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gao_GAO-08-885 | gao_GAO-08-885_0 | Research Suggests Recent LBOs Have Generally Had a Positive Impact on the Financial Performance of Acquired Companies, but LBOs Were Associated with Lower Employment Growth
Academic research on recent LBOs by private equity firms suggests that the impact of these transactions on the financial performance of acquired companies generally has been positive, but these buyouts have been associated with lower employment growth at the acquired companies. We also found some evidence that recent private equity-sponsored LBOs were associated with lower employment growth than comparable companies. However, uncertainty remains about the impact of such buyouts on employment, in part because, as one study found, target companies had lower employment growth than their peers before acquisition. Nevertheless, some large club deals have been the object of several recent shareholder lawsuits and, according to media reports and securities filings, have led to inquiries by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. Our Analysis Indicates That Public-to-Private Club Deals, in Aggregate, Generally Are Not Associated with Lower or Higher Prices Paid for Target Companies, and the Private Equity Marketplace Is Predisposed to Perform Competitively
To examine the potential effect club deals may have on competition among private equity firms, we developed an econometric model to examine prices paid for target companies in a subset of all private equity deals—that is, those transactions where the target company is publicly traded. 4). Because private equity funds and their advisers typically claim an exemption from registration as an investment company or investment adviser, respectively, SEC exercises limited oversight of private equity funds and their advisers. Growth in Private Equity- Sponsored LBOs Has Led to Greater Regulatory Scrutiny
SEC and others generally have not found private equity funds or their advisers to have posed significant concerns for fund investors. Before the problems related to subprime mortgages spread to the leveraged loan market in mid-2007, the regulators generally found that the major commercial and investment banks had adequate risk-management practices but noted some concerns, such as weakening of underwriting standards and significant growth in leveraged loan commitments. In light of this situation, regulators have reviewed the risk-management practices of commercial and investment banks and identified some weaknesses. However, it is often difficult to determine whether the impact resulted from the actions taken by the private equity firms or other factors, due to some limitations in academic literature. In that regard, further research may shed light on the causal relationship between private equity and employment growth, if any. Our econometric analysis of a sample of public-to-private LBOs generally found no indication that club deals, in aggregate, are associated with higher or lower prices paid for the target companies, after controlling for differences in targets. But, our analysis does not rule out the possibility of parties engaging in illegal behavior in any particular LBO. SEC generally has not found private equity funds to have posed significant concerns for fund investors. While financial institutions have taken steps to decrease their leveraged lending exposures, the unexpected increase in such exposures due to the spread of problems with subprime mortgages to other credit markets illustrates the importance of understanding and monitoring the conditions in the broader markets, including potential connections between markets. Failure of regulators to understand and fully consider such interconnections within the broader markets and their potential systemic risk implications can limit their regulatory effectiveness and ability to address issues when they occur. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with your staff, the report’s objectives are to determine, based largely on academic research, what effect the recent wave of private equity-sponsored leveraged buyouts (LBO) has had on acquired companies and employment; analyze how the collaboration of two or more private equity firms in undertaking an LBO (called a club deal) could promote or reduce competition, and what legal issues have club deals raised; review how the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has overseen private equity firms engaged in LBOs under the federal securities laws; and review how the federal financial regulators have overseen U.S. commercial and investment banks that have helped finance the recent LBOs. As a result, total debt decreased by $555 million from 2005 to 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increase in leveraged buyouts (LBO) of U.S. companies by private equity funds prior to the slowdown in mid-2007 has raised questions about the potential impact of these deals. Some praise LBOs for creating new governance structures for companies and providing longer term investment opportunities for investors. Others criticize LBOs for causing job losses and burdening companies with too much debt. This report addresses the (1) effect of recent private equity LBOs on acquired companies and employment, (2) impact of LBOs jointly undertaken by two or more private equity funds on competition, (3) Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) oversight of private equity funds and their advisers, and (4) regulatory oversight of commercial and investment banks that have financed recent LBOs. GAO reviewed academic research, analyzed recent LBO data, conducted case studies, reviewed regulators' policy documents and examinations, and interviewed regulatory and industry officials, and academics.
What GAO Found
Academic research that GAO reviewed generally suggests that recent private equity LBOs have had a positive impact on the financial performance of the acquired companies, but determining whether the impact resulted from the actions taken by the private equity firms versus other factors is difficult. The research also indicates that private equity LBOs are associated with lower employment growth than comparable companies. However, uncertainty remains about the employment effect--in part because, as one study found, target companies had lower employment growth before being acquired. Further research may shed light on the causal relationship between private equity and employment growth, if any. Private equity firms have increasingly joined together to acquire target companies (called "club deals"). In 2007, there were 28 club deals, totaling about $217 billion in value. Club deals could reduce or increase the number of firms bidding on a target company and, thus, affect competition. In analyzing 325 public-to-private LBOs done from 1998 through 2007, GAO generally found no statistical indication that club deals, in aggregate, were associated with lower or higher prices paid for the target companies, after controlling for differences in the targets. However, our results do not rule out the possibility of parties engaging in illegal behavior in any particular LBO. Indeed, according to securities filings and media reports, some large club deals have led to lawsuits and an inquiry into the practice by the Department of Justice. Because private equity funds and their advisers typically claim an exemption from registration as an investment company or investment adviser, respectively, SEC exercises limited oversight of these entities. However, in examining some registered advisers to private equity funds, SEC has found some control weaknesses but generally has not found such funds to pose significant concerns for fund investors. The growth in LBOs has led to greater regulatory scrutiny. SEC, along with other regulators, has identified conflicts of interest arising in LBOs as a potential concern and is analyzing the issue. Before 2007, federal financial regulators generally found that the major institutions that financed LBOs were managing the associated risks. However, after problems with subprime mortgages spilled over to other markets in mid-2007, the institutions were being exposed to greater-than-expected risk. As a result, the regulators reassessed the institutions' risk-management practices and identified some weaknesses. The regulators are monitoring efforts being taken to address weaknesses and considering the need to issue related guidance. While the institutions have taken steps to decrease their risk exposures, the spillover effects from the subprime mortgage problems to leveraged loans illustrate the importance of understanding and monitoring conditions in the broader markets, including connections between them. Failure to do so could limit the effectiveness and ability of regulators to address issues when they occur. |
gao_GAO-06-447 | gao_GAO-06-447_0 | The use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations has increased rapidly since the fall of 2001, with some notable successes. The Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems are DOD’s three largest unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Global Hawk and Predator Had Common Beginnings, but Different Acquisition Strategies Have Yielded Different Outcomes
While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) programs, they have since adopted different strategies in system development that have led to different outcomes. The Global Hawk adopted a riskier acquisition strategy that has led to significant cost, schedule, and performance problems. Support to the warfighter is the program’s top priority. Total program acquisition and procurement unit costs have increased 73 percent and 35 percent, respectively, and aircraft quantities decreased by 19 percent. The Predator program overall has experienced fewer cost, schedule, and performance problems than the Global Hawk program has experienced. Its decisions have been more consistent with DOD’s acquisition policy preferences. J-UCAS Program Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global Hawk and Predator Programs
J-UCAS represents the next generation of unmanned aircraft. Since the pre-acquisition program was initiated in 2003, it has experienced funding cuts and leadership changes. Regardless of future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs to develop the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support advanced unmanned aircraft acquisitions. Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and its offspring include maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task Force Arnold; establishing a clear business case that constrains individual program requirements to match available resources based on proven technologies and engineering knowledge before committing to system development and demonstration; establishing an incremental acquisition strategy that separates technology development from product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and production; establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and investing more money; and managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully resource product development and production based on a cost estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary design. However, given the magnitude of the program’s continuing changes and challenges discussed in this report, we are concerned that these efforts will fall short. The Quadrennial Defense Review calls for restructuring J-UCAS into a Navy effort to develop an unmanned carrier-based aircraft, while the Air Force will consider J-UCAS technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new, land- based long-range strike capability. Figure 2 compares the salient performance characteristics of these unmanned aircraft systems. Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but More Controls Are Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion to significantly increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft systems, which are providing new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to U.S. combat forces--including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite their success on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft programs have experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls. Given the sizable planned investment in these systems, GAO was asked to review DOD's three largest unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, GAO assessed the Global Hawk and Predator programs' acquisition strategies and identified lessons from these two programs that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program, the next generation of unmanned aircraft.
What GAO Found
While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful demonstration programs, they adopted different acquisition strategies that have led to different outcomes. With substantial overlap in development, testing, and production, the Global Hawk program has experienced serious cost, schedule, and performance problems. As a result, since the approved start of system development, planned quantities of the Global Hawk have decreased 19 percent, and acquisition unit costs have increased 75 percent. In contrast, the Predator program adopted a more structured acquisition strategy that uses an incremental, or evolutionary, approach to development--an approach more consistent with DOD's revised acquisition policy preferences and commercial best practices. While the Predator program has experienced some problems, the program's cost growth and schedule delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in operational environments has already begun. Since its inception as a joint program in 2003, the J-UCAS program has experienced funding cuts and leadership changes, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another restructuring into a Navy program to develop a carrier-based unmanned combat air system. Regardless of these setbacks and the program's future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs. Until DOD develops the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support the acquisition of J-UCAS and other advanced unmanned aircraft systems, it will continue to risk cost and schedule overruns and delaying fielding capabilities to the warfighter. |
gao_GAO-15-121 | gao_GAO-15-121_0 | Background
Student Population
BIE’s mission is to provide Indian students with quality education opportunities starting in early childhood. About one-third of BIE schools serve students from the Navajo Nation. BIE Schools Receive Most of their Funding from Federal Sources, Unlike Public Schools
BIE Schools Receive Funding Mainly from Interior and Education
All BIE schools—both BIE-operated and tribally-operated—receive almost all of their funding to operate from federal sources, namely, Interior and Education. Specifically, these elementary and secondary schools received approximately $830 million in fiscal year 2014—including about 75 percent, or $622 million from Interior and about 24 percent, or approximately $197 million, from Education. In contrast to BIE schools, federal funding has generally comprised about 9 percent of public schools’ funding from school year 2002-03 to 2008-09. BIE-Operated Schools Spent Substantially More Per Student than Public Schools Nationwide Due to Several Factors
BIE-Operated Day Schools Spent at Least 50 Percent More Per Pupil than the National Average for Public Schools
Average per-pupil expenditures for the 32 BIE-operated day schools were at least 56 percent higher than in public schools nationally in school year 2009-10, and were higher in the four categories of operating expenditures that we analyzed. Student demographics. Smaller enrollment and remote location. BIE Lacks Sufficient Staff with Expertise to Oversee School Expenditures
Line office administrators are integral to overseeing school expenditures, but the number of full-time administrators who oversee school expenditures decreased from a total of 22 in 2011 to 13 in 2014, 6 permanent and 7 acting. As a result of having fewer line office administrators, the remaining administrators have been assigned additional responsibilities and their workload has increased, making it challenging for them to conduct needed oversight. BIE’s approach to staffing line offices runs counter to federal internal control standards and key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. BIE’s Processes Are Not Adequate to Ensure that School Funds Are Spent Appropriately
BIE Lacks Consistent Processes for Documenting and Sharing Findings and Overseeing Major Programs
Single Audits
BIE oversees tribally-operated school spending primarily through information provided in the schools’ annual single audits; however, it does not have a process in place for consistently documenting actions it takes to respond to audit findings. If funds are not used for their intended purpose, students in BIE schools may not receive the services they need, such as tutoring and other forms of instruction. Rather than using a risk-based approach to guide how it uses limited monitoring resources, BIE officials use an ad hoc approach. A March 2014 single audit found that a tribally-operated school lost $1.7 million in federal funds that were illegally transferred to an off- shore bank account. Conclusions
BIE’s mission is to provide the students attending its schools a quality education. Further, BIE does not utilize tools, such as written procedures and a risk- based approach to monitor school expenditures that would help improve the effectiveness of its oversight. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to take the following four actions:
Develop a comprehensive workforce plan to ensure that BIE has an adequate number of staff with the requisite knowledge and skills to effectively oversee BIE school expenditures. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) how sources of funding for Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools compare to those of public schools; (2) how BIE school expenditures compare to those of public schools; (3) the extent to which BIE has the staff and expertise needed to oversee school expenditures; and (4) the extent to which BIE’s processes are adequate for ensuring that school funds are spent appropriately. We reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. Additionally, we reviewed agency documents from BIE, the Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs), and the Department of Education (Education), including budget justifications, published reports, annual financial audit reports, and other documents. Further, we conducted site visits to select BIE schools and nearby public school districts. We focused on school year 2009-10, since it was the most recent year for which data were available from Education at the time of our analysis. We generally reviewed the most recent version available of these studies. Objective 3: Staff and Expertise to Oversee School Expenditures
To determine the extent to which BIE has the staff and expertise needed to oversee school expenditures, we analyzed BIE data on the number and location of staff currently responsible for overseeing these expenditures as compared to the number of staff in prior years and the location of schools for which they are responsible. | Why GAO Did This Study
BIE, within Interior's office of Indian Affairs, oversees 185 schools, serving about 41,000 students on or near Indian reservations. BIE's mission is to provide students with a quality education. However, BIE student performance has been consistently below that of public school students, including other Indian students. Given these challenges, GAO was asked to review BIE school funding and expenditures.
This report examines how funding sources and expenditures of BIE schools compare to those of public schools; the extent to which BIE has the staff and expertise needed to oversee school expenditures; and the extent to which BIE's processes for oversight adequately ensure that school funds are spent appropriately.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations and agency documents, and analyzed BIE and public school expenditure data for school year 2009-10, the most recent year for which data were available. GAO also visited select BIE schools and nearby public schools in four states based on location, school and tribal size, and other factors.
What GAO Found
Unlike public schools, Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools receive almost all of their funding from federal sources. BIE directly operates about a third of its schools, and tribes operate two-thirds. According to BIE data, all of the BIE schools received a total of about $830 million in fiscal year 2014: about 75 percent from the Department of the Interior (Interior), 24 percent from the Department of Education (Education), and 1 percent from the Department of Agriculture and other agencies. Public schools nationwide receive about 9 percent of their funding from federal sources and rely mostly on state and local funding.
GAO found that some BIE schools spend substantially more per pupil than public schools nationwide. Specifically, GAO estimates that the average per pupil expenditures for BIE-operated schools—the only BIE schools for which detailed expenditure data are available—were about 56 percent higher than for public schools nationally in school year 2009-10, the most recent year for which data were available at the time of GAO's review. Several factors may help explain the higher per pupil expenditures at BIE-operated schools, such as their student demographics, remote location, and small enrollment.
BIE lacks sufficient staff with expertise to oversee school expenditures. Since 2011, the number of BIE full-time administrators located on or near Indian reservations to oversee school expenditures decreased from 22 to 13, due partly to budget cuts. As a result, the 13 administrators have many additional responsibilities and an increased workload, making it challenging for them to provide effective oversight of schools. Additionally, these administrators have received less training in recent years. Further, the three administrators GAO spoke with said they do not have the expertise to fully understand the school audits they are responsible for reviewing. BIE's staffing of these positions runs counter to federal internal controls standards and key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, such as having sufficient, adequately-trained staff. Without adequate staff and training, BIE will not be able to ensure that school funds are spent appropriately.
BIE's processes for oversight do not adequately ensure that funds are spent appropriately. BIE lacks written procedures for how and when staff should monitor school spending and does not use a risk-based approach to prioritize how it should use its limited resources for oversight. Instead, BIE told GAO that it relies primarily on ad hoc suggestions by staff regarding which schools to oversee more closely. Meanwhile, some schools have serious financial problems. Notably, external auditors identified $13.8 million in unallowable spending at 24 schools as of July 2014. Further, in March 2014, an audit found that one school lost about $1.2 million in federal funds that were improperly transferred to an off-shore account. Without written procedures and a risk-based approach to overseeing school spending—both integral to federal internal control standards—there is little assurance that federal funds are being used for their intended purpose to provide BIE students with needed instructional and other educational services.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that Indian Affairs develop a workforce plan to ensure that BIE has the staff to effectively oversee school spending and written procedures and a risk-based approach to guide BIE's oversight of school spending. Indian Affairs generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-48 | gao_NSIAD-97-48_0 | Laboratory participants reported little success in addressing 9 of the top 10 cost drivers identified by Coopers & Lybrand, with the majority of the projected savings expected to come from changes in the contractors’ quality assurance systems. On other projects, differences in views between DOD and contractor personnel on the merits of certain oversight requirements slowed down or otherwise limited opportunities to make meaningful changes. Coordinating and obtaining approval for proposed changes among multiple customers—while generally not precluding a project from being pursued—also tended to be difficult. Further, DCMC officials told us that the reinvention laboratory, a joint DCMC/DCAA initiative, tended not to get the highest level of support from other components within DOD and from service components. However, these waivers—which DOD estimates could result in cost avoidances of about $2.3 million annually—account for only a small portion of the laboratory’s potential cost reductions. Lessons Learned From Laboratory Experiences
On October 30, 1996, DOD announced it was in the process of ending the reinvention laboratory. These officials noted that many of the lessons learned from the reinvention laboratory are being employed in the Single Process Initiative, including the use of management councils, the designation of senior service officials to facilitate the review and approval of proposals, the establishment of a 120-day goal to have proposals approved, and an improved mechanism for processing waiver requests. Overall, DOD officials believe that these factors will allow proposals submitted under the initiative to be reviewed and approved in a timely fashion. Additionally, DOD officials noted that while the reinvention laboratory was limited to only 10 participants, participation in the Single Process Initiative is open to all DOD contractors. Given the broader base of potential participants and the more structured approach to reviewing and approving proposals, DOD officials believe the initiative will provide a more effective means for addressing many of the technically oriented issues such as manufacturing and quality assurance processes. From a budgetary perspective, the laboratory’s results, as well as our discussions with contractor and DOD officials, suggest that caution must be exercised in estimating cost reductions that can be achieved from oversight reform initiatives and using those reductions for budgetary purposes. DOD officials noted that it may be some time before it is known whether the remaining projects will be approved and implemented. Further, according to DOD and laboratory participants, implementation costs may partially offset cost reductions from proposed changes. Overall, while the laboratory results highlight the challenges faced by DOD, the results should not deter DOD from continuing its efforts to reduce nonvalue added oversight requirements. Rather, the reinvention laboratory suggests that continued commitment by senior DOD leadership is needed to make meaningful changes in DOD’s culture and processes. Scope and Methodology
To determine the laboratory’s success in effecting changes to DOD oversight requirements and reducing oversight costs, and to identify any obstacles to achieving these benefits, we reviewed the laboratory’s December 1995 and July 1996 status reports and pertinent supporting documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Reducing Oversight Costs reinvention laboratory, focusing on: (1) the laboratory's success in effecting changes to DOD oversight requirements and reducing oversight costs; (2) any obstacles to achieving these benefits; and (3) lessons learned from laboratory experiences.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) overall, the reinvention laboratory has made only limited progress in implementing changes to reduce contractors' costs of complying with government regulations and oversight requirements; (2) laboratory participants reported little success in addressing 9 of the top 10 cost drivers; (3) several factors, according to DOD and contractor officials, limited the ability of laboratory participants to make changes and achieve significant cost reductions; (4) DOD officials noted that on a more general level the reinvention laboratory tended not to get the highest level of support from other components within DOD and from service components; (5) other factors tended to affect specific projects, including statutory and non-DOD regulatory requirements, disagreements between DOD and contractor personnel on the value of certain oversight requirements, and difficulties in coordinating and obtaining approval for proposed changes where multiple customers were involved; (6) while the laboratory results highlight the challenges faced by DOD, the results should not deter DOD from continuing its efforts to reduce nonvalue added oversight requirements; (7) the lessons learned from the reinvention laboratory suggest that DOD leadership needs to continue support of oversight reform; (8) while DOD is in the process of closing the reinvention laboratory, DOD officials noted that many of the lessons learned have been reflected in structuring its Single Process Initiative; (9) DOD officials noted that the initiative is open to all defense contractors and believe that it will provide a more effective means for addressing many of the technically oriented issues such as manufacturing and quality assurance processes; (10) DOD officials cited the use of management councils as a key element in the initiative, as well as using a more structured approach to reviewing and approving projects and designating senior DOD and service officials to serve as facilitators; (11) DOD anticipates that proposals submitted under the Single Process Initiative will be reviewed and approved in a more timely fashion; (12) from a budgetary perspective, the laboratory results also suggest that caution must be used in estimating cost reductions from oversight reform; (13) only a small portion of the projected potential cost reductions from laboratory projects had been realized as of July 31, 1996; and (14) DOD officials noted that it may be some time before it is known whether the remaining projects will be approved and implemented, and many of the projects may incur implementation costs that would partially offset cost reductions in the near term. |
gao_GAO-01-204 | gao_GAO-01-204_0 | Conduct a hazard analysis. Identify the critical control points (CCPs). Conclusions
Since FDA first issued the HACCP regulations for seafood, seafood- processing firms have made some progress in implementing the new system. However, several important weaknesses compromise the overall effectiveness of the federal seafood safety system. If left uncorrected, they will continue to undermine the goal of HACCP systems—that is, controlling hazards in the production process before the product reaches the market. More importantly, U.S. consumers may continue to be placed at risk of contracting foodborne illness from contaminated domestic and imported seafood products. | What GAO Found
Since the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point system (HACCP) regulations for seafood, the food industry has made some progress in ensuring the safety of seafood. However, several important weaknesses compromise the overall effectiveness of the federal seafood safety system. If left uncorrected, they will continue to undermine the goal of HACCP systems--that is, controlling hazards in the production process before the product reaches the market. More importantly, U.S. consumers may remain at risk of contracting foodborne illness from contaminated domestic and imported seafood products. |
gao_RCED-98-225 | gao_RCED-98-225_0 | In addition, because this report focuses on the Fund’s performance, it reviews the strategic plan developed under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Results Act) to guide the Fund’s other activities. Better Performance Measures Are Needed to Monitor and Evaluate the CDFI Program’s Accomplishments
In entering into assistance agreements with the 1996 awardees in the CDFI program, the Fund complied with the CDFI Act’s requirements for negotiating performance measures based on the awardees’ business plans. However, opportunities exist for the Fund to improve the nature, completeness, and specificity of the performance measures that it negotiates with future awardees. Our evaluation of the 1996 assistance agreements revealed (1) an emphasis on measures of activity, such as the number of loans made, rather than on measures of accomplishment, such as the net number of jobs created or retained; (2) the occasional omission of measures for key aspects of goals; and (3) the widespread omission of baseline data and information on target markets, needed to track progress over time. The Fund is just beginning to develop mandated monitoring and evaluation systems. Most CDFIs only recently signed their assistance agreements. These goals and measures were consistent with the CDFI program’s mission of promoting economic revitalization and community development and were generally based on the awardees’ business plans. As a result, the assistance agreements focus primarily on what the awardees will do, rather than on how their activities will affect the distressed communities. In large part because of staffing limitations, the Fund has not yet completed postaward monitoring and evaluation systems. Nevertheless, most banks have reported that they have voluntarily reinvested their awards in lending and investments related to community development. As a result, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the BEA award from the effects of other incentives. Finally, because the Fund did not require banks receiving 1996 awards to report any material changes in rewarded investments, it did not know whether rewarded investments remained long-term increases in the capital available to CDFIs or distressed communities. The Fund’s Strategic Plan Does Not Yet Fulfill the Requirements of the Results Act
The Fund’s current strategic plan contains the six basic elements required by the Results Act, but these elements generally lack the clarity, specificity, and linkage with one another that the act envisioned. Strategic Plan Could Better Address Crosscutting Activities
In its strategic plan, the Fund states that it will “coordinate its strategies with other Treasury bureaus and agencies with similar missions.” The Fund’s strategic plan does not specifically address the relationship of the Fund’s activities to similar activities in other agencies and does not indicate whether or how the Fund coordinated with other agencies in developing the strategic plan. This report discusses (1) the progress of the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund in developing performance measures for awardees in the CDFI program and systems to monitor and evaluate their progress in meeting their performance goals, as well as the accomplishments they have reported to date; (2) the performance of banks under the Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) program, the impact of the program on banks’ activities and on distressed communities, and the uses to which banks have put their award funds; and (3) the Fund’s progress in meeting the Results Act’s requirements for strategic planning and the steps the Fund could take to improve its management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the performance of the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, focusing on: (1) the first round of awards in the CDFI and Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) programs and the strategic plan that the Fund developed under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; (2) the Fund's development of systems to measure, monitor, and evaluate the awardees' performance; and (3) BEA's impact on banks' lending and investment in CDFIs and distressed communities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for fiscal year 1996, the Fund complied with the CDFI Act's requirements for negotiating performance goals and measures based on the awardees' business plans; (2) moreover, these goals and measures are consistent with the CDFI program's mission of promoting economic revitalization and community development; (3) however, because the CDFI Act provides no specific guidance for evaluating performance measures, GAO applied the Results Act's standards to the goals and measures that the Fund negotiated in assistance agreements with the 1996 awardees; (4) GAO found that the Fund could improve the nature, completeness, and specificity of these goals and measures; (5) GAO's evaluation of the awardees' assistance agreements revealed an emphasis on measures of activity, rather than on measures of accomplishment; (6) as a result, the assistance agreements focus primarily on what the awardees will do, rather than on how their activities will affect the distressed communities; (7) GAO's evaluation also revealed occasional omissions of measures for key aspects of goals and widespread omissions of baseline data and information on target markets; (8) primarily because of staffing limits, the Fund has just begun to develop mandated monitoring and evaluation systems; (9) given that most awardees have just recently signed their assistance agreements, it is still too early to assess their progress; (10) the impact of the BEA program on banks' lending and investment in CDFIs and distressed communities is difficult to isolate from the impact of regulatory and other economic incentives; (11) moreover, because the Fund did not require banks to report material changes in rewarded investments, it did not have a systematic way of learning about any such changes; (12) the Fund is not authorized to address what banks do with their award funds; however, most awardees have reported that they have reinvested at least a portion of their awards in community development activities; (13) the Fund's current strategic plan contains all of the elements required by the Results Act and suggested by the Office of Management and Budget's implementing guidance; (14) however, these elements generally lack the clarity, specificity, and linkage with one another that the act envisioned; (15) in addition, the plan does not describe the relationship of its activities to similar ones in other government agencies, and it does not indicate whether or how the Fund coordinated with other agencies in developing the plan; and (16) these difficulties are similar to those experienced by other federal agencies in implementing the Results Act's requirements. |
gao_GAO-12-694 | gao_GAO-12-694_0 | All states make supplemental Medicaid payments to certain providers. Fifty of the 51 states reported making DSH payments during fiscal year 2010, with total reported payments ranging from about $650,000 for South Dakota to over $3.1 billion for New York.10 states reporting the largest total DSH payments in fiscal year 2010 The accounted for more than 70 percent of the $17.6 billion nationwide total, and the 4 states with the largest total DSH payments—New York, California, Texas, and New Jersey—accounted for almost half (47 percent) of the nationwide total. In assessing the contribution of DSH payments to each state’s overall spending, we found that DSH payments as a percentage of states’ reported Medicaid payments varied considerably among the states. Figure 1 provides information on the amount of each state’s DSH payments and each state’s DSH payments as a percentage of its total Medicaid expenditures. States Reported $14.4 Billion in Non-DSH Supplemental Payments during Fiscal Year 2010, but the Exact Amount of These Payments Is Not Known
During fiscal year 2010, states separately reported making $14.4 billion in non-DSH supplemental payments (of which the federal share was $9.9 billion), primarily for inpatient hospital services.states were to report non-DSH supplemental payments on the CMS-64 separately from their regular payments for six categories of service. For example,
27 states separately reported non-DSH supplemental payments for inpatient hospital services, and the percentage of their expenditures for inpatient hospital services that were non-DSH supplemental payments ranged from less than 1 percent (Virginia and Washington) to 48 percent (Tennessee);
13 states separately reported non-DSH supplemental payments for outpatient hospital services, and the percentage of their expenditures for outpatient hospital services that were non-DSH supplemental payments ranged from less than 1 percent (Texas) to 57 percent (Illinois); and
16 states separately reported non-DSH supplemental payments for physician and surgical services, and the percentage of their expenditures for physician and surgical hospital services that were non-DSH supplemental payments ranged from less than 1 percent (Oklahoma) to 34 percent (West Virginia). They then took steps to improve states’ reporting of these payments, for example, by training state staff in the use of the revised form CMS-64 and asking regional CMS staff to work with states to identify and resolve reporting problems. Reported Non-DSH Supplemental Payments Were over $8 Billion Higher during 2010 Than during 2006, and New and Modified Supplemental Payments Were a Factor in the Increase
The 39 states that separately reported non-DSH supplemental payments during either 2006 or 2010 (or both) reported an increase of $8.1 billion in non-DSH supplemental payments during this period. Most of this increase was from 15 states that reported during both years, and most of the reported increase was for inpatient hospital services. Changes in reporting also contributed to the increase. Concluding Observations
Medicaid supplemental payments can help ensure that providers make important services available to Medicaid beneficiaries. Ongoing federal efforts to improve the completeness of reporting of Medicaid supplemental payments are important for effective oversight and to better understand these payments’ role in financing Medicaid services. HHS stated that HHS and CMS will continue their ongoing efforts to improve states’ reporting of Medicaid supplemental payments. Supplemental Medicaid payments include Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments to hospitals and other supplemental payments to hospitals or other providers, which we refer to as non-DSH supplemental payments. To determine what supplemental Medicaid payments states reported during fiscal year 2010 and how non-DSH supplemental payments reported during 2010 compared with those reported during 2006, we obtained and analyzed data about the Medicaid expenditures states reported during these 2 years. We did not quantify the extent to which states did not separately report their supplemental payments. Information from Selected States
To examine reasons for differences between 2006 and 2010 in reported non-DSH supplemental payments, and to obtain additional information about states’ reports of these payments, we obtained information from CMS and public sources about non-DSH supplemental payments in a judgmental sample of 11 states selected to include a mix of relevant characteristics. GAO-11-318SP. Medicaid: Ongoing Federal Oversight of Payments to Offset Uncompensated Hospital Care Costs Is Warranted. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and Human Services. Medicaid: States Use Illusory Approaches to Shift Program Costs to Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated Medicaid a high-risk program because of concerns about its size, growth, and inadequate fiscal oversight. The program cost the federal government and states an estimated $383 billion in fiscal year 2010. In addition to regular Medicaid payments to providers, states make supplemental payments, including DSH payments, which are intended to offset the uncompensated costs of care provided to uninsured individuals and Medicaid beneficiaries. States also make other supplemental payments, which we refer to as non-DSH supplemental payments, to hospitals and other providers, for example, to help offset the costs of care provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. GAO and others have raised concerns about the transparency of states Medicaid supplemental payments. GAO was asked to provide information on supplemental payments.
GAO examined (1) how much states reported paying in supplemental Medicaid payments during fiscal year 2010 and (2) how non-DSH supplemental payments reported during 2010 compared with those reported during 2006 and reasons for differences. GAO analyzed CMSs Medicaid expenditure data for all states and information from CMS and other sources about non-DSH supplemental payments in a nongeneralizable sample of 11 states selected to capture a mix of relevant characteristics.
In its comments on a draft of GAOs report, HHS stated that HHS and CMS will continue their ongoing efforts to improve states reporting of supplemental Medicaid payments.
What GAO Found
States reported $32 billion in Medicaid supplemental payments during fiscal year 2010, but the exact amount of supplemental payments is unknown because state reporting was incomplete. On expenditure reports used to obtain federal funds filed with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), states reported the following:
A total of $17.6 billion in Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. The 10 states reporting the largest total DSH payments in fiscal year 2010 accounted for more than 70 percent of the nationwide total, with 4 states New York, California, Texas, and New Jerseyaccounting for almost half (47 percent). DSH payments as a percentage of total Medicaid payments varied considerablyranging from 1 to 17 percentamong the 50 states that reported DSH payments.
A total of $14.4 billion in non-DSH supplemental payments to hospitals and other providers. Because not all states reported these payments separately, complete information is not available. Like DSH payments, non-DSH supplemental payments as a percentage of total state Medicaid spending varied considerablyalso ranging from 1 to 17 percentamong the 30 reporting states. These payments can also constitute a large portion of states expenditures for particular categories of services, such as inpatient or outpatient hospital, nursing facility, or physician and surgical services. For example, non-DSH supplemental payments for inpatient hospital services ranged from 1 to 48 percent of state expenditures for these services among reporting states.
CMS officials told GAO that they were taking steps to improve states reporting of non-DSH supplemental payments, including working with states to train staff on reporting of payments and on identifying and resolving reporting problems.
States reported non-DSH supplemental payments were more than $8 billion higher during 2010 than during 2006, the year for which GAO previously reported on the amount of these payments. More complete state reporting of payments and new and modified supplemental payments were factors in this increase. The information available to identify changes from 2006 to 2010 came from 39 states that separately reported non-DSH supplemental payments during either 2006 or 2010 or both. Most of the increase was from the 15 states that reported some payments in both years and reported higher non-DSH supplemental payments during 2010 than 2006. In addition, most of the reported increase was for inpatient hospital services. In 11 selected states, GAO found that new and modified supplemental payments contributed to some increases. For example, new and modified supplemental payments for hospital services in Colorado and Illinois are estimated to increase the states non-DSH supplemental payments by about $300 million and $1 billion per year, respectively. However, data limitations prevented GAO from quantifying the full extent to which the increase was attributable to new and modified payments. In light of the apparent increase in non-DSH supplemental payments, ongoing federal efforts to improve the completeness of reporting are important for effective oversight and to better understand the payments role in financing Medicaid services. |
gao_GAO-12-382T | gao_GAO-12-382T_0 | DHS Strategically Planned Its Homeland Security Missions Departmentwide through the QHSR, but Stakeholder Consultations Could Be Enhanced
DHS’s primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. DHS reported on the results of this second phase in the July 2010 BUR report. In December 2010, we issued a report on the extent to which the QHSR addressed the 9/11 Commission Act’s required reporting elements. In September 2011, we reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. DHS consulted with stakeholders—federal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy experts— through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR and a web-based discussion forum. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process. For example:
Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO noted concerns about the limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders’ input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input during future reviews. We recommended that DHS provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process and examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from nonfederal stakeholders during the QHSR process, such as whether panels of state, local, and tribal government officials or components’ existing advisory or other groups could be useful. DHS Did Not Prioritize QHSR Missions or Use Risk Assessments to Help Set Strategic Priorities and Could Improve Departmentwide Performance Measures
The 9/11 Commission Act called for DHS to prioritize homeland security missions in the QHSR. DHS Could Strengthen Its Use of Risk Information in Prioritizing Initiatives and Planning and Investment Decision Making
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors as called for in our prior work and DHS’s risk management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to help strengthen DHS’s activities and serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas (see app. Risk information was not included as an element in any of these three criteria, according to DHS officials, because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. Consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including assisting in determinations of which initiatives should be implemented in the short or longer term. In our September 2011 report, we recommended that DHS examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS Has Established Performance Measures, but Has Not Yet Fully Developed Outcome-Based Measures for Many of Its Mission Functions
In September 2011, we reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop additional measures. While DHS had made progress in strengthening performance measurement, our work across the department has shown that a number of programs lacked outcome goals and measures, which may have hindered the department’s ability to effectively assess results or fully assess whether the department was using resources effectively and efficiently. DHS Has Taken Action to Implement, Strengthen, and Integrate Its Management Functions, but Needs to Demonstrate Sustainable Progress
In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. DHS also put in place common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. Specifically, the strategy contained details on the implementation and transformation of DHS, such as corrective actions to address challenges within each management area, and officials responsible for implementing those corrective actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the United States. In February 2010, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report, outlining a strategic framework for homeland security. In July 2010 DHS issued a report on the results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a departmentwide assessment to implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHSs programmatic activities, such as inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals identified in the QHSR. This testimony addresses DHSs efforts to (1) strategically plan its homeland security missions through the QHSR, (2) set strategic priorities and measure performance, and (3) build a unified department. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in December 2010, February 2011, and September 2011.
What GAO Found
DHSs primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. In September 2011, GAO reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, several stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically, DHS consulted with stakeholdersfederal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy expertsthrough various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process, such as concerns about the limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR and the need to examine additional mechanisms for including more nonfederal stakeholders in consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders input during future reviews.
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAOs prior work and DHSs risk-management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas. According to DHS officials, DHS did not consider risk information in prioritizing initiatives because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. In September 2011, GAO reported that consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHSs prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR. Further, GAO reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop additional measures. However, with regard to specific programs, GAOs work has shown that a number of programs and efforts lack outcome goals and measures, hindering the departments ability to effectively assess results.
In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agenciesseveral with major management challengesinto one department, and failure to effectively address DHSs management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. DHS has taken action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions, such as developing a strategy for addressing this high-risk area and putting in place common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. However, DHS needs to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its strategy and corrective actions to address its management challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process, examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from nonfederal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and has actions planned or underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-03-497T | gao_GAO-03-497T_0 | FAA’s and the Airport Industry’s Estimates of Airports’ Planned Capital Development Vary Substantially
The estimated costs of planned airport capital development vary depending on which projects are included in the estimates. According to FAA’s estimate, which includes only projects that are eligible for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, the total cost of airport development will be about $46 billion, or about $9 billion per year, for 2001 through 2005. ACI’s estimate includes all of the projects in FAA’s estimate, plus other planned airport capital projects that may or may not be eligible for AIP grants. ACI estimates a total cost of almost $75 billion, or nearly $15 billion per year for 2002 through 2006. Neither ACI’s nor FAA’s estimate includes funding for the terminal modification projects that are needed to accommodate the new explosives detection systems required to screen checked baggage. ACI estimates that these projects will cost a total of about $3 billion to $5 billion over the next 5 years. $12 Billion a Year, Mostly from Bonds and Federal Sources
From 1999 through 2001, the 3,364 airports that make up the national airport system received an average of about $12 billion per year for planned capital development. The single largest source of these funds was bonds, followed by AIP grants and passenger facility charges. The amount and type of funding vary depending on the airport’s size. Past Funding Levels Would Cover All of FAA’s Planned Development Estimate but Would Fall About $3 Billion Short of ACI’s Estimate
If the funding for airport capital development remains at about $12 billion a year over the next 5 years, it would cover all of the projects in FAA’s estimate. However, it does provide a useful indication of where funding differences may be the greatest. From 1999 through 2001, smaller airports received an average of about $2.4 billion a year for planned capital development while large- and medium-hub airports received an average of about $9.4 billion. Ability to Fund Planned Capital Development Has Improved for Both Smaller and Larger Airports
The difference between past funding and planned development has declined over the past 5 years, and, at recent funding levels, airports would be able to fund a higher percentage of their planned capital development than they could fund in 1998. Options Are Available to Address Difference between Funding and Planned Development
Options are available to increase airport funding or to make better use of the existing funding. These options, some of which were authorized or implemented as part of AIR-21, include increasing the AIP grant funding for smaller airports, increasing passenger facility charges, creating a separate fund for new security projects, and using innovative financing approaches. The various options would benefit different types of airports to varying degrees. Another option would be to increase or eliminate the cap on passenger facility charges. This option would primarily benefit larger airports, because passenger facility charges are a function of the volume of passenger traffic. Analysts nonetheless expect the demand for air travel to rebound, and the nation’s aviation system must be ready to accommodate the projected growth safely and securely. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21 Century (AIR-21) 3 years ago, much has changed. At that time, the focus was on reducing congestion and flight delays. Today, flights are being canceled for lack of business, two major air carriers are in bankruptcy, and attention has shifted from increasing the capacity of the national airspace system to enhancing aviation security. Furthermore, as the federal budget deficit has increased, competition for federal resources has intensified, and the costs of airport capital development are growing, especially with the new requirements for security. Nonetheless, analysts expect the demand for air traffic services to rebound. Until that time, the unexpected slump in air traffic creates a window of opportunity to improve the safety and efficiency of the national airport system.
What GAO Found
Although there is general consensus among stakeholders that maintaining the integrity of the national airport system requires continual capital investment, estimates vary as to the type and cost of planned airport capital development required to ensure a safe and efficient system. For 2001 through 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has estimated annual planned capital development costs of about $9 billion, while the Airport Council International (ACI), a key organization representing the airport industry, has estimated annual costs of about $15 billion for 2002 through 2006. The estimates differ primarily because FAA's includes only projects that are eligible for federal funding, whereas ACI's includes projects that may or may not be eligible for federal funding. Neither FAA's nor ACI's estimate covers the airport terminal modifications needed to accommodate the new explosives detection systems required to screen checked baggage. According to ACI, the total cost of these modifications could be $3 billion to $5 billion over the next 5 years. From 1999 through 2001, airports received an average of about $12 billion a year for planned capital development. The primary source of this funding was bonds, which accounted for almost $7 billion, followed by federal grants and passenger facility charges, which accounted for $2.4 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. The amounts and types of funding also varied by airport type. Of the $12 billion, large- and medium-hub airports received over $9 billion, and smaller airports received over $2 billion. If airports continue to receive about $12 billion a year for planned capital development, they would be able to fund all of the projects included in FAA's estimate, but they would not be able to fund about $3 billion in planned development estimated by ACI. While this projected shortfall could change with revisions in future funding, planned development, or both, it nevertheless indicates where funding differences may be the greatest. Options are available to increase or make better use of the funding for airport development, and these options would benefit different types of airports to varying degrees. For example, raising the current cap on passenger facility charges would primarily benefit larger airports, while increasing or redistributing Airport Improvement Program grant funds would be more likely to help smaller airports. |
gao_GAO-09-603 | gao_GAO-09-603_0 | Over Two-Thirds of the 424 Grantees We Analyzed Did Not Consistently Meet More Federal Requirements From Fiscal Years 2000 through 2008, But Practices Used by Some Grantees Could Improve Other Grantees’ Performance
Our analysis of OTRAK data shows that 51 percent of 424 grantees had mixed results in terms of meeting more triennial review requirements from fiscal years 2000 through 2008, as demonstrated by both increases and decreases in their numbers of findings over three consecutive reviews. One management practice included linking the job descriptions of pertinent individuals to the triennial review—a practice that grantee executives said contributed to a culture of accountability. FTA officials stated that during the workshops, they plan to emphasize ways to identify systemic deficiencies. However, we found a few areas where FTA could improve the triennial review process by ensuring and documenting grantees receive a complete review at least once every three years and by coordinating the schedules of multiple oversight reviews in the same fiscal year. For example, contractors recorded in the triennial review reports of ten grantees that the drug and alcohol program area was “not reviewed” during the 2008 triennial review because these grantees had received special drug and alcohol program reviews in fiscal year 2006. FTA headquarters officials indicated that regional officials and contractors discuss all 23 areas during the triennial review process and identify concerns about the grantees. Further, FTA is aware of the burden oversight reviews place on grantees and works to limit this burden. FTA’s Two Triennial Review Performance Measures Meet Some, But Not All Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures
FTA established two performance measures to assess timeliness of steps in the triennial review program: (1) 80 percent of triennial review findings are to be closed within 30 days of their due date (“Close Findings Timely”); and (2) 95 percent of the final triennial review reports are to be issued within 30 days of the completion of the review (“Issue Reports Timely”). Measurable target. Both program performance measures have unique names, definitions, and do not overlap. Objectivity. Core program activities. While FTA’s existing performance measure of Close Findings Timely may increase adherence to federal requirements by encouraging grantees to address findings, it does not provide an overall program level assessment of grantees’ performance over time. However, the measures do not evaluate other governmentwide priorities, including the outcome of the reviews—the extent to which grantees are meeting federal requirements, or the quality of the triennial reviews. FTA has no performance measures for assessing the quality of the triennial review program. Balance. Although one of the goals of the triennial review program is to assist grantees in meeting more federal requirements over time, our analysis of OTRAK data shows many grantees with mixed success in reducing their numbers of findings over three triennial reviews from fiscal years 2000 through 2008; and 17 percent of the grantees we reviewed met fewer federal requirements in their latest triennial review than they did in their two previous reviews. Second, until the Oversight Review Council performs its role as oversight review coordinator or delegates this role to another FTA body, uncoordinated, multiple oversight reviews may not effectively increase FTA’s coverage of grantees and may place undue burden on a few grantees. 2. To help ensure that a complete performance review and evaluation of each grantee is conducted at least once every three years, in accordance with the statutory requirement, revise the contractors’ guide to remove the “not reviewed” category, require an updated evaluation of areas reviewed in the prior two years of the triennial review, and describe how contractors should document the triennial review reports with updates to other reviews, such as special oversight reviews conducted in the prior two years. 3. 5. To determine FTA’s performance measures for the triennial review and to what extent FTA’s performance measures meet nine key attributes, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed, among other documents: GAO reports describing the importance of establishing effective performance measures, GAO guidance on assessing the strengths and weaknesses of federal agencies’ performance measures and identifying the key attributes of successful performance measures, FTA triennial review end-of-year reports, and FTA performance appraisal templates. Programs must have a drug and alcohol testing program in place for all safety-sensitive employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) oversees about $5.5 billion in federal funds each year to transit agencies serving urban areas (grantee), in part through its triennial review program, which evaluates grantee adherence to federal requirements at least once every 3 years. GAO recommended in a 1998 oversight report that FTA improve the program. The subcommittee requested that GAO review this program. GAO identified (1) the extent to which triennial reviews indicate that grantees met applicable federal requirements from fiscal years 2000 through 2008; (2) the strengths and weaknesses of the triennial review process; and (3) FTA's performance measures for the triennial review and the extent to which they meet key attributes of successful performance measures. GAO addressed these objectives by analyzing oversight data on 424 grantees that had three triennial reviews, reviewing triennial review reports and guidance, assessing FTA's performance measures; and interviewing FTA headquarters and regional officials, contractors who conduct the reviews, and grantees.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of FTA's triennial review oversight data found that over two-thirds of the 424 grantees analyzed have not consistently improved overall performance in terms of meeting more federal requirements from fiscal years 2000 through 2008. Fifty-one percent of grantees had mixed results in meeting requirements and 17 percent consistently met fewer requirements; while 31 percent consistently met more requirements--one of the goals of the triennial review program. Executives from three grantees that met most requirements attributed their performance to, among other things, having job descriptions that link employee responsibilities to the triennial review--a practice they said contributed to a culture of accountability. During the same time, grantees had the greatest number of findings in 5 of 23 triennial review areas, including the procurement and drug and alcohol testing areas. While FTA helps grantees address findings, additional efforts to identify the underlying causes and the severity of findings could further benefit grantees. FTA's triennial review program uses some strong management practices--having a well-defined process, using an information system to monitor grantees, and issuing reports timely. Still, two areas could be strengthened. First, while FTA is legislatively required to conduct a complete review of grantees' adherence to federal requirements at least once every 3 years, GAO identified a few instances where documentation does not clearly show that FTA reviewed all requirement areas. For example, 10 triennial review reports for 2008 showed that the drug and alcohol program area was "not reviewed." FTA's practice is to review all areas, regardless of documentation, but because FTA's guidance is not clear about how to document the review of areas where FTA has conducted a related special review in the prior two years, a few grantees may not be reviewed for 5 years. FTA plans to revise its guidance to avoid ambiguity. Second, FTA is aware of the burden oversight reviews place on grantees and works to limit this burden. However, in a limited number of cases, FTA did not coordinate its special oversight reviews with the triennial review schedule, which may place undue burden on a few grantees receiving multiple oversight reviews in the same fiscal year. FTA's two timeliness performance measures for assessing the triennial review program--(1) closing 80 percent of grantees' deficient findings within 30 days of their due date and (2) issuing 95 percent of the final triennial review reports within 30 days of completing a review--meet some, but not all key attributes of successful measures. Although both measures link throughout the organization, have measurable targets, are clearly stated, and do not overlap, the "close findings" measure does not meet the objectivity and reliability attribute. For example, data inaccuracies in past "close findings" data raised questions about the reliability of the measure. Also, both measures do not assess the core program activity to evaluate grantees' performance or governmentwide priorities, such as the quality of the triennial review program, and thus, as a whole, are not balanced, making it difficult for managers to not overemphasize one priority at the expense of others. |
gao_GAO-05-633 | gao_GAO-05-633_0 | United States Is Providing Compact Funding to the FSM and the RMI, but Strategic Issues Impacting Long-Term Use of Funds Have Not Been Addressed
The U.S. government has signed sector grant agreements with the FSM and RMI as provided for in the amended compacts, and trust funds for both countries have been established. Strategic planning issues that impact the long-term, effective use of funds have not been addressed by the three governments: (1) the allocations of sector grants are not linked to amended compact development goals such as the promotion of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance, (2) the FSM and RMI have not developed strategic plans to manage required annual grant funding decreases, and (3) the trust funds have not been placed with investors that can maximize trust fund earnings (although efforts are under way to resolve this issue). As provided in the amended compacts, the U.S. government has provided $32 million to the FSM trust fund and $14.5 million to the RMI trust fund for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. United States, FSM, and RMI Have Taken Actions to Meet Key Accountability Requirements, Though a Few Requirements Remain Uncompleted
The U.S., FSM and RMI governments have taken several actions to fulfill key accountability requirements, such as meeting annually to approve grants, establishing special grant terms and conditions, and preparing various reports. The U.S. government has not provided its fiscal year 2004 report from the President to the U.S. Congress, due in December 2004, though a draft is being circulated for interagency approval. The FSM has not completed its fiscal year 2004 single audit. OIA Opened New Office in 2003, FSM and RMI Took Steps in 2005 to Establish Centralized Compact Offices
In October 2003, OIA took a significant step toward facilitating implementation and oversight of the amended compacts by opening a Honolulu field office to manage compact issues. OIA Opened a Honolulu Field Office to Facilitate Compact Implementation and Monitoring, but Extent of Required On-Site Review Has Not Been Established
In October 2003, OIA opened a new Honolulu field office specifically intended to facilitate implementation and oversight of the amended compacts, although OIA has not determined how much on-site review of compact activities in the FSM and the RMI is necessary. The U.S. To improve grant administration and oversight and to facilitate planning for the effective use of compact funding, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as Chairman of the Joint Economic Management Committee, in coordination with other U.S. agencies that participate in this committee, to work with the FSM government to take the following four actions: establish sector grant levels for each of the five governments that are consistent with national priorities and will assist in promoting long-term development goals such as economic advancement and budgetary self- reliance, establish a time frame for the completion of required and overdue FSM establish a time frame for the completion of FSM government plans to manage decreasing annual grant amounts and to shift basic government operations under the public sector capacity building to local revenues in a strategic fashion, and outline specific actions that the FSM government will take in managing and monitoring day-to-day sector grant operations to ensure compliance with all grant terms and conditions. This report evaluates actions taken by the United States, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands governments since fiscal year 2004 to (1) meet funding requirements and plan for the use of this funding, (2) meet accountability requirements, and (3) establish operations to facilitate compliance with funding and accountability requirements. To address all objectives, we held extensive interviews with officials from the U.S. Department of the Interior (Washington, D.C., Honolulu, Hawaii, the FSM, and the RMI) and the Department of State (Washington, D.C., the FSM, and the RMI). | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1987 to 2003, the United States provided economic aid to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) through a Compact of Free Association. A previous GAO report found little accountability for the assistance provided by the U.S. Department of the Interior under this compact. In 2004, amended compacts with the FSM and RMI went into effect and will provide $3.5 billion in assistance over 20 years, consisting of grants and contributions to trust funds that are to replace the grants after 2023. The amended compacts include funding and accountability requirements that were not present in the original compact. To better understand the status of the compacts' implementation, GAO evaluated actions taken by the U.S., FSM, and RMI governments since fiscal year 2004 to (1) meet funding requirements and plan for the use of this funding, (2) meet accountability requirements, and (3) establish operations to implement the new agreements.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the U.S. government signed grant agreements with the FSM and the RMI focused on six sectors, such as health and education, as provided for in the amended compacts. Authorized grant amounts for each year were about $76 million for the FSM and about $35 million for the RMI. Required trust funds were also established. Strategic planning issues impacting the long-term, effective use of funds have not been addressed. The allocations of the grants to the sectors have not been linked to the countries' development goals; the FSM and RMI have not planned for annual required decreases in grant funding; and trust funds have not been invested to maximize interest earnings (though efforts are currently under way to resolve this final issue). The U.S., FSM, and RMI governments have taken actions to meet compact accountability requirements. For example, the FSM and the RMI have provided financial and performance reports, and the U.S. government has withheld funding to ensure compliance with grant requirements. However, a few important accountability requirements have not been met. For instance, the FSM's development plan has not been approved by the U.S. government, and it is unclear whether the U.S. government has assessed the RMI's planning documents. Finally, the FSM has not completed single audits for fiscal years 2003 or 2004, and none of the three governments has submitted its required annual compact spending and development report for fiscal year 2004. The Department of the Interior took a significant step in October 2003 to facilitate implementation and oversight of the amended compacts by opening a new office in Honolulu, Hawaii. However, Interior has not determined how much oversight of compact activities in the FSM and the RMI is necessary, though the current level of on-site review is viewed as insufficient. The FSM and RMI governments have each taken actions to establish centralized compact management offices; the RMI government is progressing more rapidly in these efforts than the FSM government. |
gao_NSIAD-98-160 | gao_NSIAD-98-160_0 | Because USAREUR units are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, deployed units were augmented with personnel from other European units and active and reserve forces from the United States. Most of the Army reservists were involuntarily called to active duty under PSRC, whereas most Air Force reservists volunteered to participate in the Bosnia mission. The remainder are in the Army reserve. Army Personnel Needed to Be Added to Forces/Units Deploying to Bosnia
Augmentation from reserve forces and U.S.-based active forces was required because USAREUR did not possess all the personnel and capabilities the mission needs. With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army canceled its June 1998 troop withdrawal and extended its plans for providing personnel beyond June. Although the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and aviation-related requirements can be filled, about a dozen unit capabilities will require special attention in the future because the capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these capabilities have already been mobilized and deployed in support of the operation. Requirements for these capabilities have totaled several hundred persons per rotation. The availability of the Reserve Component to meet some of the future Bosnia mission requirements at current force levels is limited to some extent. Conclusions
The military services have successfully provided the needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years. These steps have met the mission’s needs with varying impacts on parent units that have provided personnel and have required the Army to operate in a fashion different from the way in which it organizes its forces, which is as entire units to fight a major theater war. The Army also has relied on the reserves both to provide support capabilities that reside primarily or solely in the reserve component and to reduce the high level of activity of some active forces. The President has statutory authority to involuntarily activate units and members of the Selected Reserve. The Bosnia mission has led to a situation in which in some instances all of the units with needed capabilities already have been ordered to duty and served the maximum time permitted. In some instances, the services have activated reservists involuntarily for shorter periods of time than the statute allows. It is possible that some of these reservists could be recalled to serve the full activation period under a single PSRC of 270 days. The statute does not prohibit multiple activations as long as the total number of days on active duty does not exceed 270 days. Scope and Methodology
To determine how the military services are providing needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission and plan to provide follow-on forces for the extended mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed personnel at the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs; Department of the Army headquarters and Department of Air Force headquarters, Washington, D.C.; U.S. European Command, USAREUR, and USAFE, all located in Germany; U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military services' efforts to provide the needed capabilities for continued military operations in Bosnia, focusing on: (1) how the services have provided the needed capabilities for the operation thus far; (2) how the services plan to provide them in the future; and (3) the President's ability to call up reserves under his Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the military services have successfully provided needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2 1/2 years; (2) the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has provided the majority of Army forces, augmented with reserve forces and active forces from the United States; (3) because USAREUR units are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized, the Army had to borrow personnel from nondeploying units so that deploying units could deploy with the required number of people; (4) also, because the operation did not always require entire units, the Army deployed partial ones; (5) these steps enabled the Army to meet the mission's needs but, in some cases, have had an adverse impact on the parent units that have provided personnel; (6) the U.S. Air Forces Europe has provided the majority of air forces, augmented with U.S.-based active and reserve forces; (7) both services have used their reserve components to meet the mission requirements because some critical support capabilities reside primarily or solely in the reserves and because use of the reserves reduces the high level of activity of some active forces; (8) most Army reservists were involuntarily activated through PSRC, while most Air Force Air Reserve Component members were volunteers; (9) with the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army and the Air Force are developing plans for a follow-on force; (10) though the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and the aviation-related requirements for the mission can be filled, about a dozen unit capabilities will require special attention in the future because the capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these capabilities have already been used; (11) requirements for these capabilities have totalled several hundred persons per rotation; (12) to satisfy future mission needs, the military services and the U.S. Atlantic Command are considering using similar capabilities in the other military services, asking for greater participation from other countries, and contracting for some of the needed capabilities; (13) some reservists have served for fewer than the 270 days that the PSRC statute allows; (14) because the statute does not prohibit multiple involuntary activations if the total does not exceed the 270-day limit, some of these reservists could be recalled to serve up to the full activation period; and (15) in addition, the Bosnia mission has led to a situation in which in some instances all of the reservists with needed capabilities have been ordered to duty and served the maximum time allowed for a single call-up. |
gao_RCED-99-8 | gao_RCED-99-8_0 | About 1,800 Sites Classified as Awaiting a National Priorities List Decision Remain Potentially Eligible for the List
The responses to our surveys of officials of EPA, other federal agencies, and states indicate that 1,789 of the 3,036 sites classified by EPA’s database as awaiting a National Priorities List decision are potentially eligible for the list. Another 1,234 sites are unlikely to become eligible for the Superfund program for various reasons. Officials of EPA, other federal agencies, and states who responded to our survey characterized the risks presented by about two-thirds of the potentially eligible sites. They said that about 17 percent of the sites currently pose high human health and environmental risks; another 10 percent of the sites potentially pose high future risks. In addition, officials were unsure about the severity of site conditions for a large proportion of potentially eligible sites. 6) if they are not cleaned up. Average current risks (455 sites)
Low current risks (443 sites)
EPA’s and States’ Cleanup Activities at Potentially Eligible Sites Have Been Limited
The 1,789 sites that are potentially eligible for the National Priorities List include (1) 686 sites where some cleanup activities have reportedly taken place or are currently being conducted but the final cleanup remedies are not yet under way and (2) 1,103 sites where officials reported that no substantive cleanup activities beyond initial site assessments or investigations have occurred or no information on cleanup progress is available. 8). 9). As shown in figure 10, one-third of the sites that have been known for 10 to 14 years and another third of the sites that have been in the inventory for 15 years or more have undergone some cleanup activities. 11). They estimated that 536 (30 percent) of the sites will be cleaned up under state programs but usually could not give a date for the start of cleanup or say whether responsible parties would participate. 12). Although respondents from EPA, other federal agencies, and states jointly believed that as many as 232 of the potentially eligible sites may eventually be placed on the list, none of these sites has yet been proposed for listing. Recommendations
Because of the need for current and accurate information on the risks posed by the 1,789 sites that are potentially eligible for the National Priorities List in order to set cleanup priorities and delineate cleanup responsibilities, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, in consultation with each applicable state, (1) develop a timetable for EPA or the state to characterize and rank the risks associated with the potentially eligible sites and (2) establish interim cleanup measures that may be appropriate for EPA and the state to take at potentially eligible sites that pose the highest risks while these sites await either placement on the National Priorities List or state action to fully clean them up; in consultation with each applicable state, (1) develop a timetable for determining whether EPA or the state will be responsible for cleaning up individual sites, taking into consideration, among other factors, some states’ limited resources and enforcement authority, and (2) once a determination is made, notify the public as to which party is responsible for cleaning up each site; and correct the errors in the CERCLIS database that incorrectly classify sites as awaiting a National Priorities List decision and prevent the recurrence of such errors so that the database accurately reflects whether sites are awaiting a listing decision. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this review were to (1) determine the number of sites awaiting an NPL decision that remain potentially eligible for the list; (2) describe the characteristics of these sites, including their health and environmental risks; (3) determine the status of any actions to clean up these sites; and (4) collect the opinions of EPA and other federal and state officials on the likely final disposition of these sites, including the number of sites that are likely to be added to the Superfund program. For example, these three states account for 54 percent of the sites for which we could not obtain an official’s estimate of the risks to human health and the environment. Additional Information on Potentially Eligible Sites That Have Undergone Some Cleanup Actions
We asked officials of EPA, other federal agencies, and states about the cleanup actions that have been conducted at the potentially eligible sites. Officials of about a quarter of the responding states told us that their state’s financial capability to clean up potentially eligible sites, if necessary, is excellent or good, and more than half said that their state’s ability to fund these cleanups is poor or very poor. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO surveyed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regions, other federal agencies, and states to: (1) determine the number of sites classified as awaiting a National Priorities List (NPL) decision that remain potentially eligible for the list; (2) describe the characteristics of these sites, including their health and environmental risks; (3) determine the status of any actions to clean up these sites; and (4) collect the opinions of EPA and other federal and state officials on the likely final disposition of these sites, including the number of sites that are expected to be added to the NPL.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of surveys of EPA regions, other federal agencies, and states, GAO has determined that 1,789 of the 3,036 sites that EPA's database classified as awaiting a NPL decision in October 1997 are still potentially eligible for placement on the list; (2) GAO considered the 1,234 other sites as unlikely to become eligible for various reasons; (3) the other sites do not require cleanup in the view of the responding officials, have already been cleaned up, or have final cleanup activities under way; (4) officials of EPA, other federal agencies, and states said that many of the potentially eligible sites present risks to human health and the environment; (5) the potentially eligible sites are generally located in populated areas; (6) officials of EPA, other federal agencies, and states said that about 17 percent of the potentially eligible sites currently pose high human health and environmental risks and that another 10 percent could also pose high risks in the future if they are not cleaned up; (7) however, these officials were unsure about the severity of risks for a large proportion of the sites; (8) responding officials said that some cleanup actions have taken place at 686 of the potentially eligible sites; (9) no cleanup activities beyond initial site assessments or investigations have been conducted, or no information is available on any such actions, at the other 1,103 potentially eligible sites; (10) many of the potentially eligible sites have been in states' and EPA's inventories of hazardous sites for extended periods; (11) 73 percent have been in EPA's inventory for more than a decade; (12) no cleanup progress was reported at the majority of the sites that have been known for 10 years or more; (13) responding officials did not indicate whether or how more than half of the potentially eligible sites would be cleaned up; (14) collectively, EPA and state officials believed that 232 of the potentially eligible sites might be placed on the NPL in the future; (15) however, EPA and the states agreed on the listing prospects of only a small number of specific sites; (16) officials estimated that almost one third of the potentially eligible sites are likely to be cleaned up under state programs but usually could not give a date for the start of cleanup activities; (17) officials of about 20 percent of the states said that their state's enforcement capacity to compel responsible parties to clean up potentially eligible sites is fair to very poor; and (18) officials of about half of the states told GAO that their state's financial capability to clean up potentially eligible sites is poor or very poor. |
gao_GAO-12-509T | gao_GAO-12-509T_0 | DHS Employees Indicated Less Job Satisfaction Than the Rest of the Federal Government
Over time, federal surveys have consistently found that DHS employees are less satisfied with their jobs than the governmentwide average. At that time, 56 percent of DHS employees responded that they were satisfied with their jobs, compared to the 68 percent governmentwide.subsequent years when comparative data were available using the job satisfaction index, the disparity continued—ranging from a difference of 8 percentage points in 2006 to a 4 percentage point difference in 2008, 2010, and 2011. In some key areas, DHS’s percentage of positive responses was lower than the rest of the federal government averages. For example:
Slightly less than half of the DHS employees surveyed reported positive responses to the statement “My talents are used well in the workplace,” nearly 12 percentage points less than the rest of the federal government average of 61.6 percent. In two areas, DHS’s percentage of positive responses was nearly the same or higher than the rest of the federal government average. Specifically:
DHS’s percentage of positive responses to the statement “Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your pay?” was not statistically different than the rest of the federal government average, with responses of 62 percent for DHS and 63 percent for the rest of the federal government. The 2011 job satisfaction data also indicate that satisfaction levels vary across components within DHS. For example, as shown in table 1, job satisfaction index results for the 2011 FEVS show the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as 11 percentage points below governmentwide averages while other large components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), posted above average results. DHS Has Ongoing Actions to Address Job Satisfaction, but Has Not Yet Improved Employee Satisfaction Results
DHS has taken steps to identify where it has the most significant employee satisfaction problems and has developed plans for addressing those problem areas. DHS has conducted some analysis of employee survey results and developed action plans to address some employee satisfaction problems, but it has not yet addressed the key goals related to job satisfaction—to improve DHS’s scores on OPM’s job satisfaction index, among other indexes, and to improve its ranking on the Partnership’s Best Places to Work in the Federal Government. The results from our prior work at DHS and other departments identify a wide variety of issues that can lead to employee morale problems. Thus, conducting an analysis of the root causes of employee satisfaction problems and developing plans to address them are important. DHS. DHS completed an evaluation of the 2008 Federal Human Capital Survey results to determine root causes of job satisfaction departmentwide, according to DHS officials. In that analysis, DHS determined that the drivers of employee satisfaction across DHS included the DHS mission, senior leadership effectiveness, and supervisor support. According to DHS officials, DHS is currently working with a contractor on a departmentwide analysis of root causes of employee morale. As of March 2012, this analysis was not complete. DHS and the components are taking actions that could improve employee satisfaction, with a focus on improving components’ positive responses to selected survey items. DHS’s Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management. In the Integrated Strategy, DHS identified corrective actions to improve employee job satisfaction scores, among other things. DHS and component action plans. In September 2008, we reported that the 2004 and 2006 employee survey results for the Small Business Administration (SBA) showed a lack of respect for and trust in SBA leadership and a concern about training opportunities. The variation in potential issues that can result in morale problems underscores the importance of looking beyond survey scores to understand where problems, such as low employee satisfaction, are taking place within the organization, along with the root causes of those problems. Given the critical nature of DHS’s mission to protect the security and economy of our nation, it is important that DHS employees are satisfied with their jobs so that DHS can retain and attract the talent required to complete its work. We will continue to monitor and assess DHS’s efforts to address employee job satisfaction through our ongoing work and expect to issue a report on our final results in September 2012. High-Risk Series: An Update. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation and Transformation of Management Functions, but More Work Remains. High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is the third largest cabinet-level agency in the federal government, employing more than 200,000 employees in a broad range of jobs. Since its creation in 2003, DHS has faced challenges implementing its human capital functions, and its employees have reported having low job satisfaction. GAO designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk because it represented an enormous and complex undertaking that would require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. This testimony presents preliminary observations regarding: (1) how DHSs employees workforce satisfaction compares with that of other federal government employees, and (2) the extent to which DHS is taking steps to improve employee job satisfaction. GAOs comments are based on ongoing work on DHSs employee job satisfaction survey results and its actions and plans to improve them, as well as reports issued from January 2003 through February 2012 on high-risk and morale issues in the federal government and at DHS. To conduct its ongoing work, GAO analyzed DHS and component planning documents, interviewed relevant DHS officials about employee morale, and analyzed 2011 federal employee job satisfaction survey results.
What GAO Found
Over time, federal surveys have consistently found that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees are less satisfied with their jobs than the government-wide average. In the 2004 Office of Personnel Managements federal employee surveya tool that measures employees perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency56 percent of DHS employees responded that they were satisfied with their jobs, compared to 68 percent government-wide. In subsequent years, the disparity continuedranging from a difference of 8 percentage points in 2006 to a 4 percentage point difference in 2008, 2010, and 2011. In 2011, DHSs percentage of positive responses was lower than the averages for the rest of the federal government. For example, slightly less than half of the DHS employees surveyed reported positive responses to the statement My talents are used well in the workplace, nearly 12 percentage points less than the rest of the federal government average. In two areas, DHSs percentage of positive responses was nearly the same or higher than the rest of the federal government average. For example, DHSs percentage of positive responses to the statement Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your pay? was not statistically different than the rest of the federal government average. Job satisfaction data for 2011 show that satisfaction levels vary across DHS components. For example, job satisfaction index results show the Transportation Security Administration as 11 percentage points below government-wide averages while other components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, posted above average results.
DHS has taken steps to identify where it has the most significant employee satisfaction problems and developed plans to address those problems, but has not yet improved DHS employee satisfaction survey results. For example, to determine root causes of job satisfaction department-wide, DHS conducted an evaluation of the 2008 Federal Human Capital Survey results, according to DHS officials. In that analysis, DHS determined that the drivers of employee satisfaction across DHS included the DHS mission, senior leadership effectiveness, and supervisor support. According to DHS officials, DHS is working with a contractor on a new department-wide analysis of root causes of employee morale. As of March 2012, this analysis was not complete. DHS and its components are also taking steps to improve components positive response rates to selected survey items. For example, DHSs Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management identified corrective actions to improve employee job satisfaction scores, such as the launch of the Employee Engagement Executive Steering Committee. GAO has previously reported on a variety of issues, including concerns about pay and a lack of trust in leadership that can lead to morale problems. This variation in potential issues that can result in morale problems underscores the importance of looking beyond survey scores to understand the root causes of those problems and developing plans to address them. Given the critical nature of DHSs mission to protect the security and economy of the United States, it is important that DHS employees are satisfied with their jobs so that DHS can attract and retain the talent required to complete its work. GAO will continue to assess DHSs efforts to address employee job satisfaction and expects to issue a report on its results in September 2012. |
gao_GAO-13-684 | gao_GAO-13-684_0 | Currently, the Forest Service issues contracts for large and very large airtankers, as well as large and medium helicopters, and Interior issues contracts for single-engine airtankers and water scoopers. Agencies’ Efforts to Identify Firefighting Aircraft Needs Have Been Hampered by Limited Information and Collaboration
Since 1995, the Forest Service and Interior have cumulatively produced nine major studies and strategy documents related to their firefighting aviation needs, but the agencies’ efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft needed have been hampered by limited information and collaboration. While the Forest Service and Interior studies and strategy documents contained various key elements, none included information on performance and effectiveness of aircraft in helping to suppress wildland fires because agencies have not collected such information. This limited availability of information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft is an area of long-standing concern; since the 1960s, multiple reviews of federal fire aviation programs have called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect information on the performance of firefighting aircraft but neither agency has taken action until recently. Many Forest Service and Interior officials, as well as other stakeholders, we spoke with expressed concerns about limited collaboration, and many cited shortcomings with the formal mechanism for interagency collaboration—the National Interagency Aviation Committee, which includes representatives from the Forest Service, Interior and its bureaus, and the National Association of State Foresters. Specifically, the committee’s members have defined and articulated a common purpose and have agreed on agency roles and responsibilities. Although the committee has implemented some leading practices for collaboration, it has not taken additional steps to reinforce agency accountability for collaboration, such as developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative efforts. The Forest Service’s Approach to Modernizing the Large Airtanker Fleet Faces Challenges, Resulting in Uncertainty over Continued Large Airtanker Availability
The Forest Service plans to modernize the large airtanker fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long terms, but each component of this approach faces challenges that make the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire suppression needs uncertain. The components of the agency’s approach include: (1) in the near term, continuing to contract with private vendors for “legacy” large airtankers—generally aging aircraft with limited future service life spans—on exclusive-use contracts and very large airtankers on call-when-needed contracts, as well as relying on agreements with cooperator governments and the military; (2) in the medium term, contracting with vendors for airtankers that are more modern and capable than those generally in use currently; and (3) in the long term, acquiring new federally-owned aircraft with expected service life spans of up to 30 years. However, agency officials and vendor representatives told us about limitations and challenges—including availability, performance, and cost—regarding these resources. As a result, it is uncertain when the “next-generation” large airtankers will be available to support fire suppression activities. Interior has no current plans to collect performance information on the aircraft it manages. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the agencies enhance their abilities to identify their firefighting aircraft needs and better ensure they obtain aircraft that meet those needs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Safety, Resource Protection, and Emergency Services, respectively, to take the following three actions:
Expand efforts to collect information on aircraft performance and effectiveness to include all types of firefighting aircraft in the federal fleet;
Enhance collaboration between the agencies and with stakeholders in the fire aviation community to help ensure that agency efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need reflect the input of all stakeholders in the fire aviation community; and
Subsequent to the completion of the first two recommendations, update the agencies’ strategy documents for providing a national firefighting aircraft fleet to include analysis based on information on aircraft performance and effectiveness and to reflect input from stakeholders throughout the fire aviation community. The Department of Defense did not provide comments. We also note, however, that the agency may face challenges regarding the retardant capacity and operating costs associated with the airtankers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) Forest Service and Department of the Interior efforts undertaken to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need and (2) the Forest Service’s approach to modernizing the large airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so. To examine Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify their firefighting aircraft needs, we reviewed major agency studies and strategy documents and interviewed agency officials responsible for managing fire aviation programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Forest Service and Interior contract for aircraft to perform various firefighting functions, including airtankers that drop retardant. The Forest Service contracts for large airtankers and certain other aircraft, while Interior contracts for smaller airtankers and water scoopers. However, a decrease in the number of large airtankers, from 44 in 2002 to 8 in early 2013--due to aging planes and several fatal crashes--has led to concerns about the agencies' ability to provide aerial firefighting support.
GAO was asked to review agency efforts to ensure the adequacy of the firefighting aircraft fleet. This report examines (1) Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need and (2) the Forest Service's approach to modernizing the large airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so. GAO reviewed agency studies and strategies, assessing the extent to which they included key elements important for understanding fire aviation needs; reviewed large airtanker planning and acquisition documents; and interviewed agency officials and representatives of the fire aviation community selected to represent state agencies, aircraft vendors, and others.
What GAO Found
The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have undertaken nine major efforts since 1995 to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need, but those efforts--consisting of major studies and strategy documents--have been hampered by limited information and collaboration. Specifically, the studies and strategy documents did not incorporate information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft, primarily because neither agency collected such data. While government reports have long called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect aircraft performance information, neither agency did so until 2012 when the Forest Service began a data collection effort. However, the Forest Service has collected limited data on large airtankers and no other aircraft, and Interior has not initiated a data collection effort. In addition, although firefighting aircraft are often shared by federal agencies and can be deployed to support firefighting operations on federal and nonfederal lands, the agencies have not consistently collaborated with one another and other stakeholders to identify the firefighting aircraft they need. Many agency officials and stakeholders GAO contacted noted concerns about limited collaboration, and many cited shortcomings with the formal mechanism for collaboration--the National Interagency Aviation Committee. The committee has implemented some leading practices for collaboration such as defining and articulating a common purpose, but it has not taken additional steps to monitor and evaluate its collaborative activities, another leading practice. Collectively, additional information on aircraft performance and effectiveness and collaboration across agencies and with stakeholders could enhance agency estimates of their firefighting aircraft needs to more accurately represent national needs for such aircraft, and as a result, better position the agencies to develop strategic planning documents that represent those needs.
The Forest Service plans to modernize the large airtanker fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long term, but each component of this approach faces challenges that make the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire suppression needs uncertain. In the near term, the agency plans to rely on a mix of contracted "legacy" airtankers as well as supplemental aircraft available through additional contracts and agreements with other governments and the military. However, agency concerns exist regarding the availability, capability, and costs of these resources. In the medium term, the Forest Service has awarded contracts for "next-generation" large airtankers that are faster and more up-to-date than most "legacy" aircraft, but it is uncertain when all of these aircraft will begin supporting fire suppression activities. Specifically, bid protests delayed contract issuance, and most of the aircraft receiving awards have not been fully tested and approved. In the long term, the Forest Service's plan includes purchasing certain large airtankers and obtaining others through intergovernmental transfer at no initial cost if they are declared surplus by the military--a shift from its long-standing practice of contracting for rather than owning aircraft. However, the Forest Service was unable to justify its previous plans for purchasing large airtankers to the Office of Management and Budget, and concerns exist regarding the retardant capacity and operating cost of the other airtankers it would obtain through intergovernmental transfer.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Forest Service and Interior expand efforts to collect information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft and enhance collaboration across agencies and the fire aviation community. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-124 | gao_GAO-15-124_0 | Applications for specific authorization, which must be approved by the Secretary of Energy, undergo a three-stage review process, as depicted in figure 1. DOE Consistently Missed Target Time Frames for Processing Part 810 Applications, with the Interagency and Final Review Stages Taking Longest
From 2008 through 2013, DOE consistently missed its 30-day targets to complete the initial and interagency stages of the Part 810 review process. The third stage, for which DOE has not established a target time frame, had the longest median review times. According to DOE officials, MOX is a sensitive technology, which requires greater scrutiny. Interagency Review Times Missed DOE’s Target for More Than 95 Percent of Applications
Interagency review times missed DOE’s 30-day target for 85 of the 89 applications approved from 2008 through 2013. DOE’s targets are not comprehensive, as DOE has not established targets for the entire third stage of the Part 810 process, or for overall processing time. DOE and Representatives of U.S. Nuclear Exporters Stated That the Lengthy Part 810 Process Can Impose Business Risks
DOE, in its preamble to the proposed changes to Part 810, acknowledged nuclear exporters’ concerns that the time frame for processing specific authorizations can impose business risks for companies. DOE has not provided written guidance to help exporters interpret the scope of the regulation; instead, DOE encourages exporters to inquire with DOE officials for interpretation. DOE officials said that they do not document all inquiries or responses because some inquiries are vague, and DOE’s responses are predecisional. DOE Has Taken Steps to Clarify the Regulation
DOE has taken steps to clarify Part 810, recognizing in its Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that the scope of activities regulated under Part 810 could be clearer. DOE’s primary method for monitoring compliance with the conditions is for NNSA officials to read required reports from exporters and in some cases to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the reports. However, NNSA officials report that they typically conduct an in-depth analysis for compliance with the authorizations on less than 10 percent of the reports, and they do not have risk-based procedures for prioritizing which reports to analyze. In addition, according to a State official, U.S. embassies play a role in monitoring the extent to which the importing country and company or other entity, as well as the exporter, are complying with the conditions associated with Part 810 authorizations. DOE Has Not Determined Its Authority to Impose Civil Penalties and Does Not Provide Guidance for Companies to Self-Identify and Self-Report Possible Violations
DOE has not determined whether it has legal authority to impose civil penalties for violations of Part 810 and does not provide guidance for companies to self-identify and self-report possible violations. DOE and DOJ Have Not Taken Any Formal Actions to Enforce Part 810
Neither DOE nor DOJ have taken formal actions—such as revoking an authorization or prosecuting an exporter—to enforce Part 810 within the last 6 years, even though there have been violations of Part 810 within this period. Without a documented inquiry process, DOE does not have the information it needs to provide reasonable assurance that its responses are consistent, and DOE officials are not documenting information that could identify parts of the regulation that may need clarification. Consequently, DOE is missing an opportunity to encourage exporters to recognize and address violations. Based on the results of this review, establish realistic and achievable targets for each stage of the Part 810 process, including the third stage, as well as the overall process. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we examine (1) Part 810 processing times, compared with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) targets, for over the last 6 years; (2) the extent to which Part 810 is clear and DOE can reasonably assure consistent interpretation; and (3) the extent to which DOE enforces Part 810. We analyzed DOE data on the processing times for the 89 specific authorizations granted from 2008 through 2013. To examine the extent to which DOE can reasonably assure that the regulation is consistently interpreted, we consulted DOE’s 10 C.F.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Encouraging U.S. exports of civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while ensuring they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs is a fundamental goal of U.S. policy. Exports of U.S. civilian nuclear technology, assistance, and services are regulated by DOE through 10 C.F.R. Part 810. Depending on the importing country and technology, exports can be generally authorized, with no application required, or specifically authorized, in which case the exporter must submit an application to DOE. The Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, also review the applications, which must finally be approved by the Secretary of Energy.
GAO was asked to examine the Part 810 process. This report examines (1) Part 810 processing times over the last 6 years compared with DOE's targets; (2) the extent to which Part 810's scope is clear and DOE can reasonably assure consistent interpretation; and (3) the extent to which DOE enforces Part 810. GAO analyzed all 89 specific authorizations granted from 2008-2013 and interviewed key agency officials and U.S. nuclear industry representatives.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has consistently missed its 30-day targets for the initial and interagency stages of the Part 810 review process (see table). From 2008 through 2013, DOE missed the target for the initial review stage for 80 of 89 applications processed, and interagency review times missed DOE's 30-day target for 85 applications. DOE has not established a target for the entire final review stage, which had the longest median review times, or for the overall process. DOE has acknowledged exporter concerns that processing times for specific authorizations can impose business risks, and DOE officials have proposed initiatives to reduce processing times.
a
The scope of Part 810 is unclear, and DOE's inquiry process does not reasonably assure that the regulation is consistently interpreted. For example, it is unclear what marketing activities are covered by Part 810. DOE has not provided written guidance to clarify the regulation's scope, instead directing exporters to inquire with DOE officials. DOE officials said that they do not document all such inquiries or their responses. Without such documentation, DOE can neither reasonably assure that its responses are consistent, nor can it analyze the inquiries to identify parts of the regulation that may need clarification. DOE is taking some steps to clarify Part 810 by defining or refining some key terms. However, DOE's revisions do not address all terms that exporters have identified as unclear, and the time frame of DOE's revisions is unknown.
DOE has taken limited actions to enforce Part 810. DOE's primary method for monitoring compliance with Part 810 is reading reports from exporters, but according to DOE officials, they conduct in-depth analysis on less than 10 percent of reports and do not have a risk-based procedure for selecting reports to analyze. Also, because DOE does not provide guidance for companies to self-identify and self-report possible violations, DOE is missing an opportunity to leverage exporters' role in monitoring their own compliance. DOE has not yet determined whether it has the legal authority to impose civil penalties for violations of Part 810. According to DOE officials, DOE has never taken a formal action for a violation of Part 810, such as revoking an authorization or referring a potential violation to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Furthermore, DOJ officials reported that they are not aware of any prosecutions related to Part 810 violations from 2008-2013, the time frame GAO reviewed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy take several actions to improve the Part 810 process, such as determine whether DOE has legal authority to impose civil penalties, and establish realistic and achievable targets for each stage of the Part 810 process, as well as the overall process. DOE agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-99-109 | gao_RCED-99-109_0 | When airports are not monitored, the unauthorized use of airport land is more likely to occur and can lead to the loss or diversion of airport revenues and increased risks to aviation safety. Few Field Offices Monitor Compliance
Of the 23 FAA field offices that are responsible for monitoring general aviation airports’ compliance with federal requirements, only four—FAA’s field offices in Kansas City, Missouri; Renton, Washington; Denver, Colorado; and Helena, Montana—regularly monitor and document airports’ compliance with land-use requirements. This requirement serves as an internal control to provide assurance that the federal government’s investment in airports is protected from mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse. In summarizing its reviews of airports’ revenue use in a separate effort, the Inspector General reported material weaknesses in FAA’s monitoring of commercial and general aviation airports’ revenues and concluded that relying on self-certifications and third-party complaints was insufficient for ensuring compliance with federal requirements on revenue use. The report indicated that 14 of the 15 general aviation and commercial airport owners identified as not complying with revenue use requirements had previously certified they were in compliance, and third-party complaints had been filed against only 2 of the 15 airports. Some of these cases went undetected for over a decade. Instead, FAA prefers to address noncompliance through negotiation and settlement. However, in several instances FAA’s attempts at negotiation have been unsuccessful, and airports’ lack of willingness to comply with federal requirements justified greater efforts to enforce compliance. FAA also informed the airport that a failure to take corrective action could result in the city’s becoming ineligible for federal grants. Safety issues have resulted from unauthorized use. Because none of FAA’s 23 field offices conduct regularly scheduled on-site visits to monitor general aviation airports’ compliance with federal requirements, FAA does not know the extent of noncompliance at these airports nationwide. Nor does FAA always effectively enforce federal requirements. It has not withheld transportation grants, taken back the title to airport land, or taken action through the courts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on: (1) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) monitoring of general aviation airports' compliance with federal land-use requirements; and (2) FAA's use of enforcement tools to resolve cases of noncompliance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA does not adequately monitor general aviation airports' compliance with federal requirements and does not have the internal controls in place to protect the federal government's investment in the airports from mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) although FAA's compliance policy clearly calls for monitoring airports to ensure they meet federal requirements, only 4 of FAA's 23 field offices monitor compliance; (3) this monitoring, however, relies primarily on airports themselves certifying that they are complying with federal requirements; (4) in 1994, the Department of Transportation's Inspector General concluded that relying on such certifications was insufficient for ensuring compliance with federal requirements on revenue use, noting that 14 of the 15 airport owners identified as not complying with revenue use requirements had previously certified that they were in compliance; (5) one result of FAA's lack of monitoring is that airports' unauthorized use of land has gone undetected in some cases for over a decade; (6) unauthorized use has resulted in the loss or diversion of millions of dollars in airport revenues from general aviation airports, typically owned by a local government; (7) in some cases, increased risks to aviation safety also resulted; (8) FAA determined that birds attracted by an unauthorized landfill at Hesler-Noble Field in Laurel, Mississippi, posed a possible danger to aircraft; (9) FAA generally addresses airports' noncompliance with federal requirements through negotiation and settlement rather than the use of available enforcement actions; and (10) when negotiations are unsuccessful and persistent noncompliance occurs, FAA has not always taken appropriate enforcement action--such as withholding transportation grants, taking back the title to airport land, or taking action through the courts. |
gao_GAO-14-753 | gao_GAO-14-753_0 | To help agencies achieve these benefits, OMB required agencies to immediately shift to a “Cloud First” policy and increase their use of available cloud-based and shared services whenever a secure, reliable, and cost-effective cloud service exists. Specifically, the seven agencies had implemented 21 cloud computing services and spent a total of $307 million for cloud computing in fiscal year 2012, about 1 percent of their total IT budgets. Agencies Have Made Progress in Implementing Cloud Computing Services, but Progress Is Uneven
OMB’s Cloud First policy requires federal agencies to implement cloud computing services whenever a secure, reliable, and cost-effective cloud option exists. Since then, the agencies have added more cloud computing services. Table 1 lists the number of cloud computing services implemented by each agency in 2012 and 2014. These agencies also increased the amount they budgeted and reported spending on cloud computing services. Specifically, the seven agencies, collectively, reported their spending increased by $222 million, from $307 million to $529 million. Officials from OMB and the agencies attributed the agencies’ varying degrees of progress in part, to the following: in implementing its Cloud First policy, OMB has granted the agencies discretion in determining whether and which services are to be migrated. In addition, the agencies’ relatively low percentage of budget allocated to cloud spending is due in large part to the fact that the agencies have not assessed a majority of their investments, although OMB’s guidance calls for agencies to assess all their IT services for migration to the cloud irrespective of where each investment is in its life cycle. Specifically, as shown in table 4, the agencies collectively had not assessed about 67 percent of their 2000 investments. A key reason cited by the agency officials for why most of their investments had not been evaluated for cloud services was that they were largely legacy investments in operations and maintenance; the agencies had only planned to consider cloud options when the investments were to be modernized or replaced at the end of their life cycle. Until the agencies assess their IT investments that have yet to be evaluated for suitability for migration to the cloud, they will not know which services are likely candidates for migration to cloud computing services, and therefore will not gain the operational efficiencies and cost savings associated with using such services. Agencies Reported Cost Savings from Implementation of Cloud Computing Services
Agencies reported that they had cost savings from implementing 22 out of 101 cloud computing services through fiscal year 2013. Specifically, they collectively saved about $96 million by implementing these 22 services. These savings included both one-time savings and life-cycle savings. For example, GSA had a one-time cost savings of $2.6 million by migrating to a cloud customer service solution, which was a less expensive alternative than upgrading its existing system. First, a motivation for changing to some of the cloud-based services was not to reduce spending, but to improve service. Second, in selected cases, the cloud computing service opened up a new service or provided a higher quality of service; while this provided useful benefits to the agency, the associated costs negated any savings. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure continued progress in the implementation of cloud computing services, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury; and the Administrators of the General Services Administration and Small Business Administration direct their respective Chief Information Officers to take the following actions:
Ensure that all IT investments are assessed for suitability for migration to a cloud computing service. It also is to provide increased availability and other performance benefits as well as a scalable on-demand network. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cloud computing is a relatively new process for acquiring and delivering computing services via information technology (IT) networks. Specifically, it is a means for enabling on-demand access to shared and scalable pools of computing resources with the goal of minimizing management effort and service provider interaction. To encourage federal agencies to pursue the potential efficiencies associated with cloud computing, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a “Cloud First” policy in 2011 that required agency Chief Information Officers to implement a cloud-based service whenever there was a secure, reliable, and cost-effective option.
GAO was asked to assess agencies' progress in implementing cloud services. GAO's objectives included assessing selected agencies' progress in using such services and determining the extent to which the agencies have experienced cost savings. GAO selected for review the seven agencies that it reported on in 2012 in order to compare their progress since then in implementing cloud services; the agencies were selected using the size of their IT budgets and experience in using cloud services. GAO also analyzed agency cost savings and related documentation and interviewed agency and OMB officials.
What GAO Found
Each of the seven agencies reviewed implemented additional cloud computing services since GAO last reported on their progress in 2012. For example, since then, the total number of cloud computing services implemented by the agencies increased by 80 services, from 21 to 101. The agencies also added to the amount they reported spending on cloud services by $222 million, from $307 million to $529 million. Further, the agencies increased the percentage of their information technology (IT) budgets allocated to cloud services; however, as shown in the table, the overall increase was just 1 percent.
The agencies' relatively small increase in cloud spending as a percent of their overall IT budgets, is attributed in part, to the fact that these agencies collectively had not considered cloud computing services for about 67 percent of their investments. With regard to why these investments had not been assessed, the agencies said it was in large part due to these being legacy investments in operations and maintenance; the agencies had only planned to consider cloud options for these investments when they were to be modernized or replaced. This is inconsistent with Office of Management and Budget policy that calls for cloud solutions to be considered first whenever a secure, reliable, and cost-effective option exists regardless of where the investment is in its life cycle. Until the agencies fully assess all their IT investments, they will not be able to achieve the resulting benefits of operational efficiencies and cost savings.
The agencies collectively reported cost savings of about $96 million from the implementation of 22 of the 101 cloud services. These savings included both one-time and multiyear savings. For example, the General Services Administration saved $2.6 million by migrating to a cloud customer service solution, and Homeland Security saved $1.2 million from fiscal years 2011 through 2013 by implementing a cloud-based collaboration service. Agency officials cited two major reasons for why the other services they had implemented did not save money. First, a motivation for changing to some of the cloud-based services was not to reduce spending, but to improve service. Second, in selected cases, the cloud computing service opened up a new service or provided a higher quality of service; while this provided useful benefits to the agency, the associated costs negated any savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending, among other things, that the seven agencies assess the IT investments identified in this report that have yet to be evaluated for suitability for cloud computing services. Of the seven agencies, six agreed with GAO's recommendations, and one had no comments. |
gao_GAO-03-377 | gao_GAO-03-377_0 | States Used Multiple Tools to Enforce the Fiscal Accountability Provisions, but Relied Primarily on the Single Audit Process to Enforce SNS
In the states we visited, state program officials use three tools—the states’ annual financial reports, the single audit process, and limited program monitoring—to monitor Title I’s fiscal accountability requirements in their LEAs. While we did not verify the quality of the data, it is the same data used to calculate the MOE requirements. But, many state and local program officials and auditors we spoke with cited a number of factors that made it difficult to ensure that grantees were in fact using federal funds to supplement and not supplant their own funds. Some Officials Rely on the Single Audit, without Understanding What Its Scope and Methodology Mean for Assessing the SNS Provision
While some auditors struggled to apply the SNS provision to the particular circumstance of districts and schools, SEA officials were frequently unaware of what the results of a single audit actually meant, potentially failing to cover key programs or provisions of law, and thus adding to the difficulty of enforcing the SNS provision. However, some of the auditors could not document that they had followed their work plans. While program monitoring provided a depth of coverage that cannot be achieved in single audits, these efforts were limited. Education’s Key Efforts to Enforce Fiscal Accountability Provisions Have Limitations
We identified three key efforts the Department of Education made to help enforce the fiscal accountability provisions but each had limitations. First, Education developed guidance and provided technical assistance to state and local officials and their auditors; but, these officials have expressed confusion regarding application of the SNS provision to their particular circumstances. Second, Education conducted limited program monitoring of its own, but these efforts did not have fiscal accountability as a primary focus. Finally, Education reviewed states’ single audit reports conducted under the Single Audit Act. Little Change in Federal Share from School Years 1999- 2000 to 2000-2001
We found that few changes have occurred in the relative shares of federal, state’ and local funding for education for school years (SY) 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 (the most recent data available) in the six states we reviewed. It is too soon to tell how recent increases in federal funds for Title I and other federal education programs and the fiscal pressures facing states will affect funding for education in general and how changes, if any, in state and local financing will affect the federal share. Title I’s two fiscal accountability provisions—the MOE and the SNS provisions— are intended to limit the extent that grantees can use federal funds to replace their own and thereby erode the fiscal partnership. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how select states ensure compliance with maintenance of effort (MOE) and supplement-not-supplant (SNS), we interviewed state program and budget officials in six states: Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Massachusetts. To determine what efforts the U.S. Department of Education has taken to enforce the Title I fiscal accountability provisions and what limitations, if any, these efforts may have, we spoke with Education officials and reviewed Education guidance and documentation as well as recent GAO and OIG reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
New resources for education come at a time when states are struggling to address budget shortfalls. Two provisions in Title I--maintenance of effort (MOE) and supplement not supplant (SNS)--are designed to limit the extent to which federal funds could be used to replace state and local resources. To assess the quality of oversight of these provisions, GAO determined (1) how 6 states--Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Massachusetts--conducted oversight of the MOE and SNS provisions and what factors affected their ability to do so; (2) what efforts were made by the U.S. Department of Education to enforce MOE and SNS; and (3) in the 6 states, what changes have occurred in the federal share of education funding from school year 1999-2000 to 2000-2001.
What GAO Found
In the states we visited, state program officials used three tools--the states' annual financial reports, the single audit process, and limited program monitoring--to oversee Title I's fiscal accountability requirements. While program officials had little difficulty in applying the MOE provision because it involves a straightforward calculation, state and local program officials and auditors we spoke with cited a number of factors that made it difficult to enforce the SNS provision under certain circumstances. One of the challenges auditors faced was determining whether a school district would have removed its own funds from a program and allocated them elsewhere even if federal funds had not been available--an action that is allowable. Another challenge was applying the SNS provision in circumstances where it is difficult to track federal dollars such as in schoolwide programs--where all funds are pooled--or in districts undergoing significant districtwide reforms--where comparisons to previous budgets are problematic. While some auditors struggled to apply the SNS provision to the particular circumstance of districts and schools, program officials relied primarily on the results of the single audits without being aware of some of these audit's limitations. For example, some officials did not understand that not all districts, programs, or transactions may be covered by the audit. While program monitoring adds a degree of depth to the efforts to oversee the SNS provision, most of the states in GAO's review conducted only limited program monitoring. We identified three key efforts Education made to guide, monitor, and enforce the fiscal accountability provisions, but each had limitations. First, Education provided guidance and technical assistance to state and local education agencies and auditors on how to interpret and apply Title I's fiscal accountability requirements. Despite the availability of this guidance, many of the auditors and program officials we spoke with expressed confusion regarding the application of these provisions to their particular circumstances, such as schoolwide programs. Second, Education conducted program monitoring of select state and local education programs each year; however, coverage was limited. Third, Education, reviewed the audit reports conducted under the Single Audit Act. However, Education's Office of Inspector General and GAO have criticized the review and audit follow up process. Few changes occurred in the federal/state/local fiscal partnership in financing education services between school year 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. It is too soon to tell how recent increases in federal funds and state and local fiscal pressures will affect funding for education and the federal share. |
gao_GAO-16-102 | gao_GAO-16-102_0 | Audit programs in W&I cover mainly refundable credits on the Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Three Offices Have Responsibility for Audit Selection, but Automated Programs Select the Majority of Returns That W&I Audits
Three W&I Offices Largely Determine What Returns Get Selected for Audit
W&I’s audit programs are managed out of an office called Return Integrity and Compliance Services (RICS), which operates three other offices that directly or indirectly review tax return data for potential audits. Automated System Led to the Most W&I Audit Selections
In fiscal year 2014, DDb selected 59 percent of W&I’s audit inventory, as shown in figure 2. Audits that end with no change to the reported tax assessment on the return impose burdens on compliant taxpayers. We found several IRS procedures that demonstrated some factors of a positive environment for promoting internal controls. W&I has not clearly defined, documented, or communicated key terms. Existing performance measures focus on audit results rather than audit selection. For example, one workload selection template notes that returns with the highest audit potential are marked, but it does not describe how audit potential is determined. Additionally, the absence of a fully documented selection process may make it difficult for W&I to defend against accusations that it is not appropriately following its processes and procedures, since the incomplete documentation makes it difficult to clearly communicate about how audit selection works. However, the documentation indicates that it is an annual—rather than continuous—review as part of W&I’s annual 3-day working session that included evaluating the effectiveness of its criteria for selecting returns for possible audit. Second, W&I does not have complete documentation its audit selection procedures; doing so would improve the assurance that W&I staff have a common understanding of how the selection process work and their role in the process. Lastly, W&I did not provide support that changes to audit selection processes and procedures were appropriately monitored and implemented in a timely manner. Taking such actions to address these areas would help provide W&I reasonable assurance that its audit selection criteria are fair. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure W&I meets its mission and selects audits fairly and with integrity, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following seven actions:
Clearly define and document: (1) key terms such as “fairness”; and (2)
W&I program level objectives, performance measures, and indicators for audit selection to evaluate whether the audit selection process is meeting its mission of applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all. For our recommendation on having additional procedures for monitoring audit selection controls and corrective actions, IRS stated that it will review the processes in place for documentation and timely implementation of selection controls and corrective actions to further ensure the controls and actions are implemented in a timely manner. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the Wage and Investment (W&I) process for selecting tax returns for audit; and (2) determines how well W&I’s procedures for selecting tax returns for audit support its mission and goal to apply the tax law with integrity and fairness to all. To determine how well W&I’s procedures for selecting tax returns for audit support its mission, we reviewed W&I’s audit selection procedures and related internal controls intended to help W&I achieve its stated mission of “applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.” We then assessed whether these relevant W&I procedures followed selected internal control standards from Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To determine IRS’s definition of fairness and integrity as it applied to W&I’s audit selection, we reviewed W&I’s mission statement and other documentation related to how W&I selects audits for examination and interviewed relevant IRS officials concerning their understanding of how integrity and fairness applies to W&I audit selection activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Audit activities help ensure taxpayers pay the right amount of tax and help address the net $385 billion tax gap—the difference between the amount of taxes paid voluntarily and on time, and the amount owed. Audit programs in W&I mainly cover refundable credits reported on the Form 1040, Individual Income Tax Return. The hundreds of thousands of taxpayers whom W&I interacts with annually during audits make it critical to apply the tax law fairly. Unfair selection would increase burden on taxpayers and reduce public confidence in IRS.
GAO was asked to review W&I's audit selection process. This report (1) describes the W&I process for selecting tax returns for audit, and (2) determines how well W&I's audit selection procedures support its mission and goal to apply the tax law with integrity and fairness to all. GAO reviewed documentation on program procedures, an audit work plan, and various Internal Revenue Manual sections; analyzed audit data from fiscal years 2013 and 2014; and interviewed relevant IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Three offices in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Wage and Investment division (W&I) are responsible for selecting returns for audit. Most returns are selected via computer systems that automatically send notices to taxpayers based on certain criteria, such as the validity of dependents. W&I program officials annually review the criteria and apply updates to the following filing season's returns. In 2014, about 59 percent of all W&I audits—more than 516,000—were selected with a specialized computer tool called the Dependent Database, while the remainder was selected through a combination of referrals and manual selection methods.
W&I generally has established a positive environment for internal controls but could improve several areas in its audit selection procedures to support its mission. GAO found several procedures that establish a positive environment for promoting internal controls, such as ethics training. In addition, IRS has guidance to help ensure that decisions about updates to audit selection criteria are correctly implemented in its automated systems. However, W&I does not have established objectives for its audit selection process, and existing performance measures focus on audit results rather than audit selection. In addition, W&I has not defined key terms such as “fairness and integrity,” as required by internal control standards. Documented objectives and key terms would help W&I hone the measures it uses to assess its audit selection efforts and bring a consistent understanding of “fairness and integrity” to audit selection staff.
GAO also found that not all elements of the selection process were appropriately documented. For example, W&I does not have clear documentation about how the three offices that select the majority of returns W&I audits interact with one another. Additionally, one guidance document notes that returns with the highest audit potential should be marked, but it does not describe how audit potential is determined or any related internal controls. Further, W&I also did not provide support showing that changes to automated audit selection processes and procedures were appropriately implemented in a timely manner. Moreover, the documentation indicates that W&I conducts an annual—rather than continuous—review of its audit selections and results as part of an annual 3-day working session. Strengthening controls in these areas would help provide greater assurance that W&I is fulfilling its mission to select tax returns with fairness and integrity. Additionally, the absence of a fully documented selection process may make it difficult for W&I to defend against accusations that it is not appropriately following its processes and procedures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that IRS establish program objectives and definitions of key terms such as “fairness” that apply to audit selection and use those definitions in assessing its selection performance; document selection processes more thoroughly; and document that changes to procedures are done in a timely manner. IRS generally agreed with all seven recommendations and provided additional comments reprinted in appendix II. |
gao_RCED-97-193 | gao_RCED-97-193_0 | Economic Development Activities of the Eight Federal Programs
The eight federal programs provide loans and grants that states, communities, and others can use for funding a variety of activities for which the economic development of an area or of individuals is the intended or possible offshoot benefit. Three Programs Have Relocation Restrictions
Three of the eight programs—the Public Works and Development Facilities Program, the Employment and Training Assistance for Dislocated Workers Program, and the EZ/EC Program—have restrictions against using program funds to relocate businesses if the relocations result in the loss of jobs in other areas. The remaining four programs—HHS’ Community Services Block Grant Program, EPA’s Clean Water State Revolving Fund Program, Agriculture’s Water and Waste Disposal Program, and Transportation’s Surface Transportation Program—do not address the issue of using program funds to relocate jobs. 2. Types of Incentives and Role They May Play in Business Relocations
Tax concessions, financial assistance, and other benefits may be used by states and communities to attract and keep businesses. If federal funds are used for an activity that the state or community would have undertaken anyway, money is freed up for states or communities to use for such activities as the provision of business relocation incentives. Most early studies found that incentives had little or no effect on an area’s economic development. To determine (1) which programs have legislative or regulatory restrictions on using program funds to relocate existing businesses and jobs (2) for those programs with restrictions, the procedures that federal agencies have established to ensure that states and communities comply with such restrictions, we reviewed program legislation and regulations, congressional reports accompanying program legislation, agencies’ operating procedures, and other documents relating to the relocation prohibitions. We summarized the types of state and local incentives available and the role that incentives may play in a business’ decision to relocate. The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program. The Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Program, administered by the Department of Agriculture and HUD and funded primarily by HHS. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Water State Revolving Fund Program. Entitled communities develop their own programs and funding priorities and can use CDBG grants for various activities, including to acquire, construct, reconstruct, or rehabilitate public facilities, including hospitals, nursing homes, halfway houses, battered spouse shelters, and water and sewer facilities; preserve historical sites and remove architectural barriers in public facilities that restrict the movement of the handicapped and the elderly; establish new or expand existing public services, including those involving employment, crime prevention, child care, health, drug abuse, education, and welfare; rehabilitate housing and other publicly owned residential buildings; provide direct assistance to expand home ownership opportunities for low- and moderate-income homebuyers, including subsidizing interest rates and acquiring guarantees for mortgage financing from private lenders; carry out special economic development projects, including acquiring, constructing, and reconstructing commercial or industrial buildings and facilities, and providing loans, grants, loan guarantees, or other types of assistance to private for-profit businesses for activities to carry out an economic development project; provide relocation assistance for individuals, families, and businesses displaced by CDBG activities; and provide loans, grants, or other assistance to community-based development organizations to carry out community economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and energy conservation projects. The plan must also ensure compliance with a variety of constraints and requirements specified in the law. Nevertheless, EPA recognizes that while wastewater treatment projects are not funded solely to foster economic growth, the economic development of an area often occurs as an offshoot of such projects. Program Information
Administered by the Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration, STP provides grants that states and localities can use to finance a variety of transportation-related projects. GAO’s Comments
1. 3. Comments From the Department of Labor
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Labor’s letter dated July 21, 1997. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the economic development activities of eight federal programs, focusing on: (1) the economic development activities that major federal programs fund for the benefit of states and communities; (2) restrictions for using program funds to relocate existing businesses and jobs; (3) procedures that federal agencies established to ensure compliance with the restrictions; and (4) types of incentives that states and communities have used to attract businesses and the role that incentives may play in a business's decision to relocate.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) funds for the eight programs GAO examined can be used for a variety of economic development activities; (2) three of the programs, the Economic Development Administration's Public Works and Development Facilities Program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant Program, and HUD's and the Department of Agriculture's Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community Program, fund activities that focus primarily on the economic development of distressed areas; (3) two of the programs, the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Assistance for Dislocated Workers Program and the Department of Health and Human Services' Community Services Block Grant Program, focus on improving the economic viability of individuals by funding activities that help unemployed individuals qualify for and find new jobs and help low-income individuals and families obtain adequate jobs, education, nutrition, and housing; (4) the three remaining programs, the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Water State Revolving Fund Program, Agriculture's Water and Waste Disposal Program, and the Department of Transportation's Surface Transportation Program, fund infrastructure projects in the form of wastewater treatment projects and other water quality projects and highway, mass transit, or other transportation projects where economic development of an area may be an offshoot; (5) of the eight programs, three have restrictions against using funds to relocate jobs, four do not address the issue of using funds to relocate jobs, and under one, legislation that would impose prohibitions against relocating jobs is pending; (6) agencies responsible for programs with relocation restrictions rely on various procedures to ensure compliance with the prohibitions; (7) states may use a variety of incentives, such as tax concessions, financial assistance, and other benefits, to encourage economic development and attract businesses; (8) also, when federal funds are used for an activity that the state or community would have undertaken anyway, those federal funds free up state money for some other activity, including incentives to attract businesses; and (9) studies have shown that when making decisions to locate in a particular area, businesses consider a variety of factors, such as workers' productivity, the efficiency of transportation facilities, and the community receptivity; incentives may or may not be a major factor in a firm's decision to locate to a particular area. |
gao_GAO-08-907T | gao_GAO-08-907T_0 | Trade preference programs extend unilateral tariff reductions to over 130 developing countries. Currently, the United States offers the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and three regional programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). U.S. trade preference programs are widely used, but some economists and others have raised questions about them. Total U.S. preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $92 billion in 2006. Most of this growth in U.S. imports from preference countries has taken place since 2000. Critical Policy Trade- offs among U.S. Consumers, Producers, and Foreign Beneficiaries Are Inherent in Preference Programs
Preference programs entail three critical policy trade-offs. GAO’s analysis showed that notable gaps remain, particularly in agricultural and apparel products. Certain U.S. industries have joined African nations in opposing the idea of extending duty-free access for apparel from these countries, arguing these nations are already so competitive in exporting to the United States that in combination they surpass U.S. FTA partners Mexico and CAFTA, as well as the Andean/AGOA regions, which are the major export market for U.S. producers of textiles. This same trade-off involves decisions regarding the graduation of countries or products from the programs. Although the intent of country and product graduation is to focus benefits on those countries most in need of the competitive margin preferences provide, some U.S. and beneficiary country officials observe that remaining GSP beneficiaries will not necessarily profit from another country’s loss of preference benefits. Policymakers face a third trade-off in setting the duration of preferential benefits in authorizing legislation. However, some U.S. officials believe that periodic program expirations can be useful as leverage to encourage countries to act in accordance with U.S. interests such as global and bilateral trade liberalization. Proliferation of Preference Programs Has Led to a Need for a More Integrated Approach
Preference programs have proliferated over time. While there is overlap in various aspects of trade preference programs, each program is currently considered separately by Congress based on its distinct timetable and expiration date. Reflecting the relevant statutory requirements, two different approaches—a petition process and periodic reviews—have evolved to monitor compliance with criteria set for various programs. Separate Reporting and Examination Hinder Measuring Progress on Programs’ Contribution to Economic Development
Separate reporting for the various preference programs makes it difficult to measure progress toward achieving the fundamental and shared goal of promoting economic development. Moreover, there is no evaluation of how trade preferences, as a whole, affect economic development in beneficiary countries. GAO Recommendations and Agency Response
To address the concerns I have summarized today, in our March 2008 report, GAO recommended that USTR periodically review beneficiary countries that have not been considered under the GSP or regional programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. trade preference programs promote economic development in poorer nations by providing duty-free export opportunities in the United States. The Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Andean Trade Preference Act, and African Growth and Opportunity Act unilaterally reduce U.S. tariffs for many products from over 130 countries. However, two of these programs expire partially or in full this year, and Congress is exploring options as it considers renewal. This testimony describes the growth in preference program imports since 1992, identifies policy trade-offs concerning these programs, and evaluates the overall U.S. approach to preference programs. The testimony is based on two recent studies on trade preference programs, issued in September 2007 and March 2008. For those studies, GAO analyzed trade data, reviewed trade literature and program documents, interviewed U.S. officials, and did fieldwork in six trade preference beneficiary countries.
What GAO Found
Total U.S. preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $92 billion in 2006, with most of this growth taking place since 2000. The increases from preference program countries reflect legislation passed by Congress in 1996 and 2000 that enhanced preference programs and added new eligible products. Preference programs give rise to three critical policy trade-offs. First, preferences entail a trade-off to the extent opportunities for beneficiary countries to export products duty free must be balanced against U.S. industry interests. Some products of importance to developing countries, notably agriculture and apparel, are ineligible by statute as a result. Secondly, certain developing countries have been given additional preferential benefits for such import-sensitive products under regional programs. But some of the poorest countries, outside targeted regions, do not qualify. Third, Congress faces a trade-off between longer program renewals, which may encourage investment and undermine support for the likely greater economic benefits of broader trade liberalization, a key U.S. goal, and shorter renewals, which may provide opportunities to leverage the programs to meet evolving priorities. Trade preference programs have proliferated over time, becoming more complex, but neither Congress nor the administration formally considers them as a whole. Responsive to their legal mandates, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and other agencies use different approaches to monitor compliance with program criteria, resulting in disconnected review processes and gaps in addressing some countries and issues. Disparate reporting makes it difficult to determine progress on programs' contribution to economic development in beneficiary countries. |
gao_GAO-05-11 | gao_GAO-05-11_0 | FAA Has Separate Processes for Approving Ground Systems and Certifying Aircraft Equipment
FAA has separate processes for approving ground systems and certifying aircraft equipment for safe use in the national airspace system. FAA’s process for approving ground systems, such as radar systems, is done in accordance with policies and procedures in FAA’s Acquisition Management System. This process involves a determination by FAA’s Air Traffic Organization regarding whether a vendor is in compliance with contract requirements and/or FAA operational requirements, followed by a rigorous test-and-evaluation process to ensure that the new system will operate safely in the national airspace system. In contrast, the process for certifying aircraft equipment, which is usually developed by private companies, is done in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations, with FAA serving as the regulator. If an ATC system has both a ground system and aircraft equipment, as was the case for 3 of the 5 systems we reviewed, then the system must go through both processes before it is approved for safe use in the national airspace system. FAA Faced Challenges in Approving Several ATC Systems
FAA faced challenges in approving systems for safe use in the national airspace system that contributed to cost growth, delays, and performance shortfalls in deploying these systems. We identified three specific challenges through the review of 5 ATC systems and our past work. These challenges are the need to involve appropriate stakeholders, such as users and technical experts, throughout the approval process; ensure that the FAA offices that have responsibility for approving ground systems and certifying aircraft equipment effectively coordinate their efforts for integrated systems; and accurately estimate the amount of time needed to meet complex technical requirements at the beginning of the design and development phase. FAA Has Taken Action to Improve Its Process for Approving ATC Systems
FAA has taken action to address two of the three management challenges that we identified. FAA stated that coordination would improve because as part of the new Safety Management System the agency plans to realign its organizational structure to create a formal link between the Air Traffic Organization and the Office of Regulation and Certification. FAA expects full implementation to take 3 to 5 years. We are reserving judgment on whether this change will fully address the challenge because of the early state of this effort and because FAA’s problems with internal coordination when approving ATC systems are long-standing. In addition, because FAA has historically faced internal and external coordination challenges in approving ATC systems for safe use in the national airspace, we believe that as FAA moves forward with the agency’s new Safety Management System, it should, in the interim, develop plans that describe how both internal and external coordination will occur on a system-specific basis. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that key stakeholders, such as air traffic controllers, maintenance technicians, and technical experts, outside FAA’s acquisitions offices and Office of Regulation and Certification, are involved early and throughout FAA’s ground system approval process and to ensure better internal coordination between FAA’s offices responsible for approving ground systems and certifying aircraft equipment, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FAA to develop ATC system-specific plans early in the approval process that specify how and when the approving and certifying offices within FAA and other stakeholders, including controllers, maintenance technicians, technical experts, and industry representatives, will meet to ensure coordination. 2.) 3.) However, the partnership was not able to develop a system that FAA believed would operate safely in the national airspace system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) process for ensuring that air traffic control (ATC) systems will operate safely in the national airspace system is an integral part of the agency's multibillion-dollar ATC modernization and safety effort. GAO was asked to review (1) FAA's process for approving ATC systems for safe use in the national airspace system; (2) challenges FAA has faced approving ATC systems and how these challenges affected the cost, schedule, and performance estimates of the systems; and (3) actions FAA has taken to improve its process for approving ATC systems.
What GAO Found
FAA has separate processes for approving ground systems and certifying aircraft equipment for safe use in the national airspace system. FAA's process for approving ground systems, such as radar systems, is done in accordance with policies and procedures in FAA's Acquisition Management System. Approving ground systems, which are usually developed, owned, and operated by FAA, typically involves FAA's Air Traffic Organization determining whether a vendor is in compliance with contract requirements, followed by a rigorous test-and-evaluation process to ensure that the new system will operate safely in the national airspace system. The process for certifying aircraft equipment, which is usually developed by private companies, is done in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations, with FAA serving as the regulator. If a system has both ground components and aircraft equipment components, then the system must go through both processes before it is approved for safe use in the national airspace system. FAA has faced challenges approving systems for safe use in the national airspace system that contributed to cost growth, delays, and performance shortfalls in deploying these systems. We identified three specific challenges through the review of 5 ATC systems and our past work. These challenges are the need to (1) involve appropriate stakeholders, such as users and technical experts, throughout the approval process; (2) ensure that the FAA offices that have responsibility for approving ground systems and certifying aircraft equipment effectively coordinate their efforts for integrated systems; and (3) accurately estimate the amount of time needed to meet complex technical requirements at the beginning of the design and development phase. FAA has taken some actions to address two of the three challenges we identified. However, FAA has not taken action to fully involve all stakeholders, such as air traffic controllers and technical experts, throughout the approval process. FAA officials believe that the agency's new Safety Management System will help ensure that the ground system approval and aircraft certification processes are better coordinated. FAA stated that coordination would improve because, as part of the new Safety Management System, the agency plans to realign its organizational structure to create a formal link between the Air Traffic Organization and the Office of Regulation and Certification. FAA expects full implementation of this system to take 3 to 5 years. We are reserving judgment on whether this change will fully address the challenge because of the early state of this effort and FAA's long-standing problems with internal coordination when approving ATC systems. As such, we believe that FAA should, in the interim, develop specific plans that describe how both internal and external coordination will occur on a system-specific basis. |
gao_HEHS-99-46 | gao_HEHS-99-46_0 | Oversight Is a Shared Federal and State Responsibility
The states and the federal government share responsibility for oversight of the quality of care in the nation’s 17,000 nursing homes. Many Nursing Homes Had Deficiencies That Harmed Residents
National data on nursing home surveys for July 1995 to October 1998 showed that the proportion of homes with the most severe deficiencies remained at uncomfortably high levels throughout this period. Furthermore, about 40 percent of the homes found to have serious deficiencies in a survey early in the period were found to have deficiencies of equal or greater severity in a subsequent survey late in the period. One-Fourth of All Homes Had Deficiencies in the Highest Severity Categories
Compliance with nursing home standards of care continued to be a problem during the entire 3-year period we examined. In the two highest severity categories, common deficiencies included inadequate attention to prevent pressure sores, failure to provide supervision or assistance devices to prevent accidents, and failure to assess residents’ needs or provide necessary care. In other words, during the 3-year period, 4 of 10 homes that were found by the base survey to have caused actual or potential death or serious injury or other actual harm to residents had deficiencies (possibly different deficiencies) that were just as severe—or worse—in the most recent inspection. Sanctions Do Not Ensure Nursing Homes Maintain Compliance
To determine the role sanctions play in bringing about a greater degree of compliance, we focused on a sample of 74 homes that had been referred for sanctions. The case histories of these homes showed that sanctions helped bring the homes back into temporary compliance but provided little incentive to keep them from slipping back out of compliance. Many homes corrected their deficiencies after being notified that a sanction would be imposed. In these cases, HCFA rescinded the sanction. Civil monetary penalties, a sanction with strong potential deterrent effect, were hampered by a growing backlog of appeals. Another group of homes that can largely avoid the threat of immediate sanction even though they exhibited a pattern of recurring and serious noncompliance are those that have been terminated from Medicare and subsequently readmitted. Two other aspects of HCFA’s use of termination also limit its effectiveness. The home’s surveys did not document major problems. Recommendations to the Administrator of HCFA
To strengthen its ability to ensure that nursing homes maintain compliance with Medicare and Medicaid quality-of-care standards, we recommend that the Administrator of HCFA take the following actions: Improve the effectiveness of civil monetary penalties. The Administrator should (1) continue Medicare and Medicaid payments beyond the termination date only if the home and state Medicaid agency are making reasonable efforts to transfer residents to other homes or alternate modes of care, (2) ensure that reasonable assurance periods associated with reinstating terminated homes are of sufficient duration to effectively demonstrate that the reason for termination has been resolved and will not recur, and (3) revise existing policies so that the pre-termination history of a home is considered in taking a subsequent enforcement action. However, we did not find that the enforcement process was working as effectively as it should, even for these homes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the enforcement of federal nursing home standards, focusing on: (1) national data on the existence of serious deficiencies in nursing home compliance with Medicare and Medicaid standards; and (2) the use of sanction authority for homes that failed to maintain compliance with the standards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work showed that while the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has taken steps to improve oversight of nursing home care, it has not yet realized a main goal of its enforcement process--to help ensure that homes maintain compliance with federal health care standards; (2) surveys conducted in the nation's 17,000-plus nursing homes in recent years showed that each year, more than one-fourth of the homes had deficiencies that caused actual harm to residents or placed them at risk of death or serious injury; (3) the most frequent violations causing actual harm included inadequate prevention of pressure sores, failure to prevent accidents, and failure to assess residents' needs and provide appropriate care; (4) although most homes were found to have corrected the identified deficiencies, subsequent surveys showed that problems often returned; (5) about 40 percent of the homes that had such problems in their first survey during the period GAO examined (July 1995 to October 1998) had them again in their last survey during the period; (6) sanctions initiated by HCFA against noncompliant nursing homes were never implemented in a majority of cases and generally did not ensure that the homes maintained compliance with standards; (7) GAO's review of HCFA's survey data combined with GAO's analysis of 74 homes that had a history of problems showed a common pattern; (8) HCFA would give notice to impose a sanction, the home would correct its deficiencies, HCFA would rescind the sanction, and a subsequent survey would find that problems had returned; (9) the threat of sanctions appeared to have little effect on deterring homes from falling out of compliance again because homes could continue to avoid sanctions' effect as long as they kept correcting their deficiencies; (10) HCFA has some tools to address this cycle of repeated noncompliance but has not used them effectively; (11) fines are potentially a strong deterrent because they can be applied even if a home comes back into compliance; (12) however, the usefulness of civil monetary penalties is being hampered by a backlog of administrative appeals coupled with a legal provision that prohibits collection of the penalty until the appeal is resolved; (13) the sanction is often delayed for several years; and (14) GAO also found problems with several aspects of HCFA's policies for ensuring that sufficient attention is placed on homes that have serious deficiencies or a history of recurring noncompliance as well as policies for reinstating homes that have been terminated from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. |
gao_RCED-98-79 | gao_RCED-98-79_0 | Performance and Cost Risks Disclosed, but Schedule Uncertainties Not Fully Recognized
The Secretary’s report provided a complete assessment of the major risks FAA faces in achieving the technical performance goals of the WAAS project. Performance Risks Disclosed
In discussing the risks FAA faces in developing WAAS, the Secretary’s report highlighted the vulnerability of the system’s signals to intentional or unintentional interference from electronic equipment. The Secretary’s report recognized that WAAS’ vulnerability to interference must be assessed and appropriate countermeasures must be in place before FAA can complete the transition to a satellite-based navigation system. In January 1998, FAA found that full decommissioning would result in the agency’s saving about $500 million (in net present value) over WAAS’ life cycle. The benefit-cost analysis estimated that the operators would save about $350 million by removing such equipment. Cost Risks Identified
In 1997, we expressed our concern that FAA’s cost estimates for WAAS were firm, discrete-point estimates, implying a level of precision that could not be supported, particularly early in the project’s development. The Secretary’s report addressed this concern by identifying a range of possible costs and associated probabilities. We agree with the Secretary’s report that the greatest degree of uncertainty about the WAAS cost estimates surrounds the costs of the satellites. The uncertainty exists because FAA does not yet know exactly how many additional satellites will be needed and how much the per unit costs will be. Schedule Uncertainties Not Fully Recognized
Although the Secretary’s report discussed risk factors that could affect the achievement of FAA’s schedule goals for developing WAAS, it fell short of providing a complete assessment. Aircraft operators would not realize some portion of the $350 million (in net present value) that FAA estimates operators would save by removing ground-based navigation equipment from their aircraft. If the satellite contract is not awarded by July 1998 as planned, the remainder of the schedule is likely to slip. Nonaviation benefits were excluded from FAA’s analyses. We found that our alternative cost and decommissioning assumptions alone did not cause much of a decrease in the benefit-cost ratios and net benefits. However, the exclusion of small increments of passenger time savings alone led to a $1 billion decline in net benefits. Nevertheless, when the alternative assumptions are taken together, the system’s benefits still exceed the costs by nearly a 2-to-1 ratio. Even under our alternative assumptions, WAAS’ benefits clearly outweigh its costs. Recommendation
To assist the Congress in making future funding decisions for the Wide Area Augmentation System project, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to report information to the Congress on the range of milestones for making the initial and full Wide Area Augmentation System operational and the probabilities associated with those milestones; a detailed explanation of the agency’s strategy for leasing geostationary updated benefit-cost analyses, including a comparison with alternative investments of FAA’s resources and an explanation of the effects of including small increments of passenger time savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) project, focusing on: (1) whether the Secretary of Transportation's report provides a complete assessment of FAA's risks in developing the WAAS project; and (2) how alternative assumptions would affect WAAS' benefit-cost analysis of January 1998.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Secretary's report provided a complete assessment of FAA's risks in achieving the WAAS project's performance and cost goals but not its scheduled goals; (2) in terms of system performance, the Secretary's report recognized that WAAS' vulnerability to intentional or unintentional interference from electronic equipment must be addressed; (3) in January 1998, FAA estimated that it would save about $500 million (in net present value) over the WAAS project's life cycle by fully phasing out its network of ground-based navigation aids; (4) if FAA retains some portion of this network, these benefits would decrease; (5) FAA also estimated that aircraft operators could save $350 million by removing ground-based navigation equipment from their aircraft; (6) these benefits would be reduced to the extent that operators must continue to keep such equipment on board; (7) by identifying a range of cost estimates and associated probabilities, the Secretary's report addressed GAO's past concern that FAA's firm, discrete-point cost estimates implied a level of precision that could not be supported; (8) GAO agreed with the Secretary's report that the greatest degree of uncertainty about the WAAS cost estimates relates to the costs of the geostationary communications satellites; (9) the uncertainty exists because FAA does not know exactly how many satellites will be needed and how much the per-unit costs will be; (10) the Secretary's report fell short of providing a complete assessment of the uncertainties FAA faces in achieving WAAS' schedule goals; (11) the report also did not discuss the risks to the overall schedule if FAA does not award the contract to lease the satellites by July 1998 as planned; (12) in January 1998, FAA's analysis found that the benefits to aviation from WAAS would be three times as great as its costs; (13) GAO requested that FAA recalculate its benefit-cost analysis to determine the impact of three alternative assumptions; (14) using these cost and decommissioning assumptions did not cause much of a decrease in the benefit-cost ratio or the net benefits; (15) however, the exclusion of small increments of passenger time savings had a much more significant impact; and (16) when these alternative assumptions were taken together, GAO found that the net present value of the project's net benefits decreased by more than $1 billion but were still about twice as great as the costs. |
gao_GAO-15-506 | gao_GAO-15-506_0 | Goals and History of MIDAS
In early 2004, FSA began planning the MIDAS program to streamline and automate farm program processes and to replace obsolete hardware and software. Poor Program Performance and Uncertainty Regarding Future Plans Led to the Decision to Halt Further MIDAS Development
In a July 2014 memo, the Secretary of Agriculture decided to halt the MIDAS program after deploying minimal functionality due to performance challenges in the early months after the system became operational, and delays in determining the remaining scope, schedule, and cost for the program. For example, by August 2012, FSA had overrun its cost estimates by 11 percent and schedule estimates by 10 percent. When FSA implemented its first software release in April 2013, MIDAS experienced significant technical problems, which is not surprising given its lack of testing. However, FSA did not deliver a new baseline by the deadline. As of March 2015, FSA had spent about $423 million on MIDAS, which was $93 million higher than the 2012 baseline estimate of $330 million. FSA Delivered a Fraction of the Functionality Envisioned for MIDAS
FSA has delivered a fraction of what was originally planned for MIDAS. At that time, MIDAS was envisioned to provide a single SAP platform to host data, applications, and business processes for administering farm program benefits, and advanced tools for customers and FSA employees.seamlessly with other USDA systems, including USDA’s financial system, In addition, it was expected to integrate geospatial information system, and enterprise data warehouse. MIDAS currently provides farm and customer record data on a SAP platform that is integrated with USDA’s geospatial information system. FSA Did Not Adequately Implement Key Program Management Disciplines on MIDAS and Lacks the Capacity to Effectively Manage Successor Programs
FSA did not adequately implement program management disciplines on MIDAS in four key areas—requirements development and management, project planning and monitoring, system testing, and executive-level governance—and lacks the demonstrated capacity to manage successor programs. Until FSA addresses shortfalls in key program management disciplines on successor programs to MIDAS, the agency will be at an increased risk of producing additional projects with cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. The agency tasked a contractor with assessing the results and lessons learned from portions of MIDAS that were implemented; however, it did not conduct a comprehensive review of the lessons learned on the program as a whole. FSA Is Planning Next Steps after MIDAS as Required, but Has Not Demonstrated the Capacity to Manage Future IT Initiatives
Required by law to automate, integrate, and modernize its farm program services, FSA has begun planning how it will do so. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to institutionalize sound IT management practices and build FSA’s IT management capacity while improving service to the Nation’s farmers and ranchers, we are making five recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture to:
Direct the FSA Administrator to establish and implement an improvement plan to guide the agency in adopting recognized best practices and following agency policy. We subsequently received written comments from the FSA Administrator. While the agency did not explicitly agree or disagree with the recommendations, it cited steps it had taken and plans to take to implement best practices in the areas of requirements management, project planning and monitoring, system testing, and executive IT governance. However, until FSA establishes and implements a plan to adhere to agency policies and best practices, we believe the agency has not yet demonstrated that it has the capacity to effectively manage IT acquisitions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe what led to the recent decision to halt further development on MIDAS, (2) compare the functionality that MIDAS has implemented to its original plans, and (3) evaluate the adequacy of key program management disciplines in place for MIDAS and successor programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2004, FSA has spent about $423 million to modernize IT systems through a program known as MIDAS. FSA planned for this program to replace aging hardware and software applications and to provide a single platform to manage all of the agency's farm programs. However, the agency experienced significant challenges in managing this program. In July 2014, the Secretary of Agriculture decided to halt MIDAS after the completion of a second software release.
GAO was asked to review the MIDAS program. This report (1) describes what led to the decision to halt further MIDAS development, (2) compares the functionality that MIDAS has implemented to its original plans, and (3) evaluates the adequacy of key program management disciplines in place for MIDAS and successor programs.
To do so, GAO analyzed agency policies and guidance; evaluated program management plans and related artifacts, program and contractor status reports, program milestone artifacts, and lessons learned; obtained a live demonstration of MIDAS; and interviewed agency and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The key factors that led to the decision to halt the Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems (MIDAS) program were poor program performance and uncertainty regarding future plans. The Farm Service Agency (FSA) experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays, deferred the majority of the envisioned features, skipped key tests, and deployed software in April 2013 that was slow and inaccurate. In addition, FSA struggled to establish a new program baseline as estimates grew from $330 million to $659 million and time frames were delayed from early 2014 to late 2016. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and FSA did not approve three different baseline proposals by the time the program was halted. By March 2015, MIDAS had overrun its baseline cost estimate by $93 million.
FSA has delivered about 20 percent of the functionality that was originally planned for MIDAS. FSA envisioned MIDAS as a single platform to host data, tools, and applications for administering farm program benefits that would be integrated with USDA financial, geospatial, and data warehouse systems. However, FSA delivered a platform that hosts data for administering farm program benefits and is integrated with USDA's geospatial system; it does not host tools and applications for administering benefits, and is not integrated with USDA's financial system or data warehouse.
FSA did not have key program management disciplines in place for MIDAS, and lacks the capacity to effectively manage successor programs. Of 18 key practices associated with sound IT acquisition and investment management and required by USDA or FSA policy, FSA implemented 2, partially implemented 7 practices, and did not implement 9 others. For example, USDA and FSA did not establish a complete set of requirements, perform key tests before deploying the system, or provide effective oversight as the program floundered for 2 years. Moving forward, FSA has begun planning how it will continue to automate, integrate, and modernize its farm program services through additional system development initiatives. However, the agency has not yet established plans to improve its management capabilities. Until FSA establishes and implements such a plan, the agency will continue to lack the fundamental capacity to manage IT acquisitions. Further, until FSA addresses shortfalls in key program management disciplines on successor programs to MIDAS, the agency will be at an increased risk of having additional projects that overrun cost and schedule estimates and contribute little to mission-related outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to FSA, including establishing and implementing a plan for adopting recognized best practices. GAO received written comments from the FSA administrator. While the agency did not explicitly agree or disagree with the recommendations, it cited steps it has taken or plans to take to implement best practices. |
gao_GAO-09-325 | gao_GAO-09-325_0 | Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites
The Air Force’s GPS IIF acquisition initially was not well executed, and currently poses technical problems. A slip in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could increase the likelihood that the GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service the U.S. government has committed to provide. The launch of the first IIF satellite has been delayed until November 2009—almost 3 years late. According to the program office, the cost to complete GPS IIF will be about $1.6 billion—about $870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. Several other studies have raised similar issues. While recent studies have made recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years. This includes reevaluating the contractor incentive/award fee approach; providing a commitment from the Air Force to fully fund GPS IIIA in Program Objectives Memorandum 2010; funding and executing recommended mitigation measures to address the next generation operational control segment and the GPS IIIA satellites; combining the existing and new ground control segment levels of effort into a single level of effort, giving the Air Force greater flexibility to manage these efforts; not allowing the program manager to adjust the GPS IIIA program scope to meet increased or accelerated technical specifications, system requirements, or system performance; and conducting an independent technology readiness assessment of the contractor design once the preliminary design review is complete. This schedule is 3 years shorter than the schedule the Air Force has so far achieved under its IIF program. 3). Nonetheless, no major satellite program undertaken in the past decade has met its scheduled goals. New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities
To maximize the benefit of GPS, the deployment of its space, ground control, and user equipment capabilities must be synchronized so that the full spectrum of military assets—weapons, aircraft, and ships, for example—and individual users can take advantage of new capabilities such as added protection from jamming. However, because of funding shifts and diffuse leadership, the Air Force has not been successful in synchronizing space, ground control, and user equipment segments. As such, there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all the procurements and fielding related to GPS. A 2008 U.S. Strategic Command Functional Solutions Analysis, conducted to provide recommendations for solutions to positioning, navigation, and timing gaps, noted that the Air Force is responsible for developing and integrating military GPS user equipment for select platforms, and that integration and testing of these platforms is required to be complete so that the user equipment is available for procurement when the military signal becomes operational. While there is a consensus that DOD and other federal organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring that GPS is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems. Conclusions
GPS has enabled transformations in military, civil, other government, and commercial operations and has become part of the critical infrastructure serving national and international communities. While the Air Force is making a concerted effort to address acquisition problems, there is still considerable risk that satellites will not be delivered on time, leading to gaps in capability. The major contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite, ground control, and user equipment acquisition programs and determine whether GPS capabilities are being synchronized, we reviewed and analyzed program plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, requirements, program direction, and satellite constellation sustainment, and compared programmatic data to GAO’s criteria compiled over the last 12 years for best practices in system development. To assess the risks that a delay in the acquisition and fielding of GPS III satellites could result in the GPS constellation falling below the 24 satellites required by the standard positioning service and precise positioning service performance standards, we obtained information from the Air Force predicting the reliability for 77 GPS satellites—each of the 31 current (on-orbit) and 46 future GPS satellites—as a function of time. China also is in the process of developing its own GNSS, Compass (also called Beidou). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out this assessment, GAO's efforts included reviewing and analyzing program documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, and interviewing key military and civilian officials.
What GAO Found
It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected. In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009--almost 3 years late. Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent repeating mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the next generation of GPS sa this schedule is optimistic, given the program's late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contracto tellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. GAO's analysis found that r. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource allocation. If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts. In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO identified challenges to ensuring civilian requirements and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems. |
gao_GAO-13-439T | gao_GAO-13-439T_0 | Housing Choice Voucher Program
In recent years, HUD’s voucher program annually helped provide affordable rental housing to about 2 million households with very or extremely low incomes. Approximately 2,400 state and local housing agencies administer the voucher program on HUD’s behalf. Moving to Work Program
HUD implemented the MTW demonstration program in 1999. The purposes are to (1) reduce costs and achieve greater cost-effectiveness in federal housing expenditures, (2) give families with children incentives to obtain employment and become self-sufficient, and (3) increase housing choices for low-income families. The Condition of FHA’s Fund Has Worsened, and FHA’s Risk Assessment Mechanisms Are Not Fully in Place
FHA’s Insurance Fund Has a Negative Capital Ratio
The insurance fund’s capital ratio dropped sharply in 2008 and fell below the statutory minimum in 2009, when economic and market developments created conditions that simultaneously reduced the fund’s economic value (the numerator of the ratio) and increased the insurance-in-force (the denominator of the ratio). If the capital reserve account were to be depleted due to additional upward reestimates, FHA would need to draw on permanent and indefinite budget authority to have sufficient reserves for all future insurance claims on its existing portfolio. Further actions could help to restore FHA’s long-term financial soundness and define its future role. For example, we previously concluded that Congress or HUD needs to determine the economic conditions the insurance fund would be expected to withstand without borrowing from Treasury (drawing on permanent and indefinite budget authority). Based on the consultant’s findings, as well as our internal control guidance and HUD guidance, we recommended that FHA (1) integrate the internal quality control initiative of the Office of Single Family Housing into the processes of the Office of Risk Management, (2) conduct an annual risk assessment, and (3) establish ongoing mechanisms—such as using report templates from the consultant’s report—to anticipate and address risks that might be caused by changing conditions. FHA has begun addressing recommendations made by the consultant. These initiatives are critical to FHA’s efforts to assess and manage risk. HUD agreed with our recommendations. After adjusting for inflation, subsidy costs for existing vouchers grew 2.4 percent. Steps Congress and HUD Took to Manage Cost Increases
Since 2003, Congress and HUD have taken some actions to limit the extent of increases, while maintaining assistance for existing program participants. HUD has also taken steps to increase program efficiencies. Options to Reduce Program Costs or Increase Efficiencies
We identified several options that if implemented effectively, could reduce voucher program costs or allow housing agencies to assist additional households. Improved information on the level of subsidy reserve funding housing agencies should maintain could aid budget decisions and reduce the need for new appropriations. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. These reforms include streamlining complex and burdensome requirements and improving the delivery and oversight of rental assistance. For example, housing agencies must re-examine household income and composition at least annually. We recommended in our March 2012 report that HUD consider proposing to Congress options for streamlining and simplifying the administration of the voucher program and making corresponding changes to the administrative fee formula to reflect any new or revised administrative We stated that such proposals should be informed by requirements.results of HUD’s ongoing administrative fee study and the experience of the MTW program. While each of these options could reduce costs or create administrative efficiencies—each also involves trade-offs. Opportunities Exist to Improve Information on and Monitoring of the MTW Program
As we reported in April 2012, HUD has not identified standard performance data and indicators needed to evaluate the MTW program. HUD also has not established performance indicators for the MTW program. Consistent with our recommendations, HUD has taken initial steps to revise performance reporting requirements for MTW agencies, but these requirements had not yet been finalized as of March 2013. Because HUD does not currently have a systematic process for identifying lessons learned, it is limited in its ability to promote useful practices that could be implemented more broadly. Without a process for systematically assessing compliance with statutory requirements, HUD lacks assurance that agencies are complying with them. HUD also lacks assurance that it is efficiently using its limited monitoring resources. Because HUD does not verify the accuracy of any reported To improve HUD’s oversight over the MTW program, we recommended in April 2012 that HUD (1) issue guidance that clarifies key program terms, such as the statutory purposes and requirements MTW agencies must meet; (2) develop and implement a systematic process for assessing compliance with statutory requirements; (3) conduct an annual risk assessment for MTW and implement risk-based monitoring policies and procedures; and (4) implement control activities to verify the accuracy of a sample of the performance information that MTW agencies self-report. Without more complete information on program effectiveness and compliance, it will be difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW program would benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD operates programs that provide mortgage insurance to homebuyers and subsidize the rents of low-income households. In recent years, HUD's FHA has experienced dramatic growth in its insurance portfolio. Expenditures for HUD's rental voucher program also have risen substantially. Through the MTW demonstration program, HUD has sought to reduce costs and achieve greater cost-effectiveness in federal expenditures for rental housing.
This testimony discusses (1) the financial condition of FHA's insurance fund and FHA's risk management, (2) the costs of the voucher program and options to increase its efficiency, and (3) HUD's efforts to evaluate and monitor the MTW program.
This testimony draws from GAO reports on FHA's insurance fund and oversight capacity ( GAO-10-827R and GAO-12-15), HUD's voucher program (GAO-12-300), and HUD's MTW program (GAO-12-490). GAO also reviewed updated information on the insurance fund and voucher subsidy reserves as of the end of 2012.
What GAO Found
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) faces financial and risk-management challenges. For the fourth straight year, capital reserves for FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund are below the statutory minimum. Also, declining balances in the fund's capital reserve account have heightened the possibility that FHA will require additional funds to have sufficient reserves for all future insurance claims on its existing portfolio. Further actions could help to restore FHA's financial soundness. For example, GAO previously concluded that Congress or HUD needs to determine the economic conditions the fund would be expected to withstand without drawing on Department of the Treasury funding. With regard to risk management, FHA has made or plans improvements. For example, FHA implemented an initiative in 2009 to strengthen internal controls and risk assessment for single-family housing and created a risk office in 2010. However, FHA has only recently begun to integrate these activities and conduct annual risk assessments in accordance with HUD guidance. Without integrated and updated risk assessments that identify emerging risks, as GAO recommended, FHA lacks assurance that it has identified all its risks.
Congress and HUD have taken steps to limit cost increases in the Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) program while maintaining assistance for existing program participants. Nonetheless, between 2003 and 2010, program expenditures grew about 9 percent (after adjusting for inflation), mainly due to rising rents, declining household incomes, and decisions to expand the number of assisted households. GAO identified options that, if implemented effectively, could reduce the need for new appropriations, cut expenditures, or increase the number of households assisted. These options include (1) reducing the subsidy reserves (unspent funds) of state and local housing agencies that administer the program, (2) streamlining administrative requirements, and (3) implementing rent reforms and consolidating voucher administration. These options would also involve trade-offs, such as higher rent burdens for low-income households.
Opportunities exist to improve how HUD evaluates and monitors the Moving to Work (MTW) program, which is intended to give state and local housing agencies flexibility to design and test innovative strategies for providing housing assistance. HUD's guidance does not specify that performance information collected from participating housing agencies be outcome-oriented, and HUD has not identified performance indicators for the program. In addition, HUD has not developed a systematic process for identifying lessons learned from the program, which limits HUD's ability to promote useful practices for broader implementation. HUD also has not taken key monitoring steps set out in internal control standards, such as issuing guidance that defines program terms or assessing compliance with all the program's statutory requirements. As a result, HUD lacks assurance that agencies are complying with statutory requirements. Also, without more complete information on program effectiveness and compliance, it will be difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW program would benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve. Consistent with GAO recommendations, HUD has begun to revise guidance on MTW performance reporting.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations to improve FHA's risk management, and FHA has taken some actions. GAO also recommended that HUD consider proposing to Congress options for improving the efficiency of the voucher program. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed and has not yet proposed such options. In addition, GAO recommended that HUD improve MTW information and monitoring. HUD partially agreed with these recommendations and has taken initial steps to improve performance data. |
gao_HEHS-98-140 | gao_HEHS-98-140_0 | The District’s Combined Taxes on Beer and Wine Are Higher Than Those in Most States
Although the District’s excise taxes on alcoholic beverages are lower than those in most of the 50 states, the District’s combined tax rates on beer and wine are higher than those in most states because its sales tax is among the highest. Sales Tax Increases Have More Than Offset the Effect of Inflation on Excise Tax Rates for Most Alcoholic Beverages
All of the District’s per-unit excise tax rates have declined in inflation-adjusted terms since they were last changed. The increases in the sales tax rates have more than compensated for the lack of indexation of the excise tax rates for most of the beverage items we examined. The District’s alcohol excise taxes will continue to decline gradually in inflation-adjusted terms. Economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that higher alcohol taxes increase the prices for alcoholic beverages, and higher prices affect alcohol consumption. Many States Earmark Portions of Their Alcohol Tax Revenues for Specific Purposes
As of 1993, 24 states earmarked at least a portion of their alcohol excise tax revenues for specific purposes. Table 6 describes different types of education and skill-building programs that are commonly used to combat alcohol abuse and prevent drinking among youth. If an establishment sells alcohol to a decoy, it can be penalized. The District cannot conform its alcohol tax structure to those in all surrounding jurisdictions at the same time, because the tax structures among those neighboring jurisdictions differ significantly. The best current evidence suggests, however, that some legal and regulatory strategies, when enforced, can help reduce illegal drinking and alcohol-related problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined issues relating to the taxation and regulation of alcoholic beverages in the District of Columbia, focusing on: (1) a comparison of the District's alcohol taxes with surrounding jurisdictions; (2) whether those taxes could be set closer to surrounding jurisdictions; (3) how much higher the alcohol tax would be if it had been indexed for inflation; (4) which states earmark alcohol taxes for specific purposes; (5) whether raising alcohol taxes will reduce abuse; and (6) the characteristics of effective alcohol prevention programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) compared to taxes levied in nearby jurisdictions, the District's combined tax rates are higher because its sales tax is among the highest; (2) the District cannot conform its alcohol tax structure to match those in surrounding jurisdictions because tax structures among neighboring jurisdictions differ significantly; (3) the District's per-unit excise tax rates have declined in inflation-adjusted terms since they were last changed, and special sales tax rates on all alcoholic beverages have compensated for the lack of indexation of the excise tax rates, these taxes will continue to decline gradually in inflation-adjusted terms; (4) economic theory and empirical evidence indicates that increases in the District's alcohol taxes are likely to reduce alcohol use, especially among youths; (5) at least 24 states have earmarked at least a portion of their alcohol excise tax revenues for specific purposes; and (6) best current evidence suggests that several legal and regulatory strategies, along with visible enforcement with education about these laws, can reduce illegal drinking and alcohol-related problems in the District of Columbia. |
gao_GAO-14-15 | gao_GAO-14-15_0 | GPS is used extensively and in various ways in many critical infrastructure sectors for PNT information. In developing the NRE, DHS conducted a scenario-based risk assessment for critical infrastructure using subject matter experts from inside and outside government. The NRE Did Not Fully Follow Risk Assessment Guidance or Fully Assess GPS Risks
Risk assessments, such as the NRE, involve complex analysis; conducting a risk assessment across multiple sectors of systems with many unknowns and little data is particularly challenging. DOT and DHS Have Initiated Mitigation Efforts, but Have Not Met All Requirements
DOT and DHS Are Required to Develop Backup Capabilities to Mitigate GPS Disruptions but Have Made Limited Progress
According to a presidential directive, DOT, in coordination with DHS, is required to develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup capabilities that can support critical civilian and commercial infrastructure in the event of a GPS disruption. DOT and DHS have initiated a variety of ongoing mitigation efforts that contribute to fulfilling their presidential directive, such as (1) developing plans and strategies for the nation’s PNT architecture, (2) researching GPS alternatives for aviation, (3) developing plans and strategies for GPS interference detection, (4) researching possibilities for a nationwide timing backup, and (5) conducting other studies. In 2007, DHS began efforts on GPS interference detection and mitigation (IDM) to improve the federal government’s ability to detect, locate, and mitigate sources of GPS interference. Other activities remain incomplete, including those related to identifying GPS backup-system requirements and determining suitability of backup capabilities. In prior work, we have identified key elements of effective collaboration that can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies, thereby maximizing performance and results. Without clearly defining both roles and desired outcomes for efforts that require collaboration, DOT and DHS cannot ensure that they will satisfy mutual responsibilities. Select Critical Infrastructure Sectors Employ Various Mitigation Strategies, but DHS Has Not Measured the Effectiveness of These Efforts
Sector-Specific Strategies to Mitigate GPS Disruptions Vary
Agency officials and industry representatives from the four critical infrastructure sectors we contacted said their sectors would generally be able to withstand short-term GPS disruptions and provided examples of strategies to mitigate GPS disruptions for aspects of sector operations, as follows. Increasing dependency. Although DHS attempted to overcome these challenges, the NRE also lacks some of the key characteristics of risk assessments outlined in the NIPP and, as a result, is incomplete. As such, the NRE is limited in its usefulness to inform mitigation planning, priorities, and resource allocation. Federal risk management policy requires DHS to work with SSAs and sector partners to measure the nation’s ability to manage and reduce risks to critical infrastructure by using a metrics and analysis process. However, we found DHS has not measured the effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts to GPS disruptions. As a result, DHS cannot ensure that critical infrastructure sectors could sustain essential operations during GPS disruptions. The lack of agreed-upon metrics to measure the actual effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts hinders DHS’s ability to objectively assess improvements, track progress, establish accountability, provide feedback mechanisms, or inform decision makers about the appropriateness of—or need for additional—mitigation activities. Nevertheless, DOT and DHS have not defined their respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities or what agreed-upon outcome would satisfy the presidential directive. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the increasing risks of GPS disruptions to the nation’s critical infrastructure are effectively managed, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: Increase the reliability and usefulness of the GPS risk assessment by developing a plan and time frame to collect relevant threat, vulnerability, and consequence data for the various critical infrastructure sectors, and periodically review the readiness of data to conduct a more data-driven risk assessment while ensuring that DHS’s assessment approach is more consistent with the NIPP. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks of Global Positioning System (GPS) disruptions and their potential effects on the nation’s critical infrastructure, (2) the extent to which the Department of Transportation (DOT) and DHS have planned or developed backup capabilities or other strategies to mitigate the effects of GPS disruptions, and (3) what strategies, if any, selected critical infrastructure sectors employ to mitigate the effects of GPS disruptions, and any remaining challenges they face. To review the extent to which DHS has assessed the risks of GPS disruptions and their potential effects on the nation’s critical infrastructure, we compared DHS’s efforts to established risk assessment criteria and contacted GPS stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide and is used extensively in many of the nation's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, such as communications and transportation. GPS is also a key component in many of the modern conveniences that people rely on or interact with daily. However, sectors' increasing dependency on GPS leaves them potentially vulnerable to disruptions. GAO was asked to review the effects of GPS disruptions on the nation's critical infrastructure. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the risks and potential effects of GPS disruptions on critical infrastructure, (2) the extent to which DOT and DHS have developed backup strategies to mitigate GPS disruptions, and (3) what strategies, if any, selected critical infrastructure sectors employ to mitigate GPS disruptions and any remaining challenges. GAO reviewed documents, compared them to relevant federal guidance, and interviewed representatives and experts from federal and state governments, industry, and academia. The focus of this review was on civilian GPS uses within four critical infrastructure sectors.
What GAO Found
To assess the risks and potential effects from disruptions in the Global Positioning System (GPS) on critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the GPS National Risk Estimate (NRE) in 2012. In doing so, DHS conducted a scenario-based risk assessment for four critical infrastructure sectors using subject matter experts from inside and outside of government. Risk assessments involve complex analysis, and conducting a risk assessment across multiple sectors with many unknowns and little data is challenging. DHS's risk management guidance can be used to help address such challenges. However, we found the NRE lacks key characteristics of risk assessments outlined in DHS's risk management guidance and, as a result, is incomplete and has limited usefulness to inform mitigation planning, priorities, and resource allocation. A plan to collect and assess additional data and subsequent efforts to ensure that the risk assessment is consistent with DHS guidance would contribute to more effective GPS risk management.
A 2004 presidential directive requires the Department of Transportation (DOT), in coordination with DHS, to develop backup capabilities to mitigate GPS disruptions, and the agencies have initiated a variety of efforts that contribute to fulfilling the directive. For example, DOT is researching GPS alternatives for aviation, and DHS began efforts on GPS interference detection and mitigation and is researching possibilities for a nationwide backup to GPS timing, which is used widely in critical infrastructure. However, due to resource constraints and other reasons, the agencies have made limited progress in meeting the directive, and many tasks remain incomplete, including identifying GPS backup requirements and determining suitability of backup capabilities. Furthermore, the agencies' efforts have been hampered by a lack of effective collaboration. In particular, DOT and DHS have not clearly defined their respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities or what outcomes would satisfy the presidential directive. Without clearly defining both roles and desired outcomes, DOT and DHS cannot ensure that they will satisfy mutual responsibilities. Implementing key elements of effective collaboration would allow the agencies to address many uncertainties regarding fulfillment of their presidential policy directive.
Selected critical infrastructure sectors employ various strategies to mitigate GPS disruptions. For example, some sectors can rely on timing capabilities from other sources of precise time in the event of GPS signal loss. However, both the NRE and stakeholders we interviewed raised concerns about the sufficiency of the sectors' mitigation strategies. Federal risk management guidance requires DHS to work with federal agencies and critical infrastructure sector partners to measure the nation's ability to reduce risks to critical infrastructure by using a process that includes metrics. We found that DHS has not measured the effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts to GPS disruptions and that, as a result, DHS cannot ensure that the sectors could sustain essential operations during GPS disruptions. The lack of agreed-upon metrics to measure the effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts hinders DHS's ability to objectively assess improvements, track progress, establish accountability, provide feedback mechanisms, or inform decision makers about the appropriateness of the mitigation activities.
What GAO Recommends
DHS should ensure that its GPS risk assessment approach is consistent with DHS guidance; develop a plan to measure the effectiveness of mitigation efforts; and DOT and DHS should improve collaboration. DHS concurred with the latter two recommendations but did not concur with the first. GAO continues to believe that improving the risk assessment approach will capitalize on progress DHS has made and will improve future efforts. |
gao_GAO-02-1125T | gao_GAO-02-1125T_0 | We estimate that in the 1999-2000 school year, about 1.5 million of the 19 million students involved in postsecondary education took at least one electronically transmitted distance education course. As the largest provider of student financial aid to postsecondary students (an estimated $52 billion in fiscal year 2002), the federal government has a substantial interest in the quality of distance education. Characteristics of Distance Education Students and Institutions That Offer Distance Education
Our analysis of the NPSAS showed that the estimated 1.5 millionpostsecondary students who have taken distance education courses have different demographic characteristics when compared with the characteristics of postsecondary students who did not enroll in distance education. Distance education students are more likely to be married. Distance education students are more likely to be part-time students. Growth of Distance Education Affects Federal Student Aid Policies on Several Fronts
Federal student aid is an important consideration for many students who take distance education courses, although not to the same degree as students in more traditional classroom settings. Without some relief, the students that attend these institutions may become ineligible for student aid from the federal government in the future. Minority Serving Institutions Tend To Use Distance Education Less Frequently Than Other Schools
While our work examining the use of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) is not yet completed, the preliminary data indicate that MSIs—and more specifically, minority students at MSIs— make less use of distance education than students at other schools. We plan to review a number of accreditation efforts to determine the way in which accrediting agencies review distance education programs. Congress and the Administration need to ensure that changes to the HEA and regulations do not increase the chances of fraud, waste, or abuse to the student financial aid programs. | What GAO Found
Increasingly, the issues of distance education and federal student aid intersect. About one in every 13 postsecondary students enrolls in at least one distance education course, and the Department of Education estimates that the number of students involved in distance education has tripled in just 4 years. As the largest provider of financial aid to postsecondary students, the federal government has a considerable interest in distance education. Overall, 1.5 million out of 19 million postsecondary students took at least one distance education course in the 1999-2000 school year. The distance education students differ from other postsecondary students in a number of respects. Compared to other students, they tend to be older and are more likely to be employed full-time while attending school part-time. They also have higher incomes and are more likely to be married. Many students enrolled in distance education courses participate in federal student aid programs. As distance education continues to grow, several major aspects of federal laws, rules, and regulations may need to be reexamined. Certain rules may need to be modified if a small, but growing, number of schools are to remain eligible for student aid. Students attending these schools may become ineligible for student aid because their distance education programs are growing and may exceed statutory and regulatory limits on the amount of distance education an institution can offer. In general, students at minority serving institutions use distance education less extensively than students at other schools. Accrediting agencies play an important role in reviewing distance education programs. They, and Education, are "gatekeepers" with respect to ensuring quality at postsecondary institutions--including those that offer distance education programs. |
gao_GAO-08-1057 | gao_GAO-08-1057_0 | Under TRIA, the federal government is to reimburse insurers for a portion of their losses from certified terrorist acts. Terrorism Insurance Generally Is Available Nationwide, although Some Policyholders Had to Take Additional Steps to Obtain Coverage
According to a variety of sources, commercial property terrorism insurance currently appears to be widely available on a nationwide basis at rates viewed as reasonable, largely due to the TRIA program and the current “soft” insurance market. However, some policyholders in urban areas viewed as being at higher risk of a terrorist attack, particularly in Manhattan and to a lesser extent in some other high-risk cities such as Chicago and San Francisco, may be forced to take additional steps to overcome challenges they may have initially faced in obtaining desired amounts of coverage at prices viewed as reasonable. Policyholders generally have been able to obtain desired or required amounts of terrorism coverage by increasing the number of carriers in what already may be large and complex insurance programs, adding to what can be a time-consuming and complicated process for policyholders and their insurance brokers. Specifically, industry participants said that owners of large, high-value properties in financial districts or downtown locations, or near government offices or transit hubs, may face initial challenges in obtaining coverage in their all-risk property policies. Insurer and Reinsurer Efforts to Mitigate Their Risks Appeared to Be Why Certain Policyholders Faced Initial Challenges in Obtaining Terrorism Insurance Coverage
While TRIA limits insurers’ potential losses from a terrorist attack, the efforts of insurers’ to manage the remaining risks they faced appeared to be the primary reasons for certain policyholders experiencing initial challenges in obtaining desired amounts of coverage at prices they viewed as reasonable. To mitigate their risks, many insurers set limits on the amount of coverage that they would provide to policyholders in confined geographic areas within a city, such as downtown locations or financial districts where many large buildings are clustered, or in specific areas of cities considered to be at high risk of attack. According to a variety of sources we contacted, these limits generally make obtaining coverage more difficult or costly for certain policyholders in these areas. The representative of one large insurer said that the company’s TRIA deductible was three times the net losses the company suffered due to the September 11 attacks. For example, one reinsurance company representative said that the company was less willing to write contracts covering properties in cities viewed to be at high risk of terrorist attack. Various Proposals to Increase the Availability and Affordability of Terrorism Insurance Coverage Have Both Advantages and Disadvantages
Insurance industry participants and analysts did not express consensus on whether TRIA should be modified or additional actions taken to increase the availability of terrorism insurance coverage. They cited a variety of advantages and disadvantages associated with five proposals that have been offered in legislation, discussed in our prior reports, or suggested by industry participants to increase the availability and perhaps limit the cost of terrorism insurance. Because this proposal was designed to significantly reduce potential industry losses, some insurers and industry participants we contacted said that it might make them more willing to offer coverage in areas affected by a future attack. The federal government would be responsible for losses in excess of $40 billion up to $100 billion. However, several challenges and disadvantages also may be associated with this option. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to Department of the Treasury and NAIC for their review and comment. In oral comments, Treasury and NAIC officials said that the report was informative and useful. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) whether the availability of terrorism insurance for commercial properties is constrained in any geographic markets and the effect of any constraints on pricing and coverage amounts, (2) factors limiting insurers’ willingness to provide coverage, and (3) advantages and disadvantages of some public policy options to increase the availability of property terrorism insurance. The geographic markets we studied represent locations considered to be at high, moderate, and low risk of exposure to terrorist attacks—Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. We selected these markets based on rankings of locations by risk of terrorism exposure that accounts for the risk of terrorist attacks and the potential for associated losses from the Insurance Services Office, an insurance industry analytics firm. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) specifies that the federal government assume significant financial responsibility for insured losses on commercial properties resulting from future terrorist attacks. While TRIA has been credited with stabilizing markets for terrorism insurance after the September 11, 2001, attacks, questions remain as to whether certain policyholders, especially those located in large urban areas viewed as being at high risk of attack, may still face challenges in obtaining coverage. GAO was asked to conduct a study to describe (1) whether the availability of terrorism insurance for commercial properties is constrained in any geographic markets, (2) factors limiting insurers' willingness to provide coverage, and (3) advantages and disadvantages of selected public policy options to increase the availability of such insurance. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed available data and interviewed industry participants, including those with expertise in specific geographic markets considered to be at high, moderate, or low risk of attack (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.). GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Treasury and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Treasury and NAIC said the report was informative and useful.
What GAO Found
While some owners of high-value properties in major cities may face initial challenges obtaining terrorism insurance coverage compared with most policyholders nationwide, they generally have reported that they could meet current coverage requirements through a variety of approaches. Many industry participants said that terrorism insurance is currently available nationwide at prices viewed as reasonable and that the TRIA program was a key reason for these favorable conditions. However, some policyholders that own large, high-value properties in densely built urban areas viewed as at high risk of attack, particularly in Manhattan and to a lesser extent in Chicago and San Francisco, may still face initial challenges obtaining desired amounts of coverage at prices viewed as reasonable, according to industry participants. To address these challenges, some policyholders purchased coverage from a large number of insurers, which can be a time-consuming and complicated process for policyholders and their insurance brokers. Others purchased coverage in a separate policy (rather than as part of an overall property insurance package) which may be more costly, or self-insured. While TRIA specifies that the federal government assume substantial financial responsibility for insured losses associated with future terrorist attacks, the steps insurers take to manage the risks they do face appear to be the primary reason some policyholders face challenges in obtaining coverage. Insurers said they seek to mitigate potential terrorism losses by limiting the amount of property coverage that they offered in specific areas of cities, such as downtown locations or areas considered to be at high risk of attack. These risk mitigation efforts generally make obtaining coverage more difficult or costly for policyholders with high-value properties in these areas, according to a variety of sources GAO contacted. Industry participants also said that the availability of reinsurance (insurance for insurers) and the views of rating agencies can limit the availability of coverage in such cities. Industry participants had no consensus on whether TRIA should be modified or additional actions taken to increase the availability of terrorism coverage, and identified advantages and disadvantages of selected policy proposals that have been included in legislation, discussed in prior GAO reports, or suggested by industry participants to increase such coverage. A proposal to increase the federal government's current responsibility under TRIA for the insured losses associated with a future attack could make insurers more willing to offer coverage in affected areas. For example, one large insurer said that the proposal might make the company more willing to immediately offer additional coverage in cities viewed as at high risk of attack. However, any such benefits might be limited for reasons including the widespread insurance market disruptions that may result from another attack. This proposal, along with several other proposals analyzed in the report, also would increase the federal government's exposure to the losses associated with terrorist attacks, which is already 85 percent of losses up to $100 billion annually, after an industry deductible. |
gao_GAO-08-636T | gao_GAO-08-636T_0 | Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Planning Fusion Centers That Vary in Their Characteristics
Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center. Further, 23 of the 36 operational fusion centers that provided us mission statements had missions that involved collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism- related information. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5 employees to over 80. DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to address many of these challenges. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks. While these efforts to improve the quality and flow of information to state and local users are promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will address the challenges in accessing and managing information reported to us by fusion center officials. DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials, but Officials Cited Some Challenges with Obtaining and Using Clearances
Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous state and local personnel in order to access classified information and have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security clearance. DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training to Fusion Centers
DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their challenges in these areas. Furthermore, officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training on intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Additionally, along with the PM-ISE and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional and national conferences, including the second annual national fusion center conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion centers in building capabilities and understanding their roles and responsibilities as described in the National Strategy. Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and the FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent
Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related to obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)—challenges that some of these officials also said affected their centers’ sustainability. Both DHS and the FBI have continued to support fusion centers by deploying personnel, consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of capability, the National Strategy states that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve such a baseline level of capability. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers. However, fusion center officials raised some concerns about sustainability of funding and personnel as the federal government continues work to incorporate fusion centers into the information sharing environment and implement the National Strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing information, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2007 report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second annual national fusion center conference.
What GAO Found
Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their characteristics. Centers were generally established to address gaps in information sharing, and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had adopted broad missions that could include both counterterrorism and law enforcement-related information. While law enforcement entities, such as state police, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the centers GAO contacted, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. The majority of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel, including from DHS or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to them as of September 2007. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances. DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 21 centers cited challenges with the availability of training for mission-specific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued providing a technical assistance program for fusion centers and disseminated a baseline capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines minimum operational standards for fusion centers. While this support and guidance is promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which it will address challenges identified by officials contacted. Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center related activities. The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007 by the President, states that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns about how specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate fusion centers into the ISE and to implement the strategy. |
gao_GAO-16-807T | gao_GAO-16-807T_0 | Background
VA operates one of the largest health care systems in America, providing care to millions of veterans and their families each year. Since 1998, VA has undertaken a patchwork of initiatives with DOD to allow the departments’ health information systems to exchange information and increase interoperability. Table 1 summarizes a number of these key initiatives. Together with DOD and the Interagency Program Office, VA Needs to Develop Goals and Metrics for Assessing Interoperability
Even as VA has undertaken numerous initiatives with DOD that were intended to advance electronic health record interoperability, a significant concern is that these departments have not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics to clearly define what they aim to achieve from their interoperability efforts, and the value and benefits these efforts are expected to yield. The IPO is responsible for monitoring and reporting on VA’s and DOD’s progress in achieving interoperability and coordinating with the departments to ensure that these efforts enhance health care services. Accordingly, we recommended that the departments, working with the IPO, establish a time frame for identifying outcome- oriented metrics; define related goals as a basis for determining the extent to which the departments’ modernized electronic health record systems are achieving interoperability; and update IPO guidance accordingly. Further, since that time, VA has established a performance architecture program that has begun to define an approach for identifying outcome-oriented metrics focused on health outcomes in selected clinical areas, and it also has begun to establish baseline measurements. We intend to continue monitoring the department’s efforts to determine how these metrics define and report on the results achieved by interoperability between the departments. VA’s Plan to Modernize VistA Raises Concern about Duplication with DOD’s Electronic Health Record System Acquisition
Following the termination of the iEHR initiative, VA moved forward with an effort to modernize VistA separately from DOD’s planned acquisition of a commercially available electronic health record system. The department took this course of action even though it has many health care business needs in common with those of DOD. Further, the results of a 2008 study pointed out that over 97 percent of inpatient requirements for electronic health record systems are common to both departments. Moreover, we noted that the departments’ plans to modernize their two separate systems were duplicative and stressed that their decisions should be justified by comparing the costs and schedules of alternate approaches. VA, as well as DOD, agreed with our recommendations and stated that an initial comparison had indicated that the approach involving separate systems would be more cost effective. However, as of June 2016, the departments had not provided us with a comparison of the estimated costs of their current and previous approaches. Further, with respect to their assertions that separate systems could be achieved faster, both departments had developed schedules which indicated that their separate modernization efforts are not expected to be completed until after the 2017 planned completion date for the previous single-system approach. These include an interoperability plan and a road map describing functional capabilities to be deployed through fiscal year 2018. According to the road map, the first set of capabilities was delivered by the end of September 2014 and included access to the Joint Legacy Viewer and a foundation for future functionality, such as an enhanced graphical user interface and enterprise messaging infrastructure. However, a recent independent assessment of health IT at VA reported that lengthy delays in modernizing VistA had resulted in the system becoming outdated. Further, this study questioned whether the VistA Evolution program to modernize the electronic health record system can overcome a variety of risks and technical issues that have plagued prior VA initiatives of similar size and complexity. In speaking about this matter, VA’s Under Secretary for Health has asserted that the department will follow through on its plans to complete the VistA Evolution program in fiscal year 2018. However, the Chief Information Officer has also indicated that the department is taking a step back in reconsidering how best to meet its electronic health record system needs beyond fiscal year 2018. As such, VA’s approach to addressing its electronic health record system needs remains uncertain. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the nation's largest health care systems, serving millions of veterans each year. For almost two decades, the department has undertaken a patchwork of initiatives with DOD to increase interoperability between their respective electronic health record systems. During much of this time, VA has also been planning to modernize its system. While the department has made progress in these efforts, it has also faced significant information technology challenges that contributed to GAO's designation of VA health care as a high risk area.
This statement summarizes GAO's August 2015 report (GAO-15-530) on VA's efforts to achieve interoperability with DOD's electronic health records system. It also summarizes key content from GAO's reports on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation of federal government programs. Lastly, this statement provides updated information on VA's actions in response to GAO's recommendation calling for an interoperability and electronic health record system plan.
What GAO Found
Even as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has undertaken numerous initiatives with the Department of Defense (DOD) that were intended to advance the ability of the two departments to share electronic health records, the departments have not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics to clearly define what they aim to achieve from their interoperability efforts. In an August 2015 report, GAO recommended that the two departments establish a time frame for identifying outcome-oriented metrics, define related goals as a basis for determining the extent to which the departments' systems are achieving interoperability, and update their guidance accordingly. Since that time, VA has established a performance architecture program that has begun to define an approach for identifying outcome-oriented metrics focused on health outcomes in selected clinical areas and has begun to establish baseline measurements. GAO is continuing to monitor VA's and DOD's efforts to define metrics and report on the interoperability results achieved between the departments.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to develop a joint system with DOD, VA switched tactics and moved forward with an effort to modernize its current system separately from DOD's planned acquisition of a commercially available electronic health record system. The department took this course of action even though, in May 2010, it identified 10 areas of health care business needs in common with those of DOD. Further, the results of a 2008 study pointed out that more than 97 percent of inpatient requirements for electronic health record systems are common to both departments. GAO noted that the departments' plans to separately modernize their systems were duplicative and recommended that their decisions should be justified by comparing the costs and schedules of alternate approaches. The departments agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that their initial comparison indicated that separate systems would be more cost effective. However, the departments have not provided a comparison of the estimated costs of their current and previous approaches. Further, both departments developed schedules that indicated their separate modernization efforts will not be completed until after the 2017 planned completion date for the previous joint system approach.
VA has developed a number of plans to support its development of its electronic health record system, called VistA, including a plan for interoperability and a road map describing functional capabilities to be deployed through fiscal year 2018. According to the road map, the first set of capabilities was delivered by the end of September 2014 and included a foundation for future functionality, such as an enhanced graphical user interface and enterprise messaging infrastructure. However, a recent independent assessment of health information technology (IT) at VA reported that lengthy delays in modernizing VistA had resulted in the system becoming outdated. Further, this study questioned whether the modernization program can overcome a variety of risks and technical issues that have plagued prior VA initiatives of similar size and complexity. Although VA's Under Secretary for Health has asserted that the department will complete the VistA Evolution program in fiscal year 2018, the Chief Information Officer has indicated that the department is reconsidering how best to meet its future electronic health record system needs.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations to VA to improve the modernization of its IT systems. Among other things, GAO has recommended that VA address challenges associated with interoperability, develop goals and metrics to determine the extent to which the modernized systems are achieving interoperability, and address shortcomings with planning. VA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-612 | gao_GAO-02-612_0 | Each passage alternative has associated risks and contributes to the mortality of juvenile fish. None of these efforts proved to be enough, however, and in the 1990s, 12 salmon and steelhead populations were listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA, resulting in the advent of intensified recovery actions. Agencies Estimate Recovery Expenditures in the Billions
The 11 federal agencies estimate that they expended almost $1.8 billion (unadjusted for inflation) from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 1996 and about $1.5 billion (in 2001 dollars) from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal 2001 on efforts specifically designed to recover Columbia River Basin salmon and steelhead. BLM habitat improvement projects include riparian plantings, such as 50 acres in the Grande Ronde River Basin, and erosion control activity, such as the Hayden Creek road sediment reduction project. For example, over the past 25 years, annual adult returns for all ESA listed and unlisted salmon and steelhead counted at Bonneville Dam, the first dam on the Columbia River, averaged 660,000, but counts for individual years varied widely. In addition to the $1.5 billion expended by federal agencies or provided by federal agencies to nonfederal agencies for specific salmon and steelhead recovery actions, federal agencies also estimated that they expended $302 million (in 2001 dollars) in the last 5 fiscal years on changes to mission-related projects that benefited, but were not specifically directed at, salmon or steelhead, such as road improvements that reduce erosion. The following examples illustrate actions the agency has taken to meet its obligations and/or to benefit salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin: Consulted with NMFS on the operation and maintenance of the Federal Columbia River Power System and 19 other BOR projects in the Columbia River Basin. Fish and Wildlife Service. National Marine Fisheries Service
Under the Endangered Species Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service is responsible for preparing a recovery plan and for consulting with other agencies on whether their planned actions will jeopardize listed salmon and steelhead populations. Hence, our point that there is little evidence to quantify the effects of recovery efforts on the number of returning salmon and steelhead is valid. | What GAO Found
Before 1850, an estimated 16 million salmon and steelhead returned to the Columbia River Basin annually to spawn. Over the past 25 years, the number of salmon and steelhead returning to the Columbia River Basin has averaged only 660,000 per year although annual population levels have varied widely. Factors such as over-harvesting, construction and operation of dams, degradation of spawning habitat, increased human population, and unfavorable weather and ocean conditions have contributed to the long-term decline. The population decline has resulted in the listing of 12 salmon and steelhead populations in the basin as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, the act requires that efforts be taken to allow its recovery. Eleven federal agencies are involved with salmon and steelhead recovery efforts in the Columbia River Basin. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), as the lead agency, is responsible for preparing a recovery plan and consulting with the other federal agencies on their planned actions. The 11 federal agencies estimate expenditures of $1.8 billion from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1996 and $1.5 billion from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001 on efforts specifically designed to recover Columbia River Basin salmon and steelhead. In addition to the $1.5 billion, the 11 federal agencies estimated that they expended $302 million in the last five fiscal years on modifications to mission-related projects that benefited, but were not specifically directed at, salmon and steelhead, such as erosion control to improve crop productivity and wildlife habitat, which also improves stream flows and reduces sedimentation in spawning habitat. Although federal agencies have undertaken many types of recovery actions, there is little conclusive evidence to quantify the extent of their efforts on returning fish populations. Recovery actions taken include projects, such as constructing fish passage facilities at dams; research studies, such as determining the presence or absence of toxic substances that cause diseases in fish; monitoring actions, such as surveying spawning grounds; and other activities, such as consultations required by the act. |
gao_GAO-14-128T | gao_GAO-14-128T_0 | FPS Faces Challenges Ensuring Contract Guards Have Been Properly Trained and Certified before Being Deployed to Federal Facilities
Some FPS Contract Guards Have Not Received Required Training on Responding to Active- Shooter Scenarios
According to FPS officials, since 2010 the agency has required its guards to receive training on how to respond to an active-shooter scenario. For example, of the 16 contract guard companies we interviewed about this topic: officials from eight contract guard companies stated that their guards have received active-shooter scenario training during FPS orientation; officials from five guard companies stated that FPS has not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training; and officials from three guard companies stated that FPS had not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training, but that the topic was covered at some other time. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. For example, an official at one contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three separate FPS contracts (awarded in 2009) have never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from FPS. Consequently, some guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x- ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use ─thus raising questions about the ability of some guards to execute a primary responsibility to properly screen access control points at federal facilities. We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received screener training. FPS agreed with our recommendation that they take immediate steps to determine which guards have not received screener training and provide it to them. FPS Lacks Effective Management Controls to Ensure Guards Have Met Training and Certification Requirements
In our September 2013 report, we found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure that guards have met training and certification requirements. For example, although FPS agreed with our 2010 and 2012 recommendations to develop a comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight, it still does not have such a system. In our September 2013 report, we found that 23 percent of the 276 guard files we reviewed (maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies we interviewed) lacked required training and certification documentation.some guard files lacked documentation of basic training, semi-annual firearms qualifications, screener training, the 40-hour refresher training (required every 3 years), and CPR certification. Preliminary Results Indicate that FPS and Select Federal Agencies’ Risk Assessment Methodologies Do Not Align with ISC’s Risk Assessment Standards
Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures to mitigate the potential undesirable effects of these risks. ISC’s risk assessment standards state that agencies’ facility risk assessment methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified by ISC as possible risks to federal facilities, and assess the threat, vulnerability, and consequence of specific undesirable events. Preliminary results from our ongoing review of nine federal agencies’ risk assessment methodologies indicate that several agencies, including FPS, do not use a methodology that aligns with ISC’s risk assessment standards to assess federal facilities. Most commonly, agencies’ methodologies are not consistent with ISC’s standards because agencies do not assess their facilities’ vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events. Because agencies’ risk assessment methodologies are inconsistent with ISC’s risk assessment standards, these agencies may not have a complete understanding of the risks facing approximately 57,000 federal facilities located around the country—including the 9,600 protected by FPS and several agencies’ headquarters facilities. For example, if an agency does not know its facility’s potential vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events, it cannot set priorities to mitigate them. In addition, we reported in 2012 that although federal agencies pay FPS millions of dollars to assess risk at their facilities, FPS’s interim facility assessment tool—the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST)—was not consistent with federal risk assessment standards and had other limitations. Specifically, FPS’s risk assessment methodology was inconsistent with ISC’s risk assessment standards because it did not assess the consequence of possible undesirable events (i.e., the level, duration, and nature of loss resulting from undesirable events). GAO-13-222. Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FPS is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,600 federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). Recent incidents at federal facilities demonstrate their continued vulnerability to attacks or other acts of violence. To help accomplish its mission, FPS conducts facility risk assessments and provides oversight of approximately 13,500 contract security guards deployed to federal facilities.
This testimony is based on the results of our September 2013 report (released by the Subcommittee today), previous reports, and preliminary results of work GAO conducted for a report that GAO plans to issue to the Chairman later this year. GAO discusses (1) challenges FPS faces in ensuring contract security guards deployed to federal facilities are properly trained and certified and (2) the extent to which FPS and select federal agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies align with standards issued by the ISC. To perform this work, GAO reviewed FPS and guard company documentation and interviewed officials about oversight of guards. GAO also reviewed FPS's and eight federal agencies' risk assessment documentation and compared it to ISC's standards. These agencies were selected based on their missions and types of facilities.
What GAO Found
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) faces challenges ensuring that contract guards have been properly trained and certified before being deployed to federal facilities around the country. In a September 2013 report, GAO found that providing active-shooter-response and screener training is a challenge for FPS. For example, according to officials at five guard companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active-shooter. Without ensuring that all guards receive this training, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for such a threat. Similarly, officials from one of FPS's contract guard companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards have never received screener training. As a result, those guards may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment at federal facilities that they are not qualified to use, raising questions about their ability to properly screen access control points at federal facilities--one of their primary responsibilities. We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS's guards have received active-shooter-response and screener training. FPS agreed with GAO's 2013 recommendation that they take steps to identify guards that have not had required training and provide it to them. GAO also found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO's 2010 and 2012 recommendations that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards' training, certifications, and qualifications, it still does not have such a system. Additionally, 23 percent of the 276 guard files GAO examined (maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies we interviewed) lacked required training and certification documentation. Examples of missing items include documentation of initial weapons and screener training and firearms qualifications.
GAO's preliminary results indicate that several agencies, including FPS, do not use a methodology to assess risk at their facilities that aligns with the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) risk assessment standards. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures to mitigate the risk. ISC's standards state that agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies must: 1) consider all of the undesirable events identified by ISC as possible risks to federal facilities, and 2) assess the threat, vulnerability, and consequence of specific undesirable events. Most commonly, agencies' methodologies that GAO reviewed are inconsistent with ISC's standards because they do not assess facilities' vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events. If an agency does not know its facilities' potential vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events, it cannot set priorities to mitigate these vulnerabilities. In addition, as GAO reported in August 2012, although federal agencies pay FPS millions of dollars to assess risk at their facilities, FPS's risk assessment tool is not consistent with ISC's risk assessment standards because it does not assess consequence (i.e., the level, duration, and nature of loss resulting from undesirable events). As a result, FPS and the other non-compliant agencies GAO reviewed may not have a complete understanding of the risks facing approximately 57,000 federal facilities located around the country (including the 9,600 protected by FPS).
What GAO Recommends
DHS and FPS agreed with GAO's recommendations in its September 2013 report. |
gao_GAO-04-439T | gao_GAO-04-439T_0 | Strengths and Weaknesses of PART in Its First Year of Implementation
Through its development and use of PART, OMB has more explicitly infused performance information into the budget formulation process; increased the attention paid to evaluation and to performance information; and ultimately, we hope, increased the value of this information to decision makers and other stakeholders. OMB should be credited with opening up for scrutiny—and potential criticism—its review of key areas of federal program performance and then making its assessments available to a potentially wider audience through its Web site. As OMB has recognized, following through on these recommendations is essential for improving program performance and ensuring accountability. Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and results. In addition, the limited availability of credible evidence on program results also constrained OMB’s ability to use PART to rate programs’ effectiveness. We found inconsistencies in how the definition of acceptable performance measures was applied. As a result, the goals and measures used in PART must meet OMB’s needs. Federal programs cannot be assessed in isolation. Targeting PART assessments based on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs and activities addressing common strategic and performance goals not only could help ration scarce analytic resources but also could focus decision makers’ attention on the most pressing policy and program issues. The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving. As part of the executive branch budget formulation process, PART must clearly serve the President’s interests. Accordingly, if PART is to be accepted as other than one element in the development of the President’s budget proposal, congressional understanding and acceptance of the tool and analysis will be important. We have recommended that OMB reach out to key congressional committees early in the PART selection process to gain insight about which program areas and performance issues congressional officials consider warrant PART review. We have also suggested that Congress consider the need to develop a more systematic vehicle for communicating its top performance concerns and priorities; develop a more structured oversight agenda to prompt a more coordinated congressional perspective on crosscutting performance issues; and use this agenda to inform its authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes. PART offers the potential to build on the infrastructure of performance plans and information ushered in by GPRA and the law’s intent to promote the use of these plans in resource allocation decision making. Continue to improve the PART guidance by (1) expanding the discussion of how the unit of analysis is to be determined to include trade-offs made when defining a unit of analysis, implications of how the unit of analysis is defined, or both; (2) clarifying when output versus outcome measures are acceptable; and (3) better defining an “independent, quality evaluation.”
Clarify OMB’s expectations to agencies regarding the allocation of scarce evaluation resources among programs, the timing of such evaluations, as well as the evaluation strategies it wants for the PART, and consider using internal agency evaluations as evidence on a case-by- case basis—whether conducted by agencies, contractors, or other parties. Improving the integration of inherently separate but interrelated strategic planning and performance budgeting processes can help support a more strategic focus for PART assessments. GPRA’s strategic planning goals could be used to anchor the selection and review of programs by providing a foundation to assess the relative contribution of related programs and tools to broader performance goals and outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs during budget formulation. The subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our recent report, Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal 2004 Budget (GAO-04-174) and strategies for improving PART and furthering the goals envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).
What GAO Found
PART helped structure OMB's use of performance information for internal program and budget analysis and stimulated agency interest in budget and performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build on GPRA's foundation to more actively promote the use of performance information in budget decisions. OMB deserves credit for inviting scrutiny of its federal program performance reviews and sharing them on its Web site. Much of PART's potential value lies in its program recommendations but follow through will require sustained commitment by agencies and OMB. OMB devoted considerable effort to developing PART, but diagnosing problems and rating programs are only the beginning of PART's ambitious agenda. Implementing change and providing oversight takes time; OMB needs to be mindful of this as it considers capacity and workload issues in the PART. As is to be expected in the first year of any reform, PART is a work in progress and we noted in our report where OMB might make improvements. Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will require exercising some judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that we found inconsistencies in OMB staff interpreting and applying PART. PART provides an opportunity to more efficiently use scarce analytic resources, to focus decision makers' attention on the most pressing policy issues, and to consider comparisons and trade-offs among related programs by more strategically targeting PART assessments based on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs and activities. PART assessments underscored long-standing gaps in performance and evaluation information throughout the federal government. By reaching agreement on areas in which evaluations are most essential, decision makers can help ensure that limited resources are applied wisely. The relationship between PART and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving. Although PART can stimulate discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is not a substitute for GPRA's strategic, longer-term focus on thematic goals, and department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons. Although PART and GPRA serve different needs, a strategy for integrating the two could help strengthen both. Federal programs are designed and implemented in dynamic environments where competing program priorities and stakeholders' needs must be balanced continually and new needs addressed. PART clearly serves OMB's needs but questions remain about whether it serves the various needs of other key stakeholders. If PART results are to be considered in the congressional debate it will be important for OMB to (1) involve congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the focus of the assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the assessments and underlying performance information; and (3) initiate discussions with key congressional committees about how they can best leverage PART information in congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes. |
gao_GAO-04-101 | gao_GAO-04-101_0 | Consolidation loans are available under Education’s two major student loan programs—the FFELP and FDLP. Under FDLP, the federal government makes loans to students using federal funds. For FDLP loans, the federal government pays for administration costs directly. Consolidation Borrowers Had Higher Student Loan Debt and Incomes, Larger Loan Repayments, and Longer Repayment Periods
Borrowers with consolidation loans had a higher average amount of student loan debt than nonconsolidation loan borrowers. Consolidation Borrowers Defaulted Less Often
Fewer consolidation loan borrowers in our sample had defaulted on their consolidation loans than nonconsolidation borrowers had defaulted on their loans. Interest Rates and Increased Loan Volumes Have Increased Federal Costs
Although recent trends in interest rates and consolidation loan volumes have affected the FFELP and FDLP consolidation programs in somewhat different ways, the net effect has been an increase in estimated subsidy and administration costs for loans made in fiscal year 2003 as compared with loans made in fiscal year 2002. Administration costs are not specifically tracked for either loan program, but available evidence indicates that these costs have also risen. Under these conditions, some borrowers may find it in their economic self-interest to consolidate their loans so that they can lock in a low fixed interest rate for the life of the loan, as opposed to paying variable rates on their existing loans, regardless of whether they need a consolidation loan to avoid difficulty in making loan repayments. Increased Special Allowance Payments to Lenders and Increased Loan Volume Caused FFELP Subsidy Costs to Rise
Estimated subsidy costs for FFELP consolidation loans are expected to increase from $1.3 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2002 to almost $3 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2003. In both years, borrower interest rates for FDLP consolidation loans were somewhat higher than the discount rate, resulting in a net gain to the government. Repayment Options Other Than Consolidation Loans That Allow Borrowers to Simplify Loan Repayments and Reduce Repayment Amounts Exist, but Borrowers’ Use of These Options Is Limited by Several Factors
Repayment options, other than consolidation loans, that allow borrowers to simplify loan repayment and reduce repayment amounts are now available to some borrowers under both FFELP and FDLP, but these alternatives are not available to all borrowers. Table 7 compares the extent to which borrowers can combine multiple loan payments into one, lower monthly repayment amounts, and extend repayment periods under consolidation and nonconsolidation options. Borrowers’ Choices between Fixed or Variable Rate Alternatives Affect Federal Costs
The choices that borrowers ultimately make will have consequences for federal costs. For both programs, federal costs are also affected by the repayment period chosen by borrowers. For example, borrowers who obtained a consolidation loan in the past and are paying higher rates of interest would be provided the opportunity to obtain a new consolidation loan at current (lower) borrower interest rates. While consolidation loans may thus remain an important tool to help borrowers manage their educational debt and thus reduce the cost of student loan defaults, the surge in the number of borrowers consolidating their loans suggests that many borrowers who face little risk of default are choosing consolidation as a way of obtaining low fixed interest rates—an economically rational choice on the part of borrowers. An assessment of the advantages of consolidation loans for borrowers and the government, taking into account program costs and the availability of, and potential changes to, existing alternatives to consolidation, and how consolidation loan costs could be distributed among borrowers, lenders, and the taxpayers, would be useful in making decisions about how best to manage the consolidation loan program and whether any changes are warranted. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government makes consolidation loans available to help borrowers manage their student loan debt. By combining loans into one and extending the repayment period, a consolidation loan reduces monthly repayments, which may lower default risk and, thereby, reduce federal costs of loan defaults. Consolidation loans also allow borrowers to lock in a fixed interest rate--an option not available for other student loans--and are available to borrowers regardless of financial need. GAO was asked to examine (1) how consolidation borrowers differ from nonconsolidation borrowers; (2) how federal costs have been affected by recent interest rate and loan volume changes; and (3) the extent to which repayment options--other than consolidation--are available to help simplify and reduce loan repayments.
What GAO Found
On average, consolidation loan borrowers, over the 1987 to 2002 period, had higher levels of student loan debt, higher incomes, and larger loan repayments than did nonconsolidation borrowers. For example, the average student loan debt among consolidation borrowers prior to consolidating their loans was about $22,000 versus about $10,000 for nonconsolidation borrowers. As a group, they defaulted less often on their consolidation loans than borrowers who did not consolidate their loans. Recent trends in interest rates and consolidation loan volumes have affected consolidations in the Department of Education's (Education) two major student loan programs--the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP)--in different ways, but in the aggregate, estimated subsidy and administration costs have increased. Subsidy costs for FFELP consolidation loans grew from $1.3 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2002 to nearly $3 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2003. Lower interest rates available to borrowers in fiscal year 2003 increased these costs because FFELP consolidation loans carry a government guaranteed rate of return to lenders that is projected to be higher than the fixed interest rate consolidation loan borrowers pay. Higher loan volumes also added to the estimated subsidy costs. Interest rates and loan volume also affected costs for FDLP consolidation loans, but in a different way. Because the interest rate the government charges borrowers has been somewhat greater than the interest rate that Education pays to finance its lending, consolidation loans have generated a net gain for the government in recent years. Lower rates paid by borrowers and reduced loan volume from recent record highs, however, reduced the net gain to $286 million for loans made in fiscal year 2003, down from $460 million the year before. While administration costs are not specifically tracked for either loan program, available evidence indicates that these costs have also risen. Alternatives to consolidation, such as the ability to make a single repayment to cover multiple loans and obtain extended repayment terms, now give some borrowers opportunities to simplify and reduce loan repayments, but not all borrowers can use them. As a result, consolidation loans may be the only option for some borrowers to simplify and reduce repayments. Borrowers' repayment choices--whether to obtain a consolidation loan or use other alternatives--have consequences for federal costs. While consolidation loans may remain an important tool to help borrowers, overall federal costs in providing for consolidation loans may exceed federal savings from reduced defaults. An assessment of the advantages of consolidation loans for borrowers and the government, taking into account program costs and how costs could be distributed among borrowers, lenders, and the taxpayers, would be useful for decisionmakers. |
gao_GAO-01-35 | gao_GAO-01-35_0 | Social Security Reform Proposals Address Solvency by Affecting the Level and Structure of Benefits
In order to address the solvency of the trust funds, a number of Social Security reforms have been proposed. The effects of the PIA changes on the disabled worker are shown in figure 4. Concluding Observations
In the cases we studied, our analyses indicate that most disabled beneficiaries would receive higher benefits under Social Security reform proposals than under a solvency scenario that maintained payroll tax rates while reducing benefits. However, most disabled beneficiaries with the characteristics we studied would receive lower benefits under reform than under a solvency scenario that maintained current-law benefits while raising payroll taxes. The proposals we studied treat DI beneficiaries similarly to OASI beneficiaries. However, the circumstances facing disabled workers differ from those facing retired workers. These differences between disabled and retired workers suggest that Social Security reform proposals should be viewed not only in light of their effects on retired workers but also explicitly for their effect on disabled beneficiaries and their families. | Why GAO Did This Study
There has been little analysis of how the various Social Security reform proposals might affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. This report assesses the potential impact of these proposals on the solvency of the DI trust fund.
What GAO Found
GAO found that most disabled beneficiaries would receive higher benefits under the various Social Security reform proposals it reviewed than under a solvency scenario that maintained payroll tax rates while reducing benefits. However, most of the disabled beneficiaries GAO studied would receive lower benefits under three of the reform proposals reviewed than under a solvency scenario that maintained current-law benefits while raising payroll taxes. The proposals GAO studied treat DI beneficiaries similar to Old-Age and Survivor Insurance beneficiaries. However, the circumstances facing disabled workers differ from those facing retired workers. The differences between disabled workers and retired workers suggest that Social Security reform proposals should be viewed not only in light of their effects on retired workers but also explicitly for their effect on disabled beneficiaries and their families. |
gao_RCED-99-54 | gao_RCED-99-54_0 | The name of this program was changed to the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) in 1996. IPP was also expected to promote long-term nonproliferation goals through the commercialization of NIS technologies. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked us to review (1) the costs to implement the IPP program for fiscal years 1994-98, including the amount of funds actually received by NIS scientists and institutes; (2) the extent to which IPP projects are meeting their nonproliferation and commercialization objectives; and (3) DOE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative. As indicated in figure 2.1, an analysis of the program’s expenditures from fiscal year 1994 through June 1998 shows that 51 percent, or $32.2 million, of the $63.5 million spent on the IPP program has gone to reimburse DOE laboratories. In some cases, scientists currently working on Russia’s weapons of mass destruction program are receiving IPP program funds to supplement their salaries. He noted that commercializing a new specialty chemical or polymer can take from 6 to 8 years in the United States. Despite the limited success in commercializing IPP projects, DOE officials told us that the program has been successful because it has at least temporarily employed thousands of weapons scientists at about 170 institutes and organizations throughout Russia and other Newly Independent States. In several instances, information provided by the U.S. national laboratories did not indicate how many scientists were employed on a project. DOE estimates that the Nuclear Cities Initiative may cost $600 million during the next 5 years, with the initial funding set at $15 to $20 million for fiscal year 1999. The 10 nuclear cities were among the most secret facilities in the former Soviet Union. It is uncertain, however, to what extent IPP funds have focused on the most critical scientific institutes and targeted the most important weapons scientists. Given these problems and the limited commercial success evidenced in the IPP program, we believe that the Nuclear Cities Initiative is likely to be a subsidy program for many years, rather than a stimulus for economic development. Recommendations to the Secretary of Energy
To maximize the impact of the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program’s funding and improve DOE’s oversight of the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the role and costs of the national laboratories’ involvement with a view toward maximizing the amount of program funds going to the NIS institutes; obtain information on how program funds are being spent by the NIS seek assurances from the Russian government, either through a government-to-government agreement or through other means, that program funds are exempt from Russian taxes; require that program officials, to the extent possible, obtain accurate data on the number and background of the scientists participating in program projects and eliminate funding for institutes that did not formerly work on weapons of mass destruction; clarify program guidance as to whether scientists currently employed in weapons of mass destruction programs are eligible for program funding; require that project reviewers consider all military applications of projects to ensure that useful defense-related information is not unintentionally transferred; strengthen and formalize DOE’s process for reviewing proposed chemical and biological projects by (1) providing complete project information to all reviewing U.S. government agencies and organizations, (2) developing criteria to help frame the evaluation process, and (3) providing feedback to all of the reviewing agencies about the final disposition of the projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to create jobs for displaced former Soviet Union scientists through its Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, focusing on: (1) the costs to implement the program for fiscal years 1994-98, including the amount of funds received by weapons scientists and institutes; (2) the extent to which the program's projects are meeting their nonproliferation and commercialization objectives; and (3) DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the cost to implement the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program from fiscal year 1994 through June 1998 are as follows: (a) of the $63.5 million spent, $23.7 million, or 37 percent, went to scientific institutes in the Newly Independent States (NIS); (b) the amount of money that reached the scientists at the institutes is unknown because the institutes' overhead charges, taxes, and other fees reduced the amount of money available to pay the scientists; and (c) about 63 percent, or $39.8 million, of the program's funds was spent in the United States, mostly by DOE's national laboratories in implementing and providing oversight of the program; (2) regarding the extent to which the program is meeting its nonproliferation and commercialization goals, GAO found that: (a) the program has been successful in employing weapons scientists through research and development projects, but it has not achieved its broader nonproliferation goal of long-term employment through the commercialization of these projects; (b) program officials do not always know how many scientists are receiving program funding or whether the key scientists and institutes are being targeted; (c) some scientists currently working on Russia's weapons of mass destruction program are receiving program funds; (d) some dual-use projects may have unintentionally provided defense-related information--an outcome that could negatively affect U.S. national security interests; and (e) chemical and biological projects may not be adequately reviewed by U.S. officials prior to approval; and (3) the Nuclear Cities Initiative may cost $600 million over the next 5 years: (a) the initiative is still largely in a conceptual phase, and it is uncertain how jobs will be created in the 10 nuclear cities because of restricted access and the current financial crisis in Russia; and (b) the initiative is likely to be a subsidy program for Russia for many years, given the lack of commercial success in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program. |
gao_T-RCED-96-85 | gao_T-RCED-96-85_0 | The most hazardous constituent of uranium mill tailings is radium. Mr. Chairman, we now return to the topics discussed in our report: the status and cost of DOE’s surface and groundwater cleanup and the factors that could affect the federal government’s costs in the future. As of February 1996, DOE’s surface cleanup was complete at 16 of the 24 Title I sites, under way at 6 additional sites, and on hold at the remaining 2 sites.Of the 16 sites where DOE has completed the cleanup, 4 have been licensed by NARC as meeting the standards of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). By 1992, however, the Department was estimating that the surface cleanup would be completed in 1998 and that 13 piles of tailings would need to be relocated. In addition, DOE made changes in its cleanup strategies to respond to state and local concerns. What these future costs will amount to is currently unknown and will depend largely on how three issues are resolved. In addition, the final cost of the groundwater cleanup depends on the affected states’ ability and willingness to pay their share of the cleanup costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the status and cost of the Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium mill tailings cleanup program and the factors that could affect future costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) surface contamination cleanup has been completed at two-thirds of the identified sites and is underway at most of the others; (2) if DOE completes its surface cleanup program in 1998, it will have cost $2.3 billion, taken 8 years longer than expected, and be $261 million over budget; (3) DOE cleanup costs increased because there were more contaminated sites than anticipated, some sites were more contaminated than others, and changes were needed to respond to state and local concerns; (4) the future cost of the uranium mill tailings cleanup will largely depend on the future DOE role in the program, the remediation methods used, and the willingness of states to share final cleanup costs; and (5) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to ensure that enough funds are collected from the responsible parties to protect U.S. taxpayers from future cleanup costs. |
gao_GAO-06-847 | gao_GAO-06-847_0 | USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are Incomplete
USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to prepare or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy; identify resources needed for mission planning and execution; and establish an organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide planning, training, and exercise tools. In addition, while USSTRATCOM’s leadership has provided general guidance to its mission organizations, it has not provided specific information or identified consistent requirements for achieving full operating capability and most of the command’s new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they have reached this milestone. Also, while the command has adopted some key management principles, the command has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide Outreach Strategy
USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy
While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the command because it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide outreach strategy to effectively manage these activities. In our prior work in identifying key practices adopted by organizations undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that reaches out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in the organization’s transformation. Conclusions
USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President and the Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to more effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats to U.S. national security, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint Staff’s Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the relationships and authorities of the military services in supporting combatant commanders and by USSTRATCOM in various documents, we continue to believe that additional guidance from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the command’s service components is needed to provide clear and specific information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission organizations, particularly since the components have expressed a desire for further guidance from the command. We then compared USSTRATCOM’s approach against these examples of success that we had identified in other organizations to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place. To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other DOD commands and organizations, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents and spoke with various officials involved in implementing and advocating for the command’s new missions about its roles and related plans and actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful organizational transformations.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision. Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military options for responding to future threats--two key DOD goals. USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However, it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command. In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the command to build effective relationships with other commands. |
gao_GAO-08-433T | gao_GAO-08-433T_0 | These concerns have led GAO, the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General, the Forest Service, Interior, and others to conduct numerous reviews of the federal wildland fire program. Agencies Need a Cohesive Wildland Fire Strategy to Manage Limited Resources Effectively, but Have Retreated from Their Commitment to Develop One
If the agencies and Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire, the agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to fires. We first recommended the development of a cohesive strategy for addressing excess vegetation in 1999. By 2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and that year we reiterated the need for such a strategy and broadened our recommendation’s focus to include options not only for reducing fuels but also for responding to wildland fires when they do occur, in order to better address the interrelated nature of the two activities. We also believe the agencies have mischaracterized our recommendation to develop long- term options, and associated funding, for reducing fuels. Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires
We reported in 2007 that although the Forest Service and Interior agencies had taken several steps intended to help contain wildland fire costs, they had not clearly defined their cost-containment goals or developed a strategy for achieving those goals—steps that are fundamental to sound program management. As we reported, the agencies are implementing a number of steps designed to help them contain wildland fire costs—such as improving how they acquire and use firefighting assets, updating policies to require officials to consider the full spectrum of available strategies when selecting a firefighting strategy, and developing new decision support tools that help officials select the most appropriate strategy. As a result, we recommended that the agencies take several steps to improve the management of their cost-containment efforts, including establishing clearly defined goals and measurable objectives and a strategy to achieve them. As a result, despite improvements the agencies continue to make to policy, decision support tools, and oversight, we believe that managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies’ leadership places on containing costs, and—as we concluded in our 2007 report—are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. Better Information and a Systematic Process Would Improve Agencies’ Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction Funds
In 2007, we also identified several shortcomings in the agencies’ processes for allocating fuel reduction funds to field units and selecting fuel reduction projects, which the agencies should correct in order to use their fuel reduction funds more effectively. Specifically, we noted that the agencies (1) did not consistently use systematic allocation processes—that is, processes that are based on criteria and applied consistently—in all agencies or at all levels, often relying instead on historical funding levels and professional judgment to allocate funds and select projects; (2) did not consistently consider the potential risk from wildland fire or the potential effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments when allocating funds and selecting projects; and (3) had not clarified the relative importance of the numerous factors they consider when allocating funds and selecting projects, including factors (such as funding stability or the use of forest products resulting from fuel reduction treatments) unrelated to risk or effectiveness. Some agencies have begun implementing systematic processes for allocating funds. Agencies Plan to Complete the FPA Model in 2008, but the Extent to Which It Will Help Ensure Cost-Effective Fire Management Decisions Is Uncertain
Agency officials plan to complete the FPA model by June 30, 2008, but preliminary results from our ongoing review raise questions about the extent to which the current model will be able to meet all of the key goals established for FPA. FPA also is critical to developing and implementing a cohesive strategy, and to the agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs. Such a limited time frame, however, substantially impairs the ability of the model to analyze long-term trade- offs between annual fuel reduction treatment costs and future expected suppression costs for large fires, a key goal of FPA. They have taken an important first step by establishing and updating federal wildland fire policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened over the past decade. Recent years have seen dramatic increases in the number of acres burned and the dollars spent on preparing for and responding to wildland fires. As GAO has previously reported, a number of factors have contributed to worsening fire seasons and increased firefighting expenditures, including an accumulation of fuels due to past land management practices; drought and other stresses, in part related to climate change; and an increase in human development in or near wildlands. Recent GAO reports have identified shortcomings in the approach to wildland fire management taken by the responsible federal agencies--the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and four agencies within the Department of the Interior. GAO was asked to testify on agency efforts to (1) develop a cohesive strategy for preparing for and responding to wildland fire, (2) contain federal expenditures related to wildland fire, and (3) improve the processes used to allocate funds for reducing accumulated fuels and to select fuel reduction projects. GAO also is providing preliminary findings from its ongoing review of an interagency budget allocation and planning model known as fire program analysis (FPA). This testimony is based on issued GAO reports, reviews of agency documents related to the development of FPA, and discussions with agency officials.
What GAO Found
In recent years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal wildland fire agencies should take to better diagnose the extent of the nation's wildland fire problems and develop a strategic approach for addressing them. The agencies have taken some steps to respond to GAO's recommendations, but have not completed other needed steps. Specifically, the agencies should: (1) recommit to developing a cohesive strategy that identifies options and associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. In several reports dating to 1999, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing hazardous fuels and for responding to wildland fires. Such a strategy would assist Congress and the agencies in making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems. As of January 2008, the agencies had not developed such a strategy and, in fact, had retreated from earlier commitments to do so. (2) Establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain wildland fire costs. In 2007, GAO reported that the agencies had taken several steps to contain wildland fire costs, including developing new decision support tools to help officials select the most appropriate strategy for fighting wildland fires, but lacked clearly defined cost-containment goals and a strategy for achieving them. As a result, we believe managers in the field lacked a clear understanding of the relative importance agency leadership placed on containing costs and were therefore likely to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. Although the agencies have continued to implement individual cost-containment steps, they still have not developed clear goals or a strategy for achieving them. (3) Continue to improve their processes for allocating fuel reduction funds and selecting fuel reduction projects. Also in 2007, GAO recommended several improvements to the agencies' processes for allocating fuel reduction funds to field units and selecting projects. Specifically, GAO recommended that the agencies use a more systematic allocation process, improve the information they use to make allocation decisions, and clarify the relative importance of the various factors they consider when allocating funds. The agencies are currently taking steps to implement these improvements, although none have yet been completed. In addition, GAO's ongoing review of FPA suggests that the current model, which the agencies expect to complete in June 2008, may not allow the agencies to meet all of the key goals established for FPA. Specifically, preliminary results from GAO's review suggest that the model will not allow the agencies to analyze long-term trade-offs between annual fuel reduction treatments and future expected suppression costs for large fires. GAO intends to conduct a full assessment of FPA once it is completed. |
gao_GAO-16-68 | gao_GAO-16-68_0 | Background
In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force recorded payroll obligations of over $23 billion for direct compensation of active duty military personnel, a force of approximately 324,000. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), a separate component of DOD, processes the Air Force’s active duty military payroll using its Defense Joint Military Pay System-Active Component. The Air Force Had in Place Systems and Processes Designed to Produce a Complete Universe of Active Duty Military Pay Transactions
Based on our testing, we determined that the Air Force and DFAS had in place systems and processes designed to provide a complete universe of active duty military pay transactions for the period we tested. The Air Force’s documented processes included reconciling payroll information with accounting, financial reporting, and disbursement information, designed to provide reasonable assurance that payroll transactions are properly recorded in the Statement of Budgetary Resources or the Schedule of Budgetary Activity and are consistent with personnel records. Reconciliation of payroll system to accounting system. The Air Force Could Not Always Provide or Readily Provide Supporting Documentation for Certain Categories of Active Duty Payroll Transactions
We selected statistical samples of six categories of military pay and, based on the testing we performed, found that while the Air Force could provide adequate supporting documentation for three of the categories, it was not able to provide or readily provide documentation for certain transactions involving Special Pay, Overseas Housing, and Domestic Housing. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and DOD’s FIAR Guidance require audited entities to document transactions and events, and to reasonably assure that internal controls are effective to help ensure that supporting documentation is maintained and readily available for management and audit purposes. To test the Air Force’s ability to provide supporting documentation, we selected several random statistical samples—a total of 360 active duty military payroll transactions—from transactions recorded during the first 10 months of fiscal year 2014 (October 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014) except for Domestic Housing for which a single month of transactions was selected. We tested random samples of transactions to determine whether the Air Force could provide documentation to support the population of individual payroll transactions. 2.) Air Force officials stated that they could not determine the cause for the missing documentation, nor did they identify to us a cause for their delay in retrieving and providing the supporting documentation. The ability to maintain and readily provide documentation supporting all pay categories is one of many key financial controls that help to provide reasonable assurance that servicemembers are appropriately paid and that military payroll is properly reported in the Air Force’s financial statements. Without continuing focus on ensuring that documentation is readily available to support military payroll transactions, both the Air Force and DOD are at risk that military personnel may not be paid appropriately and financial statement auditability goals may not be achieved. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help reasonably assure that supporting documentation for military payroll, particularly for Special Pay, Overseas Housing, and Domestic Housing, is properly maintained and readily available for management and audit purposes, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller to take the following two actions:
Review the processes and systems used to obtain, maintain, and readily provide supporting pay documentation to identify the root cause of deficiencies responsible for delayed, missing, and incomplete documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of DOD's efforts to achieve auditability of its financial statements, the Air Force in July 2014 asserted audit readiness for its Schedule of Budgetary Activity, of which military payroll is a significant part. In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force obligated over $23 billion for direct compensation of active duty servicemembers.
GAO was asked to examine Air Force military payroll systems and processes. This report evaluates whether for the period October 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014, the Air Force (1) had in place systems and processes designed to provide a complete universe of active duty military pay transactions and (2) could provide adequate documentation to support individual military payroll transactions. GAO examined the Air Force's reconciliations of its payroll system to personnel, accounting, reporting, and disbursement information. GAO selected random statistical samples from various categories of military pay to determine if the Air Force could provide key documents supporting those transactions.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's testing of the first 10 months of fiscal year 2014, the Air Force and its service provider, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, had in place systems and processes designed to provide a complete universe of Air Force active duty military payroll transactions. In addition to reconciling payroll information with accounting, financial reporting, and disbursement information, the Air Force reconciles its payroll system with its personnel system each month to help reasonably assure that actual servicemembers are being paid and are paid correctly. GAO found that the reconciliations were documented and supported the Air Force's ability to provide a population of active duty military payroll transactions for the period tested.
GAO's testing of randomly selected active duty payroll transactions, for the period tested, found that the Air Force could not always provide or readily provide supporting documentation for some categories of pay. While the Air Force provided adequate support for three categories of military payroll—including basic pay, the largest category by dollar amount—it could not always provide or readily provide support for domestic and overseas housing transactions or special pay benefits. The Air Force stated that it could not determine the cause for the missing documentation, nor did it identify to us the cause of delays in retrieving and providing the supporting documentation.
Documentation supporting payroll transactions is one of many key financial controls that helps to provide reasonable assurance that servicemembers are appropriately paid. Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and guidance as well as Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , require that audited entities document transactions and events, and that this documentation be readily available for examination for management and audit purposes. Without continued focus on ensuring that documentation is readily available to support military payroll, both the Air Force and DOD are at risk that military personnel may not be paid appropriately and that financial statement auditability goals may not be achieved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force improve its ability to maintain and readily provide, for management and audit purposes, documentation to support certain types of active duty pay by (1) identifying the causes of the deficiencies responsible for delayed, missing, and incomplete documentation and (2) implementing controls to help assure that documentation is readily available. The Air Force agreed with the report and its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-656 | gao_GAO-13-656_0 | Depending on their performance on the test, students who are not considered college-ready in these subject areas are placed into developmental education courses. While developmental education is a category of coursework and not a specific federal program, community colleges use a variety of federal funding sources, such as federal grants, to help fund their programs. Community Colleges and States Are Using Several Strategies to Improve Developmental Education
All of the community college and state education officials we interviewed described strategies that they have used related to curriculum, placement, and working with high schools to help improve developmental education outcomes for students. Lastly, most of the community college The following provides examples of strategies that are being implemented by some states and community colleges we visited:
Shortening the time in developmental education: All of the states and community colleges we visited implemented a number of initiatives to shorten the amount of time students spent in developmental education. For example, two community colleges we visited offered fast track math classes that allowed students to complete two classes in one semester. Washington’s Integrated Basic Education and Skills Training (I-BEST) program places students directly into career and technical or college-level academic classes with two instructors: one to teach the subject matter and the other to teach developmental education in the context of the class. With the refresher course, students could place into a higher-level developmental education class or be placed directly into college-level courses. In another example, Washington state officials told us that, starting in 2015, the state plans to offer a college assessment test in the 11th grade to identify and provide additional instruction to students who may have remediation needs so that when these students graduate, they will be ready for college. Researchers are reviewing some of the initiatives that community colleges are instituting to improve outcomes for developmental education students, but the evidence base is limited. Education’s Planned Research Center Could Help Community Colleges Overcome Challenges
Community College Challenges
Most of the community colleges and other stakeholders with whom we spoke stated that more research is needed to determine if developmental education initiatives work. Obtaining faculty support for unproven reforms was also cited by several community college and state officials as a challenge. Education officials confirmed that not enough information was available about successful developmental education strategies. In light of this goal and to help further community colleges’ understanding of what works in developmental education, in May 2013, Education requested proposals for a National Research Center on Developmental Education Assessment and Instruction. Education plans for this research center to focus exclusively on developmental education assessment and instruction in order to help policy makers and practitioners improve student outcomes. The research center is expected to launch in 2014. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what strategies select states and community colleges are using to improve developmental education for community college students and (2) what challenges, if any, community colleges have identified while implementing these developmental education strategies. We conducted site visits to Texas, Virginia, and Washington, which had been identified by experts as doing innovative work in improving developmental education. Additionally, we reviewed pertinent agency documents, including budget proposals, Requests for Application, and a list of Education’s current initiatives for community colleges, as well as relevant laws, regulations, and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Education reported that approximately 42 percent of entering community college students were not sufficiently prepared for college-level courses and enrolled in at least one developmental education course. Researchers also estimate that fewer than 25 percent of developmental education students will complete a degree or certificate. Improving developmental education is key to increasing degree and certificate completion. Some community colleges and states are instituting various initiatives to improve the outcomes of students placed into developmental education.
GAO was asked to examine current developmental education efforts. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What strategies are selected states and community colleges using to improve developmental education for community college students; and (2) what challenges, if any, have community colleges identified while implementing these developmental education strategies? GAO conducted site visits to community colleges and state education offices in Texas, Virginia, and Washington, which were identified by experts and the literature as states initiating innovative changes in developmental education coursework. GAO interviewed Education officials, as well as stakeholders from non-profit and research organizations focused on community college issues. In addition, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance.
What GAO Found
States and community colleges GAO visited have implemented several strategies to improve developmental education--which is remedial coursework in math, reading, or writing for students who are assessed not to be ready for college-level classes. Many initiatives involved shortening the amount of time for developmental education and better targeting material to an individual student's needs. For example, two community colleges have implemented fast track classes that enable students to take two classes in one semester instead of in two semesters. One developmental education program in Washington places students directly into college level classes that also teach developmental education as part of the class. Community colleges are also using tools such as test preparatory classes to help students prepare for placement tests that determine if they will need to take developmental education courses. According to community college officials GAO spoke with, these classes help familiarize students with prior coursework and, in some cases, help them place directly into college level courses. Additionally, most community colleges GAO visited have worked to align their curriculum with local high schools so that graduating seniors are ready for college. Little research has been published on these developmental education initiatives and whether they are leading to successful outcomes.
Most community college officials with whom GAO spoke noted that the limited availability of research in this area is a challenge to implementing strategies to improve developmental education programs. Specifically, they noted that it is difficult to determine whether new programs are working, and to gain faculty support for unproven models of teaching. Department of Education (Education) officials confirmed that research regarding successful developmental education strategies is insufficient. In response, Education has announced the availability of grant funds for a National Research Center on Developmental Education Assessment and Instruction. The Center will focus exclusively on developmental education assessment and instruction to inform policymakers and instructors on improving student outcomes. The Center is expected to launch in 2014.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-551 | gao_GAO-16-551_0 | The act assigns OPM major leadership responsibilities including (1) providing policy and policy guidance for telework; (2) assisting each agency in establishing appropriate qualitative and quantitative measures and teleworking goals; (3) identifying best practices and recommendations for the federal government and reviewing the outcomes associated with an increase in telework, including effects on energy consumption, job creation and availability, urban transportation patterns, and the ability to anticipate the dispersal of work during periods of emergency; and (4) submitting an annual report to Congress addressing the telework program of each executive agency that includes an assessment of each agency’s progress in meeting outcome goals that the agency may have established, such as the impact of telework on recruitment and retention and energy use, among others. Selected Agencies Identified Benefits and Costs Associated with Telework, but Generally Lacked Supporting Data
Figure 2 shows telework benefits we identified associated with federal agency telework programs, based on a literature review and the experiences of the six selected agencies whose telework programs we examined. The cost of personnel was the most frequently identified ongoing cost associated with these five agency telework programs. Personnel costs can include salaries for telework coordinators or employee training costs. Selected Agencies Had Little Supporting Data for Benefits and Costs
The act does not require agencies to provide supporting data to OPM for benefits or costs incurred. Selected Agencies Had Supporting Data for Some Benefits
Supporting data for benefits from all of the selected agencies are shown in figure 5. OPM had asked questions about costs savings in its 2011, 2012, and 2013 telework data calls and added additional questions on the amount of cost savings and the methodology for calculating the savings in the 2013 telework data call in response to our recommendation. None of the selected agencies’ officials said that they were planning to collect additional cost savings information. However, with no information being required on cost savings as a part of OPM’s data call and agencies’ plans to reduce collection of this data in the future, agencies will have less information to assess the value of their telework programs than they currently do. Officials from DOT, EPA, GSA, and USDA stated that they provided telework training for managers and employees. First, OPM offers training and webinars on responding to the telework data call. Third, OPM offers various services for a fee to help agencies implement or improve an existing telework program. OPM has guidance on calculating telework benefits in various resources but none on costs incurred. By not taking advantage of data sources that can inform on benefits nor providing guidance on costs associated with telework, agency assessments may be less informative about the net cost savings of telework and, ultimately, the value of telework. OPM did not ask agencies about cost savings in its 2014-2015 telework data call despite a substantial decrease in the number of cost savings examples reported associated with telework programs and the number of agencies planning on tracking telework cost savings. Congress also will not have the information it needs to oversee federal telework programs as OPM will not be reporting this information to Congress. To help ensure that agencies are reporting cost savings associated with their telework programs, include cost savings questions in future telework data calls. To help agencies determine the value of their telework programs, working with the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, provide clarifying guidance on options for developing supporting data for benefits and costs associated with agency telework programs. OPM also concurred with our second recommendation and said it would work with the CHCO Council to support agency efforts to determine the value of their telework programs by developing clarifying guidance for agencies with CHCO input and by hosting a CHCO academy session focused on evaluating the benefits and costs of telework programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report identifies (1) the reported benefits and costs associated with federal agency telework programs and assesses the extent to which selected agencies have supporting data; and (2) some of the key resources that federal agencies can use to help calculate benefits and costs associated with their telework programs. One-time costs incurred include one-time information technology set-up, such as system software. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of six agencies: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), General Services Administration (GSA), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), Department of Transportation (DOT), and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). We analyzed this information to assess the extent that the selected agencies have supporting data for the benefits and costs associated with telework programs that the agencies identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
With over 1 million federal employees eligible for telework in 2013, federal agencies are fully engaged in incorporating telework as a standard human capital flexibility. GAO was asked to review the benefits and costs associated with agency telework programs. This report (1) identifies the reported benefits and costs associated with federal agency telework programs and assesses the extent to which selected agencies have supporting data; and (2) identifies some of the key resources that federal agencies can use to help calculate benefits and costs associated with their telework programs.
For this review, GAO selected six agencies—DOT, EPA, FDIC, GSA, MSPB, and USDA—based on criteria that included agency size and reported cost savings from telework. GAO analyzed selected agencies' documents and interviewed agency officials to assess the extent that these agencies had supporting data. GAO also compiled and reviewed potential resources for agencies.
What GAO Found
Benefits associated with telework programs include continuity of operations and reduced employee absences, based on GAO's literature review and the experiences of six selected agencies. The benefits most frequently cited by the selected agencies—the Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), General Services Administration (GSA), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)—were improved recruitment/retention, increased productivity, and improved work/life balance. Ongoing costs of telework programs include training and managing the telework program and one-time costs include information technology set up. The ongoing cost most frequently cited by the selected agencies was personnel costs. However, GAO found that the selected agencies had little data to support the benefits or costs associated with their telework programs. All of the selected agencies could provide some supporting documentation for some of the benefits and only two could provide supporting documentation for some of the costs.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) collects data on telework via its annual data call and consults with the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council about its annual telework report to Congress. However, GAO found substantial declines in agency reporting of telework cost savings to OPM. For example, in 2012, agencies reported 66 examples of telework cost savings, but a year later they reported 29 examples. Amidst this decline, OPM decided to collect less information about cost savings—a key benefit of telework. OPM asked agencies for cost savings information in 2011, 2012, and 2013 but did not in its 2014-2015 agency data request. The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires an annual assessment of agencies in meeting established outcome goals. Assessments that include information on benefits, net costs savings, and costs can help decision makers in determining the overall effects of their telework programs and the progress achieved. OPM officials stated that they streamlined the annual data request to focus on the act's requirements, which do not explicitly include reporting on cost savings. However, as a result of this decision Congress will have less information to assess the value of telework.
OPM provides resources to agencies to help them with their telework programs, but may be missing other opportunities to help agencies better identify the net cost savings associated with their telework programs. The resources OPM offers include fee-for-service assistance to help implement or improve existing telework programs and training and webinars on responding to its annual data call. However, OPM guidance lacks information about how agencies can use existing data collection efforts to more readily identify benefits of their telework programs, and OPM has not provided guidance on how agencies should calculate the costs of their programs. By not taking advantage of existing data sources or having guidance on calculating costs, agencies are limited in their efforts to evaluate the net cost savings associated with their telework programs. As a result, Congress does not have the information it needs to assess the true value of telework, which could impact its ability to provide oversight of telework across the federal government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OPM should include cost savings questions in future telework data calls and provide clarifying guidance on options for developing supporting data for benefits and costs. OPM concurred with both recommendations. OPM will include cost savings questions from previous surveys in the 2016 agency telework survey. OPM will work with the CHCO Council to develop more guidance for agencies on evaluating the benefits and costs of telework programs. |
gao_GAO-05-825T | gao_GAO-05-825T_0 | Fewer Than Half of All IRF Medicare Patients in 2003 Were Admitted for Conditions on List in Rule, and Few IRFs Were Able to Meet a 75 Percent Threshold
As we reported in April 2005, among the 506,662 Medicare patients admitted to an IRF in fiscal year 2003, less than 44 percent were admitted with a primary condition on the list in the 75 percent rule. Among the 194,922 IRF Medicare patients that did not have a primary or comorbid condition on the list in the rule, almost half were admitted for orthopedic conditions, and among those the largest group was joint replacement patients whose condition did not meet the list’s specific criteria. Although some joint replacement patients may need admission to an IRF, such as those with comorbidities that affect the patient’s function, our analysis showed that few of these patients had comorbidities that suggested a possible need for the level of services offered by an IRF. In conjunction with our finding on the number of patients admitted to IRFs for conditions not on the list in the rule, we determined that only 6 percent of IRFs in fiscal year 2003 were able to meet a 75 percent threshold. CMS, working through its fiscal intermediaries, has not routinely reviewed IRF admission decisions, although it reported that such reviews could be used to target problem areas. Experts Differed on Adding Conditions to List in Rule but Agreed That Condition Alone Does Not Provide Sufficient Criteria
As we reported, the experts IOM convened and other experts we interviewed differed on whether conditions should be added to the list in the 75 percent rule but agreed that condition alone does not provide sufficient criteria to identify types of patients appropriate for IRFs. The experts IOM convened generally questioned the strength of the evidence for adding conditions to the list in the rule. They reported that the evidence on the benefits of IRF services is variable, particularly for certain orthopedic conditions, and some of them reported that little information was available on the need for inpatient rehabilitation for cardiac, transplant, pulmonary, or oncology conditions. In general, they reported that, except for a few subpopulations, uncomplicated, unilateral joint replacement patients rarely need to be admitted to an IRF. Most of them called for further research to identify the types of patients that need inpatient rehabilitation and to understand the effectiveness of IRFs in comparison with other settings of care. There was general agreement among all the groups of experts we interviewed, including the experts IOM convened, that condition alone is insufficient for identifying appropriate types of patients for inpatient rehabilitation, because not all patients with a condition on the list need to be in an IRF. Among the experts convened by IOM, functional status was identified most frequently as the information required in addition to condition. We concluded that if condition alone is not sufficient for determining which types of patients are most appropriate for IRFs, more conditions should not be added to the list at the present time, and that future efforts should refine the rule to increase its clarity about which types of patients are most appropriate for IRFs. Appendix I: List of Conditions in CMS’s 75 Percent Rule
A facility may be classified as an IRF if it can show that, during a 12-month period at least 75 percent of all its patients, including its Medicare patients, required intensive rehabilitation services for the treatment of one or more of the following conditions:1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare classifies inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) using the "75 percent rule." If a facility can show that during a 12-month period at least 75 percent of its patients required intensive rehabilitation for 1 of 13 listed conditions, it may be classified as an IRF and paid at a higher rate than for less intensive rehabilitation in other settings. Because this difference can be substantial, it is important to classify IRFs correctly. GAO was asked to discuss issues relating to the classification of IRFs, and in April 2005 it issued a report, Medicare: More Specific Criteria Needed to Classify Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities (GAO-05-366). For that report, GAO analyzed data on all Medicare patients (the majority of patients in IRFs) admitted to IRFs in fiscal year 2003, spoke to IRF medical directors, and had the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convene a meeting of experts to evaluate the use of a list of conditions in the 75 percent rule. This testimony is based on the April 2005 report.
What GAO Found
As noted in the April 2005 report, GAO found that in fiscal year 2003 fewer than half of all IRF Medicare patients were admitted for having a primary condition on the list in the 75 percent rule. Almost half of all patients with conditions not on the list were admitted for orthopedic conditions, and among those the largest group was joint replacement patients. The experts IOM convened said that uncomplicated unilateral joint replacement patients rarely need to be admitted to an IRF, and GAO analysis suggested that relatively few of the Medicare unilateral joint replacement patients had comorbid conditions that suggested a possible need for the IRF level of services. Additionally, GAO found that only 6 percent of IRFs in fiscal year 2003 were able to meet a 75 percent threshold. GAO also found that IRFs varied in the criteria used to assess patients for admission, using patient characteristics such as functional status, as well as condition. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), working through its fiscal intermediaries, had not routinely reviewed IRF admission decisions to determine whether they were medically justified, although it reported that such reviews could be used to target problem areas. The experts IOM convened and other clinical and nonclinical experts GAO interviewed differed on whether conditions should be added to the list in the 75 percent rule. The experts IOM convened questioned the strength of the evidence for adding conditions to the list--finding the evidence for certain orthopedic conditions particularly weak--and some of them reported that little information was available on the need for inpatient rehabilitation for cardiac, transplant, pulmonary, or oncology patients. They called for further research to identify the types of patients that need inpatient rehabilitation and to understand the effectiveness of IRFs. There was general agreement among all the groups of experts interviewed that condition alone is insufficient for identifying appropriate types of patients for inpatient rehabilitation, since within any condition only a subgroup of patients require the level of services of an IRF, and that functional status should also be considered in addition to condition. GAO concluded that if condition alone is not sufficient for determining which types of patients are most appropriate for IRFs, more conditions should not be added to the list at the present time and the rule should be refined to clarify which types of patients should be in IRFs as opposed to another setting. |
gao_GAO-04-772 | gao_GAO-04-772_0 | For Medicare payment purposes, an outpatient service consists of a primary service and packaged services, the additional services or items associated with that primary service. A hospital can receive multiple APC payments for a single outpatient visit if more than one primary service is delivered during that visit. On single-service claims, claims with one primary service, CMS can associate packaged services with the primary service and calculate a total cost for the service (see fig. Payment Rates May Not Uniformly Reflect Hospitals’ Costs
The OPPS rate-setting methodology used by CMS may result in APC payment rates for drugs, devices, and other outpatient services that do not uniformly reflect hospitals’ costs. Two areas of CMS’s methodology are particularly problematic. First, the claims that CMS uses to calculate hospitals’ costs and set payment rates may not be a representative sample of hospital claims, as CMS excluded many multiple-service claims when calculating the cost of OPPS services, including those with drugs and devices. However, if the types or costs of services on excluded claims differ from the types or costs of services on included claims, the payment rates of some or all APCs may not uniformly reflect hospitals’ costs of providing those services. Second, when calculating hospitals’ costs, CMS assumes that, in setting charges within a specific department, a hospital marks up the cost of each service by the same percentage. However, not all hospitals use this methodology, and charge-setting methodologies for drugs, devices, and other outpatient services vary greatly across hospitals and across departments within a hospital. CMS’s methodology does not recognize hospitals’ variability in setting charges, and, therefore, the costs of services used to set payment rates may be under or overestimated. When calculating the cost of all OPPS services, including drugs and devices, to set payment rates, CMS excluded over 40 percent of all multiple-service claims because CMS could not associate particular packaged services with a specific primary service on these claims. Drug and device industry representatives we spoke with raised concerns that certain drugs and devices are often billed on multiple-service claims that are largely excluded from rate setting. Because of the structure of the outpatient claim, the data CMS has available do not allow for the comparison of single-service claims and multiple-service claims to determine whether excluding many multiple- service claims has an effect on OPPS payment rates. We received information from 113 hospitals, although not all hospitals responded to each question. Third, the Administrator should, in the context of the first two recommendations, analyze whether the OPPS rate-setting methodology results in payment rates that uniformly reflect hospitals’ costs of the outpatient services they provide to Medicare beneficiaries, and, if it does not, make appropriate changes in that methodology. Scope and Methodology
We analyzed Medicare claims data used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to set the 2003 outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) payment rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS), hospitals receive a temporary additional payment for certain new drugs and devices while data on their costs are collected. In 2003, these payments expired for the first time for many drugs and devices. To incorporate these items into OPPS, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) used its rate-setting methodology that calculates costs from charges reported on claims by hospitals. At that time, some drug and device industry representatives noted that payment rates for many of these items decreased and were concerned that hospitals may limit beneficiary access to these items if they could not recover their costs. GAO was asked to examine whether the OPPS rate-setting methodology results in payment rates that uniformly reflect hospitals' costs for providing drugs and devices, and other outpatient services, and if it does not, to identify specific factors of the methodology that are problematic.
What GAO Found
The rate-setting methodology used by CMS may result in OPPS payment rates for drugs, devices, and other services that do not uniformly reflect hospitals' costs of providing those services. Two areas of the methodology are particularly problematic. The hospital claims for outpatient services that CMS uses to calculate hospitals' costs and set payment rates may not be a representative sample of all hospital outpatient claims. For Medicare payment purposes, an outpatient service consists of a primary service and the additional services or items associated with the primary service, referred to as packaged services. CMS has excluded over 40 percent of multiple-service claims, claims that include more than one primary service along with packaged services, when calculating the cost of all OPPS services, including those with drugs and devices. It excludes these multiple-service claims because, when more than one primary service is reported on a claim, CMS cannot associate each packaged service with a specific primary service. Therefore, the agency cannot calculate a total cost for each primary service on that claim, which it would use to set payment rates. The data CMS has available do not allow for a determination of whether excluding many multiple-service claims has an effect on OPPS payment rates. However, if the types or costs of services on excluded claims differ from those on included claims, the payment rates of some or all services may not uniformly reflect hospitals' actual costs of providing those services. In addition, in calculating hospitals' costs, CMS assumes that, in setting charges within a specific department, a hospital marks up the cost of each service by the same percentage. However, based on information from 113 hospitals, GAO found that not all hospitals use this methodology: charge-setting methodologies for drugs, devices, and other outpatient services vary greatly across hospitals and across departments within a hospital. CMS's methodology does not recognize hospitals' variability in setting charges, and therefore, the costs of services used to set payment rates may be under- or overestimated. |
gao_T-RCED-98-177 | gao_T-RCED-98-177_0 | Background
The Title I property improvement program was established by the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. In conducting these activities, lenders are responsible for complying with FHA’s underwriting standards and regulations and ensuring that home improvement work is inspected and completed. Information Needed to Manage the Program Not Collected by HUD
When FHA-approved Title I lenders make program loans, they collect information on borrowers, such as age, income, and gender; the property, such as its address; and loan terms, such as interest rate. HUD does collect all of the information available on borrowers, property, and loans when Title I loans default and lenders submit claims. In addition, while information available to HUD allows identification of potential abuses of the $25,000 indebtedness limit after loans have defaulted, control over the indebtedness limitation is not possible for 90 percent of the program’s loans made that do not default because borrowers’ Social Security numbers and property addresses are not collected when the loans are made. During fiscal years 1996 and 1997, HUD performed five and two on-site lender reviews, respectively. The original loan application is important because it is used by the claims examiner to review the adequacy of the lender’s underwriting and to ensure that the borrower’s signature and Social Security number matches those on other documents, including the credit report. Furthermore, for 23 of the 53 claim files, we found that required completion certificates, certifying that the property improvement work had been completed, were missing or were signed but not dated by the borrowers. We found that for 4 of the 13 loans, on which HUD eventually paid claims, lenders made questionable underwriting decisions. Recent and Proposed Changes to the Title I Program
Under its HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, HUD has been making changes to the Title I program operations. In closing, Mr. Chairman, our preliminary analysis shows weaknesses in HUD’s management of its Title I property improvement loan insurance program and oversight of program lenders. These weaknesses center on the absence of information needed to manage the program and HUD’s oversight of lenders’ compliance with program regulations. HUD officials attributed these weaknesses to the program’s being lender-operated, limited staff resources, and HUD’s assignment of monitoring priorities. The challenge faced by HUD in managing and overseeing this program centers on how to obtain the information needed to manage the program and to strengthen the oversight of lenders for this program, which is relatively small compared with other FHA housing insurance programs. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed certain aspects of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) management and oversight of its loan insurance program for home improvements under Title I of the National Housing Act, focusing on: (1) the extent to which the information needed to manage the program was available to HUD; (2) the extent to which HUD was overseeing program lenders; and (3) whether HUD has any ongoing or planned efforts under way to strengthen its management and oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its preliminary analysis shows that HUD is not collecting information needed for managing the program; (2) specifically, GAO found that HUD collects little information when loans are made on program borrowers, properties, and loan terms, such as the borrower's income and the address of the property being improved; (3) moreover, HUD does not maintain information on why it denies loan claims or why it subsequently approves some for payment; (4) HUD also provides limited oversight of lenders' compliance with program regulations, conducting only 2 on-site lender reviews in fiscal year 1997 of the approximately 3,700 program lenders; (5) regarding the need for oversight of lenders' compliance, GAO found that loan claim files submitted by lenders to HUD following loan defaults often do not contain required loan documents, including the original loan applications and certifications signed by the borrower that the property improvement work has been completed; (6) in addition, some claims were paid by HUD even though there were indications that lenders did not comply with required underwriting standards when insuring the loan; (7) as a result of the management and oversight weaknesses GAO has observed, its preliminary work indicates that HUD does not know who the program is serving, if lenders are complying with program regulations, and whether certain potential program abuses are occurring, such as violations of the $25,000 limitation on the amount of Title I loan indebtedness for each property; (8) HUD officials attributed these weaknesses to the program's being lender-operated, limited staff resources, and HUD's assignment of monitoring priorities; (9) under the HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, HUD is making significant changes in all of its single-family housing programs, including the Title I property improvement program; (10) these changes are motivated in part by HUD's goals to downsize the agency and address long-standing agencywide management weaknesses; and (11) GAO is assessing the extent to which these changes may affect the management and oversight weaknesses it identified. |
gao_GAO-08-419T | gao_GAO-08-419T_0 | In 2002, Congress established several new requirements for Ex-Im relating to small business, including increasing from 10 to 20 percent the proportion of Ex- Im’s aggregate loan, guarantee, and insurance authority that must be made available for the direct benefit of small businesses. Trends in Ex-Im’s Small Business Financing
Between fiscal years 2002 and 2007, Ex-Im increased the percentage of its financing for small businesses and continued to finance most small business transactions through insurance or working capital guarantees. Ex-Im Small Business Financing Share Has Recently Exceeded 20 Percent
Ex-Im met the Congressional requirement to make available not less than 20 percent of its financing authority for small businesses in 2006 and 2007. While the small business financing value slowly increased between fiscal years 2001 and 2007, the value for non-small business financing was noticeably lower in 2006 and 2007, compared to 2005. Weaknesses Limited Ex-Im’s Ability to Measure Small Business Financing; Ex-Im Has Implemented Improvements
In our 2006 report, we found weaknesses in Ex-Im’s data and data systems for tracking small business financing and made recommendations for improvement, and Ex-Im has taken steps to address those weaknesses. We reported that, while Ex-Im generally classified companies’ small business status correctly, weaknesses in its data and data systems limited its ability to accurately determine its small business financing amounts and share. In implementing “Ex-Im Online” and certain internal control measures, Ex-Im has improved its ability to accurately measure small business financing. Most notably, Ex-Im replaced its previous data systems with Ex-Im Online, an interactive, web-based process that allows exporters, brokers, and financial institutions to transact with Ex-Im electronically. Weaknesses Existed in Ex-Im’s System for Estimating Small Business Financing When the Exporter Is Not Immediately Knowable
We reported two weaknesses in Ex-Im’s system for estimating small business financing when the exporter is not known at the time Ex-Im authorizes the transaction, which applied to about one-third of Ex-Im’s total small business financing for fiscal year 2004. Also, we found that Ex-Im classified the small business status of a significant portion of the companies making shipments as “unknown” and excluded them from its calculation of the estimate of its small business support. GAO recommended that Ex-Im improve its system for estimating the value and proportion of direct small business support for those transactions where the exporter is not known at the time Ex-Im authorizes the transaction. Ex-Im’s Reporting on the Number of Transactions Directly Benefiting Small Business
Ex-Im is statutorily required to report on the number of its authorized transactions that directly benefit small business; in our 2006 report we found that Ex-Im’s method of determining this number included some transactions that did not directly benefit small business. GAO recommended that Ex-Im more accurately determine and clearly report the number of transactions that directly benefit small business; however Ex-Im officials disagreed with this recommendation and have not changed their methodology. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) provides loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to support U.S. exports. Its level of support for small business has been a long-standing issue of congressional interest. In 2002, Congress increased the proportion of financing Ex-Im must make available for small business to 20 percent. In 2006, Congress directed Ex-Im to make organizational changes related to small business and to better evaluate its small business efforts. This statement discusses (1) trends in Ex-Im's small business financing since fiscal year 2000 and (2) the weaknesses GAO found in the tracking and reporting of Ex-Im's small business financing and the steps Ex-Im has taken to address them. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's March 2006 report (GAO-06-351) concerning Ex-Im's small business program. In that report, we recommended that Ex-Im (1) improve the data it maintains on its customers with regard to their small business status; (2) improve its system for estimating the value and proportion of direct small business support for those transactions where the exporter is not known at the time of authorization; (3) more accurately determine and clearly report the number of transactions that directly benefit small business; and (4) have its auditor audit Ex-Im's reporting of its direct support for small business. Ex-Im agreed with three of the four recommendations. We discuss the actions Ex-Im has taken to implement our suggestions in this statement.
What GAO Found
The share of Ex-Im financing directly benefiting small business has increased over recent years, surpassing the required 20 percent in 2006 and 2007. The percentage increase reflects a slow increase in Ex-Im financing for small businesses, while financing for non-small businesses was noticeably lower in 2006 and 2007 compared to 2005. Ex-Im continues to finance most small business transactions through insurance or working capital guarantees. In our 2006 report, we found weaknesses in Ex-Im's data and data systems for tracking small business financing and made recommendations for improvement, and Ex-Im has taken steps to address those weaknesses. We reported that while Ex-Im generally classified companies' small business status correctly, weaknesses limited its ability to accurately determine small business financing values. For transactions where Ex-Im can identify the exporter at the time it authorizes the transaction, we found that internal control weaknesses in Ex-Im's data systems limited its ability to accurately determine small business financing amounts and share. For transactions where Ex-Im cannot identify the exporter up-front, we found that weaknesses in its system for estimating small business financing also limited its ability to accurately measure and report on such financing. We also reported some limitations in Ex-Im's calculation of the number--as opposed to the value--of transactions benefiting small business. GAO made four recommendations. Ex-Im has taken several steps in response to those recommendations. Most notably, Ex-Im replaced its previous data systems with "Ex-Im Online," an interactive, web-based process that allows exporters, brokers, and financial institutions to transact with Ex-Im electronically. According to Ex-Im, this has resulted in more timely and accurate information on Ex-Im's financing. |
gao_GAO-10-286T | gao_GAO-10-286T_0 | Recent Trends in the Commercial Space Launch Industry
To date, the commercial space launch industry has primarily focused on putting payloads, such as satellites, into orbit, using launch vehicles that are used only once. The number of launches for this purpose has, however, dropped off, and the industry appears to be increasing its focus on space tourism. Concurrently, companies and states are developing additional spaceports to accommodate anticipated commercial space tourism flights, with states providing economic incentives for development. Manned commercial space launches took place for the first and only time with the five manned flights of SpaceShipOne in 2004. The Number of Spaceports Is Increasing
Since we reported in 2006, private companies and states are developing additional spaceports to accommodate anticipated commercial space tourism flights and to expand the nation’s launch capacity. Challenges Facing FAA in Overseeing the Commercial Space Launch Industry
FAA faces challenges in ensuring that it has a sufficient number of staff with the necessary expertise to oversee the safety of commercial space launches and spaceport operations. In addition, FAA will need to determine whether its current safety regulations are appropriate for all types of commercial space vehicles, operations, and launch sites. Regulation of Crew and Passenger Safety after 2012
Although FAA is prohibited from regulating crew and passenger safety before 2012 except in response to serious injuries or fatalities or an event that poses a high risk of causing a serious or fatal injury, FAA is responsible for the protection of the uninvolved public, which could be affected by a failed mission. However, FAA has not developed indicators that it would use to monitor the safety of the developing space tourism sector and determine when to step in and regulate human space flight. Distinguishing FAA’s Dual Role of Industry Promotion and Safety
In 2006, we reported that FAA faced the potential challenge of overseeing the safety of commercial space launches while promoting the industry. We reported that as the commercial space launch industry evolves, it may be necessary to separate FAA’s regulatory and promotional activities. Emerging Issues
The expected expansion of the U.S. commercial space launch industry due to anticipated events such as the development of space tourism and the retirement of NASA’s space shuttle and the agency’s shift to using the commercial sector to provide space transportation will affect the federal role in various ways such as increasing FAA’s licensing and regulatory workload. To assist in the expansion of the industry, other issues will emerge for federal agencies and Congress to consider, such as whether to assist the industry in lowering costs by extending existing liability indemnification and how to enhance the global competitiveness of the U.S. industry. Lack of an Overarching National Space Launch Policy
Finally, an overarching issue that has implications for the U.S. commercial space launch industry is the lack of a comprehensive national space launch strategy, according to federal officials and industry experts. Appendix I: Status of GAO’s Recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration Concerning Commercial Space Launches
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) needs to assess the level of expertise and resources that will be needed to oversee the safety of the space tourism industry and the new spaceports under various scenarios and timetables. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on the commercial space launch industry in 2006, the industry has evolved and moved further toward space tourism. Commercial space tourism promises to make human space travel available to the public for the first time. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees the safety of commercial space launches, licensing and monitoring the safety of such launches and of spaceports (sites for launching spacecraft), and FAA promotes the industry. FAA is also responsible for overseeing the safety of space tourism, but it may not regulate crew and passenger safety before 2012 except in response to high-risk incidents, serious injuries, or fatalities. This testimony addresses (1) recent trends in the commercial space launch industry, (2) challenges that FAA faces in overseeing the industry, and (3) emerging issues that will affect the federal role. This statement is based on GAO's October 2006 report on commercial space launches, updated with information GAO gathered from FAA, the Department of Commerce, and industry experts in November 2009 on industry trends and recent FAA actions. In past work, GAO recommended that FAA take several actions to improve its oversight of commercial space launches, including assessing its future resource needs. FAA has taken some steps to address the recommendations.
What GAO Found
Recent Trends: Historically, the commercial space launch industry focused primarily on putting payloads, such as satellites, into orbit, using launch vehicles that did not return to earth. Such launches have, however, dropped off, and the industry is increasing its focus on space tourism. Since five manned commercial flights demonstrated the potential for commercial space tourism in 2004, companies have pursued research and development and are further developing reusable vehicles for manned flights. Concurrently, companies and states are developing additional spaceports to accommodate anticipated increases in commercial space launches. States have provided economic incentives, and FAA has provided some funding for development. Oversight Challenges: In overseeing the commercial space launch industry, including the safety of space tourism, FAA faces several challenges. These include maintaining a sufficient number of staff with the necessary expertise to oversee the safety of launches and spaceport operations; determining whether FAA's current safety regulations are appropriate for all types of commercial space vehicles, operations, and launch sites; developing information to help FAA decide when to regulate crew and passenger safety after 2012; and continuing to avoid conflicts between FAA's regulatory and promotional roles. Emerging Issues: The U.S. commercial space launch industry is expected to expand as space tourism develops and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration starts to rely on the commercial sector for space transportation. This expansion will affect the federal role. For example, FAA will face increases in its licensing and regulatory workload, and federal agencies and Congress will face decisions about whether to support the U.S. industry by continuing to provide liability indemnification to lower its costs. Additionally, FAA will face policy and procedural issues when it integrates the operations of spacecraft into its next generation air transportation system. Finally, coordinating the federal response to the commercial space industry's expansion is an issue for the federal government in the absence of a national space launch strategy for setting priorities and establishing federal agency roles. |
gao_GAO-06-1126T | gao_GAO-06-1126T_0 | Federal climate change science programs were reorganized in 2001 and 2002. With respect to federal research, OMB, in annual reports and testimony before the Congress, reported climate change funding for 1993 through 2004 using four categories: Technology, which includes the research, development, and deployment of technologies and processes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or increase energy efficiency. OMB reports also indicated that 12 of the 14 federal agencies receiving funding for climate change programs in 2004 received more funding in that year than they had in 1993, but again, unexplained modifications in the reports’ contents limit the comparability of agencies’ funding data, making it difficult to determine whether funding increased as OMB reported. Reported Federal Climate Change Funding Increased for Three of the Four Funding Categories, but Data May Not Be Comparable Over Time
We found that federal funding for climate change, as reported by OMB, increased from $2.35 billion in 1993 to $5.09 billion in 2004 (117 percent), or from $3.28 billion to $5.09 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation, and reported funding increased for three of the four categories between 1993 and 2004. However, changes in reporting methods limit the comparability of funding data over time, and therefore it was unclear whether total funding actually increased as OMB reported. We were unable to compare changes in the fourth category–climate-related tax expenditures–because OMB reported estimates for proposed but not existing tax expenditures from 1993 to 2004. OMB and CCSP generally presented consistent climate change science funding totals from 1993 through 2004. However, it is unclear whether funding changed as OMB reported because of, among other things, unexplained changes in what was defined as climate change funding. Reported funding for the Department of Energy (DOE), the agency with the most reported climate-related funding in 2004, increased from $963 million to $2.52 billion (162 percent), or from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion (88 percent) after adjusting for inflation. DOE and NASA accounted for 81 percent of the reported increase in funding from 1993 through 2004. However, because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, changes in the reports’ contents, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, limit the comparability of agencies’ funding data over time, making it difficult to determine if these are real or definitional increases. Some Climate Leaders and Climate VISION Participants Have Not Completed Program Steps as Soon as Expected, and Neither Agency Had a Written Policy For Dealing with Such Participants
EPA and DOE expect participants in their voluntary emissions reduction programs to complete a number of actions; however, participants’ progress toward completing those actions, as well as the agencies’ efforts to track accomplishments, varied. Both Agencies Had Estimated Their Programs’ Coverage and Were Working to Estimate Their Impact, But It Will Be Difficult to Attribute Specific Emissions Reductions From These Programs
EPA and DOE both estimated the share of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions attributable to participants in their respective programs and were working to develop an estimate of the programs’ impacts. First, there is considerable overlap between these two programs and other voluntary programs. Second, it will be difficult to determine how much of a firm’s or trade group’s emissions reductions can be attributed to its participation in the program because the level of a participant’s emissions in the absence of the program is unknown. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports on federal funding for climate research and to develop technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among other things. The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, also reports on science funding. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Climate Leaders and the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Climate VISION programs aim to reduce such emissions through voluntary industry efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report Climate Change: Federal Reports on Climate Change Funding Should Be Clearer and More Complete (GAO-05-461) and its April 2006 report Climate Change: EPA and DOE Should Do More to Encourage Progress Under Two Voluntary Programs (GAO-06-97), which addressed (1) reported changes in federal climate change funding and (2) the status and progress of two federal voluntary climate programs.
What GAO Found
Federal funding for climate change, as reported by OMB, increased from $2.35 billion in 1993 to $5.09 billion in 2004 (117 percent), or from $3.28 billion to $5.09 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. OMB reports show that, during this period, funding increased for technology, science, and--before adjusting for inflation--international assistance. CCSP, which reports only science funding, generally presented totals that were consistent with OMB's, but provided more detail. However, changes in reporting methods used by both OMB and CCSP limit the comparability of funding data over time, and therefore it was unclear whether total funding actually increased as reported. Furthermore, we were unable to compare changes in the fourth category (climate-related tax expenditures), because from 1993 to 2004 OMB reported estimates for proposed but not existing tax expenditures. With regard to individual agencies' funding, OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies receiving funding for climate change programs in 2004 received more funding in that year than they had in 1993, but it is unclear whether funding changed as OMB reported because of unexplained changes in what was defined as climate change funding. Reported funding for DOE, the agency with the most reported climate-related funding in 2004, increased from $963 million to $2.52 billion (162 percent), or from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion (88 percent) after adjusting for inflation. DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration accounted for 81 percent of the reported increase in funding from 1993 through 2004. However, because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, changes in the reports' contents, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, limit the comparability of agencies' funding data over time, making it difficult to determine if these are real or definitional increases. EPA and DOE expected participants in their voluntary climate programs to complete several program steps within general time frames, but participants' progress in completing those steps within the time frames was mixed. Furthermore, DOE did not have a system for tracking groups' progress in completing program steps, and neither DOE nor EPA had a written policy specifying the consequences for participants not proceeding as expected. In addition, EPA and DOE had both estimated the share of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions attributable to participants in their respective programs and were working through an interagency process to quantify emissions reductions attributable to their programs. However, determining reductions attributable to each program will be challenging because of the overlap between these programs and other voluntary programs and because it is difficult to determine how much of a participant's emissions reductions can be attributed to its participation in the program, since the participant's emissions in the absence of the program cannot be known. |
gao_GAO-05-318T | gao_GAO-05-318T_0 | Social Security Reform Is Part of a Broader Fiscal and Economic Challenge
In my role as lead partner on the audit of the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements and the de facto Chief Accountability Officer of the United States government, I have become increasingly concerned about the state of our nation’s finances. Our current path also will increasingly constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs. While the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance grew significantly, the retirement of the baby boom generation has come closer to becoming a reality. There are different ways to describe the magnitude of Social Security’s long-term financing challenge, but they all show a need for program reform sooner rather than later. Today Social Security spending exceeds federal spending for Medicare and Medicaid, but that will change. Accordingly, substantive reform of Social Security and our major health programs remains critical to recapturing our future fiscal flexibility. If we did nothing until 2042—the year SSA estimates the Trust Funds will be exhausted—achieving actuarial balance would require changes in benefits of 30 percent or changes in taxes of 43 percent. 7.) Although health care spending is the largest driver of the long-term fiscal outlook, this does not mean that Social Security reform should be postponed until after health is addressed. Considerations In Assessing Reform Options
As important as financial stability may be for Social Security, it cannot be the only consideration. Social Security remains the foundation of the nation’s retirement system. It is also much more than just a retirement program; it pays benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, spouses and children of retired workers, and survivors of deceased workers. Our criteria aim to balance financial and economic considerations with benefit adequacy and equity issues and the administrative challenges associated with various proposals. GAO Framework For Evaluating Reform Proposals
The analytic framework GAO has developed to assess proposals comprises three basic criteria:
Financing Sustainable Solvency—the extent to which a proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would affect the economy and the federal budget. Moreover, issues such as feasibility and cost can, and should, influence policy choices. Proposals also differ in the manner in which accounts would be financed, the extent of choice and flexibility concerning investment options, the way in which benefits are paid out, and the way the accounts would interact with the existing Social Security program—individual accounts could serve either as an addition to or as a replacement for part of the current benefit structure. Finally, the effort to reform Social Security is occurring as our nation’s private pension system is also facing serious challenges. In addition, our Social Security challenge is only part of a much broader fiscal challenge that includes, among other things, the need to reform Medicare, Medicaid, and our overall health care system. Furthermore, absent reform, younger workers will face dramatic benefit reductions or tax increases that will grow over time. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security is the foundation of the nation's retirement income system, helping to protect the vast majority of American workers and their families from poverty in old age. However, it is much more than a retirement program, providing millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. As the baby boom generation retires and given longer life spans and lower birth rates, Social Security's financing shortfall will grow. The current gap between promised and funded benefits is $3.7 trillion and is growing daily. The Chairman of the House Budget Committee asked GAO to discuss the need for Social Security reform. This testimony addresses the nature of Social Security's long-term financing problem and why it is preferable for Congress to take action sooner rather than later. This testimony also notes the broader context in which reform proposals should be considered and the criteria that GAO has recommended as a basis for analyzing any Social Security reform proposals.
What GAO Found
Although the Social Security system is not in crisis today, it faces a serious and growing solvency and sustainability challenge that is growing as time passes. If we did nothing until 2042, achieving actuarial balance would require a 30-percent reduction in benefits or a 43-percent increase in payroll taxes. Furthermore, Social Security's problems are a subset of our nation's overall fiscal challenge. Absent reform, the nation will ultimately have to choose among escalating federal deficits and debt, huge tax increases and/or dramatic budget cuts. As GAO's long-term budget simulations show, substantive reform of Social Security and our major federal health programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) is critical to saving our fiscal future. Taking action soon would also serve to reduce the amount of change needed to ensure that Social Security is solvent, sustainable, and secure for current and future generations. Acting sooner would also serve to improve the federal government's credibility with the markets and the confidence of the American people in the government's ability to address long-range challenges before they reach crisis proportions. However, financial stability should not be the only consideration when evaluating reform proposals. Other important objectives, such as balancing the adequacy and equity of the benefits structure and various administrative and operational issues need to be considered. Furthermore, any changes to Social Security should be considered in the context of the broader challenges facing our nation, such as the changing nature of the private pension system, escalating health care costs, and the need to reform Medicare and Medicaid. |
gao_GAO-03-394 | gao_GAO-03-394_0 | The employee has a right to respond to the letter. To identify what problems, if any, IRS and TIGTA have encountered in processing section 1203 cases and the extent to which they have addressed them, we reviewed IRS’s and TIGTA’s policies and procedures for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating section 1203 allegations. Few Section 1203 Allegations Were Substantiated and Resulted in an Employee’s Firing, Except for Those Involving Compliance with Federal Tax Laws
IRS data show that, with the exception of employees’ tax compliance provisions, few of the 3,970 section 1203 allegations received between July 1998 and September 2002 were substantiated as violations of section 1203 and resulted in an employee’s firing. Table 1 shows that IRS or TIGTA had finished investigating 3,512 allegations and substantiated 419 as violations, for which IRS fired 71 employees. Most Employees Believed That They Understood but Feared Section 1203, and That It Was One of Several Factors Affecting Their Work
Our survey indicated that most frontline enforcement employees understood but feared section 1203, and that, because of section 1203, their work takes longer and the likelihood of their recommending a seizure decreased. Many Employees Said That IRS’s Reorganization and Tax Law Changes Have Had a Greater Impact on Their Ability to do Their Jobs Than Section 1203
Many IRS frontline enforcement employees also reported that IRS’s reorganization and tax law changes have had a greater impact on their ability to do their jobs than section 1203. . . efforts to ensure those rights are honored.”
IRS and TIGTA Have Taken Steps Intended to Improve the Section 1203 Process, but Extent of Progress is Unknown
IRS and TIGTA have taken steps intended to correct known problems, such as lengthy investigations and conflicts of interest during investigations, that may have reduced the effectiveness of the section 1203 process as well as the morale and productivity of enforcement employees. However, the extent to which these steps have succeeded is unknown because IRS and TIGTA have not coordinated on an approach for evaluating the section 1203 process on the basis of consistent types of results-oriented goals, measures, and performance data. Recommendations
We recommend that the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration coordinate on an approach for evaluating the section 1203 process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 1203 of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 outlines conditions for firing IRS employees for any of 10 acts of misconduct covering taxpayer and employee rights and tax return filing requirements. Both IRS and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) have responsibilities related to section 1203. Because of concerns that section 1203 may have a chilling effect on IRS enforcement staff's productivity, GAO (1) determined the number of section 1203 allegations, (2) surveyed IRS employee perceptions about section 1203, and (3) identified problems IRS and TIGTA face in processing section 1203 cases and the extent to which they have addressed them.
What GAO Found
IRS data show that of the 3,970 section 1203 allegations IRS received from July 1998 through September 2002, IRS or TIGTA completed investigations on 3,512 allegations and substantiated 419 as violations, resulting in 71 employees being fired for section 1203 misconduct. Employee misconduct related to the two section 1203 provisions on whether employees filed their tax returns on time and accurately stated their tax liability (as opposed to the eight taxpayer and employee rights provisions) accounted for almost all of the violations and firings. Most of the IRS frontline enforcement employees who responded to GAO's survey said that they understood, but feared, section 1203. They also reported that, because of section 1203, their work takes longer and the likelihood of their taking an enforcement action, such as recommending a seizure, has decreased. However, employees also were more likely to say that other factors, such as IRS's reorganization, have had a greater impact on their ability to do their job than to say that section 1203 had a greater impact. IRS and TIGTA have taken steps intended to correct known problems in their processing of section 1203 employee misconduct cases--such as lengthy investigations and conflicts of interest during investigations--that may have negatively affected frontline employees' morale and productivity. However, the extent to which these steps have succeeded is unknown because IRS and TIGTA do not have a coordinated approach for evaluating how effectively they process section 1203 cases. Such an approach would include results-oriented goals, balanced performance measures to mark progress towards these goals, and means to collect performance data. |
gao_GAO-04-62 | gao_GAO-04-62_0 | These schools are generally subject to the same set of requirements that govern traditional schools within the district. Number of Schools Managed by Education Management Companies Is Increasing; Descriptive Information on Achievement Widely Available
Although the number of public schools operated by private, for-profit management companies has risen rapidly in recent years, these schools still comprise a very small proportion of all public schools nationwide. Descriptive information about achievement in these schools was widely available in the form of individual school report cards that often provided comparisons with state or district averages, but often not with similar traditional schools. School and company reports provided useful information on student achievement, but generally were not designed to answer research questions about the effectiveness of privately managed schools compared with traditional schools. By school year 2002-03, the companies had schools in 25 states and the District of Columbia, with about 48 percent of the privately managed schools in Arizona and Michigan. The number of private management companies identified by the Arizona State University researchers also increased over the same period, but the companies varied greatly in terms of the number of schools they operated. No Consistent Pattern of Differences in Scores on State Tests Found between Public Schools Managed by Private Companies and Comparable, Traditional Elementary Schools
Differences in student performance on state assessments between privately managed public schools and comparable, traditional public schools varied by metropolitan areas for the grade levels in our study.Average student scores were significantly higher in both reading and math for fifth graders in 2 privately managed schools, 1 in Denver and 1 in San Francisco, compared with similar traditional public schools, as were gains over time when we examined a previous year’s scores for these students. No significant differences in reading or math scores were found between the privately managed school and comparison schools in Phoenix. II, where tables 5 and 6 show detailed results of these analyses.) 6.) Scores on State Tests Were Lower in Privately Managed Schools in Cleveland and St. Paul
Average scores on state tests for fourth grade students attending privately managed schools in Cleveland and fifth grade students attending privately managed schools in St. Paul were significantly lower compared with scores of students attending similar traditional public schools. Scores on State Tests in Privately Managed Schools Varied in Detroit and Were Similar to Traditional Schools in Phoenix
Average scores for fourth grade students in Detroit varied, but tended to be lower in both reading and math for students attending privately managed schools than for students attending similar traditional schools.As in other locations, student populations in schools we studied in Detroit tended to be minority and low income. For selected grade levels, we compared the individual student scores of students attending the privately managed schools with those of students in the similar traditional public schools. This resulted in a total of 14 privately managed schools included in the study, 8 of which were located in Detroit. We used a variety of approaches to verify the accuracy of these data. In addition, our matching process may not have produced equivalent groups for comparison. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, a series of educational reforms have increased opportunities for private companies to play a role in public education. For instance, school districts have sometimes looked to private companies to manage poorly performing schools. The accountability provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 may further increase such arrangements because schools that continuously fail to make adequate progress toward meeting state goals are eventually subject to fundamental restructuring by the state, which may include turning the operation of the school over to a private company. GAO determined the prevalence of privately managed public schools and what could be learned about student achievement in these schools from publicly available sources. To do so, GAO examined existing data on the number and location of privately managed schools and reviewed a variety of reports on student achievement. In addition, GAO compared standardized test scores of students attending privately managed public schools with scores of students attending similar traditional public schools. GAO identified privately managed schools that had been in operation for four years or more in 6 large cities and matched these schools with a group of traditional schools serving similar students. GAO then analyzed student scores on state reading and math tests at selected grade levels, controlling for differences in student populations.
What GAO Found
The number of public schools managed by private companies has tripled in the last 5 years according to data compiled by university researchers, although such schools comprise less than 0.5 percent of all public schools. In the 2002-03 school year, nearly 50 private companies managed over 400 public schools nationwide. These companies managed schools in 25 states and the District of Columbia, with about one-half of the schools located in Arizona and Michigan. Information on student achievement at these schools was available in the form of state- or district-issued school report cards and annual reports issued by the management companies. Although these reports provided valuable descriptive information, they were generally not designed to answer research questions about the relative effectiveness of privately managed schools compared with traditional schools in raising student achievement. Consequently, GAO conducted test score analyses that provide further insight into student achievement in these schools. GAO's analyses of student test scores in 6 cities yielded mixed results. Scores for 5th grade students in Denver and San Francisco were significantly higher in both reading and math in two privately managed schools when compared with traditional schools serving similar students. However, 4th grade scores in reading and math were significantly lower in a privately managed public school in Cleveland, as were 5th grade scores in two privately managed schools in St. Paul. In Detroit, where eight privately managed schools were studied, reading and math scores of 5th graders in privately managed schools were generally lower. In Phoenix, GAO found no significant differences. GAO's results are limited to the schools and grade levels examined and may not be indicative of performance at other schools. |
gao_GAO-06-793 | gao_GAO-06-793_0 | For example, the Departments of Commerce and State rely in part on DOD’s input on what is militarily critical to inform export control decisions. At the same time, the lists are significantly out of date. As a result, the lists are of questionable value. Validation Process Provides Little Assurance That Lists Are Complete and Accurate
Working group chairs face two key challenges in identifying and selecting experts to participate in the technology working groups that update the MCTL and DSTL. To ensure the lists are complete and accurate, DOD components review and validate the working groups’ updates— a process DOD program officials consider a critical check of the working groups’ efforts. Second, the reviewers may not have the technical knowledge to validate the updates. However, one-quarter of the reviewers did not review the lists. MCTL and DSTL Lack Currency
A Militarily Critical Technologies Program goal is to completely update the MCTL and DSTL at least every 4 years by updating about 5 sections of each list every year. The DSTL is also out of date. Over the past 5 years, only half of the DSTL sections have been updated (see table 2). Agencies Tend to Rely on Information Other than the MCTL and DSTL to Support Decisions about Critical Technologies
While the MCTL was created to help determine items that need to be controlled, the list has generally not been used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions. Several DOD components have developed their own efforts to catalog critical technologies to meet their needs. While the MCTL is expected to inform review of export license applications or export control decisions, the Defense Technology Security Administration—which represents DOD on export control decisions—does not use the MCTL for export licensing decisions or to inform DOD’s input to U.S. government export control proposals that are considered by the multilateral export control regime known as the Wassenaar Arrangement. In 1996, the Air Force issued guidance instructing personnel not to use the MCTL to inform export control and other decisions. As with export control decisions, we found that the MCTL is seldom used to inform various DOD policy decisions, including those related to identifying and protecting critical technology on weapon systems, counterintelligence efforts related to critical technologies, and programs reporting on the protection of the defense industrial base. Officials from the Army’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology/Chief Scientist, who were aware of the existence of the DSTL, stated that the DSTL is not useful for informing science and technology decisions because it is overly broad, its taxonomy does not align with Army Research and Technology taxonomy, and its assessments are rarely in consonance with Army Research and Technology subject matter experts. To ensure that users’ requirements are met, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director for Defense Research and Engineering, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to examine existing efforts within the department to catalog critical technologies and determine best practices for identifying technologies; using these best practices, develop an approach that best meets user requirements in a timely manner; on the basis of the new approach, identify duplicative efforts, if any; ensure the efficient use of resources; and determine what level of funding is appropriate; develop an implementation plan for the approach, including timelines for execution and implementing guidance or directives; and establish an oversight mechanism to ensure that user needs are met. We also compared MCTL and DSTL updates over the past 10 years with program-stated goals for updating the lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Major acquisitions in the Department of Defense's (DOD) force transformation rely on maintaining technological superiority to ensure U.S. military dominance. Failure to identify and protect critical technologies makes U.S. military assets vulnerable to cloning, neutralization, or other action that degrades current and anticipated capabilities. To help minimize these risks, DOD's Militarily Critical Technologies Program developed and periodically updates two lists of technologies--the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL). While the lists are primarily intended to inform U.S. export control decisions, they can also inform counterintelligence activities, research plans, and technology protection programs, making MCTL and DSTL fundamental resources for security decisions. To ensure these lists are informative, GAO assessed the Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL and determined how the lists are used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions.
What GAO Found
The Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL has generated lists that are of questionable value. To update the lists, working groups of experts from government, industry, and academia identify militarily critical technologies. However, participation in the working groups is voluntary, and some experts choose not to participate or do not participate fully. Validation of the updates--a critical check to ensure the lists are complete and accurate--also provides little assurance that the lists are of value. More than one-third of the reviewers acknowledged they do not have the technical expertise necessary to validate the updates, and one-quarter did not review the lists. The lists are also out of date. Although a stated program goal calls for all 20 sections of the lists to be completely updated at least every 4 years, about half of the sections on the MCTL--including technologies related to weapons, communications, and biological warfare--have not been updated for 10 years. The DSTL is also out of date; almost half of the sections have not been updated in the past 5 years. With the limited value of the MCTL and DSTL, agencies tend to rely on other information sources to inform export control and DOD policy decisions. According to DOD and Department of Commerce export control officials, the MCTL is too broad, difficult to use, and out of date to inform export control proposals or export licensing decisions. Concerned about the MCTL's accuracy and reliability, the Air Force instructed its personnel not to use the MCTL. The DSTL is also seldom used--in part because some DOD components were not aware of the list. For those components that were aware of the DSTL, some found it only marginally useful because it too is out of date. Several DOD components have developed their own efforts to track global technologies. For example, the Army established international technology centers dedicated to identifying international cooperative opportunities as well as to maintain knowledge of foreign research efforts to avoid technological surprises for the warfighter. |
gao_RCED-99-7 | gao_RCED-99-7_0 | Authorized by the Congress in 1996 as a 3-year pilot program, the recreational fee demonstration program allows the Park Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the Fish and Wildlife Service to experiment with new or increased fees at up to 100 demonstration sites per agency. Fee Revenues Have Substantially Increased—Particularly in the Park Service
Among the four agencies, the pace and the approach used to implement the recreational fee demonstration program have differed. This difference is a result of the agencies’ experiences in charging fees prior to the demonstration. Each agency estimated that it has generated at least 70 percent more in fee revenues than it did prior to the demonstration program, and the combined estimated revenues for the four agencies have nearly doubled since fiscal year 1996. At the same time, other sites within an agency may not have enough to meet their most critical needs. The Agencies Have Used Only 24 Percent of the Funds Available
The four agencies have spent about 24 percent of the revenues available under the fee demonstration program through March 1998. Of the $21.6 million in expenditures by the four participating agencies as of March 31, 1998, most have been for repairs and maintenance, the cost of collection, and operations. BLM did not have a national breakdown available. Headquarters officials noted that in fiscal year 1997, most sites had not been able to spend all the revenues they collected because fee collection started in the middle of the fiscal year, time was needed to make the fee deposits available to the sites for expenditure, and time was needed to plan and contract for the projects to be funded with fee revenues. Under the demonstration program’s current 80-20 percent split of the revenues, the Park Service’s park units will stand to receive very uneven shares of the program’s $136 million in estimated fee revenues for fiscal year 1998: Of the 100 fee-collecting sites (which actually includes 116 park units), the top 44 units in terms of revenues are expected to retain $93 million, or 68 percent of the total, while the remaining collecting sites are expected to retain $13 million, or 10 percent of the total, leaving $30 million, or 22 percent of the total, for 260 nonparticipating sites. Among the four agencies, a number of examples exist in which a new or innovative approach to collecting fees has resulted in greater convenience for the visitors and has improved efficiency for the agency. However, some agencies could do more in this area. Innovative Pricing Is Being Tried by Some Agencies
Besides innovating and experimenting to make paying fees more convenient for visitors, two of the agencies are also experimenting with various pricing strategies at demonstration sites. 4.2). 4.3). Preliminary Data Suggest No Major Adverse Effect on Visitation From New Recreational Fees
Although data for more years will be needed to fully assess the effect of increased recreational fees on visitation, 1997 data from the 206 sites participating in the demonstration program preliminarily suggest that the increased fees have had no major adverse effect on visitation. Surveys on the impact of fees on visitation and other issues planned for 1998 and 1999 include the following:
The Park Service plans additional research on visitation in 1998 that will (1) survey the managers at all 100 recreational fee demonstration sites concerning visitation and obtain their perceptions of the equity, the efficiency, and the quality of visitors’ experiences resulting from the fee demonstration program; and (2) conduct detailed case study evaluations at 13 fee demonstration sites, including a detailed visitor survey at each site. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of the recreational fee demonstration program by the National Park Service (NPS), the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), focusing on the: (1) implementation of the program and the fee revenues generated; (2) program's expenditures; (3) extent to which the agencies have used innovative or coordinated approaches to fee collection; and (4) program's effects, if any, on visitation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) among the four agencies, the pace and the approach used to implement the recreational fee demonstration program have differed; (2) this difference reflects the extent of the agencies' experiences in charging fees prior to the demonstration; (3) nonetheless, each agency has been successful in increasing fee revenues; (4) the four agencies estimated that their combined recreational fee revenues have nearly doubled from about $93 million in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to an about $179 million in FY 1998; (5) of the four agencies, NPS is generating the most fee revenues; (6) for FY 1998, NPS estimates that its fee revenues will be about 85 percent of the total estimated revenues collected by the four agencies at demonstration sites; (7) about 76 percent of the funds available under the program had not been spent through March 1998; (8) thus far, most expenditures have been for repairs and maintenance and the cost of fee collection; (9) the agencies expect to make significant expenditures in the latter part of FY 1998 and in FY 1999; (10) in the longer term, because some sites may have a much greater potential than others for raising revenues, the requirement that at least 80 percent of the fees be retained at the location where they were collected may lead to substantial inequities between sites; (11) some sites may reach the point where they have more revenues than they need for their projects, while other sites still do not have enough; (12) opportunities remain for the agencies to be more innovative and cooperative in designing, setting, and collecting fees; (13) among the agencies, several notable examples of innovation exist at demonstration sites of the Forest Service and the BLM; (14) these innovations have resulted in either more equitable pricing for the visitors, or greater convenience for visitors in how they pay fees; (15) while NPS has been innovative in making fees more convenient for visitors to pay, it has not experimented with different pricing structures to make fees more equitable; (16) coordination of fees among agencies has been erratic; (17) overall, preliminary data suggest the increased or new fees have had no major adverse effect on visitation to the fee demonstration sites; (18) with data from just 1 year, however, it is difficult to accurately assess the fees' impact on visitation; (19) the agencies' surveys indicate that visitors generally support the purpose of the program and the level of the fees implemented; and (20) each agency is planning additional visitor surveys and research in 1998 and 1999. |
gao_GAO-11-673 | gao_GAO-11-673_0 | In addition to annual training, forces that deploy conduct both individual and collective predeployment training. Training requirements may have several associated tasks. For example, in October 2010, Forces Command established a goal for active component units to achieve company-level proficiency at home station. Based on our unit visits, 7 of 13 Army and Marine Corps units conducting a culminating training event at a combat training center were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective training (e.g., company-level, live-fire training) prior to their arrival at the combat training centers. Further, officials from all of the Army and Marine Corps units we spoke with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at the combat training centers since resources—such as theater-specific equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles—were more readily available there. Furthermore, we found that some units had to train to improve proficiency levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. Army and Marine Corps officials, including trainers at the combat training centers, reported that while units arrive at the combat training centers with varying levels of proficiency, all units leave with at least the platoon level proficiency required to execute counterinsurgency missions for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, junior leaders have focused more on training execution and their higher headquarters have assumed much of the responsibility for planning and preparing unit training. Army and Marine Corps Lack Results-Oriented Performance Metrics to Fully Evaluate the Impact of Their Training Management Initiatives
The Army’s and Marine Corps’ initiatives are a solid start to the development of training management skills in their junior leaders, but neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore training management skills. However, the pace of operations over the past decade has limited training time and reduced the services’ abilities to focus on developing training management skills in their junior leaders. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq and a commitment to resume training for a fuller range of missions, both services have recognized the need and opportunity to restore and develop leaders’ abilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the wider range of needed training. However, without a means of measuring the effectiveness of their efforts to restore and develop leaders’ training management skills, the Army and Marine Corps lack the information they need to assess the extent to which their leaders are prepared to plan, prepare, and assess required training. Further, we reviewed unit training documents and interviewed officials from 19 Army and 10 Marine Corps units to discuss training information such as: (1) the training that units were completing, (2) any training that units were unable to complete prior to the culminating training events, (3) any factors that impacted units’ abilities to complete training prior to the culminating training events, and (4) the impact that not completing training prior to the final culminating training event might have on those events. To assess the extent to which leaders are positioned to plan and manage training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions, we reviewed service policy and guidance that provided information on the return to training for a fuller range of missions, such as the U.S. Army Forces Command Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal Year 2011-2012, Army Field Manual 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations, the Marine Corps’ Commandant Planning Guidance, and the Marine Corps Posture Statement for 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, Army and Marine Corps forces have deployed repeatedly with limited time between deployments. At their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations, units have focused their limited training time on training for counterinsurgency operations. Prior to deploying, units also conduct a large-scale exercise referred to as a culminating training event. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the services have begun to resume training for a fuller range of offensive, defensive, and stability missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to report on the Army's and Marine Corps' abilities to complete training requirements. GAO assessed the extent to which the services' (1) active component forces are completing training prior to the culminating training event and (2) leaders are positioned to plan and manage training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions. GAO analyzed training requirements and unit training documentation, and interviewed headquarters and unit personnel during site visits between July 2010 and July 2011.
What GAO Found
Deploying Army and Marine Corps units conduct extensive predeployment training--both individual and collective, to include a large-scale culminating training event--at their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations. However, several factors, such as limited training time between deployments, the large number of training requirements, and the current focus on counterinsurgency operation training have been preventing units from completing all desired training prior to the culminating training event. For example, based on GAO's site visits, 7 of 13 units were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective training (e.g., company-level live fire training) prior to arriving at the combat training centers. Further, officials from all of the units GAO spoke with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at the combat training centers since resources--such as theater-specific equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles--were more readily available there. GAO found that some units had to train to improve proficiency levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. Still, according to trainers at the combat training centers, while units arrive with varying levels of proficiency, all forces leave with at least the platoon level proficiency required to execute the counterinsurgency missions required for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past decade, continuous overseas deployments have reduced training timeframes and resulted in senior leaders assuming training management responsibilities from junior leaders. Specifically, leaders at higher headquarters have taken responsibility for much of the training management function--planning, preparing, and assessing training--while junior leaders have focused primarily on training execution. However, changing conditions, such as increased competition for resources in a constrained fiscal environment, increased time at home station, and a return to training for a fuller range of missions, make it imperative that all leaders possess a strong foundation in training management. The services are developing various initiatives to restore and develop training management skills in their leaders, but neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore these skills. As GAO has previously reported, establishing metrics can help federal agencies target training investments and assess the contributions that training programs make to improving results. Without a means of measuring the effectiveness of their efforts, the Army and Marine Corps will not have the information they need to assess the extent to which their leaders have the training management skills needed to plan, prepare, and assess required training.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the services develop results-oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of their training management initiatives and support any adjustments that the services may need to make to these initiatives. DOD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-00-10 | gao_AIMD-00-10_0 | Legislative efforts have focused on improving the federal government’s control environment. The Results Act is supported by the development of federal cost accounting standards under the CFO Act, which require agencies to identify the costs of government activities. Other federal expenditures are also likely to increase. We also identified and reviewed recent GAO reports to identify additional types of programs at risk. For the nine agencies that reported improper payments in their financial statement reports, we reviewed the agencies’ Results Act performance plans for fiscal year 2000 to determine the extent to which the plans addressed improper payments. However, efforts by agencies to develop comprehensive estimates have varied. For example, USDA disclosed improper payments of $1.4 billion for the Food Stamp Program, but only acknowledged making improper payments without providing a specific amount for its Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Eleven of the CFO Act agencies did not report any information related to improper payments in their financial statement reports. Table 1 lists the nine agencies and the manner in which they reported improper payments in their fiscal year 1998 financial statement reports for the 17 programs identified. The extent of the problem for certain of these agencies’ programs is unknown because agencies are not performing comprehensive quality control reviews to estimate the range and/or identify rates of improper payments. Although HCFA’s most recent estimate of improper payments in its $177 billion Medicare Fee-for-Service program amounted to $12.6 billion, this estimate did not consider improper payments made as part of another $33 billion Medicare Managed Care program. Further, nonexistent or ineffective internal controls, as previously discussed, increase this risk. Annual estimates of improper payments in future audited financial statements will provide information on the progress of these initiatives. These agencies’ performance plans included both performance goals and strategies for minimizing improper payments for the Medicare Fee-for-Service, Old Age and Survivors Insurance, Veterans Benefits, and Federal Employees’ Life Insurance programs. Recommendations
To assist agencies in estimating and managing improper payments, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, through the Deputy Director for Management and OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management, within the framework of the CFO and Results Acts:
Develop and issue guidance to executive agencies to assist them in (1) developing and implementing a methodology for annually estimating and reporting improper payments for major federal programs and (2) developing goals and strategies to address improper payments in their annual performance plans. Require agencies to (1) include a description of steps being taken to address improper payments in their strategic and annual performance plans when the level of improper payments is mission critical and (2) consult with congressional oversight committees, as appropriate, on the projected target levels and goals for estimating and reducing improper payments, as presented in the agencies’ annual performance plan. Supplemental Security Income: Long-Standing Problems Put Program at Risk for Fraud, Waste and Abuse (GAO/T-HEHS-97-88, March 4, 1997). High-Risk Series (GAO/GGD-97-37R, February 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on improper payments in light of the projected future growth of federal expenditures, focusing on the: (1) amounts reported by agencies as improper payments in their fiscal year (FY) 1998 financial statements prepared pursuant to the Chief Financial Officers (FO) Act of 1990; (2) types of federal programs at risk of disbursing improper payments; (3) reported causes of improper payments across the federal government; and (4) extent to which agencies are addressing improper payments in their performance plans under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in their FY 1998 financial reports, nine agencies collectively reported improper payment estimates of $19.1 billion; (2) these improper payment estimates relate to 17 major programs that expended approximately $870 billion; (3) the programs and related improper payment estimates include: (a) Medicare Fee-for-Service ($12.6 billion); (b) Supplemental Security Income ($1,648 million); (c) Food Stamps ($1,425 million); (d) Old Age and Survivors Insurance ($1,154 million); (e) disability insurance ($941 million); (f) housing subsidies ($857 million); and (g) veterans benefits, unemployment insurance, and others ($514 million); (4) also included are the Agency for International Development (AID), Medicaid, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation; (5) AID and the agencies administering these programs acknowledged making improper payments in their FY 1998 financial statement, but did not disclose specific dollar amounts; (6) improper payments are much greater than have been disclosed thus far in agency financial statements reports, as shown by GAO's prior audits and those of agency inspectors general; (7) agencies are not performing comprehensive quality control reviews--internal studies or reviews--for certain programs to determine the propriety of program expenditures; (8) as a result, the full extent of the problem--and possible solutions to it--is unknown; (9) comprehensive quality control reviews could also identify the causes of improper payments, which range from inadvertent errors to fraud and abuse; (10) working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), some agencies are taking steps to mitigate this risk by focusing attention on identifying, reporting, and reducing improper payments through the discipline of annual audited financial statements and the development of performance goals; (11) however, agencies responsible for 13 of the 17 programs having made improper payments--many of which GAO identified in its High-Risk and Performance and Accountability series issued earlier this year--did not include specific performance goals or strategies to comprehensively address these payments in their FY 2000 performance plans under the Results Act; and (12) as the federal budget grows, more taxpayer dollars are placed at risk, thus increasing the urgency for identifying and preventing these types of payments and providing complete accountability to taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-16-616 | gao_GAO-16-616_0 | Indirect costs represent an organization’s general support expenses that cannot be specifically attributed to a specific research project or function. As noted above, OMB and HHS have designated three primary cognizant agencies to negotiate indirect cost rates for research organizations that receive NIH-funded grants: (1) CAS, (2) NIH- DFAS, and (3) ONR. The cognizant agencies are responsible for ensuring that the negotiated indirect cost rates comply with OMB guidance and the FAR, as applicable. CAS and NIH-DFAS review proposals whereas ONR generally sends proposals to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to be audited. Consequently, NIH relies on the cognizant agencies to design adequate internal controls over their processes for negotiating indirect cost rates with research organizations that support the various types of NIH extramural research programs. Our review determined that while the three cognizant agencies had designed some controls for setting indirect cost rates, deficiencies in the design of these controls could result in the waste of federal resources. The deficiencies we identified are as follows: internal guidance at all three cognizant agencies was not updated to reflect current OMB guidance or changes in agency requirements, such as documentation requirements or formalizing agency internal guidance;
ONR’s internal guidance lacked adequate review procedures over DCAA’s advisory audit function when a DCAA audit was significantly delayed or resulted in a qualified opinion or when DCAA rescinded a previously issued opinion; internal guidance at all three cognizant agencies lacked detailed instructions to supervisors on their review responsibilities over the indirect cost rate process;
CAS and ONR had not developed internal guidance addressing differences in negotiating indirect cost rates with certain types of research organizations; and
ONR and NIH-DFAS had not developed mechanisms to track key milestones for the indirect cost rate-setting process. If these deficiencies are not addressed, there is an increased risk that the cognizant agencies may not properly and consistently negotiate indirect cost rates and that the rates negotiated may not comply with applicable federal regulations. Thus, there is an increased risk that the indirect cost rates used to reimburse NIH research organizations will include costs that are not allowable, allocable, and reasonable and may result in wasted federal resources. To improve the design of internal controls over the indirect cost rate- setting process, we recommend that the Director of ONR take the following five actions: implement the May 2014 policy requiring an annual review of guidance so that internal guidance is updated when changes are made to applicable regulations and procedures to reasonably assure that the guidance reflects current requirements; include in its internal guidance acceptable DCAA audit completion time frames and identify supplemental procedures to be performed by negotiators if DCAA cannot perform its audits timely or if DCAA issues a qualified opinion or rescinds one of its previously issued audit opinions, to reasonably assure that the indirect cost rate proposal has been adequately reviewed and the negotiated rate complies with applicable regulations; develop detailed procedures for the completion and documentation of supervisory review of the indirect cost rate negotiation process to provide reasonable assurance that required certifications and assurances are obtained and follow-up with the research organization is documented; finalize and issue internal guidance for negotiating indirect cost rates with universities and nonprofit organizations, including establishing a time frame for issuance of the internal guidance, to help ensure that the procedures are implemented in a timely manner; and update ONR’s existing process for tracking key milestones in the indirect cost rate-setting process to include information such as when indirect cost rate proposals are overdue and when DCAA’s audit reports are due. Appendix l: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this review was to determine the extent to which the cognizant agencies have designed internal controls to mitigate fraud, waste, and abuse in the indirect cost rate-setting process for National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants. However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have designated three primary cognizant agencies to negotiate indirect cost rates for grants funded by NIH: (1) HHS’s Cost Allocation Services (CAS), (2) NIH’s Division of Financial Advisory Services (NIH-DFAS), and (3) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of Naval Research (ONR). | Why GAO Did This Study
NIH spent over $23 billion to support extramural research in 2015, including $6.3 billion for indirect costs, which are costs not directly attributable to a specific research project or function, such as utilities expenses, for grants and cooperative agreements. NIH relies on designated cognizant agencies to design adequate internal controls over the processes for negotiating indirect cost rates with research organizations. Once set, these rates must be accepted by NIH and all federal awarding agencies.
GAO was asked to review the internal controls for overseeing the validity of indirect cost rates for NIH's research organizations. This report examines the extent to which the three primary cognizant agencies (CAS, NIH-DFAS, and ONR) that set indirect cost rates on NIH's behalf have designed internal controls to mitigate the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse in the indirect cost rate-setting process. GAO reviewed OMB guidance, the FAR, and the cognizant agencies' internal guidance on indirect cost rate negotiation; interviewed staff at the cognizant agencies; and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of negotiation case files to obtain an understanding of the design of controls.
What GAO Found
Research organizations that apply for National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding participate in an indirect cost rate-setting process, which involves submitting a rate proposal; reviewing the proposal and having it audited by a third-party agency at the cognizant agency's request; and finalizing (negotiating) the rate for the organization. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have designated three primary cognizant agencies to set indirect cost rates for federal financial assistance funded by NIH:
HHS's Cost Allocation Services (CAS),
NIH's Division of Financial Advisory Services (NIH-DFAS), and
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of Naval Research (ONR).
These cognizant agencies are responsible for ensuring that negotiated indirect cost rates comply with OMB guidance and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as applicable.
GAO found that while the three agencies had designed controls for setting indirect cost rates, deficiencies in the design of some of these controls could result in the waste of federal resources. The deficiencies GAO identified are as follows:
None of the three agencies has updated its internal guidance to reflect current OMB guidance or changes in agency requirements, such as documentation requirements.
ONR relies on audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency to ensure the adequacy and compliance of indirect cost proposals that it processes, but ONR has not included acceptable time frames in its internal guidance for when these audits are to be completed or what steps are to be taken when audits result in qualified opinions or when a prior audit opinion is rescinded.
All three cognizant agencies' internal guidance lacks detailed instructions to supervisors on their review responsibilities over the indirect cost rate process.
CAS and ONR have not developed internal guidance addressing differences in negotiating indirect cost rates with certain types of research organizations, such as universities and hospitals.
ONR and NIH-DFAS have not developed mechanisms to track key milestones for the indirect cost rate-setting process.
If these deficiencies are not addressed, there is an increased risk that these cognizant agencies may not properly and consistently negotiate indirect cost rates and that the rates negotiated may not comply with applicable federal regulations. Thus, there is an increased risk that the indirect cost rates used to reimburse NIH research organizations will include costs that are not allowable, allocable, and reasonable, and may result in wasted federal resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 12 recommendations to improve controls over their indirect cost rate process. HHS concurred with GAO's 7 recommendations to CAS and NIH-DFAS and described ongoing and planned actions to address them. DOD concurred with 4 recommendations to ONR and partially concurred with 1. GAO continues to believe that action is needed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-160 | gao_GAO-06-160_0 | Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the initial requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. However, as shown in figure 1, by that time requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits
We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide truck armor to deployed troops. Third, material shortages also affected the availability of armor kits. As a result, troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need for kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 3,780 armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. However, the Army was not able to document these funding requests. DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck Armor during Current Operations
DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve the availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed for OIF and other CENTCOM operations. Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of Truck Armor for Future Operations
The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations through the development of a long-term armoring plan. To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of producing and installing armor. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 131 additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were not produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the initial requirement was identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed by deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army forces.
What GAO Found
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the requirement until May 2005--18 months after the initial requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the case for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined, sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates also impacted the availability of truck armor. DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations. |
gao_GAO-06-1122T | gao_GAO-06-1122T_0 | This act, among other things, required the administration to (1) prepare and at least every 3 years revise and submit to the Congress a national global change research plan, including an estimate of federal funding for global change research activities to be conducted under the plan; (2) in each annual budget submission to the Congress, identify the items in each agency’s budget that are elements of the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), an interagency long-term climate change science research program; and (3) report annually on climate change “expenditures required” for the USGCRP. The Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) is a multiagency technology research and development coordinating structure similar to CCSP. Reported Federal Climate Change Funding Increased for Three of the Four Funding Categories, but Data May Not Be Comparable Over Time
Federal climate change funding, as reported by OMB, increased from $2.35 billion in 1993 to $5.09 billion in 2004 (116 percent), or from $3.28 billion to $5.09 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. Funding also increased for technology, science, and international assistance between 1993 and 2004, as shown in table 1. However, changes in reporting methods have limited the comparability of funding data over time; therefore it is unclear whether funding increased as much as reported by OMB. According to OMB officials, these changes in report structure and content for technology funding, as well as similar changes in science and international assistance funding, were the result of time constraints and other factors. Second, OMB reported that it expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities but did not specify how the definitions were changed. Science funding by agency, as presented by OMB and CCSP from 1993 through 1997, differed in many cases, with the exception of funding for the National Science Foundation (NSF), which was nearly identical over that time period. From 1998 through 2004, OMB and CCSP data on funding by agency were nearly identical. International assistance funding reported by OMB was generally comparable over time, although some new accounts were added without explanation. OMB officials said that they consistently reported proposed tax expenditures where a key purpose was specifically to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Reported Funding for Most Agencies Increased, but Unexplained Changes in Report Content Limit the Comparability of Data Over Time
OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that received funding for climate change programs in 2004 received more funding in that year than they had in 1993. However, it is unclear whether funding changed as much as reported by OMB because unexplained modifications in the reports’ contents limit the comparability of agencies’ funding data. Adjusted for inflation, such funding increased from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion, for an increase of $1.18 billion (88 percent). The funding increases for these two agencies accounted for 81 percent of the reported total increase in federal climate change funding from 1993 through 2004. Table 5 shows OMB’s reports on climate change funding by agency for selected years. Unexplained changes in the content of OMB reports make it difficult to determine whether funding changed as much as was reported by OMB. Because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, the changes in the reports’ contents discussed earlier, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, limit the comparability of agencies’ funding data over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress has required annual reports on federal climate change spending. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports funding for: technology (to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), science (to better understand the climate), international assistance (to help developing countries), and tax expenditures (to encourage emissions reduction). The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, also reports on science funding. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report Climate Change: Federal Reports on Climate Change Should Be Clearer and More Complete (GAO-05-461). GAO examined federal climate change funding for 1993 through 2004, including (1) how total funding and funding by category changed and whether funding data are comparable over time and (2) how funding by individual agencies changed and whether funding data are comparable over time.
What GAO Found
According to OMB, from 1993 to 2004, federal funding for climate change increased from $3.3 billion to $5.1 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. During this period, reported inflation-adjusted funding increased for technology and science, but decreased for international assistance. However, it is unclear whether funding changed as much as reported because changes in the format and content of OMB and CCSP reports make it difficult to compare funding data over time. For example, over time, OMB expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities, but did not specify how it changed the definitions. OMB officials stated that it is not required to follow a consistent reporting format from year to year. Further, CCSP's science funding reports were difficult to compare over time because CCSP introduced new methods for categorizing funding without explaining how they related to previous methods. The Director of CCSP said that its reports changed as the program evolved. These and other limitations make it difficult to determine actual changes in climate change funding. Similarly, OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that funded climate change programs in 2004 increased such funding between 1993 and 2004, but unexplained changes in the reports' contents limit the comparability of data on funding by agency. For example, reported funding for the Department of Energy (DOE), the agency with the most reported climate-related funding in 2004, increased from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion (88 percent) after adjusting for inflation. DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration accounted for 81 percent of the reported increase in funding from 1993 through 2004. However, because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, changes in the reports' contents, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, make it difficult to compare agencies' funding data over time and, therefore, to determine if this is a real or a definitional increase. Furthermore, GAO found that OMB reported funding for certain agencies in some years but not in others, without explanation. OMB told GAO that it relied on agency budget offices to submit accurate data. These data and reporting limitations make determining agencies' actual levels of climate change funding difficult. |
gao_GAO-12-301 | gao_GAO-12-301_0 | According to Treasury officials, the nine financial institutions agreed to participate in CPP in part to signal the program’s importance to the stability of the financial system. Treasury Estimates a Lifetime Gain for CPP, but Concerns about Some Investments Remain
Repayments and income from dividends, interest, and warrants from CPP investments have exceeded the amounts originally disbursed, but concerns remain about the financial strength of the remaining institutions and their ability to repay and exit the program. As we have reported, Treasury disbursed $204.9 billion to 707 financial institutions nationwide from October 2008 through December 2009. As of January 31, 2012, Treasury had received $211.5 billion in repayments and income from its CPP investments, exceeding the amount originally disbursed by $6.6 billion (see fig. Although this $16.7 billion is still potentially at risk, Treasury estimated a lifetime gain of $13.5 billion for CPP as of November 30, 2011. About two-thirds of the outstanding investments were concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions (see fig. Specifically, 25 remaining CPP investments accounted for $11.2 billion, or 67 percent of outstanding investments. Nearly half (341) of the 707 institutions that originally participated in CPP had exited the program as of January 31, 2012. number of institutions missing dividend or interest payments due on their CPP investments increased steadily from 8 in February 2009 to 158 in November 2011, or about 42 percent of institutions still in the program (see fig. The number of institutions missing payments has stabilized since February 2011, but most of these institutions continued to miss them. FDIC compiles a list of banks with demonstrated financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability and publicly reports the number of such institutions on a quarterly basis. Remaining CPP Institutions Are Financially Weaker than Former CPP and Non-CPP Institutions, but Treasury’s Analysis Does Not Show This Difference
Institutions that remain in CPP tend to be financially weaker than institutions that have exited the program and institutions that did not receive CPP capital. First, remaining CPP institutions had a consistently higher percentage of noncurrent loans than former CPP institutions and the non-CPP group from March 2008 to December 2011 (see fig. Our analysis found differences in the financial condition of remaining and former CPP institutions, suggesting that the remaining CPP institutions could face challenges in repaying CPP funds and exiting the program. In particular, our analysis showed that institutions remaining in CPP were generally less profitable, held riskier assets and less regulatory capital, and had lower reserves for covering losses compared with institutions that repaid their CPP investment and those that never participated in the program. Enhancing the quarterly CPP analysis by distinguishing between remaining and former CPP participants will help Treasury provide Congress and the public with a more transparent and comprehensive understanding of the status of CPP and the institutions that participate in it. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide Congress and the public with more transparent and comprehensive information on remaining CPP institutions and enhance its reporting, the Secretary of the Treasury should consider analyzing and reporting on remaining and former CPP participants separately. In its written comments, Treasury stated that it would carefully consider our recommendation to further enhance transparency by analyzing and reporting on remaining and former CPP participants separately. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) the status of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), including repayments and other proceeds to date, restructuring of investments, and timeliness of dividend payments, and (2) the financial condition of institutions that received investments under CPP compared with institutions that exited CPP and those that did not participate in the program. In particular, we used Treasury’s January 2012 Monthly 105(a) Report to Congress to determine the dollar amounts of outstanding investments, the number of remaining and former participants, and the geographical distribution of each as of January 31, 2012. We also used data from Treasury’s Dividends and Interest reports from February 2009 through November 2011 to determine the extent to which participants had missed payments throughout the life of the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was established as the primary means of restoring liquidity and stability to the financial system under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under CPP, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) invested almost $205 billion in 707 eligible financial institutions between 2008 and December 2009. CPP recipients have made dividend and interest payments to Treasury on the investments. TARPs authorizing legislation requires GAO to report every 60 days on TARP activities, including those of CPP. This report examines (1) the status of CPP and (2) the financial condition of institutions receiving CPP investments.
GAO reviewed Treasury reports on the CPP program and participants and interviewed officials from Treasury and the financial regulators. Using financial and regulatory data, GAO compared the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP with those that had exited the program and those that did not participate in CPP.
What GAO Found
While repayments, dividends, and interest from institutions participating in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) have exceeded the programs original investment disbursements, the number of missed payments has increased over the life of the program. As of January 31, 2012, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had received $211.5 billion from its CPP investments, exceeding the $204.9 billion it had disbursed. Of that amount, $16.7 billion remains outstanding, and most of these investments were concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions. In particular, as of January 31, 2012, 25 institutions accounted for $11.2 billion, or 67 percent, of outstanding investments. As of November 30, 2011, Treasury estimated that CPP would have a lifetime income of $13.5 billion after all institutions exited the program. As of January 31, 2012, 341 institutions had exited CPP, almost half by repaying CPP with funds from other federal programs. Institutions continue to exit CPP, but the number of institutions missing scheduled dividend or interest payments has increased. For example, as of November 30, 2011, the number of institutions that had missed their quarterly payments rose to 158, a marked increase from 8 in February 2009, even though CPP had fewer participants. The number of CPP institutions designated as problem banksthat is, demonstrating financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threatened their continued financial viabilityalso rose from 47 in December 2009 to 130 in December 2011. Institutions that continue to miss payments and problem institutions may have difficulty ever fully repaying their CPP investments.
GAOs analysis showed that the remaining CPP institutions were financially weaker than institutions that had exited the program and institutions that did not receive CPP capital. In particular, the remaining CPP institutions tended to be less profitable and hold riskier assets than other institutions of similar asset size. Among other things, they had significantly lower returns on average assets and higher percentages of noncurrent loans than former CPP and non-CPP institutions. They also held less regulatory capital and reserves for covering losses. Although GAOs analysis found differences in the financial health of remaining and former CPP institutions, Treasurys quarterly financial analysis of CPP institutions did not distinguish between them. In prior work, GAO has noted the importance of providing clear information to Congress and the public about the performance of the assistance provided through the various programs within the Troubled Asset Relief Program. By distinguishing between remaining and former CPP participants, Treasury could provide greater transparency about the financial health of institutions remaining in CPP.
What GAO Recommends
To provide Congress and the public with more transparent and comprehensive information on institutions remaining in CPP and enhance its reporting, the Secretary of the Treasury should consider analyzing and reporting on remaining and former CPP participants separately. Treasury stated that it would carefully consider our recommendation. |
gao_GGD-98-96 | gao_GGD-98-96_0 | This procedure entails additional calculations to account for underpayment balances that may remain from previous payment periods. These additional calculations are necessary to comply with the definition of the term “underpayment” in section 6654(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. The 15-Day Periods Between ES Interest Rate Dates and ES Payment Dates Increase the Number of Calculations Taxpayers Have to Make
To determine their ES penalties, taxpayers must calculate the interest on the underpayment amount for the number of days it was outstanding, that is, the number of days between when the taxpayer should have made the ES payment and the earlier of (1) when the payment was actually made, or (2) the 15th day of the 4th month following the close of the taxable year (April 15 for a taxpayer using a calendar-year basis). Specifically, aligning the July 1, October 1, and January 1 interest rate effective dates with the June 15, September 15, and January 15 ES payment dates, respectively, would eliminate the 15-day ES penalty calculations. Expanding the special rule would have little effect on ES penalty amounts, either increasing or decreasing them for the affected 15-day periods, depending on the direction of the interest rate change. The Requirement to Adjust the ES Penalty Formula for Leap Year Related Changes Increases the Number of Calculations Taxpayers Have to Make
Under current IRS procedures, taxpayers who have outstanding underpayment balances that extend through the end of a leap year must make separate calculations to account for the change from a 366- to a 365-day year regardless of whether there is an interest rate change on January 1. This change would increase ES penalty amounts by 0.3 percent during the period affected. Conclusions
To help ensure compliance with the Internal Revenue Code and IRS administrative requirements, the Form 2210 requires taxpayers to perform numerous calculations to track individual underpayment amounts and to determine precise ES penalty amounts. In three instances, the additional calculations did not seem to be justified because they resulted in either little or no change in penalty amounts. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
To simplify the ES penalty process for taxpayers, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revise the Form 2210 underpayment schedule to allow taxpayers to track the accumulated underpayment amount rather than individual underpayment amounts and revise the Form 2210 ES penalty calculation schedule to allow taxpayers to use a 365-day year in all ES penalty calculations. 6-9). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the: (1) Internal Revenue Code and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative requirements that cause some of the complexity associated with estimated tax (ES) penalty calculations; and (2) likely effects of corresponding changes to the requirements that would make it easier for taxpayers to calculate their ES penalties.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to help ensure compliance with the Internal Revenue Code and IRS administrative requirements, form 2210 requires numerous calculations to track individual ES underpayments and to determine precise ES penalty amounts; (2) GAO identified three requirements where the additional calculations did not seem to be justified because they resulted in either little or no effect on ES penalty amounts; (3) the form 2210 underpayment schedule, which currently requires that taxpayers track each underpayment individually, results in a complicated procedure, involving numerous calculations, to comply with the definition of underpayment in the Code; (4) GAO found that if taxpayers were allowed to track the accumulated underpayment amounts rather than if individual amounts and if a corresponding change were made to the ES penalty underpayment period, taxpayers could reduce the number of calculations without affecting ES penalty amounts; (5) taxpayers currently have to make additional ES penalty calculations to account for three of the four 15-day periods between ES interest rate effective dates and ES payment dates; (6) if interest rates change, this requirement increases the number of calculations taxpayers must make but only increases or decreases the penalties by small amounts; (7) in 1986, Congress eliminated this requirement for the 15-day period between April 1 and April 15 by aligning the interest rate effective date with the ES payment date; (8) similar alignments for the other three 15-day periods during the year would eliminate the calculations taxpayers must make for the 15-day periods and have little effect on ES penalty amounts; (9) to account for leap years, taxpayers currently have to make additional ES penalty calculations when underpayment balances extend either through the end of the leap year or the end of the year preceding a leap year; and (10) GAO found that, if taxpayers were allowed to use a 365-day year in all ES penalty calculations, they could eliminate the additional calculations and the penalties for the periods affected would increase by a very small amount--only 0.3 percent. |
gao_GAO-04-131T | gao_GAO-04-131T_0 | The trapped energy warms the earth’s climate, much as glass in a greenhouse. In addition to the emissions intensity goal and domestic elements intended to help achieve it, the President’s February 2002 climate initiative includes (1) new and expanded international policies, such as increasing funding for tropical forests, which sequester carbon dioxide, (2) enhanced science and technology, such as developing and deploying advanced energy and sequestration technologies, and (3) an improved registry of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. While U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have increased significantly, the Energy Information Administration reports that U.S. emissions intensity has generally been falling steadily for 50 years. Administration’s Public Documents Provide a Context But Not a Specific Basis for the 18-percent Goal
The Administration explained that the Initiative’s general goal is to slow the growth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but it did not explain the basis for its specific goal of reducing emissions intensity 18 percent by 2012 or what a 4-percent reduction is specifically designed to accomplish. Reducing emissions growth by 4 percentage points more than is currently expected would achieve the general goal, but—on the basis of our review of the fact sheets and other documents--we found no specific basis for establishing a 4-percentage-point change, as opposed to a 2- or 6- percentage-point change, for example, relative to the already anticipated reductions. Because economic output will increase faster than emissions between 2002 and 2012, according to EIA’s projections, emissions intensity is estimated to decline from 183 tons per million dollars of output in 2002 to 158 tons per million dollars in 2012 (a 14-percent decline) without the Initiative, and to 150 tons per million dollars under the Initiative (an 18- percent decline). Administration’s Public Documents Estimated Contributions for Some, but Not All, of the Initiative’s Elements
The Administration identified 30 elements (26 in February 2002 and another 4 later) that it expected would help reduce U.S. emissions by 2012 and, thus, contribute to meeting its 18-percent goal. These 30 elements include regulations, research and development, tax incentives, and other activities. The Administration groups them into four broad categories, as described below. Providing incentives and programs for renewable energy and certain industrial power systems. Three efforts relating to automotive technology and two other elements are expected to improve fuel economy. Promoting domestic carbon sequestration. Challenging business to reduce emissions. We have concerns about some of the 19 emission reduction elements for which the Administration did not provide savings estimates. In five cases, an estimate is provided for a current or recent savings level, but no information is provided about the expected additional savings to be achieved by 2012. For example, the Administration states that aluminum producers reduced their emissions by 1.8 million metric tons to meet a goal in 2000, but it does not identify future savings, if any. In two cases, it is not clear how much of the claimed savings will occur by the end of the Initiative in 2012. In one case, savings are counted for an activity that does not appear to be directly attributable to the Initiative. Because this agreement was signed before the Initiative was announced, it is not clear that the estimated reductions should be considered as additions to the already anticipated amount. Estimates for the remaining 3 of the 11 elements appear to be attributable to the Initiative in that they represent reductions beyond previous or current levels and are associated with expanded program activities. Administration’s Public Documents Do Not Discuss Plans for Monitoring Interim Progress
According to the February 2002 fact sheet, progress in meeting the 18- percent goal will be assessed in 2012, the final year of the Initiative. The fact sheets did not indicate whether the Administration plans to check its progress before 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Administration announced its Global Climate Change Initiative. It included, among other things, a goal concerning U.S. carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions, which are widely believed to affect the earth's climate. The Administration's general goal was to reduce the growth rate of emissions, but not total emissions, between 2002 and 2012. Its specific goal was to reduce emissions intensity 18 percent, 4 percentage points more than the 14 percent decline already expected. Emissions intensity measures the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per unit of economic output. In the United States, this ratio has generally decreased for 50 years or more. Under the Initiative, emissions would increase, but less than otherwise expected. GAO was asked to testify on whether the Administration's publicly available documents (1) explain the basis for the Initiative's general and specific goals, (2) identify elements to help reduce emissions and contribute to the 18 percent reduction goal, as well as their specific contributions, and (3) discuss plans to track progress in meeting the goal. This testimony is based on ongoing work, and GAO expects to issue a final report on this work later this year. Because of time constraints, GAO's testimony is based on its analysis of publicly available Administration documents.
What GAO Found
The Administration stated that the Initiative's general goal is to slow the growth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but it did not provide a basis for its specific goal of reducing emissions intensity 18 percent by 2012. Any reduction in emissions above the 14-percent reduction already anticipated would contribute to this general goal. However, GAO did not find a specific basis or rationale for the Administration's decision to establish a 4-percentage-point reduction goal beyond the already expected reductions. The Administration identified 30 elements that it expected would reduce U.S. emissions and contribute to meeting its 18 percent reduction goal by 2012. The 30 elements include a range of policy tools (such as regulations, research and development, tax incentives, and other activities) that cover four broad areas: (1) improving renewable energy and certain industrial power systems, (2) improving fuel economy, (3) promoting domestic carbon sequestration (for example, the absorption of carbon dioxide by trees to offset emissions), and (4) challenging business to reduce emissions. GAO found that the Administration provided estimates of the reductions associated with 11 of the 30 elements, but not with the remaining 19 elements. Of these 11 estimates, GAO found that 3 estimates represented future emissions reductions related to activities that occurred after the Initiative was announced. However, the other 8 estimates represented past or current emissions reductions or related to activities that were already underway before the Initiative was announced. Specifically, in five cases, an estimate is provided for current or recent reductions, but no information is provided about the expected additional savings to be achieved by 2012, the end of the Initiative. In two cases, the elements are expected to yield savings over many years, but it is not clear what emissions reductions will be achieved by 2012. In one case, savings are counted for an activity that began prior to the announcement of the Initiative. It is, therefore, unclear to what extent the 30 elements will contribute to the goal of reducing emissions and, thus, lowering emissions intensity by 2012. The Administration plans to determine, in 2012, whether the 18-percent reduction goal was met. Unless the Administration conducts one or more interim assessments, it will not be in a position to determine, until a decade after announcing the Initiative, whether its efforts are having the intended effect or whether additional efforts may be warranted. |
gao_GAO-15-777 | gao_GAO-15-777_0 | DOD Office of Small Business Programs Had Not Identified and Disseminated Cybersecurity Resources to Defense Small Businesses
DOD OSBP officials have explored some ways whereby the office could integrate cybersecurity into its existing outreach and education efforts; however, as of July 2015, the office had not identified and disseminated information about cybersecurity resources in its outreach and education efforts to defense small businesses. While DOD OSBP is not required to educate small businesses on cybersecurity, DOD OSBP officials acknowledged that cybersecurity is an important and timely issue for small businesses—and therefore the office is considering incorporating cybersecurity into its existing outreach and education efforts. We identified 15 existing federal cybersecurity outreach and education resources that the office could leverage for defense small businesses. This resource is available to defense small businesses. While DOD OSBP officials recognized the importance of identifying and disseminating cybersecurity resources through outreach and education efforts to defense small businesses, they also identified a number of factors that had, to date, limited their progress in doing so. While we recognize that these factors could affect progress, federal government internal controls state that management should ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders who may have a significant impact on the agency’s achieving its goals. While they had not yet identified or disseminated information about existing cybersecurity resources to defense small businesses, officials agreed that doing so could help the businesses to become more aware of cybersecurity practices and cyber threats. In addition, by identifying and disseminating this information, DOD OSBP could help defense small businesses to protect their networks against cyber exploits, which would support the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy goals of working with the private sector to help secure defense industrial base trade data and build layered cyber defenses. While DOD OSBP officials have recognized the importance of educating defense small businesses about cybersecurity, they have not identified and disseminated cybersecurity resources through their outreach and education efforts to businesses because they have been focused on other priorities, such as developing a training curriculum for DOD professionals who work with small businesses. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We focused our review on the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) because this office is responsible for providing small business policy advice to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and for providing policy oversight to DOD military department and DOD component small business offices, per DOD Directive 4205.01. To address the extent to which the DOD OSBP has integrated cybersecurity into its existing outreach and education efforts for defense small businesses, we analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from the DOD OSBP about its existing cybersecurity outreach and education efforts to small businesses. GAO-15-758T. | Why GAO Did This Study
Small businesses, including those that conduct business with DOD, are vulnerable to cyber threats and may have fewer resources, such as robust cybersecurity systems, than larger businesses to counter cyber threats.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO assess DOD OSBP's outreach and education efforts to small businesses on cyber threats. This report addresses the extent to which DOD OSBP has integrated cybersecurity into its outreach and education efforts to defense small businesses. DOD OSBP's mission includes providing small business policy advice to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and policy oversight to DOD military department and component small business offices.
To conduct this review, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from DOD OSBP about its cybersecurity outreach and education efforts. GAO also analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from nine organizations selected for their cybersecurity expertise to identify examples of cybersecurity outreach and education programs potentially available to defense small businesses.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) has explored some options, such as online training videos, to integrate cybersecurity into its existing efforts; however, as of July 2015, the office had not identified and disseminated cybersecurity resources in its outreach and education efforts to defense small businesses. While DOD OSBP is not required to educate small businesses on cybersecurity, DOD OSBP officials acknowledged that cybersecurity is an important and timely issue for small businesses—and therefore the office is considering incorporating cybersecurity into its existing outreach and education efforts. During the review, GAO identified 15 existing federal cybersecurity resources that DOD OSBP could disseminate to defense small businesses.
Source: GAO analysis of information from listed agencies. | GAO-15-777
While DOD OSBP officials recognized the importance of identifying and disseminating cybersecurity resources through outreach and education efforts to small businesses, they identified factors that had limited their progress in doing so. Specifically, they were not aware of existing cybersecurity resources, they had leadership turnover in the office, and the office was focused on developing a training curriculum for professionals who work with small businesses. While GAO recognizes that these factors could affect progress, federal government internal controls state that management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders who may have a significant impact on the agency's achieving its goals. DOD OSBP officials agreed that identifying and disseminating information about existing cybersecurity resources to defense small businesses could help small businesses be more aware of cybersecurity practices and cyber threats. In addition, by identifying and disseminating this information, DOD OSBP could help small businesses to protect their networks, thereby supporting the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy goals of working with the private sector to help secure defense industrial base trade data and build layered cyber defenses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD identify and disseminate cybersecurity resources to defense small businesses. DOD concurred with the recommendation and agreed to implement training events and education programs. |
gao_GAO-04-296 | gao_GAO-04-296_0 | Since September 2001, DOD has activated about 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel. During the summer of 2003, public concerns were raised in the Tampa area about the practices used at MacDill to acquire off-base lodging for reservists and temporary office space for coalition partners in the war against Iraq. Questions were also raised about whether the contract providing office space for coalition partners supporting military operations in Iraq was adequately managed to avoid excessive costs. MacDill used BPAs as a flexible procurement method to obtain lodging at prices that were at or below the maximum allowable GSA rate of $93 per day for Tampa. MacDill also implemented installation guidance that required reservists at certain ranks to share two-bedroom apartment units that further reduced costs on a per-person basis. MacDill officials estimate that these procedures saved about $12.6 million in off-base lodging costs in fiscal year 2003. Our review showed that the prices paid by MacDill were similar to those paid by corporate entities in Tampa for comparable lodging units, but were lower on a per-person basis due to lodging sharing arrangements. This practice allowed MacDill to achieve a cost savings of up to 55 percent of the GSA rate (table 1). Of a total of 800 reservists housed in apartments, about 600 shared two-bedroom units. As a result, the installation reported that it saved an estimated $12.6 million for off-base lodging costs by using blanket purchase agreements and requiring apartment sharing. Weaknesses in Contract Management Hamper Efforts to Assess Contract Costs
From project initiation to settlement of the contractor’s claim, the management of Coalition Village II suffered from questionable acceptance of the winning offer, poor record keeping, undocumented decisions regarding changes to the contract, and changes to contract requirements that were not properly coordinated with contracting officials. Although not all the pages of Resun’s proposal were received by the deadline, the contracting officer determined that because the first page had been received in time, the entire proposal was timely. Resun’s initial offer for the contract was $111,000, but a MacDill contracting official subsequently noted a computation error, which increased the offer to $142,755. Conclusions
MacDill Air Force Base and other installations we identified that provide lodging for reservists on extended temporary duty are often making efforts to reduce off-base lodging costs by (1) obtaining prices that are below the maximum allowable rate for lodging established by GSA and (2) requiring military personnel below specified ranks to share apartments and/or hotel rooms. We were not able to assess the basis for additional costs paid to the contractor or the extent to which costs might have been avoided or minimized because of these contract management weaknesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, thousands of National Guard and Reserve members have been activated and mobilized to military installations across the country. Some installations, like MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, where more than 3,000 reservists have been mobilized, have had to arrange for off-base lodging in local hotels and apartment buildings. In addition, MacDill, which serves as U.S. Central Command headquarters, has had to set up temporary office space for staffs of coalition partner nations. Public concerns have been raised about these arrangements. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which MacDill used cost-effective measures to provide off-base lodging for reservists and (2) whether a contract providing office space for coalition partners was adequately managed to control costs.
What GAO Found
During recent mobilizations, MacDill contracting officials used two practices that effectively reduced the overall cost of off-base lodging for reservists on extended temporary duty to below that allowed by the General Services Administration's (GSA) lodging rate. Officials used a simplified acquisition procedure--Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA)--to obtain prices that were at or below the maximum allowable GSA rate of $93 per day for Tampa, Florida. MacDill officials obtained daily lodging rates of $71 to $93 per unit for two-bedroom apartments. The BPAs also provided greater flexibility in vacating units without incurring penalties. In addition, MacDill officials reduced per person lodging costs further by implementing a roomsharing policy for personnel at certain ranks. When two reservists shared a two-bedroom unit (about 600 reservists), the cost dropped by up to 55 percent of the daily GSA rate. Overall, during fiscal year 2003, MacDill reported that it saved about $12.6 million using these practices. Our review of local rental costs showed that BPA prices were similar to those paid by corporate entities for comparable lodging units, but were lower on a perperson basis because of lodging sharing arrangements. From project initiation to settlement of the contractor's claim, the Coalition Village II contract suffered from questionable acceptance of the winning offer, poor record keeping, undocumented contracting decisions, and changes to contract requirements that were not properly coordinated with contracting officials. Although MacDill officials determined that the winning offer was received on time, only the first page of the proposal was received by the established deadline. Contract costs for the project, which was implemented under tight time constraints, increased by more than $367,000 over the winning offer of $142,755. However, due to the absence of proper documentation in the contract files, we were unable to fully assess the basis for additional costs paid to the contractor or the extent to which costs might have been avoided or minimized. |
gao_GAO-09-661T | gao_GAO-09-661T_0 | Background
As computer technology has advanced, federal agencies have become dependent on computerized information systems to carry out their operations and to process, maintain, and report essential information. Information security is thus especially important for federal agencies to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems. Federal Systems and Infrastructures Face Increasing Cyber Threats
Cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In September 2007, we reported that these threats can be unintentional and intentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified multiple sources of threats to our nation’s critical information systems, including foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, domestic criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees and contractors working within an organization. These groups and individuals have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal. Government officials are increasingly concerned about the potential for a cyber attack. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to networked operations, as digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems become more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and service of IT have moved overseas, the threat will continue to grow. Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. Agencies have experienced a wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches, underscoring the need for improved security practices. However, serious and widespread information security control deficiencies continue to place federal assets at risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, financial information at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption. Over the last several years, most agencies have not implemented controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. To illustrate, weaknesses were reported in such controls at 23 of 24 major agencies for fiscal year 2008. Furthermore, agencies did not always ensure that continuity of operations plans contained all essential information necessary to restore services in a timely manner. An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements for an agencywide information security program. ● Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: In January 2008, President Bush began to implement a series of initiatives aimed primarily at improving the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies’ efforts to protect against intrusion attempts and anticipate future threats. In summary, the threats to federal information systems are evolving and growing, and federal systems are not sufficiently protected to consistently thwart the threats. The White House, OMB, and certain federal agencies have initiated efforts that are intended to strengthen the protection of federal information and information systems. Until such opportunities are seized and fully exploited, and agencies fully and effectively implement the hundreds of recommendations by us and by IGs to mitigate information security control deficiencies and implement agencywide information security programs, federal information and systems will remain vulnerable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information security is a critical consideration for any organization that depends on information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or business. It is especially important for government agencies, where maintaining the public's trust is essential. The need for a vigilant approach to information security has been demonstrated by the pervasive and sustained computerbased (cyber) attacks against the United States and others that continue to pose a potentially devastating impact to systems and the operations and critical infrastructures that they support. GAO was asked to describe (1) cyber threats to federal information systems and cyberbased critical infrastructures and (2) control deficiencies that make these systems and infrastructures vulnerable to those threats. To do so, GAO relied on its previous reports and reviewed agency and inspectors general reports on information security.
What GAO Found
Cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. These threats can be unintentional and intentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources, such as foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees and contractors working within an organization. Moreover, these groups and individuals have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal, and cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to networked operations, as digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems become more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and service of information technology have moved overseas, the threat will continue to grow. In the absence of robust security programs, agencies have experienced a wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches, underscoring the need for improved security practices. These developments have led government officials to become increasingly concerned about the potential for a cyber attack. According to GAO reports and annual security reporting, federal systems are not sufficiently protected to consistently thwart cyber threats. Serious and widespread information security control deficiencies continue to place federal assets at risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, financial information at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption. For example, over the last several years, most agencies have not implemented controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, and information, and weaknesses were reported in such controls at 23 of 24 major agencies for fiscal year 2008. Agencies also did not always configure network devices and service properly, segregate incompatible duties, or ensure that continuity of operations plans contained all essential information. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that agencies have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements of their agencywide information security programs. To improve information security, efforts have been initiated that are intended to strengthen the protection of federal information and information systems. For example, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative was launched in January 2008 and is intended to improve federal efforts to protect against intrusion attempts and anticipate future threats. Until such opportunities are seized and fully exploited and GAO recommendations to mitigate identified control deficiencies and implement agencywide information security programs are fully and effectively implemented, federal information and systems will remain vulnerable. |
gao_GAO-09-245 | gao_GAO-09-245_0 | The BTC idea that FDA sought comment on would require that these drugs be sold only in pharmacies, and that a pharmacist’s intervention with a consumer occur before the drug could be dispensed. Drugs in the BTC class would be those determined by FDA to be nonprescription but would require the intervention of a pharmacist. For example, the number of pharmacies in a country affects the availability of BTC drugs. Arguments Made Supporting and Opposing a BTC Drug Class Reflect Disagreement on Its Impact on Health Care and Health Care Costs
Arguments that have been made supporting and opposing a BTC drug class are generally based on public health or cost considerations and reflect disagreement on the likely consequences of the establishment of such a class. Some Proponents of a BTC Drug Class Argue It Will Improve Public Health
Some of those who support a BTC drug class, including representatives of pharmacist associations and some academics, suggest that such a class would lead to improved public health through increased availability of nonprescription drugs. Opponents also raise concerns about the potential harm that might be done to consumers if pharmacists are not able to provide high-quality, reliable BTC services. Cost savings could also result from a decrease in the number of physicians’ visits. For instance, because insurers do not typically reimburse consumers for OTC drugs and thus might not provide coverage for BTC drugs, out-of-pocket expenses for consumers could increase if prescription drugs were switched to a BTC drug class and if the cost of the BTC product were greater than the previous copay. All Study Countries Have Increased Nonprescription Drug Availability, but the Impact of Restricted Nonprescription Drug Classes on Availability Is Unclear
All five study countries have increased nonprescription drug availability since 1995; however, the impact of restricted nonprescription drug classes on availability is unclear. Italy and the Netherlands established new OTC classes by making some or all nonprescription drugs available for sale at nonpharmacy outlets, while Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States switched a number of drugs from more restrictive to less restrictive drug classes. The United States required a prescription for more of the selected drugs than did the two study countries (Australia and the United Kingdom) with a BTC drug class but also had more of these drugs classified as OTC—the option that provides greatest availability— than the other four study countries. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have increased drug availability since 1995 by switching certain drugs from more restrictive to less restrictive drug classes. The classification of drugs in other countries and the existence of other classes provide little insight into the likely effect of a BTC drug class on nonprescription drug availability in the United States. Pharmacist-, Infrastructure-, and Cost-Related Issues Would Be Important Considerations if a BTC Drug Class Were Established
Pharmacist-, infrastructure-, and cost-related issues would have to be addressed before a BTC drug class could be established in the United States. If third-party payers do not reimburse consumers for drugs that were switched from prescription to BTC, consumers’ out-of-pocket expenditures could increase. Third-party payers might also be willing to cover pharmacist services. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
HHS provided comments on a draft of this report. In its comments HHS agreed that cost-related issues would have to be addressed before implementing a BTC drug class. In addition, HHS and VA provided technical comments on the report draft, which we have incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
In light of the November 2007 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) public meeting to explore the public health implications of behind-the-counter (BTC) availability of certain drugs in the United States and the fundamental change that BTC availability would represent in the U.S. drug classification system, we are updating information we first presented in our 1995 report. Specifically, we are reporting on (1) the arguments that have been made supporting and opposing the creation of a BTC drug class in the United States; (2) changes in drug availability in our five study countries since 1995 and the impact of restricted nonprescription drug classes on drug availability; and (3) issues that would be important to the establishment of a BTC drug class. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the United States, most nonprescription drugs are available over-the-counter (OTC) in pharmacies and other stores. Experts have suggested that drug availability could be increased by establishing an additional class of nonprescription drugs that would be held behind the counter (BTC) but would require the intervention of a pharmacist before being dispensed; a similar class of drugs exists in many other countries. Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not developed a detailed proposal for a BTC drug class, it held a public meeting in 2007 to explore the public health implications of BTC drug availability. GAO was asked to update its 1995 report, Nonprescription Drugs: Value of a Pharmacist-Controlled Class Has Yet to Be Demonstrated (GAO/PEMD-95-12). Specifically, GAO is reporting on (1) arguments supporting and opposing a U.S. BTC drug class, (2) changes in drug availability in five countries since 1995 and the impact of restricted nonprescription classes on availability, and (3) issues important to the establishment of a BTC drug class. GAO reviewed documents and consulted with pharmaceutical experts. To examine drug availability across countries, GAO studied five countries it had reported on in 1995 (Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and determined how 86 drugs available in all five countries were classified in each country.
What GAO Found
Arguments supporting and opposing a BTC drug class in the United States have been based on public health and health care cost considerations, and reflect general disagreement on the likely consequences of establishing such a class. Proponents of a BTC drug class suggest it would lead to improved public health through increased availability of nonprescription drugs and greater use of pharmacists' expertise. Opponents are concerned that a BTC drug class might become the default for drugs switching from prescription to nonprescription status, thus reducing consumers' access to drugs that would otherwise have become available OTC, and argue that pharmacists might not be able to provide high quality BTC services. Proponents of a BTC drug class point to potentially reduced costs through a decrease in the number of physician visits and a decline in drug prices that might result from switches of drugs from prescription to nonprescription status. However, opponents argue that out-of-pocket costs for many consumers could rise if third-party payers elect not to cover BTC drugs. All five countries GAO studied have increased nonprescription drug availability since 1995 by altering nonprescription classes or reclassifying some drugs into less restrictive classes. Italy and the Netherlands, which previously allowed nonprescription drugs to be sold only at specialized drug outlets, made some or all of these drugs available for OTC sale. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States switched certain drugs from more restrictive to less restrictive drug classes, increasing these drugs' availability. However, the impact of restricted nonprescription drug classes on availability is unclear. When we examined the classification of 86 selected drugs in the five countries, we found that the United States required a prescription for more of those drugs than did Australia or the United Kingdom--the study countries using a BTC drug class. However, the United States classified more of the 86 drugs as OTC--the option that provides greatest access to these drugs for consumers--than all four of the other study countries. Pharmacist-, infrastructure-, and cost-related issues would have to be addressed before a BTC drug class could be established in the United States. For example, ensuring that pharmacists provide BTC counseling and that pharmacies have the infrastructure to protect consumer privacy would be important. Issues related to the cost of BTC drugs would also require consideration. For example, the availability of third-party coverage for BTC drugs would affect consumers' out-of-pocket expenditures and pharmacists' compensation for providing BTC services would need to be examined. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agreed that cost-related issues would have to be addressed before implementing a BTC drug class and also provided technical comments. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) also reviewed the report and provided technical comments. We have incorporated HHS and VA technical comments as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-98-184 | gao_HEHS-98-184_0 | While the estimated health insurance offer rates between large and small employers differ markedly, the offer rates among medium and large employers vary moderately by firm size and industry and somewhat more widely by state. Medium employers that do not offer health coverage generally have access to health insurance but may decide for various reasons that they do not need to offer health benefits as part of their employee compensation package or may consider the cost of providing health coverage to be too high relative to their profits or employees’ wages. At the state level, the estimated offer rate among medium and large employers ranged from a low of about 72 percent in Wyoming and Texas to almost 100 percent in 14 states. The higher offer rates were concentrated in the Northeast, including the six New England states, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Differences in Offer Rates Reflect Firms’ Wage Levels and Other Traits
Although the likelihood of a firm’s offering health insurance is strongly linked with its size, whether an employer offers health coverage to its workers also depends on the characteristics of its workforce, the cost of providing health insurance, the firm’s financial condition, and the competitive environment in which it operates. For employees earning lower wages, paying the required share of premium costs may be prohibitive. Some research literature indicates that firms with high labor turnover rates are less likely to offer health insurance. As table 3 shows, in 1997, 31 percent of part-time employees were eligible for their employer-sponsored health insurance compared with 82 percent of full-time employees. Uninsured part-time employees accounted for about 27 percent of the 19.9 million uninsured wage and salary workers in 1997. As the evidence presented above shows, virtually all medium and large firms have access to health insurance. 104-191, Aug. 21, 1996) directed us to examine the extent to which classes of large employers in the different states have access to health insurance and the circumstances for the lack of access, if any. In consultation with the offices of the committees interested in the subject matter, we agreed to report on (1) the extent to which medium and large employers in different states and categories have access to health insurance and the barriers (if any) that these employers face in obtaining health insurance; (2) major factors, including health insurance costs, that affect employers’ decisions to offer health insurance; and (3) the extent to which employees are eligible for and covered by their employers’ health insurance. People may decline to enroll for a variety of reasons, including not being able to afford the insurance or having coverage through another source, such as another family member’s coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the extent to which classes of large employers in different states have access to health insurance and the circumstances surrounding the lack of access, if any, to coverage, focusing on: (1) the extent to which medium and large employers in different categories and states have access to health insurance and the barriers, if any, these employers face in seeking health insurance; (2) major factors that affect employers' decisions to offer health insurance; and (3) the extent to which employees are eligible for their employer-provided health plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) virtually all medium and large employers have access to group health insurance, and about 90 percent actually offer health coverage to their employees; (2) the larger the firm the more likely it is to offer health insurance; (3) employers that do not offer health insurance are likely to be influenced by a variety of factors such as firm size, the wage level, and health insurance premiums; (4) sponsorship of health insurance by medium and large employers varies moderately by industry sector and somewhat more widely by state; (5) across the states, estimated offer rates among medium and large employers ranged from 72 percent in Wyoming to close to 100 percent in 14 states in 1993; (6) the highest offer rates were concentrated in the Northeast, including the six New England states, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; (7) the propensity of an employer to offer health insurance depends not only on the firm's size but on other, often interrelated workforce and firm characteristics, including employee earnings, labor turnover, and health insurance cost; (8) by contrast, some medium employers may be less likely to offer coverage if they believe that lower-wage employees would not enroll in the plans; (9) in addition, medium employers may be less likely to offer coverage if insurers charge high premiums to cover the higher administrative costs of handling smaller groups or the greater variability of a smaller group's costs due to a catastrophic medical case; (10) data on the prevalence of these circumstances are not available; (11) some employees of medium and large firms do not have access to their employers' sponsored health plan because of eligibility requirements; (12) the eligibility rate of part-time employees was about 31 percent in contrast to a rate of more than 80 percent for full-time workers in 1997; (13) although the majority of part-time employees nationwide have coverage--mostly through another family member's job or nonemployment sources--5.4 million were uninsured in 1997; and (14) uninsured part-time employees represented about 27 percent of the roughly 19.9 million uninsured wage and salary workers that year. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-222 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-222_0 | This difference in who makes licensing decisions underscores the weight the two systems assign to economic and commercial interests relative to national security concerns. Under State’s system, Commerce is not involved, underscoring the primacy of national security and foreign policy concerns. Commerce’s system is more transparent to the license applicant than State’s system. Evolution of Export Controls for Commercial Satellites
Export control of commercial communications satellites has been a matter of contention over the years among U.S. satellite manufacturers and the agencies involved in their export licensing jurisdiction—the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the intelligence community. Commercial communications satellites were contained on the industrial list. 1.) In April 1995, the Chairman of the President’s Export Council met with the Secretary of State to discuss issues related to the jurisdiction of commercial communications satellites and the impact of sanctions that affected the export to and launch of satellites from China. The process of planning a satellite launch takes several years, and there is concern that technical discussions between U.S. and foreign representatives may lead to the transfer of information on militarily sensitive components. Technology transfer control plans are prepared by the exporter and approved by Defense. Observations on the Current Export Control System
The addition of new controls over satellites transferred to Commerce’s jurisdiction in 1996 addressed some of the key areas where the Commerce procedures are less stringent than those at State. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the military sensitivity of commercial communications satellites and the implications of the 1996 change in export licensing jurisdiction, focusing on: (1) key elements in the export control systems of the Departments of Commerce and State; (2) how export controls for commercial satellites have evolved over the years; (3) the concerns and issues debated over the transfer of commercial communications satellites to the export licensing jurisdiction of Commerce; (4) the safeguards that may be applied to commercial satellite exports; and (5) observations on the current export control system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. export control system--comprised of both the Commerce and State systems--is about managing risk; (2) exports to some countries involve less risk than to other countries and exports of some items involve less risk than others; (3) the planning of a satellite launch with technical discussions and exchanges of information taking place over several years involves risk no matter which agency is the licensing authority; (4) recently, events have focused concern on the appropriateness of Commerce jurisdiction over communication satellites; (5) this is a difficult judgment; (6) by design, Commerce's system gives greater weight to economic and commercial concerns, implicitly accepting greater security risks; and (7) by design, State's systems gives primacy to national security and foreign policy concerns, lessening--but not eliminating--the risk of damage to U.S. national security interests. |
gao_GAO-03-159 | gao_GAO-03-159_0 | In addition, consolidation of surfclam and ocean quahog quota is greater than NMFS data indicate. The governing rules of each program may have affected the extent of consolidation and the information collected. However, without clear and accurate data on quota holders and fishery-specific limits on quota holdings, it is difficult to determine whether any quota holdings in a particular fishery would be viewed as excessive, as prohibited by the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Instead, the councils let federal antitrust laws determine whether any quota holdings are excessive. Because the surfclam/ocean quahog and wreckfish programs have no specific limits on the amount of quota any one individual or entity can hold, NMFS does not routinely gather and assess information on the ownership interest of each quota holder. No Foreign-Owned Entities Currently Hold Quota
We found no evidence that foreign entities currently hold or control quota in the three IFQ programs. The Alaskan halibut and sablefish program explicitly prohibits foreign citizens and businesses from holding quota and requires all quota transfer applicants to declare themselves to be U.S. citizens or U.S. entities. In contrast, the surfclam/ocean quahog and wreckfish programs allocate quota to qualified “persons,” defined as U.S. citizens, and tie eligibility for holding quota to the requirements for owning a U.S.-documented vessel engaged in the fisheries of the United States, that is, being a U.S. citizen or in the case of a corporate owner being 75 percent owned and controlled by U.S. citizens. Economic Effects on Halibut and Sablefish Processors Varied and Are Difficult to Quantify
Some processors were adversely affected by the implementation of the halibut and sablefish IFQ program while others benefited. However, quantifying the economic effects of the IFQ program on processors is difficult because much of the data needed to measure changes in profitability are proprietary. The study estimated that halibut processors suffered a 56 percent, or $8.7 million, loss in gross operating margins because the IFQ program caused halibut prices to increase and processors’ market shares to change. While we could not validate or replicate the study’s results because the proprietary data used in the study were confidential, we identified a number of problems with the study’s methodology and scope that brings into question the reliability of the study’s estimates. Scope and Methodology
To assist in deliberations on individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs, we reviewed the Alaskan halibut and sablefish, wreckfish, and surfclam/ocean quahog programs to determine (1) the extent of consolidation of quota holdings, (2) the extent of foreign holdings of quota, and (3) the economic effect of IFQ programs on seafood processors. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist in deliberations on individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs, GAO determined (1) the extent of consolidation of quota holdings in three IFQ programs (Alaskan halibut and sablefish, wreckfish, and surfclam/ocean quahog); (2) the extent of foreign holdings of quota in these programs; and (3) the economic effect of the IFQ program on Alaskan halibut and sablefish processors.
What GAO Found
All three IFQ programs have experienced some consolidation of quota holdings. Further, consolidation of surfclam and ocean quahog quota is greater than National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data indicate, because different quota holders of record are often part of a single corporation or family business that, in effect, controls many holdings. Program rules may affect the extent of consolidation in each IFQ program. While the Alaskan halibut and sablefish program set specific and measurable quota limits, the surfclam/ocean quahog and wreckfish programs did not, relying instead on federal antitrust laws to determine whether any quota holdings are excessive. Without defined limits on the amount of quota an individual or entity can hold, it is difficult to determine if any holdings would be viewed as excessive. GAO did not identify any instances where foreign entities currently hold or control quota. While NMFS requires transfer applicants in the halibut and sablefish program to declare themselves to be U.S. citizens or U.S. entities, there is no similar requirement for the surfclam/ocean quahog and wreckfish programs. As a result, in these programs, the potential exists for the transfer of quota to foreign entities. The economic effects of the halibut and sablefish IFQ program are not uniform. Some processors were adversely affected by the IFQ program, while others benefited; however, it is difficult to quantify the actual effects. The only estimate of the program's economic effect on processors is a 2002 study commissioned by the state of Alaska. This study estimated that halibut processors experienced a 56 percent loss in gross operating margins. While GAO could not validate or replicate the study's results, its analysis of public data and the study's methodology raised several concerns about the reliability of the study's estimates. Also, the study did not take into account other factors that may affect profits, such as the diversity and value of other species processed. |
gao_GAO-13-346T | gao_GAO-13-346T_0 | According to an industry forecast, the market for government and commercial use of UAS is expected to grow, with small UAS having the greatest growth potential. This forecast estimates that the worldwide UAS market could be potentially worth $89 billion over the next decade. FAA Is Responsible for Leading Coordination Efforts across Agencies and Industry to Achieve UAS Integration
Congress has tasked FAA to lead the effort of safely integrating UAS into the national airspace, but several other federal agencies—such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—also have a role. FAA has established various mechanisms to facilitate collaboration with its partner agencies, and private sector entities to safely integrate UAS (see table 2). FAA has also involved industry stakeholders and academia through the UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee and RTCA SC-203. FAA also has agreements with a range of industry, federal research entities, universities, and international organizations to conduct research. The office will coordinate all intra-agency collaboration efforts. While collaboration mechanisms have been developed to help facilitate UAS integration into the national airspace, continued collaboration among UAS stakeholders will be critical to minimizing duplication of research and addressing implementation obstacles. Meeting the 2012 Act’s Requirements Will Continue to Challenge FAA
FAA has several efforts under way to satisfy the 2012 Act’s requirements, most of which must be achieved between May 2012 and December 2015. FAA has made progress toward these selected requirements. In light of the timeframes and complicated tasks involved in achieving the requirements, in September 2012, we recommended that FAA incorporate mechanisms in its 5-year roadmap and comprehensive plan that allow for regular monitoring to assess progress toward safe and routine access of UAS into the national airspace. Incorporating regular monitoring can help FAA understand what has been achieved and what remains to be done and help keep Congress informed about this significant change to the domestic aviation landscape. FAA has taken steps to develop, but has not yet established, a program to integrate UAS at six test ranges, as required by the 2012 Act. Standards and Data Needed to Guide UAS Research and Development Efforts for Agencies
As we reported in 2012, many entities have research and development efforts under way to mitigate obstacles before UAS are allowed to operate safely and routinely in the national airspace. However, these research and development efforts cannot be completed and validated without safety, reliability, and performance standards, which have not yet been developed because of data limitations. Since UAS fly based on pre-programmed flight paths and by commands from a pilot-operated ground control station, the ability to maintain the integrity of command and control signals are critically important to ensure that the UAS operates as expected and as intended. Development of UAS Safety, Reliability, and Performance Standards
The development of standards for UAS operations is a key step in the process of safe integration and supporting research and development efforts. Without specific and permanent regulations for safe operation of UAS, federal stakeholders, including DOD and NASA, continue to face challenges and limitations on their UAS operations. Congress has highlighted the importance of UAS integration by establishing statutory requirements and setting deadlines for FAA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unmanned aircraft systems are aircraft and associated equipment that do not carry a pilot aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually controlled by pilot-operated ground stations. Although current domestic uses of UAS are limited to activities such as law enforcement, forensic photography, border security, and scientific data collection, UAS also have a wide range of other potential commercial uses. According to an industry forecast, the market for UAS is expected to grow and could be potentially worth $89 billion over the next decade. Concerned with the pace of UAS integration into the national airspace, Congress established specific requirements and set deadlines for FAA in the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 2012 Act).
This testimony discusses 1) the roles and responsibilities of and coordination among federal agencies and other UAS stakeholders involved in integrating UAS, 2) FAAs progress in complying with the 2012 Acts UAS requirements, and 3) research and development efforts by FAA and other entities to address challenges for safely integrating UAS.
This testimony is based on a 2012 GAO report. In past work, GAO analyzed FAAs efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace, the role of other federal agencies in achieving safe and routine integration, and research and development issues. GAO also conducted selected interviews with officials from FAA and other federal agencies, industry, and academic stakeholders.
What GAO Found
While Congress has tasked FAA to lead the effort of safely integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the national airspace, several federal and other entities also have a role. FAA has established various mechanisms to facilitate collaboration with these entities. For example, FAA has entered into formal agreements with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on obtaining appropriate safety data and coordinating research and development, respectively. FAA has also involved industry stakeholders and academia in the development of standards and research for UAS operations. FAA recently created the UAS Integration Office, within FAA, to coordinate all intra-agency UAS efforts and provide organizational leadership. Continued collaboration among UAS stakeholders will be critical to minimizing duplication of research and addressing implementation obstacles.
While FAA has made progress toward meeting the 2012 Act's requirements, as of January 2013, it has missed several of its deadlines. FAA continues to face challenges, with many of its efforts still in process. For example, the establishment of six test ranges for UAS operations, as required by the 2012 Act, is being delayed due to privacy concerns. Meeting the 2012 Act's requirements moving forward will require continued collaboration and significant work for FAA. In September 2012, GAO recommended that FAA incorporate mechanisms in its planning that allow for regular monitoring to assess its progress. Such mechanisms can help FAA identify what has been achieved and what remains to be done.
Research and development efforts are under way to mitigate obstacles to safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace. However, these research and development efforts cannot be completed and validated without safety, reliability, and performance standards, which have not yet been developed because of data limitations. GAO previously reported that FAA has not utilized the operational data it already possesses, such as data provided by the DOD. |
gao_GAO-06-732 | gao_GAO-06-732_0 | Program funds can be used on housing, economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and other community development activities. According to HUD’s data, CDBG recipients spend the largest percentage of their funding on public improvements and housing activities. In fiscal year 2005, recipients spent about $4.8 billion in CDBG funds to address a wide range of local needs. HUD Does Not Centrally Maintain the Data Needed to Determine Compliance with Statutory Spending Limits on Public Service Activities and Administration and Planning
HUD does not centrally maintain the data needed to determine if entitlement communities and states are complying with the statutory spending limits on public services and administration and planning. In the absence of centralized data on all recipients, we requested that HUD contact its field offices to provide data on the extent to which the 100 most populous entitlement communities had complied with the statutory spending limits in program year 2004. These entitlement communities received about one-third of the CDBG funds allocated in fiscal year 2006. Our analysis of the limited data showed that not all of these entitlement communities complied with the statutory spending limits. Of the 100 entitlement communities, 3 exceeded their public service spending limit, and 1 exceeded the administration and planning spending limit. Although HUD Uses a Risk-Based Approach to Monitor CDBG Recipients, It Lacks a Plan to Replace Monitoring Staff and Has Not Fully Involved Field Staff in Its Plans to Redesign IDIS
While HUD has implemented a risk-based monitoring strategy for the CDBG program, it has not developed a plan to ensure that it has enough staff with the skills needed to conduct monitoring or fully involved its field staff in plans to redesign IDIS, an information system they use to monitor recipients. HUD’s monitoring strategy calls for its field offices to consider various risk factors when determining which recipients to review because it has limited monitoring resources, and its workload has increased as its staffing levels have decreased. For example, 13 of the 42 field offices overseeing CDBG recipients do not have a financial specialist, and 39 percent of its field staff is eligible to retire within the next 3 years. Despite these statistics, HUD has not developed a plan to hire staff with needed skills or help manage upcoming retirements. Finally, although IDIS is one of the tools that HUD field staff use to monitor recipients, HUD headquarters has solicited little input from them on efforts to redesign IDIS. HUD Has Implemented a Clear Timeliness Policy, but Has Not Issued Similar Guidance on Other Enforcement Actions
Although HUD has issued a clear policy stating what actions it will take when entitlement communities fail to meet the statutory requirement that funds be spent in a timely manner, it has not developed similar guidance establishing a consistent framework for holding CDBG recipients accountable for deficiencies identified during monitoring. As it monitors CDBG recipients, however, HUD has the flexibility to assess other sanctions ranging from issuing a warning letter to advising the recipient to pay back CDBG funds. Entitlement communities collectively spend at or close to the limits on public services and planning and administration. Therefore, it is important for HUD to be able to report on the extent of entitlement community compliance with these limits. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. In particular, we examined (1) how recipients have used CDBG funds, including the extent to which they have funded activities that meet national program objectives, complied with spending limits, and reported accomplishments achieved with funds; (2) how HUD has monitored recipients’ use of CDBG funds; and (3) how HUD has held recipients that have not complied with CDBG program requirements accountable for their actions. Given the great flexibility that exists when taking sanctions, we believe it would be useful to provide field office staff further guidance to ensure they are treating recipients that commit similar infractions equitably. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides funding for housing, economic development, and other community development activities. In fiscal year 2006, Congress appropriated about $4.2 billion for the program. Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the CDBG program provides funding to metropolitan cities and urban counties, known as entitlement communities, and to states for distribution to nonentitlement communities. This report discusses (1) how recipients use CDBG funds, including the extent to which they comply with spending limits, (2) how HUD monitors recipients' use of CDBG funds, and (3) how HUD holds recipients that have not complied with CDBG program requirements accountable. To address these objectives, we visited 20 recipients, analyzed HUD data, and interviewed HUD staff.
What GAO Found
HUD data show that CDBG recipients spend the largest percentage of their grants on public improvements (such as water lines and streets) and housing, but HUD does not centrally maintain the data needed to determine compliance with statutory spending limits. Due to the lack of centralized data, GAO was not able to determine the extent to which all recipients have complied with statutory spending limits on public services (such as health and senior services) and administration and planning. However, data provided by HUD for the 100 most populous entitlement communities, which received about one-third of the CDBG funds allocated in fiscal year 2006, showed that not all of these entitlement communities complied with the limits. Of the 100 communities, 3 exceeded their public service spending limit, and 1 exceeded the administration and planning spending limit. Given that entitlement communities collectively spend at or close to the limits, it is important for HUD to be able to report on the extent of their individual compliance with these limits. HUD uses a risk-based approach to monitor CDBG recipients; however, it has not developed a plan to replace monitoring staff or fully involved its field staff in plans to redesign an information system they use to monitor recipients. HUD's monitoring strategy calls for its field offices to consider various risk factors when determining which recipients to review because it has limited monitoring resources, and its workload has increased as its staffing levels have decreased. For example, 13 of the 42 field offices that oversee CDBG recipients do not have a financial specialist to evaluate the financial operations of each recipient, and 39 percent of CDBG monitoring staff is eligible to retire within the next 3 years. Despite these statistics, HUD has not developed a plan to hire staff with needed skills or manage upcoming retirements. Finally, although the Integrated Disbursement and Information System (IDIS) is a tool that HUD field staff use to monitor, HUD headquarters has solicited little input from them on efforts to redesign IDIS. Although it has issued a clear policy stating what actions it will take when entitlement communities fail to meet the statutory requirement that funds be spent in a timely manner, HUD has not developed similar guidance establishing a consistent framework for holding CDBG recipients accountable for deficiencies identified during monitoring. For deficiencies other than being slow to expend funds, HUD has the flexibility to institute sanctions ranging from issuing a warning letter to advising the recipient to return funds. Although its field offices have great flexibility when taking sanctions, HUD has not issued guidance establishing a framework to ensure that they are treating recipients that commit similar infractions equitably. We found instances in fiscal year 2005 where treatment seemed inconsistent. For example, several field offices found that recipients had not documented that a funded activity met any one of the program's three national objectives, but took different actions. In the continued absence of guidance, HUD lacks a means to better ensure consistency in the sanctioning process. |
gao_GAO-16-820 | gao_GAO-16-820_0 | DOD’s Study Did Not Consistently Follow Relevant Generally Accepted Research Standards
Our analysis of the Study found that it followed some, but not all, of the relevant generally accepted research standards for research design and execution. The Study did not sufficiently mitigate limitations concerning its analysis of the required number of active-duty medical and civilian medical personnel. The Study included a limited assessment of clinical currency—the requirements necessary to maintain the skills of active-duty medical providers. The Study Did Not Fully Mitigate Limitations Concerning Its Analysis of the Required Number of Active-Duty and Civilian Medical Personnel
The Study presented data on the size and composition of the wartime active-duty medical force, also known as the “operational force.” However, the data were largely drawn from service models with known problems and not based on new analysis conducted by the Study team. While the Study clearly outlined the limitations of its service-oriented approach, the Study did not fully mitigate them, such as by explaining how these limitations affected the results of the analysis. Absent such efforts to address these limitations, DOD will not have a full assessment of its medical workforce needs. Having accurate workload information is important to establishing a sound standard for maintaining the clinical skills of medical providers. The Study Established Goals for Transferring Health Care into Its Own Network of Hospitals and Clinics and Increasing the Productivity of Providers without a Strategy Explaining How These Goals Would Be Achieved
The Study, in developing its findings and recommendations, assumed that DOD would be successful in its goals for transferring health care from patients being treated in DOD’s purchased private-sector network into its own military treatment facilities, as well as in achieving related goals for improving provider productivity. Without a strategy that incorporates leading practices, it remains unclear whether or how DOD can achieve its goals to transfer health care from the purchased care network into its own network of facilities. DOD’s Estimate of Cost Savings from Changes to Small Hospitals Did Not Fully Reflect Key Practices
DOD’s estimated cost savings for the recommended changes to 10 small hospitals and the related achievement of goals related to transfer of health care to DOD facilities and increased active-duty provider productivity included a net estimate of savings and costs, but did not fully reflect key practices for cost and cost savings estimates. First, the Study did not provide an appropriate level of detail concerning the calculation of the estimated cost savings or the assumptions upon which they were based. Second, the Study’s predicted net savings estimate did not include all potentially significant costs. Construction costs, if applicable, at facilities losing or gaining active- duty providers: The Study recommended that a number of inpatient facilities be closed or converted to ambulatory surgery centers, but our analysis found that the Study did not identify estimated costs associated with these changes. The Study’s recommendations for further analysis and work in a number of areas position DOD, over time, to explore these areas and take actions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the MHS. To strengthen ongoing efforts to analyze the costs of medical force readiness and establish clinical currency standards, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take steps to identify and mitigate limitations regarding the standard for maintaining providers’ clinical skills, including improving the accuracy of information concerning providers’ workload and conducting an analytically rigorous calculation of active-duty providers’ time devoted to military-specific responsibilities. To strengthen any future assessments of additional changes to DOD’s network of military treatment facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take the following two actions: describe steps taken to assess the reliability of data supporting the assessment, including, at a minimum, the sources of data, data limitations, and efforts to test data reliability; and include in any accompanying cost estimates an appropriate level of detail, all significant costs, and an assessment of the reliability of the data supporting the cost estimate. Appendix I: Selection of Generally Accepted Research Standards Relevant for the Military Health System Modernization Study
To guide our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Report on Military Health System Modernization (the Study), we identified relevant generally accepted research standards for the design, execution, and presentation of findings that define a sound and complete study. a. Defense Health Care: Applying Key Management Practices Should Help Achieve Efficiencies within the Military Health System. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD initiated the Study to address perceived weaknesses within the Military Health System and to leverage advances in civilian business practices. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for DOD to submit the Study to the congressional defense committees and for GAO to review the Study. DOD submitted its study in February 2016. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which the Study followed an approach that is consistent with relevant generally accepted research standards and utilized key practices for estimating cost savings. GAO compared the Study with generally accepted research standards that were developed by reviewing research literature and DOD guidance and with key practices derived from cost-estimating guidance.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) approach in its Report on Military Health System Modernization (the Study) did not consistently follow relevant generally accepted research standards for research design and execution. While the Study's recommendations position DOD, over time, to take actions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Military Health System, GAO found a number of shortcomings, including the following:
The Study did not fully mitigate limitations identified in its analysis of the required number of active-duty and civilian medical personnel. For example, the Study did not explain how known issues with the military services' workforce models affected the results of its requirements analysis. Without addressing such limitations, DOD will not have a full assessment of its medical workforce needs.
The Study did not sufficiently identify or mitigate limitations concerning its assessment of the requirements necessary to maintain the skills of active-duty medical providers. For example, although there were limitations concerning the accuracy of information on medical providers' workload, the Study did not identify or mitigate these limitations. Having accurate workload information is important to establishing a sound standard for maintaining the clinical skills of medical providers.
The Study established goals for transferring health care from DOD's purchased care network into its own network of hospitals and clinics and for increasing the productivity of active-duty medical providers, but did not develop a strategy explaining how these goals would be achieved. Without such a strategy it remains unclear whether DOD can achieve its goals to transfer health care from the purchased care network into its own network.
DOD's estimated cost savings did not fully utilize key practices for developing such estimates. DOD estimated net annual savings of $366 million from changes to 10 small hospitals and achievement of its goals for recapturing health care and increasing the productivity of active-duty health care providers. However, DOD did not include in its estimate an appropriate level of detail concerning the calculation of estimated savings, all potentially significant costs, or a description of the steps taken by the Study team to assess the reliability of cost data used to develop the estimate. For example, the Study recommended that a number of inpatient facilities be closed, but GAO's analysis found that the Study did not identify estimated costs associated with these changes. As a result, DOD's cost savings estimate did not present a full and accurate picture of possible costs and savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD conduct a new analysis of the required number of active-duty and civilian medical personnel that mitigates known limitations; identify and mitigate limitations regarding the standard for maintaining providers' clinical skills; develop a strategy for achieving its goals for transferring health care to DOD facilities and increasing the productivity of active-duty providers; and, when considering proposed changes to facilities, include in any accompanying cost estimates an appropriate level of detail. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-247T | gao_GAO-09-247T_0 | Principles for Large- Scale Federal Financial Assistance Efforts Could Guide Congressional Consideration of Auto Manufacturers’ Requests
We have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering large-scale federal assistance efforts. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government’s interests. Identify and define the problem: The government should clearly identify and define the specific problems confronting the industry— separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. General Motors and Ford have not been profitable since at least 2006, and sales have decreased substantially for the Big 3 in 2008. In this regard, deteriorating financial and real estate markets, weakening labor markets, and high fuel prices have contributed to reductions in consumers’ demand for new vehicles, particularly less fuel-efficient vehicles. Determine national interests and set clear goals and objectives that address the problem: After defining the problem, Congress must determine whether a legislative solution best serves the national interest. It is important that the legislation include a clear and concise statement of the objectives and goals of the assistance program. Protecting the government’s interest: Because these assistance programs pose significant financial risk to the federal government, appropriate mechanisms should be included to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. 3. Using the Principles As A Framework for Considering Financial Assistance for the Auto Manufacturing Industry
Congress could apply these principles if it decides to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that the systemic, economic consequences of risking the immediate failure of any or all of these companies are too great, a two-pronged approach in applying the principles could be appropriate. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government’s interests. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. While the exact membership of a board to provide financial assistance to the Big 3 auto manufacturers could differ, past federal financial assistance efforts suggest that it would be prudent to include representatives from agencies knowledgeable about the auto manufacturing industry as well as from those agencies skilled in financial and economic analysis and assistance. In addition, the board should be required to provide periodic reports to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the economy has worsened, sales of the "Big 3" (General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is considering, immediate federal financial assistance. This testimony discusses principles that can serve as a framework for considering the desirability, nature, scope, and conditions of federal financial assistance. Should Congress decide to provide financial assistance, we also discuss how these principles could be applied in these circumstances. The testimony is based on GAO's extensive body of work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s.
What GAO Found
From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government's interests. First, problems confronting the industry must be clearly defined--separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government's interests. |
gao_NSIAD-98-69 | gao_NSIAD-98-69_0 | Backlogs Exist at Some Consulates
Nine of the 26 consulates we reviewed, including the one in Sao Paulo, experienced backlogs in processing nonimmigrant visas to the United States in fiscal year 1997. The backlogs ranged from 8 to 52 days and occurred primarily during peak travel seasons for tourists. State does not systematically compile information on visa processing turnaround times at overseas posts nor has it established a time standard for processing visas. Peak periods generally occur during the summer months or winter holiday season. Sao Paulo Visa Processing Backlogs
At the consulate in Sao Paulo, Brazil, turnaround times varied depending on the visa processing method involved. Inadequate consular staffing at overseas posts and other staffing-related issues were identified as barriers to timely processing of visas by the majority of posts that we reviewed. Inadequate Computer Equipment, Consular Facilities, and Other Resources
Consular officials pointed to inadequate computer and other equipment as further barriers to efficient visa processing. An Appointment System. Although State has taken a number of actions to improve its visa-processing operations, it has not made a systematic effort to identify and address visa-processing backlogs on a global basis. Timeliness standards could also help State’s efforts to implement better work load management practices and to improve long-range planning for staffing and other resource needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how Department of State consulates process visas for visitors (nonimmigrants) to the United States, focusing on the: (1) extent and nature of visa processing backlogs in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and at other consulates; (2) factors affecting consulates' ability to process nonimmigrant visas in a timely manner; and (3) activities planned or under way to improve nonimmigrant visa processing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) visa processing backlogs are a problem for some consulates, including the one in Sao Paulo; (2) the visa backlogs at the consulates GAO reviewed varied widely, ranging from 8 to 52 days; (3) the longest delays occurred during peak travel periods such as the summer months and winter holiday season; (4) factors that affected consulates' ability to process nonimmigrant visas in a timely manner included inadequate consular staffing and other staffing-related issues as well as inadequate computer systems, facilities, and other equipment; (5) an increased emphasis on preventing the entry of illegal immigrants, terrorists, and other criminals also contributed to delays; (6) State has initiatives under way to address staffing problems, upgrade equipment, and identify and implement practices that could improve visa processing at overseas posts; and (7) however, it does not systematically gather data on visa processing turnaround times and has not yet set specific timeliness standards to help guide its improvement program. |
gao_GAO-06-142T | gao_GAO-06-142T_0 | The Administration’s Draft Proposed “Working for America Act”
The draft proposed “Working for America Act” is intended to ensure that agencies are equipped to better manage, develop, and reward employees to better serve the American people. Importantly, the draft proposal, as we understand it, incorporates many of the key practices of more market-based and performance-oriented pay systems and requires that OPM certify that each agency’s pay for performance system meet prescribed criteria. Under the draft proposal, OPM is to design a new core classification and pay system and agencies, in coordination with OPM, are to establish performance appraisal systems to promote high performance. OPM Certification
As I noted, before implementing any human capital reforms, executive branch agencies should follow a phased approach that meets a “show me” test. That is, each agency should be authorized to implement a reform only after it has shown it has met certain requirements, including an assessment of its institutional infrastructure and an independent certification by OPM of the existence of this infrastructure. Going forward, I believe that OPM should define in regulation what it will take in terms of fact-based and data-driven analyses for agencies to demonstrate that they are ready to receive this certification. OPM’s Roles and Responsibilities
OPM should play a key leadership and oversight role in helping individual agencies and the government as a whole work towards overcoming a broad range of human capital challenges. However, it is unclear whether OPM has the current capacity to discharge its new responsibilities. Labor Management Relations and Adverse Actions and Appeals
The Administration’s draft proposal would amend some provisions of Title 5 of the U.S. Code covering labor management relations and adverse actions and appeals. Selected federal agencies have been implementing more market-based and performance-oriented pay for some time—some organizations for well over a decade—and thus they have built a body of experience and knowledge about what works well and what does not that allows the sharing of lessons learned. On the other hand, the federal government has had far less experience in changes regarding labor management relations and adverse actions and appeals. Congress granted DHS and DOD related new authorities in these areas and may wish to monitor the implementation of those authorities, including lessons learned, before moving forward for the rest of the federal government. Next Steps for Human Capital Reform
Moving forward with human capital reform, in the short term, Congress should consider selected and targeted actions to continue to accelerate the momentum to make strategic human capital management the centerpiece of the government’s overall transformation effort. Highlights of Selected GAO Reports
The federal government must have the capacity to plan more strategically, react more expeditiously, and focus on achieving results. Critical to the success of this transformation are the federal government’s people— its human capital. A key question is how to update the federal government’s compensation system to be market-based and more performance-oriented. Market-based and more performance-oriented pay cannot be simply overlaid on most organizations’ existing performance management systems. While implementing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems is both doable and desirable, organizations’ experiences show that the shift to market-based and more performance-oriented pay must be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives. To begin to make this change, organizations need to build up their basic management capacity at every level of the organization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government must have the capacity to plan more strategically, react more expeditiously, and focus on achieving results. Critical to the success of this transformation are the federal government's people--its human capital. We have commended the progress that has been made in addressing human capital challenges in the last few years. Still, significant opportunities exist to improve strategic human capital management to respond to current and emerging 21st century challenges. A key question, for example, is how to update the federal government's classification and compensation systems to be more market-based and performance-oriented. The Administration's draft proposed "Working for America Act" is intended to ensure that agencies are equipped to better manage, develop, and reward their employees. Under this proposal, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is to design a new core classification and pay system, among other things. In addition, the draft proposal amends some provisions of Title 5 covering labor management relations and adverse actions and appeals. This testimony presents preliminary observations on the draft proposal; presents the principles, criteria, and processes for human capital reform; and suggests next steps for selected and targeted actions.
What GAO Found
GAO supports moving forward with appropriate human capital reforms and believes that implementing more market-based and performance-oriented pay systems is both doable and desirable. Importantly, broad-based human capital reform must be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives and cannot be simply overlaid on existing ineffective performance management systems. In addition, organizations need to build up their basic management capacity and must have adequate resources to properly design and effectively implement more market-based and performance-oriented systems. Before implementing dramatic human capital reforms, executive branch agencies should follow a phased approach that meets a "show me" test. That is, each agency should be authorized to implement a reform only after it has shown it has met certain conditions, including an assessment of its related institutional infrastructure and an independent certification by OPM that such infrastructure meets specified statutory standards. In any event, OPM's and agencies' related efforts should be monitored by Congress. Given the above, GAO has the following observations on the draft proposal. Congress should make pay and performance management reforms the first step in government-wide reforms. The draft proposal incorporates many of the key principles of more market-based and performance-oriented pay systems and requires that OPM certify that each agency's pay for performance system meets prescribed criteria. Going forward, OPM should define in regulation what it will take in terms of fact-based and data-driven analyses for agencies to demonstrate that they are ready to receive this certification and implement new authorities. OPM should play a key leadership and oversight role in helping individual agencies and the government as a whole work towards overcoming a broad range of human capital challenges. OPM's role would be expanded in several areas under the draft proposal. It is unclear whether OPM has the current capacity to discharge these new responsibilities. Congress should move more cautiously in connection with labor management relations and adverse actions and appeals reforms. Selected federal agencies have been implementing more market-based and performance-oriented pay systems for some time and thus they have built a body of experience and knowledge about what works well and what does not that allows the sharing of lessons learned. On the other hand, the federal government has had far less experience in changes regarding labor management relations and adverse actions and appeals. Congress may wish to monitor the Departments of Homeland Security's and Defense's implementation of related authorities, including lessons learned, before moving forward in these areas for the rest of the federal government. |
gao_GAO-11-672 | gao_GAO-11-672_0 | Agencies Established Different Requirements and Levels of Oversight for Acquisition Planning
HHS, DHS, NASA, and USAID established policies that set different requirements and levels of oversight for acquisition planning to balance oversight with time and administrative burden. In particular, HHS, DHS, and NASA each require written acquisition plans that align closely with the elements defined in the FAR. Guidance at all four agencies state that cost estimates and requirements documents should be prepared during acquisition planning, and DHS and NASA guidance include the consideration of lessons learned from previous contracts as part of acquisition planning. Agencies Have Different Requirements for Reviewing and Approving Acquisition Planning Documents
Agencies’ requirements for who must review and approve acquisition planning documents vary, particularly for written acquisition plans. Agencies Missed Opportunities to Build Strong Foundations for Services Contracts
Agencies did not always use the acquisition planning process to the fullest extent possible to develop a strong foundation for the contracts we reviewed, but some have identified ways to encourage improved acquisition planning. We found that important planning steps were not performed at all, could have been used more fully to improve acquisition planning, or were not documented for future use. In particular, we found that agencies faced challenges defining their needs, documented cost estimates to varying degrees, and documented lessons learned to a limited extent. We identified several practices agencies use to support program staff with acquisition planning activities, including hiring personnel who specialize in procurement business issues and cost and price analysis, and providing detailed templates to assist in preparing key documents. Agencies Have Not Established Time Frames for When Program Offices Should Begin Acquisition Planning
Most agency components have established expected time frames for the last phase of acquisition planning—beginning when the program and contracting offices finalize a request for contract package. However, none of the agency components have measured and described in guidance the time needed for program offices to develop and obtain approvals of key acquisition planning documents—including statements of work, cost estimates, and written acquisition plans, if required—during the pre- solicitation phase, which serves as the foundation for the acquisition process. Agencies have also not measured the time needed during the procurement request phase to finalize these documents in collaboration with contracting offices. To take fuller advantage of important acquisition planning elements and to ensure that information is available for future use, we recommend that the Secretaries of HHS and DHS and the Administrators of NASA and USAID direct their procurement offices to ensure that agency and component guidance clearly define the role of cost estimating and incorporating lessons learned in acquisition planning, as well as specific requirements for what should be included in documenting these elements in the contract file. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to assess (1) the extent to which agencies have developed policies and procedures related to acquisition planning; (2) how agencies have carried out acquisition planning in the areas of requirements definition, cost estimates, and lesson learned in selected cases; and (3) the extent to which agencies’ guidance provides time frames for when to begin and how long acquisition planning activities should take. four civilian agencies that obligated the most on these types of services in fiscal year 2009: the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Management Comments: USAID concurs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Civilian agencies obligated over $135 billion in fiscal year 2010 for services --80 percent of total civilian spending on contracts. Services acquisitions have suffered from inadequate planning, which can put budget, schedule, and quality at risk. GAO was asked to examine how civilian agencies conduct acquisition planning for services contracts and assessed (1) the extent to which agencies have developed policies and procedures for acquisition planning, (2) how agencies have carried out acquisition planning, and (3) the extent to which agencies' guidance identifies when to begin and how long acquisition planning should take. GAO reviewed acquisition planning at the four civilian agencies with the most spending on professional, administrative, and management support services. GAO also reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions; agency regulations and guidance; and 24 selected contracts; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have established policies that set different requirements and levels of oversight for acquisition planning. Acquisition planning elements--including written acquisition plans, requirements development, cost estimation, and incorporation of lessons learned--are critical to the process. HHS, DHS, and NASA require written acquisition plans that align closely with elements defined in the FAR--USAID does not. All four agencies' guidance include preparing cost estimates and requirements documents during acquisition planning, and DHS and NASA guidance include the consideration of lessons learned from previous contracts in acquisition planning. Agencies' requirements for oversight vary, including who reviews and approves acquisition planning documents. Agencies did not always take full advantage of acquisition planning to develop a strong foundation for the contracts GAO reviewed, but some have identified ways to encourage improved acquisition planning. Key planning steps were not performed, could have been better used to improve acquisition planning, or were not documented for future use. In particular, GAO found that agencies faced challenges defining their needs, documented cost estimates to varying degrees, and documented lessons learned to a limited extent. GAO identified several practices agencies use to support program staff with acquisition planning, including hiring personnel who specialize in procurement business issues and cost and price analysis and providing templates to assist in preparing key documents. Most agency components have established time frames for the last phase of acquisition planning--beginning when the program and contracting offices finalize a request for contract package. None of the agency components, however, have measured and provided guidance on the time frames needed for program offices to develop and obtain approvals of key acquisition planning documents during the pre-solicitation phase--which serves as the foundation for the acquisition process--or to finalize these documents in collaboration with contracting offices during the procurement request phase.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID establish requirements for written acquisition plans and that each agency enhance guidance for cost estimating and lessons learned; DHS, NASA, and USAID concurred. GAO also recommends that each agency establish time frames for pre-solicitation activities. NASA and USAID generally concurred but DHS did not, noting that existing policy states that planning should begin as soon as a need is identified. GAO clarified its recommendation to emphasize pre-solicitation planning activities. HHS had no comments. |
gao_GAO-10-189 | gao_GAO-10-189_0 | In response, VA initiated a process known as the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES)—a comprehensive, long-range assessment of its health care system’s capital asset requirements. Costs Have Increased for 18 of the 32 Construction Projects and Schedules for 11 Construction Projects Have Been Delayed
While about half of VHA’s ongoing major construction projects are within budget, 18 projects have experienced cost increases and 11 have experienced schedule delays. Several Projects Have Experienced Cost Increases
Eighteen of the 32 ongoing VHA major construction projects have experienced cost increases. Five projects have experienced a cost increase of more than 100 percent. We found that VA reduced the scope of some projects so that the projects would not exceed their budget. In addition to those projects that did not experience a cost increase, one project experienced a cost decrease. Some Cost Estimates Were Not Thorough
The CARES process required VA to quickly provide initial cost estimates for about 30 major construction projects. According to VA, a number of VA staff worked to produce these initial estimates, including staff that had limited cost estimating expertise. For example, VHA officials in Syracuse told us that they had about 6 weeks to prepare their initial estimate for a new spinal cord injury center, which they did by using analogous estimating techniques such as the cost-per-square foot of new construction in Syracuse. Some Cost Estimates and Schedules Were Affected by Scope Changes
In two of our case studies, the scope of the project changed substantially after VA submitted its estimate to Congress. VA Is Working to Improve Estimates but Could Better Assess Risks to Costs and Schedules
VA has developed a new process for determining its initial estimates that allows for more time between VA approving a project and submitting a cost and schedule estimate to Congress. VA Does Not Have an Integrated Master Schedule for Major Construction Projects
VA does not require an integrated master schedule for major construction projects that encompasses both VA and contractor effort for all phases of the entire project and shows the relationships between various project phases (such as design, construction, and when the project is “activated” for occupancy and use). Such a risk analysis should include a determination of the largest risks to the project, a plan for mitigating those risks, and an estimate of when the project will be finished if the risks are not mitigated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we examined: (1) how costs and schedules of current Veterans Affairs (VA) major medical construction projects have changed since they were first submitted to Congress, (2) the reasons for cost and schedule changes in VA’s major medical construction projects, and (3) the actions VA has taken to address cost increases and schedule delays as well as the challenges VA faces in managing its major medical construction program. Projects were estimated to cost $75 million or more. Conducting a schedule risk analysis: A schedule risk analysis uses a good critical path method schedule and data about project schedule risks as well as Monte Carlo simulation techniques to predict the level of confidence in meeting a project’s completion date, the amount of time contingency needed for a level of confidence, and the identification of high-priority risks. Reasons for the Project
VA initiated the medical center project under the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) process between 2003 and 2004 because, according to VA officials, the increase in the number of Iraq war veterans needing medical care combined with the growth in the Las Vegas area supported building a large medical center. Project Cost
The cost of the medical center has increased from an initial estimate of $286 million in 2004 to a current estimate of $600.4 million (an increase of 110 percent). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates one of the largest health care systems in the country. As of August 2009, VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA) had 32 major ongoing construction projects with an estimated total cost of about $6.1 billion and average cost per project of about $191 million. Some of these projects were initiated as part of VA's Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) process, which was a comprehensive assessment of VHA's capital asset requirements. In response to a congressional request, GAO (1) described how costs and schedules of current VHA major construction projects have changed, (2) determined the reasons for changes in costs and schedules, and (3) described the actions VA has taken to address cost increases and schedule delays. To do its work, GAO reviewed construction documents, visited three construction sites, and interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
While about half of the 32 major ongoing construction projects are within their budget, 18 projects have experienced cost increases and 11 have experienced schedule delays since they were first submitted to Congress. Five projects have experienced a cost increase of over 100 percent. For example, the cost of a new medical center in Las Vegas rose from an initial estimate of $286 million to over $600 million, an increase of about 110 percent. Thirteen projects have experienced cost increases of between 1 and 100 percent. In addition, 11 projects have experienced schedule delays, 4 of which are more than 24 months. There are several reasons for construction project cost increases and schedule delays, including VA preparing initial cost estimates that were not thorough, significant changes to project scope after the initial estimate was submitted, and unforeseen events such as an increase in the cost of construction materials. According to VA officials, VA prepared numerous estimates during the CARES process, and some of these estimates used rudimentary estimating techniques such as average cost-per-square-foot and were completed by VA staff that did not have cost estimating expertise. The scope of some projects changed after VA submitted an estimate to Congress, which increased the projects' costs. For example, the scope for the original design for a new medical center in Las Vegas did not fully account for the amount of medical services the center would need to provide. As a result, the original estimate of $286 million rose to over $600 million. VA has taken steps to improve initial construction project cost estimates, but could better assess the risks to costs and schedules. VA plans to prepare more comprehensive estimates after approving projects and before submitting them to Congress. It is not clear how effective this new process will be, but it could improve VA's estimates. While VA contractors follow construction scheduling procedures that generally meet best practices, VA does not conduct cost or schedule risk analyses, which use statistical techniques to predict risks that can lead to cost increases and schedule delays. Thus, VA cannot quantify the largest risks to a project or mitigate those risks. For example, GAO conducted a schedule risk analysis for a medical center in Las Vegas and found that there is a 50 percent chance that the project won't be finished until more than 6 months after its estimated completion date. VA also does not require an integrated master schedule that includes VA and contractor efforts for all project phases, which can be critical to a project's success. |
gao_GAO-10-273T | gao_GAO-10-273T_0 | PCASG Fund Recipients Used PCASG Funds to Support Primary Care Services by Hiring Health Care Providers and Other Staff and Adding Services and Sites
PCASG fund recipients that responded to our October 2008 survey reported that they used PCASG funds to hire or retain health care providers and other staff, add primary care services, and open new sites. Recipients also said that the PCASG funds helped them improve service delivery and access to care for the patients they served. These patients had over 1 million encounters with a health care provider, two-thirds of which were for medical and dental care and one-third of which were for mental health care. 1.) Of the 23 recipients that responded to our survey, 17 reported they used PCASG funds to retain health care providers, and 15 of these reported that they also used grant funds to retain other staff. In addition, PCASG fund recipients also reported using grant funds to add or expand specialty care or ancillary services. In addition, they reported that the PCASG funds helped them improve access to health care services for residents of the greater New Orleans area. Other Federal Hurricane Relief Funds Helped PCASG Fund Recipients to Pay Staff, Purchase Equipment, and Expand Mental Health Services to Help Restore Primary Care
PCASG fund recipients also used other federal hurricane relief funds to help support the restoration of primary care services. According to LDHH data, as of August 2008, 11 PCASG fund recipients expended $12.9 million of the SSBG supplemental funds that were awarded to Louisiana and that the state designated for primary care. The two PCASG fund recipients that received a total of almost $12 million in SSBG supplemental funds designated for mental health care used those funds to provide crisis intervention, substance abuse, and other mental health services, mostly through contracts to other organizations and providers. The majority of funds were expended on the categories LDHH identified as “substance abuse treatment and prevention services,” “immediate intervention and crisis response services,” and “behavioral health services for children and adolescents.”
As of August 2008, most of the 25 PCASG fund recipients had retained or hired a health care provider who had received a Professional Workforce Supply Grant incentive payment to continue or begin working in the greater New Orleans area. PCASG Fund Recipients Face Multiple Challenges and Have Various Plans for Sustainability
PCASG fund recipients face significant challenges in hiring and retaining staff, as well as in referring patients outside of their organizations, and these challenges have grown since Hurricane Katrina. In addition, 16 of the 23 recipients reported that retaining health care providers was a great or moderate challenge. Among those, about three-quarters also reported that this challenge had grown since Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, HRSA designated all of Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes, and much of Jefferson Parish, as HPSAs for primary care. Beyond challenges in hiring and retaining their own providers and other staff, PCASG fund recipients that responded to our survey reported significant challenges in referring their patients to other organizations for mental health, dental, and specialty care services. PCASG Fund Recipients Are Taking Actions to Address the Challenge of Sustainability, but Are Concerned About What Will Happen When PCASG Funds Are No Longer Available
In our July 2009 report on the PCASG, we found that an additional challenge that the PCASG fund recipients face is to be sustainable after PCASG funds are no longer available in September 2010. LPHI officials told us that they expect that some PCASG fund recipients might have to close, and others could be forced to scale back their current capacity by as much as 30 or 40 percent. LPHI and a PCASG fund recipient have identified additional potential approaches for securing revenues to decrease what LPHI estimated would be a $30 million gap in the PCASG fund recipients’ annual revenues when PCASG funds are no longer available. Although PCASG fund recipients have completed or planned actions to increase their ability to be sustainable and have received guidance from LPHI, it is unclear which recipients’ sustainability strategies will be successful and how many patients recipients will be able to continue to serve. With the availability of PCASG funds scheduled to end in less than 10 months, preventing disruption in the delivery of primary care services could depend on quickly identifying and implementing workable sustainability strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The greater New Orleans area--Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes--continues to face challenges in restoring health care services disrupted by Hurricane Katrina which made landfall in August 2005. In 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded the $100 million Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant (PCASG) to Louisiana to help restore primary care services to the low-income population. Louisiana gave PCASG funds to 25 outpatient provider organizations in the greater New Orleans area. GAO was asked to testify on (1) how PCASG fund recipients used the PCASG funds, (2) how recipients used and benefited from other federal hurricane relief funds, and (3) challenges recipients faced and recipients' plans for sustaining services after PCASG funds are no longer available. This statement is based on a recent GAO report, Hurricane Katrina: Federal Grants Have Helped Health Care Organizations Provide Primary Care, but Challenges Remain (GAO-09-588), other GAO work, and updated information on services, funding, and sustainability plans, which we shared with HHS officials. For the report, GAO analyzed responses to an October 2008 survey sent to all 25 PCASG fund recipients, to which 23 responded, and analyzed information related to other federal funds received by PCASG fund recipients. GAO also interviewed HHS and Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
PCASG fund recipients reported in 2008 that they used PCASG funds to hire or retain health care providers and other staff, add primary care services, and open new sites. For example, 20 of the 23 recipients that responded to the GAO survey reported using PCASG funds to hire health care providers, and 17 reported using PCASG funds to retain health care providers. In addition, most of the recipients reported that they used PCASG funds to add primary care services and to add or renovate sites. Recipients also reported that the grant requirements and funding helped them improve service delivery and expand access to care in underserved neighborhoods. As of September 2009, recipients used PCASG funds to support services for almost 252,000 patients, who had over 1 million interactions with a health care provider. Other federal hurricane relief funds helped PCASG fund recipients pay staff, purchase equipment, and expand mental health services to help restore primary care. According to data from the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 11 recipients received HHS Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) supplemental funds designated by Louisiana for primary care, and 2 received SSBG supplemental funds designated by Louisiana specifically for mental health care. The funds designated for primary care were used to pay staff and purchase equipment, and the funds designated for mental health care were used to provide a range of services including crisis intervention and substance abuse prevention and treatment. Most of the PCASG fund recipients benefited from the Professional Workforce Supply Grant incentives. These recipients hired or retained 69 health care providers who received incentives totaling over $4 million to work in the greater New Orleans area. PCASG fund recipients face multiple challenges and have various plans for sustainability. Recipients face significant challenges in hiring and retaining staff, as well as in referring patients outside of their organizations, and these challenges have grown since Hurricane Katrina. For example, 20 of 23 recipients that responded to the 2008 GAO survey reported hiring health care providers was a great or moderate challenge, and over three-quarters of these 20 recipients reported that this challenge had grown since Hurricane Katrina. PCASG fund recipients also reported challenges in referring patients outside their organization for mental health, dental, and specialty care services. Although all PCASG fund recipients have completed or planned actions to increase their ability to be sustainable, recipients are concerned about what will happen when PCASG funds are no longer available. Officials of the Louisiana Public Health Institute, which administers the PCASG locally, expect that some recipients might have to close and others could be forced to scale back capacity by as much as 30 or 40 percent. They have suggested strategies to decrease what they estimate would be a $30 million gap in annual revenues when PCASG funds are no longer available. With the availability of PCASG funds scheduled to end in less than 10 months, preventing disruptions in the delivery of primary care services could depend on quickly identifying and implementing workable sustainability strategies. |
gao_AIMD-98-25 | gao_AIMD-98-25_0 | For DOD, mission assets, such as submarines, ships, aircraft, and combat vehicles, is a major category of property, plant, and equipment. Implementing Guidance Needed to Ensure Consistent and Timely Reporting of Deferred Maintenance
Neither DOD nor the Navy have developed implementing guidance for determining and disclosing deferred maintenance on financial statements. Navy officials said that they are reluctant to develop their procedures until DOD issues its guidance. As we reported in our September 30, 1997, letter, the guidance is important to ensure consistency among the military services and to facilitate the preparation of DOD-wide financial statements. DOD guidance for applying the deferred maintenance definition to aircraft is essential to consistent reporting by all of the military services since each service operates aircraft. The views on how to apply the deferred maintenance standard to the aircraft maintenance process ranged from considering only the work needed on grounded aircraft to estimating the cost of repairing all maintenance problems identified on all aircraft during inspection, whether the aircraft “failed” or not. Other views expressed by DOD and Navy officials of what should be reported as deferred maintenance fell between the two described previously. 6 allows agencies to decide what “acceptable condition” means and what maintenance needs to be done to keep assets in that condition. Applicability of the reporting requirements - DOD and the military services need to determine whether deferred maintenance should be reported for assets that are not needed for current requirements. Also, if DOD chooses to disclose deferred maintenance for all reported assets, including maintenance on assets exceeding current operating requirements, identifying the types of assets included in the deferred maintenance disclosure may be another way to differentiate between critical and noncritical. Agency Comments
In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense agreed that it must consider the key issues identified in the report as it develops implementing guidance and policy for reporting deferred maintenance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to develop guidance for disclosing deferred maintenance on aircraft, focusing on deferred maintenance on mission assets of Navy aircraft.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the development of DOD and Navy policy and implementing guidance for deferred maintenance is essential to ensure consistent reporting among the military services and to facilitate the preparation of accurate DOD-wide financial statements, particularly since the new accounting standard provides extensive management flexibility in implementing the disclosure requirement; (2) Navy officials stated that they were reluctant to develop procedures to implement the required accounting standard until DOD issues overall policy guidance; (3) GAO's September 30, 1997, letter points out the need for accelerating DOD plans to issue implementing guidance to the military services; (4) DOD and Navy officials have expressed numerous views as to how to apply the deferred maintenance standard to aircraft; (5) since numerous views exist, GAO believes it is even more important for clear guidance to be developed; (6) the opinions ranged from including only maintenance needed on grounded aircraft to including all maintenance needs identified during aircraft inspections; (7) in formulating the DOD and Navy guidance, GAO believes key issues must be resolved to allow for consistent reporting within the Navy, among the military services, and from year to year, including: (a) what constitutes acceptable operating condition in aircraft; and (b) when unperformed maintenance on aircraft becomes deferred maintenance; (8) in addition, DOD needs to address in its implementing guidance: (a) whether the deferred maintenance standard should be applied to certain groups of assets, such as equipment (for example, aircraft engines) for which there is no current operational requirement; and (b) whether the reported deferred maintenance should differentiate between critical and noncritical and, if so, what constitutes critical. |
gao_T-RCED-96-112 | gao_T-RCED-96-112_0 | HUD’s Management Deficiencies
In February 1995, we reported that HUD’s top management had begun to focus attention on overhauling the Department’s operations to correct its long-standing management deficiencies—an ineffective organizational structure, an insufficient mix of staff with the proper skills, weak internal controls, and inadequate information and financial management systems.The agency had formulated a new management approach and philosophy that included balancing risks with results, had begun implementing a substantial reorganization of field offices, and had initiated a number of other actions that would address the four management deficiencies. Accordingly, we believe that both now and for the foreseeable future, the agency’s programs will be high-risk in terms of their vulnerability to waste, fraud, and abuse. Specifically, for a large proportion of this housing, the government is paying more to house lower-income families than what is needed to provide them decent, affordable housing. The insured multifamily properties also expose the federal government to substantial current and future financial liabilities from default claims. The economic net worth of FHA’s single-family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (Fund) continued to improve in fiscal year 1994. Public Housing Management and Budget Problems
The nation’s 3,300 PHAs do not all have severe management problems nor do they share the same problems. We believe that these legislative and regulatory changes will help maintain PHAs’ financial health. Future Federal Housing and Community Development Policy
HUD’s serious management and budget problems have greatly hampered its ability to carry out its wide-ranging responsibilities. High-Risk Series: Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/HR-95-11, Feb. 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed management and budget problems facing the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) weak internal controls, an ineffective organizational structure, an insufficient staff skill mix, and inadequate information and financial management systems have hampered HUD ability to carry out its mission and led to GAO designating HUD as a high-risk area in January 1994; (2) despite some progress in curing management deficiencies, problems persist and, as a result, will likely continue to make HUD vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse; (3) HUD and Congress must try to reduce excessive housing subsidies, address the physical inadequacies of insured multifamily properties, maintain the single-family insurance fund's financial health, address public housing's social, management, and budget problems, and contain the costs of renewing housing subsidy contracts for lower-income families; (4) Congress and HUD also need to reexamine and reach consensus on housing and community development policy; and (5) HUD downsizing will likely affect its ability to limit financial exposure, carry out its mission, and correct Department-wide management and information system problems. |
gao_GAO-11-381 | gao_GAO-11-381_0 | EPA’s Drinking Water Enforcement Response Policy and Enforcement Targeting Tool
Under its 2009 Drinking Water Enforcement Response Policy, EPA is to identify water systems with the most serious compliance problems and direct enforcement resources to these systems. SDWIS Data from States Did Not Reliably Reflect Community Water Systems’ Violations of SDWA or the Status of Enforcement Actions
The data that states provided to EPA did not reliably reflect the frequency of community water systems’ violations of SDWA’s health-based standards, according to our analysis of EPA’s audit data for 2007 and 2009 and past EPA audit reports. Officials identified several factors, such as inadequate training, staffing, and guidance, as contributing to errors in data on violations and enforcement. For example, we estimate that the 14 states audited in 2009 did not report or inaccurately reported about 54,600—or 84 percent—of the monitoring violations committed by community water systems to SDWIS/Fed. EPA and State Officials Indicated That Violation and Enforcement Data Are Unreliable for Several Reasons
EPA and state officials responding to our survey or in interviews cited several factors as contributing to inaccuracies in SDWIS/Fed data on health-based and monitoring violations and the status of enforcement. Incomplete and Inaccurate Data on Violations and Enforcement Actions Reduce EPA’s Ability to Ensure Its Enforcement Goals Are Met
Incomplete and inaccurate data on violations and enforcement actions reduce EPA’s ability to ensure that it is achieving its goal of targeting for enforcement those systems with the most serious compliance problems. Unreported Violations and Enforcement Data Impede EPA’s Ability to Monitor and Report Progress Toward Its Strategic Objective of Reducing Exposure to Contaminants in Drinking Water
Unreported violations and enforcement data impede EPA’s ability to fully measure and communicate its progress toward meeting the strategic objective of reducing human exposure to contaminants in drinking water. For example: EPA’s 2011 national water program guidance contains an indicator for the number and percentage of systems serving less than 10,000 people with certain repeated health-based violations. However, the ability to set and reliably use an indicator of this type requires complete and accurate data on enforcement actions. Actions EPA and States Are Taking to Improve the Quality of Data in SDWIS Have Not Been Fully Successful and More Actions Are Planned
EPA and the states have taken actions over many years to identify and address the causes of incomplete and inaccurate violations data, but those efforts have not been fully successful, according to those we surveyed. Survey respondents generally reported that those audits have contributed to improvement, but EPA has discontinued them. EPA and the states also established work groups to address data management and quality. The director also requested comments from the regions’ water management directors on four proposed measures that would assist the office in monitoring the regions’ oversight of the states’ performance, including several directly related to the steps discussed above: the percentage of states within a region with which the region has an annual discussion regarding data quality; the percentage of states that have an action plan to correct deficiencies relating to drinking water compliance determinations or data reporting that were noted in the most recent EPA data verification audit; the percentage of a region’s annual PWSS grants that include grant conditions requiring the states to make compliance determinations that are consistent with drinking water regulations; and the extent to which a region is achieving EPA’s goal that 90 percent of health-based violations are completely and accurately reported to SDWIS/Fed, when a region is acting as the primacy authority for a particular rule in a state. Conducting fewer audits of state- reported data—both violations and enforcement data—will hamper the effectiveness of EPA’s oversight of the states and its ability to assess its efforts to improve data quality. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve EPA’s ability to oversee the states’ implementation of the Safe Drinking Water Act and provide Congress and the public with more complete and accurate information on compliance, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA take the following four actions: Resume data verification audits to routinely evaluate the quality of selected drinking water data on health-based and monitoring violations that the states provide to EPA. EPA partially agreed with two of our recommendations, disagreed with one, and neither agreed nor disagreed with another. EPA noted that it has implemented a number of activities to improve data quality and its ability to oversee the drinking water program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the quality of the Safe Drinking Water Information System/Federal (SDWIS/Fed) data that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses to measure community water systems’ compliance with the health-based and monitoring requirements in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), we examined the results of audits EPA conducted from 1996 through 2009 in which it assessed—for a sample of states—the completeness and accuracy of violations data those states submitted to SDWIS/Fed. We also examined survey respondents’ views on steps that EPA and the states could take to address data quality—including the adoption of particular data management tools—and ways in which the three EPA-state work groups could be more effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's drinking water is among the safest in the world, but contamination has occurred, causing illnesses and even deaths. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authorized most states, territories, and tribes to take primary responsibility for ensuring that community water systems provide safe water. EPA needs complete and accurate data on systems' compliance with SDWA to conduct oversight. GAO was asked to assess the (1) quality of the state data EPA uses to measure compliance with health and monitoring requirements of the act and the status of enforcement efforts, (2) ways in which data quality could affect EPA's management of the drinking water program, and (3) actions EPA and the states have been taking to improve data quality. GAO analyzed EPA audits of state data done in 2007, 2008, and 2009, and surveyed EPA and state officials to obtain their views on factors that have affected data quality and steps that could improve it.
What GAO Found
The data states reported to EPA for measuring compliance with health and monitoring requirements of SDWA did not reliably reflect the number of health-based and monitoring violations that community water systems have committed or the status of enforcement actions. Using data from the 14 states EPA audited in 2009, GAO estimates that those 14 states did not report or inaccurately reported 26 percent of the health-based violations that should have been reported and 84 percent of the monitoring violations that should have been reported. GAO's findings were consistent with the results of prior EPA audits. In addition, according to EPA headquarters and regional officials GAO interviewed and surveyed, state-reported data underreported the percentage of water systems with violations against which the states have taken enforcement actions. Survey respondents and other officials reported that numerous factors contribute to errors in reported data on violations and enforcement, including inadequate training, staffing, and guidance, and inadequate funding to conduct those activities. Unreported health-based and monitoring violations and incomplete enforcement data limit EPA's ability to identify water systems with the most serious compliance problems and ensure that it is achieving its goal of targeting for enforcement those systems with the most serious compliance problems. Specifically, incomplete and inaccurate data on both violations and enforcement actions affect a scoring tool EPA and the states are using to rank systems for enforcement actions. In addition, unreliable data quality impedes EPA's ability to monitor and report progress toward a strategic objective of reducing exposure to contaminants in drinking water. For example, EPA's 2011 national program guidance contains a performance measure for the number and percentage of systems with certain repeated health-based violations, but EPA's ability to reliably use this type of measure requires complete and accurate data on violations. Because of unreported violations data, EPA may not be able to report accurate performance information on systems with these violations. EPA and the states have collaborated over many years to identify and address the causes of incomplete and inaccurate violations data, but those efforts have not been fully successful, according to EPA and state officials GAO surveyed. EPA's efforts have included (1) conducting audits--discontinued in 2010 because of funding constraints--to determine the completeness and accuracy of the violations data states reported to EPA, (2) establishing three work groups to address data management and quality, and (3) urging EPA regions and states to use data management tools the agency has developed. However, EPA has encouraged but not required that its regions or the states take specific actions that could improve data quality. EPA's 2010 drinking water strategy calls for, among other things, an increase in shared data between the agency and the states. EPA also plans to redesign its drinking water data system to provide it with greater access to, and oversight of, the states' determinations of SDWA violations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to improve EPA's ability to oversee the states' implementation of SDWA and provide Congress and the public with more complete and accurate data on compliance and enforcement. EPA partially agreed with two of the recommendations, disagreed with one, and neither agreed nor disagreed with one. GAO believes that EPA needs to implement all of the recommendations to improve its ability to oversee SDWA. |
gao_GAO-17-118 | gao_GAO-17-118_0 | Rule of law assistance is an important component of U.S. efforts to build foreign partner capacity, and according to officials, includes defense institution-building and foreign partner training focused on military justice, human rights, anticorruption, and professionalization of the military. Foreign Military Financing funds account for 4 percent, $1.0 million, of DIILS disbursements for fiscal years 2013 through 2016. DIILS assesses the quality of its assistance in various ways, including implementing student surveys, conducting pre- and post- course tests, and instituting real-time classroom assessments of participants’ comprehension. Our interviews with foreign partner recipients of DIILS assistance and U.S. officials working to provide it generally reflected positive views about the quality of DIILS’s services. Since Fiscal Year 2013, DIILS Has Provided Assistance to Almost 100 Countries, with the Greatest Number of Events in Africa
For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, DIILS provided over 500 training and institution-building events to about 100 countries; that includes over 200 core rule of law events, about 200 defense institution-building events, and about 100 statutorily required human rights training events. DIILS Takes Several Steps to Assess the Quality of Its Assistance, Which Is Generally Viewed Positively by Recipients and U.S. Officials
DIILS officials provided examples of several steps that they take to assess the quality of DIILS’s assistance. DOD Has Not Assessed Whether the Size of DIILS’s Workforce Aligns with the Scope of Its Mission
The demand for DIILS’s assistance has increased over time, as summarized in table 2. Federal internal control standards highlight the need for management to conduct reviews at the functional or activity level, which may include conducting a workforce review or developing a corrective action plan, if needed. Amid increasing demand and interest in DIILS’s provision of defense- institution building assistance and statutorily required human rights training, the number of events that DIILS has provided has increased since fiscal year 2013, while its workforce has increased by a single full- time equivalent (FTE) staff, going from 28 FTE staff in 2013 to 29 FTE staff in 2016, as illustrated by figure 7. DOD officials told us that the decision was based on budget considerations rather than on an assessment of whether the size of DIILS’s workforce aligns with the scope of its mission to provide rule of law assistance. In addition, according to DIILS officials, although DIILS has the physical space to increase the capacity for the courses it holds in Newport, Rhode Island, from 50 to 75 participants, DIILS is facing logistical challenges in increasing capacity as a result of staffing constraints. Since fiscal year 2013, the demand for DIILS’s assistance has increased by nearly 50 percent. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOD successfully achieves the goal of supporting foreign nations in upholding the rule of law, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess the extent to which the size of DIILS’s workforce is aligned with the scope of its mission, including whether DIILS has sufficient staff to complete required after action reports and to increase its resident course capacity. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
House Report 114-102 includes a provision for us to review Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to work with DOD’s foreign military partners to build rule of law capacity. This report examines the extent to which, for fiscal years 2013 through 2016, (1) the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) has provided rule of law assistance to foreign partners and assessed its quality, (2) planning processes for DIILS’s rule of law efforts have considered foreign partner needs, and (3) DOD has considered whether the size of DIILS’s workforce aligns with the scope of its mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rule of law assistance is an important component of U.S. efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners to support international peace and security. DIILS is DOD's lead global resource for providing professional legal education and assistance to foreign military personnel and civilian defense officials on core rule of law issues. Such issues include military justice, anticorruption, and professionalization of the military. In addition, DIILS provides defense institution-building assistance and statutorily required human rights training to foreign partners. In fiscal years 2013 through 2016, DIILS disbursed over $24 million.
House Report 114-102 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to build partner capacity in the rule of law. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DIILS has provided rule of law assistance to foreign partners and assessed its quality and (2) DOD has considered whether the size of DIILS's workforce aligns with the scope of its mission. GAO reviewed and analyzed agency funding, planning, and organizational structure documents for fiscal years 2013 through 2016. GAO interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork in Newport, Rhode Island; Botswana; Germany; and Uganda. Locations were selected on the basis of the nature and timing of assistance.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) conducted over 500 rule of law events in almost 100 countries, and it assessed the quality of its assistance in a variety of ways. DIILS provides three types of assistance: (1) core rule of law training in the United States and abroad, (2) defense institution-building, and (3) statutorily required human rights training. DIILS takes steps to assess the quality of its assistance, such as by conducting student feedback surveys and real-time classroom assessments of students' learning. Foreign partner recipients of DIILS assistance and U.S. officials working to provide it told us they generally held positive views about the quality of DIILS's services.
Although the demand for DIILS's assistance has increased since 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not assessed whether the size of DIILS's workforce aligns with the scope of its mission. Federal internal control standards highlight the need for management to conduct reviews at the functional or activity level, including conducting a workforce review, if needed. Since fiscal year 2013, the demand for DIILS's assistance has grown by nearly 50 percent, while its workforce has increased by one full-time equivalent (FTE) staff position. According to DIILS officials, as a result of staffing constraints, DIILS staff have completed 55 percent of required after action reports, which capture lessons learned for future events; expended 55 percent of all defense institution-building funds that DOD has made available since fiscal year 2013; and faced challenges in increasing capacity of residence courses to help meet demand. According to DOD officials, DOD has declined DIILS's requests for additional FTE staff based on budget considerations and not on an assessment of whether the size of DIILS's workforce aligns with the scope of its mission. Without a clear understanding provided by such an assessment, DOD cannot adequately ensure that DIILS is effectively meeting demands for its training and assistance to foreign military officials, which may contribute to more robust rule of law systems, more accountable governments, and greater respect for human rights.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of Defense should assess the extent to which the size of DIILS's workforce is aligned with the scope of its mission. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_HEHS-97-2 | gao_HEHS-97-2_0 | On average, workers receiving DI and adult SSI beneficiaries have been receiving benefits for over 9 years and their predominant disability is mental disorders. Individuals who have responded to a mailer CDR and are found to be still disabled are not referred for full medical CDRs, and SSA sets a future CDR date. Because SSA has not finished incorporating the new CDR requirements into its plans, it is too early to determine whether the authorized funding will be adequate for all required CDRs. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Social Security
We recommend that, to the extent SSA is authorized to act, the Commissioner of SSA replace the routine scheduling for CDRs of all who receive DI and SSI program benefits with a more cost-effective process that would (1) select for review beneficiaries with the greatest potential for medical improvement and subsequent benefit termination, (2) correct a weakness in SSA’s CDR process by conducting CDRs on a random sample from all other beneficiaries, and (3) help ensure program integrity by instituting contact with beneficiaries not selected for CDRs. To determine the number of SSI beneficiaries currently due or overdue for a CDR, we used OD’s database that contains information on all SSI beneficiaries SSA has determined were due or overdue for a CDR in fiscal year 1996. In conjunction with data on the beneficiaries’ impairment, age, and other characteristics, SSA uses responses to mailer CDRs to help identify those beneficiaries most likely to have medically improved who thus should receive full medical reviews. Not available. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, focusing on: (1) the backlog of DI and SSI cases due for continuing disability reviews (CDR); (2) the number and characteristics of individuals who are due for CDR; (3) whether adequate resources are available for conducting CDR; and (4) ways to improve the CDR process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) almost half of all DI and SSI beneficiaries are due or overdue for CDR in fiscal year 1996; (2) the typical beneficiary awaiting CDR is under age 59, has been receiving benefits for an average of 8 years, is unlikely to medically improve, and has been overdue for CDR for 3 years; (3) SSA uses either a full medical examination or a mail-in form to conduct CDR, depending on the likelihood that it will find reason to terminate a recipient's benefits; (4) it is too soon to tell if authorized funding will be adequate to conduct all required CDR through 2002; (5) the SSA plan to conduct over 8 million CDR over 7 years is ambitious; and (6) SSA could improve the CDR process by reviewing beneficiaries most likely to medically improve, conducting CDR on a random sample from all other beneficiaries, and using CDR contact to determine beneficiaries' rehabilitation needs. |
gao_GAO-07-129T | gao_GAO-07-129T_0 | Last week, at the request of the Subcommittee and as we had recommended, AOC completed and sent to Congress an action plan for improving management execution of the project and its schedule. The action plan was responsive to our recommendation. However, it is too early to tell whether implementing the plan will curtail the types of schedule slippages that have occurred since the Subcommittee’s last CVC hearing and throughout the project. AOC developed this plan at the Subcommittee’s request in response to recommendations we made to AOC at the Subcommittee’s September 21 CVC hearing. Besides the actions it identified in its November 2006 action plan, AOC has been considering how to deal with the impact of passing the sequence 2 contract completion date, September 15, 2006. Problems: Required Changes to Fire Protection System and Continued Slippages in Other Important Activities Have Extended the Project’s Schedule and Completion Date
The additional time needed to make design changes to the CVC’s fire protection system has extended the project’s completion date by about 6 weeks since the Subcommittee’s September 21 CVC hearing—from September 17, 2007, according to the schedule in effect at that time, to October 26, 2007, according to the October 2006 schedule issued last week. As we indicated at the Subcommittee’s last CVC hearing, we asked our mechanical engineering consultant to reassess the status of the CVC’s air handling units in early November 2006 because the CVC’s HVAC system affects many activities, has had a number of problems, and poses significant risks to the project’s successful completion. However, in light of the recurring slippages in the HVAC system’s schedule, the system’s importance to the pretesting and final testing of the facility’s fire protection system, and the concerns expressed by AOC’s construction management contractor and the commissioning contractor, we believe prompt action is needed to resolve the concerns and ensure that the schedule for completing the HVAC system work is realistic and will be met. Delays in Completing the Expansion Spaces and the Library of Congress Tunnel
The schedule for essentially completing the construction of the House and Senate expansion spaces (currently scheduled for April 23, 2007) has slipped about 6 weeks since the Subcommittee’s last CVC hearing, and several activities important to completing these spaces have also been delayed. Indicators of Construction Progress Point to Further Delays unless AOC’s Project Execution Significantly Improves
The four indicators of construction progress that we have been tracking for the Subcommittee, together with the risks and uncertainties that continue to face the project—which we will discuss shortly—demonstrate to us that AOC will be unlikely to meet its fall 2007 project completion date unless it significantly improves its project execution. Installation of interior wall and floor stone is taking longer than expected. Even more important, the adverse impact of scope and design changes on a project’s schedule is likely to increase as the project moves toward completion. The CVC team has also identified trade stacking as a high risk. Thus, until we see that AOC has satisfactorily addressed our schedule-related concerns, we believe that the project is more likely to be completed in early 2008 rather than in the fall of 2007. Recommendations
To minimize the risks associated with the CVC’s HVAC system and the government’s ability to get the CVC completed within the current schedule and cost estimates and to give Congress and us greater confidence in the CVC team’s project schedules from this point forward, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol promptly take the following two actions: Work with the rest of the CVC team to ensure that the schedule for completing and commissioning the HVAC system is realistic, that all the work necessary for the proper and safe functioning of the HVAC system— including work in the spaces the air handling units are to serve—is completed in a timely, well-coordinated manner, and that sufficient resources will be available to meet the schedule without creating a trade- stacking problem. | Why GAO Did This Study
We are pleased to assist the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress and problems since the Subcommittee's September 21, 2006, hearing and their impact on the project's schedule; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding situation. As part of this discussion, we will address a number of key challenges and risks that continue to face the project as well as actions AOC has recently taken, and plans or needs to take, to meet its currently scheduled completion date.
What GAO Found
Since the Subcommittee's September 21 CVC hearing, the CVC team has continued to move the project's construction forward, but the project's scheduled completion date has slipped by 6 weeks, to October 26, 2007,3 and further delays are possible. The 6-week delay was attributable to problems with the project's most critical activity--the fire protection system. Under the current schedule, the construction of the House and Senate expansions spaces will be completed before the CVC's construction, but both the CVC and the expansion spaces will be available for occupancy at the same time because final acceptance testing of both is slated to be done concurrently. During the past month, the CVC team has made progress on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior floor stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. In addition, AOC sent Congress an action plan for improving its execution of the project and the project's schedule, as the Subcommittee requested and we had recommended, and this plan is responsive to our recommendations. AOC is also considering other action not discussed in this plan. Despite this progress, problems have occurred in many important activities besides the CVC's fire protection system, according to AOC's construction management contractor. Although these delays did not add time to the project's schedule this month, additional delays could do so in the future. Recently identified issues associated with the CVC's HVAC system, fire protection system, and security system--including issues associated with their coordination and testing--also pose risks to the project's scheduled completion date. In addition, concerns have arisen about AOC's ability to achieve a high-quality, complete, and usable facility within the current estimated time frame and cost now that the contractual date for completing sequence 2 construction work--September 15, 2006--has passed. In particular, there is a risk that, without negative consequences, the resolve of some major stakeholders to complete the project in a timely and efficient manner could be adversely affected. Finally, all the indicators of progress that we have been tracking for the Subcommittee, together with other risks and uncertainties, suggest that the project is likely to finish later than October 2007. It is too early to tell whether the actions identified in AOC's November 2006 action plan will be effective in curtailing additional schedule slippages. Furthermore, the concerns identified since the Subcommittee's last CVC hearing, particularly those related to the CVC's HVAC system, if not quickly addressed, could adversely affect the project's schedule. Thus, until it is clear that AOC's actions are effective in curtailing additional schedule slippages, we believe that the facility is more likely to be completed in early 2008 than in the fall of 2007. |
gao_GAO-07-340 | gao_GAO-07-340_0 | BJS is organizationally located within the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (see fig. BJS Followed Nearly All Available Quality Guidelines to Help Ensure Accuracy and Integrity of Products Issued from Police- Public Contact Surveys
BJS Fully Followed All Applicable Quality Guidelines for the Four Reports Issued from the 1999 and 2002 Police- Public Contact Surveys
For all four reports issued from the two Police-Public Contact Surveys, we found that BJS fully followed all of the review, approval, and dissemination guidelines available at the time of issuance. The data quality guidelines that BJS followed describe how agencies should review statistical information, obtain the approval of key decision makers, and publicly disseminate the information. It is important to note that, for reasons discussed later in this report, BJS officials did not believe these guidelines were applicable to its press releases in the first place. BJS cited a lack of specificity in the National Research Council’s guidelines as a basis for this conclusion. We believe, however, that while BJS’s interpretation of the guidelines was not unreasonable, there was nonetheless sufficient evidence for a different interpretation; namely, that this press release was a statistical product, that the available guidelines did apply, and that BJS was not in a position to meet 3 of 10 guidelines for the single press release issued from the 1999 survey, owing to a second factor. BJS Interpreted Guidelines as Not Applying to Press Releases, Raising Questions about the Applicability and Clarity of Certain Guidelines
In both written documentation and oral comments, BJS officials stated that they believed they were in full conformance with the National Research Council’s guidelines and disagreed with our determination that the agency was not in a position to follow 3 of 10 guidelines for the 2001 Police-Public Contact Survey press release that was issued from the 1999 survey. These guidelines were: (1) The statistical agency has recognition by policy officials of its authority to release statistical information without prior clearance. Based on its content rather than its label as a press release, and notwithstanding that the policies and procedures for developing and issuing products labeled by the Office of Justice Programs as press releases differed from policies and procedures for products it labeled as statistical products, we believe there is sufficient evidence for us to conclude that the press release issued from the 1999 Police-Public Contact Survey qualified as a statistical product to which the National Research Council’s quality guidelines appropriately apply. BJS, however, did not hold this view. Specifically, we determined that BJS was not in a position to fully follow the 3 National Research Council guidelines listed in the previous section for the 2001 press release based on the 1999 survey (the only applicable, available data quality guidelines in place in 2001) because certain noncareer appointees outside of BJS and within the Department of Justice, are vested—pursuant to the Department of Justice’s and Office of Justice Programs’ policies defining the roles and responsibilities of their noncareer appointees—with the ability to participate in the review, approval, and dissemination of press releases. (2) What key factors affected whether and how BJS followed available guidelines? Appendix II: Applicable Quality Guidelines for Statistical Products Issued by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and Other Agencies
BJS followed numerous recommended data quality guidelines designed to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of the Police-Public Contact Survey products that it issued in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006 based on its 1999 and 2002 surveys. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), a statistical agency of the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, produces a recurring national Police-Public Contact Survey documenting contacts between the police and the public, including instances involving the use or threat of force by police. BJS issues public reports and sometimes press releases from survey results. For reports and a press release issued from the 1999 and 2002 surveys (the most recent available), GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which BJS followed quality guidelines to ensure the accuracy and integrity of its survey-related products, and (2) factors that affected whether and how BJS followed available guidelines. GAO reviewed applicable federal data quality guidelines, policy and procedure documents, and interviewed current and former officials familiar with BJS.
What GAO Found
BJS followed nearly all quality guidelines for its 1999 and 2002 Police-Public Contact Surveys. Specifically, for the four public reports issued from these surveys, BJS fully followed all data quality guidelines available for reviewing statistical information, obtaining the approval of key decision makers, and publicly disseminating information. These guidelines were issued by the National Research Council, Department of Justice, Justice's Office of Justice Programs, and BJS itself. GAO believes that because BJS followed these guidelines, proper steps were taken to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of the reports. BJS followed 7 of the 10 quality guidelines available for the one press release issued from its 1999 survey, but was not in a position to fully follow 3 other guidelines for reasons discussed below. Two key factors affected whether and how BJS followed quality guidelines. The first concerned different interpretations about certain guideline applicability. BJS considered its survey-related reports--but not its press releases--to be statistical products covered by the National Research Council's guidelines. BJS cited a lack of specificity in these guidelines, which did not specifically state that they were applicable to statistical agency press releases, as a basis for concluding that the survey press releases need not conform to guidelines for statistical products. We believe BJS's position was not unreasonable, and did not find fault with the agency. However, we determined nonetheless that the single press release issued from the 1999 survey was a statistical product, and therefore believe the council's guidelines appropriately applied. Second, certain noncareer appointees outside BJS may, in accordance with Justice Department policy, make decisions about the review, approval, and dissemination of press releases, and BJS press releases are jointly issued with the Justice Department, with input from its Office of Justice Programs. Both conditions can potentially affect BJS's independence. Owing to these conditions, BJS was not, in our view, in a position to meet 3 council quality guidelines related to statistical agency independence, including that it be able to issue statistical products without prior clearance, and control the scope and content of its products. Justice affirmed several of GAO's findings but disagreed with certain GAO conclusions about the applicability of guidelines to a press release. Justice's detailed comments and GAO's response are contained in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-772 | gao_GAO-03-772_0 | The Mission of U.S. International Broadcasting
Each broadcast entity has its own legislated mandate. The Board’s New Strategic Approach
The Board’s new approach to broadcasting represents an ambitious attempt to reach larger audiences in key markets. The Board’s new strategic plan was issued in December 2002; however, development of its new approach to broadcasting began in July 2001. These initiatives include the Afghanistan Radio Network (ARN) and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. The first program under the Board’s new approach, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such as the extensive use of music formats, to improve performance in this priority market and lend support to the war on terrorism by targeting youth audiences. How much will it cost? The Board’s strategic plan includes a frank assessment of the market challenges that must be addressed to make U.S. international broadcasting more competitive. Technology. Conclusions
The Broadcasting Board of Governors’ strategic plan embodies, defines, and guides the Board’s new approach to U.S. international broadcasting, which aims to dramatically increase the size of listening and viewing audiences in markets of U.S. strategic interest while focusing on the war on terrorism. However, the Board’s plan lacks measurable program objectives, detailed implementation strategies, resource needs, and project time frames. We identified a number of key areas that could provide a starting point for developing multiyear program objectives that focus on the Board’s actual effectiveness. These measures include audience size by language service, audience awareness, broadcaster credibility, and whether VOA effectively presents information about U.S. thought, institutions, and policies to target audiences. The Board has identified a number of market and internal challenges and proposed solutions to address them. Finally, the Board needs to evaluate how many language services it can effectively carry and what level of overlap and duplication in VOA and surrogate broadcast services is appropriate. Resolving these key questions will have significant resource implications for the Board and its ability to reach large audiences in markets of priority interest to the United States. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve overall management of U.S. international broadcast operations and maximize their impact on U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors: revise the BBG’s 5-year strategic plan to include measurable program objectives, implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time frames; include audience size, audience awareness, broadcaster credibility, and VOA mission effectiveness as measurable program objectives in the strategic plan; revise the BBG’s annual performance plan to include performance goals and indicators that track the Board’s progress in implementing the multiyear program objectives established in the Board’s revised strategic plan; and revise the Board’s strategic plan to include a clear vision of the Board’s intended scope-of-operations and the appropriate level of overlap and duplication between VOA and surrogate language services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prompted by a desire to reverse declining audience trends and to support the war on terrorism, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the agency responsible for U.S. international broadcasting, began developing its new strategic approach to international broadcasting in July 2001. This approach emphasizes the need to reach mass audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority markets. GAO was asked to examine (1) whether recent program initiatives have adhered to the Board's new strategic approach to broadcasting, (2) how the approach's effectiveness will be assessed, and (3) what critical challenges the Board faces in executing its strategy and how these challenges will be addressed.
What GAO Found
Consistent with its new plan to dramatically increase the size of U.S. international broadcasting listening and viewing audiences in markets of U.S. strategic interest, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has launched several new projects, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, Radio Farda in Iran, and the Afghanistan Radio Network. These projects adhere to the Board's core strategy of identifying a target audience and tailoring each broadcast product to market circumstances and audience needs. The Board's plan lacks measurable program objectives designed to gauge the success of its new approach to broadcasting, detailed implementation strategies, resource needs, and project time frames. A number of key effectiveness measures could provide a starting point for developing measurable program objectives and related performance goals and indicators under the Board's annual performance plan. These measures include audience size in specific markets, audience awareness, broadcaster credibility, and whether the Voice of America (VOA) effectively presents information about U.S. thought, institutions, and policies to target audiences. The Board has identified a number of market and internal challenges--such as technological innovation and better coordination of its seven separate broadcast entities--that must be addressed to make U.S. international broadcasting more competitive. It has also developed a number of solutions to address these challenges. However, the Board has not addressed how many language services it can carry effectively (with the number rising nearly 20 percent over the past 10 years) and what level of overlap and duplication in VOA and surrogate broadcast services would be appropriate under its new approach to broadcasting. Resolving these questions will have significant resource implications for the Board and its ability to reach larger audiences in high-priority markets. |
gao_GAO-12-810 | gao_GAO-12-810_0 | The goal of BioWatch is to provide early warning, detection, or recognition of a biological attack. Since fiscal year 2007, DHS’s OHA has been responsible for overseeing the acquisition of this technology. DHS Did Not Fully Develop Critical Information for Initial Investment Decision Making
DHS approved the Gen-3 acquisition in October 2009, but it did not fully engage in the early phases of its acquisition framework to ensure that the acquisition was grounded in a justified mission need and that it pursued an optimal solution—for example, DHS did not fully develop a Mission Needs Statement or an Analysis of Alternatives with a cost-benefit analysis, as called for in its Acquisition Life-cycle Framework. They said that the department directed them to proceed because there was already departmental consensus around the solution. DHS Did Not Develop Complete and Reliable Performance, Schedule, and Cost Information before Approving the Gen-3 Acquisition
In October 2009, DHS approved the Gen-3 acquisition at ADE-2A— based on the information contained in acquisition documents provided by the BioWatch program—authorizing the BioWatch program to proceed with characterization testing of Gen-3 candidate technologies. Additionally, they reported that they did not account for risk in the schedule estimates that were included in the Acquisition Program Baseline for ADE-2A. to engage in a full effort to develop a Life-Cycle Cost Estimate in accordance with the GAO Cost Estimating Guide ahead of ADE-2A, but were directed by the department to proceed with the best point estimate they could derive. These changes in performance, schedule, and cost, along with maturation in the department’s acquisition management process, create an opportunity for DHS to reevaluate the mission need and alternatives in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion, and in accordance with DHS acquisitions guidance, to help ensure that it invests its limited resources in the most cost-effective solution possible. BioWatch Must Demonstrate System Performance and Receive Approval before Full Deployment, Estimated for 2022
According to DHS officials the remaining steps in the Gen-3 acquisition include performance testing, operational testing and evaluation, production, deployment, and sustainment. Collectively, the BioWatch program estimates that this testing will take approximately 3 years and cost approximately $89 million. If the BioWatch program can demonstrate that the candidate technology meets requirements and DHS approves the Gen-3 acquisition at ADE-3, the DHS June 2011 life-cycle cost estimate indicates that Gen-3 is expected to cost $5.8 billion (80 percent confidence) through June 2028. To prepare for the deployment of Gen-3, the BioWatch program must work with Gen-3 jurisdictions to prepare sites for detector placement and to develop location-specific Concepts of Operations to provide key information and considerations—such as specifying roles and responsibilities and developing public information and risk communication messages—that are integral to response operations in the event that Gen-3 detects a pathogen. Similarly, the $2.1 billion cost estimate presented to DHS decision makers and Congress for planning purposes at the start of the acquisition is now $5.8 billion (for the first 13 years of deployment; only 6 of which are for full deployment) and may still rise because of lingering uncertainty about the acquisition strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that Gen-3’s public health and risk mitigation benefits justify the costs, the program pursues an optimal solution, and DHS bases its acquisition decisions on reliable performance, cost, and schedule information developed in accordance with guidance and good practices, we recommend that before continuing the Gen-3 acquisition, the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that program and acquisition decision makers take the following two actions: 1. reevaluate the mission need and systematically analyze alternatives based on cost-benefit and risk information, using information from studies like those conducted by the Homeland Security Institute and Sandia National Laboratories, along with any other risk and cost information that may need to be developed, and 2. update other acquisition documents, such as the Acquisition Program Baseline and the Operational Requirements Document, to reflect any changes to performance, cost, and schedule information that result from the reevaluation of mission needs and alternatives. DHS concurred with both recommendations, but did not concur that these actions need to be completed before continuing with the acquisition. Our work showed that DHS does not have reasonable assurance that the solution it has been pursuing warrants investment of limited resources and that it represents an optimal solution. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2001 anthrax attacks brought attention to the potentially devastating consequences of a biological attack. DHS operates a program, known as BioWatch, intended to help detect such an attack by airborne pathogens. The currently deployed technology can take 12 to 36 hours to confirm the presence of pathogens. DHS has been pursuing a third generation of the technology that will perform automated testing, potentially generating a result in under 6 hours and reducing labor costs.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to the Gen-3 acquisition. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS used its acquisition life cycle framework to justify the need and consider alternatives; (2) DHS developed reliable performance, schedule, and cost expectations; and (3) steps remaining before Gen-3 can be deployed. GAO reviewed acquisition documentation and test results and interviewed agency officials from the BioWatch program and other DHS components with development, policy, and acquisition responsibilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved the Generation-3 (Gen-3) acquisition in October 2009, but it did not fully engage in the early phases of its acquisition framework to ensure that the acquisition was grounded in a justified mission need and that it pursued an optimal solution. Critical processes in the early phases of DHS's framework are designed to (1) justify a mission need that warrants investment of resources and (2) select an optimal solution by evaluating viable alternatives based on risk, costs, and benefits. BioWatch program officials said that these early acquisition efforts were less comprehensive and systematic than the DHS framework calls for because there was already departmental consensus around the solution. Without a systematic effort to justify the need for the acquisition in the context of its costs, benefits, and risks, DHS has pursued goals and requirements for Gen-3 with limited assurance that they represent an optimal solution. Reevaluating the mission need and systematically analyzing alternatives could provide better assurance of an optimal solution.
The performance, schedule, and cost expectations presented in required documents when DHS approved the acquisition were not developed in accordance with DHS guidance and good acquisition practices--like accounting for risk in schedule and cost estimates. BioWatch program officials said that DHS leadership directed them to prepare information quickly for the 2009 decision, which was accelerated by more than 1 year. Since DHS approved the acquisition in October 2009, the estimated date for full deployment has been delayed from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2022, and the original life cycle cost estimate for the 2009 decision--a point estimate unadjusted for risk--was $2.1 billion. In June 2011, DHS provided a risk-adjusted estimate at the 80 percent confidence level of $5.8 billion. Comprehensive and systematic information developed using good practices for cost and schedule estimating, could help ensure more reliable performance, schedule, and cost information for decision makers.
Several steps remain before DHS can deploy and operate Gen-3. First, DHS must conduct additional performance and operational testing. This testing--estimated to take 3 years and cost $89 million--is intended to demonstrate full system performance, including the information technology network. To do so, the BioWatch program must address testing challenges including limitations on the use of live pathogens, among others. Following operational testing, DHS intends to decide whether to authorize the production and deployment of Gen-3. If Gen-3 is approved, the BioWatch program plans to prepare for deployment by working with BioWatch jurisdictions to develop location-specific plans to guide Gen-3 operations. DHS estimates show that about $5.7 billion of the $5.8 billion life-cycle cost remains to be spent to test, produce, deploy, and operate Gen-3 through fiscal year 2028.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that before continuing the acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and alternatives and develop performance, schedule, and cost information in accordance with guidance and good acquisition practices. DHS concurred with the recommendations, but not the implementation timeline. DHS plans to proceed with the acquisition while implementing them to avoid further delays. However, GAO believes the recommendations should be enacted before DHS proceeds with the acquisition as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-10-855T | gao_GAO-10-855T_0 | Cloud Computing Is a Form of Shared Computing with Several Service and Deployment Models
Cloud computing is a new form of delivering IT services that takes advantage of several broad evolutionary trends in information technology, including the use of virtualization. A public cloud is available to any paying customer and is owned and operated by the service provider. A hybrid cloud is a composite of the deployment models. Cloud Computing Has Both Positive and Negative Information Security Implications
The adoption of cloud computing has the potential to provide benefits related to information security. The use of virtualization and automation in cloud computing can expedite the implementation of secure configurations for virtual machine images. Other advantages relate to cloud computing’s broad network access and use of Internet-based technologies. Additional advantages relate to the potential economies of scale and distributed nature of cloud computing. The self-service aspect of cloud computing may also provide benefits. In addition to benefits, the use of cloud computing can create numerous information security risks for federal agencies. In response to our survey, 22 of 24 major agencies reported that they are either concerned or very concerned about the potential information security risks associated with cloud computing. Several of these risks relate to being dependent on a vendor’s security assurances and practices. Multitenancy, or the sharing of computing resources by different organizations, can also increase risk. Although there are numerous potential information security risks related to cloud computing, these risks may vary based on the particular deployment model. For example, NIST states that private clouds may have a lower threat exposure than community clouds, which may have a lower threat exposure than public clouds. Several industry representatives stated that an agency would need to examine the specific security controls of the vendor the agency was evaluating when considering the use of cloud computing. Federal Agencies Have Begun Efforts to Address Information Security Issues for Cloud Computing, but Specific Guidance Is Lacking and Efforts Remain Incomplete
Federal agencies have begun to address information security for cloud computing; however, they have not developed the corresponding guidance. These agencies identified measures they are taking or plan to take when using cloud computing. Most agencies have concerns about ensuring vendor compliance and implementation of government information security requirements. Several Governmentwide Cloud Computing Information Security Initiatives Have Been Started, but Key Guidance and Efforts Have Not Been Completed
While several governmentwide cloud computing security activities are under way by organizations such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA), significant work remains to be completed. In addition, OMB has not yet defined how information security issues, such as a shared assessment and authorization process, will be addressed in this strategy. Accordingly, we recommended that OMB establish milestones for completing a strategy for implementing the cloud computing initiative and ensure the strategy addresses the information security challenges associated with cloud computing, such as needed agency-specific guidance, controls assessment of cloud computing service providers, division of information security responsibilities between customer and provider, a shared assessment and authorization process, and the possibility for precertification of cloud computing service providers. NIST Is Coordinating Activities with CIO Council but Has Not Established Cloud-Specific Guidance
NIST is responsible for establishing information security guidance for federal agencies to support FISMA; however, it has not yet established guidance specific to cloud computing or to information security issues specific to cloud computing, such as portability and interoperability, and virtualization. Federal agencies have taken steps to address cloud computing security, but many have not developed corresponding guidance. Until federal guidance and processes that specifically address information security for cloud computing are developed, agencies may be hesitant to implement cloud computing, and those programs that have been implemented may not have effective information security controls in place. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cloud computing, an emerging form of computing where users have access to scalable, on-demand capabilities that are provided through Internet-based technologies, reportedly has the potential to provide information technology services more quickly and at a lower cost, but also to introduce information security risks. Accordingly, GAO was asked to testify on the benefits and risks of moving federal information technology into the cloud. This testimony summarizes the contents of a separate report that is being released today which describes (1) the models of cloud computing, (2) the information security implications of using cloud computing services in the federal government, and (3) federal guidance and efforts to address information security when using cloud computing. In preparing that report, GAO collected and analyzed information from industry groups, private-sector organizations, and 24 major federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Cloud computing has several service and deployment models. The service models include the provision of infrastructure, computing platforms, and software as a service. The deployment models relate to how the cloud service is provided. They include a private cloud, operated solely for an organization; a community cloud, shared by several organizations; a public cloud, available to any paying customer; and a hybrid cloud, a composite of deployment models. Cloud computing can both increase and decrease the security of information systems in federal agencies. Potential information security benefits include those related to the use of virtualization and automation, broad network access, potential economies of scale, and use of self-service technologies. In addition to benefits, the use of cloud computing can create numerous information security risks for federal agencies. Specifically, 22 of 24 major federal agencies reported that they are either concerned or very concerned about the potential information security risks associated with cloud computing. Risks include dependence on the security practices and assurances of a vendor, and the sharing of computing resources. However, these risks may vary based on the cloud deployment model. Private clouds may have a lower threat exposure than public clouds, but evaluating this risk requires an examination of the specific security controls in place for the cloud's implementation. Federal agencies have begun efforts to address information security issues for cloud computing, but key guidance is lacking and efforts remain incomplete. Although individual agencies have identified security measures needed when using cloud computing, they have not always developed corresponding guidance. Agencies have also identified challenges in assessing vendor compliance with government information security requirements and clarifying the division of information security responsibilities between the customer and vendor. Furthermore, while several governmentwide cloud computing security initiatives are under way by organizations such as the Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration, significant work needs to be completed. For example, the Office of Management and Budget has not yet finished a cloud computing strategy, or defined how information security issues will be addressed in this strategy. The General Services Administration has begun a procurement for expanding cloud computing services, but has not yet developed specific plans for establishing a shared information security assessment and authorization process. In addition, while the National Institute of Standards and Technology has begun efforts to address cloud computing information security, it has not yet issued cloud-specific security guidance. Until specific guidance and processes are developed to guide the agencies in planning for and establishing information security for cloud computing, they may not have effective information security controls in place for cloud computing programs. In the report being released today, GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Commerce take steps to address cloud computing security, including completion of a strategy, consideration of security in a planned procurement of cloud computing services, and issuance of guidance related to cloud computing security. These agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-533T | gao_GAO-08-533T_0 | CBP also works with other customs organizations to enhance international supply chain security. The SAFE Port Act Requires a Pilot Program to Test the Feasibility of 100 Percent Scanning
To improve maritime container security, the SAFE Port Act was enacted in October 2006 and requires, among other things, that CBP conduct a pilot program to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. The SFI Pilot Program and 100 Percent Scanning Face a Number of Challenges
We identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) workforce planning, (2) the lack of information about host government cargo examination systems,(3) measuring performance outcomes, (4) undefined resource responsibilities for the cost and labor for implementation, (5) logistical feasibility for scanning equipment and processes, (6) technological issues, (7) the use and ownership of scanning data, (8) a perceived disparity between 100 percent scanning and the risk management approach of CBP’s international partners, and (9) potential requests for reciprocity from foreign governments. Under the CSI program, CBP operated and conducted cargo container scanning at 58 foreign seaports as of January 2008; however, given that additional scanning equipment will be used in the SFI pilot program, and fulfilling the 100 percent scanning requirement will naturally increase the number of containers to be scanned at the more than 700 seaports that ship cargo to the United States, the SFI pilot program and 100 percent scanning requirement will generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, in implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, CBP will face staffing challenges because more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze these data from participating seaports. Without outcome-based performance measures, it will be difficult for CBP and DHS managers and Congress to effectively provide program oversight and determine whether 100 percent scanning achieves the desired result—namely increased security for the United States. The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts did not require nor prohibit the federal government from bearing the cost of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers. For example, we observed that scanning equipment at some seaports is located several miles away from where cargo containers are stored, which could add to the time and cost requirements for scanning these containers. For example, cargo containers that arrive at a seaport by truck or rail are generally easier to isolate, whereas transshipment cargo containers—those moved from one vessel to another—are only available for scanning for a comparatively short time and may be more difficult to access. While the SAFE Port Act specifies that SFI pilot program scan data should be available for review by U.S. government officials, neither it nor the 9/11 Act establishes who is to be responsible for managing the data collected at foreign seaports. 100 Percent Scanning Could Lead to Calls for Reciprocity and Be Viewed as a Barrier to Trade
Implementation of the 100 percent scanning requirement could result in calls for reciprocity of scanning activities from foreign officials and be viewed as a barrier to trade. Related GAO Products
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign customs officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports. (2) Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices. (3) Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security. (4) Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning. (5) Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access. (6) Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program. (7) Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials. (8) Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats. (9) Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade. |
gao_NSIAD-95-3 | gao_NSIAD-95-3_0 | Property Sales Revenue Is Significantly Below DOD’s $1.2 Billion Estimate
The Army is credited for almost all of the $69.4 million in property sales revenue and for $5.3 million of the $22.2 million in pending sales. About $19 million of the $92 million in sales and pending sales was merely a transfer of funds from one federal agency to another—not a revenue gain for the federal government. Planned sales of 9,400 acres of property will result in additional revenue once final property disposition decisions are made and cleanup or remediation is in place. As we reported earlier, DOD has been reducing the estimates for land sales revenue as it receives better information on property values and sales data. Most Property Is Transferred to Other Federal Agencies and States and Localities at No Cost
The primary reason for the low property sales revenues is that 88 percent of the property at the bases we reviewed will be retained by DOD or transferred at no cost to other federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions. The results of our analysis show that while communities at these 16 bases are developing and implementing reuse plans for 28 percent of the total acres of the 37 bases, they have received 78 percent of the $66 million in planning and infrastructure grants. Communities Ask DOD and Other Federal Agencies for Additional Assistance
Communities are asking the federal government to provide (1) cash grants; (2) marketable revenue-producing properties, such as golf courses and housing units, to help pay for reuse activities; and (3) funds for upgrading buildings and infrastructure. DOD responsibility for environmental cleanup further delays disposal of base property. Disputes between communities and homeless providers over the extent of base property to be conveyed for the homeless have led to delays at some bases. Changing Laws and Regulations
In 1993, Congress passed legislation to expedite the base conversion process and support economic development in communities facing base closures. Military Bases: Information on Air Logistics Centers (GAO/NSIAD-90-287FS, Sept. 10, 1990). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) projected revenues from property sales from closed military bases, focusing on the: (1) revenues the government has received and expects to receive from military base property sales; (2) amount of additional resources the government has given to support communities' reuse plans; and (3) factors which delay the transfer of property to communities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) revenues from military base property sales are expected to be far less than DOD anticipated; (2) the majority of the disposed property will be retained by DOD or transferred to other federal agencies, states, and localities at no cost; (3) where Congress has not specifically authorized a property transfer without reimbursement, it has specified that agencies receiving transferred property should reimburse DOD for 100 percent of the property's estimated fair-market value or acquire a reimbursement waiver; (4) $69.4 million of the projected $92 million in revenues from military base property sales has been realized and an additional $22.2 million is expected from pending property sales; (5) about $19 million in property sales has been the result of interagency transfers; (6) DOD could increase its revenues by selling an additional 9,400 acres of military property; (7) DOD continues to reduce its property sales revenue estimates as it obtains better property value and property availability information; (8) in addition to transfers of large portions of land at no cost, many communities have asked the government for cash grants, marketable revenue-producing properties, and building and infrastructure upgrades; (9) as of May 1994, 37 communities have received $107 million in cash grants; (10) additional funding requirements will increase as the base closure process continues; and (11) reasons for the delays in property transfers include disagreements over reuse plans between competing interests, changing laws and regulations, and unresolved environmental cleanup efforts at some bases. |
gao_GAO-11-554 | gao_GAO-11-554_0 | The transfer of FPS to NPPD became effective when the fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations act was signed into law on October 28, 2009. DHS Transferred FPS’s Mission and Most Support Functions to NPPD, but Could Benefit from a Revised Schedule and Cost Estimate for Transferring IT Services
FPS’s Facility Protection Mission Has Transferred to NPPD without Disruption
In October 2009, FPS’s facility protection mission transferred and its reporting channels were shifted from ICE to NPPD. In August 2009, DHS reported to Congress that the transition would be completed by October 2010 and estimated it would cost $14.6 million. However, DHS now reports that the transfer of 4 functions will not be completed until the end of fiscal year 2011 or start of fiscal year 2012 and one of these functions will not be transferred until October 2012. As reflected in table 2, the delays in the transition schedule for the delayed mission-support functions range from almost 1 to 2 years. Specifically, DHS officials explained the following All activities for the transfer of business continuity and emergency preparedness have been completed but are waiting on NPPD to complete the building of a continuity of operations site, which according to NPPD officials, will be complete by October 2011. DHS’s transition plan called for working groups to develop comprehensive project management plans (i.e., detailed schedules) with detailed tasks and end dates for the individual mission-support functions to ensure critical path activities were identified, managed, and resourced. Because of the complexity of transferring IT services, DHS developed a detailed schedule to manage the transfer of IT services, as called for in the transition plan. Our analysis of the IT schedule found that it did not reflect our best practices for scheduling, as seen in table 4. Nevertheless, if the schedule does not fully and accurately reflect the project, it will not serve as an appropriate basis for analysis and may result in unreliable completion dates, time extension requests, and delays. Incorporating Cost Estimating Best Practices in the IT Transition Cost Estimate Could Enhance the Reliability of, and Better Inform, Decisions about the Cost to Complete the Transition
According to best practices for cost estimates, in addition to a reliable schedule, a reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program. Transition May Provide Opportunity to Address Previously Identified FPS Challenges, but It Is Too Early to Tell Its Impact
Since 2007, we have reported that FPS faces significant challenges with protecting federal facilities, and in response, FPS has started to take steps to address some of them. If successfully managed, the transfer of FPS to NPPD could provide DHS the opportunity to better advance progress towards addressing FPS’s challenges. Further, the transition plan noted that the transfer would improve the mission effectiveness of both FPS and NPPD. According to NPPD officials, the agency has undertaken actions that serve as a foundation for integrating FPS into NPPD. Second, NPPD officials stated that FPS has begun to develop a new strategic plan to align FPS’s activities and resources to support NPPD mission-related outcomes. For example, in consultation with NPPD, FPS is developing a human capital strategic plan. While these are encouraging steps, it is too early to tell if these planned actions will help address the challenges we have previously identified. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS and Congress have reliable, accurate information on the timeframes and costs of transferring FPS from ICE to NPPD, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for NPPD, in consultation with the Director of FPS and the Director of ICE, to improve the schedule for transferring IT services, in accordance with the transition plan, and to reflect scheduling best practices, and update the IT transition cost estimate, in accordance with cost- estimating best practices. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined the transition of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). To determine the extent to which the FPS transition has been implemented and what challenges, if any, FPS and NPPD faced in implementing the transition, we reviewed documents related to the transition, including the August 2009 FPS-NPPD Transition Plan, all transition plan updates, DHS delegations of authority related to the execution and administration of FPS, and Memorandum of Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding, and all service level agreements signed among FPS, NPPD, and ICE. | Why GAO Did This Study
Events such as the February 2010 attack on the Internal Revenue Service offices in Texas, and the shooting in the lobby of the Nevada federal courthouse, demonstrate the vulnerabilities of federal facilities and the safety of the federal employees who occupy them. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is the primary agency responsible for the security of over 9,000 federal government facilities across the country. The fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations act transferred FPS from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This report addresses (1) the extent to which the FPS transition has been implemented and any remaining related challenges, and (2) the extent to which the transition will help address previously identified challenges to protecting federal facilities. GAO reviewed the 2009 FPS-NPPD transition plan; agreements between FPS, NPPD, and ICE, and best practices for scheduling and cost estimating; and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
Since October 2009, FPS's facility protection mission and 13 of 18 mission-support functions have transferred from ICE to NPPD; however, the transition schedule for the 5 remaining mission-support functions has been delayed. For example, while functions such as human capital and budget formulation have been transferred, information technology (IT) services, business continuity and emergency preparedness, facilities, personnel security, and equal employment opportunity have not. In August 2009, DHS reported to Congress that the transition of these functions would be completed by October 2010. DHS now reports that it plans to complete the transfer of 4 of the 5 remaining mission-support functions by September or October 2011, and estimates that the transfer of IT services will not be complete until October 2012. DHS developed a transition plan to guide the planning and execution of the transfer. Among other things, the plan called for schedules with detailed tasks and end dates to be developed for all mission-support functions to ensure critical path activities were identified, managed, and resourced. DHS also developed a detailed schedule to manage the transfer of IT services, as called for in the transition plan. However, GAO's analysis of the schedule found that it did not reflect GAO's best practices for scheduling such as capturing, sequencing, and assigning resources to all activities necessary to accomplish the work. When a schedule does not accurately reflect the project, it will not serve as an appropriate basis for analysis and may result in unreliable completion dates and delays. As of May 2011, DHS estimated that it would cost $6.2 million to complete the IT transition. GAO's analysis of this cost estimate found it did not meet all the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. For example, the estimate was not well documented because it was not supported by detailed explanation describing how the estimate was derived and did not include sufficient detail so that GAO could corroborate it. By incorporating cost estimation best practices for the IT transition cost estimate, DHS could enhance the estimate's reliability and better inform decisions about the cost to complete the transition. The transfer of FPS to NPPD could provide DHS the opportunity to better advance progress towards addressing FPS's challenges to protecting federal facilities that have been previously identified by GAO. Since 2007, GAO has reported that FPS faces significant challenges with protecting federal facilities. The transition plan noted that the transfer of FPS to NPPD would improve the mission effectiveness of both agencies. NPPD officials explained that the agency has undertaken actions that serve as a foundation for integrating FPS into NPPD. For example, FPS has begun to develop a new strategic plan to align FPS's activities and resources to support NPPD mission-related outcomes. Additionally, NPPD is assisting FPS in developing a human capital strategic plan, as recommended by GAO in July 2009. These steps are encouraging, but it is too early to tell if these planned actions will help address challenges previously identified by GAO.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS improve the schedule for transferring IT services to reflect scheduling best practices, and update the IT transition cost estimate, in accordance with cost-estimating best practices. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-68 | gao_NSIAD-97-68_0 | Test Results Do Not Support Full-Rate Production
LRIP of the Joint STARS aircraft began in fiscal year 1993. Alternative Aircraft Should Be Considered
There is an opportunity not currently under consideration that could reduce the Joint STARS program cost and result in an improved system. Since the Joint STARS was approved for LRIP, the procurement cost objective of the Air Force’s share of the Joint STARS has increased by about $1 billion. I would ask that you underscore your personal support for our collective efforts on behalf of [Joint STARS] when you meet with your NATO and European counterparts.”
Notwithstanding DOD’s September 1996 commitment to full-rate Joint STARS production, a DOD official informed us that the NATO armament directors in their November 1996 meeting delayed for 1 year any decision on designating Joint STARS as NATO’s common system or pursuing an alternate system to be developed. However, DOD plans follow-on test and evaluation of the system to address the deficiencies identified during the system’s earlier testing. On September 20, 1996, DOT&E sent to Congress a Joint STARS “Beyond LRIP” report that (1) clearly indicates that further operational testing is needed, (2) could only declare effectiveness for operations other than war, and (3) stated that Joint STARS is unsuitable as tested. On September 25, 1996, DOD approved the full-rate production of Joint STARS. Conclusions
Notwithstanding any concurrent efforts to have Joint STARS designated as a NATO common system, Joint STARS test performance and the clearly unresolved questions about its operational suitability and affordability should have, in our opinion, caused DOD to delay the full-rate production decision until (1) the system had, through the planned follow-on operational test and evaluation, demonstrated operational effectiveness and suitability; (2) the Air Force had completed an updated analysis of alternatives for the Joint STARS to address the identified aircraft suitability and cost issues; and (3) the Air Force had developed an analysis to determine whether a cost-effective maintenance concept could be designed for the system. To determine whether DOD considered and resolved important cost and performance issues prior to making its full-rate production decision, we reviewed Joint STARS program budget documents and program-related memoranda issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated March 31, 1997. We believe, given the system’s test performance as reported by both the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command (AFOTEC) and DOT&E and the program’s procurement cost growth of $1 billion between the low-rate and full-rate production decision points, that an informed full-rate production decision required the following information: (1) an approved test and evaluation master plan for follow-on operational testing and specific plans for the tests called for in that master plan, (2) the results of the already ongoing study of ways to reduce the program’s cost, and (3) an analysis of alternatives to the current platform. As we stated in the body of our report, the program could have continued under low-rate initial production (LRIP) until operational effectiveness and suitability for combat were demonstrated and plans to address identified deficiencies and reduce program costs were completed. 4. 5. 6. 7. DOD made its Joint STARS full-rate production decision without this knowledge. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) recent decision to commit to the full-rate production of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), focusing on whether: (1) the system had demonstrated a level of maturity through testing to justify a full-rate production commitment; (2) DOD considered and resolved important cost and performance issues prior to making its decision; and (3) there are future actions that could reduce program risk.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Joint STARS' performance during its combined development and operational test and the operational evaluation done in Bosnia do not support a decision to commit the system to full-rate production; (2) the system's operational effectiveness and suitability were not demonstrated during the operational testing; (3) DOD's decision to move Joint STARS into full-rate production was premature and raised the program's level of risk; (4) the program could have continued under low-rate initial production (LRIP) until operational effectiveness and suitability for combat were demonstrated and plans to address identified deficiencies and reduce program costs were completed; (5) DOD decided in favor of Joint STARS full-rate production without the benefit of that information; (6) during the period that the full-rate production decision was being considered, the Assistant to the President for National Security was promoting the sale of the system to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); (7) in an August 10, 1996, memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant to the President stated that: "We have been working through various military, diplomatic, and political channels to secure NATO support for a fall 1996 decision in principle by the Conference of Armament Directors...to designate (Joint STARS) as NATO's common system"; (8) a DOD official informed GAO that in November 1996, the NATO armament directors delayed their decision on Joint STARS for 1 year; (9) before DOD approved the full-rate production of Joint STARS, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) provided Congress with a Joint STARS "Beyond LRIP" report; (10) the report clearly indicates that further operational testing is needed, DOT&E could only declare effectiveness for operations other than war, and the system was unsuitable as tested; (11) DOD plans follow-on test and evaluation to address the deficiencies identified during the earlier testing; (12) there is an opportunity not currently under consideration that could reduce the Joint STARS' program cost and result in an improved system; (13) since the Joint STARS was approved for LRIP, the procurement cost objective of the Air Force's share of the Joint STARS has increased by about $1 billion, primarily due to the greater effort and more resources needed to refurbish the 25- to 30-year-old Boeing 707 airframes than previously anticipated; and (14) it may now be more cost effective for the Air Force to buy the Boeing 767-200 Extended Range aircraft or some other new, more capable aircraft. |
gao_GAO-15-205T | gao_GAO-15-205T_0 | The TSISE describes, among other things, the information–sharing process. TSA is also specifically responsible for receiving, assessing, and distributing intelligence information related to potential threats and significant security concerns (rail security incidents) related to the nation’s rail system. Specifically, in 2008, TSA issued a regulation requiring U.S. rail systems to report all rail security incidents to TSA’s Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), among other things. TSA’s Office of Security Operations (OSO) is responsible for overseeing and enforcing the incident reporting requirement. TSA Has Developed Processes Designed to Integrate Stakeholder Feedback and Address Gaps in Trend Analysis
TSA Has Developed a Process Designed to Incorporate Feedback on Security-Related Information
In June 2014, we found that TSA had some mechanisms in place to collect stakeholder feedback on the products it disseminates containing security-related information and had initiated efforts to improve how it obtains customer feedback, but had not developed a systematic process for collecting and integrating such feedback. TSA Efforts Should Help Address Gaps in Conducting Trend Analysis of Rail Security Incident Information
In December 2012, we found TSA had made limited use of the rail security incident information it had collected from rail agencies, in part because it did not have a systematic process for conducting trend analysis. However, the incident information provided to rail agencies by TSA was generally limited to descriptions of specific incidents with minimal accompanying analysis. As a result, officials from passenger rail agencies we spoke with generally found little value in TSA’s incident reporting process, because it was unclear to them how, if at all, the information was being used by TSA to identify trends or threats that could help TSA and rail agencies develop appropriate security measures. TSA concurred with this recommendation and by August 2013 had developed a new capability for identifying trends in the rail security incident data, known as the Surface Compliance Trend Analysis Network (SCAN). Although we have not assessed the effectiveness of these efforts to better utilize rail security information, we believe these actions address the intent of our recommendation. TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Consistent Implementation of the Rail Security Incident Reporting Process
TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Consistency of the Rail Security Incident Reporting Process
In December 2012, we found that TSA had not provided consistent oversight of the implementation of the rail security reporting requirement, which led to considerable variation in the types and number of passenger rail security incidents reported. Specifically, we found that TSA headquarters had not provided guidance to local TSA inspection officials, the primary TSA points of contact for rail agencies, about the types of rail security incidents that must be reported, a fact that contributed to inconsistent interpretation of the regulation by local TSA inspection officials. This variation we identified was compounded by inconsistencies in compliance inspections and enforcement actions, in part because of limited utilization of oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level. On the basis of these findings, in December 2012, we recommended that TSA: (1) develop and disseminate written guidance for local TSA inspection officials and rail agencies that clarifies the types of incidents that should be reported to the TSOC and (2) enhance and utilize existing oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level, as intended, to provide management oversight of local compliance inspections and enforcement actions. TSA concurred with both of these recommendations and has taken actions to implement them. Specifically, in September 2013, TSA disseminated written guidance to local TSA inspection officials and passenger and freight rail agencies that provides clarification about the requirements of the rail security incident reporting process. TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy and Completeness of Incident Data
In December 2012, we also found that TSA’s incident management data system, known as WebEOC, had incomplete information, was prone to data entry errors, and had other limitations that inhibited TSA’s ability to search and extract basic information. On the basis of these findings, in December 2012 we recommended that TSA (1) establish a process for updating WebEOC when incidents that had not previously been reported are discovered through compliance activities, and (2) develop guidance for TSOC officials that includes definitions of data entry options to reduce errors resulting from data entry problems. Specifically, in March 2013, TSA established a process for the surface detailee position, discussed earlier in this statement, to update WebEOC when previously unreported incidents are discovered through compliance activities. Additionally, in October 2014, TSA officials reported they have updated the guidance used by TSOC officials responsible for entering incident data into WebEOC to include definitions of incident types. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. surface transportation system's size and importance to the country's safety, security, and economic well-being make it an attractive target for terrorists. Within the federal government, TSA–a component of the Department of Homeland Security–is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing and enhancing the security of the surface transportation system. A key component of this responsibility is ensuring that security-related information is collected, analyzed, and shared effectively across all modes, including rail. In 2008, TSA issued a regulation requiring U.S. passenger rail agencies to report all potential threats and significant security concerns to TSA, among other things.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) developed systematic processes for integrating stakeholder feedback about security-related information it provides and analyzing trends in reported rail security incidents and (2) ensured consistent implementation of rail security incident reporting requirements. This statement is based on related GAO reports issued in June 2014 and December 2012, including selected updates on TSA's efforts to implement GAO's prior recommendations related to rail security and information sharing. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed related documentation, including tools TSA developed to provide oversight. GAO also interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Found
In June 2014, GAO found that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not have a systematic process for incorporating stakeholder feedback to improve security-related information sharing and recommended that TSA systematically document and incorporate stakeholder feedback. TSA concurred with this recommendation and, in April 2015, TSA developed a standard operating procedure to help ensure proper evaluation and consideration of all feedback TSA receives. In December 2012, GAO found TSA had made limited use of the rail security incident information it had collected from rail agencies, in part because it did not have a systematic process for conducting trend analysis. TSA's purpose for collecting this information was to allow TSA to "connect the dots" through trend analysis. However, the incident information provided to rail agencies by TSA was generally limited to descriptions of specific incidents. As a result, officials from passenger rail agencies GAO spoke with reported that they generally found little value in TSA's incident reporting requirement. On the basis of these findings, GAO recommended that TSA establish a systematic process for regularly conducting trend analysis of the rail security incident data. Although GAO has not assessed the effectiveness of TSA's efforts, by August 2013, TSA had developed a new analysis capability that, among other things, produces Trend Analysis Reports from the incident data.
In December 2012, GAO found that TSA had not provided consistent oversight of its rail security reporting requirement, which led to variation in the types and number of passenger rail security incidents reported. Specifically, GAO found that TSA headquarters had not provided guidance to local TSA inspection officials, the primary TSA points of contact for rail agencies, about the types of rail security incidents that must be reported, which contributed to inconsistent interpretation of the regulation. The variation in reporting was compounded by inconsistencies in compliance inspections and enforcement actions, in part because of limited utilization of oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level. GAO also found that TSA's incident management data system, WebEOC, had incomplete information, was prone to data entry errors, and had other limitations that inhibited TSA's ability to search and extract basic information. On the basis of these findings, GAO recommended that TSA (1) develop and disseminate written guidance on the types of incidents that should be reported, (2) enhance existing oversight mechanisms for compliance inspections and enforcement actions, (3) establish a process for updating WebEOC with previously unreported incidents, and (4) develop guidance to reduce data entry errors. TSA concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions to implement them. Specifically, in September 2013, TSA disseminated written guidance to local TSA inspection officials and passenger and freight rail agencies that provides clarification about the rail security incident reporting requirement. In August 2013, TSA enhanced existing oversight mechanisms by creating an inspection review mechanism, among other things. TSA also established a process for updating WebEOC in March 2013, and in October 2014, officials reported that they have updated the guidance used by officials responsible for entering incident data to reduce data entry errors associated with incident types. Although GAO has not assessed the effectiveness of these efforts, they address the intent of the recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GAO-10-376 | gao_GAO-10-376_0 | Coordinated Plans and New Organizations Have Facilitated Progress in the Drawdown from Iraq, but DOD Has Yet to Plan for All Contracted Support Needed During the Drawdown
A number of DOD organizations have issued plans outlining a phased drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set forth in the Security Agreement and presidential guidance while being responsive to security conditions on the ground. In support of its plans DOD created several organizations to oversee the drawdown and ensure unity of effort. While DOD’s progress since May 2009 exceeded some of its targets, a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down within the established timelines. USF-I guidance, however, may not allow sufficient time for all contracted services needed during the drawdown to be put on contract in a responsible manner. Several Additional Challenges May Affect the Efficient Execution of the Drawdown
Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by several challenges. First, challenges associated with the planned simultaneous transition of several key contracts may lead to the interruption of vital services and wasteful contracting practices. Third, persistent shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. And lastly, DOD lacks complete visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping containers. However, these anticipated benefits may not be fully realized since DOD will have only until December 31, 2011, to realize potential cost savings before the U.S. military completely withdraws. According to DOD reports, these efforts to date have contributed to the meeting or exceeding of established goals for drawing down forces and retrograding equipment. However, while DOD has made significant progress executing the drawdown, there remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases yet to be drawn down, and several actions needed to facilitate this are incomplete. While DOD has begun to address some of these issues, none of them has yet been fully resolved. Recommendations
To facilitate DOD’s ability to efficiently conduct the drawdown of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq in accordance with established timelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate authorities to: Ensure that joint doctrine regarding operational planning for contract support is followed and that operational personnel identify contract support requirements in a timely manner to avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services; Ensure unity of effort in contract management is attained through the clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the various contract review boards in the CENTCOM theater; Assess and develop options to mitigate the risks associated with the upcoming simultaneous contract transitions in Iraq and Kuwait; Conduct an analysis of the benefits, costs, and risks of transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts in Iraq under current withdrawal timelines to determine the most efficient and effective means for providing essential services during the drawdown; Evaluate the risk of having too few qualified contract oversight personnel in light of the planned proportional increase in the number of Iraqi contractors during the drawdown and take steps to rectify, if needed; Clarify in existing planning the extent to which Kuwait and other locations in southwest Asia can support the temporary staging of equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq while DOD is finalizing the disposition instructions for certain types of equipment. To identify factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown we reviewed DOD plans and interviewed officials in the United States, Iraq, and Kuwait on issues that may hamper the progress of the drawdown. | Why GAO Did This Study
The drawdown from Iraq is a complex operation of significant magnitude. Established drawdown timelines dictate a reduction in forces to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. While DOD has made progress toward meeting these goals, a large amount of equipment, personnel, and bases remain to be drawn down. Moreover, escalating U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may increase the pressure on DOD to efficiently execute the drawdown. Due to broad congressional interest in drawdown issues, GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has planned for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with set timelines, and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown. To evaluate these efforts GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the U.S., Kuwait, and Iraq.
What GAO Found
Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown and created new organizations to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown. To date, DOD reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For example, in January 2010, DOD reported that it had exceeded its target figure for withdrawing wheeled and tracked combat vehicles in Iraq, among other items, by over 2,600 pieces, yet a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. However, DOD has not (1) fully included contracted support in its operational planning for the drawdown, (2) allowed sufficient time in its guidance to ensure that all contracted services can be put on contract in a responsible manner, or (3) clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of various contract validation review boards. Several other issues may impede the efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq. First, challenges associated with the planned simultaneous transition of several major contracts may lead to the interruption of vital services. Second, DOD has not determined whether the benefits of transitioning its major base and life support contract in Iraq outweigh the costs and risks of doing so. Third, shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Fourth, key decisions concerning equipment that will be retrograded from Iraq have yet to be made. And finally, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping containers. While DOD has begun to address some of these issues, GAO has not fully assessed DOD's actions. |
gao_GAO-11-372 | gao_GAO-11-372_0 | Shift in Approach to European Missile Defense
Another significant change that took place in 2009 was the new administration’s shift in its approach to European missile defense. MDA Undertook Steps to Improve Transparency and Accountability
Throughout 2010, MDA continued to make significant changes to its key acquisition processes in order to increase transparency and accountability and reflect acquisition best practices. While the steps taken are significant and positive, our analysis identified shortcomings in cost, schedule, and testing baselines that limit the extent to which cost and schedule growth as well as system performance can be tracked. DOD concurred with all of these recommendations. In 2010, MDA made progress in implementing these recommendations by finalizing a new baseline phase review process in which the agency set detailed baselines for several BMDS elements, or portions of elements, for the first time. Specifically, MDA established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and contract baselines for several BMDS components. As a result of MDA’s new baseline phase review process, its 2010 BAR is more comprehensive than its 2009 BAR. For the remaining 6, we found that the documentation that MDA provided contained insufficient evidence to meet the characteristics of a high- quality cost estimate. While the new IMTP still represents a significant improvement in test planning and transparency for MDA, frequent revisions to the test baseline due to test failures and/or target availability, hinders external oversight of MDA’s test baseline and the funding allocated for testing. To assist Congress in its review of this policy shift and its implications, we were asked to assess DOD’s efforts to implement the phased adaptive approach for Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe. With respect to acquisition management for the European PAA, our December 2010 report found that DOD has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes European PAA acquisition activities and ensures transparency and accountability. The consequences of these issues have included limited means of independently assessing progress and a limited basis for oversight and the department entering into production before fully demonstrating system performance, leading to rework, cost increases, delays, and uncertainties about delivered capabilities. We were mandated by the Congress in 2009 to examine a DOD assessment and plan related to the GMD system, that included issues related to acquisition, sustainment and refurbishment. We found that while the GMD system has demonstrated a limited capability, DOD has not yet determined the system’s full capabilities and limitations. However, in certain cases, the agen is just beginning to collect necessary sustainment data that would suppo the service life. This plan was undertaken in response to GAO findings regarding cost, schedule and performance problems with the previous targets acquisition approach. MDA officials stated that this action was in response to the target failure in the FTT-11 flight test, and was not related to the cancellation of the medium- range solicitation. In addition, as with previous years, failures and delays in testing have continued to delay the validation of the models and simulations used to assess the overall performance of the BMDS. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA to undertake the following 10 actions to strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Assessment of MDA Resource Baselines
We reviewed 12 resource baselines for Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements’ efforts as presented in the June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report (BAR) including: Aegis Ashore; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IB missiles and associated software upgrades for ship sets; future Aegis BMD ship software upgrades; two capability deliveries for Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2); Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) Spiral 6.4; Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); two capability deliveries for the Sea Based X-Band (SBX) Radar; current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) capability configuration; and Targets and Countermeasures program short-range ballistic missile; Targets and Countermeasures program medium-range ballistic missile; Targets and Countermeasures program intermediate-range ballistic Targets and Countermeasures program intercontinental ballistic missile target efforts. A cost estimate is considered: Comprehensive: when it accounts for all possible costs associated with a project, details all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions, is technically reasonable, is structured in sufficient detail to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double-counted, and the estimating teams’ composition is commensurate with the assignment; Well-documented: when supporting documentation for the estimate is accompanied by a narrative explaining the process, sources, and methods used to create the estimate and contains the underlying data used to develop the estimate; Accurate: when the estimate is not overly conservative or too optimistic and is based on an assessment of the costs most likely to be incurred; and Credible: when the estimate has been cross-checked with independent cost estimates, the level of confidence associated with the point estimate has been identified, and a sensitivity analysis has been conducted—that is, the project has examined the effect of changing one assumption related to each project activity while holding all other variables constant in order to identify which variable most affects the cost estimate. However, testing will not be completed for many years. consistent with GAO-recommended best practices. Decisions on Acquisition of Targets Made in Fiscal Year 2010
intercontinental-range targets in September 2010, also as part of its 2009 acquisition plan, but it was later canceled as well. previously reported that conducting work through the prime contractor had increased target costs. Likewise, MDA may also make a decision on its strategy for procuring medium-range targets. Also during the test, the program was able to successfully demonstrate THAAD’s performance against a simulated mass raid scenario. As a result, we were unable to assess this material as part of this year's annual review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, Congress has directed GAO to assess the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) annual fiscal year cost, schedule, testing, and performance progress in developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). This year's report specifically assesses MDA's progress in (1) delivering missile defense assets as scheduled (2) improving accountability and transparency over the past year (3) implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (4) implementing changes to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program (5) implementing the targets revised acquisition strategy identified in 2009, and (6) testing the BMDS and developing its modeling and simulations to assess performance. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed MDA's progress reports to the Congress, pertinent Department of Defense (DOD) policies and reports including a DOD assessment and plan related to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.
What GAO Found
In 2010, MDA made progress in delivering assets as well as increasing transparency and accountability. While many significant, positive steps were taken, GAO also found issues limiting the extent to which cost, schedule, and system performance can be tracked. Stabilizing the new acquisition approach, improving execution and increasing transparency are key steps for DOD. Asset Delivery: In 2010, MDA was able to meet or exceed its delivery goals for several MDA activities, such as missile defense upgrades to Aegis ships. However, the agency was unable to meet all of its goals for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, a system used to defend against targets in their last phases of flight. Transparency and Accountability: MDA finalized a new process in which detailed baselines were set for several missile defense systems. As a result of the new process, its 2010 progress report to the Congress is more comprehensive than it was in 2009. Although the information in MDA's progress reports to the Congress increased, GAO found its unit and life-cycle cost baselines had unexplained inconsistencies and documentation for six baselines had insufficient evidence to be a high-quality cost estimate. As a result, GAO could not evaluate cost progress. European Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense: The September 2009 shift in focus for European missile defense represents a significant change in U.S. policy and a substantial investment for DOD. However, DOD has not fully implemented a management process that synchronizes European missile defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and accountability. Without key management and oversight processes, there is a limited basis for oversight, and there is a risk that key components will start production before demonstrating system performance. In the past, similar deficiencies in missile defense acquisition oversight have led to rework, cost increases, delays, and doubts about delivered capabilities. Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD): While the GMD system---which is primarily designed to engage longer-range targets in the midcourse range of flight--has demonstrated a limited capability, DOD has not yet determined the system's full capabilities and limitations. In January and December 2010, GMD experienced two flight test failures. In addition, GMD is just beginning to take actions necessary to sustain the capability through 2032. Targets Acquisition, Testing, and Performance: MDA made a targets acquisition decision in 2010 in response to a target failure. This decision was not consistent with its 2009 acquisition plan which envisioned competitive contract awards that would reduce reliance on its prime contractor. The cost of this action remains unknown. Also, as in previous years, failures and delays in testing have continued to delay validation of models and simulations used to assess BMDS performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 10 recommendations for MDA to strengthen its resource, schedule and test baselines, facilitate baseline reviews, and further improve transparency and accountability. GAO is also making a recommendation to improve MDA's ability to carry out its test plan. In response, DOD fully concurred with 7 recommendations. It partially concurred with 3, contending that its current actions are sufficient and that the test recommendation is also not affordable. GAO continues to believe that additional action is needed. |
gao_HEHS-98-32 | gao_HEHS-98-32_0 | Specifically, it discusses the evolution of hospital care during the 20th century, factors contributing to the declining demand for hospital care in community and VA hospitals, the extent to which excess capacity exists in community and VA hospitals, and actions taken by community and VA hospitals to increase efficiency and compete for patients. To identify factors contributing to the declining demand for care in community and VA hospitals, we interviewed policy analysts from associations and think tanks, including the American Medical Association (AMA), AHA, and the CATO Institute; obtained the views of representatives from the major veterans service reviewed many studies and reports on hospitals, including those prepared by the Pew Health Professions Commission, Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Physician Payment Review Commission, HIAA, Hay Group, National Committee for Quality Health Care, Congressional Research Service, the former Office of Technology Assessment, HCFA, and VA; reviewed our prior reports and testimonies on VA health care, Medicare, and health care cost containment; and reviewed reports and studies on VA health care prepared by the VA Office of Inspector General and others. 4.3). 5.2.) Overall, about 26 percent of community hospital beds exceeded demand in 1995, and over 65 percent may exceed demand within the next 15 years. However, new users attracted through community-based clinics are unlikely to generate as much hospital demand as current users because new users have indicated they are more likely to choose their local hospital rather than a distant VA facility. Multiple Challenges Face VA Concerning Hospital Closures
Most of the hospital beds in both VA and the private sector will likely exceed demand within the next 15 years, leading to more closing of both VA and community hospitals. 7.3.) Changes in materials management, however, create policy issues and management challenges. If VA decides to try and preserve certain VA hospitals by competing with private-sector hospitals, then it will probably have to expand its marketing efforts. That change, however, did not force hospitals to directly compete with each other for market share. 11.4). Until recently, both nonfederal and VA teaching hospitals had steadily increased their use of medical residents partly because residents were a lower cost labor source. 12.1.) Similarly, the Council on Graduate Medical Education recommended an overall reduction in the nation’s physician supply and the number of physicians in training. For example, should VA hospitals receive the same kinds of incentives to reduce the number of residency positions that the Congress provided non-VA hospitals through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997? 13.1.) 14.2). Conclusions, Agency Comments, and Our Evaluation
Conclusions
Both VA and community hospitals are struggling to survive. Demand for hospital care, which increased for much of the century, has steadily declined since the 1980s in community hospitals and since the 1960s in VA hospitals. Decisions about the future of VA hospitals, whether it be to close hospitals or open them to nonveterans, have significant implications for veterans, VA employees, affiliated medical schools, community hospitals, and taxpayers. It is therefore important that the Congress and the administration have available sufficient information to properly weigh the potential effects of VA health care system infrastructure changes on all affected stakeholders. We recognize that VA’s strategic goals and performance measures call for increasing VA’s market share of mandatory veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed major issues and challenges that Congress and the administration will face in the next few years concerning Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals, focusing on: (1) how VA and community hospitals' care evolved during the twentieth century, including changes in supply and demand; (2) factors contributing to the declining demand; (3) the extent of excess capacity; (4) actions taken to increase efficiency and compete for patients; and (5) changes in hospitals involved in training the nation's physicians and conducting medical research.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) both community and VA hospitals are struggling to survive; (2) demand for hospital care abruptly reversed and has steadily declined since the 1980s in community hospitals and since the 1960s in VA hospitals; (3) although many factors contributed to the reversal, medical advances and changes in health insurance mainly drove changes to community hospitals; (4) VA hospitals, however, were mainly affected by declining numbers of veterans and the improving health care options available to veterans through Medicare and other insurance; (5) GAO's work, and studies by others, suggest that if trends continue, 60 percent or more of community hospital beds and over 80 percent of VA hospital beds may not be needed in the next 15 years; (6) if such reductions occur, many hospitals will cease operation; (7) VA's current strategy for attracting new users may not generate the demand needed to preserve VA hospitals; (8) new users have indicated they are more likely to choose their local hospitals rather than a distant VA facility; (9) if VA decides to directly compete with community hospitals for market share, then it will have to subsequently decide whether to adopt private-sector marketing techniques; (10) both VA and community hospitals are fundamentally changing the ways they operate; (11) such changes include the hospitals' basic structure and management; reinvention of basic work, procurement, and supply processes; development of new marketing strategies; and methods and procedures of monitoring and delivering patient care; (12) teaching hospitals' use of medical residents as a lower cost labor source is often seen as contributing to the oversupply of physicians; (13) Congress, through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, gave non-VA teaching hospitals financial incentives through the Medicare program to reduce residency positions; (14) both VA's strategic goals and the incentives it is creating through some of its restructuring efforts suggest that VA, like many community hospitals, is focusing its marketing efforts on attracting revenue-generating patients; (15) decisions on the future of VA hospitals, whether they mean closing hospitals or opening them to nonveterans, have significant implications for veterans, VA employees, affiliated medical schools, community hospitals, and taxpayers; and (16) therefore, Congress and the administration must have sufficient information for properly assessing the potential effects of VA's health care system changes on all stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-09-509 | gao_GAO-09-509_0 | The environmental impacts of OHV use, both direct and indirect, have been studied and documented over the past several decades. Most field unit officials also indicated that social and safety impacts occasionally occurred on their lands. According to field unit officials from all three agencies, in an average year, OHVs were used on federal lands primarily for recreational activities such as trail and open-area riding. Environmental Impacts of OHV Use Occur on Less Than One-Fifth of Federal Lands
Most field unit officials from all three agencies indicated that environmental impacts of OHV use occur on less than 20 percent of the lands they manage; a few field unit officials, however, reported that 80 percent or more of their lands are affected by OHV-related environmental impacts. These plans, however, are missing some key elements of strategic planning—such as results-oriented goals, strategies to achieve the goals, time frames for implementing strategies, or performance measures to monitor incremental progress—that could improve OHV management. The Park Service has no extensive planning or guidance for managing OHV use, but this absence seems reasonable given that Park Service regulations limit OHV use to only a few units and that OHV use is not a predominant recreational activity on Park Service lands. Despite identifying numerous goals and strategies to achieve the goals, BLM’s recreation plan does not identify any time frames for implementing the strategies or any performance measures for monitoring incremental progress. Agencies’ Field Units Reported Taking Many Actions, but Additional Efforts Could Improve Communication and Enforcement; a Majority of Units Said They Are Unable to Sustainably Manage OHV Use
Actions that agencies’ field units reported taking to manage OHV use include supplementing federal funds with authorized outside resources (such as state grants), communicating with and educating the public, enforcing OHV regulations, and engineering and monitoring OHV trail systems. Additional efforts could improve communication with the public about OHV trails and areas and enforcement of OHV regulations. A majority of officials who post signs also said that it is an effective OHV management action. For example, nearly all Forest Service and BLM field unit officials and most Park Service officials said their units conduct occasional patrols of OHV routes or open areas. Some field unit officials from all three agencies had also arrested individuals for OHV violations. Additionally, about half the field unit officials indicated that existing fines were insufficient to deter illegal or unsafe OHV use. A Majority of Field Units Indicated They Cannot Manage Existing OHV Areas in a Sustainable Manner
Although field units are taking many management actions, a majority of field unit officials indicated that they cannot sustainably manage existing OHV areas; sustainable management would include having the necessary human and financial resources available to ensure compliance with regulations, educate users, maintain OHV use areas, and evaluate the existing OHV program. In addition to staffing and financial challenges, a majority of field unit officials cited enforcement of OHV regulations as a great challenge as well. Other challenges identified by field unit officials include managing varied public expectations about how public lands should be used and altering long-established OHV use patterns. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the trends in and status of off-highway vehicle (OHV) use on federal lands managed by the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National Park Service (Park Service) from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008, as well as the reported environmental, social, and safety impacts of OHV use; (2) the agencies’ strategic planning for managing OHV use on federal lands; (3) actions taken by the agencies’ field units in managing OHV use on their lands; and (4) current OHV management challenges facing these agencies. To address our objectives, we collected and analyzed OHV-related documentation, including applicable executive orders and agency plans, regulations, and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Off-highway vehicle (OHV) use on lands managed by the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National Park Service (Park Service) has become popular over the past few decades. Some critics have asserted that OHV use causes adverse environmental, social, and safety impacts, while proponents have voiced concerns about retaining access to federal lands. GAO examined the (1) trends in and status of OHV use on federal lands, as well as reported environmental, social, and safety impacts; (2) agencies' strategic planning for managing OHV use; (3) actions taken by agency field units to manage OHV use; and (4) current OHV management challenges. GAO collected and analyzed related executive orders and agency OHV plans, regulations, and guidance; interviewed agency and interest group officials; and conducted a Web-based survey of all three agencies' field unit officials.
What GAO Found
OHV use on federal lands--both authorized and unauthorized--increased from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008, with varying environmental, social, and safety impacts, according to officials from all three agencies. All three agencies reported that OHVs are predominantly used on their lands for OHV recreation, such as trail and open-area riding. Most Park Service officials said that OHV use constitutes less than 10 percent of the recreation on their lands. Most officials from all three agencies also said that OHV-related environmental impacts occur on less than 20 percent of their lands, although a few said that such impacts occur on 80 percent or more of their lands. Most officials said that social and safety impacts, such as conflicts with nonmotorized users, occasionally or rarely occurred. Forest Service and BLM plans for OHV management are missing key elements of strategic planning, such as results-oriented goals, strategies to achieve the goals, time frames for implementing strategies, or performance measures to monitor incremental progress. For example, the Forest Service's strategic plan has no strategies to address key aspects of OHV management, such as communicating with the public or enforcing OHV regulations. Similarly, while BLM's recreation plan contains strategies addressing key aspects of OHV management, the agency has not identified time frames for implementing these strategies or performance measures for monitoring progress. The Park Service has no extensive planning for managing OHV use, but this absence seems reasonable given that its regulations limit OHV use to only a few units and OHV use is not a predominant recreational activity on its lands. While agencies' field units have taken many actions to manage OHV use, additional efforts could improve communication and enforcement. In particular, units have taken actions such as supplementing federal funds with outside resources like state grants, communicating with the public by posting signs and maps, and enforcing OHV regulations by occasionally patrolling OHV areas and writing citations for OHV violations. Few officials, however, indicated that their unit had signs and maps for nearly all of their OHV areas. Additionally, while most field unit officials said that they conduct enforcement activities, such as writing citations, about half indicated that fines are insufficient to deter illegal or unsafe OHV use. In addition, a majority of officials reported they cannot sustainably manage their existing OHV use areas; sustainable management would include having the necessary human and financial resources to ensure compliance with regulations, educate users, maintain OHV use areas, and evaluate the OHV program. Officials identified numerous challenges in managing OHV use, of which the most widely identified were insufficient financial resources, as well as staff for OHV management and enforcement. In addition, most officials cited enforcement of OHV regulations as a great challenge. Other challenges were maintaining signs, managing the public's varied expectations about how federal lands should be used, and changing long-established OHV use patterns. |
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