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gao_GAO-11-800 | gao_GAO-11-800_0 | USHCN Stations Were Selected on the Basis of Several Factors, but Siting Conditions Played a Limited Role
According to NCDC officials, achieving a relatively uniform geographic distribution across the contiguous 48 states was a high priority when selecting USHCN stations and was balanced with other factors, including how long stations had collected temperature records, limited periods of missing temperature data, and the stability of measurement conditions. NCDC officials told us they considered other factors, such as geographic distribution and a long history of temperature records, to be more important to their ability to analyze long-term temperature trends than strict adherence to NWS’s siting standards. With regard to management requirements for USHCN stations, we found that the weather forecast offices generally but not always met requirements to conduct annual inspections and update station records. Close to Half of USHCN Stations Do Not Meet NWS Siting Standards
The survey responses we received from weather forecast offices that manage stations included in the USHCN indicate that about 42 percent of the active stations in 2010 did not adhere to one or more of the NWS siting standards for air temperature measurement. The use of temperature-measuring equipment that is connected by a cable to an indoor readout device can require installing equipment closer to buildings than specified in the standards, according to our survey. According to NCDC and NWS officials, it is important to annually visit stations and keep station records up to date so that users of the stations’ temperature records, such as NCDC, know the conditions under which the observations were recorded. NWS Does Not Centrally Track Whether USHCN Stations Meet Siting Standards or Have a Policy for Addressing Stations That Do Not Meet the Standards
NWS does not use its information systems to centrally track whether USHCN stations adhere to siting standards or if weather forecast offices are meeting the requirement to update station records at least once every 5 years. NWS Does Not Have an Agencywide Policy to Address Stations That Do Not Adhere to Siting Standards
NWS does not have an agencywide policy for stations not adhering to siting standards that clarifies for staff in weather forecast offices whether the stations should be closed, relocated, or maintained in their present condition to preserve the continuity of their temperature records. Standards for internal control in the federal government call for federal agencies to document their policies and procedures to help managers achieve desired results. As a result, the agency cannot easily measure the USHCN’s performance against its siting standards and management requirements. In the absence of such policy, it is not clear to weather forecast office officials whether stations that do not adhere to siting standards should remain open because data continuity is important for analyzing long-term climate trends, or whether the stations should be moved or closed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve NWS’s ability to manage the USHCN in accordance with performance management guidelines and federal internal control standards, as well as to strengthen congressional and public confidence in the data the network provides, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to take the following two actions: Enhance NWS’s information system to centrally capture information that would be useful in managing stations in the USHCN, including (1) more complete data on siting conditions (including when siting conditions change), which would allow the agency to assess the extent to which the stations meet its siting standards, and (2) existing data on when station records were last updated to monitor whether the records are being updated at least once every 5 years as NWS requires. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) selected stations for the U.S. To examine in greater depth the extent to which USHCN stations meet siting standards and management requirements for weather-monitoring stations, we visited a nonprobability sample of 8 NWS weather forecast offices. To evaluate the extent to which NWS tracks USHCN stations’ adherence to siting standards and management requirements and has established a policy for addressing stations that do not adhere to siting standards, we took several actions. The differences reflect the fact that, whereas NCDC designated stations for the USHCN from an existing network of NWS weather-monitoring stations, NOAA has specifically located and designed stations in the newer networks for monitoring the nation’s climate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintains a network of weather-monitoring stations known as the U.S. Historical Climatology Network (USHCN), which monitors the nation's climate and analyzes long-term surface temperature trends. Recent reports have shown that some stations in the USHCN are not sited in accordance with NOAA's standards, which state that temperature instruments should be located away from extensive paved surfaces or obstructions such as buildings and trees. GAO was asked to examine (1) how NOAA chose stations for the USHCN, (2) the extent to which these stations meet siting standards and other requirements, and (3) the extent to which NOAA tracks USHCN stations' adherence to siting standards and other requirements and has established a policy for addressing nonadherence to siting standards. GAO reviewed data and documents, interviewed key NOAA officials, surveyed the 116 NOAA weather forecast offices responsible for managing stations in the USHCN, and visited 8 forecast offices.
What GAO Found
In choosing USHCN stations from a larger set of existing weather-monitoring stations, NOAA placed a high priority on achieving a relatively uniform geographic distribution of stations across the contiguous 48 states. NOAA balanced geographic distribution with other factors, including a desire for a long history of temperature records, limited periods of missing data, and stability of a station's location and other measurement conditions, since changes in such conditions can cause temperature shifts unrelated to climate trends. NOAA had to make certain exceptions, such as including many stations that had incomplete temperature records. In general, the extent to which the stations met NOAA's siting standards played a limited role in the designation process, in part because NOAA officials considered other factors, such as geographic distribution and a long history of records, to be more important. USHCN stations meet NOAA's siting standards and management requirements to varying degrees. According to GAO's survey of weather forecast offices, about 42 percent of the active stations in 2010 did not meet one or more of the siting standards. With regard to management requirements, GAO found that the weather forecast offices had generally but not always met the requirements to conduct annual station inspections and to update station records. NOAA officials told GAO that it is important to annually visit stations and keep records up to date, including siting conditions, so that NOAA and other users of the data know the conditions under which they were recorded. NOAA officials identified a variety of challenges that contribute to some stations not adhering to siting standards and management requirements, including the use of temperature-measuring equipment that is connected by a cable to an indoor readout device--which can require installing equipment closer to buildings than specified in the siting standards. NOAA does not centrally track whether USHCN stations adhere to siting standards and the requirement to update station records, and it does not have an agencywide policy regarding stations that do not meet its siting standards. Performance management guidelines call for using performance information to assess program results. NOAA's information systems, however, are not designed to centrally track whether stations in the USHCN meet its siting standards or the requirement to update station records. Without centrally available information, NOAA cannot easily measure the performance of the USHCN in meeting siting standards and management requirements. Furthermore, federal internal control standards call for agencies to document their policies and procedures to help managers achieve desired results. NOAA has not developed an agencywide policy, however, that clarifies for agency staff whether stations that do not adhere to siting standards should remain open because the continuity of the data is important, or should be moved or closed. As a result, weather forecast offices do not have a basis for making consistent decisions to address stations that do not meet the siting standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA enhance its information systems to centrally capture information useful in managing the USHCN and develop a policy on how to address stations that do not meet its siting standards. NOAA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-725 | gao_GAO-17-725_0 | Multiple Factors Caused Funding Gaps and RHS Took Steps to Mitigate Effects
An Interplay of Factors Contributed to Fiscal Year 2013–2015 Gaps
An interplay of factors—primarily sequestration and rescissions, unreliable estimation methods, and limits on RHS’s ability to manage program funds differently—resulted in the program funding falling short of the amount needed to renew all eligible rental assistance agreements at the ends of fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015. The officials noted that RHS also did not calculate this number for fiscal year 2014 because it addressed the rental assistance needs of the affected properties by using previously obligated funds associated with properties that had exited the program, as discussed below. In fiscal year 2013, sequestration and rescissions cut about $70 million of the rental assistance program’s approximately $907 million budget. Unreliable estimation methods. In fiscal years 2013–2015, RHS calculated the amount of renewal funding each property would receive by multiplying the number of rental assistance units by a state-wide, per-unit average cost. Because actual rental assistance costs at each property generally differed from the state-wide average, this method resulted in some properties receiving agreement renewals that provided less funds than needed for 1 year (resulting in the need for an additional renewal within the same 12-month period) and other properties receiving more funds than needed for 1 year (tying up funds that could have been obligated to other properties). RHS Took Steps to Mitigate the Effects of the Funding Gaps but Some Had Negative Consequences
RHS used a variety of approaches in the years it faced funding gaps to try to minimize effects on property owners, with mixed results. RHS Improved Rental Assistance Estimates but Some Weaknesses Exist in Budget Estimation and Execution
RHS’s New Tool Improved Estimates of Rental Assistance Costs
To improve its rental assistance estimates and streamline the obligation process, RHS in 2014 began developing a “rental assistance obligation tool” (obligation tool), a model that estimates rental assistance costs based on each property’s rental assistance payment requests over the prior 12 months. RHS began using the tool—which is integrated with MFIS, RHS’s management information system for the rental assistance program—to renew agreements in fiscal year 2016 and to estimate the program’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. Federal internal control standards call for management to design control activities for entities’ information systems to respond to risks. RHS Has Not Used Appropriate Inflation Rates to Estimate Its Budget Request in Recent Years
Since fiscal year 2010, RHS either has used no inflation rate or one that differed from the President’s economic assumptions when calculating budget request estimates for the rental assistance program (see table 1). In these cases, state office staff are to use their judgment about whether providing a 1- year agreement renewal would be appropriate, according to RHS national office officials. First, RHS does not have a plan for ongoing monitoring (including testing and evaluation) of its new obligation tool and has not always used the most relevant data for monitoring, contrary to federal internal control standards calling for monitoring of control activities and use of quality information. Fourth, contrary to federal internal control standards on documentation of policies, RHS lacks written guidance on the responsibilities of Rural Development state offices for reviewing rental assistance agreement renewals before obligating funds. These weaknesses may exist partly because RHS continues to refine its estimation method, which has been in effect for about 2 years. RHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, but did not provide comments on our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the reasons the Rural Housing Service (RHS) ran out of funds for renewing rental assistance agreements under the Section 521 program in fiscal years 2013–2015, and how it responded to the funding gaps in those years; and (2) what RHS has done to help prevent future funding gaps and the extent to which it addressed related budgetary issues. Funding Gaps and How RHS Resolved Them
To examine the reasons why RHS ran out of funds for renewing rental assistance agreements in fiscal years 2013–2015, we reviewed documentation from RHS that provided evidence of funding gaps, including a list of properties whose agreements were due for renewal but could not be renewed at the ends of the 3 fiscal years. We also examined the extent to which RHS had developed plans for future testing. Additionally, we interviewed OMB staff with responsibility for reviewing the rental assistance program’s budget estimates about the inflation rates RHS used in its budget requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
RHS provides about $1.4 billion annually in rental subsidies to owners of multifamily housing for more than 270,000 low-income rural households. RHS's agreements with property owners provide rental assistance payments estimated to last 1 year. In fiscal years 2013–2015, RHS was unable to renew all its agreements because it ran out of funds. For example, in fiscal year 2015, the funding gap was about $97 million. As a result, some property owners' rental assistance payments were delayed.
GAO was asked to examine the reasons why RHS ran out of funds and how RHS plans to improve its budget requests. This report examines (1) reasons RHS ran out of funds for renewing rental assistance agreements in fiscal years 2013–2015 and how it responded, and (2) what RHS has done to help prevent future funding gaps and the extent to which it has addressed related budgetary issues. GAO analyzed RHS budget and rental assistance data for fiscal years 2011–2016, reviewed RHS policies and procedures, and interviewed RHS national office officials and staff from15 (of 47) randomly selected state offices.
What GAO Found
An interplay of three primary factors contributed to the funding gaps that the rental assistance program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS) faced in fiscal years 2013–2015:
Fiscal year 2013 sequestration and rescissions. An across-the-board cancelation of budgetary resources in March 2013 decreased the program's approximately $907 million budget by about $70 million.
Unreliable methods for estimating rental assistance costs. RHS used a state-wide, per-unit average cost to calculate rental assistance agreement amounts. This resulted in some properties receiving more funds than needed, tying up funds that could have been used for other properties.
Limited management flexibility. RHS had limited ability to adjust its program management to help prevent funding gaps. For example, RHS does not have authority to fund agreement renewals for less than 1 year.
RHS took steps to mitigate the effects of the funding gaps on property owners, but some had negative consequences. For example, to cover fiscal year 2014–2015 gaps, RHS used unexpended rental assistance funds from properties that had exited the program. But, as a result, the program lost the associated rental assistance units and RHS could not re-assign the units to other properties.
RHS has taken steps under its existing authorities to help prevent future funding gaps but lacks certain plans and controls to help ensure its estimates of rental assistance costs are reasonable. In fiscal year 2016, RHS began using a new cost model integrated with its program information system that more accurately estimates rental assistance agreement renewals. For instance, the model estimates renewal costs based on property-level data rather than state-wide averages. RHS also began including estimates of agreements that would need two renewals in the same fiscal year (a number of which are to be expected) in budget requests. But, GAO found weaknesses in aspects of RHS's budget estimation and execution of rental assistance. Specifically, RHS:
does not have a plan for ongoing monitoring or testing of the new estimation method. Federal internal control standards call for management to establish monitoring activities and evaluate results.
lacks controls to detect misestimates of rental assistance, a problem RHS experienced during early use of the model. Federal internal control standards call for control activities for information systems to respond to risks.
has not used the appropriate inflation rates in its budget estimates since fiscal year 2009. Office of Management and Budget guidance states budgets should be consistent with the economic assumptions it provides.
has not provided staff guidance on their responsibilities for determining whether properties' rental assistance should be renewed. Federal internal control standards call for documenting responsibilities through policies.
The weaknesses may exist partly because RHS continues to refine its estimation method, which has been in effect for about 2 years. By addressing them, RHS would have greater assurance that it will develop the best possible estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that RHS develop plans for testing rental assistance estimation methods, develop estimation controls, create controls to ensure use of appropriate assumptions in budget requests, and provide guidance on reviews of rental assistance renewals. RHS did not comment on GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-599T | gao_GAO-07-599T_0 | After a drug is on the market, FDA continues to assess its risks and benefits. FDA Lacked a Clear and Effective Decision-making Process for Postmarket Drug Safety
In our March 2006 report, we found that FDA’s postmarket drug safety decision-making process was limited by a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. We observed that there was a lack of established criteria for determining what safety actions to take and when, and aspects of ODS’s role in the process were unclear. Decision-making Process on Drug Safety Lacked Clarity about Criteria for Action and the Role of ODS
While acknowledging the complexity of the postmarket drug safety decision-making process, we found through our interviews with OND and ODS staff and in our case studies that the process lacked clarity about how drug safety decisions were made and about the role of ODS. In those reviews FDA indicated that an absence of established criteria for determining what safety actions to take, and when to take them, posed a challenge for making postmarket drug safety decisions. The OND review division responsible for Arava presented its own analysis of postmarket drug safety data at the meeting, but did not allow the ODS staff—who had recommended that Arava be removed from the market—to present their analysis because it felt that ODS’s review did not have scientific merit. A Lack of Communication and Limited Oversight Hindered the Decision- making Process
A lack of communication between ODS and OND’s review divisions and limited oversight of postmarket drug safety issues by ODS management also hindered the decision-making process. Another problem was the lack of systematic information on drug safety issues. Data Constraints Contributed to Difficulty in Making Postmarket Safety Decisions
Data constraints—such as weaknesses in data sources and FDA’s limited ability to require certain studies and obtain additional data—contributed to FDA’s difficulty in making postmarket drug safety decisions. We found that FDA’s access to postmarket clinical trial and observational data was limited by its authority and available resources. FDA’s Initiatives to Improve Postmarket Drug Safety Decision Making
Prior to the completion of our March 2006 report, FDA began several initiatives to improve its postmarket drug safety decision-making process. Most prominently, FDA commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a committee of experts to assess the current system for evaluating postmarket drug safety, including FDA’s oversight of postmarket safety and its processes. IOM issued its report in September 2006. For example, FDA established the Drug Safety Oversight Board to help provide oversight and advice to the CDER Director on the management of important safety issues. Since our report, FDA has made efforts to improve its postmarket safety decision-making and oversight process. FDA has also begun several initiatives since our March 2006 report that we believe could address three of our four recommendations. Because none of these initiatives was fully implemented as of March 2007, it was too early to evaluate their effectiveness. To make the postmarket safety decision-making process clearer and more effective, we recommended that FDA revise and implement its draft policy on major postmarket drug safety decisions. To make the postmarket safety decision-making process clearer, we recommended that FDA clarify ODS’s role in FDA’s scientific advisory committee meetings involving postmarket drug safety issues. The policy is also expected to clarify ODS’s role in planning for, and participating in, meetings of FDA’s scientific advisory committees. We also suggested in our report that Congress consider expanding FDA’s authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies in order to ensure that the agency has the necessary information, such as clinical trial and observational data, to make postmarket decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to testify on the effectiveness of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) postmarket decision-making process. This testimony is based on Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process, GAO-06-402 (March 31, 2006). The report focused on the complex interaction between two offices within FDA that are involved in postmarket drug safety activities: the Office of New Drugs (OND), and the Office of Drug Safety (ODS). OND's primary responsibility is to review new drug applications, but it is also involved in monitoring the safety of marketed drugs. ODS is focused primarily on postmarket drug safety issues. ODS is now called the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology. For its report, GAO reviewed FDA policies, interviewed FDA staff, and conducted case studies of four drugs with safety issues: Arava, Baycol, Bextra, and Propulsid. To gather information on FDA's initiatives since March 2006 to improve its decision-making process for this testimony, GAO interviewed FDA officials and reviewed FDA documents in February and March 2007.
What GAO Found
In its March 2006 report, GAO found that FDA lacked clear and effective processes for making decisions about, and providing management oversight of, postmarket drug safety issues. There was a lack of clarity about how decisions were made and about organizational roles, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. GAO observed that there was a lack of criteria for determining what safety actions to take and when to take them. Certain parts of ODS's role in the process were unclear, including ODS's participation in the meetings of scientific advisory committees organized by OND to discuss safety issues for specific drugs. In the case of Arava, for example, ODS staff were not allowed to present their analysis of postmarket safety at an advisory committee meeting held to review Arava's safety risks and benefits. Insufficient communication between ODS and OND hindered the decision-making process. ODS management did not systematically track information about ongoing postmarket safety issues, including the recommendations that ODS staff made for safety actions. GAO also found that FDA faced data constraints that contributed to the difficulty in making postmarket safety decisions. GAO found that there were weaknesses in the different types of data available to FDA, and FDA's access to data was constrained by both its authority to require certain studies and its limited resources. During the course of GAO's work for its March 2006 report, FDA began a variety of initiatives to improve its postmarket drug safety decision-making process, including the establishment of the Drug Safety Oversight Board. FDA also commissioned the Institute of Medicine to examine the drug safety system, including FDA's oversight of postmarket drug safety. GAO recommended in its March 2006 report that FDA take four steps to improve its decision-making process for postmarket safety. GAO recommended that FDA revise and implement its draft policy on the decision-making process for major postmarket safety actions, improve its process to resolve disagreements over safety decisions, clarify ODS's role in scientific advisory committees, and systematically track postmarket drug safety issues. FDA has initiatives underway and under consideration that, if implemented, could address three of GAO's four recommendations. Because none of these initiatives was fully implemented as of March 2007, it was too early to evaluate their effectiveness. In the 2006 report GAO also suggested that Congress consider expanding FDA's authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies, as needed, to collect additional data on drug safety concerns. |
gao_GAO-05-557 | gao_GAO-05-557_0 | While CBP Has Enhanced Its Ability to Target Containers Overseas, Limitations Remain
We identified both positive and negative factors that affect CBP’s ability to target shipments at overseas seaports. According to CBP officials, the CSI program has produced factors that contribute to CBP’s ability to target shipments at overseas seaports, including improved information sharing between the CSI teams and host government officials regarding U.S.- bound shipments and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation on and international awareness of the need for securing the global shipping system. Although CBP’s goal is to target all U.S.-bound containers at CSI ports before they depart for the United States, it has not been able to place enough staff at some CSI ports to do so. CBP has been unable to staff the CSI teams at the levels called for in the CSI staffing model because of diplomatic and practical considerations. It does not consider whether some of the targeting functions could be performed in the United States. However, considering that the inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in detection capability and that there are no minimum requirements for the detection capability of equipment used for CSI, CBP has no absolute assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying WMD. These containers were inspected using nonintrusive inspections and physical examinations. In addition, technologies to detect other WMD have limitations. CBP Has Made Progress Developing a Strategic Plan and Performance Measures for CSI, but Further Refinements Are Needed
Although CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI, we found that further refinements to the bureau’s management tools are needed to help achieve program goals. In July 2003, we recommended that CBP develop a strategic plan and performance measures, including outcome-oriented measures, for CSI. In February 2004, CBP finalized a strategic plan for CSI containing three of the six key elements identified by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) for an agency strategic plan: a mission statement, objectives, and implementation strategies. CBP has also made progress in the development of outcome-oriented performance measures for some objectives, particularly for the objective of increasing information sharing and collaboration among CSI and host country personnel. In February 2005, CBP officials told us that CBP is revising the CSI strategic plan to address the elements we raise in this report. While it appears that the bureau’s initial efforts in this area meet the intent of our prior recommendation to develop a strategic plan for CSI, we cannot determine the effectiveness of further revisions to the plan without first reviewing and evaluating them. We will continue to monitor CBP’s efforts in this area. Proxy measures are used to assess the effectiveness of program functions, such as the targeting and inspection processes of CSI, rather than directly assess the effectiveness of the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the objectives of CSI are achieved, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: revise the CSI staffing model to consider (1) what functions need to be performed at CSI ports and what functions can be performed in the United States, (2) the optimum levels of staff needed at CSI ports to maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities in conjunction with host nation customs officials, and (3) the cost of locating targeters overseas at CSI ports instead of in the United States; establish minimum technical requirements for the capabilities of nonintrusive inspection equipment at CSI ports, to include imaging and radiation detection devices, that help ensure that all equipment used can detect WMD, while considering the need not to endorse certain companies and sovereignty issues with participating countries; develop performance measures that include outcome-based measures and performance targets (or proxies as appropriate) to track the program’s progress in meeting all of its objectives. Under CSI, to what extent have high-risk containers been inspected overseas prior to their arrival at U.S. destinations? | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2002, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to address the threat that terrorists might use maritime cargo containers to ship weapons of mass destruction. Under CSI, CBP is to target and inspect high-risk cargo shipments at foreign seaports before they leave for destinations in the United States. In July 2003, GAO reported that CSI had management challenges that limited its effectiveness. Given these challenges and in light of plans to expand the program, GAO examined selected aspects of the program's operation, including the (1) factors that affect CBP's ability to target shipments at foreign seaports, (2) extent to which high-risk containers have actually been inspected overseas, and (3) extent to which CBP formulated and documented strategies for achieving the program's goals.
What GAO Found
Some of the positive factors that have affected CBP's ability to target shipments overseas are improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the need to secure the whole global shipping system. Although the program aims to target all U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports, it has been unable to do so because of staffing imbalances. CBP has developed a staffing model to determine staffing needs but has been unable to fully staff some ports because of diplomatic considerations (e.g., the need for host government permission) and practical considerations (e.g., workspace constraints). As a result, 35 percent of these shipments were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection overseas. In addition, the staffing model's reliance on placing staff at CSI ports rather than considering whether some of the targeting functions could be performed in the United States limits the program's operational efficiency and effectiveness. CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment used as part of CSI. Ports participating in CSI use various types of nonintrusive inspection equipment to inspect containers, and the detection and identification capabilities of such equipment can vary. In addition, technologies to detect other weapons of mass destruction have limitations. Given these conditions, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist weapons of mass destruction. A lthough CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI, we found that further refinements to the bureau's management tools are needed to help achieve program objectives. In July 2003, we recommended that CBP develop a strategic plan and performance measures, including outcome-oriented measures, for CSI. CBP developed a strategic plan for CSI in February 2004 that contains three of the six key elements required for agency strategic plans, and CBP officials told us they continue to develop the other three elements. While it appears that the bureau's efforts in this area meet the intent of our prior recommendation to develop a strategic plan for CSI, we will continue to monitor progress in this area. CBP has also made progress in the development of outcome-oriented performance measures, particularly for the program objective of increasing information sharing and collaboration among CSI and host country personnel. However, CBP continues to face challenges in developing performance measures to assess the effectiveness of CSI targeting and inspection activities. Therefore, it is difficult to assess progress made in CSI operations over time, and it is difficult to compare CSI operations across ports. |
gao_GAO-01-727 | gao_GAO-01-727_0 | Indeed, many countries have no approval process for these products at all. For example, given the importance of the EU market, U.S. soybean producers have been reluctant to introduce new biotech varieties that have not been approved for marketing in the EU. This is primarily because of the comingling of conventional and biotech varieties in the U.S. grain handling system. U.S. industry representatives note that labeling requirements in these countries may adversely impact the marketability of products with a biotech component and present additional difficulties for U.S. corn exports. Unlike corn, U.S. soybean exports have not yet experienced disruptions. Challenges Facing U.S. Biotech Exports
The United States faces a number of challenges to maintaining access to markets for biotech crops and foods containing or derived from agricultural biotechnology products (see slide 9). Growing consumer concerns, particularly in Europe, about the safety of biotechnology underlie actions taken by foreign governments that may restrict biotech trade. Given the numerous international discussions in Codex committees and elsewhere, the U.S. government must contend with an increasing demand for staff resources devoted to biotech trade issues. Scope and Methodology
To meet our objectives of (1) summarizing developments in key international organizations and among major U.S. trading partners that are likely to affect agricultural biotech trade; (2) identifying principal U.S. commodities most affected by foreign regulations on biotechnology exports; and (3) describing challenges U.S. biotech exporters face in maintaining access to foreign markets, we studied official documents from various U.S. federal agencies and foreign governments. Moreover, we did not address the appropriateness of U.S. or foreign regulatory measures regarding biotech products. Corn and soy exports are most threatened by foreign regulations on biotech products. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the challenges facing U.S. agricultural biotechnology products in international trade.
What GAO Found
GAO found that new regulations and guidelines that may restrict U.S. exports of crops with a large biotech component are being enacted or considered by some U.S. trading partners and are also under discussion in various international organizations. These actions address approval, labeling, and traceability of agricultural biotech products. U.S. corn and soybean exports are most threatened by new foreign regulatory measures because of their biotech content. Although U.S. soybean exports have not yet experienced disruptions, U.S. corn exports have been largely shut out of the European Union (EU) market because U.S. farmers are producing some biotech varieties that have not been approved for marketing in the EU. U.S. agricultural biotech exports face several significant challenges in international markets. First, as the single major producer of biotech products, the United States has been relatively isolated in its efforts to maintain access to markets for these products. Second, in many parts of the world, consumer concerns are growing about the safety of biotech foods, which have led key market countries to implement or consider regulations that may restrict U.S. biotech exports. Another challenge is that U.S. industry combines conventional and biotech grain in the distribution chain. Consequently, foreign regulations governing biotech varieties could affect all U.S. exports of these commodities. Finally, as international negotiations in Codex Alimentarius and elsewhere take on greater importance, the U.S. government faces increasing demands for staff resources and coordination among the multiple agencies involved in biotech trade issues. |
gao_GGD-99-1 | gao_GGD-99-1_0 | In response, the then Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue announced that IRS would hold monthly PSDs in each of its 33 districts, beginning in November 1997. To determine taxpayers’ overall satisfaction with the initiative and the extent to which taxpayers’ problems were resolved, we obtained and reviewed available IRS statistics concerning the status of PSD cases in general and the specific results of closed PSD cases, as well as summary reports on the results of IRS’ monthly taxpayer surveys and a summary report on the results of IRS’ April and May 1998 taxpayer follow-up telephone survey. Taxpayers and practitioners were advised to call in advance to schedule appointments. In addition, some taxpayers who called IRS regarding a PSD were able to get their problems resolved over the telephone without visiting an IRS office. “Walk-ins” who attended a PSD without an appointment were also generally provided an opportunity to meet with IRS staff to discuss their tax problems. During PSDs, the participating offices we visited were generally staffed with IRS employees from various operating groups, such as Customer Service, Examination, and Collection, who had a wide range of expertise in various tax matters and were available to assist taxpayers, thus making the initiative conducive to discussing and resolving their ongoing tax problems. IRS’ initial national PSD, which was held at each of the 33 district offices on Saturday, November 15, 1997, was attended by about 6,300 taxpayers and received generally favorable press coverage and reactions from taxpayers. IRS’ district offices have also held additional monthly PSD events between November 1997 and July 1998. More than 22,000 taxpayers had attended PSDs through the end of July 1998. In particular, the results of our taxpayer survey showed that the vast majority of taxpayers who participated in the first PSD felt that (1) it was easy to schedule an appointment for this event, (2) they were treated courteously by IRS employees, and (3) they appreciated the opportunity to meet face to face with IRS staff to discuss their problems. Overall, about 91 percent of taxpayers believed that the PSD was a good idea. However, each month survey respondents indicated that IRS’ effort to resolve their problems could be improved. The net result was that an estimated 34 percent of these taxpayers felt that their problems had been fully resolved at the time of our survey. IRS Is Considering Ways to Institutionalize Lessons Learned During the PSD Initiative
IRS has conducted various studies related to the PSD initiative. According to IRS officials involved in this review, among the lessons learned from PSDs were that many taxpayers who attended did so because they wanted to discuss their ongoing tax problems face to face with IRS staff in an effort to finally get them resolved. In addition, IRS is studying ways to incorporate lessons learned from the PSDs into its day-to-day operations to better assist taxpayers in resolving their tax problems, by establishing procedures for providing taxpayers with appointments and for providing the necessary technical support. 105-206) (1) strengthens the role of the national Taxpayer Advocate by expanding the authority to assist taxpayers; (2) replaces the current problem resolution program with local taxpayer advocates reporting directly to the national Taxpayer Advocate; (3) requires the national Taxpayer Advocate to report annually to Congress, at least 20 of the most serious problems encountered by taxpayers and the actions taken by IRS concerning these problems; (4) requires IRS to publish the telephone numbers for each local office of the Taxpayer Advocate; and (5) requires IRS to publish a taxpayer’s right to contact the local Taxpayer Advocate on the statutory notice of deficiency, including the location and telephone number of the appropriate office.These changes, if effectively implemented, should be helpful to taxpayers. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Definition of the Main Problem Areas Identified During Problem-Solving Days
IRS has analyzed the types of problems that taxpayers have sought to resolve on problem-solving days since the beginning of the initiative and identified four main problem areas, including (1) penalties, (2) audit reconsiderations, (3) installment agreements, and (4) offers in compromise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) problem-solving days (PSD), focusing on: (1) how the PSDs were organized and advertised and what IRS did to make them conducive to discussing and resolving taxpayers' ongoing tax problems; (2) taxpayers' overall satisfaction with the initiative and the extent to which taxpayers' problems were resolved; and (3) whether IRS identified any systemic problems or lessons learned and took subsequent actions on them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS began monthly PSDs in November 1997 to assist taxpayers in getting their tax problems resolved; (2) to advertise the initiative, IRS used various means, including national and local newspapers, television, and radio; (3) taxpayers and practitioners were advised to call in advance to schedule appointments to discuss their tax problems with IRS staff; (4) some taxpayers who called in advance were able to get their problems resolved over the telephone; (5) for taxpayers who scheduled an appointment in advance, IRS was generally able to have information about the taxpayers' case available at the time of the appointment; (6) taxpayers who walked in without an appointment were generally afforded an opportunity to meet with IRS staff to discuss their tax problems; (7) during PSDs each participating IRS office was staffed with employees from various functional groups to provide a range of expertise and thus make the initiative conducive to discussing and resolving taxpayers' tax problems; (8) IRS' initial national PSD was held at each of its 33 district offices on November 15, 1997, and about 6,300 taxpayers attended; (9) a subsequent national PSD, held on May 16, 1998, was attended by about 2,500 taxpayers; (10) between November 1997 and July 1998, these events attracted more than 22,000 taxpayers; (11) IRS estimated that it incurred incremental costs of about $11.5 million through the end of July 1998; (12) GAO's survey of taxpayers attending the first PSD indicated that about 91 percent believed it was a good idea, even though only about 34 percent of taxpayers reported that their problems had been fully resolved by the time they responded to the questionnaire; (13) IRS surveys of taxpayers attending PSDs each month and a follow-up telephone survey conducted by IRS in April and May 1998 indicated a generally positive response to the initiative, noting that some indicated that IRS' effort to resolve problems could be improved; (14) IRS has identified four types of problems that taxpayers have sought to resolve on PSDs and have assembled task groups to review each: penalties, audit reconsiderations, installment agreements, and offers in compromise; (15) according to IRS officials who have studied the PSD initiative, an important lesson learned was that taxpayers with ongoing tax problems wanted to discuss them face to face with IRS staff to finally get their problems resolved; and (16) IRS is also studying ways to incorporate problem-solving lessons learned from the PSD initiative into its day-to-day operations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-76 | gao_NSIAD-98-76_0 | Additionally, McClellan Air Force Base, California, and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, California, including the Air Force maintenance depot, is to be closed by July 2001. Consequently, the act requires that a solicitation may be issued for a single contract for the performance of multiple depot-level maintenance or repair workloads, only if (1) the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that the individual workloads cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those individual workloads, (2) the Secretary submits a report setting forth the determination together with the reasons for the determination, and (3) the solicitation of offers for the contract is issued more than 60 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the report. DOD’s Reports Do Not Provide Sufficient Support for the Determination
DOD’s reports and supporting data do not provide adequate support for the determinations that the Sacramento and San Antonio competition workloads cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those workloads. Air Force officials indicated they were uncertain about how to perform this analysis. However, our work indicates that there is sufficient information to make an analysis of the logic and economics of having solicitations for individual workloads. Other Air Force studies show that the Air Force has analyzed information related to the performance of individual workloads by qualified offerors. For example, in late 1996, the Air Force accomplished repair base analyses for six depot-level workloads currently performed by the Sacramento depot. The objective of each analysis was to identify industry capabilities and capacity to repair and overhaul specific workloads. The report states that all competitors indicated throughout their separate workload studies for Sacramento that consolidating workloads offered the most logical and economical performance possibilities. Further, one offeror’s study states that the present competition format is not in the best interest of the government. A second option recommended in this study was that the Sacramento workload be separated into two competitive packages—aircraft and commodities—with the A-10 workload being transferred within the Air Force rather than being included in the competition package. We were unable to fully evaluate the support for the report because the Air Force did not give us adequate or timely access to the contractor studies. Conclusions
DOD’s reports and supporting documentation do not provide adequate support for its determinations that the individual workloads at the Sacramento and San Antonio depots cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the requirements relating to the public-private competitions for maintenance workloads at two closing Air Force maintenance depots.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it may be that the individual workloads at the closing San Antonio, Texas, and Sacramento, California, Air Force maintenance depots cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and be awarded a contract to perform those individual workloads; (2) however, Department of Defense (DOD) reports and supporting data do not provide adequate information supporting the determinations; (3) there is no analysis of the logic and economies associated with having the workload performed individually by potentially qualified offerors; (4) there is no support for determining that the individual workloads cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that would do them individually; (5) Air Force officials stated that they were uncertain as to how an analysis of performing the workloads on an individual basis would be done; (6) however, Air Force studies indicate that the information to make such an analysis is available; (7) in 1996 the Air Force performed analyses for six depot-level workloads performed by the Sacramento depot to identify industry capabilities and capacity; (8) as a part of these analyses, the Air Force identified sufficient numbers of qualified contractors interested in various segments of the Sacramento workload to support a conclusion that it could rely on the private sector to support these workloads; (9) the reports and available supporting data did not adequately support DOD's determination that the individual workloads cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those individual workloads; (10) DOD's determination report relating to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center states that all competitors indicated throughout their Sacramento workload studies that consolidating workloads offered the most logical and economical performance possibilities; (11) this statement was based on studies performed by the offerors as part of the competition process; (12) one offeror's study states that the present competition format is not in the best interest of the government and recommended that the workload be separated into two competitive packages; and (13) GAO was unable to determine whether the other two contractor studies support the statement in the DOD report that all competitors favored consolidating the workloads because the Air Force did not provide it adequate or timely access to the studies cited in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-1052T | gao_GAO-05-1052T_0 | Background
Since the onset of OIF and OEF, over 1 million servicemembers have been deployed. Servicemembers injured during OIF and OEF are surviving injuries that would have been fatal in past conflicts. Separation from the military and return to civilian life may entail the exchange of individually identifiable health information between DOD and VA. VA Has Established Policies and Outreach Efforts Intended to Smooth the Transition from DOD Health Care
VA has taken several steps to provide OIF and OEF servicemembers with timely access to health care and information on health care services. Recent VA Policies Designed to Facilitate Transition to VA Health Care
Since 2002, VA has issued a memorandum and four directives addressing eligibility criteria and the health care needs of recently discharged servicemembers. An October 2003 directive (1) provided instructions to VA employees for determining the eligibility of recent combat veterans to be enrolled for VA health care; (2) required each VA medical facility to designate a clinically trained combat case manager, usually a social worker or nurse, to coordinate all of the medical care and services provided to recent combat veterans by VA and non-VA agencies until the veterans no longer need care; and (3) required VA medical facilities to designate a point of contact—administrative staff, social worker, or nurse—to receive and expedite transfers of servicemembers from MTFs to VA medical facilities and coordinate with VA’s combat case managers. Also in August 2003, VA created the Taskforce for the Seamless Transition of Returning Service Members. In January 2005, VA established the Seamless Transition Office to further improve coordination within the Veterans Benefits Administration and the Veterans Health Administration as well as between DOD and VA. To help ensure that VA staff assisting OIF and OEF servicemembers can be responsive to their health care needs, the agency created an internal Web site to provide a single source of access to VA policies, procedures, and directives for wounded, ill, and seriously injured servicemembers and veterans. VA Outreach Efforts to OIF and OEF Servicemembers
VA has instituted several outreach strategies to provide information about the health care services available to OIF and OEF servicemembers who have been discharged. For OIF and OEF servicemembers who may potentially use VA services, DOD and VA share some types of administrative data, such as individuals’ names and addresses; however, the sharing of health information between the two departments remains limited. VA could not report how many of these were OIF and OEF servicemembers. MOU for the sharing of individually identifiable health information. The MOU does not specify particular types of individually identifiable heath information that will be exchanged and when the information will be shared. The absence of specific data sharing procedures continues to hinder VA’s efforts to obtain needed health information from DOD. In July 2005, DOD transmitted to VA postdeployment health assessment data for those individuals who have been discharged from the military. According to VA officials, DOD is expected to transmit these data monthly beginning in October 2005. However, according to VA officials, DOD is not providing health assessment information to VA for Reserve and National Guard members, who comprise 35 percent of the OIF and OEF forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) servicemembers and those who are discharged from military service may receive health care from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Since the onset of OIF and OEF, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported that more than 15,000 servicemembers have been wounded in combat. Those who are seriously injured require comprehensive health care services and may be treated at either DOD or VA medical facilities. Because VA is expected to provide health care to many of the injured OIF and OEF servicemembers, concerns have been raised about the ease with which these individuals and their health care information transition from DOD's to VA's health care system. This statement is based on GAO's preliminary work on "seamless transition" and focuses on (1) the policies and outreach efforts that VA has instituted to provide timely access to health care to OIF and OEF servicemembers and (2) the extent to which individually identifiable health information is shared systematically between DOD and VA. Since GAO's work is still in the early stages of review, the statement is limited to information gathered to date.
What GAO Found
Since 2002, VA has developed policies and procedures that direct its medical facilities to provide OIF and OEF servicemembers timely access to care. Most notably, VA assigned VA social workers to selected military treatment facilities in August 2003, directed VA facilities to designate combat case managers in October 2003, and directed the establishment of four VA polytrauma centers for OIF and OEF servicemembers in June 2005. In January 2005, VA established the Seamless Transition Office to further improve coordination within the Veterans Benefits Administration and the Veterans Health Administration as well as between DOD and VA. In addition, VA has increased outreach efforts by providing OIF and OEF servicemembers who have been discharged with personal letters and newsletters, a Web site for health information tailored to OIF and OEF servicemembers, counseling services, and briefings on available VA health care services. GAO is in the beginning stages of reviewing VA's efforts to provide a smooth transition from DOD health care and has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of VA's related policies, procedures, and outreach initiatives. An important issue associated with transitioning servicemembers to VA health care is the sharing of health care information between DOD and VA. The two departments have signed a memorandum of understanding for sharing individually identifiable health information, but the memorandum does not specify the particular types of individually identifiable health information that will be exchanged and when the information will be shared. The absence of specific procedures continues to hinder VA's efforts to obtain needed health information from DOD. Recently, DOD has begun to share certain health assessment information with VA on individuals who have been discharged from the military, and the transmitting of this information to VA on a routine basis is expected to occur in October 2005. However, according to VA officials, DOD is not providing health assessment information to VA for Reserve and National Guard members, who comprise 35 percent of the OIF and OEF forces. |
gao_GAO-05-538 | gao_GAO-05-538_0 | Background
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established as a result of the Uruguay Round on January 1, 1995, as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The outcome of ministerial conferences is a ministerial declaration that guides future work. In negotiating the Doha Round on behalf of the United States, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is also guided by certain goals, notably the goals outlined by the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) granted by Congress in 2002. The December 2003 General Council meeting did not result in any agreements, except to resume talks in early 2004. Doha Round Behind Schedule but July Framework Injected New Momentum into Trade Talks after Failed Cancun Ministerial
Despite the Doha Round starting 2004 on an uncertain note, political leadership, intensified dialogue, and a series of conciliatory gestures resulted in adoption by WTO members of a framework agreement on key negotiating issues called “the July framework” or “package.” The framework is credited with putting global trade talks back on track, and participants report that they have finally begun to make progress. The WTO negotiating process also became more effective, contributing to progress. Moreover, agriculture is recognized as having achieved greater progress than other issues, such as industrial market access and services, which are essential for attaining an acceptable balance of issue interests among the WTO’s 148 members. Negotiators Have Made Uneven Progress in Key Issue Areas
Negotiating progress has varied markedly in the six issues designated as key work areas at the upcoming Hong Kong ministerial—(1) agriculture, (2) trade facilitation, (3) industrial (nonagricultural) market access, (4) services, (5) development issues, and (6) rules. Progress has also been limited on two other issues being advocated by other WTO members—development-related issues and rules. Negotiators still need to agree on numerous outstanding details if WTO members are to achieve modalities at the December 2005 Hong Kong ministerial. Nevertheless, achieving a meaningful agreement in industrial market access will be essential for the United States. Several Factors Pose Challenges to Successful Negotiations in Hong Kong
Seven interrelated factors may influence the Doha Round’s progress in resolving substantive differences in the lead-up to the Hong Kong ministerial. Sixth, there are timing considerations, with the mid-2007 expiration of any renewed U.S. Trade Promotion Authority acting as an implicit deadline. The last (Uruguay) round succeeded in the complex challenge of adding agriculture, services, and intellectual property rights to the trading system for the first time. A special relationship between U.S. and EU leaders contributed to the Doha ministerial’s success and to the July 2004 package. Agriculture remains central to the round. We met with officials from key U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the State Department, and the Department of the Treasury, to obtain perspectives on progress in the negotiations overall and individual issue areas and factors affecting negotiations. Agriculture
Given the importance of agriculture in the Doha Round negotiations, coalitions of countries regrouped in 2004 and focused on making progress on the three pillars in agricultural reform of export subsidies, domestic supports, and market access. | Why GAO Did This Study
The outcome of ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations is vital to the U.S. economy, because trade with WTO members accounts for about one-fifth of the U.S. gross domestic product. The current round of trade negotiations--called the Doha Round--was supposed to end by January 2005 with agreement on the key issues of agriculture, industrial market access, services, and to strengthen the trading system's contribution to economic development. Failure to reach any agreement at the last WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, put the talks behind schedule and threatened the outcome; however, talks resumed in 2004, and a new ministerial conference will convene in Hong Kong in December 2005. In light of these events, and with the impending renewal decision on U.S. Trade Promotion Authority, which streamlines the process by which Congress approves trade agreements, GAO was asked to assess (1) the overall status of the Doha Round negotiations, (2) progress on key negotiating issues, and (3) factors affecting progress toward concluding the negotiations.
What GAO Found
During 2004, Doha Round negotiations got back on track as trade ministers signed a framework agreement known as the "July package." By committing to eliminate agricultural export subsidies, the agreement's main achievement was to recognize the importance of agriculture in the round and thus reopen talks on other issues. Since this breakthrough, negotiations are picking up momentum, as WTO members are working toward deadlines for more detailed agreements at the December 2005 Hong Kong ministerial conference. Yet despite the improved negotiating atmosphere, the talks are behind schedule, and considerable work remains on the numerous issues that must constitute a final agreement. Progress has been uneven on the six negotiating issues identified as central to the Hong Kong meeting--agriculture, trade facilitation (customs reforms), industrial market access, services, WTO rules, and development issues. The United States has particular reform interests in the first four of these issues. Progress has occurred on two of them: in agriculture, based on agreements in the July framework, and trade facilitation, for which talks have finally been started. However, little progress has been made on industrial market access and services, two other issues of interest to the United States. Several factors could affect progress in the critical period leading up to the December 2005 Hong Kong ministerial. Achieving consensus among the WTO's 148 members is a challenging task, and diverse economic incentives and competing visions add complexity to the negotiations. Cooperation by the United States, the European Union, and some of the developing countries is also seen as key to a successful conclusion before U.S. Trade Promotion Authority expires in mid-2007, an implicit deadline for the talks. |
gao_HEHS-98-72 | gao_HEHS-98-72_0 | Billions of Federal Dollars Support Drug Abuse Treatment
As part of its overall drug control effort, the federal government provides significant support for activities related to drug abuse treatment, including grants to states, direct services, and research. 1.) 2.) It requires agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments and thus should provide a useful framework for assessing the effectiveness of federally funded drug treatment efforts. For those who do require treatment, services may be provided in either outpatient or inpatient settings, and via two major approaches: pharmacotherapy and behavioral therapy, with many programs combining elements of both. Other treatment approaches, such as faith-based strategies, have yet to be rigorously examined by the research community. Experts recognize that not all drug users require treatment to forgo drug use because some drug users do not progress to abuse or dependence. Drug Abuse Treatment Approaches and Settings
Data from 1992-93 on use of drug treatment in the United States (the most current available) show that about 1.4 million people received drug treatment during the previous year. Regardless of how faith-based treatment is defined, there has not been sufficient research to determine the results of this type of treatment. Research Issues Make Assessment of Treatment Effectiveness Difficult
The study of drug treatment programs is complicated by a number of challenging methodological and implementation issues. The ability to compare the results of effectiveness studies is also influenced, and often limited, by differences in how outcomes are measured, how programs are operated, and client variables. According to an analysis by the Lewin Group, among the reasons cited for the limited use of randomized trials are the difficulties in obtaining informed consent from drug abusers and the perceived ethical issue of randomly assigning people who are seeking drug treatment to a control group in which no treatment or a treatment regimen not of the client’s choice is provided. Recent major studies of drug treatment effectiveness have used urinalysis to validate self-reported data. At the same time, researchers emphasize that client reporting on use of illicit drugs during the previous year (the outcome measure used in most effectiveness evaluations) has been shown to be more accurate than reporting on current drug use. Assessing treatment effectiveness is also complicated by differences in client factors. In large-scale evaluations conducted over the past 20 years, researchers have concluded that treatment reduces the number of regular drug users as well as criminal activity. Major Studies Report Reductions in Drug Use and Crime Following Treatment
Comprehensive analyses of the effectiveness of drug treatment have been conducted by several major studies over a period of nearly 30 years: DATOS, NTIES, TOPS, and the Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP) (see table 4). These large, multisite studies were designed to assess drug abusers on several measures before, during, and after treatment. These studies are generally considered by the Institute of Medicine and the drug treatment research community to be the major evaluations of drug treatment effectiveness, and much of what is known about typical drug abuse treatment outcomes comes from these studies. Evidence Varies on the Best Treatment Approaches for Specific Groups of Drug Abusers
Research provides strong evidence to support methadone maintenance as the most effective treatment for heroin addiction. However, research on the most effective treatment interventions for other groups of drug abusers is less definitive. Despite a number of studies on the topic, little is known about the best way to treat adolescent drug abusers. The relative effectiveness of alternative approaches for treating adolescents remains uncertain. Drug and Alcohol Abuse: Billions Spent Annually for Treatment and Prevention Activities (GAO/HEHS-97-12, Oct. 8, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on: (1) the level of federal support for drug abuse treatment activities; (2) the treatment approaches and settings most commonly used and what is known about an alternative approach--faith-based treatment; (3) research issues affecting drug abuse treatment evaluations; and (4) research findings on the effectiveness of drug treatment overall as well as what is known about the effectiveness of treatment for heroin, cocaine, and adolescent drug addiction. GAO did not comprehensively analyze the extensive literature on drug treatment research methodologies and study results, independently evaluate the effectiveness of drug treatment programs, or verify the results reported in the studies it reviewed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) billions of dollars are spent annually to support treatment for drug abuse and related research; (2) in 1998, 20 percent of the federal drug control budget, $3.2 billion, supported drug abuse treatment; (3) to meet the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, agencies are beginning to set goals and performance measures to monitor and assess the effectiveness of federally funded drug treatment efforts; (4) treatment services and research aim to reduce the number of current drug abusers; (5) experts recognize that not all drug users require treatment because some do not progress to the stage of abuse or dependence; (6) those who do need treatment can receive services in a variety of settings and via two major approaches: pharmacology and behavioral therapy, with many programs combining elements of both; (7) other treatment approaches, such as faith-based strategies, are sometimes used but have not been sufficiently evaluated to determine their effectiveness; (8) measuring the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment is a complex undertaking; (9) the most comprehensive studies have used an observational or quasiexperimental design, assessing effectiveness by measuring drug use before and after treatment; (10) few studies have used the most rigorous approach--random assignment to treatment and control groups--to isolate the particular effects of treatment on drug abuse; (11) in most studies, the conclusions researchers can draw are limited by factors such as reliance on self-reported data and the time frame planned for client followup; (12) furthermore, comparisons of study results are complicated by differences in how outcomes are defined and measured and differences in program operations and client factors; (13) a number of large, multisite, longitudinal studies provide evidence that drug abuse treatment is beneficial, but reliance on self-reported data may overstate effectiveness; (14) substantial numbers of clients report reductions on drug use and criminal activity following treatment; (15) research on treatment effectiveness relies heavily on client records of drug use; (16) when examining recent drug use, objective tests, such as urinalysis, consistently identify more drug users than self-reports do; (17) the research evidence to support the relative effectiveness of specific treatment approaches or settings for particular groups of drug abusers is more varied; (18) methadone maintenance has been shown to be the most effective approach to treating heroin abusers; and (19) research on the best treatment approach or setting for other groups of drug abusers is less definitive. |
gao_GAO-11-430T | gao_GAO-11-430T_0 | 2011 High-Risk Series Update on the Medicare Program
As we report in our 2011 High-Risk Series update, Medicare remains on a path that is fiscally unsustainable over the long term. This fiscal pressure heightens the need for CMS to reform and refine Medicare’s payment methods to achieve efficiency and savings, and to improve its management, program integrity, and oversight of patient care and safety. CMS has made some progress in these areas, but many avenues for improvement remain. Reforming and Refining Payments
Since January 2009, CMS has implemented payment reforms for Medicare Advantage (Part C) and inpatient hospital, home health, and end-stage renal disease services. The agency has also begun to provide feedback to physicians on their resource use and is developing a value-based payment method for physician services that accounts for the quality and cost of care. In addition, CMS has taken steps to ensure that some physician fees recognize efficiencies when certain services are furnished together, but the agency has not targeted the services with the greatest potential for savings. Our work has also shown that payment for imaging services may benefit from refinements. Improving Program Management
CMS’s implementation of competitive bidding for medical equipment and supplies and its new Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) have progressed, with some delays. Of greater concern is that we found pervasive internal control deficiencies in CMS’s management of its contracting function that put billions of taxpayer dollars at risk of improper payments or waste. However, CMS has not made sufficient progress to complete actions to address recommendations related to clarifying the roles and responsibilities for implementing certain contractor oversight responsibilities, clearing a backlog of contacts that are overdue for closeout, and finishing its investigation of over $70 million in payments we questioned in 2007. Enhancing Program Integrity
New directives, implementing guidance, and legislation designed to help reduce improper payments will affect CMS’s efforts over the next few years. CMS has already taken action in some areas—for example, as required by law, it implemented a national Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC) program in 2009 to analyze paid claims and identify overpayments for recoupment. CMS has set a key performance measure to reduce improper payments for Parts A and B (fee-for-service) and Part C and is developing measures of improper payments for Part D. CMS was not able to demonstrate sustained progress at reducing its fee-for-service error rate because changes made to improve the methodology for measurement make current year estimates noncomparable to any issued before 2009. Other recent CMS program integrity efforts include issuing regulations tightening provider enrollment requirements and creating its Center for Program Integrity, which is responsible for addressing program vulnerabilities leading to improper payments. CMS did not develop an adequate process to address the vulnerabilities to improper payments identified by the RACs and we recommended that it do so. However, CMS has taken some actions to increase it. Overseeing Patient Care and Safety
CMS’s oversight of the quality of nursing home care has increased significantly in recent years, but weaknesses in surveillance remain that could understate care quality problems. CMS’s current approach for funding state surveys of facilities participating in Medicare is ineffective, yet these surveys are meant to ensure that these facilities provide safe, high-quality care. CMS needs a plan with clear measures and benchmarks for reducing Medicare’s risk for improper payments, inefficient payment methods, and issues in program management and patient care and safety. One important step relates to our recommendation to develop an adequate corrective action process to address vulnerabilities to improper payments. CMS has implemented certain recommendations of ours, such as in the area of nursing home oversight. In addition, further action is needed by CMS to establish policies to improve contract oversight, better target review of claims for services with high rates of improper billing, and improve the monitoring of nursing homes with serious care problems. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: Deficiencies in Contract Management Internal Control Are Pervasive. Medicare: Improvements Needed to Address Improper Payments in Home Health. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the February 2011 High-Risk Series update, GAO continued designation of Medicare as a high-risk program because its complexity and susceptibility to improper payments, combined with its size, have led to serious management challenges. In 2010, Medicare covered 47 million people and had estimated outlays of $509 billion. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has estimated fiscal year 2010 improper payments for Medicare fee-for-service and Medicare Advantage of almost $48 billion. This statement focuses on the nature of the risk in the program, progress made, and specific actions needed. It is based on GAO work developed by using a variety of methodologies--including analyses of Medicare claims, review of policies, interviews, and site visits--and information from CMS on the status of actions to address GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in its 2011 High-Risk Series update, Medicare remains on a path that is fiscally unsustainable over the long term. This fiscal pressure heightens CMS's challenges to reform and refine Medicare's payment methods to achieve efficiency and savings, and to improve its management, program integrity, and oversight of patient care and safety. CMS has made some progress in these areas, but many avenues for improvement remain. Reforming and refining payments. Since January 2009, CMS has implemented payment reforms for Medicare Advantage and inpatient hospital and other services, and has taken other steps to improve efficiency in payments. The agency has also begun to provide feedback to physicians on their resource use, but the feedback effort could be enhanced. CMS has taken steps to ensure that some physician fees recognize efficiencies when certain services are furnished together, but the agency has not targeted the services with the greatest potential for savings. Other areas that could benefit from payment method refinements include oxygen and imaging services. Improving program management. CMS's implementation of competitive bidding for medical equipment and supplies and its transfer of fee-for-service claims workload to new Medicare Administrative Contractors have progressed, with some delays. Of greater concern is that GAO found pervasive internal control deficiencies in CMS's management of contracts that increased the risk of improper payments. While the agency has taken actions to address some GAO recommendations for improving internal controls, it has not completely addressed recommendations related to clarifying the roles and responsibilities for implementing certain contractor oversight responsibilities, clearing a backlog of contacts that are overdue for closeout, and finishing its investigation of over $70 million in payments GAO questioned in 2007. Enhancing program integrity. CMS has implemented a national Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC) program to analyze paid claims and identify improper overpayments for recoupment, set performance measures to reduce improper payments, issued regulations to tighten provider enrollment, and created its Center for Program Integrity. However, the agency has not developed an adequate process to address vulnerabilities to improper payments identified by RACs, nor has it addressed three other GAO recommendations designed to reduce improper payments, including one to conduct postpayment reviews of claims submitted by home health agencies with high rates of improper billing. Overseeing patient care and safety. The agency's oversight of the quality of nursing home care has increased significantly in recent years, but weaknesses in the survey methodology and guidance for surveillance could understate care quality problems. In addition, CMS's current approach for funding state surveys of facilities participating in Medicare is ineffective. However, CMS has implemented, or is taking steps to implement, many recommendations GAO has made to improve nursing home oversight. CMS needs a plan with clear measures and benchmarks for reducing Medicare's risk for improper payments, inefficient payment methods, and issues in program management and patient care and safety. Further, CMS's effective implementation of recent laws will be critical to helping reduce improper payments. CMS also needs to take action to address GAO recommendations, such as to develop an adequate corrective action process, improve controls over contracts, and refine or better manage payment for certain services. |
gao_GAO-01-479 | gao_GAO-01-479_0 | DOD has indicated that the costs to clean up these training ranges is probable and measurable and as such should be reported as a liability in the financial statements. Training Range Inventories Are Not Complete
Although DOD and the services have collected information on other environmental contamination under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program for years, they have not performed complete inventories of training ranges to identify the types and extent of contamination present. Past data collection efforts were delayed because the services were waiting for the promulgation of the Range Rule which has been withdrawn. Although the Senate Report’s directives were dated May 1999, DOD did not provide formal guidance to the services for collecting training range data until October 2000—17 months later. However, the assumptions and cost factors used in the model were not independently validated to ensure accurate and reliable estimates. Lack of Leadership and Focus Hinders DOD Progress in Reporting Training Range Cleanup Costs
DOD lacks leadership in reporting on the cleanup costs of training ranges. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review DOD’s ongoing efforts to (1) gather and collect information on its training ranges and issues affecting the successful completion of the inventory and (2) recognize environmental liabilities associated with the cleanup of unexploded ordnance from its training ranges, including DOD’s efforts to develop and implement a methodology to develop cost estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of concerns about the long-term budgetary implications associated with the environmental cleanup of the Department of Defense (DOD) training ranges, GAO examined (1) the potential magnitude of the cost to clean up these ranges in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, (2) the scope and reliability of DOD's training range inventory, and (3) the methodologies used to develop cost estimates.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD lacks complete and accurate data with which to estimate training range cleanup costs. DOD has not done a complete inventory of its ranges to fully identify the types and extent of unexploded ordnance present and the associated contamination. Recently, DOD began to compile training range data, but these initial efforts have been delayed because DOD did not issue formal guidance to the services for collecting the information until October 2000. Because DOD has not completed an inventory of its ranges, the services have used varying methods to estimate the size and condition of the ranges necessary to estimate the cost of cleanup for financial statement purposes. As a result, environmental liability costs are not consistently calculated and reported across the services. |
gao_GAO-15-641 | gao_GAO-15-641_0 | The Field Study Followed Several Accepted Research Standards, but Did Not Report Its Limitations or Make Conclusions That Were Fully Linked to the Results
Based on our prior work evaluating research programs, our internal expertise in research design, and established guidelines and reports for conducting research and program evaluations, we identified six generally accepted research standards that are critical for designing, analyzing, and reporting the results of scientific research. Without such guidance, FMCSA research may not include critical elements, as occurred in the reporting of the field study. FMCSA Used Several Key Assumptions to Estimate the Potential Effects of the Rule
As part of its rule-making process, FMCSA developed assumptions about the motor carrier industry and its operations to estimate the economic costs and the safety and health benefits of the 2011 HOS rule. For example, FMCSA assumed that drivers working more than 65 hours per week would incur the majority of schedule changes as a result of the rule. Further, FMCSA assumed that reduced work time would increase a driver’s opportunity to sleep leading to safety and health benefits. Analysis of Available Data Provides Some Insight into the Effects of the Rule
Analyzing available data can help provide some insight into the rule’s potential effects and the extent to which they aligned with FMCSA’s assumptions and estimates. The results from our analysis of schedule data from 16 for-hire carriers is consistent with FMCSA’s assumption that drivers working more than 65 hours per work week would be more likely to reduce their work hours. Which drivers were affected: Our analysis of 2012 to 2014 driver schedule data from 16 for-hire motor carriers is consistent with FMCSA’s expectation that the percentage of drivers working the longest hours— over 65 hours per 8-day work week—decreased after the rule went into effect on July 1, 2013. Therefore, our findings cannot be generalized to the motor carrier industry as a whole. However, the literature is less clear on which HOS interventions (e.g., rest breaks and limiting driving and on-duty time) best minimize fatigue and reduce crash risk. First, we used the model to compare hypothetical driver schedules that complied with two of the 2011 HOS rule provisions—the 168-hour limit and the two-night provision—to similar schedules that did not comply with the rule but were in compliance with the previous HOS rule.the rule went into effect would result in lower fatigue scores and, We found that some schedule changes that would be required after therefore, a lower risk of driver fatigue.schedules we modelled that had to change after July 1, 2013, in order to comply with the rule were:
Maximum Allowed-Hours Day and Night schedules: 14-hour shifts over 5 consecutive days or nights. Lack of Representative Driver Schedule Data Limits Analysis of the Effects of the HOS Rule
The ability of FMCSA and others to assess the effects of the 2011 HOS rule is impacted by the limited availability and representativeness of driver schedule data (i.e., records of drivers’ work hours). No organization, including FMCSA, collects or maintains a centralized database with representative driver schedule data that can be generalized to the entire motor-carrier industry. Collecting these types of data has historically been difficult, but a recent statutory change to how driver schedule data will be collected provides a potential opportunity to do so. However, FMCSA officials said that they do not currently plan to collect and use such data for research purposes because MAP-21 limits their use to the enforcement of laws. There may be ways of mitigating these privacy and cost concerns, but FMCSA has not examined the costs and benefits of collecting electronic driver-schedule data on a large-scale and currently does not plan to do so. For example, to address privacy concerns, information can be “de- identified” for the purposes of analyzing data. While electronically collected, representative schedule data that will soon be available to FMCSA would allow it to assess the impact of its rules, MAP-21 places limitations on the use of this data for purposes other than enforcing laws. Given the potential value of such data for evaluating the impact of future regulatory rules, Congress may benefit from information on how the electronic data to be collected in response to the MAP-21 requirements could be extracted, stored, and analyzed and how privacy and cost concerns associated with the use of these data could be addressed. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress may wish to consider directing DOT to study and provide a report to Congress identifying approaches for extracting, storing, and analyzing electronically collected motor carrier drivers’ schedule data, including the potential benefits, privacy, and cost concerns, and options for how such concerns could be mitigated. 2. Appendix III: GAO Identified Assumptions in the Hours of Service Rule’s Regulatory Impact Analysis
As part of our review of the effects of the 2011 hours of service (HOS) rule, we were asked to identify the assumptions used by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to estimate the costs and benefits of the rule. These assumptions cover which drivers would be affected by the HOS rule and how they would be affected. | Why GAO Did This Study
FMCSA—within the Department of Transportation (DOT)—issues rules to address safety concerns of the motor carrier industry, including on truck drivers' HOS. In July 2013, FMCSA began to enforce three new provisions of its HOS rule. GAO was asked to review a 2014 FMCSA study on the rule, as well as the rule's assumptions and effects. This report (1) compares the study to generally accepted research standards, and (2) identifies the assumptions used to estimate the rule's costs and benefits and the rule's driver-operation, economic, safety, and health effects.
GAO identified research standards that professional associations, academics, and GAO's prior work have used. GAO evaluated the 2014 FMCSA study against these standards. GAO also compared FMCSA's assumptions about how drivers would be affected by the HOS rule against actual drivers' schedule data from 16 for-hire carriers that cover the years 2012 through 2014. These data include information on over 15,000 drivers per year, but are not generalizable to the motor carrier industry as a whole.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the January 2014 study issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to examine the efficacy of its hours of service (HOS) rule—a regulation that governs how many hours truck drivers transporting freight can work—followed most generally accepted research standards. However, FMCSA did not completely meet certain research standards such as reporting limitations and linking the conclusions to the results. For example, by not adhering to these standards, FMCSA's conclusion in the study about the extent to which crash risk is reduced by the HOS rule may be overstated. GAO found that FMCSA has not adopted guidance on the most appropriate methods for designing, analyzing, and reporting the results of scientific research. Without such guidance, FMCSA may be at risk for excluding critical elements in research it undertakes to evaluate the safety of its rules, leaving itself open to criticism.
FMCSA made several assumptions and anticipated certain effects of the HOS rule in the regulatory impact analysis. Specifically, to estimate the economic costs of the rule, FMCSA assumed that some drivers would lose a certain amount of driving and on-duty time and then estimated the amount and cost of the work time lost. Further, FMCSA assumed that reduced work time could increase a driver's opportunity to sleep, leading to safety and health benefits. Assessing the effectiveness of the HOS rule is difficult because of the limited availability of representative driver schedule data (i.e., records of drivers' work hours). Nevertheless, GAO's analysis of a limited sample of available data provides some insight into the rule's effects and the extent to which they aligned with FMCSA's assumptions and estimates. For example, according to GAO's analysis, some drivers at a sample of 16 for-hire carriers who worked the longest hours (over 65 hours per work week) reduced their work hours after the rule went into effect, a finding consistent with FMCSA's assumptions that drivers working over 65 hours were more likely to be affected. However, GAO's analysis found that drivers who worked less than 65 hours per work week also changed their schedules after the rule went into effect, a result not anticipated by FMCSA.
The ability of FMCSA and others to assess the effects of rules, such as the 2011 HOS rule, is impacted by the limited availability of representative driver schedule data. No organization collects or maintains a centralized database with such data that can be generalized to the motor carrier industry as a whole. Collecting schedule data has historically been difficult, but a recent statutory change that requires carriers to electronically record and store these data provides a potential data source for the future. However, before these data can be used for research purposes several challenges would have to be addressed. First, there are statutory limits on the use of these data for purposes other than enforcing motor carrier safety regulations. Additionally, privacy and cost concerns must be resolved before these data could be made available for analysis. According to FMCSA officials, they do not plan to study how to use these data in a way that will address privacy and cost concerns, in part, because of the statutory limits. Given the potential value of these data to future regulatory analysis, it may be important to provide Congress with information on how these data can be extracted, stored, and analyzed while addressing any privacy and cost concerns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA adopt guidance outlining agency research standards. FMCSA agreed with GAO's recommendation. GAO also suggests that Congress consider directing DOT to study and report on how electronically collected driver schedule data can be extracted, stored, and analyzed in a way that addresses cost and privacy concerns. |
gao_GAO-02-603 | gao_GAO-02-603_0 | New Starts Evaluation and Rating Process Assesses Project’s Justification and Local Financial Commitment
FTA’s current New Starts evaluation process assigns candidate projects individual ratings for each TEA-21 criterion to assess each project’s justification and local financial commitment. The process also assigns an overall rating that is intended to reflect the project’s overall merit. However, some projects rated as highly recommended or recommended may not meet FTA’s readiness test for funding. For its New Starts report for fiscal year 2003, FTA evaluated a total of 50 projects and provided overall ratings for 31 of these projects. The purpose of the baseline comparison is to isolate the costs and benefits of the proposed major transit investment. FTA Proposes Four Projects for New Starts Funding in Fiscal Year 2003
FTA’s New Starts report and budget for fiscal year 2003 requests that $1.21 billion be made available for the construction of four new transit systems and expansions of existing systems through the New Starts program (see app. TEA-21 provided the majority of FTA’s commitment authority, authorizing $6.09 billion in “guaranteed” funding for the New Starts program. A cap on New Starts funds would allow more projects to receive funding but could have an effect on specific projects that are currently being developed. For example, based on current project cost estimates, a 60-percent cap on New Starts funds for the 49 projects currently in final design or preliminary engineering would result in about $500 million that could be used to fund additional projects. Concluding Observations
Although FTA has been faced with an impending transit budget crunch for several years, the agency will end the TEA-21 authorization period with unused commitment authority impart because fewer projects than expected were ready for grant agreements. | What GAO Found
Since the early 1970's, the federal government has provided a large share of the nation's capital investment in urban mass transportation. Much of this funding has come through the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts Program, which helps pay for rail, bus, and trolley projects. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century authorized about $6 billion in "guaranteed" funding for the New Starts program through fiscal year 2003. FTA's evaluation process assigns candidate projects individual ratings for project justification and local financial commitments. The process also assigns an overall rating intended to reflect the project's merit. FTA recommended four projects for funding commitments for fiscal year 2003 in its New Starts report and budget proposal. FTA evaluated 50 proposed projects for fiscal year 2003 and developed ratings for 31 of them. Twenty-seven of these projects were rated as "highly recommended" or "recommended." Although FTA has faced transit budget crunches for years, the agency will end the act's authorization period with $310 million in unused commitment authority. Proposals to limit the amount of New Starts funds would allow more projects to receive such funding, but could harm specific projects being developed and the local transportation planning process. For example, limiting New Starts funds to 60 percent of a project's cost for the 49 projects now in final design or preliminary engineering would "free up" $500 million for additional projects. However, only 20 percent of these projects plan to use New Starts funds for more than 60 percent of projected costs and would be affected by such a cap. |
gao_RCED-99-78 | gao_RCED-99-78_0 | FHA is required by statute to set limits on the dollar amount of individual loans it will insure. These limits are based, in part, on local median home prices. FHA relies heavily on the survey to measure median home sales prices because it is the most comprehensive source of published house price data readily available to the agency. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) also collects information on home sales. The Finance Board and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Usually Estimate Similar Median Prices
In about two-thirds of the 42 metropolitan areas we reviewed, no substantive difference existed in the 1997 median house prices calculated with Finance Board and OFHEO data. As figure 1 shows, in 27 of these areas, the difference between the higher and lower estimates of median prices according to the two sets of data was 5 percent or less. In an additional 10 areas, the two agencies’ estimates were within 10 percent of each other. For the 15 areas where the two estimates differed by more than 5 percent, the Finance Board estimated a higher median home sales price than OFHEO in 10 areas, while OFHEO estimated a higher median in 5 areas. Less than or equal to 5% (27 areas)
Because one basis for measuring the median price—the Finance Board’s data—does not result in a substantively different price than another—OFHEO’s data—for about two-thirds of the areas we reviewed, FHA loan limits in those areas would be similar using either source of data. Officials See Data Sources as Mutually Supportive, With Differences Largely Due to Jumbo Loans
The Finance Board’s data were a reasonable measure of an area’s median home sales price (for homes with conventional financing), according to officials at the Finance Board, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Specifically, the Finance Board’s data included purchase prices up to $750,000 and loan amounts up to $500,000.Conversely, OFHEO’s data excluded all jumbo loans because they exceed the conforming loan limit ($214,600 in 1997), meaning neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac could have purchased them. Median House Prices Are Lower When They Are Based on Conventional and Government-Insured Loans
Supplementing the Finance Board’s or OFHEO’s data with information on prices of homes financed with government-insured mortgages reduces the estimates of median prices across the board and within all of the metropolitan areas we reviewed. When we added these data to OFHEO’s data, median prices were 6 to 31 percent lower. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Housing Finance Board (the Finance Board), the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, the Federal National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation for their review and comment. The Finance Board agreed that our analysis indicates its survey is a reasonable measure of 1997 home sales prices in the areas we reviewed. For the 42 areas, we obtained (1) from FHA and the Department of Veterans Affairs, data on the median price of all of the homes sold for which the federal government insured or guaranteed the mortgages and (2) from the Finance Board, the median purchase price of all the homes sold whose mortgages were reflected in the Board’s monthly interest rate survey. Because homes financed with government-insured loans are typically lower priced and neither the Finance Board nor OFHEO includes data on government-insured mortgages, we also calculated median purchase prices that included data from FHA and the Department of Veterans Affairs with the data from OFHEO and the Finance Board. We also discussed the results of our analysis comparing median prices from the various sources with officials from the agencies that provided these data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on housing prices from sources other than the Federal Housing Finance Board, focusing on: (1) comparing data on house prices from the Finance Board with data the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) collects to measure house price changes; (2) views of officials of the agencies involved on the results of this analysis; (3) the effect on median prices of supplementing the Finance Board's and OFHEO's data with information each does not already include on lower-priced homes with government-insured mortgages; and (4) the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) recent efforts to explore alternative sources of data for measuring median home prices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Finance Board and OFHEO's estimates of 1997 median home sales prices were similar in about two-thirds of the metropolitan areas GAO reviewed; (2) in 27 of the 42 areas, the two agencies' estimates were within 5 percent of each other; (3) loan limits based on either set of data would be similar in these areas; (4) for the remaining 15 areas GAO reviewed, the Finance Board estimated a higher median home sales price in 10 of the areas, while OFHEO's estimate was higher in 5 areas; (5) officials familiar with these data cited the low number of substantive differences in GAO's analysis as an indicator of the validity of the Finance Board's data; (6) because no substantive difference existed between the two sets of data in about two-thirds of the areas GAO reviewed, the officials indicated the Finance Board's data are a reasonable measure of an area's median sales price for homes without government-insured financing; (7) in those areas for which substantive differences did exist, officials from the different agencies involved agreed the reason was that the Finance Board includes larger loans, and thus higher home purchase prices, in its survey than does OFHEO; (8) the Finance Board's 1997 data include loan amounts up to $500,000 and house purchase prices up to $750,000; (9) OFHEO's data for 1997 included no loans greater than $214,600; (10) these officials also cited normal variations associated with surveys and statistical sampling as a reason for some differences between the two sets of data; (11) supplementing the data from either the Finance Board or the OFHEO with data on homes financed with government-insured loans would lower the estimated median home sales price in any given area by 2 to 31 percent; (12) the purchase prices of homes financed with mortgages insured by FHA and the Department of Veterans Affairs are, on average, lower than those of homes bought with privately insured financing; (13) these lower prices result from the limits on the size of individual loans FHA may insure and because government-insured financing tends to be focused on first-time homebuyers; (14) FHA is engaged in an effort to use additional sources of data; (15) FHA relies heavily on the Finance Board's survey for the data it needs to set its loan limits, but to a limited extent it has also supplemented that survey with data its field offices gather on local home sales prices; and (16) FHA is considering using data on loans that neither the Federal National Mortgage Association nor the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation has purchased. |
gao_GAO-12-367 | gao_GAO-12-367_0 | Military officers can participate in a variety of types of fellowships at host organizations such as universities, think tanks, corporations, federal agencies, and congressional committees or member offices. Think tanks. assignments. However, for two types of fellowships—legislative and interagency—the underlying authorities are less explicit than they are for the others. DOD Primarily Uses Two Explicit Statutory Authorities
We determined that DOD’s authority to pursue fellowships at non-DOD educational institutions, foundations, and corporations derives primarily from section 2603 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which authorizes servicemembers to accept fellowships from certain organizations, and section 2013 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which authorizes the training of servicemembers at nongovernmental facilities. OSD Has Limited Visibility over Fellowship and Training-with-Industry Programs
OSD has limited visibility over its fellowship and training-with-industry programs, because (1) OSD has not developed a clear mission statement for these programs that defines the programs’ purpose, (2) OSD has not consistently enforced its requirement for the military departments to provide annual reports on fellowship and training-with-industry programs, and (3) not all fellowship and training-with-industry programs have a designated office within each department to be responsible for preparing information for these programs. In turn, OSD does not have a reliable inventory of the various fellowship and training-with-industry programs to educate its military officers. Additionally, OSD has limited visibility over one type of fellowship program—legislative—because OSD has not clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for overseeing this program and has not developed documented criteria for the placement of DOD fellows with congressional committees and members. OSD officials agree that such placement criteria would be helpful, since DOD does not have enough legislative fellows to meet the full congressional demand. Having a clear mission statement is critical because it defines an organization’s purpose in language that states desired outcomes. An OSD official stated that establishing a clear mission statement would improve its ability to conduct policy oversight of DOD’s fellowship and training programs. Military Services Are Not Well Positioned to Determine the Extent of the Benefits from These Programs
The military services believe that they derive benefits from their fellowships and training-with-industry programs, but they are not well positioned to determine the extent of these benefits for four main reasons. For example, they do not ensure that the needs that prompted the program and the goals of the program are being met. Third, the services do not know their overall program costs, including both direct and indirect costs, and therefore it is difficult to know whether these programs are cost-effective. For some of the programs, there is no requirement to conduct periodic program reviews. Without conducting periodic and comprehensive performance reviews, the services’ ability to determine the benefit they derive from fellowship and training-with-industry programs will remain limited. To help ensure compliance with DOD Instruction 1322.06 and thus enhance DOD’s visibility over all of the fellowship and training-with- industry programs, and to promote a shared understanding across the military services of what is expected in meeting the instruction, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following five actions: (1) develop a mission statement that clearly defines the respective purposes of the legislative and nonlegislative fellowship and training-with- industry programs to be in a better position to know the extent to which desired program outcomes are being achieved; (2) more consistently enforce the DOD instruction’s requirement on the submission of annual reviews from the military services on these programs; and (3) collaborate with the military departments to ensure that each service has designated an office to be responsible for compiling information on the legislative and nonlegislative fellowship and training-with-industry programs for the annual reports required in the DOD instruction. Finally, to better position DOD to determine the extent of the benefits it derives from legislative and nonlegislative fellowship and training-with- industry programs and better assess whether fellowship and training-with- industry programs offer the best venues for developing needed personnel skills, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force to take the following four actions: (8) perform periodic and comprehensive program reviews that assess the progress using quantifiable measures, validate that programs continue to meet current or emerging needs, incorporate feedback from program participants and host organizations, and document the results of reviews; (9) clarify guidance for determining what qualifies as a follow-on utilization tour, and establish criteria to determine when a utilization tour is needed or, conversely, when it can be postponed or waived; (10) determine the direct costs of these programs by periodically obtaining and analyzing overall direct program costs, and explore the feasibility of estimating indirect program costs; and (11) establish and periodically review fellowship written agreements or memoranda of understanding to document key information and expectations between the services and the host organizations, such as fellowship objectives, criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of fees or tuition charged to the military departments , and criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of the projects involved. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 11 recommendations we made to improve OSD oversight and strengthen the military services’ management of its fellowships and training-with- industry programs. To determine the extent to which the military services are able to determine that they derive benefits from these programs, we obtained and assessed service guidance, collected and reviewed information on service processes and practices used to manage their programs, and interviewed service officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD), which includes the military services, selects mid- to upper-career-level military officers to participate in fellowship and training-with-industry programs conducted at non-DOD organizations such as universities, think tanks, private corporations, federal agencies, and Congress. For some fellowships, the military departments pay a fee or tuition to the host organization. GAO was directed to review DODs use of these programs. GAOs objectives were to determine: (1) the statutory provisions that authorize DODs fellowship and training-with-industry programs for military officers, (2) the extent of the Office of the Secretary of Defenses (OSD) visibility over these programs, and (3) the extent to which the services are able to determine that they derive benefits from these programs. GAO analyzed relevant laws and DOD policies, collected data, and interviewed OSD and military service officials on their oversight and management roles and responsibilities for these programs.
What GAO Found
GAO determined that DOD primarily uses two explicit statutory authoritiessection 2603 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which authorizes servicemembers to accept fellowships from certain organizations, and section 2013 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which authorizes the training of servicemembers at nongovernmental facilitiesfor its fellowships and training-with-industry programs for military officers. For two specific types of fellowshipsLegislative and Interagencythe underlying authorities are less explicit than they are for the others.
OSD has limited visibility over its fellowship and training-with-industry programs for several reasons. First, OSD has not developed a mission statement that would clearly define the respective key purposes for these programs. Having a clear mission statement is critical because it defines an organizations purpose in language that states desired outcomes. Additionally, OSD has not consistently enforced its requirement for the military departments to provide an annual report on fellowship and training-with-industry programs. Further, not all fellowship and training-with-industry programs have a designated office within each department for preparing the annual report. OSDs visibility is also limited by not having a reliable inventory of these various programs, and by not having a clear and commonly shared definition of a fellowship. Without improved oversight, OSDs visibility over the military departments compliance with its requirements governing these programs will remain limited. Additionally, visibility is limited over the legislative fellowship program in particular because oversight responsibilities are not clearly delineated, and because OSD does not have documented criteria for the placement of DOD fellows with the offices of congressional committees and members. OSD officials agree that such criteria would be helpful since it does not have enough available fellows to meet the full congressional demand.
The military services are not well positioned to determine the extent of the benefits they are deriving from their participation in these programs for four principal reasons. First, not all of the services conduct periodic program reviews, as are required for some programs. In addition, the reviews that are conducted are not comprehensive in that they do not assess the program against program goals using quantifiable performance measures, review the needs that prompted the program, incorporate feedback from fellows into the review, or document the results of the review. Second, they do not have clear guidance as to what qualifies as a postfellowship assignmentan assignment that uses the skills and knowledge developed during the fellowship programor criteria for when such assignments can be postponed or waived, thus limiting the extent the services are able to determine they are deriving benefits from these programs. Third, the services do not know their overall program costs, so it is difficult to know whether these programs are cost-effective. Finally, some of the services do not have memoranda of understanding with the non-DOD host organizations, such as think tanks, so they cannot be assured that expectations are clearly understood and the intended benefits are obtained. Without better management controls, the services ability to determine the benefits of these programs will remain limited. However, service officials believe that they obtain benefits from fellowships and training-with-industry programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 11 recommendations to DOD for improving oversight and management of DODs fellowship and training-with-industry programsfor example, submitting DOD-required annual reports and performing service-required program reviewsthat would enhance OSDs visibility over the programs and better position DOD to determine the extent to which it derives benefits from them. In response to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 11 recommendations and stated its action plan to implement the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-923T | gao_GAO-08-923T_0 | Progress on the KMCC Has Been Slow, Quality Problems Persist, and Project Costs Are Unknown
Approximately 1 year after our initial testimony and over 2 years after the KMCC’s originally scheduled construction completion date, the project continues to experience significant cost and schedule uncertainty along with construction quality problems and ongoing criminal investigations. Since our testimony in June of 2007, limited progress has been made on KMCC construction, and estimates of how much the total project will cost or when it will be completed are uncertain. Specifically, tens of millions of dollars related to design, foreign currency fluctuation, rework, personnel, and furniture and equipment costs are not included in the Air Force’s cost to date or estimate for construction completion of the project. Contingencies to fund items such as potential hindrance claims are also not included in the estimated costs for construction completion. When including all estimated costs, the total cost of the project will likely exceed $200 million. In addition, major construction deficiency problems, such as the leaking roof and improperly installed kitchen exhaust ducts, which we discussed in our 2007 testimony, are just now being repaired. Final Costs of the KMCC Project Are Still Unknown
Because the Air Force does not track the total cost of the KMCC project, there are no accurate estimates of how much the total KMCC project will cost. Construction deficiency repairs. Concrete cracking. According to an Air Force estimate, on average each month that the opening of the hotel is delayed results in the U.S. government paying an additional $90,000 for off-base lodging of displaced personnel traveling at the government’s expense. The Air Force Has Improved Controls over the KMCC Project
The Air Force has made significant improvements in its oversight and internal controls over the KMCC project. The Air Force has also standardized its invoice and change order review processes to minimize future risks of paying for unapproved work. These repeated meetings between U.S. and German officials prompted the German government to provide $37.9 million (25 million euros) to the project for backlogged change orders and repair work. Other Recent U.S. Projects on Ramstein Air Base Have Experienced Similar Problems
Other projects recently completed in the KMCC area managed by LBB- Kaiserslautern have experienced problems similar to those affecting the KMCC. In addition, officials were concerned that a building attached to the freight terminal was also structurally deficient as a result of potentially insufficient welds on the structural steel. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the current status of the Kaiserslautern Military Community Center (KMCC) construction project, including projected costs, cost completion analyses, projected construction completion dates, and status of ongoing investigations, we interviewed officials from the Air Force at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), the Air Force Services Agency (AFSVA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Air Force Audit Agency, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and the Department of State. To determine whether oversight and internal control improvements have been made by the Air Force since our last testimony, we interviewed Air Force officials from the KMCC Resident Director’s Office. We obtained and reviewed project management plans, standardized policies and procedures, cost estimates, training materials for certifying officers and accountable officials, and other relevant documents related to project management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Kaiserslautern Military Community Center (KMCC) is one of many projects initiated at Ramstein Air Base to upgrade capabilities of the base as a result of the consolidation of military bases in Europe. The KMCC is intended to provide lodging, dining, shopping, and entertainment for thousands of U.S. military and civilian personnel and their families in the area. Construction on the project, which began in late 2003, was originally scheduled to be completed in early 2006. On June 28, 2007, GAO testified that construction deficiencies and mismanagement had drawn into question when the project would be completed and at what cost. This testimony discusses updated findings related to the KMCC project. The testimony describes (1) the current status of the KMCC construction project, (2) whether oversight and internal control improvements have been made by the Air Force since GAO's last testimony, and (3) if other projects recently completed in the KMCC area have experienced problems similar to those affecting the KMCC. To address the objectives, GAO interviewed officials from the U.S. Air Force, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Air Force Services Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of State, and German government. GAO also conducted site visits and reviewed project plans, cost estimates, completion analyses, and other relevant KMCC documents.
What GAO Found
Approximately 1year after GAO'sJune 2007 testimony and over 2years after the KMCC's originally scheduled construction completion date, the project continues to experience significant cost and schedule uncertainty along with construction quality problems and ongoing criminal investigations. Limited progress has been made on KMCC construction, and there are still no accurate estimates of how much the total project will cost or when it will be completed. Major construction deficiencies GAO reported in 2007 are just now beginning to be corrected. In addition, the Air Force does not track the total cost of the KMCC. Specifically, tens of millions of dollars related to design, foreign currency fluctuation, rework, personnel, and furniture and equipment costs are not included in the Air Force's cost estimates. Contingencies to fund items such as repairs to cracking concrete are also not included in the Air Force's estimates. After including all estimated costs, the total cost of the project will likely exceed $200 million. Project delays have also resulted in additional costs to the U.S. government and lost profit for project funding partners. For example, AAFES estimates that it is losing $500,000 of profit for each month that the exchange facility is not open. Although these problems exist, the Air Force has made significant improvements in its oversight and control over the project. For example, the Air Force established standardized policies and procedures for reviewing change orders and invoices. Improvements in controls over payments and change orders have minimized future risks of paying for unapproved work or fraudulent billings for work not performed. Cost, schedule, and construction deficiencies affected other projects built by German government construction agents in the KMCC area. For example, underground electrical ducts at Ramstein Air Base flood with water causing runway lights to malfunction. A freight terminal on the air base was also built with structural deficiencies that resulted in its temporary evacuation. |
gao_GAO-07-557 | gao_GAO-07-557_0 | Drug Sponsors Agreed to Study the Majority of On-Patent Drugs with Written Requests under BPCA, but No Studies Were Conducted When Drug Sponsors Declined the Written Requests
Most of the on-patent drugs for which FDA requested pediatric drug studies under BPCA were being studied, but no studies resulted when the requests were declined by drug sponsors. Drug Sponsors Agreed to Conduct Pediatric Drug Studies for Most On-Patent Drugs with Written Requests Issued under BPCA
From January 2002 through December 2005, FDA issued 214 written requests for on-patent drugs to be studied under BPCA, and drug sponsors agreed to conduct pediatric drug studies for 173 (81 percent) of those. FNIH had not funded the study of any of these drugs. Most Drugs Granted Pediatric Exclusivity under BPCA Had Labeling Changes, but the Process for Making Changes Was Sometimes Lengthy
Most drugs—about 87 percent—that have been granted pediatric exclusivity under BPCA have had labeling changes as a result of the pediatric drug studies conducted under BPCA. Pediatric drug studies conducted under BPCA showed that children may have been exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffective dosing, overdosing, or side effects that were previously unknown. For the remaining 18 drugs (about 40 percent), it took from 238 to 1,055 days for FDA to complete the scientific review process and approve labeling changes. For 7 of those drugs, it took more than a year to complete the scientific review process and approve labeling changes. We found that the drugs studied under BPCA represented more than 17 broad categories of disease. Table 4 provides information on some of the drugs studied for pediatric use and what is known about the diseases that are relevant to children. HHS stated that the draft report provided a significant amount of data and analysis and generally explains the BPCA process. First, HHS commented that the report does not sufficiently acknowledge the success of BPCA. Nevertheless, the draft report extensively discussed HHS accomplishments such as the number of studies conducted, the number and importance of labeling changes that FDA approved, and the wide range of diseases, including some that are common, serious, or life threatening to children, for which drugs were studied. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) assessed the extent to which pediatric drug studies were being conducted for on-patent drugs under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA), including when drug sponsors declined to conduct the studies; (2) evaluated the impact of BPCA on labeling of drugs for pediatric use and the process by which the labeling was changed; and (3) illustrated the range of diseases treated by the drugs studied under BPCA. We reviewed data provided to us by the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH)—a nonprofit corporation independent of NIH—about funding for pediatric drug studies of on-patent drugs. | Why GAO Did This Study
About two-thirds of drugs that are prescribed for children have not been studied and labeled for pediatric use, which places children at risk of being exposed to ineffective treatment or incorrect dosing. The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA), enacted in 2002, encourages the manufacturers, or sponsors, of drugs that still have marketing exclusivity--that is, are on-patent--to conduct pediatric drug studies, as requested by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). If they do so, FDA may extend for 6 months the period during which no equivalent generic drugs can be marketed. This is referred to as pediatric exclusivity. BPCA required that GAO assess the effect of BPCA on pediatric drug studies and labeling. As discussed with the committees of jurisdiction, GAO (1) assessed the extent to which pediatric drug studies were being conducted under BPCA for on-patent drugs, including when drug sponsors declined to conduct the studies; (2) evaluated the impact of BPCA on labeling drugs for pediatric use and the process by which the labeling was changed; and (3) illustrated the range of diseases treated by the drugs studied under BPCA. GAO examined data about the drugs for which FDA requested studies under BPCA from 2002 through 2005. GAO also interviewed officials from relevant federal agencies, pharmaceutical industry representatives, and health advocates.
What GAO Found
Drug sponsors have initiated pediatric drug studies for most of the on-patent drugs for which FDA has requested studies, but no drugs were being studied when drug sponsors declined these requests. Sponsors agreed to 173 of the 214 written requests for pediatric studies of on-patent drugs. In cases where drug sponsors decline to study the drugs, BPCA provides for FDA to refer the study of these drugs to the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH), a nonprofit corporation. FNIH had not funded studies for any of the nine drugs that FDA referred as of December 2005. Most drugs (about 87 percent) granted pediatric exclusivity under BPCA had labeling changes--often because the pediatric drug studies found that children may have been exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffective dosing, overdosing, or previously unknown side effects. However the process for approving labeling changes was often lengthy. It took from 238 to 1,055 days for information to be reviewed and labeling changes to be approved for 18 drugs (about 40 percent), and 7 of those took more than 1 year. Drugs were studied under BPCA for the treatment of a wide range of diseases, including those that are common, serious, or life threatening to children. These drugs represented more than 17 broad categories of disease, such as cancer. The Department of Health and Human Services stated that the report provides a significant amount of data and analysis and generally explains the BPCA process, but expressed concern that it did not sufficiently acknowledge the success of BPCA or clearly describe some elements of FDA's process. GAO incorporated comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-1046 | gao_GAO-03-1046_0 | Civilian Workforce- Planning Model’s Data Reliability and Information Technology Structure Are Adequate, but Forecasting Ability Not Fully Established
The Army has taken steps to ensure the reliability of the historical personnel data used by the model and the adequacy of its information technology structure used to support the model, but it has not provided documentation that it has sufficiently tested and reviewed the most critical aspect of the model—its forecasting capability and the appropriateness of its assumptions. Information Technology Structure Is Adequate
The Army’s procedures for validating the information technology support structure (the software and hardware used to interface with and house the model) were also sufficient. For example, the Army (1) adequately documented the information technology structure to allow for continuity of operations, (2) tested its functionality, and (3) provided expertise for system modification and operation. The Army’s program manager said this had been done for the original certification of CIVFORS in 1987. However, without proper documentation of the abilities of the model, there exists a risk that the forecasts it produces may be inaccurate or misleading. As a result, DOD has decided to test the Army’s civilian forecasting model. Conclusions
As DOD continues to transform and downsize its civilian workforce, it is imperative that the department properly shape and size the workforce. The Army has taken adequate steps to ensure that the historical personnel data used in the model are sufficiently reliable and the information technology structure appropriately supports the model; however, it has not fully documented that it has taken adequate steps to demonstrate the credibility of the model’s forecasting capability. Without sufficient documentation to demonstrate that adequate steps have been taken to ensure the credibility of the model’s forecasting capabilities, decisions about the Army’s future civilian workforce may be based on questionable data and other potential users cannot determine with certainty the model’s suitability for their use. We continue to believe that without adequate documentation, the Army cannot show that it has taken sufficient steps to ensure the model’s credibility in terms of its forecasting capability. To determine the adequacy of the steps the Army has taken to ensure the credibility of its civilian workforce-forecasting model, we discussed CIVFORS with the Army’s CIVFORS program manager in the Army G-1 office, Civilian Personnel Policy Directorate, who has overall responsibility for the workforce analysis and the forecasting system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) reduced its civilian workforce by about 38 percent, with little attention to shaping or specifically sizing this workforce for the future. As a result, the civilian workforce is imbalanced in terms of the shape, skills, and experience needed by the department. DOD is taking steps to transform its civilian workforce. To assist with this transformation, the department is considering adopting an Army workforce-planning model, known as the Civilian Forecasting System (CIVFORS), which the Army uses to forecast its civilian workforce needs. Other federal agencies are also considering adopting this model. GAO was asked to review the adequacy of the steps the Army has taken to ensure the credibility of the model.
What GAO Found
The Army has taken adequate steps to ensure that the historical personnel data used in the model are sufficiently reliable and that the information technology structure adequately and appropriately supports the model. For example, the Army has established adequate control measures (e.g., edit checks, expert review, etc.) to ensure that the historical data that goes into the model are sufficiently reliable. Moreover, it has taken adequate steps to ensure that the information technology support structure (i.e., the software and hardware used to interface with and house the model) would enable continuity of operations, functionality, and system modification and operations. However, the Army has not demonstrated that it has taken adequate steps to ensure that the model's forecasting capability provides the basis for making accurate forecasts of the Army's civilian workforce. The Army's original certification of CIVFORS in 1987 was based on a formal documented verification and validation of the model structure that has not been formally updated since that time even though the Army has undertaken several model improvements. According to the Army's CIVFORS program manager, the Army has taken several steps, to include an independent review, peer reviews, and a comparison of forecasted data to actual data. However, documentation of these steps is incomplete and, therefore, does not provide adequate evidence to demonstrate the credibility of the forecast results. Without adequate documentation, the Army cannot show that it has taken sufficient steps to ensure the model's credibility in terms of its forecasting capability; consequently, there exists a risk that the forecasts it produces may be inaccurate or misleading. Furthermore, without documentation of CIVFORS's forecasting capability, it may be difficult for DOD and other federal organizations to accurately determine its suitability for their use. |
gao_GAO-10-251 | gao_GAO-10-251_0 | Each of the Federal Agencies and Offices Involved in Preparing and Publishing the Draft Declaration Shares Some Responsibility for Its Release to the Public
While no single U.S. government agency or office was entirely responsible for the public disclosure of the draft declaration, all of the agencies and offices involved in preparing and publishing the draft declaration share some responsibility for its public release. We identified several points during the life cycle of the draft document where problems occurred. Since this IAEA marking has no legal significance in the United States, DOE, Commerce, and NRC treated the information as OUO. State prepared the draft declaration for transmittal to the White House. In describing the purpose and contents of the document and the classification level of the information, State wrote in the draft presidential message, “the IAEA classification of the enclosed declaration is ‘Highly Confidential Safeguards Sensitive’; however, the United States regards this information as ‘Sensitive but Unclassified’.” The two-page transmittal letter described the contents of the draft declaration and the top and bottom was clearly marked SBU, accompanied by a footnote explaining that the draft declaration was exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The National Security Council, which reviewed these documents on behalf of the White House, did not add explicit and clear instructions in the presidential message on how to handle the draft declaration, such as whether or not it should be published, when it sent the documents to the White House Clerk’s Office, which transmitted the documents to Congress. The National Security Council also did not include a transmittal letter, as other executive branch agencies had, with instructions on how to handle the draft declaration. Congressional Offices That Reviewed and Transmitted the Draft Declaration Determined Incorrectly That the Document Could be Published
Congressional offices that reviewed and then transmitted the draft declaration to GPO for publication—the House of Representatives’ Office of the Parliamentarian and Clerk’s Office—determined, incorrectly in our view, that the document could be published. The White House Clerk’s Office. GPO Did Not Raise Concerns about Publishing the Draft Declaration
GPO, which edited and processed the document for publication, did not raise any concerns about the document’s sensitivity. Public Release of Draft Declaration Does Not Appear to Have Harmed National Security, According to DOE, NRC, and Commerce Officials
The inadvertent public release of the draft declaration of civilian nuclear sites and nuclear facilities does not appear to have damaged national security, according to officials from DOE, NRC, and Commerce. Information in the draft declaration was limited to civilian nuclear activities, and most nuclear-related information was publicly available on agency Web sites or in other published documents, according to officials from the three agencies. However, officials from all of the agencies that compiled this information told us the information—all of which was considered unclassified—was sensitive because it was consolidated into one document and should never have been posted to GPO’s Web site. Commerce, DOE, and NRC did not formally assess the impact of the public release of the information on U.S. national security. According to officials from these agencies, no such assessment was necessary because all of the agencies involved in the development of the draft declaration (as well as the Department of Defense) had fully reviewed the consolidated list of civilian nuclear facilities and related activities on multiple occasions to ensure that no information of direct national security significance was included and that no classified information was contained in the declaration prior to transmitting it to the White House and Congress. Regarding the first point, we believe that given the sensitive nature of the draft document—and commensurate with its role and responsibilities— the House Security Office should have, at a minimum, raised concerns with the House Clerk’s Office about publicly releasing 266 pages of information on U.S. nuclear sites and activities and advised the House Clerk not to print the document without explicit authorization from the agencies that designated the information SBU. GAO Comments
1. 2. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
On May 7, 2009, the Government Printing Office (GPO) published a 266-page document on its Web site that provided detailed information on civilian nuclear sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States. At the request of the Speaker of the House, this report determines (1) which U.S. agencies were responsible for the public release of this information and why the disclosure occurred, and (2) what impact, if any, the release of the information has had on U.S. national security. In performing this work, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzed policies, procedures, and guidance for safeguarding sensitive information and met with officials from four executive branch agencies involved in preparing the document, the White House, the House of Representatives, and GPO.
What GAO Found
While no single U.S. government agency or office was entirely responsible for the public disclosure of the draft declaration, all of the agencies and offices involved in preparing and publishing the draft declaration share some responsibility for its release. GAO identified several points during the life cycle of the draft document where problems in the process occurred. First, none of the agencies that prepared the draft declaration--the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)--took the added precaution of ensuring that the consolidated draft they helped prepare had a U.S. security designation on each page of the document. Rather, the final version of the document, which they all reviewed, was marked only with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) designation--"Highly Confidential Safeguards Sensitive." This marking has no legal significance in the United States. Second, the Department of State, which prepared the draft declaration for transmittal to the White House, sent a transmittal letter to the National Security Council indicating that the contents of the draft declaration should be treated as Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). Not all federal agencies use this particular marking and, therefore, the marking created confusion for other executive and legislative branch offices that subsequently received the draft declaration on whether the information could be published. Third, the National Security Council, which reviewed the draft declaration on behalf of the White House, did not provide explicit and clear instructions on how to handle the draft declaration to the White House Clerk's Office. Fourth, the legislative branch offices which reviewed and then transmitted the document to GPO for publication--the House of Representatives' Parliamentarian and Clerk's Office--determined incorrectly, in GAO's view, that the document could be published. Officials from these congressional offices were not familiar with the phrase "Sensitive but Unclassified" and did not know how to safeguard that information. Finally, GPO, which proofread and processed the document for publication, did not raise any concerns about the document's sensitivity. GAO believes it is important to correct these problems as soon as possible because the United States is required to submit a declaration to IAEA annually. The public release of the draft declaration of civilian nuclear sites and nuclear facilities does not appear to have damaged national security, according to officials from DOE, NRC, and Commerce. Commerce, DOE, and NRC did not assess the national security implications of the draft declaration's public release because these agencies--plus the Department of Defense--had reviewed the list of civilian nuclear facilities and related activities prior to transmitting it to the White House and Congress to ensure that information of direct national security significance was not included. Information in the draft declaration was limited to civilian nuclear activities, and most nuclear-related information was publicly available on agency Web sites or other publicly available documents. However, according to officials from all of the agencies responsible for compiling this information, the information consolidated in one document made it sensitive and, thus, it should never have been posted to GPO's Web site. |
gao_GAO-17-642T | gao_GAO-17-642T_0 | Offshore Oil and Gas Infrastructure in the Gulf Varies in Size and Complexity, and Lessees Have Installed and Removed Thousands of Structures Over the Past Half Century
As we reported in December 2015, offshore oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf varies in size and complexity, and lessees have installed and plugged or removed thousands of wells and structures over the past half century. The simplest structures are found in shallow water and include caissons and well protectors. A caisson is a cylindrical or tapered large diameter steel pipe enclosing a well conductor and is the minimum structure for offshore development. A more complex structure in shallow water is a fixed platform, which uses a jacket and pilings to support the superstructure, or deck. A typical platform is designed so that multiple wells may be drilled from it. Structures in deep water rely on other methods to anchor to the ocean floor. For example, a “compliant tower” structure supports the deck using a narrow, flexible tower and a piled foundation. Illustrations of these structures are shown in figure 1. In our December 2015 report, we also discussed the oil and gas infrastructure installed and removed in the Gulf over time. Most of the structures installed and removed were fixed platforms and caissons installed in shallow water. From 1985 through 2014, oil production from deepwater wells has increased significantly, as shown in figure 5. In 2014, over 80 percent of Gulf oil production occurred in deep water, up from 6 percent in 1985. Interior Requires Lessees to Decommission Offshore Infrastructure and Developed Procedures to Oversee the Process and Estimate the Associated Costs
As we reported in December 2015, Interior requires lessees to decommission offshore oil and gas infrastructure, and Interior’s BSEE developed procedures to oversee the decommissioning process for offshore oil and gas infrastructure and to estimate costs associated with decommissioning liabilities. According to Interior regulations, lessees must permanently plug all wells, remove all platforms and other structures, decommission all pipelines, and clear the seafloor of all obstructions created by the lease and pipeline right-of-way operations when the lessee’s facility is no longer useful for operations. Generally, lessees must permanently plug wells and remove platforms within 1 year after a lease terminates. In December 2015, we reported that BSEE had developed procedures for overseeing the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas infrastructure and estimating costs associated with decommissioning liabilities. Interior Requires Lessees to Provide Financial Assurances for Decommissioning Liabilities, but Our December 2015 Report Found that Interior’s Procedures Posed Risks to the Federal Government
As we reported in December 2015, Interior’s BOEM requires financial assurances from lessees to cover decommissioning liabilities, but we found that Interior’s financial assurance procedures in place at that time posed risks to the federal government. Under BOEM’s financial assurance procedures in place at the time of our December 2015 report, each offshore lease with a decommissioning liability had to be covered by a supplemental bond unless BOEM determined that a lessee had the financial ability to fulfill its decommissioning obligations. According to our December 2015 report, if a lessee passed the financial strength test by demonstrating its financial ability to pay for decommissioning on its leases, BOEM waived its requirement for the lessee to provide supplemental bonds. Specifically, as of October 2015, according to BOEM officials, for an estimated $38.2 billion in decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf, BOEM held or required about $2.9 billion in bonds and other financial assurances. For $33.0 billion in decommissioning liabilities, BOEM had waived 47 lessees from the requirement to provide supplemental bonds based on BOEM’s reviews of the lessees’ financial strength, according to BOEM officials., As we have found in prior GAO reports, the use of financial strength tests and corporate guarantees in lieu of bonds pose financial risks to the federal government. However, because it was unclear whether BOEM’s planned revisions would improve its procedures and the extent to which these revisions would increase the amount of bonding that lessees provide, we recommended in our December 2015 report, that BOEM complete its plans to revise its financial assurance procedures, and Interior concurred. In January 2017, BOEM delayed implementation of its revised financial assurance procedures for 6 months. We will continue to monitor Interior’s actions to address our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil and gas produced on federal leases in the Gulf are important to the U.S. energy supply. When oil and gas infrastructure is no longer in use, Interior requires lessees to decommission it so that it does not pose safety and environmental hazards. Decommissioning can include plugging wells and removing platforms, which can cost millions of dollars. Interior requires lessees to provide bonds or other financial assurances to demonstrate that they can pay these costs; however, if lessees do not fulfill their decommissioning obligations, the federal government may be liable for these costs.
This statement describes offshore oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf and Interior's requirements and procedures for overseeing decommissioning, and the risks posed by its financial assurances procedures. This statement is based on GAO-16-40 from December 2015. For that report, GAO reviewed agency regulations and procedures and interviewed officials from Interior, credit rating agencies, academia, and trade associations. GAO also followed up on the implementation status of the report's recommendations.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in December 2015, offshore oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico (Gulf) varies in size and complexity, and lessees have installed and removed thousands of structures over the past half century. The simplest structures are found in shallow water and include a caisson, which is a cylindrical, large diameter steel pipe enclosing a well. A more complex structure in shallow water is a fixed platform, which uses a jacket and pilings to support the superstructure, or deck. A typical platform is designed so that multiple wells may be drilled from it. Structures in deep water rely on other methods to anchor to the ocean floor, such as using a narrow, flexible tower and a piled foundation. From 1947 through 2014, lessees drilled over 50,000 wells and installed over 7,000 structures in the Gulf. Over the same time period, lessees plugged almost 30,000 of these wells and removed about 5,000 of these structures. Oil production from deepwater wells increased significantly in recent decades, and in 2014, over 80 percent of Gulf oil production occurred in deep water.
The Department of the Interior (Interior) requires lessees to decommission offshore oil and gas infrastructure, and according to GAO's December 2015 report, Interior developed procedures for overseeing the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas infrastructure and estimating costs associated with decommissioning liabilities. According to Interior regulations, lessees must permanently plug all wells, remove all platforms and other structures, decommission all pipelines, and clear the seafloor of all obstructions created by the lease and pipeline operations when the lessee's facility is no longer useful for operations. Lessees must also permanently plug wells and remove platforms within 1 year after a lease terminates. According to officials GAO interviewed for its December 2015 report, Interior's procedures for overseeing decommissioning and estimating costs associated with decommissioning liabilities included (1) identifying and tracking unused infrastructure, (2) reviewing lessee plans to decommission infrastructure, and (3) using different cost estimates for decommissioning in shallow and deep water.
Interior requires financial assurances from lessees to cover decommissioning liabilities, but GAO's December 2015 report found that Interior's financial assurance procedures in place at that time posed risks to the federal government. Under Interior's financial assurance procedures in place at the time, each offshore lease with a decommissioning liability had to be covered by a bond unless Interior determined that a lessee had the financial ability to fulfill its decommissioning obligations. Interior's procedures allowed it to waive its requirement for a lessee to provide a bond if the lessee passed a financial strength test. However, GAO found that of $38.2 billion in decommissioning liabilities as of October 2015, Interior held or required about $2.9 billion in bonds and other financial assurances, and had foregone requiring about $33.0 billion in bonds for most of the remaining liabilities. Prior GAO work has shown that the use of financial strength tests in lieu of bonds poses risks to the federal government. GAO recommended that Interior address this risk by following through on plans to revise its financial assurance procedures. Interior issued revised financial assurance procedures in July 2016 but, according to Interior, delayed implementing them in 2017 pending a six-month review process.
What GAO Recommends
Among other recommendations, GAO recommended in GAO-16-40 that Interior complete plans to revise its financial assurance procedures to address risks posed by these procedures. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations and has taken or described planned actions to address the recommendations, which GAO will continue to monitor. |
gao_GAO-13-687 | gao_GAO-13-687_0 | Bi-State Tolling Authorities Have Broad Authority to Set and Use Tolls, and Tolling Decisions Are Primarily Influenced by Debt Rather Than Federal Toll Provisions
Interstate compacts provide the bi-state tolling authorities with broad authority to set toll rates and use revenues for a range of purposes, including capital improvements for their transportation infrastructure and, in certain cases, economic development projects. To obtain financing for capital projects, bi-state authorities pledge through bond agreements to maintain specific revenue required to repay their debt. Bi-State Authorities Are Generally Not Subject to Federal or State Requirements for Public Involvement and Provided the Public Limited Opportunities to Participate in Recent Toll-Setting Decisions
In general, bi-state authorities are not required to follow federal or generally applicable state requirements for involving and informing the public, such as open meeting and open records laws. Instead, they set their own policies, which may be less stringent than those that apply to federal agencies, states, and other organizations. We found four areas in their most recent toll increases in which the bi-state authorities provided the public limited opportunities to learn about and provide comment on toll proposals, in contrast to federal and state requirements for involving the public, as well as practices used by other tolling authorities. The bi-state authorities did not in all cases (1) have documented public involvement processes for toll-setting; (2) provide the public with key information on their toll proposals in advance of public hearings; (3) offer the public sufficient opportunities to comment on toll proposals; and (4) provide a public summary of comments received before toll increases were approved. In commenting on a draft of this report, the PANYNJ stated that its policy is to provide the public with the amount, purpose, and estimated revenues of the proposed toll increase 10 days before convening toll hearings, and that this policy constitutes a documented public involvement process. External Oversight of Bi-State Tolling Authorities Has Been Limited, but Bi-State Authorities Have Established Some Internal Oversight
States Have Conducted Few Audits of Bi-State Tolling Authorities, and States’ Audit Authorities Are Unclear
The external oversight of the bi-state authorities has been limited as only one of the four bi-state authorities has been regularly audited by a state audit entity. However, differences in states’ laws and disagreements between the bi-state authorities and the state audit agencies have prompted questions about the authority of several states to provide oversight. As a result, the DRPA office of inspector general lacks an assurance of independence. Concluding Observations
Congress has given wide latitude to four states to address infrastructure needs in the Northeast by consenting to the creation of bi-state tolling authorities that operate some of the most highly traveled interstate crossings in the United States. Because these authorities are neither federal nor state entities, and because GAO does not make recommendations to non-federal entities, we are not making any recommendations in this report. The DOT and the DRPA had no comments on the draft. GAO staff that made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our three objectives were to assess: (1) the authority of bi-state tolling authorities to set and use tolls and the factors that influence toll setting, (2) the extent to which bi-state tolling authorities involve and inform the public in their toll-setting decisions, and (3) the extent to which bi-state tolling authorities are subject to external and internal oversight. Appendix III: Public Involvement in Toll Increases by Bi-State Tolling Authorities
Appendix IV: Summary of States’ Reported Audit Authority over the Four Bi-state Tolling Authorities
Delaware River and Bay Authority (DRBA), New Jersey and Delaware
Officials from the New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller stated that, the office, established in 2007, has standing oversight authority over DRBA—and the three other bi-state authorities—under the New Jersey state law that enables it to audit and investigate New Jersey “public agencies” and “independent state authorities.” However, it has not been firmly established in state law or state judicial cases that these bi-state authorities are considered “public agencies” or “independent state authorities” for the purposes of this law. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Northeast is home to some of the most highly traveled interstate crossings in the United States, funded by toll revenues collected from the traveling public. Since 1921, Congress has provided its consent to New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware to enter into legal agreements known as interstate compacts, establishing four bi-state tolling authorities to build and maintain toll bridges and tunnels. In recent years, bi-state tolling authorities have come under scrutiny for toll increases and other concerns, and GAO was asked to review their toll-setting decisions and oversight framework. GAO examined: (1) the authority of bistate tolling authorities to set and use tolls and the factors that influence toll setting; (2) the extent to which the authorities involve and inform the public in toll-setting decisions; and (3) the extent to which the authorities are subject to external and internal oversight. GAO reviewed federal and state laws, bi-state tolling authority documents, and interviewed officials from the authorities and state audit offices. GAO does not make recommendations to non-federal entities; nonetheless the authorities could benefit from greater transparency in public involvement and clearer lines of external oversight. DOT had no comments on a draft of this report and three authorities provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. In addition, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey disagreed, stating its policies constituted a documented public involvement process. GAO maintains that these policies were not publicly available, or a defined and structured process.
What GAO Found
Bi-state tolling authorities have broad authority to set toll rates and use revenues for a range of purposes, including maintaining, repairing, and improving their infrastructure. In setting tolls, bi-state tolling authorities are primarily influenced by debt obligations and maintain specific operating revenues to repay their debt. A federal statute requiring bridge tolls to be "just and reasonable" has less influence on tolling decisions, in part, because no federal agency has authority to enforce the standard.
Bi-state tolling authorities are not required to follow federal or general state requirements for involving and informing the public; they set their own policies that can be less stringent than practices of transportation agencies that follow federal or state requirements. In their most recent toll increases, the bi-state authorities generally provided the public limited opportunities to learn about and comment on proposed toll rates before they were approved. For example, one bistate authority did not hold any public toll hearings, while another provided one day for hearings. In contrast to federal and general state requirements and leading practices, the bi-state authorities did not in all cases (1) have documented public involvement procedures for toll setting; (2) provide the public with key information on the toll proposals in advance of public hearings; (3) offer the public sufficient opportunities to comment on toll proposals; and (4) provide a public summary of comments received before toll increases were approved.
External oversight of the bi-state authorities is limited as only one of the four authorities has been regularly audited by a state audit entity. While these audits have uncovered areas of concern, the authority of most state audit entities to oversee the bi-state authorities is unclear. Differences in states' laws and disagreements between the bi-state authorities and state audit agencies have raised questions about the authority of several states to provide oversight. Each of the four bi-state authorities provides some internal oversight, but one has not established access authority for its inspector general, which, as a result, lacks an assurance of independence. Because internal auditors are generally not required under internal audit standards to report to outside audiences, the public may lack knowledge of their efforts to ensure accountability for the use of toll revenues. |
gao_GAO-10-326 | gao_GAO-10-326_0 | Funding for the IHBG program has remained steady. The APR that HUD currently uses to track the use of grant funds does not collect data on activities that are not unit-based (directly involving housing units built, acquired, or rehabilitated). However, HUD is revising its reporting to track more activities. Tribes Have Used IHBG Funds to Build, Acquire, and Rehabilitate Affordable Housing and to Provide Other Types of Housing Assistance
In recent years, Native American tribes and TDHEs receiving IHBG funds under NAHASDA have used the funds to build, acquire, and rehabilitate affordable housing units and to provide other types of housing assistance, such as tenant-based rental assistance, housing counseling, and downpayment assistance to eligible tribal members. In fiscal year 2008, 102 out of 359 grantees received grants of less than $250,000 to maintain existing housing, develop new housing, and pursue other eligible activities under NAHASDA (see fig. One other small grantee we interviewed also had developed new housing, but not with IHBG funds. HUD data supports this assessment. Tribes View NAHASDA as Effective at Addressing Their Affordable Housing Needs and as an Improvement over the HUD Programs It Replaced
Based on our survey of and interviews with NAHASDA grantees, most grantees view NAHASDA as an effective low-income housing program, and a primary reason was NAHASDA’s recognition of tribal self-determination. We found that survey respondents viewed NAHASDA as very effective at improving housing conditions and increasing access to affordable rental housing and homeownership, but less effective at developing housing finance mechanisms and increasing economic development on Indian lands (see fig. Almost Half of the Grantees We Surveyed Use IHBG Funds for Infrastructure Development, but HUD Does Not Collect Grantees’ Plans or Monitor Their Investments in Housing-Related Infrastructure
Of the 232 NAHASDA grantees responding to our survey, 70 percent viewed investment in housing-related infrastructure—such as connecting a home to a local water supply—as a great housing need, but slightly less than half indicated that they use IHBG funds to develop infrastructure (see fig. Housing-related infrastructure development is an affordable housing activity under NAHASDA. However, according to IHS officials, HUD can access IHS’s sanitation deficiency database pursuant to a 2007 memorandum of understanding that specifically authorizes data sharing between IHS, HUD, and other agencies. As a result, additional opportunities exist for HUD to collect such information, which would allow it to track grantees’ efforts to address a key need in their communities and would broaden the scope of accomplishment data that HUD can report to Congress. If HUD were to obtain this data and share it with grantees, the data could help tribes identify any unmet sanitation needs that they might include in their reporting and address with their NAHASDA grants. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate (1) how Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) program funds have allowed Native American tribes to address their affordable housing needs; (2) how, if at all, NAHASDA has improved the process of providing Native American tribes with access to federal funds to meet their affordable housing needs; and (3) the extent to which NAHASDA funding has contributed to infrastructure improvements in Native American communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) changed how the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides housing assistance to Native Americans. Congress created NAHASDA to recognize self-determination for tribes in addressing their low-income housing needs. In NAHASDA's 2008 reauthorization, Congress asked GAO to assess the program's effectiveness. This report discusses (1) how tribes have used NAHASDA funds, (2) how NAHASDA has improved the process of providing tribes with funds for housing, and (3) the extent to which NAHASDA has contributed to infrastructure improvements in tribal communities. GAO analyzed agency documentation, surveyed all tribes receiving grants in fiscal year 2008, conducted site visits with select tribes, and interviewed officials at HUD and other agencies.
What GAO Found
Native American tribes have used NAHASDA block grant funds to develop new housing and to provide other types of housing assistance to eligible members, but fewer small grantees have developed new housing. Out of 359 grantees in fiscal year 2008, 102 received less than $250,000, with 22 of those reporting that they had developed new housing over the life of their participation in the program. Smaller grantees often provide tenant-based rental assistance and other such services to members, but HUD neither tracks activities that are not unit-based (units built, acquired, or rehabilitated) nor reports those activities to Congress. However, HUD is revising its reporting to track more activities, which should help efforts to assess the impact of NAHASDA. Most grantees that we surveyed and interviewed view NAHASDA as effective, largely because it emphasizes tribal self-determination. Grantees feel the program has helped to improve housing conditions and increase access to affordable housing, but they reported that developing housing finance mechanisms and increasing economic development remain as challenges. Housing-related infrastructure development is an affordable housing activity under NAHASDA, but HUD does not collect grantees' infrastructure plans or measure their infrastructure investments. Indian Health Service (IHS) data show an acute need for sanitation-related infrastructure in Indian housing, and 85 percent of grantees responding to our survey reported that developing infrastructure, such as providing homes with access to drinking water, was a continuing need. According to IHS officials, HUD can access IHS data on sanitation deficiencies under a 2007 memorandum of understanding between the agencies. HUD could use this data to track grantees' efforts to address a key need in their communities and broaden the scope of accomplishment data it reports to Congress. This data could also help grantees identify any unmet sanitation needs they might address with their NAHASDA grants. |
gao_GAO-10-155T | gao_GAO-10-155T_0 | Acquisition Strategy Was Tailored and Had Special Priority
DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles. The program established minimal operational requirements, decided to rely on only proven technologies, and relied heavily on commercially available products. The program also undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the most survivable vehicles as quickly as possible. To expand limited existing production capacity, the department expanded competition by awarding IDIQ contracts to nine commercial sources. To evaluate design, performance, producibility, and sustainability, DOD committed to buy at least 4 vehicles from each vendor. According to program officials, subsequent delivery orders were based on a phased testing approach with progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite the fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the responsibility for final integration of mission equipment packages including radios and other equipment into the vehicles after they were purchased. DOD also designated the MRAP program as DOD’s highest priority acquisition, which helped contractors and other industry partners to more rapidly respond to the urgent need and meet production requirements. Finally, some of the contractors involved in the acquisition responded to the urgency communicated by the department by investing their own capital early to purchase needed steel and other critical components in advance of orders. DOD leadership took several steps to communicate the importance of producing survivable vehicles as quickly as possible, for example In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense designated MRAP as DOD’s single most important acquisition program and established the MRAP Task Force to integrate planning, analysis, and actions to accelerate MRAP acquisition. MRAP Schedule and Performance Results Have Been Very Good
Schedule and performance results for the MRAP have been very good overall. At the time of our review in July 2008, nearly all of the developmental and operational testing had been completed; the Marine Corps, the buying command for the MRAP, had placed orders for 14,173 MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, a little more than a year after the first contracts were awarded, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered. As of July 2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles have been fielded in two theaters of operation. Total procurement funding for the MRAP vehicles, mostly through supplemental appropriations, was about $22.7 billion. Production began in February 2007 with one vendor producing 10 vehicles. On the positive side, it appears that quick action by the Secretary of Defense to declare the MRAP program DOD’s highest priority and give it a DX rating allowed the government and the contractors access to more critical materials than otherwise would have been available. The availability of funding mostly through supplemental appropriations was essential. In addition, the decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into the contracting strategy, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the government are all practices that led to positive outcomes. Challenges remain in the form of reliability, mobility, and safety, which have required some modifying of the designs, postproduction fixes, and adapting how vehicles were to be used. Also, long term sustainment costs for MRAP are not yet well understood and the services are only now deciding how MRAP will fit into their longer term organizations. Another lesson, based on operational use of the MRAP vehicles, was their lack of maneuverability and off-road capability. The question is, can this formula be applied to all of DOD’s major acquisitions and the broader acquisition process? GAO has issued multiple reports under our “best practices” body of work that underscore the need for faster development cycles and the need for mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker deliveries. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it may be time to invest the time, money, and management skills in the S&T community to enable the effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of July 2008, about 75 percent of casualties in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were attributed to improvised explosive devices. To mitigate the threat from these weapons, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program in February 2007, which used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles. In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense affirmed MRAP as DOD's most important acquisition program. To date, about $22.7 billion has been appropriated for the procurement of more than 16,000 MRAP vehicles. This testimony today describes the MRAP acquisition process, the results to date, lessons learned from that acquisition, and potential implications for improving the standard acquisition process. It is mostly based on the work we have conducted over the past few years on the MRAP program. Most prominently, in 2008, we reported on the processes followed by DOD for the acquisition of MRAP vehicles and identified challenges remaining in the program. To describe DOD's approach for and progress in implementing its strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding MRAP vehicles, we reviewed DOD's plans to buy, test, and field the vehicles and discussed the plans with cognizant department and contractor officials. To identify the remaining challenges for the program, we reviewed the results of testing and DOD's plans to upgrade and sustain the vehicles
What GAO Found
DOD use of a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles was successful. The program relied only on proven technologies and commercially available products; established minimal operational requirements; and undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited production capacity, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts were awarded to nine commercial sources, with DOD agreeing to buy at least 4 vehicles from each. Subsequent orders were based on a concurrent testing approach with progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the responsibility for final integration in them of mission equipment packages including radios and other equipment. DOD also made MRAP its highest priority acquisition, which helped contractors and others more rapidly respond to the need and meet production requirements, in part by early investing of their own capital to purchase steel and other critical components in advance of orders. Schedule and performance results for MRAP were very good overall. In July 2008, nearly all testing was completed; the Marine Corps had placed orders for 14,173 MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered. As of July 2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles fielded in two theaters of operation. Total MRAP production funding was about $22.7 billion, mostly through supplemental appropriations. In terms of lessons learned, MRAP's success was driven by several factors, including quick action to declare its acquisition DOD's highest priority and giving it a DX rating, which allowed access to more critical materials than was otherwise available. The availability of supplemental appropriations was also essential. However, while neither of these factors are practically transferable to other programs, decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into contracting, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the government all led to positive outcomes and may be transferable. Challenges to MRAP remain in its reliability, mobility, and safety, which required some modifying of designs and postproduction fixes, and adapting how vehicles were used. Also, long term sustainment costs are not understood and the services are only now deciding how MRAP fits them in the longer term. GAO's multiple best practices reports have underscored the need for the use of mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker deliveries. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it is time to invest the time, money, and management skills in the science and technology community to enable the effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community. |
gao_GAO-15-436 | gao_GAO-15-436_0 | CPP currently has eight electricity-powered chillers to produce chilled water. AOC Has Implemented Many Measures to Manage Energy-Related Costs and Has Opportunities to Further Manage These Costs
Since 2008, AOC has implemented many measures to manage the energy-related costs of the buildings served by CPP. AOC has additional opportunities to further manage its energy costs. Also, in fiscal year 2014, AOC installed new chillers at CPP. As described below, AOC implemented some measures and intends to implement others as resources allow. AOC also hired contractors to improve the energy efficiency of the Capitol and House and Senate office buildings through conservation measures. These include upgrades to building lighting, plumbing, and mechanical systems throughout the complex. AOC Decided to Pursue a Cogeneration System Based on Partial Updates of Its 2009 Long-term Plan but Did Not Follow Key Leading Federal Capital-Planning Practices
Based on a 2009 long-term plan and subsequent partial updates, AOC decided that it should install a cogeneration system to replace aging boilers, meet future demand for steam, and produce electricity. The draft July 2014 partial update said the electricity generated by the cogeneration system would only be used within CPP and would not serve the rest of the complex or be sold to a utility; CPP does not have the infrastructure to provide electricity to the complex. AOC Officials Said Appropriations Would Not Likely Be Available and Intend to Finance the Cogeneration Project
AOC intends to procure the cogeneration system using a utility energy services contract (UESC)—an agreement, similar to ESPCs described previously, in which, in this case, a utility arranges financing to cover the upfront costs of an energy project that a federal agency then repays over the contract term from energy cost savings achieved by the project. However, AOC officials said that since upfront appropriations would likely not be available to procure the cogeneration system, they had decided to pursue the project using a UESC. However, by not fully updating its 2009 long-term plan, AOC has continued to pursue a cogeneration system without up-to-date information on a variety of factors, such as the changes in the natural gas markets and the realized impacts of AOC’s demand reduction efforts, that could change the relative merits of the full range of alternatives available to AOC for meeting its long-term needs. As a result, AOC may not have identified the most cost-effective means to heat and cool the complex. For example, the December 2014 draft plan recommends a single turbine system that provides electricity to CPP and not the complex The 2014 plans also did not fully take into account AOC’s efforts to reduce the demand for steam through conservation measures in the buildings served by CPP–which may include operational changes or smaller capital investments–on future steam demand. AOC officials said they instead relied on other sources of federal guidance, such as NIST’s handbook on determining the life cycle costs of energy conservation projects or DOE’s guidance for using UESCs to finance such projects, an approach that led them to believe that it was unnecessary to fully update the long-term energy plan before executing a contract for the cogeneration project since its intent is to replace aging boilers. Thus, the guidance AOC officials said they followed does not substitute for first completing an up-to-date capital plan. Conclusions
AOC has implemented many measures to manage the costs of heating and cooling the Capitol Complex and has achieved measurable results. Related to this, AOC’s planning to evaluate the relative merits of the currently proposed cogeneration project has not followed key leading practices identified in OMB, GAO, and other relevant capital-planning guidance. These include not (1) fully updating the agency’s 2009 long- term energy plan to reflect changes in energy costs and demand that occurred since the plan was issued; (2) fully assessing long-term energy needs or the performance gap the project would address in light of changes in key variables that could affect its relative merits; (3) identifying a full range of alternatives for meeting future needs, including non-capital or conservation measures; (4) conducting valid sensitivity or uncertainty analyses; or (5) engaging an independent panel of experts to review AOC’s updates of its long-term plan. AOC officials said they were unaware of some of these leading practices and therefore did not follow them. Recommendations for Agency Action
GAO is making two recommendations to the Architect of the Capitol. In particular, this report examines: (1) measures AOC implemented since GAO’s 2008 report to manage the energy-related costs of the buildings served by CPP and opportunities, if any, to further manage these costs, and (2) how AOC decided to procure a cogeneration system and the extent to which AOC followed leading capital-planning practices. To identify measures AOC could potentially implement to further manage its energy-related costs, we reviewed AOC reports and other documents, such as energy audits of CPP’s steam and chilled water systems. However, given that many factors have changed that could potentially lead AOC to reach a different, more cost-effective solution to meet any future performance gaps, we continue to recommend that AOC fully update its long-term energy plan while following key leading capital-planning practices and seek an independent review of the plan and provide the results of this review to Congress. However, AOC did not update the key assumptions in the context of a full update of its 2009 plan, which assessed a broad range of options for meeting the complex’s heating and cooling needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
AOC's CPP heats and cools 25 buildings in the complex, including the Capitol and House and Senate office buildings. CPP does not have the infrastructure to distribute electricity to the buildings it serves. CPP buys fossil fuels (mostly natural gas) to run boilers that make steam and buys electricity to run chillers that make chilled water. CPP distributes the steam and chilled water for heating and cooling using a network of tunnels. AOC seeks to install a ‘cogeneration' system that would produce steam and electricity.
The House of Representatives report accompanying the Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, 2014 included a provision for GAO to analyze potential cost savings at CPP. GAO analyzed (1) measures AOC implemented since 2008 to manage the energy-related costs of the complex and opportunities, if any, to further manage these costs, and (2) how AOC decided to procure a cogeneration system and the extent to which AOC followed leading capital- planning practices. GAO analyzed AOC budgets and plans; reviewed federal guidance on capital planning; and interviewed AOC staff and other stakeholders, including other heating and cooling plant operators.
What GAO Found
The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) implemented many measures since 2008 to manage the energy-related costs of the Capitol Complex (the complex) and has opportunities to further manage these costs. AOC updated some of the Capitol Power Plant's (CPP's) production and distribution systems to reduce energy use and increase efficiency. AOC also implemented measures to reduce energy consumption in the complex, such as conservation projects improving lighting and air-handling systems that yielded monetary savings. AOC has opportunities to implement other conservation measures in the complex. For example, energy audits by contractors identified additional opportunities to implement similar measures or other upgrades to lighting, mechanical, and plumbing systems to achieve additional energy and monetary savings. However, AOC officials said they have not implemented these measures but intend to act as resources become available.
AOC decided to procure a cogeneration system to produce electricity and steam based on a 2009 long-term plan and subsequent partial updates but did not follow key leading federal capital-planning practices. In 2009, AOC issued a long-term energy plan that stated it should pursue cogeneration to meet future steam demand and provide a new source of electricity for its chillers, enabling the agency to decrease electricity purchases. Partial updates to the plan in 2014 sought to justify the choice of a cogeneration system. However, AOC's planning did not follow key leading capital-planning practices developed by GAO and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). First, though called for by leading federal planning practices, AOC has not fully updated the 2009 long-term plan, although changes in key planning assumptions, such as on fuel prices and the complex's demand for energy, have occurred. Instead, AOC intends to make a decision on implementing an $85 million cogeneration system before updating its long-term plan later in fiscal year 2015. Second, the 2014 partial updates to its 2009 plan that AOC has used to justify the project did not include complete information on the need or problem that the project would address. Third, the 2014 updates did not identify a full range of options for cost-effectively meeting projected future needs, including non-capital measures such as conservation. Fourth, the updates did not have valid sensitivity or uncertainty analyses to test key assumptions about whether the system would achieve sufficient savings over time—from decreased electricity purchases—to justify its costs. Related to this, AOC officials said that since upfront appropriations would likely not be available to procure the system, they had decided to use a third party to finance the project, thereby increasing its costs. These officials also said they relied on federal guidance for analyzing and financing energy projects. However, such guidance does not substitute for first completing an up-to-date capital plan. Finally, GAO's prior work has recommended using independent panels of experts to review complex projects such as a cogeneration system, but AOC has not engaged such a panel to review its 2014 updates to its long-term plan. AOC officials said they were unaware of some of these practices and that they needed to sign a contract quickly to avoid the risk of losing construction and air quality permits. Without updating its long-term energy plan and obtaining independent review, AOC may pursue a project that does not cost-effectively meet its needs.
What GAO Recommends
AOC should (1) update its long-term energy plan while following key leading practices, including considering a full range of measures to further manage costs, before committing to major energy projects at CPP, and (2) seek independent review of its plan. AOC disagreed with GAO's recommendations; GAO continues to believe they are valid, as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-997 | gao_GAO-08-997_0 | In addition to the AME examination, FAA has a computer system that initially processes all the applications and prioritizes some for review, such as those where the AMEs deferred the decision or denied the certificate. The computer system also identifies for further review applications where the AME has issued the medical certificate and the application indicates potentially disqualifying medical conditions. Finally, FAA checks the National Driver Register to help ensure pilots meet standards by checking for indications of substance abuse. AMEs Determine Whether Pilots Meet Medical Standards Based on Pilots’ Applications and Physical Examinations
AMEs determine whether a pilot meets FAA medical standards based on their review of the pilot’s medical certification application and the results of their physical examination. In 2007, FAA application examiners evaluated all 34,590 priority applications (see fig. FAA Checks for Drug- and Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle Actions Using National Database
FAA checks the National Driver Register each time a pilot applies for medical certification to look for indications of substance dependence. Specifically, FAA has established two quality assurance review programs in which FAA has identified instances in which AMEs issued medical certificates to pilots that have disqualifying medical conditions and in which FAA application examiners overlooked relevant medical documents and made clerical errors. According to FAA officials, they plan to continue reviewing AME- issued certificates and collecting data from the reviews. Also, as previously mentioned, FAA checks the National Driver Register for indications of substance abuse to help ensure pilots who are issued medical certificates meet medical standards. FAA currently does not check federal disability benefits for indications of disqualifying medical conditions. Our comparison found that federal disability benefits databases can provide useful information on pilots’ medical conditions. According to FAA officials, the impetus for this quality assurance program was that FAA recognized it needed to see if AMEs issued medical certificates appropriately because the majority of these determinations are closed without FAA review, thus making the AME decision final. These additional data from subsequent years could help identify increases or decreases in incomplete or inappropriately issued certificates and demonstrate how well its certification procedures are ensuring that medical certificates are being properly issued. In its 2007 reviews, FAA did not find any medical certificates that application examiners had inappropriately issued. GAO’s Database Match Results Indicate Disability Databases Have Information on Potentially Disqualifying Medical Conditions
We found that for February 2008, less than 1 percent (1,246 of 394,985 pilots) of U.S. pilots with a current medical certificate were receiving Social Security disability benefits. FAA has also developed programs to determine if medical certificates have been properly issued. The Department of Transportation indicated that it generally agreed with our findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In order to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to screen medical certification applicants and identify medically unqualified pilots, we answer the following questions (1) what procedures does FAA use to certify that pilot applicants meet medical standards and (2) how does FAA determine that medical certificates have been properly issued? To identify FAA’s procedures for certifying that pilots meet medical standards, we reviewed agency guidance and federal regulations. We matched FAA pilot medical certification records with two Social Security disability databases to determine (1) the number of pilots with current medical certificates who were receiving disability benefits; (2) from the group of pilots receiving disability benefits, how many had supplied their Social Security number to FAA and how many did not provide their Social Security number; and (3) what the most common disabling medical conditions were for pilots receiving disability benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) seeks to make the U.S. aviation system one of the safest in the world. However, a 2005 Department of Transportation Inspector General investigation found that FAA had issued medical certificates to a small percentage of pilots with disqualifying medical conditions, such as heart conditions, schizophrenia, and drug or alcohol addiction. In response to your request, our report addresses the following questions: (1) what procedures does FAA use to certify that pilot applicants meet medical standards and (2) how does FAA determine that medical certificates have been properly issued? In addressing these objectives, GAO researched FAA guidance and federal regulations; interviewed federal officials; analyzed FAA's application review procedures, quality assurance program, and its use of the National Driver Register; and conducted a data match between FAA's pilot registry and Social Security Administration's disability programs. The data match does not determine if pilots receiving disability benefits have medical conditions that would disqualify them from holding an FAA medical certificate. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation generally agreed with our findings. FAA and the Social Security Administration provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
FAA's pilot medical certification procedures consist of a multi-step process intended to determine whether pilots meet medical standards. As part of its certification procedures, aviation medical examiners (AME) review information provided by pilot applicants and the results of their physical examination before issuing medical certificates. In the majority of cases (about88 percent in 2007), applicants meet medical standards and AMEs issue certificates. FAA uses a computer system to process all the applications. It designates some applications for additional review by FAA application examiners, such as when AMEs do not issue the medical certificate or defer the decision. The computer system also identifies for FAA review the applications in which AMEs issued the medical certificate and the application indicates potentially disqualifying medical conditions. Finally, FAA checks each pilot applicant against the National Driver Register to look for drug- and alcohol-related motor vehicle actions and indications of substance abuse. FAA has developed programs to help it determine whether it has properly issued medical certificates. Specifically, FAA has established two quality assurance review programs--one evaluating certificates that the AMEs issued and the other evaluating certificate decisions made by FAA application examiners. In its 2007 reviews, FAA identified 19 instances in which AMEs issued certificates to pilots who have disqualifying medical conditions as well as 16 cases in which FAA application examiners overlooked relevant medical documents and 44 with clerical errors. According to FAA officials, they plan to continue reviewing AME-issued certificates and collecting the results. These additional data from subsequent years could help FAA identify how well its procedures are ensuring that medical certificates are being properly issued. In addition, FAA relies on the National Driver Register check to help ensure pilots meet medical standards. Finally, due to recently resolved litigation, FAA currently does not check federal disability benefits databases for indications that pilots may have disqualifying medical conditions. Although our analysis of the Social Security Administration's disability databases found that 1,246 of 394,985 medically certified pilots were receiving disability benefits, this does not necessarily mean these pilots do not meet FAA medical standards. It may, however, indicate that federal disability databases can provide useful information on potentially disqualifying medical conditions. |
gao_GAO-10-231 | gao_GAO-10-231_0 | As of November 27, 2009, the federal government had outlayed $69.1 billion in Recovery Act funds to state and local governments. The largest programs within these areas were the FMAP, SFSF, and highway spending. As of November 30, 2009, the 16 sample states and the District had drawn down more than $22.26 billion from increased FMAP grant awards, or nearly 97 percent of funds available for federal fiscal year 2009. As of November 30, 2009, they have drawn down about $3.58 billion, or almost 54 percent of funds available. For example, as of November 16, 2009, $20.4 billion of the funds had been obligated for just over 8,800 projects nationwide and $4.2 billion had been reimbursed. In the 16 states and the District, $11.9 billion had been obligated for nearly 4,600 projects and $1.9 billion had been reimbursed. Almost half of Recovery Act highway obligations nationally and in the 16 states and the District have been for pavement improvements—including resurfacing, rehabilitating, and reconstructing roadways. Almost 88 percent of Recovery Act Transit Capital Assistance Program obligations are being used for upgrading transit facilities, improving bus fleets, and conducting preventive maintenance. 10). The percentage of LEAs reporting they planned to use over 50 percent of their Recovery Act education funds to retain jobs varied considerably by state. Housing Agencies Continue to Make Progress on Recovery Act Projects, Although Less Than Half of the Funds Have Been Obligated
The Recovery Act requires the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to allocate $3 billion through the Public Housing Capital Fund to public housing agencies using the same formula for amounts made available in fiscal year 2008. 20). An additional 467 housing agencies (15 percent) had reported obligating more than 75 percent of their funds as of November 14, 2009. The 43 states and territories also reported that, as of September 30, 2009, they had outlaid $113 million, or about 2 percent, of the $5 billion for weatherization activities and had completed weatherizing about 7,300, or about 1 percent, of the 593,000 housing units planned. Recovery Act EFSP Award Funds to LROs in 16 States and the District of Columbia
As of November 4, 2009, LROs in the 16 states and the District of Columbia (District) that GAO is following as part of its Recovery Act review were awarded almost $66.2 million in Recovery Act EFSP funds (76 percent) out of almost $87 million in standard Recovery Act awards nationwide, and about $4.8 million (almost 40 percent) of the approximately $12 million in Recovery Act SSA awards. Our analysis of the planned use of EFSP Recovery Act funds reported by the Local Boards in the 16 states and the District showed that the largest planned use of funds by the LROs was for “other food” (32 percent)—that is, food programs such as food banks and pantries, food vouchers and food-only gift certificates, and rent and mortgage assistance (29 percent). States’ and Localities’ Uses of Recovery Act Funds
Using criteria described in our earlier bimonthly reports, we selected the following streams of Recovery Act funding flowing to states and localities for review during this report: increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards; the Federal-Aid Highway Surface Transportation Program; the Transit Capital Assistance Program, the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF); Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA); Parts B and C of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); the Public Housing Capital Fund; the Weatherization Assistance Program; and the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. The Recovery Act includes $1.5 billion for this program. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report is the fourth in a series responding to a mandate under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). As of November 27, 2009, $69.1 billion, or about one quarter of the approximately $280 billion of total Recovery Act funds for programs administered by states and localities, had been paid out. The largest programs were the Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), and highways. The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work continues to focus on 16 states and the District of Columbia (District).
What GAO Found
Of their increased FMAP grant awards for federal fiscal year 2009, the 16 states and the District had drawn down about $22.3 billion, or 97 percent of the funds available, as of November 30, 2009. Through November 16, 2009, in the 16 states and the District, $11.9 billion (76 percent) of Recovery Act highway funds had been obligated for nearly 4,600 projects and $1.9 billion (16 percent) had been reimbursed. Nationally, $20.4 billion (77 percent) had been obligated for over 8,800 projects and $4.2 billion (20 percent) had been reimbursed. Almost half of Recovery Act obligations nationally have been for pavement improvements--resurfacing, rehabilitating, and reconstructing roadways. Of the $7.5 billion in Recovery Act formula funding made available nationally for transit projects, $6.7 billion (88 percent) had been obligated through November 5, 2009. Most of these obligations are being used to upgrade transit facilities, improving bus fleets and light rail systems, and conducting preventive maintenance. As of November 6, 2009, of the Recovery Act funds available to them, the 16 states and the District had drawn down about $8.4 billion (46 percent) in SFSF; $735 million (11 percent) in Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title I, Part A funds; and $755 million (10 percent) in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Part B funds. GAO surveyed a sample of local educational agencies about their planned uses of Recovery Act funds and found (1) retaining jobs is the primary planned use, with 63 percent planning to use over 50 percent of their SFSF funds to retain jobs; (2) other planned uses include nonrecurring items such as equipment; and (3) most report placing great importance on educational goals and reform. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has entered into funding agreements with 3,121 public housing agencies and made available nearly all of the almost $3 billion in public housing formula grant funds provided under the Recovery Act. As of November 14, these agencies had reported obligating about half of the funds HUD had made available. Housing agencies GAO visited are using funds to replace roofs, windows, and floors; upgrade kitchens and baths, and renovate rental units. Regarding the Weatherization Assistance Program, nationally, the states reported that, as of September 30, 2009, they had spent about $113 million (2 percent) of the $5 billion in Recovery Act funding and had completed weatherizing about 7,300 (1 percent) of the 593,000 housing units planned for weatherization. The Recovery Act also included a $100 million appropriation for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. Local recipient organizations in the 16 states and the District were awarded almost $66.2 million and plan to use the funds primarily for "other food" services such as food banks and pantries, food vouchers, and rent and mortgage assistance. |
gao_HEHS-96-68 | gao_HEHS-96-68_0 | Characteristics and Services of the Community-Based Programs
Most veterans receive home health care services from community-based providers through either VA’s fee-based program or Medicare’s home health care benefit. Most veterans in this program receive short-term home health care services to address acute medical conditions, such as hip fractures or surgical wounds. HBHC program costs are based on data developed by the hospitals that support the programs. Since VA reports the costs of its programs differently, VA hospital officials are left to make decisions on whether or not to have an HBHC program based on their perceptions of the relative cost of HBHC and fee-based programs. Quality Assurance Approaches for VA Programs and Medicare
VA monitors the quality of care provided by its home health care programs, but it is more directly involved in monitoring the care its own employees provide, through HBHC, than the care delivered by community-based providers. Licensing and certification assessments of community-based providers conducted by independent organizations provide VA some assurance that veterans in the fee-based program and those covered by Medicare’s home health care benefit receive care from qualified home health care providers. Observations
Because VA’s home health care programs provide different arrays of services to veterans who generally have different home health care needs and because consistent program cost data are not available, it is difficult to compare the relative costs of VA’s methods of meeting veterans’ home health care needs. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) meets veterans' home health care needs, focusing on: (1) the characteristics and services of the home health care programs VA uses; (2) the available data describing program costs; and (3) how VA ensures that veterans receive quality home care services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most veterans receive home health care services from community-based providers through either the VA fee-based program or Medicare's home health care benefit; (2) most veterans in these programs receive short-term home health care services for acute medical conditions, while some veterans receive long-term care for chronic conditions; (3) VA provides in-home physician, nursing, social work, and dietician services to veterans with chronic conditions through its Hospital-Based Home Care (HBHC) program; (4) VA makes decisions about using HBHC programs based on its perception of relative costs, since comparable cost data are not available; (5) HBHC program costs are based on data developed by hospitals that support the programs, while VA reported fee-based program costs represent payments made to providers and exclude certain administrative costs; (6) VA monitors the quality of care provided by HBHC programs more directly than it does community-based care; and (7) licensing and certification assessments of community-based providers provide VA assurance that care is provided by qualified sources, but VA is ultimately responsible for ensuring the quality of care in its programs. |
gao_GAO-17-353 | gao_GAO-17-353_0 | Specifically, the policy reduces the amount of per diem paid for long-term TDYs: for TDYs of between 31 and 180 days’ duration, the flat rate per diem is 75 percent of the locality rate payable for each full day at the location. For TDYs of greater than 180 days’ duration, the flat rate per diem is 55 percent of the locality rate. Further, while more than half of depot officials responding to our questionnaire reported that the policy has affected civilian employees’ willingness to volunteer for long-term TDYs, the majority of depot officials reported that the policy has not affected depot operations. DOD Guidance Regarding the Flat Rate Per Diem Policy Is Unclear
Some aspects of DOD’s flat rate per diem policy, such as the guidance for lodging receipts and application of the M&IE waiver, are not clear. This unclear guidance may hinder the policy’s achieving its intended objectives, such as simplifying travel. Based on results from our questionnaire, we found that 15 out of 16 depots still require long-term travelers to submit lodging receipts, which is contrary to the intent of the flat rate per diem policy to simplify the reimbursement process for long-term travelers. DOD Lacks Procedures to Ensure That Required Processes Are Completed Prior to a Major Change, and Its Assessment of Costs and Benefits Was Not Comprehensive
The Committee does not have procedures to ensure that required processes are completed prior to finalizing a major JTR change, and its assessment of costs and benefits was not comprehensive, lacking other potential costs and benefits that could result from the policy change. The Committee Did Not Ensure That Certain Required Processes Were Completed
The Committee did not ensure that certain required processes to inform the flat rate per diem policy change were completed prior to the policy’s approval. The Committee does not have procedures in place to ensure that required processes, such as completing cost data and budgetary impact statements and a legal sufficiency review, are completed prior to a major JTR policy change’s approval. DOD Instruction 7041.03, Economic Analysis for Decision-making, which applies to all DOD components, establishes their responsibility for following OMB Circular A-94 guidelines concerning benefit-cost analysis of federal programs. OMB Circular A-94 states that agencies should follow the guidelines provided when preparing analyses in support of federal activities, and that a comprehensive enumeration of the different types of benefits and costs, monetized or not, can be helpful in identifying the full range of program effects when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of a policy. However, our review of that draft plan, which according to DTMO officials was drafted in July 2016, found that it does not include an approach to capture other potential costs and benefits from the policy beyond the cost-savings of the policy. Further, we found that DTMO’s site visit to assess the adequacy of the flat rate per diem policy for long-term TDYs did not include a full assessment of the policy’s per diem rates. Without having conducted a comprehensive assessment that incorporated principles from OMB Circular A-94 and without having a Performance Measurement Plan that considers other potential costs and benefits resulting from the flat rate per diem policy, the Committee and DTMO may not be well positioned to understand whether the policy is cost- beneficial and is meeting set objectives to reduce travel costs without negatively affecting the traveler and mission. Conclusions
Depot officials have identified various benefits, such as cost savings, as well as challenges, such as difficulties in finding lodging accommodations that will accept the flat rate per diem, resulting from DOD’s JTR flat rate per diem policy. However, certain aspects of DOD’s flat rate per diem guidance remain unclear to depot officials. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee, in coordination with the Military and Civilian Advisory Panels, to take the following four actions to clarify the flat rate per diem policy and ensure that the department has the full range of information needed by decision-makers when considering a major Joint Travel Regulations change:
Revise the Joint Travel Regulations policy related to the flat rate per diem to provide clear language concerning (1) what is meant by proof of lodging, and (2) at what point in the travel process the meals and incidental expenses waiver for actual expenses should be requested and approved;
Establish procedures to ensure that required processes to inform major Joint Travel Regulations policy changes are completed prior to the approval of those changes; Incorporate principles from Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, including the costs and benefits of effects that may be difficult to quantify or monetize, into future assessments related to major Joint Travel Regulations changes; and Incorporate principles from Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, including the costs and benefits of effects that may be difficult to quantify or monetize, into future assessments related to the flat rate per diem policy, such as the draft Performance Measurement Plan. In written comments reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with all four recommendations and highlighted the actions it was taking to address each recommendation. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which depot officials identified benefits and challenges resulting from the flat rate per diem policy, including any effects on civilian employees and operations at the selected depots, we focused on the policy’s effects on Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees at DOD’s 17 depot maintenance industrial sites. These results were not generalizable but provided important insights. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to government-wide direction for agencies to reduce travel costs, in November 2014 DOD changed its JTR by instituting a flat rate per diem policy on long-term TDY travel. This policy reduced the locality rate payable for each full day at the location, depending on the duration of the TDY: for TDYs of between 31 and 180 days the flat rate per diem is 75 percent, and for TDYs of greater than 180 days it is 55 percent.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO assess the impact of DOD's policy change to the JTR on shipyard and depot workers. This report assesses the extent to which (1) depot officials identified benefits and challenges resulting from the policy change, and any effects on civilian employees and operations; (2) DOD established clear guidance regarding the policy; and (3) DOD followed its processes when considering the policy change and included an assessment of benefits and costs. GAO collected and analyzed responses to a questionnaire disseminated at DOD's 17 depot maintenance industrial sites, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
Officials at depots responding to a GAO questionnaire identified various benefits, such as cost-savings, and challenges, such as increased processing time for vouchers, resulting from the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) flat rate per diem policy change for long-term temporary duty (TDY) travel. While more than half of depot officials reported that the policy has affected civilian employees' willingness to volunteer for long-term TDYs, a majority of depot officials reported that the policy has generally not affected depot operations.
GAO's review of the JTR and analysis of questionnaire responses found that certain aspects of DOD's flat rate per diem policy are not clear. For example, the requirement to provide lodging receipts for long-term travel was replaced by a requirement to provide proof that lodging costs were incurred, but according to depot officials it is not clear what constitutes proof of lodging. As a result, the majority of the depots still require long-term travelers to submit lodging receipts. Such lack of clarity may hinder DOD's ability to achieve the policy's intended objectives, such as simplifying the administrative aspects of travel.
DOD did not ensure that certain required processes established in DOD guidance were completed prior to the policy's approval, and its assessment of the policy's costs and benefits was not comprehensive. Specifically, GAO found that prior to the flat rate per diem policy's approval certain required steps, such as providing cost data and budgetary impact statements and a legal sufficiency review, were not completed. This occurred because DOD has not established procedures to ensure that these required steps are completed prior to approving a major change to the JTR. Further, although DOD's Defense Travel Management Office (DTMO) estimated total savings of approximately $194 million resulting from the flat rate per diem as of January 2017, GAO found that DOD's cost-savings assessment did not comprehensively consider all potential costs and benefits of the policy change. DOD guidance, which applies to all DOD components, establishes responsibilities for following Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 guidelines concerning benefit-cost analysis of federal programs. OMB Circular A-94 states that a comprehensive enumeration of the different types of benefits and costs, monetized or not, can be helpful in identifying the full range of program effects when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of a policy. However, DTMO's assessment of the JTR policy change was not comprehensive and did not include the full range of potential costs and benefits. For example, it included some potential costs to implement the policy, but not others, such as the cost to update the travel system with the needed functionality to support the policy. DTMO has recently developed a draft Performance Measurement Plan, which officials described as a first step in a larger effort to track and report savings from the flat rate per diem policy. However, GAO's review of the draft plan found that it also does not include a comprehensive approach to capture costs and benefits of the policy. As a result, DOD may not be well positioned to understand whether the flat rate per diem policy is cost-beneficial and meeting its objectives to reduce travel costs without negatively affecting the traveler and the mission.
What GAO Recommends
DOD should clarify certain aspects of the flat rate per diem policy; establish procedures to ensure required steps are completed before major JTR policy changes are approved; and ensure that OMB benefit-cost analysis guidelines are followed in future policy assessments. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and highlighted actions it was taking to address each recommendation. |
gao_RCED-98-199 | gao_RCED-98-199_0 | Nearly 60 percent of the emergency orders revoked or suspended pilot certificates or the medical certificates pilots must also have. Of the cases FAA initiated using emergency orders, over three-quarters ultimately resulted in a suspension or revocation of the certificate. FAA’s Increased Use of Administrative Actions Resulted in a Larger Proportion of Emergency Certificate Actions
Of the 137,506 enforcement cases closed in fiscal years 1990 through 1997, FAA initiated 3 percent using emergency orders. As FAA shifted to using administrative actions to handle less serious enforcement cases, its use of certificate actions decreased. Regional Use of Certificate Actions and Emergency Orders Varied
FAA used emergency orders to initiate 18 percent of its certificate action cases, on average, for fiscal years 1990 through 1997, but three regions initiated from 28 to 38 percent of their certificate actions using emergency orders. Of the emergency orders, nearly 60 percent affected pilots by revoking or suspending 1,563 pilot certificates and 625 medical certificates. Most Certificate Actions Initiated Using Emergency Orders Resulted in Revocations or Suspensions
A high percentage of the certificate actions initiated using emergency orders ultimately resulted in revocations or suspensions. FAA informally implemented this policy change in 1990 and 1991 before formally incorporating it into FAA Order 2150.3A in February 1992. As a result, FAA increased the use of emergency orders to initiate revocations from 184 in fiscal year 1990 to between 264 and 382 annually thereafter. For Half of the Enforcement Cases That Involved Emergency Orders, More Than 4 Months Elapsed Between FAA’s Learning of the Violation and Issuing the Emergency Order
For half of the enforcement cases in which FAA used emergency orders in fiscal years 1990 through 1997, more than 4 months elapsed between the time FAA learned of the violation and the time it issued the emergency order. During this time, a certificate holder who lacks qualifications or who represents a threat to safety can continue to operate. FAA Regions Varied Widely in the Number of Days Used to Investigate Violations and Issue Emergency Orders
FAA regions varied widely in the number of days used to investigate the violations that led to the issuance of emergency orders in fiscal years 1990 through 1997. However, NTSB has no deadline for initiating cases when an individual’s basic qualifications to hold the operating certificate are in question. Very few of these cases are later dropped because FAA determines that no violation was committed or has insufficient evidence to prove a violation. We discussed our findings, the circumstances under which FAA uses emergency orders, and changes to FAA Order 2150.3A that might have affected the agency’s use of emergency orders for fiscal years 1990 through 1997 with the following FAA personnel: the Assistant Chief Counsel and other staff in FAA’s Enforcement Division, all nine counsels in FAA’s regions, the Acting Director of the Flight Standards Service and members of his staff, the Manager of the Compliance and Enforcement Branch in the Civil Aviation Security Division, and the managers of the Medical Specialties and Aeromedical Certification Divisions in the Office of Aviation Medicine. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) use of emergency orders during fiscal years 1990 through 1997, focusing on: (1) the extent to which FAA used emergency orders, including data on regional variation in their use, the types of certificate holders affected, and the final outcomes of cases initiated using emergency orders; (2) the ways in which changes in FAA's policies might have affected the agency's use of emergency orders; and (3) the time needed for FAA to investigate alleged violations and issue emergency orders.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA used emergency orders to initiate action to revoke or suspend operating certificates in 3 percent (3,742) of the 137,506 enforcement cases closed during fiscal years 1990 through 1997; (2) as FAA moved to handling less serious enforcement cases through administrative actions rather than certificate actions, the number of certificate actions decreased, and emergency orders came to represent a larger proportion of the more serious certificate actions that remained, increasing from 10 percent in 1990 to an annual average of nearly 20 percent over the following 7 years; (3) emergency orders as a percentage of certificate actions varied by FAA region, resulting from differences in enforcement practices and from unusual circumstances in an individual case; (4) in fiscal years 1990 through 1997, nearly 60 percent of the emergency orders revoked or suspended pilots' operating certificates or the certificates of their medical fitness to fly; (5) FAA initiated a substantially higher proportion of certificate actions with emergency orders for pilots with commercial operating certificates than for air transport pilots; (6) over three-quarters of the enforcement cases initiated using emergency orders resulted in the suspension or revocation of the certificate holder's operating certificate, and fewer than 5 percent resulted ultimately in FAA's dropping the case because it determined that no violation was committed or had insufficient evidence to prove a violation; (7) during fiscal years 1990 through 1997, FAA implemented a formal change in its policy on emergency actions that is reflected in the increased number of revocations using emergency orders; (8) in 1990, FAA decided that, for those cases in which revocations are based on a demonstrated lack of qualification to hold the relevant certificate, the certificate generally should be revoked immediately and not after the lengthy appeal process that other nonemergency certificate actions can be subject to; (9) FAA informally implemented this policy change in 1990 and 1991 before formally incorporating it into its compliance and enforcement guidance in 1992; (10) FAA initiated 184 revocations using emergency orders in fiscal year 1990, after which this number increased, ranging between 264 and 382 annually; and (11) although the use of emergency orders is intended to expedite the handling of serious enforcement of cases in which operating certificates are revoked or suspended, the time needed for FAA to investigate violations and issue emergency orders varied widely. |
gao_GAO-02-194 | gao_GAO-02-194_0 | In resolution 1308, passed in July 2000, the U.N. Security Council recognized that in conditions of conflict, violence, and instability there is increased risk of exposure to HIV. Resolution 1308 encouraged U.N. agencies to take action with member states to develop strategies to mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS in peacekeeping missions. Department of Peacekeeping’s Policy Discourages but Does Not Preclude Deployment of HIV- Positive Peacekeepers
DPKO recommends that countries contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations should not send HIV-positive individuals on peacekeeping missions for three reasons. The U.N. Code of Conduct for Peacekeepers, although it does not address specific sexual conduct, states that peacekeepers should do no physical, sexual, or psychological harm. The United Nations Does Not Know How Many Peacekeepers Have HIV
The United Nations does not know how many peacekeepers have HIV/AIDS because it opposes mandatory HIV testing before, during, or after deployment to a peacekeeping mission and because contributing countries either do not test or do not share test results with the United Nations. Nigeria is the largest African contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Despite the absence of data, U.N. and U.S. government officials have expressed concern that peacekeepers may be transmitting or contracting the virus during peacekeeping operations. However, these prevention efforts face immediate obstacles that may impact their implementation. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, we (1) analyzed U.N. policies and guidance on the use and deployment of peacekeepers with HIV; (2) examined the data available on HIV prevalence rates among peacekeepers; (3) assessed actions the United Nations is taking to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS among peacekeepers; and (4) examined the actions the United Nations is taking to limit the impact of HIV/AIDS on civilians affected by armed conflict, including groups who may come in contact with peacekeepers. We also discussed the current training with senior officials at the U.N. Population Fund, the U.N. Development Fund for Women, and the U.S. No information available. | What GAO Found
Last year, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution expressing concern that the conflicts and instability associated with peacekeeping operations produce condition that could increase the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The resolution encouraged member states to educate peacekeeping personnel--including those who are HIV positive--on peacekeeping missions. The policies and guidance of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations discourage, but do not preclude, countries from sending individuals who are HIV positive on peacekeeping missions. This is consistent with the U.N. peacekeeper's code of conduct to do no harm. This is also consistent with the U.N.'s stated opposition to discrimination against those who are HIV positive. The number of HIV-positive peacekeepers is unknown because (1) the U.N. opposes mandatory HIV testing and collects no information on infection rates and (2) countries that contribute peacekeepers either do not test or do not share test results with the U.N. The U.N. has tried to reduce the spread of HIV during peacekeeping operations, but it faces immediate and long-term challenges. U.N. officials said that the U.N. has not given this effort enough priority and that it has been difficult to obtain funding for HIV prevention efforts. Moreover, little has been done to help civilian populations at risk of HIV infection from U.N. peacekeepers. |
gao_GAO-07-993 | gao_GAO-07-993_0 | 1.) For fiscal year 2007, Congress appropriated almost $349 million for LSC. LSC Is Subject to Weaker Governance and Accountability Requirements Than Federal Entities but More Federal Oversight Than Nonprofit Corporations
Although LSC is subject to more statutory governance and accountability requirements than most private, nonprofit corporations, it is subject to governance and accountability requirements that are weaker than those of most independent federal agencies headed by boards or commissions and U.S. government corporations. Although LSC has an informal orientation program for its members, the board does not have a comprehensive, formal orientation or an ongoing training program for board members. Because it has not incorporated many practices currently considered necessary for effective governance, LSC’s Board of Directors is at risk of not fulfilling its role in effective governance in keeping with its fiduciary duties. In fact, recent incidents of compensation rates that exceed statutory limitations, questionable expenditures, and potential conflicts of interest may have been prevented by a properly implemented governance structure. LSC’s board has four standing committees. Given LSC’s status as a federally funded nonprofit corporation, these are important activities that are appropriately handled by a board-level committee. The OIG also found that LSC hired acting special counsels from grant recipient organizations causing potential conflicts of interest. LSC Management Has Not Thoroughly Assessed Internal Controls or Conducted a Risk Assessment
Management has not completed a thorough assessment of its internal controls or implemented risk mitigation policies in response to a systematic or formal risk assessment. LSC Management Has Not Assessed the Propriety of Its Financial Reporting Standards
LSC’s management has not conducted its own assessment or analysis to determine which set of accounting standards—those promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), or Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board—are most applicable for LSC to use. Since its inception over 30 years ago, LSC’s governance and accountability requirements, including its financial reporting and internal control, have not changed significantly. The current accepted practices of federal agencies, U.S. government corporations, and nonprofit corporations provide a framework for identifying standards that can most effectively be used for strengthening LSC’s governance and accountability. Because LSC’s board and management have not kept pace with the modernization of practices in federal entities and other nonprofit corporations, many opportunities exist to improve and modernize existing processes. By updating and strengthening its governance and accountability structures, LSC can increase assurance that federal funds are being properly spent and its operations are effectively carried out to meet its mission. Recommendations for Board Action
In order to improve and modernize the governance processes and structure of LSC, we recommend that the LSC Board of Directors take the following eight actions: establish and implement a comprehensive orientation program for new board members to include key topics such as fiduciary duties, IRS requirements, and interpretation of the financial statements; develop a plan for providing a regular training program for board members that includes providing updates or changes in LSC’s operating environment and relevant governance and accountability practices; establish an audit committee function to provide oversight to LSC’s financial reporting and audit processes either through creating a separate audit committee or by rewriting the charter of its finance committee; establish a compensation committee function to oversee compensation matters involving LSC officers and overall compensation structure either through creating a separate compensation committee or by rewriting the charter of its annual performance review committee; establish charters for the Board of Directors and all existing and any newly developed committees to clearly establish committees’ purposes, duties, and responsibilities; implement a periodic self-assessment of the board’s, the committees’, and each individual member’s performance for purposes of evaluating whether improvements can be made to the board’s structure and processes; develop and implement procedures to periodically evaluate key management processes, including at a minimum, processes for risk assessment and mitigation, internal control, and financial reporting; and establish a shorter time frame (e.g., 60 days) for issuing LSC’s audited financial statements. While federal agencies and government corporations have been subject to strengthened governance and accountability requirements over recent years, LSC has not kept up with evolving reforms aimed at strengthening internal control over an organization’s financial reporting process and systems, with LSC’s board’s practices falling short of modern board practices and LSC not keeping up with current management practices. We will then send copies to other appropriate congressional committees, the president of LSC, and the LSC Board of Directors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was federally created as a private nonprofit corporation to support legal assistance for low-income people to resolve their civil matters and relies heavily on federal appropriations. Due to its unique status, its governance and accountability requirements differ from those of federal entities and nonprofits. This report responds to a congressional request that GAO review LSC board oversight of LSC's operations and whether LSC has sufficient governance and accountability. GAO's report objectives are to (1) compare LSC's framework for corporate governance and accountability to others', (2) evaluate LSC's governance practices, and (3) evaluate LSC's internal control and financial reporting practices. We reviewed the LSC Act, legislative history, relevant standards and requirements, and LSC documentation and accountability requirements and interviewed board and staff.
What GAO Found
Although LSC has stronger federal accountability requirements than many nonprofit corporations, it is subject to governance and accountability requirements that are weaker than those of independent federal agencies and U.S. government corporations. Congress issued LSC's federal charter over 30 years ago. Established with governance and accountability requirements as they existed at the time, LSC has not kept up with evolving reforms aimed at strengthening internal control over an organization's financial reporting process and systems. Rigorous controls are important for the heavily federally funded LSC. During fiscal year 2007, LSC is responsible for the safeguarding and stewardship of $348.6 million of taxpayer dollars. Although no single set of practices exists for both private and public entities, current accepted practices of federal agencies, government corporations, and nonprofit corporations offer models for strengthening LSC's governance and accountability, including effective board oversight of management; its performance; and its use of federal funds and resources. The board members demonstrated active involvement in LSC through their regular board meeting attendance and participation in LSC oversight. Although LSC's Board of Directors was established with provisions in law that may have supported effective operation over 30 years ago, its practices fall short of modern board practices. The LSC board generally provides each new member an informal orientation to LSC and the board, but it does not have consistent, formal orientation and ongoing training with updates on new developments in governance and accountability standards and practice. The current board has four committees, but none are specifically targeted at providing critical audit, ethics, or compensation functions, which are important governance mechanisms commonly used in corporate governance structures. Because it has not taken advantage of opportunities to incorporate such practices, LSC's Board of Directors is at risk of not being able to fulfill its role of effective governance and oversight. A properly implemented governance and accountability structure may have prevented recent incidents of compensation rates in excess of statutory caps, questionable expenditures, and potential conflicts of interest. LSC also has not kept up with current management practices. Of particular importance are key processes in risk assessment, internal control, and financial reporting. Management has not formally assessed the risks to the safeguarding of its assets and maintaining the effectiveness and efficiency of its operation, nor has it implemented internal controls or other risk mitigation policies. LSC is also at increased risk that conflicts of interest will occur and not be identified because senior management has not established comprehensive policies or procedures regarding ethical issues that are aimed at identifying potential conflicts and taking appropriate actions to prevent them. Finally, management has not performed its own assessment or analysis of accounting standards to determine the most appropriate standards for LSC to follow. |
gao_GAO-03-864 | gao_GAO-03-864_0 | Following significant mergers among the Big 8 in the 1980s and 1990s and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002, market share among the accounting firms became more concentrated and dominated by the Big 4. The resulting firm became the largest firm nationally (and internationally). Large Public Company Audit Market is a Tight Oligopoly
By any measure, the large public company audit market is a tight oligopoly, which is defined as the top four firms accounting for more than 60 percent of the market and other firms facing significant barriers to entry into the market. In the large public company audit market, the Big 4 now audit over 97 percent of all public companies with sales over $250 million, and other firms face significant barriers to entry into the market. Consolidation Does Not Appear to Have Impaired Price Competition to Date
Despite the high degree of concentration among accounting firms, with four firms auditing more than 78 percent of all public companies and 99 percent of all public company sales, we found no evidence that price competition to date has been impaired. Given the significant changes that have occurred in the accounting profession since the mid-1980s, we were also unable to isolate the impact of consolidation from other factors. Although audit fees are generally a relatively small percentage of a public company’s revenue, recent evidence suggests audit fees have increased significantly since 2000 and there are indications they may increase further in the future. Some companies indicated that most of this increase has occurred in the last few years. Linking Consolidation to Audit Quality and Auditor Independence Is Difficult
Although we identified no research directly studying the impact of consolidation among the accounting firms on audit quality or auditor independence, we did find limited research that attempted to measure general changes in audit quality and auditor independence, and we explored these issues with market participants and researchers. Moreover, the possible reduction in the number of accounting firms willing to audit public companies in the wake of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley could further impact the availability and cost of capital for some smaller companies, particularly companies for whom the accounting firms may doubt the profitability of the audit engagements. First, smaller firms generally lack the staff resources, technical expertise, and global reach to audit large multinational companies. Observations
The audit market is in the midst of unprecedented change and evolution. Fourth, Big 4 market share concentration, particularly in key industries, may warrant ongoing and additional analysis, including evaluating ways to increase accounting firm competition in certain industries by limiting market shares. As a result, we clarified the language provided in this report. 107- 204) and as agreed with your staff, our objectives were to study (1) the factors leading to the mergers among the largest public accounting firms in the 1980s and 1990s; (2) the impact of consolidation on competition, including the availability of auditor choices for large national and multinational public companies; (3) the impact of consolidation on the cost, quality, and independence of audit services; (4) the impact of consolidation on capital formation and securities markets; and (5) the barriers to entry faced by smaller firms in competing with the largest firms for large national and multinational public company clients. Not applicable – did not employ Arthur Andersen 2. Please enter a number. | Why GAO Did This Study
The audit market for large public companies is an oligopoly, with the largest firms auditing the vast majority of public companies and smaller firms facing significant barriers to entry into the market. Mergers among the largest firms in the 1980s and 1990s and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002 significantly increased concentration among the largest firms, known as the "Big 4." These four firms currently audit over 78 percent of all U.S. public companies and 99 percent of all public company sales. This consolidation and the resulting concentration have raised a number of concerns. To address them, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandated that GAO study (1) the factors contributing to the mergers; (2) the implications of consolidation on competition and client choice, audit fees, audit quality, and auditor independence; (3) the impact of consolidation on capital formation and securities markets; and (4) barriers to entry faced by smaller accounting firms in competing with the largest firms for large public company audits.
What GAO Found
Domestically and globally, there are only a few large firms capable of auditing large public companies, which raises potential choice, price, quality, and concentration risk concerns. A common concentration measure used in antitrust analysis, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) indicates that the largest firms have the potential for significant market power following mergers among the largest firms and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen. Although GAO found no evidence of impaired competition to date, the significant changes that have occurred in the profession may have implications for competition and public company choice, especially in certain industries, in the future. Existing research on audit fees did not conclusively identify a direct correlation with consolidation. GAO found that fees have started to increase, and most experts expect the trend to continue as the audit environment responds to recent and ongoing changes in the audit market. Research on quality and independence did not link audit quality and auditor independence to consolidation and generally was inconclusive. Likewise, GAO was unable to draw clear linkages between consolidation and capital formation but did observe potential impacts for some smaller companies seeking to raise capital. However, given the unprecedented changes occurring in the audit market, GAO observes that past behavior may not be indicative of future behavior, and these potential implications may warrant additional study in the future, including preventing further consolidation and maintaining competition. Finally, GAO found that smaller accounting firms faced significant barriers to entry--including lack of staff, industry and technical expertise, capital formation, global reach, and reputation--into the large public company audit market. As a result, market forces are not likely to result in the expansion of the current Big 4. Furthermore, certain factors and conditions could cause a further reduction in the number of major accounting firms. |
gao_GAO-03-1036T | gao_GAO-03-1036T_0 | Information on Frequency, Type, and Cause of Credit Report Errors Is Limited; Industry Data and Available Studies Disagree on Frequency of Errors
Available studies and credit reporting industry data disagree on the extent of errors in credit reports. The limited literature on credit report accuracy indicated high rates of errors in credit report data. Both the literature and the data provided by the credit industry had serious limitations that restricted our ability to assess the overall level credit reporting accuracy. The credit industry has developed and implemented procedures to help ensure accuracy of credit report data, although no one has assessed the efficacy of these procedures. Both Literature and Industry Identified Similar Types and Causes of Errors
While both the literature and credit industry representatives cited similar types and causes of errors, neither the literature nor the credit industry data identified one particular type or cause of error as the most common. For example, collection agencies and public records on bankruptcies, tax liens, and judgments were cited as major sources of errors. FTC Has Taken Enforcement Actions Related to the Accuracy of Credit Reports Since 1996 FCRA Amendments
FTC has taken eight formal enforcement actions since the passage of the 1996 FCRA amendments against CRAs, data furnishers, and resellers that directly or indirectly relate to credit report accuracy. Impact of 1996 FCRA Amendments on Credit Report Accuracy and the Potential Effects of Errors on Consumers Is Not Fully Known
To date, no comprehensive assessments have addressed the impact of the 1996 FCRA credit report accuracy amendments or the potential effects inaccuracies have had on consumers. FTC staff could not say what the trend in the frequency of errors in credit reports has been since the 1996 amendments because that data is not available. The Federal Reserve Bulletin article previously mentioned also concluded that limitations in consumer reporting agency records have the potential to both help and hurt individual consumers. Impact of Errors May Be Influenced by Other Factors in a Credit File
Industry officials and the literature we reviewed suggested that the impact of an error in a consumer’s credit report was dependent on the specific circumstance of the information contained in a credit file. Fully understanding the impact of errors on consumer’s credit scores would require access to consumer credit reports, discussions with consumers to identify errors, and discussions with data furnishers to determine what impact, if any, correction of errors might have on decisions made based on the content of a credit report. Because of the importance of accurate credit reports to the fairness of our national credit system, it would be useful to perform an independent assessment of the accuracy of credit reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Accurate credit reports are critical to the credit process--for consumers attempting to obtain credit and to lending institutions making decisions about extending credit. In today's sophisticated and highly calibrated credit markets, credit report errors can have significant monetary implications to consumers and credit granters. In recognition of the importance of this issue, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs asked GAO to (1) provide information on the frequency, type, and cause of credit report errors, and (2) describe the impact of the 1996 amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) on credit report accuracy and potential implications of reporting errors for consumers.
What GAO Found
Information on the frequency, type, and cause of credit report errors is limited to the point that a comprehensive assessment of overall credit report accuracy using currently available information is not possible. Moreover, available literature and the credit reporting industry strongly disagree about the frequency of errors in consumer credit reports, and lack a common definition for "inaccuracy." The literature and industry do identify similar types of errors and similar causes of errors. Specifically, several officials and reports cited collection agencies and governmental agencies that provide information on bankruptcies, liens, collections, and other actions noted in public records as major sources of errors. Because credit report accuracy is essential to the business activities of consumer reporting agencies and credit granters, the credit industry has developed and implemented procedures to help ensure accuracy. However, no study has measured the extent to which these procedures have improved accuracy. While the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) tracks consumer complaints on FCRA violations, these data are not a reliable measure of credit report accuracy. Additionally, FTC has taken eight formal enforcement actions directly or indirectly related to credit report accuracy since Congress enacted the 1996 FCRA amendments. Neither the impact of the 1996 FCRA amendments on credit report accuracy nor the potential implications of errors for consumers is known. Specifically, because comprehensive or statistically valid data on credit report errors before and after the passage of the 1996 FCRA amendments have not been collected, GAO could not identify a trend associated with error rates. Industry officials and studies indicated that credit report errors could either help or hurt individual consumers depending on the nature of the error and the consumer's personal circumstances. To adequately assess the impact of errors in consumer reports would require access to the consumer's credit score and the ability to determine how changes in the score affected the decision to extend credit or the terms of the credit granted. Ultimately, a meaningful independent review in cooperation with the credit industry would be necessary to assess the frequency of errors and the implications of errors for individual consumers. |
gao_NSIAD-98-30 | gao_NSIAD-98-30_0 | Goal four of the National Drug Control Strategy is “to shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.” In its efforts to achieve this goal, the United States has efforts underway to detect, monitor, and interdict illegal narcotics moving through the transit zone. The Department of Defense (DOD) supports U.S. law enforcement agencies by tracking and monitoring suspected drug-trafficking activities. According to the revised plan, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East, located in Key West, Florida, is responsible for detection, monitoring, sorting, and handoff of suspect air and maritime drug-trafficking events in the Pacific Ocean east of 92 west longitude, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, Central America north of Panama, and surrounding seas and the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. interagency 1996 estimates indicated that of the 608 metric tons of cocaine destined for the United States, 234 metric tons flowed through the Eastern Pacific, 264 metric tons flowed through the Western Caribbean, and 110 metric tons flowed through the Eastern Caribbean. Of this amount, about 70 percent was shipped through the Eastern Pacific. Maritime Smuggling Continues to Dominate Activity in the Transit Zone
Since 1993, cocaine traffickers have continued to increase their reliance on maritime vessels. Figure 3 shows typical maritime vessels most commonly used by drug traffickers in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific corridors. Host Nation Counterdrug Capabilities Remain Limited
As we reported in April 1996, host countries in the Caribbean continue to be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities. While the drug flow through the transit zone continues at about the same level, drug seizures by most countries in this region are minimal. There are 12 countries in the region with which the United States currently has no formal counterdrug agreements. 4). JIATF-East Has Requested Additional Resources
Although JIATF-East acknowledges that U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor “go-fast” boats in the Caribbean and aircraft throughout the transit zone are limited, it currently believes that targeting multiton cargo vessels in the Eastern Pacific provides the richest target of opportunity to seize large quantities of cocaine. A draft of the regional plan is scheduled to be completed by January 1998. Since these measurable targets have not yet been developed, agencies cannot be held accountable for their performance. An effective transit zone operation is an integral part of the U.S. strategy to limit drug availability in the United States. But it alone will not be the solution to the drug problem. We interviewed and obtained information from JIATF-East and other federal agencies on the resources and capabilities of U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone. We met with ONDCP officials on the status of its implementation of our recommendation to develop a plan of action for the Caribbean and its efforts to develop performance measures for U.S. counternarcotics initiatives. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional committees, the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the U.S. Attorney General, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the Administrator of DEA, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed drug trafficking lanes into the United States from the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern Pacific Ocean, focusing on: (1) the nature of drug trafficking activities through the transit zone; (2) host nation efforts, capabilities, and impediments to an effective counternarcotics program; (3) U.S. agencies' capabilities, including funding, in interdicting drug trafficking activities in the region; and (4) the status of U.S. agencies' efforts to plan, coordinate, and implement U.S. interdiction activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since its April 1996 report, the amount of drugs smuggled and the counternarcotics capabilities of host countries and the United States have remained largely unchanged; (2) cocaine trafficking through the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions continues, and drug traffickers are still relying heavily on maritime modes of transportation; (3) recent information shows that traffickers are using "go-fast" boats, fishing vessels, coastal freighters, and other vessels in the Caribbean and fishing and cargo vessels with multi-ton loads in the Eastern Pacific; (4) recent estimates indicate that, of all cocaine moving through the transit zone, 38 percent (234 metric tons) is being shipped through the Eastern Pacific; (5) although the United States has continued to provide technical assistance and equipment to many Caribbean and other transit zone countries, the amount of cocaine seized by most of the countries is small relative to the estimated amounts flowing through the area; (6) the counter-drug efforts of many transit zone countries continue to be hampered by limited resources and capabilities; (7) the United States does not have bilateral maritime agreements with 12 transit zone countries to facilitate interdiction activities; (8) the United States has increased funding but has had limited success in detecting, monitoring, and interdicting air and maritime trafficking in the transit zone; (9) Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East assets devoted to these efforts have stayed at almost the same level; (10) JIATF-East has requested additional resources from the Department of Defense to address Eastern Pacific drug trafficking; (11) Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) officials told GAO that it developed an overall strategy that identifies agency roles, missions and tasks to execute the drug strategy and establish task priorities; (12) according to ONDCP, its performance measurement systems remains incomplete; (13) until measurable targets are developed, it will not be possible to hold agencies with jurisdiction in the Caribbean accountable for their performance; and (14) law enforcement agencies with Caribbean jurisdiction are developing a regional plan to be completed by January 1998, led by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Customs Service. |
gao_GAO-16-393 | gao_GAO-16-393_0 | These courts are typically local courts dedicated to handling criminal cases involving veterans with mental health or substance abuse problems. The VJO Program Operates Through VA Medical Centers and Has Linked Many Post-9/11 Veterans to Supports and Services
VJO Program Operates Through VA Medical Centers to Respond to Local Needs
The VJO Program operates through VA medical centers. More specifically, VA established broad program parameters that allow VA medical center officials to set VJO specialists’ activities to meet the needs of veterans in local criminal justice systems. VA staff said once VJO specialists refer and link veterans to the appropriate supports and services, they perform follow-up visits with veterans to ensure they are receiving them. For example:
Specialty courts: VJO specialists provide services to veterans in a variety of specialty courts, such as veterans treatment courts, drug courts, and mental health courts. In fiscal year 2015, the VJO Program Served about 46,500 Veterans, Many of Whom Served in Post-9/11 Conflicts and Reported Substance Abuse Problems
In fiscal year 2015, the VJO Program served about 46,500 justice- involved veterans, and the program has experienced steady growth in the number of veterans served, according to data from VA. During fiscal years 2012 through 2015, the number of justice-involved veterans annually served by the VJO Program increased from about 27,000 to 46,500, a 72 percent increase (see fig. VA planned to obtain information through interviews with 1,500 veterans. VA Has Not Established Performance Goals or Performance Measures
Although VA has developed five broad strategic goals for the VJO Program and taken steps to evaluate it, VA has not fully measured progress toward any of the strategic goals because it has developed neither performance goals nor performance measures, contrary to leading practices for managing programs. They allow agencies to monitor and report program accomplishments on an ongoing basis. This information is useful for some aspects of program management. VA medical centers have discretion in determining the activities of VJO specialists. VA Has Identified Capacity Challenges but Has Not Comprehensively Assessed Related Risks or Developed Mitigation Strategies
VA Identified Key Challenges Related to Justice-involved Veterans’ Demand for Services Outpacing VJO Program Resources
VA identified several key challenges related to the demand for services outpacing the VJO Program’s resources, which could limit the program’s capacity to serve all justice-involved veterans. While these courts can help improve veterans’ mental health and sobriety, the increase in the number of these courts is a major reason for the VJO Program’s workload challenges, according to VJO specialists, VISN officials, VA central office officials, and justice system partners we interviewed. This online system improves the jails’ identification process compared with the self-identifying process currently used by most jail administrators. VA Has Not Comprehensively Assessed Program Risks, which Would Allow It to Develop Strategies to Mitigate Their Effects
VA has not performed a comprehensive assessment of risks posed by the challenges the VJO Program faces, which is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control and one component of effective program management. In addition, VA’s lack of performance goals, as previously discussed, negatively affects its ability to effectively identify and assess risk. Lacking comprehensive risk assessments may limit VA’s ability to target areas posing the greatest risks and, in turn, develop appropriate mitigation strategies. In written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III, VA agreed with our recommendations and noted steps it plans to take to address them. VA did not provide technical comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine: (1) how the Veterans Justice Outreach (VJO) Program delivers services, and the number and characteristics of veterans served by the program; (2) the extent the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has used performance assessment to help manage the Veterans Justice Outreach Program; and (3) what key challenges, if any, VA has identified and to what extent the agency has developed mitigation strategies, as necessary. Selection Criteria for Areas Served by VA Medical Centers in our Review
We selected the nine areas in our review based on the size of the population of veterans in the area, geographic diversity, VA officials’ recommendations, and proximity to veterans treatment courts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Most veterans transition to civilian life trouble-free. For those who struggle with their transition to the point that they are arrested and jailed, VA created the VJO Program, which connects veterans with supports and services to help avoid re-incarceration. The program relies on VJO specialists to link veterans to treatment. GAO was asked to review the management of the VJO Program.
This report examines 1) how the program delivers services and the number and characteristics of veterans in the program, 2) the extent to which VA uses performance assessment of the program, and 3) the key challenges VA has identified and the extent to which VA has developed mitigation strategies. GAO obtained VA data on program participants for fiscal years 2012 through 2015; reviewed documents; interviewed VA officials and staff from nine areas served by a VA medical center and selected for their geographic diversity and differences in the structures of local criminal justice systems; and in three of the areas interviewed criminal justice system stakeholders and veterans. While information from these interviews cannot be generalized, they provide insights on program challenges and operations.
What GAO Found
The Veterans Justice Outreach (VJO) Program—created by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—operates through VA medical centers to provide services to veterans involved in local criminal justice systems, and in fiscal year 2015 served about 46,500 veterans, mostly men and many diagnosed with mental health or substance abuse problems. Officials from VA medical centers manage more than 260 VJO Program specialists who identify veterans in jails and local courts, assess their health and social needs, and link them to supports and services. VJO specialists monitor veterans' services and treatment in courts dedicated to veteran offenders. According to VA data, the number of veterans served by the program increased 72 percent from fiscal years 2012 - 2015. In addition, many veterans involved in the program were Post-9/11 veterans; about two-thirds were diagnosed with one or more mental health problems.
VA has taken some steps to incorporate a performance assessment system into the VJO Program, one component of effective program management (see figure). Specifically, VA developed strategic goals and plans to conduct evaluations. However, VA has not established performance goals with related targets, timeframes, and performance measures for any of the program's five broad strategic goals. VA officials told GAO they have not taken this step, in part, because VA medical centers have flexibility in determining the activities of VJO specialists. GAO's past work has highlighted strategies that agencies can use in this situation, such as developing measures based on common activities. Best practices call for agencies to establish performance goals and associated performance measures. Until VA incorporates performance goals and measures, it will lack a systematic way to obtain ongoing information to identify possible underperforming areas for improvements.
VA identified several key challenges—most of which were related to the demand for services outpacing the program's resources—but has not fully developed appropriate mitigation strategies. One key challenge, for example, is addressing increased program demand as jail administrators more widely use VA's online system that better identifies incarcerated veterans. In addition, a major reason for the demand-resource imbalance is the heavier workload of VJO specialists serving veterans in an expanding number of courts dedicated to veterans, according to VA officials and stakeholders that GAO interviewed. However, GAO found that VA did not comprehensively identify and assess risks posed by each of the key challenges it identified, contrary to federal internal control standards. Absent a comprehensive risk assessment, VA is not well-positioned to develop appropriate strategies to mitigate the greatest risks, which may limit its ability to help justice-involved veterans receive assistance and avoid re-incarceration.
What GAO Recommends
To improve program management, VA should establish performance goals and measures and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA agreed with the recommendations and discussed actions it plans to take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-14-535 | gao_GAO-14-535_0 | Background
To achieve its primary debt management objective of financing the federal government’s borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time, Treasury issues debt through a regular and predictable schedule of auctions across a wide range of securities. Floating Rate Notes Are Likely to Help Treasury Borrow at the Lowest Cost over Time, Extend the Average Maturity, and Increase Demand, but They Also Present Certain Risks
2-Year FRNs Are Likely to Cost Less than 2-Year Fixed-Rate Notes but Could Cost More or Less Than Bills, and the Cost Will Vary by the Interest Rate Environment
We analyzed the potential cost to Treasury of issuing 2-year FRNs and found they are likely to have interest costs lower than 2-year fixed-rate notes and not substantially different than 13-week bills. As a result, FRNs will likely result in savings over the long run, helping Treasury achieve its goal of borrowing at the lowest cost over time. Because interest rate environments vary substantially over time, we also compared how the cost of FRNs may vary based on changes in the level and volatility of interest rates. Mismatch Between the FRN’s Index Rate Maturity and Reset Frequency Poses Risk That Treasury Has Not Fully Analyzed
One element of the design of the Treasury 2-year FRN is that it is what the market refers to as a “mismatched floater.” The difference (i.e., the mismatch) between the term of its index rate (13 weeks) and the length of its reset period (stated as daily, but effectively weekly) may introduce the risk of price instability on the reset date that is not typical of most floating rate securities. They said that they expect investors to price the 2-year FRN in a way that reflects the expectation that the yield curve risk for Treasury’s 2-year FRN is likely to be small relative to its reduced interest rate risk. increase the maturity profile of the debt portfolio while meeting high demand for high-quality, short-term securities. Interest rate risk For a borrower, such as Treasury, interest rate risk is the risk of having to refinance its debt at less favorable interest rates and, for floating rate debt, of interest rates rising during the life of the security. FRNs provide Treasury with additional flexibility in its debt issuance by adding a new type of security to Treasury’s debt portfolio and by increasing overall demand for Treasury securities. Our interviews and survey results found that although market participants will likely primarily purchase Treasury FRNs as a substitute for other Treasury securities (especially bills), market participants will also purchase Treasury FRNs as a substitute for other investment options, including FRNs from other issuers and repurchase agreements (see figure 9). Our survey results suggest demand for Treasury FRNs is likely to grow. Overall, market participants felt prepared for the introduction of a new security. In addition, most survey respondents said that they were able to provide sufficient input to Treasury, but respondents from some sectors reported lower levels of opportunity to provide input. Survey Respondents Reported Interest Both in FRNs with Different Maturities and Other New Types of Treasury Securities
Responses from our survey of market participants indicate an interest in FRNs of both shorter- and medium-term maturities, but respondents expressed more limited interest in 7- and 10-year FRNs than in shorter- term FRNs (see figure 11). To achieve the lowest cost of financing the government over time, it is important that Treasury spread debt across maturities and take into account investor demand for new and existing products. FRNs can also help enhance Treasury flexibility by marginally increasing demand for Treasury securities. Without analyzing how the mismatch between the frequency of the reset period and the maturity of the index could affect pricing, however, Treasury is unable to judge either (1) the risks (and therefore the ultimate cost) of FRNs in a different interest environment, or (2) whether the additional demand from money market funds due to the mismatch feature outweighs the potential costs it creates. Tracking and reporting an additional measure of the length of the debt portfolio that captures interest rate risk could help Treasury debt managers understand and weigh risks in the portfolio, and publicly reporting that measure would facilitate transparency and market understanding of Treasury debt management decisions. It will also be important for Treasury to gauge market demand for FRNs and other products by soliciting input from all sectors of Treasury investors, specifically state and local government retirement fund managers. When deciding what to issue, Treasury must make prudent decisions about investor demand by product. Analyze the price effects of the mismatch between the term of the index rate and the reset period; 2. On May 23, 2014 the Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets told us that Treasury thought it was an excellent report, that they agreed with the recommendations, and that they had already taken steps to begin implementing them. In the maturity-based model, the FRN spread—the difference between the index rate and the interest rate on the FRN—split the difference between the 13-week bill and 2-year note yields on the date of the FRN auction: This model was suggested to us by a market participant as one way to estimate the likely spread for the Treasury FRN, and we found it to be reasonable. Appendix II: Survey Scope and Methodology
To address both of our objectives, we surveyed and interviewed market participants regarding (1) the market for FRNs, (2) the structure of FRNs, (3) other actions Treasury may consider to expand demand for Treasury securities, and (4) communication between Treasury and investors. Results of the survey are not generalizable. | Why GAO Did This Study
To continue meeting its goal of financing the federal government's borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time, Treasury began issuing a new type of security—a 2-year floating rate note (FRN)—in January 2014. The FRN pays interest at a rate that resets periodically based on changes in the rate of the 13-week Treasury bill (to which the FRN is indexed). GAO was asked to review Treasury debt management, including this product and other debt management issues.
This report (1) evaluates Treasury's rationale for introducing FRNs and (2) identifies the demand for Treasury securities from a broad range of investors to assess whether changes would help Treasury meet its goals. To address these objectives, GAO used Treasury auction data from 1980 - 2014 to simulate the costs of Treasury FRNs, reviewed Treasury documents, surveyed a non-generalizable sample of 82 large domestic institutional investors across sectors, and interviewed market participants and academic experts. (For the survey and results, see GAO-14-562SP .)
What GAO Found
Issuing floating rate notes (FRN) is likely to help the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) meet its goals to borrow at the lowest cost over time, extend the average maturity of the debt portfolio, and increase demand for Treasury securities, but it also presents risks related to changes in interest rates.
GAO simulated the costs of 2-year Treasury FRNs using historical Treasury auction data and found that interest costs of the FRNs were generally less than costs of fixed-rate 2-year notes, but could be either more or less than costs of 13-week bills, depending on assumptions about how investors price the FRNs. GAO also found that in rising interest rate environments, the FRNs may be more costly than these alternatives.
Multiple components contribute to achieving lowest cost financing over time: issuing FRNs is part of Treasury's approach to achieving this goal. GAO analysis identified a number of design elements that may affect how FRNs contribute to that goal. Treasury officials believe it is prudent for Treasury to extend the average maturity of its debt portfolio because the debt level is already high and is expected to grow. Relative to issuing shorter-term debt, 2-year FRNs will help Treasury extend the average maturity of the debt portfolio and thereby reduce the risk inherent in going to market. Because the interest rate on a FRN can change during the life of the security, FRNs expose Treasury to the risk of rising interest rates whereas fixed-rate securities of the same maturity do not. These shifts in risk are likely to be small because currently FRNs are expected to constitute a small proportion of Treasury debt. Although managing interest rate risk is an important aspect of Treasury's goal to borrow at the lowest cost over time, Treasury does not track and report a measure of the average maturity of the portfolio that captures the additional interest rate risk of FRNs.
One element of the design of the 2-year FRN—the difference between the term of its index rate (13 weeks) and the length of its effective reset period (one week)—is not typical for floating rate notes and creates tradeoffs in interest rate risks but also may result in additional demand for the product. The risks could affect the pricing of FRNs and raise Treasury's borrowing costs in environments of high and volatile interest rates. Treasury officials told us they examined design elements, including this difference, before issuing the 2-year FRN. However, Treasury had not analyzed how the difference may affect FRN pricing.
FRNs give Treasury debt managers additional flexibility by increasing demand for Treasury securities and by adding a new security that meets the high demand for short-term securities. Results from GAO's survey of a broad range of investors and interviews with market participants found that market participants likely will purchase Treasury FRNs primarily as a substitute for other Treasury securities, but they will also purchase the FRNs as a substitute for non-Treasury securities, bringing new and potentially growing demand to Treasury. To provide the lowest cost of financing the government over time, Treasury must consider investor demand for new and existing products. Survey respondents indicated an interest in FRNs of additional maturities and in other new Treasury products. Treasury currently offers many ways for market participants to provide input, but GAO's survey identified opportunities for Treasury to enhance input from some sectors—including state and local government retirement fund managers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Treasury (1) track and report a measure of interest rate risk in its debt portfolio, (2) analyze the price effects of the difference between the term of the index rate and the reset period, (3) examine opportunities for additional new types of securities, such as FRNs of other maturities, and (4) expand outreach to certain market participants. Treasury agreed with the recommendations and said that they had already taken steps to begin implementing them. |
gao_GAO-09-629 | gao_GAO-09-629_0 | To hear selected audio clips of undercover calls illustrating poor customer service to our fictitious callers, refer to http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-458t/. Although all of our fictitious complaints alleged violations of laws that WHD enforces, 5 of our 10 complaints were not recorded in WHD’s database. According to WHD policies, investigators should enter reasonable complaints into WHD’s database and either handle them immediately as conciliations or refer them to management for possible investigation. Case Studies Show That WHD Inadequately Investigated Complaints
Similar to our 10 fictitious scenarios, in our testimony we identified 20 cases affecting at least 1,160 workers whose employers were inadequately investigated by WHD. We performed data mining on WHD’s database to identify 20 inadequate cases closed during fiscal year 2007. Five of the cases we investigated were closed based on unverified information provided by the employer. In each case, the information could have been verified by a search of public records, such as bankruptcy records, but the case files contain no evidence that the investigators attempted to perform these searches. WHD officials told us that investigators rely on internet searches to collect information about employers and generally do not have access to other publicly available or subscription databases. The employer claimed that the company did not meet the income requirement to be covered under federal labor law but did not provide documentary evidence. WHD’s Complaint Intake Process, Conciliations, and Other Investigative Tools Do Not Provide Assurance of a Timely and Thorough Response to Wage Theft Complaints
WHD’s complaint intake processes, conciliations, and other investigative tools are ineffective and often prevent WHD from responding to wage theft complaints in a timely and thorough manner, leaving thousands of low wage workers vulnerable to wage theft. As discussed above, our undercover tests showed that some WHD staff deterred callers from filing a complaint by encouraging employees to resolve the issue themselves, directing most calls to voicemail, not returning phone calls to both employees and employers, accepting only written complaints at some offices, and providing conflicting or misleading information about how to file a complaint. When an employer refuses to pay, investigators may recommend that the case be elevated to a full investigation, but several WHD District Directors and field staff told us WHD lacks the resources to conduct an investigation of every complaint and focuses resources on investigating complaints affecting large numbers of employees or resulting in large dollar amounts of back wage collections. In addition, WHD’s poor record-keeping makes WHD appear better at resolving conciliations than it actually is. Timely completion of investigations by WHD is important because the statute of limitations for recovery of wages under the FLSA is 2 years from the date of the employer’s failure to pay the correct wages. Specifically, this means that every day that WHD delays an investigation, the complainant’s risk of becoming ineligible to collect back wages increases. Labor has not sought additional authority to suspend the statute of limitations during an investigation, yet in several district offices, a large backlog prevents investigators from initiating cases within 6 months. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Administrator of WHD to take the following five actions to improve processes for recording and responding to wage theft complaints: The Administrator should reassess current policies and processes and revise them as appropriate to better ensure that relevant case information is recorded in WHD’s database, including all complaints alleging applicable labor law violations regardless of whether the complaint was substantiated, and all investigative work performed on conciliations, regardless of whether the conciliation was successfully resolved. To provide assurance that WHD personnel interacting with complainants and employers appropriately capture and investigate allegations of labor law violations, and provide appropriate customer service, the Administrator should conduct an assessment of WHD’s complaint intake and resolution processes and revise them as appropriate. Delay Invetigating Complaint. Construction/ Anonymous Child Labor/ Minimum Wage (FLSA)
The complainant alleged that the company employed 15 year old children, failed to pay its employees minimum wage, and did not properly report income to the Internal Revenue Service. However, in ome coians, the emloer is able to vopaying back wag si by refusing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) includes enforcing provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which is designed to ensure that millions of workers are paid the federal minimum wage and overtime. Conducting investigations based on worker complaints is WHD's priority. On March 25, 2009, GAO testified on its findings related to (1) undercover tests of WHD's complaint intake process, (2) case study examples of inadequate WHD responses to wage complaints, and (3) the effectiveness of WHD's complaint intake process, conciliations (phone calls to the employer), and other investigative tools. To test WHD's complaint intake process, GAO posed as complainants and employers in 10 different scenarios. To provide case study examples and assess effectiveness of complaint investigations, GAO used data mining and statistical sampling of closed case data for fiscal year 2007. This report summarizes the testimony (GAO-09-458T) and provides recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that WHD frequently responded inadequately to complaints, leaving low wage workers vulnerable to wage theft and other labor law violations. Posing as fictitious complainants, GAO filed 10 common complaints with WHD district offices across the country. These tests found that WHD staff deterred fictitious callers from filing a complaint by encouraging employees to resolve the issue themselves, directing most calls to voicemail, not returning phone calls to both employees and employers, and providing conflicting or misleading information about how to file a complaint. An assessment of complaint intake processes would help ensure that WHD staff provide appropriate customer service. To hear clips of undercover calls illustrating poor customer service, see http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-458t/ . According to WHD policies, investigators should enter all reasonable complaints into WHD's database. However, even though all of GAO's fictitious complaints alleged violations of the laws that WHD enforces, 5 of 10 complaints were not recorded in WHD's database. In addition, WHD policy in one region instructs staff not to record the investigative work done on small cases in which the employer refuses to pay, making WHD appear better at resolving these cases than it is. Reassessing its processes for recording complaints would help WHD ensure that all case information is available. Similar to the 10 fictitious scenarios, GAO identified 20 cases affecting at least 1,160 real employees whose complaints were inadequately investigated by WHD. Five of the cases were closed based on false information provided by the employer that could have been verified by a search of public records, such as bankruptcy records, but WHD investigators do not have access to publicly available or subscription databases. In another case, the employer claimed that the company did not meet the income requirement to be covered under federal law but did not provide documentary evidence. WHD investigators do not have access to income information collected by the Internal Revenue Service and were unable to verify the employer's claim. Obtaining more research tools and implementing information sharing processes with other agencies would assist WHD in verifying employer-provided information. GAO's overall assessment found ineffective complaint intake and investigation processes. WHD officials often told GAO that WHD lacks the resources to conduct an investigation of every complaint, allowing employers in some small cases to avoid paying back wages simply by refusing to pay. GAO found that WHD's investigations were often delayed by months or years. Monitoring the extent to which WHD staff are able to handle the volume of complaints would provide assurance that WHD has sufficient resources available. Under FLSA, the statute of limitations is 2 years from the date of the violation, meaning that every day that WHD delays an investigation, the complainant's risk of becoming ineligible to collect back wages increases. However, in several offices, backlogs prevent investigators from initiating cases within 6 months. Suspending the statute of limitations during a WHD investigation would prevent employees from losing back wages due to delays. |
gao_GAO-17-51 | gao_GAO-17-51_0 | Under the National Nuclear Security Administration Act, the Secretary of Energy is responsible for establishing policy for NNSA. DOE and NNSA Have Not Established Policies Addressing Internal Control Standards or Leading Practices Related to Program Management
DOE has not established a department-wide policy addressing internal control standards or leading practices related to program management, and NNSA canceled its program management policy in 2013. As described earlier, according to federal internal control standards, management should assign responsibilities, delegate authority, and establish expectations of competence for key roles, which would include program managers. For example, in our 2016 report examining NNSA’s plans to build a multi- billion-dollar facility for plutonium analysis at its Los Alamos site in New Mexico, we found that the agency had not clarified whether the project would satisfy the mission needs of DOE and NNSA programs other than those of DP. NNSA might have been better able to clarify the mission needs associated with these projects if NNSA and DOE programs had been operating under a department-wide policy that incorporated (1) leading practices, such as capturing and understanding stakeholder needs and expectations and other activities associated with program stakeholder engagement, and (2) internal control principles related to assigning responsibilities and delegating authority to key roles such as program managers. DOE and NNSA officials told us that they recognize the importance of establishing a program management policy. However, DOE has not taken steps to develop a policy for program management. DOE and NNSA Have Not Established Training Programs for Program Managers
DOE and NNSA have not established training programs for program managers to ensure that they are capable of meeting core competencies; as a result, most of the 15 NNSA program managers we interviewed had not received training related to program management. According to the PMI standard, a successful program manager exhibits certain core competences, including the ability to manage details while taking a holistic, benefits-focused view of the leverage a strong working knowledge of the principles and process of both program and project management; interact seamlessly and collaboratively with governance boards and other executive stakeholders; establish productive and collaborative relationships with team members and their organizational stakeholders; leverage their own technical knowledge and experience to provide perspectives that support the understanding and management of program uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity; and facilitate understanding through the use of exceptionally strong communication skills. However, according to DOE officials, the department does not have an office responsible for program management that provides training for program managers. In contrast, DOE has established a training program for project managers. NNSA had plans to establish a training program for its program managers but has not done so. According to its cancelled 2004 policy on program management, NNSA was to develop (1) standardized training materials that would demonstrate a program manager’s understanding of and proficiency with core NNSA processes and management practices and (2) a database to track the training and certification requirements for each program manager position. However, NNSA officials said that because of the loss of senior managers and other staff, they were unsure if these training materials were ever developed. Establishing a clear, department-wide program management policy that incorporates key internal control standards and leading practices related to program management may help ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices are better able to achieve their missions, goals, and objectives. DOE and NNSA officials told us that they recognize the importance of establishing a policy on program management but have not taken steps to develop such a policy. In addition, although federal internal control standards call for management to train its personnel to enable them to develop competencies appropriate for key roles, DOE and NNSA have not established training programs for program managers. Without a department-wide training program for program managers, NNSA may have difficulty developing and maintaining a cadre of professional, effective, and capable program managers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that NNSA effectively manages the performance of its programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy establish a program management policy that (1) assigns responsibilities and delegates authority to program managers and establishes expectations of competence for them, in accordance with federal internal control standards, and (2) addresses leading program management practices, such as developing program plans. To help ensure that NNSA develops and maintains a cadre of professional, effective, and capable program managers in accordance with leading program management practices and federal internal control standards, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy establish a training program for program managers. DOE had no comments on the draft report, and NNSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Program managers are an important part of the federal government's workforce. They interact with project managers to provide support and guidance on individual projects but also must take a broad view of program objectives and organizational culture. NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, is responsible for managing DOE's nuclear security missions. Since 1990, DOE's management of major contracts and projects, including those executed by NNSA, has been on GAO's list of areas at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE and NNSA have undertaken steps to address these challenges but have focused primarily on project management issues.
Senate Report 114-49 includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA program management capabilities. This report examines the extent to which DOE and NNSA have established (1) policies addressing internal control standards and leading practices related to program management and (2) training programs for program managers. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA policies, consulted internal control and PMI standards, and interviewed DOE and NNSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have not established policies addressing internal control standards and leading practices related to program management. There are no federal government-wide standards specifically addressing program management. However, federal internal control standards include principles that are relevant to key roles such as program managers, and the Project Management Institute (PMI) has established a standard on program management that is generally recognized as a leading practice for most programs. Specifically, internal control standards state that management should assign responsibilities, delegate authority, and establish expectations of competence for key roles such as program managers. According to leading practices, organizations develop program plans, capture and understand stakeholder needs, and establish processes for maintaining program management oversight, among other activities. DOE has not established a department-wide program management policy, and NNSA cancelled its program management policy in 2013 without establishing a new one. A policy incorporating key internal control standards and leading program management practices may help ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices are better able to achieve their missions, goals, and objectives. For example, in a 2016 report examining NNSA's plans to build a plutonium analysis facility, GAO found that the agency had not clarified whether the project would satisfy the mission needs of other NNSA and DOE programs. NNSA might have been better able to clarify this project's mission needs if DOE and NNSA had been operating under a DOE-wide program management policy incorporating leading practices. DOE and NNSA officials said that they recognize the importance of establishing a program management policy, but DOE has not taken steps to do so.
DOE and NNSA have not established training programs for program managers. According to federal internal control standards, management should train key staff to enable them to develop competencies appropriate for key roles, which would include program managers. In addition, according to PMI, a successful program manager exhibits certain core competences, such as leveraging a strong working knowledge of the principles and process of both program and project management. NNSA's cancelled program management policy also required the agency to develop standardized training materials for program managers and track the training requirements for each program manager position. However, according to DOE officials, the department has not developed a training program for program managers. In contrast, DOE has developed a training program for project managers and established an office responsible for managing this program and certifying the qualifications of DOE and NNSA project managers. NNSA officials said that they were unsure if NNSA had ever developed training materials for program managers and that the agency does not track the training requirements for its program manager positions. Of the 15 NNSA program managers GAO interviewed, only five individuals stated that they had received training related to program management. In the absence of a training program for program managers, NNSA may have difficulty developing and maintaining a cadre of professional, effective, and capable program managers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE establish (1) a program management policy addressing internal control standards and leading practices and (2) a training program for program managers. DOE had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-04-912 | gao_GAO-04-912_0 | USTR’s Special 301 annual reports on the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property protection around the world demonstrate that, from a U.S. perspective, intellectual property protection is weak in developed as well as developing countries and that the willingness of countries to address intellectual property issues varies greatly. Agencies Undertake Three Types of IPR Efforts
The efforts of multiple U.S. agencies to protect U.S. intellectual property overseas fall into three general categories—policy initiatives, training and technical assistance, and U.S. law enforcement actions. Most agencies involved in efforts to protect U.S. IPR overseas conduct training and technical assistance activities. Select Agencies Engage in U.S. IPR Law Enforcement Efforts
A small number of agencies are involved in enforcing U.S. intellectual property laws. U.S. Efforts Have Contributed to Improved Foreign IPR Laws, but Enforcement Overseas Remains Weak; Industry Supports U.S. Efforts
U.S. efforts have contributed to strengthened foreign IPR laws and international IPR obligations, and, while enforcement overseas remains weak, U.S. industry groups are generally supportive of U.S. efforts. However, the specific impact of many U.S. activities, such as diplomatic efforts or training and technical assistance, can be difficult to measure. The efforts of U.S. agencies have contributed to the establishment of strengthened intellectual property legislation in many foreign countries. Several Mechanisms Coordinate IPR Efforts, but Their Usefulness Varies
Several interagency mechanisms exist to coordinate overseas intellectual property policy initiatives, development and assistance activities, and law enforcement efforts, although these mechanisms’ level of activity and usefulness varies. According to U.S. government and industry officials, this interagency process is rigorous and effective. Council to Coordinate IPR Enforcement Has Had Little Impact
The National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC), created by the Congress in 1999 to coordinate domestic and international intellectual property law enforcement among U.S. federal and foreign entities, seems to have had little impact. In addition, a Justice official noted that the department increasingly engages in policy activities, such as the Special 301 annual review and the negotiation of free trade agreements, as well as training efforts, to improve coordination between policy and law enforcement agencies and to strengthen international IPR enforcement. For example, internally, competing U.S. policy objectives can affect how much the U.S. government can accomplish. In addition, many economic factors, including low barriers to entering the counterfeiting and piracy business and large price differences between legitimate and fake goods as well as problems such as organized crime, pose challenges to U.S. and foreign governments’ efforts, even in countries where the political will for protecting intellectual property exists. Of note, the Training Coordination Group is a completely voluntary effort and is generally cited as a positive development. To describe agencies’ efforts, as well as the impact of these efforts, we analyzed key U.S. government intellectual property reports, such as the annual “Special 301” reports for the years 1994 through 2004, and reviewed information available from databases such as the State Department’s intellectual property training database and the Department of Homeland Security’s online database of counterfeit goods seizures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the U.S. government provides broad protection for intellectual property, intellectual property protection in parts of the world is inadequate. As a result, U.S. goods are subject to piracy and counterfeiting in many countries. A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in efforts to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property abroad. This report describes U.S agencies' efforts, the mechanisms used to coordinate these efforts, and the impact of these efforts and the challenges they face.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies undertake policy initiatives, training and assistance activities, and law enforcement actions in an effort to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property abroad. Policy initiatives include assessing global intellectual property challenges and identifying countries with the most significant problems--an annual interagency process known as the "Special 301" review--and negotiating agreements that address intellectual property. In addition, many agencies engage in training and assistance activities, such as providing training for foreign officials. Finally, a small number of agencies carry out law enforcement actions, such as criminal investigations involving foreign parties and seizures of counterfeit merchandise. Agencies use several mechanisms to coordinate their efforts, although the mechanisms' usefulness varies. Formal interagency meetings--part of the U.S. government's annual Special 301 review--allow agencies to discuss intellectual property policy concerns and are seen by government and industry sources as rigorous and effective. In addition, a voluntary interagency training coordination group meets about once a month to discuss and coordinate training activities. However, the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council, established to coordinate domestic and international intellectual property law enforcement, has struggled to find a clear mission, has undertaken few activities, and is generally viewed as having little impact. U.S. efforts have contributed to strengthened intellectual property legislation overseas, but enforcement in many countries remains weak. The Special 301 review is widely seen as effective, but the impact of actions such as diplomatic efforts and training activities can be hard to measure. U.S. industry has been supportive of U.S. actions. However, future U.S. efforts face significant challenges. For example, competing U.S. policy objectives take precedence over protecting intellectual property in certain regions. Further, other countries' domestic policy objectives can affect their "political will" to address U.S. concerns. Finally, many economic factors, as well as the involvement of organized crime, hinder U.S. and foreign governments' efforts to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. |
gao_GAO-11-612 | gao_GAO-11-612_0 | The regulators use formal actions to address more severe deficiencies. Since the first quarter of 2007, the DIF balance has decreased by about $57 billion. All 270 banks that failed after undergoing the PCA process during the period we reviewed caused losses to the fund, and these losses were comparable as a percentage of assets with those of the generally larger banks that did not undergo PCA. Other Indicators Provide Early Warning of Deterioration, and although Regulators Identified Conditions Early, Responses Were Inconsistent
Because they rely on capital, PCA’s triggers have weaknesses, and the PCA framework does not take full advantage of early warning signs of bank distress that other financial indicators we tested can provide. Capital can lag behind other indicators of bank health, and once a bank’s capital has deteriorated to the undercapitalized level, it may be too late for the bank to recover. While their off- site monitoring tools and CAMELS ratings often indicated deteriorating conditions more than a year before banks failed, regulators did not consistently take enforcement actions before banks underwent the PCA process. While the Presence and Timeliness of Enforcement Actions Were Inconsistent, Regulators Have Incorporated Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis
Although regulators generally were successful in identifying early warning signs of bank distress, the presence and timeliness of subsequent enforcement actions were often inconsistent. We asked stakeholders from research organizations, regulatory agencies, and the banking industry whether PCA should be changed and, if so, to identify and rank broad options to change the current framework to make it more effective in minimizing losses to the DIF. In response, 23 of 29 stakeholders said that PCA should be modified using one or more of the survey’s listed options. Incorporate an Institution’s Risk Profile into the PCA Capital Category Thresholds
Stakeholders responding to our survey were most supportive of incorporating a bank’s risk profile into the PCA capital category thresholds. This option would add an additional risk element to the PCA capital measures beyond the already existing risk-weighted asset component. This option would require regulators to monitor other aspects of a bank’s performance, such as asset concentration, asset quality, or liquidity, and if problems were identified, to take increasingly severe actions to address problems in that area. Including another PCA trigger could also produce advantages and disadvantages for regulators and banks. Conclusions
Before the current financial crisis, PCA was largely untested because the financial condition of banks generally had been strong since PCA was enacted. In turn, PCA has not achieved a principal goal of preventing widespread losses to the DIF when banks fail. Moreover, without an additional PCA trigger, the regulators risk not acting soon enough to address a bank’s deteriorating condition, thereby limiting their ability to minimize losses to the DIF. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of the PCA framework, we recommend that the heads of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC consider additional triggers that would require early and forceful regulatory actions tied to specific unsafe banking practices and also consider the other two options—adding a measure of risk to the capital category thresholds and increasing the capital ratios that place banks into PCA capital categories— identified in this report to improve PCA. In written comments, FDIC, the Federal Reserve and OCC agreed with our recommendation to consider options to make PCA more effective. To assess the regulatory enforcement actions associated with banks that had deteriorated, we examined the type and timing of regulatory actions for failed banks with various outcomes, and analyzed the extent to which regulatory indicators provided warning of likely bank deterioration or failure. Specifically, we reviewed material loss reviews and other evaluation reports available on 136 institutions that failed in 2008, 2009, and 2010. FDIC DRR officials told us that although the cost of a bank failure is largely fixed by the time of failure, the manner of resolution can affect losses to the DIF “in the margin.” In an effort to minimize these losses, FDIC DRR customized purchase and assumption transactions, which it used to sell 254 of the 270 banks that failed after undergoing the PCA process, to the needs of the market. In order to derive a better estimate of PCA’s impact than comparing mean or median losses, we controlled for other factors that might affect losses to the DIF and therefore account for some systematic differences between banks that underwent the PCA process before failure and those that did not. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 300 insured depository institutions have failed since the current financial crisis began in 2007, at an estimated cost of almost $60 billion to the deposit insurance fund (DIF), which covers losses to insured depositors. Since 1991, Congress has required federal banking regulators to take prompt corrective action (PCA) to identify and promptly address capital deficiencies at institutions to minimize losses to the DIF. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires GAO to study federal regulators' use of PCA. This report examines (1) the outcomes of regulators' use of PCA on the DIF; (2) the extent to which regulatory actions, PCA thresholds, and other financial indicators help regulators address likely bank trouble or failure; and (3) options available to make PCA a more effective tool. GAO analyzed agency and financial data to describe PCA and DIF trends and assess the timeliness of regulator actions and financial indicators. GAO also reviewed relevant literature and surveyed expert stakeholders from research, industry, and regulatory sectors on options to improve PCA.
What GAO Found
Although the PCA framework has provided a mechanism to address financial deterioration in banks, GAO's analysis suggests it did not prevent widespread losses to the DIF--a key goal of PCA. Since 2008, the financial condition of banks has declined rapidly and use of PCA has grown tenfold. However, every bank that underwent PCA because of capital deficiencies and failed in this period produced a loss to the DIF. Moreover, these losses were comparable as a percentage of assets to the losses of failed banks that did not undergo PCA. While regulators and others acknowledged PCA's limitations, regulators said that the PCA framework provides benefits, such as facilitating orderly closures and encouraging banks to increase capital levels. PCA's triggers limit its ability to promptly address bank problems, and although regulators had discretion to address problems sooner, they did not consistently do so. Since the 1990s, GAO and others have noted that the effectiveness of PCA, as currently constructed, is limited because of its reliance on capital, which can lag behind other indicators of bank health. That is, problems with the bank's assets, earnings, or management typically manifest before these problems affect bank capital. Once a bank falls below PCA's capital standards, a bank may not be able to recover regardless of the regulatory action imposed. GAO tested other financial indicators, including measures of asset quality and liquidity, and found that they were important predictors of future bank failure. These indicators also better identified those institutions that failed and did not undergo the PCA process during the recent crisis. Although regulators identified problematic conditions among banks well before failure, the presence and timeliness of enforcement actions were inconsistent. For example, among the banks that failed, more than 80 percent were on a regulatory watch list for more than a year, on average, before bank failure. However, GAO's analysis of regulatory data and material loss reviews showed that actions to address early signs of deterioration were inconsistent and, in many cases, regulators either took no enforcement action or acted in the final days before an institution was subject to PCA or failed. Without an additional early warning trigger, the regulators risk acting too late, thereby limiting their ability to minimize losses to the DIF. Most stakeholders (23 of 29) GAO surveyed agreed that PCA should be modified and identified three top options to make it more effective. The first option--incorporating an institution's risk profile into PCA capital categories--would add a measure of risk to the capital category thresholds beyond the existing risk-weighted asset component. The second option was increasing the capital ratios that place banks in PCA capital categories. The third most popular option was including another trigger for PCA, such as asset quality or asset concentration. Each option has advantages and disadvantages. For example, while an additional trigger could account for other factors often found to precede capital deterioration, it might be difficult to implement. Although stakeholders supported these broad options, they cautioned that the manner in which any option was crafted would determine its success.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the bank regulators consider additional triggers that would require early and forceful regulatory action to address unsafe banking practices as well as the other options identified in the report to improve PCA. The regulators generally agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_T-GGD-99-152 | gao_T-GGD-99-152_0 | Internet Banking Growth Continues
Internet banking services are offered by a fast growing number of depository institutions. Regulators Need to Ensure Institutions Mitigate Risks
regulators have provided to depository institutions, concerning various types of Internet banking risks, including security risk, transactional risk, and various types of strategic risk. Limited Examinations Do Not Indicate the Extent of Any Industrywide Problems
Before I go into what we found in looking at examinations, I need to point out that, we found too few examinations had been completed to identify the extent of any industrywide Internet banking-related problems.Reasons the regulators gave for the small number of examinations done to date included examiners being diverted to mitigation efforts concerning the Year 2000 computer problem and a shortage of trained examiners to carry out Internet banking examinations. implemented the on-line banking risk mitigation steps outlined by the regulator. For example, regulators found that some institutions had not prepared strategic plans or had not obtained board of directors’ approval before initiating on-line banking. For example, examiners were concerned that some smaller institutions were implementing Internet banking systems before they had established operating policies and procedures and that bank management had to be reminded that operating policies and procedures were not optional. As more examinations are completed, information sharing among the regulators could help them better understand the extent of the risks posed by Internet banking, develop risk profiles that would allow them to target institutions requiring further attention, and help them allocate limited resources among competing priorities. Some Regulators Do Not Identify New Internet Banking Systems Plans
Before discussing how regulators supervise Internet banking, I want to touch on a problem we found in how some regulators identify depository institutions planning new Internet banking services. We found that regulators used a variety of methods to identify institutions that were already offering Internet banking services, such as Internet Web site searches and examiners’ preexamination planning information gathering. However, we found that only two regulators were systematically obtaining information on institutions’ plans to provide such services and had a centralized database of this information at the time of our review. Regulators’ Efforts to Supervise New Internet Banking Systems Differ
We found that regulators’ policies differed in the discretion examiners had to decide whether to examine an institution’s new Internet banking activity. In updating our information for this testimony, we were told that as part of the joint study, regulators have met with five of the largest third-party firms to discuss risks associated with Internet banking, to gain a better understanding of available products and services and the associated security features of those products and services, and to obtain information on these firms’ contingency plans. At the time of our fieldwork NCUA had not examined any third- party firm’s Internet banking services; but NCUA officials recognized the need to begin to conduct such examinations. We recommended that the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration establish procedures to obtain more timely information on institutions’ plans to offer Internet banking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the regulatory efforts to identify and mitigate risks to U.S. depository institutions' operations introduced by the growth in the use of Internet banking systems, focusing on: (1) the risks posed by Internet banking and the extent of any industrywide Internet banking problems; (2) how the five U.S. financial regulators track institutions' plans to provide Internet banking services; (3) how regulators have begun to examine Internet banking activities; and (4) the extent to which regulators have examined firms providing Internet banking support services to institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Internet banking heightens various types of traditional banking risks and GAO's review of 81 examinations showed that roughly 44 percent of the depository institutions examined had not completely implemented risk-management steps that regulators said are needed to limit on-line banking risks; (2) shortcomings included some institutions' lack of approval of strategic plans by their board of directors and a lack of policies and procedures at some institutions for Internet banking operations; (3) however, too few examinations had been conducted at the time of the review to identify the extent of any industrywide Internet banking-related problems; (4) regulators attributed their limited number of examinations to a diversion of examiners to higher-priority efforts to address the year 2000 computer problems and to their limited number of examiners with expertise in information systems; (5) GAO's work found that some regulators could use more systematic methods for identifying institutions' plans for new Internet banking systems and maintaining this information centrally; (6) GAO found that regulators use a variety of methods to identify depository institutions that already offer Internet banking services, but that only two of the regulators centrally collected information on plans for new services; (7) GAO found that regulators could benefit from adopting systems to keep abreast of institutions' plans for new Internet banking services and to allow them to proactively oversee this new and evolving banking activity; (8) GAO found variations in the supervisory approaches regulators followed to help ensure that institutions mitigate the risks posed by Internet banking; (9) GAO found that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has completed the most examinations of on-line banking operations, and that the Office of Thrift Supervision and FDIC have been actively issuing policies and procedures for Internet banking examinations; (10) in contrast, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) had not conducted any Internet banking examinations at the time of GAO's fieldwork and was the only regulator that had not developed procedures for Internet banking examinations; (11) five regulators are beginning to work cooperatively to carry out a study of third-party firms providing Internet banking support services; and (12) although NCUA is part of the joint study, GAO is concerned that third-party firms providing services solely to credit unions are not being reviewed. |
gao_GAO-09-1047T | gao_GAO-09-1047T_0 | FPS Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
FPS faces a number of challenges that hamper its ability to protect government employees and the public in federal facilities. For example, these challenges include (1) developing a risk management framework, (2) developing a human capital plan, and (3) better oversight of its contract security guard program. FPS Has Not Implemented a Risk Management Framework for Identifying Security Requirements and Allocating Resources
In our June 2008 report we found that in protecting federal facilities, FPS does not use a risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. FPS Does Not Have A Strategic Human Capital Plan to Guide Its Current and Future Workforce Planning Efforts
In our July 2009 report, we reported that FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. Moreover, we found FPS’s headquarters does not collect data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. Consequently, FPS cannot determine what its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these gaps. FPS’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by Weaknesses in Its Contract Guard Program
FPS’s contract guards are the most visible component of FPS’s operations as well as the public’s first contact with FPS when entering a federal facility. However, as we testified at a July 2009 congressional hearing, FPS does not fully ensure that its guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal facility. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required 8 hours of x-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. According to FPS officials, the 1,500 guards were not provided the required x-ray or magnetometer training because the region does not have employees who are qualified or have the time to conduct the training. Moreover, FPS’s primary system—Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System (CERTS)—for monitoring and verifying whether guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities is not fully reliable. FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with post orders once they are deployed to federal facilities. Each time they tried, our investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards, with the components for an IED concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. At some of the facilities, the restrooms were locked. In August 2009, we accompanied FPS on a test of security countermeasures at a level IV facility. FPS Has Recently Taken Some Actions to Better Protect Federal Facilities, However Many are Not Fully Implemented
While FPS has taken some actions to improve its ability to better protect federal facilities, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these actions address these challenges because most of them occurred recently and have not been fully implemented. It is also important to note that most of the actions FPS has recently taken focus on improving oversight of the contract guard program and do not address the need to develop a risk management framework and a human capital plan. In response to our covert testing, FPS has taken a number of actions. FPS also required more x-ray and magnetometer training for LESOs and guards. However, there are a number of factors that will make implementing and sustaining these actions difficult. First, FPS does not have adequate controls to monitor and track whether its 11 regions are completing these new requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say with certainty that it is being done. According to FPS, the agency plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems including CERTS into RAMP. Finally, over the last couple of years we have completed a significant amount of work related to challenges described above and made recommendations to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, the Federal Protective Services (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,200 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work for this Subcommittee and discusses: (1) challenges FPS faces in protecting federal facilities and (2) how FPS's actions address these challenges. To perform this work, GAO visited FPS's 11 regions, analyzed FPS data, and interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information, GAO cannot identify the specific locations of incidents discussed. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
What GAO Found
FPS faces challenges that hamper its ability to protect government employees and members of the public who work in and visit federal facilities. First, as we reported in our June 2008 report, FPS does not have a risk management framework that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Without such a framework, FPS has little assurance that its programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address changing conditions. Second, as discussed in our July 2009 report, FPS lacks a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. FPS does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities and therefore cannot determine its optimal staffing levels or identify gaps in its workforce and determine how to fill these gaps. Third, as we testified at a July 2009 congressional hearing, FPS's ability to protect federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security guard program. GAO found that many FPS guards do not have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities in some regions. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required 8 hours of X-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. GAO also found that FPS does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities. In addition, FPS has limited assurance that guards perform assigned responsibilities (post orders). Because guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post orders, GAO investigators with the components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons, passed undetected through access points controlled by FPS guards at 10 of 10 level IV facilities in four major cities where GAO conducted covert tests. FPS has taken some actions to better protect federal facilities, but it is difficult to determine the extent to which these actions address these challenges because many of the actions are recent and have not been fully implemented. Furthermore, FPS has not fully implemented several recommendations that GAO has made over the last couple of years to address FPS's operational and funding challenges, despite the Department of Homeland Security's concurrence with the recommendations. In addition, most of FPS's actions focus on improving oversight of the contract guard program and do not address the need to develop a risk management framework or a human capital plan. To enhance oversight of its contract guard program FPS is requiring its regions to conduct more guard inspections at level IV facilities and provide more x-ray and magnetometer training to inspectors and guards. However, several factors make these actions difficult to implement and sustain. For example, FPS does not have a reliable system to track whether its 11 regions are completing these new requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say with certainty that the requirements are being implemented. FPS is also developing a new information system to help it better protect federal facilities. However, FPS plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems, which GAO found were not fully reliable or accurate, into the new system. |
gao_RCED-99-86 | gao_RCED-99-86_0 | Agencies Were Successful in Providing Funds for Brownfield Activities
The 10 agencies in our review reported that they provided about $413 million —$272 million primarily through grants and $141 million in HUD loan guarantees in financial assistance for brownfield activities in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. EPA, HUD, and EDA within the Department of Commerce were responsible for $409 million, or 99 percent of this assistance. While HUD’s planned financial assistance through grants as stated in the Partnership Agenda was for $155 million, agency brownfield managers clarified that the agency could only commit to spend $25 million because it received this amount of appropriations for its new Brownfield Economic Development Initiative (BEDI) program. EDA grant recipients have reported that their communities are only using up to about 10 percent of their funds on actual cleanup. The administration reported that the agencies would provide a total of $469 million in financial assistance by implementing more than 100 brownfield action items and that this assistance was expected to result in the (1) leveraging of additional private investments in brownfields, (2) creation of new jobs, and (3) protection of greenfields. However, the administration cannot tell if the initiative is meeting the economic goals because most agencies are not tracking these results or collecting data specific to brownfields that would allow them to do so. Federal Agencies Have Completed Most of the Partnership’s Action Items
Officials of the 10 federal agencies in our review stated that their agencies had accomplished 63 of their 71 nonfinancial action items in the agenda, or about 89 percent. Also, most federal agencies generally do not have the comprehensive data necessary to determine the extent to which the economic benefits will be achieved, according to the EPA managers. HUD also tracks the number of jobs created under its Community Development Block Grant program. In addition, the agency clarified the extent to which it tracks the number of jobs created as a result of its grant programs. Scope and Methodology
To respond to our first and second objectives—to compare federal agencies’ planned financial investment for brownfields, as stated in the Partnership Agenda, to their actual obligations for brownfields in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and to describe the purposes of these obligations—we used a structured data collection instrument to request and then review the fiscal year 1997 and 1998 brownfield-related obligations and activities of the following agencies: (1) the departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation, (2) the Economic Development, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric, and the General Services administrations, and (3) the Environmental Protection Agency. To respond to our third objective—to determine the extent to which agencies met the Partnership’s goals and objectives—we used a structured survey to obtain the brownfield managers’ perspectives on these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the status of 10 federal agencies' efforts to implement the Brownfield National Partnership Action Agenda, focusing on: (1) comparing federal agencies' planned financial assistance to brownfields, which are abandoned, idle, or underused industrial facilities, to their actual spending for brownfields in fiscal years (FY) 1997 and 1998; (2) describing the purposes of these obligations; and (3) determining the extent to which agencies met the Partnership's goals and objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during FY 1997 and FY 1998, the 10 federal agencies GAO examined reported that they provided about $413 million in assistance to brownfields, as compared to the Partnership's planned financial assistance of $469 million; (2) brownfield managers at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also told GAO that the agency may have provided more financial assistance for brownfields than it reported because it provided most of its financial assistance through its Community Development Block Grant program; (3) about one-half of the total assistance that agencies provided for grant programs was from new funds made available for brownfields; (4) the remainder represented funds that the agencies had traditionally been providing to low-income and depressed communities under their community and economic development grant programs, not new or reprogrammed funds for brownfields; (5) HUD, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Economic Development Administration were responsible for $409 million, or 99 percent of the assistance provided; (6) the three agencies used most of the funds to make grants and loan guarantees to communities; (7) the 10 federal agencies in GAO's review reported achieving better coordination and accomplishing their brownfield action items but do not have comprehensive data to determine the extent to which this will result in the expected economic benefits of jobs and private investment in brownfields; (8) the agencies reported that they increased their ongoing coordination as a result of the Partnership initiative, most noticeably through their showcase community projects; (9) the agencies also completed about 89 percent of their action items in the Partnership Agenda, such as revising policies that were barriers to brownfield redevelopment and providing communities more information about available assistance, predominantly as part of their ongoing programs; and (10) however, the extent to which the Partnership initiative is meeting the economic goals--creating new jobs, leveraging additional private investments in brownfields, and preserving greenfields--cannot be determined because most agencies are not tracking all of these outcomes or collecting data specific to brownfields that would allow them to do so. |
gao_GAO-05-53 | gao_GAO-05-53_0 | U.S. officials noted this continuation was an indicator that China was able to address the more easily resolvable problems during 2002 but that the remaining issues had proven to be more difficult for China to address. In addition to the problems that persisted from 2002, about a quarter of all compliance problems were new in 2003, with many of these problems arising from phased-in commitments that China was due to implement in 2003. United States Continues to Pursue Resolution of Compliance Problems in 2004 and Noted Several Positive Developments
Since USTR’s December 2003 report, the U.S. government has continued to pursue resolution of China’s WTO compliance problems. United States Increased Bilateral Engagement with China in 2003 on WTO Issues
U.S. government efforts to resolve WTO compliance issues with China in 2003 reflected an emphasis on high-level bilateral engagement. Key Agencies’ China Units Could Improve Their Performance Management Activities
Although the key agencies’ formal plans address trade monitoring and enforcement activities, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the agencies’ China-WTO compliance efforts based on their performance management reports. Moreover, the specific units within the agencies that are most directly involved with China compliance activities lacked specific strategies for ensuring that they supported their agency’s goals, and they did not measure their unit’s results. The key agencies have done much to enhance their capacity to carry out these efforts by coordinating on policy issues and increasing staff resources. Nevertheless, the TRM and the benefits it provides could be enhanced by increased member participation and more timely U.S. preparation, which would improve the chances for full and informed responses from Chinese officials and maximize the potential exchange of information. Specifically, in an environment of high and regular staff turnover, new staff are called upon to take up monitoring and enforcement activities that involve complex, long-term issues. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As part of a long-term body of work that the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance, as well as the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, requested, we examined how the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Departments of Commerce, State, and Agriculture (USDA) are positioned to monitor and enforce China’s compliance with its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. Specifically, in this report, we (1) examined the scope and disposition of China-WTO compliance problems that the U.S. government is working to resolve; (2) reviewed the U.S. government’s bilateral and multilateral approaches for resolving compliance problems; (3) assessed the agencies’ strategies, plans, and measures for ensuring China’s compliance; and (4) assessed how the U.S. government has adapted its staff resources to monitor and resolve China compliance problems. Our evaluation of agency planning efforts was informed by our previous studies on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). Summary of WTO Member Participation in China’s Transitional Review Mechanism, 2002 and 2003
China’s commitments to the WTO provide for an annual review, referred to as the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM), of China’s implementation to take place within the WTO’s General Council and 16 subsidiary bodies. Previous GAO reports have discussed human capital management challenges at State more thoroughly. | Why GAO Did This Study
China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) required China to reform its economy and trade practices. As part of ongoing work, GAO reviewed how the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and State pursued China's WTO compliance in 2003. Specifically, this report (1) discusses the scope and disposition of China's compliance problems, (2) reviews the U.S. government's bilateral and multilateral approaches for resolving these problems, (3) assesses the key agencies' strategies and plans for ensuring compliance, and (4) assesses how the agencies have adapted their staff resources to conduct compliance activities.
What GAO Found
China has successfully implemented many of its numerous WTO commitments, but USTR reported that over 100 separate compliance problems arose in 2002 and 2003. These problems ranged from specific, relatively simple issues to broader, more systemic concerns. Most problems continued from 2002 to 2003, an indication that China was able to address the more easily resolvable problems, while the more complex issues persisted. Furthermore, new problems emerged, with many arising from phased-in commitments that China was due to implement in 2003. The U.S. government continued to pursue resolution of compliance problems in 2004, and the agencies noted the successful resolution of several major issues of economic importance to U.S. companies. The key U.S. agencies have done much to ensure China's compliance, but GAO found three areas in which these key agencies could take steps to improve their efforts: First, U.S. efforts to address compliance problems emphasized high-level bilateral engagement with China in 2003, with increased senior-level delegations to China and elevated participation in formal consultative mechanisms. U.S. multilateral engagement with China in 2003 reflected more emphasis on working through regular WTO committee business, because the WTO's annual review of China's implementation, the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM), has ongoing limitations. Nevertheless, the TRM has benefits and these could be enhanced by increased member participation and earlier U.S. submissions, which would maximize the potential for full and informed responses from China. Second, although interagency and intra-agency coordination on policy and high level compliance strategies was generally effective, GAO found various performance management limitations that make it difficult to clearly measure and assess the outcome of the key agencies' China-WTO compliance efforts. GAO found that the specific units within the agencies that are most directly involved with these efforts could improve how the agencies measure and report the results of their activities. Furthermore, developing clearer linkages between unit-level results and agency goals that are established in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 could enhance the effectiveness of these units' activities. Third, turnover and lack of training limited the effectiveness of increased staff resources for China-WTO compliance activities. New staff members were called upon to take up complex monitoring and enforcement activities while relying primarily on on-the-job training, which was complicated by high and often predictable staff turnover. Attention to human capital management is particularly important, given the long-term challenges associated with ensuring China's compliance. |
gao_GAO-06-1113T | gao_GAO-06-1113T_0 | A complete evaluation of the tax treatment of businesses, which is a critical element of our overall federal tax system, cannot be made without considering how business taxation interacts with and complements the other elements of the overall system, such as the tax treatment of individuals and excise taxes on selected goods and services. Business tax revenues of the magnitude discussed make them very relevant to considerations about how to address the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance. We will need to make tough choices using a multipronged approach: (1) revise budget processes and financial reporting requirements; (2) restructure entitlement programs; (3) reexamine the base of discretionary spending and other spending; and (4) review and revise tax policy, including tax expenditures, and tax enforcement programs. Business tax policy, business tax expenditures, and business tax enforcement need to be part of the overall tax review because of the amount of revenue at stake. Efficiency, Complexity, Compliance, and Equity Concerns Contribute to Calls for Business Tax Reform
The design of the current system of business taxation causes economic inefficiency and is complex. There are some features of current business taxation that have attracted criticism by economists and other tax experts because of efficiency costs. The goal of those who push for this type of competitiveness is to improve the U.S. balance of trade. Business Tax Complexity Also Makes IRS’s Job of Enforcing Tax Rules Very Challenging and Can Reduce Public Confidence in the Fairness of the System
Although the precise amount of business tax avoidance is unknown, IRS’s latest estimates of tax compliance show a tax gap of at least $141 billion for tax year 2001 between the business taxes that individual and corporate taxpayers paid and what they should have paid under the law. The tax reform debate of the last several years has focused attention on several important choices, including the extent to which our system should be closer to the extreme of a pure income tax or the other extreme of a pure consumption tax, the extent to which sales by U.S. businesses outside of this country should be taxed, the extent to which taxes should be collected from businesses or individuals, and the extent to which taxpayers are compensated for losses or costs they incur during the transition to any new tax system. The proposed system should raise sufficient revenue over time to fund our expected expenditures. The tax base should be as broad as possible. One, discussed in this statement, is through neutral taxation of investment alternatives. Higher saving and investment from a more balanced fiscal policy would contribute to increased productivity and a higher standard of living for Americans over the long term. Finally, the consideration of transition rules needs to be an integral part of the design of a new system. This, in turn, leads to widely divergent views on even the basic direction of reform. However, I have described some basic principles that ought to guide business tax reform. While economic growth alone will not solve our long-term fiscal problems, an improvement in our overall economic performance makes dealing with those problems easier. Brumbaugh, David L. Federal Business Taxation: The Current System, Its Effects, and Options for Reform. | Why GAO Did This Study
Business income taxes, both corporate and noncorporate, are a significant portion of federal tax revenue. Businesses also play a crucial role in collecting taxes from individuals, through withholding and information reporting. However, the design of the current system of business taxation is widely seen as flawed. It distorts investment decisions, hurting the performance of the economy. Its complexity imposes planning and record keeping costs, facilitates tax shelters, and provides potential cover for those who want to cheat. Not surprisingly, business tax reform is part of the debate about overall tax reform. The debate is occurring at a time when long-range projections show that, without a policy change, the gap between spending and revenues will widen. This testimony reviews the nation's long term fiscal imbalance and what is wrong with the current system of business taxation and provides some principles that ought to guide the debate about business tax reform. This statement is based on previously published GAO work and reviews of relevant literature.
What GAO Found
The size of business tax revenues makes them very relevant to any plan for addressing the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance. Reexamining both federal spending and revenues, including business tax policy and compliance must be part of a multipronged approach to address the imbalance. Some features of current business taxes channel investments into tax-favored activities and away from more productive activities and, thereby, reduce the economic well-being of all Americans. Complexity in business tax laws imposes costs of its own, facilitates tax shelters, and provides potential cover for those who want to cheat. IRS's latest estimates show a business tax gap of at least $141 billion for 2001. This in turn undermines confidence in the fairness of our tax system--citizens' confidence that their friends, neighbors, and business competitors pay their fair share of taxes. Principles that should guide the business tax reform debate include: (1) The proposed system should raise sufficient revenue over time to fund our current and future expected expenditures. (2) The tax base should be as broad as possible, which helps to minimize overall tax rates. (3) The proposed system should improve compliance rates by reducing tax preferences and complexity and increasing transparency. (4) To the extent other goals, such as equity and simplicity, allow, the tax system should aim for neutrality by not favoring some business activities over others. More neutral tax policy has the potential to enhance economic growth, increase productivity and improve the competitiveness of the U.S. economy in terms of standard of living. (5) The consideration of transition rules must be an integral part of any reform proposal. |
gao_T-GGD-98-17 | gao_T-GGD-98-17_0 | On the basis of our review, we found that CFTC’s plan contained all of the components required by the Results Act but that some of the components could be strengthened. We also found that the plan could be improved by additional stakeholder input, including interagency coordination. Finally, due to the complex set of factors that determine regulatory outcomes, measuring program impacts presents challenges to CFTC in addressing the requirements of the Results Act, as it does for regulatory agencies in general. As indicated in the Results Act and OMB guidance, each plan is to include six major components: (1) a comprehensive statement of the agency’s mission, (2) the agency’s long-term goals and objectives for all major functions and operations, (3) a description of the approaches (or strategies) for achieving the goals and the various resources needed, (4) an identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control, that could significantly affect its achievement of the strategic goals, (5) a description of the relationship between the long-term strategic goals and annual performance goals, and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals and a schedule for future evaluations. However, we identified several areas in which CFTC could improve the plan as it is revised and updated. Although the general goals and outcome objectives support the agency’s mission, most could benefit by being restated in a way that facilitates future assessment of whether they have been achieved. Similarly, the plan’s discussion of communicating accountability could be expanded to address how CFTC will assign accountability to managers and staff for achieving objectives. While CFTC’s strategic plan discusses performance measures, it does not include performance goals that could be used to indicate the planned progress made each year toward achieving the general goals and objectives. CFTC could strengthen its plan by describing how the external factors are linked with particular goals and how a particular goal could be affected by the external factors. It could also be made more informative by discussing the timing and scope of future program evaluations as well as the particular issues to be addressed. CFTC’s Strategic Plan Reflects Limited Consultation
In developing their strategic plans, agencies are to consult with Congress and solicit the views of stakeholders—those potentially affected by or interested in the plan. Although developing performance measures and evaluating program impact are difficult, it is important that CFTC and other regulatory agencies continue their effort toward that end. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) strategic plan for compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) CFTC's strategic plan contained all of the major components required by the Results Act; (2) there are several areas in which CFTC could improve its plan; (3) the plan defines goals and objectives that supported CFTC's mission, but most of these could benefit by being restated in a way that would facilitate future assessment; (4) the plan identifies activities for achieving CFTC's goals and objectives, but could be more informative by including the resources needed for the activities, schedules for completing key actions, and ways for assigning accountability to managers and staff; (5) the plan's discussion of the relationship between goals in the annual and strategic plans could be strengthened by including more results-oriented performance measures that could be used to reflect progress made toward achieving its goals; (6) the plan identifies some key external factors that could affect the agency's ability to achieve its goals, but the plan could be improved by describing how such factors are linked to particular goals and how a particular goal can be affected by a specific factor; (7) the plan indicates that CFTC will use its existing processes to evaluate its programs, but the plan could be expanded to include information on the timing and scope of future evaluations; (8) the draft plan was made available to stakeholders late in the process and reflects limited consultation with stakeholders during plan development; (9) the plan does not discuss how CFTC will incorporate stakeholders' views in the development of future plans, and (10) although developing performance measures and measuring program impacts present challenges to CFTC and to other regulatory agencies in addressing the requirements of the Results Act, it is important that CFTC and these agencies continue their efforts toward that end. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-147 | gao_T-AIMD-98-147_0 | The cash-based budget, however, often provides incomplete or misleading information about cost where cash flows to and from the government span many budget periods, and/or where the government obligates itself to make future payments or incur future losses well into the future. Accrual Concepts Could Improve the Budgetary Information and Incentives for Federal Insurance Programs
The use of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs has the potential to overcome a number of the deficiencies of cash-based budgeting—if the estimating problems I discuss below can be dealt with. Thus, the use of accrual concepts in the budget has the potential to overcome the time lag between the extension of an insurance commitment, collection of premiums, and payment of claims that currently distorts the government’s cost for these programs on an annual cash flow basis. As with the approach taken for credit programs, accrual-based reporting for insurance programs recognizes the cost of the government’s commitment when the decision is made to provide the insurance, regardless of when cash flows occur. For federal insurance programs, the key information is whether premiums over the long term will be sufficient to pay for covered losses and, if not, to identify the net cost to the government. Earlier recognition of the cost of the government’s insurance commitments under a risk-assumed accrual-based budgeting approach would (1) allow for more accurate cost comparisons with other programs, (2) provide an opportunity to control costs before the government is committed to making payments, (3) build budget reserves for future claims, and (4) better capture the timing and magnitude of the impact of the government’s actions on private economic behavior. Estimating the Cost of the Risk Assumed by the Government for Insurance Commitments Is a Significant Challenge
A crucial component in the effective implementation of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs is the ability to generate reasonable, unbiased estimates of the risk assumed by the federal government. Supplemental approach: Under this approach, accrual-based cost measures would be included as supplemental information in the budget documents. Budget authority approach: Under this approach, accrual-based cost measures—the full cost of the risk assumed by the government—would be included in budget authority for the insurance program account and in the aggregate budget totals. Outlay approach: Under this approach, accrual-based cost measures would be incorporated into both budget authority and net outlays for the insurance program account and in the budget totals. The complexity of the issues involved and the need to build agency capacity to generate such estimates suggest that it is not feasible to integrate accrual-based costs directly into the budget at this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) current budget reporting and accrual-based reporting; and (2) accrual budgeting and its specific application for insurance programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the cash-based budget often provides incomplete or misleading information about cost where cash flows to and from the government span many budget periods, or where the government obligates itself to make future payments or incurs losses well into the future; (2) the use of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs has the potential to overcome a number of the deficiencies of cash-based budgeting--if estimating problems can be dealt with; (3) the use of accrual concepts in the budget has the potential to overcome the time lag between the extension of an insurance commitment, collection of premiums, and payment of claims that currently distorts the government's cost for these programs on an annual cash flow basis; (4) accrual-based reporting for insurance programs recognizes the cost of the government's commitment when the decision is made to provide insurance, regardless of when cash flows occur; (5) for federal insurance programs, the key information is whether premiums over the long term will be sufficient to pay for covered losses; (6) earlier recognition of the cost of the government's insurance commitments under a risk-assumed accrual-based budgeting approach would: (a) allow for more accurate cost comparisons with other programs; (b) provide an opportunity to control costs before the government is committed to making payments; (c) build budget reserves for future claims; and (d) better capture the timing and magnitude of the impact of the government's actions on private economic behavior; (7) a crucial component in the effective implementation of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs is the ability to generate reasonable, unbiased estimates of the risk assumed by the federal government; (8) GAO reviewed three different approaches to incorporating risk-assumed estimates into the budget: (a) under the supplemental approach, accrual-based cost measures would be included as supplemental information in the budget documents; (b) under the budget authority approach, accrual-based cost measures would be included in budget authority for the insurance program account and in the aggregate budget totals; and (c) under the outlay approach, accrual-based cost measures would be incorporated into both budget authority and net outlays for the insurance program account and in the budget totals; and (9) the complexity of the issues involved and the need to build agency capacity to generate such estimates suggest that it is not feasible to integrate accrual-based costs directly into the budget at this time. |
gao_NSIAD-95-1 | gao_NSIAD-95-1_0 | Essentiality Is Not Validated
Significant numbers of nonessential parts and supplies continue to be stocked as insurance items because ASO and DISC do not have the internal controls to periodically review insurance items to identify those that are unneeded because they do not meet essentiality criteria. DOD downsizing and weapon system obsolescence and retirement also contributed to the stock buildup. First, contrary to DOD regulations, ASO has established retention levels for many insurance items that exceed the allowed stockage quantity of one unit. While it is difficult to precisely determine the costs to manage and maintain nonessential and excessive insurance stocks, our review and DOD’s comments indicate that these costs would be millions of dollars a year. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to (1) periodically review insurance items to ensure that they are mission essential and stocked in allowable quantities and (2) dispose of existing nonessential and excess insurance stock. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's and the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) management of their spare parts and supplies inventories, focusing on whether their insurance stocks are limited to: (1) mission-essential parts; and (2) one replacement unit as required by Department of Defense (DOD) regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Navy and DLA stock millions of dollars of unnecessary insurance items that are not mission-essential; (2) the Navy and DLA frequently exceed their authorized maximum stock levels, contrary to DOD regulations; (3) the Navy and DLA do not periodically review insurance items to ensure that they are mission-essential and stocked in appropriate quantities because they lack the internal controls necessary to prevent excessive stock buildup; (4) DOD downsizing, weapon system obsolescence and retirement, and stock retention policies have also contributed to excessive inventories; and (5) the excessive inventories cost DOD millions of dollars to procure, manage, and maintain. |
gao_RCED-95-163 | gao_RCED-95-163_0 | However, the agency did not have an automated system for monitoring data on such incidents until 1992, when it developed the Incident Data System to organize and track data originating from both pesticide registrants and the voluntary sources. FIFRA does not require states or sources other than registrants to collect or submit data on exposures. In this case, EPA issued a data call-in noticerequiring the pesticides’ registrants to submit data from the American Association of Poison Control Centers. EPA Has Taken Initiatives to Improve Collection of Data on Incidents
EPA has recognized that its approach to data collection needs improvement, and in September 1994, its Office of Pesticide Programs established a work group to focus on potential improvements. This work group was established to develop a long-term plan for collecting, storing, manipulating, and using data on incidents. EPA has also proposed a new rule, which it calls the 6(a)(2) rule, aimed at improving the quality of the data on incidents the agency receives from pesticide registrants and making the processing of this information easier for the registrants and the agency. Furthermore, EPA staff have been working with four companies that submit large numbers of reports on incidents of exposure to determine the feasibility of electronic submission of reports. Conclusions
While EPA has a system for collecting, reviewing, and acting on incidents of exposure to pesticides and has taken action on some data on incidents, the system does not currently ensure that EPA always has sufficient information to determine whether action to protect public health is necessary. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether EPA collects data on incidents of exposure to pesticides and takes action based on these data, and whether such data are sufficient to allow the agency to determine if unacceptable risks to public health are occurring. Table I.1 lists examples of EPA’s use of such data to take actions between 1989 and 1994. Through an increase in the number of incidents reported by the National Pesticide Telecommunications Network,EPA identified a public perception of risk from lawn care pesticides. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) monitoring of human exposures to pesticides, focusing on whether EPA: (1) collects data on exposure arising from the use on nonagricultural pesticides; (2) takes action in response to potential health risks from such exposure; and (3) receives sufficient information to assess whether unacceptable risks are occurring.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EPA has collected pesticide exposure data from pesticide registrants and public and private entities since the 1970s and, in 1992, it implemented a computerized system to organize and track such data; (2) EPA has not assigned full-time staff to data collection and processing; therefore, the system has a data entry backlog, which limits its effectiveness; (3) EPA acted in 19 instances between 1989 and 1994 to protect the public from pesticide risks; (4) EPA often cannot assess whether a pesticide poses an unacceptable health risk, since incident reports frequently lack key data, may not be representative, or are not submitted; (5) an EPA work group is developing a long-term plan to collect and manage exposure data, but it has yet to develop a plan for putting the most cost-effective improvements into effect; (6) to improve the number and quality of exposure reports, EPA has proposed a rule that requires pesticide registrants to submit more detailed data on exposure incidents and clarifies the registrants' responsibilities; (7) EPA is determining the feasibility of having registrants who submit large numbers of reports to submit them electronically; and (8) the current exposure monitoring system includes data on both agricultural and nonagricultural pesticides, since EPA collects and processes the same information for those chemicals. |
gao_GAO-12-903 | gao_GAO-12-903_0 | Companies Collect, Use, and Share Location Data That Provide Consumer Benefits, but Also Pose Privacy Risks
Collecting, using, and sharing location data provides benefits for both mobile industry companies and for consumers. Furthermore, as stated previously, the sharing of location data facilitates a faster response from emergency services through E911 and allows companies to identify network service problems. Users generally do not know when law enforcement agencies access their location data. Private Sector Entities Have Not Consistently Implemented Recommended Practices to Protect Consumers’ Location Privacy
Mobile industry associations and privacy advocacy organizations have recommended practices for industry to better protect consumers’ privacy while making use of customers’ personal information. Companies we examined have developed privacy policies to disclose information to consumers about the collection of location data and other personal information, but have not consistently or clearly disclosed to consumers what the companies are doing with these data or which third parties they may share them with. However, some policies were not clear about how the companies used location data. Companies’ policies on whether location data were considered personal information varied. Most policies we examined stated the types of third-party companies location data may be shared with, such as application developers and advertisers; however, some policies described third parties with vague terms such as “trusted businesses” or “others.” Although some policies stated that the company takes steps to protect this information, such as requiring the third party to follow the company’s privacy policy, others made no such statement, and one company’s policy said it would not be liable if the third party it shares data with fails to protect it. For example, although privacy policies generally discussed that users’ data could be shared with third parties, they sometimes included vague statements like “trusted business partners” rather than specifying the types of companies they shared the data with and the reasons for doing so. Agencies Have Taken Actions to Promote Awareness of Privacy Issues
Several federal agencies that interact with the mobile industry or have responsibilities for consumer privacy protection have provided educational outreach to the public, developed reports with recommendations aimed at protecting consumer privacy, developed regulatory standards that address mobile-location data privacy, and developed guidance for law enforcement on obtaining mobile location data. Specific topics discussed included how location-based services work; what parents should know about location tracking when their children trends, benefits, and risks of location-based services; industry recommended practices; and use mobile devices. The report also included recommendations to companies that make use of precise mobile location data, including that they should obtain affirmative express consent from consumers before collecting precise location data; limit collection to data needed for a requested service or transaction; establish standards that address data collection, transfer, use, and disposal, particularly for location data; and, to the extent that location data are collected and shared with third parties, work to provide consumers with more prominent notice and choices about such practices. Commission last solicited public input on this question 5 years ago and technologies and business practices in this area have changed, the Commission sought comments on a variety of issues including: the applicability and significance of telecommunications carriers’ duty under section 222(a) of the Communications Act to protect customer information stored on their users’ mobile communications devices; whether the definition of CPNI could apply to information collected at a carrier’s direction even before it has been transmitted to the carrier; what factors are relevant to assessing a wireless provider’s obligations under section 222 of the Communications Act, as amended, and the Commission’s implementing rules, or other provisions of law within the Commission’s jurisdiction, and in what ways; what privacy and security obligations should apply to customer information that service providers cause to be collected by and stored on mobile communications devices; and what should be the obligations when service providers use a third party to collect, store, host, or analyze such data. Lacking defined performance goals, milestones, and deliverables, it is unclear whether NTIA’s multistakeholder process will establish an effective means for addressing mobile location data privacy issues. Such guidance could also clarify for companies circumstances under which FTC might take enforcement action against unfair acts. A key federal effort to address these privacy risks is NTIA’s planned multistakeholder process, which seeks to develop industry codes of conduct. However, NTIA has not defined the effort’s performance goals, milestones, or deliverables. However, FTC has not issued comprehensive industry guidance establishing its views on the appropriate actions that mobile companies should take to protect consumers’ mobile location data privacy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address privacy risks associated with the use and sharing of mobile location data, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct NTIA, in consultation with stakeholders in the multistakeholder process, to develop specific goals, time frames, and performance measures for the multistakeholder process to create industry codes of conduct. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how mobile industry companies collect location data, why they use and share these data, and how this affects consumers; (2) the types of actions private sector entities have taken to protect consumers’ privacy and ensure security of location data; and (3) the actions federal agencies have taken to protect consumer privacy and what additional federal efforts, if any, are needed. We also interviewed officials from federal agencies that interact with the mobile industry or have responsibilities for consumer privacy protection, including the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Department of Justice (Justice), to obtain their views. | Why GAO Did This Study
Smartphones can provide services based on consumers' location, raising potential privacy risks if companies use or share location data without consumers' knowledge. FTC enforces prohibitions against unfair and deceptive practices, and NTIA sets national telecommunications policy. GAO was asked to examine this issue. GAO reviewed (1) how mobile industry companies collect location data, why they share these data, and how this affects consumers; (2) actions private sector entities have taken to protect consumers' privacy and ensure security of location data; and (3) actions federal agencies have taken to protect consumer privacy and what additional federal efforts, if any, are needed. GAO analyzed policies and interviewed representatives of mobile industry companies, reviewed documents and interviewed officials from federal agencies, and interviewed representatives from industry associations and privacy advocates.
What GAO Found
Using several methods of varying precision, mobile industry companies collect location data and use or share that data to provide users with location-based services, offer improved services, and increase revenue through targeted advertising. Location-based services provide consumers access to applications such as real-time navigation aids, access to free or reduced-cost mobile applications, and faster response from emergency services, among other potential benefits. However, the collection and sharing of location data also pose privacy risks. Specifically, privacy advocates said that consumers: (1) are generally unaware of how their location data are shared with and used by third parties; (2) could be subject to increased surveillance when location data are shared with law enforcement; and (3) could be at higher risk of identity theft or threats to personal safety when companies retain location data for long periods or share data with third parties that do not adequately protect them.
Industry associations and privacy advocates have developed recommended practices for companies to protect consumers' privacy while using mobile location data, but companies have not consistently implemented such practices. Recommended practices include clearly disclosing to consumers that a company is collecting location data and how it will use them, as well as identifying third parties that companies share location data with and the reasons for doing so. Companies GAO examined disclosed in their privacy policies that the companies were collecting consumers' location data, but did not clearly state how the companies were using these data or what third parties they may share them with. For example, some companies' policies stated they collected location data and listed uses for personal information, but did not state clearly whether companies considered location to be personal information. Furthermore, although policies stated that companies shared location data with third parties, they were sometimes vague about which types of companies these were and why they were sharing the data. Lacking clear information, consumers faced with making a decision about whether to allow companies to collect, use, and share data on their location would be unable to effectively judge whether the uses of their location data might violate their privacy.
Federal agencies have held educational outreach events, developed reports with recommendations aimed at protecting consumer privacy, and developed some guidance on certain aspects of mobile privacy. The Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is implementing an administration-proposed effort to bring industry, advocacy, and government stakeholders together to develop codes of conduct for industry to address Internet consumer privacy issues generally. However, NTIA has not set specific goals, milestones, and performance measures for this effort. Consequently, it is unclear if or when the process would address mobile location privacy. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could enforce adherence to the codes if companies adopted them, but since adoption is voluntary, there is no guarantee companies would adopt the resulting codes. While FTC has issued some guidance to address mobile location privacy issues, it has not issued comprehensive guidance that could inform companies of the Commission's views on the appropriate actions companies should take to protect consumers' mobile location data privacy.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NTIA work with stakeholders to outline specific goals, milestones, and performance measures for its process to develop industry codes of conduct and that FTC consider issuing guidance on mobile companies' appropriate actions to protect location data privacy. Because the agencies had concerns about certain aspects of GAOs draft recommendations, GAO revised them by including that NTIA should work with stakeholders in the process to develop industry codes and removing from the draft FTC recommendation that the guidance should include how FTC will enforce the prohibition against unfair practices. |
gao_GAO-17-208 | gao_GAO-17-208_0 | Performance Partnership Initiatives Exhibit Four Key Characteristics Somewhat Differently
We identified 4 key characteristics that PPGs and the disconnected youth pilots share: 1. documented agreement outlining goals, roles, and responsibilities; 2. flexibility in the use of funds across multiple federal programs; 3. additional flexibilities, such as expanded program participant eligibility or streamlined reporting requirements; and 4. accountability for results. EPA and state agencies define the scope of their partnership in a PPG work plan. A state agency can submit a single application covering all of the grants it is seeking to consolidate in its PPG rather than a separate application for each. Disconnected Youth Pilots Use Flexibilities to Tailor Services to Target Populations
Similar to PPGs, the disconnected youth pilots enable non-federal partners to combine funds from federal agencies’ programs and obtain additional flexibilities, but we found that for the disconnected youth pilots we reviewed, these flexibilities were generally used to tailor service interventions to the specific needs of their target populations rather than to reduce administrative burden. Second, an agency also can waive program requirements associated with funds being used in a pilot, but only after its agency head issues a written determination that the granting of such waivers (1) are consistent with the statutory purposes of the underlying federal program and other provisions of the pilot authority, including that individuals will not be denied or restricted eligibility for services, (2) are necessary to achieve the outcomes of the pilot and no broader in scope than is necessary to do so, and (3) will result in either realizing efficiencies (by simplifying reporting or reducing administrative barriers) or increasing the ability of individuals to obtain access to services. Non-federal partners periodically report to federal partners on their progress towards the goals established in the partnership document. In Designing, Implementing, and Evaluating the Disconnected Youth Pilots, Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps Intended to Ensure Success, but Have Opportunities for Improvement
Federal Agencies Generally Took Actions Consistent with Leading Practices for Interagency Collaboration
The federal agencies involved in the disconnected youth pilots have taken a number of actions consistent with leading practices for interagency collaboration identified in our prior reports. For example, the non-federal partners in both the Oklahoma and Seattle pilots plan to use AmeriCorps funding. Although the federal agencies have identified a variety of data to collect through performance reporting and the national and pilot-level program evaluations, they did not identify criteria or standards for assessing scalability of the flexibilities being tested by the pilots as part of the pilot or evaluation design processes. However, agencies—including OMB, which has responsibility for coordinating agencies’ overall efforts to implement the disconnected youth pilots—have not fully identified the key financial and staff resources each agency will need to contribute over the lifetime of the initiative. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the pilot programs for disconnected youth can be effectively implemented over the lifetime of the initiative, the Director of OMB should coordinate with relevant federal agencies to identify and estimate expected annual financial and staff resource contributions from each agency, including during the implementation and evaluation phases of the pilots. To ensure that federal agencies involved in the disconnected youth pilots are able to evaluate pilot outcomes and ultimately communicate to Congress whether and to what extent the flexibilities tested by the pilots should be integrated into broader efforts, the Director of OMB should coordinate with relevant federal agencies to identify criteria or standards for assessing scalability, and collect data needed to address those criteria or standards. OMB staff also provided oral comments in which they asked us to clarify that (1) OMB’s role is to coordinate agencies’ overall efforts to implement the disconnected youth pilots, (2) the resource issues identified in our report involve agencies better identifying and planning for their individual contributions to the pilot initiative, and (3) our discussion of scalability is focused on the flexibilities being tested by the pilots. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) put into place a framework intended to increase the use of performance information and other evidence in federal decision making. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), because performance partnerships require federal agencies and their grant recipients to manage toward agreed upon outcomes, they can help the 2 sides to collect information and evidence about what works and therefore how to employ federal resources more efficiently. This report identifies the key characteristics of those 2 existing performance partnership initiatives. It also provides a more in-depth review of the design, implementation, and evaluation of 1 of the 2—the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth. To identify key characteristics of performance partnership initiatives and how these key characteristics are exhibited, we collected, reviewed, and analyzed documents about the overall performance partnership initiatives, such as authorizing legislation, regulations, and notices inviting applications, as well as from selected individual performance partnerships within them, including applications, performance partnership agreements, and grant work plans. Appendix II: Additional Information on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Performance Partnership Grants
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) performance partnership grants (PPG) permit state agencies to request that funding they receive from 2 or more EPA program grants be combined into a single award. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 established a framework intended to increase federal agencies' use of performance information and evidence in decision making. In performance partnerships, agencies and grant recipients manage toward outcomes, which can help measure program performance and collect evidence about what works to achieve desired outcomes. OMB has encouraged the use of such partnerships by agencies that make federal grants.
GAO is required by the act to report on how its implementation is affecting federal agency performance management. This report identifies the key characteristics of 2 existing performance partnerships. It also provides an in-depth review of the design, implementation, and evaluation of 1 of the 2 initiatives—the disconnected youth pilots.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and documents and selected 8 illustrative examples from the 2 partnership initiatives (4 each), based on various criteria, such as the type and number of grants included and location. GAO also interviewed federal and non-federal officials involved in these partnerships.
What GAO Found
Congress has authorized 2 federal performance partnership initiatives. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Performance Partnership Grants (PPG) has been in place for 20 years and allows state agencies to consolidate funds from up to 19 environmental program grants into a single PPG. The other, Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth (disconnected youth pilots), is a more recent initiative authorized in 2014 that allows funding from multiple programs across multiple agencies to be combined into pilot programs serving disconnected youth. GAO identified 4 key characteristics shared by the 2 federal performance partnership initiatives. Specifically:
1. Documented agreement . Federal and non-federal partners identify goals, roles, and responsibilities. EPA and state agencies accomplish this through a PPG work plan. For each disconnected youth pilot, multiple federal agencies and non-federal partners, such as local government agencies and community-based organizations, use a performance partnership agreement.
2. Flexibility in using funding. PPGs combine funding from 2 or more EPA program grants. The disconnected youth pilots can combine funding from multiple programs across the agencies involved in the initiative.
3. Additional flexibilities. PPGs reduce administrative burden for state agencies, for example, by requiring only a single application for all grants in them. Disconnected youth pilots also provide non-federal partners flexibility to serve disconnected youth, including the ability to better tailor service interventions to their target populations.
4. Accountability for results . In both initiatives, non-federal partners report to federal partners on progress towards mutually-established goals. Partners in the disconnected youth pilots are also assessing results through national and pilot-specific program evaluations.
GAO's in-depth review of the disconnected youth pilots found that agencies had taken actions consistent with leading practices for collaboration and pilot design, such as establishing a leadership model for collaboration. Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for coordinating agencies' overall efforts to implement the pilots, GAO identified additional actions that OMB should take in coordination with the agencies to help ensure future success.
Resources. Agencies have not fully identified the funding and staff resources each will need to contribute to sustain their efforts over the lifetime of the pilots. This is because agencies primarily have been focused on meeting near-term needs to support design and implementation. By fully identifying specific future financial and staff resource needs, agencies can better plan for their individual contributions to ensure they are sufficient to support the pilots.
Scalability. Agencies have not developed criteria to inform determinations about whether, how, and when to implement the flexibilities tested by the pilots in a broader context (this is known as scalability). Although the agencies identified a variety of data to collect, they have not identified criteria for assessing scalability. Officials involved in the pilots told GAO it was too early in pilot implementation to determine such criteria. By not identifying these criteria during the design of the pilots, they risk not collecting needed data during their implementation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB coordinate with federal agencies implementing the disconnected youth pilots to identify (1) agency resource contributions needed for the lifetime of the pilots and (2) criteria and related data for assessing scalability. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-722 | gao_GAO-13-722_0 | FHA and Private Insurers Follow Distinct Reserving Practices and Capital Requirements
Reserving practices and capital requirements for FHA’s Fund differ in key respects from those for PMIs. These differences stem from the distinct environments in which FHA and PMIs operate, including the particular accounting principles and statutory provisions that they must follow. For both FHA and PMIs, capital requirements are expressed as ratios that compare risk and capital, but these terms have different meanings in the PMI and FHA contexts. It is calculated by estimating the net present value of expected future cash flows for all outstanding loans (anticipated losses less anticipated future revenue). FHA has not met its capital requirement for the last 4 years (see fig. As shown in figure 4, PMIs also have struggled to meet their capital requirements in recent years, and regulators forced three large PMIs to cease writing new business for failing to meet these requirements. However, certain consequences PMIs face for not meeting capital requirements— remediation plans and additional reporting—could be applied to FHA to enhance agency accountability. For example, two of the liabilities that PMIs record under statutory accounting principles—unearned premium reserves and contingency reserves—are intended, in part, to protect policyholders by limiting payment of excessive dividends to stockholders, which reduce capital. Industry Practice of Separately Disclosing Reserve Components Could Increase Transparency of Risks Facing FHA’s Fund
Although specific PMI reserving practices have limited applicability to FHA, the concept of separately disclosing reserve components as PMIs do could be applied to the Fund. For example, the PMI loss reserve and unearned premium reserve focus on the timing of specific cash flows— the loss reserve on claims that are likely to be paid on delinquent loans in the near-term and the unearned premium reserve on premiums as they are earned over time. In contrast, FHA has a single reserve from a financial accounting perspective, the liability for loan guarantees, which combines estimates of future claims payments with estimates of future premiums and recoveries over a 30-year period into a single number. Disclosing the timing of specific cash flows would help illustrate the extent to which estimates of claims payments, premiums, and recoveries in the liability for loan guarantees are concentrated in the near term or longer term and therefore more or less certain. Disclosing this information could enhance congressional oversight of FHA’s financial condition and would be consistent with reporting practices of other federal programs and federal internal control guidance. In 2012, FHA provided Congress with a set of planned actions to address its capital shortfall, but had not done so in prior years. A capital restoration plan requirement triggered by noncompliance with the Fund’s statutory capital requirements could help ensure prompt action by FHA and focus Congress’s monitoring efforts should this situation arise in the future. This type of requirement is contained in legislative proposals currently before Congress and would be consistent with prior congressional actions for certain financial institutions and government entities. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To strengthen FHA accountability for complying with the Fund’s statutory capital requirement, Congress should consider requiring that FHA submit a capital restoration plan and regular updates on plan implementation whenever the capital ratio falls below 2 percent as calculated in the annual actuarial review of the Fund, or the Fund’s financial condition does not meet other congressionally-defined requirements. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide additional perspective on the Fund’s financial status, FHA should disclose estimates of the individual cash flows associated with the liability for loan guarantees (premiums, claims, and recoveries), including their value for each year of the 30-year estimation period. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) financial condition requirements for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (Fund) and compared them with those used by private mortgage insurers (PMI). Specifically, we discuss (1) how the reserving practices and capital requirements of FHA’s Fund compare with those for the PMI industry and (2) how, if at all, applicable PMI reserving practices and capital requirements could enhance oversight of FHA’s Fund. We reviewed generally accepted accounting principles for federal entities and federal statutes that apply to FHA’s Fund. We analyzed data from FHA on the volume and performance of the mortgages it has insured through the end of fiscal year 2012 to calculate a loss reserve for FHA in the manner of a PMI. | Why GAO Did This Study
FHA insures private lenders against losses from defaults on single-family mortgages that meet FHA criteria. FHA's insured portfolio was more than $1 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2012. The mortgage insurance market also includes PMIs regulated by the states. Since 2009, FHA's Fund (under which FHA insures almost all its single-family mortgages) has not met its statutory 2 percent capital requirement. GAO was asked to examine the financial condition requirements that apply to FHA and PMIs. This report examines (1) how reserving practices and capital requirements for FHA's Fund compare with those for PMIs, and (2) how applicable PMI practices and requirements could enhance Fund oversight.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed accounting standards, federal and state laws, regulations, and policies; analyzed FHA data; and interviewed federal officials and PMI industry officials and analysts.
What GAO Found
Reserving practices and capital requirements for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (Fund) of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) differ in key respects from those for private mortgage insurers (PMI). These differences stem from the distinct environments in which FHA and PMIs operate, including the particular accounting principles and statutory provisions that they must follow. For example, statutory accounting principles (developed to meet the needs of insurance regulators in assessing financial condition) require PMIs to establish several reserve components, including a reserve for estimated losses expected in the near term on loans that are delinquent (loss reserve). In contrast, generally accepted accounting principles for federal entities (developed to align financial statement reporting with federal budget requirements) require FHA to reserve for the present value of estimated losses for all outstanding loans net of anticipated revenues (liability for loan guarantees). For both FHA and PMIs, capital requirements are expressed as comparisons of risk to capital, but the calculations measure risk and capital differently. Like FHA, PMIs have struggled to meet their capital requirements in recent years.
The PMI regulatory framework has limited applicability to FHA's Fund, but it has certain features that could enhance Fund oversight. Some of the purposes and concepts underlying PMI reserving practices and capital requirements are not pertinent to FHA. For example, two of the PMI reserve components (the unearned premium reserve and the contingency reserve) are intended, in part, to prevent PMIs from reducing capital through payment of excessive dividends to stockholders. However, the concept of separately disclosing reserve components as PMIs do could be applied to the Fund. The PMI loss reserve and unearned premium reserve focus on the timing of specific cash flows--the loss reserve on near-term insurance claims for delinquent loans and the unearned premium reserve on insurance premiums as they are earned over time. In contrast, FHA's liability for loan guarantees combines 30-year estimates of future claims, premiums, and recoveries into a single number, as required, and does not disclose the timing of each type of cash flow. Disclosing the timing of specific cash flows would help illustrate the extent to which estimates of claims payments, premiums, and recoveries in the liability for loan guarantees are concentrated in the near term or longer term and therefore more or less certain. Such disclosure could enhance congressional oversight of FHA and would be consistent with reporting practices of other federal programs and federal internal control guidance for communicating externally about an agency's risks. Accountability features of the PMI regulatory framework also could be applied to FHA. Unlike FHA, PMIs must take certain actions for noncompliance with their capital requirements. These actions may include remediation plans to restore capital to required levels and additional reporting. In 2012, FHA provided Congress with a set of planned actions to address its capital shortfall, but had not done so in prior years. Producing a capital restoration plan when the capital ratio fell below the required level could help ensure prompt action by FHA. This type of requirement is contained in legislative proposals currently before Congress and would be consistent with requirements Congress has enacted for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and certain financial institutions.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring FHA to submit a capital restoration plan and regular updates on implementation whenever the Fund's capital ratio does not meet required levels. Also, FHA should disclose estimates of specific cash flows (premiums, claims, and recoveries) over time to provide additional perspective on the Fund's financial status. FHA generally agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-423 | gao_GAO-04-423_0 | Multiemployer plans are distinct from single- employer plans, which are established and maintained by only one employer and where the plans may or may not be collectively bargained. The Financial Stability of Multiemployer Plans Has Likely Weakened Recently, While Long- term Declines in the Number of Plans and Participants Continue
While multiemployer plan funding has exhibited considerable stability over the past 2 decades, available data suggest that many plans have recently experienced significant funding declines. Recently, however, it appears that a combination of stock market declines coupled with low interest rates and poor economic conditions have reduced the assets and increased the liabilities of many multiemployer plans. The number of insured multiemployer plans has dropped by a quarter since 1980 to fewer than 1,700 plans in 2003, the latest data available. By 2000, the majority of multiemployer plans reported assets exceeding 90 percent of total liabilities, with the average plan funded at 105 percent of liabilities. 2 and 3.) In addition, PBGC reported its own multiemployer insurance program deficit of $261 million for fiscal year 2003, the first deficit since 1981 and its largest ever. Multiemployer Plans Are Experiencing Long-term Declines in Plan Formation and Worker Participation
Over the past 2 decades, the multiemployer system has experienced a steady decline in the number of plans and in the number of active participants. PBGC Monitors Multiemployer Plans for Financial Problems, Provides Technical and Financial Assistance, and Guarantees a Minimum Level of Benefits
PBGC’s role regarding multiemployer plans includes monitoring plans for financial problems, providing technical and financial assistance to troubled plans, and guaranteeing a minimum level of benefits to participants in insolvent plans. For example, PBGC annually reviews the financial condition of multiemployer plans to identify those that may have potential financial problems in the near future. PBGC officials believe that the low frequency of PBGC financial assistance to multiemployer plans is likely due to specific features of the multiemployer insurance regulatory framework: (1) the employers sponsoring the plan share the risk for providing benefits to all participants in the plan and (2) benefit guarantees are set at a lower level for the multiemployer insurance program compared with the guarantees provided by the single-employer program. Plan administrators may contact PBGC’s customer service representatives at designated offices to obtain assistance on such matters as premiums, plan terminations, and general legal questions related to PBGC. Since 1980, the agency has provided loans to 33 plans totaling $167 million. Other things equal, there are fewer opportunities for potential PBGC assistance to multiemployer plans than to single-employer plans. A Number of Factors Challenge the Long- term Prospects of the Multiemployer Defined Benefit System
A number of factors pose challenges to the long-term prospects of the multiemployer pension plan system. These include the growing trend among employers to choose defined contribution plans over DB plans, including multiemployer plans, the continued growing life expectancy of American workers, resulting in participants spending more years in retirement, thus increasing benefit costs, and increases in employer-provided health insurance costs, which are increasing employers’ total compensation costs generally, making them less willing or able to increase elements of compensation, like wages or pensions. 7.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiemployer-defined benefit pension plans, which are created by collective bargaining agreements covering more than one employer and generally operated under the joint trusteeship of labor and management, provide coverage to over 9.7 million of the 44 million participants insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The recent termination of several large single-employer plans--plans sponsored by individual firms--has led to millions of dollars in benefit losses for thousands of workers and left PBGC, their public insurer, an $11.2 billion deficit as of September 30, 2003. The serious difficulties experienced by these single-employer plans have prompted questions about the health of multiemployer plans. This report provides the following information on multiemployer pension plans: (1) trends in funding and worker participation, (2) PBGC's role regarding the plans' financial solvency, and (3) potential challenges to the plans' long-term prospects.
What GAO Found
Following 2 decades of relative financial stability, multiemployer plans as a group appear to have suffered recent and significant funding losses, while long-term declines in participation and new plan formation continue unabated. At the close of the 1990s, the majority of multiemployer plans reported assets exceeding 90 percent of total liabilities. Recently, however, stock market declines, coupled with low interest rates and poor economic conditions, appear to have reduced assets and increased liabilities for many plans. PBGC reported an accumulated net deficit of $261 million for its multiemployer program in 2003, the first since 1981. Meanwhile, since 1980, the number of plans has declined from over 2,200 to fewer than 1,700 plans, and there has been a long-term decline in the total number of active workers. PBGC monitors those multiemployer plans, which may, in PBGC's view, present a risk of financial insolvency. PBGC also provides technical and financial assistance to troubled plans and guarantees a minimum level of benefits to participants in insolvent plans. PBGC annually reviews the financial condition of plans to determine its potential insurance liability. Although the agency does not trustee the administration of insolvent multiemployer plans as it does with single-employer plans, it does offer them technical assistance and loans. PBGC loans have been rare, with loans to only 33 plans, totaling $167 million since 1980. Several factors pose challenges to the long-term prospects of the multiemployer system. Some are inherent to the multiemployer regulatory framework, such as the greater perceived financial risk and reduced flexibility for employers compared to other plan designs, and suggest that fewer employers will find such plans attractive. Also, the long-term decline of collective bargaining results in fewer new participants to expand or create new plans. Other factors threaten all defined benefit plans, including multiemployer plans: the growing trend among employers to choose defined contribution plans; the increasing life expectancy of workers, which raises the cost of plans; and continuing increases in employer health insurance costs, which compete with pensions for employer funding. |
gao_NSIAD-96-203 | gao_NSIAD-96-203_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed DOD’s military family housing program in the United States to determine whether (1) DOD’s policy of relying primarily on private housing to meet military family housing requirements is cost-effective, (2) the military services are complying with this policy, and (3) DOD’s family housing policies result in equitable treatment for all military families. Relying on Private Housing Is Cost-Effective
Studies by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and DOD show that the cost to the government is significantly less when military families are paid a housing allowance and live in private housing. These studies and our analysis estimate that the cost difference to the government for each family that lives in private housing, instead of government housing, ranges from about $3,200 to $5,500 annually. First, military families pay a portion of their housing costs out of pocket when living in private-sector housing. DOD and the services have not maximized use of private housing for a variety of reasons, including a reliance on housing requirements analyses that often underestimate the private sector’s ability to meet family housing needs; a concern over quality of life, although there is little evidence that family quality of life is better served through use of government housing; a reluctance to designate a greater portion of existing government housing for use by junior personnel who are less able to afford private housing than senior personnel; and a housing allowance system that results in available private housing being unaffordable in some areas. Current initiatives to increase housing allowances and to encourage private investors to build housing for military families have the potential for reducing costs while meeting military family housing needs. Specifically, the program allows significant differences in the value of the housing benefit that is provided to members of the same paygrade depending on whether they live in private or government housing. Further, housing allowances also can offer service members a greater selection of housing options to fit their needs instead of limiting them to what is available in government housing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) military family housing program to determine whether the program: (1) is cost-effective; and (2) provides equal housing benefits to all military families.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD reliance on private-sector housing to meet military family housing needs is cost-effective; (2) the government's cost is significantly less when military families receive housing allowances to live in private housing; (3) the cost difference for each military family living in private housing ranges from $3,200 to $5,000 annually; (4) families living in private housing pay a portion of their housing costs and have a greater selection of housing options to meet their needs; (5) DOD is not maximizing its use of private housing due to its reliance on inaccurate housing requirements, concerns with military quality of life standards, reluctance to designate more government housing for use by junior personnel, and inaccurate categorization of affordable private housing; (6) the housing benefits afforded to service members within the same pay grade differ depending on whether the members live in government or private housing; (7) members living in private family housing have less disposable income than members in the same pay grade living in government family housing; (8) DOD has taken initiatives to increase housing allowances and encourage private family housing to reduce service members' reliance on government housing; and (9) DOD needs to take additional steps to ensure the maximum use of private housing and the equitable distribution of benefits among military families. |
gao_GAO-16-809 | gao_GAO-16-809_0 | Within that framework, states often use a variety of arrangements to deliver services to their Medicaid populations, including traditional FFS, PCCM and managed care. The state Medicaid agency is responsible for administering the program, and the structure of how Medicaid services are coordinated, administered, and delivered varies by state and arrangement. Over 40 Percent of Medicaid Beneficiaries, Including Many with Disabilities, Were in Fee-for-Service Arrangements in 2014
CMS data show 41 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide were in FFS arrangements in 2014, with wide variation among states; more recent 2015 Medicaid Survey data suggest that millions remain in these arrangements. 2014 Federal Data Show 41 Percent of Beneficiaries in Fee-for- Service, with Wide Variation among States; 2015 Medicaid Survey Data Suggest Millions Remain in These Arrangements
The most recent CMS data available show that 41 percent of about 71 million beneficiaries nationwide were served through FFS arrangements as of July 1, 2014. Among states, the percentage of beneficiaries in FFS arrangements varied widely, ranging from 0 to 100 percent (fig.1). In 22 states, the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries were served through FFS arrangements. However, the Medicaid Survey data also suggest that the proportion of beneficiaries in FFS arrangements is declining, as states continue to move populations from a FFS delivery model into managed care. According to Medicaid Survey data, of the 39 states with managed care as of July 1, 2015, 6 had enrolled no aged or disabled beneficiaries in managed care, and another 7 had enrolled fewer than one-third of these beneficiaries. Children with special health care needs and certain other populations also were more likely to be served through FFS arrangements, because states were less likely to require or permit these populations to enroll in managed care. A Few Federal Resources Exist to Help Fee-For-Service Beneficiaries Find Providers; Selected States’ Resources Vary
Although CMS and states consider the provision of resources to help beneficiaries locate a provider to be primarily a state role, CMS has provided a few resources to help beneficiaries. States Generally Have Resources to Help Beneficiaries Find a Provider, but Scope of Information and Availability of the Resources Varies
The 23 states we reviewed generally offered four common types of resources—searchable provider directories, nonsearchable provider lists, handbooks, and telephone helplines—to help beneficiaries in FFS arrangements find a provider, with variation across states in the scope of information they provided and how they addressed the needs of specific Medicaid populations through their resources. 2). All of the 23 selected states had a publicly available beneficiary handbook or brochure containing information about the Medicaid program and operated a statewide telephone helpline that allows beneficiaries to contact a Medicaid representative by telephone— either at the state Medicaid office or through a contractor—who can answer questions and provide information on a variety of topics. The scope of information offered and the functionality of these common resources varied:
Searchable provider directories: Seventeen of the 23 selected states had online, searchable provider directories, and 16 of these included provider information on specialty care physicians. Four of the 23 selected states’ searchable directories indicated whether providers (primary or specialty care) were accepting new patients. Beneficiary telephone helplines: All states operated a helpline and six operated outside of regular business hours. Medicaid officials we interviewed in four of the six states and representatives from advocacy groups in three of the six states noted that helplines are the primary resource beneficiaries use to report issues finding a provider. When beneficiaries contact helplines, they can be directed to additional resources—beyond those listed in the above sections—to address their complaint. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is the federal and state health care program for low-income and medically needy individuals including certain children, adults, and aged and disabled individuals. As states transition more Medicaid enrollees and services to managed care, stakeholders have raised questions about populations that remain in FFS arrangements and the resources they can use to find health care providers. GAO was asked to provide information about Medicaid beneficiaries in FFS arrangements.
This report examines (1) the proportion and characteristics of Medicaid beneficiaries served in FFS arrangements, and (2) the federal and state resources available to help Medicaid beneficiaries in FFS arrangements find participating providers and report related challenges. GAO analyzed 2014 CMS data, the most recent available, on the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries in different service delivery arrangements by state, and a 2015 survey of state Medicaid agencies by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. GAO catalogued online, publicly available information from the 23 states having at least 30 percent of their Medicaid population in FFS arrangements, and confirmed the information via email or interview. GAO interviewed Medicaid officials and advocates in 6 of the 23 states and CMS officials. These states were selected, in part, based on the diversity of delivery system arrangements and resources. GAO also reviewed federal and state resources.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), as of July 2014, over 40 percent of nearly 71 million Medicaid beneficiaries were in fee-for-service (FFS) arrangements—traditional FFS and primary care case management—in which participating providers are paid for each delivered service (e.g., an office visit, test, or procedure). The percentage of beneficiaries in FFS arrangements varied widely among states—22 states served between 50 and 100 percent of beneficiaries, almost 16 million people, in FFS arrangements. A recent survey of states suggests that millions remained in FFS arrangements as of July 1, 2015. The survey also suggests that the proportion of beneficiaries in FFS arrangements is declining as states move more populations into risk-based managed care. Aged and disabled beneficiaries and children with special health care needs were the most likely of different Medicaid populations to be served through FFS arrangements instead of managed care.
CMS, the federal agency that oversees Medicaid, and states consider the development of resources to help beneficiaries find a provider to be a state role. CMS supports a federal resource for pediatric dental care and has provided guidance to states related to resources. The 23 states GAO reviewed have 4 common types of resources to help beneficiaries: searchable provider directories; nonsearchable provider lists; beneficiary helplines; and beneficiary handbooks. These resources vary with respect to the scope of information, availability, and states' adaptations to address beneficiary needs. Of the 23 states, GAO found the following:
17 had online, searchable provider directories; 16 of these included provider information on specialty care physicians and 4 indicated whether primary or specialty care providers were accepting new patients.
23 operated a helpline; 6 operated these outside of regular business hours.
9 included a mapping or location feature with their directories or lists.
Helplines are the primary resource that beneficiaries use to report issues finding a provider, according to Medicaid officials in 4 of 6 selected states and half of the advocacy group representatives GAO interviewed. When beneficiaries contact helplines, they can be directed to additional resources—beyond those listed above—to address their complaint. |
gao_GAO-14-621 | gao_GAO-14-621_0 | We obtained perspectives on the potential impacts of We conducted interviews with representatives from 10 investment firms and six corporations to learn about (1) factors that influence their decisions to invest in or do business with bank holding companies of various sizes; (2) how they assess the risks of banks and the extent to which they rely on credit rating agencies’ assessments of these risks; (3) their views on the likelihood that the federal government would intervene to prevent the failure of a large bank holding company and factors that have influenced these views over time; and (4) how, if at all, expectations of government support have impacted their decisions to invest in or do business with banks of various sizes. To inform our econometric approach and understand the breadth of results and methodological approaches, we reviewed studies that estimated the funding cost difference between large and small financial institutions that could be associated with the perception that some institutions are too big to fail. We used these data to assemble a dataset with one observation for each bond in each quarter from the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2013. We developed a variety of econometric models that use alternative measures of bond liquidity, bank holding company credit risk, and the size or systemic importance of a bank holding company. We estimated the parameters for each of our models separately for each year from 2006 through 2013 to allow the relationship between bank holding company size and bond funding costs to vary over time. In addition, we assessed the impact of credit risk on our comparisons by making comparisons at credit risk levels higher and lower than the average for each year and also while holding the level of credit risk constant over time at the average level for 2008—the year when the financial crisis peaked and credit risk for bank holding companies was high. To summarize the overall relationship between bond funding costs and size reflected in each specification, we calculated bond funding costs for bank holding companies of different sizes and credit risk levels using our estimates of the parameters for each specification for each year. also took steps to prevent the failures of large financial institutions. Orderly Liquidation Authority. Other Reforms. Two of the three largest credit rating agencies cited FDIC’s resolution process as a key factor in their decisions to reduce or eliminate “uplift”—an increase in the credit rating—they had assigned to the credit ratings of eight of the largest bank holding companies due to their assumptions of government support for these firms. Enhanced regulatory standards. Remaining Market Expectations of Government Support Can Have Benefits for Large Firms
Remaining market assumptions about government support can give rise to advantages for the largest bank holding companies in three broad categories to the extent these assumptions affect decisions by investors, counterparties, and customers of these firms. Funding Costs
Market beliefs about government support could benefit a firm by lowering its funding costs. In the section addressing the second objective of this report, we analyze the existence and size of potential funding cost advantages for the largest bank holding companies using quantitative approaches that control for factors outside of government support that can influence funding cost differences. Higher capital and liquidity requirements for banks can increase their funding and other costs. Evidence Suggests Large Banks Had a Funding Cost Advantage over Small Ones during the Financial Crisis That May Have Declined or Reversed Since
Our analysis and the results of studies we reviewed provide evidence that the largest bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller bank holding companies during the 2007-2009 financial crisis but that differences may have declined or reversed in more recent years. Studies Generally Found the Largest Banks Had Lower Funding Costs during the Financial Crisis but Results Have Limitations
Studies we reviewed generally found that the largest financial institutions had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the 2007-2009 financial crisis but that the difference between the funding costs of the largest and smaller financial institutions has since declined. In some cases these findings could be interpreted as evidence of advantages driven by too- big-to-fail perceptions; however, these empirical analyses are imperfect and contain a number of limitations that could reduce their validity or applicability to U.S. bank holding companies. However, in hypothetical scenarios where levels of credit risk in every year from 2010 to 2013 are assumed to be as high as they were during the financial crisis, our analysis suggests that large bank holding companies might have had lower funding costs than smaller bank holding companies. Although our analysis improves on certain aspects of prior studies, important limitations remain and our results should be interpreted with caution. These models estimate the relationship between bank holding companies’ bond funding costs and their size, while also controlling for other drivers of bond funding costs, including credit risk and bond liquidity. Key features of our econometric approach include the following:
U.S. bank holding companies. To better understand the relationship between bank holding company funding costs and size in the context of the current economic and regulatory environment, we analyzed the period from 2006 through 2013, which includes the recent financial crisis as well as years before the crisis and following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Bond funding costs. We used bond yield spreads as our measure of bank holding company funding costs because they are a direct measure of what investors charge bank holding companies to borrow money and because they are sensitive to credit risk and hence expected government support. Extensive controls for bond liquidity, credit risk, and other key factors. To account for the many factors that could influence funding costs, we controlled for credit risk, bond liquidity, and other key factors in our models. Multiple model specifications. In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to using alternative measures of size, bond liquidity, and credit risk discussed above, we estimated multiple different model specifications. Link between size and credit risk. Altogether, we estimated 42 different models for each year from 2006 through 2013 and then used these models to compare bond yield spreads—our measure of bond funding costs—for bank holding companies of different sizes but with the same level of credit risk. Figure 1 shows our models’ comparisons of the difference between bond funding costs for bank holding companies with $1 trillion in assets and average credit risk and bond funding costs for similar bank holding companies with $10 billion in assets, for each model and for each year. Each circle and dash in figure 1 shows the comparison of bond funding costs for a different model. Circles show model-estimated differences that were statistically significant at the 10 percent level, while dashes represent differences that were not statistically significant at that level.dashes below zero correspond to models suggesting that bank holding companies with $1 trillion in assets have lower bond funding costs than bank holding companies with $10 billion in assets, and vice versa. In addition, our estimates of differences in bond funding costs for bank holding companies of different sizes may reflect factors other than investors’ beliefs about the likelihood of government support. Furthermore, as we have noted, many market participants we spoke with believe that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the perception of “too big to fail” and both they and Treasury officials indicated that additional steps were required to address “too big to fail.” As discussed in the final section of our report on page 56, changes over time in our estimates of the relationship between bond funding costs and size may reflect changes in one or more components of investors’ beliefs about government support—such as their views on the likelihood that a bank holding company will fail and the likelihood it will be rescued if it fails—but we cannot precisely identify the influence of each of these components with certainty. While we agree that bank holding companies with $50 billion in assets may be more similar to $1 trillion bank holding companies than bank holding companies with $10 billion in assets, we used a smaller size for small bank holding companies because bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets may be viewed by investors as “large” and systemically important, in part because $50 billion in assets is the size threshold for Dodd-Frank Act requirements related to enhanced regulatory standards. Methodology for Analysis of Funding Cost Differences between Large and Small Bank Holding Companies
To assess the extent to which the largest bank holding companies have received funding cost advantages as a result of perceptions that the government would not allow them to fail, we conducted an econometric analysis of the relationship between a bank holding company’s size or systemic importance and its funding costs. We used bond yield spreads—the difference between the rate of return on a bond and the rate of return on a Treasury bond of comparable maturity to measure a bank holding company’s cost of bond funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
“Too big to fail” is a market notion that the federal government would intervene to prevent the failure of a large, complex financial institution to avoid destabilizing the financial sector and the economy. Expectations of government rescues can distort investor incentives to properly price the risks of firms they view as too big to fail, potentially giving rise to funding and other advantages for these firms.
GAO was asked to review the benefits that the largest bank holding companies (those with more than $500 billion in assets) have received from perceived government support. This is the second of two GAO reports on government support for bank holding companies. The first study focused on actual government support during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and recent statutory and regulatory changes related to government support for these firms. This report examines how financial reforms have altered market expectations of government rescues and the existence or size of funding advantages the largest bank holding companies may have received due to perceived government support.
GAO reviewed relevant statutes and rules and interviewed regulators, rating agencies, investment firms, and corporate customers of banks. GAO also reviewed relevant studies and interviewed authors of these studies. Finally, GAO conducted quantitative analyses to assess potential “too-big-to-fail” funding cost advantages.
In its comments, the Department of the Treasury generally agreed with GAO's analysis. GAO incorporated technical comments from the financial regulators, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
While views varied among market participants with whom GAO spoke, many believed that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies. Recent reforms provide regulators with new authority to resolve a large failing bank holding company in an orderly process and require the largest bank holding companies to meet stricter capital and other standards, increasing costs and reducing risks for these firms. In response to reforms, two of three major rating agencies reduced or removed the assumed government support they incorporated into some large bank holding companies' overall credit ratings. Credit rating agencies and large investors cited the new Orderly Liquidation Authority as a key factor influencing their views. While several large investors viewed the resolution process as credible, others cited potential challenges, such as the risk that multiple failures of large firms could destabilize markets. Remaining market expectations of government support can benefit large bank holding companies if they affect investors' and customers' decisions.
GAO analyzed the relationship between a bank holding company's size and its funding costs, taking into account a broad set of other factors that can influence funding costs. To inform this analysis and to understand the breadth of methodological approaches and results, GAO reviewed selected studies that estimated funding cost differences between large and small financial institutions that could be associated with the perception that some institutions are too big to fail. Studies GAO reviewed generally found that the largest financial institutions had lower funding costs during the 2007-2009 financial crisis but that the difference between the funding costs of the largest and smaller institutions has since declined. However, these empirical analyses contain a number of limitations that could reduce their validity or applicability to U.S. bank holding companies. For example, some studies used credit ratings which provide only an indirect measure of funding costs.
GAO's analysis, which addresses some limitations of these studies, suggests that large bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the financial crisis but provides mixed evidence of such advantages in recent years. However, most models suggest that such advantages may have declined or reversed. GAO developed a series of statistical models that estimate the relationship between bank holding companies' bond funding costs and their size or systemic importance, controlling for other drivers of bond funding costs, such as bank holding company credit risk. Key features of GAO's approach include the following:
U.S. Bank Holding Companies: The models focused on U.S. bank holding companies to better understand the relationship between funding costs and size in the context of the U.S. economic and regulatory environment.
Bond Funding Costs: The models used bond yield spreads—the difference between the yield or rate of return on a bond and the yield on a Treasury bond of comparable maturity—to measure funding costs because they are a risk-sensitive measure of what investors charge bank holding companies to borrow.
Extensive Controls : The models controlled for credit risk, bond liquidity, and other variables to account for factors other than size that could affect funding costs.
Multiple Models : GAO used 42 models for each year from 2006 through 2013 to assess the impact of using alternative measures of credit risk, bond liquidity, and size and to allow the relationship between size and bond funding costs to vary over time with changes in the economic and regulatory environment.
Credit Risk Levels : GAO compared bond funding costs for bank holding companies of different sizes at the average level of credit risk for each year, at low and high levels of credit risk for each year, and at the average level of credit risk during the financial crisis.
The figure below shows the differences between model-estimated bond funding costs for bank holding companies with $1 trillion in assets and bank holding companies with $10 billion in assets, with average levels of credit risk in each year. Circles represent statistically significant model-estimated differences.
Estimates from 42 Models of Average Bond Funding Cost Differences between Bank Holding Companies with $1 Trillion and $10 Billion in Assets, 2006-2013
Notes: GAO estimated econometric models of the relationship between BHC size and funding costs using data for U.S. BHCs and their outstanding senior unsecured bonds for the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2013. The models used bond yield spreads to measure funding costs and controlled for credit risk factors such as capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, maturity mismatch, and volatility, as well as bond liquidity and other characteristics of bonds and BHCs that can affect funding costs. GAO estimated 42 models for each year from 2006 through 2013 to assess the sensitivity of estimated funding cost differences to using alternative measures of capital adequacy, volatility, bond liquidity, and size or systemic importance. GAO used the models to compare bond funding costs for BHCs of different sizes but the same levels of credit risk, bond liquidity, and other characteristics. This figure compares bond funding costs for BHCs with $1 trillion and $10 billion in assets, for each model and for each year, with average levels of credit risk. Each circle and dash shows the comparison for a different model, where circles and dashes below zero suggest BHCs with $1 trillion in assets have lower bond funding costs than BHCs with $10 billion in assets, and vice versa.
All 42 models found that larger bank holding companies had lower bond funding costs than smaller ones in 2008 and 2009, while more than half of the models found that larger bank holding companies had higher bond funding costs than smaller ones in 2011 through 2013, given the average level of credit risk each year (see figure). However, the models' comparisons of bond funding costs for bank holding companies of different sizes varied depending on the level of credit risk. For example, in hypothetical scenarios where levels of credit risk in every year from 2010 to 2013 are assumed to be as high as they were during the financial crisis, GAO's analysis suggests that large bank holding companies might have had lower funding costs than smaller ones in recent years. However, reforms in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, such as enhanced standards for capital and liquidity, could enhance the stability of the financial system and make such a credit risk scenario less likely.
This analysis builds on certain aspects of prior studies, but important limitations remain and these results should be interpreted with caution. GAO's estimates of differences in funding costs reflect a combination of several factors, including investors' beliefs about the likelihood a bank holding company will fail and the likelihood it will be rescued by the government if it fails, and cannot precisely identify the influence of each factor. In addition, these estimates may reflect factors other than investors' beliefs about the likelihood of government support and may also reflect differences in the characteristics of bank holding companies that do and do not issue bonds. Finally, GAO's estimates, like all past estimates, are not indicative of future trends. |
gao_GAO-11-435 | gao_GAO-11-435_0 | HHS Efforts to Enhance Domestic Production Capacity to Expand the Supply or Accelerate the Availability of Influenza Vaccine
Given its responsibilities for national seasonal influenza and pandemic preparedness and response, HHS has an interest in enhancing domestic production capacity—that is, enhancing the nation’s overall infrastructure for influenza vaccine production—and expanding the supply or accelerating the availability of influenza vaccine. Specifically, HHS has funded the development of vaccines using two alternative production technologies—cell-based and recombinant technologies—and vaccines using a third alternative technology—antigen-sparing technology (adjuvants). The Federal Government Has Provided about $2.1 Billion in Funding for the Development of Alternative Technologies that Can Be Used in Producing Influenza Vaccines, and Manufacturers Are Demonstrating Progress Toward Licensure
From fiscal year 2005 through March 2011, the federal government awarded approximately $2.1 billion in contracts and technology investment agreements for the research and development of cell-based and recombinant technologies and adjuvants, which can be used in producing influenza vaccines. HHS and DOD Have Funded the Research and Development of Recombinant Technology, and One Manufacturer Has Submitted a Licensing Application to FDA
In fiscal year 2009, HHS awarded contracts to manufacturers for the research and development of recombinant technology. Some Stakeholders Identified Challenges to the Development and Licensure of Influenza Vaccines Using Alternative Technologies
Some stakeholders and federal reports identified three primary challenges to the development and licensure of influenza vaccines using alternative technologies: low demand, high research and development costs, and regulatory challenges. Some Stakeholders Said Low Demand Hinders the Development of Influenza Vaccines Using Alternative Technologies
Some stakeholders told us that low demand because of low vaccination rates hinders manufacturers’ willingness to develop seasonal influenza vaccines using alternative technologies. Additionally, despite the increase in influenza vaccine production and distribution and the United States using more seasonal vaccine than any other country, 5 of 12 manufacturer representatives, 1 of 3 industry association representatives, and 2 of 12 other experts we interviewed said that this low demand decreases incentives for manufacturers to develop new seasonal influenza vaccines using alternative technologies. Additionally, HHS noted that increased investments in this area have generated a significant interest in this type of research and development. Some stakeholders also identified a second challenge, namely that FDA’s written guidance and consultation with manufacturers on some of the requirements for licensure of new influenza vaccines using alternative technologies is not sufficiently comprehensive. FDA officials acknowledged that its guidance documents are high level, explaining that specific instructions are unique to the product as guidance documents cannot cover all possible scenarios. Because of their inability to be very specific in guidance documents, FDA officials told us that they regularly meet with manufacturers developing vaccines using alternative technologies to discuss various issues and provide advice. HHS Plans to Assist Manufacturers with High Research and Development Costs by Funding the Establishment of Specialized Facilities to Provide Support and Expertise
HHS plans to assist manufacturers with high research and development costs by supporting the establishment of two or three privately owned facilities called Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing that will provide support and expertise to manufacturers. HHS Intends to Enhance Regulatory Science at FDA to Facilitate the Review of Licensing Applications for Influenza Vaccines Produced Using Alternative Technologies
HHS has announced plans to spend $170 million available from its fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 annual appropriations, in part, to facilitate FDA’s review of licensing applications for influenza vaccines produced using alternative technologies and for other medical countermeasures. Agency Comments
HHS, DOD, and the Department of State reviewed a draft of this report. The Department of State did not provide comments. Appendix I: The Research, Development, and Review of Licensing Applications for New Influenza Vaccine in the United States
The research, development, and review of licensing applications for new influenza vaccine for the U.S. market involve several stages. Also, the amount of influenza vaccine that can be produced depends on the manufacturer’s egg supply. Adjuvants were also used with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine in other countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Production delays for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine using the current egg-based production technology heightened interest in alternative technologies that could expand the supply or accelerate the availability of influenza vaccine. Within the federal government, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) support the development of technologies that can be used in producing influenza vaccines. HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reviews licensing applications for new vaccine, and the Department of State is the U.S. diplomatic liaison to the international entity that declares worldwide pandemics. GAO was asked to review federal activities for the development of alternative technologies used in producing influenza vaccine. This report examines (1) federal funding from fiscal year 2005 through March 2011 for alternative technologies and the status of manufacturers' efforts, (2) challenges to development and licensure identified by stakeholders, and (3) how HHS is addressing those challenges. GAO reviewed HHS and DOD documents and funding data. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including manufacturer representatives, industry associations, and other experts on challenges to development and licensure. GAO interviewed HHS officials on how they are addressing those challenges.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2005 through March 2011, HHS and DOD provided about $2.1 billion in funding for the development of alternative technologies that could potentially expand the supply or accelerate the availability of influenza vaccine. Specifically, HHS and DOD have funded two alternative production technologies--cell-based and recombinant technologies, which produce vaccine in cells instead of eggs--and adjuvants, which can reduce the amount of vaccine needed to stimulate an immune response. HHS's funding supports the development of a new influenza vaccine using alternative technologies with the goal of manufacturers submitting licensing applications to FDA. DOD's funding supports the research and development of a technology that can make various vaccines, including influenza vaccines. HHS awarded $1 billion in contracts to manufacturers to develop cell-based technology, with manufacturers making progress toward licensure. HHS and DOD funded $296.5 million in contracts and $86.9 million in technology investment agreements, respectively, for the development of recombinant technology. HHS also awarded about $152 million in contracts for the development of adjuvanted influenza vaccines. Two manufacturers receiving HHS funds plan to submit licensing applications for their adjuvanted vaccines to FDA within the next 2 years. Some stakeholders said low demand, high research and development costs, and regulatory challenges can hinder the development and licensure of new vaccines using alternative technologies. For example, despite the United States using more seasonal vaccine than any other country, some stakeholders told us that low vaccination rates can decrease incentives for manufacturers to develop new influenza vaccines using alternative technologies because there is not sufficient demand for new products. Some stakeholders said high research and development costs can also decrease manufacturers' incentives; however, HHS noted that increased investments in this area have generated a significant interest in this type of research and development. Some stakeholders also told us that some of FDA's guidance documents are not sufficiently comprehensive. FDA officials told us that their guidance documents cannot cover all possible scenarios; thus, they regularly meet with manufacturers to discuss issues and provide advice. HHS is addressing challenges in the development and licensure of new influenza vaccines using alternative technologies. For example, HHS intends to fund the establishment of specialized facilities that will provide support and expertise to manufacturers. Additionally, through FDA, HHS plans to facilitate the review of licensing applications for new influenza vaccines using alternative technologies and to enhance FDA's staff expertise. HHS, DOD, and the Department of State reviewed a draft of this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS and DOD agreed with GAO on its findings. The Department of State did not provide comments. HHS provided suggestions to clarify the discussion. |
gao_GAO-03-987T | gao_GAO-03-987T_0 | All this information—satellite data, imagery, derived products, and model output—is used in mapping and monitoring changes in weather, climate, the ocean, and the environment. The converged program is called the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), and it is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring. Specifically, changing funding streams and revised schedules have delayed the expected launch date of the first NPOESS satellite, and concerns with the development of key sensors and the data processing system may cause additional delays in the satellite launch date. In attempting to address these risks, the program office is working to develop a new cost and schedule baseline for the NPOESS program, which it hopes to complete by August 2003. As a result of the changes in funding between 2003 and 2007, project office officials estimate that the first NPOESS satellite will be available for launch 21 months after it is needed to back up the final POES satellite. This means that should the final POES launch fail in March 2008, there would be no backup satellite ready for launch. Unless the existing operational satellite is able to continue operations beyond its expected lifespan, there could be a gap in satellite coverage. NPOESS Program Office Is Working to Address Risks
Program officials are working to address the changes in funding levels and schedule, and to make plans for addressing specific sensor and data processing system risks. NPOESS is expected to merge today’s two separate satellite systems into a single state-of-the-art weather and environmental monitoring satellite system to support all military and civilian users, as well as the public. This new satellite system is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2018, and the first satellite was expected to be ready to act as a backup should the launch of the final satellites in the predecessor POES and DMSP programs fail. However, the NPOESS program faces key programmatic and technical risks that may affect the successful and timely deployment of the system. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide an overview of our nation’s current polar- orbiting weather satellite program and the planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and to identify key risks to the successful and timely deployment of NPOESS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the ocean, and the environment. The current polar satellite program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing centers. In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is to merge the two current satellite systems into a single state-of-the-art environment monitoring satellite system. This new $7 billion satellite system is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2018. In its testimony GAO was asked, among other topics, to discuss risks to the success of the NPOESS deployment.
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program faces key programmatic and technical risks that may affect the successful and timely deployment of the system. The original plan for NPOESS was that it would be available to serve as a backup to the March 2008 launch of the final satellite in one of the two current satellite programs--the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) system. However, changing funding streams and revised schedules have delayed the expected launch date of the first NPOESS satellite by 21 months. Thus, the first NPOESS satellite will not be ready in time to back up the final POES satellite, resulting in a potential gap in satellite coverage should that satellite fail. Specifically, if the final POES launch fails and if existing satellites are unable to continue operations beyond their expected lifespans, the continuity of weather data needed for weather forecasts and climate monitoring will be put at risk. Moreover, concerns with the development of key NPOESS components, including critical sensors and the data processing system, may cause additional delays in the satellite launch date. The program office is working to address the changes in funding levels and schedule, and to make plans for addressing specific risks. Further, it is working to develop a new cost and schedule baseline for the NPOESS program by August 2003. |
gao_GAO-09-709 | gao_GAO-09-709_0 | U.S. U.S. and Mexican government officials stated most guns trafficked into Mexico are facilitated by and support operations of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Available Information Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come from the United States and Are Increasingly More Powerful and Lethal
According to U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials and data from ATF on firearms seized in Mexico and traced from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, a large portion of the firearms fueling the Mexican drug trade originated in the United States, including a growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Sales of Firearms and to Stem the Flow of These Arms across the Southwest Border Face Key Challenges
U.S. efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to prevent the trafficking of these arms across the Southwest border into Mexico confront several key challenges. First, relevant law enforcement officials we met with noted certain provisions of some federal firearms laws present challenges to their efforts to address arms trafficking. Some Federal Firearms Laws Present Challenges to U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico, according to Law Enforcement Officials
U.S. agencies implement efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico within current applicable federal firearms laws. For example, they identified key challenges related to (1) restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms purchases, (2) a lack of required background checks for private firearms sales, and (3) limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. U.S. Assistance Limited by a Lack of Targeting Resources at Needs and Concerns over Corruption among Some Mexican Government Officials
U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some technical and operational assistance to Mexican counterparts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico. Also, U.S. assistance has been limited due to the incomplete use to date of eTrace by Mexican government officials. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials told us Mexican government officials’ failure to submit all of the firearms tracing information could be attributed to several factors, including the following: Mexican officials only recently began to fully appreciate the long-term value to Mexico of providing gun trace information to ATF; the Mexican military serves as the central repository for all seized guns in Mexico, while the Mexican Attorney General’s office is responsible for maintaining information on seized firearms, and coordinating access to the guns in order to collect necessary information has presented some challenges, according Mexican government officials; the Mexican Attorney General’s office is understaffed and has not had sufficient resources to clear the eTrace backlog, according to U.S. and Mexican government officials; only some of the Mexican Attorney General’s office staff had received ATF-provided training on identification of firearms and on using the eTrace system; and eTrace has been provided only in an English language version. However, these efforts are in the early stages and may take years to affect comprehensive change, according to Mexican and U.S. government officials. United States Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
While U.S. law enforcement agencies have developed initiatives to address arms trafficking to Mexico, none have been guided by a comprehensive, governmentwide strategy. However, at this point, it is not clear whether the implementation plan will include performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our report. New National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Includes Chapter on Arms Trafficking, but It Does Not Contain Some Key Elements of an Effective Strategy
In June 2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which, for the first time, contains a chapter on arms trafficking to Mexico. To help identify where efforts should be targeted to combat illicit arms trafficking to Mexico, we have several recommendations to improve the gathering and reporting of data related to such efforts, including that the U.S. Attorney General direct the ATF Director to regularly update ATF’s reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends; the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in light of DHS’s recent efforts to assess southbound weapons smuggling trends, direct ATF and ICE to ensure they share comprehensive data and leverage each other’s expertise and analysis on future assessments relevant to the issue; and the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure the systematic gathering and reporting of data related to results of these efforts, including firearms seizures, investigations, and prosecutions. To identify key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to stem the flow of these arms across the Southwest border into Mexico, we interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) ATF, Executive Office for U.S. To explore challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat illicit arms trafficking, we visited U.S.-Mexico border crossings at Laredo and El Paso, Texas, and San Diego, California. To assess the U.S. government’s strategy for addressing the issue of arms trafficking to Mexico we reviewed strategic planning, internal guidance, policy, and procedures documents for relevant agencies and departments. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated dramatically, due largely to the Mexican government's efforts to disrupt Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO). U.S. officials note the violence associated with Mexican DTOs poses a serious challenge for U.S. law enforcement, threatening citizens on both sides of the border, and U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials generally agree many of the firearms used to perpetrate crimes in Mexico are illicitly trafficked from the United States across the Southwest border. GAO was asked to examine (1) data on the types, sources, and users of these firearms; (2) key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stem the flow of them into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat the problem of illicit arms; and (4) the U.S. government's strategy for addressing the issue. GAO analyzed program information and firearms data and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
What GAO Found
Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence originated in the United States, including a growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. While it is impossible to know how many firearms are illegally smuggled into Mexico in a given year, about 87 percent of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced in the last 5 years originated in the United States, according to data from Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). According to U.S. and Mexican government officials, these firearms have been increasingly more powerful and lethal in recent years. Many of these firearms come from gun shops and gun shows in Southwest border states. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials stated most firearms are intended to support operations of Mexican DTOs, which are also responsible for trafficking arms to Mexico. The U.S. government faces several significant challenges in combating illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming their flow into Mexico. In particular, certain provisions of some federal firearms laws present challenges to U.S. efforts, according to ATF officials. Specifically, officials identified key challenges related to restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms purchases, a lack of required background checks for private firearms sales, and limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. GAO also found ATF and Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the primary agencies implementing efforts to address the issue, do not effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency agreement. Additionally, agencies generally have not systematically gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico. U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican counterparts in combating arms trafficking, but these efforts face several challenges. U.S. law enforcement assistance to Mexico does not target arms trafficking needs, limiting U.S. agencies' ability to provide technical or operational assistance. In addition, U.S. assistance has been limited due to Mexican officials' incomplete use of ATF's electronic firearms tracing system, an important tool for U.S. arms trafficking investigations. Another significant challenge facing U.S. efforts to assist Mexico is corruption among some Mexican government entities. Mexican federal authorities are implementing anticorruption measures, but government officials acknowledge fully implementing these reforms will take considerable time, and may take years to affect comprehensive change. The administration's recently released National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy includes, for the first time, a chapter on combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico. Prior to the new strategy, the U.S. government lacked a strategy to address arms trafficking to Mexico, and various efforts undertaken by individual U.S. agencies were not part of a comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the problem. At this point, it's not clear whether ONDCP's "implementation plan" for the strategy, which has not been finalized, will include performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our report. |
gao_GAO-15-302 | gao_GAO-15-302_0 | 2). In most states, this regulatory approach continues. Key State Supports Aided the Development of Electricity Generation Projects
Key state supports, in the form of state policies, aided the development of utility-scale electricity generation projects—particularly renewable energy projects—for fiscal years 2004 through 2013. For example, most states have a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) that mandates that retail service providers obtain a certain percentage or amount of the electricity they sell from renewable energy sources, which helped create additional demand for renewable energy, according to many stakeholders we interviewed. In addition, most states remain traditionally regulated, and regulatory policies in these states provided important state-level support for renewable or traditional projects by allowing regulated utilities to recover costs incurred while purchasing power from existing electricity generation facilities or building new generating capacity themselves. Federal Financial Supports Aided the Development of New Electricity Generating Capacity, but Limited Data on Tax Expenditures Hinders an Understanding of their Effectiveness
For fiscal years 2004 through 2013, programs at DOE, Treasury, and USDA aided the development of new electricity generating capacity through outlays, loan programs, and tax expenditures. As shown in table 1, one program—Treasury’s temporary Payments for Specified Energy Property in Lieu of Tax Credits (payments-in-lieu-of-tax-credits program)— accounted for most of the $16.8 billion in total outlays, which supported over 29,000 MW of new generating capacity. Federal Tax Expenditures Accounted for an Estimated $15.1 Billion in Forgone Revenue, but IRS Does Not Collect Key Data on the Two Largest Tax Expenditures
Seven tax expenditures administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at Treasury accounted for an estimated $15.1 billion in forgone revenue for fiscal years 2004 through 2013, but IRS does not collect or report key data on the two largest tax expenditures supporting new utility- scale electricity generation projects. However, IRS does not make available the project-level data it collects for the ITC. IRS officials stated that, given a number of factors, IRS is unlikely to collect additional information on these tax expenditures without being directed to do so by Congress. Developers Combined State and Federal Supports to Finance Renewable Projects, and Reducing State or Federal Supports Would Likely Reduce Development of These Projects
Developers combined state and federal supports to secure financing for renewable projects, and these supports reduced the price paid for renewable electricity by retail customers. Reducing state or federal supports would likely reduce the development of renewable projects unless PPA prices increased to compensate for the reduction in federal support. Developers combined state and federal supports to finance renewable projects. According to several stakeholders, the amount that developers can bid for a PPA depends on how much federal support the project expects to receive; therefore, these supports allowed developers to offer lower prices in their PPAs than they otherwise could have. These lower prices were then passed on to retail customers. To understand the effects of changes to federal tax expenditures, we modeled hypothetical utility-scale solar photovoltaic and wind projects and found that reducing or eliminating the ITC or PTC would likely reduce the number of renewable projects built because either developers’ returns would decline or PPA prices would increase. The extent to which development of renewable projects would decrease depends on, among other factors, how states respond to the effects of reduced federal supports. 4). The amount PPA prices could increase may also be constrained by state cost-containment mechanisms. Matters for Congressional Consideration
If Congress wishes to evaluate the effectiveness of the ITC and the PTC as incentives for the development of renewable utility-scale electricity generation projects as it considers proposals to extend the ITC or reauthorize the PTC, it should consider directing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to take the following two actions:
Provide Congress with project-level data currently collected from taxpayers who claim the ITC in lieu of the PTC—such as the number of projects for which they are claiming the credit, the technology of the projects taking the credit, and the total generating capacity added— and make such data available for analysis. Additionally, take steps to collect and report the same data from all taxpayers claiming the ITC. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOE, Treasury, and USDA for review and comment. Our objectives were to: (1) identify key state supports for these projects; (2) examine key federal financial supports provided through outlays, loan programs, and tax expenditures for these projects; and (3) examine how state and federal supports affect the development of new renewable projects and how reducing federal supports may affect such development. | Why GAO Did This Study
The states and the federal government have supported the development of electricity generation projects in a variety of ways. In recent years, state and federal supports have been targeted toward renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, although there have been some supports for projects using traditional sources—natural gas, coal, and nuclear.
GAO was asked to examine state and federal supports for the development of utility-scale electricity generation projects—power plants with generating capacities of at least 1 MW that are connected to the grid and intend to sell electricity—for fiscal years 2004 through 2013. This report (1) identifies key state supports for these projects; (2) examines key federal support provided through outlays, loan programs, and tax expenditures for these projects; and (3) examines how state and federal supports affect the development of new renewable projects. GAO analyzed relevant legislation, agency outlay and loan program data, and interviewed stakeholders, including project developers and experts. GAO also surveyed state regulatory commissions about state policies. In addition, GAO modeled the impact of reducing federal tax expenditures on project finances.
What GAO Found
Key state supports, in the form of state policies, aided the development of utility-scale electricity generation projects—particularly renewable ones—in most states, for fiscal years 2004 through 2013. For example, most states have a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandating that retail service providers obtain a specific amount of the electricity they sell from renewable energy sources, which creates additional demand for renewable energy. In addition, most states supported new renewable and traditional projects through regulatory policies that set electricity prices, which allowed utilities to recover the costs of building new projects or purchasing electricity from them.
Federal financial supports aided the development of new projects, but limited data hinder an understanding of the effectiveness of tax expenditures. From fiscal year 2004 through 2013, programs at the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), and the Treasury (Treasury) provided supports including outlays, loan programs, and tax expenditures. For example, one Treasury program provided payments in lieu of tax credits and accounted for almost all of the $16.8 billion in outlays that supported 29,000 megawatts (MW) of new renewable generating capacity. Tax expenditures accounted for an estimated $13.7 billion in forgone revenue to the federal government for renewable projects and $1.4 billion for traditional projects. The two largest tax expenditures GAO examined—the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and the Production Tax Credit (PTC)—supported renewable projects and accounted for $11.5 billion in forgone revenue. However, the total generating capacity they supported is unknown because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is not required to collect project-level data from all taxpayers claiming the ITC or report the data it does collect, nor is it required to collect project-level data for the PTC. IRS officials stated that IRS is unlikely to collect additional data on these tax credits unless it is directed to do so. Since 1994, GAO has encouraged greater scrutiny of tax expenditures, including data collection. Without project-level data on the ITC and PTC, Congress cannot evaluate their effectiveness as it considers whether to reauthorize or extend them.
Developers combined state and federal supports to finance renewable projects, and reducing these supports would likely reduce development of such projects. Demand created by state RPSs allowed developers of renewable projects to obtain power purchase agreements (PPA)—long-term contracts to sell power at specific prices. Federal supports, in turn, lowered developers' costs to build renewable projects, which allowed them to offer lower PPA prices than they otherwise could have. According to most stakeholders, these lower prices were then passed on to retail customers. Overall, if the level of support is reduced, fewer projects would likely be built. For example, GAO's modeling suggests that reducing the ITC or eliminating the PTC would likely reduce the number of renewable projects built because developers' returns would decline unless PPA prices increased to compensate for the reduction in federal support. The extent to which development would decrease depends on how states respond to reduced federal support and the associated increase in prices. For example, many states limit the amount retail prices could increase, limiting PPA price increases, which could reduce development.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider directing IRS to (1) collect and report project-level data from all taxpayers who claim the ITC and (2) collect and report similar data for taxpayers who claim the PTC.
DOE, Treasury, and USDA did not provide formal comments in response to a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-04-134 | gao_GAO-04-134_0 | Background
The Launching Our Communities’ Access to Local Television Act of 2000 created a guaranteed loan program to facilitate access to signals of local television stations for households located in nonserved and underserved areas of the United States. The Act established the LOCAL Television Loan Guarantee Board (Board) whose primary function is to approve loan guarantees to finance projects to provide local television access for communities in remote areas throughout the United States. Specifically, the Act required the Board to: (1) direct the Administrator to prescribe regulations within 120 days after the Congress appropriated funds, (2) develop underwriting criteria in consultation with the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and an independent public accounting firm (IPA) within 120 days after the Congress appropriated funds, (3) establish and collect loan application and loan guarantee origination feesto offset the cost of administering the Program under the Act, including the costs of the Board and the Administrator, and (4) consider other numerous specialized technical and business requirements prior to approving a loan guarantee. Although the Act was passed on December 21, 2000, which required the establishment of program regulations and underwriting criteria, initial funding for the Program was not provided until November 2001 through the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the Congress, federal entities involved in implementing the LOCAL TV Program, and the public. Scope and Methodology
To determine how the provisions of the Act were administered, we focused primarily on program activities and related obligations and administrative expenses that were incurred on behalf of the Program during fiscal year 2002. Since funds were appropriated in November 2001, the target time frame was March 2002. However, as of the end of August 2003, neither of these key documents had been finalized. According to Board and RUS officials, three factors contributed to program delays: (1) initial uncertainties over program funding, (2) inadequate dedicated staff resources for program activities, and (3) the decision to issue a proposed rule. Policies and Procedures Needed as a Basis for Collecting User Fees Have Not Been Established
Total costs of administering the Program, including those incurred by the respective departments and agencies providing support to the Board, were not accumulated and charged to the Program. Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard No. 4, Managerial Cost Accounting Standards (SFFAS No. 4) requires federal agencies to capture the costs of federal programs to assist the Congress in authorizing, modifying, and discontinuing programs and to provide agencies with reliable cost data for making informed managerial decisions and evaluating performance. Conclusions
The LOCAL TV Program has not been implemented within the time frames specified in the LOCAL TV Act. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury, and the Chairman of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, members of the Local Television Loan Guarantee Board, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
The LOCAL TV Act required that GAO perform an annual audit of the (1) administration of the provisions of the Act, and (2) financial position of each applicant who receives a loan guarantee under the Act, including the nature, amount, and purpose of investments made by the applicant. In fiscal year 2002, the LOCAL TV Program was funded; however, because it was not fully implemented in that year, there were no loan guarantee applicants for GAO to audit. Therefore, this report primarily addresses whether program administration during fiscal year 2002 satisfied the provisions of the Act.
What GAO Found
In December 2000,the Congress passed the Launching Our Communities' Access to Local Television Act of 2000 (LOCAL TV Act or Act). The Act created the Local Television Loan Guarantee Program (Program or LOCAL TV Program) and established the Local Television Loan Guarantee Board (Board) to approve guaranteed loans, totaling no more than $1.25 billion, to finance projects that will provide local television access to households with limited over-the-air television broadcast signals or cable service. The Board is comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce, or their designees. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Utilities Service serves as Program Administrator (Administrator). The LOCAL TV Program has not been established in an expeditious fashion as specified by the Act. Given that funds were appropriated in November 2001, thus starting the clock on the 120 days allowed for completing program regulations and underwriting criteria, the Program should have been ready for implementation by March 2002. According to the Board and Administrator, three factors contributed to program delays: (1) initial uncertainties over program funding, (2) inadequate dedicated staff resources for program activities, and (3) the decision to issue a proposed rule. As of the end of August 2003, neither of these key documents, which provide the overall framework for the Program, was ready for implementation, thus delaying lending activities and ultimately, realization of improved television reception in target areas throughout the United States. Further, the full costs of administering the Program, including those incurred by the respective agencies and departments providing support to the Board, were not accumulated and charged to the program as called for by federal accounting standards. Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard No.4, Managerial Cost Accounting Standards requires federal agencies to capture the costs of federal programs to assist the Congress in authorizing, modifying, and discontinuing programs and to provide agencies with reliable cost data for making informed managerial decisions and evaluating performance. Further, the capacity to capture these costs going forward is key to fully recovering certain costs of administering the Program through loan application and loan guarantee origination fees. |
gao_GAO-12-957 | gao_GAO-12-957_0 | The primary objectives of the program are to provide temporary, partial compensation for lost earnings of individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their own, with some exceptions, and meet certain other eligibility criteria, and to stabilize the economy during economic downturns.payroll taxes levied on employers. The federal-state structure of the UI program places primary responsibility for its administration on the states, and gives them wide latitude to administer their programs in a manner that best suits their needs within the guidelines established by federal law. Labor’s Primary Role in Facilitating IT Modernization Efforts is Providing Funding and Technical Support to State UI Programs
Labor’s role in facilitating UI IT modernization efforts primarily consists of providing funding and technical support to the state agencies. There are two primary federal sources: (1) supplemental budget funding that is designated by Labor for specific state and consortium IT modernization efforts; and (2) general UI administration funding, which can be used for a variety of purposes, including IT modernization. In this regard, a “base” administrative grant for each state is determined by Labor at the beginning of each fiscal year. This act was an economic stimulus package from which states received two special distributions of funds. Of the nine states we reviewed, each of the three states that were part of a consortium were in the initial phases of planning that includes defining business needs and requirements; two individual states were in the development phase, that is, building the system based on requirements; two were in a combination of development and operations and maintenance (also called a “mixed” phase, meaning a portion of the system is completed and in the operations and maintenance phase but other portions are still in the development phase); and two were completed and in operations and maintenance. The challenges for individual states relate to limited funding and the increasing cost of UI systems, among others. We have recognized the importance of analyzing and prioritizing challenges and then documenting lessons learned from major efforts such as the UI projects, in order to help mitigate risks and track successful ideas for more effectively managing IT and improving cost effectiveness that can be utilized in the future. Until Labor comprehensively analyzes and prioritizes challenges, and documents lessons learned on these federally funded state UI modernization efforts, it may miss opportunities to help support future consortium and state modernization efforts, potentially hindering effective administration of the UI program. All of the selected states have established management controls for modernizing the IT systems that support their UI programs. These controls align with industry-accepted program management practices and, if effectively implemented, could help successfully guide modernization efforts. Labor has tasked ITSC to assess lessons learned, observations, and successful practices of consortium efforts, which is a valuable first step toward helping the states overcome challenges as they move forward in modernizing UI systems. However, this effort is not complete and does not represent an independent survey of all the states’ lessons learned. As such, Labor has not clearly identified challenges and lessons learned, disseminated them to each state, or facilitated an appropriate information sharing mechanism. Lessons learned and best practices identified could include practices for mitigating issues associated with inconsistent and insufficient funding streams, helping ensure staff have the necessary technical and project management expertise to manage modernization technology resources, and sufficient staff to operate both legacy and modernized systems while developing and implementing new systems; and consortium-specific challenges, including practices for addressing concerns about differences in state requirements and business processes among consortium member states, mitigating potential liabilities and concerns that lead states face in providing services to and oversight of another states’ modernization efforts, and identifying independent qualified leadership for consortium efforts. Labor neither agreed nor disagreed with our second recommendation, which called for it to distribute the analysis of lessons learned to each state to share and foster ideas and facilitate the efficient and effective modernization of UI systems through an information-sharing platform or repository, such as a website. Specifically, Labor noted that the Reed Act distribution funds are not solely available for UI IT modernization efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the Department of Labor’s (Labor) role in facilitating the modernization efforts, (2) identify and describe the types of federal funding selected states have spent on IT modernization, (3) provide the status of modernization efforts for the selected states, (4) determine key modernization challenges, and (5) evaluate what management controls have been established for IT modernization. We selected the states on the basis of varying regional location, size, and modernization status. We also reviewed documentation on federal funding sources that can be used for state UI modernization, such as the State Unemployment Insurance and Employment Service Operations appropriation, Reed Act distributions, and the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, as well as Labor’s documentation on funding for UI modernization, including supplemental budget funds for state UI modernization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Labors UI program is a federal-state partnership that provides partial compensation for lost earnings of eligible individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their own. In fiscal year 2011, about $117 billion was spent on the UI program. To administer the program, states rely heavily on IT, including benefits and tax systems. However, a July 2010 state survey noted that most of the UI IT systems are outdated and cannot efficiently handle their current workloads.
GAO was asked to (1) determine Labor's role in facilitating UI IT modernization efforts, (2) identify and describe the types of federal funding selected states have spent on modernization, (3) provide the status of modernization for selected states, (4) determine key modernization challenges, and (5) determine what management controls have been established for IT modernization. To do this, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of nine states (selected based on varying location, size, and modernization status); and reviewed Labor policies; and interviewed department officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor (Labor) facilitates states efforts to modernize information technology (IT) systems supporting their unemployment insurance (UI) programs by (1) providing funds for administrating overall UI operations and (2) participating in groups that provide technical support to states. While the federal-state structure of the UI program places primary responsibility for its administration on the states, Labor provides potential strategies for IT modernization activities through supplemental budget funds.
Federal funds for UI modernization efforts come primarily from two sources: (1) supplemental budget funds that are designated by Labor for state IT modernization efforts and (2) general UI administration funding. General administration funding primarily consists of State UI and Employment Service Operations funds (an administrative grant issued by Labor at the beginning of each fiscal year); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 funds, (distributed under the Reed Act, a mechanism by which the federal government transfers surplus UI funds to states); and American Reinvestment and Recovery Act funds (an economic stimulus package enacted in February 2009). However, federal funds can be used for multiple UI purposes, and states are not required to report costs for UI modernization projects.
The status of the nine states UI IT modernization efforts that GAO reviewed range from planning to deployment. Of the nine states, three are part of a consortium (multiple states that develop a single common system) and are all in the initial planning phase; two individual state efforts are in the development phase; two are in a combination of different phases; and two are in operations and maintenance. For example, Virginia is in the development phase whereas Minnesota has a deployed system and is in operations and maintenance.
States and Labor have challenges specific to (1) individual states and (2) consortiums modernization efforts. The challenges for individual states that GAO reviewed relate to having sufficient technical expertise and limited funding, among others, and challenges faced by consortiums relate to differences in state laws and business processes among member states. It is widely recognized that analyzing and prioritizing challenges and then documenting lessons learned can help mitigate risk and track successful ideas for more effectively managing IT in the future. A committee was tasked to assess lessons learned from consortium efforts which may serve as a valuable first step toward helping the states mitigate challenges. However, the effort is not complete and does not represent an independent survey of all the states lessons learned. As such, Labor has not yet comprehensively evaluated and prioritized challenges and lessons learned, disseminated them to each state, or facilitated an appropriate information sharing mechanism. Until it does, Labor may miss opportunities to help support future consortium and state modernization efforts.
All nine states reviewed have established selected management controls for modernizing IT which, if properly implemented, could help reduce the risks of modernization challenges. The controls align with industry-accepted program management practices, such as independent verification and validation; and include state-specific practices, such as oversight through a Chief Information Officer office and consortium-specific practices, such as governance structures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor (1) comprehensively analyze and document challenges and lessons learned and (2) distribute the lessons learned to each state to share and foster ideas for effective modernization of UI systems. Labor generally agreed with the first recommendation; it did not agree or disagree with the second recommendation, but said it is committed to sharing lessons learned. |
gao_GAO-07-835T | gao_GAO-07-835T_0 | While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, whose details are discussed later. Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas. Emergency Communications. Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used appropriately. Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and (5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance. DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post- Katrina Reform Act
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. DHS’s Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and federal emergency preparedness and response. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a new hurricane season approaches, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulates major changes to FEMA intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
What GAO Found
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the coming hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. |
gao_GAO-09-46 | gao_GAO-09-46_0 | These programs support over 1.6 million housing units. HUD Has Taken Positive Steps to Promote Energy Efficiency, but Efforts to Encourage Voluntary Actions Have Limitations
HUD’s energy efficiency efforts, which have focused primarily on the voluntary adoption of various measures, have included positive steps such as promoting the use of energy performance contracts in public housing, developing a benchmarking model that allows for the identification of public housing authority properties that consume comparatively more energy, and piloting a green initiative. HUD has sought to promote energy efficiency by providing information, training, and technical assistance; offering program incentives; and leveraging resources outside of HUD. Energy Performance Measures
HUD has taken steps to improve its energy program management and monitoring through the development of performance measures to track and assess the progress of its energy efficiency efforts. HUD pays an estimated $5 billion in utility costs annually but has not collected the data that would be necessary to understand its current utility costs or the financial benefits that these practices could provide for many of its programs. HUD officials told us that collecting these data and developing a benchmarking system could be useful to understand the energy use and savings opportunities in its multifamily housing portfolio, but that it could be costly to HUD and the property owners. A 2003 study by Harvard University—funded by HUD—found that collecting consumption data in FHA-insured privately owned multifamily housing would not be unreasonably burdensome. By not benchmarking utility costs in its multifamily portfolio, HUD is missing an opportunity to target less efficient multifamily properties for green building improvements, an action that could reduce the resource consumption and utility expenses for HUD and its funding recipients. HUD has focused its attention on incentives that encourage energy efficiency, but it provides few financial incentives to encourage more comprehensive green building practices—such as water conservation and indoor air quality. Many state and local governments have used financial incentives to encourage the use of green building, including nonenergy green building practices, in their affordable housing programs. Some states have worked with organizations with experience in green building to promote green affordable housing in their regions. Although green building practices can provide long-term benefits and savings opportunities, HUD has focused its attention primarily on energy efficiency and currently has few incentives to encourage nonenergy green building in its affordable housing portfolio. However, some of HUD’s affordable housing portfolio may not participate in programs such as the LIHTC. While some green building practices can add to up-front costs, they can also provide long-term financial and health benefits. HUD’s public housing office has shown leadership and initiative in partnering to develop a utility benchmarking tool that could be used to identify properties with high levels of utility consumption, but HUD’s multifamily assisted housing has no such tool. Such HUD green building programs could provide affordable housing developers with financial assistance to deal with the added costs of green building and HUD with the data it needs to understand the relationship between the up-front costs and long-term benefits of green building. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to better promote green building practices, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the appropriate program offices to take the following actions: ensure completion of the regulation that would require the use of energy-efficient products and appliances for public housing as directed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, proactively work with DOE to expeditiously implement energy- efficiency updates to the HUD Manufactured Housing Code, ensure that updates to handbooks are regularly completed in a timely fashion to provide more current guidance on energy-efficient and other green building practices, consider working with DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and EPA to develop a utility benchmarking tool for multifamily properties, and assess whether the single-point incentive awarded for energy efficiency is sufficient to stimulate higher levels of energy efficiency for its competitive grant programs and consider providing nonenergy green building incentive points for these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rising energy prices and concerns about the environment have fueled interest in "green building"--resource-efficient construction and maintenance practices that reduce adverse impacts on the natural environment. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), spends an estimated $5 billion on energy costs annually in its affordable housing programs and has recently taken steps to reduce its energy costs. GAO was asked to review (1) HUD's efforts to promote energy efficiency in its programs and the use of performance measures, (2) potential costs and long-term benefits of green building in HUD's affordable housing programs, and (3) lessons learned elsewhere that HUD could use to promote green building. GAO reviewed HUD program documents and studies on green building, interviewed HUD officials and industry representatives, and made site visits to locations that use green building practices.
What GAO Found
HUD has taken steps to promote energy efficiency by providing information, training, and technical assistance, but its efforts have limitations. HUD has also provided some financial incentives to promote green building, including energy efficiency, for public housing and for a small segment of the multifamily properties HUD supports. Additionally, HUD has developed some performance measures to track the progress of its energy efficiency efforts. However, HUD has not begun requiring energy-efficient products and appliances in its public housing properties, as required by statute. HUD has also not implemented major energy efficiency updates to the building code for manufactured housing in more than a decade. Without such requirements and updates, public housing authorities may be spending more on utility expenses than is necessary and manufacturers may lack an incentive to build energy- efficient manufactured homes. Green building practices can increase up-front costs but may also provide long-term benefits, including financial, environmental, and health benefits. But the benefits in rental housing may not go to the party incurring the up-front costs, potentially discouraging the use of green building practices in a significant segment of affordable housing. HUD has partnered with others to develop a utility benchmarking tool for identifying savings in public housing, but only for the public housing portfolio. Utility benchmarking is often used to assess energy consumption and to help identify properties that could improve their energy efficiency. HUD does not collect the data needed to understand its current utility costs or future savings possibilities in some parts of its multifamily housing portfolio. HUD officials told GAO that developing a utility benchmarking tool for this portfolio would be helpful but could be costly to HUD and property owners. However, a 2003 study by Harvard University--and funded by HUD--found that collecting consumption data in insured privately owned multifamily housing would not be unreasonably burdensome. Without such a tool, HUD cannot fully understand the utility costs for over 1.6 million units in its portfolio and may be missing opportunities to reduce utility expenses for some properties. HUD has focused its attention on incentives that encourage energy efficiency but has few financial incentives, such as those used by states, to encourage other green building practices such as water conservation. Many state and local governments have used financial incentives to promote the development of green affordable housing. For example, in the scoring systems for some competitive funding, applicants are awarded additional incentive points for energy and nonenergy green building practices. Without financial incentives for nonenergy green building, HUD is likely missing opportunities to make its affordable housing more resource efficient and environmentally friendly. |
gao_GAO-06-643 | gao_GAO-06-643_0 | Pre-Katrina Preparations Did Not Fully Address the Military Capabilities Needed during a Catastrophic Natural Disaster
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises involving the military were insufficient, and did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise program. As a result of the inadequate plans—and the lack of realistic exercises to test those plans—a lack of understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active- duty and National Guard components. DOD’s Supporting Plan Lacked Details About the Military Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters
While the military’s approach to planning is well defined, prior to Hurricane Katrina, DOD did not develop a detailed plan to account for the full range of tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the event of a catastrophe. In general, a feasible plan would anticipate the personnel and resources that might be required in response to a catastrophic event. Moreover, the functional plan did not establish time frames for the response. Prior to Katrina, the Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were not synchronized with DOD’s plans, and they were also inadequate for a catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude. The Military’s Response to Hurricane Katrina was Massive but Faced Several Challenges
Even though there was a lack of detailed planning, the military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts, but several factors affected this response. During the response to Katrina, a number of interrelated factors affected the military’s ability to leverage its resources to gain situational awareness and effectively organize and execute its response efforts. Some factors that affected the military response were: a lack of timely damage assessments, communications difficulties, problems integrating the use and capabilities of active-duty and National Guard forces, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and challenges with the significant logistics functions that FEMA unexpectedly turned over to DOD. Active-duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and the initial buildup of active-duty forces shown in figure 1 reflects the deployment of key active-duty capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large active-duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after Katrina’s landfall. In addition, some National Guard responders were short of equipment. DOD Has Begun Taking Actions to Address Catastrophic Disaster Response Problems, Some of Which are Complex and Long-standing
DOD is aware of disaster response problems described in this report and is beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. While it is too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of these ongoing and planned actions, many appear to hold promise for improving future responses. Substantial improvement to the military’s disaster and catastrophe response will require sustained attention from management at the highest levels of DOD and from key officials across the government. Many of the problems encountered during the Katrina response were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Without urgent and detailed attention to improve planning, the military and federal government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe. Joint Force Headquarters, Jackson, Ms.
To assess the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might be required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, we analyzed planning and directive documents related to military support to civil authority, such as the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and the Military Support and Assistance to Civil Authorities directives, and state plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Due to widespread congressional interest, this review was performed under the Comptroller General's authority. It examined (1) the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might be required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the military support provided in response to Katrina and factors that affected that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to address lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophe.
What GAO Found
The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but many lessons are emerging. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the government's National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to a smaller regional disaster and its response to a catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The plan did not: account for the full range of assistance that might be provided by DOD, divide tasks between the National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, plans had not been tested with a robust exercise program. None of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, a lack of understanding exists within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active-duty and National Guard forces. Despite the lack of planning, the military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. Active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications difficulties, force integration problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and unexpected logistics responsibilities. Without detailed plans to address these factors, DOD and the federal government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe. DOD is examining the lessons learned from its own reviews and those of the White House and the Congress, and it is beginning to take actions to address the lessons and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina such as damage assessments are long-standing problems that were identified by GAO after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. They will be difficult to address because they are complex and cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD, and across the government. |
gao_AIMD-98-202 | gao_AIMD-98-202_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify those Defense long-haul telecommunications networks operating outside of the common-user DISN, (2) evaluate the Department of Defense’s progress in implementing its policies for managing telecommunications services, which include: developing a comprehensive inventory of telecommunications equipment and services, reporting on telecommunications services acquired, trends, and costs, mandating the use of common-user networks, and developing a waiver process to grant exceptions from using common-user networks, and (3) evaluate Defense’s progress in developing performance measures for DISN to ensure effective and efficient use of the department’s telecommunications resources. As a result, Defense components operate many stovepiped telecommunications systems that are not interoperable and cannot share information across functional and organizational boundaries. In a previous review of the DISN program, we found that Defense was not doing enough to ensure that the program would be managed efficiently and effectively. In response, Defense agreed to establish measures for the program. In order to estimate the number and cost of networks that are operating outside of DISN, we conducted our own survey, which identified 87 such networks operated by the military services alone. DISA Does Not Have Data to Develop Required Reports on Telecommunications Acquisitions, Trends, and Costs
To ensure that a common-user network is efficiently and effectively managed, it is essential to closely monitor its acquisitions of telecommunications services, costs, and trends in usage, that is, the volumes and types of traffic it carries. However, it has not done so, and it lacks the data needed to begin developing such reports. Therefore, it cannot effectively report annually on acquisitions. Although it agreed to develop performance measures in response to that review, Defense has never developed measures for the DISN program. Conclusions
In the 7 years that it has been implementing the DISN program and striving to improve telecommunications management in the department, Defense has done very little to implement the basic management controls it believed were needed to ensure success. As a result, Defense has not achieved its goals for an interoperable telecommunications environment, cannot support any claims that the long-haul networks it operates are cost-effective, and cannot determine which independent long-haul networks should be replaced by common user networks such as DISN or FTS 2000/2001. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Senior Civilian Official for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) provided written comments on a draft of this report. In its response, the department notes that it has: (1) established the Defense Information Systems Database (DISD) as a comprehensive inventory of long-haul telecommunications networks throughout Defense, (2) clarified existing policy by issuing an ASD/C3I memorandum dated May 5, 1997, that reaffirms DISA’s role as the sole manager and provider of long-haul telecommunications systems and services, (3) developed a process for determining how individual telecommunications requirements can best be satisfied, (4) developed a process for granting temporary waivers, and (5) begun the process of establishing performance metrics for DISN. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), focusing on: (1) those DOD long-haul telecommunications networks operating outside of the common-user DISN; (2) DOD's progress in implementing its policies for managing DISN; and (3) DOD's progress in developing performance measures for DISN, which DOD agreed to do in response to GAO's previous review of the DISN program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although DOD has been implementing the DISN program for 7 years, numerous networks continue to exist without the Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) knowledge; (2) GAO's survey found that the military services are operating at least 87 independent networks that support a variety of long-haul telecommunications requirements; (3) the services reported costs on 68 of these networks totalling more than $89 million annually; (4) DOD's inability to restrict the number of networks operating across the department stems from its failure to implement basic telecommunications management policies established at the beginning of the DISN program and its failure to develop objective performance measures for the program; (5) DISA has not developed a comprehensive inventory of telecommunications networks throughout DOD nor have the military services developed inventories of their own networks; (6) DISA has not reported on telecommunications acquisitions, trends (volumes and types of traffic) and costs throughout DOD, and it lacks the data to develop such reports; (7) DOD has not effectively enforced the use of common-user services, nor were Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) officials clear on how enforcement would occur; (8) DOD has only recently begun to implement an interim waiver process to exempt DOD components from using common-user networks--a final process has yet to be implemented; (9) DOD has not developed performance measures for the DISN program even though it agreed with GAO's previous report that these measures were essential to ensuring DISN was efficiently and effectively managed; (10) by not implementing the above, DOD lacks the basic management controls to ensure that it can achieve its goal for an interoperable and cost-effective telecommunications environment; (11) specifically, it lacks a foundation for identifying stovepiped and redundant networks that are not interoperable and cannot share information, and replacing them with mandated common-user services; it lacks a basis for maximizing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of DISN; it cannot quantify problems; and it cannot learn from mistakes; and (12) as a result, DOD's stated goals for DISN are at risk, and DOD cannot ensure that DISN is the most cost-effective solution to DOD's telecommunications service requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-219 | gao_GAO-14-219_0 | Recovery Act grants provided to states and localities covered a broad range of areas such as transportation, energy, and housing. Practices at Federal, State, and Local Levels Contributed to Improved Accountability of Recovery Act Grant Programs but Challenges Existed
Strong Support by Top Leaders, a Collaborative Approach, and Systematic Use of Data Were Key to Managing Recovery Act Implementation
Under the Recovery Act, accountability for timely and effective implementation of the law was a shared responsibility that included agencies involved in directly implementing the law as well as the external oversight community. On the operational side, among the practices that facilitated accountability were (1) strong support by top leaders, (2) centrally-situated collaborative governance structures, and (3) the regular and systematic use of data to support management reviews. The Recovery Act Prompted Adjustments and Innovations in Oversight to Foster Accountability
Faced with the short time frames and accelerated roll out of Recovery Act funds, both the oversight community and agencies adjusted their oversight approach and innovated to foster accountability for Recovery Act funds at the federal and state agency levels. These practices included (1) assessing and planning for risks up front; (2) reviewing programs before and while they were being funded rather than waiting until after programs were implemented; (3) communicating findings quickly through informal processes as opposed to regular full reports; and (4) using advanced data analytics. In October 2009, the Recovery Board established an innovative center to analyze the use of Recovery Act funds by employing data analytics (see figure 3). DOT issued guidance seven times during the first year after the act was signed to clarify how states were to calculate their planned or actual expenditures for their maintenance-of-effort certifications. The Recovery Act Resulted in Increased Transparency but Also Presented Challenges
Recovery Act Transparency Websites Embody Several Leading Practices
In an April 2009 memorandum, OMB directed agencies to follow leading practices for federal website development and management, such as those listed on HowTo.gov, a website managed by the Federal Web Managers Council and the General Services Administration.makes available a list of the “Top 10 Best Practices” for federal websites as a resource to improve how agencies communicate and interact with HowTo.gov customers and provide services.state and city Recovery websites, demonstrated several of these leading practices including establishing a clear purpose of the website, using social networking tools to garner interest in the website, tailoring websites to meet audience needs, and obtaining stakeholder input when designing the website. Recovery Act Performance Was Mostly Measured by Outputs Rather than Outcomes, and Challenges with Both Existed
Recipients and Agencies Were Required to Report Amount and Speed of Funding but Faced Challenges in Doing So
The Recovery Act requires recipients to report on their use of funding and agencies that provide those funds to make the reports publicly available. Many state and local partners were limited in their capacity to meet spending reporting requirements because they lacked knowledge and expertise. For example, one city official stated that, in order to meet reporting deadlines, it was necessary had to enter data manually, which created additional work. While Recovery.gov provided a template for facilitating the reporting of this information, the level of detail and specificity of outcomes varied greatly for some of the agencies we reviewed, making it difficult to determine the extent to which some were making progress toward their goals and demonstrating results. DOT did not implement our recommendation. By increasing accountability and transparency requirements while at the same time setting aggressive timelines for the distribution of funds, the Recovery Act created high expectations as well as uncertainty and risk for federal, state, and local governments responsible for implementing the law. These and other experiences, as well as the challenges identified in this report, provide potentially valuable lessons for the future. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of the Departments of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation; and to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The agencies generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments which were incorporated in the report. Specifically, this report identifies and provides examples of good practices employed and the challenges faced by select federal, state, and local agencies implementing grant programs funded by the Recovery Act, in the areas of accountability and transparency. To obtain a broad view of lessons learned during the implementation of grants funded by the Recovery Act, we conducted a detailed literature review of relevant reports describing lessons learned from implementing grants funded by the Recovery Act from GAO; federal and state inspectors general; federal agencies; state and local governments; accountability boards; state and local government advocacy organizations; think tanks; and academia. To get a broader state perspective, we also interviewed officials from the state Recovery Act coordinators’ network, which included key state officials involved in implementing the Recovery Act from several states. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to the recent serious recession, Congress enacted the Recovery Act to promote economic recovery, make investments, and minimize or avoid reductions in state and local government services. Approximately $219 billion was distributed as grants for use in states and localities, making grants a major component of the act. These grants covered a broad range of areas including education, transportation, energy, infrastructure, the environment, health care, and housing.
GAO was asked to examine grant management lessons learned resulting from the Recovery Act. This report examines federal, state, and local experiences with implementing grants funded by the Recovery Act by identifying examples of good practices employed and challenges faced in meeting the act's accountability and transparency requirements. GAO reviewed relevant documents including OMB and Recovery Board guidance, relevant literature, and previous reports by GAO, federal inspectors general, and others. GAO also interviewed officials from OMB, the Recovery Board, four federal agencies, three state governments, and two local governments, among others. This report also draws on GAO's past bi-monthly reviews of selected states' and localities' use of Recovery funds.
What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local officials responsible for implementing grants funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) as well as the external oversight community reported lessons learned regarding both useful practices and challenges to ensuring accountability. Faced with aggressive timelines for distributing billions of dollars, they adopted a number of practices to foster accountability including (1) strong support by top leaders; (2) centrally-situated collaborative governance structures; (3) the use of networks and agreements to share information and work towards common goals; and (4) adjustments to, and innovations in, usual approaches to conducting oversight such as the increased use of up-front risk assessments, the gathering of "real time" information, earlier communication of audit findings, and the use of advanced data analytics. For example, in 2009, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Recovery Board) established the Recovery Operations Center which used advanced data analysis techniques to identify potential fraud and errors before and after payments were made. The Recovery Act's emphasis on accountability also presented challenges for several states and federal agencies. These included limited resources for oversight at the state and local levels, and the speed with which Recovery Act funds were distributed. One state addressed the challenge of limited resources by transferring funds from its central administration account to Recovery Act oversight. To facilitate the quick distribution of funds, maintenance-of-effort provisions concerning transportation projects (which prevented Recovery funds from being used for planned state projects) were rolled out before the Department of Transportation had time to issue sufficiently detailed definitions of what constituted "state funding." To address this challenge, the department had to issue clarifying guidance to states seven times during the first year of the Recovery Act.
Federal, state, and local officials also developed practices and encountered challenges related to the transparency of Recovery Act funds. An example of one good practice that was required by the Recovery Act was the creation of the Recovery.gov website. This site, as well as similar portals created by states and localities, demonstrated several leading practices for effective government websites. These included (1) establishing a clear purpose, (2) using social networking tools to garner interest, (3) tailoring the website to meet audience needs, and (4) obtaining stakeholder input during design. Efforts to increase transparency also led to challenges for several states and federal agencies. For example, some recipients lacked knowledge or expertise in using the data systems needed to report grant spending, while others faced challenges with reporting the same data to multiple systems. Early GAO reviews also found several problems with job reporting data including discrepancies in how full time equivalents were recorded and the capacity of recipients to meet reporting deadlines. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) addressed these challenges by issuing additional guidance and providing technical support. Finally, agencies receiving Recovery Act funds were required to submit performance plans that identified measures on a program-by-program basis. The level of detail and the specificity of outcomes in these plans varied greatly for the agencies GAO examined, making it difficult to determine the extent to which some were making progress toward their goals and demonstrating results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to relevant agencies for comment. They generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-17-281 | gao_GAO-17-281_0 | According to HUD’s budget request, these funds are to support new investments intended to deliver modernized enterprise capabilities that better support the department’s mission. Disciplined processes include establishing guidance that can be used for developing reliable cost estimates that project realistic life-cycle costs. HUD’s Cost Estimates for Selected IT Investments Exhibited Significant Weaknesses That Made Them Unreliable
The cost estimates that HUD developed for each of the four selected investments exhibited significant weaknesses in that they did not meet or substantially meet best practices for each characteristic. As such, the estimates were unreliable and did not provide a sound basis for informing the department’s investment and budgetary decisions. Specifically, none of the estimates exhibited all of the characteristics of a reliable estimate, as they were not substantially or fully comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Only one estimate—for the Customer Relationship Management investment—more than minimally met best practices associated with any of the four characteristics because it partially met the practices for a comprehensive and accurate estimate. The remaining three investments minimally met or did not meet the best practices associated with the four characteristics. For example, the Enterprise Data Warehouse estimate minimally met all four characteristics; the Enterprise Voucher Management System estimate did not meet the characteristic for being accurate, and minimally met the other three characteristics; and the Federal Housing Administration Automation and Modernization estimate did not met the characteristic for being credible, while minimally meeting the rest of the characteristics. Of the cost estimates for the four selected investments, none were comprehensive. HUD officials responsible for the selected investments’ estimates stated that department guidance had not yet been established and that IT investments were not required to develop estimates that exhibit the four characteristics of a reliable estimate. As a result, according to these officials, cost estimating practices are inconsistently implemented across the department and are decentralized because of the reliance on the efforts and experience of various subject matter experts and contractors. Following this review, the department drafted guidance in June 2015 that was intended to conform to best practices in the Cost Guide. Until HUD establishes guidance that calls for the implementation of best practices identified in the Cost Guide, the department is less likely to develop reliable cost estimates for its IT investments that can serve as the basis for informed investment decision making. Many of the weaknesses found in the investments can be attributed to the lack of established cost-estimating guidance, which the department has not yet finalized because it has focused on addressing management weaknesses and taking action to establish an infrastructure to support improved cost estimation practices. Until HUD finalizes and ensures the implementation of guidance to improve its cost estimating practices, the department is at risk of continuing to make investment decisions based on unreliable information. Recommendation for Executive Action
To increase the likelihood that its IT investments develop reliable cost estimates, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD finalize, and ensure the implementation of, guidance that incorporates the best practices called for in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD relies extensively on IT to deliver services and manage programs in support of its mission. For fiscal year 2017, HUD requested $36 million for IT investments intended to deliver modernized enterprise-level capabilities that better support the department's mission. Critical to the success of such efforts is the department's ability to develop reliable cost estimates that project life-cycle costs and provide the basis for, among other things, informed decision making and realistic budget formulation.
The joint explanatory statement that accompanied the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision for GAO to evaluate HUD's cost estimating practices. This review determined the extent to which HUD implemented cost estimating best practices for selected IT investments. GAO selected four IT modernization investments with the largest portion of requested funding for fiscal year 2017, interviewed relevant agency officials, and analyzed and compared each investment's cost estimate to best practices in the Cost Guide . This guide states that, when most or all of the practices are “fully” or “substantially” met, an estimate is considered reliable.
What GAO Found
The cost estimates that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) developed for the four selected information technology (IT) investments were unreliable and, thus, lacked a sound basis for informing the department's investment and budgetary decisions. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide ( Cost Guide ) defines best practices that are associated with four characteristics of a reliable estimate—comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible. However, none of the cost estimates for the selected investments exhibited all of these characteristics. Only one estimate—for the Customer Relationship Management investment—more than minimally met best practices associated with any of the four characteristics because it partially met the practices for a comprehensive and accurate estimate. The remaining three investments minimally or did not meet the best practices associated with the four characteristics. For example, the Enterprise Data Warehouse estimate minimally met all four characteristics; the Enterprise Voucher Management System estimate did not meet the characteristic for being accurate and minimally met the other three characteristics; and the Federal Housing Administration Automation and Modernization estimate did not meet the characteristic for being credible, while minimally meeting the remaining characteristics (see table).
The significant weaknesses in the cost estimates for the selected investments can largely be attributed to the department's lack of guidance for developing reliable cost estimates. HUD officials responsible for the selected investments stated that the department had not required the development of estimates that exhibit the four characteristics of a reliable estimate. As a result, according to these officials, cost estimating practices have been decentralized and inconsistent across the department. While HUD drafted guidance in June 2015 that was intended to conform to the best practices in GAO's Cost Guide , the department has not yet finalized the guidance because it has focused on establishing the infrastructure needed to support improved cost estimation practices. Until HUD finalizes and ensures the implementation of guidance to improve its cost estimating practices, the department is at risk of continuing to make investment decisions based on unreliable information.
What GAO Recommends
To improve cost estimating practices, GAO recommends that HUD finalize and implement guidance that incorporates best practices called for in the Cost Guide . HUD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-107 | gao_GAO-16-107_0 | SBICs are able to borrow at favorable rates because SBA guarantees the loan obligations (known as debentures) that SBICs make. Holders of SBIC licenses may own or operate a single SBIC or multiple SBICs (sometimes referred to as multiple licenses under common control). Multiple Licensees Controlled Most SBA Leverage and Shared Similar Characteristics with Single Licensees
Multiple Licensees Controlled Most SBICs and SBA Leverage in 2014
About seventy percent (130 of 187) of debenture SBICs—the most common SBIC fund type—were managed by 69 multiple licensees in 2014, according to our analysis. 2). 5). Single and Multiple Licensees Had Largely Similar Characteristics
SBIC characteristics, including geographic distribution and management demographics, were largely similar for single and multiple licensees, according to our analysis. About 6 percent of multiple-license SBICs and 11 percent of single-license SBICs were estimated to have at least one female SBIC manager. SBICs in low- or moderate-income areas. Multiple Licensees Have Outperformed Single Licensees but Their Investments Have Similar Attributes across a Number of Measures
Multiple licensees, in the aggregate, demonstrated better investment performance than single licensees from 2005 to 2014, according to our analysis. We could not report on minority, women, and veteran ownership of SBIC investments because the data were unreliable, in part because SBA does not provide guidance to SBIC licensees on how to collect and report this information. Multiple- and single-license SBICs invested in small businesses representing a range of industries in 2014. More reliable data in this area would be consistent with SBA’s strategic plan, which cites as a strategic priority of the SBIC program expanding access to financial capital for minority-, women-, and veteran-owned small businesses. The degree to which the SBIC program’s performance can be attributed to SBA oversight is uncertain, but several statutory requirements, regulations, and oversight mechanisms—including licensing procedures, examinations, and liquidation and asset recovery—seek to manage financial risk. Application and Licensing Processes
According to SBA, applicant screening, which occurs through the application and licensing processes, is a key mechanism for managing program risk. Other Factors May Influence Program Performance
While SBA has procedures designed to manage financial risk to taxpayers from SBICs and their investments, the effect of SBA oversight on financial performance would be difficult to measure because it cannot easily be isolated from other internal and external factors, which include program design, economic conditions, and the characteristics of the SBICs and their investments. Recommendation for Executive Action
The Administrator of the Small Business Administration should direct the Office of Investment and Innovation to provide clear and specific guidance to SBIC licensees on how to collect and report data in Form 1031 on their investments in minority-, women-, and veteran-owned businesses. In its response, SBA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation addressed to it and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine the (1) characteristics of multiple-license Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC) compared with single-license SBICs, (2) investment performance of multiple licensees compared with single licensees and the attributes of the small businesses in which SBICs invest, and (3) overall financial performance of the SBIC program and the extent SBA manages the risk associated with the program. For the SBIC debenture and participating securities programs in particular, SBA provided these data for fiscal years 2003 through 2014 because 2003 was the year in which SBA started separately reporting losses for these two programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the SBIC program, SBA licenses privately owned and managed investment funds that provide capital to small businesses. SBICs use their own capital plus funds (known as leverage) that are borrowed at favorable rates because SBA guarantees the loan obligation, which is known as a debenture. Holders of SBIC licenses can manage a single SBIC (“single licensee”) or two or more SBICs (“multiple licensee”).
This report examines (1) the characteristics of single- and multiple-license SBICs, (2) the investment performance of single versus multiple licensees and the attributes of the small businesses in which they invest, and (3) the SBIC program's overall financial performance and the extent to which SBA manages program risk. GAO analyzed SBA data (generally covering from 2005-2014), policies, processes, and procedures and interviewed SBA staff, SBIC fund managers, and industry stakeholders, who were selected to represent a mix of SBIC characteristics and based on suggestions by various stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC) managed by entities holding multiple licenses controlled most Small Business Administration (SBA) leverage and shared similar characteristics with entities holding a single license. At the end of fiscal year 2014, multiple licensees controlled $5.2 billion of the $7 billion (about 74 percent) in outstanding debenture SBA leverage, compared to 2005, when they controlled 24 percent (see figure, left). SBIC characteristics, including geographic distribution and management demographics, were largely similar for single and multiple licensees.
Multiple licensees have demonstrated better aggregate investment performance than single licensees, although the investments have similar attributes. For example, from 2005 to 2014, 6 percent of multiple-license debenture SBICs were put into liquidation (typically because of excessive losses), compared with 39 percent of single-license SBICs (see figure, right). Both types of licensees invested in a roughly similar range of industries and geographic areas. Multiple-license SBICs were slightly more likely to invest in smaller enterprises or in low- or moderate-income areas. However, data on minority, women, and veteran ownership of SBIC investments are unreliable, in part because SBA does not provide guidance to SBIC licensees on how to collect and report this information. Providing such guidance would help improve the quality, consistency, and value of these data, which would help inform SBA's strategic priority of providing financial capital for underserved small businesses.
The SBIC program's financial performance has been relatively stable in recent years, although the degree to which program performance can be attributed to SBA oversight is unclear. For instance, most losses from 2003 to 2014 were incurred from SBICs remaining in the participating securities program (where SBA held an equity interest in SBICs), for which SBA stopped issuing new licenses in 2004 due to losses. The SBIC program's risk management mechanisms include the application and licensing processes, which are largely the same for single and multiple licensees, and requirements for private capital fundraising. SBA monitors SBICs through risk assessments of their financial condition; examinations assessing regulatory compliance; and, as necessary, liquidation to recover financial assets. The effect of SBA oversight on financial performance is difficult to measure, however, because it cannot easily be isolated from other internal and external factors, such as economic conditions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA provide guidance to SBIC licensees on how to collect and report data on their investments in minority-, women-, and veteran-owned businesses. SBA neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-181T | gao_GAO-12-181T_0 | 1). Army Faces Major Challenges to Identify a Feasible, Cost- Effective, and Executable GCV Solution
Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the Army faces major challenges to identify a feasible, cost-effective, and executable solution that meets the Army’s needs. Among these are making choices on which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle design and determining whether the best option is a new vehicle or a modified current vehicle. In our March 2011 testimony, we identified key questions about GCV pertaining to how urgently it is needed, robustness of the analysis of alternatives, plausibility of its 7-year schedule, cost and affordability, and whether mature technologies would be used. DOD and the Army have taken positive steps to increase their oversight of the program; however, the timely resolution of issues surrounding the areas previously identified will be a major challenge. Since GCV was originally conceived in 2009, the Army has already reduced some requirements and encouraged interested contractors to use mature technologies in their proposals. However, the schedule remains ambitious and USD/ATL has stipulated that the Army will need to demonstrate that the schedule is both feasible and executable. Ambitious Army Information Network Strategy Has Noteworthy Aspects but Unresolved Issues Could Affect Long- Term Implementation
The Army has taken a number of steps to put together a more realistic strategy to develop and field an information network for its deployed forces than the network envisioned for the Future Combat System program. However, the Army is proceeding without defining requirements for the network and articulating clearly defined capabilities. As a result, the Army runs the risk of developing a number of stovepipe capabilities that may not work together as a network, thus wasting resources. The Army has moved away from its plan for a single network development program under Future Combat System to an incremental approach with which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. With this baseline, the Army expects to build on elements of the network already in place with an emphasis on capturing emerging technologies that deliver capability incrementally to multiple units at the same time. The network integration evaluations are a key enabler of the Army’s new network strategy and assess systems that may provide potential benefits and value to the Army while identifying areas requiring additional development. The evaluation process provides the Army an opportunity to improve its knowledge of current and potential network capability. Additionally, it provides soldier feedback on the equipment being tested. For example, The Army has not yet announced requirements nor has it established cost and schedule projections for development and fielding of its network. With the termination of the ground mobile radio, it is unclear how waveform maturation will continue. Services to Rely on Industry to Provide Potential Solutions for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs
To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the Army and Marine Corps entered a technology development phase with multiple vendors to help increase their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technologies’ maturity level, and determine which combination of requirements were achievable. Because of the knowledge gained through the technology development phase, the services have worked together to identify trades in requirements to reduce weight and to drive down the cost of the vehicle. For example, the services found that JLTV could not achieve both protection levels and transportability, with weight being the issue. HMWWV Recapitalization Effort
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant role for the Up-Armored HMMWV in combat, combat support, and combat service support roles beyond fiscal year 2025 but their fleets are experiencing reduced automotive performance, loss of transportability, higher operation and sustainment costs, and the need for better protection as the threats have evolved. The Army plans to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored HMMWV fleets by establishing requirements, seeking solutions from industry through full and open competition, and testing multiple prototype vehicles before awarding a single production contract. The Army’s emerging effort—the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program— aims to modernize vehicles to increase automotive performance, regain mobility, extend service life by 15 years, and improve blast protection. As plans for GCV move forward, it will be important for DOD, the Army, and the Congress to focus attention on what GCV will deliver and at what cost and how that compares to other needs within the combat vehicle portfolio. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the Army canceled the Future Combat System in June of 2009, it began developing modernization plans, including developing a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and additional network capability. At the same time, the Army was considering options on how to improve its light tactical vehicles. This statement addresses potential issues related to developing (1) the new GCV, (2) a common information network, and (3) the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in a constrained budget environment. The statement is based largely on previous GAO work conducted over the last year in response to congressional requests and results of other reviews of Army modernization. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed program documentation, strategies, and test results; interviewed independent experts and Army and Department of Defense (DOD) officials; and witnessed demonstrations of current and emerging network technologies. DOD reviewed the facts contained in this statement and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Delivering a feasible, cost-effective, and executable GCV solution presents a major challenge to the Army, with key questions about the robustness of the analysis of alternatives, the plausibility of its 7-year schedule, and cost and affordability. DOD and the Army have taken steps to increase oversight of the program, but resolving these issues during technology development will remain a challenge. For example, the Army has already reduced some requirements and encouraged contractors to use mature technologies in their proposals, but the 7-year schedule remains ambitious, and delays would increase development costs. Independent cost estimates have suggested that 9 to 10 years is a more realistic schedule. Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the Army faces major challenges in deciding which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle design and determine whether the best option is a new vehicle or modifications to a current vehicle. The Army's new information network strategy moves away from a single network development program to an incremental approach with which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. The new strategy has noteworthy aspects, such as using periodic field evaluations to assess systems that may provide potential benefit and getting soldier feedback on the equipment being tested. However, the Army has not articulated requirements, incremental objectives, or cost and schedule projections for its new network. It is important that the Army proceed in defining requirements and expected capabilities for the network to avoid the risk of developing individual capabilities that may not work together as a network. With the cancellation last week of its ground mobile radio and continuing problems in developing technology to provide advanced networking capability, the Army will still need to find foundational pieces for its network. The Army is reworking earlier plans to develop and acquire the JLTV and is planning to recapitalize some of its High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWV). These efforts have just begun, however, and their results are not yet assured. To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the services relied on multiple vendors during technology development to increase their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technology maturity level, and determine which requirements were achievable. As a result, the services identified trades in requirements to drive down the cost of the vehicle. For example, the services found that JLTV could not achieve both protection level and transportability goals, so the services are accepting a heavier vehicle. A potential risk for the services in allowing industry to build vehicles for testing is that the prototypes may not be mature; the Army will need to keep its options open to changes that may result from these tests. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant future role for their Up-Armored HMMWV fleets, yet the fleets are experiencing reduced automotive performance, the need for better protection as threats have evolved, and other issues. The Army is planning to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored HMMWV fleet to increase automotive performance and improve blast protection. The Marine Corps' plans to extend the service life of some of its HMMWVs used in light tactical missions are not yet known.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations with this statement; however, consistent with previous work, this statement underscores the importance of developing sound requirements and focusing up front on what modernization efforts will deliver and at what cost. |
gao_GAO-06-253T | gao_GAO-06-253T_0 | Although the Social Security Act provides that people meeting the work and contribution requirements accrue benefits, the act also generally prohibits payment of benefits to people who are not lawfully present in the U.S. as specified by DHS regulations. IRTPA included several specific provisions for strengthening the SSN enumeration process and documentation requirements for obtaining SSNs and cards. IRTPA also required that SSA limit the number of replacement cards it issues annually; adopt measures to improve verification of documents presented to obtain an original or replacement Social Security card; independently verify any birth record presented to obtain an SSN; prevent the assignment of SSNs to unnamed children and adopt additional measures to prevent assignment of multiple SSNs to the same child; form an interagency taskforce to establish standards to better protect Social Security cards and SSNs from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft; and provide for implementation of security requirements by June 2006. The Social Security Protection Act (SSPA) of 2004 imposed new restrictions on the payment of Social Security benefits to noncitizens. Totalization Agreements
SSA also has specific procedures to award benefits for foreign-born workers who work in both the U.S. and in another country with which the U.S. has a totalization agreement. First, they eliminate dual social security coverage and taxes that multinational employers and employees encounter when workers temporarily reside in a foreign country with its own Social Security program. Revised Enumeration Procedures for the Foreign-Born Are Expected to Reduce Potential for Abuse
In coordination with the State Department and DHS, SSA determines who is eligible for an SSN by verifying certain immigration documents and determining if an individual’s card requires a work restriction. Depending on their immigration status, noncitizens may be eligible for one of three types of Social Security cards: regular cards, those cards valid for work only with authorization from the DHS, and nonwork SSN cards. Nonwork card: The third type of card is for people not eligible to work in the U.S. SSA sends recipients of these SSNs a card showing their name, SSN, and the inscription “NOT VALID FOR EMPLOYMENT.” To be issued these cards, noncitizens who are legally in the U.S. and do not have DHS permission to work must have been found eligible to receive a federally-funded benefit or are subject to a state or local law that requires them to have an SSN to get public benefits. As of 2003, SSA had issued a total of slightly more than 7 million nonwork Social Security cards, but in recent years SSA has greatly reduced the number it issues. For example, SSA requires third-party verification of all noncitizen documents, such as a birth certificate, with DHS and the State Department before issuing an SSN. Working undercover and posing as parents of newborns, our investigators were able to obtain two SSNs using counterfeit documents. Since SSPA required all noncitizens originally assigned an SSN on or after January 1, 2004, to have a work authorized SSN to accrue benefits, those living outside the country must also obtain a work- authorized SSN. SSA is also exploring a more systematic approach for independently verifying foreign countries’ data, such as the use of computer matches. Changes in immigration laws and shortcomings in the enforcement of those laws make it difficult for SSA to identify noncitizens who are eligible for SSNs and for benefit payments. Continued attention to these issues by both SSA and the Congress is essential to ensure that noncitizens receive benefits to which they are entitled and the integrity of the Social Security program is protected. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, an estimated 35.7 million foreign-born people resided in the United States, and many legitimately have SSNs. Many of these individuals have Social Security numbers (SSNs) which can have a key role in verifying authorization to work in the United States. However, some foreign-born individuals have been given SSNs inappropriately. Recent legislation, aimed at protecting the SSN and preventing fraud and abuse, changes how the Social Security Administration (SSA) assigns numbers and awards benefits for foreign-born individuals. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security asked GAO to address two questions. First, how does SSA determine who is and is not eligible for an SSN? Second, how does SSA determine who is and is not eligible for Social Security benefits?
What GAO Found
SSA determines who is eligible for an SSN by verifying certain immigration documents and determining if an individual's card requires a work restriction. Some foreign-born individuals are eligible for one of three kinds of Social Security cards depending in part on their immigration status: (1) regular cards, (2) those valid for work only with authorization from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and (3) those that are not valid for work--non-work cards. As of 2003 SSA had issued slightly more than 7 million non-work cards to people who need them to receive benefits for which they were otherwise entitled. Both SSA's Inspector General and GAO have identified weaknesses in SSA procedures for assigning SSNs and issuing cards, also known as enumeration. For example, working undercover and posing as parents of newborns, GAO investigators were able to obtain Social Security cards by using counterfeit documents. Congress has enacted recent legislation strengthening the SSN enumeration process and documentation requirements. SSA is implementing the law and is improving document verification and now requires third-party verification of noncitizen documents such as birth certificates and visual inspection of documents before issuing an SSN. SSA also continues to strengthen program integrity by, for example, restricting the number of replacement cards. Congress and SSA have also improved laws and procedures designed to strengthen program integrity in the payment of benefits to the foreign-born. Due to provisions of the Social Security Protection Act of 2004, some foreign-born individuals who were not authorized to work will no longer be eligible for benefits. To be entitled to benefits, the law requires noncitizens originally assigned an SSN after 2003 to have a work-authorized SSN. Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1996 require individuals to be lawfully present in the U.S. to receive Social Security benefits, though some noncitizens can receive benefits while living abroad, such as noncitizens who have worked in the U.S. and in a country with which the U.S. has a totalization agreement. SSA's totalization agreements coordinate taxation and public pension benefits. The agreements help eliminate dual taxation and Social Security coverage that multinational employers and employees encounter when workers temporarily reside in a foreign country with its own Social Security program. Successful implementation of these agreements requires the countries involved to carefully coordinate and verify data they exchange. Computer matches with foreign countries, for example, may help protect totalization programs from making payments to ineligible individuals. SSA is exploring options for undertaking such exchanges. |
gao_GAO-13-238 | gao_GAO-13-238_0 | Financial Services Industry and Diversity
We previously conducted work on the challenges faced in the financial sector for promoting and retaining a diverse workforce, focusing on private-sector firms.management level in the financial services industry did not change substantially from 1993 through 2008 and that diversity in senior positions was limited. For example, in 2011 the representation of women was greater in professional positions (about 51 percent) compared to sales positions (about 38 percent). Agency and Reserve Bank officials identified key challenges to increasing workforce diversity overall and at the senior management-level, including limited representation of minorities and women among internal and external candidate pools. Senior Management-Level Representation of Minorities and Women Varied at Agencies and Reserve Banks, with Slight Changes Overall
Senior management-level representation of minorities and women varied across individual federal financial agencies and the 12 Reserve Banks. In 2011, the representation of women among senior management-level employees ranged among the agencies from 31 percent at FDIC to 47 percent at FHFA. In 2011, the representation of minorities at the agencies ranged from 25 percent at NCUA to 44 percent at the Federal Reserve Board. Most agency and Reserve Bank OMWIs indicated that they had been conducting various diversity recruitment practices prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act—such as partnering with organizations focused on developing opportunities for minorities and women. Most agencies and Reserve Banks have developed and included a provision in contracts for services requiring their contractors to make efforts to ensure the fair inclusion of women and minorities in their workforce and subcontracted workforces. Similarly, according to Reserve Bank OMWI reports, Reserve Bank contracting dollars paid to businesses owned by minorities or women ranged between 3 percent and 24 percent in 2011 (see fig. With respect to our recommendation that each OMWI report on efforts to measure the progress of its employment diversity and inclusion practices, including measurement outcomes as appropriate, to indicate areas for improvement as part of their annual reports to Congress, all the federal financial agencies and Reserve Banks indicated that they plan to implement the recommendation: the OMWI Director of CFPB explained that its OMWI was the newest of such offices because the agency was created with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and that it planned to include measurement information in future reports; the OMWI Director of the Federal Reserve Board stated that the recommendation was consistent with its ongoing practices and that it would look for additional ways to report on diversity practices;
FDIC’s OMWI Director agreed with the recommendation and stated that it will include efforts to measure the progress of its diversity practices in its annual reports to Congress; the Acting Associate Director of FHFA’s OMWI stated that it would include measurement information in its 2013 OMWI report to Congress; the Executive Director of NCUA said the agency will work toward reporting on its efforts to measure the progress of workforce diversity and practices; the Comptroller of the Currency stated that OCC had a well- developed diversity and inclusion program through which the agency measures its progress and that OCC has included additional metrics in its 2013 OMWI report to Congress;
SEC’s OMWI Director noted that the agency plans to incorporate measurement information on its diversity and inclusion practices in its future OMWI reports to Congress;
Treasury’s OMWI Director agreed with our recommendation and stated that it was consistent with the agency’s efforts to use more than demographic representation to measure the progress of diversity and inclusion efforts; and the Federal Reserve Banks’ OMWI directors noted that the banks currently include some measurement information in annual reports and said that they will consider additional ways to measure and report on Reserve Banks’ diversity practices. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this report were to examine (1) what available data show about how the diversity of the financial services industry workforce and how diversity practices taken by the industry have changed from 2007 through 2011; (2) what available data show about how diversity in the workforces of the federal financial agencies and the Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks) has changed from 2007 through 2011; (3) how these federal financial agencies and Reserve Banks are implementing workforce diversity practices under section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Act, including the extent to which their workforce diversity practices have changed since the financial crisis; and (4) the status of federal financial agencies’ and Reserve Banks’ implementation of the contracting provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act related to the inclusion of women and minorities. Appendix IV: Representation of Minorities and Women at Federal Financial Agencies and Reserve Banks
We reviewed agency and Reserve Bank reports and found that since the financial crisis, senior management-level minority and gender diversity at the agencies and Reserve Banks has varied across individual entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the U.S. workforce has become increasingly diverse, many private- and public-sector entities recognize the importance of recruiting and retaining minorities and women for management-level positions to improve their business. The 2007-2009 financial crisis has renewed questions about commitment within the financial services industry (e.g., banking and securities) to workforce diversity. The Dodd-Frank Act required that eight federal financial agencies and the Federal Reserve Banks implement provisions to support workforce and contractor diversity. GAO was asked to review trends and practices since the beginning of the financial crisis. This report examines (1) workforce diversity in the financial services industry, the federal financial agencies, and Reserve Banks, from 2007 through 2011 and (2) efforts of the agencies and Reserve Banks to implement workforce diversity practices under the Dodd-Frank Act, including contracting. GAO analyzed federal datasets and documents and interviewed industry representatives and officials from the federal financial agencies and Reserve Banks.
What GAO Found
Management-level representation of minorities and women in the financial services industry and among federal financial agencies and Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks) has not changed substantially from 2007 through 2011. Industry representation of minorities in 2011 was higher in lower-level management positions--about 20 percent--compared to about 11 percent of senior-level manager positions. Industry representation of women at the overall management level remained at about 45 percent. Agency representation of minorities at the senior management level in 2011 ranged from 6 percent to 17 percent and from 0 percent to 44 percent at the Reserve Banks. Women's representation ranged from 31 to 47 percent at the agencies and from 15 to 58 percent at the Reserve Banks. Officials said the main challenge to improving diversity was identifying candidates, noting that minorities and women are often underrepresented in both internal and external candidate pools.
In response to the requirements in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), in 2011 federal financial agencies and Reserve Banks began to report annually on the recruitment and retention of minorities and women and other diversity practices. They all have established Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI) as required. Many agencies and Reserve Banks indicated they had recruited from minority-serving institutions and partnered with organizations focused on developing opportunities for minorities and women, and most described plans to expand these activities. Some used employee surveys or recruiting metrics to measure the progress of their initiatives, as suggested by leading diversity practices, but OMWIs are not required to include this type of information in the annual reports to Congress. Better reporting of measurement efforts will provide Congress, agency officials, and other stakeholders additional insights on the effectiveness of diversity practices and demonstrate how agencies and Reserve Banks are following a leading diversity practice. Most federal financial agencies and Reserve Banks are in the early stages of implementing the contracting requirements required under the act. For example, most now include a provision in contracts for services requiring contractors to make efforts to ensure the fair inclusion of women and minorities in their workforce and subcontracted workforce and have established ways to evaluate compliance. The proportion of an agency's dollars awarded or a Reserve Bank's dollars paid to minority- or woman-owned businesses reported in 2011 OMWI reports ranged between 3 percent and 38 percent.
What GAO Recommends
Each agency and Reserve Bank should include in its annual OMWI report to Congress efforts to measure the progress of its diversity practices. The agencies and Reserve Banks agreed to include this information in the annual OMWI reports. Additionally, some agencies and the Reserve Banks described steps they have taken or plan to take to address the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-616 | gao_GAO-10-616_0 | To achieve this goal, CDHPs combine a high-deductible health plan with a tax-advantaged account to pay for health care expenses. Data Suggest HRA Enrollees Were Healthier Than Traditional Plan Enrollees
On average, enrollees in the HRA groups of both employers we reviewed spent less and generally used fewer health care services before they switched into the HRA in 2003 than those who remained in the PPO, suggesting that they were healthier. Average annual spending per enrollee for the public employer’s HRA group was $1,505 lower than the PPO group for the 2-year period prior to switching in 2003. Similarly, the private employer’s HRA group spent $566 less per enrollee for the 2-year period prior to switching than the PPO group. Specifically, of the 21 studies that assessed health status of HRA and other CDHP enrollees, 18 found that they were healthier than traditional plan enrollees based on utilization of health care services, self-reported health status, or the prevalence of certain diseases or disease indicators. Spending and Utilization for Enrollees in HRAs Generally Increased by a Smaller Amount or Decreased Compared with Those in Traditional Plans
For the public and private employers we reviewed, health care spending and utilization of health care services for the HRA groups generally increased by a smaller amount or decreased compared with the PPO groups, from the period before to the period after switching. Additionally, the majority of the studies we reviewed that examined total or medical spending and controlled for differences in health status or other characteristics of enrollees reported lower spending among enrollees in HRAs and other CDHPs relative to traditional plans. Specifically, average annual spending for the HRA group increased by $478 per enrollee compared with $879 for the PPO group. However, average annual spending for prescription drugs for the HRA group decreased by $47 per enrollee compared with an increase of $263 per enrollee for the PPO group. In addition, we found that when compared with the PPO group, the average annual utilization of services per enrollee for the HRA group either increased by a smaller amount or decreased from the 2-year period before switching to the 5-year period after switching for six out of eight service types we reviewed. Specifically, average annual spending for the private employer’s HRA group increased by $152 per enrollee compared with $206 for the PPO group (we were not able to analyze pharmacy claims for this employer). At the specific service level, the private employer’s HRA group experienced greater increases in spending for inpatient hospital services compared with the PPO group, but this increase was offset by a decrease in spending for emergency room services as well as lower increases in spending for outpatient, physician office, and other services from the 2-year period before switching to the 3-year period after switching. OPM did not comment on the draft report. The remaining parties did not comment on the draft report. Two large employers. We conducted a comprehensive review of studies published from January 2003 through March 2009 that included an assessment of the health status, spending, utilization, or other demographic characteristics of HRA and other CDHP enrollees compared with those in traditional plans. Spending and Utilization of HRA and Traditional Plan Enrollees
To assess changes in spending and utilization of health care services for enrollees who switched into an HRA compared with those who stayed in a traditional plan, we analyzed the change in spending and utilization of health care services for the HRA and PPO groups from the period before to the period after introduction of the HRA in plan year 2003. The results of our analyses are not generalizable beyond the enrollees, health plans, and employers included in our review. The results of our employer analyses cannot be compared between the public and private employers. Demographic Characteristics of HRA and Traditional Plan Enrollees
Unlike our findings that policyholders in the HRA groups were younger and more likely to be male than those in the PPO groups for the two employers we reviewed, our analysis of national insurance carrier data and findings from published studies found mixed evidence on the age and gender of HRA enrollees compared with traditional plan enrollees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consumer-directed health plans (CDHP) combine a high-deductible health plan with a tax-advantaged account, such as a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA), that enrollees can use to pay for health care expenses. In an effort to restrain cost growth, several employers, including the federal government through its Office of Personnel Management (OPM), have offered HRAs for several years. For enrollees in HRAs compared with those in traditional plans such as preferred provider organization (PPO) plans, GAO assessed (1) differences in health status, and (2) changes in spending and utilization of health care services. GAO analyzed data from two large employers--one public and one private--that introduced an HRA option in 2003. GAO compared changes in health spending and utilization before and after 2003 for enrollees who switched from a PPO into an HRA (the HRA group) with those who stayed in a PPO (the PPO group). At the time GAO made its data requests to each employer, 2007 data from the public employer and 2005 data from the private employer were the most current and complete data available. GAO also reviewed published studies that included an assessment of the health status, spending, or utilization of HRA and other CDHP enrollees compared with traditional plan enrollees. Results are not generalizable beyond the enrollees, health plans, and employers GAO reviewed and also cannot be compared between the public and private employers.
What GAO Found
On average, enrollees in the HRA groups of both employers GAO reviewed spent less and generally used fewer health care services before they switched into the HRA in 2003 than those who remained in the PPO, suggesting that the HRA groups were healthier. Average annual spending per enrollee for the public employer's HRA group was $1,505 lower than the PPO group for the 2-year period prior to switching. (Spending for the public employer was based on analysis of both medical and pharmacy claims.) Likewise, the private employer's HRA group spent $566 less per enrollee for the 2-year period prior to switching than the PPO group (we were not able to examine pharmacy claims for the private employer). Similarly, of the 21 studies GAO reviewed that assessed the health status of HRA and other CDHP enrollees, 18 found they were healthier than traditional plan enrollees based on utilization of health care services, self-reported health status, or the prevalence of certain diseases or disease indicators. Other demographic differences may also explain spending and utilization differences including that policyholders in the HRA group were younger than those in the PPO group. Spending and utilization for enrollees in HRAs generally increased by a smaller amount or decreased compared with those in traditional plans that GAO reviewed. (1) Public employer. From the 2-year period before switching--2001 to 2002--to the 5-year period after switching--2003 to 2007--average annual spending for the HRA group increased by $478 per enrollee compared with $879 for the PPO group. This smaller increase for the HRA group was partially driven by decreases in spending for prescription drugs. Additionally, average annual utilization of services per enrollee increased by a smaller amount or decreased for the HRA group compared with the PPO group for six out of eight services GAO reviewed. (2) Private employer. From the 2-year period before switching--2001 to 2002--to the 3-year period after switching--2003 to 2005--average annual spending for the HRA group increased by $152 per enrollee compared with $206 for the PPO group. This smaller increase for the HRA group was partially driven by smaller increases in spending for physician office visits and decreases in spending for emergency room services. Additionally, average annual utilization of services per enrollee increased by a smaller amount or decreased for the HRA group compared with the PPO group for four out of seven services GAO reviewed. Similarly, GAO's review of published studies found that seven out of eight students that examined spending and controlled for differences in health status or other characteristics reported lower spending among HRAs and other CDHP enrollees relative to traditional plans. OPM did not provide comments on the draft report. Representatives of the two employers whose health plans GAO reviewed did not comment on the draft report. |
gao_GAO-08-280 | gao_GAO-08-280_0 | SEC Has Made Important Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses and Improving Security
SEC has corrected or mitigated 8 of the 20 security control weaknesses that we had reported as unresolved at the time of our previous audit. For example, SEC has documented authorizations for software modifications, developed a comprehensive program for monitoring access activities to its computer network environment, and tested and evaluated the effectiveness of controls for the general ledger system. SEC has also developed remedial action plans to mitigate identified weaknesses in its systems and developed a mechanism to track the progress of the actions taken to correct deficiencies. A key reason for its progress in these areas is that SEC senior management has been actively engaged in mitigating the previously reported weaknesses. While SEC has made important progress in strengthening its information security controls, it has not completed actions to correct or mitigate 12 previously reported weaknesses. In addition, SEC has not adequately controlled access to its facility. Significant Control Deficiencies Place SEC’s Internal Financial Information at Risk
Controls intended to restrict access to data and systems, as well as in other information security controls, insufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC financial systems and information. Specifically, SEC did not adequately restrict user privileges to the minimum access employees needed to perform their job-related duties on several of its enterprise databases. SEC did not always ensure that sensitive data was protected by encryption. As a result, increased risk exists that unauthorized individuals could gain access to sensitive computing resources and data and inadvertently or deliberately misuse or destroy them. SEC continues to have difficulty implementing certain configuration management controls. SEC Has Not Fully Implemented Its Information Security Program
Although SEC has made important progress in implementing its information security program, a key reason for these weaknesses is that SEC has not effectively or fully implemented key program activities. Among other things, FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and implement periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. For example, security plans for certain enterprise database applications were incomplete, information security training for key personnel was not sufficiently documented and monitored, security tests and evaluations of enterprise database applications were not comprehensive, and continuity of operations plans were not always complete. 2. 3. 4. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were (1) to determine the status of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) to determine whether controls over key financial systems were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out its mission to ensure that securities markets are fair, orderly, and efficiently maintained, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies extensively on computerized systems. Integrating effective information security controls into a layered control strategy is essential to ensure that SEC's financial and sensitive information are protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of SEC's fiscal year 2007 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of SEC's actions to correct previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of SEC's controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. To do this, GAO examined security plans, policies, and practices; interviewed pertinent officials; and conducted tests and observations of controls in operation.
What GAO Found
SEC has made important progress toward correcting previously reported information security control weaknesses. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 8 of 20 weaknesses previously reported as unresolved at the time of our prior audit. For example, SEC has documented authorizations for software modifications, developed a comprehensive program for monitoring access activities to its computer network environment, and tested and evaluated the effectiveness of controls for the general ledger system. In addition, the commission has made progress in improving its information security program. To illustrate, it has developed remedial action plans to mitigate identified weaknesses in its systems and developed a mechanism to track the progress of actions to correct deficiencies. A key reason for its progress is that SEC senior management has been actively engaged in implementing information security activities. Nevertheless, SEC has not completed actions to correct 12 previously reported weaknesses. For example, SEC workstations are susceptible to malicious code attacks and perimeter security is not properly implemented at its Operations Center. Significant control weaknesses intended to restrict access to data and systems, as well as other information security controls, continue to threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC's financial and sensitive information and information systems. SEC has not consistently implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to computing resources. For example, it did not always (1) consistently enforce strong controls for identifying and authenticating users, (2) limit user access to only those individuals who need such access to perform their job functions, (3) encrypt sensitive data, (4) log and monitor security related events, (5) physically protect its computer resources, and (6) fully implement certain configuration management controls. A key reason for these weaknesses is that SEC has not yet fully implemented its information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Specifically, SEC has not effectively or fully implemented key program activities. For example, security plans for certain enterprise database applications were incomplete, information security training for certain key personnel was not sufficiently documented and monitored, security tests and evaluations of enterprise database applications were not comprehensive, and continuity of operations plans were not always complete. As a result, SEC is at increased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of its financial information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of its financial systems, operations, and services. |
gao_GAO-02-968T | gao_GAO-02-968T_0 | A Hospital’s Labor Cost Adjustment Is Based On Average Wages Paid in a Geographic Area
Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) provides incentives for hospitals to operate efficiently by paying them a predetermined, fixed amount for each inpatient hospital stay, regardless of the actual costs incurred in providing the care. Labor Cost Adjustment Does Not Adequately Account for Wage Differences Within Certain Areas
The variation in hospital wages within some Medicare geographic areas – MSAs or the non-metropolitan areas in a state—is systematic across different parts of these areas. While wages paid by hospitals are expected to vary within a labor market, such systematic variation suggests that some Medicare geographic areas include multiple labor markets within which hospitals pay different average wages. Because the labor cost adjustment does not take this kind of systematic variation into account, the adjustment sometimes does not appropriately reflect the average wages that hospitals pay. Certain Hospitals Can Be Reclassified Without Meeting Wage Criterion
While reclassification is designed to increase payments to hospitals paying wages significantly above the average for their area, certain provisions allow some hospitals that pay lower wages to reclassify. Physician Fees Are Adjusted for Cost-of- Living, Practice Expense and Malpractice Premium Differences
Medicare’s physician fee schedule, which specifies the amount that Medicare will pay for each physician service, includes an adjustment to help ensure that the fees paid in a geographic area appropriately reflect the cost of living in that area and the costs associated with the operation of a practice. Medicare’s geographic adjustments for physician fees are based on indexes that are designed to reflect cost differences among the 92 areas. To ensure that PPS rewards hospitals because they are efficient, rather than because they operate in favorable circumstances, payment adjustments are made to account for cost differences across hospitals that are beyond any individual hospital’s control. Geographic reclassification provides relief to some hospitals that pay wages that are higher than the average in their area. Their labor cost adjustment, however, is not necessarily the cause of these problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses Medicare program payment adjustments to hospitals and physicians that account for geographic differences in costs.
What GAO Found
Because Medicare's hospital and physician payment systems are based on national rates, these geographic cost adjustments are essential to account for costs beyond providers' control and to ensure that beneficiaries have adequate access to services. If these adjustments are not adequate, this could affect providers' financial stability and their ability or willingness to continue serving Medicare patients. Medicare's payments to hospitals vary with the average wages paid in a hospital's labor market. Yet, some hospitals believe that the labor cost adjustment applied does not reflect the average wage in their labor market area. Medicare's labor cost adjustment does not adequately account for geographic differences in hospital wages in some areas because a single adjustment is applied to all hospitals in an area, even though it may encompass multiple labor markets or different types of communities within which hospitals pay significantly different average wages. Geographic reclassification addresses some inequities in Medicare's labor cost adjustments by allowing some hospitals that pay wages enough above the average in their area to receive higher labor cost adjustments. However, some hospitals can reclassify even though they pay wages that are comparable to the average in their area. To help ensure that beneficiaries in all parts of the country have access to services, Medicare adjusts its physician fee schedule on the basis of indexes designed to reflect cost differences among 92 geographic areas. The adjustment is designed to help ensure that the fees paid appropriately reflect the cost of living and operating a practice in that area. |
gao_GAO-05-427 | gao_GAO-05-427_0 | Figure 1 shows the locations of DOD’s prepositioned stocks. Inventory Shortfalls and Poor Equipment Condition Leave Many of DOD’s Prepositioning Programs at Risk
DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale conflict emerge due to inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance condition of some of its prepositioned stocks. For example, the department has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support ongoing operations in Iraq and relatively little has been reconstituted. In addition, while remaining stocks provide some residual capability, many have significant inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. For example, the Army used much of the equipment and supplies associated with the combat brigade sets stored at land sites in Kuwait and Qatar and aboard prepositioning ships afloat near Diego Garcia to support operations in Iraq. The Air Force Is Reporting Low Inventory Fill and Some Stocks in Poor Condition
The Air Force has used a considerable amount of its prepositioned equipment and supplies to support combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and, as a result, the inventory fill of many of these stocks is low. While the Air Force is working on refilling its prepositioned equipment and supplies, if a conflict arises in the near term, these stocks may not be available for use as it is unclear when these stocks will be refilled. Although the precise operational risks created by shortfalls in the Marine Corps and Air Force’s prepositioned stocks are difficult to assess, officials from these services told us that these risks can be managed. However, should a new conflict arise in the near term—especially one where U.S. forces did not control the timing—the combatant commander would likely face even more difficult operational challenges. DOD and Some of the Military Services Have Provided Insufficient Oversight Over Their Prepositioning Programs
Oversight over prepositioning programs by DOD and the military services has been insufficient, despite the importance of prepositioning to the military. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems to linger. However, DOD has not adhered to its directive on war reserve materiel policy that could provide oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials further told us they did not believe the reporting requirement in the directive was necessary because they were able to provide adequate oversight of the department’s prepositioning programs through other mechanisms, such as reviewing the services’ budget submissions and quarterly readiness assessments. As a result, the services cannot assess the overall readiness of their prepositioning programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future. Army officials told us that its information management system does not provide reliable information on the inventory levels and maintenance condition of its operational projects and sustainment stocks. Inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain management, have been considered high-risk areas by us since 1990. DOD Lacks A Plan To Coordinate Future Prepositioning Programs
DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department’s plans to rely on them in the future. In the absence of a departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and future plans for these programs, the military services have been recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Without an overarching framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives and identifies the resources required to implement the future programs, DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will ultimately produce programs that will operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable. To assess the sufficiency of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, we discussed the processes used by DOD and the services to oversee their prepositioning programs with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services. To assess whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of its prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy, we collected and analyzed information from the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency on the future plans for their prepositioning programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The importance of prepositioned stocks to the U.S. military was highlighted during recent operations in Iraq, as much of the equipment and supplies stored at land sites in the region and aboard prepositioning ships were used to support operations. Long-standing problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD) prepositioning program are systematic of the inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain management issues, that GAO has considered as high-risk areas since 1990. GAO was asked to review the risks facing DOD's prepositioning programs, including an assessment of (1) the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of these stocks, (2) the sufficiency of DOD and service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, and (3) whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of the department's prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy.
What GAO Found
DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks provide some residual capability, many of the programs face significant inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. For example, the Army has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned stocks to support operations in Iraq. Some of its storage sites have shortfalls of equipment and sustainment items, like spare parts, and some stocks are in poor condition. Additionally, the Marine Corps has used a significant portion of the stocks downloaded from 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support operations in Iraq and it is unclear when this equipment will be refilled. The Air Force is also continuing to use a considerable amount of its prepositioned stocks to support combat operations in Iraq and it is unclear when these stocks will be refilled. The precise operational risk created by these shortfalls is difficult to assess. However, should a new conflict arise in the near term, the combatant commander would likely face difficult operational challenges. The department and the military services have provided insufficient oversight over DOD's prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems with determining program requirements and managing inventory to persist. DOD has not enforced its directive that could provide centralized oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials told us they did not enforce this directive because they were able to provide adequate oversight through other mechanisms. Even if the department had enforced its directive, however, the requirements underpinning some of DOD's prepositioning programs are questionable and the services do not have sufficient information on the inventory level and maintenance condition of some prepositioned stocks. Without reliable information on requirements, inventory levels, and maintenance condition, DOD cannot provide sufficient oversight over its programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future. DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department's plans to rely on them in the future. DOD's recently published defense strategy indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative, flexible, and joint. In the absence of a departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and future plans for these programs, the services have been recapitalizing stocks and developing future plans without an understanding of how the programs will fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Without a framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives, DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will produce programs that operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable. |
gao_GAO-08-855 | gao_GAO-08-855_0 | FARA requires all persons in the United States working as agents of a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal to disclose to Justice such connections, as well as the activities they perform on behalf of such principals in the United States. Certain activities, such as humanitarian, commercial, and legal activities, are exempt from FARA. Agencies Promote Compliance with Post-Government Employment Restrictions and Foreign Agent Registration Requirements
The agencies (State, Treasury, USAID, and USTR) we reviewed are not required to and generally do not collect and maintain information on and monitor the post-government employment activities of persons who leave government employment, including former senior government employees who represent foreign entities. Justice Collects and Maintains Information on Entities That Register as Foreign Agents, and Promotes Voluntary Compliance with FARA
Justice collects and maintains information on all entities that register with the department as foreign agents; however, this information does not identify individuals who were former senior federal employees, and Justice is not required to do so. However, this number may not include all former senior federal employees who represent foreign entities because individuals engaged in certain activities who may be exempted, including those registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, are not required to register with Justice. The 29 registrants we identified engaged in activities that included the promotion of trade, lobbying, policy consulting, and public relations on the behalf of foreign principals such as the governments of Argentina, China, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq. Agencies Face Information, Legal, and Resource Challenges
The agencies we reviewed face information, legal, and resource challenges in promoting compliance with post-government employment restrictions and in enforcing and monitoring the registration requirements of FARA. For example, while the ethics officials provide guidance and information to employees on post-government employment restrictions, they do not consistently document specific advice provide to senior federal employees. In addition, OGE has encouraged the executive branch agencies to document such advice. For example, a November 17, 2005, OGE memorandum to all designated agency ethics officials discussed the advantages of documenting advice and offered suggestions on when to document ethics advice. The agencies document information such as ethics training courses given, subject matters covered, and counseling services offered to employees. Legal and Resource Challenges
Justice officials cite a lack of clear legal authority and a lack of resources as barriers to increased monitoring of FARA compliance. Documentation of specific advice on post-government employment restrictions provided to senior federal employees can help the agencies to prove the intent element needed to prosecute violations of the post- government employment restrictions. However, Justice officials said the department does not have clear legal authority to inspect the records of persons that it believes should be registered or to require advance written notification by persons engaging in exempt activities. Without advance written notification, Justice has no way of knowing whether persons exempting themselves should in fact be registered. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To enhance Justice’s ability to ensure that the American people know the identity of persons trying to influence U.S. government policy in the United States on behalf of foreign entities, Congress may wish to consider (1) granting the Department of Justice civil investigative demand authority to inspect records of persons Justice believes should be registered as foreign agents and (2) requiring persons claiming certain exemptions to provide advance written notification to Justice before engaging in the exempt activities. We are sending this report to other interested Members of Congress and to the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Directors of the Office of Government Ethics and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Trade Representative. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the U.S. government collects and maintains information on the post-government employment activities of former senior federal employees who represent foreign entities, we analyzed Office of Government Ethics (OGE) guidance and other documents on post-government employment restrictions. From this process, we identified 29 former senior federal officials that registered as foreign agents between calendar years 2000 and 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has enacted post-government employment restrictions and foreign agent registration requirements with the objectives of protecting the U.S. government against the improper use of government information by former federal employees and ensuring the American people know the identity of persons trying to influence U.S. government policy in the United States on behalf of foreign entities. This report discusses (1) the extent to which selected agencies have information on the post-government employment activities of former senior federal employees who represent foreign principals and (2) the challenges the agencies face in enforcing these requirements. We reviewed federal ethics guidance, laws, and other documents, and interviewed officials at the Departments of State and the Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Trade Representative.
What GAO Found
Executive branch agencies are not required to and do not collect and maintain information on the post-government employment activities of former senior federal employees who represent foreign principals. Post-government employment restrictions prohibit former senior federal employees from engaging in certain activities, such as lobbying or other advocacy communications, for a specified period of time after leaving federal service. The agencies we reviewed undertake a variety of activities, including providing training and advice, to promote compliance with the restrictions. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires that all persons in the United States working as agents of a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal disclose to the Department of Justice (Justice) such connections as well as the activities they perform on behalf of such principals in the United States. Justice provides information on FARA registration requirements to the public. It also collects information on all entities that register with Justice as foreign agents. However, the registration information does not identify individuals who are former senior federal employees. Nevertheless, of the nearly 8,000 senior federal employees who left government service between calendar years 2000 and 2007, we identified 29 who registered as foreign agents and engaged in activities that ranged from promoting tourism to lobbying on behalf of foreign principals such as the governments of Argentina and Saudi Arabia. This number may not include all former senior federal employees who represent foreign entities because individuals engaged in exempted activities under FARA, such as diplomatic, commercial, and legal activities, and those registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, are not required to register. The agencies we reviewed face information, legal, and resource challenges in promoting compliance with the post-government employment restrictions and monitoring FARA. One challenge is inconsistent documentation of advice provided to senior federal employees on post-government employment restrictions. While agencies document information such as ethics training courses given, subject matters covered, and counseling services offered, they do not consistently keep records of what advice was given to specific employees. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has encouraged the executive branch agencies to document such advice. For example, a 2005 OGE memorandum to all designated agency ethics officials discussed the advantages of documenting advice and offered suggestions on when to document ethics advice. Documentation of advice is useful for proving intent, which can help to prosecute violations of the restrictions. In addition, a lack of clear legal authority and a lack of resources have been cited by Justice as barriers to increased monitoring of FARA compliance. For example, Justice officials said the department does not have clear legal authority to inspect the records of persons that it believes should be registered and that the department does not have the authority to require advance written notification from persons claiming to be exempt from FARA requirements. Without advance written notification, Justice has no way of knowing whether persons exempting themselves should in fact be registered. |
gao_GAO-02-747 | gao_GAO-02-747_0 | However, we found that the redistribution was illegal because it moved disbursement charges back to an appropriation account that had closed several months before the initial disbursement was made. However, the officials told us that because there are so many contracts that may have to be reaudited to correct the accounting, they do not plan to have the reaudits and corrections for fiscal year 2001 closed account adjustments completed until September 2004. Upgraded Controls Help Reduce Amount of Closed Account Adjustments
DOD’s reported closed account adjustments during the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002 totaled about $200 million, or about 80 percent less than the over $1 billion of closed account adjustments DOD reportedly made during the same 6-month period of fiscal year 2001. We did not determine for each of these contracts why and for what purpose the numerous ACRNs were being used. As noted earlier in this report, these actions are beginning to produce positive short-term results while efforts to address the long-term problems are still ongoing. If the Congress finds in the future that DOD top management does not sustain its commitment to address its overall disbursement problems, the Congress could require a combination of oversight and reporting by DOD as to the validity of any closed account adjustments. If DOD could not correct the error, it would not be able to make the current payment. This will require a sustained commitment by DOD’s top management team over a number of years. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to direct the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to help ensure that DFAS Columbus completes its review and correction of the remaining fiscal year 2000 illegal and otherwise improper adjustments, reverse closed account adjustments made during fiscal year 2001 identified in this report as illegal or otherwise improper, determine the entries necessary to correct the accounting for reversed fiscal year 2001 transactions, help ensure that DFAS Columbus completes the review and correction of the additional $1.1 billion of fiscal year 2001 adjustments it has scheduled for detailed review, and continue with DFAS’s top-level management attention and monitoring of the program for future adjustments to closed appropriation accounts. | What GAO Found
Congress changed the law governing the use of appropriation accounts in 1990 because it found that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have spent hundreds of millions of dollars for purposes that Congress had not approved. The 1990 law provided that, 5 years after the expiration of the period of availability of a fixed-term appropriation, the appropriation account be closed and all remaining balances canceled. After closing, the appropriation account could no longer be used for obligations or expenditures for any purpose. DOD has started the process of correcting the illegal or improper closed account adjustments made during fiscal year 2000. However, this will require substantial effort and, according to DOD, estimates will not be complete before the end of fiscal year 2002. DOD had upgraded its system control features by the end of fiscal year 2001 to preclude many of the wholesale adjustments that GAO had previously identified. Because its system enhancements were done in stages, including some near the end of fiscal year 2001, DOD continued to make large amounts of illegal and otherwise improper closed account adjustments during the year. However, given the intensity of staff efforts to address these issues, it did not expect to complete the correct accounting for transactions found to be in error until September 2004. A lack of fundamental controls and management oversight over the closed accounts was the primary reason DOD was making so many closed account adjustments. DOD's action to resolve its problems with closed account adjustments is beginning to produce positive short-term results. However, if DOD fails to sustain these positive results, Congress could require DOD to validate and report to the Congress all closed account adjustments. |
gao_GAO-07-398T | gao_GAO-07-398T_0 | DHS’s Transformation
We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003 based on three factors. For example, many of the major components that were merged into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s national security mission was of such importance that the failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’ health and safety, and our economy. DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges
Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital and acquisition efforts. The strategy should also involve key stakeholders to help ensure that resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in the development of the plan. DHS has also not completed other important planning-related activities. However, DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its management integration efforts. Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage them. Financial Management and Internal Controls
DHS has made limited improvements in addressing financial management and internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant challenges in these areas. Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. Transportation Security
Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in effectively executing transportation security efforts. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS’s Transformation and Integration Efforts
To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure their progress. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
Implementation and Transformation
High-Risk Series: An Update. Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, management challenges facing DHS, programmatic challenges facing DHS, and actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure success. While DHS has developed a strategic plan, the plan does not link resource requirements to goals and objectives, and its creation did not involve key stakeholders to ensure resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its integration efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements revealed 10 material internal control weaknesses and confirmed that DHS's financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital--the centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will require continued attention to ensure that DHS allocates its resources efficiently and effectively. Since GAO's January 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure that its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advanced contracting for goods and services necessary for emergency response. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its existing management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. |
gao_GAO-07-62 | gao_GAO-07-62_0 | More Than 500 Statistical or Research Surveys Have Been Approved
At the time of our review, OMB had approved 584 new and ongoing statistical and research surveys as recorded in the database of OMB- approved information collections. Forty percent of OMB-approved statistical and research surveys were administered to individuals and households, as shown in figure 2. OMB has developed guidance that agencies can use in complying with the approval process. If specific information is needed for identification, classification, or categorization of respondents; or analysis in conjunction with other data elements provided by the respondent, and is not otherwise available in the detail necessary to satisfy the purpose and need for which the collection is undertaken; and if the information is considered essential to the purpose and need of the collection, and/or to the collection methodology or analysis of results, then the information is generally deemed to be necessary, and therefore not duplicative within the meaning of the PRA and OMB regulation.”
When an agency is ready to submit a proposed information collection to OMB, the agency’s CIO is responsible for certifying that the information collection satisfies the PRA standards, including a certification that the information collection is not unnecessarily duplicative of existing information sources. OMB Is Responsible for Reviewing Agencies’ Efforts to Identify and Prevent Unnecessary Duplication
OMB has three different guidance publications that agencies can consult in the process of developing information collection submissions, according to OMB officials. Duplicative Content in Selected Surveys Exists, but Survey Purposes and Scope Differ
On the basis of OMB’s definition of unnecessary duplication, the surveys we reviewed could be considered to contain necessary duplication. To examine selected surveys to assess the extent of unnecessary duplication in areas with similar subject matter, we looked at surveys that addressed three areas: (1) people without health insurance (CPS, NHIS, MEPS, and SIPP), (2) people with disabilities (NHIS, NHANES, MEPS, SIPP, and ACS), and (3) the housing questions on the AHS and ACS. However, the agencies and OMB judged that this was not unnecessary duplication given the differences among the surveys. The SIPP originated in 1983 in order to provide data on income, labor force, and government program participation. While these differences can be explained, the wide differences in the estimates are of concern and have created some confusion. For example, the 2004 CPS estimate for people who were uninsured for a full year is over 50 percent higher than the NHIS estimate for that year. Starting in 2010, the ACS will replace the long-form census. SIPP has been used to estimate future costs of certain government programs. Agencies Have Undertaken Efforts to Improve the Efficiency and Relevance of Surveys
In addition to the seven surveys discussed previously, we also identified examples of how, over the years, agencies have undertaken efforts to enhance their surveys’ relevance and efficiency through steps such as using administrative data in conjunction with survey data, reexamining and combining or eliminating surveys, and redesigning existing surveys. OMB recognizes that the federal government should build upon agencies’ practice of reexamining individual surveys to conduct a comprehensive reexamination of the portfolio of major federal household surveys, in light of the advent of the ACS. In many cases, the government is still trying to do business in ways that are based on conditions, priorities, and approaches that existed decades ago and are not well suited to addressing today’s challenges. Recommendation for Executive Action
To deal with the longer term considerations crucial in making federally funded surveys more effective and efficient, GAO recommends that the Director of OMB work with the Interagency Council on Statistical Policy to plan for a comprehensive reexamination to identify opportunities for redesigning or reprioritizing the portfolio of major federal household surveys. HHS also stated that NCHS works through various mechanisms to ensure that surveys are efficient. For the second objective describing current agency and OMB roles in identifying and preventing unnecessary duplication, we took several different steps. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal statistical information is used to make appropriate decisions about budgets, employment, and investments. GAO was asked to (1) describe selected characteristics of federally funded statistical or research surveys, (2) describe agencies' and Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) roles in identifying and preventing unnecessary duplication, (3) examine selected surveys to assess whether unnecessary duplication exists in areas with similar subject matter, and (4) describe selected agencies' efforts to improve the efficiency and relevance of surveys. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials. Using this information and prior GAO work, GAO identified surveys with potential unnecessary duplication.
What GAO Found
At the time of GAO's review, OMB had approved 584 ongoing federal statistical or research surveys, of which 40 percent were administered to individuals and households. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, agencies are to certify to OMB that each information collection does not unnecessarily duplicate existing information, and OMB is responsible for reviewing the content of agencies' submissions. OMB provides guidance that agencies can use to comply with the approval process and avoid unnecessary duplication, which OMB defines as information similar to or corresponding to information that could serve the agency's purpose and is already accessible to the agency. Based on this definition, the seven surveys GAO reviewed could be considered to contain necessary duplication. GAO identified three subject areas, people without health insurance, people with disabilities, and housing, covered in multiple major surveys that could potentially involve unnecessary duplication. Although they have similarities, most of these surveys originated over several decades, and differ in their purposes, methodologies, definitions, and measurement techniques. These differences can produce widely varying estimates on similar subjects. For example, the estimate for people who were uninsured for a full year from one survey is over 50 percent higher than another survey's estimate for the same year. While agencies have undertaken efforts to standardize definitions and explain some of the differences among estimates, these issues continue to present challenges. In some cases, agencies have reexamined their existing surveys to reprioritize, redesign, combine, and eliminate some of them. Agencies have also used administrative data in conjunction with their surveys to enhance the quality of information and limit respondent burden. These actions have been limited in scope, however. In addition, two major changes to the portfolio of major federal household surveys are underway. The American Community Survey is intended to replace the long-form decennial census starting in 2010. This is considered to be the cornerstone of the government's efforts to provide data on population and housing characteristics and will be used to distribute billions of dollars in federal funding. Officials are also redesigning the Survey of Income and Program Participation which is used in estimating future costs of certain government benefit programs. In light of these upcoming changes, OMB recognizes that the federal government can build upon agencies' practices of reexamining individual surveys. To ensure that surveys initiated under conditions, priorities, and approaches that existed decades ago are able to cost-effectively meet current and emerging information needs, there is a need to undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the long standing portfolio of major federal household surveys. The Interagency Council on Statistical Policy (ICSP), which is chaired by OMB and made up of the heads of the major statistical agencies, is responsible for coordinating statistical work and has the leadership authority to undertake this effort. |
gao_GAO-06-939T | gao_GAO-06-939T_0 | We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders
Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent, simultaneous border crossings. For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors. Suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in determining whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources our investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington, D.C.
Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.- Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border
Northern Border Crossing
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our investigators – acting in an undercover capacity – drove to an official port of entry between Canada and the United States. At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the booth for their primary inspection. The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they were transporting in their vehicle. Our investigators were then directed to park in a secondary inspection zone, while the CBP inspector conducted further inspections of the vehicle. Our investigators drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document. The instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document. Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were able to transport into the United States during our operation would be sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of mass disruption. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. GAO's testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed during its investigation. GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-06-545R).
What GAO Found
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of GAO's investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO's investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington D.C. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, GAO's investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. |
gao_GAO-01-906 | gao_GAO-01-906_0 | Background
The U.S. government is one of the world’s largest property owners, with a real estate portfolio of over 400,000 defense and civilian buildings and over one-half billion acres of land. Multiple potential benefits to the federal government of public-private partnerships were also identified. Partnerships could even provide other financial benefits to the federal government, such as reduced operating expenses and increased income that could be used for renovating other federal buildings. The potential benefits of public-private partnerships do not diminish the need for GSA to pursue and consider other alternatives for addressing problems in deteriorating federal buildings, such as federal financing through appropriations or the sale or exchange of property. However, a determination on how the partnerships would be treated for budget-scoring purposes would have to be made after more details are available on the partnerships. This study only looked at the potential benefits to the federal government and private sector of public-private partnerships as a management tool to address problems in deteriorating federal buildings. Public-Private Partnership
An arrangement by which the federal government contributes real property and a private entity contributes financial capital and borrowing ability to redevelop or renovate real property to serve, in part or in whole, a public need. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government is one of the world's largest property owners, with a real estate portfolio of more than 400,000 defense and civilian buildings and more than one-half billion acres of land. Each year, the federal government spends billions of dollars to maintain its buildings. Even so, the General Services Administration (GSA) contends that it needs $4 billion, over and above these expenditures, to maintain its existing inventory. This report identifies the potential benefits to the federal government of entering into public-private partnerships on real property--an arrangement in which the federal government contributes real property and a private entity contributes financial capital and borrowing ability to redevelop or renovate the real property.
What GAO Found
GAO found that public-private partnership authority could be an important management tool to address problems in deteriorating federal buildings, but further study of how the tool would actually work and its benefits compared to other options is needed. Potential net benefits to the federal government of entering into these public-private partnerships include better space, lower operating costs, and increased revenue without up-front federal capital expenditures if further analysis shows that they would not be treated as capital leases for budget-scoring purposes. The potential benefits of public-private partnerships do not diminish the need for GSA to pursue other alternatives for addressing problems in deteriorating federal buildings. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see Public-Private Partnerships: Factors to Consider When Deliberating Governmental Use as a Real Property Management Tool, by Bernard L. Ungar, Director for Physical Infrastructure Issues, before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, House Committee on Government Reform. GAO-02-46T , October 1 (11 pages). |
gao_GAO-08-724 | gao_GAO-08-724_0 | IHS-funded facilities are allowed to retain reimbursements without an offsetting reduction in their IHS funding. Federal Consultation Requirements
In recognition of the unique government-to-government relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, federal agencies are required by Executive Order to consult with Indian tribes on “policies that have tribal implications.” The order states that “ach agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.” The order defines policies that have tribal implications as regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the federal government and Indian tribes. CMS and IHS Have Interacted to Provide Support as Well as Address Broader Policy and Regulatory Concerns
CMS and IHS have interacted to provide support to IHS-funded facilities and Indian tribes in accessing Medicare and Medicaid as well as to address efforts associated with broader policy and regulatory concerns regarding the two programs. At a broader policy level, CMS and IHS have worked together on policy initiatives aimed at ensuring that existing health care policies meet the needs of IHS-funded facilities and the populations they serve. Additionally CMS and IHS interactions have included assistance intended to maximize IHS-funded facilities’ collection of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. With regard to regulations, CMS and IHS have had mixed success identifying CMS regulatory changes that have the potential to affect IHS- funded facilities and their populations and thus warrant IHS review. CMS Has Used Tribal Liaisons and an Advisory Board as Its Mechanisms to Interact with Indian Tribes
CMS has used two key mechanisms to interact with representatives from Indian tribes, namely (1) tribal liaisons, who generally serve as tribal representatives’ points of contact within CMS and provide assistance with Medicare and Medicaid, and (2) an advisory board, which provides input to CMS about issues affecting the delivery of health care to American Indians and Alaska Natives. Interactions between CMS officials and the TTAG are meant to complement, but not replace, consultation between CMS and Indian tribes. The TTAG has been an important vehicle for CMS to obtain input from tribal representatives. CMS Efforts to Consult with Indian Tribes Have Relied Primarily on HHS Annual Regional Consultation Sessions
CMS has used the annual HHS regional consultation sessions as its main mechanism to consult with the 562 federally recognized Indian tribes; CMS is required by Executive Order and HHS policy to consult with Indian tribes about policies that have tribal implications. However, consulting with so many tribes is an inherently difficult task, in part because of the variation in the size, location, and economic status of the Indian tribes. The HHS regional consultation sessions have offered limited time for consultation and discussion, as the sessions have generally occurred in the spring and lasted 1 to 2 days. Most of the state Medicaid programs reviewed reported consulting with Indian tribes about changes to their Medicaid program. Medicaid Programs Have Used Mechanisms, Such as Tribal Liaisons, and State Policies to Interact and Consult with Indian Tribes
The six state Medicaid programs we reviewed have used at least one of three mechanisms to interact and consult with Indian tribes: (1) tribal liaisons—who serve as the tribes’ primary contact with the states on issues related to Medicaid; (2) advisory boards—which, among other things, inform the state about Medicaid issues affecting American Indians and Alaska Natives; and (3) other regularly scheduled meetings—which states and tribes used to discuss Medicaid issues and identify opportunities for collaboration, technical assistance, and consultation. Policies
Five of the six states we reviewed—Arizona, Minnesota, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Utah—reported having policies in place that govern the interactions, and in most cases consultations, between their states’ Medicaid programs and Indian tribes. American Indians and Alaska Natives Have Faced Several Barriers to Medicare and Medicaid Enrollment Despite Efforts to Assist with the Application Process
American Indians and Alaska Natives have faced several barriers to Medicare and Medicaid enrollment despite efforts to provide assistance with the application process. For example, almost all of the IHS-funded facilities we visited had staff who help patients complete and submit Medicare and Medicaid applications. Other barriers were similar to those faced by other populations. CMS acknowledged that it is working to improve its process for identifying whether proposed regulatory changes would affect IHS-funded facilities and the populations they serve. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Director of the Indian Health Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
By law, facilities funded by the Indian Health Service (IHS) may retain reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid without an offsetting reduction in funding. Ensuring that IHS-funded facilities enroll individuals in--and obtain reimbursement from--Medicare and Medicaid can provide an important means of expanding the funding for health care services for the population served by IHS. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare and oversees states' Medicaid programs, is required by Executive Order and HHS policy to consult with Indian tribes on policies that have tribal implications. This requirement is in recognition of the unique government-to-government relationship between the 562 federally recognized Indian tribes and the federal government. GAO was asked to (1) describe interactions between CMS and IHS, (2) examine mechanisms CMS uses to interact and consult with Indian tribes, (3) examine mechanisms that selected states' Medicaid programs use to interact and consult with Indian tribes, and (4) identify barriers to Medicare and Medicaid enrollment and efforts to help eligible American Indians and Alaska Natives apply for and enroll in these programs. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed federal and state officials, and visited a judgmental sample of Indian tribes and IHS-funded facilities in six states.
What GAO Found
CMS and IHS have interacted to (1) provide support to IHS-funded facilities and tribes in their access to Medicare and Medicaid and (2) address broader policy and regulatory concerns regarding these programs. Their interactions to provide support have included education and technical assistance; the agencies also have interacted to obtain input from tribal representatives on program operations. On broader policy and regulatory concerns, CMS and IHS have worked on policy initiatives aimed at ensuring that existing health care policies meet the needs of IHS-funded facilities and the populations they serve. CMS and IHS have had mixed success identifying whether proposed CMS regulatory changes would affect IHS-funded facilities or their populations and thus warrant IHS review. CMS has been working to improve its identification of such regulations. CMS has used two key mechanisms--tribal liaisons and an advisory board--to interact with representatives from Indian tribes, and it has relied primarily on annual regional sessions sponsored by HHS as its mechanism to consult with Indian tribes. Tribal liaisons in CMS's central and regional offices generally served as the point of contact for tribal representatives. CMS's tribal advisory board, which is meant to complement but not replace consultation, has provided the agency with advice on policies affecting the delivery of health care for American Indians and Alaska Natives. CMS has used annual HHS regional consultation sessions as the primary basis for consulting with Indian tribes. However, consulting with tribes is an inherently difficult task, in part because of the variation in tribes' size, location, and economic status. Further, these HHS regional sessions--which generally lasted 1 to 2 days and covered all HHS programs--have offered limited time for consultation and discussion. The six state Medicaid programs we reviewed have used at least one of three mechanisms--tribal liaisons, advisory boards, and regular meetings--to interact and consult with Indian tribes. Five of the six states reported having policies in place that governed the interactions between the state's Medicaid program and Indian tribes, with most of these policies establishing guidelines for how consultation should be conducted. Five states reported consulting with tribes about changes to their Medicaid programs. American Indians and Alaska Natives have faced several barriers to Medicare and Medicaid enrollment despite efforts to assist them with the application process. Many of these barriers are similar to those experienced by other populations, such as transportation and financial barriers. To help eligible American Indians and Alaska Natives enroll in Medicare and Medicaid, almost all of the IHS-funded facilities we visited had staff who assisted patients with the application process, including helping them complete and submit applications, and collecting required documentation. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS noted that it was appreciative of GAO's review of CMS activities related to interactions with IHS and tribes. |
gao_HEHS-96-6 | gao_HEHS-96-6_0 | Connie Lee is authorized to insure municipal bonds rated by a national rating firm at or below the lowest investment grade category—the equivalent of Standard and Poor’s BBB and below ratings—issued by schools of higher education; the proceeds of these bonds are to be used to finance the construction and renovation of academic facilities. Connie Lee Primarily Insures the Lowest Investment Grade Bonds
Between October 29, 1991, the date Connie Lee sold its first primary insurance, and September 30, 1995, Connie Lee insured 95 bonds, totaling about $2.6 billion, for colleges, universities, and teaching hospitals. Federal and state law and industry practices impose limits on Connie Lee. In addition, some public and private schools receive funds for capital projects from other sources, such as endowments. Issuing Bonds Without Connie Lee Insurance
Some HBCUs may issue bonds without insuring them, and some may be able to obtain bond insurance from companies other than Connie Lee. Giving Connie Lee authority to borrow money from the federal government, as needed, to pay claims on defaulted bonds that it insured is another suggestion that Connie Lee officials offered. Conclusions
Connie Lee is limited to insuring bonds issued by a narrow range of schools. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how the College Loan Insurance Association (Connie Lee) has served the needs of 102 Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Connie Lee insured 95 bonds totalling $2.6 billion from October 1991 through September 1995, 90 of which received the lowest investment grade rating; (2) Connie Lee offered to insure 8 HBCU bonds, declined to insure 3 HBCU bonds it considered risky, determined that 13 HBCU were rated above the category of risk they applied for, and was undecided on whether to issue insurance for 1 HBCU bond; (3) Connie Lee is limited to insuring low grade bonds by federal and state laws, as well as by industry practices; (4) some HBCU may finance the construction and renovation of HBCU facilities by issuing bonds without insurance, obtaining bond insurance from companies other than Connie Lee, and using loans or grants from federal and state governments, alumni, and private foundations; and (5) officials suggest removing federal limits and credit ratings on certain types of bonds Connie Lee insures, guaranteeing federal loans to pay for defaulted bonds, and providing Connie Lee with additional loans and grants for capital. |
gao_GAO-11-806 | gao_GAO-11-806_0 | DOD Is Continuing to Implement Reform Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain
The new offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation have continued to make progress implementing the Reform Act requirements. In addition to the progress highlighted in the table above, the offices are also taking actions in areas that they had not acted upon last year— issuing required guidance on the development and tracking of performance criteria and exercising a Reform Act option of designating the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation for concurrent service as the Director of the Test Resource Management Center. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developmental Test and Evaluation indicated that there could be some limitations on his ability to streamline management and reporting activities or shift resources between the organizations because the Test Resource Management Center is designated by statute to be a field activity and the organizations are funded separately. For example, they pointed out that the office’s primary avenue for voicing concerns about weapon acquisition programs to senior leaders is at overarching integrated product team meetings that take place in preparation for Defense Acquisition Board meetings. Former testing officials believe an opportunity exists to both increase the developmental testing office’s influence and address resource concerns by merging Test Resource Management Center and developmental testing office activities. The services planned to increase their systems engineering and test and evaluation career fields by about 5,000 people (14 percent) and about 300 people (4 percent), respectively, between fiscal years 2009 and 2015 through hiring actions and by insourcing contractor positions. The services have increased the systems engineering career field by about half of their projections and exceeded their planned growth for the test and evaluation career field through the end of fiscal year 2010. However, budget cuts and a clarification in DOD’s insourcing approach may make hiring civilians more challenging in the future. The services’ developmental test ranges are also experiencing declining budgets, as the fiscal year 2012 budget includes cuts of nearly $1.2 billion over the next 5 years to support accounts that pay for overhead costs. Services Have Increased Their Systems Engineering and Test and Evaluation Career Fields
The services planned to increase their acquisition systems engineering and test and evaluation career fields by 14 percent and 4 percent, respectively, between fiscal years 2009 and 2015 through hiring and insourcing actions. This could offset some of the test and evaluation career field gains already achieved over the past 2 years. Therefore, we could not determine the impact funding cuts would have on the ranges’ ability to meet program office testing needs. Services Lack Common Range Performance Measures to Aid Decision Making
The services have not implemented common range performance measures that would help them justify funding and assist them in making workforce decisions, how best to allocate funding, or make difficult decisions about mothballing, closing, or consolidating test capabilities, if necessary. To the extent DOD cannot provide adequate systems engineering and developmental testing support to its weapons portfolio, the risks of executing the portfolio within cost and schedule are increased. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: assess the resources and influence needed by the developmental test and evaluation office to assist and oversee defense acquisition programs, including the number of defense acquisition programs that can be supported by different developmental test and evaluation office staffing levels, including specifying the total number of personnel, the mix of government and contractor employees, and the number of senior executive service personnel needed for each of these staffing levels; whether the Test Resource Management Center and the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developmental Test and Evaluation should be combined or resources shifted between organizations to more effectively support the activities of both organizations and if so, identify for Congress any statutory revisions that would be necessary; and the proper reporting channel, taking into account the decision on whether or not to combine the organizations, the statutory oversight requirements, and the level of influence needed to oversee and assess program office developmental testing and service budgeting activities. develop a plan to implement the results of the assessment. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two others. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines the military services’ systems engineering and developmental testing workforce capabilities and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to implement Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act) requirements. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress DOD has made in implementing the Reform Act’s systems engineering and developmental testing requirements and (2) whether there are challenges at the military service level that could affect their systems engineering and developmental testing activities. We also discussed with these officials the progress DOD and the services have made in developing metrics that could be used to make workforce and investment decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 2 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been implementing the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (Reform Act) requirements for systems engineering and developmental testing. These activities are important to DOD's ability to control acquisition costs, which increased by $135 billion over the past 2 years for 98 major defense acquisition programs. GAO was asked to determine (1) DOD's progress in implementing the Reform Act's requirements and (2) whether there are challenges at the military service level that could affect their systems engineering and developmental testing activities. To do this, GAO analyzed implementation status documents, discussed developmental testing office concerns with current and former DOD officials, and analyzed military service workforce growth plans and test range funding data..
What GAO Found
The new offices for systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation are continuing to make progress implementing Reform Act requirements. Since GAO's 2010 report on this topic, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation have issued additional policies and guidance, assisted more weapons acquisition programs in the development of acquisition plans, and provided input to senior leaders at Defense Acquisition Board meetings. DOD also designated the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developmental Test and Evaluation for concurrent service as the Director of the Test Resource Management Center. This was an optional Reform Act provision, which places oversight of testing resources and acquisition program developmental testing activities under one official. Despite these steps, the developmental test and evaluation office reports having difficulty covering its portfolio of about 250 defense acquisition programs with its current authorized staff of 63 people. Current and former testing officials believe the office needs more influence and resources to be effective, but they said thorough analysis has not been done to determine the appropriate office size. Further, according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developmental Test and Evaluation, a statutory provision that designates the Test Resource Management Center as a field activity may limit his ability to achieve management and reporting efficiencies that could be obtained by combining or shifting resources between the two organizations. GAO has a matter for Congressional consideration to allow shifting resources between the Test Resource Management Center and the developmental test and evaluation office. The military services are facing workforce challenges that could curb systems engineering and developmental testing efforts, if not properly addressed. The services planned to increase their systems engineering and test and evaluation career fields by about 5,000 people (14 percent) and about 300 people (4 percent), respectively, between fiscal years 2009 and 2015 through hiring actions and converting contractor positions to government positions. The services have increased the systems engineering career field by about half of its projections and exceeded its planned growth for the test and evaluation career field through the end of fiscal year 2010. However, future growth may be difficult because of budget cuts and a clarification in DOD's insourcing approach, which may make civilian hiring more difficult. For example, the services now plan to hire about 800 fewer systems engineers by 2015 than they originally projected. Further, cuts to development test ranges' fiscal year 2012 budgets of nearly $1.2 billion (17 percent) over the next 5 years could offset some of the workforce gains already achieved. Currently, the services lack metrics that could be used to justify funding levels, effectively allocate funding cuts, make workforce decisions, or make difficult decisions related to mothballing, closing, or consolidating test capabilities, if future budget cuts are necessary. To the extent DOD cannot provide adequate systems engineering and developmental testing support to its weapon systems portfolio, the risks of executing the portfolio within cost and schedule are increased.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD assess the resources needed by the developmental test and evaluation office, develop a plan to implement the assessment, develop metrics to aid funding decisions, and report the effect budget cuts are having on the services' ability to meet program office needs. GAO also has a matter for congressional consideration. DOD concurred with two recommendations, and offered clarifying language, which GAO incorporated, on the other two recommendations for which DOD partially concurred. |
gao_GAO-08-521T | gao_GAO-08-521T_0 | DOE Could Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the SPR
For information on the composition of the SPR, see DOE, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Annual Report for Calendar Year 2006. difference were to persist over the duration of the new fill period, DOE would save about $1.2 billion in nominal terms by filling the SPR with 100 million barrels of heavy oil. Including heavier oil would have the additional benefit of making the composition of SPR oil more compatible with U.S. refineries. For these reasons, we recommended that DOE conduct a new review of the optimal oil mix in the SPR and determine the maximum volume of heavy oil that could be effectively put in the reserve. In addition, we recommended that DOE consider filling the SPR by acquiring a steady dollar value of oil over time, rather than a steady volume of oil over time as has occurred in recent years. This “dollar-cost- averaging” approach would allow DOE to take advantage of fluctuations in oil prices and ensure that more oil would be acquired when prices are low and less when prices are high. In our 2006 report, we found that if DOE had used this approach from October 2001 through August 2005, it could have saved approximately $590 million in fill costs. We also ran simulations to estimate potential future cost savings from using a dollar- cost-averaging approach over 5 years and found that DOE could save money regardless of the price of oil as long as there is price volatility, and that the savings would be generally greater if oil prices were more volatile. We also recommended that DOE consider allowing oil companies participating in the royalty-in-kind program more flexibility to defer their deliveries to the SPR at times when filling would significantly tighten the market or when prices are expected to decline. In updating us on the status of recommendations we made to DOE in our August 2006 report, DOE indicated that its November 8, 2006, rule on SPR acquisition procedures addressed our recommendations on dollar-cost- averaging and deferrals. As to our recommendation on the optimal mix of oil in the SPR, DOE indicated that, due to the planned SPR expansion, such determinations should wait until it prepares a new study of U.S. Gulf Coast heavy sour crude refining requirements. We look forward to DOE completing its new study of U.S. Gulf Coast heavy crude refining requirements and believe such a study will find that DOE should include at least 10 percent heavy oils in the SPR. Purchasing Oil to Fill the SPR May Be More Cost-Effective Than Current Royalty-in- Kind Program
There are several reasons that purchasing oil—as DOE did until 1994— may be more cost-effective than filling the SPR using the current royalty- in-kind program. In addition, royalty-in-kind exchanges add a layer of administrative complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing the potential for waste or inefficiency. In a January 2008 report, the DOE Inspector General concluded that DOE does not have an effective control system over receipts of royalty oil from Interior at the market centers. Moreover, rather than diverting a fraction of the oil collected through the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR, Interior could sell that fraction in competitive sales, as it currently does for the other oil it receives through the royalty-in-kind program. Further, DOE’s method for evaluating bids is more robust for cash purchases than royalty-in-kind exchanges, increasing the likelihood that cash purchases are more cost-effective. In November 2006, DOE issued a final rule that describes how DOE will evaluate offers when it is purchasing oil and when it is exchanging royalty oil for other oil for the SPR. For example, in April 2007, DOE solicited two different types of bids—one to purchase oil for the SPR in cash and one to exchange royalty oil for other oil to fill the SPR. In deciding whether to purchase oil, DOE evaluated the bids it received in the context of overall market trends. In this case, in the same month, DOE entered into royalty oil exchange contracts when the spot price of LLS was about $67 a barrel, effectively committing the government to pay—through foregone revenues to the U.S. Treasury— roughly the same price for oil that DOE concluded was too high to purchase. Based on our past estimates of the cost savings potential of dollar cost averaging and the significantly lower cost of heavier oils, DOE could save well over 10 percent of the costs of filling the SPR to the currently authorized level—an amount that is likely well in excess of $1 billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created in 1975 to help insulate the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions and currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to increase the SPR storage capacity from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which it plans to accomplish by 2018. Since 1999, oil for the SPR has generally been obtained through the royalty-in-kind program, whereby the government receives oil instead of cash for payment of royalties on leases of federal property. The Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) collects the royalty oil and transfers it to DOE, which then trades it for oil suitable for the SPR. As DOE begins to expand the SPR, past experiences can help inform future efforts to fill the reserve in the most cost-effective manner. In that context, GAO's testimony today will focus on: (1) factors GAO recommends DOE consider when filling the SPR, and (2) the cost-effectiveness of using oil received through the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR. To address these issues, GAO relied on its 2006 report on the SPR, as well as its ongoing review of the royalty-in-kind program, where GAO interviewed officials at both DOE and MMS, and reviewed DOE's SPR policies and procedures. DOE provided comments on a draft of this testimony, which were incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
To decrease the cost of filling the SPR and improve its efficiency, GAO recommended in previous work that DOE should include at least 10 percent heavy crude oils in the SPR. If DOE bought 100 million barrels of heavy crude oil during its expansion of the SPR it could save over $1 billion in nominal terms, assuming a price differential of $12 between the price of light crude oil and the lower price of heavy crude oil, the average differential over the last five years. Having heavy crude oil in the SPR would also make the SPR more compatible with many U.S. refineries, helping these refineries run more efficiently in the event that a supply disruption triggers use of the SPR. DOE indicated that, due to the planned SPR expansion, determinations of the amount of heavy oil to include in the SPR should wait until it prepares a new study of U.S. Gulf Coast refining requirements. In addition, we recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value--rather than a steady volume--of oil over time when filling the SPR. This "dollar-cost-averaging" approach would allow DOE to acquire more oil when prices are low and less when prices are high. GAO found that if DOE had used this purchasing approach from October 2001 through August 2005, it would have saved approximately $590 million, or over 10 percent, in fill costs. GAO's simulations indicate that DOE could save money using this approach for future SPR fills, regardless of whether oil prices are trending up or down as long as there is price volatility. GAO also recommended that DOE consider giving companies participating in the royalty-in-kind program additional flexibility to defer oil deliveries in exchange for providing additional barrels of oil. DOE has granted limited deferrals in the past, and expanding their use could further decrease SPR fill costs. While DOE indicated that its November 2006 rule on SPR acquisition procedures addressed our recommendations, this rule does not specifically address how to implement a dollar-cost-averaging strategy. Purchasing oil to fill the SPR--as DOE did until 1994--is likely to be more cost-effective than exchanging oil from the royalty-in-kind program for other oil to fill the SPR. The latter method adds administrative complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing the potential for waste and inefficiency. A January 2008 DOE Inspector General report found that DOE is unable to ensure that it receives all of the royalty oil that MMS provides. In addition, we found that DOE's method for evaluating bids has been more robust for cash purchases than royalty-in-kind exchanges, increasing the likelihood that cash purchases are more cost-effective. For example, in April 2007, DOE solicited two different types of bids--one to purchase oil for the SPR in cash and one to exchange royalty oil for other oil to fill the SPR. DOE rejected offers to purchase oil when the spot price was about $69 per barrel, yet in the same month, DOE exchanged royalty-in-kind oil for other oil to put in the SPR at about the same price. Because the government would have otherwise sold this royalty-in-kind oil, DOE committed the government to pay, through foregone revenues to the U.S. Treasury, roughly the same price per barrel that DOE concluded was too high to purchase directly. |
gao_GAO-04-17 | gao_GAO-04-17_0 | Head Start and Early Head Start programs are administered by ACF, which funds and monitors more than 1,500 grantees through its 10 regional and 2 branch offices. 3.) In addition, during the 1990s, the number of other federal and state programs offering services to low-income children increased substantially. The Extent to Which Head Start Programs Are Underenrolled is Not Known
The extent to which Head Start programs are underenrolled is unknown because ACF does not collect accurate national data and it does not monitor grantee enrollment in a uniform or timely way. PIR data also showed a significantly higher proportion of grantees—33 percent—reported enrollment ratios below 95 percent than the 7 percent of grantees reported as unacceptably underenrolled by the regional offices. Differing Definitions of Underenrollment Create Potential for Uneven Treatment of Grantees across Regions
As a result of differences in regional definitions of what constitutes an unacceptable level of underenrollment, grantees with similar levels of underenrollment may be treated differently across regions, particularly in areas without a defined threshold. Regional and Grantee Officials Often Cited Combinations of Factors as Responsible for Underenrollment
ACF regional officials and officials of underenrolled Head Start grantees often cited a mixture of factors that made it difficult to achieve full enrollment, including increased parental demand for full-day child care and a decrease in the number of eligible children. ACF and Grantees Use a Variety of Approaches to Address Underenrollment
ACF national and regional offices and grantees all report taking action to address underenrollment, such as issuing guidance, increasing monitoring, and attempting to conduct broader outreach efforts. The ACF national office issued a memorandum instructing regional offices to address underenrollment, and all ACF regions we surveyed said that they have increased their monitoring efforts. While 18 of the 25 grantees we contacted had made progress toward achieving full enrollment, others cited continuing challenges. The guidance instructs regional officials to address underenrollment depending on four possible causes. The most frequently mentioned was more aggressive recruiting followed by collaboration with other programs. Furthermore, grantees told us of their concern to maintain total funded enrollment levels, even as they were converting unfilled part-day openings to full-day. Since ACF oversight of Head Start grantees is primarily accomplished through its regions and program branches, we designed a survey instrument in which these entities could provide written responses to our specific requests for such information as: the methods the regions used to oversee grantee and delegate agency enrollment levels; the threshold, if any, they had established for determining the point at which a grantee or delegate agency’s level of underenrollment is considered to be unacceptable; a list of all grantees and delegate agencies that they believed had unacceptable levels of underenrollment for both the 2001-02 and 2002-03 program years; the reasons that they believed unacceptable levels of underenrollment had occurred and the extent (major, moderate, minor, or none) that they believed each identified reason had contributed to underenrollment; the actions they had taken to address the unacceptable level of underenrollment for their grantees and delegate agencies. Education and Care: Early Childhood Programs and Services for Low- Income Families. | Why GAO Did This Study
Head Start, created in 1965, is designed to prepare low-income preschool children for school by providing a comprehensive set of early child development services primarily through communitybased organizations. Over the last decade there have been a number of changes in Head Start's operating environment, including a decrease in the number of poor children; an increase in the number, size, and scope of other federal and state early childhood programs; and an expansion in Head Start spending and enrollment. Given this environment, GAO was asked to determine (1) what is known about the extent to which Head Start programs are underenrolled, (2) ACF regional officials' and Head Start grantees' views on what factors contribute to underenrollment, and (3) what actions ACF and grantees have taken to address underenrollment.
What GAO Found
The extent to which Head Start programs have enrolled fewer children than they are funded to serve is unknown because the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) does not collect accurate national data and does not monitor underenrollment in a uniform or timely manner. While some modest fluctuations in enrollment are to be expected, regional offices had differing definitions of unacceptable underenrollment, and the approaches they used to identify it were either not timely or not systematic. The regional offices identified a total of about 7 percent of grantees as unacceptably underenrolled in 2001-02, significantly less than the percentage of grantees reporting enrollment ratios below 100 and 95 percent on ACF's survey of grantees. As a result of differences in regional definitions of what constitutes an unacceptable level of underenrollment, grantees with similar levels of underenrollment may be treated differently across regions. ACF regional officials and officials of underenrolled Head Start grantees often cited a mixture of factors that made it difficult to achieve full enrollment, including increased parental demand for full-day child care, a decrease in the number of eligible children, facilities-related problems, and more parents seeking openings with other sponsors of early education and care. ACF national and regional offices and grantees all report taking action to address underenrollment through the issuance of guidance, increased monitoring by regional offices, and more aggressive outreach attempts by grantees. The ACF national office issued a memo in April 2003 that instructed regional offices to address underenrollment with a variety of measures depending on its causes. While this guidance was clear on the actions to be taken, it lacked clear criteria for prioritizing grantees for corrective actions. Also, while many grantees we spoke with had taken steps to address underenrollment, some told us of their concern to maintain total funded enrollment levels, even as they were converting unfilled part-day openings to full-day. While 18 of the 25 grantees we contacted had made progress toward full enrollment, others cited continuing problems. |
gao_GAO-07-145 | gao_GAO-07-145_0 | While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long- standing Problems Continue to Hinder DOD’s Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations
A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. These problems include a lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support at deployed locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel; the failure to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at deployed locations; and limited or no training of military personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education. DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy and Guidance on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces, but Lack of High-Level Action Hinders Implementation
In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. However, the instruction does not address a number of problems we have raised in previous reports. With limited visibility over contractors, military commanders and other senior leaders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors as an asset to support their operations. According to a senior Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information, Multi-National Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the capacity of the consolidated bases to accommodate the number of individuals expected to be stationed there. However, inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage contracts that support deployed U.S. forces is another long-standing problem that continues to hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors in Iraq. Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor its many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not be able to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting their contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location. As a result, he was unable to determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract’s requirements at each of those 27 sites. Yet having too few contract oversight personnel presents unique difficulties at deployed locations given the more demanding contracting environment compared to the United States. Moreover, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing those procedures. However, we found no procedures in place to ensure units follow this guidance. When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have developed during past operations that involved contractor support. The entity that functions as the focal point would act as an advocate within the department for issues related to the use of contractors to support deployed forces, serve as the principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and guidance to DOD components, and be responsible for carrying out actions, including the following six actions: oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability of contractors; develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique difficulties of contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DOD’s ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its acquisition workforce; lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide lessons-learned program that will capture the experiences of units that have deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations; develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant commanders, and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities of commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2) incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor support they will rely on; develop training standards for the services on the integration of basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their professional military education to ensure that military commanders and other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage contractors; and review the services’ efforts to meet the standards and requirements established above to ensure that training on contractor support to deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the services. We focused our efforts on contractors supporting military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest Asia because of the broad range of services contractors provide U.S. forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations that involved contractor support. Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations. Despite DOD's concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information about contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training. |
gao_GAO-07-883 | gao_GAO-07-883_0 | Increases in EPA Funding Have Not Kept Pace with Inflation and Enforcement Responsibilities
Overall funding to regions and authorized states increased from fiscal years 1997 through 2006. However, these increases did not keep pace with inflation and the growth in enforcement responsibilities. According to officials in OECA and EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer, OECA headquarters absorbed decreases in OECA’s total enforcement funding in recent years to prevent further reductions to the regions. For example, data provided to us by New York State officials showed that the state’s grant for hazardous waste management dropped in real terms by 19 percent between fiscal years 1997 and 2006. As a result of this decline in funding, New York State officials said that the grant supports fewer full-time staff. EPA and States Have Taken Steps to Improve Planning and Priority Setting for Enforcement, but Results Are Uneven
EPA has made substantial progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national enforcement priorities and NEPPS, which have fostered a more cooperative relationship. For example, on states’ recommendation, OECA accepted as a priority ensuring that facilities handling hazardous substances, such as lead or mercury, have the financial resources to close their facilities, clean up contamination, and compensate communities and individuals affected by the contamination. EPA and states have also made some progress in using NEPPS for joint planning and resource allocation. State participation in the partnership grew from 6 pilot states in fiscal year 1996 to 41 states in fiscal year 2006. EPA responsibility. State Review Framework Has the Potential to Provide More Consistent Oversight
With its implementation of the SRF, EPA has—for the first time—a consistent approach for overseeing authorized states’ compliance and enforcement programs and has identified several significant weaknesses in how states enforce their environmental laws in accordance with federal requirements. Until EPA addresses enforcement weaknesses and their causes, it faces limitations in determining whether states perform timely and appropriate enforcement, and whether they apply penalties to environmental violators in a fair and consistent manner within and among the states. In this regard, its structured approach provides consistent information that would be useful to (1) inform the public about how well the states are implementing their enforcement responsibilities and (2) serve as a basis for assessing the performance of EPA’s regions, which have been inconsistent in their enforcement and oversight efforts in the past. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance EPA’s oversight of regional and state enforcement activities to implement environmental programs consistent with the requirements of federal statutes and regulations, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA take the following actions: include, in EPA’s fiscal year 2008 evaluation of the SRF, an assessment of lessons learned and an action plan for determining how significant problems identified in state programs will be uniformly and expeditiously addressed; evaluate the capacity of individual authorized state programs, where the SRF finds the state appears to lack sufficient resources (e.g., funding, staff, and expertise), to implement and enforce authorized programs and then develop an action plan to improve that state’s capacity; publish the SRF findings so that the public will know how well state regulators are enforcing authorized programs and protecting public health and the environmental conditions in their communities; and conduct a performance assessment similar to SRF for regional enforcement programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized state agencies work together to deploy resources, plan, set priorities, and define roles and responsibilities for enforcement of and compliance with environmental programs consistent with federal requirements, we (1) identified the federal resources provided to EPA regions and states for enforcement between 1997 and 2006, and obtained EPA regional and states’ views on the adequacy of these resources to implement their activities; (2) determined EPA’s progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with its regions and authorized states; and (3) examined EPA efforts to improve its oversight of states’ enforcement and compliance programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces the nation's environmental laws through its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). OECA sets overall enforcement policies and through its 10 regions oversees state agencies authorized to implement environmental programs consistent with federal requirements. GAO was asked to (1) identify trends in federal resources to regions and states for enforcement between 1997 and 2006, and determine regions' and states' views on the adequacy of these resources; (2) determine EPA's progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with states; and (3) examine EPA's efforts to improve oversight of states' enforcement programs and identify additional actions EPA could take to ensure more consistent state performance and oversight. GAO examined information from all 10 regions and 10 authorized states, among other things.
What GAO Found
Overall funding to regions and authorized states increased from 1997 through 2006, but these increases did not keep pace with inflation and the growth in enforcement responsibilities. Over the 10-year period, EPA's enforcement funding to the regions decreased 8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Regional officials said they reduced the number of enforcement staff by about 5 percent. EPA's grants to states to implement federal environmental programs also declined by 9 percent in inflation-adjusted terms while enforcement and other environmental program responsibilities increased. According to state officials, reductions in grant funds have limited their ability to meet EPA's requests to implement new requirements. For example, according to New York State officials responsible for the hazardous waste program, a reduction in EPA grants between 1997 and 2006 has meant a 38 percent reduction in the full-time state staff supported by federal funding for this program. However, EPA information on the workload and staffing needs of its regions and the states is incomplete, and, thus, it is not possible with existing data to determine their overall capacity to meet their enforcement responsibilities. EPA has made substantial progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national enforcement priorities and the EPA/state National Environmental Partnership System (NEPPS), which have fostered a more cooperative relationship. For example, on states' recommendation, OECA accepted as a priority ensuring that facilities handling hazardous substances, such as lead or mercury, have the financial resources to close their facilities, clean up contamination, and compensate communities and individuals affected by the contamination. EPA and states have also made some progress in using NEPPS for joint planning and resource allocation. State participation in the partnership grew from 6 pilot states in fiscal year 1996 to 41 states in fiscal year 2006. EPA has improved its oversight of state enforcement programs by implementing the State Review Framework (SRF) as a means to perform a consistent approach for overseeing the programs. Moreover, EPA can make additional progress by addressing weaknesses that the SRF reviews identified and by implementing other improvements to ensure oversight that is more consistent. For example, the SRF reviews show that EPA has limited ability to determine whether the states are performing timely, appropriate enforcement and whether penalties are applied to environmental violators in a fair and consistent manner within and among the states. In addition, GAO noted that EPA could make further use of the SRF to (1) determine the root causes of poorly performing programs; (2) inform the public about how well the states are implementing their enforcement responsibilities; and (3) extend the use of the SRF methodology to assess the performance of EPA's regions, which have been inconsistent in their enforcement and oversight efforts. |
gao_HEHS-96-145 | gao_HEHS-96-145_0 | Subsequently, the number of rehabilitation agencies providing physical, occupational, and speech therapy increased dramatically—as did Medicare spending on therapy services delivered in nursing homes. The absence of information on the amount of time spent providing a service also makes it difficult to determine whether a claim is reasonable prior to payment. Under current HCFA regulations, OPTs and SNFs are not required to specify on their claims how much therapy time they are billing for or what specific service was provided. HCFA Attempts to Implement Salary Guidelines Have Not Yet Been Successful
Since 1990, HCFA has taken a number of interim and long-term actions to curb inappropriate charges for SNF therapy services. HCFA has focused its efforts on implementing salary equivalency guidelines for those providing occupational and speech therapy services under arrangement. 2). For a long-term solution to the problem of therapy overcharges, HCFA officials emphasized the importance of more systematic legislative approaches, such as requiring unified billing. Comments From the Health Care Financing Administration
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) progress in curbing overbilling for occupational speech and physical therapy services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) therapy charges billed to Medicare by skilled nursing facilities (SNF) and rehabilitation agencies have more than doubled since 1990; (2) some providers are exploiting weaknesses in Medicare's payment system, since HCFA places no absolute dollar limit on Medicare reimbursements for occupational and speech therapy; (3) HCFA is unable to determine whether a claim is reasonable prior to payment, since SNF are not required to specify how much therapy time they are billing for specific services; (4) HCFA has taken a number of interim actions to curb inappropriate charges, such as implementing salary equivalency guidelines for those SNF providing occupational and speech therapy services; and (5) HCFA officials have emphasized the importance of more systematic legislative approaches, such as unified billing, to solve the problem of therapy overcharges. |
gao_GAO-13-41 | gao_GAO-13-41_0 | They provide most of the same products and services as post offices (see fig. 3.) USPS Uses CPUs to Provide Retail Services at Additional Locations and Hours
Although total number of CPUs has decreased in recent years, USPS continues to use CPUs to provide customers with access to postal services at additional locations and for more hours of service. CPUs are located in a variety of locations, both urban and rural, and range from very close to far from post offices, demonstrating how USPS uses CPUs to provide customers with alternatives located near crowded post offices—which are often found in urban areas— and to provide service where post offices are not conveniently located or may not be cost effective for USPS, often in rural areas. Decrease in Number of CPUs
According to USPS data, the number of CPUs fell from 5,290 in 2002 to 3,619 in 2011. Consistent with USPS’s goal to use CPUs to absorb excess demand at post offices, our analysis of the distance between CPUs and post offices shows that more than 56 percent of CPUs are less than 2 miles from the nearest post office and 26 percent are less than 1 mile. Trends in CPU Contract Types, Revenues, and Compensation
Use of the Performance- Based Contract Type Increased
In recent years, USPS has intentionally shifted its means of compensating CPUs from fixed-price contracts—in which compensation to CPUs is a fixed amount regardless of sales—to performance-based contracts—under which compensation to CPUs is a percentage of the CPU’s postal sales—resulting in potentially greater revenue and less financial exposure to USPS. The total revenues USPS received from sales of postal products and services at CPUsyear 2007 to $611 million in fiscal year 2011, as shown in figure 8. On average, USPS’s revenue from individual CPUs averaged about $160,000 in revenue in fiscal year 2011, but a substantial number (41 percent) generated less than $50,000. USPS compensation to CPUs increased about 6 percent from $75.4 million in fiscal year 2007 to $79.9 million in fiscal year 2011. However, USPS compensation to CPUs has decreased every fiscal year from 2008 to 2011. According to USPS officials, the increase in compensation from fiscal years 2007 and 2008 was because of larger numbers of performance-based contracts, fewer public service contracts, which are generally less expensive, individual CPUs’ petitions for increased compensation because of increased cost of doing business, and economic conditions. Measured in another way, after compensating CPUs, USPS retained $0.87 of every dollar of CPU revenues. USPS’s target for individual CPUs is to retain, after compensation, $0.80 for every dollar in revenues. Most of these CPUs were in rural areas. Forty-nine percent of small-town rural CPUs with fixed-price contracts generated less revenue for USPS than the compensation USPS provided in fiscal year 2011. USPS’s Future Use of CPUs May Pose Challenges
USPS is embarking on a substantial makeover of its retail network, including reducing hours of service at thousands of underutilized post offices and expanding the use of retail alternatives through partnerships with national and regional retailers. At the same time, pending legislation in the Senate would require USPS to consider opening CPUs as replacements for post offices that it closes.pared down its plans to close post offices by instead reducing their hours, to the extent that USPS closes post offices in the future, this requirement may put more pressure on USPS to open more CPUs. Furthermore, some district retail managers we spoke with said that they see a potentially larger role for CPUs in the future as USPS transforms its traditional retail network. USPS may face limited private interest in opening CPUs in certain areas. As a result, district staff are not always able to open as many new CPUs as they would like. Limited Staff Resources in USPS Districts. Some USPS district retail managers we spoke with told us that although there are unmet needs for CPUs in their districts, compared to prior years, they now have fewer staff and less time to seek out opportunities for new CPUs. We continue to believe, as we stated in November 2011, that it is important that such a strategy discuss how USPS plans to increase its use of retail alternatives—including CPUs— while considering significant changes to its network of post offices and the means through which it provides access to USPS’s customers. For example, by considering factors, such as the distance of CPUs to existing post offices, CPU hours and days of service, and USPS’s costs of compensating CPUs, USPS could better inform its retail strategy in order to make better strategic use of CPUs in its future retail network, which will likely include reduced hours at thousands of post offices. To determine USPS revenue from CPUs and USPS’s compensation to them from fiscal years 2007 to 2011, we analyzed data from CPUT. To determine challenges USPS might face if it increases its use of CPUs, we reviewed relevant legislation, USPS documents related to managing CPUs, prior GAO reports, and USPS Office of Inspector General reports. Appendix II: Number of Contract Postal Units and Post Offices by State
Table 5 provides the number of Contract Postal Units (CPUs) and post offices in each state, as well as the number of CPUs per 100 post offices in each state as a measure of how reliant each state is on CPUs for providing access to postal services. Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPSs declining revenues have become insufficient to cover its costs. Its strategies to address losses include reducing hours of service at many post offices and expanding the use of post office alternatives, including CPUs.CPUs are independent businesses compensated by USPS to sell most of the same products and services as post offices at the same price. Although CPUs can provide important benefits, the number of CPUs has fallen from 5,290 in fiscal year 2002 to 3,619 in fiscal year 2011. As requested, this report discusses: (1) how CPUs supplement USPSs post office network, (2) USPSs revenue from CPUs and compensation to them from fiscal years 2007 to 2011, and (3) challenges USPS might face if it increases its use of CPUs. GAO analyzed USPS data on CPU locations, revenues, compensation, and hours of operation as well as on post office locations and hours of operation. GAO interviewed CPU owners and USPS staff in charge of managing CPUs.
What GAO Found
Although contract postal units (CPUs) have declined in number, their nationwide presence in urban and rural areas supplements the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) network of post offices by providing additional locations and hours of service. More than 60 percent of CPUs are in urban areas where they can provide customers nearby alternatives for postal services when they face long lines at local post offices. Over one-half of CPUs are located less than 2 miles from the nearest post office. Urban CPUs are, on average, closer to post offices than rural CPUs. CPUs are also sometimes located in remote or fast-growing areas where post offices are not conveniently located or may not be cost effective. CPUs further supplement post offices by providing expanded hours of service. On average, CPUs are open 54 hours per week, compared to 41 hours for post offices. In addition, a greater proportion of CPUs than post offices are open after 6 p.m. and on Sundays. These factors are important as USPS considers expanding the use of post office alternatives to cut costs and maintain access to its products and services.
Total USPS revenues from CPUs fell from fiscal years 2007 to 2011, while USPS's compensation to them increased during this period; nonetheless, CPUs generated high revenues relative to USPS's compensation to CPUs. Declines in mail volumes and the number of CPUs drove revenues down 9 percent, from $672 million to $611 million from fiscal years 2007 to 2011. USPS total compensation to CPUs increased 6 percent during this period, from $76 million to $80 million; however, after increasing from fiscal year 2007 to 2008, compensation decreased every fiscal year from 2008 to 2011. According to USPS officials, the overall increase was because of increased compensation to individual CPUs and decreasing numbers of less expensive CPUs. In fiscal year 2011, after compensating CPUs, USPS retained 87 cents of every dollar of CPU revenue. USPS has a target to retain 80 cents for every dollar in revenue for individual CPUs. USPS did not meet this target at many individual CPUs-- especially ones in rural areas. In fact, 49 percent of CPUs that USPS compensates a fixed amount regardless of their sales in small-town rural areas-- where CPUs may serve as the de facto post office--generated less postal revenue than the CPUs received in compensation from USPS. CPU revenues and compensation are important factors as USPS seeks a more sustainable cost structure.
Limited interest from potential partners, competing demands on USPS staff resources, and changes to USPS's retail network may pose challenges to USPS's use of CPUs. USPS has no current plans to strategically increase the number of CPUs as part of its retail network transformation. However, a number of district USPS staff charged with identifying the need for CPUs told us they see a larger role for CPUs. Nevertheless, USPS may face limited interest from potential partners as many may not want to operate CPUs because of concerns over CPU contract requirements such as space requirements and prohibitions on selling products and services that compete with USPS. Many USPS district retail managers we spoke with in charge of opening CPUs said that finding partners to operate CPUs could be difficult. Furthermore, many of these managers said that they now have fewer staff and less time and, as a result, do not have the resources to manage opening CPUs to meet the need they have identified.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that USPS develop and implement a plan to modernize its retail network. GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time, but believes that it is important for USPS to consider the role of CPUs as USPS works to develop and implement its retail network plan and control costs. In commenting on a draft of this report, USPS provided information on its efforts to provide convenient access to its products and services. |
gao_GAO-10-611 | gao_GAO-10-611_0 | CCRCs Can Help Ensure That Older Americans Have Long-Term Care, but Face Financial and Operational Risks
CCRCs Can Provide Older Americans with Ongoing Housing and Health Care Services
CCRCs offer older Americans a range of housing and health care options that include independent living, assisted living, and skilled nursing units all within the same community. As a result, CCRCs absorb the risk of any increases in the cost of providing health and long- term care to residents with these contracts. When a resident’s needs exceed those services, the fees increase to market rates. As a result, accurate projections of future revenues and costs are important as a CCRC becomes operational. States We Reviewed Varied in the Extent to Which They Ensured CCRCs Address Risks to Their Financial Viability
States We Reviewed Generally Used Similar Licensing Requirements, but Some Required More Information Than Others
To help ensure that CCRCs address the risks they face during their start-up period, seven of the eight states we reviewed used a similar application and licensing process. For example, these seven states required CCRC providers to submit detailed financial information on CCRC projects for review by regulators. In particular, California, New York, and Texas required periodic actuarial studies, but only for CCRCs that offered contracts which incur long-term liabilities by guaranteeing health care services over the long term. In addition, some noted that actuarial studies can help regulators identify potential threats to CCRCs’ long-term viability. Because some states do not appear to have CCRC-specific regulations, an entity in one state might be licensed and regulated as a CCRC while a similar entity in another state may not. While we did not review laws and regulations in the states that did not appear to have specific CCRC regulations, to the extent that states do not license CCRCs and oversee their contracts, residents in those states may not receive the same protections as CCRC residents in states with such regulations. In addition, bondholders may conduct analyses that appear to go beyond those used by states. For example, dissatisfied residents may have limited ability to move out. Policies regarding admission and discharge from different levels of care can be subject to state law, but this decision can be a point of contention as well. According to Florida CCRC operators, for example, CCRCs may impose fees on services that were previously free, such as transportation to activities in the local community. State Laws Designed to Protect Residents Vary, and Some States Do Not Mandate Key Disclosures or Contract Provisions
Regulating Contract Content and Clarity
According to a CCRC industry study, of the 38 states that have some level of regulation specifically addressing CCRCs, 34 states collect and review the standard form contract that the CCRC enters into with residents. Protecting CCRC Residents’ Fees and Deposits
Some states directly protect the financial interests of residents by (1) establishing requirements for fees and deposits to be escrowed, (2) addressing criteria for monthly fee increases, or (3) placing liens on CCRC assets on behalf of residents or confer a preferred status on resident claims on such assets in the event of liquidation. However, entering a CCRC often means committing a large portion of one’s assets, and while CCRC bankruptcies have been rare, and few residents have lost their housing or their entrance fees, a CCRC failure could put residents in a difficult financial situation. Such difficulties, coupled with the stress that recent economic events have placed on CCRC finances, underscore the importance of regulators being vigilant in their efforts to monitor CCRCs’ long-term viability and protect consumers. However, the potential risks to residents that result from committing a considerable amount of money to a CCRC highlight the importance of states being vigilant in their efforts to help ensure that CCRC residents’ long-term interests are adequately protected. NAIC and HHS Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of the report to the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, but neither commented on the draft. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address concerns about the risks and regulation of CCRCs, we have been asked to (1) describe how CCRCs operate and what financial risks are associated with their operation and establishment, (2) describe how state laws address these risks and identifies what is known about how adequately they protect CCRCs’ financial condition, (3) describe risks that CCRC residents face; and (4) describe how state laws address these risks and identifies what is known about their adequacy. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing number of older Americans are choosing continuing care retirement communities (CCRC) to help ensure that their finances in retirement will cover the cost of housing and care they may require. However, recent economic conditions have placed financial stress on some CCRCs. GAO was asked to (1) describe how CCRCs operate and the risks they face, (2) describe how state laws address these risks, (3) describe risks that CCRC residents face, and (4) describe how state laws address these risks. To review these areas, GAO analyzed state statutory provisions pertaining to CCRCs with respect to financial oversight and consumer protection, met with selected state regulators, and interviewed CCRC providers, resident's associations, and consumer groups. While GAO is not recommending specific action at this time, the potential risks to CCRC residents--as well as the potential for this industry to grow--highlight the importance of states being vigilant in their efforts to help ensure adequate consumer protections for residents. GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for review, but neither commented on the draft.
What GAO Found
CCRCs can benefit older Americans by allowing them to move among and through independent living, assisted living, and skilled nursing care in one community. They offer a range of contract types and fees that are designed to provide long-term care and transfer different degrees of the risk of future cost increases from the resident to the CCRC. Developing CCRCs can be a lengthy, complex process that requires significant long-term financing and accurate revenue and cost projections. Once operational, risks to long-term viability include declining occupancy and unexpected cost increases. While few CCRCs have failed, challenging economic and real estate market conditions have negatively affected some CCRCs' occupancy and financial condition. Seven of the eight states GAO reviewed had CCRC-specific regulations, and these states varied in the extent to which they helped ensure that CCRCs addressed risks to their long-term viability. For example, while each licensed and required periodic financial information from CCRCs, only four either examined trended financial data or required periodic actuarial reviews. The lack of a long-term focus creates a potential mismatch with residents' concerns over their CCRCs' long-term viability. CCRC bondholders and rating agencies, which focus on long-term viability, often place requirements on CCRCs that go beyond those used by states in their licensing and oversight activities. Regulators and CCRC providers GAO spoke with generally believed that current regulations were adequate, but some consumer groups felt more comprehensive oversight was needed. While CCRCs offer long-term residence and care in the same community, residents can still face considerable risk. For example, CCRC financial difficulties can lead to unexpected increases in residents' monthly fees. And while CCRC bankruptcies or closures have been relatively rare, and residents have generally not been forced to leave in such cases, should a CCRC failure occur, it could cause residents to lose all or part of their entrance fee. Residents can also become dissatisfied if CCRC policies or operations fall short of residents' expectations or there is a change in arrangements thought to be contractually guaranteed, such as charging residents for services that were previously free. Most of the states GAO reviewed take steps to protect the interests of CCRC residents, such as requiring the escrow of entrance fees and mandating certain disclosures. For example, a number require contracts to be readable, but not all review the content of contracts even though some industry participants questioned residents' ability to fully understand them. Also, not all require disclosure of policies likely to have a significant impact on residents' satisfaction, such as policies for moving between levels of care. According to an industry study, 12 states do not have CCRC-specific regulations, meaning an entity in 1 state may be subject to such regulations while a similar entity in another state may not, and consumers in some states may not receive the same protections as those in others. In contrast, some CCRCs voluntarily exceed disclosures and protections required by state regulations. |
gao_GAO-01-564 | gao_GAO-01-564_0 | By choosing to proceed with a funding scenario that appears to be unrealistically high in the face of budget projections that are substantially less, the Coast Guard is increasing the risk that the project will incur future cost increases and schedule stretch-outs. Our work focused on four risks: (1) planning the project around annual funding levels far above what the administration has told the Coast Guard it can expect to receive, (2) keeping costs under control in the contract’s later years, (3) ensuring that procedures and personnel are in place for managing and overseeing the contractor once the contract is awarded, and (4) minimizing potential with developing unproven technology. We reviewed the Coast Guard’s draft acquisition plan and RFP for the Deepwater Project phase 2, comments that the Coast Guard received from the consultants it hired to evaluate its acquisition strategy, and other documents to identify how the agency plans to manage and administer the procurement phase of the Deepwater Project. This is the largest aircraft in the Coast Guard’s fleet. This helicopter is capable of flying 150 nautical miles off shore. Whether the Coast Guard has adequately addressed these risks will not be known for years to come. First, it requires sustained funding at planned levels of more than $500 million for 2 or more decades. | What GAO Found
The Coast Guard is in the final stages of planning the largest procurement project in its history-the modernization or replacement of more than 90 cutters and 200 aircraft used for missions more than 50 miles from shore. This project, called the Deepwater Capability Replacement Project, is expected to cost more than $10 billion and take 20 years or longer to complete. Congress and the Coast Guard are at a major crossroads with the project. Planning is essentially complete, and Congress will soon be asked to commit to a multibillion-dollar project that will define the way the Coast Guard performs many of its missions for decades to come. The deepwater acquisition strategy is unique and untried for a project of this magnitude. It carries many risks that could potentially cause significant schedule delays and cost increases. The project faces risks in the following four areas: (1) planning the project around annual funding levels far above what the administration has told the Coast Guard it can expect to receive, (2) keeping costs under control in the contract's later years, (3) ensuring that procedures and personnel are in place for managing and overseeing the contractor once the contract is awarded, and (4) minimizing potential problems with developing unproven technology. All of these risks can be mitigated to varying degrees, but not without management attention. |
gao_GAO-01-1084SP | gao_GAO-01-1084SP_0 | Framework for Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies
The framework is organized into four themes that emphasize different dimensions of results-oriented agency budget practices. 2.a. Can relate budget, workforce, accounting, and performance information. Challenges to Implementing Results-Oriented Agency Budget Practices
We asked the panel of senior agency budget officials to identify practices that would be difficult to implement and to discuss some of the challenges to implementation. | What GAO Found
GAO analyzed federal government budget practices in order to produce a framework for agency budget practices that can guide an agency toward incorporating performance information into the budget process. GAO also reviewed challenges to implementing results-oriented budget practices that were identified by a panel of agency budget officials. |
gao_GAO-06-408 | gao_GAO-06-408_0 | In enforcing these laws, SEC issues rules and regulations to provide protection for investors and to help ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest. SEC relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial operations and store the sensitive information it collects. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the status of SEC’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security and (2) the effectiveness of the commission’s information system controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. SEC Has Made Limited Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
Although SEC has taken steps to address its information security controls weaknesses, most of the weaknesses persist. Specifically, the commission has corrected or mitigated 8 of the 51 weaknesses that we previously reported as unresolved. Ineffective Controls Place Financial and Sensitive Data at Risk
SEC has not effectively implemented information security controls to properly protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to the 43 previously reported weaknesses that remain uncorrected, we identified 15 new information security weaknesses during this review. Electronic access controls include user accounts and passwords, access rights and permissions, network services and devices, and audit and monitoring of security-related events. Weaknesses in these areas increase the risk of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, or loss of SEC’s financial systems and sensitive information. A key reason for SEC’s information security controls weaknesses is that the commission has not fully developed or implemented an information security program to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained. FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes the following: periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; security awareness training to inform personnel—including contractors and other users of information systems—of information security risks and their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system that is identified in the agencies’ inventories; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. SEC has not developed a reporting and tracking mechanism for its remedial action plans. SEC does not have a program to handle security incidents. Until SEC fully develops, documents, and implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program that includes enhanced policies, procedures, plans, training, and continuity of operations, its facilities and computing resources and the information that is processed, stored, and transmitted on its systems will remain vulnerable to unauthorized access, modification, or destruction. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a demanding responsibility enforcing securities laws, regulating the securities markets, and protecting investors. In enforcing these laws, SEC issues rules and regulations to provide protection for investors and to help ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. Information security controls affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of sensitive information maintained by SEC. As part of the audit of SEC's fiscal year 2005 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of SEC's actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of the commission's information system controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information.
What GAO Found
Although SEC has taken steps to strengthen its information security program, most of the previously reported information security controls and program weaknesses persist. Specifically, the commission has corrected or mitigated 8 of the 51 weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved in last year's report. Among the corrective actions SEC has taken include replacing a vulnerable, publicly accessible workstation and developing and implementing change control procedures for a major application. However, the commission has not yet effectively controlled remote access to its servers, established controls over passwords, managed access to its systems and data, securely configured network devices and servers, or implemented auditing and monitoring mechanisms to detect and track security incidents. Overall, SEC has not effectively implemented information security controls to properly protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to the 43 previously reported weaknesses that remain uncorrected, GAO identified 15 new information security weaknesses. Most identified weaknesses pertained to electronic access controls such as user accounts and passwords, access rights and permissions, and network devices and services. These weaknesses increase the risk that financial and sensitive information will be inadequately protected against disclosure, modification, or loss, possibly without detection, and place SEC operations at risk of disruption. A key reason for SEC's information security controls weaknesses is that the commission has not fully developed, implemented, or documented key elements of an information security program to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained. Until SEC implements such a program, its facilities and computing resources and the information that is processed, stored, and transmitted on its systems will remain vulnerable. |
gao_GAO-09-332T | gao_GAO-09-332T_0 | USPS’s Current Financial Condition and Outlook Have Deteriorated
USPS’s financial condition deteriorated in fiscal year 2008. According to USPS, this was due largely to declines in the economy—particularly in the financial and housing sectors—that were reflected in a 4.5 percent decline in total mail volumes and flattened revenues despite rate increases. In addition, fuel prices increased costs by over $500 million, and cost-of- living allowances provided to postal employees increased costs by about $560 million. Even after reducing over $2 billion in costs, primarily by cutting more than 50 million work hours, USPS was not able to close the gap between revenues and expenses. USPS debt increased by $3 billion in fiscal year 2008—the annual statutory limit—and reached $7.2 billion in total outstanding debt at the end of the fiscal year, or nearly half of the $15 billion statutory debt limit. Rate Increases and Cost- Cutting Efforts are Insufficient to Offset the Impact of Volume Declines
As USPS has reported, it experienced the single largest volume drop in its history in fiscal year 2008 when mail volume fell by 9.5 billion pieces (see app. 1). Mail volume in fiscal year 2008 was also affected by the continuing shift of mail to electronic communication and payment alternatives. USPS’s Fiscal Year 2009 Outlook Has Become Mo Pessimistic
According to USPS officials, USPS’s financial outlook has continued to deteriorate based on preliminary results for the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, as well as updated projections for mail volume and revenue. In light of these results and updated projections, USPS officials told us this month that they expect fiscal year 2009 mail volume to decline by 10 billion to 15 billion pieces. In the long term, aggressive USPS action beyond its current cost-cutting effort urgently needed to reduce costs and improve efficiency, particularly in light of accelerated declines in mail volume and changes in the public’s use of mail. We agree with the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) that unfavorable mail volume and revenue trends may imperil USPS’s financial viability and that USPS must dramatically reduce its costs to remain viable. Options to Assist USPS through Its Short Term Difficulties
Several options could assist USPS through its short-term difficulties, some of which would require congressional action. Although we recognize the need to provide USPS with immediate financial relief, such relief should meet its short-term needs and is no substitute for aggressive USPS action to preserve its long-term viability. Specifically, USPS has proposed that Congress change the statutory obligation to pay retiree health benefits premiums for current retirees from USPS to the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (Fund) for the next 8 years. Another option would be for Congress to provide USPS with 2-year relief for retiree health benefits premium payments, totaling about $4.3 billion, which would be consistent with providing immediate financial relief, while having much less impact on the Fund than USPS’s proposal. Therefore, we believe that the option to provide 2-year relief totaling $4.3 billion would be preferable to USPS’s proposal. Under this short- term option Congress could revisit USPS’s financial condition to determine whether further relief is needed and also review what actions USPS has taken to assure its long-term financial viability. Comprehensive Action Is Needed to Help Keep USPS Financially Viable in the Long-Term
Action is urgently needed to streamline USPS costs in two areas where it has been particularly difficult—the compensation and benefits area, which generates close to 80 percent of its costs, and USPS’s mail processing and retail networks. We have reported for many years that USPS needs to rightsize its workforce and realign its network of mail processing and retail facilities. USPS has several options for realigning its mail processing operations to eliminate excess capacity and costs, but has taken only limited action. Another option we reported on would be for USPS to close unnecessary retail facilities, and by reducing the number of facilities, USPS could lower the costs of maintaining its network of facilities. Congress encouraged USPS to expeditiously move forward in its streamlining efforts in PAEA. We recommended that USPS enhance transparency and strengthen accountability of its realignment efforts to assure stakeholders that realignment would be implemented fairly and achieve the desired results. We asked USPS to comment on a draft of our testimony. USPS generally agreed with the accuracy of our statement and provided technical corrections and some additional perspective, which we incorporated where appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
When Congress passed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act in December 2006, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) had just completed fiscal year 2006 with its largest mail volume ever--213 billion pieces of mail and a net income of $900 million. Two years later, USPS's mail volume dropped almost 5 percent--the largest single-year decline. The Postmaster General testified last March before this subcommittee that USPS was facing a potential net loss of over $1 billion for fiscal year 2008. He noted that USPS anticipated continued deterioration due to the economic slowdown, as the financial, credit, and housing sectors are among its key business drivers. He also said that the shifts in transactions and messages from mail to electronic communications and from advertising mail to lower-cost electronic media have affected the USPS's financial situation. This testimony focuses on (1) USPS's financial condition and outlook and (2) options and actions for USPS to remain financially viable in the short and long term. It is based on GAO's past work and updated postal financial information. We asked USPS for comments on our statement. USPS generally agreed with the accuracy of our statement and provided technical corrections and some additional perspective, which we incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
USPS has reported that the declining economy accelerated declines in mail volume in fiscal year 2008 and flattened revenues despite postal rate increases. In fiscal year 2008, mail volume fell by 9.5 billion pieces, fuel prices increased costs by over $500 million, and cost-of-living allowances for postal employees increased costs by $560 million. Cutting costs by $2 billion--primarily by cutting over 50 million work hours--did not close the gap between revenues and expenses. Thus, USPS recorded a loss of $2.8 billion for fiscal year 2008. Its debt increased by $3 billion by the end of the year to $7.2 billion. USPS's outlook for fiscal year 2009 has become more pessimistic. USPS projects a volume decline of 10 billion to 15 billion pieces, another loss, and $3 billion more in debt. At this pace, USPS could reach its $15 billion statutory debt limit by fiscal year 2011. In the short term, several options could assist USPS through its difficulties, some of which would require congressional action. USPS has proposed that Congress give it immediate financial relief totaling about $25 billion over the next 8 years by changing the funding of its retiree health benefits. Although GAO recognizes the need to provide USPS with immediate financial relief, such relief is no substitute for aggressive USPS action to preserve its long-term viability. USPS projects an improvement in its financial condition in fiscal year 2010. Therefore, GAO believes it would be preferable to provide 2-year relief totaling $4.3 billion. This would have less impact on the retiree health benefits fund, and then Congress could revisit USPS's financial condition to determine whether additional relief is needed. In the long term, USPS action beyond its current cost-cutting efforts is urgently needed to reduce costs and improve efficiency. GAO agrees with the Postal Regulatory Commission that unfavorable mail volume and revenue trends may imperil USPS's financial viability and that USPS must dramatically reduce its costs to remain viable. Two areas for further action to reduce costs include compensation and benefits, which is close to 80 percent of its costs, and mail processing and retail networks. GAO previously reported that excess capacity in USPS's mail processing infrastructure has impeded efficiency gains. USPS has considered several options to realign its facility network, such as outsourcing operations in some mail processing facilities, but has taken only limited action. Another option would be for USPS to close unnecessary retail facilities and thereby reduce its large maintenance backlog. While it has been difficult for USPS to take action in these areas, Congress encouraged USPS to expeditiously move forward in its streamlining efforts in the postal reform act of 2006. GAO recommended that USPS enhance transparency and strengthen accountability of its realignment efforts to assure stakeholders that realignment would be implemented fairly and achieve the desired results, and it has made improvements in this area. Accelerated volume declines and changes in the public's use of mail indicate that USPS needs to move beyond incremental efforts and take aggressive action to streamline its workforce and network costs to assure its long-term viability. |
gao_GAO-07-512T | gao_GAO-07-512T_0 | This is due in part to increased filing of claims, including those filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Moreover, questions remain about consistency of VA’s decisions across regional offices and at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Similarly, as shown in figure 2, VA reduced the average age of its pending claims from 182 days at the end of fiscal year 2001 to 111 days at the end of fiscal year 2003. However, by the end of fiscal year 2006 average days pending had increased to 127 days. Rating-related claims, including those filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, increased steadily from about 579,000 in fiscal year 2000 to about 806,000 in fiscal year 2006, an increase of about 39 percent. Despite VA’s Continuing Steps, a Number of Factors May Limit Its Ability to Improve Claims Processing
VA has recently taken several steps to improve service delivery, but their potential to lead to significant improvements may be limited by several factors. VA’s budget justification provides information on actual and planned productivity, in terms of claims decided per full-time equivalent employee. VA expects that this new process will reduce the time needed to obtain the evidence needed to decide claims. To resolve appeals faster, VA has been working to reduce the number of appeals sent back by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals for further work such as obtaining additional evidence and correcting procedural errors. Despite these efforts, VA may be limited in its ability to make and sustain significant claims processing performance improvements. Recent history has shown that VA’s claims processing workload and performance are affected by several factors, including the impacts of laws and court decisions, increasing numbers and complexity of claims, and difficulties in obtaining accurate and timely information to adjudicate claims. Since 1999, several court decisions and laws related to VA’s responsibilities to assist veterans in developing their benefit claims have significantly affected VA’s ability to process claims in a timely manner. Opportunities for Improvement May Lie in More Fundamental Reform
While VA is taking actions to address its claims processing challenges, there are opportunities for more fundamental reform that could dramatically improve decision making and processing. These include reexamining program design, as well as the structure and division of labor among field offices. Veterans’ Benefits: Improvements Needed in the Reporting and Use of Data on the Accuracy of Disability Claims Decisions. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs. Veterans’ Benefits: Quality Assurance for Disability Claims and Appeals Processing Can Be Further Improved. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee asked GAO to discuss its recent work related to the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability claims and appeals processing. GAO has reported and testified on this subject on numerous occasions. GAO's work has addressed VA's efforts to improve the timeliness and accuracy of decisions on claims and appeals, VA's efforts to reduce backlogs, and concerns about decisional consistency.
What GAO Found
VA continues to face challenges in improving service delivery to veterans, specifically in speeding up the process of adjudication and appeal, reducing the existing backlog of claims, and improving the accuracy and consistency of decisions. For example, as of the end of fiscal year 2006, rating-related compensation claims were pending an average of 127 days, 16 days more than at the end of fiscal year 2003. During the same period, the inventory of rating-related claims grew by almost half, due in part to increased filing of claims, including those filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Meanwhile, appeals resolution remains a lengthy process, taking an average of 657 days in fiscal year 2006. Further, we and VA's Inspector General have identified concerns about the consistency of decisions by VA's regional offices and the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). VA is taking steps to address these problems. For example, the President's fiscal year 2008 budget requests an increase of over 450 full-time equivalent employees to process compensation claims. VA is working to improve appeals timeliness by reducing appeals remanded for further work. VA is also developing a plan to monitor consistency across regional offices. However, several factors may limit VA's ability to make and sustain significant improvements in its claims processing performance, including the potential impacts of laws and court decisions, continued increases in the number and complexity of claims being filed, and difficulties in obtaining the evidence needed to decide claims in a timely and accurate manner, such as military service records. Opportunities for significant performance improvement may lie in more fundamental reform of VA's disability compensation program. This could include reexamining program design such as updating the disability criteria to reflect the current state of science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions. It could also include examining the structure and division of labor among field offices. |
gao_GAO-15-248T | gao_GAO-15-248T_0 | Background
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 directed NASA to, among another things, develop a Space Launch System as a follow-on to the Space Shuttle and as a key component in expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. The first version of the SLS that NASA is developing is a 70-mt launch vehicle known as Block I. NASA has committed to conduct two test flights of the Block I vehicle—the first in 2018 and the second in 2021. Specifically, we reported in July 2014 that NASA had yet to establish baselines that matched the SLS program’s cost and schedule resources with the requirement to develop the SLS and launch the first flight test in December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. NASA policy generally requires a 70 percent joint confidence level—a calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets—for a program to proceed with final design and fabrication. At that time, the agency’s funding plan for SLS was insufficient to match requirements to resources for the December 2017 flight test at the 70 percent joint confidence level and the agency’s options for matching resources to requirements were largely limited to increasing program funding, delaying the schedule, or accepting a reduced confidence level for the initial flight test. In our July 2014 report we recommended, among other things, that NASA develop baselines for SLS based on matching cost and schedule resources to requirements that would result in a level of risk commensurate with its policies. NASA concurred with our findings and recommendations. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and schedule baselines for the SLS program at the 70 percent joint confidence level for a committed launch readiness date of November 2018. Nevertheless, the program plans to continue to pursue an initial capability of SLS by December 2017 as an internal goal and has calculated a joint cost and schedule confidence level of 30 percent associated with that date. As illustrated by table 1 below, the SLS and GSDO programs are pursuing ambitious and varying target dates for the EM-1 test flight. In addition, the Orion program is currently tracking and reporting to December 2017. With the Orion and GSDO programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an aggressive SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve other issues within the human exploration effort. NASA’s SLS and Orion Programs Are Making Progress, but the Orion Program Is Facing Technical Challenges
We reported in July 2014 that NASA’s metrics indicated the SLS program was on track to meet many of its design goals for demonstrating the initial capability of SLS. The Orion program just completed its first experimental test flight—EFT-1. Data from this flight are required to address several significant risks that the Orion program is currently tracking that must be addressed before humans can be flown on Orion. For example, during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the capsule thereby endangering the crew. Further, NASA faces choices between differing design solutions to resolve cracking issues discovered during manufacturing of the heat shield that protects the capsule during re-entry. Both the parachute and heat shield challenges must be resolved before EM-2 because each represents a significant risk to crew safety. NASA’s Human Exploration Programs’ Long-Term Missions and Affordability Are Uncertain
NASA has yet to address our concerns regarding mission planning or life- cycle cost estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and GSDO, the supporting ground systems. As a whole, the efforts represent NASA's largest exploration investment over the next decade, approaching $23 billion, to demonstrate initial capabilities.
In May 2014, GAO found that NASA's preliminary life-cycle cost estimates for human exploration were incomplete and recommended that NASA establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines for each upgraded block of SLS, Orion, and GSDO; NASA partially concurred. In July 2014, GAO issued a report on SLS's progress toward its first test flight and recommended that NASA match SLS's resources to its requirements and define specific missions beyond the second test flight, among other actions. NASA concurred with these recommendations.
This testimony is based on GAO's May 2014 report ( GAO-14-385 ), July 2014 report ( GAO-14-631 ), and ongoing audit work related to SLS and Orion. It discusses NASA's efforts to match resources to requirements for the SLS program and developmental challenges facing the SLS and Orion programs. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant design, development, cost, and schedule documents and interviewed program officials.
What GAO Found
In 2014, GAO reported on a number of issues related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) human exploration programs: the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). For example, in July 2014, GAO found that NASA had not matched resources to requirements for the SLS program and was pursuing an aggressive development schedule—a situation compounded by the agency's reluctance to request funding commensurate with the program's needs. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and schedule baselines for the SLS program at the agency-required 70 percent joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL), which satisfied one recommendation from GAO's July 2014 report. The JCL is a calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets. To satisfy the 70 percent JCL requirement, the SLS program delayed its committed launch readiness date for its first test flight from December 2017 to November 2018. The program is still pursuing December 2017 as an internal goal, or target date, for the test flight, even though NASA calculated the JCL associated with launching SLS on this date at 30 percent. Moreover, neither the Orion nor GSDO program expects to be ready for the December 2017 launch date. With these programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an accelerated SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve challenges on other human exploration programs.
In addition, GAO's ongoing work has found that the Orion program is facing significant technical and funding issues. Orion just completed its first test flight, and data from this flight is required to address several risks that must be resolved before the second test flight in 2021 because they represent risks to crew safety. For example, during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the capsule, thereby endangering the crew. In addition, data from the test is necessary to inform NASA's design solution to address heat shield cracking issues, which NASA has been working to resolve since August 2013. The heat shield is integral to crew safety during re-entry. |
gao_GAO-11-520T | gao_GAO-11-520T_0 | Generally, the purpose of prior BRAC rounds was to generate savings to apply to other priorities, reduce property deemed excess to needs, and realign DOD’s workload and workforce to achieve efficiencies in property management. Underlying Obstacles Have Impeded the Government’s Ability to Dispose of Unneeded Property and Reduce Overreliance on Costly Leasing
When we designated federal real property management as high risk, we reported that the federal government faced a number of obstacles to effectively managing its real property. These included a lack of strategic focus on real property issues, a lack of reliable real property data, legal limitations, and stakeholder influences in real property decision making. Lack of Strategic Focus on Real Property Issues
In 2003, we reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of real- property-related problems, there had been no governmentwide strategic focus on real property issues. Currently, before GSA can dispose of a property that a federal agency no longer needs, it is required to offer the property to other federal agencies. Further complicating this issue is that different agencies have different authorities to enter into leases with public and private entities for the use of federal property, to sell real property, and to retain the proceeds from these transactions. The interests of these multiple and often competing stakeholders may not always align with the most efficient use of government resources and can complicate real property decisions. The Government Has Adopted a More Strategic Focus to Improve Real Property Management and Has Taken Steps to Increase Data Reliability, but Other Obstacles Remain
The administration and real-property-holding agencies have made progress in a number of areas since we designated federal real property as high risk in 2003. Specifically, the federal government has taken steps toward strategically managing its real property and improving the reliability of its real property data. However, many problems related to unneeded property and leasing persist because the government has not addressed the underlying legal limitations and stakeholder influences which we identified. As part of the government’s efforts to strategically manage its real property, the administration established FRPC—a group composed of the OMB Controller and the senior real property officers of landholding agencies—to support real property reform efforts. In 2007, we recommended that OMB, which is responsible for reviewing agencies’ progress on federal real property management, assist agencies by developing an action plan to address the key problems associated with decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder influences. However, the administration’s recently proposed legislative framework, CPRA, is somewhat responsive to this recommendation in that it addresses both legal limitations and stakeholder influences in real property decision making. To address stakeholder influences, CPRA would create an independent board to recommend federal properties for disposal or consolidation after receiving recommendations from civilian landholding agencies. Key Elements That Underpin the Process for Closing or Realigning DOD Installations May Be Applicable to Managing Civilian Real Property
In our prior work on the BRAC process, we identified certain key elements underpinning the process, which may be applicable to the management of real property governmentwide. The BRAC process was designed to address certain challenges to closures or realignments, including stakeholder interests, thereby permitting DOD to dispose of installations or realign its missions to better use its facilities and generate savings. Key Elements That DOD Used to Develop Its 2005 BRAC Recommendations Could Be Considered in a Civilian Real Property Closure or Realignment Process
In developing its recommendations for the BRAC Commission, DOD relied on certain elements, as follows: Establish goals for the BRAC process. Develop criteria for evaluating closures and realignments. Estimate costs and savings to implement closure and realignment recommendations. Establish a common analytical framework. Establish an organizational structure. Involve the audit community to better ensure data accuracy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government holds more than 45,000 underutilized properties that cost nearly $1.7 billion annually to operate, yet significant obstacles impede efforts to close, consolidate, or find other uses for them. In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property management as a high-risk area, in part because of the number and cost of these properties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for reviewing federal agencies' progress in real property management. In 2007, GAO recommended that OMB assist agencies by developing an action plan to address key obstacles associated with decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder influence. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget proposed establishing a legislative framework for disposing of and consolidating civilian real property, referred to as a Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA), which may be designed to address stakeholder influences in real property decision making. This testimony identifies (1) obstacles to effectively managing federal real property, (2) actions designed to overcome those obstacles, including government actions and CPRA, and (3) key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process that are designed to help DOD close or realign installations and may be relevant for CPRA. To do this work, GAO reviewed GAO reports, other reports, and CPRA.
What GAO Found
In designating federal real property management as a high-risk issue in 2003, GAO found that the federal government faced a number of obstacles to effectively managing its real property. These included its lack of strategic focus on real property issues, a lack of reliable real property data, legal limitations, and stakeholder influence. That year, GAO reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of real-property-related problems, there was no governmentwide strategic focus on real property issues and that governmentwide data were unreliable and outdated. GAO also reported then that before disposing of excess property, the General Services Administration is legally required to follow a lengthy screening process, which includes offering the property to other federal agencies and other entities for public uses. Furthermore, stakeholders--including local governments, private real estate interests, and advocacy groups--may have different interests that do not always align with the most efficient use of government resources. Since 2003, the federal government has taken steps to address some of these obstacles and improve its real property management. For instance, the administration and real-property-holding agencies have improved their strategic management of real property by establishing an interagency Federal Real Property Council designed to enhance real property planning processes. The government has also implemented controls to improve the reliability of federal real property data. However, many problems related to unneeded property and leasing have persisted because legal limitations and stakeholder influences remain. GAO's 2007 recommendation that OMB develop an action plan is designed to address these problems. In addition, CPRA proposes an independent board to identify facilities for disposal and consolidation, which could streamline legal requirements and mitigate stakeholder influences. Congress authorized DOD to undergo five BRAC rounds to reduce excess property and realign DOD's workload to achieve efficiencies and savings in property management. The BRAC process, much like CPRA, was designed to address obstacles to closures or realignments, thus permitting DOD to close installations or realign its missions to better use its facilities and generate savings. GAO's prior work on the BRAC process identified certain key elements that may be applicable to managing civilian real property, such as establishing goals and an organizational structure, developing criteria and an analytical framework, using a model to estimate costs and savings, and involving the audit community to better ensure data accuracy. A key similarity between BRAC and CPRA is that both establish an independent board that reviews agency recommendations; a key difference is that the BRAC process created criteria for selecting installations for realignment while CPRA does not include specific criteria to be used to select properties for disposal or consolidation. |
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