additional undercover testing, in which we sought to obtain consumer assistance with our applications; and (3) delays in the development of a system needed to analyze enrollment.
This statement is based on preliminary analysis from GAO's ongoing review for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters. GAO created fictitious identities to make applications through the federally facilitated exchange in several states by telephone, online, and in-person. The number and locations of the target areas are not disclosed because of ongoing testing. The results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the overall applicant or enrollment populations. GAO expects to issue a final report next year.
What GAO Found
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) officials told us they have internal controls for health care coverage eligibility determinations. GAO's undercover testing addressed processes for identity- and income-verification, with preliminary results revealing questions as follows:
For 12 applicant scenarios, GAO tested "front-end" controls for verifying an applicant's identity or citizenship/immigration status. Marketplace applications require attestations that information provided is neither false nor untrue. In its applications, GAO also stated income at a level to qualify for income-based subsidies to offset premium costs and reduce cost sharing. For 11 of these 12 applications, which were made by phone and online using fictitious identities, GAO obtained subsidized coverage. For one application, the marketplace denied coverage because GAO's fictitious applicant did not provide a Social Security number as part of the test.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires the marketplace to provide eligibility while identified inconsistencies between information provided by the applicant and by government sources are being resolved through submission of supplementary documentation from the applicant. For its 11 approved applications, GAO was directed to submit supporting documents, such as proof of income or citizenship; but, GAO found the document submission and review process to be inconsistent among these applications. As of July 2014, GAO had received notification that portions of the fake documentation sent for two enrollees had been verified. According to CMS, its document processing contractor is not required to authenticate documentation; the contractor told us it does not seek to detect fraud and accepts documents as authentic unless there are obvious alterations. As of July 2014, GAO continues to receive subsidized coverage for the 11 applications, including 3 applications where GAO did not provide any requested supporting documents.
For 6 applicant scenarios, GAO sought to test the extent to which, if any, in-person assisters would encourage applicants to misstate income in order to qualify for income-based subsidies. However, GAO was unable to obtain in-person assistance in 5 of the 6 initial undercover attempts. For example, one in-person assister initially said that he provides assistance only after people already have an application in progress. The in-person assister was not able to assist us because HealthCare.gov website was down and did not respond to follow-up phone calls. One in-person assister correctly advised the GAO undercover investigator that the stated income would not qualify for subsidy.
A key factor in analyzing enrollment is to identify approved applicants who put their policies in force by paying premiums. However, CMS officials stated that they do not yet have the electronic capability to identify such enrollees. As a result, CMS must rely on health insurance issuers to self-report enrollment data used to determine how much CMS owes the issuers for the income-based subsidies. Work is underway to implement such a system, according to CMS, but the agency does not have a timeline for completing and deploying it. GAO is continuing to look at these issues and will consider recommendations to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-17 | gao_GAO-16-17_0 | 1.) Finally, the department engages in some coordinated planning, but lacks comprehensive planning and oversight to ensure that its many workforce efforts address identified national needs. HHS’s Strategic Plan Lacks Specific Strategies for Its Health Care Workforce Programs Related to Their Effect on Access and Quality
HHS’s strategic plan includes broad strategies to which the department’s health care workforce efforts relate, but these strategies do not focus specifically on workforce issues. For example, as part of one strategy, HHS seeks to improve access to comprehensive primary and preventative medical services in historically underserved areas and to support federally funded health centers. While it is important to have specific performance measures that assess individual programs, health care workforce is an issue that straddles many different programs and HHS agencies, and therefore it is also important to have broader measures that assess how these individual programs contribute to the department’s overall effectiveness in developing the health care workforce to improve access to care. According to HHS, over three-quarters of the 72 health care workforce programs had performance measures tracked by the relevant HHS agency. HHS Coordinates Some Health Care Workforce Planning, but Lacks Comprehensive and Ongoing Oversight to Ensure Needs Are Fully Addressed
HHS does not have a consistent and ongoing effort to coordinate all of the workforce planning efforts and resources that are distributed across the department’s various offices and agencies. Recently, multiple stakeholders reported that a more coordinated federal effort—possibly managed at the department level—could help to ensure a more adequate supply and distribution of the health care workforce, especially given changes in the delivery of care. For example, in examining federal GME funding, IOM and COGME each stated that the GME program lacks the oversight and infrastructure to track outcomes, reward performance, and respond to emerging workforce challenges. HHS’s Largest Health Care Workforce Programs Do Not Target Areas of Identified Need, Although Smaller Programs Do
Our review showed that although HHS’s health care workforce programs support education and training for multiple professions, the biggest programs do not specifically target areas of workforce need. The two CMS Medicare GME programs, which accounted for 77 percent of HHS’s fiscal year 2014 obligations for health care workforce development, support hospital-based training of the many different types of physician specialties. However, HHS cannot specifically target existing Medicare GME program funds to projected workforce needs—such as primary care and rural areas— because the disbursement of these funds is governed by requirements unrelated to workforce shortages. HHS Has Limited Authority to Target Health Care Workforce Programs to Areas of Need and Has Taken Some Steps To Do So
According to HHS officials, the department generally has limited authority to better target workforce programs to address projected health care workforce needs. According to these officials, the agency has used demonstration authorities to test new payment models for the Medicaid GME program. Because the responsibilities for HHS’s workforce efforts, programs, and resources are dispersed among many agencies, it is important that HHS have a department-wide approach regarding its strategies and the actions needed to ensure an adequate supply and distribution of the nation’s workforce. HHS has proposed additional authorities in the past, but these have not been enacted, and HHS officials acknowledge that these additional authorities may not be sufficient to fully address the existing program limitations identified by stakeholders. Without a comprehensive and coordinated approach to program planning, HHS cannot fully identify the gaps between existing programs and national needs, identify actions needed to address these gaps, or determine whether additional legislative proposals are needed to ensure that its programs fully meet workforce needs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that HHS workforce efforts meet national needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services develop a comprehensive and coordinated planning approach to guide HHS’s health care workforce development programs—including education, training, and payment programs—that includes performance measures to more clearly determine the extent to which these programs are meeting the department’s strategic goal of strengthening health care; identifies and communicates to stakeholders any gaps between existing programs and future health care workforce needs identified in HRSA’s workforce projection reports; identifies actions needed to address identified gaps; and identifies and communicates to Congress the legislative authority, if any, the Department needs to implement the identified actions. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
An adequate, well-trained, and diverse health care workforce is essential for providing access to quality health care services. The federal government—largely through HHS—funds programs to help ensure a sufficient supply and distribution of health care professionals. Some experts suggest that maintaining access to care could require an increase in the supply of providers, while others suggest access can be maintained by, among other things, greater use of technology.
GAO was asked to review HHS's workforce efforts. In this report, GAO examines (1) HHS's planning efforts for ensuring an adequate supply and distribution of the nation's health care workforce and (2) the extent to which individual HHS health care workforce programs contribute to meeting national needs. GAO reviewed strategic planning documents, workforce projection reports, and other related documents obtained from HHS agencies; interviewed HHS officials; and analyzed performance measures for the largest health care workforce programs operated by HHS.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) engages in some planning for the 72 health care workforce programs administered by its agencies, but lacks comprehensive planning and oversight to ensure that these efforts meet national health care workforce needs. HHS's current strategic plan includes broad strategies—such as improving access to comprehensive primary and preventive medical services in historically underserved areas and supporting federally funded health centers—to which department officials said the health care workforce programs relate. However, these strategies do not explicitly reference workforce issues or specify how these programs contribute towards HHS's current strategic goals and performance targets. The health care workforce performance measures tracked by HHS and its agencies are specific to individual workforce programs and do not fully assess the overall adequacy of the department's workforce efforts. The Office of the Secretary leads workforce planning efforts, but it does not have an ongoing formal effort to ensure that the workforce programs distributed across its different agencies are aligned with national needs. Multiple external stakeholders, such as the Institute of Medicine and the Council on Graduate Medical Education, have reported that graduate medical education (GME) funding lacks the oversight and infrastructure to track outcomes, reward performance, and respond to emerging workforce challenges and that a more coordinated effort could help to ensure an adequate supply and distribution of the health care workforce. Consistent with leading practices, a coordinated department-wide planning effort is important to ensure that these efforts are aligned and managed effectively to meet workforce needs.
While HHS's workforce programs support education and training for multiple health professions, its largest programs do not specifically target areas of workforce need, such as for primary care and rural providers. For example, its two Medicare GME programs accounted for about three-quarters of HHS's fiscal year 2014 obligations for health care workforce development. However, HHS cannot target existing Medicare GME program funds to projected workforce shortage areas because the programs were established by statute and funds are disbursed based on a statutory formula that is unrelated to projected workforce needs. HHS has limited legal authority to target certain existing programs to areas of emerging needs and has taken steps to do so within its existing authorities, such as the approval of certain demonstration projects to test new payment models for Medicaid GME funds. Further, the President's budget has proposed additional authorities that would allow HHS to implement new education and training programs and payment reforms intended to support primary care providers, but these authorities have not been enacted and officials did not know the extent to which they would be sufficient to address identified needs. External stakeholders have recommended additional reforms that would allow these programs to better targets areas of need. Without a comprehensive and coordinated planning approach, HHS cannot fully identify gaps and actions to address those gaps, including determining whether additional legislative proposals are needed to ensure that its programs fully meet workforce needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS develop a comprehensive and coordinated planning approach that includes performance measures, identifies any gaps between its workforce programs and national needs, and identifies actions to close these gaps. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-221 | gao_GAO-16-221_0 | Background
Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), CMS is responsible for overseeing Medicaid at the federal level, while states are responsible for the day-to-day operations of their Medicaid programs. For example, states are not permitted to exclude coverage of mandatory benefits, such as NEMT, under their state plans, but they may do so by obtaining a waiver of the requirement under a demonstration. CMS has required those states that have obtained approval to exclude the NEMT benefit for one year under a demonstration to submit annual evaluations on the effect of this change on access to care, which will inform the agency’s decision to approve any extension requests. We also previously reported that there are many federal programs, including Medicaid, that provide the NEMT benefit to the transportation-disadvantaged population. State Efforts to Exclude Medicaid NEMT Benefits Are Not Widespread
Among the 30 states that expanded Medicaid as of September 30, 2015, 25 reported that they did not undertake efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees and were not considering doing so. Three states reported pursuing such efforts, and two states did not respond to our inquiry, although CMS indicated that neither of these states undertook efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit. 1.) However, only Indiana and Iowa had received approval from HHS for these waivers as of September 30, 2015, while Arizona was still seeking approval. Indiana: Indiana’s effort to exclude the NEMT benefit from coverage pre-dates PPACA and is not specific to newly eligible enrollees under the state’s expansion. Evaluations of Efforts to Exclude the NEMT Benefit in Two States Assess Comparability of Access for Enrollees With and Without Benefit
The two states that obtained approval to exclude the NEMT benefit for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees—Indiana and Iowa—are at different stages of evaluating the effect this will have on enrollees and have different time frames for reporting their results. According to a draft of the evaluation design, the state plans to survey enrollees and providers to compare the experiences of Medicaid enrollees with and without the NEMT benefit with respect to missed appointments, preventative care, and overall health outcomes; the state also seeks to determine whether enrollees residing in certain parts of the state are more affected by a lack of this benefit. However, looking within the group of newly eligible enrollees without the NEMT benefit, the Iowa evaluation found that those with lower incomes— under 100 percent of the FPL—tended to need more transportation assistance and have more unmet needs than those with higher incomes. Research and Advocacy Groups Raised Concerns Regarding the Implications of Altering the Transportation Benefit for Newly Eligible Enrollees
Officials from the 10 research and advocacy groups we interviewed— which represent Medicaid enrollees, underserved populations, and health care providers—noted potential concerns of excluding the NEMT benefit as it relates to enrollee access to services and costs of coverage. Access to Services: Officials from 9 of the 10 groups we interviewed indicated that excluding the NEMT benefit would impede newly eligible enrollees’ ability to access health care services, particularly individuals living in rural or underserved areas, as well as those with chronic health conditions. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a federal-state health financing program for certain low-income individuals, offers NEMT benefits to individuals who are unable to provide their own transportation to medical appointments. This benefit can be an important safety net for program enrollees as research has identified the lack of transportation as affecting Medicaid enrollees' access to services. Under PPACA, states can opt to expand eligibility for Medicaid to certain adults. However, some states have excluded the NEMT benefit for these newly eligible enrollees by obtaining a waiver of the requirement under the authority of a Medicaid demonstration project.
GAO was asked to explore state efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees, and the potential implications of such efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which states have excluded this benefit for newly eligible enrollees, and (2) the potential implications of such efforts on enrollees' access to services.
GAO contacted the 30 states that expanded Medicaid under PPACA as of September 30, 2015; reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials in the 3 states that have taken efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit; reviewed prior research on transportation for disadvantaged populations; and interviewed officials from CMS, the federal agency that oversees Medicaid, and 10 research and advocacy groups based on referrals from subject-matter experts and knowledge of the NEMT benefit.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
States' efforts to exclude nonemergency medical transportation (NEMT) benefits from enrollees who are newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) are not widespread. Of the 30 states that expanded Medicaid as of September 30, 2015, 25 reported that they did not undertake efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit for newly eligible enrollees, 3 states reported pursuing such efforts, and 2 states—New Jersey and Ohio—did not respond to GAO's inquiry. However, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), indicated that neither New Jersey nor Ohio undertook efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit.
Two of the three states pursuing efforts to exclude the NEMT benefit—Indiana and Iowa—have received waivers from CMS to exclude the benefit, and are in different stages of evaluating the effect these waivers have on enrollees' access to care.
Indiana's draft evaluation design describes plans to survey enrollee and provider experiences to assess any effect from excluding the NEMT benefit.
Iowa's evaluation largely found comparable access between enrollees with and without the NEMT benefit; however, it also found that newly eligible enrollees beneath the federal poverty level tended to need more transportation assistance or have more unmet needs than those with higher incomes.
Officials from the groups that GAO interviewed identified potential implications of excluding the NEMT benefit, such as a decrease in enrollee access to services and an increase in the costs of coverage. For example, nearly all of the groups indicated that excluding the NEMT benefit would impede access to services, particularly for those living in rural areas, as well as those with chronic health conditions. |
gao_NSIAD-95-44 | gao_NSIAD-95-44_0 | DOD buys tools either from GSA or by local purchase. 1.) The military services also have not provided adequate guidance to installations and operating units. Cost Information Is Not Uniformly Maintained
DOD has insufficient cost data at the headquarters, command, and installation levels to identify and track hand tool purchases, inventory levels, and losses. DOD headquarters does not maintain cost information reflecting hand tool purchases, inventory levels, and losses. Some of the personnel authorized to purchase tools also were responsible for establishing the tool requirements for the unit. Inventory Records Are Inadequate
At all units we visited, either inventory records were inaccurate or no records were available that could be used to identify and track hand tool purchases and related receipts, issues, and on-hand quantities. The Air Force units we visited at Langley Air Force Base did not have records showing receipts and issues. This review identified a need for better procedures and controls. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions to ensure that hand tool purchases and inventories are adequately controlled:
Require that the military services and major commands provide guidance to installations and operating units specifying the needed internal controls over hand tools. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD agreed that, to varying degrees, the military services’ policies and procedures governing the purchase and accountability of hand tools are inadequate (see app. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and the military services’ policies and procedures for controlling hand tools. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military services' controls over hand tools, focusing on: (1) whether the services' policies and procedures for preventing the loss or unnecessary purchase of hand tools are adequate; (2) whether information is available on the costs associated with missing, lost, and stolen hand tools; and (3) the extent to which military installations control hand tool inventories and review their hand tool controls.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it cannot determine the extent to which DOD purchases unnecessary hand tools because DOD does not maintain cost data or track tool purchases and inventory levels; (2) DOD and the military services have not provided sufficient guidance and oversight to ensure that hand tools are adequately safeguarded and controlled at military installations; (3) military units do not have adequate internal controls or records to properly account for tool purchases and manage inventories; (4) many military units permitted personnel to purchase tools without prior authorization, could not identify tool purchases and trace them to inventory records, and had discrepancies between available inventory records and actual tool quantities; (5) Air Force operating units purchased many new warranted tools that were unnecessary and made local purchases even though the tools were available through normal DOD supply channels; and (6) in response to a GAO recommendation, the Air Force advised its major commands to comply with established acquisition policies and procedures. |
gao_GAO-01-1073T | gao_GAO-01-1073T_0 | Generally, Code Red and Code Red II are both “worms,” which are attacks that propagate themselves through networks without any user intervention or interaction. They both take advantage of a flaw in a component of versions 4.0 and 5.0 of Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS) Web server software. SirCam is a malicious computer virus that spreads primarily through E- mail. Once activated on an infected computer, the virus searches through a select folder and mails user files acting as a “Trojan horse” to E-mail addresses in the user’s address book. In addition to spreading, the virus can attempt to delete a victim’s hard drive or fill the remaining free space on the hard drive making it impossible to perform common tasks such as saving files or printing. On July 19, the Code Red worm infected more than 250,000 systems in just 9 hours, according to the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). It is allegedly responsible for the leaking of secret documents from the government of Ukraine. Third, agencies do not have an effective information security program to prevent and respond to attacks—both external attacks, like Code Red, Code Red II, and SirCam, and internal attempts to manipulate or damage systems and data. Agencies also often lack effective access controls to their computer resources and consequently cannot protect these assets against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. We reported earlier this year that several agencies have taken significant steps to redesign and strengthen their information security programs. Lastly, the Congress recently enacted legislation to provide a comprehensive framework for establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal government operations and assets. | What GAO Found
Organizations and individuals have recently had to contend with particularly vexing computer attacks. The most notable is Code Red, but potentially more damaging are Code Red II and SirCam. Together, these attacks have infected millions of computer users, shut down websites, slowed Internet service, and disrupted businesses and government operations. They have already caused billions of dollars of damage, and their full effects have yet to be completely assessed. Code Red and Code Red II are both "worms," which are attacks that propagate themselves through networks without any user intervention or interaction. Both take advantage of a flaw in a component of versions 4.0 and 5.0 of Microsoft's Internet Information Services Web server software. SirCam is a malicious computer virus that spreads primarily through E-mail. Once activated on an infected computer, the virus searches through a select folder and mails user files acting as a "Trojan horse" to E-mail addresses in the user's address book. In addition to spreading, the virus can delete a victim's hard drive or fill the remaining free space on the hard drive, making it impossible to save files or print. On July 19, 2001, the Code Red worm infected more than 250,000 systems in just nine hours, causing more than $2.4 billion in economic losses. SirCam is allegedly responsible for the leaking of secret documents from the Ukrainian government. U.S. government agencies do not have an effective information security program to prevent and respond to these attacks and often lack effective access controls to their computer resources and consequently cannot protect these assets against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. However, several agencies have taken significant steps to redesign and strengthen their information security programs. Also, Congress recently enacted legislation to provide a comprehensive framework for establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.