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gao_GAO-06-119 | gao_GAO-06-119_0 | According to FEMA, about 95 percent of the NFIP policies in force are written by insurance agents who represent 95 private insurance companies that issue policies and adjust flood claims in their own names. Due to Statutory and Regulatory Limitations, NFIP Payments May Not Cover All Costs to Repair or Replace Flood-Damaged Property
The amount of insurance coverage available to homeowners under the NFIP is limited, based on requirements set forth in statute and regulation. Because of these statutory and regulatory limitations, insurance payments to claimants for flood damage may not cover all of the costs of repairing or replacing damaged property. Because of this statutory ceiling, homes that could sustain more than $250,000 in damage cannot be insured to reflect full replacement costs. The SFIP covers only “direct physical loss by or from flood.” It does not cover losses resulting from events other than flood, such as windstorms or earth movements. In addition, FEMA’s program contractor is to reinspect a sample of claims adjustments for every flood event to identify errors, among other things. As a result, FEMA did not meet our internal control standard that federal agencies have internal controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved and that program operations are effective and efficient. Without a statistically valid sampling methodology, the agency cannot project the results of these monitoring and oversight activities to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling their responsibilities for the NFIP. In April 2004, about 7 months after Hurricane Isabel, FEMA established a task force to review claims settlements based on requests by Hurricane Isabel claimants. For example: Task force agreed with the original determination that flood damage to parts of a basement were not covered. Based on our analysis, reviewers allowed additional payments most frequently to: Repair or replace building or personal property items that the initial adjuster did not include in the loss report. The 6-month statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. Without establishing a roadmap and a schedule for meeting mandated time frames that have already elapsed, FEMA is limited in its ability to project when program improvements will be made. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve FEMA’s oversight and management of the NFIP, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response to take the following two actions: use a methodologically valid approach to draw statistically representative samples of claims for underwriting and claims portions of operational reviews and for quality assurance reinspections of claims by general adjusters; and develop documented plans with milestones for implementing requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to provide policyholders with a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that insurance agents meet minimum NFIP education and training requirements. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address provisions in the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 for a GAO study and report on issues related to the processing of flood insurance claims and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) oversight and management of the program, we assessed (1) the statutory and regulatory limitations on homeowners’ coverage under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP); (2) FEMA’s role in monitoring and overseeing the NFIP; (3) FEMA’s response to concerns regarding NFIP payments for Hurricane Isabel claims; and (4) the status of FEMA’s implementation of requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of Hurricane Isabel in 2003, GAO was mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to report on issues related to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and its oversight and management by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Private insurance companies sell NFIP policies and adjust claims, while a private program contractor helps FEMA administer the NFIP. To address this mandate, this report assesses (1) the statutory and regulatory limitations on coverage for homeowners under the NFIP; (2) FEMA's role in monitoring and overseeing the NFIP; (3) FEMA's response to concerns regarding NFIP payments for Hurricane Isabel claims; and (4) the status of FEMA's implementation of provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. Although impacts from Hurricane Katrina were not part of the report's scope, GAO recognizes that this disaster presents the NFIP with unprecedented challenges.
What GAO Found
The amount of insurance coverage available to homeowners under the NFIP is limited by requirements set forth in statute and FEMA's regulations, which include FEMA's standard flood insurance policy. As a result of these limitations, insurance payments to claimants for flood damage may not cover all of the costs of repairing or replacing flood-damaged property. For example, homes that could sustain more than $250,000 in damage cannot be insured to their full replacement cost, thus limiting claims to this statutory ceiling. In addition, NFIP policies cover only direct physical loss by or from flood. Therefore, losses resulting primarily from a preexisting structural weakness in a home or losses resulting from events other than flood, such as windstorms, are not covered by NFIP policies. To meet its monitoring and oversight responsibilities, FEMA is to conduct periodic operational reviews of the 95 private insurance companies that participate in the NFIP, and FEMA's program contractor is to check the accuracy of claims settlements by doing quality assurance reinspections of a sample of claims adjustments for every flood event. FEMA did not use a statistically valid method for sampling files to be reviewed in these monitoring and oversight activities. As a result, FEMA cannot project the results of these reviews to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling responsibilities for the NFIP--actions necessary for FEMA to have reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved. In the months after Hurricane Isabel, FEMA took steps intended to address concerns that arose from that flood event. In April 2004, FEMA established a task force to review claims settlements from Hurricane Isabel claimants. As a result of task force reviews, almost half of the 2,294 policyholders who sought a review received additional payments. The additional payment amount averaged $3,300 more than the original settlement--for a total average settlement of about $32,400 per claimant. In most cases, the additional funds were for repairing or replacing buildings or property not included in the initial adjuster's loss determination, or to cover additional material or labor costs. FEMA has not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 requiring the agency to provide policyholders with a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that insurance agents meet minimum NFIP education and training requirements. The statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. Efforts to implement the provisions are under way, but have not yet been completed. FEMA has not developed plans with milestones for assigning accountability and projecting when program improvements will be made, so that improvements are in place to assist victims of future flood events. |
gao_GAO-16-274 | gao_GAO-16-274_0 | All international rail traffic enters and exits the continental United States through 30 different rail POEs—23 along the Canadian border and 7 along the Mexican border. As part of its mission to safeguard U.S. borders while enabling legitimate trade and travel, CBP has personnel, including CBP Agricultural Specialists, located at rail POEs that scan inbound trains for security threats. Rail Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (R-VACIS): Inbound trains slow to pass through R-VACIS, a machine that produces an image of the inside of railcars using gamma radiation technology (see fig. Crew Changes Affect Inbound and Outbound Trains on the Southern Border due to Factors Such as Differing Safety Regulations
DOT officials told us that inbound and outbound trains on the southern border are required to stop at the border to change crew due to lack of comparable rail safety regulations between the United States and Mexico. Two railroads have expressed interest in developing an international pool of crew to eliminate the need for crew changes on the southern border; however, DOT and CBP officials, and BLET representatives cited barriers to this initiative. As discussed later in this report, FRA has undertaken efforts to improve the availability of data on freight rail movements, including those at POEs. International Freight Rail Impacts Vary by Community GAO Visited, and DOT’s Data Improvement Efforts Could Help Determine the Extent of Blocked Highway- Rail Grade Crossings
Impacts of International Freight Rail on Communities GAO Visited Vary Based on Border- Specific Factors and Community Characteristics
The factors noted above—customs inspections, brake inspections, and crew changes—can slow or stop trains travelling through U.S. POEs and consequently block highway-rail grade crossings in those communities, but different POEs are affected differently. In addition, although U.S. customs inspections can block U.S. highway-rail grade crossings for inbound trains on both borders, foreign customs inspections primarily impact outbound trains on the southern border. The extent to which the above factors may result in a train blocking a highway-rail grade crossing and delaying vehicular traffic also vary due to community characteristics, such as the number and location of highway- rail grade crossings and the availability of overpasses. Local officials attribute issues related to blocked highway-rail grade crossings in Blaine to the R-VACIS; however, as mentioned previously, CBP has adjusted its procedures to enable certain trains to go through R-VACIS faster. The effect that freight rail may have on communities also varies based on the time of day that trains pass through the rail POE communities, as well as efforts made by railroads to prevent trains from blocking certain highway-rail grade crossings. On January 6, 2015, FRA issued a final rule requiring railroads to update the inventory once every 3 years. Improved information on the average number of daily trains could better equip state and local governments to identify community congestion impacts from freight rail—including blocked highway-rail grade crossings located in POE communities along the border. In addition, in September 2014, we issued a report on freight-related community impacts and recommended, among other things, that DOT incorporate additional information to help states define and prioritize local community impacts of national freight movements, including traffic- congestion impacts, and to establish what data could be consistently collected and analyzed in order to prioritize impacts of freight on local traffic congestion in its final guidance to states in the development of their state freight plans. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT and CBP provided technical comments, which we incorporated. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes factors that affect the movement of freight rail through selected ports of entry and the actions taken by federal agencies and others to expedite freight rail in these locations, and (2) examines what is known about the impacts of freight rail operations on highway-rail grade crossings in U.S. port of entry communities. To determine the factors that affect the movement of freight rail through selected ports of entry and the actions taken to expedite freight rail in these locations, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and Department of State. These communities were selected because they had at least one inbound train on average per day from 2010 through 2014, according to DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ (BTS) Border Crossing data. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 93 trains a day on average crossed into the continental United States from Canada and Mexico in 2014, according to DOT's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). Trains enter and leave the United States through 30 POEs—23 on the northern border and 7 on the southern border. Although international freight rail plays an important role in U.S. economic and trade interests, the movement of rail through U.S. communities at the border can result in blocked highway-rail grade crossings and vehicle traffic congestion. House Report 113-464 accompanying the Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act included a provision for GAO to review the impact of international rail crossings on U.S. border communities.
This report (1) describes the factors that affect the movement of freight rail and the actions taken by federal agencies and others to expedite freight rail in selected POEs and (2) examines what is known about the impacts of freight rail operations on highway-rail grade crossings in POE communities. GAO visited four POE communities that were selected in part based on BTS's 2010–2014 data on average incoming train volume. In each POE, GAO interviewed officials from local and state governments, the railroad, CBP, and FRA. GAO also interviewed officials from DOT, CBP, the Border Trade Alliance, and the Association of American Railroads.
What GAO Found
Factors such as inspections and crew changes affect freight rail movements in the four U.S. border port of entry (POE) communities GAO visited, which can result in blocked highway-rail grade crossings. Federal agencies and others have taken actions to expedite rail in these communities. As part of its mission to safeguard the border, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) scans inbound rail cars on both borders using the Rail Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (R-VACIS), a machine used to detect anomalies and threats to national security. CBP generally requires trains to slow in order to pass through R-VACIS. To expedite freight rail and reduce blocked highway-rail grade crossings, CBP, for example, adjusted its procedures to allow certain trains to go through R-VACIS faster at two POEs on the northern border. Similarly, crew changes can result in stopped trains and blocked U.S. highway-rail grade crossings, particularly on the southern border. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) officials stated that crew changes are required due to differences in safety regulations between the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Mexico. Railroads have expressed interest in eliminating such crew changes but face challenges such as FRA and labor union safety concerns.
The impacts of international freight rail on highway-rail grade crossings in communities GAO visited vary based on border-specific factors and community characteristics, and DOT improvement efforts including the issuance of a final rule could provide better data for help determining these impacts in the future. Inspections and crew changes, as well as rail traffic levels, can vary across POEs. For example, some factors play a role at southern, but not northern POEs. In addition, freight rail impacts vary based on community characteristics such as the availability of overpasses. State and local officials face data limitations, which reduce their ability to quantify rail-related community impacts. For example, local officials often do not have data on the number and length of trains passing through the community. In September 2014, GAO recommended that DOT improve the availability of national data to assess freight impacts on traffic congestion. DOT agreed and has actions under way. In January 2015, the FRA issued a final rule requiring railroads to update FRA's highway-rail crossing inventory once every 3 years. Prior to this rule, railroads voluntarily submitted data that were not always updated. DOT data efforts could better equip state and local governments to define the extent of blocked highway-rail grade crossings in communities nationwide, including at rail border communities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT and CBP provided technical comments, which were incorporated. |
gao_GAO-05-277 | gao_GAO-05-277_0 | Analysis of Reutilization Program Identifies Billions of Dollars in Waste and Inefficiency
Our analysis of $18.6 billion in fiscal year 2002 and 2003 excess commodity disposal activity identified $2.5 billion in excess items that were reported to be in new, unused, and excellent condition (A condition). Although federal regulations and DOD policy require reutilization of excess property in good condition, to the extent possible, our analysis showed that DOD units only reutilized $295 million (12 percent) of these items. The remaining $2.2 billion (88 percent) of the $2.5 billion in disposals of A- condition excess commodities were not reutilized, but instead were transferred, donated, sold, or destroyed. Unnecessary Commodity Purchases
Our analysis of fiscal year 2002 and 2003 DLA commodity purchases and DRMS excess property inventory data identified numerous instances in which the military services ordered and purchased items from DLA at the same time identical items—items with the same NSN—that were reported to be in new, unused, and excellent condition were available for reutilization. Case Study Requisitions of New and Unused DOD Commodities
To illustrate waste and inefficiency associated with transfers and donations of excess A-condition commodities to entities outside of DOD, we used the GSA Federal Disposal System, available to all federal agencies, to requisition several new and unused excess DOD commodity items, including a medical instrument chest, two power supply units, and two circuit cards, at no charge. These items had an original DOD acquisition cost of $55,817, and we paid only $5 shipping cost to obtain all of them. We paid a total of $1,466 for these items, about 12 cents on the dollar, including buyer’s premium, tax, and shipping cost. We found key factors in the overall DRMS management control environment that contributed to waste and inefficiency in the reutilization program, including (1) unreliable excess property inventory data; (2) inadequate DRMS oversight, accountability, physical control, and safeguarding of property; and (3) outdated, nonintegrated excess inventory and supply systems. Damage to GAO purchase of bandages and medical supplies. Improved management of DOD’s excess property and a strong reutilization program could help save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The purpose of our audit was to assess the economy and efficiency of the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property program. Where we found controls to be ineffective, we tested them further to determine (1) the magnitude and (2) root causes of associated waste and inefficiency. Magnitude of Excess Property Reutilization Program Waste and Inefficiency
To determine the overall magnitude of waste and inefficiency related to the DOD excess property reutilization program, we identified fiscal year 2002 and 2003 excess commodity disposal activity by property condition code and examined the extent of DOD reutilization of excess items in new, unused, and excellent condition (A-condition) versus transfers, donations, public sales, and other disposals outside of DOD through scrap, demilitarization, and hazardous materials contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Based on limited previous GAO work that identified examples of purchases of new items at the same time identical items in excellent or good condition were excessed, GAO was asked to assess the overall economy and efficiency of the Department of Defense (DOD) program for excess property reutilization (reuse). Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) whether and to what extent the program included waste and inefficiency and (2) root causes of any waste and inefficiency. GAO was also asked to provide detailed examples of waste and inefficiency and the related causes. GAO's methodology included an assessment of controls, analysis of DOD excess inventory data, statistical sampling at selected sites, and detailed case studies of many items.
What GAO Found
DOD does not have management controls in place to assure that excess inventory is reutilized to the maximum extent possible. Of $18.6 billion in excess commodity disposals in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, $2.5 billion were reported to be in new, unused, and excellent condition. DOD units reutilized only $295 million (12 percent) of these items. The remaining $2.2 billion (88 percent) includes significant waste and inefficiency because new, unused, and excellent condition items were transferred and donated outside of DOD, sold for pennies on the dollar, or destroyed. DOD units continued to buy many of these same items. GAO identified at least $400 million of commodity purchases when identical new, unused, and excellent condition items were available for reutilization. GAO also identified hundreds of millions of dollars in reported lost, damaged, or stolen excess property, including sensitive military technology items, which contributed to reutilization program waste and inefficiency. Further, excess property improperly stored outdoors for several months was damaged by wind, rain, and hurricanes. To illustrate continuing reutilization program waste and inefficiency, GAO ordered and purchased at little or no cost several new and unused excess commodities that DOD continued to buy and utilize, including tents, boots, power supplies, circuit cards, and medical supplies. GAO paid a total of $1,471, including tax and shipping cost, for these items, which had an original DOD acquisition cost of $68,127. Root causes for reutilization program waste and inefficiency included (1) unreliable excess property inventory data; (2) inadequate oversight and physical inventory control; and (3) outdated, nonintegrated excess inventory and supply management systems. Procurement of inventory in excess of requirements also was a significant contributing factor. Improved management of DOD's excess property could save taxpayers at least hundreds of millions of dollars annually. |
gao_OSI-98-4 | gao_OSI-98-4_0 | Command Structure
The U.S. Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the UCMJ investigations process, we reviewed the record of decisions made by the Inquiry Officers and Investigating Officers in the UCMJ investigations to determine whether they were in compliance with provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. We found that the Board, in a limited time frame, conducted an extensive investigation that fulfilled the requirements of Air Force Regulation 110-14 to obtain and preserve evidence and, with a few exceptions, to report the factual circumstances relating to the accident. During our review of the Board’s investigation/report and subsequent Department of Defense reviews, plus our interviews of Operation Provide Comfort officials and participants, we noted that the Board report and/or opinion (1) did not discuss the incident F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under the Airspace Control Order, to report to the Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS about the unidentified helicopters; (2) cited a CFAC Commander statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having authority to stop the incident; and (3) erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect electronic code prevented the F-15 pilots from receiving electronic responses from the helicopters. (The Board President’s opinion appears as app. We found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence exerted during the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process. No Discussion of F-15 Pilots’ Requirement to Report to Airborne Command Element Who Had Authority to Stop Encounter
Although the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reported that incident participants, including the Black Hawk pilots, lacked knowledge of command and control guidance, such as portions of the Airspace Control Order, it did not discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility under the Airspace Control Order to report to the Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown aircraft during Operation Provide Comfort missions. A Perceived Discipline Problem and a Perceived Rush to Engage
Victims’ family members and others raised concerns about the lack of discussion in the Board report concerning the discipline of F-15 pilots in general in Operation Provide Comfort and the F-15 pilots’ perceived urgency to engage during the shootdown. This more complete information, in turn, may have raised additional questions about the actions and inaction of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element and, therefore, could have influenced subsequent disciplinary or corrective actions. On the basis of his review of administrative actions taken by higher-level authorities regarding Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown, the Air Force Chief of Staff determined that the personnel records of some involved personnel did not reflect their failure to meet Air Force standards. Consequently, we were unable to confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed military investigations made subsequent to the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters of two Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq in which 26 individuals died.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board conducted an extensive investigation that complied with evidentiary requirements and guidelines in collecting and preserving evidence and produced a report that, with a few exceptions, provided an overview of the factual circumstances relating to the accident; (2) the report focused on command and control problems, including individuals' lack of knowledge of specific procedures, but: (a) did not discuss the F-15 pilots' responsibility to report to the Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown aircraft; and (b) cited a statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having authority to stop the incident, even though evidence that the Airborne Command Element had the authority was available to the Board; (3) the Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks' use of an incorrect electronic identification code resulted in the F-15 pilots not receiving an electronic response; (4) family members and others raised concerns about a perceived general lack of discipline in the F-15 pilot community in Operation Provide Comfort and a perceived urgency by the pilots to engage during the shootdown, but the Board's report and opinion did not discuss these issues; (5) Operation Provide Comfort officials stated that the pilots' failure to contact the Airborne Command Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission discipline at the time of the incident; (6) the officials stated that, in their view, there was no reason for the F-15 pilots' urgency to engage; (7) these issues are not inconsistent with the Board President's conclusion regarding the chain of events, but including them in the Board's report may have raised additional questions about the pilots' actions and the Airborne Command Element that could have been useful in subsequent proceedings; (8) during its review of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process, GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence; (9) the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) investigations complied with provisions of the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial; (10) GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence in the UCMJ investigations, but was unable to confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence; and (11) the Air Force Chief of Staff took additional personnel actions after finding that a number of individuals' performance evaluations had not reflected their failure to meet Air Force standards. |
gao_GAO-03-654T | gao_GAO-03-654T_0 | Local health care organizations, including hospitals, are generally responsible for the initial response to a public health emergency, be it a bioterrorist attack or a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak. In the event of a large-scale infectious disease outbreak, hospitals and their emergency departments would be on the front line, and their personnel would take on the role of first responders. Officials view influenza vaccine as the cornerstone of efforts to prevent and control annual influenza outbreaks as well as pandemic influenza. State and Local Officials Reported Varying Levels of Public Health Preparedness for Infectious Diseases Outbreaks
In the cities we visited, state and local officials reported varying levels of public health preparedness to respond to an infectious disease outbreak. In addition, we found that the level of preparedness varied across the cities. Jurisdictions that had multiple prior experiences with public health emergencies were generally more prepared than those with little or no such experience prior to our site visits. We found that regional planning was lacking between states. States were working on their own plans for receiving and distributing the Strategic National Stockpile and for administering mass vaccinations. Progress Has Been Made in Elements of Public Health Preparedness, But Gaps Remain
States and local areas were addressing gaps in public health preparedness elements, such as communication, but weaknesses remained in other preparedness elements, including the response capacity of the workforce and the disease surveillance and laboratory systems. Although most hospitals across the country reported participating in basic planning activities for large-scale infectious disease outbreaks, few have acquired the medical equipment resources, such as ventilators, to handle large increases in the number of patients that may result from outbreaks of diseases such as SARS. Most Hospitals Lack Adequate Equipment, Facilities, and Staff Required to Respond to a Large-Scale Infectious Disease Outbreak
Most hospitals lack adequate equipment, isolation facilities, and staff to treat a large increase in the number of patients for an infectious disease such as SARS. Officials Have Been Slow to Finalize Plans for Federal and State Response to an Influenza Pandemic
Federal and state influenza pandemic response plans, another important component to public health preparedness, are in various stages of completion and do not consistently address the problems related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic. Federal and State Pandemic Response Plans Are Not Finalized
Federal and state officials have not finalized plans for responding to pandemic influenza. Although to a certain extent planning efforts for other emergencies can be used for pandemic response, additional planning is important to deal with specific aspects of a pandemic response. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the bioterrorist events of the fall of 2001, there has been concern that the nation may not be prepared to respond to a major public health threat, such as the current outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Whether a disease outbreak occurs naturally or is due to the intentional release of a harmful biological agent by a terrorist, much of the initial response would occur at the local level, particularly hospitals and their emergency departments. Efforts to plan for worldwide influenza pandemics are useful for understanding public health preparedness for other large-scale outbreaks. GAO was asked to examine (1) the preparedness of state and local public health agencies and organizations for responding to a large-scale infectious disease outbreak, (2) the preparedness of hospitals for responding to a large-scale infectious disease outbreak, and (3) federal and state efforts to prepare for an influenza pandemic. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Apr. 7, 2003), a survey of hospitals GAO conducted to assess their level of emergency preparedness, and information updating GAO's prior report on federal and state planning for an influenza pandemic, Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response, GAO-01-4 (Oct. 27, 2000).
What GAO Found
The efforts of state and local public health agencies to prepare for a bioterrorist attack have improved the nation's capacity to respond to infectious disease outbreaks and other major public health threats, but gaps in preparedness remain. GAO found workforce shortages and gaps in disease surveillance and laboratory facilities. The level of preparedness varied across cities GAO visited. Jurisdictions that have had multiple prior experiences with public health emergencies were generally more prepared than others. GAO found that regional planning was generally lacking between states but that states were developing their own plans for receiving and distributing medical supplies for emergencies, as well as plans for mass vaccinations in the event of a public health emergency. GAO found that many hospitals lack the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. Most hospitals across the country reported participating in basic planning activities for large-scale infectious disease outbreaks and training staff about biological agents. However, most hospitals lack adequate equipment, isolation facilities, and staff to treat a large increase in the number of patients that may result. Federal and state officials have not finalized plans for responding to pandemic influenza. These plans do not consistently address problems related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs that may be needed during a pandemic. |
gao_GAO-01-606 | gao_GAO-01-606_0 | Although production flexibility contract payments have been declining since 1996, other assistance has increased farm payments to their highest levels ever. As a result, all these payments are playing an increasingly critical role in supporting farmers, as evidenced by the fact that, in fiscal year 2000, the payments accounted for almost half of net farm income. For fiscal year 2000, USDA was authorized over $5 billion for these loans. Producers of wheat, feed grains, rice, cotton, and oilseeds have received most of the farm payments because the payments are generally based on the production of these crops. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion on defining farm size and additional analyses of the distribution of farm payments by (1) the number of farm acres operated, (2) the definition of small farms recommended by the National Commission on Small Farms, which was established by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1997 to examine the status of the nation’s small farms, (3) a new typology developed by USDA’s Economic Research Service that is based on a combination of gross agricultural sales and the occupation of the farm’s principal operator, and (4) individual recipients or payees rather than farming operation. The percentage of the farms receiving payments in all three of these size categories has increased since 1991, when about 60 percent of the large and medium farms and about 22 percent of the small farms received payments. In 1999, operators under age 35 received about 6 percent of the farm payments compared to 56 percent for operators that were 35 to 54 years old and 38 percent for those who were 55 or older. For the most part, farmers under age 35 appear to be in a financial position similar to other farmers. Although all states received some commodity payments for crop year 1999, six states—Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota— each received over a billion dollars in payments. For those who want to enter farming, the major obstacle is the cost of acquiring land, machinery, and other needed capital. Although farm program payments can help beginning farmers, the payments can also make it more difficult to get started because their value is reflected in a higher price for the farmland. Farm program payments are helpful to new farmers once they grow eligible crops. However, their share of the payments has been decreasing. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the distribution of farm payments over the past decade by farm size, the age of farm operators, crop, and state, we analyzed data from USDA’s Agriculture Resource Management Study (ARMS) surveys (formerly the Farm Costs and Returns Surveys) and its Program Payments Reporting System (PPRS). To identify the major barriers that make it difficult for young people to enter farming, we reviewed available literature and interviewed knowledgeable Farm Service Agency and Economic Research Service officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Payments to farmers under federal farm programs have reached an historic high--over $20 billion in fiscal year 2000. Nearly half of U.S. farms are receiving payments for income or price support purposes and/or for engaging in activities such as land conservation. These payments, in total, made up almost one-half of net farm income in fiscal year 2000. Despite the annual influx of billions of federal dollars to the farm sector, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that the number of farms has been declining about one percent per year, with the most notable declines in small family farms and young farmers. GAO reviewed USDA's annual surveys of U.S. farm operations--called the Agricultural Resource Management Study--and state and crop information from its Program Payments Reporting System to (1) determine the distribution of farm payments over the past decade by farm size, operators' age, state, and crop and (2) identify the major barriers that make it difficult for young people to enter farming.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in recent years, over 80 percent of farm payments have been made to large- and medium-sized farms, while small farms have received less than 20 percent of the payments. Even though small farms substantially outnumber medium and large farms, because payments are generally based on volume of production, the average payment to small farms was much less than the average payment to medium and large farms. The distribution pattern for 1999 was similar to that of the other years during the past decade, but the portion of the payments going to large farms has increased and the portion going to small farms has decreased since 1996. Farmers under age 35 received about 6 percent of farm payments while farmers ages 35 through 54 received 56 percent of the payments. Farm payments are principally directed at producers of eight major crops: wheat, corn, barley, oats, sorghum, rice, cotton, and oilseeds,. All states received a portion of payments, but six states--Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota--together received almost half of the payments in 1999. The major obstacle facing young people who wish to enter farming is the high cost of acquiring the needed assets, principally farmland and farm machinery. Although farm program payments can help beginning farmers once they have started farming, the payments can also present a hurdle because their value is reflected in a higher price to buy or lease the farmland. |
gao_GAO-04-914T | gao_GAO-04-914T_0 | S. 2543 Would Establish a Systematic Process for Identifying and Designating Proposed National Heritage Areas
As proposed, S. 2543 would establish a systematic process for determining the suitability of proposed sites as national heritage areas and for designating those areas found to be qualified. We noted that, while the Congress generally has made designation decisions with the advice of the Park Service, it has, in some instances, designated heritage areas before the agency has fully evaluated them. S. 2543, however, would create a more systematic process that would make the Congress’ designation of a heritage area contingent on the prior completion of a suitability-feasibility study and the Secretary’s determination that the area meets certain criteria. The Park Service has recently developed guidance for applying these criteria, which will help to clarify how both the existing criteria and the criteria proposed in S. 2543 could be applied to better determine the suitability of a prospective heritage area. Provisions in S. 2543 Would Limit the Amount of Federal Funds Dedicated to National Heritage Areas
S. 2543 would impose some limits on the amount of federal funds that can be provided to national heritage areas through the National Park Service’s budget. In our March 2004 testimony, we stated that from fiscal years 1997 through 2002 about half of heritage areas’ funding came from the federal government. According to data from 22 of the 24 heritage areas, the areas received about $310 million in total funding. Of this total, about $154 million came from state and local governments and private sources and another $156 million came from the federal government. Over $50 million was dedicated heritage area funds provided through the Park Service, with another $44 million coming from other Park Service programs and about $61 million from 11 other federal sources. Of this amount, not more than $1 million may be provided to an individual area in a given fiscal year and not more than $10 million over 15 years. S. 2543 Includes a Number of Provisions to Enhance the Park Service’s Ability to Hold National Heritage Areas Accountable for Their Use of Federal Funds
S. 2543 includes a number of provisions that could enhance the Park Service’s ability to hold national heritage areas accountable for their use of federal funds. We recommended that, in the absence of a formal heritage area program within the Park Service, the Secretary of the Interior direct the Park Service to develop well-defined, consistent standards and processes for regional staff to use in reviewing and approving heritage areas’ management plans; require regional heritage area managers to regularly and consistently review heritage areas’ annual financial reports to ensure that the agency has a full accounting of their use of funds from all federal sources; develop results-oriented performance goals and measures for the agency’s heritage area activities, and require, in the cooperative agreements, that heritage areas adopt such a results-oriented management approach as well. By establishing this program, the bill would provide the Park Service with the direction and funding that agency officials believe they need to impose management controls on their own and heritage areas’ activities. Furthermore, S. 2543 includes a number of provisions that address the concerns we raised in March. First, the bill establishes a schedule and criteria for reviewing and approving or disapproving heritage areas’ management plans. S. 2543 also requires that the management plans include information on, among others, performance goals, the roles and functions of partners, and specific commitments by the partners to accomplish the activities outlined in the management plan. This report must specify, among other things, the local coordinating entity’s performance goals and accomplishments, expenses and income, amount and sources of matching funds, amounts and sources of leveraged federal funds, and grants made to any other entity during the fiscal year. S. 2543 provides property owners the right to refrain from participating in any planned project or activity conducted within the national heritage area. Furthermore, it does not require any property owner to permit public access, nor does it modify public access under any other federal, state, or local law. It also does not alter any adopted land use regulation, approved land use plan, or other regulatory authority of any federal, state, or local authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress has established, or "designated," 24 national heritage areas to recognize the value of their local traditions, history, and resources to the nation's heritage. These areas, including public and private lands, receive funds and assistance through cooperative agreements with the National Park Service, which has no formal program for them. They also receive funds from other agencies and nonfederal sources, and are managed by local entities. Growing interest in new areas has raised concerns about rising federal costs and the risk of limits on private land use. GAO was asked to comment on how provisions of S. 2543 might affect issues identified in GAO's March 2004 testimony addressing the process for (1) designating heritage areas, (2) determining the amount of federal funding to these areas, (3) overseeing areas' activities and use of federal funds, and (4) determining the effects, if any, they have on private property rights.
What GAO Found
Provisions of S. 2543 would establish a systematic process for identifying and designating national heritage areas, addressing many of the concerns identified in GAO's March 2004 testimony. At that time, GAO reported that no such systematic process exists, noting that the Congress has, in some instances, designated heritage areas before the Park Service has fully evaluated them. S. 2543 contains provisions that would require that a suitability study be completed and the Park Service determine the area meets certain criteria before the Congress designates a heritage area. While the bill defines heritage areas more specifically in terms of their national significance, the criteria outlined in S. 2543 will benefit from guidance that the Park Service has recently developed to guide the application of the criteria. This guidance will improve the designation process. Provisions of S. 2543 would limit the amount of federal funds that can be provided to heritage areas through the Park Service's budget. In March 2004, GAO testified that from fiscal years 1997 through 2002 about half of heritage areas' funding came from the federal government. Specifically, for 22 of the 24 heritage areas where data were available, $156 million of the areas' $310 million in total funding came from the federal government. Of this, over $50 million came from Park Service funds dedicated for this purpose, $44 million from other Park Service programs, and about $61 million from 11 other federal sources. S. 2543 would restrict annual dedicated Park Service funding for heritage areas to $15 million. Individual areas may not receive more than $1 million in a given fiscal year and $10 million over 15 years. Furthermore, S. 2543 includes provisions that could enhance the Park Service's ability to hold heritage areas accountable for their use of federal funds. In this regard, S. 2543 (1) establishes a program that would provide the Park Service with the direction and funding needed to manage the agency's and the heritage areas' activities; (2) establishes a schedule and criteria for reviewing and approving heritage areas' management plans; (3) identifies criteria for use in reviewing areas' plans; (4) requires that the plans include information on, among other things, performance goals and the roles and functions of partners; and (5) requires areas to submit annual reports specifying, among other things, performance goals and accomplishments, expenses and income, and amounts and sources of funds. GAO has identified potential amendments to S. 2543 that would further enhance areas' accountability. S. 2543 includes provisions that address some of the concerns GAO identified in March with regard to heritage areas' potential restrictions on property owners' rights and land use. For example, S. 2543 allows property owners to refrain from participating in any planned project or activity within the heritage area. Furthermore, the bill does not require any owner to permit public access to property and does not alter any existing land use regulation, approved land use plan, or other regulatory authority. |
gao_GAO-14-156 | gao_GAO-14-156_0 | CBP Online Contract Supplier Locator. CMS has directed beneficiaries to call its 1-800-MEDICARE beneficiary help line with CBP questions— referred to by CMS as inquiries. CMS posts quarterly reports of these health outcomes on its website. Medicare Claims Data Show Larger Decreases in Beneficiary Utilization in Competitive Bidding Areas than Comparator Areas, but Beneficiary Access Does Not Appear to Have Been Affected
Our analysis of Medicare claims data found that for five of the six product categories we examined, the number of distinct beneficiaries furnished CBP-covered items generally decreased more in the competitive bidding areas than in the comparator areas in each month of 2011 and 2012 compared to the same month of 2010. As CMS has reported, the CBP may have curbed previous inappropriate distribution of some CBP-covered items in competitive bidding areas. For the comparator areas, the number of beneficiaries furnished one or more items decreased by about 5 percent in May 2011 and by about 16 percent in May 2012. CMS Reports that Its Ongoing Monitoring Tools Indicate that CBP’s Round 1 Rebid Has Not Affected Beneficiary Access and Satisfaction
As it did in 2011, CMS continued several ongoing activities to monitor CBP’s effects on beneficiaries in 2012. According to CMS data, the agency obtained responses from at least 400 beneficiaries in each of the nine competitive bidding areas and nine comparator areas to collect beneficiary satisfaction ratings for six questions related to the beneficiary’s initial interaction with DME suppliers, the training received regarding DME items, the delivery of the DME item, the quality of service provided by the supplier, the customer service provided by the supplier, and the supplier’s overall complaint handling. For the Round 1 Rebid Product Categories and Areas, a Small Number of Contract Suppliers Accounted for a Large Portion of the CBP Market Share in 2011 and 2012
For the round 1 rebid product categories we examined, a small number of contract suppliers accounted for a large portion of Medicare total allowed charges across 2011 and 2012. Few contract suppliers left the CBP through contract terminations, voluntarily withdrawing from Medicare, or having had a change in ownership. For five of the six product categories, we found that, in general, the top 4 suppliers—those with the highest individual Medicare total allowed charges across all quarters of 2011 and 2012—accounted for a large portion of the market in all competitive bidding areas, although the top 4 suppliers for each product In our examples, the category could vary by competitive bidding area.top 4 suppliers’ combined market share in the fourth quarter of 2012 ranged from 50 percent for the enteral product category in the Dallas competitive bidding area to 86 percent for the walkers product category in the Orlando competitive bidding area. In CBP’s First Two Years, About 8 Percent of Contract Suppliers Had Contracts Terminated or Voluntarily Withdrew From Medicare
By the end of the CBP’s second year, 27 of the original 356 contract suppliers—about 8 percent—had been terminated by CMS or had voluntarily withdrawn from Medicare, according to CMS data. Concluding Observations
The CBP round 1 rebid’s savings for both the Medicare program and the rebid-covered beneficiaries continued in the second year, with CMS reporting total savings of more than $400 million in the rebid’s first two years due to its lower payments, decreased utilization, and lower beneficiary coinsurance. CMS’s monitoring activities, however, did not indicate beneficiary access issues. CMS’s fraud prevention efforts may also be affecting DME utilization. Continued monitoring of CBP experience is important to determine the full effects it may have on Medicare beneficiaries and DME suppliers. With the CBP’s 3-year round 1 rebid complete, the CBP’s 2013 round 2 expansion into an additional 100 competitive bidding areas, the 2013 implementation of the national mail-order diabetic testing supplies program, and the 2013 selection of the new contract suppliers in the original nine areas for the next 3-year contracts beginning in 2014, significant new data will soon be available to further assess the impact of the program. In its general comments, HHS stated that CMS will continue monitoring the CBP to ensure Medicare beneficiaries are not adversely affected by the program, including continuing to use its real-time claims monitoring system. Appendix I: Number of Suppliers in the Round 1 Rebid Competitive Bidding Areas and Their Comparator Areas; 2010 and 2012
Number of suppliers with $2,500 or more in
Number of suppliers with $2,500 or more in
Appendix II: Medicare Allowed Charges for Round 1 Rebid Competitive Bidding Areas and Their Comparator Areas; 2010 and 2012
Round 1 rebid competitive bidding areas and their comparator areas 1 Charlotte Virginia Beach comparator
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Martin T. Gahart, Assistant Director; Yesook Merrill, Assistant Director; Todd Anderson; Dan Lee; Drew Long; Michelle Paluga; Hemi Tewarson; and Opal Winebrenner. Medicare: Issues for Manufacturer-level Competitive Bidding for Durable Medical Equipment. | Why GAO Did This Study
To achieve Medicare savings for DME, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required that CMS implement the CBP for certain DME. In 2008, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act terminated the first round of supplier contracts and required CMS to repeat the CBP round 1—referred to as the round 1 rebid, resulting in the award of contracts to suppliers with CBP payments that began January 1, 2011.
GAO was asked to review issues concerning the rebid's second year of operation—2012. This report reviews the round 1 rebid's effects on (1) Medicare beneficiaries, (2) the market share of contract suppliers, and (3) all suppliers, including both contract and non-contract suppliers (the suppliers not awarded rebid contracts.) To examine the effects on Medicare beneficiaries, GAO compared Medicare claims data for 2011 and 2012 with that for 2010, the year before the round 1 rebid. GAO also examined other information about CMS's efforts to monitor the effects of the CBP, and interviewed DME industry representatives and officials from Medicare beneficiary organizations. To examine the effects on both contract and non-contract suppliers, GAO compared Medicare claims data for 2012 with that for 2010 and analyzed other data provided by CMS.
What GAO Found
The Medicare competitive bidding program (CBP) for durable medical equipment (DME) is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. Under the CBP, only competitively selected contract suppliers can furnish certain DME product categories (such as oxygen supplies and hospital beds) at competitively determined prices to Medicare beneficiaries in designated competitive bidding areas. The CBP's round 1 rebid was in effect for a 3-year period, from 2011 through 2013. It included nine DME product categories in nine geographic areas. For CBP monitoring purposes, CMS also selected nine comparator areas that were demographically similar to the rebid areas. GAO's analysis found that in 2012, the second year of the round 1 rebid:
The number of beneficiaries furnished DME items included in the CBP generally decreased more in the CBP areas than in the comparator areas. For example, the number of beneficiaries furnished oxygen supplies decreased by about 22 percent in the CBP areas and by about 16 percent in the comparator areas. According to CMS, CBP may have reduced inappropriate usage of DME and these decreases do not necessarily reflect beneficiary access issues. Based on its monitoring tools, which include comparing changes in the health outcomes of beneficiaries in the CBP areas to those in the comparator areas, CMS has concluded that beneficiaries have not been affected adversely by the CBP.
In general, a small number of contract suppliers had a large proportion of the market share in the nine competitive bidding areas. The top four contract suppliers generally accounted for a large proportion of the market in all CBP areas, although the top four suppliers for each product category were not the same in every competitive bidding area. CMS has reported that few contract suppliers had contracts terminated by the agency or voluntarily withdrew from Medicare.
The total number of DME suppliers and Medicare allowed charges decreased more in the CBP areas than in the comparator areas. For example, the number of suppliers in the CBP areas with Medicare allowed charges of $2,500 or more decreased, on average, 27 percent. In the comparator areas, supplier numbers decreased by 5 percent. The decreases in supplier numbers may reflect other factors, such as CMS's efforts to reduce Medicare DME fraud.
The round 1 rebid's first 2 years achieved Medicare cost savings of about $400 million as estimated by CMS, and did not appear to have adversely affected beneficiary access to CBP-covered items. However, with CBP's national mail-order diabetic testing supplies program and expansion into an additional 100 bidding areas in July 2013, it will be important for CMS to continue its efforts to monitor the effects of the CBP.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS cited the results of CMS's monitoring of beneficiaries' access to CBP items as evidence that CBP has not adversely affected beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-08-1078 | gao_GAO-08-1078_0 | In 1995, GAO designated the ATC modernization program as a high-risk information technology initiative because of its size, complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past. FAA, in response to over 45 recommendations we have made, has taken steps to improve its acquisition management. NextGen also includes the acquisition of ATC systems. Most Acquisition Programs Are Meeting Cost and Schedule Estimates since the Creation of ATO
Since the creation of ATO in 2004, FAA has shown significant improvement in its management of ATC modernization through better acquisitions management and the introduction of more efficient business practices. FAA has demonstrated executive-level commitment to addressing the systemic factors that we have identified as contributing to FAA’s historic cost overruns and schedule delays. Since 2004, many more acquisition programs are being completed within the original cost and time estimates than prior to ATO’s existence. While FAA has made progress in improving acquisition management practices in the 4 years since ATO was created, areas remain that need further improvement. In December 2007, we recommended that FAA identify or establish a vehicle for regularly reporting to Congress and the public on the agency’s overall, long-term performance in acquiring ATC systems by providing original budget and schedule baselines for each rebaselined program and the reasons for the rebaselining. FAA plans to address our recommendation by reporting such information in its Capital Improvement Plan, which it sends annually to Congress. FAA will need to continue to manage the acquisition of billions of dollars worth of new ATC systems as NextGen progresses. Basic Planning for NextGen Is Completed and ATO Has Reorganized as It Transitions to NextGen, but Stakeholders Have Concerns
Congress authorized JPDO to plan and coordinate the development of NextGen and placed JPDO organizationally within FAA. In addition, a number of stakeholders as well as members of Congress have expressed concerns with the key NextGen planning documents being developed by JPDO and FAA—JPDO’s Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan and FAA’s implementation plan for NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). However, it is too early to tell if this reorganization sufficiently addresses concerns raised by stakeholders about the fragmented management structure for NextGen since other executives continue to have responsibility for parts of NextGen mentioned earlier in this report, and the division of responsibility for NextGen efforts among the senior vice presidents and associate administrators is not clear. FAA’s Ability to Implement and Obtain Expected Benefits from NextGen Will Be Affected by Research and Development, Human Capital, and Infrastructure Challenges
A number of areas are central to FAA’s ability to implement NextGen and thus realize the safety and efficiency gains that are expected for the nation’s air transportation system. Ten industry stakeholders told us that the “research gap” left by NASA’s declining aeronautics research budget needs to be addressed. 5) reflect the expected increases in NextGen research funding. To help bridge the gap between NASA’s research and FAA’s need to develop and implement new technology, the two agencies have developed a strategy to identify, conduct, and transfer to FAA the research and development needed for NextGen. NextGen Will Require New Skills and Abilities of FAA Personnel
FAA will need technical skills such as systems engineers and contract management expertise to implement NextGen. We believe that this is a reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address this issue, recognizing that once the right skill set is identified, it may take considerable time to select, hire, and integrate what FAA estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. In addition, building new runways at some of these airports will present considerable obstacles. Without significant reductions in emissions and noise around the nation’s airports and continuing efforts at all levels of government, efforts to expand airport capacity could be stalled and the implementation of NextGen delayed. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we assessed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) ability to acquire and integrate new air traffic control (ATC) systems and transition to the next generation air transportation system (NextGen). (3) What key challenges does FAA face in implementing NextGen? To determine the status of the key NextGen planning and transition issues and key challenges facing FAA in implementing NextGen, we interviewed senior ATO and Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), an interagency organization within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was created to plan and coordinate research and development for the next generation air transportation system (NextGen). Transitioning to NextGen will require FAA to continue to acquire new air traffic control (ATC) systems on schedule and on budget. GAO's concerns about the size, complexity, and cost of FAA's acquisition of ATC systems led GAO to designate this issue as high-risk in 1995. NextGen includes system acquisitions but is a significantly larger initiative involving multiple federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which conducts aeronautics research and development for NextGen, and nonfederal aviation stakeholders, such as aviation equipment manufacturers, airports, and aircraft operators. GAO addressed (1) FAA's ATC systems acquisition activities, (2) key NextGen planning and transition issues, and (3) key challenges that FAA faces in implementing NextGen. GAO reviewed FAA's management processes and cost and schedule data for acquiring ATC systems, interviewed senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA officials, and 24 aviation stakeholders involved in NextGen. This report is also based on recent GAO products. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and NASA provided technical corrections, which GAO included.
What GAO Found
The majority of FAA's key ATC acquisition programs are currently being managed within the established cost and time estimates since FAA created the performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2004 and improved its management of acquisitions. The agency has demonstrated executive-level commitment to addressing systemic factors that have contributed to historic cost overruns and schedule delays. FAA's response to over 45 recommendations by GAO contributed to significantly improved acquisition management. While FAA has implemented numerous acquisition management practices, areas remain that need further improvement, such as ensuring transparency on rebaselined programs. FAA plans to address this issue by reporting annually to Congress the original budget and schedule baselines and the reasons for the rebaselining. FAA needs to continue its progress in managing acquisitions, since it will be acquiring billions of dollars of new systems as part of the NextGen transformation. JPDO has completed the initial versions of three basic planning documents for NextGen, but many aviation stakeholders felt the documents, which focus on a 2025 time frame, lack the information that industry needs to make near-term business decisions to support NextGen. The next version of the NextGen work plan, scheduled to be issued in September 2008, will address some of these concerns. ATO recently reorganized to facilitate the transition to NextGen, but it is too early to tell if the reorganization addresses concerns about the fragmented management structure for NextGen, since multiple offices in ATO and FAA continue to have responsibility for NextGen. FAA's ability to implement NextGen will be affected by how it addresses research and development, human capital, and infrastructure challenges. Although research and development are critical for NextGen, research gaps exist because of a recent decline in NASA's aeronautical research funding and the expanded requirements of NextGen. FAA faces a human capital challenge of having the necessary knowledge and skills, such as contract management and system engineering expertise, to implement NextGen. In response to GAO's prior recommendation, in September 2008, FAA expects to complete an analysis comparing the skills needed for NextGen with its current staff resources. However, it may take considerable time to hire what FAA estimates could be up to 200 more staff with the needed skills. FAA also faces the challenge of maintaining and repairing existing ATC infrastructure, such as radar stations, while consolidating or realigning its facilities to accommodate NextGen technologies and operations. An additional infrastructure challenge is increasing airport runway capacity to handle the expected increases in traffic. While FAA's plans call for building or expanding runways at the nation's 35 busiest airports, its analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional runway capacity. These efforts to expand capacity by means of runway development could be delayed without significant reductions in emissions and noise around some airports. |
gao_GAO-14-471 | gao_GAO-14-471_0 | One program is the Rural Broadband Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program, which authorizes RUS to provide treasury rate loans, 4 percent loans, and loan guarantees. “Repaid” loans include those that have already been fully paid back. Since 2003, 100 Loans Have Been Made to Geographically and Demographically Diverse Areas, but Over 40 Percent Are No Longer Active
Communities Receiving RUS Loans Are Geographically and Demographically Diverse
RUS has approved 100 loans, out of 249 applications, through the Broadband Loan Program since 2003. The total dollar amount of the loans awarded to date is about $2 billion. 1). These areas had low population densities and also tended to be lower-income, overall. 2). The other 43 loans are no longer active, either because they have been rescinded or are in default. Despite these issues, RUS has not gathered information or performed analysis to better understand what might lead a project to default or otherwise make a project a poor candidate for receiving the loan. Federal guidance emphasizes the importance of assessing the risk associated with loan programs. RUS Loans Can Help Promote Limited Broadband Deployment and Economic Development, but Performance Goals Do Not Fully Align with Program’s Purpose
RUS Loans Can Help Overcome Financial Barriers to Deploying Broadband in Rural Areas
Broadband projects in rural areas are generally more expensive, on a cost-per-subscriber basis, than projects in metropolitan areas, creating a financial barrier to deployment, according to our review of the relevant literature. In order to further assess the impact of loans on broadband deployment, we compared the number of broadband providers in counties that have RUS- financed broadband projects to the number of providers in counties that applied but were rejected for a RUS loan as well as counties that had fully rescinded loans, using the latest data from the NBM. According to our analysis of RUS loans and economic development data, counties affected by at least one approved RUS loan were associated with modestly higher levels of employment and payroll after the year of loan approval and in all subsequent years, as compared to counties that did not receive RUS loans. Quality of Life
Beyond economic development, broadband services financed with RUS loans can enhance the quality of life in rural communities. USDA Annual Performance Goals and Measures Do Not Fully Align with the Loan Program’s Purpose
USDA’s Annual Performance Report (APR) provides information on the achievements of USDA’s programs each fiscal year. As our past work has shown, an attribute of a successful performance measure is whether it aligns with division and agency-wide goals. The purposes of the loan program are to improve broadband deployment in rural areas—that is, increase the number of broadband subscribers with access to new or improved broadband service—and ultimately increase economic opportunity in rural America. As the National Broadband Plan states, “adoption is necessary for utilization, but utilization is necessary to extract value from a connection.” Furthermore, USDA’s APR does not have any goals or measures to determine the loan program’s progress towards economic development outcomes. As our past work has shown, agency performance goals that do not link to program goals can lead to incentives and behaviors that do not support the achievement of division or agency-wide goals. Performance goals that better evaluate progress toward the loan program’s goals may help USDA and Congress better monitor the outcomes of the loan program. Considerable resources are invested by RUS to administer these loans and their failures therefore may represent an inefficient use of RUS resources. USDA evaluates progress toward these and other outcomes in its APR, though the performance goals it uses do not fully align with the purpose of the RUS broadband loan program. Recommendations
We recommend the Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions: evaluate loans made by RUS through the broadband loan program to identify characteristics of loans that may be at risk of rescission or default; and align performance goals under the “enhance rural prosperity” strategic objective in the APR to the broadband loan program’s purpose, to the extent feasible. We also provided a draft of this report to USDA for review and comment. 1). Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the geographic distribution and financial performance of loans, we gathered and analyzed Rural Utilities Service (RUS) loan data from 2003—2013. We also analyzed the extent to which the loans met various definitions of rural, including those adopted by RUS for the loan program in 2002, 2004, and 2008, as well as the U.S. Census Bureau (Census) definition (areas not within urbanized areas) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) Census tract-based codes. We used the most recent data available, which were current as of June 2013. We also discussed these reforms with broadband providers that have and have not received USF support, as described above. Scope and Data
The time frame for our analysis was 2003 through 2011 because those are the years for which RUS and relevant Census data are available. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to affordable broadband telecommunications is increasingly viewed as vital to economic growth and improved quality of life. Broadband is particularly critical in rural areas, where advanced communications can reduce the isolation of remote communities and individuals. To extend access to broadband and therefore increase economic opportunity in rural America, RUS finances the construction of broadband through a loan program.
GAO was asked to assess issues related to the loan program. This report addresses the (1) geographic distribution and financial performance of loans and (2) relationship between loans and broadband deployment and economic development, and how USDA evaluates progress towards these outcomes.
To address these research questions, GAO interviewed broadband providers and stakeholders selected for their varying experiences, including those that have and have not received RUS loans. GAO also analyzed RUS and U.S. Census Bureau data from 2003—2013 as well as the most recent National Broadband Map data.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has approved 100 loans to geographically and demographically diverse areas through its Rural Broadband Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program (“loan program”), though over 40 percent of these loans are no longer active. The geographic distribution of RUS loans is widespread, with broadband providers in 43 states having received one or more loans through the loan program from 2003 through 2013. About $2 billion in loans have been made to providers in areas with diverse demographics and economies, including areas with low population densities and income as well as areas in relative proximity to large cities with robust local economies. Of the 100 RUS loans approved through the loan program, 48 are currently being repaid, and 9 have been fully paid back. Forty-three are no longer active, either because they were cancelled before they were paid out (25 rescinded) or because the provider defaulted by failing to abide by the terms of the loan (18 defaulted). Approving a loan requires significant resources. Loans that default or are rescinded can represent an inefficient use of RUS resources. Despite these issues, RUS has not gathered information or performed analysis to better understand what might lead a project to default or otherwise make a project a poor candidate for receiving a loan. Federal guidance, though, emphasizes the importance of assessing the risk associated with loan programs.
RUS loans can help promote limited broadband deployment and economic development, but USDA's performance goals do not fully align with the loan program's purpose. According to GAO analysis of National Broadband Map deployment data as of June 2013, areas with RUS loans generally have the same number of broadband providers as areas without a loan. However, the RUS loan program can enhance the quality and reach of broadband networks in rural areas, according to stakeholders. Further, according to GAO analysis of RUS loans and U.S. Census Bureau data from 2003 through 2011—the years for which RUS and relevant Census data are available—areas affected by at least one approved RUS loan were associated with modestly higher levels of employment and payroll (1 to 4 percent) after the year of loan approval and in all subsequent years, as compared to areas that did not receive RUS loans. As stated in the program regulations, the purpose of the RUS loan program is to increase broadband deployment (that is, the number of broadband subscribers with access to new or improved broadband service) and economic opportunity in rural America through the provision of broadband services. USDA's Annual Performance Report ( APR ) provides information on the achievements of USDA's programs each fiscal year. The goals in USDA's report, though, do not fully align with the purpose of the loan program. For instance, USDA's APR does not have any goals or measures to determine the loan program's progress towards economic development outcomes. As our past work has shown, an attribute of a successful performance goal is whether it aligns with division and agency-wide goals. Agency performance goals that do not link to program goals can lead to incentives and behaviors that do not support the achievement of division or agency-wide goals. Performance goals aligned with the program's purpose may help USDA and Congress better monitor the outcomes of the loan program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA (1) evaluate loans made by RUS through the loan program to identify characteristics of loans that may be at risk of rescission or default and (2) align the goals in its APR to the loan program's purpose, to the extent feasible. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA said it will strive to fully implement the report's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-99-30 | gao_NSIAD-99-30_0 | DELG Program Has Seen Little Demand
Consistent with congressional intent, DOD designed the DELG Program to operate through various user fees to cover its operating costs and the risk of potential default on loan payments by the borrowing nation. In addition, it is unclear what impact export financing arrangements have on export sales, because other factors may also affect a purchasing country’s decision on from whom to buy. DELG Program Guaranteed One Loan and Issued Nine Nonbinding Notifications for Other Loan Guarantees
Since its inception, the DELG Program has issued one loan guarantee valued at about $16.7 million to support a U.S. company’s licensed direct commercial sale of unmanned air vehicle and moving target simulator systems to Romania. The DELG Program Differs From Other U.S. Government Defense Export Financing
In addition to the DELG Program, the U.S. government supports defense-related export financing through the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) for dual-use and drug interdiction equipment and through the Foreign Military Financing Program, administered by DOD, for direct commercial or government-to-government sales of defense articles, services, and training. Resolving Uncertainty Concerning DELG Program Responsibility Poses a Challenge to DOD
DOD has not submitted a required report to Congress nor resolved issues concerning programmatic responsibilities and resource management of the program. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required that the President submit to Congress a report on the loan guarantee program, including an analysis of the costs and benefits of the program and any recommendations for modification of the program that may be appropriate, such as adding to the list of eligible countries, and any proposed legislation necessary to authorize a recommended modification. The ongoing dispute regarding program management responsibility may be hampering day-to-day program operations. This has not occurred. We discussed with several banking and industry officials the level of interest in the DELG Program as well as alternative financing sources available to borrowing countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) Program, focusing on: (1) the level of program activity to date; (2) the program's financial status; (3) other sources of financing available to borrowing countries; (4) comparing DELG Program characteristics with other U.S. government export financing programs; and (5) examining issues related to the planned fiscal year 1999 transfer of DELG Program responsibilities within DOD.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since its implementation in 1996, the DELG Program has guaranteed one loan and has not generated enough revenue in fees to cover its operations; (2) the program's ability to attract future activity to generate sufficient revenue for continued operations is uncertain, since countries have other sources that offer financing at a lower cost; (3) further, the availability of loan guarantees is one of numerous factors that affect a country's decision to purchase U.S. defense exports; (4) unlike the DELG Program, other U.S. government-administered programs that offer direct loans or guarantees for defense-related items are designed to operate with U.S. government subsidies, which reduce financing costs to the purchasing countries; (5) decisions on the scope and nature of continued DELG operations pose a challenge to DOD; (6) a report on program operations and any recommended changes has not been submitted to Congress, as required by law; (7) in addition, the DELG Program has not been transferred within DOD as originally planned under the Defense Reform Initiative; and (8) uncertainty about future program responsibility may also be hampering day-to-day operations. |
gao_GAO-17-301 | gao_GAO-17-301_0 | Background
RUS, an agency in USDA’s Rural Development mission area, oversees three programs for deploying broadband infrastructure in rural communities. RUS’s Management Procedures and Activities for Broadband Loan and Grant Programs Are Consistent or Partially Consistent with Leading Practices, and Could Improve in Some Areas
Overall, RUS has procedures and activities addressing the leading practices we identified, including the key activities associated with these practices, as part of its management of the rural broadband programs. RUS has procedures and activities that are partially consistent with leading practices for conducting program performance measurement, conducting risk assessments, mapping, monitoring loan and grant infrastructure projects, communicating internally, and providing written program documentation. Through our review of USDA and RUS documentation, we identified a goal set by USDA at the Rural Development mission area level. Outside of this one high-level strategic goal and performance measure, RUS officials told us they do not have formal documented program performance goals and measures for the individual loan and grant programs. Risk Assessment
RUS has procedures and activities that are partially consistent with the leading practice of risk assessment because RUS conducts a variety of risk assessment activities at the application and the individual project level, as well as having procedures to guard against fraud; however, RUS has not established procedures to conduct risk assessment activities at the program level. But a higher-level, programmatic risk assessment would provide a holistic look at the programs’ core processes and practices and assess internal controls over each program. Mapping
Currently, RUS’s procedures and activities are partially consistent with the leading practice of mapping because RUS has two mapping systems in place, but its mapping information is not complete and the agency has efforts under way to improve its mapping activities. Second, applicants can also use the RUS mapping tool, which predates the RDApply mapping system. RUS officials told us that they do not have a mapping system that houses extensive broadband service-area data. For example, we found that, over the past 5 years, RUS has held a number of external training and outreach events, such as workshops and seminars, to provide a range of information about its broadband loan and grant programs to rural communities and prospective applicants. Project Monitoring
RUS’s procedures and activities are partially consistent with the leading practice of project monitoring because RUS has in place a number of monitoring and oversight activities of program recipients, but RUS does not currently evaluate Community Connect project results. However, not periodically evaluating grant project results affects RUS’s ability to measure the outcomes and success of its grant program. Without analysis of post-award project successes or failures, Community Connect program managers are missing information that could be used to determine if programmatic changes might improve the selection of grant recipients or the results of grant awards. To reach out to others, RUS’s website contains information on its programs, including information about eligibility criteria, corresponding regulations, time frames, and frequently asked questions. However, RUS falls short of this leading practice in that it does not have a centralized system to obtain relevant data to monitor grant awards and loans, including correspondence and deliverables. Although RUS has effectively developed written documentation to communicate to program applicants and recipients, we found that RUS has not consistently updated its written policies and procedures to retain organizational knowledge and to communicate loan- and grant-management knowledge internally among its staff. For the Broadband Program, RUS provided us with the program’s initial application review report. RUS has established procedures and activities that are consistent with leading practices in the management of its broadband infrastructure loan and grant programs in several areas, including its application review process, its external training of and communication with program participants, and its collaboration with other federal entities on efforts related to broadband deployment. With regard to mapping, we believe that RUS’s plan to obtain mapping information from recipients going forward will help RUS to better align with the leading practice in this area. Establish a timeline for implementing a centralized internal system for staff to obtain relevant and timely program data for use in managing and monitoring loans and grant awards. USDA agreed with our recommendations. Require periodic reviews, including progress reports. Establish procedures for outreach efforts to potential applicants. | Why GAO Did This Study
RUS provides loans and grants to help finance the construction of broadband infrastructure in rural America. GAO was asked to review RUS's management of its programs to fund broadband deployment, including consistency with leading practices for federal funding, program management, and broadband deployment.
This report examines the extent to which RUS's procedures and activities are consistent with leading practices and how, if at all, its management practices could be improved. GAO synthesized, from federal guidance and relevant literature, a set of 10 leading practices that would be appropriate for the management of broadband loan and grant programs. GAO validated its set of practices with states that have programs similar to the RUS programs. GAO then reviewed RUS documentation and interviewed RUS officials and six program recipients, selected for having geographically dispersed projects currently under construction. Based on this information, GAO determined whether RUS's procedures and activities were consistent, partially consistent, or not consistent with each leading practice.
What GAO Found
The Rural Utilities Service (RUS), an agency within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), has procedures and activities that are consistent with four leading practices and partially consistent with six leading practices in managing two loan programs and one grant program aimed at funding broadband infrastructure projects in rural communities.
Consistent with Leading Practices: With regard to reviewing applications, RUS has procedures for training reviewers, guarding against conflicts of interest, and conducting multiple levels of review. For external training and external communication, RUS holds workshops and seminars to inform rural communities and applicants about its programs. RUS's website contains program information, including eligibility criteria, time frames, and frequently asked questions. Applicants can also seek assistance from the RUS general field representative (GFR) assigned to their area. Program recipients whom GAO interviewed often spoke positively of the help provided by GFRs. As to coordination mechanisms, RUS has worked with other federal agencies on rural broadband-deployment efforts, including having a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Communications Commission.
Partially Consistent with Leading Practices: While USDA has a high-level goal and a performance metric for measuring the benefits to rural communities of the broadband loans and grants, RUS has not developed specific program-level goals or performance measures for its individual programs. Without specific measureable goals for each loan and grant program, RUS will have difficulty determining how well the programs are performing. Regarding risk assessment, RUS conducts a variety of risk assessment activities at the loan and grant application and project level, but has not conducted a risk assessment at the program level. A higher-level, programmatic risk assessment would provide a holistic look at the programs' core processes and internal controls. For broadband programs, another leading practice is establishing mapping systems that can provide program data and reveal areas that lack service. RUS has mapping tools and systems in place, but does not have complete mapping information. RUS has efforts under way to improve its mapping data going forward. These efforts should increase RUS's understanding of broadband coverage and help RUS begin to identify possible unserved areas for outreach. For project monitoring, RUS currently oversees loan and grant recipients' projects through GFR site visits, progress reports, and audits. However, RUS does not evaluate its grant projects post-completion and is therefore missing information that could be used to improve the selection of grant recipients or the results of grant awards. RUS has established an organizational structure that supports internal communication, but does not have a centralized system to monitor loan and grant data. RUS officials said USDA is working toward such a system, but they did not have established deliverables or time frames. RUS generally has external written documentation for recipients, but internal written documentation is often outdated, affecting RUS's ability to share knowledge among its staff and retain institutional knowledge.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that RUS develop program performance goals and measures, conduct program risk assessments, evaluate completed grant projects, establish a timeline for implementing a centralized internal data system, and update written policies and procedures for RUS staff. USDA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-371 | gao_GAO-03-371_0 | In fiscal year 2001, DOD reportedly obligated more than $6.2 billion on IT services alone. Our November 2001 report recognizes the importance of such sourcing decisions and provides a framework that spans the full range of activities that are performed during IT services outsourcing. GAO’s Framework for Outsourcing IT Services
Outsourcing of IT services has become increasingly popular in both the public and private sector. Projects Substantially Used Leading Commercial Practices
As illustrated in figure 4, the five IT services projects substantially used leading commercial practices. In addition, collectively the projects fully implemented 88 percent of the practices (see table 3). Phase I: Determine sourcing strategy. Phase II: Define operational model. Phase III: Develop the contract. Phase IV: Select the provider(s). Phase V: Transition to provider(s). Phase VII: Ensure services are provided. Although outsourcing transfers responsibility for performing the service to the provider(s), the client organization is ultimately responsible for ensuring that services are provided and that end-user needs are met. Although DOD has taken action to gather and disseminate lessons learned and best practices on general acquisition issues, these efforts generally do not focus on outsourcing or include sharing the lessons learned from IT outsourcing projects across the department. Lessons learned that are pragmatic and easily accessible could give DOD managers a more informed understanding of the important issues to be addressed when making outsourcing decisions, as well as the factors to be considered to help ensure the success of these endeavors. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which selected Department of Defense (DOD) information technology (IT) services outsourcing projects use leading commercial practices as specified in our framework and (2) whether DOD is sharing lessons learned from its IT outsourcing projects across the department. Projects’ Implementation of Phase VI: Manage Provider(s) Performance
The effectiveness with which the performance of the provider(s) is managed—the focus of this phase—is critical to the successful implementation of an outsourcing project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given the magnitude of its reported spending on information technology (IT) services--more than $6.2 billion in fiscal year 2001--it is critical that the Department of Defense (DOD) adopt effective practices for acquiring IT services. GAO researched leading commercial practices for the outsourcing of IT services, and, in November 2001, published a framework consisting of seven phases that span the full range of activities that are performed during the outsourcing of those services (this is an acquisition in which a client organization transfers responsibility for performing services to an external provider). GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which selected DOD projects for outsourcing IT services use leading commercial practices as specified in GAO's framework and (2) whether DOD is sharing lessons learned from its IT outsourcing projects across the department.
What GAO Found
The projects in GAO's review substantially used leading commercial practices as specified in GAO's framework for outsourcing IT services. Specifically, the agencies fully implemented 88 percent of the practices (not including practices not applicable to a particular project). This framework consists of practices organized into seven phases: (I) determine sourcing strategy, (II) define operational model, (III) develop the contract, (IV) select the provider(s), (V) transition to provider(s), (VI) manage the performance of the provider(s), and (VII) ensure services are provided. Although DOD has acted on gathering and disseminating lessons learned and commercial leading practices related to general acquisition issues, its actions have generally not been focused on outsourcing or on sharing the lessons learned from IT services outsourcing across the department. By not systematically capturing and disseminating such information across the department, DOD is losing the opportunity to leverage the knowledge gained on IT services projects like those in GAO's review. Lessons learned that are pragmatic and easily accessible would give DOD managers a more informed understanding of important issues to be addressed when making outsourcing decisions, as well as the factors to be considered to help ensure the success of these endeavors. |
gao_HEHS-95-114 | gao_HEHS-95-114_0 | Specifically, an estimated 12 percent of the children received no routine health care, and 34 percent received no immunizations in the three locations reviewed. Many of these children may need health-related services and treatment beyond those needed by the average child. Although young foster children received a wide variety of services from health care providers, many children had identified health-related needs that were not met. HIV-Infected Children Need to Be Identified Early, but Risk Assessments Often Did Not Take Place
One particularly critical health need of young foster children is HIV risk assessment because most young children in the locations reviewed are at risk for the infection as a result of parental drug abuse. The Number of HIV-Infected Children Is Largely Unknown as Few Children Are Tested
Foster care agencies in the locations reviewed do not know the full extent of their caseloads that is at high risk for HIV since no mechanism exists to ensure that all young foster children are assessed for HIV risk. Few data are available on the number of foster children infected with HIV. Children Placed With Relatives in Los Angeles County and New York City Were Less Likely to Receive Health-Related Services
Young children placed exclusively with relatives—known as kinship care—were less likely to receive health-related services than children placed exclusively with nonrelatives—known as traditional foster care.Specifically, children placed in kinship care were nearly three times as likely as those placed in traditional foster care to have received no routine health care. Studies indicate that caseworkers generally provide less monitoring and assistance to kinship care placements. Other efforts by this agency have focused on establishing medical clinics for foster children. ACF also audits states to certify states’ compliance with the safeguards for foster children specified in the Social Security Act. It questioned whether inadequate caseworker recordkeeping provided an incomplete depiction of the health-related services received by young foster children. “Guidelines for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)-Infected Children and Their Foster Families.” Pediatrics, Vol. 4 (Apr. 1 (Spring 1991). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1 (1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the health-related services needed and received by young children in foster care, focusing on: (1) the relationship between the receipt of health-related services and foster care placements with relatives versus placements with nonrelatives; and (2) how responsible agencies are ensuring that foster children are receiving needed health-related services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite foster care agency regulations requiring comprehensive routine health care, an estimated 12 percent of young foster children receive no routine health care, 34 percent receive no immunizations, and 32 percent have some identified health needs that are not met; (2) an estimated 78 percent of young foster children are at high risk for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) as a result of parental drug abuse, yet only about 9 percent of foster children are tested for HIV; (3) young foster children placed with relatives receive fewer health-related services than children placed with nonrelative foster parents, possibly since relative caregivers receive less monitoring and assistance from caseworkers; (4) the number of young children placed with relatives increased 379 percent between 1986 and 1991, which resulted in the lower likelihood of these children receiving services associated with kinship care; and (5) the Department of Health and Human Services has not designated any technical assistance to assist states with health-related programs for foster children and does not audit states' compliance with health-related safeguards for foster children. |
gao_RCED-96-30 | gao_RCED-96-30_0 | Nationwide Inventory of Abandoned Hard Rock Mines on Federal Lands Is Unavailable
Attempts to determine how many hard rock mines lie abandoned nationwide have not resulted in a definitive inventory of these mines on federal lands. The four major land-managing agencies are in various stages of inventorying the abandoned mines on the lands they manage. According to the Forest Service, there are about 25,000 sites within National Forest boundaries. Abandoned Hard Rock Mines Generally Pose Two Kinds of Hazards
The problems posed by abandoned hard rock mines can generally be classified as physical safety hazards or environmental degradation. Furthermore, the factors the agencies use to classify their inventories are not consistent from agency to agency. Specifically, the Mineral Policy Center classified the sites as follows: 194,500 were benign, needing little if any remediation; 231,900 needed revegetation or landscaping; 116,300 presented safety hazards needing prompt but not necessarily extensive action; 14,400 needed extensive work to prevent surface water contamination; 500 needed complex work to prevent groundwater contamination; and 50 were Superfund sites, posing a severe threat to the public and needing complex cleanup. The agencies have completed a few such detailed site analyses. Cost Estimates by Other Federal Agencies
The Bureau of Mines estimated the “worst-case” cost of reclaiming abandoned mine sites on federal lands at between $4 billion and $35.3 billion. Estimates of Number and Types of Sites and Cost to Reclaim, by Organization
Degree of hazard, degree of environmental impact, accessibility $165 million (about $40 million short-term)
Six categories ranging from “benign” to “Superfund”
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Resources, asked us to report on the (1) approximate number of abandoned hard rock mines on federally managed land, (2) types of hazards these mines pose, and (3) approximate cost to reclaim these mines. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on abandoned hard rock mines on federal lands, focusing on the: (1) approximate number of such mines; (2) types of hazards the mines pose; and (3) approximate cost to reclaim the mines.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the four major federal land managing agencies are each taking inventory of the abandoned mines on the lands they manage, but because the agencies do not use consistent methodologies to develop their estimates, there is no definitive inventory available; (2) the Forest Service has estimated of the number of abandoned mines on federal lands to be up to 25,000 sites; (3) nonfederal entities are also working to standardize terminology and guidelines to aid in future inventories; (4) abandoned hard rock mines can pose physical safety hazards, cause environmental degradation, and contaminate water; (5) the agencies use different factors to classify their sites for risk, and only two of the four agencies rank the severity of hazards; (6) nonfederal organizations have determined that 194,500 sites were generally safe, while 231,900 needed landscaping, 116,300 presented minor safety hazards, 14,900 could cause water contamination, and 50 threatened public safety and required complex cleanup; (7) the agencies have not completed the fieldwork needed to identify the number and types of problems on their sites; and (8) the Bureau of Mines believes that worst-case scenario costs could range between $4 billion and $35.3 billion and nonfederal organizations estimate that costs could exceed $70 billion, but no comprehensive cost estimate for reclaiming abandoned hard rock mines on federal lands exists. |
gao_GAO-16-243 | gao_GAO-16-243_0 | Key Federal Agencies Have Taken Various Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks to the Grid; Some Actions Align with the 2008 EMP Commission Recommendations
Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks to the Grid
DHS, DOE and FERC have taken various actions to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, which generally fall under four categories: (1) standards, guidelines, tools and demonstration projects; (2) research reports; (3) strategy development and planning; and (4) training and outreach. Some Actions Taken by DHS and DOE Align with EMP Commission Recommendations
The actions recommended by the EMP Commission generally align with existing authorities and responsibilities of DHS and DOE relating to the protection of critical infrastructure, such as identifying key assets and analyzing risks, and as discussed above, DHS and DOE have taken actions to address some risks to the electric grid from electromagnetic events. Although DHS and DOE did not report that any of their actions were taken in response to the commission report, actions taken by both agencies have aligned with some of the recommendations. Specifically, the EMP Commission made seven recommendations related to the electric grid, most of which were directed to DHS and DOE. In addition, a DHS entity developed EMP protection guidelines to help federal agencies and industry identify options for safeguarding critical communication equipment and control elements, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, from an EMP attack. Additional Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Identify Responsibilities, Assess Risks, and Strengthen Collaboration with Partners to Address Electromagnetic Risks
DHS Has Not Identified Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Electromagnetic Risks
DHS has not clearly identified internal roles and responsibilities for addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric grid or communicated these to external federal and industry partners. Designating internal roles and responsibilities within DHS regarding electromagnetic risks and communicating these to federal and industry partners could provide additional awareness of related activities and help ensure more effective and coordinated engagement with other federal agencies and industry stakeholders. DHS Has Not Fully Leveraged Existing Opportunities to Collect and Analyze Information on Electromagnetic Risks
Although DHS components have independently conducted some efforts to assess electromagnetic risks as identified above, the department has not fully leveraged available risk information or conducted a comprehensive analysis of these risks. Within the DHS Office of Policy, there is recognition that “space weather” and “power grid failure” are significant risk events, which DHS officials have determined pose great risk to the security of the nation. For example, further collection of information on sector interdependencies could help DHS to assess the potential economic consequences associated with long-term power outages. Federal Agencies Have Not Fully Coordinated Efforts to Implement Key EMP Risk Management Activities
Key federal agencies, including DHS and DOE, as well as industry partners have not established a fully coordinated approach to identifying and implementing risk management activities to address EMP risks. According to the NIPP Risk Management Framework, such activities include identifying and prioritizing research and development efforts, and evaluating potential mitigation options, including the cost-effectiveness of specific protective equipment. EMP Research and Development
There are several areas of EMP research highlighted in previous studies where coordinated federal involvement could help address identified gaps and further inform risk assessment efforts. While DHS recognizes that both space weather and power grid failure are risk events that can affect the nation’s security, there are additional opportunities for DHS to collect key risk inputs, such as further collaboration with DOD to obtain applicable EMP threat, vulnerability, and consequence information. To more fully leverage critical infrastructure expertise and address responsibilities to identify critical electrical infrastructure assets as called for in the NIPP, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Energy direct responsible officials to review FERC’s electrical infrastructure analysis and collaborate to determine whether further assessment is needed to adequately identify critical electric infrastructure assets, potentially to include additional elements of criticality that might be considered. To facilitate federal and industry efforts to coordinate risk-management activities to address an EMP attack, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Energy direct responsible officials to engage with federal partners and industry stakeholders to identify and implement key EMP research and development priorities, including opportunities for further testing and evaluation of potential EMP protection and mitigation options. DOD did not provide comments on this report. Appendix II: Summary of Key Federal Agency Actions Addressing Electromagnetic Risks to the Electric Grid
Standards, Guidelines, Tools, and Demonstration Projects
Since 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken an array of actions aimed at addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Electromagnetic risks caused by a man-made EMP or a naturally occurring solar weather event could have a significant impact on the nation's electric grid as well as other infrastructure sectors that depend on electricity, such as communications. These risks could lead to power outages over broad geographic areas for extended durations.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. This report examines (1) the extent to which key federal agencies have taken action to address electromagnetic risks and how these actions align with the 2008 EMP Commission report recommendations, and (2) what additional opportunities exist to enhance federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. GAO reviewed the EMP Commission report and federal program documents, and interviewed DHS, DOE, and FERC officials and relevant stakeholders who provided insights on key actions taken.
What GAO Found
Key federal agencies have taken various actions to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, and some actions align with the recommendations made in 2008 by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (EMP Commission). Since 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken actions such as establishing industry standards and federal guidelines, and completing EMP-related research reports. GAO found that their actions aligned with some of the EMP Commission recommendations related to the electric grid. For example, DHS developed EMP protection guidelines to help federal agencies and industry identify options for safeguarding critical communication equipment and control systems from an EMP attack. Further, agency actions and EMP Commission recommendations generally align with DHS and DOE critical infrastructure responsibilities, such as assessing risks and identifying key assets.
Additional opportunities exist to enhance federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. Specifically, DHS has not identified internal roles and responsibilities for addressing electromagnetic risks, which has led to limited awareness of related activities within the department and reduced opportunity for coordination with external partners. Doing so could provide additional awareness of related activities and help ensure more effective collaboration with other federal agencies and industry stakeholders. Moreover, although DHS components have independently conducted some efforts to assess electromagnetic risks, DHS has not fully leveraged opportunities to collect key risk inputs—namely threat, vulnerability, and consequence information—to inform comprehensive risk assessments of electromagnetic events. Within DHS, there is recognition that space weather and power grid failure are significant risk events, which DHS officials have determined pose great risk to the security of the nation. Better collection of risk inputs, including additional leveraging of information available from stakeholders, could help to further inform DHS assessment of these risks. DHS and DOE also did not report taking any actions to identify critical electrical infrastructure assets, as called for in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Although FERC conducted a related effort in 2013, DHS and DOE were not involved and have unique knowledge and expertise that could be utilized to better ensure that key assets are adequately identified and all applicable elements of criticality are considered. Finally, DHS and DOE, in conjunction with industry, have not established a coordinated approach to identifying and implementing key risk management activities to address EMP risks. Such activities include identifying and prioritizing key research and development efforts, and evaluating potential mitigation options, including the cost-effectiveness of specific protective equipment. Enhanced coordination to determine key research priorities could help address some identified research gaps and may help alleviate concerns voiced by industry regarding the costs and potential adverse consequences on grid reliability that may be caused by implementation of such equipment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS identify internal roles to address electromagnetic risks, and collect additional risk inputs to further inform assessment efforts; that DHS and DOE collaborate to ensure critical electrical infrastructure assets are identified; and engage with industry stakeholders to identify and prioritize risk-management activities, such as research and development efforts, to address EMP risks to the grid. DHS and DOE concurred with our recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-77 | gao_GAO-07-77_0 | Epogen is typically administered to Medicare ESRD patients intravenously. Under this authority, CMS determined that Medicare would pay for the separately billable ESRD drugs using the method required by the MMA to pay physicians for these drugs—that is, 106 percent of the drug’s ASP. New Payment Provisions Reduced Subsidy from Separately Billable Drugs but Did Not Eliminate Incentives to Overuse These Drugs
Since 2003, several legislative and regulatory changes have been implemented affecting Medicare’s composite rate for routine ESRD services and payment rates for separately billable ESRD drugs. For Epogen, the most frequently used drug, several months of data indicate that the per-patient use of this drug continues to rise, although at a slower rate than under pre- MMA payment rates. The base composite rate was increased by 1.6 percent in 2005 and 2006 and the composite rate total was further increased through a “drug add-on” payment, which shifted some of the payments for separately billable drugs to the composite rate. The most significant changes to the ESRD payment system are the changes in payment rates for separately billable drugs. Since 2006, when the payment method for separately billable drugs changed to ASP + 6 percent, Medicare’s payment rates have varied from quarter to quarter but have remained relatively consistent with the lower 2005 payments based on average acquisition costs. The practical aspects of ASP are several: it is based on actual transactions and is a better proxy for providers’ acquisition costs than Medicare’s previous methods to pay for these drugs; ASP is the most recent publicly available price information, as it is updated quarterly, and is therefore timely for rate-setting purposes; and price data from manufacturers are administratively easier for CMS to collect than obtaining such data from health care providers. The ASP payment method is of particular concern with respect to Epogen because it is the only product available in the ESRD market for anemia management. The ASP method relies on market forces to achieve a favorable payment rate for Medicare—that is, one that is sufficient to maintain beneficiary access but not overly generous for providers and therefore wasteful for taxpayers. For this reason, Medicare’s ASP method may not be appropriate for Epogen, which is the product of a single manufacturer has no competitor products in the ESRD market. The lack of price competition may be financially insignificant for noncompetitive products that are rarely used, but for Epogen, which is pervasively and frequently used, the lack of price competition could be having a considerable effect on Medicare spending. Consistent with payment policy, the Congress has required CMS to develop a system tha would no longer pay for each injectable ESRD drug under a separate rat but would bundle payment for these drugs together with other ESRD services under a single rate. A bundled rate would have advantages for achieving efficiency and greater clinical flexibility. In creating one payment bundle for a group of associated items and services provided during an episode of care, Medicare encourages providers to operate efficiently, as providers retain the difference if Medicare’s payment exceeds the costs they incur to provide the services. These individuals commented that CMS’s monitoring policy, which currently focuses on overutilization of Epogen, would need to refocus its attention on underutiliza under a bundled payment system ESRD patients received appropriate levels of Epogen and other dialysis-related drugs and services. Implementation of Bundled Payment System for ESRD Services Could Be Years Away
The MMA mandated a two-pronged approach for CMS to study the creation of a bundled payment method. It required CMS to submi to the Congress on a bundled payment system design in October 2005 an start a 3-year bundling demonstration in January 2006. The report had not been issued nor had the demonstration been launched as of November 2006. mandated report. Officials could not tell us when the report would be available. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare covers dialysis--a process that removes excess fluids and toxins from the bloodstream--for most individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), a condition of permanent kidney failure. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays for certain dialysis services under a type of bundled rate, called a composite rate, and, for certain dialysis-related drugs, pays a separate rate per dose each time the drug is administered. These drugs are referred to as "separately billable" and are paid at 6 percent above manufacturers' average sales price (ASP). Recently, the Congress required CMS to explore the creation of a bundled payment for all ESRD services, including separately billable drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1) recent changes in payments for ESRD services, (2) the ASP payment method of setting rates for separately billable ESRD drugs, and (3) CMS efforts to develop a bundled payment method that includes all ESRD drugs. GAO obtained information for this study from CMS, the U.S. Renal Data System, ESRD experts, and previously issued GAO reports.
What GAO Found
The effect of several legislative and regulatory changes since 2003 has been to raise the composite rate while reducing Medicare's pre-2005 generous payments for separately billable ESRD drugs. In 2005, when the first legislative change was implemented, Medicare expenditures for certain separately billable drugs dropped 11.8 percent. In 2006, Medicare regulation changed the payment for these drugs to a method based on ASP. Since then, Medicare's payment rates have varied from quarter to quarter but have remained relatively consistent with the lower 2005 payment rates. Medicare's cost containment efforts have targeted the most expensive of the separately billable drugs--Epogen--for which program spending totaled $2 billion in 2005. Epogen is used to treat anemia in ESRD patients; most patients receive this drug at nearly every dialysis session. Recent data indicate that Epogen use per patient continues to rise, although more slowly than in previous years. Several unknowns about the composition of ASP and the lack of empirical evidence for the percentage level added to ASP make it difficult for CMS to determine whether the ASP-based payment rates are no greater than necessary to achieve appropriate beneficiary access. Paying for Epogen under the ASP method is of particular concern. The ASP method relies on market forces to moderate manufacturers' prices; but Epogen is the product of a single manufacturer and has no competitor products in the ESRD market. Without competition, the power of market forces to moderate price is absent. For rarely used products, the lack of price competition may be financially insignificant, but for Epogen, which is pervasively and frequently used, the lack of price competition could be having a considerable effect on Medicare spending. In 2003, the Congress required CMS to issue a report and conduct a demonstration of a system that would bundle payment for ESRD services, including drugs that are currently billed separately, under a single rate. The bundled payment approach, used to pay for most Medicare services, encourages providers to operate efficiently, as they retain the difference if Medicare's payment exceeds the costs they incur to provide the services. GAO and others have found that a bundled rate for all ESRD services would have advantages for achieving efficiency and clinical flexibility in treating ESRD patients. CMS's demonstration testing the feasibility of a bundled rate, mandated to start in January 2006, is delayed, as is the completion of the agency's mandated report to the Congress on bundling. The report was due in October 2005; as of November 2006, CMS officials could not tell us when the report would be available. |
gao_GAO-09-499T | gao_GAO-09-499T_0 | Regulators also have a role in assessing risk management at financial institutions. In particular, oversight of risk management at large financial institutions is divided among a number of regulatory agencies. GLBA authorizes the Federal Reserve and OTS to examine the holding company and each subsidiary in order to: (a) inform the regulator of “the nature of the operations and financial condition” of the holding company and its subsidiaries; and (b) inform the regulator of the financial and operational risks within the holding company system that may threaten the safety and soundness of the holding company’s bank subsidiaries and the systems for monitoring and controlling such risks; and (c) monitor compliance with applicable federal laws. Regulators Identify Areas of Risk and Examine Risk Management Systems, but Their Specific Approaches Vary
The Federal Reserve, FINRA, OCC, OTS, and SEC each identify areas of risk relating to the large, complex financial institutions they oversee and examine risk management systems at regulated institutions. However, the banking and securities regulators take different approaches. SEC and FINRA aggregate information from officials and staff of the supervised institutions throughout the year to identify areas of concern across all broker-dealers. The focus of SEC and FINRA oversight is on compliance with their rules and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. SEC and FINRA conduct horizontal or “sweep” examinations and, for example, have completed one for subprime mortgages. Banking Regulators Have a Variety of Tools to Address Risk Management Weaknesses
The banking regulators have developed guidance on how they should communicate their examination findings to help ensure that financial institutions take corrective actions. Regulators told us that despite these identified weaknesses, they did not take forceful action—such as changing their assessments— until the crisis occurred because the institutions reported a strong financial position and senior management had presented the regulators with plans for change. Some Regulators Identified Weaknesses in Risk Management Systems in a Limited Number of Institutions but Did Not Take Forceful Actions to Address Them until the Crisis Began
In several instances, regulators identified shortcomings in institutions’ oversight of risk management at the limited number of large, complex institutions we reviewed but did not change their overall assessments of the institutions until the crisis began in the summer of 2007. Moreover, the examiners said that senior management had presented them with plans to address the risk management weaknesses. Regulators Identified Weaknesses in Models Used to Calculate Risk but May Not Have Acted on These Findings
Regulators also identified weaknesses in the oversight and testing of risk models that financial institutions used, including those used to calculate the amount of capital needed to protect against their risk exposures and determine the valuation of complex products. We found that regulators had identified numerous weaknesses in stress testing at large institutions before the financial crisis. However, our limited review did not identify any instances in which an institution’s lack of worst-case scenario testing prompted regulators to push forcefully for institutional actions to better understand and manage risks. Regulators’ Oversight of Institutions’ Risk Management Systems Illustrates Some Limitations of the Current Regulatory System
In this and other work, we identified two specific shortcomings of the current regulatory system that impact the oversight of risk management at large, complex financial institutions. First, no regulator has a clear responsibility to look across institutions to identify risks to overall financial stability. Even when regulators perform horizontal examinations across institutions, they generally do not use the results to identify potential systemic risks. Second, although financial institutions manage risks on an enterprisewide basis or by business lines that cut across legal entities, primary bank and functional regulators may oversee risk management at the level of a legal entity within a holding company. While the regulators periodically conducted horizontal examinations in areas such as stress testing, credit risk practices, and risk management for securitized mortgage products, these efforts did not focus on the stability of the financial system, nor were they used as a way to assess future threats to that system. Primary Bank and Functional Regulators May Limit Their Oversight of Risk Management to Specific Legal Entities Such As Depository Institutions or Broker- Dealers
Some regulators have noted that the current practice of assessing risk management at the level of a depository institution or broker-dealer did not reflect the way most large, complex institutions manage their risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Financial regulators have an important role in assessing risk management systems at financial institutions. Analyses have identified inadequate risk management at large, complex financial institutions as one of the causes of the current financial crisis. The failure of the institutions to appropriately identify, measure, and manage their risks has raised questions not only about corporate governance but also about the adequacy of regulatory oversight of risk management systems. GAO's objectives were to review (1) how regulators oversee risk management at these institutions, (2) the extent to which regulators identified shortcomings in risk management at certain institutions prior to the summer of 2007, and (3) how some aspects of the regulatory system may have contributed to or hindered the oversight of risk management. GAO built upon its existing body of work, evaluated the examination guidance used by examiners at U.S. banking and securities regulators, and reviewed examination reports and work papers from 2006-2008 for a selected sample of large institutions, and horizontal exams that included additional institutions. In January 2009, GAO designated the need to modernize the financial regulatory system as a high risk area needing congressional attention. Regulatory oversight of risk management at large, financial institutions, particularly at the holding company level, should be considered part of that effort.
What GAO Found
The banking and securities regulators use a variety of tools to identify areas of risk and assess how large, complex financial institutions manage their risks. The banking regulators--Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)--and securities regulators--Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)--use somewhat different approaches to oversee risk management practices. Banking examiners are assigned to continuously monitor a single institution, where they engage in targeted and horizontal examinations and assess risks and the quality of institutions' risk management systems. SEC and FINRA identify areas of high risk by aggregating information from examiners and officials on areas of concern across broker-dealers and by monitoring institutions. SEC and FINRA conduct discrete targeted and horizontal examinations. The banking regulators focused on safety and soundness, while SEC and FINRA tended to focus on compliance with securities rules and laws. All regulators have specific tools for effecting change when they identify weaknesses in risk management at institutions they oversee. In the examination materials GAO reviewed for a limited number of institutions, GAO found that regulators had identified numerous weaknesses in the institutions' risk management systems before the financial crisis began. For example, regulators identified inadequate oversight of institutions' risks by senior management. However, the regulators said that they did not take forceful actions to address these weaknesses, such as changing their assessments, until the crisis occurred because the institutions had strong financial positions and senior management had presented the regulators with plans for change. Regulators also identified weaknesses in models used to measure and manage risk but may not have taken action to resolve these weaknesses. Finally, regulators identified numerous stress testing weaknesses at several large institutions, but GAO's limited review did not identify any instances in which weaknesses prompted regulators to take aggressive steps to push institutions to better understand and manage risks. Some aspects of the regulatory system may have hindered regulators' oversight of risk management. First, no regulator systematically looks across institutions to identify factors that could affect the overall financial system. While regulators periodically conducted horizontal examinations on stress testing, credit risk practices, and risk management for securitized mortgage products, they did not consistently use the results to identify potential systemic risks. Second, primary bank and functional regulators' oversee risk management at the level of the legal entity within a holding company while large entities manage risk on an enterprisewide basis or by business lines that cut across legal entities. As a result, these regulators may have only a limited view of institutions' risk management or their responsibilities and activities may overlap with those of holding company regulators. |
gao_GAO-12-63 | gao_GAO-12-63_0 | Approximately 2 percent of employers reported that they offered coverage for only mental health conditions in 2008 but not substance use disorders, and continued to offer coverage for only mental health conditions in the current plan year. Conversely, a small percentage of employers—about 2 percent of those employers that responded to our survey about their coverage of MH/SU for both plan years—reported discontinuing their coverage of both MH/SU or only substance use disorders in the current plan year. Published employer surveys also reported that few employers discontinued coverage of MH/SU since MHPAEA was passed. However, fewer employers reported excluding at least one broad MH/SU diagnosis and more employers reported excluding a treatment related to MH/SU in the current plan year than for 2008. The types of MH/SU diagnoses included and excluded from employers’ MH/SU benefits remained consistent between the current plan year and 2008. Of the employers that responded to our survey question about the diagnoses included in their MH/SU benefits for both the current plan year and 2008 plan year, 34 percent reported that their most popular plan in their current plan year excluded at least one broad MH/SU diagnosis from their benefits, and 39 percent reported this for the 2008 plan year. The most common change to MH/SU benefits reported among those that responded to our survey was enhancing benefits through the removal of treatment limitations, such as the number of allowed office visits or inpatient days. Reported use of lifetime dollar limits on MH/SU treatments also declined from 2008 to the current plan year.answered detailed benefits questions in our survey reported lifetime dollar About 5 percent of employers that limits on treatments for MH/SU for the current plan year, compared to 20 percent in 2008. Among employers who reported information on cost-sharing, copayments and coinsurance amounts for office visits with in-network providers generally stayed about the same, fluctuating minimally from 2008 to the current plan year, while copayments and coinsurance amounts for outpatient services with in-network providers decreased slightly from 2008 to the current plan year (see table 1). Employers May Continue to Modify Benefits as Agencies Refine Parity Requirements
Employers may continue to modify certain nonfinancial requirements— such as changes to the services they cover (the scope of services) and NQTLs—in their MH/SU benefits in response to agencies’ issuance of final implementing regulations for MHPAEA. Agency officials reported that the final regulations may provide additional detail on the required scope of services and on using NQTLs. Research also indicates that health insurance coverage for MH/SU has had mixed effects on access to, and use of, MH/SU services. In addition, little research has explored the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on health status. Research Indicates That Enhanced Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Health Conditions and Substance Use Disorders Reduces Enrollee Expenditures
Of the nine studies we reviewed that focused on the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on enrollee expenditures, six studies generally found that the implementation of parity requirements led to reduced enrollee expenditures. For example, one of these studies examined the effect of a state parity requirement within the first 3 years following implementation of parity requirements, and found that the implementation of parity requirements resulted in increased access to, and use of, mental health services; however, the implementation of parity resulted in reduced access to substance use disorder services.increased access to, or use of, MH/SU services for individuals with mild to moderate mental health needs, but that state parity Another study found that state parity requirements requirements had no effect on access to, or use of, MH/SU services for individuals with severe mental health needs. Little Research Has Explored the Relationship between Health Insurance Coverage and Health Status
Of the studies we reviewed, two studies examined the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on health status of the general population. Agency Comments
DOL and HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Given the response rate, our survey results are not generalizable. Rather, the survey responses provide information limited to responding employers’ coverage of MH/SU in the current plan year and 2008 plan year. We spoke with agency officials from the Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS) Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), and HHS’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration who had expertise in MH/SU issues. We also interviewed four employer survey respondents—one in each employer size category—to obtain more detailed information about the employers’ coverage of MH/SU, and their reasons for making or not making changes to coverage after the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) took effect. Appendix II: Articles Reviewed on the Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on Enrollees
We conducted a review of published studies between January 2000 and March 11, 2011, that included an assessment of the effect of health insurance coverage for mental health conditions and substance use disorders (MH/SU) on enrollee expenditures, access to, or use of, MH/SU services, or health status. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) requires that employers who offer health insurance coverage for mental health conditions and substance use disorders (MH/SU) provide coverage that is no more restrictive than that offered for medical and surgical conditions. Employers were required to comply with the law for coverage that began on or after October 3, 2009. The Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of the Treasury share oversight for MHPAEA. MHPAEA also requires GAO to examine trends in health insurance coverage of MH/SU. This report describes (1) the extent to which employers cover MH/SU through private health insurance plans, and how this coverage has changed since 2008; and (2) what is known about the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on enrollees' health care expenditures; access to, or use of, MH/SU services; and health status. GAO surveyed a random sample of employers about their MH/SU coverage for the most current plan year and for 2008. GAO received usable responses from 168 employers--a 24 percent response rate. The survey results are not generalizable; rather, they provide information limited to responding employers' MH/SU coverage. GAO reviewed published national employer surveys on health insurance coverage and interviewed officials from DOL, HHS, and other experts. GAO also reviewed studies that evaluated the effect of MH/SU coverage on enrollees' expenditures, access to, or use of, MH/SU services, and health status.
What GAO Found
Most employers continued to offer coverage of MH/SU since MHPAEA was passed. Of the employers that responded to GAO's survey, 96 percent offered coverage of MH/SU for the current plan year and for 2008, before MHPAEA was passed. Approximately 2 percent of employers reported offering coverage for only mental health conditions but not substance use disorders for the current plan year and for 2008. Conversely, about 2 percent of employers reported discontinuing their coverage of both MH/SU or only substance use disorders in the current plan year. The types of MH/SU diagnoses included and excluded in employers' MH/SU benefits remained consistent between the current plan year and 2008. Of the employers who provided information about diagnoses included in their MH/SU benefits for both the current plan year and 2008, 34 percent reported that their most popular plan in the current plan year excluded at least one MH/SU diagnosis from their benefits, and 39 percent of employers reported excluding at least one MH/SU diagnosis from their benefits for the 2008 plan year. The most common change to MH/SU benefits reported among those who responded to the survey was enhancing benefits through the removal of treatment limitations, such as the number of allowed office visits. Reported use of lifetime dollar limits on MH/SU treatments also declined from 2008 to the current plan year. Among employers who reported information on cost-sharing, copayments and coinsurance amounts for in-network providers generally stayed about the same, fluctuating minimally from 2008 to the current plan year. Published national employer surveys on health insurance coverage also reported results consistent with GAO's survey data. Employers may continue to modify certain nonfinancial requirements--such as changes to the services they cover (the scope of services) and nonquantitative treatment limits--in their MH/SU benefits in response to agencies' issuance of final implementing regulations for MHPAEA. Officials from DOL and HHS reported that the final regulations may provide additional detail on these nonfinancial requirements. Research suggests that coverage for MH/SU has a varied effect on enrollees. Research examining the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on enrollee expenditures generally found that the implementation of parity requirements reduced enrollee expenditures. Studies that examined the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on enrollee access to, and use of, MH/SU services had mixed results, with some studies indicating there was little to no effect and others indicating that there was some effect--such as finding that restricting coverage had a negative effect on use of services. Little research has explored the relationship between health insurance coverage and health status. Of the studies we reviewed, two examined the effect of health insurance coverage for MH/SU on enrollee health status and found different effects. GAO provided a draft of the report to DOL and HHS. Both agencies provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-1157T | gao_GAO-08-1157T_0 | Government officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as criminals, terrorists, and nation-states. In addition, there is continued concern about the threat that our adversaries, including nation-states and terrorists, pose to our national security. To address threats posed against the nation’s computer-reliant infrastructures, federal law and policy establishes DHS as the focal point for cyber CIP. DHS Needs to Address Several Key Areas Associated with Its Cybersecurity Responsibilities
Over the last several years, we have reported that DHS has yet to comprehensively satisfy its key cybersecurity responsibilities. These reports included about 30 recommendations that we summarized into the following key areas that are essential for DHS to address in order to fully implement its cybersecurity responsibilities. We concluded that while US-CERT demonstrated aspects of each of the key attributes, it did not fully incorporate all of them. The organization also provided warnings by developing and distributing a wide array of attack and other notifications; however, these notifications were not consistently actionable or timely—providing the right information to the right persons or groups as early as possible to give them time to take appropriate action. We also concluded that while DHS had demonstrated progress in addressing the lessons learned, more needed to be done. Consequently, we recommended that DHS schedule and complete the identified corrective activities so that its cyber exercises can help both public and private sector participants coordinate their responses to significant cyber incidents. Improving Cybersecurity of Infrastructure Control Systems
In a September 2007 report and October 2007 testimony, we identified that federal agencies had initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems—computer-based systems that monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. For example, DHS was sponsoring multiple control systems security initiatives, including efforts to (1) improve control systems cybersecurity using vulnerability evaluation and response tools and (2) build relationships with control systems vendors and infrastructure asset owners. However, the department had not established a strategy to coordinate the various control systems activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Consequently, we recommended that DHS develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems and establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control system vulnerability information to improve federal government efforts to secure control systems governing critical infrastructure. In summary, DHS has developed and implemented capabilities to satisfy aspects of key cybersecurity responsibilities. Until these steps are taken, our nation’s computer-reliant critical infrastructure remains at unnecessary risk of significant cyber incidents. Appendix II: Key Attributes of Cyber Analysis and Warning Capabilities
Attribute Establish a baseline understanding of network assets and normal network traffic volume and flow Assess risks to network assets Obtain internal information on network operations via technical tools and user reports Obtain external information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents through various relationships, alerts, and other sources Detect anomalous activities Verify that an anomaly is an incident (threat of attack or actual attack) Investigate the incident to identify the type of cyber attack, estimate impact, and collect evidence Identify possible actions to mitigate the impact of the incident Integrate results into predictive analysis of broader implications or potential future attack Develop attack and other notifications that are targeted and actionable Provide notifications in a timely manner Distribute notifications using appropriate communications methods Contain and mitigate the incident Recover from damages and remediate vulnerabilities Evaluate actions and incorporate lessons learned This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent cyber attacks demonstrate the potentially devastating impact these pose to our nation's computer systems and to the federal operations and critical infrastructures that they support. They also highlight that we need to be vigilant against individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as criminals, terrorists, and nation-states perpetuating these attacks. Federal law and policy established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for coordinating cybersecurity, including making it responsible for protecting systems that support critical infrastructures, a practice commonly referred to as cyber critical infrastructure protection. Since 2005, GAO has reported on the responsibilities and progress DHS has made in its cybersecurity efforts. GAO was asked to summarize its key reports and their associated recommendations aimed at securing our nation's cyber critical infrastructure. To do so, GAO relied on previous reports, as well as two reports being released today, and analyzed information about the status of recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported over the last several years that DHS has yet to fully satisfy its cybersecurity responsibilities. To address these shortfalls, GAO has made about 30 recommendations in the following key areas. Specifically, examples of what GAO reported and recommended are as follows: (1) Cyber analysis and warning--In July 2008, GAO reported that DHS's United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) did not fully address 15 key cyber analysis and warning attributes. For example, US-CERT provided warnings by developing and distributing a wide array of notifications; however, these notifications were not consistently actionable or timely. Consequently, GAO recommended that DHS address these attribute shortfalls. (2) Cyber exercises--In September 2008, GAO reported that since conducting a cyber attack exercise in 2006, DHS demonstrated progress in addressing eight lessons it learned from this effort. However, its actions to address the lessons had not been fully implemented. GAO recommended that the department schedule and complete all identified corrective activities. (3) Control systems--In a September 2007 report and October 2007 testimony, GAO identified that DHS was sponsoring multiple efforts to improve control system cybersecurity using vulnerability evaluation and response tools. However, the department had not established a strategy to coordinate this and other efforts across federal agencies and the private sector, and it did not effectively share control system vulnerabilities with others. Accordingly, GAO recommended that DHS develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing such systems and establish a process for sharing vulnerability information. While DHS has developed and implemented capabilities to address aspects of these areas, it still has not fully satisfied any of them. Until these and other areas are effectively addressed, our nation's cyber critical infrastructure is at risk of increasing threats posed by terrorists, nation-states, and others. |
gao_GAO-09-385 | gao_GAO-09-385_0 | The purpose of this program is to develop a standard approach for planning nuclear weapons refurbishment activities so that the nuclear weapons complex can extend the operational lives of the weapons in the stockpile by another 20 to 30 years. NNSA Met the B61 Program Schedule, but Did Not Meet All Refurbishment Objectives
NNSA completed the refurbishment of the B61 bomb on schedule in November 2008. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA was not able to meet all the refurbishment objectives because it established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase 6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid significant cost overruns for the B61 only because (1) DOD changed some of the refurbishment objectives, (2) NNSA was able to reuse, rather than manufacture, a critical component for the B61, and (3) the Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the stockpile. However, the refurbished B61 bombs still do not meet all refurbishment objectives. Dismantlement of decommissioned B61 bombs allowed NNSA to obtain the necessary material for the refurbished B61 bombs. DOD Failed to Adequately Oversee Critical NNSA Life Extension Activities for the B61
Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life extension program activities. Second, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA’s design, engineering, and testing activities—a review that would have alerted it to the fact that NNSA was unable to meet all refurbishment objectives. NNSA Did Not Adequately Address One of the Highest Risks to the W76 Program, Which Led to Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and an Unrealistic Production Schedule
NNSA developed a risk mitigation strategy to avoid potential cost overruns and schedule delays related to the manufacture of Fogbank but failed to effectively implement it. As a result, NNSA’s original plans to produce the first refurbished W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September 2008. In addition, NNSA spent $69 million to address Fogbank production problems, and the Navy faced logistical challenges in replacing old W76 warheads with refurbished ones on submarines owing to the delay. Furthermore, NNSA did not use the same criteria and accounting practices each fiscal year to develop a cost baseline for the W76 program, which makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time. NNSA Lacks a Consistent Approach to Developing the W76 Cost Baseline
NNSA does not have a consistent approach for developing a cost baseline for the W76 program. We believe that our report fairly attributes management problems with the B61 life extension program to both NNSA and DOD. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administers the Stockpile Life Extension Program, whose purpose is to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of the weapons in the nuclear stockpile. NNSA encountered significant management problems with its first refurbishment for the W87 warhead. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) have effectively managed the refurbishment of two other weapons--the B61 bomb and the W76 warhead. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the refurbishment of the B61 bomb and W76 warhead.
What GAO Found
NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program. Regarding the B61 program, although NNSA completed the refurbishment of the strategic variants of the B61 bomb--the Mods 7 and 11--on schedule in November 2008, the refurbished weapons do not meet all refurbishment objectives. According to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its refurbishment guidance, known as the Phase 6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid significant cost overruns for the B61 program only because (1) some of the refurbishment objectives were changed, (2) NNSA was able to reuse, rather than manufacture, a critical component when B61 bombs were decommissioned, and (3) the Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the stockpile. Despite DOD concerns about the adequacy of NNSA testing of the B61 bombs under certain conditions, NNSA continued refurbishing the weapons. Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA's life extension program activities. For example, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA's design, engineering, and testing activities--a review that would have alerted DOD that NNSA was missing some of its refurbishment objectives. Regarding the W76 program, NNSA did not effectively manage a high risk associated with manufacturing an essential material, known as Fogbank, needed to refurbish the W76 warhead. NNSA had developed a risk mitigation strategy to avoid potential cost overruns and schedule delays related to the manufacture of this key material but failed to effectively implement this strategy. As a result, NNSA's original plans to produce the first refurbished W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September 2008; NNSA spent $69 million to address Fogbank production problems; and the Navy faced logistical challenges owing to the delay. Furthermore, NNSA did not have a consistent approach to developing a cost baseline for the W76 program, which makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time and to know the actual cost of the program. |
gao_GAO-12-68 | gao_GAO-12-68_0 | USAID and State Have Obligated and Expended Small Amounts of the Almost $412 Million Allocated for Construction Activities
As of September 30, 2011, USAID and State allocated $411.6 million for bilateral post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in Haiti using $356.9 million in fiscal year (FY) 2010 supplemental funds and $54.8 million from regular fiscal year appropriations. State has activities in the governance and rule of law sector, which account for $45.9 million (11.1 percent) of the total funds allocated for infrastructure construction. USAID and State Have Obligated Almost 12 Percent and Expended 0.8 Percent of Funds Allocated for Infrastructure Construction
As of September 30, 2011, USAID had obligated $42.6 million for activities in the energy, ports, shelter, health, and food security sectors. USAID Staffing Difficulties Were a Factor in Delaying USAID Infrastructure Construction Activities in Haiti
USAID Has Had Difficulty Replacing Staff Since the Earthquake
Within a month after the earthquake, 10 of the mission’s 17 U.S. direct- hire staff had departed Haiti, leaving the mission with 7 staff in country to manage a program heavily involved in massive relief operations and anticipating an increase in reconstruction activities. However, the mission will be implementing infrastructure construction activities until at least 2015, according to USAID planning documentation. As U.S. direct-hire staff leave Haiti, the mission will need to replace them in order to continue the progress of infrastructure construction activities. For example: Engineering: Although USAID allocated more than $300 million in supplemental funds for infrastructure activities that would require engineering skills, the mission’s planning process was delayed due, in part, to the lack of U.S. direct-hire engineers, according to USAID officials. In addition, mission staff have experienced increased workloads and some mission staff have had to take on additional responsibilities outside their normal areas of expertise. The USAID mission in Haiti, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies and USAID in Washington, D.C., has drafted eight Activity Approval Documents (AADs)—detailed planning documents for each sector. As of October 2011, six AADs had been approved: education, energy, food security, governance and rule of law, health, and shelter (see table 5). According to USAID officials, the AADs for Haiti are more comprehensive and have involved a more extensive review process than is typical. Haitian Government Capacity Is a Key Challenge to Sustainability of U.S. Government Infrastructure Reconstruction Activities
The sustainability of USAID-funded infrastructure activities depends, in part, on improvements to Haiti’s long-standing economic and institutional weaknesses, the Haitian government’s political will to implement change, as well as the success of planned capacity-building activities. Some activities face sustainability challenges. Additional issues, such as difficulties in obtaining land title and the time needed to conduct environmental assessments, have led to delays in planning construction activities, and some activities do not yet have start dates. Recommendation for Executive Action
To facilitate USAID’s progress in planning and implementing its many post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in Haiti over the next several years, particularly those requiring key technical staff such as contracting officers, engineers, and program specialists, we recommend that the USAID Administrator ensure that U.S. direct-hire staff are placed at the mission within time frames that avoid future staffing gaps or delays. In addition, USAID described certain actions it is currently taking, such as providing accelerated one-on-one language training and special bidding incentives for Haiti, that, if continued, could address our recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the infrastructure-related post-earthquake reconstruction efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State) in Haiti. This report examines, for infrastructure construction activities only, (1) the amounts of USAID and State obligations and expenditures; (2) USAID’s staffing; (3) USAID’s planning; and (4) potential sustainability challenges USAID faces. In response to a congressional mandate in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010 (the Act) that made funds available for GAO to review U.S. efforts in Haiti, we focused our review on the $918 million in bilateral reconstruction funding provided to USAID and State in the Act as well as other funding provided to USAID and State in annual fiscal year appropriations that support reconstruction activities, including infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, in Haiti. Appendix II: Sector Fact Sheets
Appendix II provides information on the funding, status of activities, select challenges, and sustainability plans for the six sectors that include infrastructure construction activities: energy, ports, shelter, health, food security, and governance and rule of law. | Why GAO Did This Study
On January 12, 2010, a powerful earthquake struck Haiti, resulting in an estimated 230,000 deaths, including more than 16,000 Haitian government personnel, and the destruction of many ministry buildings. In addition to immediate relief efforts, in July 2010, Congress appropriated $1.14 billion in supplemental funds for reconstruction, most of which was provided to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). USAID and State are administering about $412 million in supplemental and regular fiscal year appropriations for infrastructure construction activities. In May 2011, in response to a congressional mandate, GAO reported on overall U.S. plans for assistance to Haiti. This report addresses infrastructure construction activities, including (1) USAID and State obligations and expenditures; (2) USAID staffing; (3) USAID planning; and (4) potential sustainability challenges USAID faces. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Haiti, and visited ongoing and planned construction sites in Haiti..
What GAO Found
USAID and State have obligated and expended a small amount of funds for infrastructure construction activities in six sectors: energy, ports, shelter, health, food security, and governance and rule of law. As of September 30, 2011, USAID and State had allocated almost $412 million for infrastructure construction activities, obligated approximately $48.4 million (11.8 percent), and expended approximately $3.1 million (0.8 percent). Of the almost $412 million, about 87 percent was allocated from the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act and 13 percent from regular fiscal year appropriations. USAID accounts for about 89 percent of the $412 million, including funds for construction in the energy, ports, shelter, health, and food security sectors. State activities in the governance and rule of law sector account for the remaining 11 percent. USAID had difficulty staffing the Haiti mission after the earthquake, a factor that has contributed to delays in infrastructure construction activities. Soon after the earthquake, 10 of the 17 U.S. citizen Foreign Service Officers, known as U.S. direct-hire staff, in Haiti left. USAID, lacking a process for expediting the movement of staff to post-disaster situations, had difficulty replacing them and recruiting additional staff. These staff included key technical personnel such as engineers and contracting officers needed to plan and implement infrastructure activities in sectors such as energy and ports, where the mission had not previously worked. With limited U.S. direct-hire staff on board, the mission relied heavily on temporary staff, and remaining staff assumed duties outside their normal areas of expertise. The mission plans to have all U.S. direct-hire staff on board by February 2012. Since infrastructure activities will continue until at least 2015, the mission will need to maintain sufficient staff for several years to manage the activities supported by the increase in Haiti reconstruction funds. USAID and State are planning activities in Haiti, but various challenges have contributed to some of USAID's delays. As of October 2011, USAID had drafted eight Activity Approval Documents (AADs) that include planned activities, costs, risks, and assumptions. AADs for the education, energy, food security, governance and rule of law, health, and shelter sectors have been approved. The AAD process has been more comprehensive and involved than is typical for such efforts, according to USAID officials. Although USAID made progress in planning, construction of some activities was delayed for various reasons, and some activities do not yet have planned start dates. For example, the mission was delayed in awarding contracts in the shelter sector due to issues such as identifying sites for shelter and obtaining land title. The sustainability of USAID-funded infrastructure depends, in part, on improvements to the Haitian government's long-standing economic and institutional weaknesses. USAID has considered various sustainability issues and is planning institutional strengthening activities, such as management reform of the power utility, but USAID planning documents acknowledge that these reforms will be challenging and that infrastructure activities face risks. These challenges are consistent with prior GAO reports that address sustainability of U.S. infrastructure projects in other countries.
What GAO Recommends
To facilitate USAID's progress in planning and implementing its many post-earthquake infrastructure construction activities in Haiti over the next several years, particularly those requiring key technical staff, GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator ensure that U.S. direct-hire staff are placed at the mission within time frames that avoid future staffing gaps or delays. USAID described certain actions it is currently taking that, if continued, could address the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-147 | gao_GAO-08-147_0 | Background
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), FDA is responsible for reviewing the safety and effectiveness of medical devices before they go to market (premarket review) and ensuring that they remain safe and effective afterwards (postmarket oversight). The premarket notification report must provide evidence that the device is substantially equivalent to a device already on the market before FDA will allow it to be marketed. Varied Information Available on Reprocessed SUD Industry
FDA has information on domestic reprocessing establishments and the devices they are reprocessing or considering for reprocessing, but it does not have data on the extent of actual production or on where the devices are being used. Eleven Active Reprocessing Establishments Collectively May Be Reprocessing More than 100 Types of SUDs
FDA identified 11 establishments actively reprocessing SUDs in the United States as of July 2007, 1 of which was a hospital. In 2002, FDA reported that about one-fourth of U.S. hospitals used at least one type of reprocessed SUD, with larger hospitals being more likely to do so. FDA Has Increased Its Oversight of SUD Reprocessing
FDA has taken actions, both on its own initiative and in response to legislation, to strengthen the agency’s oversight of reprocessed SUDs. In August of that year, FDA issued guidance that clarified its policies on the regulation of reprocessed SUDs. This guidance was directed at hospitals and third-party entities engaged in reprocessing SUDs for reuse. FDA Actions for Postmarket Oversight of Reprocessed SUDs Have Taken Several Forms
FDA’s actions regarding its postmarket oversight of reprocessed SUDs have included (1) clarifying that SUD reprocessing establishments are subject to the same inspection requirements as other device manufacturing establishments and (2) updating reporting forms to better identify those device-related adverse event reports involving reprocessed SUDs. Available Data Lack Rigor for Definitive Comparisons but Do Not Indicate That Reprocessed SUDs Pose an Elevated Health Risk
While FDA has made changes to its data collection process regarding reprocessed SUD-related adverse events, the data are not suitable for a rigorous comparison of the safety of reprocessed SUDs relative to original SUDs of the same type on their initial use. The limited number of peer-reviewed studies related to reprocessing that we identified were insufficient to support a comprehensive conclusion on the relative safety of reprocessed SUDs. Such a study, at a minimum, would require data that would identify the type of device and adverse event, the number of original and reprocessed SUDs of that type in use, the number of times each reprocessed SUD was used, and the rate of adverse events associated with the original devices. FDA officials indicated to us, however, that such studies would not be an efficient use of agency resources given the existing level of FDA oversight. After reviewing the available evidence—including FDA’s process for identifying and investigating device-related adverse events reported to involve reprocessed SUDs, peer-reviewed studies published since 2000, and the results of our and FDA’s consultations with hospital representatives—we found no reason to question FDA’s analysis indicating that no causative link has been established between reported injuries or deaths and reprocessed SUDs. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided language to clarify several sentences which we generally incorporated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the report objectives, we (1) reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency guidance; (2) interviewed Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officials, representatives of professional associations of manufacturing establishments, and the Association of Medical Device Reprocessors (AMDR); (3) interviewed officials from a provider association, private hospitals, and the Departments of Defense and of Veterans Affairs regarding their policies on the use of reprocessed single-use devices (SUD); and (4) reviewed FDA data, market research, and peer-reviewed studies. To determine available research published about the safety of reprocessed SUDs since we last reported on the topic in 2000, we reviewed FDA documents related to adverse events involving reprocessed SUDs and an FDA-sponsored survey of the experience of some hospitals related to SUDs, reviewed summaries of, and other documents related to, FDA inspections of reprocessing establishments conducted from August 2004 through October 2007, and conducted a literature search of studies (which we call articles) published in peer-reviewed journals from January 2000 through January 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for reviewing the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. The decision to label a device as single-use or reusable rests with the manufacturer. To market a reusable device, a manufacturer must provide data demonstrating to FDA's satisfaction that the device can be cleaned and sterilized without impairing its function. Alternatively, a single-use device (SUD) may be marketed without such data after demonstrating to FDA that the device is safe and effective if used once. Even though labeled for single-use, some SUDs are reprocessed for reuse with FDA clearance. This report addresses (1) the SUD reprocessing industry--the number of reprocessing establishments, the types of devices reprocessed, and the extent to which hospitals use reprocessed SUDs, (2) the steps FDA has taken to strengthen oversight of reprocessed SUDs, both on its own and in response to legislative requirements, and (3) the safety of reprocessed SUDs compared with other types of medical devices. GAO reviewed FDA data on reprocessors, reprocessed SUDs, and device-related adverse events, as well as FDA documents and inspection reports, studies published in peer-reviewed journals, and relevant statutes and regulations. GAO interviewed FDA officials and officials from associations of manufacturers, reprocessors, and providers.
What GAO Found
FDA has information on domestic reprocessing establishments, but it does not have data on the extent of actual production or on where the devices are being used. FDA officials identified 11 establishments that reported planning to market or actively marketing more than 100 types of reprocessed SUDs in the United States as of July 2007. Reprocessed SUDs ranged from devices used external to the body, such as blood pressure cuffs, to surgical devices used to repair joints. While many hospitals were believed to be reprocessing their own SUDs in 2000, FDA identified only one hospital in 2007 that was reprocessing SUDs. Reprocessed SUDs are being used in a variety of hospitals throughout the nation, including military hospitals. However, the Department of Veterans Affairs, which operates one of the nation's largest health care systems, prohibits their use entirely. Since 2000, FDA has taken a number of steps--on its own and in response to legislation--to enhance its regulation of reprocessed SUDs both before they go to market (called premarket review) and afterwards (called postmarket oversight). In 2000, FDA published guidance that clarified its policies on the regulation of reprocessed SUDs. This guidance was directed at third-party entities and hospitals engaged in reprocessing SUDs for reuse. Following legislation passed in 2002, FDA imposed additional requirements for about 70 types of reprocessed devices and implemented new labeling requirements so that users would recognize those devices that had been reprocessed. In terms of postmarket review, FDA now inspects reprocessors and monitors reports of adverse events involving reprocessed SUDs. Seven of the 10 reprocessing establishments that FDA inspected in the last 3 years had problems requiring corrective actions. Regarding adverse event reporting, FDA modified its reporting forms in 2003 to enable FDA to better identify and analyze those adverse events involving reprocessed SUDs. Neither existing FDA data nor studies performed by others are sufficient to draw definitive conclusions about the safety of reprocessed SUDs compared to similar original devices. While FDA has made changes to its data collection process regarding reprocessed SUD-related adverse events, the data are not suitable for a rigorous comparison of the safety of reprocessed SUDs compared to similar original SUDs. The other studies published since 2000 that GAO identified are likewise insufficient to support a comprehensive conclusion on the relative safety of reprocessed SUDs. FDA officials have concluded that the cost of conducting rigorous testing would not be an efficient use of resources, especially given that the available data, while limited, do not indicate that reprocessed SUDs present an elevated health risk. FDA has analyzed its data on reported adverse events related to reprocessed SUDs and has concluded that there are no patterns that point to these devices creating such risks. After reviewing FDA's processes for monitoring and investigating its adverse event data, we found no reason to question FDA's analysis. HHS provided language to clarify several sentences of a draft of this report which GAO generally incorporated. |
gao_AIMD-98-124 | gao_AIMD-98-124_0 | Some of these standards specify a 4-digit year format. Federal and state coordinating organizations reached initial agreements in 1997 on the steps to address data exchanges issues; however, many federal agencies and states have not yet finished assessing their data exchanges to determine if they are Year 2000 compliant. Further, little progress has been made in completing key steps such as reaching agreements with partners on exchange formats, developing and testing bridges and filters, and developing contingency plans. To implement these agreements, OMB issued instructions in January 1998 for federal agencies to inventory all data exchanges with outside parties by February 1, 1998, and coordinate plans for transitioning to Year 2000 compliant data exchanges with exchange partners by March 1, 1998. Significant state actions will be needed to address Year 2000 data exchange issues. Of the 12 agencies that have been monitoring progress on the resolution of Year 2000 problems, 10 reported that they have data on the corrective action status of the organization they regulate or oversee. Most Actions Taken by Federal Agencies to Prevent International Data Exchange Problems Have Been in the Financial Services Area
Federal agencies in the financial services area reported having initiated efforts domestically and internationally to address Year 2000 problems with international data exchanges, but other federal agencies reported that they are still in the initial stages of addressing these issues. Ten federal agencies reported having 702 data exchanges with foreign governments or the foreign private sector. The federal agencies reported reaching agreement on formats for 98, or 14 percent, of the foreign exchanges. Organizations in the financial services area are the most active in Year 2000 efforts. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested by the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Technology, House Committee on Science, our overall objectives for the review were to identify (1) the key actions taken to date to address electronic data exchanges among federal, state, and local governments, (2) actions the federal government has taken to minimize the adverse economic impact of noncompliant Year 2000 data from other countries’ information systems corrupting critical functions of our nation, and (3) international forums where the worldwide economic implications of this issue have been or could be addressed. To identify the key actions taken to date to address electronic data exchanges among federal, state, and local governments, we contacted federal and state organizations responsible for coordinating Year 2000 activities to identify their approaches for addressing data exchange issues. They expect to complete these surveys during the first half of 1998. 1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on actions taken to address year 2000 issues for electronic data exchanges, focusing on the: (1) key actions taken to date to address electronic data exchanges among federal, state, and local governments; (2) actions the federal government has taken to minimize the adverse economic impact of non-compliant year 2000 data from other countries' information systems corrupting critical functions of the United States; and (3) international forums where the worldwide economic implications of this issue have been or could be addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) key actions to address year 2000 data exchange issues are still in the early stages; however, federal and state coordinating organizations have agreed to use a 4-digit contiguous year format and establish joint federal and state policy and working groups; (2) to implement these agreements, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued instructions in January 1998 to federal agencies to inventory all data exchanges with outside parties by February 1, 1998, and coordinate with these exchange partners by March 1, 1998; (3) at the time of GAO's review, no actions had been taken to establish target dates for additional key tasks; (4) about half of the federal agencies reported during the first quarter of 1998 that they have not yet finished assessing their data exchanges to determine if they will be able to process data with dates beyond 1999; (5) two of the 39 state-level organizations reported having finished assessing their data exchanges; (6) for the exchanges already identified as not year 2000 ready, respondents reported that little progress has yet been made in completing key steps such as reaching agreements with partners on date formats, developing and testing bridges and filters, and developing contingency plans for cases in which year 2000 readiness will not be achieved; (7) most federal agency actions to address year 2000 issues with international data exchanges have been in the financial services area; (8) ten federal agencies reported having a total of 702 data exchanges with foreign governments or the foreign private sector; (9) these foreign data exchanges represented less than 1 percent of federal agencies' total reported exchanges; (10) federal agencies reported reaching agreements so far on formats of 98 of the foreign data exchanges; (11) international organizations addressing year 2000 issues have been the most active in the financial services area; and (12) during 1997, several international organizations initiated activities to increase awareness, provide guidance, and monitor the status of year 2000 efforts. |
gao_GAO-16-717 | gao_GAO-16-717_0 | According to the U.S. 1). Specifically, it reported that the current rate of decline is unsustainable and puts the African elephant at risk of extinction. Task Force, Strategy, and Other CWT Efforts
In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established the Task Force and charged it with developing a strategy to guide U.S. efforts on CWT. Transnational Organized Criminals Drive Wildlife Trafficking, Contributing to Violence and Instability
Transnational Organized Criminals and Networks Drive Wildlife Trafficking
While criminal elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue security personnel, are involved in poaching and transporting ivory and rhino horn across Africa, transnational organized criminals and networks are the driving force behind wildlife trafficking, according to reports we reviewed and agency officials we spoke with in the United States and Africa. U.S. Task Force Agencies Are Taking a Range of Actions to Combat Wildlife Trafficking
The Task Force is co-chaired by DOI, DOJ, and State, and the Implementation Plan designates approximately 16 agencies, departments, or offices to play a role in taking action to combat wildlife trafficking. FWS Provides Law Enforcement Assistance and Supports Species Conservation Efforts
Through grants and other means, FWS provides law enforcement assistance and supports conservation efforts that contribute to addressing wildlife trafficking. USAID Works to Build Community and National- Level Enforcement Capacity to Conserve Wildlife
USAID combats wildlife trafficking by working with communities to help them conserve wildlife, particularly in Africa. CWT Task Force Lacks Performance Targets, Making Effectiveness Difficult to Determine
While the interagency Task Force, co-chaired by State, DOI, and DOJ, provides some information about progress, it lacks performance targets, making effectiveness difficult to determine at the strategic level. As we have previously reported, a fundamental element in an organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to set performance goals with specific targets and time frames that reflect strategic goals and to measure progress toward its performance goals as part of its strategic planning efforts. In addition, Task Force agencies have provided performance targets for efforts facing similar challenges to measuring and reporting results. In addition, a separate presidential task force, responsible for addressing species conservation of pollinators, identified a target that encompasses, among other things, international partners, long time periods, and factors outside the control of the U.S. government. Conclusions
Wildlife trafficking, worth at least $7 billion annually, continues to push some protected and endangered animal species to the brink of extinction. Furthermore, wildlife trafficking can fuel corruption and criminal activity, leads to loss of both human and animal lives, and destabilizes communities that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism revenue. Without such targets, it is unclear whether the Task Force’s accomplishments are meeting expectations, making it difficult to gauge progress and to ensure effective stewardship of public resources. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide a basis for comparing actual results with intended results that can generate more meaningful performance information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Interior and State and the Attorney General of the United States should jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan. The Departments of the Interior, Justice, and State, and USAID agreed with our recommendation. The report examines (1) what is known about the security implications of wildlife trafficking and its consequences; (2) actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat wildlife trafficking; (3) Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) monitoring and evaluation efforts in select countries; and (4) the extent to which the Task Force assesses its progress. To address our objectives, we met with Task Force agency officials and nongovernmental wildlife trafficking experts recommended by agency officials and other nongovernmental wildlife trafficking experts in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork in Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania. | Why GAO Did This Study
Illegal trade in wildlife—wildlife trafficking—continues to push some protected and endangered animal species to the brink of extinction, according to the Department of State. Wildlife trafficking undermines conservation efforts, can fuel corruption, and destabilizes local communities that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism revenues. This trade is estimated to be worth $7 billion to $23 billion annually. In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established the interagency Task Force charged with developing a strategy to guide U.S. efforts on this issue.
GAO was asked to review U.S. government efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. This report focuses on wildlife trafficking in Africa, particularly of large animals, and examines, among other things, (1) what is known about the security implications of wildlife trafficking and its consequences, (2) actions Task Force agencies are taking to combat wildlife trafficking, and (3) the extent to which the Task Force assesses its progress. GAO analyzed agency documents and met with U.S. and host country officials in Washington, D.C.; Kenya; South Africa; and Tanzania.
What GAO Found
While criminal elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue security personnel, engage in poaching and transporting ivory and rhino horn across Africa, transnational organized criminals are the driving force behind wildlife trafficking, according to reports GAO reviewed and agency officials GAO spoke with in the United States and Africa. Wildlife trafficking can contribute to instability and violence and harm people as well as animals. According to reports, about 1,000 rangers were killed from 2004 to 2014. Wildlife trafficking in Africa particularly affects large animals, with populations of elephants and rhinos diminishing at a rate that puts them at risk of extinction.
Agencies of the interagency Task Force leading U.S. efforts to combat wildlife trafficking are taking a range of conservation and capacity-building actions. The Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, for example, provides law enforcement assistance and supports global conservation efforts. The Department of State contributes to law enforcement capacity building and diplomatic efforts, while the Department of Justice prosecutes criminals and conducts legal training to improve partner-country capacity. Further, the U.S. Agency for International Development works to build community and national- level enforcement capacity and supports various approaches to combat wildlife trafficking. Several other agencies also contribute expertise or resources to support various activities outlined in the Task Force's National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan .
The Task Force provides some information about progress, but it lacks performance targets, making effectiveness difficult to determine at the strategic level. A fundamental element in an organization's efforts to manage for results is its ability to set specific targets that reflect strategic goals. Task Force officials identified a range of reasons why they do not have targets, including dependence on global partners, the long time periods needed to document results, and limited data availability. However, Task Force agencies have provided performance targets for other efforts that face similar challenges. Without targets, it is unclear whether the Task Force's performance is meeting expectations, making it difficult to gauge progress and to ensure that resources are being utilized most effectively in their efforts against wildlife trafficking.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and the Interior and the Attorney General of the United States, as co-chairs, jointly work with the Task Force to develop performance targets related to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan . Agencies agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-645T | gao_GAO-03-645T_0 | DOD recognizes the need to get better weapon system outcomes, and its newest acquisition policy emphasizes the use of evolutionary, knowledge- based acquisition concepts proven to produce more effective and efficient outcomes in developing new products. Our body of work focuses on how DOD can better leverage its investments by shortening the time it takes to field new capabilities at a more predictable cost and schedule. However, policy changes alone will not guarantee success. This requires sustained leadership and commitment and attention to the capture and use of key product knowledge at critical decision points to avoid the problems of the past. The Case for an Evolutionary Product Development Environment
A key enabler to the success of commercial firms is using an approach that evolves a product to its ultimate capabilities on the basis of mature technologies and available resources. Therefore, product features and capabilities not achievable in the initial development are planned for subsequent development efforts in future generations of the product, but only when technologies are proven to be mature and other resources are available. Collectively, these practices ensure that a high level of knowledge exists about critical facets of the product at key junctures during its development. First, a match must be made between the customer’s needs and the available resources—technology, engineering knowledge, time, and funding—before a program is launched. Second, a product’s design must demonstrate its ability to meet performance requirements and be stable about midway through development. Third, the developer must show that the product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets and is demonstrated to be reliable before production begins. DOD programs often do not employ these practices. These led to acquisition outcomes that included significant cost increases and schedule delays, poor product quality and reliability, and delays in getting new capability to the war fighter. F/A-22 Did Not Employ Evolutionary or Knowledge-Based Process
The F/A-22 provides an excellent example of what can happen when a major acquisition program is not guided by the principles of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition. Instead, program managers proceeded through the F/A-22’s development without the requisite knowledge necessary for reducing program risk and achieving more successful program outcomes. It Is Too Late for the F/A- 22 Program to Gain Full Benefit of a Knowledge- Based Process
The F/A-22 did not take advantage of evolutionary, knowledge-based concepts up front and now, the best it can hope for is to limit cost increases and performance problems by not significantly increasing its production until development is complete—signified by developmental and operational testing and reliability demonstrations. Ultimately, the success of the new acquisition policy will be seen in individual program and resource decisions. As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently exceeds the congressional cost limit. Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs Implement Best Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 5 years, DOD's overall investments are expected to average $150 billion a year to modernize and transition our forces. In addition, DOD must modernize its forces amid competing demands for federal funds, such as health care and homeland security. Therefore, it is critical that DOD manage its acquisitions in the most cost efficient and effective manner possible. DOD's newest acquisition policy emphasizes the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based concepts that have proven to produce more effective and efficient weapon systems outcomes. However, most DOD programs currently do not employ these practices and, as a result, experience cost increases, schedule delays, and poor product quality and reliability. This testimony compares the best practices for developing new products with the experiences of the F/A-22 program.
What GAO Found
GAO's reviews of commercial best practices have identified key enablers to the success of product development programs and focused on how DOD can better leverage its investments by shortening the time it takes to field new capabilities at a more predictable cost and schedule. First, commercial firms use an approach that evolves a product to its ultimate capabilities on the basis of mature technologies and available resources. This approach allows only the product features and capabilities achievable with available resources in the initial development. Further product enhancements are planned for subsequent development efforts when technologies are proven to be mature and other resources are available. Second, commercial firms ensure that a high level of knowledge exists at key junctures during a product's development. The knowledge-based process includes three points: (1) Before a program is launched, successful programs match customer needs and available resources--technology, engineering knowledge, time, and funding; (2) About midway through development, the ability of the product's design is demonstrated to be stable and meet performance requirements; and (3) Before production begins, programs must show that a product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. In contrast, the F/A-22 program illustrates what can happen when a major acquisition program is not guided by the principles of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition. When the program was started, several key technologies were not mature. Program managers proceeded through development without the requisite knowledge to effectively manage program risk and, at the start of production, key manufacturing processes were not under control. The F/A-22 program has undergone significant cost increases. Instead of fielding early capabilities to the war fighter, the development cycle has extended to 19 years, so far, and original quantities have been significantly reduced, raising concerns about the capability the program will eventually deliver. DOD recognizes the need to get better weapon system outcomes, and its newest acquisition policy emphasizes the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition concepts proven to produce better outcomes in developing new products. However, policy changes alone are not enough. Leadership commitment and attention to putting the policy into practice for individual programs is needed to avoid the problems of the past. DOD will have many opportunities to do so over the next several years with its force modernization investments. |
gao_GAO-02-744T | gao_GAO-02-744T_0 | VERA allocates nearly 90 percent of VA’s medical care appropriation. VERA’s Design Is a ReasonableApproach to Resource Allocation
VERA’s design is a reasonable approach to resource allocation and has helped promote more comparable resource allocations for comparable workloads in VA. VERA is a reasonable approach because it allocates resources to networks primarily based on workload. Each network receives an allocation based on a predetermined dollar amount per veteran served. When VERA was established, the number of higher income veterans without service-connected disabilities that VA treated was about 4 percent of the total number of veterans treated in fiscal year 1996. VERA allocations would have increased to 9 networks in the Northeast and Midwest and decreased to 10 networks in the South and West in the fiscal year 2001 VERA allocation. To improve its adjustment for cost differences beyond networks’ control, we also recommended that VERA use more case-mix categories to adequately adjust for differences in patients’ health care needs across networks. 3). Yet VA needs to correct weaknesses in VERA’s implementation to better align resources with workload and to adequately account for important variations in health care needs among networks. The amount of resources provided to networks through the supplemental funding process for the National Reserve Fund has continued to increase, yet VA has not been able to determine the relative contribution of factors such as imperfections in VERA, network inefficiency, or lack of managerial flexibility to close or consolidate programs or facilities to the need for supplemental resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spent $21 billion in fiscal year 2001 to treat 3.8 million veterans--most of whom had service-connected disabilities or low incomes. Since 1997, VA has used the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) system to allocate most of its medical care appropriation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that VERA has had a substantial impact on network resource allocations and workloads. VERA shifted $921 million from networks primarily in the northeast and midwest to networks in the south and west in fiscal year 2001. VERA, along with other VA initiatives, has provided an incentive for networks to serve more veterans. In GAO's view, VERA's overall design is a reasonable approach to allocating resources according to workloads. It provides a predetermined dollar amount per veteran served to each of VA's 22 health care networks. This amount varies depending upon the health care needs of the veteran served and local cost differences. However, GAO identified weaknesses in VERA's implementation. First, VERA excludes about one fifth of VA's workload in determining each network's allocation. Second, VERA does not account well for cost differences among networks resulting from variation in their patients' health care needs. Third, the process for providing supplemental resources to networks through VA's National Reserve Fund has not been used to analyze how the need for such resources is caused by potential problems in VERA's allocation, network inefficiency, or other factors. This testimony is based on an April report (GAO-02-338). |
gao_GAO-07-31 | gao_GAO-07-31_0 | 1). 3). Renovation Process Continues to Follow Leading Industry Practices but Faces Challenges Going Forward
Consistent with our 2001 and 2003 reviews of the early planning for the renovations, we found that UN officials continue to follow leading industry practices in the development of the UN headquarters renovation project. Although the CMP office has used a competitive process to date, we reported in April 2006 that the UN’s procurement process has numerous weaknesses. In addition, according to a UN procurement official the UN procurement division will be involved in processing contract amendments and ensuring compliance with UN procurement rules and procedures. Cost Estimate Increased; Industry Practices Followed but Estimate Likely to Change
The estimated total cost of the CMP increased from about $1.19 billion to almost $1.75 billion—an almost $560 million increase—between 2002 and 2005 to reflect inflation arising from a later start date, refinements to the design, and a multiphased renovation approach. We have previously reported that changes in the cost estimate should be expected as the design progresses and more project details become known. Under the cash assessment approach, each member state would likely be assessed the cost of the renovation based on the rate of its annual regular budget contributions to the UN. The General Assembly plans to revisit the issue of financing the CMP by the end of 2006. The General Assembly Has Not Decided on a Financing Arrangement for Its Remaining Renovation Project Costs
While the General Assembly has passed a resolution stating that cash assessments would be the simplest and most cost-effective approach for funding the CMP, it has yet to decide how to finance the remaining $1.43 billion, which excludes scope options. Member States Considering Cash Assessments to Finance Renovation
In June 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that a cash payment option, based on single- or multiyear assessments, would be the simplest and most cost-effective approach to funding the CMP. The cost of these fees has not been included in the UN’s cost estimate for the renovation. Decisions Needed by December 2006 to Maintain the Current Start Date and Avoid Increased Costs
The CMP’s current schedule could be delayed and costs could increase if the General Assembly does not make certain decisions by the end of 2006. Specifically, the UN would need a decision by the General Assembly on a financing arrangement and a total CMP budget to ensure that funds could be available by December 2007 so that the UN can procure construction services. OIOS Has Conducted Oversight of the CMP Office
OIOS has been conducting oversight of the CMP office since 2003 and has not found any material weaknesses in its work. OIOS’s Oversight Impaired by Its Funding Arrangement
OIOS relies on funds from the CMP budget to conduct effective oversight of the CMP, which may impair its ability to secure sufficient funds. Based on its monitoring work, State has not identified any significant concerns with the renovation planning process, according to State officials. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. To examine the factors that contributed to the increase in the 2005 cost estimate and determine whether the cost estimate was updated using industry practices, we researched industry practices related to construction project cost estimating. We identified remaining decisions that require General Assembly approval and that are needed for the renovation to proceed. To review UN oversight efforts and State monitoring activities, we reviewed UN documents such as the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and Board of Auditor reports submitted to the General Assembly, OIOS management letters to the CMP office, UN resolutions pertaining to the oversight of the CMP, and the mission statements of OIOS, the Board of Auditors, and State’s working group on the CMP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United Nations (UN) estimated in 2005 that renovating its headquarters will cost up to $1.75 billion. As the UN's host country and largest contributor, the United States has a substantial interest in the project's success. In this report, we (1) determine whether the development of the Capital Master Plan (CMP) has been consistent with leading industry practices, (2) examine factors that led to changes in the cost estimate and determine whether the 2005 estimate was updated using industry practices, (3) review the status of financing of the renovation, (4) identify decisions needed for the renovation to proceed, and (5) review UN oversight and State monitoring efforts. To address these objectives, we reviewed UN design and planning documents, including the latest cost estimate, to compare them with industry standards. To assess oversight, we reviewed Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and UN Board of Auditors reports and met with UN officials.
What GAO Found
UN officials continue to use leading industry practices in developing the UN headquarters renovation project, but reliance on existing UN procurement practices could impact the effective implementation of the renovation in the future. Since the CMP office relies on current UN procurement practices, implementation of future CMP procurements could become vulnerable to numerous UN procurement weaknesses that GAO previously reported in April 2006 (GAO-06-577), such as the lack of guidance for construction procurement in the procurement manual. The estimated total cost of the CMP increased from about $1.19 billion to almost $1.75 billion between 2002 and 2005 to reflect inflation arising from a later start date, refinements to the design, and a change in the renovation approach. The UN continued to follow construction industry practices to develop the 2005 cost estimate and has included expected elements. However, the cost estimate is still preliminary and will likely change. While the UN has passed a resolution expressing a preference for cash assessments, it has yet to decide how to finance the remaining renovation costs. In June 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that a cash payment option would be the simplest and most cost-effective approach for funding the CMP. Under this approach, the UN would assess member states for the cost of the renovation through single- or multiyear payments. The amount the UN assessed member states would be likely based on each country's rate for its annual regular budget contributions. The General Assembly plans to revisit the financing issue by the end of 2006. Without certain General Assembly decisions by the end of 2006, the renovation's current schedule could be delayed and costs could increase. Specifically, a General Assembly decision on a financing arrangement for the total CMP budget would be needed to ensure that funds could be available by December 2007. Without these decisions, the CMP office cannot finalize a start date for the renovation. UN oversight entities have continued to oversee the CMP while the Department of State has monitored its progress. OIOS has conducted audits on CMP procurements and has issued several reports of its findings and recommendations. However, OIOS relies on funds from the CMP budget and must negotiate for those funds with the UN budget office, which may impair its ability to secure sufficient funds. The UN Board of Auditors has also conducted oversight of the CMP office by reviewing its financial records and internal controls and has found no material weaknesses in its review. Similarly, State's monitoring efforts have not identified any significant concerns, according to State officials. |
gao_GAO-03-761 | gao_GAO-03-761_0 | Class I hazardous well owners and operators must meet certain requirements to construct a well. To obtain final approval to operate a deep injection well, owners and operators are required to, among other things properly design the well to ensure that the waste will not migrate into an underground source of drinking water; assure that injection pressure does not cause fractures in the injection zone or migration of fluids; provide plans for closing the well and post-closure care; demonstrate and maintain financial assurance (trust fund, bond, or other approved forms) to ensure that the well can be properly plugged and abandoned; establish monitoring and reporting requirements; and demonstrate that the injected waste will not migrate beyond the injection zone for 10,000 years, if otherwise prohibited hazardous waste will be injected into the well. Community Concerns Could Be More Comprehensively Addressed Before Draft Permits Are Completed
Under EPA regulations, communities can raise concerns during the required public comment process for deep injection well permits after a draft permit is issued. When states are the permitting authority, they provide more and earlier opportunities for obtaining community concerns. All three states have also enacted additional requirements to address community concerns. Environmental Justice Concerns Are Addressed during the Permitting Process and in Response to Civil Rights Complaints
EPA addresses environmental justice issues during the process for deciding on a construction permit and when civil rights complaints are filed with the agency after permits are issued. Individuals Can Raise Environmental Justice Concerns through Civil Rights Complaints Filed with EPA
Individuals or communities with environmental justice concerns may file petitions with EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) to review permit decisions or file complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act with EPA’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR). Members of only one community—Romulus, Michigan—have challenged permit decisions for a commercial Class I deep injection well on environmental justice grounds. Recent court decisions have limited the basis for filing Title VI complaints, making the process an unlikely avenue for challenging permit decisions. While only four sites have ceased operation since the UIC program began in 1980, two did not have adequate financial resources to plug and abandon the wells, resulting in additional costs to taxpayers. EPA has questioned the adequacy of similar aspects of financial assurance requirements in other programs. In 2001, EPA’s Office of Inspector General stated that financial assurance requirements for RCRA facilities, on which financial assurance requirements for deep injection wells were based, needed improvement, and EPA is currently requesting public comments on the Inspector General’s conclusions and recommendations. EPA has also initiated an internal review of financial assurance requirements for Class II oil and gas deep injection wells because of concerns that aspects of current requirements, similar to aspects of the Class I deep injection well requirements, may not be adequate. In two cases, the adequacy of the financial assurance was not tested because other companies purchased and continued operating the wells. EPA and state officials responsible for overseeing the 13 commercial Class I wells currently in operation believe that the owners’ or operators’ financial assurances provide enough funds to close their wells in the event of bankruptcy. Both the potential burden to the taxpayer if adequate financial resources are not available and the potential problems pointed out by the OIG and by EPA’s own working group call for action to review and improve these requirements to determine if improvements are necessary. The report clearly sets forth the public comment process that EPA follows and explains that the agency cannot deny a permit on the basis of community concerns if the permit applicant meet all regulatory requirements. In May, EDS applied to EPA for construction permits for two injection wells. However, we believe that earlier public involvement would allow communities a greater opportunity to contact appropriate state and local officials regarding those concerns not within EPA’s authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Billions of gallons of hazardous liquid waste are injected into underground wells each year. These Class I hazardous deep injection wells are designed to inject waste into an area below the lowermost underground source of drinking water. EPA and the states grant permits to commercial operators to construct and operate these wells and must obtain public comments on the permits. Communities often raise concerns about well safety and other matters. GAO examined the extent to which EPA and the states (1) address these community concerns, (2) consider environmental justice issues, and (3) ensure that financial assurances adequately protect the taxpayer if bankruptcy occurs. GAO, among other things, examined the permit process in the four states that have commercial Class I wells.
What GAO Found
Although EPA provides opportunities for public comment on proposed commercial Class I deep injection wells as required by regulations, these opportunities come late in the process, after a draft permit has been prepared and this timing may limit the extent to which concerns are addressed. EPA responds to all public comments, but it cannot deny a permit on the basis of community concerns if all regulatory requirements for protecting drinking water are met. However, earlier involvement could give communities more time to contact appropriate state or local officials to address concerns that are not within the scope of EPA's authority. In Michigan, where EPA issues injection well permits, communities believe that their concerns are often not fully resolved; in some instances, communities have filed legal actions and complaints to prevent well construction. In contrast, the three states to which EPA has authorized responsibility for issuing permits have enacted requirements for earlier and more public involvement. Overall, they believe that early involvement better addresses community concerns, mitigates controversial issues, and avoids litigation. EPA addresses environmental justice issues in two basic ways--first, as part of its process for deciding whether to issue a permit for well construction, and second, in response to specific civil rights complaints filed with the agency after permits are issued. EPA encourages its regional offices issuing construction permits to determine if minority and low-income populations are disproportionately affected by a proposed well's location. Individuals and communities may appeal EPA permit decisions with EPA's Environmental Appeals Board or, for other permit decisions, file complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act with EPA's Office of Civil Rights. Only one community has filed complaints related to deep injection wells; these complaints did not result in changes to the permit decisions. Court decisions have recently limited the basis for filing Title VI complaints, making the process an unlikely avenue for changing permit decisions. Current financial assurance requirements may not ensure that adequate resources are available to close a commercial deep injection well in the event of bankruptcy or ceased operations. While only four sites have gone into bankruptcy or ceased operating since the program began in 1980; two did not have adequate financial resources to plug and abandon wells and for the other two, financial assurance was not tested because other companies purchased and continued operating the wells. EPA has questioned the adequacy of some financial assurance requirements in other programs that are similar to those for Class I deep injection wells. EPA's Office of Inspector General has reported that financial assurance requirements for another waste management program, which the requirements for deep injection wells mirror, may not be adequate to close facilities; an EPA working group is also reviewing similar aspects of financial assurance requirements for a different type of injection well for possible changes. |
gao_GAO-04-364 | gao_GAO-04-364_0 | According to BJS data, a total of $165.2 million in NCHIP grants was awarded during fiscal years 2000 through 2003. Of this total, a majority— over 75 percent—was used for NICS-related purposes that encompassed a broad range of activities, such as converting manual records to automated formats and purchasing equipment to implement computerized systems or upgrade existing systems. All other uses of NCHIP grants during this period, according to BJS, also had either direct or indirect relevance to building an infrastructure of nationally accessible records, such as implementing technology to support the automated transfer of fingerprint data to IAFIS. Automating Records and Making Them Accessible Nationally
Using their own funds, in addition to NCHIP grants and other federal funds, states have made progress in automating criminal history records and making them accessible nationally. For example, the percentage of the nation’s criminal history records that are automated increased from 79 percent at the end of 1993 to 86 percent at the end of 1995 and to 89 percent at the end of 2001, according to BJS’s most recent biennial survey of states. On the other hand, progress has been more limited for some NICS-related purposes. The number of states participating in III increased from 26 at the end of 1993 to 30 at the end of 1995 and to 45 by May 2003. Overall, as table 4 indicates, a national system for domestic violence misdemeanor records is not available, only 10 states have provided mental health records to the NICS Index, and only 3 states have provided substance abuse records. Various Factors Are Relevant Considerations for Policymakers in Debating the Future of NCHIP
One of the most relevant factors for policymakers to consider when debating the future of NCHIP is the extent of cumulative progress (and shortfalls) to date in creating national, automated systems that cover all needed types of information. While states have made progress, more work remains. Furthermore, technology is not static, which necessitates periodic upgrades or replacements of automated systems for them to remain functional. Continued progress toward establishing and sustaining a national infrastructure inherently will involve a partnering of federal, state, and local resources and long-term commitments from all governmental levels. Managed by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), NCHIP is a federal grant program to build a national infrastructure to facilitate the interstate exchange of criminal history and other relevant records—that is, to improve the accuracy, completeness, and accessibility of records used by various national systems. One of the primary systems is the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which is managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and is used to conduct presale background checks of persons purchasing firearms. As agreed with the requester’s office, this report presents information on how states have used NCHIP grant funds, particularly the extent to which they have been used by states for NICS-related purposes; the progressusing NCHIP grants and other funding sourcesthat states have made in automating criminal history and other relevant records and making them accessible nationally; and the various factors that are relevant considerations for policymakers in debating the future of NCHIP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public safety concerns require that criminal history records be accurate, complete, and accessible. Among other purposes, such records are used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to ensure that prohibited persons do not purchase firearms. Initiated in 1995, the National Criminal History Improvement Program represents a partnership among federal, state, and local agencies to build a national criminal records infrastructure. Under the program, the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) annually provides federal grants to states to improve the quality of records and their accessibility through NICS and other national systems maintained by the FBI. GAO examined (1) how states have used program grant funds, particularly the extent to which such funds have been used for NICS-related purposes; (2) the progress--using program grants and other funding sources--that states have made in automating criminal history and other relevant records and making them accessible nationally; and (3) the various factors that are relevant considerations for policymakers in debating the future of the program.
What GAO Found
States have used program grants primarily to support NICS in conducting presale background checks of firearms' purchasers. BJS data show that over 75 percent of the total $164.3 million in program grants awarded in fiscal years 2000 through 2003 was used for NICS-related purposes. These uses encompassed a broad range of activities, such as converting manual records to automated formats and purchasing equipment to implement computerized systems or upgrade existing systems. All other uses of program grants, according to BJS, also had either direct or indirect relevance to building an infrastructure of nationally accessible records. Using their own funds, in addition to the program and other federal grants, states have made progress in automating criminal history records and making them accessible nationally. The percentage of the nation's criminal history records that are automated increased from 79 percent in 1993 to 89 percent in 2001, according to BJS's most recent data. Also, the number of states participating in the Interstate Identification Index--a "pointer system" to locate criminal history records anywhere in the country--increased from 26 at year-end 1993 to 45 by May 2003. But, progress has been more limited for some NICS-related purposes. A national system for domestic violence misdemeanor records is not available. Also, as of May 2003, only 10 states had made mental health records available to NICS, and only 3 states had provided substance abuse records. One of the most relevant factors for policymakers to consider when debating the future of the program is the extent of cumulative progress (and shortfalls) to date in creating national, automated systems. While states have made progress, more work remains. Also, the demand for background checks is growing, and technology is not static, which necessitates periodic upgrades or replacements of automated systems. Continued progress toward establishing and sustaining a national infrastructure inherently will involve long-term commitments from all governmental levels. Justice commented that GAO's report fairly and accurately described the program and its accomplishments. |
gao_GAO-04-774 | gao_GAO-04-774_0 | The CFO Act requires the agency’s CFO to develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management system that provides for complete, reliable, and timely financial information that facilitates the systematic measurement of performance at the agency, the development and reporting of cost information, and the integration of accounting and budget information. The auditors reported 14 reportable conditions on internal control, 7 of which were considered to be material weaknesses. DHS Inherited Significant Weaknesses from Its Component Agencies
When DHS was created in March 2003 and merged with 22 diverse agencies, there were many known financial management weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the inherited agencies. Further, of the four component agencies—Customs, TSA, INS, and FEMA—that had previously been subject to stand-alone audits, all four agencies’ systems were found not to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of FFMIA. Some Progress Made in Addressing Inherited Weaknesses
DHS has made some progress in addressing the internal control weaknesses it inherited from component agencies. Nine of the 30 internal control weaknesses identified in prior component financial statement audits have been closed as of September 30, 2003. The remaining 21 issues represent continuing weaknesses that have been reported in DHS’s first Performance and Accountability Report. The department’s independent auditors classified the remaining 7 weaknesses as lower level observations and recommendations. As mentioned previously, several of the departmentwide weaknesses resulted from combining previously identified weaknesses or reclassifying them, rather than from resolving the underlying internal control weaknesses. DHS Is in the Early Stages of Integrating Its Financial Management Systems
DHS intends to acquire and deploy an integrated financial enterprise solution and reports that it has reduced the number of its legacy financial systems. It Is Not Known Whether DHS’s Planned Financial Management Systems Will Be Able to Meet the Requirements of Relevant Financial Management Improvement Laws
It is too early to tell whether DHS’s planned financial enterprise solution will be able to meet the requirements of relevant financial management improvement laws-–those currently applicable to DHS (such as FMFIA), as well as some not applicable that are subject to pending legislation. DHS is currently subject to most financial management improvement laws except for the CFO Act and FFMIA. Scope and Methodology
To identify what were the existing weaknesses in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) component agencies’ financial management systems, we reviewed relevant DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports and our January 2003 report on major management challenges at DHS and looked at how such challenges are being addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in March 2003, it faced the daunting task of bringing together 22 diverse agencies. This transformation poses significant management and leadership challenges, including integrating a myriad of redundant financial management systems and addressing the existing weaknesses in the inherited components, as well as newly identified weaknesses. This review was performed to (1) identify the financial management systems' weaknesses DHS inherited from the 22 component agencies, (2) assess DHS's progress in addressing those weaknesses, (3) identify plans DHS has to integrate its financial management systems, and (4) review whether the planned systems DHS is developing will meet the requirements of relevant financial management improvement laws.
What GAO Found
DHS inherited 30 reportable internal control weaknesses identified in prior component financial audits with 18 so severe they were considered material weaknesses. These weaknesses include insufficient internal controls, system security deficiencies, and incomplete policies and procedures necessary to complete basic financial information. Of the four inherited component agencies that had previously been subject to stand-alone audits, all four agencies' systems were found not to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA), an indicator of whether a federal entity can produce reliable data for management and reporting purposes. Component agencies took varied actions to resolve 9 of the 30 inherited internal control weaknesses. The remaining 21 weaknesses were combined and reported as material weaknesses or reportable conditions in DHS's first Performance and Accountability Report, or were reclassified by independent auditors as lower-level observations and recommendations. Combining or reclassifying weaknesses does not resolve the underlying internal control weakness, or mean that challenges to address them are less than they would have been prior to the establishment of DHS. DHS is in the early stages of acquiring a financial enterprise solution to consolidate and integrate its business functions. Initiated in August 2003, DHS expects the financial enterprise solution to be fully deployed and operational in 2006 at an estimated cost of $146 million. Other agencies have failed in attempts to develop financial management systems with fewer diverse operations. Success will depend on a number of variables, including having an effective strategic management framework, sustained management oversight, and user acceptance of the efforts. It is too early to tell whether DHS's planned financial enterprise solution will be able to meet the requirements of relevant financial management improvement laws. As of June 2004, DHS is not subject to the CFO Act and thus FFMIA, which is applicable only to agencies subject to the CFO Act. While DHS is currently not required to report on compliance with FFMIA, its auditors disclosed systems deficiencies that would have likely resulted in noncompliance issues. |
gao_NSIAD-99-1 | gao_NSIAD-99-1_0 | The services remain responsible under 10 U.S.C. Some of AFSOC’s systems are common with systems used by the regular Air Force, while others are unique to special operations. AFSOC Has a Sound Acquisition Strategy
AFSOC’s acquisition strategy for electronic warfare equipment is contained within AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap. These solutions include introducing a mix of new systems and making upgrades to older systems (See app. II for descriptions of AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft.) AFSOC’s acquisition strategy is sound because it is based on eliminating operational and supportability deficiencies confirmed by an Air Force study, test reports, and maintenance records. Budget-Driven Funding Decisions Are Undercutting AFSOC’s Efforts to Correct Deficiencies and Maximize Commonality
AFSOC has made several efforts to correct deficiencies and maximize commonality in electronic warfare systems. USSOCOM is funding the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program, which is designed to make AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft less susceptible to passive detection, enhance the aircrews’ situational awareness, lower support costs, and improve commonality. Because, according to AFSOC officials, the legacy aircraft are planned to remain in service for 12 more years, for the foreseeable future, AFSOC will have to operate and maintain more types of electronic warfare systems. Opportunity Exists to Help Implement AFSOC’s Acquisition Strategy
Since AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition strategy was adopted, the Air Force has decided to fund a $4.3-billion Air Force-wide C-130 modernization program of all C-130s, including the special operations fleet. This avionics modernization program shares many common elements with the USSOCOM CAAP program. CAAP includes $247 million of MFP-11 funds for upgrades/systems to address AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft situational awareness and passive detection problems. Conclusion
AFSOC has a sound electronic warfare acquisition strategy based on a need to eliminate operational and supportability deficiencies while maximizing commonality within its C-130 fleet. An opportunity now exists, however, to help free up some MFP-11 funds to permit AFSOC to continue implementing its electronic warfare strategy as outlined in the Technology Roadmap. We also discussed AFSOC’s current electronic warfare systems and aircraft and AFSOC’s planned electronic warfare upgrades and system acquisition with officials at USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; AFSOC, Hurlburt Field, Florida; and Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Additionally, we discussed AFSOC electronic warfare system supportability with officials responsible for the systems at USSOCOM; AFSOC; and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Georgia, and reviewed logistics records for pertinent systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Special OperationsCommand's (USSOCOM) acquisition strategy for aircraft electronic warfare systems, focusing on the: (1) fixed-wing C-130 aircraft operated by USSOCOM's Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); (2) soundness of AFSOC's electronic warfare acquisition strategy; and (3) extent to which AFSOC is correcting deficiencies and maximizing commonality in its electronic warfare systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) AFSOC's electronic warfare acquisition strategy is sound because it is based on eliminating operational and supportability deficiencies confirmed by an Air Force study, test reports, and maintenance records; (2) this evidence indicates that AFSOC's current electronic warfare systems are unable to defeat many current threat systems and have supportability problems; (3) AFSOC's acquisition strategy is to procure a mix of new systems and upgrades for older ones while maximizing commonality within its fleet of C-130s; (4) amidst budget constraints, USSOCOM is funding only portions of AFSOC's acquisition strategy due to other higher budget priorities, thereby hampering AFSOC's efforts to correct deficiencies and maximize commonality in electronic warfare systems; (5) for example, although USSOCOM is funding an AFSOC effort to make C-130 aircraft less susceptible to passive detection, enhance aircrews' situational awareness, and increase commonality, it has rejected other requests to fund effectiveness and commonality improvements to systems dealing with radar- and infrared-guided missiles; (6) as a result, in the foreseeable future, deficiencies will continue, and AFSOC will have to operate and maintain older and upgraded electronic warfare systems concurrently; (7) an opportunity exists, however, to help AFSOC implement its electronic warfare acquisition strategy; (8) since AFSOC's acquisition strategy was adopted, the Air Force has decided to begin a-$4.3 billion C-130 modernization program (C-130X program) for all C-130s; (9) some of the planned elements of this modernization are common with some of the elements of AFSOC's acquisition strategy that was to be funded by USSOCOM's Major force program-11 (MFP) funds; and (10) if, as required by the memoranda of agreement, the Air Force C-130 avionics modernization program funds these common elements, USSOCOM could redirect significant portions of its MFP-11 funding currently budgeted for AFSOC C-130 passive detection and situational awareness deficiencies to other unfunded portions of AFSOC's electronic warfare acquisition strategy. |
gao_GAO-05-57 | gao_GAO-05-57_0 | DOE has identified 17 countries with Russian-origin fuel, 14 of which have HEU fuel that DOE has included under the Russian fuel return program. Eleven of the 23 Countries with U.S.- Origin HEU Do Not Have Plans to Return It to the United States or Dispose of It Domestically
DOE has not reached agreement with research reactor operators in 11 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the HEU to the United States. DOE is considering offering incentives to reactor operators to convert to LEU and return their HEU to the United States but thus far has not determined what incentives it will offer and to which countries. In contrast, reactor operators in 12 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.- origin HEU either have signed contracts with DOE to return all of the HEU to the United States by 2009 or are developing their own means to dispose of HEU fuel. However, DOE reserved the right to change the fees in response to changes in circumstances. DOE Plans to Complete the Return of HEU to Russia by 2009 at a Cost of about $100 Million
DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate and time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated with planning future fuel shipments. The program is facing delays in returning spent HEU fuel because Russia is planning to conduct an environmental assessment for each shipment of spent HEU fuel, and complex negotiations are needed to arrange some shipments. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single environmental assessment for all spent fuel in all of the countries participating in the program, which would help expedite future shipments of spent fuel, but so far, Russia has not agreed to this. DOE is considering ways to accelerate the Russian fuel return program that could also increase the cost of the program by more than $30 million. While lowering the fees for returning HEU may encourage additional countries to participate in the fuel return program, re-evaluating the fees for accepting LEU fuel, taking into account DOE’s proposed extension of the program, may show that DOE could raise the fees and recover a greater portion of the total disposal costs for accepting LEU from high-income countries. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the following two actions: consider offering incentives to foreign research reactors to return HEU to the United States, including lowering the fees that DOE charges for accepting HEU fuel from high-income countries; and evaluate raising the fees for accepting LEU fuel from research reactors in high-income countries to recover as much of the cost for disposing of the fuel in the United States as possible, if doing so would not adversely affect the conversion of reactors to LEU and the return of HEU or create unmanageable financial burdens for the reactors. In addition, DOE provided documentation on shipments of fresh HEU it has supported to date. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many foreign nuclear research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy (DOE) has two programs to return HEU from foreign reactors to either the United States or Russia. The U.S. fuel acceptance program includes HEU exported by the United States to 34 countries, 11 of which have returned all of their HEU. The program also includes low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which would be very difficult to use in a nuclear weapon. DOE imposes a fee on high-income countries to partially offset the cost of disposing of HEU and LEU fuel in the United States. Under the Russian fuel return program, DOE assists in the return of Russian-origin HEU from 14 countries to Russia. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of DOE efforts to recover remaining inventories of U.S.-origin HEU and the extent to which the fees imposed on high-income countries support these efforts, and (2) the cost and time frame for completing the Russian fuel return program.
What GAO Found
For a number of reasons, including the cost of converting reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, DOE has not reached agreement with reactor operators in 11 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the HEU to the United States. In contrast, reactor operators in 12 of the countries either have signed contracts with DOE to return all of their U.S.-origin HEU or are developing their own means of disposal. DOE is considering offering incentives to foreign research reactors to return their HEU to the United States but so far has not determined what incentives it will offer and to which countries. DOE has not revised the fees imposed on high-income countries since establishing the fuel acceptance program in 1996. However, DOE reserved the right to change the fees in response to changes in circumstances. While lowering the fees for returning HEU may encourage additional reactors to participate in the program, DOE could recover a greater portion of the disposal costs by raising the fees for accepting LEU. DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate and time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated with planning future shipments. The shipments to date have all consisted of fresh (unused) HEU fuel, which DOE considers the highest priority for returning to Russia because it is more vulnerable to theft. DOE is facing delays in returning spent HEU fuel, which has been used in a reactor, in part because Russia is planning to conduct an environmental assessment for each shipment. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single environmental assessment for the spent HEU fuel in all of the countries participating in the program to expedite future shipments of spent fuel, but so far Russia has not agreed to this. DOE is considering ways to accelerate the program that could also increase the cost of the program by more than $30 million. |
gao_RCED-98-175 | gao_RCED-98-175_0 | Background
EPA determined that 23 states needed enhanced I&M programs in order to meet national air quality standards. Figure 1 shows the 23 states that are required to implement enhanced I&M programs. In total, 12 states had begun testing vehicles under enhanced I&M programs by April 1998. A number of factors account for the delays in implementing enhanced I&M programs, including opposition to the stringent requirements of EPA’s enhanced I&M regulation, the reluctance of some state legislatures to provide authority and funding for the programs, and difficulties in obtaining test equipment and software support. Delays in Implementing Enhanced I&M Programs Have Slowed Efforts to Reduce Ozone Levels
Because of delays in implementing enhanced I&M programs, 19 of the 23 states are in jeopardy of not meeting deadlines for attaining the national ozone standard. EPA then allowed the states to revise their enhanced I&M programs to claim credit for the emissions reductions that are based on the future implementation of their programs, provided they demonstrated that the required VOC reductions would be achieved as soon as possible after November 1996 but no later than November 1999. Therefore, states will have to look to other mobile sources as well as stationary sources to meet their goals for reducing VOC emissions. However, obtaining the required reductions from other sources will be difficult because many of them, especially stationary sources, have already made major reductions in their VOC emissions, and any further reductions may be costly and take some time to achieve. Recommendation
In view of the pivotal role that enhanced I&M programs play in reducing VOC emissions and the delays experienced to date in implementing these programs, as well as the possibility of future delays, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA compile information on the more successful practices, such as public relations campaigns, used by the states that have implemented their enhanced I&M programs and share the information with those states that are in the early stages of developing and implementing their programs. States’ Progress in Performing Mandatory Enhanced Inspection and Maintenance Testing, as of April 1998
Number of vehicles (in millions)
These states had begun testing vehicles under an enhanced I&M program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of states' motor vehicle inspection programs, focusing on the: (1) progress made by the 23 states that are required to implement enhanced inspection and maintenance (I&M) programs, including the difficulties that the states have encountered; and (2) impact that delays in implementing enhanced I&M programs may have on the states' ability to comply with the national air quality standard for ozone.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two of the 23 states had begun testing vehicles by the January 1995 deadline that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set for implementing enhanced I&M programs, and 12 had begun testing vehicles as of April 1998; (2) a number of factors have contributed to delays in implementing programs; (3) opposition to EPA's enhanced I&M regulation--including the reluctance of some state legislatures to provide the legislative authority and funding needed to implement these programs--caused most of the 23 states to delay implementation; (4) in addition, the states had difficulty in obtaining new testing equipment and software support from vendors; (5) the delays in implementing enhanced I&M programs have jeopardized the states' ability to meet the deadlines for attaining the national ozone standard; (6) EPA has allowed the states to claim credit for future reductions in emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC) from their enhanced I&M programs, provided they demonstrate that they will achieve the required reductions as soon as practical after November 1996; (7) if states cannot demonstrate that reductions in VOC can be obtained from the mandatory enhanced inspection and maintenance programs, they may have to look to other mobile sources as well as stationary sources to meet their goals for reducing these emissions; and (8) however, achieving further reductions from other sources will be costly and take longer than achieving the reductions from enhanced inspection I&M programs. |
gao_GAO-07-454 | gao_GAO-07-454_0 | Generally not achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may have taken steps to satisfy some of the elements. This act defined the department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United States. DHS began operations in March 2003. Figure 2 provides a timeline of key events that have affected DHS’s implementation. DHS Has Made Varying Levels of Progress in Implementing its Core Mission and Management Functions, but Has Faced Difficulties in Its Implementation Efforts
Based on the performance expectations we identified, DHS has made progress in implementing its mission and management functions, but various challenges have affected its efforts. Among these information technology management controls and capabilities are centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer, having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system investments; defining and following a corporate process for informed decision making by senior leadership about competing information technology investment options; applying system and software development and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; and establishing a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect information and systems; Despite its efforts over the last several years, the department has significantly more to do before each of these management controls and capabilities is fully in place and is integral to how each system investment is managed. These issues have impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue as DHS moves forward. DHS Has Not Yet Transformed Its Component Agencies into a Fully Functioning Department
DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a fully functioning department, and we have designated DHS implementation and transformation as high-risk. We stated that the array of management and programmatic challenges continues to limit DHS’s ability to carry out its roles under the National Strategy for Homeland Security in an effective risk-based way. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. We reported that the creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge and that DHS faces a formidable task in its transformation efforts as it works to integrate over 170,000 federal employees from 22 component agencies. DHS Has Not Fully Applied a Risk Management Approach in Implementing All Mission Areas
DHS has not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and core management functions. These challenges include developing productive information sharing relationships among the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector; and ensuring that the private sector receives better information on potential threats. The implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security further underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and coordination. Concluding Observations
Given the dominant role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department’s mission programs and management systems and functions operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has had to undertake these critical missions while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. To address these challenges, DHS will need to continue its efforts to develop a results-oriented mission and management framework to guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired outcomes. In moving forward, it will also be important for DHS to routinely reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its missions. Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland Security’s Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. GAO was asked to report on DHS's progress in implementing its mission and management areas and challenges DHS faces. This report also discusses key themes that have affected DHS's implementation efforts.
What GAO Found
At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in all of its mission and management areas. The rate of progress, however, among these areas varies. Key underlying themes have affected DHS's implementation efforts, and will be essential for the department to address as it moves forward. These include management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination. For example, while DHS has made progress in transforming its component agencies into a fully functioning department, it has not yet addressed key elements of the transformation process, such as developing a comprehensive strategy for agency transformation and ensuring that management systems and functions are integrated. This lack of a comprehensive strategy and integrated management systems and functions limits DHS's ability to carry out its homeland security responsibilities in an effective, risk-based way. DHS also has not yet fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and management functions. Some DHS component agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard, have taken steps to do so, but DHS has not yet taken sufficient actions to ensure that this approach is used departmentwide. In addition, DHS has taken steps to share information and coordinate with homeland security partners, but has faced difficulties in these partnership efforts, such as in ensuring that the private sector receives better information on potential threats. Given DHS's dominant role in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department's mission and management programs are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has had to undertake these responsibilities while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable better accountability of its progress toward achieving desired outcomes. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its missions. |
gao_GAO-08-526 | gao_GAO-08-526_0 | Specifically, this program is to include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. TVA Provides Power to the Southeastern United States
The TVA is a federal corporation and the nation’s largest public power company. TVA Had Not Fully Implemented Appropriate Security Practices to Protect Its Critical Infrastructures
TVA had not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the control systems used to operate its critical infrastructures. Both the corporate network infrastructure and control systems networks and devices at individual facilities and plants were vulnerable to disruption. In addition, physical security controls at multiple locations did not sufficiently protect critical control systems. The interconnections between TVA’s control system networks and its corporate network increase the risk that security weaknesses on the corporate network could affect control systems networks. As a result, TVA’s control systems that operate its critical infrastructures are at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. In addition, the configuration of numerous network infrastructure protocols and devices provided limited or ineffective security protections. Moreover, the intrusion detection system that TVA used had significant limitations. However, almost all of the workstations and servers that we examined on the corporate network lacked key security patches or had inadequate security settings. Specifically, firewalls were either bypassed or inadequately configured, passwords were either weak or not used at all, logging of certain activity was limited, configuration management policies for control systems software were not consistently implemented, and servers and workstations lacked key patches and effective virus protection. Information Security Management Program Was Not Consistently Implemented across TVA’s Critical Infrastructure
An underlying reason for TVA’s information security control weaknesses is that it had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program. The effective implementation of an information security program includes implementing the key elements required under FISMA and the establishment of a continuing cycle of activity—which includes developing an inventory of systems, assessing risk, developing policies and procedures, developing security plans, testing and monitoring the effectiveness of controls, identifying and tracking remedial actions, and establishing appropriate training. TVA did not have a complete and accurate inventory of its control systems. Until TVA has a complete and accurate inventory of its control systems, it cannot ensure that the appropriate security controls have been implemented to protect these systems. In addition, as previously noted, the agency had not categorized the impact of many of its control systems. Agency officials stated that they were planning to develop security plans and complete the certification and accreditation process for these control systems. According to agency officials, training had not been completed primarily due to a lack of staff to provide the training. In addition, the agency had developed backup procedures for key information resources, including those that support its control systems. Finalize the draft agencywide cyber incident response procedure. We evaluated TVA’s implementation of these key elements by reviewing TVA’s system inventory to determine whether it contained an accurate and comprehensive list of control systems; analyzing risk assessments for key TVA systems to determine whether risks and threats were documented; examining security plans to determine if management, operational, and technical controls were in place or planned and whether these security plans were updated; analyzing TVA policies, procedures, practices, and standards to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems; inspecting training records for personnel with significant responsibilities to determine if they received training commensurate with those responsibilities; analyzing test plans and test results for key TVA systems to determine whether management, operational, and technical controls were adequately tested at least annually and were based on risk; evaluating TVA’s process to correct weaknesses and determining whether remedial action plans complied with federal guidance; and examining contingency plans for key TVA systems to determine whether those plans had been tested or updated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the control systems that regulate the nation's critical infrastructures is vital to ensuring our economic security and public health and safety. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal corporation and the nation's largest public power company, generates and distributes power in an area of about 80,000 square miles in the southeastern United States. GAO was asked to determine whether TVA has implemented appropriate information security practices to protect its control systems. To do this, GAO examined the security practices in place at several TVA facilities; analyzed the agency's information security policies, plans, and procedures against federal law and guidance; and interviewed agency officials who are responsible for overseeing TVA's control systems and their security.
What GAO Found
TVA has not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the control systems and networks used to operate its critical infrastructures. Both its corporate network infrastructure and control systems networks and devices were vulnerable to disruption. The corporate network was interconnected with control systems networks GAO reviewed, thereby increasing the risk that security weaknesses on the corporate network could affect those control systems networks. On TVA's corporate network, certain individual workstations lacked key software patches and had inadequate security settings, and numerous network infrastructure protocols and devices had limited or ineffective security configurations. In addition, the intrusion detection system had significant limitations. On control systems networks, firewalls reviewed were either inadequately configured or had been bypassed, passwords were not effectively implemented, logging of certain activity was limited, configuration management policies for control systems software were inconsistently implemented, and servers and workstations lacked key patches and effective virus protection. In addition, physical security at multiple locations did not sufficiently protect critical control systems. As a result, systems that operate TVA's critical infrastructures are at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that TVA had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program. Although TVA had developed and implemented program activities related to contingency planning and incident response, it had not consistently implemented key activities related to developing an inventory of systems, assessing risk, developing policies and procedures, developing security plans, testing and monitoring the effectiveness of controls, completing appropriate training, and identifying and tracking remedial actions. For example, the agency lacked a complete inventory of its control systems and had not categorized all of its control systems according to risk, thereby limiting assurance that these systems were adequately protected. Agency officials stated that they plan to complete these risk assessments and related activities but have not established a completion date. Key information security policies and procedures were also in draft or under revision. Additionally, the agency's patch management process lacked a way to effectively prioritize vulnerabilities. TVA had only completed one system security plan, and another plan was under development. The agency had also tested the effectiveness of its control systems' security using outdated federal guidance, and many control systems had not been tested for security. In addition, only 25 percent of relevant agency staff had completed required role-based security training in fiscal year 2007. Furthermore, while the agency had developed a process to track remedial actions for information security, this process had not been implemented for the majority of its control systems. Until TVA fully implements these security program activities, it risks a disruption of its operations as a result of a cyber incident, which could impact its customers. |
gao_T-OGC-98-55 | gao_T-OGC-98-55_0 | Prior to the March 10 hearing, GAO conducted a review to determine whether all final rules covered by CRA and published in the Federal Register were filed with the Congress and GAO. Our review covered the 10-month period from October 1, 1996, to July 31, 1997. In November 1997, we submitted to OIRA a computer listing of the rules that we found published in the Federal Register but not filed with our Office. OIRA distributed this list to the affected agencies and departments and instructed them to contact GAO if they had any questions regarding the list. Beginning in mid-February, because 321 rules remained unfiled, we followed up with each agency that still had rules which were unaccounted for. OIRA did not participate in the follow-up effort. Our Office experienced varying degrees of responses from the agencies. Overall, our review disclosed, as of the March 10 hearing, that:
279 rules should have been filed with us; 264 of these have subsequently
182 were found not to be covered by CRA as rules of particular applicability or agency management and thus were not required to be filed;
37 rules had been submitted timely and our database was corrected; and
15 rules from six agencies had not been filed. Last week, our Office concluded a second review covering the 5-month period from August 1, 1997, to December 31, 1997, which we conducted in the same manner as the prior review. First, the number of unfiled rules which should have been filed were 66 for the 5-month period. This is down markedly from the 279 for the prior 10-month review, thus indicating a more concerted effort on the part of the agencies to fulfill their responsibilities under CRA. Secondly, OIRA has become more involved and conducted the follow-up contacts with the agencies after OIRA’s distribution of the initial list. While we are unaware of any rule that OIRA deliberately misclassified to avoid the major rule designation, mistakes have been made in major rule classifications. Also, the failure of agencies to identify some issuances as “rules” at all has meant that some major rules have not been identified. We believe that OIRA should: develop a standardized reporting format that can readily be incorporated into GAO’s database providing the information of most use to the Congress, the public, and GAO; establish a system to monitor compliance with the filing requirement on an provide clarifying guidance as to what is a rule that is subject to CRA and oversee the process of identifying such rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its experience in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) and its efforts to coordinate implementation of the Act with the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under CRA two types of rules, major and nonmajor, must be submitted to both Houses of Congress and GAO before either can take effect; (2) CRA specifies that the determination of what rules are major is to be made by OIRA; (3) its primary role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule concerning GAO's assessment of the promulgating federal agency's compliance with the procedural steps required by various acts and executive orders governing the regulatory process; (4) although the law is silent as to GAO's role relating to the nonmajor rules, it believes that basic information about the rules should be collected in a manner that can be of use to Congress and the public; (5) to do this, GAO has established a database that gathers basic information about the 15-20 rules GAO receives on the average each day; (6) GAO conducted a review to determine whether all final rules covered by CRA and published in the Federal Register were filed with Congress and GAO; (7) the review, covering the 10-month period from October 1, 1996, to July 31, 1997, identified 498 rules from 50 agencies that were not properly submitted for congressional review; (8) GAO submitted the list to OIRA in November 1997; (9) OIRA distributed this list to the affected agencies and instructed them to contact GAO if they had any questions; (10) beginning in mid-February, because 321 rules remained unfiled, GAO followed up with each agency that had rules unaccounted for; (11) OIRA did not participate in the follow-up effort; (12) GAO's office experienced varying degrees of responses from the agencies during the followup; (13) GAO conducted a second review covering the 5-month period from August 1, 1997, to December 31, 1997; (14) GAO noted two areas of improvement: (a) the number of unfiled rules which should have been filed were 66, down from the 279 for the prior 10-month review, indicating a more concerted effort by agencies to fulfill their responsibilities under CRA; and (b) OIRA has become more involved and conducted the follow-up contacts with agencies after distribution of the list; (15) while GAO is unaware of any rule the OIRA deliberately misclassified to avoid the major rule designation, mistakes have been made in major rule classifications; and (16) the failure of agencies to identify some issuances as rules at all has meant that some major rules have not been identified. |
gao_GAO-01-997T | gao_GAO-01-997T_0 | Grant and Loan Payments Lacked Certain Edit Checks and Other Key Controls
Education disburses grant and loan payments by electronic funds transfer and processes these payments in GAPS. We found that Education’s student aid application processing system lacks an automated edit check that would identify students that were much older than expected. These tests included searches for a single SSN associated with two or more dates of birth, grants to recipients in excess of statutory limits, and searches for invalid SSNs. During our analysis of the third party draft payment process, we identified several internal control weaknesses, including inadequate computer systems application controls, poor segregation of duties, and inadequate audit trails. Specifically, as we discussed in our April 3, 2001, testimony, Education (1) circumvented a system’s application control designed to avoid duplicate payments by adding a suffix to the invoice/voucher number when the system indicates that an invoice/voucher number has already been used; (2) allowed 21 of the 49 Education employees who could issue third party drafts to do so without involving anyone else; and (3) lacked adequate audit trails, such as a trigger log, to identify changes made to the list of approved vendors. During our analysis of the purchase card payment process, we identified internal control weaknesses, including inadequate computer systems application controls, lack of supervisory review, and improper authorization of transactions. Based on these weaknesses and information gathered from Education IG reports, we designed tests to identify potentially improper payments made with government purchase cards. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO and the Department of Education's Office of Inspector General have issued many reports in recent years on the Department's financial management problems, including internal control weaknesses that put the Department at risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. In an April 2001 assessment of the internal control over Education's payment processes and the associated risks for improper payments, GAO identified four broad categories of internal control weaknesses: poor segregation of duties, lack of supervisory review, inadequate audit trails, and inadequate computer systems' applications controls. This testimony discusses how these weaknesses make Education vulnerable to improper payments in grant and loan payments, third party drafts, and government purchase card purchases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Education's student aid application processing system for grants and loans lacks an automated edit check that would identify potentially improper payments from students who were much older than expected, a single social security number associated with two or more dates of birth, grants to recipients in excess of statutory limits, and searches for invalid social security numbers. GAO also found problems with Education's third party draft system. Specifically, Education (1) circumvented a system's application control designed to avoid duplicate payments by adding a suffix to the invoice/voucher number when the system indicates that an invoice/voucher number has already been used; (2) allowed 21 of the 49 Education employees who could issue third party drafts to do so without involving anyone else; and (3) lacked adequate audit trails, such as a trigger log, to identify changes made to the list of approved vendors. GAO also found shortcomings with Education's internal controls over government purchase cards. |
gao_PEMD-95-3 | gao_PEMD-95-3_0 | The present report deals with crash involvement—that is, with the driver or vehicle characteristics that are related to the likelihood of a crash. Sixty-eight percent of crashes involved passenger cars, 11 percent involved light trucks and vans, and 21 percent were between cars and light trucks and vans. A 16-year-old driver was over seven times more likely to be in a single-vehicle rollover crash, over five times more likely to be in a single-vehicle nonrollover crash, and more than twice as likely to be in a two-vehicle crash as was the safest driver overall—a 45-year-old. Violation History
Driving history was a strong predictor of crash involvement for two-car and single-car crashes, ranking second only to driver age. We found that, regardless of size, newer cars were slightly less at risk for crash involvement. (This is most likely the case.) To allow comparisons of their relative importance in predicting crash involvement, the improvement in goodness of fit for each model over the base model (including driver age, violation history, gender, and vehicle age) is presented in tables V.1 and V.2. GAO Comments
1. We found that lighter vehicles were more likely to be involved in single vehicle rollovers. 2. 4. 5. S.E. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the factors that contribute to vehicular crashes, focusing on: (1) drivers' age, gender, and driving history; and (2) vehicle size and age.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) driver characteristics far outweigh vehicle factors in predicting vehicular crashes; (2) drivers who are younger, male, and have a history of traffic violations, particularly alcohol violations, are more likely to be involved in single-vehicle crashes; (3) drivers 65 and older are the second most likely group to be involved in crashes; (4) older vehicles are slightly more at risk for crash involvement, but other factors that are linked to vehicle age may also play a part in older cars' involvement in crashes; (5) light cars are three times more likely to be involved in single-vehicle rollover crashes than heavy cars; (6) a car's wheel-base or engine size is a better predictor of crash involvement; and (7) light trucks and vans show a similar crash-involvement pattern except that driver gender is generally not a significant factor in predicting light truck and van crashes.. |
gao_NSIAD-97-13 | gao_NSIAD-97-13_0 | Privatizing-in-place does not substantially reduce infrastructure and excess capacity. The privatization-in-place of the Sacramento and San Antonio depots will not reduce the large amount of excess capacity in the Air Force depot system and the private sector or their associated costs, unless additional facilities are closed or other cost-reduction means are successfully implemented. Consolidating Workloads Could Produce Substantial Savings
The Air Force’s planning has not progressed far enough to compare precisely the cost of privatizing depot workloads in place with the cost of transferring the work to other underused depots. Our analysis of BRAC Commission estimates indicates that the closure of the depots at the San Antonio and Sacramento logistics centers were expected to save about $70 million annually. This evaluation did not attempt to measure economy and efficiency improvements that resulted from workload consolidation. Finally, the potential $200 million annual savings that could result from the consolidation is in addition to the BRAC Commission’s $268-million savings estimate for eliminating base support operations and non-depot maintenance personnel at the McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases. On the other hand, if the remaining depots do not receive additional workload, they are likely to continue to operate with significant excess capacity and become more inefficient and expensive as workloads dwindle due to downsizing and privatization initiatives. The savings were to be achieved by reducing personnel requirements and operating costs. While DOD has stated that it will structure these conversions to comply with existing statutory restrictions, details of its privatization plans for Kelly and McClellan are still evolving. Sufficient information regarding the detailed procedures for conducting the competitions for the Sacramento and San Antonio workloads is not available for us to assess whether the planned conversions will comply with the requirements of existing law. To evaluate DOD’s rationale for (1) delaying the closure of McClellan Air Force Base and the realignment of Kelly Air Force Base and (2) privatizing the Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers’ depot maintenance workloads, we reviewed various documents, including the Secretary of Defense’s July 13, 1995, letter to the President and a July 13, 1995, White House press release. To determine whether Air Force plans for privatizing the closing depots is consistent with (1) laws relating to the allocation of depot maintenance workloads to the private sector and (2) the BRAC Commission’s recommendations, we identified the applicable requirements and determined their impact on DOD’s plans to privatize depot-level maintenance workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's plans to privatize-in-place depot maintenance workloads at the Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers, focusing on: (1) the impact on excess depot capacity and operating costs at the remaining defense depots; (2) the cost-effectiveness of planned privatization initiatives, including the impact of delaying base closures until the year 2001; and (3) compliance with statutory requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) privatizing-in-place rather than closing and transferring the depot maintenance workloads at the Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers will leave a costly excess capacity situation at remaining Air Force depots that a workload consolidation would have mitigated; (2) although the Air Force's privatization initiative for the Sacramento and San Antonio depots has not progressed far enough for GAO to estimate precisely costs and savings, consolidating depot maintenance workloads at remaining underused depots could result in a net savings in 2 years or less; (3) GAO's work shows that transferring the depot maintenance workloads to other depots could yield additional economy and efficiency savings of over $200 million annually in addition to the $268 million annual savings the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission estimated could be achieved by eliminating the McClellan and Kelly infrastructures and downsizing nonmaintenance personnel; (4) if the workload consolidation does not occur, the remaining Air Force depots are likely to become more inefficient and more costly, unless other workloads are added, costly excess capacity is eliminated, or other efficiency and economy initiatives are successfully implemented; (5) plans to delay many closure-related actions until 2001 will substantially reduce future savings envisioned by the BRAC Commission and could result in a net loss of $644.4 million between 1997 and 2001 for the Air Force and $24 million for the Army; and (6) the Department of Defense (DOD) stated that it will structure the San Antonio and Sacramento privatizations to comply with existing statutory restrictions, but DOD's privatization plans are still evolving and sufficient information is not available for GAO to assess whether the conversion plans will comply with existing law. |
gao_GAO-17-648 | gao_GAO-17-648_0 | Agencies Providing Democracy Assistance in Burma
U.S. democracy assistance in Burma is primarily provided by USAID’s Mission in Burma Office of Democracy and Governance (USAID/DG), USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI), and State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State/DRL). USAID and State Democracy Projects Are Primarily Coordinated through an Interagency Working Group Represented by Embassy Officials That Has Not Directly Included State/DRL
The U.S. embassy in Burma’s Assistance Working Group (AWG), the primary mechanism for coordinating agencies’ democracy projects in Burma, according to USAID officials, consists of representatives from each agency located at the embassy, including USAID, State, and the Department of Defense. In addition, in May 2017, officials from the embassy, the Burma desk, and State/DRL stated that they had recently initiated a process to identify more efficient and inclusive methods for coordinating with and obtaining State/DRL’s input on future democracy program decisions, partly as a result of our review. Further, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, required that the Burma Democracy Strategy include support for civil society, former prisoners, monks, students, and democratic parliamentarians. USAID and State Make Some Efforts to Prevent U.S. Democracy Assistance from Being Provided to Prohibited Entities and Individuals, but Partners Indicate They Could Benefit from Further Guidance, and USAID/DG and State Do Not Review Partners’ Procedures
Annual appropriations acts have included provisions that state U.S. democracy assistance may not be provided to certain categories of prohibited entities and individuals. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for management to periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in addressing related risks. USAID and State Provide Some Guidance on Due Diligence, but USAID/DG and State/DRL Do Not Review Partners’ Processes
USAID and State have provided some guidance to their implementing partners on how to conduct due diligence to address appropriations acts restrictions. Similarly, State/DRL has provided some guidance to only a few implementing partners on conducting due diligence. Another representative said that their organization lacked the capacity to conduct Internet searches in Burmese because it does not employ local staff. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that sufficient due diligence is undertaken by implementing partners of U.S. democracy assistance in Burma, where appropriate, to help ensure that assistance is not made available to prohibited entities or individuals, we are making the following two recommendations:
We recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the Mission in Burma to review its procedures and practices regarding due diligence for democracy projects to determine whether additional guidance or reviews of implementing partners’ due diligence procedures would be appropriate. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) democracy projects, including coordination of those projects; (2) steps USAID and State have taken to ensure that U.S. democracy projects and the U.S. Strategy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Burma (Burma Democracy Strategy) address and support the specified purposes and groups, respectively, for Burma assistance funding; and (3) USAID and State efforts to ensure that U.S. democracy assistance is not provided to prohibited entities and individuals. We also interviewed officials from USAID and State in Washington, D.C., and Burma about their active projects. To examine steps USAID and State have taken to help ensure that U.S. democracy projects and the Burma Democracy Strategy address and support the specified purposes and groups, respectively, for Burma assistance funding, we reviewed the specified purposes for Burma assistance funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, as well as the specified groups for the Burma Democracy Strategy in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. policy toward Burma has been to promote the establishment of a democratically elected civilian government that respects the human rights of the Burmese people, according to State. Since 2011, Burma has been in transition from military, authoritarian rule toward parliamentary democracy. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review U.S. democracy programs in Burma. This report examines (1) USAID and State democracy projects, including coordination of these projects; (2) steps USAID and State have taken to help ensure that U.S. democracy projects and the U.S. Strategy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Burma (Burma Democracy Strategy) address and support the specified purposes and groups, respectively, for Burma assistance funding; and (3) USAID and State efforts to ensure that U.S. democracy assistance is not provided to prohibited entities and individuals. GAO reviewed relevant agency documents; conducted fieldwork in Burma; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and Burma.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State) have funded 34 democracy projects in Burma since 2012, including efforts to strengthen the country's civil society and democratic institutions. These projects are primarily coordinated by the interagency Assistance Working Group (AWG) at the U.S. embassy in Burma, which approves all U.S. agencies' activities in Burma. However, State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State/DRL) is not directly included in AWG proceedings because it does not have an embassy presence, and embassy policy limits participation in the AWG to those located at the embassy. As a result, the AWG has made decisions about State/DRL's projects without direct input from State/DRL and without State/DRL always receiving feedback. State officials said that they had recently begun an effort to identify more inclusive methods for coordinating with State/DRL and obtaining its input, which, if implemented properly, could improve coordination.
Dollars in millions
USAID and State take several steps to help ensure that their projects and the Burma Democracy Strategy address the specified purposes for Burma assistance funding. When designing projects, USAID and State both consider purposes for which assistance shall be made available. For example, GAO found that several current projects include objectives addressing purposes in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. Also, the Burma Democracy Strategy—an interagency strategy for promoting democracy in Burma—includes language supporting civil society, former prisoners, monks, students, and democratic parliamentarians, as required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014.
USAID and State make some efforts to ensure that U.S. democracy assistance is not provided to prohibited entities and individuals specified in law. USAID and State/DRL provide information to implementing partners on prohibited entities and individuals and the need for partners to conduct due diligence. However, USAID's Mission in Burma Office of Democracy and Governance (USAID/DG) and State/DRL only provide some guidance to partners on how to conduct due diligence and do not review partners' procedures. Partners GAO interviewed either did not conduct due diligence or expressed concerns about their due diligence procedures. Standards for internal control in the federal government call for management to review procedures and controls for relevance in addressing risks. Without providing more guidance and reviewing partner due diligence procedures, USAID/DG and State may miss opportunities to better ensure that U.S. assistance is not provided to prohibited entities and individuals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID and State review their procedures and practices to determine whether additional guidance or reviews of implementing partners' due diligence procedures are needed. USAID and State both concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-98-12 | gao_AIMD-98-12_0 | GAO Review of the Number of Overnight Guests and Stays at the Executive Residence
As you know, in connection with requests that we determine the average cost of an overnight stay at the Executive Residence and provide information on related overtime compensation for domestic staff within the Executive Residence, the Subcommittee asked us to determine the number of persons who were overnight guests in the Executive Residence and the total number of overnight stays since January 1993. Written Request of the White House
On October 16, 1997, we wrote to the Deputy Counsel to the President to insist on our access, by November 1, 1997, to all books, documents, papers, or other records related to the number of overnight guests at the Executive Residence and the beginning and ending dates of each guest stay since January 1993. We made that request to achieve our objective of counting and reporting the number of overnight guests and stays. The Associate Counsel to the President replied by letter of October 23, 1997, that she and others had compiled the previously published list of overnight guests from documentation that included materials belonging to the First Family, including “personal and private correspondence.” The letter characterized our request as one to “gain access to private and personal papers of the First Family.” In expressing concern about GAO inspecting these materials, the Associate Counsel expressed a willingness to continue discussing the matter, but as of today we have received no records that would enable us to provide the Subcommittee with the requested information on overnight guests and stays at the Executive Residence. Accordingly, we have been and continue to be open to reviewing other materials to determine the number and duration of overnight guests and stays at the Executive Residence. She first argues that a privacy interest protects the First Family’s notes and correspondence. Second, she reminded us that our statutory right of access encompasses “agency records” and advised that this right of access does not reach records of the First Family. 1996). Here, disclosure to GAO is solely in aid of the congressional power to oversee, investigate, and legislate. The Executive Residence is a government facility staffed by federal employees and funded with appropriated tax dollars. This Subcommittee considers budget requests by the President for the operation and maintenance of the Executive Residence. In so doing, it desires to have information relating to the operation of the Executive Residence and the workload of the government employees responsible for maintaining it, including overtime and duties associated with overnight guests, as well as the number of overnight guests and stays. Accordingly, for purposes of our audit and access authority, we believe the Executive Residence is an “establishment” of the United States and that papers, correspondence, and other written materials documenting its use, created by the President or First Lady or received by them from private parties, and used by government employees to compile statistics released to the public, are “records” as that term is used in 31 U.S.C. 716. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the status of its work on the number of overnight guests and stays in the Executive Residence at the White House, focusing on: (1) an audit of certain fiscal year 1996 expenditures, including those to operate the Executive Residence, that are accounted for solely on the certificate of the President or the Vice President and referred to as unvouchered activities; (2) a review of certain processes and procedures relating to reimbursable expenditures of the Executive Residence, such as those for political events; and (3) a review of the number and cost of overnight stays in the Executive Residence since January 1993.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its first two assignments in this area, relating to audits of certain 1996 expenditures and a review of certain processes and procedures relating to reimbursable expenditures, are proceeding on schedule; (2) its third assignment relates to the number and costs of overnight stays in the Executive Residence since January 1993; (3) GAO requested access to all books, documents, papers, or other records related to the number of overnight guests at the Executive Residence to achieve its objective of counting and reporting the number of overnight guests and stays; (4) in an October 23, 1997, letter, the Associate Counsel to the President characterized GAO's request as one to gain access to private and personal papers of the First Family, but expressed a willingness to continue discussing the matter; (5) GAO is open to reviewing other materials to determine the number and duration of overnight guests and stays at the Executive Residence; (6) in the October 1997 letter, the Associate Counsel argued that a privacy interest protects the First Family's notes and correspondence, and stated that GAO's statutory right of access encompasses agency records and does not reach records of the First Family; (7) GAO believes that disclosure of the information is solely in aid of the congressional power to enact legislation, oversee the operation of government, and appropriate funds under the Constitution, with the presumption of a valid legislative purpose; (8) the Executive Residence is a government facility staffed by federal employees and funded with appropriated tax dollars; (9) this subcommittee considers budget requests by the President for the operation and maintenance of the Executive Residence, and in so doing, it desires to have information relating to the operation of the Executive Residence and the workload of the government employees responsible for maintaining it, including overtime and duties associated with overnight guests, as well as the number of overnight guests and stays; and (10) accordingly, for purposes of GAO's audit and access authority, GAO believes the correspondence, and other written materials documenting use of the Executive Residence, created by the President or First Lady or received by them from private parties, and used by government employees to compile statistics released to the public, are records as that term is used in 31 U.S.C. 716. |
gao_GAO-02-541 | gao_GAO-02-541_0 | The Air Force’s Directorate of Manpower and Organization designed the Total Force Assessment (TFA) process to assess whether the various methodologies used by the Air Force to determine manpower requirements generated sufficient manpower to accomplish two purposes: (1) meet deployment commitments should it be called on to fight two major theater wars and (2) conduct multiple small-scale contingency operations in peacetime. Total Force Assessment Has Not Established the Air Force’s Ability to Carry Out the Defense Strategy
The Air Force conducted only the wartime component of the assessment, not the component assessing the adequacy of its manpower in conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. The results of the wartime analysis were somewhat inconclusive because the Air Force stopped work on the study before some discrepancies in the assessment’s results were resolved. Conclusions
Because the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the forces necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations envisioned in defense guidance, its operational risk in both wartime and peacetime may not be fully understood. | What GAO Found
The Air Force began to test the force requirements in its manpower requirements-determination process in May 2000. The defense strategy envisions simultaneously fighting two major theater wars and conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. The Total Force Assessment was the Air Force's first evaluation of manpower adequacy in these contexts since 1995. Because the Total Force Assessment was not implemented as planned, the Air Force cannot demonstrate that it has the forces needed to carry out the full spectrum of military operations. Although intended to examine whether authorized Air Force personnel were sufficient to meet both the wartime and peacetime scenarios, the assessment only addressed the wartime scenario and did not address the adequacy of manpower for conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. Air Force officials concluded that manpower was adequate to support the wartime scenario but this assessment was inconclusive because the effort was discontinued before all discrepancies in the assessment's results were resolved. Although the Air Force spent considerable time and effort conducting at least a portion of its planned assessment, it has not used the results to the extent anticipated. |
gao_RCED-98-202 | gao_RCED-98-202_0 | 105-18, June 12, 1997), which requested that GAO study HUD’s systems for budgeting and accounting for Section 8 rental assistance funds to determine whether HUD’s systems ensure that unexpended Section 8 funds do not reach unreasonable levels and that obligations are spent in a timely manner. Because our review focused on the unexpended balances for the existing portfolio of project-based rental assistance contracts, we did not examine HUD’s budget request for Section 8 contract renewals. Unexpended Section 8 Balances Totaled More Than $59 Billion
As of September 30, 1997, HUD had available about $59.1 billion in unexpended Section 8 project-based funds. These balances consisted of about $3 billion reserved for specific contracts but not yet obligated and about $.7 billion in unreserved funds that carried over into fiscal year 1998. Broadly stated, the funds are (1) obligated to specific Section 8 contracts, (2) reserved for specific Section 8 contracts, or (3) totally unobligated. The first category, called “undisbursed obligations,” is the amount of funds obligated to the Section 8 contracts but not yet disbursed. About $55.4 billion of the funding represents undisbursed obligations; about $3 billion represents funds that are unobligated but reserved; and about $.7 billion represents unobligated and unreserved funds. In the category of “other” programs, HUD had about $170 million in unobligated but reserved funds. In chapter 3, we discuss HUD’s efforts to identify unexpended balances that can be recaptured and used to help meet its future needs for Section 8 project-based funding. Annual Review of Unexpended Balances Is Limited by Weaknesses
HUD’s procedures for identifying and deobligating funds that are no longer needed to meet its contractual obligations do not ensure that all Section 8 project-based balances are evaluated each year and that excess balances are identified and deobligated in a timely manner. For example, we found that some offices did not perform annual reviews of unexpended balances, and some funds that were identified as no longer needed were not deobligated. Thus, invalid obligations are those obligations associated with expired or terminated contracts. More specifically, HUD requested $1.3 billion for contract amendments in fiscal year 1999, whereas more recent HUD analyses, which correct most of the problems we found in the BFS model and update information to reflect more current economic assumptions, indicate that at the end of fiscal year 1998, the Department will have about $1.5 billion in funding that could be used to meet fiscal year 1999 needs. This total includes the following amounts: $833 million in project-based amendment funding that, according to the budget director for the Office of Housing, was appropriated to the Department for fiscal year 1998, including amounts associated with properties funded under the capital advance program for the elderly and disabled; $133 million of Section 8 project-based amendment funds that were unobligated and unreserved at the end of fiscal year 1997 and were carried over for use in 1998; $517 million in project-based funding that we identified in chapter 2 as being no longer needed. While HUD uses a model to perform such analysis, we found a number of errors in the analysis it used for formulating its fiscal year 1999 budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) systems for budgeting and accounting for Section 8 rental assistance funds, focusing on whether the systems ensure that unexpended Section 8 project-based funds do not reach unreasonable levels and that obligations are spent in a timely manner.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of September 30, 1997, HUD's Section 8 project-based rental assistance program had about $59.1 billion in unexpended balances in three major categories: (a) undisbursed obligations--funds obligated to Section 8 contracts but not yet disbursed; (b) unobligated but reserved funds--balances reserved for specific rental assistance contracts but not yet obligated; and (c) unobligated and unreserved funds--funds that are neither obligated nor reserved for any specific contracts; (2) most of the unexpended balances--$55.4 billion--represent undisbursed obligations associated with approximately 31,000 rental assistance contracts; (3) in addition, at the end of fiscal year (FY) 1997, HUD had about $3 billion in unobligated funds that were reserved for but not yet obligated to specific contracts and about $.7 billion in unobligated and unreserved funds that were carried over for use in 1998; (4) while most of the unexpended balances are needed for HUD to fulfill its commitments to the Section 8 contracts for which the funds have been obligated or reserved, GAO found at least $517 million in unexpended balances that are no longer needed for such purposes and thus could be recaptured by HUD and used to help fund other Section 8 contracts; (5) HUD's procedures for identifying and deobligating funds that are no longer needed to meet its Section 8 contractual obligations are not effective; (6) specifically, the procedures do not ensure that all Section 8 project-based balances are evaluated each year and that any excess balances are identified and deobligated in a timely manner; (7) while HUD's program offices are responsible for reviewing unexpended balances each year to determine whether they are still needed or can be deobligated, GAO found that some offices did not perform annual reviews in 1997 and that some funds identified as being available for deobligation in earlier reviews were not deobligated; (8) in addition, GAO found errors in the process HUD used to identify and take into account unexpended balances when formulating its budget request for FY 1999; (9) as a result, HUD's FY 1999 request for $1.3 billion in amendment funding to cover shortfalls in existing Section 8 contracts was significantly overstated; and (10) more recent analyses that correct most of these errors and update the economic assumptions used indicate that HUD already has sufficient funding available to meet its amendment needs for FY 1999. |
gao_GAO-17-471T | gao_GAO-17-471T_0 | DOJ Has Not Fully Addressed Most GAO Recommendations Related to its Law Enforcement Activities
As part of its mission to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States, DOJ undertakes a number of law enforcement activities through its component agencies. The following six reports—which we issued in 2015 and 2016—contain key findings and recommendations in this area, and highlight potential areas for continued oversight. DOJ or its components have not taken actions for 8 of our recommendations and disagreed with the remaining 4 recommendations. In June 2016, we reported that DOJ could facilitate more efficient sharing of information on missing persons and unidentified remains. As of March 2017, DOJ has begun taking actions to address three of our six recommendations, such as initiating audits to oversee the FBI’s use of its face recognition technology. DEA needs to provide additional guidance to entities that handle controlled substances. DOJ should improve handling of FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints. DOJ concurred with these recommendations, but as of March 2017 has not provided documentation of actions taken to address them. DOJ Has Not Fully Addressed Most GAO Recommendations Related to the Custody and Care of Federal Prisoners and Inmates
As part of their mission to enforce and control crime, DOJ and its components—including the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)—are responsible for the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates. To carry out these responsibilities, the President’s Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. Our recent reports on DOJ’s programs for incarceration and offender management highlight areas for oversight, including better estimating costs and measuring outcomes. Since August 2014, we have made 17 recommendations to DOJ, BOP, and USMS to improve the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates. As of March 2017, DOJ or its component agencies have implemented 7 of the 17 recommendations, have begun taking actions on 8 recommendations that remain open, and have not taken actions for the remaining 2 recommendations. DOJ and BOP could better measure the outcomes of alternatives to incarceration. DOJ has improved outreach to states to notify tribes about registered sex offenders who plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal land. DOJ concurred with these recommendations and has fully implemented them. DOJ Has Implemented Most GAO Recommendations to Improve Grant Administration and Management
DOJ supports a range of activities—including policing and victims’ assistance—through grants provided to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as national, community-based, and non-profit organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ discretionary grant programs in fiscal year 2016. The four reports discussed below highlight DOJ’s overall grant administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to reduce duplication in grant programs across the federal government. The four reports included 17 recommendations to DOJ. The department concurred with these recommendations, and as of March 2017 had taken actions to fully implement 15 of the 17 recommendations. DOJ has addressed recommendations to reduce the risk of grant program overlap and unnecessary duplication. The department concurred with these recommendations and has fully implemented them. DOJ has partially taken action to address the remaining two recommendations. DOJ Has Partially Implemented GAO Recommendations Designed to Improve Management of Funds Collected through Alternative Sources
DOJ has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties, in addition to the budget authority Congress provides DOJ through annual appropriations. The following three reports highlight DOJ’s collection, use, and management of these funds. One of the three reports contains three recommendations, which have been partially implemented. In February 2015, we reported that DOJ could better manage its alternative sources of funding—collections by DOJ from sources such as fines, fees, and penalties—which, in fiscal year 2013, made up about 15 percent of DOJ’s total budgetary resources. Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and Accuracy. Department of Justice: Alternative Sources of Funding Are a Key Source of Budgetary Resources and Could Be Better Managed. Bureau of Prisons: Management of New Prison Activations Can Be Improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2016, DOJ's $29 billion budget funded a broad array of national security, law enforcement, and criminal justice system activities. GAO has examined a number of key programs where DOJ has sole responsibility or works with other departments, and recommended actions to improve program efficiency and resource management.
This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address DOJ's (1) law enforcement activities, (2) custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates, (3) grant management and administration, and (4) use of alternative sources of funding.
This statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 to November 2016, along with selected updates obtained as of March 2017. For the selected updates on DOJ's progress in implementing GAO recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned.
What GAO Found
DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to its law enforcement activities. The Department of Justice (DOJ) undertakes a number of activities to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States. Key findings and recommendations from six recent GAO reports include, among other things, that DOJ should: better adhere to policies on collecting firearms data, assess opportunities to more efficiently share information on missing persons, better ensure the privacy and accuracy of face recognition technology, provide more information to entities that handle controlled substances, and improve the handling of whistleblower complaints. Collectively, these reports resulted in 28 recommendations. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 5 of these recommendations, begun actions to address 11, has not taken actions for 8, and disagreed with 4 recommendations.
DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates. DOJ is responsible for the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates, for which the President's Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. GAO's recent reports highlight areas for continued improvements in DOJ incarceration and offender management, including better assessing key initiatives to address overcrowding and other federal incarceration challenges, better measuring the outcomes of alternatives to incarceration, improving the management of new prison activations, better estimating cost savings for prisoner operations, and improving notification to tribes about registered sex offenders upon release. Since August 2014, GAO has made 17 recommendations to DOJ in five reports related to these issues, and DOJ generally concurred with them. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 7 of the recommendations, partially implemented 8, and has not taken actions for 2 recommendations.
DOJ has implemented most GAO recommendations to improve grant administration and management. DOJ supports a range of activities—including policing and victims' assistance—through grants provided to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as national, community-based, and non-profit organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ grant programs in fiscal year 2016. Four recent GAO reports highlight DOJ's overall grant administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to reduce overlap and duplication amongst its grant programs. The four reports include 17 recommendations to DOJ, and the department generally concurred with all of them. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 15 of the 17 recommendations and partially implemented the remaining two.
DOJ has partially implemented GAO recommendations designed to improve management of funds collected through alternative sources. DOJ has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties in addition to its annual appropriations. For example, in 2015, we reported that DOJ collected $4.3 billion from seven alternative sources of funding in 2013. This statement highlights three reports that address DOJ's collection, use, and management of these funds. One of the three reports includes three recommendations, which DOJ has partially implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made several recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve program efficiency and resource management. DOJ generally concurred with most of these recommendations and has implemented or begun taking action to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-28 | gao_GAO-08-28_0 | 1). Potential Coverage Gaps and Claims Uncertainties Can Arise When Homeowners Have Multiple Policies That Cover Different Perils
Insurance coverage for hurricane damages commonly requires the purchase of multiple insurance policies—a general homeowners policy, an NFIP policy, and in some areas, a special policy for wind damage. Insurance Coverage Gaps, Claims Adjustment Uncertainties, and Conflicts of Interest Can Materialize When Two or More Policies Cover One Event
Property owners do not know in advance whether their insurance policies will cover all damages from a hurricane, because the payments ultimately will depend on the extent to which each policy will cover the damages— that is, whether the damages are determined to be the result of hurricane winds, flooding, or some combination of both. As part of the WYO arrangement, private property-casualty insurers are responsible for selling and servicing NFIP policies, including performing the claims adjustment activities to assess the cause and extent of damages. Further, states may temporarily relax these requirements after a catastrophe. Some of the coastal states had also instituted some common licensing requirements for staff adjusters, independent adjusters, and public adjusters, while others had varying requirements for different types of adjusters. Lack of Relevant Claims Data Limits FEMA’s Ability to Oversee Hurricane Damage Assessments
Limited data are available for evaluating the damage assessments and claims payments when properties are subjected to both high winds and flooding and the extent of damage caused by each peril is difficult to determine. Further, NFIP has not sought such information even when the same insurance company serves as both the NFIP WYO insurer and the insurer for wind-related risks. FEMA officials stated that they do not have access to wind damage claims data from the WYO insurers. In the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season, the NFIP reinspection process was also challenged by the severity and scope of the damages. FEMA cannot be certain of the quality of NFIP claims adjustments allocating damage to flooding in cases where damages may have been caused by a combination of wind and flooding because NFIP does not systematically collect and analyze both types of damage claims data together on a property-level basis. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To strengthen and clarify FEMA’s oversight of WYO insurers, particularly those that service both wind and flood damage claims on the same property, we recommend the Congress consider giving FEMA clear statutory access to: both wind and flood damage claims information available from NFIP’s WYO insurers in cases in which it is likely that both wind and flooding contributed to any damage or loss to covered properties, enabling NFIP to match and analyze the wind and flood damage apportionments made on hurricane-damaged properties in a systematic fashion, as appropriate; and the policies, procedures, and instructions used by WYO insurers and their adjusters for both flood and wind claims to assess and validate insurers’ claims adjustment practices for identifying, apportioning, and quantifying damages in cases where there are combined perils. When properties are subjected to both wind and flood perils, particularly in cases where uncertainties exist due to limited or compromised evidence at the damage scene, collecting enough information to understand whether or not the WYO insurer is also the wind insurer for the same property and, if so, the extent of damage it determined to be caused by wind versus flooding, is key to maintaining transparency over the adjustment process. Such information would strengthen FEMA’s oversight and ability to identify abuses and better ensure the accuracy of flood payments made. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To evaluate how key insurance coverage issues can arise when multiple insurance plans are tied to a hurricane-damaged property, we contacted and collected information from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) contractors, state insurance regulators, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), property-casualty insurers, state-sponsored wind insurers, insurance agents, claims adjusters, industry associations, and mediators. We collected and compared licensing and training requirements for claims adjusters provided by state insurance regulators in several coastal states, incorporating information on requirements that existed prior to the 2005 hurricane season, as well as subsequent legislation enacted by some coastal states to strengthen oversight requirements for adjusters. In addition, we obtained information on FEMA’s reinspection program that is used to reevaluate the quality of NFIP claims that have been processed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disputes between policyholders and insurers after the 2005 hurricane season highlight the challenges in understanding the cause and extent of damages when properties are subjected to both high winds and flooding. Questions remain over the adequacy of steps taken by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to ensure that claims paid by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) cover only those damages caused by flooding. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) issues that arise when multiple insurance policies provide coverage for losses from a single event, (2) state regulators' oversight of loss adjusters, and (3) information that NFIP collects to assess the accuracy of damage determinations and payments. GAO collected data from FEMA, reviewed reinspection reports and relevant policies and procedures, and interviewed state regulatory officials and others about adjuster oversight and NFIP.
What GAO Found
Insurance coverage gaps and claims uncertainties can arise when coverage for hurricane damage is divided among multiple insurance policies. Coverage for hurricanes generally requires more than one policy because private homeowners policies generally exclude flood damage. But the extent of coverage under each policy depends on the cause of the damages, as determined through the claims adjustment process and the policy terms that cover a particular type of damage. This process is further complicated when the damaged property is subjected to a combination of high winds and flooding and evidence at the damage scene is limited. Other claims concerns can arise on such properties when the same insurer serves as both NFIP's write-your-own (WYO) insurer and the property-casualty (wind) insurer. In such cases, the same company is responsible for determining damages and losses to itself and to NFIP, creating an inherent conflict of interest. Differences in licensing and training requirements for insurance claims adjusters among states also create uncertainties about adjusters' qualifications. Prior to the 2005 hurricane season, some coastal states had few or no requirements, while others had requirements for most types of adjusters. Further, states can waive their normal oversight requirements after a catastrophic event to help address demand, as they did after Hurricane Katrina. As a result, significant variations can exist in the qualifications of claims adjusters available after a catastrophic event. Strengthened and more uniform state requirements for adjusters could enhance the qualifications of the adjuster force in future catastrophes and improve the quality and consistency of claims adjustments. NFIP does not systematically collect and analyze both wind and flood damage claims data, limiting FEMA's ability to assess the accuracy of flood payments on hurricane-damaged properties. The claims data collected by NFIP through the WYO insurers--including those that sell and service both wind and flood policies on a property--do not include information on whether wind contributed to total damages or the extent of wind damage as determined by the WYO insurer. The lack of this data also limits the usefulness of FEMA's quality assurance reinspection program to reevaluate the accuracy of payments. In addition, the aggregate claims data that state insurance regulators collectively gathered after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were not intended to be used to assess wind and flood damage claims together on a property- or community-level basis. Further, FEMA program contractors do not have access to WYO insurers' policies, procedures, and instructions that describe to adjusters how wind and flood damages are to be determined when properties are subjected to both perils. FEMA officials stated that they did not have the authority to collect wind damage claims data from insurers. But without the ability to examine claims adjustment information for both the wind and flood damages, NFIP cannot always determine the extent to which each peril contributed to total property damages and the accuracy of the claims paid for losses caused by flooding. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-268 | gao_T-AIMD-00-268_0 | Challenges to Effective Coordination
Developing the information sharing and coordination capabilities needed to effectively deal with computer threats and actual incidents is complex and challenging but essential. Data on possible threats–ranging from viruses, to hoaxes, to random threats, to news events, and computer intrusions–must be continually collected and analyzed from a wide spectrum of globally distributed sources. Moreover, once an imminent threat is identified, appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated among government agencies, the private sector, and, when appropriate, other nations. It is important that this function be carried out as effectively, efficiently, and quickly as possible in order to ensure continuity of operations as well as minimize disruptions. At the same time, it is not possible to build an overall, comprehensive picture of activity on the global information infrastructure. Networks themselves are too big, they are growing too quickly, and they are continually being reconfigured and reengineered. As a result, it is essential that strong partnerships be developed between a wide range of stakeholders in order to ensure that the right data are at the right place at the right time. Creating partnerships for information sharing and coordination is a formidable task. Trust needs to be established among a broad range of parties with varying interests and expectations, procedures for gathering and sharing information need to be developed, and technical issues need to be addressed. Moreover, if the federal government itself is going to be a credible player in response coordination, it needs to have its own systems and assets well protected. This means overcoming significant and pervasive security weaknesses at each of the major federal agencies and instituting governmentwide controls and mechanisms needed to provide effective oversight, guidance, and leadership. Perhaps most importantly, this activity needs to be guided by a comprehensive strategy to ensure that it is effective, to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, and to maintain continuity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges of developing effective information sharing and coordination strategies needed to deal with computer security threats.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) developing the information sharing and coordination capabilities needed to effectively deal with computer threats and actual incidents is complex and challenging but essential; (2) data on possible threats--ranging from viruses, to hoaxes, to random threats, to news events, and computer intrusions--must be continually collected and analyzed from a wide spectrum of globally distributed sources; (3) once an imminent threat is identified, appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated among government agencies, the private sector, and, when appropriate, other nations; (4) it is important that this function be carried out as effectively, efficiently, and quickly as possible in order to ensure continuity of operations as well as minimize disruptions; (5) at the same time, it is not possible to build an overall, comprehensive picture of activity on the global infrastructure; (6) networks themselves are too big, they are growing too quickly, and they are continually being reconfigured and reengineered; (7) as a result, it is essential that strong partnerships be developed between a wide range of stakeholders in order to ensure that the right data are at the right place at the right time; (8) creating partnerships for information sharing and coordination is a formidable task; (9) trust needs to be established among a broad range of parties with varying interests and expectations, procedures for gathering and sharing information need to be developed, and technical issues need to be addressed; (10) if the federal government itself is going to be a credible player in response coordination, it needs to have its own systems and assets well protected; (11) this means overcoming significant and pervasive security weaknesses at each of the major federal agencies and instituting governmentwide controls and mechanisms needed to provide effective oversight, guidance, and leadership; and (12) perhaps most importantly, this activity needs to be guided by a comprehensive strategy to ensure that it is effective, to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, and to maintain continuity. |
gao_GAO-13-111 | gao_GAO-13-111_0 | Fragmentation and Overlap in EPA and USDA Programs Can Result in Potential Duplication of Community Efforts to Apply for Funding
Drinking water and wastewater infrastructure funding is fragmented among the three programs we reviewed—EPA’s Drinking Water and Clean Water SRF programs and USDA’s RUS program. For the 54 projects we reviewed in the five states we visited, this overlap did not result in duplicate funding or funding for the same activities on the same project. In the five states we visited— Colorado, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota—42 of the 54 projects we reviewed received funding from the SRF or RUS programs, in addition to other sources. Our analysis of these projects showed the programs did not pay for the same activities with their funding, and according to state and community officials, the joint funding for a community’s project was beneficial and warranted. Program overlap among the state SRF and RUS programs can result in potential duplication of communities’ efforts to prepare funding applications and related documents, including preliminary engineering reports and environmental analyses, according to our analysis of project documents and interviews with engineers and community officials in the five states we visited. They stated that these reports contain similar information but with different formats and levels of detail. Federal and State Actions Have Not Fully Facilitated Coordination for Funding Communities’ Projects
Our review of five states and local communities in those states showed that EPA and USDA have taken some actions to coordinate their programs and funding at the federal and state level to help meet the water infrastructure needs of rural communities, but not others specified in the 1997 memorandum. Agencies Have Taken Some Actions to Encourage Coordination at the State and Community Level but Not Others
Recognizing the importance of coordinating the SRF and RUS programs at the state level, EPA and USDA agencies have taken some actions at the federal level to encourage coordination between the state-level programs and communities but not other actions specified in the 1997 memorandum. Cooperate to remove policy and regulatory barriers. Cooperate on project funding. In addition, EPA and USDA have taken action at the federal level to help the states coordinate better and make programs more efficient for communities applying for funding. The actions that EPA and USDA have taken to date, such as providing guidance in the 1997 memorandum, have helped states and state-level federal agencies to coordinate generally but have not facilitated better coordination at the state level in more specific ways. Cooperate in preparing environmental analyses documents and other common federal requirements. For example, in Montana, these programs coordinated to develop uniform application materials and preliminary engineering report requirements that are accepted by all federal and state water and wastewater infrastructure programs in the state. Specifically, recent actions by EPA and USDA, such as their efforts to inform state officials and communities about the programs and funding opportunities by participating in conferences and workshops, conducting Webinars, and sponsoring training, as well as creating a working group to examine the possibility of developing guidelines to assist states in developing uniform preliminary engineering reports to meet requirements for federal and state programs, are encouraging and will help communities. Without uniform documents, rural communities face a continuing burden and additional costs when applying for federal funds to improve their water and wastewater infrastructure. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve coordination and to reduce the potential for inefficiencies and duplication of effort, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of EPA take the following three actions: ensure the timely completion of the interagency effort to develop guidelines to assist states in developing their own uniform preliminary engineering reports to meet federal and state requirements; work together and with state and community officials to develop guidelines to assist states in developing uniform environmental analyses that could be used, to the extent appropriate, to meet state and federal requirements for water and wastewater infrastructure projects; and work together and with state and community officials through conferences and workshops, Webinars, and sponsored training to reemphasize the importance of coordinating in all four key areas in the 1997 memorandum. EPA neither agreed nor disagreed with our first two recommendations but concurred with the third. USDA neither agreed nor disagreed with any of our recommendations. EPA concurred with our third recommendation, that the agencies work together and with state and community officials in all four key areas of the 1997 memorandum, while USDA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report examine (1) the potential for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication between the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Drinking Water and Clean Water State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS) Water and Wastewater Disposal program, both of which address water and wastewater infrastructure needs in rural communities, and (2) the extent to which these programs coordinate with each other at the federal and state level to help meet the water infrastructure needs of rural communities. Further, we collected and analyzed application materials—preliminary engineering reports and environmental analyses—from communities if the community had a project that was jointly funded by both the SRF and RUS programs or had applied to both programs for the same project. Appendix II: Drinking Water and Clean Water State Revolving Fund Program Funds Provided to Communities with Populations of 10,000 or Less
Table 6 provides information on the percentages and amounts of funding provided, by state, through EPA’s Drinking Water and Clean Water SRF programs to communities with populations of 10,000 or less. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many rural communities with populations of 10,000 or less face challenges in financing the costs of replacing or upgrading aging and obsolete drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. EPA and USDA oversee the three largest federally funded drinking water and wastewater funding programs for these communities. In response to Pub. L. No. 111-139, which directs GAO to identify and report on duplicative goals or activities in the federal government, this report examines the (1) potential for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication between EPA and USDA drinking water and wastewater infrastructure programs and (2) extent to which these agencies coordinate at the federal and state level to fund community water infrastructure projects. GAO analyzed relevant laws and regulations and program data and documents. GAO also visited five states based on high rural funding needs and geographic location (Colorado, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota) to meet with federal, state, and community officials and visit projects. GAO recommends that EPA and USDA complete guidelines to help states develop uniform preliminary engineering reports, develop guidelines to help states develop uniform environmental analyses, and reemphasize the importance of statelevel coordination. EPA neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's first two recommendations and concurred with the third. USDA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations.
What GAO Found
Funding for rural water and wastewater infrastructure is fragmented across the three federal programs GAO reviewed, leading to program overlap and possible duplication of effort when communities apply for funding from these programs. The three federal water and wastewater infrastructure programs--the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Drinking Water and Clean Water State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS) Water and Waste Disposal program--have, in part, an overlapping purpose to fund projects in rural communities with populations of 10,000 or less. For the 54 projects GAO reviewed in the five states it visited, this overlap did not result in duplicate funding, that is funding for the same activities on the same projects. However, GAO identified the potential for communities to complete duplicate funding applications and related documents when applying for funding from both agencies. In particular, some communities have to prepare preliminary engineering reports and environmental analyses for each program. GAO's analysis showed--and community officials and their consulting engineers confirmed--that these reports usually contain similar information but have different formats and levels of detail. Completing separate engineering reports and environmental analyses is duplicative and can result in delays and increased costs to communities applying to both programs.
EPA and USDA have taken some actions to coordinate their programs and funding at the federal and state levels to help meet the water infrastructure needs of rural communities, but GAO's review in five states showed that their efforts have not facilitated better coordination at the state level in more specific ways. EPA and USDA signed a joint memorandum in 1997 encouraging state-level programs and communities to coordinate in four key areas: program planning; policy and regulatory barriers; project funding; and environmental analyses and other common federal requirements. As of July 2012, EPA and USDA had taken action at the federal level to help the states coordinate better and make programs more efficient for communities applying for funding. For example, EPA and USDA had formed a working group to draft uniform guidelines for preliminary engineering report requirements, but this effort is not yet complete. However, the agencies have not taken action to help states develop uniform environmental analysis requirements, as called for in the 1997 memorandum. Without uniform requirements, communities face a continuing burden and cost of applying for federal and state funds to improve rural water and wastewater infrastructure. Coordination in the four key areas varied across the five states GAO visited. For example, state and federal officials in Montana created a drinking water and wastewater working group to coordinate project funding and to resolve regulatory barriers such as different funding cycles between the programs. In addition, state and federal officials in Pennsylvania coordinated to develop uniform environmental analysis requirements. However, in North Carolina and Colorado, state-level programs did not coordinate well initially about project funding, which resulted in the state-level programs planning to pay for the same projects. The programs were able to avoid paying for the same projects, but state-level RUS programs have or expect to deobligate almost $20 million committed to these projects and return the funding to USDA. Further delays in coordinating programs could prevent funds from reaching needy communities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA and USDA complete guidelines to help states develop uniform preliminary engineering reports, develop guidelines to help states develop uniform environmental analyses, and reemphasize the importance of state-level coordination. EPA neither agreed nor disagreed with GAOs first two recommendations and concurred with the third. USDA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-758 | gao_GAO-11-758_0 | Since 2002, More Tribes Have Used Program Flexibilities to Tailor Services and Cope with Changing Economic Conditions
More Tribes Administer Their Own TANF Programs and Serve Native Families Outside of Their Tribes
The number of tribal TANF programs has increased from 36 in 2002 to 64 in 2010 (see fig. 3). We also found that some tribes have increased their rates over time. For example, more than half of the 36 tribes that have been administering a TANF program since 2002 have raised their work participation rate goals over time. Furthermore, more than half of these 22 respondents reported using Emergency Contingency Fund grant funding to issue more cash grants or to fill TANF budget gaps caused by the recession. Other tribes have had to cut back on supportive services so that they could provide more TANF families with basic cash assistance. Tribal TANF Programs Face Various Administrative and Other Challenges, and Many Partner with Other Entities to Address Them
Tribes Reported Challenges with Initial Program Implementation, Staffing, Data Systems, and Overcoming Barriers to Participants’ Self- Sufficiency
The majority of tribal TANF programs that responded to our survey reported that they have faced administrative challenges related to initial program implementation, staff development and retention, and development of adequate data systems (see fig. In addition, all 11 tribes we visited talked about other challenges related to overcoming the various barriers to self-sufficiency that their TANF participants face, such as a lack of transportation and limited employment opportunities. Many tribes face challenges in finding, developing, and retaining their TANF staff. A lack of education among participants also affects their ability to secure employment. For example, to address challenges related to developing adequate data systems, we learned that the majority of tribes use data systems and receive training on these systems from consultants, according to HHS. HHS Oversight of and Guidance for Tribal TANF Programs Lacks Consistency and Timeliness
HHS Uses Tribal TANF Single Audit Reports to Target Training and Technical Assistance, but Fragmented Systems Track and Monitor These Reports
According to HHS officials, the single audit is the primary oversight mechanism for tribal TANF programs, and single audit findings are used to target technical assistance to tribes. Due to the delays in reviewing the summaries and the fragmented systems for reporting and tracking single audit findings, HHS tribal TANF officials may not consistently be aware of all the single audit findings related to tribal TANF programs, or be in a position to promptly identify and address recurring problems and mitigate risk. HHS Collects Tribal TANF Data, but Does Not Consistently Update and Review It in a Timely Manner
In addition to HHS officials’ use of the single audit as the primary oversight mechanism for tribal TANF programs, quarterly data reports used to calculate work participation rates and financial reports, as well as other program reporting requirements, also help HHS oversee program performance and ensure program integrity (see table 2). As a result, they did not have an opportunity to include in the reports what they learned in the training. For example, one tribe responding to our survey noted that their regional office contact does not always provide direct answers to tribal leaders, which can lead to misinterpretation, while another tribe we visited noted that different HHS regional offices had different interpretations of what types of activities count as cultural activities. Regional offices do not always receive clear and consistent guidance from HHS headquarters on new policies, either. Improve processes for maintaining and monitoring tribal TANF data— such as work participation rate, caseload, and financial data—that can be shared with tribes in a timely manner. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain information on how tribal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs have changed since 2002 (when we last reviewed the program), the challenges tribes face in administering their own programs and what tribes have done to address them, and federal agencies’ guidance and oversight of tribal TANF programs, we analyzed federal TANF data, documents and tribal TANF single audit data collection reports for selected years; surveyed all tribal TANF administrators; conducted site visits at 11 tribal TANF programs in four states, and interviewed federal officials. GAO-02-768. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) gives American Indian tribes the option to administer their own Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant programs. GAO first reported on the use of this flexibility by tribes in 2002 (GAO-02-768), and given the upcoming expected reauthorization of TANF, GAO was asked to examine (1) how tribal TANF programs have changed since 2002, especially in light of changing economic conditions; (2) the challenges tribes face in administering their own TANF programs and what tribes have done to address them; and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided guidance and oversight to promote the integrity and effectiveness of tribal TANF programs. GAO analyzed federal TANF data; interviewed federal officials; surveyed all tribal TANF administrators; and conducted site visits at 11 tribal TANF programs in four states.
What GAO Found
Since GAO first reported on tribal TANF programs in 2002, the number of programs has increased--from 36 in 2002 to 64 in 2010. In addition, more tribes use program flexibilities to both tailor services to meet the needs of their TANF families and cope with changing economic conditions. GAO also found that some tribes have increased their work participation rate goals over time. For example, more than half of the 36 tribes that have been administering a TANF program since 2002 have raised these goals over time. Many tribes also allow a wide range of activities families can use to meet work participation rates, such as cultural activities or commuting time. Tribes also reported in GAO's survey that changing economic conditions have adversely affected their caseloads, funding, and services provided. For example, some tribes reported that since the beginning of the economic recession in 2007, they have larger average monthly caseloads, use other federal funding to fill budget gaps, and cut back supportive services to provide more cash grants. According to GAO's survey results, tribal TANF programs face challenges with initial program implementation, staff development and retention, and the development of adequate data systems. Moreover, all 11 tribes GAO visited talked about the various barriers to self-sufficiency facing their TANF participants, such as a lack of transportation and limited employment opportunities. To address these challenges, many tribes reach out to HHS regional office staff, other tribal and federal programs, and private consultants. For example, to address challenges related to developing adequate data systems, GAO learned that the majority of tribes use consultants to develop their systems and provide training. In addition, to enhance employment opportunities, some tribes have placed participants at their Head Start offices, while another tribe has partnered with its modular housing plant. HHS provides oversight and guidance for tribal TANF programs, but does not always do so in a timely or consistent manner. HHS officials told GAO that they use tribal TANF single audit report findings to target training and technical assistance to tribes. However, the systems that HHS uses to track these reports are fragmented, and as a result, tribal TANF officials may not consistently be aware of all the single audit findings related to tribal TANF programs, or be in a position to promptly identify and address recurring problems and mitigate risk. Other oversight tools, such as quarterly data reports used to calculate work participation rates, are not consistently updated by HHS in a timely manner, which, according to GAO's survey, is a challenge to tribes' administration of their TANF programs. HHS headquarters and regional offices provide guidance such as basic policy manuals, training at yearly conferences, and one-on-one assistance over the phone. However, some tribes expressed difficulty in finding and receiving clear, consistent, and timely guidance from HHS, which hinders their ability to successfully manage tribal TANF programs and finances.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS review its process for tracking related single audit reports, improve processes for maintaining tribal TANF data that can be shared in a timely manner, and provide timely, accessible and consistent guidance that is clearly communicated to its tribal TANF programs. HHS commented it will be mindful of these recommendations as it examines ways to improve its efforts. |
gao_GAO-14-365T | gao_GAO-14-365T_0 | Observations on DHS Efforts to Identify Facilities, Assess Risk, Review Security Plans, and Verify Compliance
Identifying Facilities Covered by CFATS
DHS has begun to take action to work with other agencies to identify facilities that are required to report their chemical holdings to DHS but may not have done so. The first step of the CFATS process is focused on identifying facilities that might be required to participate in the program. As a result of the CFATS rule, about 40,000 chemical facilities reported their chemical holdings and their quantities to DHS’s ISCD. On August 1, 2013, the same day as the hearing, the President issued Executive Order 13650–Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, which was intended to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators.established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, composed of representatives from DHS; EPA; and the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Labor, and Transportation, and directed the working group to identify ways to improve coordination with state and local partners; enhance federal agency coordination and information sharing; modernize policies, regulations and standards; and work with stakeholders to identify best practices. In February 2014, DHS officials told us that the working group has taken actions in the areas described in the executive order. Assessing Risk and Prioritizing Facilities
DHS has also begun to take actions to enhance its ability to assess risk and prioritize facilities covered by the program. ISCD uses the data submitted in facilities’ Top Screens to make an assessment as to whether facilities are covered under the program. As a result, in April 2013 we recommended that ISCD enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so. ISCD agreed with our recommendations, and in February 2014, ISCD officials told us that they were taking steps to address them and recommendations of a recently released Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI) report that examined the CFATS risk assessment model.among other things, that the CFATS risk assessment model inconsistently considers risks across different scenarios and that the model does not adequately treat facility vulnerability. Reviewing of Facilities’ Security Plans
DHS has begun to take action to lessen the time it takes to review site security plans which could help DHS reduce the backlog of plans awaiting review. For the third step of the CFATS process, ISCD is to review facility security plans and their procedures for securing these facilities. The security plan is to describe security measures to be taken and how such measures are to address applicable risk-based performance standards. In April 2013, we reported that it could take another 7 to 9 years before ISCD would be able to complete reviews of the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time. We also noted in April 2013 that ISCD had revised its process for reviewing facilities’ site security plans. In February 2014, ISCD officials told us that they are taking a number of actions intended to lessen the time it takes to complete reviews of remaining plans including the following: providing updated internal guidance to inspectors and ISCD updating the internal case management system; providing updated external guidance to facilities to help them better prepare their site security plans; conducting inspections using one or two inspectors at a time over the course of 1 day, rather than multiple inspectors over the course of several days; conducting pre-inspection calls to the facility to help resolve technical issues beforehand; creating and leveraging the use of corporate inspection documents (i.e., documents for companies that have over seven regulated facilities in the CFATS program); supporting the use of alternative security programs to help clear the backlog of security plans because, according to DHS officials, alternative security plans are easier for some facilities to prepare and use; and taking steps to streamline and revise some of the on-line data collection tools such as the site security plan to make the process faster. In April 2013, we also reported that DHS had not finalized the personnel surety aspect of the CFATS program. In implementing this provision, we reported that DHS intended to (1) require facilities to perform background checks on and ensure appropriate credentials for facility personnel and, as appropriate, visitors with unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) check for terrorist ties by comparing certain employee information with its terrorist screening database. However, as of February 2014, DHS had not finalized its information collection request that defines how the personal surety aspect of the performance standards will be implemented. Inspecting to Verify Compliance with Facility Plans
DHS reports that it has begun to perform compliance inspections at regulated facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations establishing standards for the security of these facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess risk at facilities covered by the regulations and inspect them to ensure compliance. In February 2014, legislation was introduced related to several aspects of the program.
This statement provides observations on DHS efforts related to the CFATS program. It is based on the results of previous GAO reports in July 2012 and April 2013, with selected updates conducted in February 2014. In conducting the earlier work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on the program and interviewed DHS officials. In addition, GAO interviewed DHS officials to update information.
What GAO Found
In managing its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a number of efforts underway to identify facilities that are covered by the program, assess risk and prioritize facilities, review and approve facility security plans, and inspect facilities to ensure compliance with security regulations.
Identifying facilities. DHS has begun to work with other agencies to identify facilities that should have reported their chemical holdings to CFATS, but may not have done so. DHS initially identified about 40,000 facilities by publishing a CFATS rule requiring that facilities with certain types of chemicals report the types and quantities of these chemicals. However, a chemical explosion in West, Texas last year demonstrated the risk posed by chemicals covered by CFATS. Subsequent to this incident, the President issued Executive Order 13650 which was intended to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators. Under the executive order, a federal working group is sharing information to identify additional facilities that are to be regulated under CFATS, among other things.
Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. DHS has begun to enhance its ability to assess risks and prioritize facilities. DHS assessed the risks of facilities that reported their chemical holdings in order to determine which ones would be required to participate in the program and subsequently develop site security plans. GAO's April 2013 report found weaknesses in multiple aspects of the risk assessment and prioritization approach and made recommendations to review and improve this process. In February 2014, DHS officials told us they had begun to take action to revise the process for assessing risk and prioritizing facilities.
Reviewing security plans . DHS has also begun to take action to speed up its reviews of facility security plans. Per the CFATS regulation, DHS was to review security plans and visit the facilities to make sure their security measures met the risk-based performance standards. GAO's April 2013 report found a 7- to 9-year backlog for these reviews and visits, and DHS has begun to take action to expedite these activities. As a separate matter, one of the performance standards—personnel surety, under which facilities are to perform background checks and ensure appropriate credentials for personnel and visitors as appropriate—is being developed. As of February 2014, DHS has reviewed and conditionally approved facility plans pending final development of the personal surety performance standard.
Inspecting to verify compliance . In February 2014, DHS reported it had begun to perform inspections at facilities to ensure compliance with their site security plans. According to DHS, these inspections are to occur about 1 year after facility site security plan approval. Given the backlog in plan approvals, this process has started recently and GAO has not yet reviewed this aspect of the program.
What GAO Recommends
In a July 2012 report, GAO recommended that DHS measure its performance implementing actions to improve its management of CFATS. In an April 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review, and gather feedback on its outreach to facilities. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions or has actions underway to address them.
GAO provided a draft of the updated information to DHS for review, and DHS confirmed its accuracy. |
gao_T-RCED-98-240 | gao_T-RCED-98-240_0 | K-V Fund Has Not Been Fully Reimbursed
Between 1990 and 1996, the Forest Service transferred about $645 million from the K-V Fund for emergency firefighting activities that had not been fully reimbursed. After an additional $225 million was transferred from the K-V Fund in 1996, the Congress, in 1997, provided $202 million from the emergency firefighting appropriation as a partial reimbursement of the K-V Fund. To provide the Congress with the information it needs to consider any future requests for appropriations to restore previously transferred funds, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture report to the Congress on the financial status of the K-V Fund. We recommended that if the administration decides not to forward to the Congress the Department’s request for restoration of the funds transferred for firefighting purposes, or the Congress decides not to restore these funds during the fiscal year 1997 budget considerations, the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Chief of the Forest Service, by the end of fiscal year 1997, to revise the list of planned K-V projects to take into account the actual balance in the K-V Fund. Forest Service Cannot Ensure Compliance With the K-V Act’s Requirement
The K-V Act requires that the K-V Fund expenditures in any one sale area not exceed the amount collected in that sale area. The Forest Service does not have the financial management information and controls needed to ensure compliance with the K-V Act prohibition limiting K-V Fund expenditures on individual sale areas to the collections from those same sale areas. We recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to perform, in consultation with the Chief Financial Officer, an analysis of alternatives (including the costs and benefits of each alternative) to obtain the financial data necessary to ensure that the K-V Fund’s expenditures in one sale area are limited to the amounts collected from that area, as required by the K-V Act. The Secretary indicated that he did not believe such an analysis was necessary and that the current Forest Service methods fulfilled requirements of the K-V Act. The Secretary of Agriculture directed the Chief of the Forest Service to establish a standardized methodology for assessing and withholding program support costs for the K-V program, and the Forest Service formed a task force to recommend what that standardized methodology would be. The task force completed its work in November 1997, and the Forest Service estimates that the corrective action will be fully implemented when the recommended changes become part of the agency’s directives in September 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the shortcomings in the Forest Service's administration of the Knutson-Vandenberg Trust Fund (K-V Fund), focusing on the: (1) transfers from the K-V Fund that have not been fully restored; (2) effect of unrestored transfers on planned projects; (3) lack of financial information to ensure compliance with the K-V Act requirements; and (4) lack of a standardized methodology for calculating and limiting program support costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between 1990 and 1996, $645 million was transferred from the K-V Fund to support emergency firefighting activities that was not reimbursed; (2) to assist Congress in its consideration of any future requests for appropriations to restore previously transferred funds, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture report to Congress on the financial status of the K-V fund; (3) the Department has begun providing Congress with additional information on the financial status of the K-V Fund; (4) in fiscal year 1997, Congress acted upon that information by providing $202 million to partially repay moneys transferred from the K-V Fund; (5) the Secretary of Agriculture has not directed the Forest Service to revise the list of planned K-V projects to take into account the actual balance in the K-V Fund; (6) although the K-V Act requires that K-V Fund expenditures in one sale area be limited to amounts collected in the same area, the Forest Service does not collect expenditure data on a sale-by-sale basis; (7) GAO recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Forest Service to perform an analysis of alternatives to obtain the financial data necessary to ensure that the K-V Fund's expenditures in one sale area are limited to the amounts collected from that area, as required by the K-V Act; (8) the Secretary of Agriculture indicated that such an analysis was not necessary and that the current Forest Service methods fulfilled the requirements of the K-V Act; (9) at the time of GAO's 1996 report, the Forest Service did not have a system in place to ensure the consistent handling of program support charges for the K-V program agencywide; and (10) since that time, the Forest Service has completed an analysis of the methodological changes that are needed to standardize the Forest Service's practices for assessing and withholding program support costs for the K-V program and the results of the agency's work should be implemented when the practices become part of the Forest Service's directives in September 1998. |
gao_GAO-05-1027T | gao_GAO-05-1027T_0 | HUD Has Identified the Sources of Payment Errors but Lacks Complete and Reliable Estimates for Each One
HUD has identified three basic sources of errors that have resulted in improper rent subsidy payments and has conducted separate studies for each of these sources to assess the magnitude of the problem and the progress that has been made in meeting RHIIP’s goal of reducing improper subsidies. 1). HUD Has Reliable Estimates of Improper Payments Due Only to Program Administrator Errors
To determine the amounts of improper rent subsidies resulting from program administrator errors, HUD collected data on more than 2,400 randomly selected households participating in the voucher, public housing, and project-based Section 8 programs for fiscal years 2000 and 2003. Data from the fiscal year 2003 study show that the department paid an estimated $1.4 billion in gross improper rent subsidies (representing $896 million in overpayments and $519 million in underpayments) as a result of program administrator errors in fiscal year 2003—a 39 percent decrease from fiscal year 2000. For fiscal year 2003, HUD has begun to implement a methodology for estimating billing error for vouchers and public housing. HUD Has Taken Steps to Reduce Improper Subsidies in All Three Programs, but Challenges Remain
HUD has undertaken three separate efforts under RHIIP to address improper rent subsidies for its public housing, voucher, and project-based Section 8 programs. Specifically, HUD is (1) stepped up its monitoring of program administrators, (2) improving verification of tenants’ incomes, and (3) providing HUD staff and program administrators with guidance and training to help them understand program requirements. Despite some implementation problems and remaining challenges, these actions have strengthened HUD’s oversight of the programs. To increase monitoring of program administrators, HUD has taken the following actions: For the voucher and public housing programs, HUD field office staff completed about 1,100 RIM reviews—that is, on-site assessments of PHAs’ compliance with policies for determining rent subsidies—between 2002 and 2004. Additionally, problems with a database containing information on RIM reviews prevented HUD from analyzing the results of the reviews to assess improvements in PHAs’ calculations of tenant subsidies and provide technical assistance to PHAs. According to HUD, the complexity of the existing policies contributes to errors in determining subsidies. For example, program administrators currently must determine tenants’ eligibility for 44 different income exclusions and deductions in order to calculate rent payments and subsidies. Under any simplification approach, many tenants’ rental payments could be affected, with some tenants paying higher rents and others paying lower rents. However, the department has not conducted a formal study on the impact of policy changes to inform policymakers on this issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) paid about $28 billion to help some 5 million low-income tenants afford decent rental housing. HUD has three major programs: the Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) and public housing programs, administered by public housing agencies, and project-based Section 8, administered by private property owners. As they are every year, some payments were too high or too low, for several reasons. To assess the magnitude and reasons for these errors, HUD established the Rental Housing Integrity Improvement Project (RHIIP). This testimony, based on a report issued in February 2005, discusses the sources and magnitude of improper rent subsidy payments HUD has identified and the steps HUD is taking to address them.
What GAO Found
HUD has identified three sources of errors contributing to improper rent subsidy payments: (1) incorrect subsidy determinations by program administrators, (2) unreported tenant income, and (3) incorrect billing. HUD has attempted to estimate the amounts of improper subsidies attributable to each source but has developed reliable estimates for only the first--and likely the largest--source. HUD paid an estimated $1.4 billion in gross improper subsidies (consisting of $896 million in overpayments and $519 million in underpayments) in fiscal year 2003 as a result of program administrator errors--a 39 percent decline from HUD's fiscal year 2000 baseline estimate. GAO estimates that the amount of net overpayments could have subsidized another 56,000 households with vouchers in 2003. HUD has initiated several efforts under RHIIP to address improper subsidies in its public housing, voucher, and project-based Section 8 programs. Specifically, HUD has (1) stepped up monitoring of program administrators, (2) improved verification of tenants' incomes, and (3) provided guidance and training on program requirements to HUD staff and program administrators. These actions have strengthened HUD's oversight of the programs, despite some implementation problems and remaining challenges. For example, for the voucher and public housing programs, HUD field office staff completed about 1,100 Rental Integrity Monitoring reviews--that is, on-site assessments of public housing agencies' compliance with policies for determining rent subsidies--between 2002 and 2004. However, problems with a database containing information on these reviews prevented HUD from analyzing the results. According to HUD, the complexity of existing policies contributes to the difficulties program administrators have in determining rent subsidies correctly. For example, program administrators must assess tenants' eligibility for 44 different income exclusions and deductions. However, simplification of these policies, which will likely require statutory changes by Congress, could affect many tenants' rental payments, with some tenants paying more and others paying less. HUD has considered various approaches to simplifying policies for determining rent subsidies, but it has not conducted a formal study to inform policymakers on this issue. |
gao_GAO-06-664 | gao_GAO-06-664_0 | The approximately 45,000 vendors in the WIC program accept vouchers and exchange them for cash payment—or redemption—from their WIC state agency. WIC-Only Vendors Increased in Number during Fiscal Years 1999-2004, although Their Market Share Remained Relatively Small in Fiscal Year 2004
Since 1999, WIC-only vendors have increased in number, with concentrated growth in a few states, but their share of the national WIC market stayed small in comparison to the share of regular WIC vendors during an average month in 2004. Because these data represent simply the average monthly payments received per vendor from WIC state agencies, differences between WIC- only vendors’ redemptions and those of regular WIC vendors could signify that a vendor type charges higher prices for WIC food, but could also reflect the number of participants that shop at each vendor type; the probability that a participant selected all or only part of the food items on a voucher; the amount of WIC business volume conducted, on average, by WIC-only and regular WIC vendors; or all of these practices. 6). WIC-Only Vendors and Regular WIC Vendors’ Business and Marketing Practices Differ in Their Approach to Customer Service and Price
WIC-only and regular WIC vendors generally employed different business and marketing practices, largely in response to the two different customer groups they served and the nature of the markets they faced. Because WIC participants are not required by the WIC program to consider retail prices, vendors that served only WIC participants competed for their business by emphasizing customer service, which participants seemed to value. On the other hand, regular WIC vendors served non-WIC consumers as well as WIC participants. Because these non-WIC consumers are considered price sensitive, regular WIC vendors competed for their business based on price and competitors’ behavior. Finally, WIC-only and regular WIC vendors used similar food purchasing practices, because the cost of food purchased for resale by vendors is related more to the quantity of food purchased than the type of vendor purchasing the food. Both WIC-only and regular WIC vendors were able to lower the average cost of food purchased for resale when they bought in volume, according to WIC state agency officials. However, we were unable to obtain the data needed to confirm these views. We Estimated That Program Participation Would Have Decreased by about 136,000 WIC Participants or Expenditures Would Have Increased by About $50 Million if WIC-Only Vendors’ Market Share Had Doubled in 2004
If the market share of WIC-only vendors had doubled in California, Texas, and Florida, either program participation would have decreased by about 3 percent—about 136,000 participants—or program expenditures would have increased by about 3 percent—about $50 million—in those states, according to our scenario estimates using conditions present in 2004. Conversely, in Texas and Florida, redemptions at WIC-only vendors accounted for a smaller market share than in California in 2004—8 percent in Texas and 13 percent in Florida. However, the cost containment provisions are complex and entail significant changes for some states. (3) What would WIC-only vendors’ contribution to WIC program expenditures have been if their market share increased? Procedures for Analyzing WIC-Only Vendors’ Growth and Market Share
To determine what is known about WIC-only vendors in recent years, we gathered various federal and other data sources. The model
To answer the questions presented in these two scenarios, we used the following equation for the sum of WIC-only and regular WIC retail vendor food expenditures: 1) (program food expenditures for WIC-only vendors) + (program food expenditures for regular WIC vendors) = total WIC program food expenditures, or: 2) qx + qx = Fq x = program food expenditures for WIC-only vendors where q= number of vouchers redeemed by WIC-only vendors x = average value of vouchers redeemed by WIC-only vendors qx = program food expenditures for regular WIC vendors where q = number of vouchers redeemed by regular WIC vendors x= average value of vouchers redeemed by regular WIC vendors ) equaled $13.15. If the average value is higher, fewer food vouchers could be issued under this scenario and thus fewer participants could be served. All else was held constant at 2004 levels. Because we used the average value of all food vouchers in our analysis without knowing the price or quantity of the individual food items that made up the vouchers, we could not determine if the higher average value meant that prices for individual food items were higher at WIC-only vendors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), authorizes retail grocers, called regular WIC vendors, to provide the food benefit. Recently, some states have seen an increase in vendors called WIC-only vendors, who stock only WIC food and accept only WIC vouchers. Both vendor types accept WIC vouchers in exchange for a cash payment, or redemption, from WIC state agencies with U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) grant funds. To determine what effect WIC-only vendors' growth would have on program expenditures, in the absence of recent cost containment legislation, Congress asked GAO (1) what is known about WIC-only vendors' growth and their share of the WIC market in recent years, (2) to what extent do WIC-only and regular WIC vendors differ, and (3) what would WIC-only vendors' contribution to WIC program expenditures have been, if their market share increased. GAO analyzed national WIC vendor data, interviewed WIC state officials about vendors' business practices, and analyzed redemption data from California, Texas and Florida.
What GAO Found
The number of WIC-only vendors has tripled since 1999, with growth concentrated in a few states. However, WIC-only vendors' share of the national WIC market was relatively small compared to that of regular WIC vendors in 2004. Nationally, WIC-only vendors increased in number from 394 in 1999 to 1,180 in 2004, but 84 percent of these vendors are in California, Texas, and Florida. Despite their growth, WIC-only vendors accounted for 3 percent of all WIC vendors nationwide, and their market share, that is, their percentage of all WIC redemptions nationally, was on average 6 percent in 2004. Because of limitations in the data, we were unable to calculate annual growth rates or analyze changes in market share over time. WIC-only and regular WIC vendors generally employed different business and marketing practices, largely in response to the two different customer groups they served, according to WIC state agency officials. Because WIC participants are not required to consider retail prices, WIC-only vendors competed for participants' business by emphasizing customer service, which participants seemed to value. On the other hand, regular WIC vendors served non-WIC consumers as well as WIC participants. Because these non-WIC consumers are price sensitive, regular WIC vendors competed for their business based on price and competitors' behavior. An important difference in these approaches was that because WIC participants were not price sensitive, they might choose the service offered by WIC-only vendors, regardless of price. Finally, WIC-only and regular WIC vendors used similar food purchasing practices, because the cost of food purchased for resale is related more to the volume purchased than to the type of vendor purchasing the food. Both WIC-only and regular WIC vendors were able to lower the average cost of food purchased for resale when they bought in volume, according to WIC state agency officials. If WIC-only vendors' market share in 2004 had doubled in California, Texas, and Florida, either about 3 percent--about 136,000--fewer participants could have been served in each state, or program food expenditures would have increased about 3 percent--about $50 million--according to our scenario estimates. The average value of all vouchers redeemed by WIC-only vendors in 2004 was higher than the average value of all vouchers redeemed at regular WIC vendors. Thus, if the number of vouchers redeemed by WIC-only vendors had increased and state food expenditures remained at 2004 levels, fewer vouchers could have been issued, and fewer participants served. Conversely, if the number of vouchers issued remained at 2004 levels, the higher average value of vouchers redeemed at WIC-only vendors would have resulted in increased program expenditures. However, the price and quantity of the individual food items that make up the vouchers were not available to us; therefore we could not determine if the higher average value of vouchers meant that prices for individual food items were higher at WIC-only vendors. Making price comparisons would require food item price and quantity data for both WIC-only and regular WIC vendors, at a minimum. |
gao_OSI-00-19 | gao_OSI-00-19_0 | We found in our most recent work that GSA has acted to ensure that its buildings have been assessed for security needs and to correct the data in its upgrade tracking system. In addition, we cited a similar study by GSA’s OIG that found that in 65, or 54 percent, of the buildings it reviewed, the status of the security upgrades in the buildings was not accurately reflected in the building security upgrade tracking system. And, we believe that, as a result, federal buildings are safer now than before the Oklahoma City bombing. Nevertheless, GSA still has not completely developed outcome-oriented performance goals and measures for its building security program. GSA’s goal is to implement the new risk assessment and survey policy by January 2000. Further, GSA now has better information on the status of the security upgrade program and is positioned to recoup more of its security program costs from federal agencies. Specifically, we were asked to determine the steps GSA has taken to (1) ensure completion of all building security evaluations, (2) correct the data in its building security upgrade tracking and accounting systems, (3) complete agreements with OMB regarding the funding of future security upgrades, (4) develop security program outcome-oriented goals and measures, and (5) complete review of its security risk assessment methodology and resume periodic building security inspections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the General Services Administration's (GSA) building security upgrade program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GSA directed its regions to reassess the security of all the buildings in its inventory by April 1, 1999, for two purposes: (a) to ensure that all of its buildings have been assessed and meet the Department of Justice minimum standards for security; and (b) to determine whether the security upgrade information for each building was correctly represented in both the upgrade tracking system and the accounting system; (2) GSA completed negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget and, as a result, has a means of recouping more of its building security costs; (3) GSA, however, still lacks completely accurate data in its upgrade tracking and accounting systems and has not completed development of outcome-oriented goals and measures for its building security program; (4) GSA decided on a new risk assessment methodology and is in the process of evaluating how to implement the methodology in future building security surveys; and (5) GSA's recent reassessment of each building was to mark the restart of the routine physical security surveys that were suspended because of a lack of sufficient personnel after the Oklahoma City bombing. |
gao_GAO-07-519 | gao_GAO-07-519_0 | In cases where the compact affects the balance of power between the federal government and the states, the states must obtain the consent of Congress for the compact to be valid. Most Environment and Natural Resource Compacts Are Administered by Commissions
Of the 59 interstate compacts we reviewed, 46 established commissions to administer the compact’s provisions, while the remaining 13 were administered by existing agencies or officials in the member states. Among the compacts with commissions, we found variations in organizational structure, powers and authorities, and provisions for resolving disputes, but similarities in how the compacts provided for public accountability. Organizational Structure and Governance Generally Varied among Compacts Administered by Commissions
The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed varied in organizational structure, such as the number of commissioners and staff; powers and authorities, including whether the compact granted advisory or regulatory authority; and the dispute resolution mechanisms provided as alternatives to litigation. In practice, we found that 67 percent of the commissions that responded to our survey reported having an administrative staff. In some cases, the commission only had advisory authority. Administrative appeals—a process by which an action of the commission can be appealed to the commission itself. Further, 94 percent of the survey respondents reported that they had established procedures—such as holding public meetings and allowing public input—to ensure public accountability. Compacts administered by state agencies or officials contained few provisions for dispute resolution and accountability. It called for the states to encourage the dissemination of “joint publications, press releases, or other public information.”
Significant Concerns about Compact Commissions’ Structure and Governance Have Not Been Frequently Raised
Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns about their structure and governance have rarely been raised. Moreover, a number of officials responding to our survey believed that these concerns often reflected disagreements with specific commission actions rather than general concerns about organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority. Some concerns about public accountability have resulted in lawsuits. Although the specific concerns varied from commission to commission, the concerns often involved the scope of the commission’s authority. While the Structure and Governance of TRPA Are Generally Similar to Those of Other Compact Commissions, Its Regulatory Authority Is Broader
TRPA’s organizational structure and governance are generally similar to those of three other interstate compact commissions with similar functions—the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. TRPA Has More Extensive Land Use Planning Authority than the Three Other Commissions
While all four commissions have the authority to adopt and enforce regulations, a major distinction between TRPA and the three other compact commissions is that TRPA has broad land use planning authority that requires it to address a wide range of environmental issues. For example, unlike TRPA, the CRGC cannot regulate land use for public health and safety, such as natural hazards, or for noise. Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) the approaches used to administer congressionally approved environment and natural resource compacts, including their organizational structure, powers and authorities, and mechanisms for resolving disputes and providing public accountability; (2) the extent to which concerns have been raised regarding the structure and governance of those compacts, like the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, that have commissions; and (3) specifically, how the structure and governance of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) compares to those of other similar compact commissions. From this list, we identified and reviewed 59 compacts with congressional approval. We identified three commissions that met these criteria—the Columbia River Gorge Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact established the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to administer the compact. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that are designed to resolve concerns that transcend state lines, such as allocating interstate waters. While some compacts assign their administration to existing state agencies, compacts requiring greater coordination among states may establish an interstate agency, typically called a commission, to administer their provisions. Congress must give its consent to compacts that affect the balance of power between the states and the federal government. An example of a congressionally approved environment and natural resource compact is the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, which created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to administer its provisions. For such compacts, GAO determined (1) the organizational structures, powers and authorities, and dispute resolution and public accountability mechanisms; (2) the extent to which concerns have been raised about the structure and governance of compacts that have commissions; and (3) how the structure and governance of TRPA compares to those of other similar compact commissions. GAO reviewed 59 congressionally approved compacts and surveyed those 45 that had commissions.
What GAO Found
Forty-six of the 59 congressionally approved environment and natural resource compacts that GAO reviewed had established interstate commissions to administer the compact, while the remainder relied on existing state agencies. The 46 compacts with commissions varied in their organizational structure, powers and authorities, and means of resolving disputes, but were similar in how they ensured public accountability. For example, commission size ranged from 2 to 48 members, and some commissions had regulatory authority, while others had only advisory authority. Twenty-six percent of the compacts had provisions for resolving disputes. However, about 36 percent of the commissions responding to GAO's survey reported that they had used means other than litigation to resolve disputes. Significantly more, about 94 percent, of the commissions reported having procedures for ensuring public accountability, such as holding public meetings and allowing public input. For the 13 compacts that did not have commissions, GAO found variations in their powers and authorities, and few of these compacts provided mechanisms for dispute resolution or public accountability. Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns about their structure and governance have rarely been raised. When concerns did arise about organizational structure and public accountability, they varied from commission to commission. However, concerns about regulatory authority largely centered on the scope of the commission's authority. In addition, a number of compact officials believed that concerns about commission structure and governance often reflected disagreements with specific commission actions rather than actual concerns about the organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority of the commission itself. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is generally similar in organizational structure and governance to three other interstate compact commissions with comparable functions--the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. All four commissions consist of appointed representatives, although their size and composition vary; they all have an administrative appeals process to resolve disputes, and they use similar accountability mechanisms. A major difference between the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and the other commissions relates to the breadth of its authority regarding land use issues. This authority extends to water, air, and other natural resources, as well as public health and safety, whereas the Columbia River Gorge Commission has more limited land use authority, and the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions have no land use authority. |
gao_GAO-07-233T | gao_GAO-07-233T_0 | Energy got off to a slow start in processing cases but had taken some steps to reduce the backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel. Further, insufficient strategic planning and systems limitations made it difficult to assess Energy’s achievement of goals relative to case processing and program objectives, such as the quality of the assistance provided to claimants in filing for state workers’ compensation. Specifically, we recommended that Energy take additional steps to expedite the processing of claims through its physician panels, enhance the quality of its communications with claimants, and develop cost- effective methods for improving the quality of case management data and its capabilities to aggregate these data to address program issues. Our May 2004 report also identified structural problems that could lead to inconsistent benefit outcomes for claimants whose illness was determined by a physician panel to be caused by exposure to toxic substances while employed at an Energy facility. Congress subsequently enacted legislation that dramatically restructured the program, transferred it from Energy to Labor, and incorporated features of some of the options we identified. Labor told us it has taken actions to address each of the recommendations we made to the Secretary of Energy in our report. NIOSH learned from its initial implementation experience that completing site profiles is a critical element for efficiently processing claims requiring dose reconstructions. To enhance program management and promote greater transparency with regard to timeliness, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS direct agency officials to establish time frames for completing the remaining site profiles, which HHS has done. GAO’s Prior Work Also Highlighted Issues of Advisory Board Independence and Oversight of the Contractor Supporting the Board
Our February 2006 report discussed the roles of certain federal agency officials involved in the advisory board’s review of NIOSH’s dose reconstructions and site profiles that raised concerns about the independence of this review. The project officer who was initially assigned responsibility for reviewing the monthly progress reports and monitoring the technical performance of the contractor reviewing NIOSH’s dose reconstruction activities for the advisory board was also a manager of the NIOSH dose reconstruction program. In response to concerns about the appearance of conflicting roles, the director of NIOSH replaced both of these officials in December 2004 with a senior NIOSH official not involved in the program. Since credibility is essential to the work of the advisory board and the contractor assisting the board, we concluded that continued diligence by HHS is required to prevent such problems from recurring when new candidates are considered for these roles. We found that this review presented a steep learning curve for the various parties involved. First, we recommended that HHS provide the board with more integrated and comprehensive data on contractor spending levels compared with work actually completed, which HHS has done. Third, we recommended that the Director of NIOSH establish a system to track actions taken by the agency in response to the board and contractor’s findings and recommendations. NIOSH now tracks agency actions to resolve the board and contractor’s comments. GAO’s Ongoing Work Includes Focus on Labor’s Involvement in Certain Subtitle B Program Activities
As part of our ongoing work, we are examining to what extent, if any, Labor is involved in certain Subtitle B activities. While the director of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs stated that Labor has not taken any actions to implement the options outlined in the OMB memorandum, Labor’s internal correspondence reflects major concerns about the potential for rapidly expanding costs in Subtitle B benefits resulting from adding new classes of workers to the special exposure cohort. One aspect of our ongoing work is determining whether Labor is involved in activities that have been tasked to NIOSH, the advisory board, or the contractor assisting the board, and if so, whether these activities reflect an effort to constrain the costs of benefits. For example, NIOSH has shared draft special exposure cohort petition evaluations with Labor. Labor has provided comments on some of these draft documents. Labor officials added that their reviews of these documents focus on changes needed to promote clarity and consistency in the adjudication of claims. As our review proceeds, we plan to obtain more information on key issues such as the timing, nature, and basis of Labor’s activities in light of the program’s design and assignment of responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) was enacted in 2000 to compensate Department of Energy employees and contractors who developed work-related illnesses such as cancer and lung disease. Energy administered Subtitle D of the program. Subtitle B of the program is administered by the Department of Labor, which uses estimates of workers' likely radiation exposure to make compensation decisions. The estimates, known as dose reconstructions, are performed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The act specified that the President establish an Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health to review the scientific validity of NIOSH's dose reconstructions and recommend whether workers should be part of special exposure cohorts whose claimants can be compensated without dose reconstructions. A recent memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to Labor has raised concern about potential efforts to unduly contain the cost of benefits paid to claimants. This testimony presents GAO's past work on program performance and the work of the advisory board. It also highlights GAO's ongoing work relevant to issues raised by the OMB memorandum. GAO interviewed key officials and reviewed contract and other agency documents.
What GAO Found
GAO issued two reports in 2004 that focused on claims processing and program structure. The first report found that Energy got off to a slow start in processing Subtitle D claims and faced a backlog of cases. In addition, limitations in data systems made it difficult to assess Energy's performance. GAO recommended that Energy take actions to expedite claims processing, enhance communication with claimants, and improve case management data. The report also highlighted problems with program structure that could lead to inconsistent benefit outcomes and GAO presented various options for restructuring the program. Congress subsequently incorporated features of some of these options in enacting new legislation that dramatically restructured the program and transferred it from Energy to Labor. Labor has taken action to address the recommendations GAO made to Energy. The second report found that Labor and NIOSH faced a large backlog of claims awaiting dose reconstruction. To enhance program management and transparency, HHS implemented GAO's recommendation to establish time frames for completing profiles of Energy work sites, which are a critical element in efficiently processing claims that require dose reconstruction. GAO's February 2006 report found that the roles of two key NIOSH officials involved with the work of the advisory board may not have been sufficiently independent because these officials also represented the dose reconstruction program under review. In response, NIOSH replaced them with a senior official not involved in the program. Since credibility is essential to the advisory board's work, GAO concluded that ongoing diligence by HHS is required to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of roles when new candidates are considered for these roles. GAO also found that the board's work presented a steep learning curve, prompting adjustments to the work done by the contractor assisting the board. GAO recommended actions to provide the board with more comprehensive data on contractor spending levels compared to work actually completed, assist the board in reexamining its long-term plan for reviewing NIOSH's work, and better track agency actions taken in response to board and contractor findings. HHS has implemented these recommendations. One aspect of GAO's ongoing work especially relevant to the OMB memorandum is the extent to which Labor's concerns over potentially escalating benefit costs may have led the agency to be involved in activities tasked to NIOSH, the advisory board, or the contractor assisting the board. NIOSH agreed to provide Labor with draft versions of some of its evaluations of special exposure cohort petitions and other NIOSH technical documents before sending them for board review. Labor has commented on some of these draft documents. Labor officials told us that their reviews focus on changes needed to promote clarity and consistency in the adjudication of claims. As the review proceeds, GAO plans to obtain more information on key issues such as the timing, nature, and basis of Labor's activities in light of the program's design and assignment of responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-05-418 | gao_GAO-05-418_0 | Dramatic Increases in Oil and Gas Permitting Activity Have Lessened BLM’s Ability to Ensure That Environmental Impacts Are Mitigated
Oil and gas development on BLM-managed lands has increased dramatically over the past 6 years, resulting in staff spending more time processing drilling permits and less time mitigating the environmental impacts of the development. Nationwide, the total number of oil and gas drilling permits approved by BLM more than tripled, from 1,803 to 6,399 for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. Increased Oil and Gas Permitting Activity Has Decreased Staff Resources Available for Environmental Mitigation Activities
BLM officials in five of the eight field offices we visited reported that they had to shift staff from activities designed to mitigate the impacts of oil and gas development—such as environmental inspections, monitoring, idle-well reviews, and reclamation—to those associated with processing drilling permits. Recent BLM Policy Changes Have Had Mixed Impacts on Environmental Mitigation Activities for Oil and Gas Development
The policy changes BLM made in the past 6 years to help facilitate and manage increased oil and gas development and to enhance environmental mitigation efforts have had mixed impacts on the agency’s environmental mitigation activities. Staff from four of the eight field offices indicated that the effect of the policies has been hampered by increases in permitting workloads, which has not allowed staff time to perform idle-well reviews. BLM Faces Several Major Challenges in Implementing Its Oil and Gas Program
BLM state and field office staff and GAO identified several challenges that BLM faces to effectively manage its oil and gas program, including, but not limited to, (1) managing growing workloads to meet all of its responsibilities, (2) using workforce planning and workload-related data to effectively identify and communicate its workforce needs, and (3) meeting its oil and gas program resource needs in light of budget and funding constraints. According to BLM staff, workload pressure, which was already at a high level due to the increases in permitting activity, has been further exacerbated by increases in public challenges to BLM’s decisions and actions. Further, in reviewing their efforts to manage increasing workloads, we found that BLM’s current workforce planning process does not allow all of BLM’s staffing needs to be effectively communicated to BLM state and headquarters decision makers for use in supporting budget justifications and resource allocation decisions and that some data needed to quantify workloads are either not tracked or not consistently tracked. Meeting Oil and Gas Program Resource and Staffing Needs in a Period of Declining Budgets
Lastly, but perhaps most significantly, BLM is presented with the challenge of meeting its oil and gas program resource and staffing needs in a period when these needs are growing faster than available resources. Under FLPMA, BLM has the authority to assess and collect fees for various services that it provides. We found, for example, that the policies that streamlined the permitting process had an indirect negative impact on mitigation activities because the policies also increased the emphasis on processing permits, which in turn resulted in shifting staff away from their environmental mitigation responsibilities. Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the level of oil and gas production on public lands managed by BLM has changed over the past 6 years and how these changes have affected, if at all, BLM’s ability to assess and mitigate environmental impacts; (2) what policies BLM has issued in the past 6 years related to facilitating and managing oil and gas production and how these policies have affected, if at all, BLM’s ability to assess and mitigate environmental impacts; and (3) what challenges BLM faces in managing its oil and gas program. As a result, we did not make any changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rising U.S. energy consumption and concerns about dependency on foreign energy sources have prompted the administration to aggressively pursue domestic oil and gas production, including production on public lands, which in turn has generated concern that the impacts of this activity may compromise the use of public land for other purposes. GAO determined (1) the extent to which the level of oil and gas development on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has changed in recent years, and how the change has affected BLM's ability to mitigate impacts; (2) what policy changes related to oil and gas development BLM recently made and how these policies affected BLM's environmental mitigation activities; and (3) what challenges BLM faces in managing its oil and gas program.
What GAO Found
BLM's ability to meet its environmental mitigation responsibilities for oil and gas development has been lessened by a dramatic increase in oil and gas operations on federal lands over the past 6 years. Nationwide, the total number of drilling permits approved by BLM more than tripled, from 1,803 in fiscal year 1999 to 6,399 in fiscal year 2004. BLM officials in five out of eight field offices that GAO visited explained that as a result of the increases in drilling permit workloads, staff had to devote increased time to processing drilling permits, leaving less time for mitigation activities, such as environmental inspections and idle-well reviews. BLM made policy revisions over the last 6 years that affected to varying degrees its ability to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of oil and gas development. The combined effects of these policy changes--some of which were aimed at facilitating and managing increased development, while others were meant to enhance environmental mitigation--were mixed. For example, four of the eight field offices reported that the most significant impact of the policies to expedite and manage oil and gas development was the increased emphasis that some of these policies placed on processing permits, which in turn resulted in shifting staff responsibilities away from mitigation activities. On the other hand, policies to enhance mitigation generally had a positive impact, although increases in the permitting workload have limited their effect. For example, in six field offices, policies for revitalizing BLM's inspection and enforcement program resulted in more inspection staff being hired, although most offices remain understaffed. BLM state and field office staff, and GAO, identified several challenges to managing the agency's oil and gas program, including (1) managing workloads while meeting all of its responsibilities, (2) using workforce planning to effectively identify and communicate its workforce needs, and (3) meeting its oil and gas program resource needs in light of budget constraints. Workload pressure, already high due to increased permitting activity, has been further exacerbated by increased appeals and litigation of BLM decisions and actions, according to BLM staff. In reviewing BLM's efforts to manage increasing workloads, GAO found that some data needed to quantify specific workload activities are either not tracked or not consistently tracked, and that BLM's current workforce planning process does not effectively identify and communicate BLM's staff needs to decision makers. As a result, the process does not provide consistent and readily available information that BLM can use to support budget justifications and make informed resource allocation decisions. BLM is also presented with the challenge of meeting its oil and gas program responsibilities in a period when staffing needs are growing faster than available resources. While BLM has the authority to assess and collect fees for processing oil and gas permits, it has not exercised this authority. BLM has recently taken steps to develop a fee structure for permits. |
gao_GAO-13-335T | gao_GAO-13-335T_0 | Background
DOD’s efforts to build partner capacity include a broad range of security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies. I would like to now discuss the key practices we have identified that can aid DOD in more effectively managing its building partner capacity activities. Setting Clear Goals and Defining Terminology
Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests. In our reviews, we found that DOD’s efforts to align goals with broader strategies and clarify terminology have varied. In 2010, we reported that the Section 1206 activities have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also addressing the partner countries’ security interests. In its instruction, DOD defined security force assistance as “DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.” Seeking to clarify this definition, DOD has further stated that security force assistance encompasses all DOD activities conducted under various programs to “organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise foreign security forces and their supporting institutions from the tactical to ministerial levels.” Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to clarify its terminology, we found that the commands continue to lack a common understanding of the term and therefore some were unclear as to what additional actions were needed to meet DOD’s intent. Coordinating Activities and Sharing Information
National strategies have emphasized the importance of building partner capacity using an interagency and whole of government approach, but mechanisms for coordinating activities and sharing information within DOD and across agencies have not been consistently implemented. Given these organizational differences, coordination mechanisms that can facilitate interagency collaboration are needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts. For instance, we found that the multiple data systems used to track National Guard State Partnership Program activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs. Therefore, we recommended and the department agreed that DOD, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the combatant commands, and the embassy country teams, develop guidance for all stakeholders that includes agreed-upon definitions for data fields and rules for maintaining data until the program’s global data system is fully implemented. DOD’s Security Cooperation Organizations in foreign countries reported persistent difficulties obtaining information from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the implementing agencies of the military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of security assistance equipment acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult for them to access and contain limited information. Sustaining Efforts and Evaluating Progress
Developing plans to sustain DOD’s building partner capacity activities and establishing mechanisms to monitor programs and evaluate results can help ensure that these programs have long-term impact. Our work has shown that some building partner capacity activities may not endure because planning for sustainment has been a systemic challenge. In 2010, we reported that the long-term impact of some Section 1206 projects could be limited because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects. However, we found that only 26 percent of the 135 proposals we reviewed for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly addressed the recipient country’s ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs. In addition, our work on counternarcotics efforts has found challenges with the reliability of performance data. For example, our 2012 review of the Andean countries found that although DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, the department’s Inspector General has been unable to attest to the reliability of the performance data from 2007 through 2011, as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. As a result, we recommended that the department submit its performance summary report along with the Inspector General’s attestations of the reliability of the information reported to the National Drug Control Policy office. By setting clear goals and defining terminology, coordinating activities and sharing information, and sustaining efforts and evaluating progress, DOD can avoid confusion about the activities and help to assess their long-term impact. Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has increasingly focused on security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies, furthering the U.S. objective of securing international peace and cooperation. Both the 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States of America and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism identify building partner capacity as a worldwide priority. As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S. government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges, which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen DOD's management of its building partner capacity efforts by focusing on three key practices: (1) setting clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. It is based on GAO's body of work on building partner capacity from April 2010 through November 2012.
What GAO Found
GAO's recent work has identified key practices that would enhance the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of building partner capacity efforts. Such efforts include a range of security cooperation activities such as military exercises with partner nations and counternarcotics activities. In GAO's reviews of these activities, GAO found that DOD has demonstrated some of these key practices, but opportunities for improvement remain.
Setting clear goals and defining terminology. Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests. GAO has reported that DOD activities to build the capacity of foreign military forces though the Global Train and Equip program have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also addressing partner countries' security interests. However, in a 2012 review of security force assistance, GAO found that the lack of a common understanding of this term within DOD resulted in different interpretations of what types of activities are included and presented challenges in planning activities and forecasting needs for force capabilities. GAO recommended DOD take steps to clarify its intent and then determine what additional actions are required to plan for and conduct security force assistance.
Coordinating activities and sharing information. Coordination mechanisms that facilitate communication within DOD and across agencies are needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts. In 2012, GAO found that stakeholders had difficulties in obtaining status information on security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. The department is developing a new information system to address this gap but it will not be fully implemented until 2020. Further, GAO's review of the National Guard State Partnership Program in 2012 found that data systems used by the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau were not interoperable and users applied varying methods and definitions to track the program's activities and funding. As a result, the data on types and frequency of activities were incomplete and inconsistent. GAO recommended that DOD develop guidance including agreed-upon definitions for data fields.
Sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. Developing plans to sustain projects and establishing mechanisms to evaluate them can help ensure that programs have long-term impact. In 2010, GAO reported that the long-term impact of some projects to train and equip foreign militaries could be limited because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed their sustainment. Specifically, only 26 percent of the 135 proposals for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly addressed the recipient country's ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs. In a review on counternarcotics efforts in 2012, GAO found that DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, but the department has been unable to attest to the reliability of the performance data for several countries from 2007 through 2011. GAO recommended that DOD submit its performance summary report with the reliability attestation to the National Drug Control Policy office.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations to align goals with broader strategies and to clarify terminology; develop mechanisms to better coordinate activities and share information; and develop and implement plans and metrics to sustain and evaluate progress. DOD has generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and has taken some actions, but work remains to fully implement GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-613 | gao_GAO-11-613_0 | The Major Person-to- Person Lending Platforms Serve as Intermediaries and Facilitate Loans Generally for Consumer Lending and Microfinance
Two Major For-Profit Platforms Connect Borrowers Seeking Mostly Consumer Loans with Lenders Seeking a Return on Their Investment
Prosper and LendingClub provide two major Internet-based platforms currently operating in the United States that allow lenders to select and fund loans to borrowers for consumer and business purposes. Borrowers use person-to-person lending as an alternative source of credit. Rather, lenders purchase payment-dependent notes that correspond to the selected borrower loans. As part of its efforts to alleviate poverty by connecting people through lending, Kiva facilitates the collection and transfer of capital for interest-free loans, funded by its lenders, to approximately 130 microfinance institutions around the world to fund interest-bearing loans to entrepreneurs in their communities. As of March 31, 2011, about 570,000 Kiva lenders had funded approximately $200 million for 273,000 microloans across 59 countries. Although Person-to- Person Lending Offers Potential Benefits to Lenders and Borrowers, It Also Poses Risks Currently Overseen by a Complex Regulatory Structure
Person-to-person lending offers lenders the potential to earn relatively high returns and may provide borrowers with broader access to credit than they would otherwise have. In return, lenders face the risk of losing their principal and the expected interest on their investments on for-profit platforms. For the major for-profit platforms, SEC and state securities regulators enforce lender protections, mostly through disclosures required under securities laws, and FDIC and state regulators enforce borrower protections. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and California attorney general have authority to enforce reporting and other requirements for Kiva as a charitable organization, while Kiva’s microfinance partners are subject to varying consumer financial protection requirements that apply in the jurisdictions where they lend. Person-to-Person Lending Poses Risks to Lenders That Have Been Subject to Securities Regulation
The major for-profit, person-to-person lending companies (Prosper and LendingClub) offer lenders the potential to earn higher returns than they might through conventional savings vehicles, as the examples of the companies’ Web sites show (figs. Options for Regulating Person-to- Person Lending Have Advantages and Disadvantages Related to Borrower and Lender Protection, Flexibility, and Efficiency
We identified two primary options for regulating person-to-person lending that differ primarily in their approach to lender protection: (1) continuing with the current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting lenders through securities regulators and borrowers primarily through financial services regulators, which will include the newly formed CFPB—or (2) consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single federal regulator, such as CFPB. The current regulatory system offers borrowers and lenders on the major for-profit platforms protections consistent with those for other borrowers and investors, but some industry observers suggested that using securities regulation to protect lenders on person-to-person lending platforms lacked flexibility and imposed burdens on companies that hampered efficiency. Under a consolidated regulatory approach, borrowers on person-to-person lending platforms would likely continue to receive the same kinds of protections as other borrowers, and, depending on how implemented, lender protections could be expanded. Officials from NASAA and some of the industry observers we contacted favored the current regulatory system. We assessed the advantages and disadvantages of these two regulatory options in relation to our previously developed framework for evaluating proposals for financial regulatory reform. The flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness of creating a new regulatory regime under a new agency are uncertain. Finally, FSOC could come to play a role in monitoring the industry if person-to-person lending were to grow dramatically. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to address (1) how the major person-to-person lending platforms operate and how consumers use them; (2) the key benefits, risks, and concerns that person-to-person lending poses for consumers and how the risks are currently regulated; and (3) advantages and disadvantages of the current and alternative approaches to regulating person-to-person lending. We interviewed executives from the three major U.S. firms operating person-to-person lending platforms—two for-profit companies (Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (Prosper) and LendingClub Corporation (LendingClub) and one nonprofit organization (Kiva Microfunds (Kiva))— and the bank (WebBank) that partners with Prosper and LendingClub to disburse loans made through their platforms. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing relevant documents, including the for-profit companies’ audited financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and interviewing company officials. Second, we focused on the possibility for a consolidated regulatory approach under CFPB because it is assuming a role in supervising nondepository lenders and because the version of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) passed by the House of Representatives included a provision that would have exempted person- to-person lending from federal securities regulatory requirements and vested primary jurisdiction for regulating person-to-person lending platforms and their lending activities in the new consumer financial protection agency, now known as CFPB. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, Internet-based platforms have emerged that allow individuals to lend money to other individuals in what has become known as person-to-person lending. These online platforms present a new source of credit for borrowers and a potential investment opportunity for those with capital to lend. Both for-profit and nonprofit options exist, allowing for income-generating and philanthropic lending to a variety of people and groups around the world. The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directed GAO to conduct a study of person-toperson lending. This report addresses (1) how the major person-to-person lending platforms operate and how lenders and borrowers use them; (2) the key benefits and risks to borrowers and lenders and the current system for overseeing these risks; and (3) the advantages and disadvantages of the current and alternative regulatory approaches. To do this work, GAO reviewed relevant literature, analyzed regulatory proceedings and filings, and interviewed federal and state officials and representatives of the three major person-to-person lending platforms currently operating in the United States. GAO assessed options for regulating person-to-person lending using a framework previously developed for evaluating proposals for financial regulatory reform. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Securities and Exchange Commission provided written comments on the report, and they all noted the need to continue to monitor the development of the industry.
What GAO Found
The three major U.S. person-to-person lending platforms facilitate lending by allowing individuals acting as lenders to invest in loans to individual borrowers. Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (Prosper) and LendingClub Corporation (LendingClub), the two major for-profit platforms, screen and rate the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. Individual lenders (and a growing number of institutional investors) browse the approved loan requests on the companies' Web sites and purchase notes issued by the company that correspond to their selections. Kiva Microfunds (Kiva), the major nonprofit platform, allows individual lenders to indirectly fund loans to entrepreneurs around the world by funding interest-free loans to microfinance institutions. The three platforms have grown rapidly and, as of March 2011, Prosper and LendingClub had made about 63,000 loans totaling approximately $475 million, and Kiva about 273,000 loans totaling about $200 million. The for-profit companies said that borrowers were often consolidating or paying off debts or were seeking alternate sources of credit, while lenders were seeking attractive returns. Kiva said that its lenders were not seeking to generate income and were motivated mostly by charitable interests. Person-to-person lending platforms offer lenders the potential to earn higher returns than traditional savings vehicles and may offer borrowers broader access to credit. Individual lenders and borrowers face risks that are currently overseen by a complex regulatory structure. For example, lenders risk losing their principal and, on the for-profit platforms, the interest on their investments. Borrowers face risks typical of consumer lending, such as unfair lending and collection practices. Currently, the Securities and Exchange Commission and state securities regulators enforce lender protections, mostly through required disclosures. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and state regulators enforce protections for borrowers on the major for-profit platforms, and the newly formed Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection will also play a role in borrower protection as it becomes operational. The Internal Revenue Service and the California attorney general enforce reporting and other requirements for Kiva as a charitable organization. Kiva's microfinance institution partners are subject to varying consumer financial protection requirements that apply where they lend. The two options that GAO identified for regulating person-to-person lending-- maintaining the status quo or consolidating borrower and lender protections under a single federal regulator--both offer advantages and disadvantages. The current system offers protections that are consistent with those for traditional borrowers and investors. Some industry observers suggested that protecting lenders through securities regulation under this system lacked flexibility and imposed inefficient burdens on firms. Under a consolidated regulatory approach, current protections for borrowers would likely continue and, depending on how implemented, lender protections could be expanded. But uncertainty exists about shifting to a new regulatory regime and about the potential benefits. Finally, regardless of the option selected, new regulatory challenges could emerge as the industry continues to evolve or if it were to grow dramatically, particularly if that growth was primarily due to the increased participation of institutional versus individual investors. |
gao_GAO-14-453 | gao_GAO-14-453_0 | However, the bulk of flow-through business activity was concentrated in a smaller number of entities. Due to Undetected Misreporting, Incomplete Compliance Data, and Double Counting of Income within Networks, the Full Extent of Partnership and S Corporation Income Misreporting Is Unknown
There is substantial uncertainty surrounding the extent of income misreporting by partnerships and S corporations themselves, and by the individual taxpayers to whom the income is allocated. For those two years, using a weighted average, IRS estimated that S corporations misreported about $55 billion per year in net income. Because IRS has not conducted a similar study of partnerships since 1988, and does not have plans to conduct one, it does not have a similar estimate for partnerships. Without a strategy for better estimating the extent and nature of partnership misreporting, IRS cannot make fully informed decisions on how to allocate resources across enforcement programs and across different types of business entities and taxpayers. Using this information, and considering various caveats and uncertainties, we estimated a rough order of magnitude of the misreporting to be $91 billion per year for tax years 2006 through 2009. This estimate does not cover all flow-through income. IRS Identified a Relatively Small Percentage of Estimated Misreported Income through Examinations and K-1 Matching and Lacks Reliable Information on Examination Results
Examinations
IRS examinations have not been effective at finding most of the misreported income discussed above. According to information that IRS collected for revenue agent examinations closed in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, IRS proposed increasing the total income reported by partnerships and S corporations by an annual average of about $16.3 billion. Options for IRS to Improve Identification of Partnerships and S Corporations to Consider Examining Involve Challenges, Some of Which Could Be Mitigated
There are various means through which IRS could improve how it selects partnership and S corporation tax returns to examine. IRS officials said that having more return information available electronically might improve examination selection. Currently, partnerships with more than 100 partners are required by law to e-file. However, as noted before, IRS will not be able Unless all returns are digitized, IRS will not be able to use all return line items in its examination selection process. IRS’s Computer Scoring System for Identifying Partnership Returns to Examine Uses Outdated Formulas, but Upgrading Faces Challenges
SB/SE’s partnership discriminant function (DIF) model to identify entities to examine was built on data that are now outdated, and does not capture partnership compliance issues related to tiering. Further, expanded e-filing would reduce IRS’s tax return processing costs. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider expanding the mandate for partnerships and corporations to electronically file their tax returns to cover a greater share of filed returns. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) describe what is known about the extent of income misreporting by partnerships and S corporations, and by the individuals to whom these entities allocate that income; (2) assess how much misreported partnership and S corporation income IRS identifies and assesses taxes on; and (3) analyze how IRS could improve its use of data to better identify partnerships and S corporations to consider for examination. From various documents, including GAO and Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reports and recommendations, and interviews with IRS and Treasury officials, we evaluated the costs and benefits of various approaches we encountered that could improve IRS’s use of data to better identify partnerships and S corporations to consider for examination and reduce the no-change rate for partnership and S corporation examinations. Appendix III: Additional Information about Misreporting
Methodology for Estimating Individuals’ Total Misreporting of Income from Partnerships and S Corporations
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that individual taxpayers misreported, in net terms, 15 percent of the total income from partnerships and S corporations that they should have reported on their tax returns. According to IRS, information reporting increases voluntary tax compliance because taxpayers know that IRS is aware of their income. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1980, partnerships' and S corporations' share of business receipts increased greatly. These entities generally do not pay income taxes. Instead, income or losses (hundreds of billions of dollars annually) flow through to partners and shareholders to include on their income tax returns. GAO has previously reported that the misreporting of income by partners and shareholders poses a tax compliance risk.
GAO was asked to assess IRS's efforts to ensure compliance by partnerships and S corporations. This report (1) describes what is known about misreporting of flow-through income, (2) assesses how much misreporting IRS identifies, and (3) analyzes possible improvements in IRS's use of data to better identify partnerships and S corporations to consider examining. Comparing partnership, S corporation, and other entities' examination results, GAO analyzed 2003-2012 IRS data and evaluated possible improvement ideas stemming, in part, from prior GAO work, for how IRS identifies examination workload.
What GAO Found
The full extent of partnership and S corporation income misreporting is unknown. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) last study of S corporations, using 2003-2004 data, estimated that these entities annually misreported about 15 percent (an average of $55 billion for 2003 and 2004) of their income. IRS does not have a similar study for partnerships. Using IRS data and the study results, GAO derived a rough-order-of-magnitude estimate of $91 billion per year of partnership and S corporation income being misreported by individuals for 2006 through 2009.
IRS examinations and automated document matching have not been effective at finding most of the estimated misreported income. For example, IRS reported that examinations identified about $16 billion per year of misreporting in 2011 and 2012, the bulk of which related to partnerships. However, such information about compliance results is not reliable. IRS estimated that 3 to 22 percent of the misreporting by partnerships was double counted due to some partnership income being allocated to other partnerships or related parties. Further, IRS does not know how income misreporting by partnerships affects taxes paid by partners. IRS does not have a strategy to improve the information. As a result, IRS does not have reliable information about its compliance results to fully inform decisions about allocating examination resources across different types of businesses.
IRS's processes for selecting returns to examine could be improved. Not all partnership and S corporation line items from paper returns are digitized, and IRS officials said that having more return information available electronically might improve examination selection. In 2011, about 65 percent of partnerships and S corporations electronically filed (e-filed). Certain large partnerships and S corporations are required by statute to e-file. Expanding the mandate would increase digitized data available for examination selection. Further, in 1995 GAO found that IRS's computer scoring system for selecting partnership returns to examine used outdated information. IRS does not have a strategy to update and use this information to select partnerships for examination. Relatively few partnerships are examined compared to other business entities, and many examinations result in no change in taxes owed. Improved examination selection based on more current information could generate more revenue and reduce IRS examinations of compliant taxpayers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests that Congress consider requiring more partnerships and corporations to e-file their tax returns. GAO recommends, among other things, that IRS (1) develop a strategy to improve its information on the extent and nature of partnership misreporting, and (2) use the information to potentially improve how it selects partnership returns to examine. IRS stated it would consider all the recommendations and identify appropriate actions. |
gao_NSIAD-98-162 | gao_NSIAD-98-162_0 | Reopener Clauses for Savings Have Been Rarely Used
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) have repeatedly recommended that contracting officers use reopener clauses for savings when negotiating fixed-price contracts with business combinations. One of those reopener clauses has been successfully exercised, resulting in $1.8 million in recouped restructuring savings, or about 4 percent of the contract price. During this period, DOD continued to negotiate noncompetitive fixed-price contracts with the contractors involved in business combinations. DOD awarded the contractor business segments we reviewed over 600 noncompetitive fixed-price contracts worth about $3.9 billion. Contracting officers and negotiation records cited various reasons for not using reopener clauses, including the preference to have contracts without loose ends and concerns about the administrative burden of reopening a contract. Another factor that appears to influence the use of reopener clauses is contractor resistance. However, the use of these clauses is still limited. Unless DOD takes steps to include reopener clauses in its noncompetitive fixed-price contracts for companies forming business combinations, it risks losing further substantial savings resulting from contractor restructuring. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise DFARS to require that contracting officers (1) include reopener clauses for savings in noncompetitive fixed-price contracts negotiated before the benefits of restructuring savings are reflected in reduced overhead rates used to price contracts or (2) provide a written justification in the negotiation records as to why a reopener clause is not needed. DOD agrees that the use of reopener clauses will ensure that it receives its share of restructuring savings on non-competitive fixed-price contracts awarded to defense contractors involved in business combinations. Even though DOD contracting officers may be adjusting forward pricing rates (the mechanism used to price new contracts) as quickly as possible, our work shows it is taking an average of 21 months from the announcement of an acquisition or merger to the time that contractors reflect the restructuring savings in reduced overhead rates. DOD’s comments appear in appendix II. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information related to defense contractor restructuring, focusing on: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of contract price adjustment clauses, also called reopener clauses; (2) DOD's limited use of reopener clauses for fixed-price contracts; and (3) the potential benefits of using reopener clauses in future business combinations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the time it takes for restructuring savings to be included in DOD contract prices can be considerable; (2) for the contractor business segments GAO examined, it took an average of about 21 months from the announcement of the acquisition or merger to the time that contractors reflect the restructuring savings in reduced overhead rates; (3) during this period, DOD awarded over 600 fixed-price contracts or contract modifications worth about $3.9 billion; (4) however, despite repeated recommendations from the Defense Contract Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Command, contracting officers rarely included reopener clauses for savings in fixed-price contracts awarded during this period; (5) with reopener clauses, contract prices that were negotiated before savings and were included in overhead rates used to price DOD contracts could be adjusted downward once savings were determined, thereby reducing contract costs; (6) without reopener clauses, DOD cannot recoup its share of restructuring savings; (7) DOD contracting officers cited various reasons for not using reopener clauses; (8) these reasons included the desire to have contracts with no loose ends and concerns that the use of the clauses would cause an excessive administrative burden in renegotiating contract price adjustments; (9) another factor that appeared to influence the use of reopener clauses is the level of contractor resistance; (10) also, one contractor commented that such a clause was not required by current DOD regulations; (11) the use of reopener clauses can result in substantial savings to DOD; (12) in one case in which a reopener clause was exercised, the contract price was reduced by almost 4 percent, or about $1.8 million; and (13) unless DOD takes steps to include reopener clauses in its fixed-price contracts with companies forming business combinations, it risks losing further substantial savings resulting from contractor restructuring. |
gao_AIMD-98-268 | gao_AIMD-98-268_0 | Compliance with federal financial management systems requirements, applicable accounting standards, and the SGL are all necessary to help achieve these goals. Fiscal Year 1997 Results
The majority of federal agencies’ financial management systems do not meet current accounting standards and systems requirements and cannot, as currently operated, provide uniform and reliable financial information for managing government operations. In their fiscal year 1997 audit reports, auditors for 19 of 23 CFO agencies reported that the agencies’ financial systems did not substantially comply with FFMIA’s requirements. For example, an agency could have an unqualified opinion on its financial statements and no material weaknesses in internal control indicating that the financial statements are prepared in accordance with applicable federal accounting standards, yet have financial management systems that are not in substantial compliance with financial management systems requirements. As we testified on April 1, 1998, there are serious financial management improvement challenges facing the federal government. Agencies must overcome significant financial systems weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls (including computer controls). Agencies’ Determination of Agreement With FFMIA Compliance
Once the auditor of an agency reports on FFMIA compliance, the agency head is responsible for determining, based on a review of the auditor’s report and any other relevant information, whether the agency’s financial management systems comply substantially with the three requirements.The agency head is required to make this determination no later than 120 days after (1) the receipt of the auditor’s report or (2) the last day of the fiscal year following the year covered by the audit, whichever comes first. The executive branch recognizes the extent and severity of the reported financial management deficiencies and that addressing them will require concerted improvement efforts across government. Status of Federal Accounting Standards
Using a due process approach, FASAB has developed accounting standards for the federal government. In addition, FASAB has recommended Statement of Recommended Accounting Standard No. However, agencies have indicated concerns with implementing new accounting requirements imposed by accounting standards which became effective in fiscal year 1998. Several agencies have expressed concerns about having the available resources to prepare the Statement. Agencies are further challenged by the condition of many of the government’s critical financial systems applications, which are not designed to meet current accounting standards and systems requirements. These systems will need to be replaced or significantly upgraded in the next 5 years. We recently reported that the CFO agencies’ progress in addressing Year 2000 computing issues continues at a slow pace. Agencies are appropriately focusing their priorities on Year 2000 compliance issues, and consequently, other efforts to improve financial management systems may be delayed, including efforts to address FFMIA noncompliance. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed information concerning: (1) compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996's (FFMIA) requirements, including whether the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) agencies' financial statements have been prepared in accordance with applicable accounting standards; and (2) the adequacy of applicable accounting standards for the federal government.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in their fiscal year (FY) 1997 audit reports, auditors for 19 of the 23 CFO agencies reported that the agencies' financial systems did not comply substantially with FFMIA's requirements, primarily due to noncompliance with systems requirements; (2) auditors reported that the financial systems of 9 of those 19 agencies were noncompliant with all three FFMIA requirements; (3) the serious problems described in the auditors' reports limit the reliability, usefulness, and timeliness of financial information needed to effectively manage government operations; (4) the first-ever audit of the governmentwide consolidated financial statements indicates that many agencies are not yet meeting applicable accounting standards; (5) it was unable to render an opinion on the FY 1997 consolidated financial statements for the government due to significant financial systems weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls, including computer controls; (6) agencies generally recognize the extent and severity of their financial management deficiencies, and there are several efforts under way to address these problems across government; (7) the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) has sucessfully developed a set of accounting standards; (8) FASAB is also considering additional accounting matters relevant to financial statements for the federal government, including liabilities associated with social insurance entitlement programs; (9) agencies' efforts to improve financial management are challenged by implementing new accounting standards and updating financial management systems; (10) several agencies have expressed concerns regarding their ability to effectively implement the accounting requirements, which became effective in FY 1998; (11) in addition, as the CFO agencies move toward a more effective system of financial management, a significant challenge is the poor status of financial management systems, which were not designed to meet current accounting standards and systems requirements; (12) agencies' progress in implementing new accounting standards and improving reported financial management weaknesses will be affected by competing demands associated with year 2000 computer conversion issues; and (13) agencies are necessarily making year 2000 compliance a priority, and longer-term efforts to address financial management systems are expected to be delayed. |
gao_GAO-17-694 | gao_GAO-17-694_0 | In plan year 2015, 14 states, including the District of Columbia, operated their own state-based marketplaces. Finally, marketplaces are required to perform periodic examinations of data sources to identify changes to applicant information, such as an applicant’s death. Selected States’ Key Processes Used Multiple Data Sources to Verify Applicant Eligibility, and CMS Relied on Several Methods to Oversee the States’ Efforts
Key Processes Used Federal and State Data Sources to Verify Applicant Eligibility
Each of the selected state-based marketplaces’ key processes to verify applicant eligibility for subsidized coverage used various electronic data sources in plan year 2015. PPACA requires marketplaces to verify applicant eligibility using data sources and methods approved by HHS. As noted above, the selected state-based marketplaces had access to local data sources, some of which may have been more current than the data sources used by the data hub. For example, all three selected state-based marketplaces supplemented federal tax income information obtained through the data hub with more-current state wage information to verify income for subsidy eligibility. For example, CMS conducted annual reviews, collected programmatic data, and engaged in regular communication with the selected state-based marketplaces. Few Indications of Potentially Improper or Fraudulent Enrollments Were Identified in Selected States in Plan Year 2015
Our analysis of plan year 2015 eligibility and enrollment data from three selected states identified few indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments. State-based marketplace officials cited inherent challenges with verifying SSN information. We also found instances in which the SSNs contained likely data- entry errors in two of our three selected state-based marketplaces. We identified 21 of the almost 210,000 applicants (approximately 0.01 percent) who were deceased prior to starting coverage in plan year 2015. The majority of these applicants died after their applications were submitted, but prior to starting coverage. We also reviewed 11 applicant cases of these 30 applicants and found data-entry errors. In Rhode Island and Maryland, almost 3,000 applicants—about 2.4 percent of 123,000 applicants from these states—did not resolve their immigration-related data- matching inconsistencies. As previously discussed, these two state-based marketplaces had manual inconsistency-resolution processes in place during plan year 2015 and may not have terminated coverage for these applicants in a timely manner. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) identify key processes used by selected state-based marketplaces to verify applicants’ eligibility for subsidized qualified health plans in plan year 2015, and how the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversaw such efforts; and (2) assess the extent to which applicant eligibility and enrollment data from selected state-based marketplaces show indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments in subsidized qualified health plans in plan year 2015. To identify key processes used by selected state-based marketplaces to verify applicants’ eligibility and to determine how CMS oversaw such efforts, we reviewed relevant federal and state statutes, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations, state policies and procedure manuals, and CMS documentation, such as annual reports submitted by the state marketplaces and report-review templates, data- metric templates, and review agendas. Internal Revenue Service household-income information in the data hub can be up to 2 years old. Specifically, we grouped the states’ eligibility and enrollment data using the following characteristics: condition 1 applicants with personal information that did not match SSA’s records and had SSN-related inconsistencies; condition 2 applicants with personal information that did not match SSA’s records and did not have SSN-related inconsistencies; condition 3 applicants whose SSNs and names or dates of birth matched potentially deceased individuals; condition 4 applicants whose SSNs matched potentially deceased individuals but whose names or dates of birth did not; condition 5 applicants who self-attested to being noncitizens or were identified by the state as having a potential immigration-related inconsistency; and condition 6 applicants who were identified by the state as being potentially incarcerated. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Observations on 18 Undercover Tests of Enrollment Controls for Health-Care Coverage and Consumer Subsidies Provided under the Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA offers subsidized health-care coverage for qualifying applicants, and states may elect to operate their own health-care marketplaces to assist consumers in comparing and selecting insurance plans offered by private issuers. In plan year 2015, 14 states, including the District of Columbia, operated their own marketplaces and determined eligibility and enrollment. CMS is responsible for oversight of these marketplaces. GAO was asked to examine PPACA enrollment controls for state-based marketplaces. This report, for plan year 2015, (1) identifies key processes used by selected state-based marketplaces to verify applicants' eligibility for subsidized qualified health plans, and how CMS oversaw such efforts; and (2) assesses the extent to which applicant eligibility and enrollment data from selected states show indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments in subsidized qualified health plans.
GAO selected three state-based marketplaces for review—Idaho, Maryland, and Rhode Island—based on factors such as geographic distribution and enrollment size. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO analyzed the selected state-based marketplaces' eligibility and enrollment data for plan year 2015 and matched these data to external data sources to identify indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments, and reviewed an illustrative selection of applicants' information. The results are not generalizable to other marketplaces. GAO is not making any recommendations.
What GAO Found
For plan year 2015, GAO reviewed three selected state-based marketplaces' key processes to verify applicant eligibility for subsidized coverage and found that they used various data sources. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), marketplaces are required to verify applicant eligibility using data sources and methods approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Applicant information that must be verified or validated to receive subsidized coverage includes Social Security number (SSN), citizenship or lawful presence, and income. To accomplish this verification, the selected state-based marketplaces relied on various federal data sources, including sources accessed via the federal data services hub (data hub). They also used state data sources, some of which may have been more current than the data hub sources. For example, all three selected state-based marketplaces supplemented federal tax income information accessed through the data hub, which can be up to 2 years old, with more-current state wage information to verify income. HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversaw the state-based marketplaces' verification procedures by conducting annual reviews, collecting enrollment metrics, and engaging in regular communication in plan year 2015.
For the three selected states, GAO found few indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments for plan year 2015 in the verification processes reviewed, but did identify data-quality issues, such as data-entry errors or name changes.
About 2,000 of approximately 210,000 applicants (about 1 percent) had SSNs, names, or dates of birth that did not match the Social Security Administration's records. State officials cited inherent challenges with verifying SSN information, such as name changes. GAO also found instances in which SSNs contained likely data-entry errors.
Twenty-one of approximately 210,000 applicants (about 0.01 percent) were reportedly deceased prior to starting coverage. The majority of these applicants died after their application was submitted, but prior to starting coverage.
About 3,000 of approximately 123,000 applicants in two states (about 2 percent) did not resolve immigration-related inconsistencies. Inconsistencies occur when an applicant's information does not match information contained in the data source used to verify the information. The two states had manual inconsistency-resolution processes for plan year 2015 and may not have terminated coverage for these applicants in a timely manner. Officials from both states said they have since implemented or plan to implement changes to automatically close expired inconsistencies and terminate coverage, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-364 | gao_GAO-13-364_0 | Background
Under TRICARE, beneficiaries have choices among various benefit options and may obtain care from either military treatment facilities or civilian providers. The NDAA 2008 directed DOD to conduct surveys of beneficiaries and civilian providers to assess nonenrolled beneficiaries’ access to care. Nearly One in Three Nonenrolled Beneficiaries Experienced Problems Accessing Care, and They Rated Their Satisfaction with Care Generally Lower than Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries
Nearly One in Three Nonenrolled Beneficiaries Experienced Problems Finding Civilian Providers Who Would Accept TRICARE; Those in PSAs Experienced More Problems Finding Primary and Specialty Care than Those in Non-PSAs
Overall, during 2008-2011, an estimated one in three nonenrolled beneficiaries (about 31 percent) experienced problems finding any type of civilian provider—primary, specialty, or mental health care provider—who would accept TRICARE. Civilian Providers’ Acceptance of New TRICARE Patients Has Decreased over Time; Mental Health Providers Report Lower Awareness and Acceptance than Other Provider Types
Nationwide, an estimated 82 percent of civilian providers indicated they were aware of the TRICARE program, but only an estimated 58 percent were accepting new TRICARE patients, according to our analysis of the 2008 through 2011 civilian provider survey results. When compared to a national provider survey, civilian providers’ acceptance of new TRICARE patients was less than providers’ acceptance of other types of beneficiaries. According to the TRICARE survey results, when asked the reasons for not accepting new TRICARE patients, the most-cited category by those civilian providers who were not accepting any new TRICARE patients was that the provider “was not aware of the TRICARE program/not asked/don’t know about TRICARE.” (See fig. Additionally, while nonenrolled beneficiaries cited that providers were not accepting TRICARE for payment as the top reason why any providers were unwilling to accept them as patients, the providers cited it as the third highest reason in addition to “don’t know/no answer.”
When we compared the results of TMA’s 2008-2011 civilian provider survey (excluding nonphysician mental health providers) to the results of its 2005-2007 civilian physician survey, we found that although civilian physicians’ awareness has increased over time, their acceptance of new TRICARE patients has decreased over time. This was also true whether they were accepting any new patients or new Medicare patients. Specifically, only an estimated 39 percent of civilian mental health providers were accepting new TRICARE beneficiaries, compared to an estimated 67 percent of civilian primary care providers and an estimated 77 percent of civilian specialty care providers. We also found that providers’ awareness and acceptance of TRICARE differed by type of area. Similar to TMA’s nonenrolled beneficiary survey, which showed that nonenrolled beneficiaries in PSAs generally experienced more problems finding providers than their counterparts in non-PSAs, our analysis of the 2008 through 2011 civilian provider survey indicated that civilian providers in PSAs were less aware of TRICARE and less accepting of new TRICARE patients than civilian providers in non- PSAs. Collective Results of TMA’s Beneficiary and Civilian Provider Surveys Indicate Specific Geographic Areas Where Nonenrolled Beneficiaries Have Experienced Access Problems
An analysis of the collective results of the multiyear beneficiary and civilian provider surveys indicated particular geographic areas where nonenrolled beneficiaries are experiencing considerable access problems. Table 6 shows each of these areas with the estimated percentage of (1) nonenrolled beneficiaries who experienced problems finding a civilian primary care provider and (2) civilian primary care providers who were accepting any new TRICARE patients. Civilian Mental Health Care Providers
Because of the low numbers of survey responses for beneficiaries who said they needed civilian mental health care, we are unable to report correlated survey results for access problems to civilian mental health care providers.of mental health providers and the survey results that only 39 percent of civilian mental health care providers were accepting new TRICARE patients, access to mental health care providers is a concern for all TRICARE beneficiaries, including those who use the TRICARE Standard and Extra options. Appendix I: TRICARE Management Activity’s Methodology for the 2008-2011 Beneficiary and Civilian Provider Surveys
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA 2008) directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine the adequacy of the number of health care and mental health care providers that currently accept nonenrolled beneficiaries as patients under TRICARE, DOD’s health care program. Survey Area Selection
The NDAA 2008 specified that DOD survey beneficiaries and providers in at least 20 TRICARE Prime Service Areas (PSA),areas in which TRICARE Prime is not offered—referred to as non–Prime Service Areas (non-PSA)—each fiscal year, 2008 through 2011. For the purpose of this report, we use the term “nonenrolled beneficiaries” for beneficiaries who are not enrolled in TRICARE Prime and who use the TRICARE Standard or Extra options, or TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides health and mental health care through its TRICARE program. TRICARE offers three basic options. Beneficiaries who choose TRICARE Prime, an option that uses civilian provider networks, must enroll. Beneficiaries who do not enroll in this option may obtain care from nonnetwork providers under TRICARE Standard or from network providers under TRICARE Extra. In addition, qualified National Guard and Reserve servicemembers may purchase TRICARE Reserve Select, a plan whose care options are similar to those of TRICARE Standard and TRICARE Extra. GAO refers to servicemembers who use TRICARE Standard, TRICARE Extra, or TRICARE Reserve Select as nonenrolled beneficiaries.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD to conduct annual surveys over fiscal years 2008 through 2011 of both beneficiaries and civilian providers to determine the adequacy of access to health and mental health care providers for nonenrolled beneficiaries. It also directed GAO to review these surveys. This report addresses (1) what the results of the 4-year beneficiary surveys indicate about the adequacy of access to care for nonenrolled beneficiaries; (2) what the results of the 4-year civilian provider surveys indicate about civilian providers' awareness and acceptance of TRICARE, and (3) what the collective results of the surveys indicate about access to care by geographic area. To do so, GAO interviewed DOD officials, obtained relevant documentation, and analyzed the data for both surveys over the 4-year period.
What GAO Found
In its analysis of the 2008-2011 beneficiary survey data, GAO found that nearly one in three nonenrolled beneficiaries experienced problems finding a civilian provider who would accept TRICARE and that nonenrolled beneficiaries' access to civilian primary care and specialty care providers differed by type of location. Specifically, a higher percentage of nonenrolled beneficiaries in Prime Service Areas (PSA), which are areas with civilian provider networks, experienced problems finding a civilian primary care or specialty care provider compared to those in non-Prime Service Areas (non-PSA), which do not have civilian provider networks. GAO found that the top reasons reported by nonenrolled beneficiaries for why they experienced access problems--regardless of type of provider--were that the providers were either not accepting TRICARE payments or new TRICARE patients. Additionally, GAO's comparison of the Department of Defense's (DOD) beneficiary survey data to related data from a Department of Health and Human Services survey showed that nonenrolled beneficiaries' satisfaction ratings for primary and specialty care providers were consistently lower than those of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.
GAO's analysis of the 2008-2011 civilian provider survey data found that about 6 in 10 civilian providers were accepting new TRICARE patients and the most-cited reason for not accepting new TRICARE patients was that the civilian providers were not aware of the TRICARE program. Civilian physicians' acceptance of TRICARE has also decreased over time. Specifically, when compared to DOD's 2005-2007 civilian physician survey results, civilian physicians' acceptance of new TRICARE patients has decreased. This was also true whether they were accepting any new patients or new Medicare patients. Civilian providers' awareness and acceptance of TRICARE also differed by provider type, as fewer civilian mental health care providers were aware of TRICARE or accepting new TRICARE patients than other types of providers. For example, only an estimated 39 percent of civilian mental health care providers were accepting new TRICARE patients, compared to an estimated 67 percent of civilian primary care providers and an estimated 77 percent of civilian specialty care providers. The analysis also showed that civilian providers' awareness and acceptance of TRICARE differ by location type, as civilian providers in PSAs were less aware of TRICARE and less likely to accept new TRICARE patients than those in non-PSAs.
GAO's analysis of the collective results of the beneficiary and civilian provider survey results indicates specific geographic areas, including areas in Texas and California, where nonenrolled beneficiaries have experienced considerable access problems. In each of these areas, although almost all civilian providers were accepting new patients, less than half were accepting new TRICARE patients. In most of these areas, civilian providers most often cited reimbursement concerns as the reasons why they were not accepting any new TRICARE patients.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO's overall findings. |
gao_GAO-11-755T | gao_GAO-11-755T_0 | NAGPRA’s requirements for federal agencies, museums, and the Secretary of the Interior, particularly the ones most relevant to their historical collections, which were the focus of our July 2010 report, include the following: Compile an inventory and establish cultural affiliation. In accordance with NAGPRA’s implementing regulations, National NAGPRA has developed a list of Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations for the purposes of carrying out the act. Finally, NAGPRA requires the establishment of a committee to monitor and review the implementation of inventory, identification and repatriation activities under the act. The NAGPRA Review Committee was established in 1991. NMAI Act Requirements
The NMAI Act sections 11 and 13 generally require the Smithsonian to (1) inventory the Indian and Native Hawaiian human remains and funerary objects in its possession or control, (2) identify the origins of the Indian and Native Hawaiian human remains and funerary objects using the “best available scientific and historical documentation,” and (3) upon request repatriate them to lineal descendants or culturally affiliated Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations. After Almost 20 Years, Key Federal Agencies Still Have Not Fully Complied with NAGPRA
As we reported in July 2010, federal agencies have not yet fully complied with all of the requirements of NAGPRA. Finally, although the key agencies have repatriated many NAGPRA items, repatriation activity has generally not been tracked or reported governmentwide. All of the agencies acknowledged that they still have additional work to do and some had not fully complied with NAGPRA’s requirement to publish notices of inventory completion for all of their culturally affiliated human remains and associated funerary objects in the Federal Register. The Departments of Agriculture and the Interior and TVA agreed with our recommendations. Through data provided by these three agencies, along with our survey of other federal agencies, we found that federal agencies had repatriated a total of 55 percent of human remains and 68 percent of associated funerary objects that had been published in notices of inventory completion as of September 30, 2009. Although Smithsonian officials told us that the Smithsonian generally looks to NAGPRA and the NAGPRA regulations as a guide to its repatriation process, where appropriate, in a May 2010 letter commenting on the NAGPRA regulation on disposition of culturally unidentifiable remains, the Directors of the American Indian and Natural History Museums cited overall disagreement with the regulation, suggesting that it “favors speed and efficiency in making these dispositions at the expense of accuracy.” Nevertheless, in our May 2011 report, we recommended that the Smithsonian’s Board of Regents direct the Secretary and the American Indian Museum’s Board of Trustees to develop policies for the Natural History and American Indian Museums for the handling of items in their collections that cannot be culturally affiliated to provide for a clear and transparent repatriation process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Museum of the American Indian Act of 1989 (NMAI Act), as amended in 1996, generally requires the Smithsonian Institution to inventory and identify the origins of its Indian and Native Hawaiian human remains and objects placed with them (funerary objects) and repatriate them to culturally affiliated Indian tribes upon request. According to the Smithsonian, two of its museums--the American Indian and the Natural History Museums--have items that are subject to the NMAI Act. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), enacted in 1990, includes similar requirements for federal agencies and museums. The National NAGPRA office, within the Department of the Interior's National Park Service, facilitates the governmentwide implementation of NAGPRA. Each act requires the establishment of a committee to monitor and review repatriation activities. GAO's testimony is based on its July 2010 report on NAGPRA implementation (GAO-10-768) and its May 2011 report on Smithsonian repatriation (GAO-11-515). The testimony focuses on the extent to which key federal agencies have complied with NAGPRA's requirements and the extent to which the Smithsonian has fulfilled its repatriation requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that almost 20 years after NAGPRA was enacted, eight key federal agencies with significant historical collections--Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park Service; Agriculture's U.S. Forest Service; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and the Tennessee Valley Authority--have not fully complied with the requirements of the act. All of the agencies acknowledged that they still have additional work to do and some have not fully complied with NAGPRA's requirement to publish notices of inventory completion for all of their culturally affiliated human remains and associated funerary objects in the Federal Register. In addition, GAO found two areas of concern with the National NAGPRA office's activities. First, National NAGPRA had developed a list of Indian tribes for the purposes of carrying out NAGPRA that was inconsistent with BIA's official list of federally recognized tribes and an Interior legal opinion. Second, National NAGPRA did not always screen nominations for NAGPRA Review Committee positions properly. GAO found that repatriations were generally not tracked or reported governmentwide. However, based on GAO's compilation of federal agencies' repatriation data, through September 30, 2009, federal agencies had repatriated 55 percent of the human remains and 68 percent of the associated funerary objects that had been published in notices of inventory completion. The relevant agencies agreed with the recommendations in both reports and GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-15-789 | gao_GAO-15-789_0 | Use of ICD Codes in Medicare Stakeholders’ and CMS’s Systems
Medicare fee-for-service claims that include ICD codes are submitted, processed, and authorized for payment through a combination of stakeholders’ systems and CMS’s internal claims processing systems. This level of testing is supposed to simulate a live production environment in which claims are submitted by providers (or clearinghouses) via the MACs, adjudicated by CMS, and approved or denied for payment. Based on the agency’s change management documentation, officials responsible for overseeing the transition began taking steps to update the systems in March 2010 and had finished making the systems changes to address ICD-10 requirements in time to meet the initial October 2013 compliance date. Industry standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) state that systems testing should be conducted early and often in the life cycle of a systems development project to allow for the modification of products in a timely manner, thereby reducing the overall project and schedule impacts. It also recommends planning for contingencies to help mitigate risks and minimize the impact of errors that may be introduced when new or modified systems are implemented into a live production environment. CMS Made Contingency Plans to Help Minimize Impact of Claims Processing System Errors
CMS has established contingency plans to be executed in case errors occur as a result of implementing modifications to the existing claims processing systems, which is consistent with IEEE recommendations that organizations define actions to be taken to minimize the impact of system errors. Therefore, while it can be expected that system errors will occur, the extent to which any such errors will disrupt the agency’s ability to properly process claims cannot be determined until CMS’s systems begin processing ICD-10 codes. CMS Provided Technical Support to Help Stakeholders Update Systems to Process ICD-10 Claims Data
CMS has taken various steps to help providers, clearinghouses, and insurers that participate in the Medicare fee-for-service program implement the systems changes they need to make for transitioning their systems to ICD-10. CMS also provided enhanced technical capabilities that allowed stakeholders to test the integration of their updated systems with CMS’s claims processing systems environment. CMS Developed and Provided Guidance and Tools for Making System Changes
As early as 2008, CMS had developed and published a website that includes information related to the implementation of systems changes needed to process and submit ICD-10 codes for Medicare claims processing. Additionally, CMS took steps to assist the MACs in their efforts to update the systems they use to submit providers’ claims to CMS and to address challenges identified by these contractors as they make changes to their systems. The MACs noted that, given the variety of testers participating and claims submitted during end-to-end testing, along with the three levels of testing conducted as part of CMS’s change management process, in their view overall testing had been comprehensive and sufficient to ensure that stakeholders’ and CMS’s systems would be ready to process ICD-10 claims data on October 1, 2015. In fact, we reported that agency officials had finished making the changes that they determined were needed to process the new codes and had conducted system testing and validation procedures consistent with industry practices. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of CMS’s effort to implement changes needed to be made to its systems in order to process Medicare claims that include ICD-10 codes; (2) the extent to which CMS’s testing and verification actions are sufficient to ensure changes to its systems have been made to process Medicare claims that include ICD-10 codes by October 1, 2015; (3) steps CMS is taking to ensure that health care insurers, providers, and other entities have access to the technical support, tools, and other resources needed to identify, develop, and test system modifications, and to process Medicare claims that include ICD-10 codes if needed system changes have not been made; and (4) what is known about estimated costs to CMS, insurers, and providers. We also reviewed documentation describing mitigation strategies used to manage the identified risks such as contingency plans for processing claims data in case errors occurred. These contractors’ support was intended to ensure that any errors that were not detected previously could be corrected prior to systems being released into production. To determine the extent to which the industry stakeholder groups found the support provided by CMS useful, we selected and held discussions with entities that play a role in supporting the implementation of health care information technology, including implementing system changes needed to be made for the ICD-10 transition. Appendix II: ICD-10 Changes Implemented in Quarterly Releases, July 2010-October 2014
Release date July 2010
Description Implement Fiscal Intermediary Shared System ( FISS) Integrated Outpatient Code Editor changes related to the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10)
Expand Multi-Carrier System (MCS) Diagnosis File to accommodate ICD-10 diagnosis codes Create ViPs Medicare System (VMS) utility run for Durable Medical Equipment MACs identification of edits for ICD-10 Update VMS Automated Development System to recognize and print the ICD-10 indicator Remove any obsolete Quarterly Medical Review processes and reports from VMS that include ICD-9 codes Expand MCS procedure code file to accommodate ICD-10 diagnosis codes Expand Expert Claims Processing System for FISS to accommodate ICD-10 Expand FISS End Stage Renal Disease Parameter files, Hook Selection files, and Medical Policy Parameter files to accommodate the transition to ICD-10 Convert FISS reason codes to ICD-10 format Update MCS hard-coded edits for ICD-10 diagnosis codes Expand MCS to accommodate ICD-10 by expanding Common Working File elements Update the existing VMS Utilization Parameter files for ICD-10 Expand Related Diagnosis file to accommodate ICD-10 diagnosis codes Update VMS Inbound and Outbound Claims Interface Processing Convert FISS reason codes, Phase II Expand FISS Medical Policy Parameter Convert FISS reason codes, Phase III Convert the Common Working File, Phase I Implementation Include Type of Bill 33X for ICD-10 Create file to be used for planning and testing purposes in preparation for the ICD-10 code conversion Convert FISS for Add-on Payment for Blood Clotting Factors, and ESRD Co-morbidity Adjustment Factors Implement VMS ICD-10 Release III, No. | Why GAO Did This Study
ICD is the standard code set used in the United States to document patient medical diagnoses and inpatient medical procedures. Every claim submitted by health care providers to payers for reimbursement, including those for Medicare programs, includes these codes. CMS is responsible for enforcing the use of ICD codes and is requiring providers to begin using the 10th revision of the codes (ICD-10) on October 1, 2015. Its role in preparing for the transition includes making changes to the agency's information technology systems used to process Medicare fee-for-service claims and supporting stakeholders' efforts to implement changes to the systems they use to submit Medicare claims that are to include ICD-10 data. GAO was asked to study the actions planned and taken by CMS to support entities' transition to ICD-10. This report discusses (1) CMS's efforts to implement system changes needed for the agency to process claims that include ICD-10 codes, (2) the extent to which CMS's testing and verification actions are sufficient to ensure the system changes are made, and (3) steps CMS is taking to ensure that stakeholders have access to technical support needed to make system changes. To do this, GAO reviewed project documentation and held discussions with Medicare officials, contractors, and selected stakeholder groups that represent providers, health care clearinghouses, and insurers that share claims data with CMS. GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS and incorporated its comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has finished updating its systems with the changes it determined were needed to process the new International Classification of Diseases codes (ICD-10) on Medicare fee-for-service claims. In 2007, CMS began taking steps to identify components of its systems that needed to be changed to update the ICD codes from version 9 to 10. CMS began making the system changes in early 2010 as part of an established change management process for releasing system updates on a quarterly basis, and, by October 2013, had completed actions to modify its systems to process the new data. In doing so, CMS made changes to validate that codes on submitted claims were of the correct length and format specific to ICD-10 requirements and to determine whether submitted claims data included the proper codes to be processed and approved for payment.
Industry guidance states that systems testing should be conducted early and often in the life cycle of a project to allow for the modification of software in a timely manner, and that organizations should define procedures for approving systems for release and plan for contingencies to help mitigate risks that may be introduced when software changes are implemented into a live production environment. Consistent with these practices, CMS began testing and validating the changes made to its systems in March 2010. For each quarterly release, CMS conducted three levels of testing prior to implementing the systems that had been changed, including a level conducted to simulate a live production environment of Medicare claims processing. Agency reports on the outcomes of the tests described errors found and steps taken to ensure any such errors were corrected. The agency also held management reviews to determine whether each version of the modified systems was ready to be released into a live claims processing environment. In addition, CMS officials defined contingencies for cases when systems may not properly process claims that include ICD-10 codes. Such actions are important to help minimize the impact on Medicare stakeholders that could result from errors in CMS's systems. While CMS's actions to update, test, and validate its systems, and plan for contingencies can help mitigate risks and minimize impacts of system errors, the extent to which any such errors will affect the agency's ability to properly process claims cannot be determined until CMS's systems begin processing ICD-10 codes.
CMS provided technical support to help its stakeholders identify and make system changes. As early as 2008, CMS had developed and published a website that includes information related to the implementation of system changes to process and submit ICD-10 codes, such as checklists and “lessons learned” identified through collaboration with stakeholders, to help stakeholders identify and implement system changes. The agency also developed tools to help its Medicare Administrative Contractors update claims review and submission systems, such as those used to ensure valid claims are transmitted to CMS's claims processing systems. In addition, CMS expanded and enhanced capabilities to accommodate end-to-end testing that allowed stakeholders to test the integration of their systems with CMS's internal systems, and offered alternative technical solutions for submitting claims with ICD-10 data in case their systems are not modified in time to meet the compliance date. |
gao_GAO-11-671T | gao_GAO-11-671T_0 | Half way through fiscal year 2011, USPS reported a net loss of $2.6 billion. Specifically, USPS said that absent legislative change it will be forced to default on payments to the federal government, including a $5.5 billion pre-funding payment for retiree health benefits due on September 30, 2011. While USPS’s financial condition continues to deteriorate, we and USPS have presented options to improve the agency’s financial condition. Specifically, we have reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS’s financial viability, which will enable USPS to align its costs with revenues, manage its growing debt, and generate sufficient funding for capital investment. Delivery Fleet Primarily Consists of Aging Long-Life Vehicles and Alternative Fuel Vehicles Acquired to Meet Requirements, Which Have Presented Cost and Infrastructure Challenges
As shown in figure 1, there are three principal components of USPS’s delivery fleet: about 141,000 “long-life vehicles” (LLV)—custom-built, right-hand-drive, light duty trucks with an aluminum body 16 to 23 years old, that are approaching the end of their expected 24-year operational lives; about 21,000 flex-fuel vehicles (FFV), also custom-built with right-hand drive, 9 and 10 years old, that are approaching the mid-point of their expected 24-year operational lives; and about 22,000 commercially-available, left-hand drive minivans that range in age from 2 to 13 years and have an expected operational life of 10 years. USPS is subject to certain legislative requirements governing the federal fleet. Since 2000, USPS has consistently purchased delivery vehicles that can operate on gasoline or a mixture of gasoline and 85 percent ethanol (E85) to satisfy this requirement. Apart from its experiences with E85-capable vehicles, USPS has a variety of limited experiences with other types of alternative fuel delivery vehicles. This is largely because any potential fuel savings from alternative fuel vehicles would be unlikely to offset generally higher acquisition costs over the vehicles’ operating lives, given that USPS’s delivery vehicles on average travel about 17 miles and its LLVs use the equivalent of about 2 gallons of gasoline per day. USPS’s Approach for Addressing Its Delivery Fleet Needs Has Financial and Environmental Trade- offs
USPS’s current approach is to sustain operations of its delivery fleet— through continued maintenance—for the next several years, while planning how to address its longer term delivery fleet needs. Our analysis of a custom query of USPS’s vehicle database found that delivery vehicles’ direct maintenance costs averaged about $2,450 per vehicle in fiscal year 2007 and just under $2,600 per vehicle in fiscal year 2010 (in constant 2010 dollars). USPS’s approach has trade-offs, including relatively high costs to maintain some delivery vehicles. Another trade off of its current strategy is that USPS is increasingly incurring costs for unscheduled maintenance because of breakdowns. However, in fiscal year 2010, at least 31 percent of its vehicle maintenance costs were for unscheduled maintenance, 11 percentage points over its 20 percent goal. Without Significant Improvement in USPS’s Financial Condition, There Are No Clear Options to Fund a Major Vehicle Replacement
USPS’s financial condition poses a significant barrier to its ability to fund a major acquisition of its delivery fleet. Further, officials from USPS, DOE, and an environmental organization, and operators of private fleets see little potential to finance a fleet replacement through grants or partnerships. If Congress and USPS reach agreement on a package of actions to move USPS toward financial viability, depending on the specific actions adopted, USPS’s follow-up, and the results, such an agreement could enhance USPS’s ability to invest in new delivery vehicles. In the report that this testimony is based on, we recommend that USPS develop a strategy and timeline for addressing its delivery fleet needs. USPS agreed with our findings and recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Postal Service (USPS) is in financial crisis. It also has the world's largest civilian fleet, with many of its delivery vehicles reaching the end of their expected 24- year operational lives. USPS is subject to certain legislative requirements governing the federal fleet, including a requirement that 75 percent of USPS's vehicle acquisitions be capable of operating on an alternative fuel other than gasoline. This testimony addresses (1) USPS's financial condition; (2) USPS's delivery fleet profile, including how USPS has responded to alternative fuel vehicle requirements and its experiences with these vehicles; (3) trade-offs of USPS's approach for addressing its delivery fleet needs; and (4) options to fund a major acquisition of delivery vehicles. This testimony is primarily based on GAO-11-386 , which is being released today. For that report, GAO analyzed USPS data, visited USPS facilities, and interviewed USPS and other officials. GAO recommended in that report that USPS should develop a strategy for addressing its delivery fleet needs that considers the effects of likely operational changes, legislative fleet requirements, and other factors. USPS agreed with the recommendation. For this testimony, GAO also drew upon past and ongoing work on USPS's financial condition and updated USPS financial information.
What GAO Found
USPS's financial condition continues to deteriorate. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2011, USPS reported a net loss of $2.6 billion--worse than it expected--and that, absent legislative change, it will have to default on payments to the government, including a $5.5 billion payment for its retiree health benefits. GAO has reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a package of actions to move USPS toward financial viability. USPS's delivery fleet is largely composed of custom-built, right-hand-drive vehicles designed to last for 24 years, including about 141,000 gasolinepowered vehicles (16 to 23 years old) and 21,000 flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on gasoline or 85-percent ethanol (E85) (about 10 years old). Its flexfuel vehicles and many of its 22,000 left-hand-drive minivans, which are also capable of running on E85, were purchased to comply with the 75 percent acquisition requirement for alternative fuel vehicles. Delivery vehicles travel about 17 miles and use the equivalent of about 2 gallons of gasoline on average per day. USPS has a variety of limited experiences with other alternative fuel vehicles, such as compressed natural gas and plug-in electric vehicles, most of which have higher life-cycle costs than gasoline vehicles. USPS's approach for addressing its delivery fleet needs is to maintain its current fleet until it determines how to address its longer term needs. USPS has incurred small increases in direct maintenance costs over the last 4 years, which were about $2,600 per vehicle in fiscal year 2010. However, it is increasingly incurring costs for unscheduled maintenance because of breakdowns, which can disrupt operations and increase costs. In fiscal year 2010, at least 31 percent of USPS's vehicle maintenance costs were for unscheduled maintenance, 11 percentage points over USPS's 20 percent goal. USPS's financial challenges limit options to fund a major delivery vehicle replacement or refurbishment, estimated to cost $5.8 billion and (in 2005) $3.5 billion, respectively. USPS and other federal and nonfederal officials see little potential to finance a fleet replacement through grants or partnerships. If Congress and USPS reach agreement on a package of actions to move USPS toward financial viability, such an agreement could potentially enhance USPS's ability to invest in new delivery vehicles. |
gao_GAO-12-44 | gao_GAO-12-44_0 | Background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, assigned TSA responsibility for security in all modes of transportation, which include aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway and motor carrier, freight rail, and pipeline. Our 2011 survey results indicate general satisfaction among transportation stakeholders who received these products across each mode of transportation, but satisfaction varied by transportation sector. For the purposes of the survey, actionability was defined as the degree to which TSA’s security-related information products enabled stakeholders to make adjustments to their security measures, if such a change was warranted. However, they recognized the need to provide this information to stakeholders when available and to improve the analysis provided in their products. As shown in figure 4, approximately 18 percent (48 of 266 stakeholders who provided responses to this question) of the transportation stakeholders we surveyed reported that they did not receive TSA’s transportation security-related information reports, 34 percent (91 of 271) reported that they did not receive a TSA briefing, and approximately 48 percent (128 of 264) reported that they did not receive TSA’s assessments in 2010. However, stakeholders who are not affiliated with industry associations may not receive these communications. Most Stakeholders Who Used Information-sharing Mechanisms Were Generally Satisfied; Others Were Unfamiliar with DHS’s Primary Mechanism
Aviation Stakeholders Were Generally Satisfied with TSA’s Aviation Web Boards
The mechanisms used by TSA to share information with transportation stakeholders include the Aviation Web Boards, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), and e-mail alerts. However, as shown in figure 6, almost 60 percent (158 of 266) of transportation stakeholders we surveyed had never heard of HSIN-CS. Among the highway respondents, 28 percent (11 of 39) had not heard of HSIN- CS and 8 percent (3 of 39) were unsure. DHS officials concurred with this recommendation and in January 2011 provided an implementation plan with target dates for addressing it. Of those that logged on to HSIN-CS, 40 percent (6 of 15) of highway stakeholders and 53 percent (9 of 17) of rail stakeholders were satisfied with their ability to locate information on HSIN-CS, as shown in figure 9. Defining and Documenting Roles and Responsibilities within TSA Could Help Strengthen Information Sharing
The approach that TSA uses to communicate security-related information to stakeholders relies on partnerships established among offices within the agency. However, officials from two other TSNM offices stated that the role of the TSNM offices is limited to communicating policy and regulatory information rather than threat-related information. While it is recognized that information products and mechanisms are selected and utilized as appropriate to the circumstances, clearly documenting the basic roles and responsibilities of its partners—especially TSNM offices— in sharing security-related information with transportation stakeholders and increasing awareness of information-sharing mechanisms could improve the effectiveness of TSA-OI’s information-sharing efforts and help ensure accountability. Additionally, key elements of TSA’s information approach are not described in its December 2010 information-sharing plan. Other responsibilities include developing and maintaining a working relationship with local, federal, state, and private entities responsible for transportation security, regardless of mode. Because TSA has not clearly defined and documented roles and responsibilities for disseminating security-related information and the full range of its information-sharing efforts, TSA may not be consistently providing security-related information products to external stakeholders and divisions within TSA may not be held fully accountable for performing their information-sharing activities. Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of TSA’s various offices in sharing security-related information with transportation stakeholders could improve the effectiveness of TSA’s information-sharing efforts and help ensure greater accountability. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen information sharing with transportation stakeholders and ensure that stakeholders receive security-related information in a timely manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following five actions:
To the extent possible, address the need expressed by stakeholders by providing more actionable analysis in TSA’s transportation security-related information products. (3) To what extent has TSA defined its roles and responsibilities for sharing security-related information with stakeholders? To assess the extent to which stakeholders are satisfied with the security- related information products that they receive from TSA and the mechanisms used to obtain them, we conducted a web-based survey of transportation stakeholders from the aviation, freight and passenger rail, and highway modes. To develop the survey and to identify the primary security-related information-sharing products, mechanisms, and the stakeholders for whom TSA maintains contact information, we interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) and officials from the Commercial Airline, Commercial Airport, Air Cargo, Freight Rail, and Highway and Motor Carrier Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) offices. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. transportation system, comprised of aviation, freight rail, highway, maritime, mass transit and passenger rail, and pipelines, moves billions of passengers and millions of tons of goods each year. Disrupted terrorist attacks involving rail and air cargo in 2010 demonstrate the importance of effective information sharing with transportation security stakeholders. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the lead agency responsible for communicating security-related information with all modes. In response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, GAO assessed 1) the satisfaction of transportation stakeholders with the quality of TSA's transportation security information products, 2) satisfaction with mechanisms used to disseminate them, and 3) the extent to which TSA's roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. GAO surveyed 335 aviation, rail, and highway stakeholders (with an 82 percent response rate); reviewed agency planning documents; and interviewed industry associations, transportation stakeholders, and Department of Homeland Security officials. An electronic supplement to this report--GAO-12-67SP--provides survey results.
What GAO Found
Transportation stakeholders who GAO surveyed were generally satisfied with TSA's security-related information products, but identified opportunities to improve the quality and availability of the disseminated information. TSA developed a series of products to share security-related information with transportation stakeholders such as annual modal threat assessments that provide an overview of threats to each transportation mode--including aviation, rail, and highway--and related infrastructure. Fifty-seven percent of the stakeholders (155 of 275 who answered this question) indicated that they were satisfied with the products they receive. However, stakeholders who receive these products were least satisfied with the actionability of the information--the degree to which the products enabled stakeholders to adjust their security measures. They noted that they prefer products with more analysis, such as trend analysis of incidents or suggestions for improving security arrangements. Further, not all stakeholders received the products. For example, 48 percent (128 of 264) of the stakeholders reported that they did not receive a security assessment in 2010, such as TSA's annual modal threat assessment. Improving the analysis and availability of security-related information products would help enhance stakeholders' ability to position themselves to protect against threats. Stakeholders who obtained security-related information through TSA's Web-based mechanisms were generally satisfied, but almost 60 percent (158 of 266) of stakeholders GAO surveyed had never heard of the Homeland Security Information Sharing Network Critical Sectors portal (HSIN-CS). DHS views HSIN as the primary mechanism for sharing security-related information with critical sectors, including transportation stakeholders. Forty-three percent of rail stakeholders, 28 percent of highway stakeholders, and 72 percent of aviation stakeholders--who consider TSA's aviation Web Boards as their primary information-sharing mechanism--had not heard of HSIN-CS. Among the 55 stakeholders that had logged on to HSIN-CS, concerns were raised with the ability to locate information using the mechanism. Increasing awareness and functionality of HSIN-CS could help ensure that stakeholders receive security information, including TSA products. Defining and documenting the roles and responsibilities for information sharing among TSA offices could help strengthen information-sharing efforts. Officials from TSA's Office of Intelligence consider TSA's Transportation Sector Network Management offices to be key conduits for providing security-related information directly to stakeholders. However, officials from these offices differed in their understanding of their roles. For instance, officials told GAO that their role was to communicate policy and regulatory information, rather than threat-related information. While TSA officials look to the current Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan for guidance, it does not include key elements of the approach that TSA uses to communicate security-related information to stakeholders. For example, it does not describe the roles of TSA's Field Intelligence Officers, who facilitate the exchange of relevant threat information with local and private entities responsible for transportation security. Clearly documenting roles and responsibilities for sharing security-related information with transportation stakeholders could improve the effectiveness of TSA's efforts and help ensure accountability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA, among other actions, (1) address stakeholder needs regarding the quality of analysis in and availability of its products, (2) increase awareness and functionality of its information sharing mechanisms, and (3) define and document TSA's information sharing roles and responsibilities. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-103 | gao_GAO-16-103_0 | Although these and other compliance checks may identify potentially noncompliant tax returns that are subsequently audited, these programs are not the subject of this report. SB/SE Uses a Multiphase Process and Many Methods to Identify and Review Returns for Potential Audit; Most Returns Are Not Selected
SB/SE Uses a Multiphase Process to Select Tax Returns for Audit
SB/SE selects potentially noncompliant tax returns for audit using a multiphase process intended to enable IRS to narrow the large pool of available returns to those that most merit investment of audit resources. As shown in figure 2, in broad terms, this process generally includes (1) identifying an initial inventory of tax returns that have audit potential (e.g., reporting noncompliance), (2) reviewing that audit potential to reduce the number of returns that merit selection for audit (termed “classification”), (3) selecting returns by assigning them to auditors based on a field manager’s review of audit potential given available resources and needs, and (4) auditing selected returns. Computer programs. Taxpayer-initiated. The latter generally focuses on a single compliance issue and relies more on automated filters and rules to identify returns. Some workstreams, such as taxpayer claims and some referrals, involve more manual processes to identify and review returns; other workstreams involve both manual and automated processes or are almost entirely automated. Finally, the procedures for screening out returns vary across workstreams. In fiscal year 2014, DDb identified more than 77 percent of the closed EITC audits. Segregation of duties. Safeguarding data/systems. Given the different interpretations, not having a clear definition of fairness unintentionally can lead to inconsistent treatment of taxpayers and create doubts as to how fairly IRS administers the tax law. The procedures in IRM 1.4.2 govern IRS’s processes for monitoring and improving internal controls, which include the identification and mitigation of risks. SB/SE does not require all of these decisions and rationales to be documented. Files not located. Having procedures to ensure that selection decisions and rationale are clearly and consistently documented helps provide assurance that management directives are consistently followed and return selection decisions are made fairly. We also found that classification decisions are not always required to be reviewed. SB/SE does not always require that group manager return selection decisions (i.e., screen- out) be reviewed. Spreading responsibility for reviewing selection and screen-out decisions can reduce the potential for error and unfairness. This complexity underscores the importance of having a robust internal control system to support the selection process and achieve SB/SE’s mission of administering the “tax law with integrity and fairness to all.” SB/SE has some procedures in place that are consistent with internal control standards. Further, IRS will not be able to manage risk or monitor performance as well as it otherwise could. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure SB/SE’s audit selection program meets its mission and selects returns fairly, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following actions:
Clearly define and document the key term “fairness” for return selection activities. To help ensure that SB/SE’s audit selection objective(s) on fairness are used and met, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following actions:
Develop, document, and implement related performance measures that would allow SB/SE to determine how well the selection of returns for audit meets the new objective(s). IRS stated that it agreed with our seven recommendations. We also recommended that IRS improve the documentation and monitoring of selection decisions. Second, IRS’s letter stated that the seven groupings in our report do not reflect how IRS views its workstreams for identifying returns for potential audit selection. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the processes for selecting Small Business/Self- Employed (SB/SE) returns for audit, and (2) assesses how well the processes and controls for selecting those returns support SB/SE’s mission of “applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”
For the first objective, we reviewed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documents that describe the processes and criteria for selecting SB/SE returns for audit. We also interviewed IRS officials responsible for overseeing audit selection. For the second objective, we reviewed SB/SE’s procedures for selecting returns for audit and related internal controls intended to help SB/SE achieve its stated mission of “enforcing the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.” We then assessed whether these procedures followed standards from Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that were relevant to return selection. We also conducted eight focus groups with selected SB/SE staff who are responsible for reviewing or selecting SB/SE returns for audit. 5. 6. 30. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS audits small businesses and self-employed individuals to ensure compliance with tax laws. Audits can help improve reporting compliance and reduce the tax gap—the difference between taxes owed and those voluntarily paid on time, which is estimated at $385 billion annually after late payments and enforcement actions. Therefore, it is important that IRS makes informed decisions about how it selects taxpayers for audit.
GAO was asked to review IRS's processes and controls for selecting SB/SE taxpayers for audit. This report (1) describes these processes and (2) determines how well SB/SE's selection processes and controls support its mission to apply the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.
GAO reviewed IRS criteria, processes, and control procedures for selecting taxpayers for audit; assessed whether IRS control procedures followed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government ; and reviewed nonprobability samples of over 200 audit files. GAO also conducted eight focus groups with SB/SE staff who review or make audit selection decisions and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
The Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses over 30 methods, called workstreams, to identify and review tax returns that may merit an audit. These returns were initially identified through seven sources which include referrals; computer programs that run filters, rules, or algorithms to identify potentially noncompliant taxpayers; and related returns that are identified in the course of another audit.
SB/SE's workstreams follow a general, multiphase process for identifying, reviewing (classifying), and selecting returns for audit. Within this general approach, the selection process varies across workstreams. Differences include the number of review steps and manual processes, which are greater for field audits compared to correspondence audits which generally focus on a single compliance issue and are identified using automated processes. For fiscal year 2013, IRS reported that SB/SE's primary workstream for field audits identified about 1.6 million returns as potentially most noncompliant. About 77,500 returns (5 percent) were selected for audit, a much smaller pool of returns than was initially identified.
SB/SE has control procedures for safeguarding data and segregating duties across the overall selection process, among others, but it has not implemented other key internal controls. The lack of strong control procedures increases the risk that the audit program's mission of fair and equitable application of the tax laws will not be achieved. Examples of internal control deficiencies include the following:
Program objectives and key term of fairness are not clearly defined. Fairness is specified in SB/SE's mission statement and referenced in IRS's procedures for auditors. However, IRS has not defined fairness or program objectives for audit selection that would support its mission of treating taxpayers fairly. GAO heard different interpretations of fairness from focus group participants. Not having a clear definition of fairness can unintentionally lead to inconsistent treatment of taxpayers and create doubts as to how fairly IRS administers the tax law. Further, the lack of clearly articulated objectives undercuts the effectiveness of SB/SE's efforts to assess risks and measure performance toward achieving these objectives.
Procedures for documenting and monitoring selection decisions are not consistent. SB/SE does not always require selection decisions and rationales to be documented. For example, SB/SE requires that some workstreams document survey decisions (when returns are not assigned for audit), rationale, and approval using a form. Other workstreams, such as its primary workstream for field audits, require a group manager stamp but do not require the rationale to be documented. Also, SB/SE does not always require classification decisions (when returns are assessed for audit potential and compliance issues) to be reviewed. Having procedures to ensure that selection decisions and rationale are consistently documented and reviewed can reduce the potential for error and unfairness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take seven actions to help ensure that the audit selection program meets its mission, such as establishing and communicating program objectives related to audit selection and improving procedures for documenting and monitoring the selection process. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-60 | gao_GAO-17-60_0 | Federal law and regulations establish state reporting requirements for administering CCDF funds. Such states may wait list applicants or place limits on when families can apply for the program or which families receive subsidies. According to GAO’s analysis, out of the estimated 14.2 million children under age 13 nationwide who met federal work and income requirements for subsidies in an average month in 2011 and 2012, an estimated 8.6 million were eligible according to the eligibility policies in their states, and about 1.5 million received them. States that used wait lists to manage demand for subsidies tended to have higher income limits. 5). The Number of Families Receiving Subsidies Does Not Fully Reflect the Number of Eligible Families Who May Be Interested in Obtaining Them, Which Can Be Difficult to Predict
The number of children in families receiving subsidies does not equate to the population of eligible children in families who are interested in pursuing subsidies or who need them. Various officials and stakeholders told us it is difficult to accurately predict the extent to which families with eligible children are likely to apply for and receive subsidies. Wait lists can be challenging to administer. State child care officials from 23 of the 32 states that participated in our group interviews, for example, reported various challenges, such as being able to easily contact wait listed families and ensuring that they continued to want and qualify for subsidies. Prioritizing certain eligible families over others: Based on our analysis of the CCDF Policies Database Book of Tables, most states (40 out of 51) develop priority policies that specify which eligible families they will serve before other types of eligible families. Modifying eligibility policies: According to child care stakeholders and state child care officials, states may modify their eligibility policies to manage the size of their subsidy caseloads. States Leverage Other Programs and Funds to Help Meet Subsidy Need
Child care officials from 22 states described ways in which their states leverage funds and other programs to meet the child care needs of low- income working families. The agency noted that the report provides valuable information to states and federal officials about access to subsidies, and breaks new ground by analyzing state-by-state data on families eligible for and those that actually receive Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on: (1) what is known about the number and types of families eligible for child care subsidies and the extent to which they receive them; and (2) how states determine which eligible families receive subsidies when subsidy need exceeds supply. We used a variety of methods to address these objectives, including analyzing data from Urban Institute’s Transfer Income Model, version 3 (TRIM3) on subsidy eligibility, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) summary tables of administrative data on subsidy receipt (HHS administrative data), and HHS public use sample data on Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) recipients (HHS sample data). When reporting national totals, we included all states and the District of Columbia. Group Interviews
To understand how states manage demand for child care subsidies, we held interviews with child care administrators or their designees (collectively referred to as state child care officials in the report) from 32 states that had wait list policies in 2014 about how they assess need for subsidies in their states, prioritize who they serve, and manage wait lists (see table 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Child care subsidies help low-income families pay for care, allowing parents to work or attend school or training. Through the CCDF, the federal government provides states funding to assist these families. Federal law sets broad subsidy eligibility requirements and allows states to establish more restrictive policies. Due to limited funds, some eligible families may not be able to get subsidies and may be placed on wait lists.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review participation in the CCDF program across states. GAO examined: (1) what is known about the number and types of families eligible for child care subsidies and the extent to which they receive them; and (2) how states determine which eligible families receive subsidies when subsidy need exceeds supply. GAO used Urban Institute data from 2010-2012 to estimate eligible children (most recent at time of analysis) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) data on subsidy receipt (same years as Urban's data). GAO also held interviews with child care officials from 32 states with wait list policies about subsidy need and management. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and child care stakeholders (selected by reviewing studies and websites, and obtaining suggestions); reviewed federal laws and regulations; and examined state policies in the CCDF Policies Database Book of Tables, an HHS funded project that compiles policies for the 50 states and District of Columbia.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. HHS noted that the report provides valuable information about access to CCDF subsidies.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis of nationwide data for an average month in 2011-2012 approximately 8.6 million children under age 13 were estimated to be eligible for subsidies under the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) program based on policies in their states, and about 1.5 million received them. When compared with all eligible children, those receiving subsidies tended to be younger (under age 5) and poorer (in families below federal poverty guidelines). (See figure.) Some state-by-state variations existed in these and in other characteristics GAO analyzed, such as race, when comparing children eligible for and receiving subsidies.
According to various officials and stakeholders, the number of families receiving subsidies does not equate to the population of eligible families who are interested in pursuing them or who may need them. They also said that it is difficult to accurately predict the extent to which eligible families are likely to apply for and receive subsidies. For example, some eligible families may not pursue subsidies because they may not know about them or find applying burdensome.
Child care officials GAO interviewed said that they use wait lists and other strategies to manage caseloads when more families want subsidies than their states can serve. Wait lists can be challenging to manage, according to child care officials from 23 of the 32 states that GAO interviewed. Challenges included keeping lists current and accurate. Forty states also prioritize certain families for subsidies, such as recipients of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program and children in protective services. States also stop taking applications from all or some types of eligible families and modify eligibility policies to manage caseloads. Child care officials also noted that they leverage other programs and funds to meet the child care needs of low-income working families. |
gao_GAO-01-311 | gao_GAO-01-311_0 | Objective force units using these future combat systems would be able to engage and be successful in the full spectrum of conflicts. These brigades are expected to use these vehicles to develop operational and organizational concepts, training needs, and doctrine. A major challenge facing the Army is balancing its transformation plans within the defense budget. Future Combat Systems
The Army’s foremost challenge in the transformation is to design and equip an objective force with the Future Combat Systems that have the deployability of its current light force and the lethality and survivability of its current heavy force. The Army’s modernization plans call for the integration of information technologies into the Army force; the Army refers to this as digitization. Following Best Practices Will Be Critical To The Army’s Success
The Army’s ability to meet its transformation goals will largely hinge on its ability to manage transformation acquisition efforts as successful commercial firms do. It agreed that there are significant challenges in balancing the desired schedule, the required resources, and the necessary maturation of technology to accomplish the Army’s transformation goals. | What GAO Found
Changes in the character and the conduct of warfighting and in the range and the nature of missions call for an Army force that is more responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of operations and requires much less in-theater logistics support. To meet these new demands, the Army is using the latest technology to develop a series of weapon systems that will be lighter than today's heavy force systems but just as lethal and survivable. The Army's transformation effort will face several challenges. First, the transformation will place additional funding demands on the defense budget. Second, the Army's plans for the transformation assume that weapons systems and equipment can be developed and acquired much faster than in the past. Third, the Army needs to update current acquisition plans to reflect transformation priorities and schedules. The success of this effort depends on the Army's ability to manage transformation acquisitions as leading commercial firms do. By following best practices used in the commercial sector, the Army can better match its needs with its resources. |
gao_GAO-11-942T | gao_GAO-11-942T_0 | Federal agencies’ contracts with private businesses, whether made in the normal course of agency operations or specifically related to a natural disaster declaration, in most cases, are subject to certain goals to increase participation by various types of small businesses. Federal Agencies Awarded a Significant Amount of Contract Dollars Directly to Small Businesses in Gulf Coast and Other States
Federal agencies directly awarded $20.5 billion in contracts nationwide between fiscal years 2005 and 2011 for recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Of this $20.5 billion, small businesses located in four Gulf Coast states received approximately $2.7 billion (13.3 percent), and small businesses in the rest of the United States received United States received about $2.6 billion (see fig. 1). 2). In the four states, the amount of federal contract funds directly awarded to specific types of small businesses for Hurricanes Katrina- and Rita- related recovery efforts varied (see fig. Veteran-owned small businesses in Louisiana received about $180 million, the most in the Gulf Coast states. Corps of Engineers and DOD Could Not Demonstrate Consistent Monitoring of Subcontracting Information for Selected Contracts
The Corps and DOD could not demonstrate that they consistently were monitoring subcontracting accomplishment information as required. We reviewed the 57 construction contracts that the Corps, DHS, DOD, and GSA awarded directly to large businesses in fiscal years 2005– 2009 for hurricane- related recovery and that were listed in FPDS-NG as having subcontracting plans. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense take steps to ensure that contracting officials consistently comply with requirements to monitor the extent to which contractors were meeting subcontracting plan goals, including requirements for contractors with subcontracting plans to submit subcontracting accomplishment reports. DOD did not concur with the implication that its contracting personnel did not enforce requirements. We recently received information from both DOD and the Corps that indicates that they have initiated actions to address our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses small business participation in Gulf Coast rebuilding after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Federal agencies directly awarded $20.5 billion in contracts nationwide between fiscal years 2005 and 2011 for recovery efforts related to these hurricanes. These contracts are subject to federal procurement regulations and, in most cases, are generally subject to certain goals to increase participation by small businesses. This statement is based on a report we issued in July 2010, which discussed the extent to which Gulf Coast small businesses received federal contract funds for recovery efforts, with data on contract funds updated through fiscal year 2011 where possible. More specifically, the statement discusses (1) the amounts that small businesses nationwide and small businesses in four Gulf Coast states received directly from federal agencies through contracts for relief and recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (2) the extent to which four agencies--the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD) excluding the Corps, and General Services Administration (GSA)--monitored subcontracting accomplishment information as required for selected contracts.
What GAO Found
Small businesses located in four Gulf Coast states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas) received about $2.7 billion (13.3 percent) of the $20.5 billion federal agencies directly awarded nationwide in contracts for hurricane recovery between fiscal years 2005 and 2011. Small businesses in the rest of the United States received about $2.6 billion (12.9 percent). The Corps and the rest of DOD--two of four agencies that awarded the most in federal contracts for hurricane recovery--could not demonstrate that they consistently were monitoring subcontracting accomplishment data for 13 of the 43 construction contracts for which subcontracting plans were required. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense take steps to ensure that contracting officials with the Corps and other DOD departments consistently comply with requirements to monitor the extent to which contractors were meeting subcontracting plan goals. DOD did not concur with the implication that its contracting personnel did not enforce requirements. We recently received information from both DOD and the Corps that indicates that they have initiated actions to address our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-553 | gao_GAO-10-553_0 | Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Citizenship and Immigration Services. CNRA Provisions Applying U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI
CNRA applied federal immigration laws to the CNMI beginning on November 28, 2009, subject to a transition period that ends on December 31, 2014, and with key provisions affecting foreign workers, visitors, and foreign investors. DHS Has Begun Implementing Border Control but Has Not Negotiated Solutions to Operational Challenges
DHS components CBP, ICE, and USCIS have each taken steps to secure the border in the CNMI in accordance with CNRA. As a result, as of March 2010, ICE has transferred only 3 of 30 aliens with prior criminal records to correctional facilities in Guam or Honolulu and released the other 27 on their own recognizance. From November 28, 2009, to March 1, 2010, CBP officers working at the Saipan and Rota airports processed 103,565 arriving travelers, granting parole to 11,760 (11 percent). For calendar year 2009, USCIS processed 515 CNMI applications for permanent residency and 50 CNMI applications for naturalization or citizenship, more than doubling the number of interviews conducted for applications for residency or citizenship from calendar year 2008, according to data provided by USCIS officials. DHS Components Face Operational Challenges in the CNMI and Have Been Unable to Negotiate Solutions with the CNMI Government
CBP Has Not Yet Finalized Long-Term Occupancy Agreements with the CNMI Government for Required Airport Space
The space that the CNMI government has provided for CBP operations at the Saipan and Rota airports is inadequate to meet CBP’s basic facility requirements, and the two parties have not yet concluded negotiations for long-term occupancy agreements that would allow CBP to begin upgrading the facilities. Direct access to the data will facilitate the processing of applications for CNMI-only work permits and for CNMI-only nonimmigrant treaty investor status. U.S. Agencies’ Implementation of CNRA Programs for Workers, Visitors, and Investors Is Incomplete
U.S. agencies have begun to implement CNRA for workers, visitors, and investors, but key regulations are not final and, as a result, transition programs to preserve access to foreign workers and for investors are not yet available. DHS has established the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program but did not include two countries, China and Russia, that the CNMI and Guam consider key to their tourist industries. In May 2009, DHS officials informed Congress that the department is reconsidering whether to include China and Russia in the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we describe (1) the steps that have been taken to establish federal border control in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and (2) the status of efforts to implement the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA) provisions with regard to workers, visitors, and investors. To examine the relationship between the CNMI and the United States, we reviewed the CNMI-U.S. Covenant, the lawsuit between the CNMI and the United States to overturn specific provisions of the CNRA, and the CNMI protocol for implementing U.S. immigration law. We interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2008, the United States enacted the Consolidated Natural Resources Act (CNRA), amending the United States' Covenant with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to establish federal control of CNMI immigration in 2009, with several CNMI-specific provisions affecting foreign workers and investors during a transition. CNRA requires that GAO report on implementation of federal immigration law in the CNMI. This report describes the steps federal agencies have taken to (1) secure the border in the CNMI and (2) implement CNRA with regard to workers, visitors, and investors. GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and agency documents; met with U.S. and CNMI officials; and observed federal operations in the CNMI.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) have each taken steps to secure the border in the CNMI in accordance with CNRA. From November 28, 2009, to March 1, 2010, CBP processed 103,565 arriving travelers at CNMI airports, and ICE processed 72 aliens for removal proceedings. In calendar year 2009, USCIS processed 515 CNMI applications for permanent U.S. residency and 50 CNMI applications for U.S. naturalization or citizenship. However, the DHS components face operational challenges and have been unable to negotiate solutions with the CNMI government. First, airport space available to CBP does not meet facility standards and CBP has not reached a long-term occupancy agreement with the CNMI. Second, ICE has not come to an agreement with the CNMI for access to detention space and as a result has transferred 3 of 30 aliens--convicted criminals under CNMI or U.S. law--to correctional facilities in Guam and Honolulu. Third, DHS efforts to gain direct access to the CNMI's immigration databases have been unsuccessful, hampering U.S. enforcement operations. DHS has begun to implement work permit and visa programs for foreign workers, visitors, and investors, but key regulations are not final and certain transition programs therefore remain unavailable. A lawsuit filed by the CNMI government challenging some provisions of the CNRA resulted in a court injunction delaying implementation of the CNMI-only transitional worker program until DHS considers public comments and issues a new rule. As a result this program is unavailable to employers as of May 1, 2010. DHS has established the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program. However, DHS did not include China and Russia, two countries that provide significant economic benefit to the CNMI. Currently, DHS allows nationals from these two countries into the CNMI temporarily without a visa under the DHS Secretary's parole authority. DHS is reconsidering whether to include these countries in the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program. Although DHS has proposed rules that apply temporary U.S. nonimmigrant treaty investor status to investors with CNMI foreign investor entry permits, the program is not yet available. |
gao_GAO-08-220T | gao_GAO-08-220T_0 | As implemented by DOT, testing covers five drug categories: marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines (including methamphetamines), opiates (including heroin), and phencyclidine (PCP). FMCSA has responsibility for ensuring compliance by trucking and motor coach companies with drug testing requirements. FMCSA Faces Two Key Challenges in Ensuring Drug Testing Programs Are in Place
FMCSA’s efforts to ensure that commercial motor carriers have drug testing programs in place face two key challenges: limited compliance by carriers and others involved in the process, and limitations in the mechanisms FMCSA uses to ensure that drug testing programs are in place. Compliance by Carriers and Others Is in Question
Our reviews of FMCSA data, visits to individual carriers, and discussions with industry associations indicate that carriers, particularly small carriers and owner-operators, are often not in compliance with the drug testing regulations, resulting in the possibility that many drivers are not being tested, which increases the potential for drivers who use illegal substances to continue operating in safety-sensitive positions. According to FMCSA data, more than 70 percent of compliance reviews conducted since 2001 and more than 40 percent of safety audits conducted since 2003 found violations of drug testing regulations. 2). Posing as commercial truck drivers needing DOT drug tests, our investigators determined that there is also a lack of compliance with protocols among entities that collect specimens for testing, resulting in the ability for drivers to subvert a drug test. Safety audits began in 2003, and since these audits are targeted at new entrants, they do not affect companies in business earlier than 2003. FMCSA compliance reviews only reach approximately 2 percent of carriers each year. Except in the case of specific allegations or complaints, FMCSA investigators do not visit or audit collection sites or any other service agents employed by the carrier to observe procedures and enforce compliance with drug testing requirements. The carrier must seek out information on the regulations and other responsibilities. Options that we have identified to address these limitations include providing more information to carriers, service agents, and drivers when they enter the industry, and publicizing the materials available on the FMCSA Web site; encouraging carriers to do more to test and verify that the service agents they use are in compliance with the requirements; and increasing or expanding FMCSA’s oversight activities and enforcement authority. Our ongoing work will examine the advantages and disadvantages of the various options in more detail. Additional Challenges Threaten Integrity of the Drug Testing Process
Even in situations in which FMCSA is able to ensure that a carrier has a sound framework in place for drug testing, there are additional challenges that can affect the integrity of results for individual tests. Subversion of Drug Tests Is Still Possible
Adulterating or diluting the urine sample or substituting synthetic urine or drug-free urine is possible, even if carriers and service agents are in perfect compliance with requirements. For example, our investigators were able to successfully substitute synthetic urine at a collection site that appeared to follow all DOT protocols. The sheer number of these products, and the ease with which they are marketed and distributed through the Internet, present formidable obstacles to the integrity of the drug testing process. The extent to which subversion is occurring is unknown—and is impossible to determine. SAMHSA officials with whom we met noted that when adulterants work well and destroy the evidence of their presence, they are undetectable by laboratories. In addition, the use, and misuse, of prescription drugs may also be a problem. The urine test detects drugs used by the driver within the past several days (range of 1 to 5 days). Representatives from several motor carriers with whom we met told us that drivers’ applications are often incomplete. Such drivers can remain drug-free for a period of time leading up to their next preemployment test, get a negative result, and get hired—without their new employer knowing about any past positive drug tests and without having gone through the required return-to-duty process. Various options have been suggested for dealing with this issue, and in particular, many in the industry have proposed developing a national reporting requirement for past positive drug tests. Our Future Work Will Focus on Options to Address Challenges
Our future work, which we expect to complete in May 2008, will provide more definitive information about many of the matters covered in my statement today. | Why GAO Did This Study
Crashes involving commercial motor carriers, including trucks and buses, account for 13 percent of all highway deaths each year. While illegal drug use is not among the most frequently cited factors associated with large truck crashes; studies show that the use of illegal drugs, such as marijuana, heroin, or cocaine, can severely impair driving ability. Since 1988, federal regulations have required commercial drivers to submit urine samples to be tested for drugs. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is responsible for ensuring compliance with these regulations. News reports and other investigations have raised concerns that drivers may be escaping detection by avoiding the test or somehow altering the results. This testimony provides preliminary information on the challenges confronting FMCSA in (1) overseeing and enforcing compliance with drug testing regulations and (2) ensuring the integrity of the drug tests and the processes for keeping drivers with identified drug problems off the roads. It is based on work currently in process, which includes examining options to address these challenges. GAO's work thus far has included interviews with officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), along with a wide variety of stakeholders, including motor carriers, unions, and industry associations. GAO discussed this testimony with DOT officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
FMCSA faces two key challenges in ensuring that commercial motor carriers have drug testing programs in place. First, there appears to be a significant lack of compliance among motor carriers, particularly small carriers and self-employed drivers. Violations of drug testing protocols are noted in more than 40 percent of FMCSA's safety audits conducted since 2003 of carriers that have recently started operations and more than 70 percent of the compliance reviews conducted on carriers already in the industry since 2001. These problems also extend to service agents, which are entities that collect urine samples or administer other aspects of the program. For example, GAO investigators working under cover tested 24 collection sites and determined that 22 did not fully comply with applicable protocols. The second challenge is that FMCSA's oversight activities are limited, both in quantity and scope. Safety audits, which are targeted at new entrants, began in 2003 and, as a result, do not affect carriers in business earlier than 2003. Such companies can be covered in compliance reviews, but these reviews occur at only about 2 percent of carriers a year, according to FMCSA data. In addition, FMCSA oversight does not specifically address compliance by service agents, such as collection sites, unless there are particular allegations or complaints. Even when FMCSA is able to ensure that carriers and others are in compliance with drug testing requirements, there are additional challenges in ensuring the integrity of drug testing programs. The urine test itself can be subverted in various ways, such as adulterating or diluting the urine sample or substituting synthetic urine or a drug-free sample. Products designed to ''beat'' the test are brazenly marketed on the Internet. The extent to which subversion is occurring is unknown------and is impossible to determine. SAMHSA officials with whom we met told us when adulterants work well and destroy the evidence of their presence, they are undetectable. Furthermore, the required urine test has certain limitations. For example, it covers only five drug categories (marijuana; cocaine; amphetamines; opiates, such as heroin; and phencyclidine (PCP)), and it may provide a clean result if a person has not used any of these drugs within the past several days. Finally, drivers may not disclose instances in which they failed previous drug tests. If they are able to remain drug-free for enough time to pass a preemployment test, their new employer may not know about their past history of drug use. GAO identified various options to address these challenges, some of which were proposed by carriers, industry associations, DOT, and others. These options include publicizing educational information about the regulations for carriers, service agents, and drivers; encouraging carriers to do more to ensure service agent compliance; improving and expanding FMCSA oversight and enforcement authority; adopting federal legislation to prohibit products designed to tamper with a drug test; and developing a national reporting requirement for past positive drug test results. GAO's ongoing work will examine the advantages and disadvantages of the various options in more detail; we expect to issue the report in May 2008. |
gao_GAO-16-650 | gao_GAO-16-650_0 | In September 2011, Education introduced the Flexibility initiative and invited states to request a waiver for flexibility from certain NCLBA requirements in effect at the time. Generally, Education approved states to implement their requests for a certain number of years. Education Assessed States’ Ability to Implement Flexibility Waivers and Identified Challenges but Has Not Yet Evaluated Its Own Oversight Processes
Education Identified Challenges to States’ Ability to Implement Flexibility Waivers
By establishing a process to review, approve, and monitor states’ Flexibility waivers, Education identified challenges to states’ ability to fully implement their waivers, as shown in table 2. Twelve States Faced Multiple Challenges in Implementing Their Flexibility Waivers, Especially Related to Local Oversight
Of the 43 states with Flexibility waivers, we identified 12 states that faced multiple significant challenges throughout the initiative, affecting their ability to fully implement their waivers: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas. As shown in table 3, these 12 states had at least two of the following designations:
Education included conditions when approving the state’s initial
Education found during monitoring that the state was not implementing an element of its Flexibility waiver consistent with its approved request meeting Education’s expectations for establishing systems and processes—particularly for monitoring schools and school districts—that supported waiver implementation; or
Education included conditions when renewing the state’s Flexibility waiver. For example, Education identified risks related to Pennsylvania’s capacity to monitor interventions in “focus schools” prior to approving the state’s Flexibility waiver and subsequently found during Part B monitoring (nearly 2 years later) that the state lacked a plan to conduct such monitoring. According to our analysis of Education’s documentation, it took over 4 months, on average, to provide states with final Part B monitoring reports; for 10 states, it was over 6 months. According to standards for internal control in the federal government, agencies should consider lessons learned when planning agency activity, as doing so can help an agency communicate acquired knowledge more effectively and ensure that beneficial information is factored into planning, work processes, and activities. As Education begins its efforts to implement the ESSA, it has the opportunity to learn from its experiences with the Flexibility initiative. Without identifying lessons from oversight of the waiver process, Education may miss opportunities to better support ESSA implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better manage any challenges states may face implementing the ESSA, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Office of State Support to evaluate its oversight process in light of the challenges states encountered in implementing the Flexibility initiative to identify lessons learned and, as appropriate, incorporate any lessons into plans for overseeing the ESSA, particularly around issues such as the design and implementation of states’ monitoring systems. Appendix I: Key Benefits and Challenges of Flexibility Waivers, According to Officials in Selected States
In prior work, we interviewed selected states regarding the benefits and challenges of requesting and implementing waivers granted through the Department of Education’s (Education) Flexibility initiative under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Beginning in 2011, Education used its statutory authority to invite states to apply for waivers from certain provisions in the ESEA through its Flexibility initiative. To receive Flexibility waivers, states had to agree to meet other requirements related to college- and career-ready expectations, school accountability and support, and effective instruction. Education approved Flexibility waivers for 43 states. In December 2015, Congress reauthorized the ESEA which modified Education's waiver authority. GAO was asked to review Education's Flexibility initiative.
GAO examined the extent to which Education assessed states' ability to fully implement their Flexibility waivers and the process it used to oversee the waivers. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, guidance, and key documents related to the Flexibility initiative, such as monitoring reports; and interviewed Education officials. GAO reviewed Education's documents and identified states facing multiple challenges in implementing their waivers. GAO also interviewed officials in five states, selected to reflect a range of challenges states faced in implementing the waivers.
What GAO Found
Since introducing its Flexibility initiative in 2011—inviting states to request a waiver from certain provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) in effect at the time—the Department of Education (Education) has monitored states' efforts and identified challenges to states' ability to fully implement their waivers. According to GAO's analysis of Education letters and monitoring reports, 12 of the 43 states with Flexibility waivers faced multiple challenges that affected their ability to fully implement their waivers. Education used a risk assessment process to document these challenges throughout the waiver approval, monitoring, and renewal phases (see table). For example, Education identified risks with one state's capacity to oversee and monitor schools needing improvement prior to approving the state's waiver in 2013 and noted similar issues, as a result of monitoring, in 2015. Overseeing local districts and schools was particularly challenging for states, according to GAO's analysis of Education documents. Meanwhile, Education has not yet evaluated its process to review, approve, and monitor the Flexibility waivers given to states or incorporated any relevant lessons learned into its plans for implementing the December 2015 reauthorization of the ESEA. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should consider lessons learned when planning agency activities. As Education begins to implement the new law, it has an opportunity to learn from its experiences with the Flexibility initiative and incorporate any applicable lessons learned. Absent such an evaluation, Education may miss opportunities to better oversee state implementation of the new law.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education evaluate its Flexibility initiative oversight process to identify lessons learned and incorporate any applicable lessons into its plans for overseeing state implementation of the new law. Education generally agreed and outlined steps to address the recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-150 | gao_RCED-96-150_0 | Superfund Process Does Not Fully Establish Cleanup Priorities for Federal Facilities
The Superfund process does not fully and consistently identify for possible cleanup the federal facilities presenting the greatest risks to public health and the environment. In addition, EPA’s evaluation process does not produce enough information to rank sites on the basis of relative risk. Partial Inventory, Incomplete Site Assessments, and Lack of Policy Guidance Hamper Priority Setting
Agencies cannot fully set priorities without a complete inventory of contaminated sites and adequate data on the risks at these sites. The relative risk ranking is a primary tool for setting cleanup priorities and making funding decisions. Such a process would go well beyond the current qualitative, facility-based approach. According to an Interior official, the Department has not developed a centralized system for setting cleanup priorities for sites in the earlier stages of the Superfund process. Consistent National Approach to Ranking Relative Risks Can Help Identify Highest-Priority Sites
As discussed above, individual federal agencies use their own approaches to classifying the risks at sites and setting priorities for funding cleanups. Status of the 2,070 Federal Facilities on the Docket
7.4% Currently on NPL (154)0.1% Removed From NPL (3)
Evaluation in Process (1,040)
Inclusion on NPL Not Warranted (873)
Estimates of Total Future Costs to Complete Cleanups and Number of Potentially Contaminated Federal Sites
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to assess (1) whether Superfund is identifying the highest-priority federal sites for cleanup and (2) what progress is being made by the departments of Defense, Energy, and the Interior in establishing approaches for ranking risks and setting priorities for cleanups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how priorities are being set for hazardous waste cleanups, focusing on: (1) whether the Superfund program is identifying the highest-priority cleanup sites; and (2) the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of the Interior approaches for ranking risks and prioritizing sites for cleanup.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Superfund program does not completely and consistently identify the federal facilities presenting the greatest risks to public health and the environment; (2) without a complete inventory of contaminated sites, adequate data on the risks at these sites, and consistent policy guidance, agencies cannot fully prioritize cleanup activities; (3) the National Priorities List (NPL) does not include all eligible contaminated sites and the Hazard Ranking System does not provide sufficient information to rank contaminated facilities on the basis of risk; (4) federal agencies responsible for cleanups do not use a consistent approach to assess relative risk; (5) to help set cleanup priorities and make funding decisions, DOD developed a risk-ranking tool to categorize contaminated sites; (6) DOE uses a qualitative, facility-based approach to evaluate contaminated sites and prioritize cleanups; (7) Interior uses a centralized priority-setting mechanism in the later stages of the Superfund process to rank its contaminated facilities; and (8) while individual agencies use their own risk-assessment processes, it would be more cost-effective for agencies to use a consistent, national approach to rank risks and identify high-priority sites. |
gao_GAO-14-589 | gao_GAO-14-589_0 | FTA Funds Rural and Tribal Transit Programs Largely Through Formula Grants and Oversees and Provides Assistance to Grantees
For Most Selected Providers, FTA’s Rural Transit Program is a Key Source of Funding
The rural transit program is FTA’s only dedicated funding program for rural and tribal transit. Enacted in 2012, MAP-21 increased funding for the rural transit program, from about $500 million to about $600 million annually, made planning activities an eligible activity for the first time, and added low income population as a factor in the formula that allocates grant funds to states. MAP-21 also doubled the funding level for the Tribal Transit Program from about $15 million to about $30 million annually. Officials frequently indicated that without rural transit program funds, transit service in their area would be reduced or, in some cases, eliminated. Officials in two states indicated that the consolidation should provide greater flexibility in service provision and reduce the number of federal grants they administer.New York explained that the consolidation could leave some rural transportation programs that provided service to low income people funded with JARC grants, without a federal funding source in the rural transit program because these programs do not offer transit services to the general public, as required by the rural transit program. Additionally, in fiscal year 2013, FTA also awarded discretionary grants totaling $5 million. Additionally, FTA conducts formal reviews on specific areas, such as procurement systems. Because tribes can be either direct grantees of FTA or sub-grantees of the states, or both, some tribes report directly to FTA while other tribes report their data through their state transportation agency. According to nearly all state transportation agency officials and tribal transit officials we spoke with, FTA training has been helpful. Since 2009, Rural and Tribal Transit Providers’ Services Have Remained Generally the Same and Have Experienced Increased Ridership and Costs
Rural and Tribal Transit Providers Continue to Provide a Range of Transportation Services for Transit Dependent Groups
From 2009 through 2012, to meet the transportation needs of their communities, rural and tribal transit providers offered similar types of services based on their passenger demographics, population density, and budget, among other factors. This official also said that fixed route trips accounted for the bulk of the system’s ridership. Nationally, according to data from the rural NTD, ridership increased about 4 percent from 2009 through 2012. Selected Providers Face Operational and Funding Challenges and Tribal Transit Funding Changes Have Created Some Uncertainty
Providers Identified Operational and Funding Challenges and Suggested Solutions
In providing transit services in rural and tribal areas, rural and tribal transit providers face an array of challenges. While these challenges were consistently identified in our interviews, the results of our interviews are not generalizable to all rural and tribal transit providers. Several providers indicated that the match requirement helped encourage local investments in transit, but noted that it was still difficult to secure local funds. The Consequences of Different Funding Levels under MAP-21 for Tribal Transit Program Grantees Are Unclear, but May Include Some Disruptions in Transit Services
The Tribal Transit Program was changed to a largely formula-based allocation of funds, and FTA expected this change to increase the stability and reliability of funding for tribal transit providers and thereby to provide better support for public transportation in tribal areas, the goal of the program. We analyzed FTA discretionary grant awards from fiscal year 2009 through 2012 and formula grant awards in fiscal year 2013 and 2014. Two tribes received increases of over 1,000 percent.award reductions of 50 percent or more in average annual funding compared with what they had received previously in discretionary awards. According to FTA officials, tribal transit systems that received increased grant awards generally tended to be larger tribal transit systems, while those that received decreased grant awards generally were smaller tribal transit systems. In fiscal year 2014, it was awarded approximately $1.2 million by formula. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation for review and comment. The Department of Transportation did not have any comments on the report. 3. To identify the challenges that rural transit providers face and any actions that could address these challenges, we reviewed relevant academic literature pertaining to rural and tribal transit in the U.S. and interviewed two national stakeholder groups—the Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA) and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)—that, respectively, work closely with rural and transit providers and state transportation agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public transportation in rural areas can be critical to connecting people to jobs, shopping, and health services. FTA awarded approximately $600 million in grants in both fiscal year 2013 and 2014 to support rural transit, including tribal transit. The current surface transportation authorization, enacted in 2012, increased funding for tribal transit from about $15 to $30 million per year and changed how these funds are allocated.
The committee asked GAO to review FTA's rural transit program. This report examines (1) FTA's funding, oversight, and other support for the rural transit program; (2) changes in services, ridership, and costs since 2009; and (3) challenges that rural and tribal transit providers face and possible actions to address them. To address these topics, GAO reviewed program documentation and conducted about 50 interviews with FTA officials, national groups that have a relationship with rural transit providers, state transportation officials, and officials from rural and tribal transit providers. GAO selected state officials and providers based on grant amounts, the types of services offered, the size of transit systems, and geography, among other factors. Results are not generalizable to all states and providers. Additionally, GAO analyzed FTA data on transit services, ridership, and costs from 2009 through 2012, the latest year data were available. This report contains no recommendations. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation for review and comment. The Department of Transportation did not have any comments on the report.
What GAO Found
The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) Formula Grants for Rural Areas Program (rural transit program) is FTA's only dedicated grant program for rural and tribal transit. FTA apportions nearly all program funds to states. State transportation agencies then allocate funding to rural and tribal transit providers as sub-grantees. The remainder of program funds—$30 million annually—supports the Tribal Transit Program through direct apportionments to tribes based on a new statutory formula ($25 million) used for the first time in fiscal year 2013, or through discretionary grants ($5 million). Twenty-two of the 30 selected rural and tribal transit providers GAO spoke with indicated that rural transit program funds are essential to sustaining transit in their communities, noting that without these funds, transit service in their area would be reduced or, in some cases, eliminated. FTA's oversight activities focus on state transportation agencies that oversee providers. FTA also offers support to providers, such as for training on safety, and providers generally agreed that this support is useful.
From 2009 through 2012, the types of services offered by rural and tribal transit providers have remained about the same. Demand-response service, in which riders call in advance to schedule their trips, and fixed- or deviated-fixed-route service, in which a bus will deviate from an established route, are most typical in rural areas (see fig.). In this period, ridership increased 4 percent, and operating costs increased 19 percent, according to FTA national data.
Selected rural and tribal transit providers identified an array of operational and funding challenges. For example, 24 of the 30 providers GAO interviewed said that it was difficult to hire and retain qualified drivers, and 16 said that it was hard to secure local or state funds to meet the rural transit program's funding-match requirements. Some providers GAO interviewed addressed these respective challenges by offering training and through dedicated local tax funding. GAO also found that the new Tribal Transit Program's statutory formula—which emphasizes miles driven in providing transit services—resulted in some tribes receiving grant amounts that varied significantly from previous levels, with increases and decreases of 50 percent or more common. According to FTA officials, larger tribal transit systems tended to receive increased awards, while smaller systems tended to receive reduced awards. FTA officials also indicated they anticipated that when implementing the formula for the first time that it would result in very different funding levels for some tribal transit providers. Accordingly, FTA conducted outreach and meetings with providers to educate them about these likely changes. Selected tribal transit providers and FTA have considered strategies to mitigate declines in Tribal Transit Program funding and are still in the process of adjusting to new funding levels. |
gao_GAO-03-485 | gao_GAO-03-485_0 | Although pesticides play a significant role in increasing production of tobacco, food, and other crops by reducing the number of crop-destroying pests, exposure to pesticides can harm humans. Most of these pesticides were also widely used on food crops. Failure to comply with the conditions set by EPA could result in a range of harmful effects. The assessments also identify risks to the general population that may also require special limitations on how or where the pesticides may be used. EPA has generally concluded that the low levels of residues measured in tobacco smoke do not pose health concerns that require mitigation. In addition, EPA has chosen not to assess the risk of either intermediate- or long-term exposure to pesticide residues in smoke because of the severity and quantity of health effects associated with the use of tobacco products themselves. EPA Concludes That Risks Associated with Pesticide Use Can Be Significant, but Those Associated with Pesticide Residues on Tobacco Appear to Be Minimal
EPA’s health risk assessments have identified a number of potential adverse health effects associated with the pesticides used on tobacco and other crops that, in some cases, have led the agency to impose special limitations on the uses of these pesticides. Federal Regulation of Pesticide Residues on Tobacco Is Limited
While EPA is required to regulate residues of pesticides approved for use on human food and animal feed crops, no such requirement applies to pesticides approved for use on tobacco. USDA has not reevaluated the pesticides it regulates since 1989, although changes in the pesticides used on tobacco have occurred since then. USDA Tests Imported and Domestic Tobacco for Regulated Pesticides
Also as required by the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act, USDA tests certain imported and domestic tobacco to ensure that residues do not exceed the maximum allowable concentrations the agency established. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better protect the public from exposures to residues of pesticides not approved for use on tobacco in the United States and ensure that domestic tobacco producers are not placed at an unfair disadvantage relative to producers in other countries, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture direct the Administrators of the Agricultural Marketing Service and the Farm Service Agency to periodically review and update the pesticides for which they set residue limits and test imported and domestic tobacco. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides information on (1) the pesticides commonly used on tobacco and the potential health risks associated with them; (2) how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assesses and mitigates health risks associated with pesticides used on tobacco; and (3) how, and the extent to which, EPA, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other federal agencies regulate and monitor pesticide residues on tobacco. None of these countries have adopted limits for 7 of the pesticides commonly used on U.S. tobacco during the 1990s. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pesticides play a significant role in increasing production of tobacco, food, and other crops by reducing the number of crop-destroying pests. However, if used improperly, pesticides can have significant adverse health effects. GAO was asked to (1) identify the pesticides commonly used on tobacco crops and the potential health risks associated with them, (2) determine how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assesses and mitigates health risks associated with pesticides used on tobacco, and (3) assess the extent to which federal agencies regulate and test for pesticide residues on tobacco.
What GAO Found
In the 1990s, domestic growers commonly used 37 pesticides approved for use on tobacco by EPA. Most of these pesticides were also used on food crops. When used in ways that deviate from conditions set by EPA, many of these pesticides can cause moderate to severe respiratory and neurological damage--and may result in death. Moreover, animal studies suggest that some of these pesticides may cause birth defects or cancer. Under its pesticide registration program, EPA evaluates toxicity and other data to assess health risks to workers and the public from exposure to pesticides--and risks to smokers from exposure to residues in smoke. These assessments have identified a range of risks that required such mitigation as limiting where and how the pesticide may be used, prohibiting use in certain states, and requiring workers to wear respirators and chemical-resistant clothing. On the other hand, EPA has concluded that low levels of residues in tobacco smoke do not pose short-term health concerns requiring mitigation. EPA does not assess intermediate or long-term risks to smokers because of the severity of health effects linked to use of tobacco products themselves. While EPA regulates the specific pesticides that may be used on tobacco and other crops and specifies how the pesticides may be used, it does not otherwise regulate residues of pesticides approved for use on tobacco. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), however, is required by the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act to test imported and domestic tobacco for residues of pesticides not approved by EPA for use on tobacco that federal officials believe are used in other countries. By helping ensure that other countries do not use highly toxic pesticides that U.S. tobacco growers may not use, federal regulation of pesticide residues on tobacco addresses trade equity as well as health and environmental issues. However, USDA has not reevaluated the list of pesticides for which it tests since 1989, even though EPA has cancelled tobacco use for over 30 pesticides since then. |
gao_GAO-12-802T | gao_GAO-12-802T_0 | USAID Faces Challenges in Managing Contracts and Assistance Instruments
In carrying out its Afghan assistance efforts, USAID has experienced a number of systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments, such as grants and cooperative agreements. These challenges include gaps in planning for the use of contractors and assistance recipients and having visibility into their numbers. While USAID has faced challenges, it has also taken actions to help mitigate some of the risks associated with awarding contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. Such findings are not new. In the absence of strategic planning for its use of contractors, we found that it was often individual offices within USAID that made case-by-case decisions on the use of contractors to support contract or grant administration functions. Over the last four years, we have reported on limitations in USAID’s visibility into the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments with performance in Afghanistan, as well as the number of personnel working under those contracts and assistance instruments. Having reliable, meaningful data on contractors and assistance recipients is a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management and oversight. In January 2011, in order to counter potential risks of U.S. funds being diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity, USAID created a process for vetting prospective non-U.S. contractors and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan. Specifically, we recommended that USAID, the Department of Defense (which had a vendor vetting program), and the Department of State (which did not have a vendor vetting program comparable to USAID’s or Defense’s) should consider developing formalized procedures, such as an interagency agreement, to ensure the continuity of communication of vetting results and to support intelligence information, so that other contracting activities may be informed by those results. USAID Has Taken Some Action to Strengthen Oversight of Program Performance
We have previously reported on systematic weaknesses in USAID’s oversight and monitoring of the performance of projects and programs carried out by its implementing partners in Afghanistan. In 2010, we reported that USAID did not consistently follow its established performance management and evaluation procedures with regard to its agriculture and water sector projects in Afghanistan.There were various areas in which the USAID Mission to Afghanistan needed to improve. For example, only two of seven USAID-funded agricultural programs that were active during fiscal year 2009 and included in our review had targets for all of their indicators. We also found that a lack of documentation of key programmatic decisions and an insufficient method to transfer knowledge to successors had contributed to the loss of institutional knowledge—a challenge that we reported USAID should address. USAID concurred with these recommendations and identified several actions the agency is taking in Afghanistan to address them, including the following: In 2011, USAID established mandatory technical guidance for program monitoring officials on how to establish and where to maintain files, in addition to key responsibilities of the office director to ensure that files are maintained before officials leave their positions. Although USAID conducted preaward risk assessments for most of its bilateral direct assistance to the Afghan government, we found that USAID’s policies did not require preaward risk assessments in all cases. For example, we reported in 2011 that USAID did not complete preaward risk assessments, such as determining the awardees’ capability to independently manage and account for funds, in two of the eight cases of bilateral direct assistance. We also found that USAID established general financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with Afghan ministries, including requiring that the ministries: establish separate noncommingled bank accounts, grant USAID access rights to the bank accounts, have a monitoring and evaluation plan, comply with periodic reporting requirements, and maintain books and records subject to audit. With respect to direct assistance provided multilaterally through public international organizations such as the World Bank, USAID’s policy is to generally rely on the organization’s financial management, procurement, and audit policies and procedures. We found, however, that USAID has not consistently complied with its multilateral trust fund risk assessment policies in awarding funds to the World Bank’s ARTF. In response to our findings and a prior GAO report, USAID revised and expanded its guidance on preaward risk assessments for the World Bank and other public international organizations. Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office conducts audits of Afghan government programs, including those funded by the ARTF, but lacked qualified auditors and faced other capacity restraints, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and USAID. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the United States has appropriated nearly $90 billion to help stabilize Afghanistan and build the Afghan governments capacity to provide security, enhance governance, and develop a sustainable economy. To assist Congress in its oversight, GAO has issued over 100 reports and testimonies related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, including those managed by USAID and the Departments of Defense and State. USAID provides assistance to Afghanistan through contracts and assistance instruments, such as grants and cooperative agreements, and in the form of direct assistancefunding provided through the Afghan national budget for use by its ministries. Direct assistance is provided (1) bilaterally to individual Afghan ministries or (2) multilaterally through trust funds administered by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program. This testimony discusses findings from GAO reports issued primarily in 2010 and 2011 that cover USAIDs (1) management of contracts and assistance instruments, (2) oversight of development-related program performance and results, and (3) accountability for direct assistance.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has experienced systemic challenges that have hindered its ability to manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. Key challenges include gaps in planning for the use of contractors and assistance recipients and having visibility into their numbers. For example, GAO reported in April 2010 that, absent strategic planning for its use of contractors, individual offices within USAID often made case-by-case decisions on using contractors to support contract or grant administration and risks, such as possible conflicts of interest, were not always addressed. While having reliable data on contractors and assistance recipients is a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management, GAO has also reported on limitations in USAIDs visibility into the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan, as well as the number of personnel working under them. USAID, along with other agencies, has not implemented GAOs recommendation to address such limitations. USAID, however, has taken other actions to mitigate risks associated with awarding contracts and assistance instruments in Afghanistan. In June 2011, GAO reported on USAIDs vendor vetting program, then in its early stages, which was designed to counter potential risks of U.S. funds being diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity. GAO recommended that USAID take a more risk-based approach to vet non-U.S. vendors and develop formal mechanisms to share vetting results with other agencies, both of which USAID agreed to do.
GAO has found systematic weaknesses in USAIDs oversight and monitoring of project and program performance in Afghanistan. In 2010, GAO reported that USAID did not consistently follow its established performance management and evaluation procedures for Afghanistan agriculture and water sector projects. For example, only two of seven USAID-funded agricultural programs included in GAOs review had targets for all their performance indicators. Moreover, the USAID Mission was operating without a required performance management plan. In addition, GAO reported on a lack of documentation of key programmatic decisions and an insufficient method to transfer knowledge to successors. USAID has taken several actions in response to these findings, such as updating its performance management plan and establishing mandatory guidelines on file maintenance to help ensure knowledge transfer.
USAID has established and generally complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance agreements, such as requiring separate bank accounts and maintenance of records subject to audit. However, GAO found in 2011 that USAID had not always assessed the financial risks in providing direct assistance to Afghan government entities before awarding funds. For example, USAID did not complete preaward risk assessments in two of eight cases of bilateral assistance GAO identified. With regard to direct assistance provided multilaterally through the World Banks Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), GAO found in 2011 that USAID had not consistently complied with its own risk assessment policies, and USAID had not conducted a risk assessment before awarding $1.3 billion to ARTF in March 2010. In response to GAO reports, USAID revised and expanded its guidance on preaward risk assessments for the World Bank and other public international organizations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations but has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving USAIDs management and oversight of assistance funds in Afghanistan. USAID has generally concurred with most of these recommendations and has taken or planned steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-07-799T | gao_GAO-07-799T_0 | Since the mid-1980s, about $107 billion has been spent, and over the next 5 years, another $49 billion is expected to be invested. To enable MDA to field and enhance a missile defense system quickly, the Secretary of Defense, in 2002, directed a new acquisition strategy. To carry out its mission, MDA is fielding missile defense capabilities in 2-year increments known as blocks. This block is expected to provide protection against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. For example, in fiscal year 2006, funding for the nine BMDS elements collectively accounted for 72 percent of MDA’s research and development budget. We examined the current status of MDA’s quality assurance program by visiting various contractor facilities and holding discussions with MDA officials, such as officials in the Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance. MDA Has Made Progress with Block 2006, but Scope Has Been Reduced and Costs Have Gone Up
MDA made progress during fiscal year 2006, but it will not achieve the goals it set for itself in March 2005. One year after establishing its Block 2006 goals, the agency informed Congress that it planned to field fewer assets, reduce performance goals, and increase the block’s cost goal. MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals, but the performance of the BMDS cannot yet be fully assessed because there have been too few flight tests conducted to anchor the models and simulations that predict overall system performance. During the first year of Block 2006, MDA continued to improve the BMDS by enhancing its performance and fielding additional assets. For example, the GMD element completed its first successful intercept attempt since 2002. The test was also notable because it was an end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the first such test that the program has conducted. With the exception of the GMD interceptors, MDA is on track to deliver the revised quantities. MDA also reduced the performance expected of Block 2006 commensurate with the reduction in assets. However, insufficient data are available to determine whether MDA is on track to meet the new goal. While MDA reduced Block 2006 quantity and performance goals, it increased the block’s cost goal from about $19.3 billion to approximately $20.3 billion. MDA’s Flexibility Makes Oversight and Accountability More Difficult
Because the BMDS has not formally entered the system development and demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply several important oversight mechanisms contained in certain acquisition laws that, among other things, provide transparency into program progress and decisions. On the other hand, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, making it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original expectations and to determine the actual cost of each block and of individual operational assets. Over the years, a framework of laws has been created that make major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA can make decisions faster than other major acquisition programs because it does not have to wait for higher-level approvals or independent reviews. Because MDA uses research and development funds to manufacture assets, it is not required to fully fund those assets in the year of their purchase. MDA considers the cost of deferred work, which may be the delayed delivery of assets or other work activities, as a cost of the block in which the work is performed even though the work benefits or was planned for a prior block. MDA expanded its teaming approach in 2006 to another problem supplier and reports that many systemic solutions are already underway. During fiscal year 2006, MDA’s audits continued to identify both quality control weaknesses and quality control procedures that contractors are addressing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 5 years the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) expects to invest $49 billion in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system's development and fielding. MDA's strategy is to field new capabilities in 2-year blocks. In January 2006, MDA initiated its second block--Block 2006--to protect against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. Congress requires GAO to assess MDA's progress annually. GAO's March 2007 report addressed MDA's progress during fiscal year 2006 and followed up on program oversight issues and the current status of MDA's quality assurance program. GAO assessed the progress of each element being developed by MDA, examined acquisition laws applicable to major acquisition programs, and reviewed the impact of implemented quality initiatives.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2006, MDA fielded additional assets for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), enhanced the capability of some assets, and realized several noteworthy testing achievements. For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element successfully conducted its first end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the element's first successful intercept test since 2002. However, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost, fielding, or performance goals because the agency has revised those goals. In March 2006, MDA: reduced its goal for fielded assets to provide funds for technical problems and new and increased operations and sustainment requirements; increased its cost goal by about $1 billion--from $19.3 to $20.3 billion; and reduced its performance goal commensurate with the reduction of assets. MDA may also reduce the scope of the block further by deferring other work until a future block because four elements incurred about $478 million in fiscal year 2006 budget overruns. With the possible exception of GMD interceptors, MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals. But the deferral of work, both into and out of Block 2006, and inconsistent reporting of costs by some BMDS elements, makes the actual cost of Block 2006 difficult to determine. In addition, GAO cannot assess whether the block will meet its revised performance goals until MDA's models and simulations are anchored by sufficient flight tests to have confidence that predictions of performance are reliable. Because MDA has not formally entered the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply certain laws intended to hold major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA is more agile in its decision-making because it does not have to wait for outside reviews or obtain higher-level approvals of its goals or changes to those goals. Because MDA can revise its baseline, it has the ability to field fewer assets than planned, defer work to a future block, and increase planned cost. All of this makes it hard to reconcile cost and outcomes against original goals and to determine the value of the work accomplished. Also, using research and development funds to purchase operational assets allows costs to be spread over 2 or more years, which makes costs harder to track and commits future budgets. MDA continues to identify quality assurance weaknesses, but the agency's corrective measures are beginning to produce results. Quality deficiencies are declining as MDA implements corrective actions, such as a teaming approach designed to restore the reliability of key suppliers. |
gao_GAO-15-192 | gao_GAO-15-192_0 | Information Required for Milestone Decisions Takes Significant Time and Effort to Document, but Does Not Always Add High Value
Programs we surveyed spent on average over 2 years completing the steps necessary to document up to 49 information requirements for their most recent acquisition milestone. These 49 requirements also took, in total, on average 5,600 staff days for programs to document. All four programs needed about 24 months to complete the process. DOD has recognized that its extensive review process is a challenge. The program managers considered the value added to 10 percent of the documentation to be high. DOD Has Experience Using a Streamlined Process, and Commercial Firms Also Offer Alternative Approaches
DOD has proven it can streamline its process. Programs we surveyed spent over 2 years completing information requirements that in some instances can be reviewed by as many as 56 organizations at eight levels. The challenge is to find the right balance between having an effective oversight process and the competing demands such a process places on program management. The pilot programs could rely on practices used by some DOD classified programs and private industry companies we visited—namely, fewer information requirements and levels of review and more frequent interaction between the program office and actual decision makers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve DOD’s milestone decision process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in collaboration with the military service acquisition executives, program executive officers, and program managers take the following two actions: In the near term, identify and potentially eliminate (1) reviews associated with information requirements, with a specific focus on reducing review levels that do not add value, and (2) information requirements that do not add value and are no longer needed. DOD concurred with both of our recommendations. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the Department of Defense’s (DOD) weapon system acquisition process. Specifically we examined (1) the effort and value involved in DOD’s preparation for a milestone decision, (2) the factors that influence the time needed to complete the milestone decision process, and (3) alternative processes used by some DOD programs and leading commercial firms. In addition, we asked programs to provide detailed information related to the information requirements they prepared for the milestone, including the length of time spent documenting each information requirement; length of time it took the documentation to make it through the review process; the number of staff days the program office spent documenting each information requirement; and the cost to document each information requirement. To determine the factors that influence the time needed to complete the milestone decision process, we met with officials and functional leaders and reviewed documents from several organizations within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, including the Under Secretary. To identify practices used by leading commercial firms that might be used to improve DOD’s acquisition process, we visited five companies to learn more about how they manage their product development processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has long sought to improve the efficiency of its weapon system acquisition process, including the time and effort needed to complete the milestone decision process.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to review DOD's weapon system acquisition process. This report examines (1) the effort and value involved in the preparation for a milestone decision; (2) factors that influence the time needed to complete the milestone decision process; and (3) alternative processes used by some DOD programs and leading commercial firms.
To perform this work, GAO examined the levels of review and information requirements that are part of DOD's process. GAO surveyed 24 program managers and 40 other DOD officials on the value and the time to complete milestone documentation. For 15 program offices, we gathered data on the time to complete the entire milestone decision process. GAO discussed with DOD officials the factors that lead to inefficiencies. GAO also examined practices used by some classified DOD programs and five commercial firms generally recognized as leaders in product development.
What GAO Found
The acquisition programs GAO surveyed spent, on average, over 2 years completing numerous information requirements for their most recent milestone decision, yet acquisition officials considered only about half of the requirements as high value. The requirements, in total, averaged 5,600 staff days to document.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) review process is a key factor that influences the time needed to complete information requirements. The process in some instances can include up to 56 organizations at 8 levels and accounts for about half of the time needed to complete information requirements. Most program managers felt that these reviews added high value to only 10 percent of the documents.
DOD's F-16 aircraft program, some classified programs, and five commercial firms GAO visited use streamlined processes with fewer documents and reviews and offer alternatives to the traditional DOD process. Establishing an efficient process for documentation and oversight is a key internal control to avoid wasteful spending. The challenge is to find the right balance between effective oversight and the competing demands on programs. DOD, however, has not yet identified ways to achieve the right balance by minimizing the time spent on information requirements and reviews that contribute to its inefficient milestone decision process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD identify and potentially eliminate reviews and information requirements that are no longer needed and select programs to pilot more streamlined approaches to provide only the most essential information to decision makers. DOD concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-630 | gao_GAO-06-630_0 | Airline Deregulation Was Originally Intended to Encourage Competition, Thereby Lowering Fares and Improving Service
The Airline Deregulation Act phased out federal control over airline pricing and routes. The Airline Industry Has Undergone Significant Change since Deregulation
The airline industry has undergone significant change since the late 1970s. Only two airlines still offer defined benefit pension plans. The U.S. 3). Since the industry downturn that began in 2000, there has been a shift in the airline industry: a weakening of the financial condition of legacy airlines and an increasing market share for low-cost carriers. Bankruptcy Has Been Used to Terminate Defined Benefit Pension Plans
In 2005, we examined the issue of airline bankruptcy and, in particular, how some airlines were using bankruptcy to terminate their defined benefit pension plans. Nevertheless, we expressed concern about the use of bankruptcy to terminate defined benefit pension plans because of the costs to the federal government as well as to employees and beneficiaries. USAirways and United, subjected to intense cost pressures from growing low-cost airlines like Southwest, entered bankruptcy and terminated their labor contracts and pension plans. The pension plan terminations cost PBGC nearly $10 billion and plan participants lost more than $5 billion in promised benefits that are not covered by PBGC. Real Fares Have Declined and Service Has Expanded since 1980
Airfares have fallen in real terms over time, with round-trip median fares almost 40 percent lower since 1980. However, fares in short-distance markets (less than 250 miles) and “thin” markets (the bottom 20 percent of passenger traffic) have not fallen as much as those for longer distances or in heavily traveled markets. Some studies using this approach have used the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) to approximate the regulated fare and concluded that consumers as a whole have benefited from lower fares resulting from deregulation. Airline Traffic Has Grown and Markets Are More Competitive, Though to a Lesser Degree in Small Markets
As predicted by deregulation, airline city-pair markets have become more competitive since deregulation. As shown in figure 12, the average number of effective competitors (any airline that carries at least 5 percent of the traffic in that market) in any city pair increased from 2.2 in 1980 to 3.5 in 2005. Evidence Suggests That Reregulation of Airline Entry and Rates Would Reverse Consumer Benefits and Not Save Airline Pensions
According to our analysis of the evidence, reregulation of airline entry and rates would not benefit consumers and the airline industry. Our analysis of fares and service since deregulation provides evidence that consumers have benefited over the intervening years. Reregulating the airline industry would have ramifications reaching far beyond the fare and service effects on airline passengers and communities. As we found in our 2005 report on airline bankruptcies and pension problems, pension losses were attributable to market forces, poor airline management and union decisions, and inadequate pension funding rules—including insufficient funding requirements and the inadequate relationship between premiums paid by plan sponsors and PBGC’s exposure to financial risk. These factors also led to the termination of pensions in other industries with large legacy pension costs, such as steel. We have previously recommended that Congress consider broad pension reform that is comprehensive in scope and balanced in effect. We defined “service” in terms of connectivity and the number of competitors in a market. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 phased out the government's control over fares and service and allowed market forces to determine the price and level of domestic airline service in the United States. The intent was to increase competition and thereby lead to lower fares and improved service. In 2005, GAO reported on the tenuous finances of some airlines that have led to bankruptcy and pension terminations, in particular among those airlines that predated deregulation (referred to as legacy airlines). The House Report accompanying the 2006 Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriation Act expressed concern about airline pension defaults and charged GAO with analyzing the impact of reregulating the airline industry on reducing potential pension defaults by airlines. GAO subsequently agreed to address the pension issue within a broad assessment of the airline industry since deregulation. Specifically, GAO is reporting on, among other things, (1) broad airline industry changes since deregulation, (2) fare and service changes since deregulation, and (3) whether there is evidence that reregulation of entry and fares would benefit consumers or the airline industry, or save airline pensions. DOT agreed with the conclusions in this report. GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The airline industry has undergone significant change since the late 1970s. Industry capacity and passenger traffic have tripled. At the same time, the industry's profitability has become more cyclical, and the financial health of large legacy airlines has become more precarious. Legacy airlines emerged from a regulated environment with relatively high structural costs, driven in part by labor costs, including defined benefit pension plan costs. Over the last few years, facing intense cost pressures from growing low-cost airlines like Southwest, both United and US Airways entered bankruptcy, voided labor contracts, and terminated their pension plans costing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal government insurer of defined benefit plans, $10 billion and beneficiaries more than $5 billion. In 2005, two other legacy airlines entered bankruptcy leaving their pension plans in doubt. Only two airlines still have active defined benefit pension plans. Airfares have fallen in real terms over time while service--as measured by industry connectivity and competitiveness--has improved slightly. Overall, the median fare has declined almost 40 percent since 1980 as measured in 2005 dollars. However, fares in shorter-distance and less-traveled markets have not fallen as much as fares in long-distance and heavily trafficked markets. Since 1980, markets have generally become more competitive; with the average number of competitors increasing from 2.2 per market in 1980 to 3.5 in 2005. The evidence suggests that reregulation of airline entry and fares would likely reverse much of the benefits that consumers have gained and would not save airline pensions. The change in fares and service since deregulation provides evidence that the vast majority of consumers have benefited, though not all to the same degree. Although a number of airlines have failed and some have terminated their pension plans, those changes resulted from the entry of more efficient competitors, poor business decisions, and inadequate pension funding rules. GAO has previously recommended that broad pension reform is needed. |
gao_GAO-04-709 | gao_GAO-04-709_0 | This billing pattern was evident in each of the eight Florida MSAs that accounted for the majority of Medicare CORF facilities and patients. Average Therapy Payments to CORFs Substantially Exceeded Payments to Other Facility-Based Providers
Our analysis of claims payment data showed that per-patient therapy payments to Florida CORFs were about twice as high as therapy payments to rehabilitation agencies and SNF outpatient departments, and more than 3 times higher than therapy payments to hospital outpatient departments. The pattern of relatively high payments to CORFs was evident in all of the localities where CORFs were concentrated. Patient Characteristics Did Not Explain Higher Average Therapy Payments to Florida CORFs
Some factors that could account for differences in therapy payment amounts—patient diagnosis and indicators of patient health care needs— did not explain the higher payments that some Florida CORFs received compared with other types of facility-based outpatient therapy providers. The higher therapy payments to CORFs were driven by the higher volume of therapy services that CORFs provided to their Medicare patients, compared with the volume of services other facility-based outpatient therapy providers furnished to patients in the same diagnosis group. Actions by the Florida Contractor Were Not Sufficient to Ensure Appropriate Payments to CORFs
Despite the Florida contractor’s increased scrutiny of CORF claims, our analysis of Florida CORFs’ 2002 billing patterns suggests that some providers received inappropriate payments that year. Among these claims, the contractor found widespread billing for medically unnecessary therapy services. The contractor also began reviewing all therapy claims submitted on behalf of about 650 beneficiaries identified as having high levels of therapy use from multiple CORFs and other facility-based outpatient therapy providers during the 2001 investigation. Florida CORFs’ High Medicare Payments Continued After Intensified Claim Reviews
While the contractor succeeded in ensuring that payments to CORFs for this limited group of beneficiaries met Medicare rules, our own analysis of CORF claims submitted in 2002 found several indications that billing irregularities continued. We found that 11 percent of the beneficiaries who received CORF services in Florida were treated by more than one CORF facility during the year. Our review of 2002 Florida claims data also showed that some CORFs were not complying with Medicare program rules about furnishing required services. After finding high rates of medically unnecessary therapy services to CORFs, CMS’s claims administration contractor for Florida took steps to ensure appropriate claim payments for a small, targeted group of CORF patients. This suggests that the contractor’s efforts were too limited in scope to be effective with all CORF providers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we (1) compared Medicare’s outpatient therapy payments to CORFs in 2002 with its payments that year to other facility-based outpatient therapy providers and (2) assessed the program’s effectiveness in ensuring that payments to CORFs complied with Medicare rules. Although CORFs are authorized to offer a wide range of services, we limited our comparison to a common set of therapy services: physical therapy services, occupational therapy services, and speech-language pathology services. To consider differences in payment by provider type at the substate level, we compared annual per-patient payments for CORFs and other outpatient facility providers in each of Florida’s 20 metropolitan statistical areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities (CORF) are highly concentrated in Florida. These facilities, which provide physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech-language pathology services, and other related services, have been promoted as lucrative business opportunities for investors. Aware of such promotions, the Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, raised concerns about whether Medicare could be vulnerable to overbilling for CORF services. In this report, focusing our review on Florida, we (1) compared Medicare's outpatient therapy payments to CORFs in 2002 with its payments that year to other facility-based outpatient therapy providers and (2) assessed the program's effectiveness in ensuring that payments to CORFs complied with Medicare rules.
What GAO Found
In Florida, CORFs were by far the most expensive type of outpatient therapy provider in the Medicare program in 2002. Per-patient payments to CORFs for therapy services were 2 to 3 times higher than payments to other types of facility-based therapy providers. Higher therapy payments were largely due to the higher volume of services--more visits or more intensive therapy per visit--delivered to CORF patients. This pattern of relatively high CORF payments was evident in each of the eight metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) of the state where nearly all Florida CORFs operated and the vast majority of CORF patients were treated. A consistent pattern of high payments and service levels was also evident for patients in each of the diagnosis categories most commonly treated by CORFs. Differences in patient characteristics--age, sex, disability, and prior inpatient hospitalization--did not explain the higher payments that Florida CORFs received compared to other types of outpatient therapy providers. Steps taken by Medicare's claims administration contractor for Florida have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of improper billing by CORFs. After examining state and national trends in payments to CORFs in 1999, the contractor increased its scrutiny of CORF claims to ensure that Medicare payments made to CORFs were appropriate. It found widespread billing irregularities in Florida CORF claims, including high rates of medically unnecessary therapy services. Since late 2001, the contractor has intensified its review of claims from new CORF providers and required medical documentation to support certain CORF services considered at high risk for billing errors. It has also required that supporting medical records documentation be submitted with all CORF claims for about 650 beneficiaries who had previously been identified as receiving medically unnecessary services. The contractor's analysis of 2002 claims data for this limited group of beneficiaries suggests that, as a result of these oversight efforts, Florida CORFs billed Medicare for substantially fewer therapy services than in previous years. However, our analysis of all CORF therapy claims for that year indicates that the contractor's program safeguards were not completely effective in controlling per-patient payments to CORFs statewide. With oversight focused on a small fraction of CORF patients, CORF facilities continued to provide high levels of services to beneficiaries whose claims were not targeted by the contractor's intensified reviews. |
gao_GGD-95-14 | gao_GGD-95-14_0 | During our review, an allegation of potential taxpayer abuse received considerable media attention because it involved reports of possible improper contacts with IRS by staff of the White House and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Those comments are presented and evaluated on pages 21 to 26 and are reprinted in appendix V.
IRS’ Controls and Initiatives to Protect Against Taxpayer Abuse
IRS has a wide range of controls, processes, and oversight offices designed to govern how its employees interact with taxpayers. IRS Can Strengthen Its Efforts to Prevent Taxpayer Abuse
Despite IRS’ efforts to prevent violations of taxpayers’ rights, we found various instances of what we consider to be taxpayer abuse by IRS. Relatively large trust fund recovery penalties have caused financial hardships for the individuals involved. IRS has recognized weaknesses in its controls and procedures for identifying the responsible person for this type of penalty. IRS does not, however, have specific procedures to deal with a White House contact offering information about possible tax violations. Therefore, we believe IRS should define taxpayer abuse and develop the management information needed to identify its nature and extent. Specifically, we believe IRS can (1) ensure that the information systems now being developed under its TSM initiative include the capability to minimize unauthorized access to taxpayer information, (2) clarify its guidelines for selecting tax returns during IGPs, (3) reconcile its cash receipts more often and encourage taxpayers to avoid using cash whenever possible in making payments to IRS, (4) provide individuals who may be subject to trust fund recovery penalties with more information about their responsibilities, (5) attempt to identify short-term remedies to minimize the problems caused taxpayers by IRS’ information handling weaknesses and ensure that the TSM program includes requirements designed to solve those problems as the new information systems are implemented over the next several years, and (6) develop specific guidance for IRS employees on how they are to handle White House contacts. We do not believe that Congress needs to provide additional appropriations to enable IRS to implement these recommendations, with one possible exception. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
To improve IRS’ ability to manage its interactions with taxpayers, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish a service-wide definition of taxpayer abuse or mistreatment and identify and gather the management information needed to systematically track its nature and extent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adequate controls to prevent taxpayer abuse and whether additional appropriations are needed to strengthen IRS ability to prevent taxpayer mistreatment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although IRS has undertaken several initiatives to prevent taxpayer abuse, evidence of abuse remains; (2) IRS has implemented a wide range of controls, processes, and oversight offices to govern staff behavior in their contacts with taxpayers; (3) IRS needs to better define taxpayer abuse and develop management information about its frequency and nature so that it can strengthen abuse prevention procedures, and identify and minimize the frequency of future abuses, and Congress can better evaluate IRS performance in protecting taxpayers' rights; (4) IRS needs to strengthen its controls and procedures to reduce unauthorized access to computerized tax information by IRS employees, inappropriate selection of tax returns during information gathering projects, embezzlement of taxpayers' cash payments, questionable trust fund recovery penalties, and information-handling problems that contribute to taxpayer frustration; (5) proposed taxpayer protection legislation would aid IRS in providing taxpayers with information needed to better deal with trust fund recovery penalties; (6) the allegation of potential abuse involving possible improper contacts with IRS by White House staff was unfounded; (7) the White House has provided explicit guidance for its staff regarding IRS contacts and IRS should improve its procedures for handling White House contacts; and (8) although Congress may not need to provide additional appropriations to IRS to prevent taxpayer abuse, additional appropriations may be needed to resolve IRS information-handling problems as part of its Tax Systems Modernization (TSM) program. |
gao_GAO-03-924 | gao_GAO-03-924_0 | Background
The resources that hospitals and their emergency departments would require for responding to a large-scale bioterrorist attack are far greater than those needed for everyday performance. Hospitals Reported Planning for Bioterrorism Response but Do Not Have Certain Medical Capacities to Handle a Large Increase in Patient Load
Most hospitals in urban areas across the country reported participating in basic planning and coordination activities for bioterrorism response. Although most hospitals reported providing at least some training to their personnel on identification and diagnosis of disease caused by biological agents considered likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack, only about half report they have conducted drills or exercises simulating response to a bioterrorist incident. Most Hospitals Have Emergency Response Plans Addressing Bioterrorism and Are Participating in Local, State, or Regional Planning and Coordination Activities
Our survey showed that hospitals have engaged in a variety of planning and coordination activities, with most having prepared an emergency response plan addressing bioterrorism; participated in a local, state, or regional interagency disaster preparedness committee; and made agreements with at least one other organization to share personnel or equipment in the event of a bioterrorist or other mass casualty incident. Four out of five hospitals reported having a written emergency response plan that specifically addresses bioterrorism (see fig. Hospitals Reported Insufficient Medical Equipment to Handle a Large Increase in Patients
The availability of medical equipment needed for bioterrorism response varied greatly among hospitals, and hospitals reported that they did not have the capacity to respond to the large increase in the number of patients that would be likely to result from a bioterrorist incident with mass casualties (see table 2). For example, if a large number of patients were to arrive at a hospital with severe respiratory problems associated with anthrax or botulism, a comparable number of ventilators would be required to treat them. Comments from the American Hospital Association
Representatives from the American Hospital Association provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The officials generally agreed with our findings and stated that this was a good and useful report providing helpful information on hospital preparedness. We also examined the relationships between the extent of hospital bioterrorism preparedness and size of hospital as indicated by the number of inpatient staffed beds. Questions in the survey focused on preparedness to respond to a bioterrorist event. Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Bioterrorism Preparedness Efforts Have Improved Public Health Response Capacity, but Gaps Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the event of a large-scale infectious disease outbreak, as could be seen with a bioterrorist attack, hospitals and their emergency departments would be on the front line. Federal, state, and local officials are concerned, however, that hospitals may not have the capacity to accept and treat a sudden, large increase in the number of patients, as might be seen in a bioterrorist attack. In the Public Health Improvement Act that was passed in 2000, Congress directed GAO to examine preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. In this report GAO provides information on the extent of bioterrorism preparedness among hospitals in urban areas in the United States. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed over 2,000 urban hospitals and about 73 percent provided responses addressing emergency preparedness. The survey collected information on hospital preparedness for bioterrorism, such as data on planning activities, staff training, and capacity for response.
What GAO Found
While most urban hospitals across the country reported participating in basic planning and coordination activities for bioterrorism response, they did not have the medical equipment to handle the number of patients that would be likely to result from a bioterrorist incident. Four out of five hospitals reported having a written emergency response plan addressing bioterrorism, but many plans omitted some key contacts, such as other laboratories. Almost all hospitals reported participating in a local, state, or regional interagency disaster preparedness committee. In addition, most hospitals reported having provided at least some training to their personnel on identification and diagnosis of disease caused by biological agents considered likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack, such as anthrax or botulism. In contrast, fewer than half of hospitals have conducted drills or exercises simulating response to a bioterrorist incident. Hospitals also reported that they lacked the medical equipment necessary for a large influx of patients. For example, if a large number of patients with severe respiratory problems associated with anthrax or botulism were to arrive at a hospital, a comparable number of ventilators would be required to treat them. Yet half of hospitals reported having fewer than six ventilators per 100 staffed beds. In general, larger hospitals reported more planning and training activities than smaller hospitals. Representatives from the American Hospital Association provided oral comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. They generally agreed with the findings. |
gao_NSIAD-97-30 | gao_NSIAD-97-30_0 | The Defense Logistics Agency’s Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC) has managed the stockpile since 1988. Government’s View of Usual Market for Zinc Has a Sound Basis
When evaluating the potential for undue market disruption, DNSC and the Market Impact Committee consider the usual market for zinc to be the total U.S. market for all grades of the commodity. AZA contends, however, that the statute requires an evaluation based only on the markets for the grades of zinc the stockpile plans to sell. The government, on the other hand, believes that “material” refers to the commodity of zinc, regardless of grades; therefore, the usual markets to which the statute refers means the total market for the commodity, not just the markets for the specific grades being sold from the stockpile. Even though such a company may not buy zinc from the stockpile, that company could be affected by the increase in supply resulting from stockpile sales. The government recognizes that sales from the stockpile can affect some participants in the market more than others. Stockpile sales increase supplies that can drive down prices and cause a particular producer or processor to lose business. One major U.S. zinc producer, for example, produces only one grade of zinc, which is one of those DNSC has offered for sale. Some customers taking advantage of lower prices from a new supplier is a normal commercial activity. Specifically, it has publicized its sales and price policy and solicited public comments; sold less zinc than it was authorized to sell; and tried to sell zinc close to market prices. Table 1 provides a summary of the amounts requested and approved. 4.) DNSC plans to continue to closely monitor prices when accepting bids to ensure that the market is not unduly disrupted. Scope and Methodology
The focus of our work was on the dispute between the government and AZA as it related to the government’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “usual markets” as applied to the zinc sales program, and DOD’s efforts to not unduly disrupt the zinc market. To complement our discussions with AZA and to obtain the views on the government’s interpretation of usual markets and its efforts not to disrupt the markets, we met with each of the various groups represented in the zinc market—that is, companies producing or processing zinc, those buying and selling zinc as traders or brokers, those that consume zinc in their manufacturing processes, and individuals who study or report on the zinc markets—we reviewed various documents these companies and organizations had submitted to DNSC or the Market Impact Committee and contacted them about the government/AZA dispute and/or their particular operations. 2. 3. 5. 6. 8. 9. 10. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues surrounding a dispute between the American Zinc Association (AZA) and the federal government about the Department of Defense's (DOD) sale of excess zinc from the National Defense Stockpile, focusing on: (1) the government's basis for its interpretation of the statutory phrase "usual markets" as applied to the zinc sales program; and (2) DOD's efforts to not unduly disrupt the zinc market.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the statute that governs sales from the stockpile does not define the usual markets for stockpile materials; (2) accordingly, executive branch officials have discretion in identifying the relevant market for particular sales; (3) the Defense Logistics Agency's Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC) and the Market Impact Committee, the intergovernmental group that is statutorily required to advise DNSC on the U.S. and foreign effects of sales from the stockpile, have concluded that for stockpile sales of zinc, the usual market is the total U.S. market for all grades of zinc, not just the grades being sold from the stockpile; (4) AZA considers the usual market to be the U.S. market for only the particular grades being sold from the stockpile; (5) GAO believes the government's determination has a sound basis; (6) the determination is based on practices that exist in the zinc industry, and it is consistent with the views of zinc market participants with whom GAO discussed this matter; (7) DNSC has policies and procedures for selling zinc without unduly disrupting the zinc market; (8) specifically, it has: (a) publicized its policy on timing of sales, amounts to be sold, and relation of sales prices to market prices; (b) provided plans to the appropriate congressional committees for approval; (c) sold less zinc than it was authorized to sell; and (d) given increased emphasis to selling at prices close to commercial market prices; (9) the government recognizes that stockpile sales can affect some sellers more than others, despite its attempts to minimize disruption; (10) the sales may, for example, have a greater impact on the sellers of the grades being sold from the stockpile, and a seller of one grade could be more affected than a seller of several grades; (11) the increase in zinc supplies can lower prices and cause particular producers or processors to lose business; (12) however, the Market Impact Committee contends that this is normal commercial activity, not an undue disruption; and (13) DNSC plans to continue to closely monitor prices when accepting bids to ensure that the market is not unduly disrupted. |
gao_GAO-03-638 | gao_GAO-03-638_0 | The Number of Sealed Sources in Use and Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Worldwide Is Unknown
The precise number of sealed sources that is in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. Limited Information Exists about the Number of Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Sealed Sources
Because many countries cannot account for their sealed sources, there is limited information on the number of sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned—referred to as “orphan sources.” According to the Director General of IAEA, orphan sources are a widespread phenomenon, and 34 of the 49 countries responding to our survey indicated that orphan sources pose problems in their country. Countries Responding to Our Survey Reported That They Have Established Controls over Sealed Sources
All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. Countries’ Controls over Sealed Sources Vary and Are Weakest among Developing Countries
Nuclear safety and security experts from the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; NRC; IAEA; and the European Commission told us that controls placed on sealed sources vary greatly between countries and have focused primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on securing the sources from potential terrorists threats. Other U.S. federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State, and NRC have efforts under way to help countries strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. Figure 5 shows an example of the security upgrades funded by DOE. Both NRC and the State Department have extensive experience in nuclear regulatory and safety-related issues in the former Soviet Union. The Majority of DOE’s Program Expenditures Have Been in the United States
DOE budgeted $20.6 million for the Radiological Threat Reduction program in fiscal year 2002 and received an additional $16.3 million in fiscal year 2003. Further, DOE’s efforts to develop a plan to guide its efforts is a step in the right direction. However, DOE disagreed with our finding that it had not coordinated its efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a governmentwide strategy is established. However, we believe, as noted in the report, that DOE is well suited to help other countries secure sealed sources because of its long history in securing weapons grade material in the former Soviet Union and that it should take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls of other countries’ sealed sources. Scope and Methodology
To answer our objectives related to (1) number of sealed sources worldwide and how many sources are lost, stolen, or abandoned and (2) the legislative and regulatory controls that countries that possess sealed sources use, we distributed a questionnaire to 127 member countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 3 countries whose IAEA membership had been approved but had not yet taken effect at the time of our survey. To determine what assistance has been provided by the United States to other countries to strengthen their controls over sealed sources, we obtained budget, obligation, and expenditure data from the four agencies providing assistance—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and NRC. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources pose a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources worldwide and how many have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned; (2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other countries' control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts are believed to be effectively implemented.
What GAO Found
The precise number of sealed sources in use is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. However, nearly 10 million sealed sources exist in the United States and the 49 countries responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it is estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Many of the most vulnerable sealed sources that could pose a security risk are located in the countries of the former Soviet Union. All of the 49 countries that responded to GAO's survey reported that they have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Departments of State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Commission told GAO that countries' controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are weakest among less developed countries. In fiscal year 2002, DOE established a program focusing on improving the security of sealed sources in the former Soviet Union and has started to fund security upgrades in Russia and other former Soviet countries. The Departments of Defense and State and NRC also have programs to help countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE plans to expand its program to other countries and regions in 2003 and is developing a plan to guide its efforts. However, the department has not fully coordinated its efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a government-wide strategy is established. In addition, as of January 2003, the majority of DOE's program expenditures totaling $8.9 million were spent by DOE's national laboratories in the United States. |
gao_GAO-06-1027T | gao_GAO-06-1027T_0 | These states are currently authorized to receive reimbursement of up to 50 percent of the costs of their pipeline safety programs from PHMSA. The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 modified PHMSA’s traditional oversight approach by supplementing the minimum standards with a risk-based program for gas transmission pipelines. This program—termed “integrity management”—requires gas transmission pipeline operators to assess and mitigate safety threats, such as leaks or ruptures due to incorrect operation or corrosion, to pipeline segments that are located in highly populated or frequently used areas, such as parks. The 2002 act also requires that operators reassess these pipeline segments for safety threats at least every 7 years. 1.) If conditions warrant, reassessments must occur more frequently. Gas Integrity Management Program Benefits Pipeline Safety
Operators are making good progress in assessing and repairing their pipelines, thereby improving the safety of their pipeline systems. In addition to assessing their pipelines, operators are also making progress in fulfilling the requirement to repair problems found on their pipelines in highly populated or frequently used areas. We estimate that the integrity management program should offer additional safety benefits over the minimum safety standards for up to 68 percent of the population living close to gas transmission pipelines. A number of representatives from pipeline industry organizations, state pipeline agencies, safety advocate groups, and operators that we contacted agree that integrity management benefits public safety because it requires all operators to systematically assess their pipelines to gain a comprehensive knowledge about the risks to their pipeline systems. Another concern raised by 33 (65 percent) of the operators is the requirement to reassess their pipelines for corrosion problems at least every 7 years. The 7-year Reassessment Requirement Appears to be Conservative
Periodic reassessments of pipeline threats are beneficial because threats— such as the corrosive nature of the gas being transported—can change over time. Through December 2005 (latest data available), 76 percent of the operators (182 of 241) reporting baseline assessment activity to PHMSA told the agency that their pipelines were in good condition, free of major defects, and requiring only minor repairs. 2.) In addition, since operators are required to identify and repair significant problems, the overall safety and condition of the pipeline system should be enhanced before reassessments begin toward the end of the decade. Over the past 10- 1/2 years, 12 people have died and 3 have been injured in two corrosion- related incidents. Industry consensus standards allow for maximum reassessment intervals for time-dependent threats of 10, 15, or 20 years only if the operator can adequately demonstrate that corrosion will not become a threat within the chosen time interval. The remaining three operators told us that they would reassess their pipelines at intervals shorter than the industry consensus standards but longer than 7 years because of the condition of their pipelines. Safeguards Exist if an Alternative Standard for Corrosion Reassessments is Allowed
PHMSA and the state pipeline agencies plan to inspect all operators’ compliance with integrity management reassessment requirements, among other things, to ensure that operators continually and appropriately assess the conditions of their pipeline segments in highly populated or frequently used areas. These inspections should serve as a check as to whether operators have identified threats facing these pipeline segments and determined appropriate reassessment intervals. PHMSA and states have begun inspections and expect to complete most of the first round of inspections no later than 2009. Increasing State Funding Appears Reasonable, but Funding Sources and Oversight Plans Would Need To Be Addressed
The Subcommittee’s draft bill proposes to increase the matching funds that PHMSA provides to states for pipeline safety program activities from a maximum of 50 percent to a maximum of 80 percent of a state’s pipeline safety program costs. Furthermore, state pipeline safety activities would increase if PHMSA implements its planned integrity management program for distribution pipelines. According to PHMSA, the agency plans to monitor increased state pipeline safety activities through its current oversight approach, which consists of reviewing annual reports from states and field evaluations of state activities. Finally, regarding the 7-year reassessment requirement, our preliminary view is that these reassessment intervals should be based on technical data, risk factors, and engineering analyses rather than a prescribed term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 established a risk-based program for gas transmission pipelines--termed integrity management--which requires pipeline operators to identify areas where the consequences of a pipeline incident would be the greatest, such as highly populated areas. Operators must assess pipelines in these areas for safety threats (such as corrosion), repair or replace defective segments, and reassess their pipelines at least every 7 years. Under the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) regulations, operators must reassess their pipelines for corrosion at least every 7 years and for all safety threats at least every 10, 15, or 20 years. State pipeline safety agencies that assist PHMSA are eligible to receive matching funds up to 50 percent of the cost of their pipeline safety programs. This statement is based on ongoing work for Congress and for others. It focuses on three areas germane to current legislative reauthorization proposals: (1) an overall assessment of the integrity management program, (2) the 7-year reassessment requirement, and (3) provisions to increase state pipeline safety grants. GAO contacted more than 50 pipeline operators and a broad range of stakeholders and surveyed state pipeline agencies. GAO also reviewed PHMSA and industry guidance and reviewed PHMSA pipeline performance data.
What GAO Found
While the gas integrity management program is still being implemented, early indications show that the program benefits pipeline safety. For example, the condition of transmission pipelines is improving as operators assess and repair their pipelines. As of December 31, 2005 (latest data available), 33 percent of the pipelines in highly populated or frequently used areas had been assessed and over 2,300 repairs had been completed. In addition, we estimate that up to 68 percent of the population that lives close to natural gas transmission pipelines is located in highly populated areas and is expected to receive additional protection as a result of improved pipeline safety. Furthermore, despite some uncertainty on the part of operators over the program's documentation requirements, operators, gas pipeline industry representatives, state pipeline officials, and safety advocate representatives all agree that the program enhances public safety, citing operators' improved knowledge of the threats to their pipelines as the primary benefit. Although periodic reassessments of pipeline threats are beneficial, the 7-year reassessment requirement appears to be conservative. Through December 2005, 76 percent of the operators (182 of 241) reporting baseline assessment activity to PHMSA reported that their pipelines were in good condition, requiring only minor repairs. Most of the problems found were concentrated in just 7 pipelines. These results are encouraging, since operators are required to assess their riskiest segments first and operators are required to repair defects, making them safer before reassessments begin toward the end of the decade. There have been no deaths or injuries from corrosion related pipeline incidents over the past 5-1/2 years. An alternative approach is to permit pipeline operators to reassess their pipeline segments at intervals based on technical data, risk factors, and engineering analyses. Such an approach is consistent with the overall philosophy of the 2002 act and would meet its safety objectives. Under this approach, operators could reassess their pipelines at intervals longer than 7 years only if operators can adequately demonstrate that corrosion will not become a threat within the chosen time intervals. Otherwise, the reassessment must occur more frequently. As a safeguard to ensure that operators have identified threats facing these pipeline segments and have determined appropriate reassessment intervals, PHMSA and state regulatory agencies are already conducting integrity management inspections of operators. They plan to inspect most operators' integrity management activities by 2009. The provision to increase the cap on pipeline safety grants to states appears reasonable given that states' workloads are expanding, but funding sources and oversight of states' expanded activities would need to be addressed in order to ensure that the increased grants are appropriately carried out. PHMSA has identified several potential funding sources, such as reprioritizing the agency's budget and increasing pipeline user fees. For oversight, PHMSA anticipates integrating states' expanded activities into the agency's current oversight approach that relies on annual reports from states and field evaluations. |
gao_GAO-01-485 | gao_GAO-01-485_0 | Conclusion
The Army has made progress in developing a sound basis for its force structure requirements. It has improved the rigor of its analysis through more realistic scenarios and the integration of Army plans and initiatives, and made the analysis more comprehensive by expanding it to include requirements for the entire Army. However, the weaknesses we identified suggest that the Army still does not have a sound basis for its institutional force requirements or the forces needed for the Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense. Our analysis of the institutional force requirements casts doubt on their accuracy, and, by extension, the accuracy of the shortfall that the Army identified in this element of the force. By developing more accurate estimates of institutional forces, this shortfall might be entirely eliminated. A sound basis for requirements is also hampered by the lack of criteria for the Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense element of the Army’s force structure. A clearer definition of the missions involved is needed to accurately estimate the forces needed for these missions. | What GAO Found
The Army has made progress developing a sound basis for its force structure requirements. It has improved the rigor of its analysis through more realistic scenarios and the integration of Army plans and initiatives. It has also expanded the analysis to include requirements for the entire Army. However, the weaknesses GAO identified suggest that the Army still lacks a sound basis for its institutional force requirements and the forces needed for the strategic reserve, domestic support, and homeland defense. GAO's analysis of the institutional force requirements casts doubt on their accuracy and, by extension, the accuracy of the shortfall that the Army identified in this element. By developing more accurate estimates of institutional forces, this shortfall might be entirely eliminated. A sound basis for requirements is also hampered by the lack of criteria for the strategic reserve, domestic support, and homeland defense element of the Army's force structure. A clearer definition of their missions is needed to accurately estimate the forces that will be required. |
gao_GAO-02-572 | gao_GAO-02-572_0 | Fiscal year 2000 was the first year that public housing agencies were required to submit a five-year plan and an annual plan. The remaining 13 manage low-rent units only or a combination of low-rent and tenant-based Section 8 units. Field Locations Believe Agencies Can Implement Their Plans but Are Having Some Problems
About 72 percent of respondents believed that, for the most part, housing agencies can implement the plans they developed, submitted, and had approved. The public housing agencies we visited held varying views on the usefulness of the fiscal year 2000 process. Although the amount and type of resources that agencies devoted to the plan process for fiscal year 2000 varied, seven of the eight public housing agencies we visited told us they used additional staff or resources in developing their fiscal year 2000 plans. Agencies also had mixed experiences with the resident participation requirement for the fiscal year 2000 plan. Scope and Methodology
The mandate in Section 511 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 required that we review and audit a representative sample of the nation’s housing agencies that are required to submit agency plans. We also agreed that a survey of HUD field locations to assess HUD’s management of the fiscal year 2000 agency plan process would serve as a proxy to auditing the universe of housing agencies, as each HUD field location has direct knowledge of all housing agencies within its respective jurisdiction and was responsible for reviewing and approving those agencies’ plans. resident participation requirement. | What GAO Found
The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 was designed to improve the quality of public housing and the lives of its residents. Since fiscal year 2000, housing agencies managing low-rent or tenant-based Section 8 units have been required to develop and submit five-year and annual plans. As of January 2002, 98 percent of public housing agency plans for fiscal year 2000 had been submitted and approved. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had mixed views about the fiscal year 2000 plan process and its value. The field locations that responded to GAO's survey reported that their review of fiscal year 2000 plans was hampered by several factors, including difficulty in transmitting data between public housing agencies and HUD. Most field locations responded that public housing agencies are implementing their plans but acknowledged that there may be some problems, particularly in fulfilling requirements related to resident participation in the process. The eight public housing agencies GAO visited had differing views on the usefulness of the planning process, the level of resources required to prepare the plans, the sufficiency of HUD's guidance on completing the plans, and the difficulty of meeting the resident participation requirement. |
gao_AIMD-95-27 | gao_AIMD-95-27_0 | To address this limitation, FAA is acquiring the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), an automated decision support system to aid FAA in targeting its inspection and certification resources on those areas that pose the greatest aviation safety risks. To date, FAA has spent $6.3 million on the initial and enhanced prototypes. Our objectives were to determine (1) whether FAA is effectively managing the SPAS acquisition, including its communication network, and (2) the extent to which SPAS will rely on Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS) databases and whether FAA is effectively addressing known data quality problems with these databases. Also, FAA’s decision to employ an independent verification and validation agent should further mitigate system development and acquisition risks. FAA’s current cost estimate for developing and installing SPAS is $32 million. FAA Lacks a Strategy for Ensuring the Quality of SPAS Source Data
Despite FAA’s recognition of both SPAS’ need for quality source data and its lack of such data, FAA has not developed a coordinated strategy for rectifying the situation. In other words, FAA has not agreed on a definition of its long-term data quality goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), focusing on: (1) whether FAA is effectively managing the SPAS acquisition; (2) the extent to which SPAS will rely on Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS) databases; and (3) whether FAA is effectively addressing known data quality problems with the ASAS databases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA has generally implemented good development and acquisition procedures for SPAS; (2) FAA has maximized user involvement and system prototyping in developing and evaluating SPAS; (3) FAA has reduced SPAS development risks by using an independent verification and validation agent; (4) FAA is exploring the potential of its proposed corporate-wide area network to accommodate SPAS in order to avoid the acquisition of duplicate communication networks; (5) FAA cost estimates for SPAS software may not be reliable, since they are subjective; (6) FAA lacks a strategy for improving SPAS data sources, particularly ASAS, which jeopardizes the system's utility; (7) ASAS databases contain incomplete, inaccurate, and inconsistent data on airline inspections; (8) FAA has not yet defined its long-term data quality goals; and (9) if FAA fails to improve ASAS data, it could improperly target its limited inspection and certification resources on less important problems. |
gao_GAO-09-282 | gao_GAO-09-282_0 | Liability and Indemnity Provisions in Agreements Differ, but Commuter Rail Agencies Generally Assume Most of the Financial Risk for Their Operations
Liability and indemnity provisions in agreements between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads differ, but commuter rail agencies generally assume most of the financial risk for commuter operations. For example, most liability and indemnity provisions assign liability to an entity regardless of fault—that is, a commuter rail agency could be responsible for paying for certain claims associated with an accident caused by a freight railroad. In addition, about one-third of these no-fault agreements exclude certain types of conduct, such as gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct, from the agreements. The liability and indemnity provisions also require that commuter rail agencies carry certain levels of insurance to guarantee their ability to pay for the entire allocation of damages. Federal Statutes, STB Decisions, and Federal Court Decisions Are Instructive in Interpreting Liability and Indemnity Provisions, but Questions Remain
ARAA Addresses Many Liability Concerns, but Railroad Officials Question the Applicability of the Statute’s Liability Cap
ARAA introduced tort reform measures that limit the overall damage passenger claims to $200 million, including punitive damages to the exten permitted by state law, against all defendants arising from a single accident or incident. Questions Remain Regarding Indemnification for Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct
49 U.S.C. While the Court of Appeals stated in the O&G Industries opinion that it was the intent of Congress to permit indemnity agreements regarding any claims against Amtrak, STB, when setting the terms of agreements between Amtrak and freight railroads, has held that it is against public policy to indemnify an entity against its own gross negligence or willful For example, in a 2006 decision, STB held that an indemnity misconduct. Various Factors, Such as Financial Conditions and Federal and State Laws, Influence Negotiations of Liability and Indemnity Provisions
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 provides that Amtrak and the freight railroads may contract for Amtrak’s use of the facilities owned by the freight railroads. Several Factors Influence Negotiations of Liability and Indemnity Provisions
Freight railroads’ business perspective. Financial conditions at the time of negotiations. Specifically, freight railroads are requiring more insurance coverage for new commuter rail projects than what they had required in some pas agreements. For Federal and state laws. Officials from this freight railroad told us they are seeking increase the level of insurance in their existing agreement from $250 million to $ th $500 million in insurance, in part, because the cap has not been tested in court and because the cap does not cover third-party claims. Amtrak’s statutory rights influence the negotiations of liability and indemnity provisions in agreements between Amtrak and freight railroads as well as between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies. liability and indemnity provisions. Commuter Rail Agency, Amtrak, and Freight Railroad Officials Identified Several Options for Facilitating Negotiations
Commuter rail agency, Amtrak, and freight railroad officials identified several options for facilitating negotiations of liability and indemnity provisions, including amending ARAA, establishing alternatives to commercial insurance, increasing commuter rail agencies’ leverage in negotiations with freight railroads, and separating passenger and freight rail infrastructure. While each of the options could facilitate negotiations on liability and indemnity provisions, each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. Commuter Rail Agency, Amtrak, and Freight Railroad Officials Suggested Amending ARAA to Address Concerns
Officials from commuter rail agencies, Amtrak, and freight railroads cited amending ARAA as an option for facilitating negotiations on liability and indemnity provisions. Amtrak provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. DOT and STB had no comments on the draft report. ntify liability and indemnity provisions in agreements among We conducted legislative research to identify federal statutes, federal an tate court cases, and STB decisions that related to contractual liability sand indemnity provisions of passenger and freight railroad agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) and commuter rail agencies often share rights-of-way with each other and with freight railroads. Negotiating agreements that govern the shared use of infrastructure can be challenging, especially on issues such as liability and indemnity. As requested, this report discusses (1) the liability and indemnity provisions in agreements among passenger and freight railroads, and the resulting implications of these provisions; (2) federal and state court opinions and Surface Transportation Board (STB) decisions related to contractual liability and indemnity provisions of passenger and freight railroad agreements; (3) factors that influence the negotiations of liability and indemnity provisions among passenger and freight railroads; and (4) potential options for facilitating negotiations of liability and indemnity provisions. GAO obtained information from all existing and proposed commuter rail agencies, Amtrak, and major freight railroads through site visits or telephone interviews. GAO analyzed the liability and indemnity provisions in agreements between commuter rail agencies, Amtrak, and freight railroads. GAO also reviewed federal and state laws, STB decisions, and court cases related to liability and indemnity provisions. The Department of Transportation and STB had no comments on the report. Amtrak provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The liability and indemnity provisions in agreements between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads differ, but commuter rail agencies generally assume most of the financial risk for commuter operations. For example, most provisions assign liability to a particular entity regardless of fault--that is, commuter rail agencies could be responsible for paying for certain claims associated with accidents caused by a freight railroad. The provisions also vary on whether they exclude certain types of conduct, such as gross negligence, from the agreements. The provisions also require that commuter rail agencies carry varying levels of insurance. Because commuter rail agencies are publicly subsidized, some liability and indemnity provisions can expose taxpayers as well as commuter rail agencies to significant costs. Federal statutes, STB decisions, and federal court decisions are instructive in interpreting liability and indemnity provisions, but questions remain. In response to industry concerns, Congress enacted the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (ARAA), which limited overall damages from passenger claims to $200 million and explicitly authorized passenger rail providers to enter into indemnification agreements. However, questions remain about the enforceability and appropriateness of indemnifying an entity for its own gross negligence and willful misconduct. A federal court of appeals, in a recent decision regarding Amtrak, overturned an earlier court opinion, holding that it was against public policy to indemnify for gross negligence and willful misconduct because this could undermine rail safety. STB, however, has held, when setting the terms of agreements between Amtrak and freight railroads, that it is against public policy to indemnify an agency against its own gross negligence or willful misconduct. Several factors influence the negotiations of liability and indemnity provisions, including the freight railroads' business perspective, the financial conditions at the time of negotiations, the level of awareness or concern about liability, and federal and state laws. For example, some freight railroad officials told us they are requesting more insurance coverage for new commuter rail projects than what they had required in some past agreements, in part, because ARAA's liability cap has not been tested in court and does not cover third-party claims. Statutes governing Amtrak also influence the negotiations between Amtrak and other railroads. Options for facilitating negotiations on liability and indemnity provisions include amending ARAA; exploring alternatives to traditional commercial insurance; providing commuter rail agencies with more leverage in negotiations; and separating passenger and freight traffic, either physically or by time of day. For example, officials from commuter rail agencies and freight railroads suggested amending ARAA to expand the scope of the liability cap to include third-party claims. Although each of these options could facilitate negotiations on liability and indemnity provisions, each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. |
gao_T-RCED-96-167 | gao_T-RCED-96-167_0 | The most hazardous constituent of uranium mill tailings is radium. DOE’s cleanup authority was established by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978. Mr. Chairman, we now return to the topics discussed in our report: the status and cost of DOE’s surface and groundwater cleanup and the factors that could affect the federal government’s costs in the future. By 1992, however, the Department was estimating that the surface cleanup would be completed in 1998 and that 13 piles of tailings would need to be relocated. In addition, DOE made changes in its cleanup strategies to respond to state and local concerns. Uncertain Future Costs
Once all of the sites have been cleaned up, the federal government’s responsibilities, and the costs associated with them, will continue far into the future. In addition, the final cost of the groundwater cleanup depends on the ability and willingness of the affected states to pay their share of the cleanup costs. DOE has already cleaned up the Grand Junction processing site and over 4,000 nearby properties, at a cost of about $700 million. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the status and cost of the Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium mill tailings cleanup program and the factors that could affect future costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) surface contamination cleanup has been completed at two-thirds of the identified sites and is underway at most of the others; (2) if DOE completes its surface cleanup program in 1998, it will have cost $2.3 billion, taken 8 years longer than expected, and be $621 million over budget; (3) DOE cleanup costs increased because there were more contaminated sites than originally anticipated, some sites were more contaminated than others, and changes were needed to respond to state and local concerns; (4) the future cost of the uranium mill tailings cleanup will largely depend on the future DOE role in the program, remediation methods used, and the willingness of states to share final cleanup costs; and (5) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to ensure that enough funds are collected from the responsible parties to protect U.S. taxpayers from future cleanup costs. |
gao_GAO-08-473T | gao_GAO-08-473T_0 | A number of factors contribute to these challenges, such as an increase in the numbers and complexity of the claims veterans are filing and the effects of recent laws and court decisions. The number of pending claims increased by more than 50 percent from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2007 to about 392,000. Similarly, while VA reduced the average number of days claims were pending from a high of 182 days at the end of fiscal year 2001 to 111 days at the end of fiscal year 2003, the average age of pending claims crept back up to 132 days by the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in figure 2. Further, a number of statutes and court decisions related to VA’s disability claims process have affected VA’s ability to process claims in a timely manner. For example, VA stated that the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 significantly increased the length and complexity of claims development by adding more steps to the process and lengthening the time it takes to develop and decide a claim. VA Continues to Take Steps to Improve Claims Processing
VA is taking several steps to improve claims processing. In VA’s fiscal year 2009 budget justification, an increase in claims processing staff was identified as essential to reducing the pending claims inventory and improving timeliness. The fiscal year 2009 request would fund 10,998 full-time equivalent employees working on compensation and pension claims, and represents an increase of about 2,600 positions, or 32 percent over fiscal year 2007. GAO is currently studying this pilot. VA also continues to face questions about its ability to ensure that veterans receive consistent decisions across regional offices. Opportunities for Improvement May Lie in More Fundamental Reform
While VA is taking actions to address its claims processing challenges, there are opportunities for more fundamental program reform such as reexamining program design and the structure and division of labor among field offices. In its October 2007 report, the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission (VDBC)—established by Congress in 2003 to study the appropriateness of VA disability benefits—also pointed out that VA’s eligibility criteria were outdated and recommended that the VA Rating Schedule be reviewed and updated. Opportunities may lie in more fundamental reform. Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Claims Processing Challenges and Opportunities for Improvements. Veterans Benefits: VA Needs Plan for Assessing Consistency of Decisions. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, House Veterans' Affairs Committee, asked GAO to present its views on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability claims process. This statement discusses (1) claims processing challenges VA faces, (2) steps VA is taking to address these challenges, and (3) opportunities for more fundamental reform. GAO has reported and testified on this subject on numerous occasions. GAO's work has addressed VA's efforts to improve the timeliness and accuracy of decisions on claims, VA's efforts to reduce pending claims levels, and concerns about decisional consistency. This testimony is based on a body of past work, updated as appropriate to reflect the current workload and initiatives.
What GAO Found
Despite taking steps to improve its disability claims process, VA continues to face challenges, specifically in reducing the number of claims pending, speeding up the process of deciding claims, and improving accuracy and consistency of decisions across regional offices. For example, between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, the inventory of claims awaiting a decision by VA grew by more than 50 percent to a total of about 392,000, and the average number of days claims were pending increased by 3 weeks to 132 days. Further, GAO and VA's Inspector General have identified concerns about the consistency of decisions across regional offices. Factors affecting VA's claims-processing performance may include increases in the number and complexity of claims being filed and the potential impacts of laws and court decisions. VA continues to take steps to help improve claims-processing performance, including requesting funding for additional staff. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request funds an increase of more than 2,600 additional full-time equivalent employees over fiscal year 2007 levels to process claims. Beyond the steps VA is taking to address its claims processing challenges, opportunities for significant performance improvement may lie in more fundamental reform of VA's disability compensation program. Such reforms could include reexamining program design such as updating the disability criteria to reflect the current state of science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions. It could also include examining the structure and division of labor among field offices. Recent studies conducted by presidential and congressionally appointed commissions have recommended some fundamental changes, including updating VA's rating schedule, which provides the basis for decisions about eligibility for benefits. |
gao_HEHS-98-35 | gao_HEHS-98-35_0 | This source, however, varied by district. In addition to state and federal funds targeted for technology, all five districts reported using other federal and state program funding that was not specifically designated for technology but could be used for this purpose. Informational Efforts and Partnerships Have Addressed a Variety of Barriers
Technology directors in the districts we studied identified a variety of barriers to obtaining funding both at the district level and from other sources such as grants. Officials from all districts said that resistance to higher taxes affected their ability to increase the district’s operating revenue to help meet their technology goals. Staff-Related and Other Components Difficult to Fund
Nearly all districts found maintenance, technical support, and training— components often dependent on staff—more difficult to fund than other components, according to our review. Most districts funded technology staff primarily from district operating budgets. One district official said such costs posed problems because of their large expense; an official in another district said funding these services was difficult because the need for funding is ongoing; and an official in a third district cited problems due to the need for funding from limited district operating funds. Districts Plan to Use Same Funding Sources for Ongoing Costs Despite Uncertainties
Most of the districts we studied planned to continue supporting the costs of their technology programs largely as they had in the past, despite the uncertainties associated with many funding sources. Second, districts and schools need to fund the periodic costs of upgrading and replacing hardware, software, and infrastructure to sustain their programs. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) what sources of funding school districts have used to develop and fund education technology, (2) what barriers districts have faced in funding the technology goals they set and how they have tried to overcome these barriers, (3) which components of districts’ technology programs have been the most difficult to fund and what the consequences have been, and (4) how districts plan to handle the ongoing costs of the technology they have acquired. Major questions covered in district and school interviews included but were not restricted to (1) the history of the technology program, (2) efforts to obtain technology funding, (3) barriers to obtaining technology funding and strategies used to overcome them, (4) barriers to funding technology components, and (5) funding ongoing costs of the technology program. Subsequent technology plans focused on equipping classrooms with computers. The technology director also noted that businesses and foundations tend not to support ongoing costs such as technical support or telecommunications charges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how five school districts funded their technology goals and their difficulties in finding those resources, focusing on: (1) the funding sources school districts used to develop and fund their technology programs; (2) the barriers school districts have faced in funding the technology goals they set, and their efforts to overcome these barriers; (3) which components of districts' technology programs have been the most difficult to fund, and what have been the consequences; and (4) how the districts plan to handle the ongoing costs of the technology they have acquired.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the five districts that GAO studied used a variety of ways to fund their technology programs; (2) funding sources included money from district operating budgets, special technology levies and bonds, state and federal funds, and private and other contributions; (3) most districts received a majority of funding from one source, although this funding source varied by district; (4) technology directors in the five districts have cited a variety of barriers to obtaining the funds needed to implement technology programs; (5) in all five districts, technology had to compete for funding with other needs and priorities, including school building maintenance, repair, and construction, mandated programs, and additional teachers to handle increased enrollment; (6) community resistance to higher taxes, according to district officials, limited all five districts' ability to raise more revenue; (7) technology directors also cited barriers to obtaining other sources of funding, such as business contributions or grants, particularly because the districts lacked staff to manage fund-raising efforts; (8) furthermore, some officials reported that demographics made them ineligible for some grants; (9) program components that were hardest to fund, technology directors and others said, were those heavily dependent on staff positions; (10) staffing was difficult to fund because some funding sources' could not be used for staffing and because some sources were not well suited for this purpose; (11) to support the ongoing and periodic costs of their technology programs, the districts planned to continue using a variety of funding sources largely as in the past despite some of these sources' uncertainties; (12) most planned to continue to fund annual ongoing costs, such as maintenance and technical support, with district operating dollars; (13) officials were not sure, however, how much these sources would provide in the future as program needs grow; (14) the periodic costs of eventually upgrading and replacing equipment, software, and infrastructure also faced uncertain funding; and (15) officials in some locations noted that at times major funding sources fell significantly short of expectations. |
gao_GAO-11-638 | gao_GAO-11-638_0 | Background
In recognition of the cost, energy usage, and environmental impact of IT, the federal government has undertaken various initiatives to promote the acquisition and use of more efficient and environmentally friendly IT products, commonly referred to as electronic stewardship or “green IT.” According to OMB Circular A-11, green IT refers to the application of sustainable and environmentally efficient practices so that computing resources are used in a sustainable and environmentally efficient manner. For example, monitoring and efficiently managing IT equipment’s power use can help organizations track and reduce specific energy costs. Disposing of equipment. However, the benefits of the agencies’ efforts cannot be measured because key performance information is not available. In addition, Section 2(h) of the executive order contains four broad green IT-related requirements that federal agencies are to follow: meet at least 95 percent of agencies’ requirements for new electronic products with EPEAT-registered products, unless no applicable EPEAT standard exists; enable the Energy Star feature on agency computers and monitors; establish and implement policies to extend the useful life of agency use environmentally sound practices with respect to disposition of agency electronic equipment that has reached the end of its useful life. In addition, both OMB and CEQ have responsibilities and have taken actions related to agencies’ progress in meeting the executive order requirements. Each agency has designated a senior sustainability officer and submitted its sustainability plan to OMB and CEQ for review. For example, according to officials, EPA donates the majority of its excess electronics to schools, state and local governments, eligible nonprofit organizations, and other federal agencies. Additional Data Needed to Measure Benefits of Agencies’ Efforts
While agencies have taken a variety of steps to implement green IT practices, the effectiveness of these efforts cannot be measured because of a lack of performance data. Specifically, the targets identified in the agencies’ plans are not defined in terms of benefits (such as dollar or energy savings), and as a result the agencies are not positioned to identify benefits from their activities and to use that information to evaluate and prioritize their efforts. Leading Green IT Practices Range from Increased Leadership to Improved Print Management
In addition to the activities agencies have underway to meet the requirements of the executive orders, we identified a number of leading practices used by government entities and private sector organizations that are relevant to green IT. As discussed previously, EPEAT is a tool to help purchasers in the public and private sectors evaluate, compare, and select electronic products based on their environmental attributes. Consolidate and standardize IT equipment and services. Using responses obtained from its 2009 survey of federal employees, an IT provider estimated that the federal government spends about $1.3 billion annually on employee printing, and about one-third of that total, or about $440.4 million per year, is spent on unnecessary printing. In the non-federal sector, Hewlett-Packard implemented managed print services that reportedly allowed a customer to reduce the number of printers by 47 percent globally, cut per-page print costs by up to 90 percent, and save more than $3 million in 2 years in the United States alone. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help federal managers better assess the effectiveness of progress made toward green IT-related sustainability goals, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in conjunction with the White House Council on Environmental Quality, take the following two actions: update the existing green IT sustainability guidance, through the national strategy or another appropriate method, to direct agencies to develop baselines for their green IT-related goals and, where possible, targets that measure energy or cost savings or other quantifiable benefits and consider including the leading green IT practices identified in this report as part of this guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which the federal government has defined policy and guidance on green IT and how selected federal agencies are implementing this guidance and policy and (2) identify leading green IT practices used by federal agencies, state and local governments, and private-sector organizations. We focused on a nonprobability sample of six agencies: the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DOC), Energy (DOE), and Health and Human Services (HHS); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the General Services Administration (GSA). As part of this analysis, we used GAO developed criteria on measuring performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's substantial use of information technology (IT) contributes significantly to federal agencies' energy use and environmental impact. To help mitigate this impact, organizations have adopted practices for using computing resources in a sustainable and more environmentally friendly manner-- sometimes referred to as "green IT." These practices include equipment acquisition, use, disposal, and related processes. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which the government has defined policy and guidance on green IT and how selected federal agencies are implementing this policy and guidance, and (2) identify leading green IT practices used by federal agencies, state and local governments, and private-sector organizations. To do this, GAO evaluated federal guidance and policy, as well as guidance and initiatives at selected agencies; identified and characterized efforts in the public and private sectors; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Two executive orders, from 2007 and 2009 respectively, assign responsibility to federal agencies for increasing their environmental sustainability and contain green IT-related requirements. These requirements include acquiring electronic products that meet certain environmental standards, extending the useful life of electronic equipment, implementing power management on computers, and managing federal data centers in a more energy efficient manner. In meeting these and other sustainability requirements, agencies are required to designate senior sustainability officers and develop performance plans that prioritize actions for meeting the requirements in the executive orders. The six agencies in GAO's review (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the General Services Administration) have developed sustainability performance plans and taken additional steps to implement the executive orders' requirements. For example, they have increased their acquisition of certified energy-efficient IT equipment, established and implemented policies to extend the useful life of agency equipment, and developed environmental policies for disposing of electronic equipment. However, the overall effectiveness of the agencies' efforts cannot be measured because key performance information is not available. Specifically, the agencies have not identified the information needed to measure the progress or results of their efforts. For example, the agencies have generally not established baselines (starting points) or developed performance targets that are consistently defined in terms of quantifiable benefits, such as a reduction in energy. This is in part because the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and a key White House council--the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)--have not developed specific guidance on establishing performance measures for green IT efforts. Without such guidance, the effectiveness of these efforts and their contribution to overall federal sustainability goals will remain unclear. GAO identified a number of leading practices used by federal, state, and local government and private-sector organizations that are relevant to green IT. These practices include enhanced leadership, dedicated funding, prioritization of efforts, and improved employee training, as well as acquiring IT equipment with the highest energy efficiency ratings; consolidating equipment and services; reducing use of paper; and using new, more efficient computers. For example, according to a 2009 survey of federal employees, agencies spend about $440.4 million per year on unnecessary printing. By contrast, in the non-federal sector, a major IT equipment company implemented managed print services that reportedly reduced the number of printers by 47 percent globally, cut per-page print costs by up to 90 percent, and saved more than $3 million in 2 years in the United States alone.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends OMB and CEQ develop green IT guidance to help agencies more effectively measure performance and encourage the use of leading practices. In comments on this report, OMB and CEQ partially concurred with the recommendations. They agreed to encourage the use of leading green IT practices but did not agree that additional guidance was needed for measuring performance. GAO continues to believe that additional guidance is needed to help determine the effectiveness of agencies' efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-574T | gao_GAO-04-574T_0 | The federal share of each state’s Medicaid expenditures is based on a statutory formula linked to a state’s per capita income in relation to national per capita income. In 2002, the specified federal share of each state’s expenditures ranged from 50 percent to 76 percent; in the aggregate, the federal share of total Medicaid expenditures was 57 percent. Some State Financing Schemes Have Used IGTs to Create the Illusion of Valid Medicaid Expenditures
For more than a decade, some states have used various financing schemes, some involving IGTs, to create the illusion of a valid state Medicaid expenditure to a health care provider. Many of these schemes involve payment arrangements between the state and government-owned or government-operated providers, such as local- government-operated nursing homes. These schemes share certain characteristics, including IGTs, with other financing schemes from prior years (see table 1). In reality, the large payment is temporary, since the funds essentially make a round-trip from the state to the Medicaid providers and back to the state. In cases like this, local-government facilities can use IGTs to easily return the excessive Medicaid payments to the state via electronic wire transfers. The counties wire the funds to the states, which then send most or all of the funds back to the counties as Medicaid payments. Financing Schemes Undermine Medicaid’s Federal-State Partnership
States’ use of these creative financing mechanisms undermines the federal-state Medicaid partnership as well as the program’s fiscal integrity in at least three ways. First, state financing schemes effectively increase the federal matching rate established under federal law by increasing federal expenditures while state contributions remain unchanged or even decrease. For example, for one state we analyzed (Wisconsin), we estimated that by obtaining excessive federal matching payments and using these funds as the state share of other Medicaid expenditures, the state effectively increased the federal matching share of its total Medicaid expenditures from 59 percent to 68 percent in state fiscal year 2001. Second, CMS has no assurance that these increased federal matching payments are used for Medicaid services. Under state financing schemes, however, states can use funds returned to them at their own discretion. We recently examined how six states with large UPL financing schemes involving nursing homes used the federal funds they generated. In our view, this practice is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that states ensure that Medicaid payments are economical and efficient. Under UPL financing arrangements, some states pay a few public providers excessive amounts, well beyond the cost of services provided. We found, for example, that Virginia’s proposed arrangement would allow the state to pay six local- government nursing homes, on average, $670 in federal funds per Medicaid nursing home resident per day—more than 12 times the $53 daily federal payment these nursing homes normally received, on average, per Medicaid resident. The information includes sources of state matching funds for supplemental payments to Medicaid providers, the extent to which total payments would exceed providers’ costs, how a state would use the additional funds, and whether a state required providers to return payments (and, if so, how the state planned to spend such funds). Although Congress and CMS have taken significant steps to help curb inappropriate UPL arrangements and other financing schemes, states can still claim federal matching funds for more than a public provider’s actual costs of providing Medicaid-covered services. We previously recommended that Congress consider prohibiting Medicaid payments that exceed actual costs for any government-owned facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, the federal-state health financing program for many of the nation's most vulnerable populations, finances health care for an estimated 53 million lowincome Americans, at a cost of $244 billion in 2002. Congress structured Medicaid as a shared fiduciary responsibility of the federal government and the states, with the federal share of each state's Medicaid payments determined by a formula specified by law. In 2002, the federal share of each state's expenditures ranged from 50 to 76 percent under this formula; in the aggregate, the federal share of total Medicaid expenditures was 57 percent. Some states have used a number of creative financing schemes that take advantage of statutory and regulatory loopholes to claim excessive federal matching payments. GAO was asked to summarize prior work on how some of these schemes operated, including the role of intergovernmental transfers (IGT), which enable government entities--such as the state and local-government facilities like county nursing homes--to transfer funds among themselves. GAO was also asked to discuss these schemes' effects on the federalstate Medicaid partnership and to discuss what can be done to curtail them.
What GAO Found
For many years states have used varied financing schemes, sometimes involving IGTs, to inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching payments. Some states, for example, receive federal matching funds on the basis of large Medicaid payments to certain providers, such as nursing homes operated by local governments, which greatly exceed established Medicaid rates. In reality, the large payments are often temporary, since states can require the local-government providers to return all or most of the money to the states. States can use these funds--which essentially make a round-trip from the states to providers and back to the states--at their own discretion. States' financing schemes undermine the federal-state Medicaid partnership, as well as the program's fiscal integrity, in at least three ways. The schemes effectively increase the federal matching rate established under federal law by increasing federal expenditures while state contributions remain unchanged or even decrease. GAO estimated that one state effectively increased the federal matching share of its total Medicaid expenditures from 59 percent to 68 percent in state fiscal year 2001, by obtaining excessive federal funds and using these as the state's share of other Medicaid expenditures. There is no assurance that these increased federal matching payments are used for Medicaid services, since states use funds returned to them via these schemes at their own discretion. In examining how six states with large schemes used the federal funds they generated, GAO found that one state used the funds to help finance its education programs, and others deposited the funds into state general funds or other special state accounts that could be used for non-Medicaid purposes or to supplant the states' share of other Medicaid expenditures. The schemes enable states to pay a few public providers amounts that well exceed the costs of services provided, which is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that states ensure economical and efficient Medicaid payments. In one state, GAO found that the state's proposed scheme increased the daily federal payment per Medicaid resident from $53 to $670 in six local-government-operated nursing homes. Although Congress and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services have acted to curtail financing schemes when detected, problems persist. States can still claim excessive federal matching funds for payments exceeding public facilities' actual costs. GAO suggests that Congress consider a recommendation open from prior work, that is, to prohibit Medicaid payments that exceed actual costs for any government-owned facility. |
gao_GAO-14-324 | gao_GAO-14-324_0 | Selected schools’ websites also demonstrated a focus on recruiting veteran or military students, as 29 of the 30 school websites we reviewed included sections dedicated to veteran or military students. Officials from eight of the nine schools we interviewed reported advertising to some extent in print or online media dedicated to military audiences (see fig. Once a veteran is identified, officials from most of the nine schools we interviewed said that they contacted veterans directly, such as by phone or email, and their school made special efforts to customize the individual communication. In contrast, however, about 23 percent—or an estimated 15,200 veterans when generalized to the population of veterans receiving Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits—said that they felt the contacts they received from schools were excessive, generally from schools they considered but did not ultimately attend. VA Is Taking Steps to Better Inform and Protect Student Veterans, but Its Counseling Outreach and Planning Efforts Are Insufficient
VA Plans to Offer More Information about Schools, but Is Not Effectively Promoting Educational Counseling
New Information Tools
In response to the Executive Order and recent legislation, VA is taking steps to help veterans more easily obtain information on schools to support their decision making. Yet, VA indicated in its April 2013 report to Congress that it would prioritize creating an online application for its counseling services, and Public Law 112-249 required VA to develop an outreach policy that includes effective and efficient methods to inform individuals of education counseling.its current strategic plan, VA has emphasized the importance of providing Additionally, in benefits and services to veterans through automated and paperless processes, with the goal of reducing the burden for veterans and meeting their needs in a timely way. VA has also taken some initial steps to develop a related system to publish student feedback on schools’ recruiting practices, quality of instruction, and postgraduation employment outcomes, as required by Public Law 112-249. Many others reported that they wanted more information about schools. Some of these obstacles have been out of VA’s control. Subsequently, stakeholders and policymakers have frequently lacked reliable information on VA’s progress in implementing measures that will better protect and inform student veterans. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that veterans’ education benefits are used effectively, we recommend that the Secretary of VA take the following actions: 1) Take additional steps to improve the outreach, accessibility, and usefulness of its educational counseling services, particularly for prospective student veterans, for example by featuring these services in resources intended for prospective students veterans; prioritizing efforts to enable veterans to apply for educational considering cost-effective ways to gather more information on applicants, users, and key program areas (such as the timeliness of service) to better identify service needs or gaps and to improve the effectiveness of future outreach. 2) More consistently develop, document, and communicate realistic timelines and goals for implementing VA initiatives based on federal requirements by identifying specific activities needed to achieve goals and associated implementation timelines, as well as resource issues or potential internal or external risks that may affect timing. Education had no comments on our findings or recommendations, but outlined its efforts to help veterans and other students make informed educational choices and noted its collaboration with VA and other agencies to support implementation of the Executive Order. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine: (1) how do selected schools recruit veterans; (2) what are the school search and recruiting experiences of student veterans; and (3) what actions has the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) taken to help veterans make informed education decisions and to identify inappropriate school recruiting? To address our first question, we interviewed officials from 9 schools and reviewed the websites of an additional 30 schools. For all three questions, we also spoke with veterans service and higher education organizations. National Survey of Student Veterans
Overview
To obtain information on the factors that influenced student veterans’ school decisions, as well as their experiences with school recruitment, we administered a survey to a nationally representative sample of 900 recently enrolled student veterans (300 each in the public, nonprofit, and public sectors) and asked them about their school search and recruiting experiences, information they received from their current school, and their perspectives on relevant information and services from VA. All survey results presented in the body of this report are generalizable to the population of 73,000 student veterans who were receiving Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits for the first time in 2012. 6. 12. 16. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, VA provided over $12 billion in benefits for veterans' postsecondary education; however, questions have been raised as to whether some schools are receiving these funds as a result of inappropriate recruiting practices. GAO was asked to examine issues related to schools' recruitment of veterans. This report examines (1) how selected schools recruit veterans, (2) veterans' school search and recruiting experiences, and (3) VA's actions to help veterans make informed decisions and to identify inappropriate recruiting practices.
For the first question, GAO interviewed officials from 9 schools and reviewed websites of 30 additional schools; both groups were selected for variation in sector (public, nonprofit, and for-profit) and other criteria. For the second question, GAO surveyed a nationally representative group of student veterans, producing results generalizable to the student veteran population. For the third question, GAO reviewed relevant federal requirements and agency documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO also spoke with veteran and higher education organizations.
What GAO Found
Selected schools used various practices, from mass advertising to individual outreach, to recruit and inform prospective student veterans. Eight of nine schools GAO interviewed reported advertising in print or online media dedicated to military audiences. Most of the nine schools contacted veterans directly by phone or email, sometimes with military-focused recruiters, to provide information on benefits or services or to highlight the school as “military-friendly.” Further, 29 of the 30 school websites GAO reviewed included a section specifically for veterans, some of which were featured prominently on the home page.
Many surveyed veterans reported that school communication was important in selecting a school; however, nearly 23 percent (about 15,200 veterans when generalized nationally) reported excessive contacts from schools and an estimated 10 percent (about 6,900 veterans nationwide) said they felt pressure to enroll. In addition, while most surveyed veterans reported receiving generally accurate information from their school, about 23 percent (about 16,500 veterans nationwide) reported receiving some information they viewed as inaccurate, such as estimated student loan debt. Many veterans also wanted more information from their schools, such as on veteran support services (see figure below). Inaccurate or incomplete information can lead veterans to choose schools that do not meet their needs and exhaust their benefits before achieving their goals. Veteran and higher education groups said that greater access to independent and objective advice would help veterans with their education choices.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken steps to inform and protect student veterans, but some efforts have been insufficient. VA is developing tools to help veterans understand their education benefits and compare information on schools. VA has also taken some action to improve veterans' awareness of its free education counseling services, as required by law, but its efforts to expand awareness among prospective students and ease the application process have been limited. At the same time, almost half of surveyed veterans were not aware of VA's counseling when considering schools. To help identify misleading or aggressive recruiting, VA has launched a new complaint system, created a risk-based approach to oversee schools, and taken other steps. While VA has made some progress implementing federally required initiatives, its project planning has lacked realistic timelines and goals—in contrast to sound planning practices. As a result, Congress and others lack information on VA's progress implementing planned initiatives to protect and inform student veterans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA improve outreach and accessibility of its educational counseling services and more consistently develop and communicate realistic timelines as it implements initiatives based on federal requirements. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted its current efforts to improve its outreach and planning efforts. The Department of Education had no comments on our findings or recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-561 | gao_GAO-11-561_0 | The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by Congress
State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, but does not assess these safe havens with the level of detail recommended by Congress. For instance, none of the assessments in State’s August 2010 report included information on the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Including this information in State’s reporting could help inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. State Has Reported on Existing Terrorist Safe Havens Since 2006
IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens. However, our analysis of the assessments in State’s August 2010 report determined that, while State included information on each identified terrorist safe haven, State did not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. However, a more comprehensive list of U.S. efforts would enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying safe haven to terrorists. IRTPA also recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism. Specifically, the list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens in the Country Reports on Terrorism did not include (1) all of the programs and activities State funds to address terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities funded by agencies other than State, such as DOD, DOJ, and Treasury that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. However, this program was not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. Agencies Are Not Included
Our discussions with officials from various agencies and our review of MSRPs from the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicate that State’s reports also do not include efforts funded by agencies other than State that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. The National Security Council Has Not Completed the Required Report Identifying U.S. Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
In addition to the provisions in IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an ongoing interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including an assessment of the scope, status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates and a list of U.S. counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. According to the President’s National Security Staff, the National Security Council has been assigned responsibility for completing the report required under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. The National Security Council reviewed the report but did not provide comments on its recommendations. Specifically, we assess the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. Moreover, we evaluated assessments of terrorist safe havens included in the chapter specific to terrorist safe havens in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism against criteria recommended, to the extent feasible, by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The United States is also engaged with international partners to provide assistance to Yemen. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those contributing to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens. | Why GAO Did This Study
Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and plan operations against the United States and its interests across the globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen.
What GAO Found
State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" but does not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" a detailed assessment of each foreign country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report included information on one of the four elements recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a quarter of the assessments in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this information in State's reports could help better inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts. State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual updates to its "Country Reports on Terrorism." However, efforts identified in State's August 2010 report include only certain efforts funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S. government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at least 14 programs and activities not included in State's reporting that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen. According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide comments on its recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-36 | gao_NSIAD-97-36_0 | 1997 FYDP Reflects Increased Purchasing Power Due to Lower Projected Inflation
The executive branch substantially reduced its forecast of the inflation rate for fiscal years 1997 through 2002, resulting in a decline in the estimated costs of DOD’s purchases of about $45.7 billion, including about $34.7 billion over the 1997-2001 FYDP period. However, the price measure used in the executive branch’s projections had inherent limitations and has since been improved. Using a different price measure, CBO projected a much smaller drop in inflation and estimated that the future cost of DOD’s purchases would be reduced by only about $10.3 billion over the 1997-2001 period. Lowered Inflation Forecast Yields Projected $35 Billion Increase in Purchasing Power in 1997 FYDP
The executive branch reduced its inflation forecasts from 3 percent per year for the period 1997-2001 to 2.2 percent per year, or 8/10 of 1 percent.As a result, DOD projected that the cost of defense purchases would decline by $34.7 billion for the 1997-2001 period and an additional $11 billion for 2002. The executive branch allowed DOD to retain about $19.5 billion of the projected increase in purchasing power. OMB officials told us they have not decided what methodology they will use to project inflation for the next FYDP, which will encompass the 1998-2003 defense program. CBO Forecasted an Increase in DOD Purchasing Power of $10.3 Billion in the 1997 FYDP
During consideration of the fiscal year 1997 defense budget, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget requested that CBO estimate the adjustments that should be made to DOD’s budget estimates through 2002 that would keep its purchasing power constant given lower inflation rates. Major Resource Shifts From the 1996 FYDP to the 1997 FYDP
Our analysis shows that resource allocations in the 1997 FYDP vary considerably from the 1996 FYDP. Other programs are projected to be reduced. The 1997 FYDP shows that DOD plans to lower active duty force levels in fiscal years 1998-2001. Table 2 shows the minimum force levels in the law and DOD’s planned reductions. If DOD is precluded from implementing its planned personnel reductions, it will have to make other compensating adjustments to its overall program. Projected savings from the latest round of base closures are also less than were anticipated in the 1996 FYDP. The 1996 FYDP projected savings of $4 billion during 1997-2001 from the fourth round of base closures beginning in fiscal year 1996. The 1997 FYDP projects total savings of $0.6 billion, $3.4 billion less than the 1996 FYDP projection. As a result of the transfer in programs and other adjustments, intelligence and classified programs experienced the most growth. One reason for the increase is that the 1996 FYDP projected savings based on interim base closing plans that subsequently changed, and actual closing costs were higher. We examined a variety of DOD planning and budget documents, including the 1996 and 1997 FYDPs and associated annexes. GAO Comments
1. 2. Therefore, we believe the forecasted inflation rates have a direct impact on DOD’s estimated future funding requirements. 5. 4, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) with the FYDP for FY 1996, focusing on the: (1) impact of the reduction in the inflation rate on DOD's 1997 FDYP; (2) major program adjustments from the 1996 FDYP to the 1997 FDYP; and (3) implications of these changes for the future.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as a result of projecting significantly lower inflation rates, DOD calculated that its future purchases of goods and services in its 1997 FYDP would cost about $34.7 billion less than planned in its 1996 FYDP; (2) according to DOD, the assumed increased purchasing power that resulted from using the lower inflation rates: (a) allowed DOD to include about $19.5 billion in additional programs in FY 1997-2001 than it had projected in the 1996 FYDP; and (b) permitted the executive branch to reduce DOD's projected funding over the 1997-2001 period by about $15.2 billion; (3) the price measure the executive branch used in its inflation projections for future purchases in the 1997 FYDP had inherent limitations and has since been improved; (4) if the executive branch decides to use the improved price measure for its 1998 budget, DOD may need to adjust its program as a result of that transition; (5) Office of Management and Budget officials told GAO they have not decided what price measure they will use to forecast inflation for the 1998 FYDP; (6) using projected inflation rates based on a different price measure from that used by the executive branch, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the future cost of DOD's purchases through 2001 would decline by only about $10.3 billion, or $24.4 billion less than DOD's estimate; (7) resource allocations in the 1997 FYDP vary considerably from the 1996 FYDP as a result of the lower inflation projections, program transfers, and program changes; (8) the projected savings from the latest round of base closures and realignments changed considerably from the 1996 FYDP to the 1997 FYDP; (9) in the 1996 FYDP, DOD estimated savings of $4 billion from base closures; however, the 1997 FYDP projects savings of only $0.6 billion because: (a) the 1996 FYDP projected savings based on interim base closing plans that subsequently changed; and (b) military construction costs related to environmental cleanup of closed bases are projected to be $2.5 billion higher than anticipated in the 1996 FYDP; (10) a comparison of the 1996 and 1997 FYDPs also shows that DOD plans to reduce active duty force levels; (11) the smaller force planned for FY 1998-2001 would bring force levels below the minimum numbers established by law; and (12) if DOD is precluded from carrying out its plan to achieve a smaller force, it will have to make other adjustments to its program. |
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