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gao_GAO-01-1006T | gao_GAO-01-1006T_0 | It is impractical for the agency to rely on competition to determine prices. Management of Medicare Has Been a Mixed Success
Tasked with administering this highly complex program, HCFA has earned mixed reviews in managing Medicare. It implemented payment methods that have helped constrain program cost growth and ensured that claims were paid quickly at little administrative cost. In February 2000, the HCFA Administrator testified that more than a third of the agency’s current workforce was eligible to retire within the next 5 years and that HCFA was seeking to increase “its ability to hire the right skill mix for its mission.” As we and others have reported, too great a mismatch between the agency’s administrative capacity and its designated mandate could have left HCFA, and now CMS, unprepared to handle Medicare’s future population growth and medical technology advances. Agency Has Difficulty Holding Claims Administration Contractors Accountable
Constraints on the agency’s flexibility to contract for claims administration services have also frustrated efforts to manage Medicare effectively. HCFA took steps to address plans’ regulatory concerns modifying some requirements or delaying their implementation. At the request of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, we are evaluating Medicare+Choice requirements. However, the management of the program is not always responsive to beneficiary, provider, and taxpayer expectations. The agency will also need to do its part by implementing a performance-based management approach that holds managers accountable for accomplishing program goals. Medicare: Refinements Should Continue to Improve Appropriateness of Provider Payments (GAO/T-HEHS-00-160, July 19, 2000). | What GAO Found
Management of Medicare has come under increasing scrutiny. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has had mixed success running the program. The agency has developed payment methods that have contained cost growth, and HCFA has paid fee-for-service claims quickly and at low administrative cost. However, HCFA has had difficulty ensuring that it paid claims appropriately. In addition, Medicare claims administration contractors have done a poor job of communicating with Medicare providers. HCFA has taken important steps to address some of these shortcomings, including strengthening payment safeguards, but several factors have hampered its efforts. Despite its growing responsibilities, HCFA suffers from staffing shortages. The agency also continues to rely on archaic computer systems. At the same time, HCFA has faltered in its attempts to adopt a results-based approach to agency management. Constraints on the agency's contracting authority have limited its use of full and open competition to select claims administration contractors and assign administrative tasks. Rising expectations among Medicare beneficiaries and providers are putting pressure on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to modernize and improve agency operations. Such improvements will require HCFA to begin a performance-based management approach that holds managers accountable for achieving program goals. Congressional attention also appears warranted if Medicare is to meet the challenges of the 21st century. |
gao_GAO-07-254T | gao_GAO-07-254T_0 | Further, we noted that some agencies still had not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs and activities or had not identified all programs susceptible to significant improper payments. For example, agencies had not estimated improper payments for 10 risk-susceptible programs with outlays totaling over $234 billion, even though most of these programs had such reporting requirements predating IPIA. In addition, we found that improper payment estimates totaling about $389 million for 9 programs were not based on a statistical sampling methodology. Given that total outlays for these 9 programs exceeded $58.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, estimates for these programs would likely have been much greater had statistically valid methods been used. Our preliminary review of federal agencies’ fiscal year 2006 reporting of selected improper payment information identified that while progress is being made, improvements are still needed to fully address improper payments reporting requirements. Challenges That Hinder Full Reporting of Improper Payment Information
While showing progress, agencies’ fiscal year 2005 reporting under IPIA does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies. Major challenges remain in meeting the goals of the act and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. We found that the following challenges continue to hinder full reporting of improper payment information: existing reporting remains incomplete, large programs are still not included, and OMB’s threshold criteria limit complete reporting. Improvements Needed in Agencies’ Reporting of Improper Payment Information
Of the 35 agencies whose fiscal year 2005 agency PARs or annual reports were included in our review, 23, the same number of agencies that reported having risk assessments in our prior year review, reported they had performed risk assessments of all of their programs and activities. (See GAO-07-92, app. After passage of IPIA, OMB’s implementing guidance required that these programs continue to report improper payment information under IPIA. On the surface, this would suggest that significant progress has been made. We also noted instances where agencies with large program outlays reported that their programs or activities were not susceptible to significant improper payments because the improper payment estimates only exceeded one of OMB’s criteria for reporting improper payment information, another example of how OMB’s criteria could materially affect the extent to which agencies report improper payment information in their PARs. Although we do not know the extent of improper payments that are not reported, a limited number of agencies voluntarily provided information in their PARs that allowed us to determine the amount of improper payments for certain programs and activities that were excluded from the total improper payments estimate of $38 billion for fiscal year 2005. Generally, these agencies reported on their recovery auditing efforts, such as the amount identified for recovery and the amount recovered. For example, for fiscal year 2005, NASA reported in its PAR that it had identified and recovered $617,442 in contract payments, a 100 percent recovery rate. Yet, the NASA OIG reported it had identified over $515 million in questioned contract costs during fiscal year 2005. When comparing the $51 million in questioned contract costs identified for recovery to the $617,442 NASA actually recovered, the recovery rate decreases from the reported 100 percent recovery rate to a 1.2 percent rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal year 2005 marked the second year that executive agencies were required to report improper payment information under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). The ultimate goal is to minimize such payments because, as a practical matter, they cannot be entirely eliminated. GAO's testimony is primarily based on its recently issued report, GAO-07-92 , which included a review of improper payment information reported by 35 agencies in their fiscal year 2005 performance and accountability or annual reports. This statement focuses on the progress agencies have made in their improper payment reporting, the challenges that remain, and the total amount of improper payments recouped through recovery auditing.
What GAO Found
While agencies are making progress, their fiscal year 2005 reporting under IPIA does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies. Major challenges remain in meeting the goals of the act and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. GAO found that three challenges in particular continue to hinder full reporting of improper payment information: First, existing reporting incomplete. Although 18 agencies collectively identified and estimated improper payments for 57 programs and activities totaling $38 billion, some agencies still had not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs, resulting in their identification of none or only a few programs as susceptible to significant improper payments. In many cases, these same agencies had well-known and well-documented financial management weaknesses as well as fraudulent, improper, and questionable payments. Further, improper payments estimates totaling about $389 million for 9 programs were not based on a valid statistical sampling methodology as required. Materially higher estimates would have been expected had the correct methods been used, given that total outlays for these 9 programs exceeded $58.2 billion. Second, large programs still not included. Estimates of improper payments for 10 risk-susceptible programs with outlays totaling over $234 billion still have not been provided. Most of these programs were subject to OMB reporting requirements that preceded IPIA. Third, threshold criteria limit reporting. The act includes broad criteria to identify risk-susceptible programs. OMB's implementing guidance includes more specific criteria that limit the disclosure and transparency of agencies' improper payments. GAO's preliminary review of fiscal year 2006 data indicates that while additional progress is being made, agencies continue to face many of the significant challenges noted in GAO's report on fiscal year 2005 reporting. With regard to agencies' recovery audit efforts, GAO found that the data reported may present an overly optimistic view of these efforts. While 21 agencies were required to report on their recovery audit efforts, GAO identified discrepancies in several agencies' information and found limited reviews over contract payments. For example, for fiscal year 2005, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported that it had identified and recovered $617,442 in contract payments, a 100 percent recovery rate. Yet, the NASA Office of Inspector General reported it had identified over $515 million in questioned contract costs during fiscal year 2005, of which NASA management decided to pursue recovery of $51 million. Had this amount been compared to the $617,442 NASA actually recovered, its recovery rate would drop from the reported 100 percent to 1.2 percent. |
gao_GAO-14-390 | gao_GAO-14-390_0 | These include two methods states are required to provide under IDEA—mediation and resolution meetings—as well as others that states have voluntarily implemented. Due Process Hearings Have Substantially Decreased, and States and Territories Use a Range of Other Methods to Resolve Disputes
The National Decline in Rates and Numbers of Due Process Hearings Has Been Driven by Steep Rate Declines in New York, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
Since 2004, the nationwide rates of due process hearings—a key indicator of serious disputes between parents and school districts and a formal method for resolving disputes—have decreased substantially (see fig. SEA representatives in these locations cited the use of mediation or resolution meetings as key among the reasons for the declines. Dispute resolution helplines. Facilitated resolution meetings. States, Territories, and Other Stakeholders Reported Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods Helped Resolve Disputes without Resorting to Due Process Hearings
States, Territories, and Other Stakeholders Considered Alternative Methods Important for Resolving Disputes without Resorting to Due Process Hearings
On our survey, a large majority of state officials reported mediation and resolution meetings—methods that IDEA requires states make available—as extremely, very or moderately important to resolving disputes early. Some stakeholders cited the potential of these methods to improve communication and trust between parents and schools. In follow up discussions, some state officials said the lack of public awareness as a challenge to implementing or expanding the use of alternative dispute resolution methods they have voluntarily implemented, and that they are addressing this challenge with various strategies. Education Lacks Key Information on the Timeliness of Due Process Hearing Decisions, and the Parental Involvement Data It Collects Are Not Used for Oversight
Education’s Method for Measuring the Timeliness of Due Process Hearing Decisions Does Not Reflect Time Added by Extensions
Education assesses states’ performance on dispute resolution using several different measures (see table 2) but lacks key information about the timeliness of due process hearing decisions, which reduces its ability to monitor dispute resolution effectively. According to Education’s guidance on performance measures, all states are required to report the number of due process hearing requests that were adjudicated within 45 days, or a timeline that includes any approved extensions. However, this guidance does not direct states to report the amount of time that extensions add to due process hearing decisions. Leading performance measurement practices identified in our past work state that successful performance measures should, among other things, be clearly stated and provide unambiguous information. Parental Involvement Performance Data Do Not Support Dispute Resolution Oversight
Education collects data from states on parental involvement in the education of children with disabilities, but these data are not comparable across states, and as a result Education cannot use these data to target its oversight of states’ dispute resolution activities. However, these officials said that Education cannot determine which states provide high quality parental involvement data, nor does Education use these data to monitor and oversee states’ performance in this area and is unable to compare state performance because states have considerable latitude to determine the methodologies they use to collect the data and these methodologies consequently vary across states. Having parents who are appropriately informed and involved in decision-making regarding the education of students with disabilities can lead to the resolution of disputes in a more collaborative manner without the use of formal dispute resolution methods and may result in greater trust between parents and school districts, and earlier, less adversarial dispute resolution. Education neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations but proposed alternative actions. However, Education’s proposed actions will not effectively address the weaknesses we identified in Education’s performance measures and we continue to believe our recommendations are valid. | Why GAO Did This Study
States receiving IDEA funds must ensure that a free appropriate public education is made available to all children with disabilities, and IDEA has long incorporated formal methods to resolve disputes between parents and school districts. The 2004 reauthorization of IDEA expanded the availability of alternative dispute resolution by broadening the use of voluntary mediation and requiring resolution meetings prior to due process hearings. GAO was asked to examine the use of dispute resolution methods since 2004. In this report GAO (1) examines recent trends in dispute resolution methods, (2) reports stakeholders' views on alternative methods, and (3) assesses Education's related performance measures for states. GAO analyzed federal dispute resolution data from 2004 to 2012, conducted a national survey, compared Education's performance measures to leading practices, and interviewed Education officials and stakeholders selected for their knowledge of dispute resolution.
What GAO Found
From 2004 through 2012, the number of due process hearings—a formal dispute resolution method and a key indicator of serious disputes between parents and school districts under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)— substantially decreased nationwide as a result of steep declines in New York, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Officials in these locations largely attributed these declines to greater use of mediation and resolution meetings—methods that IDEA requires states to implement. Despite the declines, officials in these locations said that higher rates of hearings persisted because of disputes over private school placements or special education services. GAO did not find noteworthy trends in the use of other IDEA dispute resolution methods, including state complaints, mediation, and resolution meetings. States and territories reported on GAO's survey that they used mediation, resolution meetings, and other methods they voluntarily implemented to facilitate early resolution of disputes and to avoid potentially adversarial due process hearings.
States, territories, and other stakeholders generally reported on GAO's survey or in interviews that alternative methods are important to resolving disputes earlier. Some stakeholders cited the potential of these methods to improve communication and trust between parents and educators. Some state officials said that a lack of public awareness about the methods they have voluntarily implemented was a challenge to expanding their use, but they were addressing this with various kinds of outreach, such as disseminating information through parent organizations.
The Department of Education (Education) uses several measures to assess states' performance on dispute resolution but lacks complete information on timeliness and comparable data on parental involvement. Education requires all states to report the number of due process hearing decisions that were made within 45 days or were extended; however, it does not direct states to report the total amount of time that extensions add to due process hearing decisions. Similarly, Education collects data from states on parental involvement—a key to dispute prevention—but does not require consistent collection and reporting, so the data are not comparable nationwide. Leading performance measurement practices state that successful performance measures should be clearly stated and provide unambiguous information. Without more transparent timeliness data and comparable parental involvement data, Education cannot effectively target its oversight of states' dispute resolution activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education improve measures for overseeing states' dispute resolution performance, including more transparent data on due process hearing decisions and comparable parental involvement data. Education neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations and proposed alternative actions. GAO does not believe these proposals will address the weaknesses in Education's performance measures and continues to believe the recommendations remain valid. |
gao_NSIAD-98-37 | gao_NSIAD-98-37_0 | No capability currently exists to destroy missiles in the boost phase. During that interval, the ABL is expected to detect, track, and destroy the missile, as shown in figure 1. ABL’s Operational Effectiveness Is Currently Unknown
A key factor in determining whether the ABL will be able to successfully destroy a missile in its boost phase is the Air Force’s ability to predict the levels of turbulence that the ABL is expected to encounter. To date, the Air Force has not shown that it can accurately predict the levels of turbulence the ABL is expected to encounter or that its technical requirements regarding turbulence is appropriate. Optical turbulence can be measured either optically on non-optically. The Air Force’s ABL program office has not determined whether non-optical measurements of turbulence can be mathematically correlated with optical measurements. Without demonstrating that such a correlation exists, the program office cannot ensure that the non-optical measurements of turbulence that it is collecting are useful in predicting the turbulence likely to be encountered by the ABL’s laser beam. Technical Requirements for Overcoming Turbulence May Be Understated
The ABL program office also has not shown that the turbulence levels in which the ABL is being designed to operate are realistic. Available optical data on optical turbulence indicate that the turbulence the ABL may encounter could be four times greater than the design specifications. These higher levels of optical turbulence would decrease the effective range of the ABL system. DOD officials also indicated that a more realistic design may not be achievable using current state-of-the-art technology. Developing and Integrating ABL Components Pose Many Technical Challenges
Developing and integrating a weapon-level laser, a beam control system, and the many associated components and software systems into an aircraft are unprecedented challenges for DOD. The Air Force must build the laser to be able to contend with size and weight restrictions, motion and vibrations, and other factors unique to an aircraft environment, yet be powerful enough to sustain a killing force over a range of at least 500 kilometers. Integrating the beam control system with the aircraft also poses a challenge for the Air Force. The Air Force must create a beam control system, consisting of complex software programs, moving telescopes, and sophisticated mirrors, that will compensate for the optical turbulence in which the system is operating and control the direction and size of the laser beam. In addition, the beam control system must be able to tolerate the various kinds of motions and vibrations that will be encountered in an aircraft environment. Conclusions and Recommendations
The ABL program is a revolutionary weapon system concept. Although DOD has a long history with laser technologies, the ABL is its first attempt to design, develop, and install a multimegawatt laser on an aircraft. A fundamental challenge is for the Air Force to accurately and reliably predict the level of optical turbulence that the ABL will encounter and then design the system to operate effectively in that turbulence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Airborne Laser (ABL) program, focusing on: (1) the way in which the ABL is expected to change theater missile defense; (2) assurances that the ABL will be able to operate effectively in the levels of optical turbulence that may be encountered in the geographical areas in which the system might be used; and (3) the technical challenges in developing an ABL system that will be compatible with the unique environment of an aircraft.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the ABL program is the Department of Defense's (DOD) first attempt to design, develop, and install a multimegawatt laser on an aircraft and is expected to be DOD's first system to intercept missiles during the boost phase; (2) a key factor in determining whether the ABL will be able to successfully destroy a missile in its boost phase is the Air Force's ability to predict the levels of turbulence that the ABL is expected to encounter; (3) the Air Force has not shown that it can accurately predict the levels of turbulence the ABL is expected to encounter or that its technical requirements regarding turbulence are appropriate; (4) because ABL is an optical weapons system, only optical measurements can measure the turbulence that will actually be encountered by the ABL laser beam; (5) the Air Force has no plans to take additional optical measurements and instead plans to take additional non-optical measurements to predict the severity of optical turbulence the ABL will encounter; (6) to ensure that the non-optical measurements can be validly applied to the ABL program, the Air Force must determine whether the non-optical measurements can be correlated to optical measurements; (7) until the Air Force can verify that its predicted levels of optical turbulence are valid, it will not be able to validate the ABL's design specifications for overcoming turbulence; (8) the Air Force has established a design specification for the ABL that is based on modelling techniques; (9) data collected by the program office indicate that the levels of turbulence that ABL may encounter could be four times greater than the levels in which the system is being designed to operate; (10) DOD officials indicated that a more realistic design may not be achievable using a current state-of-the-art technology; (11) in addition to the challenges posed by turbulence, developing and integrating a laser weapon system into an aircraft pose many technical challenges for the Air Force; (12) the Air Force must build a new laser that is able to contend with size and weight restriction, motion and vibrations, and other factors unique to an aircraft environment and yet be powerful enough to sustain a killing force over a range of at least 500 kilometers; (13) the Air Force must create a beam control system that must compensate for the optical turbulence in which the system is operating and control the direction and size of the laser beam; and (14) because these challenges will not be resolved for several years, it is too early to accurately predict whether the ABL program will evolve into a viable missile defense system. |
gao_GAO-16-113 | gao_GAO-16-113_0 | 2011 Revisions and Updates to SBA’s 8(a) Regulations
In February 2011, SBA revised its regulations for the 8(a) Business Development program by adding language that (1) restricted the award of follow-on, sole-source 8(a) contracts to sister subsidiary firms owned by the same ANC; (2) made minor technical updates to outdated terminology regarding ANC ownership of multiple sister subsidiaries operating in the same primary line of business; and (3) revised existing rules related to ownership, compensation as a component of excessive withdrawals, and ANC-owned firm benefits reporting, among other things. Weaknesses in SBA Oversight Limit its Ability to Enforce Prohibitions on Follow-On, Sole- Source Contracts to ANC Sister Subsidiaries
As we have reported previously, SBA’s ability to identify and enforce the regulations that prohibit the award of follow-on, sole-source contracts to subsidiaries of the same ANC is limited by a process that relies on the information provided by federal contracting departments and agencies, which we found in many cases to be incomplete. According to SBA regulations, once an applicant is admitted to the 8(a) program, it may not receive an 8(a) sole-source contract that is also a follow-on contract to an 8(a) contract that was performed “immediately previously” by another participant (or former participant) firm owned by the same ANC. When SBA does not have sufficient or accurate information in offer letters, and does not follow-up to obtain this information, the agency is not positioned to enforce its prohibition, as the agencies do not know whether or not a firm is a sister subsidiary of the prior small business contractor. Alaska District Office officials—those officials responsible for reviewing sole- source offer letters for 50 percent of the active ANC-owned firms in the program—agreed that it would be helpful if SBA required agencies to specifically list whether a contract is a follow-on, sole-source contract in their offer letter; as well as ensure that information about the incumbent firm, or the small business that previously performed the contract, that was awarded the previous contract, if there was one, is listed in their offer letter. However, this positive change has not been adopted more broadly across the agency. SBA noted that key documents were also missing for other selected contracts from this agency. SBA Faces Oversight Challenges in Detecting 8(a) ANC Sister Subsidiaries Operating in the Same Primary Line of Business, and Steps to Address these Challenges Are Still Being Formulated
SBA faces oversight challenges to detect ANC-owned subsidiaries owned by the same parent company from operating in the same primary line of business because of limited: (1) data collection and tracking and (2) information access and sharing across district offices, as we have previously reported. SBA has found that that these firms instead generate a greater portion of revenues in a secondary line of work under a NAICS code that another existing sister subsidiary uses as its primary NAICS code. SBA officials told us that this access limitation can also occur within a district office when different business opportunity specialists are responsible for servicing different subsidiaries that are owned by the same parent ANC. Weak Management Controls Have Hindered SBA’s Program Oversight
Weaknesses in SBA’s data collection, supervisory review, staffing, and program guidance has contributed to weak program oversight and monitoring of ANC 8(a) firms. This official and other senior officials from Business Development told us that the continuing eligibility review unit will be designed to ensure better compliance with 8(a) rules by taking a more detailed look at the financial documents provided by ANC-owned firms and verifying the self-reported information supplied, among other things. According to officials, this office has conducted a number of reviews in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. Recommendations for Executive Action
To establish an effective compliance oversight process for ANC-owned firms in the SBA 8(a) program as part of SBA’s efforts to develop a more comprehensive oversight strategy, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA direct District Office staff implementing the program to take the following three actions: Improve SBA’s ability to prohibit follow-on, sole-source contracts from being awarded to ANC-owned sister subsidiaries participating in the program by (1) requesting that procuring agencies specifically state whether a contract is a follow-on in its offer letter, (2) providing additional training to SBA staff that specifically address how to monitor for follow-on, sole source contracts, and (3) providing additional guidance to SBA officials on the enforcement of related policies;
Enhance internal controls and oversight of ANC-owned firms in the 8(a) program serviced in the Alaska District Office by enforcing policies regarding the separation of duties and supervisor or Administrator approval in order to improve supervisory review of ANC- owned firm transactions and related documentation; and
Develop a comprehensive approach to staffing its Alaska District Office to include succession planning and managing attrition and retirements in order to improve the agency’s capacity to keep pace with oversight activities. Written comments from SBA are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. SBA concurred with two of our draft recommendations, reported that it has already taken action to implement two others, and did not concur two other recommendations. SBA’s accountability review of that district office in 2014, which followed our site visit to that same office, resulted in similar findings. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine the extent to which: (1) SBA enforces its regulations prohibiting the award of follow-on, sole- source 8(a) contracts to subsidiaries of the same ANC; (2) SBA limits subsidiaries of the same ANC from operating in the same primary line of business; (3) information is known about compensation, revenues, and benefits distribution of ANC-owned firms; and (4) SBA has addressed challenges, if any, to its oversight and monitoring of ANC-owned firm participating in the 8(a) program since 2011. If such activity is left untracked, one firm’s secondary line of business could effectively become its primary revenue source in the same line of business that a sister firm claims for its primary line of business without actually violating SBA’s prohibition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal obligations under SBA's 8(a) Business Development Program totaled about $4 billion for 344 ANC-owned firms in 2014. In 2011, SBA updated program regulations to address prior oversight challenges identified by GAO. GAO was asked to follow-up on past reports and examine SBA's current oversight processes. This report discusses, among other things, SBA's ability to (1) enforce regulations prohibiting the award of follow-on, sole-source 8(a) contracts to subsidiaries of the same ANC; (2) limit subsidiaries of the same 8(a) ANC from operating in the same primary line of business, and (3) address challenges, if any, to SBA's oversight of 8(a) ANC-owned firms. To do this work, GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 through 2014 data from a federal contracting database using separate nongeneralizable samples for each objective, conducted site visits, reviewed 8(a) sole-source contracts, and ANC-owned firm annual updates, and interviewed relevant SBA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported in the past that the Small Business Administration's (SBA) ability to enforce regulations prohibiting the award of follow-on, sole-source contracts to 8(a) subsidiary firms of the same Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) relies on contract information from other federal agencies that is sometimes incomplete. SBA's regulations prohibit program participants from receiving an 8(a) sole-source contract that immediately follows another 8(a) contract with the same requirements performed by another participant owned by the same ANC. Other federal agencies offering 8(a) contracts must generally submit offer letters to SBA that include information about a contract's procurement history and name of any prior small business contractors. SBA relies on this information to determine whether a firm is eligible to receive a particular 8(a), follow-on, sole-source contract. However, GAO's analysis of a selection of contracts for this review found that agencies are not required to directly identify whether a sole-source contract is also a follow-on contract in these letters. One SBA office has begun taking action to address this limitation by asking agencies to specifically report whether contracts are follow-on, sole-source awards in offer letters, but the change has not been broadly adopted. SBA would be better positioned to limit the award of follow-on, sole-source contracts by ANC-owned subsidiaries if it requested that other federal agencies specifically state whether contracts are follow-ons in offer letters.
GAO found in past reports and this review and in that SBA's ability to enforce its regulation prohibiting subsidiaries owned by the same ANC from operating in the same primary line of business as reported to SBA is hindered by limited tracking and sharing of information across SBA's 68 district offices. ANC-owned firms must register a primary line of business with SBA, but are allowed to pursue multiple other lines of business. In this review, GAO found 5 of 39 ANCs owned subsidiaries that generated a greater portion of revenues in secondary lines of business than their registered primary line of business. Additionally, those secondary lines of business were the same lines of business as the primary lines for other subsidiaries owned by the same ANC. Such activity could potentially conflict with the regulation's intent. SBA proposed a rule designed to limit and track this activity, but lacks plans and timelines associated with this effort. Regarding limited information-sharing, different district offices service different firms that are subsidiaries of the same ANC. Oversight staff in these offices cannot access or share relevant data from other district offices. Without better data sharing, SBA cannot monitor whether firms owned by the same ANC and serviced by different district offices are complying with program rules.
As GAO reported in the past, SBA's staffing for its data collection and program guidance activities contributed to weak program oversight and monitoring of 8(a) ANC-owned firms. SBA took some recent actions to enhance oversight, such as conducting an accountability review in October 2014 of the Alaska District Office. SBA has established an office to improve compliance with 8(a) rules by verifying self-reported information supplied by firms. However, SBA does not have plans that detail the office's roles and responsibilities for its activities. With the oversight weaknesses GAO identified in this review, SBA has an opportunity to enhance its oversight by finalizing plans for this office.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, SBA asks other federal agencies to specifically identify whether a contract is a follow-on in their letters to SBA; develop plans and timelines for tracking ANC-owned firms' revenues across lines of business; and enable its staff to access and share relevant revenue data. SBA agreed with two recommendations and reported actions taken to implement two others. SBA disagreed with the final two, stating they were unnecessary. Based on a review of actions taken, GAO believes all six recommendations are still warranted. |
gao_GGD-99-134 | gao_GGD-99-134_0 | Background
On April 17, 1995, the President signed the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, P.L. In addition, the District’s CPO also awarded and administered several Authority contracts on behalf of the Authority. As you specifically requested, we focused on the contracts that were awarded for the Authority’s former CMO and to Thompson, Cobb, Bazilio and Associates. In addition, we reviewed the Authority’s and District’s procurement regulations and procedures, the Authority’s review and approval regulations governing submission by the District for contracts, and interviewed Authority and District officials involved in contract award and contract administration. The Authority Did Not Always Comply With Its Procurement Regulations
Although the Authority’s procurement regulations set forth some basic requirements for contract award, we found that the Authority did not always comply with its procurement regulations or follow sound contracting principles for the nine contracts that we assessed. However, the contract files contained little or no evidence that the Authority (1) documented its basis for contract selection for the three contracts where it is specifically required by the regulations; (2) prepared written justification for one sole source contract award or a series of “modifications” to another contract that, in effect, was a sole source award; or (3) documented its contract negotiations as required by the regulations for the two contracts where the Authority stated that negotiations had occurred. The Authority’s contract files contained evidence indicating that it received the required deliverables for four contracts. This system was not documented in the contract files. Factors Contributing To Procurement Problems
Several factors appear to have contributed to the Authority’s contracting problems. Recommendations to the Chair of the Authority
To improve its contracting operations, we recommend that the Chair of the Authority require the Executive Director to (1) approve and justify all waivers of Authority contracting regulations in writing, (2) only extend contracts in writing and prohibit the Executive Director from extending or modifying expired contracts, and (3) include in contract files a written certification, signed by an appropriate official, stating that the contractor’s performance was or was not satisfactory; direct the Executive Director to (1) fully define the roles and responsibilities of the Authority’s procurement staff; (2) prepare a written plan for contracting that includes methods for ensuring compliance with the procurement regulations; (3) provide guidance to the procurement staff on areas, such as determining best value, developing performance standards for work statements, monitoring and certifying contractors’ performance, preparing written justifications for sole source awards, documenting the basis for contract selection, awarding contracts that are between $100,000 and $500,000, and executing contract modifications, or contract options; hold the Executive Director and other procurement staff accountable for ensuring that they follow the Authority’s procurement regulations; and require the Executive Director to assess whether the Authority’s processes and controls for the review and approval of District contracts prior to award are effective and, if not, make appropriate changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the procurement practices of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, focusing on whether: (1) applicable procurement regulations and procedures were followed in awarding and administering selected contracts on behalf of the Authority's former Chief of Management Officer and to Thompson, Cobb, Bazilio and Associates; and (2) the Authority and the District received the goods and services that they contracted and paid for in the contracts that GAO reviewed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Authority did not always comply with its procurement regulations and procedures or follow sound contracting principles when it awarded and administered the 9 contracts that GAO assessed; (2) the Authority's contract files for these contracts were incomplete; (3) the files did not generally contain documentation of the key contract award and administration decisions as required by the Authority's procurement regulations; (4) as a result of the incomplete contract files, the Authority could not demonstrate that its objectives of: (a) acquiring goods and services at the lowest price or best value; and (b) treating offerors fairly were achieved for several of the contracts GAO reviewed; (5) the Authority's procurement regulations provide for a preference for competitively awarded contracts and require written justification and approval of sole source contracts; (6) the Authority's contract files contained evidence that it sought competition for 7 of the 9 contracts assessed; (7) however, contrary to regulations, the Authority did not: (a) document its basis for contract selection for 3 contracts; (b) include written justification for 1 sole source contract award or a series of modifications to another contract that, in effect, was a sole source award; or (c) comply with other requirements in several cases; (8) none of the contract files for the 9 contracts assessed contained certification or any other evidence that the contractor performed satisfactorily prior to payment of invoices; (9) for the 2 emergency sole source contracts awarded by the District government, the District's Chief Procurement Officer did not comply with the Authority's contract review and approval regulations governing District contracts or procurement regulations; (10) several factors appeared to contribute to the Authority's failure to comply with its procurement regulations; and (11) according to the Authority's former Executive Director, the magnitude of the tasks and the short timeframe in which the Authority had to complete them contributed to the Authority's procurements not being as "tidy" as the Authority would have liked. |
gao_RCED-97-36 | gao_RCED-97-36_0 | This report focuses on the two most recent proposals to dismantle HUD—S. They also recognize that budgetary constraints dictate changes. To manage these changes, the bill would redesignate HUD as the Housing and Urban Development Programs Resolution Agency and make this agency responsible for administering and concluding HUD’s affairs within 5 years.Among other things, the resolution agency would have to resolve, or provide for resolving, hundreds of billions of dollars in financial commitments and manage HUD’s shutdown. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and its Subcommittee on Housing Opportunity and Community Development and Senator Faircloth asked GAO to examine the implications of one of the proposals to dismantle HUD—S. 1145, the Housing Opportunities and Empowerment Act. Specifically, the requesters asked GAO to (1) examine the bill’s proposed changes in housing assistance, community development, and housing finance and the potential impact of these changes on the customers of these programs and (2) discuss the capacity of the states and other federal agencies to assume HUD’s functions and the tasks to be accomplished in dismantling HUD within the 5 years specified in the bill. S. 1145 Could Increase Choice in Housing and Community Development, but Some Vulnerable Populations Might Receive Less Assistance
S. 1145 would dramatically reduce the federal role in housing and community development and could have far-reaching effects on renters and communities. The bill’s plan to institute a voucher system could expand housing choices for renters in some areas, but its phaseout of project-based assistance could reduce the supply of affordable housing—and housing choices—in other areas. Similarly, the bill’s creation of a single block grant for community development would give the states and localities more choice in spending federal funds for projects in their communities, but some of HUD’s current clients, especially the homeless and very low-income families, might receive less assistance. These officials would prefer federal programs that channel funds directly to local areas. In addition, HUD noted that the impact on communities and on the poor of consolidating and cutting—by 40 percent—the funding for the Community Development Block Grant, the HOME program and the current programs for the homeless—would also be devastating. 3.1.) Particularly hard hit would be low-income and first-time home buyers. Similarly, a majority of the federal agencies that would receive HUD’s functions generally indicated that they could assume the additional responsibilities if they received adequate resources; however, they said implementation would pose problems. Balanced budget requirements exist in 49 states, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. HUD, in contrast, maintained that transferring its functions to other agencies would break up the network it has developed to implement its programs and could adversely affect the delivery of services to its clients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the implications of one of the proposals to dismantle the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Housing Opportunities and Empowerment Act, focusing on the: (1) bill's proposed changes in housing assistance, community development, and housing finance and the potential impact of these changes on the customers of these programs; and (2) capacity of the states and other federal agencies to assume HUD's functions and the tasks to be accomplished in dismantling HUD within the 5 years specified in the bill.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the recent proposal to dismantle HUD, S. 1145, couples reduced federal funding with fundamental changes to the federal role in housing and community development; (2) if enacted, such a bill could have far-reaching effects on renters, communities, and would-be home buyers; (3) while the bill's plan to institute a voucher system to allow tenants to choose their residence could expand housing choices for renters in some areas, its phaseout of assistance for specific projects could reduce the supply of affordable housing and housing choices in other areas, according to HUD and state officials; (4) nonetheless, rising costs make current levels of housing assistance increasingly difficult for the nation to afford in an era of declining federal discretionary budgets; (5) accordingly, budgetary constraints may well reduce federal housing programs and services, whether these programs are reformed or not; (6) the bill's creation of a block grant for community development would give the states and localities more choice in spending federal funds, but the total federal funding for community development programs would be cut by about 40 percent; (7) the current beneficiaries of federal programs targeted to their needs might receive less assistance in an open competition for funds at the local level; (8) also, small cities would see a significant reduction in the federal funding for their projects; (9) although some of the bill's other provisions are designed to reduce the federal government's risk in insuring loans and guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities, these same provisions would make purchasing a home more difficult, especially for low-income and first-time buyers; (10) both the states and the federal agencies that would receive HUD's functions generally believed that they could assume additional programmatic and administrative responsibilities if they also received additional resources; (11) however, several of the federal agencies cautioned that they did not seek to assume HUD's functions; (12) HUD maintained that transferring its functions to other agencies would break up the network it has developed to implement its programs, would adversely affect the delivery of services to its clients, and would eliminate the focus on housing and community development it has provided as a cabinet-level department; and (13) the bill's implementation would depend on the resolution agency's ability to transfer functions and administer, and in some cases resolve, complex financial commitments within the required 5-year period. |
gao_GAO-06-370T | gao_GAO-06-370T_0 | MSHA Devoted Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process
MSHA had extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and roof support plans—and most of these plans were reviewed and approved on a timely basis. In addition, MSHA did not always effectively coordinate its inspections of mine plans with the comprehensive quarterly inspections of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district staff. Although MSHA had extensive inspection procedures, we found that some of them were unclear and were located in so many different sources that they could be difficult to find. However, MSHA headquarters did not monitor district office performance to ensure that inspectors followed up with mine operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified during these inspections were corrected. In addition, although we found that, as of 2003, about 44 percent of MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors would be eligible to retire within 5 years—and the agency’s historic attrition rates indicated that many of them would actually retire—the agency had not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. We recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to monitor the timeliness of inspections of ventilation and roof control plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by district offices as required; monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on a timely basis; update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating regular quarterly inspections of mines with other inspections; develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including considering options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process and offering retention allowances; amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and revise the systems MSHA uses to collect information on accidents and investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to link injuries, accidents, and investigations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education, Senate Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to submit a statement for the record highlighting findings from our 2003 report on how well the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.
What GAO Found
As of 2003, to help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA staff reviewed and approved mine plans, conducted inspections, and investigated serious accidents. In these three areas, MSHA had extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, we concluded that MSHA could improve its oversight, guidance, and human-capital-planning efforts. We found that MSHA was not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters did not ensure that 6-month inspections of ventilation and roof support plans were being completed on a timely basis. This failure could have led to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials did not always ensure that hazards found during inspections were corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA used to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the agency did not collect information on hours worked by independent contractors staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it was difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations. We also concluded that the guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspections procedures were unclear and were contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors was also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. Finally, as of 2003, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine inspectors were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years, the agency had no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities available to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors. |
gao_AIMD-96-145 | gao_AIMD-96-145_0 | The Western Area Power Administration was created in 1977. Rates Do Not Recover All Power-related Costs
Some costs related to producing and marketing federal hydropower are not being recovered through power rates by the three PMAs. Pension and Postretirement Health Benefits Are Not Fully Recovered
The three PMAs do not recover the full costs to the federal government of providing postretirement health benefits and CSRS pensions for current PMA employees and operating agency employees engaged in producing and marketing the power sold by the PMAs. Washoe Project
The Washoe Project (Stampede Dam) is not generating sufficient revenue to cover annual power-related O&M expenses and interest and repay the federal investment. In addition, interest is not being paid on the $454 million. PMAs are required to recover several nonpower costs, which is a disadvantage compared to other utilities. In addition, Western is required to repay about $1.5 billion of capital costs related to assistance on completed irrigation facilities (irrigation debt). POGs rely primarily on debt financing from the capital market for capital projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed three power marketing administrations' (PMA) cost recovery practices, and financing for capital projects, focusing on how these PMA differ from nonfederal utilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the three PMA are not recovering through power rates some costs related to producing and marketing federal hydropower; (2) PMA are not recovering the full costs of providing postretirement health benefits and Civil Service Retirement System pensions to agency employees; (3) the Western Area Power Administration will probably not be able to recover the construction costs of its Washoe Project because it is not generating sufficient revenue to cover its operating and maintenance expenses and repay the federal investment; (4) Western is not required to repay the $454 million allocated to its incomplete irrigation facilities; (5) PMA rely primarily on debt financing for their large capital construction projects; and (6) compared to other nonfederal utilities, PMA benefit from their reliance on inexpensive hydropower, lower construction costs, and tax-exempt status. |
gao_GAO-15-633 | gao_GAO-15-633_0 | The RAC is paid on a contingency fee basis from amounts recovered, as required by law. CMS Implemented the Part D RAC Program by Establishing a Statement of Objectives and Conducting a Solicitation Process to Select a Contractor
CMS implemented the Part D RAC program in January 2011 by undertaking various activities, such as establishing a statement of objectives, conducting a solicitation process to select a contractor, and awarding a Part D RAC contract. Unclear Expectations and Unrealistic Project Timelines Hampered RAC Program Implementation
CMS’s challenges in setting expectations about the work the Part D RAC would conduct and establishing the length of time required for CMS and the RAC to reach project milestones hampered Part D RAC program implementation. Since CMS faced challenges setting expectations about the work the Part D RAC would conduct and about the length of time required for CMS and the RAC to reach implementation milestones for the Part D RAC program, the RAC did not have a clear understanding about the work it should perform, and CMS did not recover improper payments for Part D until a year later than projected. Consistent with FAR requirements, agencies should clearly define requirements for services. CMS Has Not Completed Annual Evaluations of the Part D RAC but Has Conducted Other Oversight of the RAC’s Performance
Since the Part D RAC contract was executed in January 2011, CMS has not completed any annual evaluations of the RAC’s performance. In March 2015, CMS officials acknowledged that they should have completed annual evaluations and said the agency has been behind in its evaluations of some of its contractors, including the RAC. CMS officials said they started an evaluation of the RAC’s contract year 2014 performance in December 2014. In May 2015, CMS officials finished the initial evaluation of the RAC’s 2014 performance and provided the evaluation to the RAC for review and comment. Multiple federal standards and our prior work contain requirements and suggestions for conducting regular performance evaluations and developing performance measures, which would have provided CMS and the RAC with a basis for evaluating the RAC’s performance. Since CMS had not completed annual contractor performance evaluations of the RAC using performance standards with measurable targets, CMS did not have a clear basis for assessing RAC performance in identifying improper payments and did not provide the RAC with targets against which the RAC could compare its performance. CMS Has Conducted Other Oversight of the RAC’s Performance, Including Inspecting Its Work Products and Reviewing Its Audit Findings
While CMS has not conducted annual contractor performance evaluations, it has conducted other oversight by establishing quality assurance procedures through contract modifications, including a statement of work. CMS officials said that the data validation contractor reviews 100 percent of the RAC’s findings, in part because of concerns CMS had about the quality of the RAC’s initial audit work. CMS Collected Less than $10 Million in Improper Payments as of May 2015, in Part Because of Challenges in Determining and Conducting Audit Activities
From January 2011 through May 2015, for five audit issues, CMS both authorized the RAC to conduct audit activities and pursued improper payment collections. Challenges faced by CMS and the RAC have resulted in few audit issues being approved and therefore a small amount of improper payments being identified and collected relative to CMS’s estimates of improper payments in Medicare Part D. In more than 4 years, initial CMS and RAC challenges in determining the audit work to conduct and later RAC challenges in determining how to apply regulations and rules to audit issues have resulted in CMS’s approving 1 of the 15 audit issues the RAC proposed, and no approvals for issues submitted since the new audit issue process took effect. Both CMS and the RAC are charged with reducing Medicare Part D improper payments. The $9.7 million in improper payments that CMS has collected since 2011 is a relatively small amount compared to CMS’s estimated improper payments in Medicare Part D of $1.9 billion in 2014 alone. If the process for identifying, reviewing, and approving new audit issues was more efficient in developing appropriate issues, the process would likely have resulted in more issues being approved each year of the RAC contract and more improper payments being identified and collected. Establishing clear work statements, realistic timelines, and an improved process for identifying, reviewing, and approving audit issues would provide more assurance that audit work can be conducted more effectively and efficiently through the next RAC contract. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, the federal government spent $58 billion on Medicare Part D, the voluntary, outpatient prescription drug coverage program. An estimated $1.9 billion of this total was improper payments--including overpayments or underpayments that may be due to errors, such as the submission of duplicate claims for the same service. In January 2011, CMS began a RAC program in Part D that was intended in part to identify and recoup improper payments, as required under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The RAC is paid a contingency fee from amounts recovered.
GAO was asked to review CMS's Part D RAC program implementation, oversight, and results. GAO examined (1) how CMS has implemented the Part D RAC program and any challenges it faced during implementation; (2) the extent to which CMS has overseen the RAC's audit activities; and (3) the results of the RAC's work to date and any challenges CMS and the RAC faced in identifying and collecting improper payments. To do this, GAO analyzed the RAC contract and audit documents, and federal statutes and regulations on Part D and federal contracting. GAO also interviewed CMS and RAC officials.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implemented the Part D recovery audit contractor (RAC) program in January 2011 by undertaking various activities, including establishing a statement of objectives and conducting a solicitation process to select a RAC to identify improper payments. However, CMS's challenges in setting expectations about the work the Part D RAC would conduct and establishing the length of time required for CMS and the RAC to reach project milestones hampered Part D RAC program implementation. Consistent with federal contracting requirements, agencies should clearly define requirements for services. As a result of CMS's challenges in setting expectations and establishing realistic timelines as it implemented the RAC program, the RAC did not have a clear understanding about the work it should perform, and CMS recovered improper payments for Part D more than a year after it had projected.
As of May 2015, CMS had not completed any annual evaluations of the Part D RAC, but an initial evaluation of the RAC's contract year 2014 performance was in progress, and the agency had conducted other oversight of the RAC's performance. Federal internal controls and contracting standards and GAO's prior work contain requirements and suggestions for conducting regular performance evaluations and developing performance measures. In March 2015, CMS officials acknowledged that the agency should have completed annual evaluations and noted that CMS has been behind schedule in conducting evaluations of some its contractors, including the RAC. In May 2015, CMS officials finished the initial evaluation of the RAC's 2014 performance and provided the evaluation to the RAC for review and comment. An annual performance evaluation would provide CMS with a clear basis for assessing RAC performance in identifying improper payments and provide the RAC with targets against which the RAC could compare its performance. While CMS has not completed annual evaluations, it has established quality assurance procedures to conduct oversight of the RAC. For example, CMS uses a separate contractor to review and validate 100 percent of the RAC's audit findings, in part because of concerns about the quality of the RAC's work.
As of May 2015, CMS had collected less than $10 million in improper payments, and had not approved the RAC to perform new audit work since March 2014. Both CMS and the RAC are charged with reducing Medicare Part D improper payments, and federal internal control standards call for agencies to have effective and efficient processes to meet agency goals. However, as a result of CMS's and the RAC's challenges in determining audit work to conduct and the RAC's challenges in developing audit methodologies, CMS has approved 1 of the 15 audit proposals from the RAC since the beginning of the contract in 2011 and has collected a limited amount of improper payments relative to the estimated $1.9 billion in improper payments in Part D in 2014. With a more effective and efficient process for identifying, reviewing, and approving appropriate new audit work, more audit work would likely have been approved each year of the RAC contract, resulting in more improper payments being identified and collected.
What GAO Recommends
As CMS prepares to solicit the next RAC contract(s), CMS should set clear expectations in contract work statements, conduct annual RAC performance evaluations, and review the process for developing new audit issues. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-582 | gao_GAO-10-582_0 | NNSA Cannot Accurately Identify the Total Costs to Operate and Maintain Weapons Activities Facilities and Infrastructure, and These Costs Likely Significantly Exceed the Budget Justified to Congress for the RTBF Operations of Facilities Program
NNSA cannot accurately identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons activities facilities and infrastructure because of differences in sites’ cost accounting practices. These indirect cost pools are often funded through multiple funding sources. NNSA Does Not Fully Identify or Estimate the Total Costs of the Products and Capabilities Supported through Stockpile Services R&D and Production Activities
While in total NNSA’s Stockpile Services work breakdown structure for fiscal year 2009 reflects $866.4 million in work scope as justified to Congress, the work breakdown structure does not fully identify or provide the estimated costs of the products or capabilities supported through the Stockpile Services program. Rather, NNSA tracks the costs for tooling as a function across all products and capabilities. RTBF Operations of Facilities and Stockpile Services Costs Are Unlikely to Be Significantly Affected by Reductions in Stockpile Size, and NNSA Lacks Cost Information to Help Justify Planned Budget Increases
Reducing the stockpile size, as has recently been negotiated in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, if ratified, and reinforced by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, is unlikely to significantly affect NNSA’s RTBF Operations of Facilities and Stockpile Services costs, which represent about one-third of NNSA’s total nuclear weapons program budget. NNSA Lacks Information on Program Costs That Could Help Justify Planned Budget Increases
While base capability costs appear to be relatively insensitive to changes in the stockpile, complete and reliable information about the costs of these capabilities is necessary for sound program management and to help inform future planning. This is particularly important in the current political and budgetary environment, in which stockpile reductions are anticipated, and the Administration has planned to increase budget requests for Weapons Activities by $4.25 billion over the fiscal year 2010 enacted level between fiscal years 2011 and 2015. To enable this arms reduction agenda, the Administration is requesting from Congress billions of dollars in increased investment in the nuclear security enterprise to ensure that base scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities are sufficiently supported such that a smaller nuclear deterrent continues to be safe, secure, and reliable. To allow Congress to better oversee management of the nuclear security enterprise and to improve NNSA’s management information with respect to the base capabilities necessary to ensure nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable: (1) develop guidance for M&O contractors for the consistent collection of information on the total costs to operate and maintain weapons activities facilities and infrastructure; (2) require M&O contractors to report to NNSA annually on the total costs to operate and maintain weapons activities facilities and infrastructure at their sites; (3) evaluate the total costs of operating and maintaining existing weapons activities facilities and infrastructure as part of program planning processes and budget formulation, especially in relation to recapitalization and modernization of the nuclear security enterprise; and (4) once the Stockpile Services work breakdown structure reflects a product or capability basis, use this work breakdown structure to develop product/capability cost estimates that adequately justify the congressional budget request for Stockpile Services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, we were asked to (1) determine the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Operations of Facilities congressional budget justification that supplements the Budget of the United States Government (i.e., the President’s Budget) for fiscal year 2009 is based on the total cost of operating and maintaining weapons facilities and infrastructure; (2) determine the extent to which NNSA’s fiscal year 2009 congressional budget justification for Stockpile Services identifies the total costs of providing foundational research and production support capabilities; and (3) discuss the implications, if any, of a smaller stockpile on RTBF Operations of Facilities and Stockpile Services costs. Cost Accounting Standards Board. R&D Support. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages and secures the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, with annual appropriations of about $6.4 billion. NNSA oversees eight contractor-operated sites that execute its programs. Two programs make up almost one-third of this budget: Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Operations of Facilities, which operates and maintains weapons facilities and infrastructure, and Stockpile Services, which provides research and development (R&D) and production capabilities. Consistent with cost accounting standards, each site has established practices to account for these activities. The Administration has recently committed to stockpile reductions. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which NNSA's budget justifications for (1) RTBF Operations of Facilities and (2) Stockpile Services are based on the total costs of providing these capabilities. GAO was also asked to discuss the implications, if any, of a smaller stockpile on these costs. To carry out its work, GAO analyzed NNSA's and its contractors' data using a data collection instrument; reviewed policies, plans, and budgets; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
NNSA cannot accurately identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure because of differences in sites' cost accounting practices. These differences are allowable under current NNSA guidance as long as sites comply with cost accounting standards and disclose their practices to NNSA. The differences among cost accounting practices include the facilities and activities sites support with RTBF Operations of Facilities funds and how sites use other funding sources to support weapons facilities and infrastructure. GAO's analysis of sites' responses to a data collection instrument showed that the total cost to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure likely significantly exceeds the budget request for the RTBF Operations of Facilities program submitted to Congress for fiscal year 2009. NNSA has an effort under way that, if fully implemented, would provide more detail on the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure. NNSA does not fully identify or estimate the total costs of the products and capabilities supported through Stockpile Services R&D and production activities. Instead, NNSA primarily identifies the functional activities--such as engineering operations, quality control, and program management--and their costs supported through Stockpile Services and bases its future-year budget requests on the extent to which prior-year budgets were sufficient to execute these functions. In 2009, GAO issued a cost guide that identified using a product-oriented management tool, rather than a functionally oriented one, as a best practice for cost estimating. Using cost guide criteria, GAO's analysis found tracking costs by functions provides little information on the costs of the individual capabilities supported through Stockpile Services. NNSA has an effort under way that, if fully implemented, would provide more detail on the total costs of the products and capabilities supported through Stockpile Services. Reducing stockpile size is unlikely to significantly affect NNSA's RTBF Operations of Facilities and Stockpile Services costs because a sizable portion of these costs is fixed to maintain base nuclear weapons capabilities. The Administration has planned to increase budget requests for NNSA's nuclear weapons program by $4.25 billion between fiscal years 2011 and 2015. This planned increase is intended, in part, to invest in and modernize facilities and infrastructure and to ensure that base capabilities are supported such that a smaller nuclear deterrent continues to be safe, secure, and reliable. While base capability costs appear to be relatively insensitive to reductions in the stockpile, without complete and reliable information about these costs, NNSA lacks information that could help justify planned budget increases or target cost savings opportunities. |
gao_GAO-10-701 | gao_GAO-10-701_0 | Planned federal IT spending has now risen to an estimated $79.4 billion for fiscal year 2011, a 1.2 percent increase from the 2010 level of $78.4 billion. According to OMB, these data are intended to provide a near real-time perspective of the performance of these investments, as well as a historical perspective. Another issue with the ratings is that large inconsistencies exist in the number of milestones that agencies report on the Dashboard. For example, the Dashboard rated the Law Enforcement Wireless Communication investment a 10 for cost (less than 5 percent variance) every month from July 2009 through January 2010. However, our analysis shows the investment’s cost rating during December 2009 and January 2010 is equivalent to an 8 (a variance of 10 percent to less than 15 percent). However, investment data we examined showed the schedule rating should have been a 5 (greater than or equal to 30 days and less than 90 days behind schedule) from September 2009 through December 2009. Cost and Schedule Ratings Do Not Reflect Current Performance and Wide Variation in Milestone Reporting Exists
A primary reason why the cost and schedule ratings were not always accurate is that the cost and schedule ratings do not take current performance into consideration for many investments on the Dashboard, though it is intended to represent near real-time performance information on all major IT investments. Having too many milestones may mask recent performance problems because the performance of every milestone (i.e., historical and recently completed) is equally averaged into the ratings. Specifically, investments that perform well during many previously completed milestones and then start performing poorly on a few recently completed milestones can maintain ratings that still reflect good performance. Conversely, having too few milestones can limit the amount of information available to track work and rate performance and allows agencies to potentially skew the performance ratings. As of July 1, 2010, this updated Dashboard had not been released. Specifically, in commenting on a draft of this report, the Federal CIO stated that OMB has recently chartered a working group comprised of representatives from several federal agencies, with the intention of developing clear guidance for standardizing and improving investment activity reporting. Despite these efforts, until OMB upgrades the Dashboard application to improve the accuracy of the cost and schedule ratings to include ongoing milestones, explains the outcome of these improvements in its next annual report to Congress on the Implementation of the E-Government Act (which is a key mechanism for reporting on the implementation of the Dashboard), provides clear and consistent guidance to agencies that standardizes milestone reporting, and ensures agencies comply with the new guidance, the Dashboard’s cost and schedule ratings will likely continue to experience data accuracy issues. Use of the Dashboard as a Management Tool Varies
Officials at three of the five agencies we reviewed—DOD, DOJ, and HHS— stated that they are not using the Dashboard to manage their investments, and the other two agencies, DOE and USDA, indicated that they are using the Dashboard to manage their investments. Specifically, officials from the three agencies are not using the Dashboard to manage their investments because they have other existing means to do so: DOD officials indicated that they use the department’s Capital Planning and Investment Control process to track IT investment data—including cost and schedule. The Federal CIO stated that the Dashboard has greatly improved oversight capabilities compared to previously used mechanisms. He also stated that the Dashboard has increased the accountability of agencies’ CIOs and established much-needed visibility. According to OMB officials, the Dashboard is one of the key sources of information that OMB analysts use to identify investments that are experiencing performance problems and select them for a TechStat session—a review of selected IT investments between OMB and agency leadership that is led by the Federal CIO. OMB agreed with our recommendation that it develop and issue clear guidance that standardizes milestone reporting on the Dashboard. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine the accuracy of the cost and schedule performance ratings on the Dashboard for selected investments and (2) determine whether the data on the Dashboard are used as a management tool to make improvements to IT investments. To select these agencies and investments, we first identified ten agencies with large IT budgets as reported in the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) fiscal year 2010 Exhibit 53. However, 4 of the 8 investments had notable discrepancies on either their cost or schedule ratings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal IT spending has risen to an estimated $79 billion for fiscal year 2011. To improve transparency and oversight of this spending, in June 2009 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) deployed a public website, known as the IT Dashboard, which provides information on federal agencies' major IT investments, including assessments of actual performance against cost and schedule targets (referred to as ratings). According to OMB, these data are intended to provide both a near real-time and historical perspective of the performance of these investments. GAO was asked to (1) examine the accuracy of the cost and schedule performance ratings on the Dashboard for selected investments and (2) determine whether the data on the Dashboard are used as a management tool to make improvements to IT investments. To do so, GAO selected 8 major investments from 5 agencies with large IT budgets, compared its analyses of the selected investments' performance to the ratings on the Dashboard, and interviewed agency officials about their use of the Dashboard to manage investments.
What GAO Found
The cost and schedule ratings on OMB's Dashboard were not always accurate for the selected investments. GAO found that 4 of the 8 selected investments had notable discrepancies on either their cost or schedule ratings. For example, the Dashboard indicated one investment had a less than 5 percent variance on cost every month from July 2009 through January 2010. GAO's analysis shows the investment's cost performance in December 2009 through January 2010 had a variance of 10 percent to less than 15 percent. Additionally, another investment on the Dashboard reported that it had been less than 30 days behind schedule since July 2009. However, investment data GAO examined showed that from September to December 2009 it was behind schedule greater than or equal to 30 days and less than 90 days. A primary reason for the data inaccuracies was that while the Dashboard was intended to represent near real-time performance information, the cost and schedule ratings did not take into consideration current performance. As a result, the ratings were based on outdated information. For example, cost ratings for each of the investments were based on data between 2 months and almost 2 years old. As of July 1, 2010, OMB plans to release an updated version of the Dashboard in July that includes ratings that factor in the performance of ongoing milestones. Another issue with the ratings was the wide variation in the number of milestones agencies reported, which was partly because OMB's guidance to agencies was too general. Having too many milestones can mask recent performance problems because the performance of every milestone (dated and recent) is equally averaged into the ratings. Specifically, investments that perform well during many previously completed milestones and then start performing poorly on a few recently completed milestones can maintain ratings that still reflect good performance. Conversely, having too few milestones limits the amount of information available to rate performance and allows agencies to potentially skew the ratings. OMB officials stated that they have recently chartered a working group with the intention of developing guidance for standardizing milestone reporting. However, until such guidance is available, the ratings may continue to have accuracy issues. Officials at three of the five agencies stated they were not using the Dashboard to manage their investments because they maintain they already had existing means to do so; officials at the other two agencies indicated that they were using the Dashboard to supplement their existing management processes. OMB officials indicated that they relied on the Dashboard as a management tool, including using the Dashboard's investment trend data to identify and address issues with investments' performance. According to OMB officials, the Dashboard was one of the key sources of information that they used to determine if an investment requires additional oversight. In addition, the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) stated that the Dashboard has greatly improved oversight capabilities compared to previously used mechanisms. He also stated that the Dashboard has increased the accountability of agencies' CIOs and established much needed visibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB report on its planned changes to the Dashboard to improve the accuracy of performance information and provide guidance to agencies that standardizes milestone reporting. OMB agreed with these recommendations, but disagreed with aspects of the draft report that GAO addressed, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-369T | gao_GAO-07-369T_0 | Onshore, Interior’s Bureau of Land Management is responsible for leasing federal oil and natural gas resources, whereas offshore, MMS has leasing authority. After the lease is awarded and production begins, the companies must also pay royalties to MMS based on a percentage of the cash value of the oil and natural gas produced and sold. The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act Will Likely Cost the Federal Government Billions of Dollars in Forgone Royalty Revenues, but Precise Estimates Remain Elusive
Based on our work to date, the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA) will likely cost the federal government billions of dollars in forgone royalties, but precise estimates of the costs are not possible at this time for several reasons. Finally, assessing the ultimate fiscal impact of royalty relief is an inherently complex task, involving uncertainty about future production and prices. In October 2004, MMS preliminarily estimated that the total costs of royalty relief for deep water leases issued under the act could be as high as $80 billion, depending on which leases ultimately received relief. However, oil and gas companies paying royalties under the act interpreted the royalty suspension volumes as applying to individual leases within a field. Given the degree of uncertainty in predicting future royalty revenues from deepwater oil and gas leases, we are using current data to carefully examine MMS’s 2004 estimate that up to $80 billion in future royalty revenues could be lost. We are also examining the impact of several variables, including changing oil and gas prices, revised estimates of the amount of oil and gas that these leases were originally expected to produce, the availability of deep water rigs to drill untested leases, and the present value of royalty payments. Additional Programs and Legislation Authorize Royalty Relief, Potentially Affecting Future Federal Royalty Collection
Although leases are no longer issued under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, royalty relief can be provided under two existing authorities: (1) the Secretary of the Interior’s discretionary authority and (2) the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, as amended, granted the Secretary of the Interior the discretionary authority to reduce or eliminate royalties for leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico in order to promote increased production. MMS intends for these discretionary programs to provide royalty relief for leases in deep waters that were issued after 2000, deep gas wells located in shallow waters, wells nearing the end of their productive lives, and special cases not covered by other programs. The Congress also authorized additional royalty relief under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which mandates relief for leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico during the five years following the act’s passage, provides relief for some wells that would not have previously qualified for royalty relief, and addresses relief in certain areas of Alaska. Finally, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains provisions addressing royalty relief in Alaska that MMS is already providing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil and gas production from federal lands and waters is vital to meeting the nation's energy needs. As such, oil and gas companies lease federal lands and waters and pay royalties to the federal government based on a percentage of the oil and gas that they produce. The Minerals Management Service (MMS), an agency in the Department of the Interior, is responsible for collecting royalties from these leases. In order to promote oil and gas production, the federal government at times and in specific cases has provided "royalty relief," waiving or reducing the royalties that companies must pay. However, as production from these leases grows and oil and gas prices have risen since a major 1995 royalty relief act, questions have emerged about the financial impacts of royalty relief. Based on our work to date, GAO's statement addresses (1) the likely fiscal impacts of royalty relief on leases issued under the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 and (2) other authority for granting royalty relief that could further impact future royalty revenue. To address these issues our ongoing work has included, among other things, analyses of key production data maintained by MMS; and reviews of appropriate portions of the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and Interior's regulations on royalty relief.
What GAO Found
While precise estimates remain elusive at this time, our work to date shows that royalty relief under the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 will likely cost billions of dollars in forgone royalty revenue--at least $1 billion of which has already been lost. In October 2004, MMS estimated that forgone royalties on deep water leases issued under the act from 1996 through 2000 could be as high as $80 billion. However, there is much uncertainty in these estimates. This uncertainty stems from ongoing legal challenges and other factors that make it unclear how many leases will ultimately receive royalty relief and the inherent complexity in forecasting future royalties. We are currently assessing MMS's estimate in light of changing oil and gas prices, revised estimates of future oil and gas production, and other factors. Additional royalty relief that can further impact future royalty revenues is currently provided under the Secretary of the Interior's discretionary authority and the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Discretionary programs include royalty relief for certain deep water leases issued after 2000, certain deep gas wells drilled in shallow waters, and wells nearing the end of their productive lives. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates relief for leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico during the five years following the act's passage, provides relief for some gas wells that would not have previously qualified for royalty relief, and addresses relief in certain areas of Alaska. |
gao_GAO-08-231T | gao_GAO-08-231T_0 | Limited Progress Has Been Made in National Reconciliation
Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks in September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within the Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. United States and Iraq Lack Clear Strategies for Key Efforts
Three GAO reports illustrate a recurring problem with U.S. efforts in Iraq—the lack of strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles and responsibilities, and performance measures. Our reports assessing (1) the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), (2) U.S. efforts to develop planning and budget capacity in Iraq’s ministries, and (3) U.S. and Iraqi efforts to rebuild Iraq’s energy sector show that clear strategies are needed to guide U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify needed resources. First, it only partially identified the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it did not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it did not detail Iraq’s anticipated contribution to its future needs. However, U.S. efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. Reconstructing Iraq’s Energy Sectors
The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqis’ lack of strategic planning in its critical energy sector. Iraqi and International Contributions Have Played a Limited Role in Rebuilding Iraq
From the onset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would help finance Iraq’s development needs. Iraqi Government Has Spent a Small Portion of Its Funds on Reconstruction
The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its 2007 revenues for capital projects and reconstruction, including capital funds for the provinces based on their populations. Iraq’s ministries, for example, spent only 24 percent of their 2007 capital budgets through mid- July 2007. Of this amount, about $11 billion is in the form of loans. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S. efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration requests additional military and economic funds for Iraq. This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international contributions to economic development. We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials, including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work.
What GAO Found
Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector. The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community would help finance Iraq's reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only $4 billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from 2007. The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the form of loans. |
gao_GAO-01-806 | gao_GAO-01-806_0 | DOE supplements its order with DOE M 471.2-1C, Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual. The manual provides requirements for the protection and control of classified matter and applies to contractors with access to classified matter, including the contractors operating the national weapons laboratories. In June 2000, DOE discovered that two computer disks containing sensitive weapons information were missing. Laboratories Have Implemented DOE's Access Controls and Need-to-Know Requirements, but These Requirements Could Permit Unnecessary Access
Our review at the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories indicates that existing DOE access controls and need-to-know requirements for both vaults and classified computer systems are being carried out in practice and the laboratories have implemented the Secretary's six security enhancements. Another part of the enhancement covered highly classified information on other computer operating systems. DOE and the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories require managers to determine that an individual's work requires a need to know the classified information before the individual is granted access to the information. DOE Needs to Further Enhance Security for Top Secret Information and Expedite Implementation of Classified Information Security Upgrades
DOE is upgrading its protection and control of classified information. DOE has issued a revision of its classified matter protection and control requirements to increase security and accountability for top secret information. In addition, DOE has worked with the Department of Defense and is revising an order to increase security for compilations of the most sensitive classified information, to be designated "Sigma 16." In January 1997, DOE recommended more stringent security measures be implemented for the protection of 137 classified information topics that had been identified as the most sensitive. Conclusions
Although the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories have implemented DOE's requirements for access and need to know for vaults and classified computer networks, DOE does not have requirements for documenting need-to-know determinations. During our visits to the laboratories, we inspected and observed operating procedures for vaults containing the most sensitive classified information, as determined by laboratory officials. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains millions of classified documents containing highly sensitive nuclear weapons design and production information. Allegations that the Peoples Republic of China obtained nuclear warhead designs from an employee of DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as the disappearance of two computer hard drives containing highly sensitive weapons information from that same laboratory, have raised concerns about how effectively DOE protects classified information, particularly the most sensitive classified information that is contained in vaults and computer systems. DOE's security program consists of many strategies for protecting and controlling classified information, such as controlling access to classified information through physical and administrative barriers and determining whether a person's work requires a "need to know" the information. DOE has recently increased protection for top-secret documents by revising its Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual, which provides detailed requirements for the protection and control of classified matter. This report reviews the (1) extent to which DOE's Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories have implemented DOE's established access controls and need-to-know requirements for classified vaults and computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information as well as the adequacy of these requirements and (2) steps DOE is taking to upgrade the protection of its classified information.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories have implemented DOE's access controls and need-to-know requirements for both vaults and classified computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information. However, DOE's requirements for documenting need to know lack specificity, allowing laboratory managers wide variations in interpretation and implementation and. DOE has recently taken, and continues to take, steps to upgrade protection and control over its classified information, but additional steps are needed. |
gao_RCED-96-8 | gao_RCED-96-8_0 | From January 1990 through July 1995, 180 applicants filed with OST to begin new airline operations. Of these 90, 57 were operating as of July 1995, while 33 began flying but ultimately ceased operations for a variety of reasons, such as insufficient revenues and competition from other airlines. These factors include the completeness of the initial application, the applicant’s managerial skills and technical knowledge about operating an airline, and the applicant’s ability to obtain sufficient funds to meet OST’s financial criteria. Additionally, OST tightened its financial standards by requiring applicants to submit third-party verification of their financial plans with their applications. The fees that applicants currently pay represent less than 1 percent of what it costs the government to conduct certification activities. Although FAA does not currently charge a fee for its certification efforts, DOT officials commented that a portion of the certification costs is recouped from ticket and fuel taxes paid by the operating airlines and deposited into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. However, about half of the applicants that applied to operate new airlines did not complete the processes, primarily because they could not obtain sufficient financial resources. Recommendation
Given the current reduction in federal resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation reevaluate the appropriateness of the Office of the Secretary’s increasing its fees and FAA’s establishing fees for services to certify new airlines, taking into consideration the government’s costs, the value of the services to the applicant, and the public policy or interest served. Specifically, (1) FAA has revised its certification process to require that applicants complete certain steps before it will expend additional resources, (2) OST now requires all applicants to submit, with their applications, third-party verification that they are working with an established brokerage firm, financial institution, or qualified individuals to raise the necessary capital, and (3) OST and FAA have established an electronic communications link to better share information about applicants. On the basis of subsequent discussions with the Subcommittee’s office, this report addresses three questions: (1) How many applicants have applied for and received certification to begin new airlines since 1990? (2) What processes does DOT have in place to certify new airlines? and (3) How much does it cost to certify new airlines and how are these costs distributed between the government and the applicants? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation's (DOT) processes for certifying the initial operations of new airlines, focusing on the: (1) number of applicants that applied for and received authorization to begin new airlines since 1990; and (2) cost to certify new airlines and how the cost is distributed between the government and the applicants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) from January 1990 to July 1995, 90 of 180 applicants were authorized to begin new airline operations; (2) 33 of these 90 airlines ceased operations prior to July 1995; (3) the 90 remaining applicants were not authorized to begin airline operations because they lacked the financial resources needed to perform proposed services or the DOT Office of the Secretary (OST) had not approved their applications; (4) factors that determine whether applicants receive OST and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification include the completeness of the initial application and applicant's ability to meet operation and financial criteria; (5) OST has tightened its financial standards by requiring applicants to provide third-party verification of their financial plans; (6) FAA has revised its certification process to prevent applicants lacking sufficient financial resources from proceeding into the airline certification process; (7) OST and FAA have established an electronic communication link to share information about airline applicants, but it is unknown how much this will reduce DOT resource waste; (8) applicants pay less than $1,000 to apply for airline certification, while the government pays up to $150,000 to process each application; (9) a portion of the government's cost of certifying new airlines is recouped from ticket and fuel taxes once the applicants begin operations; and (10) OST and FAA must examine the appropriateness of certification fees, since certification costs are not recovered under the fee structure. |
gao_GAO-11-40 | gao_GAO-11-40_0 | Students who changed schools frequently were often from low- income families, the inner city, migrant families, or had limited English proficiency. Characteristics of More Mobile and Less Mobile Students and Their Schools Differ
While nearly all students change schools at some point before reaching high school, some students change schools with greater frequency (see figure 1). Students who changed schools four or more times were disproportionately poor, African American, and from families that did not own their home or have a father present in the household. African-American students represented about 15 percent of students in kindergarten through eighth grade who changed schools two times or less; however, they represented about 23 percent of students who changed schools four or more times. These schools had larger percentages of at-risk eighth grade students compared to schools where less than 10 percent of the students changed schools. Research Suggests Student Mobility Can Have a Negative Effect on Academic Achievement, but Its Effect on Social Adjustment is Unclear
A body of research suggests that student mobility has a negative effect on students’ academic achievement, but research on its effect on their social and emotional well-being is inconclusive. Specifically, the body of research suggests that students who changed schools more frequently tended to have lower scores on standardized reading and math tests and to drop out of school at higher rates than their less mobile peers. Schools with High Student Mobility Face Challenges in Meeting the Academic and Emotional Needs of All Students
Officials we interviewed in schools with high rates of student mobility said they often face the dual challenge of meeting the needs of their students who change schools at high rates and the needs of the entire student body, which is comprised largely of low-income, disadvantaged students. Moreover, some teachers and principals said that for a new student, there may be differences in what and how instruction has been delivered to them from school to school, and this can make it difficult for teachers to assess where students are academically when they arrive and make decisions about proper placement. A number of teachers and principals also told us that mobile students’ records are often not transferred to the new school in a timely way or at all, and, as a result, this can make it difficult for school officials to determine class placement, credit transfer, and the need for special services, such as services related to special education and language proficiency. Schools Use a Range of Federal Programs Already in Place to Meet the Needs of Mobile Students
Because the highly mobile schools we visited also had large percentages of low-income, disadvantaged students and special populations already targeted by federal programs, the schools met the needs of mobile students using funding from programs already in place. In addition, some schools we visited used the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youth Program (McKinney-Vento Program), which is designed to meet the educational needs of homeless students. Some school officials told us that homeless students are often mobile. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of these federal programs in meeting the needs of mobile students. We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Education for review and comment. Our study was framed around four questions: (1) What are the numbers and characteristics of students who change schools, and what are the reasons students change schools? (2) What is known about the effects of mobility on student outcomes including academic achievement, behavior, and other outcomes? (3) What challenges does student mobility present for schools in meeting the educational needs of students who change schools? (4) What key federal programs are schools using to address the needs of mobile students? To determine schools’ student mobility rates, we used responses from the following question administered in the 2007 survey: “About what percentage of students who are enrolled at the beginning of the school year is still enrolled at the end of the school year?” Further, using the NAEP data, we explored relationships between schools’ mobility rates and the following school characteristics: (1) geographic location; (2) measures of low-income students, such as receipt of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965’s (ESEA) Title I funding and participation in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP); (3) students in special education; (4) students with limited English proficiency; and (5) students absent on an average day. | Why GAO Did This Study
Educational achievement of students can be negatively affected by their changing schools often. The recent economic downturn, with foreclosures and homelessness, may be increasing student mobility. To inform Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) reauthorization, GAO was asked: (1) What are the numbers and characteristics of students who change schools, and what are the reasons students change schools? (2) What is known about the effects of mobility on student outcomes, including academic achievement, behavior, and other outcomes? (3) What challenges does student mobility present for schools in meeting the educational needs of students who change schools? (4) What key federal programs are schools using to address the needs of mobile students? GAO analyzed federal survey data, interviewed U.S. Department of Education (Education) officials, conducted site visits at eight schools in six school districts, and reviewed federal laws and existing research.
What GAO Found
While nearly all students change schools at some point before reaching high school, some change schools with greater frequency. According to Education's national survey data, the students who change schools the most frequently (four or more times) represented about 13 percent of all kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8) students and they were disproportionately poor, African American, and from families that did not own their home. About 11.5 percent of schools also had high rates of mobility--more than 10 percent of K-8 students left by the end of the school year. These schools, in addition to serving a mobile population, had larger percentages of students who were low-income, received special education, and had limited English proficiency. Research suggests that mobility is one of several interrelated factors, such as socio-economic status and lack of parental education, which have a negative effect on academic achievement, but research about mobility's effect on students' social and emotional well-being is limited and inconclusive. With respect to academic achievement, students who change schools more frequently tend to have lower scores on standardized reading and math tests and drop out of school at higher rates than their less mobile peers. Schools face a range of challenges in meeting the academic, social, and emotional needs of students who change schools. Teachers we interviewed said that students who change schools often face challenges due to differences in what is taught and how it is taught. Students may arrive without records or with incomplete records, making it difficult for teachers to make placement decisions and identify special education needs. Also, teachers and principals told us that schools face challenges in supporting the needs of these students' families, the circumstances of which often underlie frequent school changes. Moreover, these schools face the dual challenge of educating a mobile student population, as well as a general student population, that is often largely low-income and disadvantaged. Schools use a range of federal programs already in place and targeted to at-risk students to meet the needs of students who change schools frequently. Teachers and principals told us that mobile students are often eligible for and benefit from federal programs for low-income, disadvantaged students, such as Title 1, Part A of ESEA which funds tutoring and after-school instruction. In addition, school officials we interviewed said they rely on the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youth Program, which provides such things as clothing and school supplies to homeless students and requires schools to provide transportation for homeless students who lack permanent residence so they can avoid changing schools. GAO did not evaluate the effectiveness of these programs in meeting the needs of mobile students.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Education had no comments on this report. |
gao_GAO-10-115 | gao_GAO-10-115_0 | KCP is increasing the percentage of nonnuclear components purchased from external suppliers from about 54 to 70 percent. NNSA plans to have a new KCP facility built on an undeveloped site in Kansas City, Missouri. Based on analyses conducted by KCP, NNSA chose to lease a new facility for 20 years. However, KCP compared financing alternatives using cost estimates limited to 20 years rather than the full expected life of the proposed facility; therefore, NNSA cannot be certain whether other financing alternatives might have offered lower costs over the longer term. KCP Evaluated Several Alternatives for Modernizing the Facility
KCP evaluated several alternatives on behalf of NNSA for modernizing its facility based on each alternative’s potential to satisfy key goals outlined in NNSA’s strategic plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, among other things. Specifically, KCP officials told us that they sought an option that (1) was consistent with NNSA’s goals for maintaining a smaller facility for producing nuclear weapons and that could quickly adapt to change; (2) met schedule commitments to Congress; (3) minimized costs of constructing and annually operating and maintaining the facility; and, (4) maximized chances of completing the relocation within the established scope, cost, and schedule. Ultimately, based on KCP’s analysis, NNSA decided to build its new facility on an available site in Kansas City about 8 miles from the existing facility that is not on a flood plain. However, 20 years is far shorter than the useful life of a production facility that is properly maintained; the current KCP facility has operated for more than 60 years. NNSA and KCP officials acknowledged that while leasing a facility through GSA under a 20-year scenario is less costly than a line item project, it can be more costly over a longer-term scenario—possibly even beginning at about 22 years into the lease. However, KCP’s relocation schedule— which is critical to ensuring that the move does not disrupt production— did not initially adhere to all of GAO’s best practices for schedule development. We assessed KCP’s initial schedule in February 2009 and found that KCP did not fully adhere to GAO-identified best practices for schedule development. We assessed its revised schedule in July 2009 and found that KCP officials have taken steps to address some of the problems identified in our initial review, but that the schedule still has some shortcomings. However, KCP lacks a formal, risk-based approach to identifying and mitigating risks posed by components and technologies, including weapons-related design drawings; unique production processes; and information that although mostly unclassified, could be used by adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities. KCP Has Not Conducted a Systematic Review to Identify Outsourced Technologies That Pose Nuclear Proliferation Risks
KCP has not implemented a systematic review process to identify specific components, technologies, and information that although not considered to be classified national security information, are subject to export controls and could be used to advance the nuclear capabilities of adversaries. As such, items that pose little apparent risk of contributing to potential adversaries’ development of nuclear weapons, such as a commercially available screw, are considered to be the same level of risk as complex components, such as a mechanism designed to arm nuclear weapons. Furthermore, KCP’s primary export control measure rests on its suppliers’ compliance with a contract clause outlining their responsibility to abide by export control laws and safeguard nuclear weapon component production and design information. DOE and NNSA lack clear and up-to-date export control guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the Kansas City Plant (KCP) developed plans for modernizing its facility, (2) actions KCP has taken actions to ensure uninterrupted production of components needed to support the nuclear weapons stockpile during and after the transition to the new facility, and (3) actions KCP has taken to address the risks and potential consequences of increased outsourcing of nonnuclear components. To meet this objective, key activities need to be logically sequenced in the order that they are to be carried out. KCP officials reported that they have no plans to address this issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
Built in 1943, the Kansas City Plant (KCP)--the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) primary production plant for manufacturing nonnuclear components of nuclear warheads and bombs--is to be modernized because of its age and the high cost of maintenance and operation. Among other changes, NNSA plans to relocate KCP to a new facility and increase components obtained from external suppliers from about 54 to 70 percent. KCP's continued supply of these components is essential for maintaining a reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. GAO was asked to determine (1) how KCP developed plans for modernization, (2) actions KCP has taken to ensure uninterrupted production of components, and (3) actions KCP has taken to address the risks of outsourcing. GAO reviewed planning documents and met with officials from NNSA, KCP, and Sandia National Laboratories, which designs many of the components produced at KCP.
What GAO Found
KCP evaluated several alternatives on behalf of NNSA to modernize its facility based on whether the alternative (1) was consistent with NNSA's goals for maintaining a smaller facility for producing nuclear weapons and one that could quickly adapt to change, (2) met NNSA's commitments to Congress to operate a new facility by 2012, and (3) minimized costs and implementation risks. Based on KCP's analyses of alternatives, NNSA chose to have a private developer build a new building in Kansas City 8 miles from the current facility, which NNSA would then lease through the General Services Administration (GSA) for a period of 20 years. However, in evaluating a financing method, KCP compared alternatives using cost estimates limited to 20 years. Twenty years is far shorter than the useful life of a production facility that is properly maintained; the current facility has operated for more than 60 years. NNSA and KCP officials acknowledge that while leasing a facility through GSA under a 20-year scenario is less costly than purchasing, it can be more costly over the longer term. Because KCP's analysis did not consider costs beyond 20 years, NNSA cannot be certain if other alternatives, such as purchasing the facility, might have offered lower costs over the longer term. KCP officials developed extensive plans to ensure that the production of components is not interrupted because of the transition to the new facility. However, its schedule--which is critical to ensuring that the move does not disrupt production--does not fully adhere to best practices GAO identified for schedule development and related DOE scheduling guidance. In February 2009, GAO assessed KCP's schedule and found that, among other things, KCP had not adequately sequenced all activities in its schedule in the order in which they are to be carried out. GAO followed up in July 2009 and found that although KCP officials have made progress in addressing several of these problems, the schedule still has some shortcomings. KCP has taken steps to mitigate some risks of increased outsourcing, but NNSA has not provided adequate oversight or clear and up-to-date export control guidance tailored for NNSA production and laboratory sites to effectively manage associated nuclear weapons proliferation risks. As such, KCP has not implemented a formal, risk-based approach to identify specific components and technologies that may be used by potential adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities. Lacking effective NNSA-specific guidance and a risk-based approach, KCP instead treats all components as if they pose equal proliferation risks. As such, items such as a common, commercially available screw are considered to be at the same level of proliferation risk as a complex mechanism designed to arm nuclear weapons. Further, KCP's primary means of addressing this issue rests on its suppliers' self-enforced compliance with a contract clause that outlines the suppliers' responsibility to abide by applicable export control laws. Under this broadly applied approach to managing export control--where all components are treated as equal risks--NNSA may be missing opportunities at KCP to systematically identify and more effectively mitigate those risks that pose the greatest threats. |
gao_GAO-04-985T | gao_GAO-04-985T_0 | However, the industry’s safety record for these pipelines has not improved for accidents with the greatest consequences—those resulting in a fatality, injury, or property damage totaling $50,000 or more—which we term serious accidents. OPS, within the Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), administers the national regulatory program to ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids by pipeline. In December 2002, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act increased these amounts to $100,000 and $1 million, respectively. Key Management Elements Are Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of OPS’s Enforcement Strategy
The effectiveness of OPS’s enforcement strategy cannot be determined because OPS has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management—clear performance goals for the enforcement program, a fully defined strategy for achieving these goals, and performance measures linked to goals that would allow an assessment of the enforcement strategy’s impact on pipeline safety. Agency officials recognize the need to develop an enforcement policy and up-to-date detailed enforcement guidelines and have been working to do so. To date, the agency has completed an initial set of enforcement guidelines for its operator qualification standards and has developed other draft guidelines. The three measures that OPS is considering could provide more information on the intermediate outcomes of the agency’s enforcement strategy, such as the frequency of repeat violations and the number of repairs made in response to corrective action orders, as well as other aspects of program performance, such as the timeliness of enforcement actions. While OPS’s new measures may produce better information on the performance of its enforcement program than is currently available, OPS has not adopted key practices for achieving these characteristics of successful performance measurement systems: Measures should demonstrate results (outcomes) that are directly linked to program goals. OPS Has Increased Its Use of Civil Penalties; the Effect on Deterrence Is Unclear
In 2000, in response to criticism that its enforcement activities were weak and ineffective, OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil monetary penalties it assessed. OPS Now Assesses More and Larger Civil Penalties
OPS assessed more civil penalties during the past 4 years under its current “tough but fair” enforcement approach than it did in the previous 5 years, when it took a more lenient enforcement approach. From 2000 through 2003, OPS assessed 88 civil penalties (22 per year on average) compared with 70 civil penalties from 1995 through 1999 (about 14 per year on average). Civil penalties represent about 14 percent (216 out of 1,530) of all enforcement actions taken over the past 10 years. The Effect of OPS’s Larger Civil Penalties on Deterring Noncompliance Is Unclear
Although OPS has increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it has imposed, the effect of this change on deterring noncompliance with safety regulations, if any, is not clear. The stakeholders we spoke with expressed differing views on whether the civil penalties deter noncompliance. Pipeline safety advocacy groups that we talked to also said that the civil penalty amounts OPS imposes are too small to have any deterrent effect on pipeline operators. As discussed earlier, for 2000 through 2003, the average assessed penalty was about $29,000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interstate pipelines carrying natural gas and hazardous liquids (such as petroleum products) are safer to the public than other modes of freight transportation. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), the federal agency that administers the national regulatory program to ensure safe pipeline transportation, has been undertaking a broad range of activities to make pipeline transportation safer. However, the number of serious accidents--those involving deaths, injuries, and property damage of $50,000 or more--has not fallen. When safety problems are found, OPS can take enforcement action against pipeline operators, including requiring the correction of safety violations and assessing monetary sanctions (civil penalties). This testimony is based on ongoing work for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and for other committees, as required by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. The testimony provides preliminary results on (1) the effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy and (2) OPS's assessment of civil penalties.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy cannot be determined because the agency has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management--clear program goals, a well-defined strategy for achieving goals, and performance measures that are linked to program goals. Without these key elements, the agency cannot determine whether recent and planned changes in its strategy will have the desired effects on pipeline safety. Over the past several years, OPS has focused primarily on other efforts--such as developing a new risk-based regulatory approach--that it believes will change the safety culture of the industry. OPS has also became more aggressive in enforcing its regulations and now plans to further strengthen the management of its enforcement program. In particular, OPS is developing an enforcement policy that will help define its enforcement strategy and has taken initial steps toward identifying new performance measures. However, OPS does not plan to finalize the policy until 2005 and has not adopted key practices for achieving successful performance measurement systems, such as linking measures to goals. OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it assessed against pipeline operators over the last 4 years (2000-2003) following a decision to be "tough but fair" in assessing penalties. OPS assessed an average of 22 penalties per year during this period, compared with an average of 14 per year for the previous 5 years (1995-1999), a period of more lenient "partnering" with industry. In addition, the average penalty increased from $18,000 to $29,000 over the two periods. About 94 percent of the 216 penalties levied from 1994 through 2003 have been paid. The civil penalty is one of several actions OPS can take when it finds a violation, and these penalties represent about 14 percent of all enforcement actions over the past 10 years. While OPS has increased the number and the size of its civil penalties, stakeholders--including industry, state, and insurance company officials and public advocacy groups--expressed differing views on whether these penalties deter noncompliance with safety regulations. Some, such as pipeline operators, thought that any penalty was a deterrent if it kept the pipeline operator in the public eye, while others, such as safety advocates, told us that the penalties were too small to be effective sanctions. |
gao_GAO-17-28 | gao_GAO-17-28_0 | 1). Under an agency-directed model, a provider agency employs attendants. Medicaid program requirements vary by the type of PCS program, but may include the following types of protections depending on the type of program: screening attendants to see if they are excluded as Medicaid providers; developing minimum qualification standards for attendants; establishing quality assurance processes to ensure the services provided protect the health and welfare of beneficiaries; identifying and reporting cases of potential abuse, neglect, or other events that harm, or could result in harm to beneficiaries; establishing policies and processes to ensure that services for which the state has been billed were actually provided; and reporting on the health and welfare of beneficiaries to CMS on a regular basis. Selected States Varied in How They Implemented Beneficiary Safeguards and Ensured Billed Personal Care Services Were Provided Selected States Employed Beneficiary Safeguards in Three Common Areas, but Implementation Methods Varied Among and Sometimes Within States
All four selected states—California, Maryland, Oregon, and Texas— reported employing safeguards to protect beneficiaries from harm and had methods in place to ensure billed services were actually provided, but the states varied in how they implemented them and, in some cases, variations existed within states across PCS programs. The four states also reported using different methods to help ensure billed services were provided (see Appendix I for the types of PCS programs reviewed in each state). All four selected states reported that beneficiaries’ health and welfare is monitored in part by having case managers or nurses periodically check in with beneficiaries, but the frequency and means, such as in-person versus by phone or electronic message, varied among the four states and in some cases within states across PCS programs. For example, for at least some PCS programs, two states required beneficiaries to sign timesheets, two states used electronic visit verification timekeeping systems, and all four states performed quality assurance reviews for some PCS programs to ensure billed services are received. CMS Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of States’ Personal Care Services Programs and Harmonize Requirements, but Issues Remain
CMS Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight through Guidance and Program Reviews but Does Not Collect Required State Information
Since 2010, CMS has taken several steps to improve oversight of states’ PCS programs to help ensure that beneficiaries are safe and that billed services are provided. Reviewed state PCS programs. Required reporting. This required reporting will help inform CMS and Congress about the health and welfare of beneficiaries receiving services from these programs. CMS officials told us that they are working on developing guidance for states to submit the required information. However, we found that CMS’s efforts have not addressed the significant differences across federal program requirements specific to PCS related to beneficiary safety and ensuring that billed services are provided. Harmonizing requirements across similar programs is also consistent with federal internal control standards. For example, in one state we reviewed, the state requires quarterly or biannual monitoring of beneficiaries for most of its PCS programs. Similarly, the type of fiscal controls required to prevent improper payments for these services can vary based on the type of program. Congress and others have called on HHS to take steps to improve the coordination and administration of home- and community-based services. A more consistent administration of policies and procedures across programs could ease some of the differences and provide some comparable approaches to safeguards and assurances and help the federal government and states better manage risks to beneficiaries and to protect the integrity of the program. CMS has taken some needed steps to harmonize requirements across the program authorities; however, significant differences remain in the federal program requirements that serve as the basis for state oversight policies and protections for their different PCS programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To achieve a better understanding of the effect of certain PCS services on beneficiaries and a more consistent administration of policies and procedures across PCS programs, we recommend the Acting Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: collect and analyze states’ required information on the impact of the Participant-Directed Option and Community First Choice programs on the health and welfare of beneficiaries as well as the state quality measures for the Participant-Directed Option and Community First Choice programs; and take steps to harmonize requirements, as appropriate, across PCS programs in a way that accounts for common risks faced by beneficiaries and to better ensure that billed services are provided. HHS concurred with our recommendations and noted efforts to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of people receiving in-home personal care services—such as assistance with bathing and dressing—from Medicaid is expected to grow. States can offer these services through one or more programs under which home- and community-based services can be provided, each with different federal requirements. The provision of personal care in beneficiaries' homes can pose risks to safety, and these services have a high rate of improper payments, including instances where services for which the state was billed were not provided. In recent years Congress has directed HHS to improve coordination of these programs, which could harmonize requirements—that is, implement a more consistent administration of policies and procedures—and enhance oversight.
GAO was asked to review oversight of Medicaid personal care services. GAO examined: (1) how selected states ensure that beneficiaries receiving services are safe from harm and that billed services are provided; and (2) steps CMS has taken since 2010 to improve oversight and harmonize requirements across programs. GAO reviewed policies in four states with varied programs; reviewed laws, guidance and documents; and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
Four states that GAO reviewed varied in how they implemented safeguards to protect beneficiaries receiving in-home personal care services from harm and in their methods to help ensure billed services were actually provided. For example, to help keep beneficiaries safe, the four selected states—California, Maryland, Oregon, and Texas—reported that they monitored beneficiaries by having case managers or nurses periodically check in with beneficiaries, but the frequency and means, such as in-person or by phone, varied among the states and in some cases across programs within a state. The four states also reported using different methods to help ensure that billed services were actually provided. For example, to track attendants' work time, two states required beneficiaries to sign paper timesheets for the attendants, and two states used electronic visit verification timekeeping systems for some or all programs.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has taken several steps to improve oversight of states' personal care service programs and harmonize requirements but has not collected required state reports or addressed significant differences in program requirements. Since 2010, CMS steps to improve oversight of states' programs include enhancing guidance and conducting webinars to help states address improper payments. To manage risk inherent in the provision of these services, and in keeping with statutory direction to improve coordination of these programs, CMS has taken steps to better harmonize requirements across programs including directing states to follow agency guidance issued for one type of program when implementing a similar type of program. However:
CMS has not systematically collected required states' reports on personal care services provided under two programs, although CMS stated that guidance for states to submit the reports is under development. Collecting these reports could improve oversight by providing CMS and Congress with information on programs' effects on beneficiaries' health and welfare.
CMS harmonization efforts have not addressed the significant differences across federal program requirements specific to beneficiary safety and ensuring that billed services are provided. Consequently, the safeguards and level of assurance that CMS has regarding states' beneficiary protections and oversight of billed services can vary by program. For example, one reviewed state requires quarterly or biannual beneficiary monitoring for most programs; but one program monitors annually as federal requirements do not require more frequent monitoring. Similarly, requirements to help ensure billed services are actually provided vary widely among states and programs, contributing to uneven assurances and oversight across programs.
Home- and community-based services, including personal care services, are growing in significance and in demand. A more consistent administration of policies and procedures across programs could help the federal government and states better manage risks to beneficiaries and protect the integrity of the program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Acting Administrator of CMS (1) collect and analyze required state reports on personal care services and (2) take steps to further harmonize federal program requirements, as appropriate, across programs providing these services. HHS concurred with both recommendations |
gao_GAO-12-225 | gao_GAO-12-225_0 | FDAAA included provisions to support and track pediatric device development. According to FDA officials, the agency defined an additional subpopulation, transitional adolescents, for its internal application review purposes. FDAAA further required FDA to annually report to congressional committees on the number of PMA and HDE devices approved in the preceding year (1) for which there is a pediatric subpopulation that suffers from the disease or condition that the device is intended to treat, diagnose, or cure; (2) labeled for use in pediatric patients; and (3) exempt from user fees because the device was intended solely for pediatric use. To help connect individuals with ideas for pediatric medical devices with experienced professionals to assist them through the medical device development process, FDAAA also authorized demonstration grants for pediatric device consortia to promote pediatric device development. Characteristics of the Population and Limited Economic Incentives Cited as Barriers to Pediatric Device Development
Certain characteristics unique to pediatric populations—including physiological differences in pediatric patients and challenges with recruiting pediatric participants for clinical trials—are barriers to developing pediatric medical devices that were cited by stakeholders. Given these unique characteristics of the pediatric population, as well as the fact that the market for pediatric devices is generally smaller than the market for adult devices, there are limited economic incentives for manufacturers to develop pediatric medical devices. Pediatric Device Consortia Have Assisted over 100 Device Projects; Many Were in Early Development
The pediatric device consortia reported assisting 107 pediatric device projects—that is, projects to develop new pediatric devices—in the first 2 years of the demonstration grant program. In order to facilitate the development and approval of pediatric medical devices, FDA awarded grants totaling about $5 million to four pediatric device consortia in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (see table 2). For the device projects assisted by the consortia, the phase of development varied. FDA Lacks Reliable Information to Readily Identify All Pediatric PMA and HDE Devices
FDA Has Not Consistently Collected Reliable and Timely Information Needed to Report on Pediatric Devices
Although FDAAA required FDA to annually report to congressional committees on the number of PMA and HDE devices approved in the preceding year that were labeled for use in pediatric patients, the agency lacks reliable information to readily identify all such pediatric devices. Fifteen PMA and 3 HDE Devices Have Been Explicitly Indicated for Use in Pediatric Patients since FDAAA Was Enacted
While the indication for use statement for most approved PMA and HDE devices did not identify the age of the intended population, our review identified 18 devices approved since FDAAA was enacted that were explicitly indicated for use in pediatric patients.found that 15 PMA and 3 HDE devices approved since FDAAA was enacted have indication for use statements explicitly stating that the devices are for patients that include patients age 21 or younger, pediatric patients, or skeletally immature patients. Specifically, FDA should take steps to consistently collect information using its existing pediatric electronic flag or otherwise develop internal controls to readily and reliably collect and report information on devices for pediatric use. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Commissioner of FDA, and other interested parties. Food and Drug Administration: Opportunities Exist to Better Address Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medical devices can significantly improve, and save, the lives of children. Yet according to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the development of pediatric devices lags years behind the development of devices for adults. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) provided incentives to develop devices for children, particularly devices that receive FDAs humanitarian device exemption (HDE), a process for devices that treat or diagnose rare diseases or conditions. FDAAA also authorized demonstration grants for nonprofit consortia to facilitate pediatric device development and required FDA to annually report the number of approved devices labeled for use in pediatric patients. Finally, FDAAA required GAO to report on pediatric device development. This report (1) describes barriers to developing pediatric devices, (2) describes how pediatric device consortia have contributed to the development of pediatric devices, and (3) examines FDA data on the number of pediatric devices approved since FDAAA was enacted. GAO examined FDA data and documents related to device approvals, reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed and reviewed documents from stakeholders and FDA officials.
What GAO Found
Certain characteristics unique to pediatric populationsincluding physiological differences from adult patients and challenges with recruiting pediatric participants for clinical trialsare barriers to developing medical devices for pediatric use cited by stakeholders. Given the unique characteristics of the pediatric population, and because the market for pediatric devices is smaller than the market for adult devices, there are limited economic incentives for manufacturers to develop pediatric medical devices.
FDAAA provisions authorized demonstration grants for pediatric device consortiathese consortia reported assisting over 100 pediatric device projects in the first 2 years of the program, fiscal years 2009 and 2010. FDA awarded grants totaling about $5 million to four pediatric device consortia in these 2 years. Of the device projects assisted by the consortia, many projects were in early stages of development, such as the creation of a prototype and the preclinical testing of that prototype. Activities performed by the consortia included regularly scheduled forums where innovators could discuss new device ideas with a group of experts.
FDA lacks reliable internal data with which to identify all pediatric devices. FDAAA required FDA to annually report to congressional committees on the number of devices approved in the preceding year that were labeled for use in pediatric patients. While FDA created an electronic flag in its internal tracking system to identify such devices, FDA has not consistently used this flag and therefore lacks reliable and timely information needed for reporting. GAOs review of the indication for use statements of devices approved since FDAAA was enacted identified 18 devicesincluding 3 HDE devices and 15 premarket approval (PMA) devicesthat were explicitly indicated for use in pediatric patients (patients age 21 or younger). However, the approved indication for use statements for most (72 percent) of the devices approved through the HDE or PMA processes did not specify the age of the intended patient population, so additional pediatric devices could exist.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA collect reliable information to report data on pediatric medical devices by consistently using its existing pediatric electronic flag in its tracking system or otherwise developing internal controls. HHS concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-367 | gao_GAO-01-367_0 | National data identifying WC beneficiaries do not exist. SSA Faces Difficulties Administering Disability Payments Involving WC Benefits
The lack of a reliable source of information to identify WC beneficiaries complicates SSA’s administration of benefit payments under the DI and the SSI programs. Reliance on the Self- Reporting of WC Benefits Makes SSA Payments Vulnerable to Errors
SSA’s long-standing problems with administering the WC offset persist today. The most significant payment errors occurred because SSA relied on beneficiaries to file timely reports on the status of their WC benefits. In addition to reconsidering its benefit payments in these cases, SSA has taken other actions to improve its administration of the WC offset, including sending mailers to remind beneficiaries to report changes in their WC benefits. Like SSA, each of these programs is vulnerable to payment problems caused by an inability to reliably identify beneficiaries receiving WC benefits. Like SSA, HCFA primarily relies on its beneficiaries to report their WC benefits. Lack of WC Information Could Affect Other Program Operations
Other federal programs, including Food Stamps, Section 8 Rental Voucher and Certificate Programs, and child support enforcement, also need information about the receipt of WC benefits by their program applicants and participants to effectively administer their operations. Options for Improving Access to Workers’ Compensation Information
Because of the fragmented structure of WC programs and the lack of direct federal involvement in state WC programs, developing a reliable source of information to identify WC beneficiaries for federal agencies defies a simple solution. Benefit payers know to whom, when, how much, and why they are paying benefits. Social Security benefit amounts are based on a person’s average earnings. Analysis of Effects of WC Benefits on Medicare and Other Federal Agencies
To examine Medicare’s administration of the secondary payer provision in the Social Security Act relative to workers’ compensation, we reviewed pertinent regulations and procedures and met with HCFA policy and operations officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses how workers' compensation (WC) benefits affect benefit programs run by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and other agencies. GAO (1) examines the effects of WC benefits on SSA programs, focusing on SSA's progress in administering the WC offset provision; (2) discusses other federal programs whose benefit payments are also affected by WC benefits; and (3) discusses ways to address federal benefit payment errors related to workers' compensation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that SSA's administration of the WC offset provision continues to be undermined by the lack of reliable information on WC benefits received by Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries which causes some beneficiaries to be overpaid and others to be underpaid. No national reporting system identifies WC beneficiaries. Instead, SSA largely relies on applicants and beneficiaries to report their receipt of WC benefits and any changes that occur in the benefit amounts--an approach that makes it very difficult for SSA to make accurate benefit payments. Other federal agencies also need WC information to make accurate benefit payments and face similar difficulties identifying WC beneficiaries. Like SSA, Medicare relies on its applicants and beneficiaries to self-report WC benefits and is vulnerable to payment errors when they do not. In addition, food stamp programs and Section 8 rental housing assistance consider WC benefits as income or assets, and an inability to obtain benefit information could affect the accuracy of benefit payments. There are ways to address the difficulty of reliably identifying WC beneficiaries. However, the fragmented structure of WC programs and the lack of federal involvement in state WC programs defy a simple solution. |
gao_GAO-10-341 | gao_GAO-10-341_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors and guards, we conducted site visits at 6 of FPS’s 11 regions. We conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities. To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken to address challenges with managing its contract guard program, we reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 testimony. FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of Contracts
FPS continues to face challenges with overseeing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. On the basis of our review of FPS’s contractual requirements and guard training and certification records maintained by FPS and/or the contractor, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS’s 38 guard contractors and subsequently deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired certification. FPS’s data showed that of the 663 guards, 435 are now fully certified and trained, 167 are not fully certified and trained, and 61 guards are no longer working on the contract. For example, At a level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation procedures and left two access points unattended, thereby leaving the facility vulnerable. According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement action against them for not complying with the terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS’s Inspector General’s 2009 report. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. These evaluations were for 38 contractors. FPS Faces Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities
FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in Some Regions
While FPS has given its guard contractors the responsibility to conduct most of the training of guards, FPS is responsible for conducting the 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training that all guards are required to have. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required X-ray or magnetometer training to its almost 1,500 guards since 2004. As of January 2010, these guards had not received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal facilities in this region. FPS Has Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities
FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with post orders. Each time they tried, our investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with the components for an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests in the six regions we visited. Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program
FPS Is Increasing Guard Inspections at Facilities in Some Metropolitan Areas, while the Number of Inspections at Other Facilities May Not Increase
In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. However, as of December 2009, about half of the 752 inspectors had not received RAMP training. However, FPS decided not to pursue federalizing guard positions because of the cost. Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on whether the 15,000 guards deployed at federal facilities have met the training and certification requirements is important for a number of reasons. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the long-standing and unresolved issues related to FPS’s contract guard program and challenges in protecting federal facilities, employees, and the public who use these facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to take the following eight actions: identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and financially feasible for protecting federal facilities; rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors’ and guards’ performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not complying with the terms of the contract; complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files have required documentation; develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real- time basis; and verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard program. | Why GAO Did This Study
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This report assesses the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors, overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and the actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors; and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
What GAO Found
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements, but 7 of 7 guard contractors we reviewed were not in compliance with this requirement. Specifically, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS's 38 contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one expired certification, including those showing that the guard has not committed domestic violence, which make the guards ineligible to carry firearms. As of February 2010, according to FPS data, 435 of the 663 guards are now fully certified, 167 are not fully certified, and 61 guards are no longer working on the contract. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these 7 contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, we reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in one region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). For example, we identified security vulnerabilities when GAO investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 similar tests, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that once fully implemented could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, guards will not all be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. FPS recognized that its guard program has long-standing challenges and in 2009 contemplated a number of changes to the program, including assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS has not taken any actions in pursuing these ideas. |
gao_GAO-04-932 | gao_GAO-04-932_0 | Background
Services purchased from foreigners are considered U.S. imports: a U.S. import occurs when a U.S.-based company pays for a service produced abroad and supplied to the United States (either to the company or directly to its customers, as in the case of the call center). Services offshoring has been facilitated by improvements in information technology, decreasing data transmission costs, and expanded infrastructure in developing countries. In particular, recent developments in the telecommunications industry, such as technology improvements, infrastructure growth in developing countries, and decreasing data transmission costs, have facilitated the use of offshoring. Although offshoring can be beneficial, organizations also face risks that are relevant to decisions about whether or not to offshore services. Services Trade Data Cover Some Transactions Associated with Offshoring
U.S. government data provide some insight into the trends in offshore sourcing of services by the private sector, but they do not provide a complete picture of offshoring of the business transactions that the term offshoring can encompass. The Department of Commerce’s trade data show that imports of services associated with offshoring are growing. For example, U.S. imports of BPT services grew from $21.2 billion in 1997 to about $37.5 billion in 2002, an increase of 76.9 percent. 8.) U.S. Foreign Investment Captures Other Aspects of Offshoring
U.S. government data on direct investment abroad by U.S. multinational companies producing services abroad provide information on aspects of offshoring, such as supplier countries and the distribution of labor between parent companies and affiliates. However, FPDS has limitations and may understate the total amount of IT and other services that are offshored by the federal government. MLS identifies only a portion of total layoffs because it does not include small establishments or layoffs involving fewer than 50 employees. The data also indicate that layoffs associated with “overseas relocation” reported by MLS peaked in 2002 (after rising sharply in 2001) but declined in 2003. Federal statistics provide some clues as to the extent of this activity and show that relative to imports of other services, offshoring is a small but growing trend in the U.S. economy. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to (1) describe the nature of the offshoring of IT and other services, (2) discuss what the data show about the extent of this practice, and (3) discuss what available data show about the effects of services offshoring on the U.S. economy, including labor and business. Using FPDS data, we calculated for each fiscal year in the 5-year period (1) the total dollar value of IT and other services contracting actions in which an agency reported a foreign country as the principal place of performance or manufacture and (2) the percentage of total dollars associated with foreign performance or manufacture locations relative to the total dollar value of all services contracts performed in all locations (U.S. and foreign countries). To determine the effects of services offshoring on the U.S. economy, we examined available federal data as well as private sector studies on offshoring. Definitions of Offshoring
No commonly accepted definition of offshoring currently exists, and the term has been used in the literature on the subject to include a wide range of business activities. The services that companies produce offshore may be used to supply imports to the U.S. market or to supply foreign markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much attention has focused on the topic of "offshoring" of information technology (IT) and other services to lower-wage locations abroad. "Offshoring" of services generally refers to an organization's purchase from other countries of services that it previously produced or purchased domestically, such as software programming or telephone call centers. GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature of offshoring activities and the factors that encourage offshoring, (2) discuss what U.S. government data show about the extent of this practice by the private sector and federal and state governments, and (3) discuss available data on the potential effects of services offshoring on the U.S. economy.
What GAO Found
No commonly accepted definition of "offshoring" exists, and the term has been used to include various international trade and foreign investment activities. Services that U.S.-based organizations purchase from abroad are considered imports. They may also be linked to U.S. firms' investments overseas--for example, U.S. firms may invest in overseas affiliates as a replacement for, or as an alternative to, domestic production. In recent years, services offshoring has been facilitated by factors, such as the Internet, infrastructure growth in developing countries, and decreasing data transmission costs. Organizations' decisions to offshore services are influenced by potential benefits such as the availability of cheaper skilled labor and access to foreign markets, and by risks, such as geopolitical issues and infrastructure instability in countries that supply the services. U.S. government data provide some insight into the extent of services offshoring by the private sector, but they do not provide a complete picture of the business transactions that the term offshoring can encompass. Department of Commerce data show that private sector imports of some services are growing. For example, imports of business, professional, and technical services increased by 76.8 percent from $21.2 billion in 1997 to $37.5 billion in 2002. From another perspective, Commerce's data also show that in 2002 U.S. investments in developing countries that supply offshore services were small compared to those in developed countries and that most services produced abroad are sold primarily to non-U.S. markets. Regarding public sector offshoring, the total dollar value of the federal government's offshore services contracts increased from 1999 through 2003, but the trend in the dollar value shows little change relative to all federal services contracts. No comprehensive data or studies show the extent of services offshoring by state governments. Government data provide limited information about the effects of services offshoring on U.S. employment levels and the U.S. economy. The Department of Labor's Mass Layoff Survey data show that layoffs attributable to overseas relocation represent a small fraction of overall total mass layoffs. However, the survey identifies only a portion of total layoffs because the survey does not cover establishments with fewer than 50 employees. Other government data show greater than average job declines since 2001 in occupations and industries commonly associated with offshoring, but other factors, such as the recent recession, may contribute to these declines. Some private researchers predict that offshoring may eliminate 100,000 to 500,000 IT jobs within the next few years, while others note that offshoring can also generate benefits, such as lower prices, productivity improvements, and overall economic growth. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-66 | gao_T-AIMD-96-66_0 | In our most recent work, we used a long-term economic growth model to simulate three of the many possible fiscal paths through the year 2025: a “no action” path that assumed the continuation of fiscal policies in effect at the end of fiscal year 1994; a “muddling through” path that assumed annual deficits of approximately 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); and a path that reaches balance in 2002 and sustains it. Spending on interest on our national debt also rises as annual deficits and accumulated public debt expand. Our 1995 simulations also confirm the long-term economic and fiscal benefits of deficit reduction. This means that Americans could enjoy a higher standard of living than they might otherwise experience. Reaching and sustaining balance would also shrink the share of federal spending required to pay interest costs, thereby reducing the long-term programmatic sacrifice necessary to attain deficit reduction targets. Dealing With the Deficit Drivers
The extent to which deficit reduction affects spending on fast-growing programs also matters. Further, our simulations show that even if a balanced budget is achieved early in the next century, deficits would reappear if we fail to contain future growth in health, interest, and social security costs. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would repeat our view that current policy is unsustainable. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on the budget deficit and long-term economic growth.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its long-term simulations show that unless the budget deficit is reduced or eliminated, economic growth, personal incomes, national investment, and the standard of living will be sharply reduced; (2) the nation's present fiscal policy is unsustainable in the long term; (3) reaching and sustaining a balanced budget would reduce federal spending on interest, a fast-growing segment of federal spending; (4) reductions in spending on fast-growing health, social security, and interest costs would be most beneficial and would have the most sustained effects; and (5) foreign governments' deficit reduction efforts have been painful but have provided significant fiscal benefits. |
gao_GGD-97-4 | gao_GGD-97-4_0 | Scope and Methodology
To meet our first objective, we reviewed reports on two banks that failed during the second year of the MLR mandate and two banks that failed during the first year of the mandate but whose losses were not recognized until the second year. The staff engage in a range of activities, including criminal investigations, financial audits, and audits of the economy and efficiency of agency operations. In July 1995, we issued our first report on the MLR process, as required by section 38(k). In particular, the reports found that the banks, primarily during the 1980s, engaged in unsafe and unsound practices, such as rapid growth, significant concentrations in real estate loans, inadequate lending practices, and violations of laws and regulations. The reports also identified various shortcomings in bank regulatory practices; for example, the reports on MNB and The Bank of Hartford cited OCC and FDIC for not ensuring that the banks complied with existing enforcement actions, and the Pioneer Bank report cited the Federal Reserve for not taking more aggressive enforcement actions to correct identified deficiencies. Conclusions
The four MLR reports we reviewed found that the banks failed for similar reasons. Our review of the MNB report verified its major findings. As currently structured, there are reasons to question the cost-effectiveness of the MLR process, such as the limited basis it provides for making recommendations to improve bank supervision and the administrative burden and expenditures that the requirement places on the IG offices. We are sending copies of this report to the Inspectors General for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Department of the Treasury, and other interested parties. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the compliance of the Inspectors General (IG) offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Department of the Treasury with section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1991, focusing on: (1) the findings of the material loss review (MLR) reports initiated between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995; (2) recommendations to improve bank supervisory practices; and (3) the economy and efficiency of the MLR process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Treasury IG issued a total of four MLR reports on banks that failed or whose losses were recognized during the second year of the MLR mandate; (2) these reports noted that the four banks failed for similar reasons, including rapid growth, excessive loan concentrations in the commercial real estate industry, poor internal controls, and violations of laws and regulations; (3) in three of the four cases, bank regulators did not take aggressive enforcement actions to correct identified safety and soundness deficiencies or to ensure that troubled banks complied with existing enforcement actions; (4) the relatively small number of reports issued in the first 2 years of the mandate did not provide a sufficient basis to reach overall conclusions about the quality of bank supervisory practices; and (5) there are reasons to question the cost-effectiveness of the MLR process, including the fact that certain MLR requirements are relatively inflexible and divert IG staff and resources from broader reviews of the quality of bank supervision. |
gao_GAO-02-671T | gao_GAO-02-671T_0 | The Fund’s Capital Ratio Exceeds 3 Percent
The economic value of the Fund consists of current capital resources and the net present value of future cash flows. Thus we arrived at an estimated economic value of $15.8 billion and a capital ratio of 3.20 percent. According to our estimates, worse-than-expected loan performance that could be brought on by moderately severe economic conditions would not have caused the estimated value of the fund at the end of fiscal year 1999 to decline by more than 2 percent of insurance-in-force. Once the scenarios are specified, it would be appropriate to calculate the economic value of the Fund or the capital ratio under the scenarios. It recognizes that FHA faces two principal risks: credit risk and operational risk. By establishing a 1 percent “minimum basic capital ratio,” the act recognizes the unknown risk, such as operational risk, the Fund faces. By defining the level of risk that the Fund must withstand, Section 226 will clarify what is meant by actuarial soundness and help FHA manage the Fund to achieve that goal. Related GAO Products
Mortgage Financing: Actuarial Soundness of the Federal Housing Administration’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (GAO-01-527T, Mar. | What GAO Found
The Housing Affordability for America Act of 2002 establishes risk-based capital requirements for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Through the fund, FHA operates a single-family insurance program that helps millions of Americans buy homes. The Fund's estimated value rose dramatically in 1999, prompting proposals to spend current resources or reduce net cash flows into the Fund. The value of the Fund at the end of fiscal year 1999 was $15.8 billion. This capital ratio of 3.20 percent of the unamortized insurance-in-force exceeded the minimum required capital ratio of two percent. A two-percent capital ratio appears sufficient to withstand moderately severe economic downturns that could lead to worse-than-expected loan performance. Determining an appropriate capital ratio depends on the level of risk Congress wishes the Fund to withstand. FHA faces the failure of borrowers to perform, or credit risk, and the risk of managerial shortcomings, or operational risk. By defining the risk that the Fund must withstand, the act will define actuarial soundness and help FHA manage the Fund. |
gao_GAO-07-20 | gao_GAO-07-20_0 | Background
Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly relied on private sector contractors to provide a range of services, including management and information technology support. For example, DOD’s obligations on service contracts rose from $82.3 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 2005 (see table 1). DOD committed 20 percent of its total service obligations in fiscal year 2005 for professional, administrative, and management support contracts. Managing Service Acquisition Requires Both a Strategic and a Transactional Focus
Several key factors are necessary to improve DOD’s service acquisition outcomes—that is, obtaining the right service, at the right price, in the right manner. Success factors to achieve these goals can be defined at both the strategic and the transactional level, as shown in figure 1. The strategic level is where the enterprise sets the direction or vision for what it needs, captures the knowledge to enable more informed management decisions, ensures deparmentwide goals and objectives are achieved, determines how to go about meeting those needs, and assesses the resources it has to achieve desired outcomes. The strategic level also sets the context for the transactional level, where the focus is on making sound decisions on individual transactions. Several factors are needed to implement a strategic approach, including (1) strong leadership to define and articulate a corporate vision, including specific goals and outcomes; (2) results-oriented communication and metrics; (3) defined responsibilities and associated support structures; and (4) increased knowledge and focus on spending data and trends. Key factors at this transactional level include (1) clearly defined and valid requirements; (2) appropriate business arrangements; and (3) effective contractor management and oversight. See figure 3 for key factors for effectively managing service acquisitions at the transaction level. DOD Service Acquisition Approach Does Not Fully Address Key Elements at the Strategic or Transactional Levels
DOD and the military departments have not yet fully addressed the key elements for managing service acquisition at a strategic or a transactional level. Also, the reviews have not positioned DOD to regularly identify opportunities to leverage buying power. The current transactional- level approach does not always take the necessary steps to ensure customer needs are translated into well-defined contract requirements or that post-contract award activities result in expected outcomes. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six actions: establish a normative position of how and where service acquisition dollars are currently and will be spent (including volume, type, and trends); determine areas of specific risk that are inherent in acquiring services and that should be managed with greater attention (including those areas considered sensitive or undesirable in terms of quantity or performance); on the basis of the above, clearly identify and communicate what service acquisition management improvements are necessary and the goals and timelines for completion; ensure that decisions on individual transactions are consistent with DOD’s strategic goals and objectives; ensure that requirements for individual service transactions are based on input from key stakeholders; and provide a capability to determine whether service acquisitions are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance objectives. To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) approach, including its current management structure, exhibited these characteristics, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and policy memoranda, including those that established its current management structure and review processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) obligations for service contracts rose from $82.3 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 2005. DOD is becoming increasingly more reliant on the private sector to provide a wide range of services, including those for critical information technology and mission support. DOD must maximize its return on investment and provide the warfighter with needed capabilities and support at the best value for the taxpayer. GAO examined DOD's approach to managing services in order to (1) identify the key factors DOD should emphasize to improve its management of services and (2) assess the extent to which DOD's current approach exhibited these factors.
What GAO Found
Several key factors are necessary to improve DOD's service acquisition outcomes--that is, obtaining the right service, at the right price, in the right manner. These factors can be found at both the strategic and the transactional levels and should be used together as a comprehensive, but tailored approach to managing service acquisition outcomes. At the strategic level, key success factors include (1) strong leadership that defines a corporate vision and normative goals; (2) sustained, results-oriented communication and metrics; (3) defined responsibilities and associated support structures; and (4) increased knowledge and focus on spending and data trends. The strategic level also sets the context for the transactional level, where the focus is on making sound decisions on individual transactions. Success factors at this level include having (1) valid and well-defined requirements; (2) properly structured business arrangements; and (3) proactively managed outcomes. DOD's current approach to managing service acquisition has tended to be reactive and has not fully addressed the key factors for success at either the strategic or transactional level. At the strategic level, DOD has yet to set the direction or vision for what it needs, determine how to go about meeting those needs, capture the knowledge to enable more informed decisions, or assess the resources it has to ensure departmentwide goals and objectives are achieved. For example, despite implementing a review structure aimed at increasing insight into service transactions, DOD is not able to determine which or how many transactions have actually been reviewed. The military departments, while having some increased visibility, have only reviewed proposed acquisitions accounting for less than 3 percent of dollars obligated for services in fiscal year 2005 and are in a poor position to regularly identify opportunities to leverage buying power or otherwise change existing practices. Actions at the transactional level continue to focus primarily on awarding contracts and do not always ensure that user needs are translated into well-defined requirements or that post-contract award activities result in expected performance. |
gao_GAO-06-401 | gao_GAO-06-401_0 | Few claims are expected to be submitted during the early years of a long- term care insurance policy. Because the average age of enrollees in the individual market is higher than the average age of enrollees in the federal program, the rate of claim submissions is likely to peak earlier in the individual market, after 15 to 25 years. Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program
The federal government began offering group long-term care insurance benefits in 2002 for federal employees, retirees, and certain other people. Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program Offered Benefits Comparable to Other Products, Usually at Lower Premiums
The federal program offered benefits that were similar to those of other long-term care insurance products we reviewed and usually offered lower premiums for comparable benefits in individual products. However, despite the broader range of options available in the other products, most enrollees in the federal program and in individual and group products chose similar daily benefit amounts, elimination periods, and benefit periods. Overall, annual premiums in the federal program averaged across three benefit plan designs were lower for both single people and married couples who were both the same age compared with similar individual products sold on March 31, 2005. Federal Program Participation Was Comparable to Other Group Products, while Federal Enrollees Were Younger Than Enrollees in Individual Products and Older Than Enrollees in Group Products
The employee participation rate in the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program for active federal civilian employees was 5 percent, comparable to the industry average in the group market, but overall enrollment was lower than the expectations established by Partners. The average age was 54 for enrollees in CalPERS. During its first 3 years, the federal program paid 39 percent of what it initially expected to pay for claims per enrollee; the number of claims paid per enrollee also was lower than initial expectations. It is still too early to determine whether the early claims experience will continue or whether adjustments to the expected claims experience or premiums are indicated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Long-Term Care Security Act required the federal government to offer long-term care insurance to its employees, their families, and others. The act also required GAO to conduct a study of the competitiveness of the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program, which began in 2002, compared with individual and group products generally available in the private market. GAO compared the federal program's benefits, premiums, enrollment rates, and enrollee characteristics with other products over a 3-year period. GAO also compared the federal program's early claims experience with initial expectations.
What GAO Found
Program offered benefits similar to those of other long-term care insurance products GAO reviewed. Most enrollees in the federal program and in individual and group products chose similar benefit amounts, elimination or waiting periods, and benefit periods. The federal program usually offered lower premiums than individual products for comparable benefits. Overall, annual premiums for the federal program averaged across three benefit plan designs were 46 percent lower for single people and 19 percent lower for married couples who were both the same age in comparison with similar individual products sold on March 31, 2005. The participation rate in the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program for active federal civilian employees--5 percent--was comparable to the industry average in the group market, although enrollment in the federal program was lower than initially expected. The average age of all enrollees in the federal program was younger than the average age of enrollees in individual products and older than the average age of enrollees in group products. The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program paid 39 percent of what it initially projected to pay for claims per enrollee. The number of claims paid per enrollee was also lower than initial projections. While the early claims experience was below expectations, it is still too early to determine whether this trend will continue or whether adjustments to the projected claims experience or premiums are indicated, because most claims are not expected to be submitted for many years. |
gao_GAO-13-237 | gao_GAO-13-237_0 | the advertisements. Sponsorship Identification Requirements Are Manageable, but FCC Guidance Could Be Clarified
As previously stated, sponsorship identification statutes and regulations require broadcasters and cablecasters to identify commercial content— usually an advertisement, an embedded advertisement, or a video news release (VNR) that has been broadcast in exchange for money or payment in-kind. FCC does not require an announcement when an obvious connection exists between the content and sponsor, such as with a standard commercial advertisement. In addition, whenever an individual, such as a deejay, receives money or payment in-kind for airing specific content or favorably discussing a specific product a sponsorship announcement must be made. Reporting Political Advertising Financing
In addition to monitoring compliance with these disclaimer requirements, FEC serves as a repository for campaign finance data for candidates for political office. Once payments for electioneering communications, including television or radio advertisements, exceeds $10,000 in any calendar year, those responsible for them must report payments and the sources of funds used to FEC within 24 hours of each broadcast.things, identify: Each report must, among other the person or organization that made the payments, including their principal place of business; any person sharing or exercising direction or control over the activities of the person who made the payments; the amount of each payment in excess of $200, the payment dates, and the payee; all candidates referred to in the advertisements and the elections in which they are candidates; and the name and address of each person who donated $1,000 or more since the first day of the preceding calendar year to those responsible for the advertisement. However, some broadcasters indicated that FCC could clarify how the guidance applies in specific situations, such as when a VNR or product is used but the broadcaster was not paid. FCC and FEC Follow Standard Procedures When Addressing All Complaints, but FCC Does Not Update Broadcasters Named in the Complaint
FCC Investigation and Enforcement Process
FCC’s investigation and enforcement process generally begins with a complaint to the agency that will be reviewed by the CGB and may be forwarded to the Enforcement Bureau if the complaint is complete. As shown in table 2, according to FCC, it opened 369 sponsorship identification cases from the beginning of 2000 through 2011, representing just over 1 percent of the total cases the Investigation and Hearings Division opened during that time period. Since 2000, FCC has issued enforcement actions in 22 sponsorship identification cases with varying types of violations and enforcement actions. However, broadcasters we spoke with confirmed that FCC does not inform them of the status of investigations, and some indicated they currently do not know the status of several investigations. They reported the lack of information about cases and FCC decisions creates uncertainty about the propriety of their past actions. As a result, broadcasters might not have sufficient information to determine whether they should modify their practices. This could result in stations unnecessarily editing content because of unwritten regulatory policy or what they assume the policy to be. According to FCC officials, they do not communicate with the broadcaster named in the complaint because, among other reasons, FCC has no legal obligation to do so. FCC sponsorship identification investigations can be lengthy, according to FCC data, taking from 10 months to over 5 years to complete. FEC receives most disclaimer complaints from the public. From 2000 through May 15, 2012, FEC opened 301 cases based on complaints alleging violations of disclaimer statement requirements. Unlike FCC, FEC provides status updates to those involved in investigations and issues reports explaining investigation findings. Also unlike FCC, FEC issues reports explaining its resolution of enforcement cases, including case dismissals. These reports can clarify acceptable and unacceptable practices for the regulated community. In cases where a letter of inquiry has been sent, the broadcaster or cablecaster must fulfill its responsibility and provide FCC with the requested information. Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman of the FCC take the following three actions:
To provide clarity on how sponsorship identification requirements apply to activities not directly addressed by FCC’s current guidance, such as the use of video news releases, and to update its guidance to reflect current technologies and recent FCC decisions about video news releases, FCC should initiate a process to update its sponsorship identification guidance and consider providing additional examples relevant to more modern practices. Overall, FCC indicated that it will consider our recommendations and how to address the concerns discussed in our report. Both FCC and FEC provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Chair of the Federal Election Commission. Specifically, we (1) describe the sponsorship identification requirements and guidance for commercial and political content, the federal election disclaimer requirements, as well as stakeholders’ views of these requirements and guidance and (2) assess how and to what extent FCC and FEC address sponsorship complaints through each agency’s enforcement process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FCC is responsible for ensuring that the public knows when and by whom it is being persuaded. Requirements direct broadcasters to disclose when a group or individual has paid to broadcast commercial or political programming. Political advertising must also comply with requirements overseen by the FEC. Recognition of sponsored programming has become increasingly difficult because of new technologies and increased access to sponsored programming such as video news releases. GAO (1) describes requirements for sponsorship identification and federal election disclaimers and stakeholders' views of the requirements and (2) assesses how and to what extent FCC and FEC address complaints. To conduct the work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, guidance, and enforcement procedures, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders about enforcement processes and actions.
What GAO Found
Sponsorship identification statutes and regulations, overseen by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), require broadcasters to identify commercial content--usually an advertisement, an embedded advertisement, or a video news release--that has been broadcast in exchange for payment or other consideration. A written or verbal sponsorship announcement must be made at least once during any sponsored commercial content except when the sponsor is obvious. For content considered political or that discusses a controversial issue, broadcasters must follow all requirements for commercial content and additional requirements, such as identifying officials associated with the entity paying for an advertisement. In addition, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) enforces federal election law that requires all political communications for a federal election, including television and radio advertisements, to include a disclaimer statement. FEC also oversees requirements to report campaign funding and expenditures, including funding for political advertising. FCC has guidance that helps broadcasters determine when a sponsorship announcement is needed, such as when a deejay receives a payment for airing specific content. While broadcasters consider this guidance useful, it addresses older technology that in some cases is no longer used. Furthermore, some broadcasters indicated that it would be helpful for FCC to clarify how the guidance applies in some situations, such as when a video news release or product is used during programming.
According to FCC, it opened 369 sponsorship identification cases representing just over 1 percent of the Investigations and Hearings Division's total cases opened from the beginning of 2000 through 2011. In 22 of these cases, FCC issued enforcement actions with varying types of violations and enforcement actions. While FCC follows standard procedures when addressing complaints, it does not inform the broadcaster named in the complaint of the outcome of the investigation in many cases. Most broadcasters we spoke with confirmed that FCC does not inform them of the status of investigations, and some indicated they currently do not know the status of several investigations. According to FCC, it does not communicate status with broadcasters named in complaints because, among other reasons, it has no legal obligation to do so. Broadcasters reported the lack of information about cases and FCC decisions creates uncertainty about the propriety of their past actions. As a result broadcasters might not have sufficient information to determine whether they should modify their practices. This can result in stations' editing content because of unwritten regulatory policy or what they assume the policy to be. Moreover, these investigations can be lengthy, taking from 10 months to over 5 years to complete when an enforcement action is involved. From 2000 through May 2012, FEC opened 301 cases based on complaints alleging violations of political advertisement disclaimer requirements. FEC assessed civil penalties in 29 cases, 7 of which were related to television or radio advertisement disclaimers. Unlike FCC, FEC provides status updates to those involved in investigations and issues reports explaining investigation findings. FEC also issues reports explaining case dismissals. These reports can clarify acceptable and unacceptable practices for the regulated community.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should, among other things, update its sponsorship identification guidance and consider providing additional examples relevant to more modern issues and communicate the resolution of an investigation to the target of the investigation when a letter of inquiry has been sent, and develop goals for resolving all sponsorship identification cases within a specified time frame. GAO provided FCC and FEC with a draft of this report. FCC indicated it will consider the recommended actions and how to address the concerns discussed in the report. Both FCC and FEC provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-11-728 | gao_GAO-11-728_0 | MCC Compacts in Cape Verde and Honduras
The Cape Verde and Honduras compacts were among the first countries that MCC selected as eligible for assistance and the first to reach the end of the 5-year implementation period. Performance Targets and Sustainability Issues
MCC met some key original targets and many of its final targets for the Cape Verde and Honduras compacts. Additionally, MCC took steps to provide for the sustainability of the projects, but the governments of both Cape Verde and Honduras may have difficulty maintaining the infrastructure projects in the long term due to the lack of funding, among other challenges. Cape Verde: MCC Altered the Scope of Its Three Projects, Meeting Some Key Original Targets and Many Final Targets
MCC rescoped each of the three projects under the Cape Verde compact, reducing some key targets. MCC met a key original target for the Honduras compact, and met or exceeded most of its final targets by the compact’s end. MCC Took Steps to Enhance Project Sustainability, but Cape Verde and Honduras Face Long-Term Challenges in Maintaining Infrastructure Projects
MCC took steps to provide for the sustainability of compact projects, but certain activities in Cape Verde and Honduras face challenges to long- term sustainability. MCC included privatization of port operations as a condition of the compact. Watershed management and agricultural support project. Transportation project. However, updated ERRs were not always well-documented or linked to revised targets. MCC Impact Evaluations Are Ongoing, and MCC Has Taken Steps to Revise Designs in Response to Implementation Challenges and Delays
Cape Verde. As a result, MCC added a supplemental design to enhance the methodology. Updated ERR analyses were not well-documented or supported for projects constituting almost 50 percent of compact funds in Cape Verde and more than 65 percent of compact funds in Honduras. However, documentation for the underlying quantitative analysis supporting the updated ERR is not available. However, the updated ERR analysis does not reflect the values or numerical ranges of key updated targets in the monitoring and evaluation plan. For example, the original ERR analysis for the farmer training and development activity of the rural development project is based on 14,400 hectares of high-value crops at the end of the compact. MCC Has Not Issued Guidance for Re- estimating ERRs Following Compact Completion but, If Estimated, ERRs Are Likely to Be Lower Than Predicted
MCC has not developed guidance for re-estimating project ERRs at compact completion or in subsequent years. To enhance the accuracy of MCC’s ERR projections, ensure, during compact implementation, that updated ERR analyses are well-documented and supported and that key revised indicators and targets are reflected in updated ERR analyses; and develop guidance for re-estimating ERRs at compact completion and during the long-term period when compact benefits are realized to ensure that updated estimates reflect the most recent and reliable information available for MCC’s compact investments and outcomes. We specifically focused on the port activity and roads and bridges activity in Cape Verde, and the CA-5 highway and secondary roads activities in Honduras. To assess the extent to which MCC achieved expected performance targets and longer-term sustainability for compacts in Cape Verde and Honduras, we analyzed MCC documents, interviewed MCC officials and stakeholders, and observed project results in both countries. To examine the extent to which MCC assessed progress toward the compacts’ goals of income growth and poverty reduction, we reviewed MCC’s monitoring and evaluation guidance, Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary Analysis, three versions of the monitoring and evaluation plans for each country, monitoring information MCC and MCA collected, data quality reviews, final reports prepared by contractors and grantees, documents related to impact evaluation contracts, impact evaluation design reports, final impact evaluations, and original and revised economic rate of return (ERR) analyses. Activities include upgrading and expanding a major port and rehabilitating five roads and constructing four bridges. Phase 1. Phase 2. Inaccurate early planning of the port activity led to cost increases and implementation delays. Uncertainty over Honduras government funding for road maintenance calls into question the likely sustainability of the MCC-funded roads. Although MCC officials worked with the Honduras government to increase its funding of road maintenance from a precompact amount of $37 million in 2005 to $64 million in 2010, this funding is for maintenance of all roads on the official Honduran road network and not specifically for compact- funded roads. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress and Challenges with Compacts in Africa. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established in 2004 to help developing countries reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth through multiyear compact agreements. As of June 2011, MCC had signed compacts with 23 countries totaling approximately $8.2 billion in assistance. MCC asks countries to develop compacts with a focus on results and effective monitoring and evaluation. MCC sets targets, which may be revised, to measure the compact results. In late 2010, the Cape Verde and Honduras compacts reached the end of the 5-year implementation period. This report, prepared in response to a congressional mandate to review compact results, examines the extent to which MCC has (1) achieved performance targets and sustainability for projects in Cape Verde and Honduras and (2) assessed progress toward the goal of income growth and poverty reduction. GAO analyzed MCC documents and interviewed MCC officials and stakeholders in Washington, D.C., Cape Verde, and Honduras.
What GAO Found
In its first two completed compacts, Cape Verde and Honduras, MCC met some key original targets and many final targets, but the sustainability of some activities is uncertain. In Cape Verde, MCC altered the scope of its three projects, meeting some key original targets and many final targets by the compact's end. For example, an activity to upgrade and expand a major port in Cape Verde, which represented almost 50 percent of the $110.1 million compact at signature, faced inaccurate early planning assumptions and increased costs. As a result, MCC split the port activity into two phases, funding the completion of the first phase--which covered about one-third of total expected costs for the port activity. In Honduras, MCC met a key original target and most final targets by the end of the $205 million compact. For example, MCC constructed approximately half of the planned highway and all rescoped secondary roads. In addition, several compact activities in Cape Verde and Honduras face challenges to long-term sustainability. Although MCC took steps to provide for sustainability, the governments of both Cape Verde and Honduras may have difficulty maintaining the infrastructure projects in the long term due to lack of funding, among other challenges. For example, MCC included privatization of port operations and road maintenance funding as conditions of the Cape Verde compact. However, the government has had difficulty meeting these requirements, calling into question the long-term sustainability of some projects. In Honduras, both uncertain government funding for road maintenance and design decisions on construction projects may jeopardize the sustainability of MCC-funded roads. MCC impact evaluations for the Cape Verde and Honduras compacts are ongoing but delayed, and updated economic rate of return (ERR) analyses of the largest compact projects have not been well documented or linked to revised targets. MCC has taken steps to modify impact evaluation designs in response to implementation challenges and delays. For example, challenges in implementing the original evaluation design for the farmer training and development activity in Honduras led MCC to enhance the methodology by adding a supplemental design. Furthermore, updated ERR analyses of projects representing over 50 percent of compact funds have not been well documented or supported. For example, MCC updated its ERR analysis for the Honduras transportation project, but documentation for the underlying quantitative analysis supporting the updated ERR is not available. Additionally, ERR analyses updated in response to rescoping compact activities were not consistently linked to revised targets and indicators. For example, MCC updated the ERR analysis for the watershed management and agricultural support project in Cape Verde, but the analysis does not reflect the values and numerical ranges of key revised targets. In addition, although original ERRs are estimated for a 20-year period, MCC has not developed guidance for updating ERRs following compact completion. Re-estimated end-of-compact ERRs will likely be lower than predicted at compact signature.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that MCC (1) work with countries to make decisions that reduce long-term maintenance needs, (2) ensure updated economic analyses are documented and consistent with monitoring targets, and (3) develop guidance for updating economic analyses following compact completion. MCC agreed with the intent of all three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-143 | gao_GAO-02-143_0 | Background
OPAP was established by the Secretary of State following the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. OPAP made five additional recommendations regarding the size and location of overseas posts: Rightsize the U.S. overseas presence; reduce the size of some posts, close others, reallocate staff and resources, and establish new posts where needed to enhance the American presence where the bilateral relationship has become more important. Form a new Interagency Overseas Presence Committee—a permanent committee to regularly adjust U.S. presence to U.S. goals and interests. Adopt explicit criteria to guide size and location decisions. OPAP also recommended that some administrative services be performed at regional centers or in the United States—actions that would lessen the need for administrative staff at some posts, thereby reducing security vulnerabilities. In a March 2000 report to the Congress, the Department of State said that the interagency committee planned to complete pilot studies by June 2000 to assess staffing levels, to recommend necessary changes at the study posts, and to develop decision criteria applicable to subsequent rightsizing reviews to be conducted at all overseas posts over a 5-year period. Pilot studies were conducted at six embassies— Amman, Jordan; Bangkok, Thailand; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Paris, France; and Tbilisi, Georgia, from March to May 2000. The teams spent a few days at each post. Results of the Pilot Studies
The interagency committee’s June 2000 report to the Under Secretary of State summarizing results of the pilot studies concluded that it was impractical to develop a staffing methodology that would be applicable to all posts, as OPAP had recommended, because no two posts are sufficiently similar. State’s August 2001 Final Report on Implementing the Recommendations of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel agreed with the recommendations of OPAP to rightsize the overseas presence, rather than with the positions taken in the interagency committee’s report on the pilot studies. | What GAO Found
The Department of State is leading an interagency assessment of staffing needs in U.S. embassies and consulates to improve mission effectiveness and reduce security vulnerabilities and costs. This process, called "rightsizing," was begun in response to the recommendations of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. In the aftermath of the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, the Panel determined that overseas staffing levels had not been adjusted to reflect changing missions and requirements; thus, some embassies and consulates were overstaffed, and others were understaffed. The Panel recommended a rightsizing strategy to improve security by reducing the number of embassy staff at risk. The Panel also recommended the establishment of a permanent committee to regularly adjust the U.S. presence, and the adoption of explicit criteria to guide decisions on the size and location of posts. A State-led interagency committee conducted pilot studies at six embassies in 2000 to (1) develop a methodology for assessing staffing at embassies and consulates during the next five years and (2) recommend adjustments to staffing levels at the embassies studied. The interagency committee formed teams that visited U.S. embassies in Amman, Jordan; Bangkok, Thailand; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Paris, France; and Tbilisi, Georgia. The pilot studies did not result in a staffing methodology at all embassies and consulates, as had been anticipated. The interagency committee said that it was impractical to develop explicit criteria for staffing levels at all posts because each post has unique characteristics and requirements. Contrary to the Panel's recommendations, the committee's report also questioned the need for rightsizing and establishing a permanent committee to adjust U.S. presence. The report did recommend the relocation of the regional finance centers in France and Thailand, and it identified instances in which additional study was needed. |
gao_NSIAD-96-156 | gao_NSIAD-96-156_0 | Despite the billions of dollars invested in inventory, the Navy’s logistics system is still often unable to provide spare parts when and where needed. According to the Navy’s data, customers wait over 2.5 months, on average, to receive backordered items. Several Factors Contribute to Inefficient System
The Navy’s large inventory costs and slow customer service are the result of several factors, but the largest contributor is a slow and complex repair pipeline. Shown in figure 3 as “repair facility receiving” and “repair workshops,” these activities take an average of 73 days to complete. According to Navy officials, this is a common practice at the Navy’s repair facilities. These initiatives are the regionalization of supply management and maintenance functions, privatization and outsourcing, and logistics response time reductions. We identified four best practices in the airline industry that have the potential for use in the Navy’s system. In the past, deliveries took as long as 3 weeks. Recommendations
As part of the Navy’s current efforts to improve the logistics system’s responsiveness and reduce its complexity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, working with DLA, to develop a demonstration project to determine the extent to which the Navy can apply best practices to its logistics operations. The specific practices that should be tested are inducting parts at repair depots soon after they break, consistent with repair requirements, to prevent parts from sitting idle; reorganizing repair workshops using the cellular concept to reduce the time it takes to repair parts; using integrated supplier programs to shift the management responsibilities for consumable inventories to suppliers; using local supplier distribution centers near repair facilities for quick shipments of parts to mechanics; and expanding the use of third-party logistics services to store and distribute spare parts between the depots and end-users to improve delivery times. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Navy's aircraft logistics system, focusing on the Navy's efforts to improve and reduce the cost of the system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the best practices identified in the airline industry could improve the responsiveness of the Navy's logistics system and save millions of dollars; (2) the Navy's logistics system is complex and often does not respond quickly to customer needs; (3) the factors contributing to this situation include the lack of spare parts, slow distribution, and inefficient repair practices; (4) some customers wait as long as four months for available parts; (5) the Navy is centralizing its supply management and repair activities, outsourcing certain management functions, and analyzing the effectiveness of its repair pipeline; (6) the best practices employed by the private sector show promise for the Navy because these firms hold minimum levels of inventory, have readily accessible spare parts, and quick repair times; (7) it takes an average of 11 days to repair a broken part in the private sector, as opposed to 37 days in the Navy's repair process; (8) the private-sector average is a result of repairing items immediately after they break, using local distribution centers and integrated supplier programs, and third-party logistic providers; and (9) many of the airline industry's best practices are compatible with the Navy's logistics system. |
gao_RCED-95-25 | gao_RCED-95-25_0 | Beginning in August 1989, each of these airports had to develop an access control system plan for FAA field security officials to review and approve. Access control systems are eligible for AIP funds. Costs for Access Control Systems Greatly Exceed FAA’s Initial Estimate
Airports have installed various systems—mostly computer-controlled—to meet FAA’s four access control requirements. Airports have installed different types of equipment. FAA Could Help Ensure That Systems Are Modernized in a Cost-Effective Manner
Over the next several years, many access control systems will need to be modernized. The November 1993 survey by the Airport Consultants Council found that 21 major airports incurred costs to replace or significantly modify systems that did not operate adequately to meet FAA’s requirements. FAA and the industry have initiatives under way that provide a basis for helping to ensure that access control systems are cost-effective. FAA officials can use the detailed guidance and standards as criteria to evaluate AIP funding requests and help ensure that these funds are used only for the system components needed to meet access control requirements. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) access control systems, focusing on the: (1) cost of FAA access control systems; and (2) actions FAA could take to ensure that access control systems are cost-effective in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA greatly underestimated the costs of its access control systems, due to the installation of more expensive equipment; (2) in many airports, FAA approved the installation of equipment in areas that did not need to be secured; (3) 21 major airports had to replace or significantly modify access control systems that did not meet FAA requirements; (4) FAA officials have been unable to ensure that Airport Improvement Program funds have been used only for those system components necessary to meet FAA access control requirements; and (5) FAA could help ensure that access control systems are cost-effective by providing detailed guidance on how systems should function to meet access control requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-676 | gao_GAO-14-676_0 | For example, VA offers health care, disability compensation, educational benefits, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation services, and home loans. Veterans Experience Difficulty When Readjusting to Civilian Life but Extent Is Unknown
Readjusting Veterans May Experience a Range of Economic, Social, and Other Difficulties
Veterans we spoke to and VA officials confirmed that veterans face a variety of difficulties related to readjusting to civilian life, including financial and employment, relationships, legal difficulties, homelessness, and substance abuse. One of VA’s strategic objectives is to improve veteran wellness and economic security. VA’s strategic plan also states that the ultimate measure of its success is the veteran’s success after leaving military service. However, there is limited and incomplete data available to assess the extent to which these veterans are affected by these difficulties. Therefore, it is not known to what extent veterans are facing one or a combination of these problems when they readjust to civilian life. A Sizable Minority of Post 9-11 Veterans Have Physical and Mental Health Conditions
A sizable minority of veterans who have served since September 11, 2001, had physical or mental health conditions in the first few years of their readjustment to civilian life. According to a 2010 study, 32 percent of veterans had been diagnosed by either DOD or VA with diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissues after separating from the military, and about 27 percent had been diagnosed with diseases of the nervous system and sense organs. Other studies estimated that 10 to 12 percent of post-9/11 veterans were diagnosed with PTSD. Veterans with Certain Characteristics May Be More Likely to Experience Difficulties
Some groups of veterans may be more likely to experience readjustment difficulties or be diagnosed with a physical or mental condition than others. VA Offers an Array of Services to Readjusting Veterans, but Long-Standing Weaknesses Hinder Available Support
VA Offers a Range of Benefits and Services to Veterans Early in the Readjustment Process
VA offers assistance to servicemembers before they leave military service by informing them through outreach and education on the range of benefits and services available to them. Veterans can also work with veteran service organizations (VSO) to apply for VA benefits and services. We have reported for over 10 years, and we heard confirmations during interviews with VA officials and veterans, on the continuing challenge VA faces in processing disability compensation in a timely fashion. Electronic medical records. Medication. We recommended that VA and its partner improve its capabilities for sharing electronic information. At one site we visited, VA officials suggested there were opportunities to research ways to identify individuals who are predisposed to PTSD as well as conducting a study on reasons veterans are not using VA services. While this effort would need to be developed and coordinated with DOD, veterans at all of the sites we visited noted that having time to adjust to the idea of being a civilian and relearning what civilian life is like would be beneficial. Conclusions
As over 1 million servicemembers separate from the military over the next 6 years, many will rely upon the programs administered by VA for support during their transition. For others, however, the first few years after they leave the military will be difficult. Meanwhile, despite VA’s network of outreach efforts and the range of benefits and services it administers, many veterans continue to struggle to access support, and the agency continues to face long- standing challenges in providing benefits in a timely manner. As a result, some veterans who need support may be missed. However, until VA has a better understanding of the needs of recently-separated veterans, and which veterans may be more likely to face difficulties, it is difficult to know what steps VA should take. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take steps to better understand both the difficulties faced by readjusting veterans and the characteristics of those who may be more likely to face such difficulties, and use the results to determine how best to enhance its benefits and services to these veterans. VA also described its recent efforts and plans for improvement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine what is known about (1) the extent to which veterans experience difficulties during their readjustment to civilian life, and (2) how VA assists veterans in their readjustment, and what challenges and opportunities exist. To address these objectives, we conducted a literature search, interviewed relevant officials from VA and DOD, reviewed VA’s strategic plan, annual performance reports, and other documents, visited four locations with VA facilities, and held eight discussion groups with 45 veterans and family members. The purpose of the first phase was to identify the range and types of difficulties experienced by post-9/11 veterans in the first few years after they separated from the military. Transitioning Veterans: Improved Oversight Needed to Enhance Implementation of Transition Assistance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 6 years, over 1 million servicemembers are expected to leave the military. As was the case with past generations of veterans, the transition from military to civilian life can be challenging for post-9/11 veterans as well. Over the last several years, veterans' struggles to successfully readjust to civilian life have been the subject of numerous Congressional hearings.
Providing support and services for transitioning veterans is a key issue facing the nation. This report examines what is known about (1) the extent to which veterans experience difficulties during their readjustment to civilian life; and (2) how VA assists veterans in their readjustment, as well as what challenges and opportunities exist. GAO conducted a literature search, interviewed VA and DOD officials, and held eight nongeneralizable discussion groups with a total of 45 veterans and family members. GAO also conducted interviews with relevant officials at VA facilities in four states. GAO selected these sites based on diversity of military service branches in a local area, geography, a high concentration of veterans, and proximity to VA resources.
What GAO Found
While many veterans who served in the military after September 11, 2001, have successfully readjusted to civilian life with minimal difficulties in the first few years after they were discharged, others have experienced difficulties, according to veterans GAO heard from in discussion groups and studies GAO reviewed. These readjustment difficulties include financial and employment, relationships, legal, homelessness, and substance abuse. According to VA's strategic plan, one of its strategic objectives is to improve veteran wellness and economic security, and it states that the ultimate measure of VA's success is the veteran's success after leaving military service. However, there is limited and incomplete data to assess the extent to which veterans experience readjustment difficulties. Therefore, it is not known to what extent veterans are facing one or a combination of problems when they readjust to civilian life. There is relatively more information available on the number of veterans who had a physical or mental condition within a few years of leaving the military. For example, one 2010 study shows that 32 percent of recently-separated veterans were diagnosed by either the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with a disease or injury of the musculoskeletal system. In this and other studies reviewed by GAO, estimates for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) varied from 10 to 12 percent. According to these studies, some groups of veterans--those who had served in combat and younger veterans--were more likely than others to experience readjustment difficulties or be diagnosed with a mental health condition.
While an array of VA benefits and services are available during a veteran's first few years out of the military, GAO has identified long-standing challenges with VA's delivery and management of this support. Specifically, VA provides a wide range of services and benefits through several programs, such as education, health care, counseling, employment, home loans, and insurance. VA informs veterans of these benefits and services before they leave military service through outreach and education. However, GAO's prior work over the last decade has shown that VA has struggled for years to, among other issues, (1) provide timely access to medical appointments, (2) make timely disability compensation decisions, and (3) coordinate the transfer of medical records from DOD. GAO has made numerous prior recommendations to address these issues, and VA has taken some actions to implement them; however, some recommendations remain unaddressed, and GAO continues to monitor VA's progress. Agency officials and veterans GAO spoke with during this review suggested additional actions that VA can implement to improve its assistance for transitioning veterans. For example, a few VA staff suggested that VA conduct additional research to identify veterans who are predisposed to PTSD and better understand why some veterans do not use VA services. Veterans at all of the sites GAO visited suggested that it would be beneficial for separating servicemembers to have additional time to adjust to the idea of being a civilian and relearning what civilian life is like. Without comprehensive information on the difficulties experienced by recently-separated veterans, VA cannot assess risks to achieving its objectives and may be missing opportunities to enhance assistance to veterans by not providing needed services early in the veteran's readjustment process. GAO recommends that VA take steps to better understand the difficulties faced by readjusting veterans and use this information to determine how best to enhance its benefits and services for these veterans. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation and described its recent efforts and plans for improvement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA take steps to better understand the difficulties faced by readjusting veterans and use this information to determine how best to enhance its benefits and services for these veterans. VA concurred with GAO’s recommendation and described its recent efforts and plans for improvement. |
gao_GAO-13-53 | gao_GAO-13-53_0 | Key Efforts Present the Bureau with Both Opportunities and Risks
Research on new methods likely to result in a more cost-effective 2020 Census must be accomplished early enough in the decade to confirm their likely impact on both cost and quality and to inform timely design decisions. The use of the Internet as a response option, a potential move towards targeted address canvassing, and the possible use of administrative records to replace data collected during census field operations present the Bureau with opportunities to reduce costs while maintaining a high quality census. However, the Bureau has not developed mitigation and contingency plans for the project-level risks. Also, the Bureau has not developed cost estimates for any of its 2020 research and testing projects as required in guidance provided to project teams. For example, not all project plans identified the necessary staff resources, while other project plans failed to provide performance metrics for measuring progress and for determining the project’s final outcome. The second effort to improve the Bureau’s address and mapping database is centered on the 2020 Research and Testing Program. Specifically, each of that the Bureau’s research and testing projects has its own risk registeridentifies and prioritizes the risks associated with that project, but no risk mitigation or contingency plans have been developed for these project- level risks. Several risks appear in multiple project team risk registers, including tight time frames and accurate cost information. For example, some project teams did not fully document the types of skills needed, or perform a skills gap assessment to determine the resources needed to carry out their respective projects as required in the Bureau’s planning template (the template lays out in detail what is to be included in the deliverables). According to Bureau officials, they are working to document these skills sets, as well as any gaps. Completing this analysis is important to ensuring sufficient resources are available for conducting the research and testing projects. We also found incomplete performance metric documentation for several projects. However, the “Enhancing Demographic Analysis” team that is researching the use of administrative records to assess the accuracy of census counts at the national level did not provide any of the required performance metrics, while six teams failed to include performance metrics that could be used to monitor research and testing progress. Absent such metrics, the Bureau does not have the assurance that it will be able to avoid potential slips in the research and testing schedule, or certainty as to whether project outcomes will be adequate for making decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Acting Secretary of Commerce require the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs who oversees the Economics and Statistics Administration, as well as the Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, to take the following three actions to improve the Bureau’s Research and Testing for the 2020 Census, and thus better position the Bureau to carry out a cost-effective decennial census:
Develop risk mitigation and contingency plans for all projects to ensure that risks are adequately managed to minimize their effect on the project. Develop cost estimates for each project. The Bureau also agrees with our recommendations to ensure that performance metrics and skill sets are identified for all projects and teams. Key contributors to this report are located in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report evaluates the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) efforts to improve the cost-effectiveness of the enumeration, paying particular attention to the following three key efforts that past Bureau research has shown could result in substantial cost savings: (1) leveraging the Internet to increase self-response; (2) improving how the Bureau builds its address and mapping databases, including a possible move to targeted address canvassing, and use of private-sector geographic data; and (3) using administrative records, such as tax data, to reduce nonresponse follow-up costs. To meet our objectives of identifying what opportunities and risks, if any, the Bureau might need to consider for these efforts going forward, and examining to what extent these three efforts are on track with respect to scheduling, resources, and other performance metrics, we reviewed Bureau documents pertaining to the early planning of the 2020 Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's prior work has shown that it will be important for the Bureau to reexamine the design of the census in order to ensure a cost effective census in 2020. As requested, this report evaluates the Bureau's efforts to improve the cost-effectiveness of the enumeration, paying particular attention to the following three key efforts: (1) leveraging the Internet to increase self-response; (2) improving how the Bureau builds its address and mapping databases, including a possible move to targeted address canvassing, and use of private-sector geographic data; (3) and using administrative records to reduce nonresponse follow-up costs. This report (1) identifies what opportunities and risks, if any, the Bureau might need to consider for these efforts going forward and (2) examines to what extent these three efforts are on track with respect to scheduling, resources, and other performance metrics. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed Bureau documents and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
According to U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) officials, to inform timely design decisions, research on new methods to improve the cost effectiveness of the 2020 Census must be accomplished early enough in the decade to confirm their likely impact on both cost and quality. Three key efforts--(1) the use of the Internet as a response option, (2) a potential move towards targeted address canvassing, and (3) the possible use of administrative records to replace data collected during census field operations--present the Bureau with potential opportunities to reduce costs while maintaining quality. The Bureau's 2020 Research and Testing Program has 14 fiscal year 2012 projects focused on informing design decisions related to the three key efforts. Bureau officials are also aware that the changes they are testing come with many risks, and for each project the Bureau has identified a number of risks and prioritized them from high to low. However, the Bureau has not developed mitigation or contingency plans for these project risks. For example, there are several risks, including tight time frames and accurate cost information, without mitigation and contingency plans. Additionally, GAO found that the Bureau had not developed cost estimates for any of its 2020 research and testing projects as required in guidance provided to project teams. Unreliable cost estimates was one of the reasons the 2010 Census was placed on GAO's high-risk list. Without timely cost estimates, it will be difficult for the Bureau to ensure that resources are adequate to support the research and testing program.
The Bureau met its internal deadline for submitting each of its 14 research project's plans and charters. However, not all the project plans were complete. For example, some project teams did not fully document the types of skills needed or perform a skills gap assessment to determine the resources needed to carry out their respective projects as required in the Bureau's planning template. According to Bureau officials, they are working to document these skills sets, as well as any gaps in skills. Completing this analysis is important to ensuring sufficient resources are available for conducting the research and testing projects. Additionally, performance metric documentation for several projects was incomplete. According to Bureau guidance, project teams were to provide performance metrics for measuring progress and for determining the project's final outcome. However, one team did not provide either of these required performance metrics, while six other teams did not include performance metrics that could be used to monitor research and testing progress. Absent these metrics, the Bureau does not have the assurance that it will be able to avoid potential schedule slips or the certainty as to whether project outcomes will be adequate for making decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Acting Census Director take a number of actions to improve the Bureau's research and testing for the 2020 Census, such as developing risk mitigation plans, contingency plans and cost estimates for each project, and performance metrics and skill sets for those projects that do not have them. The Department of Commerce concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations and provided one clarification, which was included in the final report. Also, the Bureau in its comments noted that it has begun to address GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-55 | gao_HEHS-96-55_0 | I for a detailed description). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand the issues involved, Senator William V. Roth, Jr., asked us to (1) describe the concerns about the fairness of the benefits received by job-holding women and their families in retirement, (2) discuss how economic and demographic trends might affect the benefits of such people in the future, and (3) discuss past proposals to address these concerns. Because women tend to have lower lifetime earnings and longer life expectancies than men, they are more likely than men to qualify for spousal and survivor benefits and to be affected by the dual entitlement limitation. The surviving member of a one-earner couple receives about 67 percent of the couple’s total monthly benefit when both were alive. The distinction is important because Social Security benefits are based on lifetime earnings. These costs do not reflect the potentially large administrative burden on SSA that enactment of either of these proposals would require. Under the proposal, for each year a couple is married, the annual covered earnings of the husband and wife would be combined and one-half of this total would be credited to each spouse’s Social Security earnings record. Married individuals would have larger benefits than other married individuals with lower lifetime earnings. Social Security is gender neutral. Because (1) the survivor of a one-earner couple receives approximately two-thirds of the couple’s total benefits when both husband and wife were alive, (2) the survivor of a two-earner couple can receive a smaller portion, as low as one-half, and (3) two-earner couples have smaller total benefits to begin with than one-earner couples with the same total lifetime earnings, we anticipate that there could be increased demands that benefits for survivors of like-earning couples be equalized. Earnings Sharing and the Double-Decker Plan
Under earnings sharing, homemakers would become eligible to receive retired worker and disabled worker benefits and their dependents would be insured for survivor benefits because earnings sharing would provide the homemakers with an earnings history and a benefit eligibility of their own. 9 Supplement. “Women’s Employment and the Social Security System.” Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 10-24. 2-12. 56-67. Congressional Symposium on Women and Retirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether married women and widows were being treated fairly under the Social Security system, focusing on: (1) how economic and demographic trends may affect women's future benefits; and (2) past proposals that have addressed these concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Social Security Act is gender neutral when it comes to awarding individual retirement benefits; (2) women are more likely to qualify for spousal and survivor benefits and experience dual entitlement limits because of their lower lifetime earnings and longer life expectancies; (3) the monthly benefits for a two-earner couple are one-third less than those of a one-earner couple with the same demographics and lifetime earnings; (4) the survivor of a one-earner couple receives 67 percent of the total benefits received when both spouses were alive; (5) the survivor of a two-earner couple can receive between 50 percent and 67 percent of combined pre-death benefits; (6) a retired married person is often eligible for larger benefits as a spouse or survivor than as a retired worker; (7) an individual's retirement contributions do not necessarily increase his retirement benefits, but may provide disability coverage and family survivor coverage; (8) people with lower lifetime earnings and fewer Social Security contributions receive more Social Security benefits; (9) the issue of benefit fairness is likely to become more widespread as women spend more time in the workforce and increase their earnings; (10) the earnings sharing proposal combines the covered earnings of a husband and wife for each year that the couple is married and credits half of the combined total to each spouse's Social Security earnings; (11) the double-decker plan provides a flat-rate benefit for qualified beneficiaries and a proportional plan based on beneficiaries' lifetime covered earnings; and (12) SSA has not changed the way it administers retirement benefits because of the potential program costs, inequity issues, and administrative burdens. |
gao_GAO-04-631T | gao_GAO-04-631T_0 | The act requires the head of each agency to annually review all programs and activities that the agency administers and identify all such programs and activities that may be susceptible to significant improper payments. The act further requires that for any agency program or activity with estimated improper payments exceeding $10 million, the head of the agency shall provide a report on the actions the agency is taking to reduce those payments. If diligently and vigorously implemented, the Improper Payments Act should have a significant impact on the governmentwide improper payments problem. The level of importance each agency, the administration, and the Congress place on the efforts to implement the act will determine its overall effectiveness and the level to which agencies reduce improper payments and ensure that federal funds are used for their intended purposes. Further review of the table shows that the PARs contained improper payment estimates for 31 of the 46 agency programs previously listed in Circular A-11. The reports contained information on agency initiatives to prevent or reduce improper payments for 22 programs and on impediments to improper payment prevention or reduction for 11 programs. Figure 1 presents, by agency program, the level of reporting that we found for the three categories of information you asked about (improper payment amounts; initiatives to prevent improper payments, reduce them, or both; and impediments to preventing or reducing them). In some cases, agencies reported that they had already determined that programs were not susceptible to significant improper payments, despite the fact that the auditor’s reports in the same PARs identified management challenges, or material internal control weaknesses within the programs where the design or operation of an internal control procedure did not reduce, to a relatively low level, the risk that errors, fraud, or noncompliance that would be material to the financial statements may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their duties. For 11 of the 46 programs for which agencies were required to report improper payment information in their fiscal year 2003 PARs, four agencies did not report estimated amounts, initiatives taken to reduce improper payments, or impediments to preventing or reducing improper payments, even though OMB Circular A-11, Section 57, originally required agencies to report improper payment data, assessments, and action plans with their initial budget submissions since July 2001. Top leadership commitment and sustained attention to achieving results, both within the agencies and at OMB, is essential to GPRA implementation. As I discussed earlier in this testimony, the fiscal year 2003 PARs typically contained limited amounts of improper payment information even for those programs previously cited in Circular A-11 for which a reporting requirement has existed since agency submissions of their fiscal year 2003 budgets to OMB. Conclusions
Since 1982, various legislative and administrative initiatives have focused on and required agency assessments of internal controls over programs and financial management activities. Although these initiatives may not specifically target improper payments, by emphasizing internal controls, they have recognized the important role that internal controls have in ensuring that federal programs achieve their intended results and that federal agencies operate them effectively and efficiently. Key to this effort is the need for a strong control environment that creates a culture of accountability and establishes a positive and supportive attitude toward reducing improper payments. Office of Personnel Management 35. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 requires that agencies annually review all their programs and activities and identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments. It further requires those agencies with improper payments exceeding $10 million to provide a report on the actions being taken to reduce those payments. This testimony updates agency progress in implementing the act based on our review of agency fiscal year 2003 Performance and Accountability Reports for the 15 agencies and 46 programs previously cited in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, Section 57. It required those agencies and programs to report improper payment information to the Office of Management and Budget beginning with their fiscal year 2003 budget proposals. The areas we addressed were (1) agencies that reported improper payments information and the programs and activities on which that information was based, (2) amounts of improper payments reported, (3) initiatives agencies reported taking to reduce those payments and the results of those initiatives, and (4) impediments to the prevention or reduction of improper payments reported.
What GAO Found
The fiscal year 2003 Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) typically contained limited amounts of improper payment information even for those programs previously cited in Circular A-11 for which a reporting requirement has existed for at least three years. The PARs contained improper payment estimates for 31 of the 46 programs listed in Circular A-11. They contained information on agency initiatives to prevent or reduce improper payments for 22 programs and on impediments to improper payment prevention or reduction for 11 programs. Seven of 15 agencies reported on all three categories of information requested (improper payment amounts, initiatives taken to reduce or prevent improper payments, and impediments to improper payment prevention or reduction) for 9 of the 46 programs. For 11 of the 46 programs, the four agencies did not report on any of the three elements. In some cases, agencies reported that they had already determined that their programs were not susceptible to significant improper payments. However, the auditor's reports in the same PARs identified management challenges or material internal control weaknesses within the programs where the design or operation of internal control procedures did not reduce, to a relatively low level, the risk that errors, fraud, or noncompliance that would be material to the financial statements may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their duties. Key to the effort of reducing improper payments is the need for a strong control environment, including top leadership commitment and sustained attention to achieving results. Since 1982, various legislative and administrative initiatives have focused on and required agency assessments of internal controls over programs and financial management activities. Although these initiatives may not specifically target improper payments, by emphasizing internal controls, they have recognized the importance of internal controls--including a strong control environment--in ensuring that federal programs achieve their intended results and that federal agencies operate them effectively and efficiently. If diligently and vigorously implemented, the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 should have a significant impact on the governmentwide improper payments problem. The level of importance each agency, the administration, and the Congress place on the efforts to implement the act will determine its overall effectiveness and the level to which agencies reduce improper payments and ensure that federal funds are used efficiently and for their intended purposes. |
gao_GAO-06-879T | gao_GAO-06-879T_0 | CLIA established an approval process to allow states and private accrediting organizations to use their own requirements to survey labs. Deficiencies are also characterized as standard- or condition-level based on the requirement in which the deficiency occurs. Insufficient Data Exist to Identify Extent of Serious Lab Quality Problems
The extent of serious quality problems at labs is unclear because CMS has incomplete data on condition-level deficiencies identified by state survey agencies prior to 2004. We also found that the lack of a straightforward linkage between CLIA requirements and the CLIA- equivalent requirements of some survey organizations makes it virtually impossible to assess lab quality in a standardized manner. Limited Quality Data for Labs Inspected by State Survey Agencies Suggest Survey Inconsistencies
CMS’s OSCAR database contains limited data on the quality of labs inspected by state survey agencies and, as a result, it is not possible to analyze changes in the quality of lab testing over time. In January 2004, CMS implemented revised CLIA survey requirements and modified the existing OSCAR data—state survey agency findings—to reflect the changes. As a result of the data modifications, the findings for surveys conducted prior to 2004 no longer reflect all key condition-level requirements in effect at the time of those surveys. Because exempt-state programs and accrediting organizations do not classify inspection requirements and related deficiencies with the same criteria used by state survey agencies—as either standard- or condition-level—they cannot easily identify the proportion of surveyed labs with condition-level deficiencies. CMS Use of Data for Monitoring Lab Quality Is Limited
CMS does not effectively use available data, such as the results of surveys and proficiency testing data, to monitor and assess lab quality. Proficiency testing is an important indicator of lab quality because it is an objective assessment of a lab’s ability to produce accurate test results and is conducted more frequently than surveys—three times a year versus once every 2 years. Although CMS’s analysis of proficiency testing data showed improvements over time, our analysis of proficiency testing data for 1999 through 2003 suggests that there has been an increase in proficiency testing failures for labs inspected by CAP and JCAHO, which generally inspect hospital labs, and a decrease in such failures for labs surveyed by state survey agencies and COLA, which tend to inspect physician office labs. CLIA Program Oversight Is Inadequate
Oversight by CMS and survey organizations is not adequate to ensure that labs meet CLIA requirements. For example, the goal of educating lab workers during surveys takes precedence over the identification and reporting of deficiencies, while the use of volunteer rather than staff surveyors by one accrediting organization raises questions about appropriate levels of training and the appearance of a conflict of interest. The significant increase in complaints since CAP took steps to help ensure that lab workers know how to file a complaint suggests that some quality problems at labs inspected by some survey organizations may not be reported. In addition, sanctions are not being used effectively as an enforcement tool to promote labs’ compliance with CLIA requirements, as evidenced by the relatively few labs with repeat condition-level deficiencies on consecutive surveys from 1998 through 2004 that had sanctions imposed. Furthermore, CMS is not meeting its responsibility to determine that accrediting organization and exempt-state program requirements and processes continue to be at least equivalent to CLIA’s. According to CMS, this educational focus allows labs and their staff to become familiar with the proficiency testing program; however, it is important to note that there was about a 13-year time lag between the 1992 regulations that implemented CLIA and the 2005 implementation of Pap smear proficiency testing. Our work demonstrated that the oversight of clinical labs needs to be strengthened in several areas. More broadly, CMS and survey organization oversight of the lab survey process is not adequate to enforce CLIA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today's hearing focuses on oversight of clinical labs. The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) strengthened quality requirements for labs that perform tests to diagnose or treat disease. About 36,000 labs that perform certain complex tests must be surveyed biennially by a state survey agency, a state CLIA-exempt program, or a private accrediting organization. CMS oversees implementation of CLIA requirements, which includes determining the CLIA equivalency of the inspection requirements used by exempt states and accrediting organizations. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the quality of lab testing and (2) the adequacy of CLIA oversight. To examine these issues, GAO analyzed data on lab performance and reviewed the procedures used by CMS and survey organizations to implement CLIA and oversee lab performance. This testimony is based on the GAO report, Clinical Lab Quality: CMS and Survey Organization Oversight Should Be Strengthened, GAO-06-416 (June 16, 2006).
What GAO Found
In summary, insufficient data exist to identify the extent of serious quality problems at labs. When CMS implemented revised CLIA survey requirements in 2004, it modified historical state survey agency findings and, as a result, data prior to 2004 no longer reflect key survey requirements in effect at the time of those surveys. The limited data available suggest that state survey agency inspections do not identify all serious deficiencies. In addition, the lack of a straightforward method to link similar requirements across survey organizations makes it virtually impossible to assess lab quality in a standardized manner. Furthermore, CMS does not effectively use available data, such as the proportion of labs with serious deficiencies or proficiency testing results, to monitor lab quality. Proficiency testing is an objective measurement of a lab's ability to consistently produce accurate test results. GAO's analysis of proficiency testing data suggests that lab quality may not have improved at hospital labs in recent years. Oversight of clinical lab quality is not adequate to ensure that labs are meeting CLIA requirements. Weaknesses in five areas mask real and potential quality problems at labs. First, the balance struck between the CLIA program's educational and regulatory goals is sometimes inappropriately skewed toward education, which may result in understatement of survey findings. For example, even though the initial test failure rates were high, CMS instructed state survey agencies not to cite deficiencies during the first two years of required Pap smear proficiency testing to allow labs and their staff to become familiar with the program. Second, the manner in which one accrediting organization structures its survey teams raised concerns about appropriate levels of training and the appearance of a conflict of interest that could undermine the integrity of the survey process. Third, concerns about anonymity and lab workers' lack of familiarity with how to file a complaint suggests that some quality problems are not being reported. Fourth, based on the large number of labs with proposed sanctions from 1998 through 2004 that were never imposed--even for labs with the same serious deficiencies on consecutive surveys--it is unclear how effective CMS's enforcement process is at motivating labs to consistently comply with CLIA requirements. Finally, CMS is not meeting its requirement to determine in a timely manner the continued equivalency of accrediting organization and exempt-state program inspection requirements and processes, nor has the agency reviewed changes to accrediting organization and exempt-state program inspection requirements before implementation. |
gao_GAO-07-579 | gao_GAO-07-579_0 | Flood of IRS’s Headquarters Building
On June 25, 2006, the IRS headquarters building suffered flooding during a period of record rainfall and sustained extensive damage to its infrastructure. In response to the flood and the closure of the building, IRS headquarters officials reported activating several of the agency’s emergency operations plans. Over 2,000 employees normally assigned to the headquarters building were relocated to other facilities throughout the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. IRS Headquarters Emergency Operations Plans Partially Addressed Elements Outlined in Federal Guidance
The IRS headquarters emergency operations plans we reviewed collectively addressed several of the general elements of guidance identified in FPC 65. For example, the plans adequately identified the people needed to continue performing essential functions and had established procedures for activation. However, other elements were not addressed or were addressed only in part. Specifically, IRS identified two separate lists of essential functions—critical business processes and essential functions for IRS leadership—within its plans but only prioritized one of the lists. Furthermore, although the COOP plan outlined provisions for tests, training, and exercises, neither the business resumption plans we reviewed—from Criminal Investigation (CI), Wage and Investment (W&I), and Chief Counsel—nor the Incident Management Plan outlined the need to conduct such activities. While IRS’s Office of Physical Security and Emergency Preparedness provided overall guidance to business units on their business resumption plans, the guidance was inconsistent with the federal guidance on several elements, including the preparation of resources and facilities needed to support essential functions and requirements for regular tests, training, and exercises. 2. The agency’s Incident Management Plan was particularly useful in establishing clear lines of authority and communications, conditions that we have previously reported to be critical to an effective emergency response. Unit-level business resumption plans we reviewed contributed to a lesser extent and the headquarters COOP plan was not activated because of conditions particular to the 2006 flood. Specifically, damage to the building was limited to the basement and subbasement levels, and employees were able to enter the building to retrieve equipment and assets. In addition, alternate work space was available for all employees within a relatively short period, reducing the importance of identifying critical personnel. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the ability of IRS to respond to the full range of potential disruptions to essential operations, we are making two recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue: Revise IRS internal emergency planning guidance to fully reflect federal guidance on the elements of a viable continuity capability, including the identification and prioritization of essential functions; the preparation of necessary resources and alternate facilities; and the regular completion of tests, training, and exercises of continuity capabilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to evaluate how the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) emergency operations plans address federal guidance related to continuity planning and evaluate the extent to which IRS emergency operations plans contributed to the actions taken by IRS officials in response to the flood. | Why GAO Did This Study
On June 25, 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) headquarters building suffered flooding during a period of record rainfall and sustained extensive damage to its infrastructure. IRS officials ordered the closure of the building until December 2006 to allow for repairs to be completed. IRS headquarters officials reported activating several of the agency's emergency operations plans. Within 1 month of the flood, over 2,000 employees normally assigned to the headquarters building were relocated to other facilities throughout the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. GAO was asked to report on (1) how IRS emergency operations plans address federal guidance related to continuity planning and (2) the extent to which IRS emergency operations plans contributed to the actions taken by IRS officials in response to the flood. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed federal continuity guidance, reviewed IRS emergency plans, and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
The IRS headquarters emergency operations plans that GAO reviewed--the headquarters Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan, Incident Management Plan, and three selected business resumption plans--collectively addressed several of the general elements identified within federal continuity guidance for all executive branch departments and agencies. For example, the plans adequately identified the people needed to continue performing essential functions. However, other elements were not addressed or were addressed only in part. Specifically, IRS had two separate lists of essential functions--critical business processes and essential functions for IRS leadership--within its plans, but prioritized only one of the lists. Furthermore, although the COOP plan outlined provisions for tests, training, and exercises, none of the other plans GAO reviewed outlined the need to conduct such activities. While IRS provided overall guidance to its business units on their business resumption plans, the guidance was inconsistent with the federal guidance on several elements, including the preparation of resources and facilities needed to support essential functions and requirements for regular tests, training, and exercises. The IRS Incident Management Plan was particularly useful in establishing clear lines of authority and communications in response to the flooding. Unit-level business resumption plans GAO reviewed contributed to a lesser extent, and the headquarters COOP plan was not activated because of conditions particular to the 2006 flood. Specifically, damage to the building was limited to the basement and subbasement levels, and employees were able to enter the building to retrieve equipment and assets. In addition, alternate work space was available for all employees within a relatively short period, reducing the importance of identifying critical personnel. While its plans helped guide IRS's response to the conditions that resulted from the flood, in more severe emergency events, conditions could be less favorable to recovery. Consequently, unless IRS fills in gaps in its guidance and plans, it lacks assurance that the agency is adequately prepared to respond to the full range of potential disruptions. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-118 | gao_T-HEHS-97-118_0 | Background
SSA’s disability programs provide cash benefits to people with long-term disabilities. Despite SSA’s Efforts, SSA Still Faces a High Backlog
Despite SSA attempts to reduce the backlog through its STDP initiatives, the agency did not reach its goal of reducing this backlog to 375,000 by December 1996. SSA attributes its difficulties in meeting its backlog target to start-up delays, overly optimistic projections of the number of appealed cases that would be processed, and an unexpected increase in the number of appealed cases. The actual backlog in December was about 486,000 cases and has risen in the last few months to 491,000 cases, still about 116,000 over the goal. This study indicated that DDS and ALJ decisionmakers reached different results even when presented with the same evidence. In the longer term, SSA plans to develop a simplified decision-making process, which will expand the role of functional capacity assessments. Because differences in functional capacity assessments are the primary reason for inconsistent decisions, SSA should proceed cautiously with its plan to expand the use of such assessments. Quality Reviews Do Not Focus on Inconsistency Between DDSs and ALJs
Although SSA has several quality review systems to examine disability decisions, none is designed to identify and reconcile factors that contribute to differences between DDS and ALJ decisions. In addition, SSA is beginning to move ahead with more systemwide changes in its redesign of the disability claims process. In particular, it is on the verge of implementing initiatives to redesign the process, including ones for improving decisional consistency and the timeliness of overall claims processing. However, competing workload demands could jeopardize SSA’s ability to make progress in reducing inconsistent decisions. 2, 1995). Social Security: Results of Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge Decisions (GAO/HRD-89-48BR, June 13, 1989). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) actions to reduce the current backlog of cases appealed to the agency's administrative law judges, focusing on: (1) how functional assessments, differences in procedures, and quality review contribute to inconsistent results between different decisionmakers; and (2) SSA'a strategy to obtain greater decisional consistency.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work shows that while SSA has developed broad-based plans to improve the management of its disability programs, many initiatives are just beginning and their effectiveness can be assessed only after a period of full-scale implementation; (2) for example, in the short term, SSA has taken action to try to deal with the backlog crisis, but it is still about 116,000 cases over its December 1996 goal of 375,000 cases; (3) in the longer term, SSA needs to come to grips with the systemic factors causing inconsistent decisions, which underlie the current high level of appealed cases and, in turn, the backlog crisis; (4) for example, GAO found that differences in assessments of functional capacity, different procedures, and weaknesses in quality reviews contribute to inconsistent decisions; and (5) although SSA is on the verge of implementing initiatives to deal with these factors, GAO is concerned that other congressionally mandated workload pressures, such as significantly increasing the number of continuing disability reviews and readjudicating childhood cases, could jeopardize the agency's ability to move ahead with its initiatives to reduce inconsistent decisions. |
gao_GAO-10-1041T | gao_GAO-10-1041T_0 | DNDO Planned for the Acquisition and Deployment of CAARS without Fully Understanding that It Could Not Feasibly Operate in a U.S. Port Environment
From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until the course correction in December 2007, DNDO planned the acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without understanding that they would not fit within existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had few discussions about operating requirements for primary inspection lanes at ports of entry. In addition, the CAARS program was among numerous acquisition programs about which we previously reported that appropriate DHS oversight was lacking. Furthermore, the development of the CAARS algorithms—a key part of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear materials automatically—did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant acquisition and deployment. Moreover, the description of the progress of the CAARS program used to support funding requests in DNDO’s budget justifications for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 was misleading because it did not reflect the actual status of the program. When CBP and DNDO officials met, shortly before the course correction, CBP officials said they made it clear to DNDO that they did not want the CAARS machines because they would not fit in primary inspections lanes and would slow down the flow of commerce through these lanes and cause significant delays. In December 2007, DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition of CAARS and limit any further work to a research and development effort. However, the technology did not develop as expected and contributed to DNDO’s decision to cancel the acquisition phase of CAARS. The fiscal years 2010 and 2011 DHS budget justifications both cited that an ongoing testing campaign would lead to a cost benefit analysis, followed by rapid development of a prototype that would lead to a pilot deployment at a CBP point of entry. Specifically, DNDO officials told us that when they made their course correction and cancelled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct a cost benefit analysis because such analyses are generally needed to justify going forward with acquisitions. During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity and stated that they are not planning to complete a cost benefit analysis since such analyses are generally associated with acquisition programs. CAARS Offers Lessons Learned Regarding the Importance of Developing Requirements, Coordinating with Users, and Managing Acquisitions
Based on our review of the CAARS program and our reports on DNDO efforts to develop an advanced RPM called the advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP), we have identified lessons learned for DHS to consider in its continuing efforts to develop the next generation of radiography imaging technology. We have also reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. As DHS transitions its research and development of radiography, DHS officials said that a draft memorandum of agreement intended to clarify roles and responsibilities for cooperation and coordination among DNDO, CBP, and S&T has not been finalized. Completing the memorandum of agreement to clarify roles and responsibilities before proceeding with the research, development, and deployment of radiography technology could give DHS reasonable assurance that problems resulting from a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities in the CAARS program do not recur. In discussions with senior officials from DHS, DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed with the need for the memorandum and said that they intend to work toward finalizing the draft memorandum of agreement. Separate Research and Development from Acquisition Functions
DNDO was simultaneously engaged in a research and development phase while planning for an acquisition phase of the CAARS program. Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities. Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with developing and acquiring equipment to detect nuclear and radiological materials to support federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. Also within DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead for operating systems to detect nuclear and radiological materials entering the country at U.S. ports of entry. In 2005, DNDO began working on the cargo advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) intending that it be used by CBP to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at U.S. ports of entry. However, in 2007 DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and convert it to a research and development program. GAO was asked to examine events that led to DNDO's decision to cancel the acquisition phase of the program and provide lessons learned from DNDO's experience. This statement is based on prior GAO reports from March 2006 through July 2010 and ongoing work reviewing DHS efforts to develop radiography technology. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed CAARS planning documents and interviewed DHS, DNDO, and CBP officials. GAO provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DHS and component agencies, which provided technical comments and which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until DNDO cancelled the acquisition phase of the program in December 2007, DNDO pursued the acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without fully understanding that they would not fit within existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had few discussions about operating requirements at ports of entry. When CBP and DNDO officials met, shortly before DNDO's decision to cancel the acquisition phase of the program, CBP officials said they made it clear to DNDO that they did not want the CAARS machines because they would not fit in primary inspections lanes and would slow down the flow of commerce through these lanes and cause significant delays. Also, the CAARS program was among numerous DHS acquisition programs about which GAO reported in 2008 that appropriate oversight was lacking. Further, the development of the CAARS algorithms (software)--a key part of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear materials automatically--did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant acquisition and deployment. Also, the description of the progress of the CAARS program used to support funding requests in DNDO's budget justifications was misleading because it did not reflect the actual status of the program. For example, the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 DHS budget justifications both cited that an ongoing CAARS testing campaign would lead to a cost-benefit analysis. However, DNDO officials told GAO that when they cancelled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct any associated cost benefit analysis. During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity, and they have no plans to prepare a cost benefit analysis. Based on GAO's review of the CAARS program and its prior reports on DHS development and acquisition efforts, GAO identified lessons learned for DHS to consider in its continuing efforts to develop the next generation of radiography imaging technology. For example, GAO previously reported that agencies can enhance coordination by agreeing on roles and responsibilities. In this regard, a draft memorandum of agreement among DHS agencies that intends to clarify roles and responsibilities in developing technologies and help ensure effective coordination has not been finalized. Completing this memorandum could give DHS reasonable assurance that problems associated with the CAARS program do not recur. In discussions with senior officials from DHS, DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed with the need for the memorandum and said that they intend to work toward finalizing the draft memorandum of agreement. Other lessons GAO identified include (1) engage in a robust departmental oversight review process (2) separate the research and development functions from acquisition functions (3) determine the technology readiness levels before moving forward to acquisition, and (4) rigorously test devices using actual agency operational tactics before making decisions on acquisition. |
gao_T-RCED-96-142 | gao_T-RCED-96-142_0 | The federal investment in the Pick-Sloan Program has nonreimbursable and reimbursable components. Infeasibility of Some Irrigation Projects Makes Repayment of Some Costs Unlikely
Because certain of the Pick-Sloan Program’s irrigation facilities will not be completed as planned, a portion of the federal investment is unrecoverable. As originally authorized in 1944, portions of the program’s power facilities and water storage reservoirs were intended for use with irrigation facilities. Some of the program’s power facilities and reservoirs are now being used in conjunction with those irrigation facilities that have been completed.As a result, the associated federal investment is now scheduled for repayment. These investments are scheduled for repayment between 2042 and 2047, according to Bureau officials. In addition, the amount of the federal investment that is considered unrecoverable will increase over time. The impact of recovering the $454 million investment through power revenues could vary significantly depending on many factors, including the amount Western passes on to its power customers. The amount of the federal investment in storage reservoirs that would be redirected for repayment through power revenues is uncertain because some of this investment could be assigned to other program purposes, thereby lessening any effect on the rates. They clarified several points about the estimate of the potential impact on the power rate of recovering a portion of the federal investment through power revenues. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Western Area Power Administration's (WAPA) repayment of the federal investment in hydropower facilities and water storage reservoirs in the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program, focusing on the: (1) portion of the investment that may not be recoverable; and (2) actions that could be implemented to recover a larger portion of the investment.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) about $454 million of the Pick-Sloan investment is not recoverable because some of the facilities were intended for use with irrigation facilities that have not been completed or are no longer feasible; (2) Department of Energy (DOE) expects the amount of federal investment that is unrecoverable to increase, since some facilities will require renovation and replacement; (3) as a result of the completion of some irrigation facilities, DOE expects about $56 million of the federal investment to be repaid between 2042 and 2047; (4) some of the $454 million investment that is considered unrecoverable could be recovered through the WAPA hydroelectric power revenues; (5) the WAPA hydroelectric power revenues cannot be used to repay the federal investment without legislative changes; (6) the impact of recovering the investment through power revenues could vary significantly depending on the terms of repayment and amount that WAPA passes on to its customers; and (7) if the WAPA passed the entire investment amount on to its customers, power rates could increase by 14.6 percent. |
gao_GAO-03-770 | gao_GAO-03-770_0 | In 2002, roughly 7 million containers entered U.S. seaports. CSI Placed Customs Officials Overseas to Screen Containers
Announced in January 2002, CSI allows Customs to screen for high-risk, U.S.-bound containers at key foreign ports, a task previously carried out only at U.S. seaports. C-TPAT Works with Private Sector to Improve Supply Chain Security
Announced in November 2001, C-TPAT is a voluntary partnership program between the business community and Customs, designed to enhance the security of international supply chains and thus reduce the number of containers that otherwise might be screened for WMDs because of risk considerations. Customs is still developing critical aspects of the program intended to ensure that member companies respond to C-TPAT recommendations for improving and maintaining supply chain security practices. By January 2003, Customs had entered into bilateral arrangements with foreign governments to place Customs officials at 24 ports and soon deployed CSI teams to 5 of them. Customs Has Not Adequately Incorporated Factors Critical to Programs’ Success and Accountability
Although CSI and C-TPAT are evolving into major tools in the U.S. war against terrorism, in implementing the programs, Customs has not taken adequate steps to incorporate human capital planning, develop performance measures, and plan strategically—factors essential to the programs’ long-term success and accountability. While Customs was able to meet the programs’ initial staffing needs, it has not devised a systematic plan to recruit, train, and retain the expected fivefold increase in CSI overseas staff by fiscal year 2004. Although Customs had created some performance measures, such as tallying the number of countries and companies that have enrolled in the CSI and C-TPAT, respectively, it has not developed measures that establish accountability and measure program achievements. In its effort to rapidly implement the programs and enroll participants, Customs focused on short-term operational planning. As a result, Customs lacks the elements of strategic planning that would allow it to establish program accountability for approximately $73 million in funds budgeted for fiscal year 2004. Furthermore, Customs has proposed to commit significantly more resources to both of these programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that CSI and C-TPAT achieve their objectives as they transition from smaller start-up programs to larger programs with an increasingly larger share of the Department of Homeland Security’s budget, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection and the CSI and C-TPAT program directors, takes the following steps: Develops human capital plans that clearly describe how CSI and C-TPAT will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing demands as they expand to other countries and implement new program elements. To examine Customs’ implementation of CSI and C-TPAT during the first year, we interviewed Customs officials at the Washington, D.C., headquarters as discussed earlier. We assessed the extent to which Customs expansion plans incorporated human capital planning, the development of performance measures, and strategic planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle weapons of mass destruction in the 7 million ocean containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. In response to this concern, the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to screen for high-risk containers at overseas ports and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) to improve global supply chain security in the private sector. GAO (1) describes the purpose and elements of these new programs, (2) examines Customs' implementation of CSI and C-TPAT during the first year, and (3) assesses the extent to which Customs has focused on factors critical to the programs' long-term success and accountability.
What GAO Found
Announced in January 2002, CSI places Customs staff at designated foreign seaports to screen containers for weapons of mass destruction. In November 2001, Customs also initiated C-TPAT, in which private companies improve the security of their supply chains in return for the reduced likelihood that their containers will be inspected for weapons of mass destruction. Customs quickly implemented both programs in the first year. It concluded bilateral arrangements with foreign governments to place Customs personnel at 24 foreign ports and deployed staff to 5 of these ports under CSI, and it enrolled more than 1,700 companies in C-TPAT. Customs is developing critical program elements intended to ensure that C-TPAT companies improve and maintain their security practices. GAO found that Customs' implementation of these programs evolved in response to challenges it encountered. Although Customs is preparing to devote significantly more resources to CSI and C-TPAT as it expands the programs, it has not taken adequate steps to incorporate factors necessary for the programs' long-term success and accountability. These factors include human capital planning, development of performance measures, and strategic planning. GAO found the following: (1) although CSI seeks to staff Customs officials at more than 30 overseas ports and C-TPAT expects to hire more than 150 additional staff, Customs has not devised systematic human capital plans to meet longterm staffing needs for both programs; (2) while Customs has created some performance measures to quantify operational activities and efforts, it has not developed measures to establish accountability and measure program achievement; and (3) in its efforts to rapidly implement the programs and enroll participants, Customs focused on short-term planning. Customs lacks a strategic plan that would allow it to establish accountability for approximately $73 million in planned expenditures for fiscal year 2004. |
gao_GAO-15-159 | gao_GAO-15-159_0 | Transportation infrastructure, which includes public transit systems, is one of these areas. DHS and DOT Assistance Can Contribute to Transit System Resilience; However, Some Limitations Exist
DHS Assistance Focuses on Security and Emergency Management
Created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems, TSA sets priorities for protecting and evaluating the security of public transit systems. FEMA’s disaster- and hazard-mitigation grant programs can also be used for helping make transit systems resilient. Second, FEMA officials noted that because various FEMA grants and other federal funds to aid recovery and resilience building after a catastrophic event have different regulations and timeframes, it could be difficult for the grant recipients to coordinate the use of these funds for resilience efforts.transit agencies and others indicate arise from competing priorities and the timing of federal grants in more detail later in the report. DOT Focuses on Transit Funding and Technical Assistance
DOT provides funding and technical assistance to transit agencies to improve their resilience. FTA Formula and Discretionary Funds
FTA provides financial assistance through various formula and discretionary programs for transit capital-investment projects and for improving and maintaining existing systems. However, Congress did not appropriate ERP funds for those events. As we discuss below, FTA and transit agency officials told us that demand for limited funds makes it difficult for transit agencies to prioritize actions for building resilience versus other, more immediate needs, such as maintaining and operating existing assets. This study focused on how transit agencies could incorporate climate change adaptation into their systems and activities—such as asset management systems, planning, and emergency response—and provided examples of strategies. The transit agencies also identified a number of actions that help improve their systems’ resilience, including actions that help them prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the impacts of emergencies and catastrophic events. In addition to developing recommendations to address risks, officials from some transit agencies explained that they use the risk assessments to, among other things, inform the types of training and drills the agencies conduct, or guide their investment decision-making. Transit Agencies Take Actions to Help Ensure the Continuity of Transit Systems and to Mitigate the Impact of Catastrophic Events on Physical Assets
In addition to developing plans and performing risk assessments, all nine transit agencies showed us or told us about redundant facilities or transit assets to help ensure continuity of transit service if a portion of their systems or facilities is damaged during catastrophic events. 5.) To remedy the problem, the transit agency raised curbs or vents throughout the city to minimize water flow into the vents (see fig. Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Placing Priority on Resilience and with Certain Aspects of Some Federal Grants
Officials from DOT, DHS, transit agencies and emergency management offices we visited stated that transit agencies face challenges related to placing priority on resilience and some aspects of certain grant programs that can help make transit systems resilient. DOT, DHS, and some transit agencies have taken or are taking some actions to address identified challenges. Second, officials from four transit agencies we visited as well as DOT, and DHS indicated that resilience activities compete with other priorities for funding. These challenges are discussed below. DHS and DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how DOT and DHS help transit agencies make their systems resilient to catastrophic events; (2) actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems resilient; and (3) challenges transit agencies face with making their systems resilient to such events. To identify actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems resilient, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from nine transit agencies and five local emergency management offices in five metropolitan areas (see table 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Public transit systems, which receive funding from the federal government, are vulnerable to catastrophic events, as demonstrated by the impact Hurricane Sandy and other events have had on transit systems. These events highlight our reliance on transit systems for access to jobs, medical care, and other services, as well as the cost of recovering from these events. For instance, of the $50.5 billion Congress appropriated to help communities devastated by Sandy, $10.9 billion was provided for disaster relief to public transit agencies. Building resilience—the ability to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the risk of catastrophic events—is one strategy to help limit the nation's fiscal exposure to catastrophic events.
GAO was asked to review transit system resilience to catastrophic events. This report examines (1) how DHS and DOT help transit agencies make their systems resilient; (2) actions selected transit agencies take to make their systems resilient; and (3) challenges transit agencies face with making their systems resilient. GAO examined documentation and interviewed officials from DHS and DOT, and officials from nine transit and five emergency management agencies.GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of agencies in five locations, chosen for transit ridership volume and variation in geography, types of risks, and transit modes.
GAO did not make any recommendations in this report. DHS and DOT provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation (DOT) provide funding and other support to transit agencies to help make their systems resilient to catastrophic events. DHS focuses on emergency management and security, and provides funding through its hazard-mitigation, transit-security, and other grant programs. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides support through formula and discretionary-funding programs for transit capital-investment projects and for improving and maintaining existing systems. Both DHS and DOT provide transit agencies with technical assistance, such as for security programs or climate-change adaptation efforts.
Transit agencies that GAO selected identified a number of actions they are taking to help make their systems more resilient, including performing risk assessments and developing plans, such as emergency operations plans. These agencies also take actions, such as building redundant assets or facilities, to ensure the continuity of operations of the agencies' systems. Further, transit agencies have changed their infrastructure to mitigate the potential impact of disasters on their assets. For example, as shown in the figure below, one agency elevated vents and curbs to minimize water flowing into the subway.
Although all transit agencies GAO selected are taking resilience-building actions, officials GAO interviewed said that transit agencies face challenges with placing priorities on resilience and with certain aspects of some grant programs. In particular, officials from DHS, DOT, and transit agencies GAO selected explained that it is difficult for transit agencies to place priority on resilience activities because managers may be reluctant to focus on resilience and resilience activities compete with other priorities for funding. Federal, transit-agency, and emergency-management officials also cited challenges related to some aspects of federal grants that have made it difficult for transit agencies to, among other things, incorporate resilience into disaster recovery efforts and make regional transit-networks resilient. DHS, DOT, and some transit agencies are taking some actions to address these challenges, such as developing tools to help management prioritize resilience activities. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-143 | gao_T-AIMD-99-143_0 | Improvements Made But Much Work Remains
Addressing the Year 2000 problem is a tremendous challenge for the federal government. To meet this challenge and monitor individual agency efforts, OMB directed the major departments and agencies to submit quarterly reports on their progress, beginning May 15, 1997. These reports contain information on where agencies stand with respect to the assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation of mission-critical systems, as well as other management information on items such as business continuity and contingency plans and costs. The federal government's most recent reports show improvement in addressing the Year 2000 problem. While much work remains, the federal government has significantly increased the percentage of mission-critical systems that are reported to be Year 2000 compliant, as figure 1 illustrates. In particular, while the federal government did not meet its goal of having all mission-critical systems compliant by March 1999, 92 percent of these systems were reported to have met this goal. While this progress is notable, 11 agencies did not meet OMB’s deadline for all of their mission-critical systems. End-to-End Testing
To ensure that their mission-critical systems can reliably exchange data with other systems and that they are protected from errors that can be introduced by external systems, agencies must perform end-to-end testing of their critical core business processes. On March 31, OMB and the Chair of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion announced that one of the key priorities that federal agencies will be pursuing during the rest of 1999 will be cooperative efforts regarding end-to-end testing to demonstrate the Year 2000 readiness of federal programs with states and other partners critical to the administration of those programs. In particular, on January 26, 1999, OMB called on federal agencies to identify and report on the high-level core business functions that are to be addressed in their business continuity and contingency plans as well as to provide key milestones for development and testing of business continuity and contingency plans in their February 1999 quarterly reports. Accordingly, in their February 1999 reports, almost all agencies listed their high-level core business functions. On March 26, 1999, OMB implemented our recommendation by issuing a memorandum to federal agencies designating lead agencies for the government’s 42 high-impact programs (e.g., food stamps, Medicare, and federal electric power generation and delivery); the attachment contains a list of these programs and lead agencies. OMB directed the lead agencies to provide a schedule and milestones of key activities in the plan by April 15. In January 1999, OMB implemented a requirement that federal oversight agencies include the status of selected state human services systems in their quarterly reports. Specifically, OMB requested that the agencies describe actions to help ensure that federally supported, state-run programs will be able to provide services and benefits. In addition to the state systems that support federal programs, another important aspect of the federal government’s Year 2000 efforts with the states are data exchanges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed federal agencies' progress in addressing the year 2000 computing challenge and outlined actions needed to ensure a smooth conversion to the next century, focusing on the: (1) status of the federal government's remediation of its mission-critical systems; (2) remaining challenges facing the government in ensuring the continuity of business operations, namely end-to-end testing and business continuity and contingency planning; (3) Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) efforts to identify the government's high-impact programs; and (4) readiness of state systems that are essential to the delivery of federal human services programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) addressing the year 2000 problem is a tremendous challenge for the federal government; (2) to meet this challenge and monitor individual agency efforts, OMB directed the major departments and agencies to submit quarterly reports on their progress, beginning on May 15, 1997; (3) these reports contain information on where agencies stand with respect to the assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation of mission-critical systems, as well as other management information; (4) the federal government's most recent reports show improvement in addressing the year 2000 problem; (5) while much work remains, the federal government has significantly increased the percentage of mission-critical systems that are reported to be year 2000 compliant; (6) in particular, while the federal government did not meet its goal of having all mission-critical systems compliant by March 1999, 92 percent of these systems were reported to have met this goal; (7) while this progress is notable, 11 agencies did not meet OMB's deadline for all of their mission-critical systems; (8) to ensure that their mission-critical systems can reliably exchange data with other systems and that they are protected from errors that can be introduced by external systems, agencies must perform end-to-end testing of their critical core business processess; (9) OMB and the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion announced that one of the key priorities that federal agencies will be pursuing during the rest of 1999 will be cooperative efforts regarding end-to-end testing to demonstrate the year 2000 readiness of federal programs with states and other partners critical to the administration of those programs; (10) OMB called on federal agencies to identify and report on the high-level core business functions that are to be addressed in their business continuity and contingency plans in their February 1999 quarterly reports; (11) accordingly, in their February 1999 reports, almost all agencies listed their high-level core business functions; (12) OMB issued a memorandum to federal agencies designating lead agencies for the government's 42 high-impact programs; (13) OMB directed the lead agencies to provide a schedule and milestones of key activities in their year 2000 plans by April 15; (14) in January 1999, OMB implemented a requirement that federal oversight agencies include the status of selected state human services systems in their quarterly reports; and (15) specifically, OMB requested that the agencies describe actions to help ensure that federally supported, state-run programs will be able to provide services and benefits. |
gao_GAO-09-267 | gao_GAO-09-267_0 | 2 for details on U.S.- procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.) Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons
Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international donations. Such accountability lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process. As a result, the Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for ANSF, including DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC-A, did not have a common understanding of what accountability procedures to apply to these weapons while they were in U.S. control and custody. USASAC and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Complete Inventory Records for Weapons
On the basis of our data analysis and tests of weapons inventory records, we estimate that USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000 weapons—about 36 percent of over 242,000 weapons they procured for ANSF and shipped from December 2004 through June 2008. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC did not maintain serial number records—information fundamental to weapons accountability—and for an estimated 41,000 weapons, CSTC-A did not maintain documentation on the location or disposition, based on our testing of a random sample of available serial number records. Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and Account for Weapons
CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and contract mentors to help ANSF units, among other things, establish and implement equipment accountability procedures. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army Units. In June 2008, Defense reported to the Congress that it was CSTC-A’s policy not to issue equipment to ANSF units unless appropriate supply and accountability procedures were verified. Afghan National Army. Illiteracy. Unclear guidance. To help ensure that ANSF units can safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive equipment they receive from the United States and international donors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct CSTC-A to (1) specifically and systematically assess the ability of each ANSF unit to safeguard and account for weapons in accordance with Afghan ministerial decrees and (2) explicitly verify that adequate safeguards and accountability procedures are in place, prior to providing weapons to ANSF units, unless a specific waiver or exception is granted based on due consideration of practicality, cost, and mission performance. State did not provide comments. It noted that Defense requirements and procedures exist for small arms tracking by serial number. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine whether Defense and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account for weapons obtained, transported, stored, and distributed to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we conducted the following work. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons.
What GAO Found
Defense did not establishclear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing and other factors. Despite CSTC-A's training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish accountability practices. CSTC-A's policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units' ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. |
gao_HEHS-98-48 | gao_HEHS-98-48_0 | 2.) Preventive measures consist of periodic health assessments that provide screening, counseling, risk assessment, and patient education. VA’s goal is for its medical centers to perform at least 65 percent of selected surgical procedures on an outpatient basis. Most VA medical centers now have outpatient surgery capability, and the percentage of such surgeries has increased nationwide from 34 to 66 percent between fiscal year 1993 and mid-fiscal year 1997. 3.) (See table 1.) At the Pittsburgh medical center, officials estimated that savings from an increase in outpatient surgeries for fiscal year 1997 totaled more than $7.5 million through May 31, 1997. Savings and Efficiency Gains From Integrations
Integrations within and among medical centers have helped generate savings and increase operational efficiency. VA Is Taking Steps to Improve Access to Health Care
Veterans’ access to health services is improving as VA hospitals reinvest the savings from efficiency initiatives and restructure their service delivery. VA hospitals have increased the number of primary care teams, added or improved space to accommodate additional primary care patients, shortened appointment waiting times, increased the number of locations providing community-based care, and redefined the role of VA inpatient nursing home care. Use of Primary Care Has Improved Access
VA has improved veterans’ access to health care through the use of primary care. Appointments enable VA to improve scheduling of its workload and resources, reducing the time patients spend waiting for an appointment as well as that spent waiting upon arrival to be seen. The medical centers we reviewed showed sizable growth in the numbers of veterans assigned to primary care teams. Some of the medical centers we visited have shortened appointment waiting times for specialty care as access to primary care has improved. For example, the Brockton/West Roxbury medical center now schedules its smoking cessation clinics in the evenings and other medical clinics on weekends to improve access. Monitoring Changes to Health Care Services Is Important
VA headquarters’ monitoring of changes to the health care system is important because network and medical center directors are responding to incentives to change VA’s health care delivery. Without such indicators, it is difficult for VA to ensure that service delivery changes do not compromise the appropriateness of the health care veterans receive. VA officials told us they have begun to develop some outcome measures. To assess VA’s progress in increasing the efficiency of its health care system, we examined VA records documenting effects of efficiency initiatives, including increased outpatient visits, decreased bed-days of care and operating beds, reduction and reassignment of staff, and integration of services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to improve and monitor veterans' access to health care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has taken important steps to improve the efficiency of its health care system and veterans' access to it; (2) VA medical centers have increased efficiency by expanding the use of outpatient care; (3) for example, VA has increased the percentage of surgical procedures performed on an outpatient basis from 34 percent in fiscal year 1993 to 66 percent by mid-fiscal year 1997; (4) this has allowed it to reduce bed-days of care, operating beds, and staff; (5) at the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, medical center, the increase in outpatient surgeries saved more than $7.5 million from October 1995 through May 31, 1997; (6) preventive care, including health assessments and patient education, has also increased, which VA officials told GAO can lead to efficiencies because patients can be kept healthier, avoiding expensive hospital stays; (7) furthermore, VA is increasing efficiency by integrating services both within and among medical centers; (8) VA is improving access to health care in several ways; (9) for example, VA has begun to emphasize primary care, in which generalist physicians see patients initially and coordinate any specialty care that patients may need; (10) by increasing the number of primary care teams, VA has improved access to routine care and expedited referrals to specialty care; (11) VA is also improving access to health care by providing outpatient care at additional community-based outpatient clinics, expanding evening and weekend hours for clinics, and exploring other innovations; (12) these efforts have shortened the time veterans spend waiting for an appointment as well as that spent waiting to be seen upon arrival for an appointment; (13) all of the medical centers GAO visited have established primary care teams and increased the number of veterans assigned to primary care; (14) as networks and medical centers continue to respond to incentives to improve the efficiency of their operations, headquarters' monitoring of the impact of such responses is necessary to help ensure that they do not compromise the appropriateness of health care veterans receive; and (15) GAO found that although VA has implemented health care monitoring mechanisms to assess some of the changes networks and medical centers are introducing, these mechanisms have not fully succeeded. |
gao_RCED-99-153 | gao_RCED-99-153_0 | DOT’s Performance Plan Provides a Clear Picture of Intended Performance Across the Department
DOT’s performance plan provides a clear statement of the performance goals and measures that address program results. For example, the OIG reported that the Department’s accounting system could not be used as the only source of financial information to prepare its financial statements. The fiscal year 2000 plan does not address this issue. Comparison With the Fiscal Year 1999 Plan
The discussion of performance goals and measures in DOT’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan is a moderate improvement over the discussion in the fiscal year 1999 performance plan and shows some degree of progress in addressing the weaknesses that we identified in the fiscal year 1999 plan. We observed that the fiscal year 1999 plan could have been improved by (1) explaining how the management challenges are related to the rest of the performance plan and by including goals and specific measures for addressing the challenges; (2) consistently linking strategic goals, program activities, and performance goals; and (3) indicating interagency coordination for the crosscutting programs and consistently discussing the Department’s contribution to these programs. DOT’s Performance Plan Provides a Specific Discussion of the Strategies and Resources the Department Will Use to Achieve Its Goals
DOT’s plan provides a specific discussion of the strategies and resources that the Department will use to achieve its performance goals. For each performance goal, the plan lists an overall strategy for achieving it, as well as specific activities and initiatives. DOT’s Performance Plan Provides General Confidence That the Performance Information Will Be Credible
The Department’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan generally provides a clear and comprehensive discussion of the performance information. For most measures, information about the data’s quality was lacking. Progress in Implementing Performance-Based Management
DOT has clearly made good progress in implementing performance-based management. According to the plan, DOT has incorporated all of its fiscal year 1999 performance goals into performance agreements between the administrators of DOT’s agencies and the Secretary. Challenges in Implementing Performance-Based Management
A key challenge that DOT faces in implementing performance-based management is the lack of accountability for its financial activities. DOT is taking actions to correct the financial reporting deficiencies that were identified by the OIG. A-11, part 2; and other relevant documents. In December 1998, the Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a similar report on the Department. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Transportation's (DOT) performance plan for fiscal year (FY) 2000, focusing on: (1) the usefulness of DOT's plan in providing a clear picture of intended performance across the Department; (2) the strategies and resources that DOT will use to achieve its goals; and (3) whether DOT's performance information will be credible.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, DOT's performance plan for FY 2000 should be a useful tool for decisionmakers; (2) it provides a clear picture of intended performance across the Department, a specific discussion of the strategies and resources that the Department will use to achieve its goals, and general confidence that the Department's performance information will be credible; (3) DOT's FY 2000 performance plan represents a moderate improvement over the FY 1999 plan in that it indicates some degree of progress in addressing the weaknesses that GAO identified in an assessment of the FY 1999 plan; (4) GAO observed that the FY 1999 plan did not: (a) sufficiently address management challenges facing the Department; (b) consistently link strategic goals, program activities, and performance goals; (c) indicate interagency coordination for crosscutting areas; or (d) provide sufficient information on external factors, the processes and resources for achieving the goals, and the performance data; (5) among the improvements in the FY 2000 plan are more consistent linkages among the program activities and performance goals, additional information on external factors and strategies for achieving the goals, and a more comprehensive discussion of the data's quality; (6) these improvements and other activities indicate that DOT has clearly made good progress in implementing performance-based management; (7) for example, the plan indicates that the Department is incorporating the performance goals into performance agreements between the administrators of DOT's agencies and the Secretary; (8) however, the plan still needs further improvement, especially in explaining how certain management challenges, such as financial management weaknesses, will be addressed; (9) for example, DOT's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that the Department's accounting system could not be used as the only source of financial information to prepare its financial statements; (10) while the FY 2000 plan does not address this issue, the Department has recognized the financial reporting deficiencies identified by the OIG and is taking actions to correct them; and (11) the lack of accountability for financial activities is a key challenge that DOT faces in implementing performance-based management. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-138 | gao_T-AIMD-97-138_0 | Several Interior agencies administer various portions of the government’s Indian trust responsibility, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the Office of American Indian Trust, and the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST). We met with Office of Special Trustee officials, including the Special Trustee for American Indians, and officials in BIA, BLM, and MMS to obtain clarification on certain aspects of the Plan. Although our work identifies key issues that the Congress needs to consider in deciding whether to approve the initiatives described in the Plan, it is by no means all inclusive and there are other issues yet to be identified. Problems With Current Indian Trust Asset Management
As we have reported in the past, Interior’s Indian trust fund accounting and asset management problems are long-standing and permeate all facets of the trust fund management business cycle. They include (1) the lack of accurate, up-to-date information on ownerships to ensure that revenue is distributed to the correct account and the increasing workload associated with fractionated ownerships, (2) inadequate management of natural resource assets resulting in a lack of assurance that all earned revenues are collected, (3) weaknesses in trust fund management systems and internal controls and policies and procedures that result in a lack of assurance about the accuracy of trust fund balances, and (4) the failure, in the past, to consistently and prudently invest trust funds and pay interest to account holders. These overall weaknesses preclude account holders from having assurance that their account balances are accurate and that their assets are being prudently managed. This problem has not yet been resolved. The Plan proposes that AITDA assume the federal government’s Indian trust authority related to Indian trust funds and assets. Table 1 summarizes the cost estimates in the Strategic Plan. Implementation Issues
A number of areas require further clarification, planning, or consideration before the Plan can move forward. These include implementation timing of certain initiatives, such as records cleanup and acquiring a new IIM accounting system component; proposals, such as establishing a centralized organization and upgrading and acquiring systems, that need more planning before they can be successfully implemented; and issues requiring congressional consideration that relate to the desirability and feasibility of establishing the new organization as a private entity and establishing the trust development bank. The Plan needs to provide more information on each of these proposals in order to support full consideration by the Congress. (2) The Strategic Plan proposes the establishment of an Indian Trust and Development Bank. Additional information is needed from the Special Trustee about the proposed organization so that the Congress may carefully consider the government’s Indian trust responsibility; type of organization, funding, and oversight; the types of programs and services to be provided by the new organization; and the relationship of any new organization to the Interior Department and other external organizations. Current Interior Organizations With Indian Programs Covered by the Strategic Plan
Proposed AITDA Organization
(OST) (OTFM) (BIA/LTRO) (OAIT / MMS)
Basis for Cost Estimates
The Strategic Plan includes budget estimates indicating that about $168 million will be needed for fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and about $61 million and $56 million for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, respectively, to implement Phase I of the Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its analysis of the Special Trustee for American Indians' Strategic Plan for Indian trust fund accounting and asset management improvement, focusing on: (1) the trust asset management problems that the Strategic Plan proposes to resolve; (2) a high-level summary of the Strategic Plan; (3) the basis for the cost estimates included in the Plan; and (4) implementation issues, including key issues that the Congress would need to consider in deciding whether to approve the initiatives described in the Plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) management of the Indian trust funds and assets has long been characterized by inadequate accounting and information management systems, untrained and inexperienced staff, backlogs in appraisals and ownership determination and recordkeeping, lack of a master lease file and an accounts receivable system, inadequate written policies and procedures, and poor internal controls; (2) because of these overall weaknesses, account holders do not have assurance that their accounts balances are accurate and that their assets are being prudently managed; (3) to address the Department of the Interior's long-standing Indian trust fund accounting and asset management problems, the Congress passed the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, which created the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians; (4) the act required that the Special Trustee provide oversight of reforms within Interior, including development of policies, procedures, and systems; (5) in April 1997, the Special Trustee submitted his Strategic Plan to the Congress; (6) the Strategic Plan proposes a new organization, independent of Interior, to administer trust fund accounting and asset programs; (7) these proposals are estimated to cost $168 million for fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and another $61 million and $56 million for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, respectively; (8) in addition, the Plan proposes establishing an Indian economic development bank to be capitalized by the federal government; (9) a number of areas require further clarification, planning, or consideration before the Plan can move forward; (10) these include: (a) implementation timing of certain initiatives, such as records cleanup and the acquisition of a new individual Indian Money accounting systems component; (b) proposals, such as establishing a centralized organization and upgrading and acquiring systems, that need more planning before they can be successfully implemented; (c) issues relating to the desirability and feasibility of establishing the new organization as a private entity, including the legality of transferring the federal government's trust authorities and responsibilities to such an entity; and (d) issues relating to the establishment of the trust development bank, including the initial funding and on-going capital maintenance proposals; and (11) in order to appropriately address these issues, more information and analysis need to be included in the Plan to provide clarification of the authority and responsibility of the proposed organization, and its relationship to Interior. |
gao_OSI-98-5 | gao_OSI-98-5_0 | The company then improperly claimed the full amounts of the leave as part of the employees’ payroll costs and was reimbursed by Medicare. Second, Mrs. Reed requested—or, again according to some employees, coerced—Mid-Delta and P&T Management employees to return a certain amount (about 20 percent or more) of their 1996 bonuses to the company. Mid-Delta improperly claimed, and received reimbursement from Medicare for, the returned bonuses. 2.) At least $155,000 was then transferred from that fund to the P&T Management operating account. When we questioned Mrs. Reed about this, she responded that she tells the nurses, “If I don’t get paid, you don’t get paid.”
Indeed, Mid-Delta’s controller told us that the indigent care fund was used to offset unpaid bills of patients of the company’s rural health clinics, Taylor’s Medical Clinics. Other Improper or Questionable Payroll-Cost/ Reimbursement Issues
Additional Mid-Delta Home Health payroll-cost issues resulted in either improper or questionable claims to and reimbursement by Medicare: Mid-Delta improperly claimed Medicare reimbursement for the total 7-month salary that Mrs. Reed’s daughter received while she attended school full-time and worked part-time. We question Mid-Delta’s (1) claiming $65,000 in bonuses to the daughter, which equated to about 119 percent of the daughter’s base salary and (2) claiming the payroll costs of “Community Education” staff who were marketing Mid-Delta and other affiliated operations. At the same time, she held the job title of Executive Vice President for Operations at P&T Management, Inc. and received a full-time 1996 salary of approximately $54,660. We question the propriety of Mid-Delta’s submitting payroll and other costs related to marketing activities for Medicare reimbursement because the costs involved marketing and promoting the company. Bonus Used to Purchase Business Improperly Claimed as Payroll Cost and Reimbursed by Medicare
According to a former Mid-Delta employee, Mrs. Reed used the bonus system as a means, in part, to purchase a business and be reimbursed by Medicare. However, Mrs. Reed told Ms. Martin that $10,000 of the bonus was partial payment for Ms. Martin’s business. Questionable Nature of Some Mid-Delta Home Health Services
Mid-Delta Home Health nurses and other professionals voiced concerns to us that Mid-Delta was providing Medicare-reimbursed home health care services to patients who, in their professional opinions, were ineligible for the services. The intermediary and we also question Mid-Delta’s provision of Medicare-reimbursable home health services to some apparently ineligible patients as they did not appear to meet HCFA’s requirement that their condition create an inability to leave home without “considerable, taxing effort.”
Questionable Mid-Delta Home Health Care Services
After interviewing a number of Mid-Delta Home Health’s patients, patients’ friends, and relatives and evaluating the patients’ plans of care (HCFA Form 485) and other case material, we question the reasonableness and/or necessity of the Medicare-reimbursable home health care services provided to 14 of the 41 patients reviewed during our investigation. For example, the intermediary and we noted that Mid-Delta was providing services that were not covered in the plans of care. 9, 1997). 5, 1997). 4, 1997). 27, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO investigated allegations of Medicare improprieties by home health care provider Mid-Delta Home Health of Belzoni, Mississippi, and affiliated companies, focusing on allegations that Mid-Delta: (1) routinely requested and received leave or bonuses back from its employees while charging Medicare their full amount; (2) paid the owner's daughter a full-time salary and charged it to Medicare although she was a full-time nursing student; and (3) conducted unnecessary and excessive home health care patient visits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare, through the intermediary, reimbursed Mid-Delta Home Health for payroll costs between January 1993 and December 1996 that, in GAO's opinion, were improperly claimed because they did not represent actual costs to the provider; (2) specifically, the owner of the company, Clara T. Reed, regularly asked employees to return to the company the cash value of unused leave and about 20 percent or more of bonuses received; (3) the employees were told that the returned money was needed for, among other things, a Mid-Delta Home Health-sponsored indigent care fund; (4) however, rather than use the fund to provide home health care to those who could not afford it, Mid-Delta officials stated that the money was used to offset unpaid bills of private-pay patients of Mid-Delta's affiliated rural health clinics; (5) Mid-Delta Home Health also improperly claimed and was reimbursed by Medicare for other costs that did not meet Medicare cost reimbursement principles since they were not related to patient care; (6) one example involved salary paid to the owner's daughter as a P&T Management executive vice president for over half of 1996 while she attended school full-time; (7) further, GAO questions the reasonableness of the daughter's $65,000 in 1996 bonuses claimed by Mid-Delta for Medicare reimbursement; (8) in addition, Mid-Delta was reimbursed by Medicare for the payroll costs of some P&T Management employees whose positions appeared to focus on marketing activities; (9) GAO questions the propriety of these claims because Medicare does not reimburse providers for marketing costs used to increase patient utilization of the provider's facilities; (10) in another payroll-cost matter, Mrs. Reed purchased a business from a third party, hired that individual to work for P&T Management, and gave the individual a $10,000 bonus that was considered partial payment of the purchase price; (11) Mid-Delta then improperly claimed the bonus as part of its payroll costs and was reimbursed by Medicare for this payment; (12) the purchase of a business does not qualify as a payroll cost; and morever, Medicare does not reimburse providers for the cost of purchasing a business; (13) as alleged by current and former Mid-Delta Home Health nurses, Mid-Delta staff visited individual Medicare beneficiaries whose eligibility or need for the visits was questionable; and (14) GAO visited or reviewed case files for 41 of the patients identified by the nurses and determined that for at least 14, or 34 percent, of the patients, eligibility for Medicare-reimbursed services was questionable. |
gao_GAO-04-524T | gao_GAO-04-524T_0 | Background
The diversion and abuse of prescription drugs are associated with incalculable costs to society in terms of addiction, overdose, death, and related criminal activities. One recent example of this growing diversion problem concerns the controlled substance oxycodone, the active ingredient in over 20 prescription drugs, including OxyContin, Percocet, and Percodan. The data provided to DEA are available for use in monitoring the distribution of controlled substances throughout the United States, in identifying retail-level registrants that received unusual quantities of controlled substances, and in investigations of illegal diversions at the manufacturer and wholesaler levels. State Monitoring Programs Varied in Objectives and Operation
State prescription drug monitoring programs varied in their objectives and operation. Which agency, such as a pharmacy board or public health department, was given responsibility for the program also varied across states. State monitoring programs are intended to facilitate the collection, analysis, and reporting of information on the prescribing, dispensing, and use of prescription drugs within a state. We found that state programs varied in their objectives. All states used monitoring programs primarily to assist law enforcement in detecting and preventing drug diversion, and but some also used the programs for educational purposes. They also identified patients who may have been abusing or diverting prescription drugs and provided this information to practitioners. Monitoring programs have also been used to educate physicians, pharmacies, and the public about the existence and extent of diversion, diversion scams, the drugs most likely to be diverted by individuals, and ways to prevent drug diversion. State programs varied in the controlled substances they covered, in part because of differences in available resources and other state-specific factors such as level of drug abuse. Some state programs had electronic reporting systems, while others were paper-based. State Monitoring Programs Have Helped Shorten Investigation Times and May Reduce Illegal Drug Diversion
We found that states with monitoring programs have experienced considerable reductions in the time and effort required by law enforcement and regulatory investigators to explore leads and the merits of possible drug diversion cases. We also found that the presence of a monitoring program in a state may help reduce illegal drug diversion there, but that diversion activities may increase in contiguous states without programs. In each of the three states we studied, state monitoring programs led to reductions in investigation times. In both Kentucky and Nevada, an increased number of program reports were being used by physicians to check the prescription drug use histories of current and prospective patients when deciding whether to prescribe certain drugs that are subject to abuse. Law enforcement officials told us that they view these drug history checks as initial deterrents— a front-line defense—to prevent individuals from visiting multiple physicians to obtain prescriptions, because patients are aware that physicians can review their prescription drug history. For an individual who may be seeking multiple controlled substance prescriptions, the check allows a physician to analyze the prescription drug history to determine whether drug treatment appears questionable, and if so, to verify it with the listed physicians. As drug diverters became aware of the Kentucky program’s ability to trace their drug histories, they tended to move their diversion activities to nearby nonmonitored states. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increasing diversion of prescription drugs for illegal purposes or abuse is a disturbing trend in the nation's battle against drug abuse. Diversion can include such activities as prescription forgery and "doctor shopping" by individuals who visit numerous physicians to obtain multiple prescriptions. The most frequently diverted prescription drugs are controlled substances that are prone to abuse, addiction, and dependence, such as hydrocodone (the active ingredient in Lortab and many other drugs) and oxycodone (the active ingredient in OxyContin and many other drugs). Some states use prescription drug monitoring programs to control illegal diversion of prescription drugs that are controlled substances. GAO was asked to examine (1) how state monitoring programs compare in terms of their objectives and operation and (2) the impact of state monitoring programs on illegal diversion of prescription drugs. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Prescription Drugs: State Monitoring Programs Provide Useful Tool to Reduce Diversion, GAO-02-634 (May 17, 2002). In that report, the programs in Kentucky, Utah, and Nevada were selected for more in-depth study because they were the most recently established programs at the time.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the 15 state monitoring programs in place in 2002 differed in their objectives and operation. The programs were intended to facilitate the collection, analysis, and reporting of information about the prescribing, dispensing, and use of controlled substances. They provided data and analysis to state law enforcement and regulatory agencies to assist in identifying and investigating activities potentially related to illegal drug diversion. The programs could be used by physicians to check a patient's prescription drug history to determine if the individual was doctor shopping to seek multiple controlled substances. Some programs also offered educational programs for the public, physicians, and pharmacists regarding the nature and extent of the problem and medical treatment options for abusers of diverted drugs. The programs varied primarily in terms of the specific drugs they covered and the type of state agency in which they were housed. Some programs covered only those prescription drugs that are most prone to abuse and addiction, whereas others provided more extensive coverage. In addition, most programs were administered by a state law enforcement agency, a state department of health, or a state board of pharmacy. GAO also found that state monitoring programs may have realized benefits in their efforts to reduce drug diversion. These included improving the timeliness of law enforcement and regulatory investigations. Each of the three states studied reduced its investigation time by at least 80 percent. In addition, law enforcement officials told GAO that they view the programs as a deterrent to doctor shopping, because potential diverters are aware that any physician from whom they seek a prescription may first examine their prescription drug utilization histories based on monitoring program data. For example, as drug diverters became aware of Kentucky's ability to trace their drug histories, they tended to move their diversion activities to nearby nonmonitored states. |
gao_GAO-04-382 | gao_GAO-04-382_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, asked GAO to address a number of issues concerning the water data that various organizations collect, and the degree to which their data collection efforts are coordinated with each other. Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) the key entities that collect water quality and water quantity data, including the types of data they collect, how they store their data, and how entities can access the data; and (2) the extent to which these entities coordinate their water quality and water quantity data collection efforts. Water Quality Data Collection
At least 15 federal agencies, as well as state agencies, local governments, volunteer monitoring groups, industry groups, members of academia and others, collect water quality data. While several federal agencies store at least some of their data in STORET and NWIS, officials in ten of the agencies we surveyed said that all or most of their water quality data are stored in databases that are specific to the project or program for which the data are collected. Volunteer monitoring groups collect data for a variety of parameters. States use volunteer monitoring groups’ data in a variety of ways. The U.S. Geological Survey is also a major collector of water use data under its National Water Use Information Program. Improved Coordination of Water Quality Data Collection Can Help Watershed Managers Make More Informed Decisions
Despite the vast array of organizations collecting water quality data, we and others have documented a considerable shortage of these data. Specifically, organizations (1) collect data for disparate missions, (2) often use inconsistent data collection protocols, (3) are often unaware of data collected by others, and (4) often assign data coordination a low priority. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To enhance and clearly define authority for coordinating the collection of water data nationwide, we recommend that the Congress consider formally designating a lead organization (either an existing water data coordinating entity or one of the federal agencies with broad water data collection responsibilities) for this purpose. Coordinate the development of an Internet-based clearinghouse to convey what entities are collecting what types of data. Overall Lack of Water Quantity Data Is a Key Concern
Among federal and state officials we interviewed, the most frequently cited concern about water quantity data was the general lack of data available to aid decision making. Federal and state officials cited several key reasons for better coordination of water quantity data as follows: Water quantity data collection is more centralized among fewer entities, which allows users and collectors to more easily identify data sources that may be helpful in making watershed management decisions and encourages coordination to meet a common purpose. At the same time, we found that more water quantity data are needed to make well- supported watershed management decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reliable and complete data are needed to assess watersheds--areas that drain into a common body of water--and allocate limited cleanup resources. Historically, water officials have expressed concern about a lack of water data. At the same time, numerous organizations collect a variety of water data. To address a number of issues concerning the water data that various organization collect, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, asked GAO to determine (1) the key entities that collect water data, the types of data they collect, how they store the data, and how entities can access the data; and (2) the extent that water quality and water quantity data collection efforts are coordinated.
What GAO Found
At least 15 federal agencies collect a wide variety of water quality data. Most notably, the U.S. Geological Survey operates several large water quality monitoring programs across the nation. States also play a key role in water quality data collection to fulfill their responsibilities under the Clean Water Act. In addition, numerous local watershed groups, volunteer monitoring groups, industries, and academic groups collect water quality data. In contrast, collection of water quantity data is more centralized, with three federal agencies collecting the majority of data available nationwide. While GAO found notable exceptions, officials in almost all of the federal and state agencies contacted said that coordination of water quality data was falling short of its potential. Key barriers frequently identified as impeding better coordination of water quality data collection include (1) the significantly different purposes for which groups collect data, (2) inconsistencies in groups' data collection protocols, (3) an unawareness by data collectors as to which entities collect what types of data, and (4) low priority for data coordination, as shown in a lack of support for councils that promote improved coordination. GAO concluded that designating a lead organization with sufficient authority and resources to coordinate data collection could help alleviate these problems and ensure that watershed managers have better information upon which to base critical decisions. Data collectors strongly agree that coordinating water quantity data collection is considerably less problematic. Reasons include the fact that controversial water allocation decisions require accurate and complete water quantity data; that some of the technologies for measuring water quantity allow for immediate distribution of data; that water quantity data parameters are generally more consistent; and that coordination is simplified in that relatively fewer entities collect these data. Collectors of water quantity data generally agreed that an overall shortage of data was a more serious problem than a lack of coordination of the data that are collected. |
gao_GAO-02-419T | gao_GAO-02-419T_0 | Superior’s business strategy of originating and securitizing subprime loans appeared to have led to high earnings, but more importantly its strategy resulted in a high concentration of extremely risky assets. FDIC has retained legal and forensic accounting assistance to conduct an investigation into the failure of Superior Bank. Effectiveness of OTS and FDIC Supervision of Superior Bank
Our review of OTS’s supervision of Superior Bank found that the regulator had information, going back to the mid-1990s, that indicated supervisory concerns with Superior Bank’s substantial retained interests in securitized, subprime home mortgages and recognition that the bank’s soundness depended critically on the valuation of these interests. In a January 2000 meeting with Superior Bank’s Audit Committee to report the audit results for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1999, Ernst & Young noted that “after running their own model to test the Bank’s model, Ernst & Young believes that the overall book values of financial receivables as recorded by the Bank are reasonable considering the Bank’s overall conservative assumptions and methods.” Not only did Ernst & Young not detect the overvaluation of Superior’s residual interests, the firm explicitly supported an incorrect valuation until, at the insistence of the regulators, the Ernst &Young office that had conducted the audit sought a review of its position on the valuation by its national office. OTS and FDIC disagree on what happened next. Although a PCA directive was issued when the bank became “significantly undercapitalized,” losses to the deposit insurance fund were still substantial. PTL was a California bank that failed in 1999, costing the insurance fund approximately $52 million. | What GAO Found
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has projected that the failure of Superior Bank could cost the deposit insurance fund as much as $526 million. A major reason for the failure was Superior Bank's business strategy of originating and securing subprime loans on a large scale. In addition to the concentration in risky assets, the bank did not properly value and account for the interests that it had retained in pooled home mortgages. Superior's external auditor, Ernst & Young, also failed to detect the improper valuation of Superior's retained interest until the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and FDIC insisted that the issue be reviewed by the auditor's national office. Federal regulators did not identify and act on the bank's problems early enough to prevent a loss to the deposit insurance fund. Both OTS and FDIC were aware of the substantial concentration of retained interests that Superior held, but they took little action because of the apparently high level of earnings, the apparently adequate capital, and the belief that the bank's management was conservatively managing the institution. |
gao_GAO-14-576T | gao_GAO-14-576T_0 | By linking financial and performance information, the PARs provide important information about the return on the taxpayers’ investment in agency programs and operations. Effective financial management is also fundamental to achieving DOD’s broader business transformation goals in the areas of asset management, acquisition and contract management, and business systems modernization. Effect of Continuing Financial Management Weaknesses on DOD Management and Operations
As we have previously reported, long-standing weaknesses in DOD’s financial management adversely affect the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the department’s operations.and related business management and system deficiencies continue to adversely affect its ability to control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues. As we have previously recommended, the successful transformation of DOD’s financial management processes and operations is necessary for DOD to routinely generate timely, complete, and reliable financial and other information for DOD’s pervasive financial day-to-day decision making, including the information needed to effectively (1) manage its assets, (2) assess program performance and make budget decisions, (3) make cost-effective operational choices, and (4) provide accountability over the use of public funds. Problems in accounting for liabilities affect the determination of the full cost of the federal governments operations and the extent of its liabilities. The flawed methodology for estimating improper payments also limits the effectiveness of DOD’s corrective actions. In a February 2014 report on our audit of the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements, we reported that DOD was responsible for the majority of the federal government’s inventories and property, plant, and equipment and that DOD did not maintain adequate systems or have sufficient records to provide reliable information on these assets. In February 2012, we reported that DOD’s reports to the Congress on estimated weapon system operating and support costs are often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable, limiting visibility needed for effective oversight of these costs. Continuing reports of violations of the Antideficiency Act (ADA) and other fiscal laws, such as the Purpose Statute, underscore DOD’s inability to assure that obligations and expenditures are properly recorded and do not exceed statutory levels of control. According to copies of ADA violation reports we reviewed, DOD reported 75 ADA violations from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2012, totaling nearly $1.1 billion. Process for identifying and mitigating risks to the FIAR effort. Component implementation of the FIAR Guidance. We recommended that DOD take various actions to improve the development, implementation, documentation, and oversight of DOD’s financial management improvement efforts. DOD agreed with our recommendation and is taking actions to address it. Without a competent workforce and effective implementation of financial management processes, systems, and controls, DOD and its components are at risk that DOD’s other financial management reform activities will not be successful, resulting in incomplete and unreliable data for decision making. In conclusion, while DOD has several financial management improvement efforts under way and is monitoring progress against milestones, as the dates for validating audit readiness approach, DOD has emphasized asserting audit readiness by a certain date over making sure that effective processes, systems, and controls are in place to ensure that its components have improved financial management information for day-to- day decision making. While establishing and working toward milestones are important to measure progress, DOD should not lose sight of the ultimate goal of implementing lasting financial management reform to ensure that it has the systems, processes, and personnel to routinely generate reliable financial management and other information critical to decision making and effective operations for achieving its missions. DOD Financial Management: Ineffective Risk Management Could Impair Progress toward Audit-Ready Financial Statements. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given the federal government's continuing fiscal challenges, it is more important than ever that the Congress, the administration, and federal managers have reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information to help ensure fiscal responsibility and demonstrate accountability, particularly for the federal government's largest department, the Department of Defense. GAO has previously reported that serious and continuing deficiencies in DOD's financial management make up one of three major impediments to achieving an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements.
GAO's statement focuses on (1) the effect of continuing financial management challenges on DOD management and operations and (2) DOD's efforts to improve financial management and its remaining challenges. GAO's statement is primarily based on previously issued reports, including GAO's updates on DOD high-risk areas and its audit reports on DOD's financial management, inventory management and asset visibility, weapon system costs, business transformation, and business system modernization.
What GAO Found
Long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD) financial management adversely affect the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of its operations. The successful transformation of DOD's financial management processes and operations will allow DOD to routinely generate timely, complete, and reliable financial and other information for day-to-day decision making, including the information needed to effectively (1) manage its assets, (2) assess program performance and make budget decisions, (3) make cost-effective operational choices, and (4) provide accountability over the use of public funds. Examples of the operational impact of DOD's financial management weaknesses include
the inability to properly account for and report DOD's total assets—about 33 percent of the federal government's reported total assets—including inventory ($254 billion) and property, plant, and equipment ($1.3 trillion);
the inability to accurately estimate the extent of its improper payments because of a flawed estimating methodology, which also limits corrective actions;
inconsistent and sometimes unreliable reports to the Congress on estimated weapon system operating and support costs, limiting visibility needed for effective oversight of these costs; and
continuing reports of Antideficiency Act violations—75 such violations reported from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2012, totaling nearly $1.1 billion—which emphasize DOD's inability to ensure that obligations and expenditures are properly recorded and do not exceed statutory levels of control.
DOD has numerous efforts under way to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses. The Congress has played a major role in many of the corrective actions by mandating them in various fiscal year National Defense Authorization Acts. However, improving the department's financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and the Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. Key challenges remain, such as identifying and mitigating risks to achieving the goals of DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) effort and successfully implementing the FIAR Guidance at the DOD component level, modernizing DOD's business information systems, and improving the financial management workforce.
DOD is monitoring its component agencies' progress toward audit readiness. However, as dates for validating audit readiness approach, DOD has emphasized asserting audit readiness by a certain date instead of making sure that effective processes, systems, and controls are in place, without which it cannot ensure that its components have improved financial management information for day-to-day decision making. While time frames are important to measuring progress, DOD should not lose sight of the ultimate goal of implementing lasting financial management reform to ensure that it can routinely generate reliable financial management and other information critical to decision making and effective operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations for improving financial systems and business systems that provide financial information as well as related processes and internal controls. DOD has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and is taking actions to address many of them. |
gao_GAO-04-612 | gao_GAO-04-612_0 | Between 1999 and 2003, the Congress reimbursed the agencies for about 80 percent of the funds that were transferred on average. From 1999 through 2003, Agencies Transferred over $2.7 Billion from Numerous Programs
For each of the last 5 years, wildfire suppression costs have been substantially greater than the amount of funds appropriated for suppression, necessitating the Forest Service and Interior to transfer over $2.7 billion from other agency programs to help fund wildfire suppression activities. As illustrated in figure 1, suppression costs have exceeded suppression appropriations almost every year since 1990. Interior transferred funds mostly from its construction and land acquisition programs, with about two-thirds of the funds coming from construction. Transfers Caused Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained Relationships with Agency Partners, and Created Difficulties in Program Management
The Forest Service and Interior canceled or delayed numerous projects, failed to fulfill certain commitments to partners, and faced difficulties in managing their programs when funds were transferred for fire suppression. Further, agency relationships with state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and communities became strained when the agencies could not fulfill commitments, such as awarding grants on time. The $100 million was intended to last for 5 years. Agencies’ Management Efforts Were Disrupted
When funds were transferred for fire suppression, the agencies’ efforts to manage their programs—including budgeting and planning for annual and long-term programs of work—were disrupted. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help minimize the impacts of wildfire funding transfers on other agency programs and to improve the agencies’ budget estimates for wildfire suppression costs, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Forest Service and Interior agencies to work together to improve their methods for estimating annual wildfire suppression costs by more effectively accounting for annual changes in costs and the uncertainties associated with wildfires in making these estimates, so that funding needs for wildfire suppression can be predicted with greater accuracy; annually conduct a formal assessment of how the agencies’ methods for estimating annual suppression costs and their monthly forecasting models performed in estimating wildfire suppression costs relative to actual costs, to determine if additional improvements are needed; and consistently track accomplishment shortfalls caused by funding transfers across all programs and include this information in annual accomplishment reports to provide agency decision makers and the Congress with better information for making wildfire suppression transfer and funding decisions. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To reduce the potential need for the Forest Service and Interior to rely on transferring funds from other programs to pay for wildfire suppression on public lands, the Congress could consider alternative funding approaches for wildfire suppression, such as, but not limited to, establishing a governmentwide or agency-specific emergency reserve account. Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount and the programs from which the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior transferred funds from 1999 through 2003, we collected data from the agencies’ headquarters on funds transferred and reimbursed by agency, program, and year. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, wildfires burned roughly 4 million acres, destroyed over 5,000 structures, took the lives of 30 firefighters, and cost over $1 billion to suppress. The substantial expense of fighting wildfires has exceeded the funds appropriated for wildfire suppression nearly every year since 1990. To pay for wildfire suppression costs when the funds appropriated are insufficient, the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have transferred funds from their other programs. GAO was asked to identify (1) the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed for wildfire suppression since 1999, and the programs from which agencies transferred funds; (2) the effects on agency programs from which funds were taken; and (3) alternative approaches that could be considered for estimating annual suppression costs and funding wildfire suppression.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and Interior transferred over $2.7 billion from other agency programs to help fund wildfire suppression over the last 5 years. On average, the Congress reimbursed agencies about 80 percent of the amounts transferred. Interior primarily used funds from its construction and land acquisition accounts. In recent years, the Forest Service used funds from many different programs; while before 2001, it transferred funds from a single reforestation program/timber sale area restoration trust fund. Transferring funds for wildfire suppression resulted in canceled and delayed projects, strained relationships with state and local agency partners, and difficulties in managing programs. These impacts affected numerous activities, including fuels reduction and land acquisition. Although transfers were intended to aid fire suppression, some projects that could improve agency capabilities to fight fires, such as purchasing additional equipment, were canceled or delayed. Further, agencies' relationships with states, nonprofit groups, and communities were negatively impacted because agency officials could not fulfill commitments, such as awarding grants. Transfers also disrupted the agencies' ability to manage programs, including annual and long-term budgeting and planning. Although the agencies took some steps to mitigate the impacts of transfers, the effects were widespread and will likely increase if transfers continue. To better manage the wildfire suppression funding shortfall, the agencies should improve their methods for estimating suppression costs by factoring in recent changes in the costs and uncertainties of fighting wildfires. Also, the Congress could consider alternative funding approaches, such as establishing a governmentwide or agency-specific reserve account. |
gao_GAO-02-480T | gao_GAO-02-480T_0 | The employer, as plan sponsor, is responsible for funding the promised benefit, investing and managing the plan assets, and bearing the investment risk. Enron’s employee stock ownership plan, like other ESOPs, was designed to encourage employee ownership in their company. Enhanced Disclosure Could Help Employees Understand Investment Risks They Face
Enron’s failure highlights the importance of plan participants receiving clear information about their pension plan and any changes to it that could affect plan benefits. Such arrangements consist of separate, but associated defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Fiduciaries are required to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. Fiduciaries are required to follow their plan’s documents and act in accordance with the terms of the plan as it is set out. Conclusions
The Enron collapse, although not by itself evidence that private pension law should be changed, serves to illustrate what can happen to employees’ retirement savings under certain conditions. In particular, Congress may wish to consider whether further restrictions on floor-offset arrangements are warranted, whether to provide additional employee flexibility in connection with matches in the form of employer stocks, and whether to limit the amount of employer stock that can be held in certain retirement saving plans. | What GAO Found
The collapse of the Enron Corporation and the resulting loss of employee retirement savings highlighted several key vulnerabilities in the nation's private pension system. Asset diversification was a crucial lesson, especially for defined contribution plans, in which employees bear the investment risk. The Enron case underscores the importance of encouraging employees to diversify. Workers need clear and understandable information about their pension plans to make sound decisions on retirement savings. Although disclosure rules require plan sponsors to provide participants with a summary of their plan benefits and rights and to notify them when benefits are changed, this information is not always clear, particularly in the case of complex plans like floor-offset arrangements. Employees, like other investors, also need reliable and understandable information on a company's financial condition and prospects. Fiduciary standards form the cornerstone of private pension protections. These standards require plan sponsors to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Enron investigations should determine whether plan fiduciaries acted in accordance with their responsibilities. |
gao_T-RCED-97-200 | gao_T-RCED-97-200_0 | A state with infected cattle or bison may also be subject to restrictions imposed by other states. In the early 1960s, however, elk kills initiated by park officials to reduce the size of a herd that was considered too large, led to a public outcry, studies, and U. S. Senate hearings on Yellowstone’s wildlife management policy. According to park staff, although little information was available on how functioning elk and bison populations might respond in a natural environment, park managers thought that Yellowstone might be a place to develop this knowledge and resolve the controversy over the size of the herds by letting natural forces regulate the populations. Current laws and regulations give park managers broad discretion on how to manage wildlife in the park. For example, Grand Teton National Park (330,000 acres), just south of Yellowstone (2.2 million acres), has a different mandate, history, neighbors, and geography and has adopted a different policy for managing bison and elk. Grand Teton National Park’s legislation provides for hunting elk within portions of the park and for grazing cattle—two uses that are not allowed in Yellowstone. In addition, critics say that the large elk and bison herds have damaged riparian areas. According to the Park Service’s recently published compilation of 28 reports on research studies of the northern range, Yellowstone’s grasslands do not appear to be overgrazed by any definition of overgrazing. First, bison migrate because they are nomadic. The Controversy Over the Risk of Transmitting Brucellosis From Bison and Elk to Cattle
The extent to which domestic cattle risk infection through exposure to diseased bison and elk—either from mingling directly with infected wild animals or from using rangeland where infected wild animals have previously grazed—is the subject of intense controversy between the Park Service, wildlife management agencies, wildlife conservation groups, livestock interests, Native Americans, and others. Furthermore, although the risk of such transmission has never been quantified, the Park Service maintains that it is likely to be very low. Both Montana and Wyoming officials believe that the vaccines they have used successfully with domestic cattle could be applied to the park’s bison and elk herds. In discussing the controversy surrounding this issue, one official described it as a war. As a result, about 1,100 bison were shot or captured and slaughtered last winter. The goal is to design a plan that will maintain the state’s brucellosis-free classification, reduce damage to private property, and sustain the free-roaming bison and elk herds. Observations
The impact of Yellowstone’s bison and elk herds on the park’s range and riparian areas and the potential for these animals to transmit brucellosis to cattle are highly controversial, sensitive, and emotional issues for the affected parties. This past winter, the slaughter of bison that migrated out of the park, combined with the winter kill, reduced the bison herd to about half of its size the previous year. In the short term, this reduction may limit the migration of bison from the park, relieve some of the immediate pressure on the Park Service to take management actions, and create an opportunity for the Park Service and its critics to complete and assess the results of studies such as the National Academy of Sciences’ review of brucellosis issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed wildlife management issues at Yellowstone National Park, focusing on the: (1) National Park Service's (NPS) current policy for managing free-roaming bison and elk in Yellowstone; (2) controversy surrounding the impact of these herds on the park's rangeland and riparian areas; and (3) controversy surrounding the risks to domestic livestock posed by exposure to diseased bison and elk.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) current laws and regulations provide park managers with broad discretion on how to manage their park's resources; (2) as a result, parks with similar wildlife resources, such as Yellowstone and neighboring Grand Teton National Park, can apply different approaches to managing these resources; (3) while Yellowstone uses "natural regulation," a policy that allows natural forces to regulate the size of its bison and elk herds, Grand Teton has established specific goals and objectives to control the size of its bison herd; (4) critics of Yellowstone's policy believe that the policy's implementation has produced bison and elk herds that are too large and damage the park; (5) in their view, the park's rangelands are being overgrazed, the riparian areas are being damaged, and because these lands are being depleted, bison and elk are migrating from the park in search of forage on private lands and public grazing areas; (6) according to NPS' recently published studies, however, researchers have found that Yellowstone's grasslands are not overgrazed, and several factors have contributed to the decline of the range and of the riparian areas' woody vegetation; (7) park officials believe that bison are leaving the park for a combination of reasons, because these animals are nomadic by nature, they do not have access to sufficient forage during hard winters, and they can follow snowmobile trails out of the park; (8) the health of Yellowstone's bison and elk herds is a major concern for livestock owners and public officials in the states bordering the park; (9) because many Yellowstone bison and elk are infected with brucellosis, a disease that can cause cattle to abort during pregnancy, these parties fear that the wild animals may transmit the disease to domestic cattle; (10) a state with infected livestock may lose its federal brucellosis-free classification, jeopardizing its right to freely transport cattle across state lines; (11) as a result, these parties believe that the risk of transmitting brucellosis from bison to domestic cattle must be eliminated by containing bison within the park, by using vaccines, or by shooting or capturing bison that leave the park; (12) according to NPS, the risk that brucellosis will be transmitted from either elk or bison to cattle is likely to be very low; (13) this past winter, the Yellowstone bison herd was reduced to about a half of its size the previous year; and (14) in the short term, this reduction may provide an opportunity for NPS and its critics to complete and assess the results of studies which could go a long way toward resolving this controversy. |
gao_GAO-07-821T | gao_GAO-07-821T_0 | States and local governments may then provide a portion of this funding to a range of entities, as specified in DHS’s program guidance. Federal and State Governments Provide Resources to School Districts for Emergency Management Planning, While Only States Have Laws that Require School Emergency Management Planning
Although no federal laws exist requiring school districts to have emergency management plans, most states reported having requirements for school emergency management planning; however, the federal government, along with states, provides financial and other resources for such planning. However, DHS program guidance does not clearly identify school districts as entities to which states and local governments may disburse grant funds. Congress has not enacted any broadly applicable laws requiring all school districts to have emergency management plans. Federal Agencies and States Provide Funding for School Districts’ Emergency Management Planning
Education and DHS provided some funding to school districts for emergency management. Although DHS officials told us that these three grant programs allow for the use of funds at the district or school level, the department’s program guidance does not clearly specify that school districts are among the entities to which state and local governments may disburse funds. Federal Agencies and States Provide Guidance, Training, and Equipment for Emergency Management in School Districts
The federal government also provides guidance, training, and equipment to school districts to assist in emergency management planning (see table 1). Education, DHS, and HHS have collaborated and developed recommended practices to assist in preparing for emergencies that can be applied to school districts. Most Districts Have Taken Steps to Prepare for Emergencies, but Some Plans and Activities Do Not Address Recommended Practices
Almost all school districts have taken steps to prepare for emergencies, including developing written plans, but some plans do not address federally recommended practices such as establishing procedures for special needs students and procedures for continued student education in the event of an extended closure. 2.) Based on our survey, we estimate that 56 percent of school districts do not include any of the following procedures (see table 3) in their plans for the continuation of student education during an extended school closure. Fewer than half of school districts with emergency management plans involve community partners such as the local head of government (43 percent) or the local public health agency (42 percent) when developing and updating their emergency management plans, as recommended by HHS. Specifically, we estimate that 29 percent of all school districts train with community partners. School Districts Report Challenges in Planning for Emergencies and Difficulties in Communicating with First Responders and Parents
In planning for emergencies, many school districts face challenges resulting from competing priorities, a lack of equipment, and limited expertise; some school districts experience difficulties in communicating and coordinating with first responders and parents, but most do not have such challenges with students. In an estimated 62 percent of districts, officials cited a lack of equipment and expertise as impediments to emergency planning. For example, officials in one Massachusetts school district we visited reported that they do not have adequate locks on some of the doors to school buildings to implement a lockdown procedure. Some School Districts Reported Difficulty in Communicating and Coordinating with First Responders
Based on our survey of school districts, an estimated 39 percent of districts with emergency plans experience challenges in communicating and coordinating with local first responders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Events such as the recent shootings by armed intruders in schools across the nation, natural disasters, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and potential pandemics have heightened awareness for the need for school districts to be prepared to address a range of emergencies within and outside of schools buildings. Congress has raised concerns over school preparedness, with a particular interest in how federal agencies provide assistance to school districts. This testimony discusses preliminary findings related to GAO's review of emergency management in school districts, including (1) the roles of federal and state governments in establishing requirements and providing resources to school districts for emergency management planning, (2) what school districts have done to plan and prepare for emergencies, and (3) the challenges school districts have experienced in planning for emergencies, and communicating and coordinating with first responders, parents, and students. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed federal officials, surveyed a stratified random sample of all public school districts, surveyed state agencies that administer federal grants that can be used for school emergency management planning, conducted site visits to school districts, and reviewed relevant documents.
What GAO Found
Federal and state governments have a role in supporting emergency management in school districts. While no federal laws require school districts to have emergency management plans, 32 states reported having laws or policies requiring school districts to have such plans. The Departments of Education and Homeland Security (DHS) provide funding for emergency management planning in schools. However, some DHS program guidance, for specific grants, does not clearly identify school districts as entities to which state and local governments may disburse grant funds. Thus, states receiving this funding may be uncertain as to whether such funding can be allocated to school districts or schools and therefore may not have the opportunity to benefit from this funding. States also provide funding and other resources to school districts to assist them in planning for emergencies. School districts have taken steps to plan for a range of emergencies, as most have developed multi-hazard emergency management plans; however some plans and activities do not address federally recommended practices. For example, based on GAO's survey of a sample of public school districts, an estimated 56 percent of all school districts have not employed any procedures in their plans for continuing student education in the event of an extended school closure, such as might occur during a pandemic, and many do not include procedures for special needs students. Fewer than half of districts with emergency plans involve community partners when developing and updating these plans. Finally, school districts are generally not training with first responders or community partners on how to implement their school district emergency plans. Many school district officials said that they experience challenges in planning for emergencies and some school districts face difficulties in communicating and coordinating with first responders and parents, but most said that they do not experience challenges in communicating with students. For example, in an estimated 62 percent of districts, officials identified challenges stemming from a lack of equipment, training for staff, and personnel with expertise in the area of emergency planning as obstacles to implementing recommended practices. |
gao_GAO-17-215 | gao_GAO-17-215_0 | 1). A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between these entities defines the roles and responsibilities for each of these stakeholders in protecting federal courthouses and the federal framework for securing courthouses. AOUSC Is Able to Identify Security Concerns across the Courthouse Portfolio, While the Marshals Service and FPS Are Able to Identify Concerns at the Individual Building Level
AOUSC Develops Portfolio-Wide Information About Security Concerns
Identifying security concerns at federal courthouses is critical to managing the risk to those courthouses. Marshals Service and FPS Identify Building-Specific Security Concerns That Cannot Readily Be Tracked across the Portfolio of Courthouses
The Marshals Service and FPS also identify security concerns at individual courthouse facilities, focused on their respective missions, but unlike AOUSC, they do not currently collect this information in a way that it can be readily compared across the portfolio of courthouses to gauge the overall concerns with these buildings. The Marshals Service is taking steps to improve the information it collects; however, these steps may not enable it to understand concerns portfolio-wide as defined by our risk management framework, because of the reasons discussed below. The improvements that both agencies are making to their information on security concerns are promising but may not provide the portfolio-wide information that decision makers need to make risk-informed decisions. CSP Shows Potential for Enhancing Security at Federal Courthouses, but Greater Transparency and Collaboration Could Improve the Program
Officials at CSP Locations Cite Improvements in Security as a Result of the Program
Congress provided $20 million in obligational authority for the CSP in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 and also provided obligational authority for the program for fiscal years 2013, 2015, and 2016, which GSA has designated for 11 projects in 10 locations. In addition to transparency improvements related to the selection process, federal stakeholders have enhanced their collaboration during CSP project execution. Further Opportunities to Improve Transparency and Collaboration of the CSP
Although federal stakeholders have taken the aforementioned positive steps to improve CSP, not all of the issues with transparency and collaboration have been addressed, in particular:
Key stakeholders were not clear on the eligibility of particular locations for a CSP project and how to suggest locations for consideration. Key stakeholders hold varying views about how collaborative the process to select CSP projects has been. By developing approaches to provide stakeholders information that clearly describes how all selection criteria are to be applied, how to put forth a location for consideration, what specific costs are eligible for funding within a project, how collaboration is to occur during project selection and execution, and when and how to include all relevant agencies in each phase of the project, stakeholders could be better assured that they all have the same understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that the program is addressing the most urgent needs and that the expertise of all government stakeholders is being used to help ensure that the program is as efficient as possible. Further, information that agencies already collect is not readily shared with the other agencies. Federal Stakeholders Do Not Have an Effective Structure for Addressing Security Issues
We found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS did not routinely meet to address courthouse security problems at a national level where decision-making authority exists. In fact, Marshals Service and AOUSC officials said that there was no working group or forum where the four agencies could discuss issues relevant to courthouse security at the national level where decision-making authority exits. The CSP was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal courthouses and provides a way to add key security features. GSA agreed with our recommendations to improve CSP documentation to improve transparency and collaboration and to establish a national- level working group or similar forum to meet regularly to address courthouse security concerns. After the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was issued, AOUSC provided additional information about actions it has taken in response to this recommendation, including implementing of a communications plan for all new CSP concept studies and ensuring that all stakeholders are included in CSP concept, design, and construction meetings. What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve courthouse security? For each of the six site visit locations that have had or will have a CSP project, we (1) toured the facility to observe security concerns and how these concerns were (or will be) addressed in a CSP project; (2) reviewed documentation including CSP concept plans, security assessments and scores, and other reports indicating security concerns; and (3) interviewed local officials from the General Services Administration (GSA), Marshals Service, and FPS as well as local judiciary officials, to obtain their views about physical security concerns prior to the projects and how these concerns have or will be addressed by the CSP, and about courthouse security concerns in general. | Why GAO Did This Study
The variety of civil and criminal cases tried in 400-plus federal courthouses can pose security risks. The CSP was started in 2012 and was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal courthouses by adding key security features to existing courthouses. Congress has provided $20 million in obligational authority for the program in each of the fiscal years that it has been funded.
GAO was asked to review physical security at federal courthouses. This report discusses (1) the extent to which federal stakeholders have identified security concerns; (2) how the CSP addresses courthouse security concerns; and (3) what actions federal agencies could take, if any, to improve courthouse security. GAO reviewed agency documents, AOUSC security scores, and interviewed officials from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and AOUSC. GAO also visited eight courthouses to include six locations selected for CSP projects, and two that were considered but not selected. Although these site visits cannot be generalized to all CSP project locations or all federal courthouses, they provide insight into federal agencies' practices to secure courthouses.
What GAO Found
Three federal agencies—the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective Service (FPS)—collect information about security concerns at federal courthouses related to the agencies' respective missions. However, only AOUSC develops information that can be used to understand security concerns across the courthouse portfolio. In contrast, the Marshals Service and FPS collect information on security concerns on a building-by-building basis in varied ways, but the manner in which the information is collected prevents it from being used to understand portfolio-wide security concerns. This is inconsistent with GAO's risk management framework. Both agencies are taking steps to improve their information, but it is not clear whether these improvements will provide the portfolio-wide information stakeholders need to make risk-informed decisions.
The General Services Administration (GSA) has initiated 11 projects at 10 courthouse locations nationwide, as part of its Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP); two projects have been completed. Local officials said that these projects have already improved or will improve security at the selected courthouses once completed. CSP improvements have been aimed at separating the paths of judges, prisoners, and the public, so that trial participants only meet in the courtroom. Transparency and collaboration issues have emerged among federal stakeholders as the program has been implemented. For example, not all key stakeholders GAO spoke to were clear on the eligibility of specific locations for CSP projects and varied in their views about how collaborative the process to select CSP projects has been. Although stakeholders have taken some steps to improve CSP transparency and collaboration as the program has evolved, some issues remain. Taking additional steps to improve documentation of decision-making and sharing this document with stakeholders could further enhance transparency and collaboration and better assure that all of the agencies and policy makers have the same understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that it is addressing the most urgent courthouse security needs, and that the expertise of all stakeholders is being used to ensure program efficiency.
GAO found that agencies could take additional actions to enhance security at federal courthouses by addressing a related GAO open recommendation, and establishing a formal mechanism such as a working group or forum to enhance coordination and information sharing. Specifically, in 2011, GAO recommended that the agencies update a 1997 memorandum of agreement to clarify their roles and responsibilities. This action has not been done although FPS has taken some steps to start the process. In addition, GAO found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS had not routinely met to address courthouse security issues at a national level where decision-making authority exists. This lack of a formal meeting mechanism inhibits their ability to communicate regularly about their roles and responsibilities and share information about security concerns.
This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive/limited official use report issued in October 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) the Marshals Service and FPS improve the courthouse security information they collect; (2) GSA and AOUSC improve the CSP's transparency and collaboration through better documentation; and (3) GSA establish a working group or other forum to enhance coordination. The agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-121 | gao_HEHS-96-121_0 | These efforts have resulted in a wide range of recommended actions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the VA system. VA developed its health care system as a direct delivery system in which the government owned and operated its own health care facilities. 1.) 2.) 3.) Resources Needed to Meet Needs of Veterans in Mandatory Care Category Are Overstated
The resources VA facilities will need in the next 7 to 10 years to provide hospital and certain outpatient care to veterans in the mandatory care categories for hospital and outpatient care are overstated for the following reasons:
VA did not adequately consider the impact of the declining veteran population on future demand for inpatient hospital care. A significant portion of VA resources is used to provide services to veterans in the discretionary care category who are eligible for care only to the extent that space and resources are available. 4.) 5.) Such actions should save additional costs over the next 7 years. Establishment of Service Networks Should Lead to Increased Emphasis on Efficiency
In 1995, the Under Secretary for Health proposed criteria for potential service realignment that would facilitate the types of changes needed to achieve efficiency comparable with private-sector hospitals and clinics. Similarly, by creating financial incentives for VA medical centers to discharge patients as soon as their medical conditions allow, VA could significantly reduce unnecessary days of hospital care. It is important that VA complete its implementation of clear mechanisms and useful management data by which to hold VISN directors accountable for workload, efficiency, and other performance targets. VHA Comment 1
[This comment responds to GAO’s reporting on page 2 that facilities receive scant pressure to effect efficiencies but do so when they want to implement new services or expand existing ones.] Network directors are at the cutting edge, assessing the current configuration of VA health services and costs in order to make decisions on redirecting resources to achieve a more efficient and patient centered health care system. 8, 1996). VA Health Care: Barriers to VA Managed Care (GAO/HEHS-95-84R, Apr. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care system, focusing on ways that VA could: (1) operate more efficiently; (2) reduce the resources needed to meet veterans' health care needs; and (3) reorganize its health care system and create efficiency incentives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the VA health care system should be able to respond to deficit reduction within the next seven years; (2) VA has overstated the level of resources that it would need to satisfy veterans health care requirements in the next seven to ten years; (3) VA did not adequately consider the impact of the declining veteran population on the future demand for inpatient hospital care; (4) a significant portion of VA resources is used to provide services to veterans in the discretionary care category; (5) VA could significantly reduce its operating costs over the next seven years by completing actions on a wide range of efficiency improvements; (6) the success of these efforts depends on how VA health care facilities spend appropriated funds; (7) VA managers often find ways to operate more efficiently when they need resources to implement new services or expand existing services; (8) VA is holding network directors accountable for the Veterans Integrated Service Network's (VISN) performance; (9) the Under Secretary for Health distributed criteria to help VISN directors develop efficiency initiatives and gave VISN and facility directors authority to realign VA medical centers to achieve efficiencies; (10) VA plans to develop a capitation funding process that provides greater efficiency incentives for VA facilities; and (11) VA must implement clear mechanisms and verify management data to achieve its workload, efficiency, and other performance targets. |
gao_GAO-06-615T | gao_GAO-06-615T_0 | IRS’s Filing Season Performance to Date Has Improved in Important Areas, Continuing a Recent Trend
IRS improved its 2006 filing season performance in important areas that affect large numbers of taxpayers. Taxpayer assistance has improved in the two most commonly used services—toll-free telephones and the Internet Web site. Electronic filing continues to grow but at a slower rate than previous years. 1 for further detail). Taxpayers Continue Their Recent Pattern of Using IRS’s Walk-In Sites Less and Using Volunteer Sites More, And Information About the Quality of Service Remains Limited
Fewer taxpayers have used IRS’s 400 walk-in sites so far in the 2006 filing season compared to the same period in prior years. 2). IRS’s Budget Proposes Decreases in Staffing and Identifies Savings, but Opportunities for Additional Savings Exist
IRS’s fiscal year 2007 budget request is a small decrease compared to 2006 enacted levels after adjusting for expected inflation. For every one of the major taxpayer services listed in the budget, 2007 planned performance goals are higher or equal to 2006 performance goals. 3). IRS’s Proposed BSM Budget Reduction Could Impede Future Progress
BSM is a high-risk, highly complex effort that involves developing and delivering a new set of information systems that are intended to replace the agency’s aging tax processing and business systems. IRS Sets Long-Term Goals, but Lacks a Data-Based Plan for Achieving the Goals, and Addressing the Tax Gap Requires Solutions Beyond Funding and Staffing for IRS
For the first time, IRS’s budget request sets long-term goals aimed at reducing the tax gap, although IRS does not have a data-based plan for achieving the goals. IRS plans to improve voluntary compliance from 83 percent in 2005 to 85 percent by 2009, and reduce the number of taxpayers who think it is acceptable to cheat on their taxes from 10 percent in 2005 to less than 9 percent in 2010. Unfortunately, quantifying the impact of IRS’s service and enforcement programs on compliance or cheating is very challenging. Finally, IRS has continually improved taxpayer service by increasing, for example, the accuracy of responses to tax law questions. Therefore, the Congress will have to rely on the IRS Commissioner for qualitative explanations, of why, in his judgment, IRS’s mix of taxpayer service and enforcement and overall approach for reducing the tax gap, including the 2007 budget proposal, will be sufficient to start IRS on a path towards achieving its long-term goals. Addressing the Tax Gap Requires Solutions Beyond Funding and Staffing for IRS
For years, we have reported that tax law enforcement is a high-risk area, in part because of the size of the gross estimated tax gap, which IRS most recently estimated to be $345 billion for tax year 2001. We have reported that significant reductions in the tax gap will likely require exploring new and innovative solutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) filing season performance affects tens of millions of taxpayers who expect timely refunds and accurate answers to their tax questions. IRS's budget request is a planning tool showing how it intends to provide taxpayer service and enforce the tax laws in 2007. It is also the first in a series of annual steps that will determine whether IRS meets its new long-term goals of increasing tax compliance and reducing taxpayers' acceptance of cheating on their taxes. Tax law enforcement remains on GAO's list of high-risk federal programs, in part, because of the persistence of a large tax gap. IRS recently estimated the gross tax gap, the difference between what taxpayers owe and what they voluntarily pay, to be $345 billion for 2001. GAO assessed (1) IRS's interim 2006 filing season performance; (2) the budget request; and (3) how the budget helps IRS achieve its long-term goals. GAO compared performance and the requested budget to previous years.
What GAO Found
IRS has improved its filing season performance so far in 2006, continuing a trend. More refunds were directly deposited, which is faster and more convenient. Electronic filing continued to grow, but at a slower rate than in previous years. IRS's two most commonly used services--telephone and Web site assistance--continued to improve. IRS estimates that the accuracy rate for its telephone answers is now 90 percent or more. Taxpayers continued the recent pattern of using IRS's walk-in sites less and community based volunteer sites more. The 2007 budget request of $11 billion, a small decrease after adjusting for inflation, sets performance goals for service and enforcement that are all equal to or higher than the 2006 goals. The budget reduces funding by 15 percent for Business Systems Modernization, the ongoing effort to replace IRS's aging information systems. The reduction could impede progress delivering improvements to taxpayers. The budget request identifies over $121 million in savings; however, opportunities exist for further savings. For example, IRS officials told us that IRS's 25 call centers have underutilized space. Those centers could be consolidated without affecting service to taxpayers. Achieving IRS's long-term compliance goals will be challenging because the tax gap has persisted for many years at about its current level. In addition, because the effect of taxpayer service and enforcement on compliance has never been quantified, IRS does not have a data-based plan demonstrating how it will achieve its goals. Nor does IRS have a plan for measuring compliance by 2009, the date for achieving the goals. Reducing the tax gap will likely require new and innovative solutions such as simplifying the tax code, increasing income subject to withholding, and increasing information reporting about income. |
gao_GAO-07-452T | gao_GAO-07-452T_0 | DHS’s Transformation
We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003 based on three factors. For example, many of the major components that were merged into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s national security mission was of such importance that the failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’ health and safety, and our economy. DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges
Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital and acquisition efforts. The strategy should also involve key stakeholders to help ensure that resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in the development of the plan. DHS has also not completed other important planning-related activities. However, DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its management integration efforts. Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage them. Financial Management and Internal Controls
DHS has made limited improvements in addressing financial management and internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant challenges in these areas. Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. Transportation Security
Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in effectively executing transportation security efforts. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS’s Transformation and Integration Efforts
To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure their progress. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
Implementation and Transformation
High-Risk Series: An Update. Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses: (1) why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, (2) management challenges facing DHS, (3) programmatic challenges facing DHS, and (4) actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure success. While DHS has developed a strategic plan, the plan does not link resource requirements to goals and objectives, and its creation did not involve key stakeholders to ensure resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its integration efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements revealed 10 material internal control weaknesses and confirmed that DHS's financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital--the centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will require continued attention to ensure that DHS allocates its resources efficiently and effectively. Since GAO's January 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure that its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advanced contracting for goods and services necessary for emergency response. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its existing management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-859T | gao_GAO-08-859T_0 | Amended Compact of Free Association: 2004-2023
In 2003, the United States approved an amended compact with the FSM that (1) continues the defense relationship; (2) strengthens immigration provisions; and (3) provides an estimated $2.3 billion to the FSM for 2004 through 2023 (see attachment II). The amended compact, which took effect in June 2004, identifies the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the FSM in its efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of its people. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector grants and contributions to the trust fund. In addition, the U.S. and JEMCO are to approve annual sector grants and evaluate the countries’ management of the grants and their progress toward program and economic goals. Moreover, the FSM has not enacted economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects. Total government expenditures in 2006, over half of which were funded by external grants, accounted for about 65 percent of GDP. The FSM’s government budget is characterized by limited tax revenue paired with growing government payrolls. The FSM development plan identifies fishing and tourism as key potential private sector growth industries. Although the FSM has undertaken some efforts aimed at economic policy reform, it has made limited progress in implementing key tax, public sector, land, and foreign investment reforms that are needed to improve its growth prospects. For example: Tax reform. However, as of April 2008, legislation required for implementing these measures had not yet been passed. Public sector reform. Further, while JEMCO recently approved some funding to support FSM efforts at public sector reform, key challenges to improving private sector growth remain. Numerous Factors Hinder Use of Compact Funds to Advance FSM Development Goals
Although the FSM has allocated compact grants to the sectors targeted by the compact, immediate problems in some sectors persist, and several factors have hindered the FSM’s use of the funds to meet long-term development goals. However, the FSM has completed only three infrastructure projects, and more than $67 million of the $82.5 million (approximately 82 percent) allocated for infrastructure grants in 2004 through 2007 remains unspent. Lack of progress in this sector is owed to national and state disagreements over infrastructure priorities, problems associated with the project management unit, and Chuuk’s inability to secure land leases. Unspent funds for other sector grants from 2004 to 2007 amounts to an additional $14.9 million, or around 7 percent of funds allocated (see attachment VI). The allocation of FSM grants among its four states is not needs based and has resulted in significant differences in per capita funding, creating varying levels of government services across the states. Lack of accountability over compact funds. The FSM has failed to consistently monitor day-to-day sector grant operations or report on progress. For example, the FSM’s single audit reports for 2005 and 2006 showed that the FSM’s ability to account for the use of compact funds was limited, as shown by weaknesses in its financial statements and lack of compliance with requirements of major federal programs. OIA has carried out various duties as administrator of the amended compact grants but has not addressed the FSM’s worsening compliance with compact reporting requirements, and several challenges continue to hamper its compact oversight. However, after 5 years—one quarter of the amended compact’s duration—the FSM faces significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance. The FSM economy shows continued dependence on government spending of foreign assistance. The FSM has also been unable to utilize more than $67 million in infrastructure and almost $15 million in other sector grant monies. To maximize the benefits of compact assistance, our prior reports include recommendations that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as chair of the FSM management and trust fund committees, to take a number of actions, including the following: ensure that JEMCO address the lack of FSM progress in implementing reforms to increase investment and tax income; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMCO to work with the FSM to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMCO to work with the FSM to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward compact goals; and ensure the FSM trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. Attachment III: Estimated FSM Per Capita Compact Grant Assistance, Fiscal Years 1987- 2023
Attachment IV: Amended Compact Implementation Framework
Annual sector grant budget
FSM propo grnt budget for ech ector tht inclde proviion – Expenditre, performnce go, nd pecific performnce indictor – Brekdown of peronnel expenditre nd other co – Informtion on U.S. federl progr nd other donor United Ste evuate the propoed ector grnt budget for: – Contency with fnding requirement in the compct nd relted – Identify poitive event thccelerte performnce otcome nd prolem encontered nd their impct on grnt ctivitie nd performnce measurereport to used to: – Monitor generopertion to ensure complince with grnt condition Submit nnual report to the U.S.
Joint management and accountability committee
Attachment V: FSM Sector Grant Allocations, Fiscal Years 2004-2008
Attachment VII: Projections of FSM Account Balance with Three Possible Investment Strategies
U.S. dollar (in illion)
U.S. dollar (in illion)
Attachment VIII: Probability of FSM Trust Fund Income Not Reaching the Maximum Disbursement Levels Allowed, Fiscal Years 2024-2050
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1987 through 2003, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) received more than $1.5 billion in economic assistance under the original Compact of Free Association with the United States. In 2003, the U.S. government approved an amended compact with the FSM that provides an additional $2.3 billion from 2004 through 2023. The Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) is responsible for administering and monitoring this assistance. The amended compact identifies the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the FSM in its efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of its people. The assistance is provided in the form of annually decreasing grants that prioritize health and education, paired with annually increasing contributions to a trust fund intended as a source of revenue for the country after the grants end in 2023. The amended compact also contains several new funding and accountability provisions intended to strengthen reporting and bilateral interaction. Among these provisions is a requirement for the establishment of a joint economic management committee and a trust fund committee to, respectively, among other duties, review the FSM's progress toward compact objectives and assess the trust fund's effectiveness in contributing to the country's economic advancement and long-term budgetary self-reliance. In 2003, we testified that these provisions could improve accountability over the assistance provided but that successful implementation of these provisions would require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from both the United States and the FSM. Drawing on several more recent reports as well as updated information, this report will discuss the FSM's economic prospects, implementation of the amended compact to meet its long-term goals, and potential trust fund earnings.
What GAO Found
The FSM has limited prospects for achieving budgetary self-reliance and long-term economic advancement, and the FSM government has not yet implemented policy reforms needed to enable economic growth. The FSM economy depends on public sector spending of foreign assistance; government expenditures, over half of which are funded by external grants, account for about 65 percent of the FSM's gross domestic product (GDP). The FSM government's budget is characterized by limited tax revenue and a growing wage bill, and the two private sector industries identified as having growth potential--fisheries and tourism--face significant barriers to expansion because of the FSM's remote geographic location, inadequate infrastructure, and poor business environment. Moreover, progress in implementing key tax, public sector, land, and foreign investment policy reforms necessary to improve growth has been slow. For example, although the FSM has agreed on principles of reform to address its tax system that has been characterized by experts as inefficient and inequitable, the FSM government has made limited progress in implementing fundamental tax reform. Also, the FSM's failure to implement key public sector reforms to reduce wage and subsidy expenditures resulted in fiscal crisis in Chuuk and Kosrae. In August 2006, nearly 2 years after the amended compact entered into force, the FSM Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) began discussions of economic policy reform and has since approved some funding to support FSM reform efforts; however, challenges to private sector growth remain. Numerous factors have negatively affected the use of the compact grants for FSM development goals. The FSM's grant allocations have reflected compact priorities by targeting education, health, and infrastructure. However, as of April 2008, the FSM had completed only three infrastructure projects and approximately 82 percent of the $82.5 million in infrastructure funds remained unexpended. Lack of progress in this sector is owed to national and state disagreements over infrastructure priorities, problems associated with the project management unit, and Chuuk's inability to secure land leases. Additionally, the FSM has almost $15 million in unspent funds for other sectors, or around 7 percent of funds allocated from 2004 to 2007. Furthermore, the FSM's distribution of grants among its four states has not been based on need, leading to significant differences in per capita funding, while the FSM's long-term planning has not taken into account the likely effects of the annual funding decrement and other budgetary changes. The FSM has also lacked accountability for the use of compact funds, as demonstrated by weaknesses in its yearly financial statements and lack of compliance with requirements of major federal programs. Moreover, the FSM has not consistently monitored day-to-day grant operations or reported on progress toward program and economic goals, owing to inadequate data, a lack of required reporting, and an unwillingness to dedicate the resources necessary. OIA has conducted administrative oversight of the sector grants, but its oversight has been constrained by the need to assist the FSM with its compact implementation activities such as preparing budgets and addressing financial management problems such as the misuse of compact funds by Chuuk and Kosrae in 2006 and 2007, respectively. |
gao_GAO-11-699 | gao_GAO-11-699_0 | Some Medicare Beneficiaries Received Prescriptions from Five or More Medical Practitioners to Obtain the Same Class of Frequently Abused Drugs
Our analysis of Medicare Part D claims found that 170,000 Medicare beneficiaries received prescriptions from five or more medical practitioners for the 12 classes of frequently abused controlled substances and 2 classes of frequently abused noncontrolled substances in calendar year 2008. This represented about 1.8 percent of the Medicare Part D beneficiaries who received prescriptions for these 14 classes of drugs during the same calendar year. Specifically, approximately 120,000 Medicare beneficiaries (about 71 percent) were eligible for Medicare Part D benefits based on a disability. These drugs represented over 80 percent of the instances of potential doctor shopping we identified. In some cases, beneficiaries may have a justifiable reason for receiving prescriptions from multiple medical practitioners, such as visiting specialists or several prescribers in the same medical group. In these situations, there is heightened concern that these Medicare beneficiaries may be seeking several medical practitioners to support and disguise an addiction. DEA’s definition of doctor shopping specifies an individual receiving more of a drug than intended by any single physician. Table 3 summarizes the 10 examples of doctor shopping for prescription drugs, including controlled substances, in the Medicare Part D program. Although systems are in place to identify individuals with doctor shopping behavior, according to CMS Part D program officials, federal law does not authorize Part D plans to restrict the access of these individuals. Although not currently used in the Medicare Part D program, officials from the Part D plan sponsors we interviewed stated that additional controls already in place in the Medicaid program and in some private sector plans could be used to better restrict the dispensing of abused drugs, such as hydrocodone and oxycodone, to individuals identified as doctor shoppers through detecting a pattern of abuse during retrospective analysis. There are issues to consider with a restricted recipient program, such as potentially denying legitimate drug needs and unknown costs for administration. Increased controls over dispensing highly abusive drugs can help reduce the risk that individuals will use Medicare to facilitate their dangerous drug activities, which increases the cost of the program and jeopardizes patient care. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve efforts to address doctor shopping by beneficiaries of highly abused prescription drugs, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS review our findings, evaluate the existing DUR program, and consider additional steps such as a restricted recipient program for Medicare Part D that would limit these beneficiaries to one prescriber, one pharmacy, or both for receiving prescriptions. CMS could consider piloting such a program with a focus on hydrocodone and oxycodone, the two drug classes where we identified the largest potential doctor shopping activity. In considering such controls, CMS should seek congressional authority as appropriate. CMS agreed with our overall recommendation to improve efforts to curb overutilization in Part D, but disagreed that a restricted recipient program is necessarily the appropriate control for the Part D program. To reflect the issues raised by CMS, we revised our recommendation to include other actions that may be taken by CMS to address overutilization of prescription drugs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, GAO reported on doctor shopping in Medicaid, where individuals see several doctors and pharmacies, receiving more of a drug than was intended by any single physician. Questions have been raised about whether similar activity exists in Medicare Part D. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries obtained frequently abused drugs from multiple prescribers, (2) identify examples of doctor shopping activity, and (3) determine the actions taken by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to limit access to drugs for known abusers. To meet the objectives, GAO analyzed Medicare Part D claims for calendar year 2008 to identify potential doctor shoppers. To identify examples, GAO chose a nonrepresentative selection of 10 beneficiaries based on a number of factors, including the number of prescribers. GAO also interviewed policy officials from CMS and from prescription drug plans that administer the drug benefit program.
What GAO Found
GAO found indications of doctor shopping in the Medicare Part D program for 14 categories of frequently abused prescription drugs. About 170,000 beneficiaries (about 1.8 percent of beneficiaries receiving these 14 categories of drugs) acquired the same class of frequently abused drugs, primarily hydrocodone and oxycodone, from five or more medical practitioners during calendar year 2008 at a cost of about $148 million (about 5 percent of the total cost for these drugs). About 120,000 of these beneficiaries were eligible for Medicare Part D because of a disability. There may be justifiable reasons for receiving prescriptions from multiple medical practitioners, such as visiting specialists or several prescribers in the same medical group. However, one individual received prescriptions from 87 different medical practitioners in 2008. In such situations, there is heightened concern that Medicare beneficiaries are seeing several medical practitioners to support and disguise an addiction. GAO judgmentally selected 10 beneficiaries and found that they were doctor shopping for prescription drugs. These cases are among the more egregious and cannot be generalized beyond the examples presented. CMS has systems in place to identify individuals with doctor shopping behavior; however, according to CMS policy officials, federal law may not authorize them to restrict these individuals' access to drugs, including highly abused drugs, such as hydrocodone and oxycodone. One option to control doctor shopping used by Medicaid and some private sector plans is the restricted recipient program. It limits individuals identified as doctor shoppers to one prescriber, one pharmacy, or both for receiving prescriptions. There are issues to consider with a restricted recipient program, such as potentially denying legitimate drug needs and unknown administrative costs. These issues should be balanced against the potential protections such a program can provide. Doctor shopping for frequently abused drugs can increase the cost of the Part D program and jeopardize patient care. Controls proven to reduce doctor shopping could be considered by CMS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS review its findings and consider steps such as a restricted recipient program for identified doctor shoppers and seek congressional authority, as appropriate. CMS agreed with the overall recommendation to improve its efforts to curb overutilization in Part D, but disagreed that a restricted recipient program is necessarily the appropriate control for the Part D program. |
gao_GAO-16-7 | gao_GAO-16-7_0 | K-12 Geography Education
According to The National Geographic Society, the subject of geography can include a disproportionate focus on dates, events, and individuals. However, geography—the study of places and the relationship between people and their environment—is an integral tool used to understand and make informed decisions about global problems. Data Show Most Eighth Grade Students Are Not Proficient in Geography, and Little Time is Spent on Instruction
About Three-Quarters of Eighth Grade Students are Not Proficient in Geography
Most eighth grade students—about three-quarters—in 2014 scored below the proficient level, indicating partial or less than partial mastery in geography, according to our analysis of Education’s nationally representative NAEP data (see fig. In 2014, certain groups of eighth grade students outperformed others. Teachers Reported Spending a Small Portion of Instruction Time on Geography
Data on student access to geography education showed that a small portion of instruction time is spent on the subject. Of those teachers spending 3 to 5 hours per week of classroom instruction time on social studies, more than half reported that “10 percent or less” of their social studies time was spent on geography. According to one university research center’s 2013 survey of states’ geography education requirements, most states did not require geography courses in middle school and high school. State education officials and K-12 teachers we interviewed echoed this sentiment, stating that allocating resources for geography education was challenging in the face of greater national and state focus on tested subjects. Perception of Geography – There is a common misconception about what geography entails, according to officials we interviewed and relevant reports we reviewed. Other Challenges – State officials and teachers we interviewed also identified other challenges. Education’s Primary Role in Geography Education is Assessing Student Achievement
Education’s role with respect to geography education primarily involves assessing student performance in the subject, and providing data and the results of its analysis to the public. However, since its development in 1994, the NAEP geography assessment has not been administered as regularly as reading and mathematics because assessing achievement in geography is not required by law. Education provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. (2) What challenges do selected school officials and teachers face in providing geography education? In addition, we reviewed selected studies and research reports, including a report with results from a 50-state survey of geography requirements. Review of Federal Laws, Policies, and Guidance
To determine the federal role with respect to geography education, we reviewed relevant federal laws, including the most recent reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the National Assessment of Educational Progress Authorization Act. Data on Student Proficiency and Access
To address the extent to which K-12 students are proficient in and have access to geography education, we analyzed Department of Education data from nationally representative samples of public and nonpublic school students in grades 4, 8, and 12 from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in geography for 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2014—the years in which the NAEP assessments in geography were administered. To provide information on students’ access to geography education, we analyzed and reported on access as measured by (1) teacher and student-reported instruction time spent on geography in the classroom as well as (2) exposure to other geography- related skills and topics, such as spatial dynamics and using maps and globes, as reported by teachers. Outreach to Selected States
To gather more in-depth information on the challenges school officials face in providing geography education and state-level geography education requirements, we conducted interviews with officials in four states—Arkansas, California, Florida, and Virginia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Geography—the study of places and the relationship between people and their environment—is present across many facets of modern life, from tracking lost cell phones to monitoring disease outbreaks like Ebola. The growing use of geographic information and location-based technology across multiple sectors of the American economy has prompted questions about whether K-12 students' skills and exposure to geography are adequate for current and future workforce needs. Senate Report 113-71 included a provision for GAO to report on the status of geography education and challenges elementary and secondary schools face in providing geography education with limited resources.
In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent that eighth grade students are proficient in geography; (2) the challenges selected school officials and teachers face in providing geography education; and (3) the role of the Department of Education with respect to geography education. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws; analyzed nationally representative Education data on student proficiency and instruction time in geography; interviewed education officials in four states selected, in part, for varying K-12 geography requirements; reviewed key studies and research reports, including a 50-state 2013 survey of geography requirements; and interviewed agency officials and researchers. We also leveraged a professional association to identify and interview 10 K-12 teachers.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Education provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
About three-quarters of eighth grade students—the only grade for which trend data are available—were not “proficient” in geography in 2014, according to GAO's analysis of nationally representative data from the Department of Education (Education). Specifically, these students had not demonstrated solid competence in the subject, and the proficiency levels of eighth grade students have shown no improvement since 1994 (see figure). Geography is generally taught as part of social studies, but data show that more than half of eighth grade teachers reported spending a small portion (10 percent or less) of their social studies instruction time on geography. Further, according to a study by an academic organization, a majority of states do not require geography courses in middle school or high school.
A key challenge to providing geography education is the increased focus on other subjects, according to officials in selected states and K-12 teachers GAO interviewed. These officials and teachers said spending time and resources on geography education is difficult due to national and state focus on the tested subjects of reading, math, and science. GAO's interviews and review of relevant reports identified a range of other challenges, as well, including:
misconceptions about what geography education entails;
lack of teacher preparation and professional development in geography;
poor quality of geography instructional materials; and
limited use of geographic technology in the classroom.
Education's role with respect to geography education primarily involves assessing student performance in the subject, and providing data and the results of its analyses to the public. Education periodically assesses student achievement in geography, and other areas, but not with the same regularity as other subjects it is required by law to assess. Beyond assessments, Education officials said that absent funding specifically for geography-focused programs, the agency is hindered in its ability to support geography education. |
gao_T-GGD-99-148 | gao_T-GGD-99-148_0 | Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program Challenges
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss work we have done addressing management and program challenges at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). These challenges have been related to INS’ strategic planning process, organizational structure, communications and coordination, financial management, and program implementation. However, we noted that, in carrying out its responsibilities, INS has to contend with issues of foreign policy (e.g., U.S. readiness to provide asylum to political refugees); domestic policy (e.g., the tension between the need for cheap labor that immigrants have historically met and the protection of employment and working standards for U.S. citizens); and intergovernmental relations (e.g., between the federal government, which sets policy on immigration, and state and local governments, which largely bear its costs and consequences). Management Challenges
(3) communications and coordination; and (4) financial management processes. INS’ Strategic Planning Process
In 1991, we reported that INS lacked a strategic plan and that past priority management processes were not successful. Its outdated accounting systems, weak internal controls, and lack of management emphasis on financial management had contributed to this situation. Program Challenges
In addition to the long-standing management challenges that we identified, program implementation issues at INS have been of continuing concern. These issues have been related to INS’ efforts to (1) stem the flow of illegal aliens across the border, (2) identify and remove criminal aliens, (3) process applications for naturalization, (4) enforce immigration laws that pertain to the workplace, and (5) process aliens for expedited removal from the country. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the management and program challenges facing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO and others have identified management and program challenges that have troubled INS for years; (2) GAO's management reports in 1991 and 1997 and related reviews have indicated that urgent attention should be given to INS' management challenges; (3) GAO pointed out significant issues related to INS': (a) strategic planning process; (b) organizational structure; (c) communications and coordination; and (d) financial management processes; (4) specifically, GAO noted that INS': (a) strategic planning required sustained management attention and commitment; (b) reorganization had created some uncertainty about organizational roles and responsibilities; (c) internal communications and coordination were problematic, as evidenced by outdated policies and procedures on how to implement immigration laws; and (d) financial management processes were weak, including outdated accounting systems, weak internal controls, and a lack of management emphasis on financial management; (5) in addition to these management challenges, program implementation issues at INS have been the focus of much of GAO's work; (6) GAO's reports on these issues have been related to INS' efforts to: (a) stem the flow of illegal aliens across the Southwest Border; (b) identify and remove criminal aliens from the country; (c) process applications for naturalization; (d) enforce workplace immigration laws; and (e) process aliens for expedited removal; (7) GAO recognizes that addressing these management and program challenges can be difficult; (8) in carrying out its mission, INS has to contend with issues of foreign policy, domestic policy, and intergovernmental relations; and (9) sustained top-level management commitment and monitoring are necessary to ensure that these challenges are addressed appropriately. |
gao_GAO-15-12 | gao_GAO-15-12_0 | The Home Care Rule, scheduled to go into effect January 2015, makes three main changes to the existing regulations: it updates terminology and narrows the definition of companionship services; it limits who may claim the companionship services and live-in domestic services exemptions by stipulating that third party employers, such as private home care agencies, will no longer be able to claim these exemptions; and it changes the record-keeping requirements for employers of live-in domestic services workers. 2). In Developing the Home Care Rule, DOL Considered Changes to the Home Care Industry and Time Needed for Implementation
When DOL was developing the Home Care Rule, it considered the growth in the home care industry and the resulting changes in the home care workforce. Figure 3 highlights some of the outreach that DOL conducted during the rulemaking process. In general, limited data are available on the number of home care workers or the amount of services provided. Stakeholders Provided Numerous and Sometimes Differing Perspectives on the Potential Effects of the Home Care Rule on Employers, Workers, Consumers, and State Medicaid Programs
Potential Effects on Employers and the Cost of Implementation
The Home Care Rule is expected to extend FLSA overtime requirements to more home care workers and, as a result of this change, representatives of almost all of the 14 national organizations we interviewed agreed that employers will likely manage workers’ hours more closely. Extending minimum wage and overtime protections to home care workers may help expand the workforce and reduce turnover at a time when the demand for home care services is expected to increase, according to representatives in 8 of the 14 national organizations we interviewed, including worker and consumer advocacy organizations. Potential Effects on State Medicaid Programs
Effects on Medicaid-funded home care services will likely vary by state since states have some flexibility in designing their Medicaid Programs and could choose to make adjustments in response to the rule. Officials in two of the states we visited told us they were concerned about how FLSA requirements may affect live-in care arrangements for those consumers who require substantial care and how it could be costly to comply with the FLSA in certain live-in situations. CMS also recently issued regulations on home and community-based services and some state officials said that they have been focusing their attention on complying with these regulations. DOL Worked with Federal Agencies and Stakeholders to Develop Guidance on Implementing the Home Care Rule
DOL Developed Implementation Guidance
After the Home Care Rule was published, DOL developed guidance, conducted outreach, and provided technical assistance to help state Medicaid programs and other stakeholders plan for implementation. She does not work for any one consumer for more than 40 hours per week. DOL Plans a Phased-In Enforcement Strategy but Does Not Have Plans to Evaluate the Effects of the Rule
While DOL has several enforcement mechanisms in place to oversee the Home Care Rule’s implementation once it goes into effect, DOL officials said they are currently focusing their efforts on technical assistance to help employers and states with implementing the rule. Conclusions
Home care agencies and state Medicaid programs are responding to the Home Care Rule through programmatic and policy changes, and while more home care workers will be entitled to receive federal minimum wage and overtime pay protections as a result of the Home Care Rule, the effects of the rule will remain unclear until after it is implemented. Recommendation for Executive Action
Depending on the outcome of the litigation, the Secretary of Labor should take steps to ensure the agency will be positioned to conduct a meaningful retrospective review consistent with the Executive Order at an appropriate time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Older adults and people with disabilities are increasingly receiving care at home, and home care workers are performing increasingly skilled duties. DOL recently revised its FLSA regulations to extend minimum wage and overtime protections to more of those home care workers. The Home Care Rule, scheduled to go into effect January 2015, may affect a diverse set of stakeholders, including home care workers, consumers receiving home care services, private home care agencies, and state Medicaid programs. GAO was asked to assess the potential effects of this rule.
GAO examined (1) changes DOL made in the Home Care Rule and factors it considered during the rulemaking process, (2) the potential effects of the rule identified by key stakeholders, and (3) steps DOL has taken to help state Medicaid agencies and other stakeholders understand and comply with the Home Care Rule. GAO visited six state Medicaid programs selected in part for variation in state Medicaid program design; reviewed relevant federal regulations; and interviewed government officials and representatives from 14 national organizations representing the spectrum of home care stakeholders, including workers and consumers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Home Care Rule is expected to increase the number of home care workers who qualify for minimum wage and overtime protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA). The Home Care Rule narrows the definition of companionship services and limits who may claim the companionship services exemption, among other changes. It is scheduled to go into effect in January 2015, although a challenge to the rule is currently pending in federal court. When developing the rule, DOL considered several factors, including the growth and specialization of the home care workforce, as well as the amount of time needed to make adjustments.
Representatives from national organizations GAO interviewed identified potential effects of the Home Care Rule on jobs and earnings, employer costs, and care, but did not always agree. Some representatives said extending FLSA protections to home care workers will create more full-time employment opportunities for part-time workers, while others said those who work more than 40 hours in a workweek may see reduced hours and earnings. Some representatives said employers may face increased business costs to pay overtime and some said that certain consumers could be placed in institutions because of possible service cost increases. Effects on Medicaid home care services will vary by state. Officials in five of six states GAO visited explained that they were still assessing possible changes to their programs, while one state had determined what changes it would make to comply with the new rule.
After the Home Care Rule was published, DOL collaborated with other federal agencies and stakeholders to develop guidance, conduct outreach, and provide technical assistance to help stakeholders plan for implementation. For example, DOL worked with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to develop guidance on applying FLSA principles to different home care living arrangements commonly funded by Medicaid. DOL officials said they are focusing on technical assistance to help employers and states with implementation and have developed a phased-in enforcement strategy. The effects of the Home Care Rule, such as whether the workforce will grow or the use of institutional care will increase, remain uncertain, and DOL officials said they do not currently have any plans to evaluate the rule.
What GAO Recommends
Depending on the outcome of the litigation, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor take steps to ensure the agency will be positioned to conduct a meaningful retrospective review of the rule at an appropriate time. DOL agreed with this recommendation and is working on developing data collection plans. |
gao_GAO-06-438 | gao_GAO-06-438_0 | However, when communities do not have an adequate amount of suitable housing, DOD intends to use housing privatization—rather than military-owned housing financed with military construction funds—as the primary means for meeting family housing requirements. As of December 2005, the services had awarded 52 projects to privatize over 112,000 family housing units and had plans to award 57 more projects to privatize over 76,000 more units by 2010. Opportunities Exist to Improve the Oversight of Awarded Privatization Projects
Although OSD and the services have implemented program oversight policies and procedures to monitor the execution and performance of privatized housing projects, opportunities exist for improvement. Specifically, as evidenced by issues identified in some Navy and Marine Corps projects we visited, the Navy’s oversight methods are not adequate to identify some project operational concerns or to ensure accurate reporting of project information. As a result, in contrast to the Army and the Air Force which have more robust oversight methods, there is less assurance that Navy management could become aware of project performance issues in a timely manner in order to plan needed actions to mitigate the concerns. Also, the usefulness of OSD’s primary program oversight tool—the semiannual privatization program evaluation report—has been limited because the report has not focused on key project performance metrics, has not been issued in a timely manner, and has included inaccuracies. Moreover, data on servicemember satisfaction with housing are inconsistent because DOD has not issued guidance to the services for collecting and reporting satisfaction information. According to the agreement, 30 percent of the project’s net cash flow—that is, the rental revenue remaining after payment of expenses and debt service— was to be deposited to a Navy-owned reserve account to be available for future project needs. Lower Than Expected Occupancy Creates Concerns in Some Privatization Projects
Sixteen projects, or 36 percent, of 44 awarded privatization projects had occupancy rates below expectations with rates below 90 percent, as of September 30, 2005, raising concerns about project performance. Although the projects were justified on the basis of meeting military family housing needs, 20 projects have begun renting housing units to parties other than military families, including unaccompanied military personnel and the general public, in an attempt to keep rental revenues up. In the long term, if lower than expected occupancy and rental revenues persist, the result could be significantly reduced funds deposited into reserve accounts, which provide for future project needs and renovations. Or, in the worst case, there could be project financial failures. Factors contributing to occupancy challenges include poor condition of existing housing that has not yet been renovated in some projects, significantly increased housing allowances, which have made it possible for more military families to afford off-base housing thus reducing the need for privatized housing, and continued problems in DOD’s housing requirements determination process, which could result in overstating the need for privatized housing. More specifically, 20 projects had rented 1,116 units to single or unaccompanied military personnel; 662 units to retired military personnel and civilians and contractors who work for DOD; and 299 units to civilians from the general public. With reduced occupancy, the project had experienced signs of financial stress. Provide guidance to the services to help ensure consistent collection and reporting of housing satisfaction information from all servicemembers, which would allow for benchmarking and tracking of tenant satisfaction over time as well as for making service-to-service comparisons. Further, we determined the status of steps taken by DOD in response to previous GAO recommendations to address concerns in the reliability of the services’ housing requirements assessments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) intends to privatize about 87 percent of the military-owned housing in the United States by 2010. As of December 2005, it had awarded 52 projects to privatize over 112,000 family housing units and had plans to award 57 more projects to privatize over 76,000 more units over the next 4 years. The program, begun in 1996, has become DOD's primary means to improve family housing and to meet its housing needs when communities near installations do not have enough suitable, affordable housing. Because of expressed interest related to the oversight responsibilities of several committees, GAO assessed (1) whether opportunities exist to improve DOD's oversight of awarded housing privatization projects, and (2) to what extent projects are meeting occupancy expectations.
What GAO Found
Although DOD and the individual services have implemented program oversight policies and procedures to monitor the execution and performance of awarded privatized housing projects, GAO identified three opportunities for improvement. First, the Navy's methods for overseeing its awarded projects have not been adequate to identify and address operational concerns in some projects or to ensure accurate reporting of project information. As a result, there is less assurance that Navy management could become aware of project performance issues in a timely manner in order to plan needed actions to mitigate the concerns. For example, contrary to project agreements, funds from one project had not been deposited to a Navy reserve account to provide for future project needs, and the Navy had not been reimbursed for police and fire protection services provided to another project. Compared to the Navy, the Army and Air Force had more robust and comprehensive methods for overseeing awarded projects and GAO did not find similar oversight concerns in the Army and Air Force projects it reviewed. Second, the value of DOD's primary oversight tool--the semiannual privatization program evaluation report--has been limited because the report lacks a focus on key project performance metrics to help highlight any operational or financial concerns, has not been issued in a timely manner, and does not ensure data accuracy by requiring periodic independent verification of key report elements. Third, data collected on servicemember satisfaction with housing, which is important for benchmarking and tracking of satisfaction levels over time as well as for making service-to-service comparisons, are inconsistent and incomplete because DOD has not issued guidance to the services for standardized collection and reporting of satisfaction information for all servicemembers. Sixteen, or 36 percent, of 44 awarded privatization projects had occupancy rates below expectations with rates below 90 percent, as of September 30, 2005. In an attempt to increase occupancy and keep rental revenues up, 20 projects had begun renting housing units to parties other than military families, including 2,077 units rented to single or unaccompanied servicemembers, retired military personnel, civilians and contractors who work for DOD, and civilians from the general public. Still, rental revenues in some projects are not meeting planned levels, resulting in signs of financial stress. If lower than expected occupancy and rental revenues continue in the long term, the result could be significantly reduced funds available to provide for future project needs and renovations or, in the worst case, project financial failures. Factors contributing to occupancy challenges include increased housing allowances, which have made it possible for more military families to live off base thus reducing the need for privatized housing, and the questionable reliability of DOD's housing requirements determination process, which could result in overstating the need for privatized housing. DOD has yet to implement some previous GAO recommendations to improve the reliability of the requirements assessments supporting proposed projects. |
gao_GAO-03-783 | gao_GAO-03-783_0 | Since the introduction of Plan Colombia in fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than $2.5 billion in assistance. U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems Were Encountered
During fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to the Colombian Army for initial training and equipment for the counternarcotics brigade and for 72 helicopters and related operational, maintenance, and training support. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being utilized by the counternarcotics brigade in conducting operations. Colombia’s Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results
Since the early 1990s, State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy Bogotá NAS and the bureau’s Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National Police’s efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until 2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001-02. Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities
The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000. However, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and management challenges. In addition, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its long-standing insurgency. Moreover, for U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia needs to ensure that the army and police comply with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets certain environmental conditions, and that alternative development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication. But because of overall poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia’s ability to contribute more is limited. As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it. Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to the Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03, and how this assistance has been used, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. To determine what challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs, we met with numerous U.S. and Colombian officials to obtain their views on the issues discussed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided over $2.5 billion. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United States. The report discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, the Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters at current levels without U.S. support because it does not yet have sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics. U.S. officials estimate that up to $150 million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent, and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent--the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and poppy plants without restriction. These officials estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue the program at its current pace. Although the U.S.-backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has begun to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United States must deal with financial and management challenges. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it. Colombia's ability to contribute more is limited, and it continues to face challenges associated with its long-standing insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue. |
gao_GAO-01-539T | gao_GAO-01-539T_0 | Conclusions
In determining how to reform the Medicare program, much is at stake— not only the future of Medicare itself but also assuring the nation’s future fiscal flexibility to pursue other important national goals and programs. Engaging in a comprehensive effort to reform the Medicare program and put it on a sustainable path for the future would help fulfill this generation’s stewardship responsibility to succeeding generations. It would also help to preserve some capacity for future generations to make their own choices for what role they want the federal government to play. Updating Medicare’s benefit package may be a necessary part of any realistic reform program. Such changes, however, need to be considered in the context of Medicare’s long-term fiscal outlook and the need to make changes in ways that will promote the program’s longer-term sustainability. Specifically, we must acknowledge that adding prescription drug coverage to the Medicare program would have a substantial impact on program costs. At the same time, many believe it is needed to ensure the financial well-being and health of many of its beneficiaries. The challenge will be in designing and implementing drug coverage that will minimize the financial implications for Medicare while maximizing the positive effect of such coverage on Medicare beneficiaries. Most importantly, any substantial benefit reform should be coupled with other meaningful program reforms that will help to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program. | What GAO Found
Much is at stake when it comes to Medicare reform--not only the program's future but also the nation's fiscal flexibility to pursue other important national goals and programs in the future. A comprehensive effort to reform Medicare and put it on a sustainable path would help fulfill this generation's stewardship responsibility to succeeding generations. It would also help to preserve some capacity for future generations to make their own choices for what role they want the federal government to play. Updating Medicare's benefit package may be a necessary part of any realistic reform program. Such changes, however, need to be considered in the context of Medicare's long-term fiscal outlook and the need to make changes that will sustain the program over the long-term. Specifically, adding prescription drug coverage to the Medicare program would have a substantial impact on program costs. At the same time, many believe it is needed to guarantee the financial well-being and health of many beneficiaries. The challenge will be to design and implement drug coverage that will minimize the financial implications for Medicare while maximizing the positive effect of such coverage on Medicare beneficiaries. Most importantly, any substantial benefit reform should be coupled with other meaningful program reforms that will help to ensure the program's long-term viability. |
gao_AIMD-95-169 | gao_AIMD-95-169_0 | We reviewed these studies to determine whether their estimates included all types of medical liability costs. The study estimated self-insurance costs at 20 percent to 30 percent of premiums, which would mean that purchased insurance and self-insurance amounted to between $5.8 billion and $6.3 billion in 1991, less than 1 percent of national health care expenditures. Table 1 summarizes the estimates of malpractice insurance costs in 1990 and 1991. The costs of defensive medicine cannot be easily estimated because of difficulties in defining it and distinguishing it from clinically justified medical care. While hospitals perform some risk management activities specifically to reduce liability-related costs, they do not segregate the costs of these activities from the cost of practices designed to promote quality assurance or to satisfy accreditation standards. Medical Device and Pharmaceutical Liability Costs Were Not Measured
Hospitals and physicians incur the following types of medical device and pharmaceutical liability costs in the prices that they pay for their products: manufacturers’ liability insurance and costs associated with product design and marketing that would not be incurred in the absence of the threat of suit. Their liability costs include insurance and liability-related production and marketing costs. Conclusion
Hospitals and physicians incur a variety of medical liability costs. Other hospital and physician liability costs, however, are impractical, if not methodologically difficult to measure with any precision. Such costs include defensive medicine, liability-related administrative expenses, and medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers’ liability expenses that they pass on to hospitals and physicians in the prices of their products. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the types of medical liability costs that affect hospitals and physicians, and whether existing studies include these costs in their estimates of hospital and physician liability expenses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in general, hospitals' and physicians' medical liability costs account for about 1 percent of national health care expenditures; (2) estimates of malpractice premiums do not take into account direct and indirect liability costs other than some self-insurance costs; (3) these nonpremium liability costs include self-insurance costs and uninsured losses, defensive medical costs, liability-related administrative costs, and medical device and pharmaceutical liability costs; (4) it is difficult to quantify hospitals' and physicians' nonpremium liability costs because data on these costs are not usually collected, defensive medical practices are not clearly defined and are hard to distinguish from reasonable care, and administrative costs intended to minimize medical liability are included in efforts to improve service or adhere to accreditation standards; (5) medical device and pharmaceutical manufacuturers include in the cost of their products liability insurance and litigation costs and product design and marketing costs incurred to reduce the threat of law suits; and (6) it is difficult to obtain information on manufacturers' liability costs because of sealed court records and proprietary and competitive concerns. |
gao_GAO-11-658 | gao_GAO-11-658_0 | Following Education’s announcement of grant recipients, states were given access to 12.5 percent of their award. States Reported Taking a Variety of Actions and Investing Considerable Resources to Be Competitive for Race to the Top Grants
Officials in 6 of the states we interviewed—including 2 states that received an RTT grant and 4 states that did not receive one—reported making policy changes to reform their education systems in order to be more competitive for RTT. While state officials told us that they had to invest a significant amount of time and effort in applying for RTT, several officials in both grantee and nongrantee states also noted that their state benefited from the collaboration and comprehensive planning that the RTT application process required. Grantees Plan to Implement a Variety of Reforms and Selected Nongrantees Will Continue Some Reforms but at a Slower Pace
Grantee States Plan to Use the Largest Share of Their Funds to Increase Teacher Effectiveness
Education awarded over $3.9 billion in RTT grants to states that implement reforms in four areas: (1) developing effective teachers and leaders, (2) improving the lowest-achieving schools, (3) expanding student data systems, and (4) enhancing standards and assessments. Nongrantee States Expect to Continue Implementing Some of Their Planned Reforms
In addition to our interviews with grantee states and review of their plans, we interviewed officials in 8 selected states that applied for—but did not receive—RTT grants to find out whether they plan to continue their reform efforts. Officials from the 8 nongrantee states we interviewed expect to implement some of their planned reforms, even though they did not receive RTT grants; however, they told us that implementation would be slower than if they had received an RTT award and would involve using other funds: Officials in 5 of the nongrantee states reported moving ahead with plans to implement teacher evaluation systems, but at a different scale or pace than stated in their RTT applications. States Reported Facing a Variety of Challenges That Have Led to Some Implementation Delays
Officials in 9 of the 12 grantee states reported facing a variety of challenges—such as difficulty identifying and hiring qualified staff and complying with state procedures for awarding contracts—that led to several implementation delays. For example, officials from Ohio said they had difficulty hiring qualified people for their state-level RTT positions. As a result of these challenges, states have been slow to draw down their RTT grant funds. Education Provided Extensive Support and Is Monitoring States’ Activities, but Its Efforts to Facilitate Information Sharing Are Somewhat Limited
Education Provided Extensive Support and Guidance to States during Early Implementation
Education provided support to states as they have begun to implement their reform plans. For example, Education assigned program officers to each state to help determine how the department could support the grantee states as they implement their RTT plans. Education has also provided additional guidance on specific challenges. Information sharing among grantees is also important. Education provided us with additional information about its program review process and clarified some information related to reasons that states may have delayed spending their first year grants. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our first objective about actions states took to be competitive for Race to the Top (RTT) grants, we reviewed proposed and final requirements for the RTT grant competition, as well as documents from the U. S. Department of Education (Education), including the grant application template, scoring guidelines, and guidance materials. Recovery Act: Status of States’ and Localities’ Use of Funds and Efforts to Ensure Accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress required the U.S. Department of Education (Education) to make education reform grants to states. Education subsequently established the Race to the Top (RTT) grant fund and awarded almost $4 billion to 12 states related to developing effective teachers and leaders, improving the lowest-achieving schools, expanding student data systems, and enhancing standards and assessments. This report, prepared in response to a mandate in the act, addresses (1) actions states took to be competitive for RTT grants; (2) how grantees plan to use their grants and whether selected nongrantees have chosen to move forward with their reform plans; (3) what challenges, if any, have affected early implementation of states' reform efforts; and (4) Education's efforts to support and oversee states' use of RTT funds. GAO analyzed RTT applications for 20 states, interviewed state officials, visited 4 grantee states, analyzed states' planned uses of grant funds, and interviewed Education officials.
What GAO Found
State officials GAO interviewed said their states took a variety of actions to be competitive for RTT grants. Of the 20 states GAO interviewed, officials in 6 said their states undertook reforms, such as amending laws related to teacher evaluations, to be competitive for RTT. However, officials from 14 states said their reforms resulted from prior or ongoing efforts and were not made to be more competitive for RTT. While officials in all 20 states told us that applying for RTT took a significant amount of time and effort, several of them also said their state benefited from the planning that the application process required. Grantees plan to use RTT grant funds to implement reforms in four areas. The largest percentage of state-level RTT funds will be used to increase the effectiveness of teachers and leaders. GAO interviewed officials in 8 nongrantee states who said they expect to continue implementing parts of their RTT plans, though at a slower pace than if they had received a grant. Most grantee states have faced a variety of challenges, such as difficulty hiring qualified personnel, that have delayed implementation. As a result, as of June 2011, about 12 percent of first-year grant funds were spent, and some projects were delayed several months. Some state officials said they expect to spend more funds soon and may seek Education's approval to reallocate some first-year grant funds into later years. Education has provided extensive support to grantee states and has begun monitoring. Education assigned a program officer to each state to assist with implementation and has developed ways for grantees to share information, such as hosting meetings on specific initiatives. Some officials from nongrantee states said they would find this information useful, but they were generally unaware of these resources or were unable to access them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Education (1) facilitate information sharing among grantees on additional promising practices and (2) provide nongrantee states with related information. Education agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second; GAO modified that recommendation to clarify how Education can provide that information to nongrantee states. |
gao_GAO-07-879 | gao_GAO-07-879_0 | The market for new manufactured homes declined significantly from 1996 to 2005, but homes that were purchased were larger in size and more often placed on private property. Modular homes can often be built in the same factory as manufactured housing but are not required to meet the HUD Code. As a result, data on the number of manufactured home parks in each state and at the national level are limited. According to 2005 American Housing Survey data, monthly housing costs for manufactured homes generally were lower than for site-built homes (see fig. Owners of Manufactured Homes Have More Consumer Protections If Homes Are Considered Real Rather Than Personal Property, and Protections Provided by States Vary
Borrowers with loans for real property are generally entitled to a broader set of protections under a federal law governing the loan settlement process than borrowers with personal property loans. Personal property loans typically are subject to repossession rather than foreclosure. States Give Manufactured Homeowners Varying Levels of Notice, Protection and Compensation Related to Length of Leases on Land, Rent Increases, Evictions, and Park Closures
Tenant protection issues affecting owners of manufactured homes include the length of the leases for land, rent increases, requirements for eviction, and park closures. We analyzed state laws in eight states and found varying written lease requirements (see fig. More Information Is Needed to Determine the Impact of Proposed Changes to the Title I Program
Legislative proposals to change the Title I program would increase loan limits; insure each loan made; incorporate stricter underwriting requirements; and establish up-front premiums and adjust annual premiums; but the potential effects of the changes on the program and the insurance fund are unclear. According to some FHA and industry officials, the potential benefits for borrowers include larger loans with lower interest rates to buy larger homes. And, in all instances where borrowers had medium or high default risk, we show the fund experiencing a loss. The agency also has not yet collected data needed to help assess risks such as credit scores and land type. FHA officials explained that it had not done so because the Title I program was low-volume and because they were unsure if the legislation would pass. In contrast to other housing types, many lending industry officials suggested that the cost of recovery for lenders when a loan defaulted was greater with manufactured homes. FHA only insured slightly more than 1,400 loans in 2006. However, FHA has not articulated which borrowers would be served, how the loans would be priced under a risk-based structure and the expected increase in risk to the General Insurance Fund, how the loans would be underwritten, and the additional data it plans to collect to manage the program. Specifically, the objectives of this report were to (1) describe selected characteristics of manufactured housing and the demographics of the owners, (2) compare federal and state consumer and tenant protections for owners of manufactured homes, and (3) describe the proposed changes to FHA’s Title I Manufactured Home Loan program and assess potential benefits and costs to borrowers and the federal government. We incorporated various risk factors unique to manufactured home lending (such as site location and loss mitigation practices of lenders), as well as other commonly used predictors of loan performance such as credit scores, into a model to illustrate ways in which these key factors might affect the performance of manufactured housing loans and, thus, how variation in these key factors might affect potential gains and losses to FHA’s General Insurance Fund. Appendix II: Scenario Analysis Methodology
To gain an understanding of the effects of the proposed changes to the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Title I Manufactured Home Loan program, we developed an approach that could illustrate potential effects of the changes on the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pending legislation to the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) Title I Manufactured Home Loan program would increase loan limits, insure each loan, incorporate stricter underwriting requirements, and set up-front premiums. GAO was asked to review (1) selected characteristics of manufactured housing and the demographics of the owners; (2) federal and state consumer protections for owners of manufactured homes; and (3) the potential benefits and costs of the proposed changes for borrowers and the federal government. In addressing these objectives, GAO analyzed select Census data; researched federal laws and laws in eight states; interviewed local, state, and federal officials; and analyzed various scenarios that might affect Title I program costs.
What GAO Found
According to 2005 American Housing Survey data, most manufactured homes (factory-built housing designed to meet the national building code) were located in rural areas in southern states, and most were occupied by lower-income owners rather than renters. Although the market for new manufactured homes declined substantially from 1996 to 2005, buyers increasingly bought larger homes and placed them on private property rather than in manufactured home parks. In addition, some states are experiencing park closures, with the properties being converted to other uses. Overall, manufactured homes can be an affordable housing option, with monthly housing costs lower than for other housing types. Owners of manufactured homes generally have more consumer protections if their homes are considered real rather than personal property, but protections provided by laws in the states GAO examined vary. Consumer protections extending to lending and settlement processes for personal property loans are not as broad as those for real property loans (mortgages). Also, delinquent Title I borrowers can be subject to repossession or foreclosure, but the consumer protections for repossession are often less extensive than those for foreclosure. State laws give owners of manufactured homes on leased land varying levels of notice, protection, and compensation related to length of leases, rent increases, evictions, and park closures. According to some FHA and lending officials, potential benefits of the proposed changes for borrowers include loans big enough to buy larger homes and more financing as more lenders participate in the program. The program insured about 24,000 loans in 1990 but only about 1,400 loans representing $54 million in mortgage insurance in 2006. While the changes could benefit borrowers, according to FHA and the Congressional Budget Office, the potential costs could expand the government's liability. To gain an understanding of the effects of the proposed changes, GAO presented various scenarios. Although risk factors unique to manufactured home lending (such as placement on leased land) as well as commonly used predictors of loan performance (such as credit scores) are associated with default risk, these data were not available. Instead, GAO modeled different variations of borrower default risk and other factors (such as premiums and lender recovery) that were based on the experience of FHA loans to illustrate how variations in these key factors could affect potential gains and losses to FHA's General Insurance Fund. The analysis suggests that in all instances where borrowers had medium or high default risk, the fund would experience a loss. However FHA has not articulated which borrowers would be served, how the loans would be underwritten and priced under a risk-based structure, or collected data on credit scores and land ownership type. FHA explained that among other reasons, it had not done so because the Title I program was currently a low-volume program. As a result, the effects of the proposed changes are unclear. |
gao_GAO-06-484T | gao_GAO-06-484T_0 | Background
The UI program was established by Title III of the Social Security Act in 1935 and is a key component in ensuring the financial security of America’s workforce. In fiscal year 2004, these programs covered about 129 million wage and salary workers and paid benefits totaling $41.3 billion to about 8.8 million workers. Moreover, we found that of the 76 percent who were eligible for UI benefits at least once, 38 percent had ever received UI. 1.) Of those who received UI benefits, 44 percent received them more than once; this represents about 17 percent of all of the workers in this age group. Some UI-Eligible Workers are More Likely to Receive UI Benefits than Others, or to Have Longer Periods of Unemployment
When all other worker characteristics have been controlled for, unemployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits are more likely to receive UI if they had higher earnings before they became unemployed, are younger, have completed more years of education, or if they have a history of past UI benefit receipt. In addition, we found that unemployed workers tend to have longer periods of unemployment if they receive UI benefits, have completed fewer years of education, had lower earnings before they became unemployed, or if they do not belong to unions. 2.) Unemployed Workers Who Received UI in the Past Are More Likely to Receive UI during Subsequent Unemployment
Of all the characteristics associated with UI benefit receipt, we found that one—past UI receipt—had a particularly strong effect on the likelihood of receiving UI benefits. Our results, however, suggest that this is not because workers with past UI receipt from these industries are more likely to receive UI benefits when they are unemployed than otherwise similar workers from other industries. A Variety of Reemployment Services Are Available to Help UI Claimants Get Jobs, but Little Information Exists to Determine the Extent to Which Workers Use Them
In our review of states’ efforts to facilitate reemployment of UI claimants, we found that across states, UI claimants have access to a variety of reemployment services, and although most states accept UI claims remotely by telephone or Internet, states make use of UI program requirements to connect claimants with available services at various points in their claims. Federal reporting requirements for states’ UI programs and for federally funded employment and training programs do not provide a full picture of services or outcomes, and few states monitor the extent to which claimants are receiving these services or outcomes for these claimants, in part because of limited information systems capabilities. Although states must meet a number of federal reporting requirements for their UI and employment and training programs, none of these reports provides a complete picture of the services received or the outcomes obtained by UI claimants, and only recently has Labor begun to require that states provide information on the reemployment outcomes of UI claimants. Last year, we recommended that the Department of Labor work with states to consider the feasibility of collecting more comprehensive information on UI claimants’ services and outcomes. Although Labor generally agreed with our findings, Labor commented that current and planned data collection efforts would provide sufficient information to policy makers. Unemployment Insurance: Information on Benefit Receipt. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unemployment Insurance (UI) has been a key component in ensuring the financial security of America's workforce for over 70 years. In fiscal year 2004, UI covered about 129 million wage and salary workers and paid about $41 billion in benefits to nearly 9 million workers. With unemployed workers at a greater risk of long-term unemployment than in the past, it is increasingly important to understand how individual workers are being served by UI. This testimony draws upon the results of three GAO reports providing new information about (1) the extent to which individual workers ever receive UI benefits or receive benefits multiple times, (2) the types of workers who are more likely to receive UI, and (3) what is known about the extent to which UI beneficiaries receive reemployment services and their reemployment outcomes. GAO is not making new recommendations at this time. The Department of Labor (Labor) generally agreed with the findings from each of the three reports on UI, but took issue with GAO's recommendation that the Secretary work with states to consider collecting more comprehensive information on UI claimants' services and outcomes. Labor commented that, in its view, current and planned efforts would provide sufficient information for policy makers. However, we believe that Labor's efforts would not provide a complete picture of UI claimants' services and outcomes.
What GAO Found
On the basis of our analysis of a nationally representative sample of workers born between 1957 and 1964, we estimate that, while 76 percent of these workers experienced at least one period of unemployment during the first half of their working lives in which they would likely have been eligible for UI benefits, about 38 percent actually received UI. Of those who received UI benefits, 44 percent received them more than once. Among workers who are eligible to receive UI benefits, those who are more likely to actually receive these benefits are younger, have higher earnings before becoming unemployed, have completed more years of education, or have already received UI benefits in the past than otherwise similar workers. Past experience with the UI program has a particularly strong effect on the likelihood of receiving UI benefits. In addition, unemployed workers tend to have longer periods of unemployment if they receive UI benefits, have completed fewer years of education, have lower earnings before they become unemployed, or if they do not belong to unions. UI-eligible workers from certain industries, such as mining and manufacturing, are more likely than other workers to receive UI benefits. Across states, UI claimants have access to a variety of reemployment services, and states make use of UI program requirements to connect claimants with available services at various points in their claim. However, federal reporting requirements for states' UI programs and for federally funded employment and training programs do not provide a full picture of the services received or the outcomes obtained by all UI claimants, and few states monitor the extent to which claimants are receiving these services or outcomes for these claimants, in part because states' information systems have limited capabilities. |
gao_GAO-08-762T | gao_GAO-08-762T_0 | Numerous studies over the past decade by OPM, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the National Academy of Public Administration, the Partnership for Public Service, the National Commission on the Public Service, and GAO have identified a range of problems and challenges with recruitment and hiring in the federal government, including the following: Passive recruitment strategies. Unclear job vacancy announcements. Time-consuming and paperwork-intensive manual processes. Congress, OPM, and Agencies Have Taken Significant Steps to Help Improve Recruiting and Hiring
In recent years, Congress, OPM, and agencies have taken a series of important actions to improve recruiting and hiring in the federal sector. For example, Congress has provided agencies with hiring flexibilities that could help agencies streamline their hiring processes and give agency managers more latitude in selecting among qualified job candidates. Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen Recruiting and Hiring
While these actions are all steps in the right direction, our past work has found that additional efforts are needed in the areas of strategic human capital planning, diversity management, and the use of existing flexibilities. Human Capital Planning
First and foremost, federal agencies will have to bolster their efforts in strategic human capital planning to ensure that they are prepared to meet their current and emerging hiring needs. To build effective recruiting and hiring programs, agencies must determine the critical skills and competencies necessary to achieve programmatic goals and develop strategies that are tailored to address any identified gaps. Recruiting and hiring for the acquisition workforce is a prime example of the government’s strategic human capital planning challenges. Diversity Management
Developing and maintaining workforces that reflect all segments of society and our nation’s diversity is another significant aspect of agencies’ recruitment challenges. As we have previously reported, recruitment is a key first step toward establishing a diverse workforce. Building formal relationships with targeted schools and colleges to ensure the cultivation of talent for future applicant pools. Agencies need to reexamine the flexibilities provided to them under current authorities and identify those that could be used more extensively or more effectively to meet their workforce needs. They include monetary recruitment and retention incentives; special hiring authorities, such as student employment programs; and work-life programs, such as alternative work schedules, child care assistance, and transit subsidies. OPM, working with and through the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, has made progress in compiling information on effective and innovative practices and distributing this information to help agencies in determining when, where, and how the various flexibilities are being used and should be used. OPM must continue to work to ensure that agencies take action on this information. Moreover, in leading governmentwide human capital reform, OPM has faced challenges in its internal capacity to assist and guide agencies’ readiness to implement change. Finally, OPM and agency leaders need to be held accountable and should hold others accountable for the ongoing monitoring and refinement of human capital approaches to recruit and hire a capable and committed federal workforce. In conclusion, OPM and agencies have made progress in addressing the impediments to effective recruitment and hiring since we first designated strategic human capital management as a high-risk area in 2001. With an ongoing commitment to continuous improvement and strong leadership in Congress, OPM, and the agencies, the federal government can indeed be an employer of choice. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address the challenges that the nation faces, it will be important for federal agencies to change their cultures and create the institutional capacity to become high-performing organizations. This includes recruiting and retaining a federal workforce able to create, sustain, and thrive in organizations that are flatter, results-oriented, and externally focused. In 2001, GAO identified strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area because federal agencies lacked a strategic approach to human capital management that integrated human capital efforts with their missions and program goals. Although progress has been made since that time, strategic human capital management still remains a high-risk area. This testimony, based on a large body of completed work issued from January 2001 through April 2008, focuses on (1) challenges that federal agencies have faced in recruiting and hiring talented employees, (2) progress in addressing these challenges, and (3) additional actions that are needed to strengthen recruiting and hiring efforts. In its prior reports, GAO has made a range of recommendations to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)--the government's personnel agency--and to agencies in such areas as hiring, workforce planning, and diversity management; a number of these recommendations have since been implemented. GAO is making no new recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
Numerous studies over the years have identified a range of problems and challenges with recruitment and hiring in the federal government. Some of these problems and challenges include passive recruitment strategies, unclear job vacancy announcements, and manual processes that are time consuming and paperwork intensive. In recent years, Congress, OPM, and agencies have made important strides in improving federal recruitment and hiring. For example, Congress has provided agencies with hiring flexibilities that could help to streamline the hiring process. OPM has sponsored job fairs and developed automated tools. Individual agencies have developed targeted recruitment strategies to identify and help build a talented workforce. Building on the progress that has been made, additional efforts are needed in the following areas: (1) Human capital planning: federal agencies will have to bolster their efforts in strategic human capital planning to ensure that they are prepared to meet their current and emerging hiring needs. Agencies must determine the critical skills and competencies necessary to achieve programmatic goals and develop strategies that are tailored to address any identified gaps. (2) Diversity management: developing and maintaining workforces that reflect all segments of society and our nation's diversity is another significant aspect of agencies' recruitment challenges. Recruitment is a key first step toward establishing a diverse workforce. Agencies must consider active recruitment strategies, such as building formal relationships with targeted schools and colleges, and partnering with multicultural professional organizations. (3) Use of existing flexibilities: agencies need to reexamine the flexibilities provided to them under current authorities, including monetary recruitment and retention incentives, special hiring authorities, and work-life programs. Agencies can then identify those existing flexibilities that could be used more extensively or more effectively to meet their workforce needs. (4) OPM leadership: OPM has taken significant steps in fostering and guiding improvements in recruiting and hiring in the executive branch. For example, OPM, working with and through the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, has moved forward in compiling information on effective and innovative practices and sharing this information with agencies. Still, OPM must continue to work to ensure that agencies take action on this information. Also, OPM needs to make certain that it has the internal capacity to guide agencies' readiness to implement change and achieve desired outcomes. OPM and agencies should be held accountable for the ongoing monitoring and refinement of human capital approaches to recruit and hire a capable and committed federal workforce. With continued commitment and strong leadership, the federal government can indeed be an employer of choice. |
gao_GAO-02-872T | gao_GAO-02-872T_0 | VA and DOD Have Not Awarded Joint National Contracts; Potential Savings Exist
VA and DOD have not awarded national joint procurement contracts for medical and surgical supplies, and none appear likely in the near future. While a few VA and DOD facilities have obtained modest savings through local joint contracting agreements, we identified some additional joint procurement opportunities that have the potential to increase VA’s and DOD’s savings. Since their 1999 memorandum of agreement, VA’s and DOD’s procurement efforts have focused on separately contracting for standardized medical and surgical supplies. Impediments to Joint Procurement
The lack of progress VA and DOD have made in jointly contracting for medical and surgical supplies has, in part, been the result of their different standardization approaches—national versus regional. Other impediments to joint purchasing have been incomplete procurement data and the lack of a means for each department to identify similar high-volume, high-dollar purchases. The manufacturing and distribution industry has been reluctant to adopt more UPNs for medical and surgical supplies. If implemented, the improvements will place the department in a better position to jointly purchase with DOD. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spent $500 million and the Department of Defense (DOD) spent $240 million for medical and surgical supplies in fiscal year 2001. Since the 1980s, To achieve greater efficiencies through improved acquisition processes and increased sharing of medical resources, VA and DOD signed a memorandum of agreement in 1999 to combine their buying power. VA and DOD saved $170 in 2001 by jointly procuring pharmaceuticals, by agreeing on particular drugs to be purchased, and contracting with the manufacturers for discounts based on their combined larger volume. VA and DOD have not awarded joint national contracts for medical and surgical supplies as envisioned by their memorandum of agreement, and it is unlikely that the two departments will have joint national contracts for supplies anytime soon. However, a few VA and DOD facilities have yielded modest savings through local joint contracting agreements. The lack of progress have made in jointly contracting for medical and surgical supplies has, in part, been the result of their different approaches to standardizing medical and surgical supplies. Other impediments to joint purchasing have been incomplete procurement data and the inability to identify similar high-volume, high-dollar purchases. |
gao_AIMD-95-19 | gao_AIMD-95-19_0 | The District’s Types of Debt and Debt Limitations
The Home Rule Act authorizes and sets limits on various types of short- and long-term debt that is backed by the full faith and credit of the District. The limits have not been revised since enactment of the provisions in the Home Rule Act that authorized the various types of debt. The District also is authorized to issue revenue bonds that are not backed by the full faith and credit of the District. Finally, the District is authorized to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to meet the District’s general expenses. The District can issue general obligation bonds to refund (that is, refinance) existing debt or to finance capital projects. These borrowings are not subject to the 14-percent limitation on long-term debt. Also on September 30, 1994, the District had $3.65 billion in long-term debt (both general obligation and U.S. Treasury debt). As calculated by the District Treasurer’s Office, total debt service for these long-term obligations is expected to be $409 million in fiscal year 1998, the highest projected year, or 11.42 percent of total expected fiscal year 1994 revenues. The District’s Bond Rating and Debt Compared With Other Jurisdictions
Various debt indicators are available to compare debt characteristics of jurisdictions. This rating has been the same since the District first issued general obligation bonds in 1984. Other comparisons of the District’s debt with other jurisdictions are more problematic. The District of Columbia’s overall net debt per capita was $6,315, and the ratio of net debt to taxable real property was 8.1 percent. Recommendations
We recommend that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct that (1) the multi-year plans contain debt service percentage information in the manner required by the Home Rule Act, and (2) the financial statements contain information on the debt service percentage that is calculated using the Home Rule Act methodology by dividing the maximum estimated annual debt service by the actual revenues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the District of Columbia's debt, focusing on: (1) the types of debt that are available to the District and the limitations on that debt; (2) the total District debt and its estimated future borrowings; and (3) how the District's debt compares with other jurisdictions' debt.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Home Rule Act authorizes and limits the District's short- and long-term debt; (2) the District's debt limits have not been revised since enactment of the Home Rule Act; (3) the District is authorized to issue revenue bonds to finance capital projects that are not backed by the full faith and credit of the District and to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to meet its general expenses; (4) as of September 30, 1994, the District's long-term general obligation debt totalled $3.65 billion; (5) total debt service for these long-term obligations is expected to be $409 million in fiscal year 1998; (6) by 2000, the District's projected debt service percentage is expected to be close to the statutory limitation of 14 percent; (7) as of September 30, 1994, the District's general obligation bond rating was at its lowest and was below that of most states and large cities; (8) the District's bond rating has not changed since it began issuing general obligation bonds in 1984; (9) the District's debt level is higher than other jurisdictions, in terms of debt per capita and debt as a percentage of real property; (10) the District's debt cannot be adequately compared with other jurisdictions because its service responsibilities include both city and state governments; and (11) debt service calculations in the District's multiyear plans and annual financial statements are not consistent with the methodology required by the Home Rule Act. |
gao_GAO-10-631T | gao_GAO-10-631T_0 | FEMA, which is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for the oversight and management of NFIP. NFIP’s Financial Challenges Have Increased the Federal Government’s and U.S. Taxpayers’ Financial Exposure from Flood Losses
By design, NFIP is not an actuarially sound program, in part because it does not operate like many private insurance companies. As of April 2010, NFIP owed approximately $18.8 billion to Treasury, primarily as a result of loans that the program received to pay claims from the 2005 hurricane season. For example, FEMA cannot deny insurance on the basis of frequent losses. NFIP could be placed on a sounder fiscal footing by addressing several elements of its premium structure. For example, as we have pointed out in previous reports, NFIP provides subsidized and grandfathered rates that do not reflect the full risk of potential flood losses to some property owners, operates in part with unreliable and incomplete data on flood risks that make it difficult to set accurate rates, and has not been able to overcome the challenge of repetitive loss properties. Not accurately reflecting the actual risk of flooding increases the risk that full-risk premiums may not be sufficient to cover future losses and add to concerns about NFIP’s financial stability. However, homeowners who are remapped into high-risk areas and do not currently have flood insurance may be required to purchase it at the full-risk rate. Despite Its Financial Challenges, NFIP Has Experienced Some Positive Developments
According to FEMA, expanded marketing efforts through its FloodSmart campaign have contributed to an increase in NFIP policies. Correspondingly, NFIP’s collected premiums have risen 28 percent since September 2006. This increase, combined with a relatively low loss experience in recent years, has enabled FEMA to make nearly $600 million in interest payments to Treasury with no additional borrowing since March 2009. While these are all encouraging developments, FEMA is still unlikely to ever pay off its current $18.8 billion debt. FEMA’s Oversight of Non- WYO Contractor Activities Is Also Lacking
Also in a previous report, we pointed out that FEMA lacked records of monitoring activities for other contractors, inconsistently followed its procedures for monitoring these contractors, and did not coordinate contract monitoring responsibilities for the two major contracts we reviewed. FEMA Continues to Lack an Effective System to Manage Flood Insurance Policy and Claims Data
To manage the flood policy and claims information that it obtains from insurance companies, NFIP’s Bureau and Statistical Agent (BSA) relies on a flood insurance management system from the 1980s that is difficult and costly to sustain and that does not adequately support NFIP’s mission needs. As part of our ongoing review of FEMA’s management of NFIP, preliminary results reveal that despite having invested roughly $40 million over 7 years, FEMA had yet to implement NextGen. Addressing NFIP’s Challenges Would Require Actions from FEMA and Congress
To address the challenges NFIP faces, FEMA would have to address its own operational and management challenges. For example, if Congress wants to structure NFIP as an insurance company and limit borrowing from Treasury in future high- or catastrophic loss years, NFIP would have to build a capital surplus fund. However, these options involve trade-offs. FEMA Could Take Further Actions to Help Address Operational and Management Challenges
Over the last several years, we have made many recommendations for actions that FEMA could take to improve its management of NFIP. For example, we have recommended that FEMA: Address challenges to oversight of the WYO program, specifically the lack of transparency of and accountability for the payments FEMA makes to WYO insurers, by determining in advance the amounts built into the payment rates for estimated expenses and profit, annually analyzing the amounts of actual expenses and profit in relation to the estimated amounts used in setting payment rates, and by immediately reassessing the practice of paying WYO insurers an additional 1 percent of written premiums for operating expenses. Address contract and management oversight issues that GAO has identified in previous reports, including determining the feasibility of integrating and streamlining numerous existing NFIP financial reporting processes to reduce the risk of errors inherent in the manual recording of accounting transactions into multiple systems; establishing and implementing procedures that require the review of available information, such as the results of biennial audits, operational reviews, and claim reinspections to determine whether the targeted audits for cause should be used; establishing and implementing procedures to schedule and conduct all required operational reviews within the prescribed 3-year period; and establishing and implementing procedures to select statistically representative samples of all claims as a basis for conducting reinspections of claims by general adjusters. Closing Comments
FEMA faces a number of ongoing challenges in managing and administering NFIP that, if not addressed, will continue to work against improving the program’s long-term financial condition. As we noted when placing NFIP on the high-risk list in 2006, comprehensive reform will likely be needed to address the financial challenges facing the program. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides policyholders with insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing NFIP. Unprecedented losses from the 2005 hurricane season and NFIP's periodic need to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to pay flood insurance claims have raised concerns about the program's long-term financial solvency. Because of these concerns and NFIP's operational issues, NFIP has been on GAO's high-risk list since March 2006. As of April 2010, NFIP's debt to Treasury stood at $18.8 billion. The Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss (1) NFIP's financial challenges, (2) FEMA's operational and management challenges, and (3) actions needed to address these challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on NFIP and GAO's ongoing review of FEMA's management of NFIP focused on information technology and contractor oversight issues.
What GAO Found
While Congress and FEMA intended that NFIP be funded with premiums collected from policyholders rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound. NFIP cannot do some of the things that private insurers do to manage their risks. For example, NFIP is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot reject high-risk applicants, and is subject to statutory limits on rate increases. In addition, its premium rates do not reflect actual flood risk. For example, nearly one in four property owners pay subsidized rates, "full-risk" rates may not reflect the full risk of flooding, and NFIP allows "grandfathered" rates, which allow some property owners to continue paying rates that do not reflect reassessments of their properties' flood risk. Further, NFIP cannot deny insurance on the basis of frequent losses and thus provides policies for repetitive loss properties, which represent only 1 percent of policies but account for 25 to 30 percent of claims. NFIP's financial condition has improved slightly due to an increase in the number of policyholders and moderate flood losses, and since March 2009, FEMA has taken some encouraging steps toward improving its financial position, including making $600 million in interest payments to Treasury without increasing its borrowings. However, it is unlikely to pay off its full $18.8 billion debt, especially if it faces catastrophic loss years. Operational and management issues may also limit efforts to address NFIP's financial challenges and meet program goals. Payments to write-your-own (WYO) insurers, which are key to NFIP operations, represent one-third to two-thirds of the premiums collected. But FEMA does not systematically consider actual flood insurance expense information when calculating these payments and has not aligned its WYO bonus structure with NFIP goals or implemented all of its financial controls for the WYO program. GAO also found that FEMA did not consistently follow its procedures for monitoring non-WYO contractors or coordinate contract monitoring responsibilities among departments on some contracts. Some contract monitoring records were missing, and no system was in place that would allow departments to share information on contractor deficiencies. In ongoing GAO work examining FEMA's management of NFIP, some similar issues are emerging. For example, FEMA still lacks an effective system to manage flood insurance policy and claims data, despite investing roughly 7 years and $40 million on a new system whose development has been halted. However, FEMA has begun to acknowledge its management challenges and develop a plan of action. Addressing the financial challenges facing NFIP would likely require actions by both FEMA and Congress that involve trade-offs, and the challenges could be difficult to remedy. For example, reducing subsidies could increase collected premiums but reduce program participation. At the same time, FEMA must address its operational and management issues. GAO has recommended a number of actions that FEMA could take to improve NFIP operations, and ongoing work will likely identify additional issues. |
gao_GAO-02-835 | gao_GAO-02-835_0 | It provides employees the right to form unions and bargain collectively and requires employers to recognize employee unions that demonstrate support from a majority of employees and to bargain in good faith. It also created an agency called the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to administer and enforce the act. While the NLRA underpins much collective bargaining activity in the United States, other federal, state, and local statutes also provide bargaining rights to many individuals excluded from the NLRA, particularly government workers and agricultural workers. Three-Quarters of U.S. Workers Have Collective Bargaining Rights
We estimate that about 103 million workers had collective bargaining rights in their primary job in February 2001. These workers constituted about 77 percent of the 135 million people in the civilian workforce. However, other federal, state, or local statutes cover some private sector workers as well as those public workers who currently have rights. Federal, state, and local government workers were excluded from the NLRA in 1935. Since 1959, federal, state, and local laws have extended rights to some of the groups excluded under the NLRA’s coverage. The proportion of the labor force with bargaining rights has increased even with the conservative assumptions that the percentage of the labor force in businesses excluded from the Board’s jurisdiction has not changed since 1959, not correcting for the extension of bargaining rights to nonprofit health care workers. Two Recent Supreme Court Cases Could Affect Gains in Coverage over the Last 40 Years
Under two recent Supreme Court rulings, some workers currently with bargaining rights may either lose bargaining rights or have their rights diminished. Because any future tests used by the Board to determine whether or not employees are supervisors should be less categorical and more fact-specific, the Kentucky River decision could have the effect of increasing the number of employees considered supervisory and thus excluded from coverage under the act. Kentucky River Requires a Determination of Supervisory Status on a Case-by-Case Basis
In the Kentucky River case, the Court ruled that the Board should revise its test for determining supervisory status, a status that can determine coverage under the act and, therefore, bargaining rights, for certain groups of employees, in this instance, charge nurses. About 5.5 Million Undocumented Alien Workers Have Rights Diminished
The Supreme Court ruling in the Hoffman Plastic case reversed a Board decision awarding back pay, a key remedy under the NLRA, to undocumented alien workers. The Board had ruled that the employer should award back pay and conditional reinstatement and, in doing so, applied the protections and remedies of the act to undocumented alien workers in the same manner as it does to other workers. | What GAO Found
In 1935, the federal National Labor Relations Act provided U.S. workers the right to bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with their employers, forming the framework for collective bargaining in the United States. The Act allowed workers to join together to form unions and required that employers recognize certified employee unions and bargain "in good faith." Although the Act applied broadly to "employees," it and subsequent amendments excluded certain groups of workers from its coverage. Three-quarters of the civilian workforce--or 103 million of the 135 million people in the labor force as of February 2001--had some form of collective bargaining rights from federal, state, or local statutes. In contrast, 32 million civilian workers were without collective bargaining rights under any law, either federal and state. The portion of the total labor force with collective bargaining rights has likely increased since 1959. Since 1959, no major group of workers has lost bargaining rights under the Act. However, other federal, state, and local laws have extended rights to some workers in the groups excluded from the Act, providing bargaining rights to 14.5 million workers, primarily nonprofit health care workers; federal, state, and local government workers; and agricultural workers. Under two recent Supreme Court cases affecting National Labor Relations Board decisions, some workers currently with bargaining rights may either lose bargaining rights or have their rights diminished. In the Kentucky River decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Board should revise its test for determining whether a worker is a supervisor, and excluded group under the Act, finding that the Board's test served to categorically include certain employees as covered under the act. Because any future tests used by the Board to determine whether or not employees are supervisors should be less categorical and more case-specific, the Kentucky River decision could increase the number of employees considered supervisory and thus excluded from coverage under the act. In the case of Hoffman Plastic, the Court reversed the Board's decision to award back pay to an undocumented alien worker who was fired for union activity. Although the Court did not exclude undocumented alien workers from protection under the Act, it prohibited the Board from awarding back pay to these documented alien workers whose rights had been violated, stating that this remedy would conflict with federal immigration law. |
gao_GGD-98-81 | gao_GGD-98-81_0 | The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and immigration judges have roles in implementing the provisions of the 1996 Act relating to the expedited removal of aliens. INS has eight asylum offices nationwide. We address the following aspects of the exclusion and expedited removal processes in this report: how the expedited removal process and INS procedures to implement it are different from the process and procedures used to exclude aliens before the 1996 Act; the implementation and results of the process for making credible fear determinations during the 7 months following April 1, 1997; and the mechanisms that INS established to monitor expedited removals and credible fear determinations and to further improve these processes. These five locations had about 50 percent of the expedited removal cases during the first 7 months after the 1996 Act was implemented. INS staff also have reviewed files and found that INS inspectors and supervisors were not always documenting that they followed INS procedures. These questions are as follows:
Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence? Two major differences between the exclusion and expedited removal processes are INS’ authority to issue the expedited removal order and the aliens’ limited right of review of that order. Other changes include (1) an increased penalty for inadmissible aliens, including those subject to expedited removal; (2) a more structured inspection process for expedited removal than for exclusion; and (3) estimated additional time taken by inspectors to complete the expedited removal process due to the additional steps in the process. As part of the case file review, we determined whether (1) the inspectors documented in the sworn statement that they asked the aliens the three required questions designed to identify a fear of returning to their home country, (2) the aliens signed the sworn statements, and (3) the supervisors reviewed the expedited removal orders. Lastly, in our case file review at five locations, the documentation showed that the range in which supervisors documented that they reviewed the expedited removal orders was from an estimated 80 to 100 percent. INS requires supervisory review of asylum officers’ credible fear determinations. Data on Aliens Referred for Credible Fear Interviews
INS data for aliens who attempted to enter the United States between April 1, 1997, and October 31, 1997, show that inspectors referred 1,396 aliens to asylum officers for a credible fear interview. Nationwide, asylum officers determined that 79 percent of these 1,108 aliens had a credible fear of persecution. Of these 198 cases, immigration judges affirmed asylum officers’ negative credible fear determinations in about 83 percent of the cases. INS’ Mechanisms to Monitor the Expedited Removal Process
In addition to the procedures discussed in chapters 2 and 3, INS has developed or is in the process of developing mechanisms to monitor the expedited removal process, including the credible fear determinations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, focusing on: (1) how the expedited removal process and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) procedures to implement it are different from the process and procedures used to exclude aliens before the act; (2) the implementation and results of the process for making credible fear determinations during the 7 months following April 1, 1997; and (3) the mechanisms that INS established to monitor expedited removals and credible fear determinations and to further improve these processes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two major differences between the exclusion process used before the act and its expedited removal process are INS inspectors' authority to issue the expedited removal order and the aliens' limited right of review of that order; (2) other changes included an increased penalty for inadmissible aliens, including those subject to expedited removal, and a more structured inspection process for expedited removal than for exclusion; (3) at the five locations GAO visited, INS estimated that the amount of time it took inspectors to complete the expedited removal process was greater than the amount of time used to complete the steps required of INS inspectors in the previous exclusion process; (4) this increased time by INS inspectors could be offset by reductions in time by immigration judges who no longer make these decisions; (5) during the first 7 months that the expedited removal process was in place, 29,170 aliens attempted to enter the country and were placed in expedited removal; (6) INS inspectors referred 1,396 of these aliens to asylum officers for credible fear interviews; (7) as of December 1997, almost all of the approximately 27,800 remaining aliens had been removed from the United States; (8) at the five locations it visited, GAO reviewed documentation in randomly selected case files of aliens subject to expedited removal; (9) the results of this review showed that between an estimated 80 percent and 100 percent of the time INS inspectors and supervisors documented that they followed certain INS procedures; (10) these documented procedures included activities such as supervisors' review of inspectors' removal orders and inspectors' asking aliens specific questions about their fear of being returned to their home country or country of last residence; (11) of the 1,396 aliens referred to asylum officers for credible fear determinations, asylum officers completed interviews with 1,108 and found that 79 percent had a credible fear; (12) immigration judges received 198 cases to review asylum officers' negative credible fear determinations between April 1 and October 31, 1997; (13) the judges affirmed the asylum officers' determinations in 83 percent of these cases; (14) INS has developed or is in the process of developing mechanisms to monitor the expedited removal procedures, including the credible fear determinations; and (15) INS has made changes to its processes on the basis of concerns raised by these internal reviewers and outside organizations. |
gao_GAO-05-660 | gao_GAO-05-660_0 | 1.) Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations
The Army Reserve has provided ready forces for ongoing military operations since September 11, 2001, by transferring personnel and equipment to deploying units; however, it is running out of personnel who can be mobilized under current policies and equipment that meets deployment standards for three key reasons. This has left nondeploying units with shortages in personnel and equipment, which hampers their ability to train for future missions. This hampers the Army Reserve’s ability to maintain unit readiness. The Army Reserve Lacks Required Full-time Support Staff
Another significant challenge the Army Reserve faces in continuing to provide support for near-term operations is that it has not been authorized all of the full-time support staff it needs to perform critical readiness duties at home. The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed Coordination and Funding Decisions
The Army and Army Reserve have taken several steps to plan and implement a number of initiatives to address the readiness challenges described above and improve deployment predictability for soldiers, but they have not yet made decisions on the numbers and types of units the Army Reserve will need in the future and several key decisions about the Army Reserve’s structure and funding have not yet been finalized. While the Army’s Campaign Plan defines overall goals to improve readiness of Army units, including Army Reserve units, it does not describe the personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the Army’s modular structure and rotational force generating model. The Army has not completed planning for how active and Army Reserve component combat support and combat service support units will be organized to support the new modular brigade combat teams. While the Army and Army Reserve have various initiatives under way to improve Army Reserve readiness over time, not all of these initiatives are being integrated and coordinated to ensure they most efficiently achieve overall goals. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief, Army Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to develop an implementation plan for a force rotation model for the Army Reserve that describes the types and numbers of units that should be available for deployment the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the strategy for providing them, and how readiness will be evaluated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments without continued reserve participation. The Army Reserve provides critical combat support and combat service support units, such as medical and transportation units, to the Army. While Army Reserve members historically could expect to train one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year with activations for limited deployments, since September 11 some have been called upon to support ongoing military operations for a year or more. GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.
What GAO Found
While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide these forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three primary causes of these shortages are (1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full-time support staff to develop and maintain unit readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging recruiting shortfalls. The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive management strategy for integrating the initiatives to ensure that each initiative most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its overall readiness and predictability goals. One of the Army Reserve's major initiatives has been to develop a rotational force model. However, the model cannot be fully implemented until the Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need to carry out its plans to restructure into a more modular and flexible force. Because the Army has not defined what personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the new modular and rotational models, it cannot be assured that its initiatives are most efficiently working together to meet readiness goals and that funding is appropriately targeted to meet those goals. Until plans that integrate the initiatives are completed and approved and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's growing challenges. |
gao_GAO-05-161 | gao_GAO-05-161_0 | Why Is Readiness a Concern? Stations have seen a substantial increase in their security workload, along with a shifting of activity levels in other missions. Until it does so, the impact of increased responsibilities on readiness cannot be determined nor can the Coast Guard or others measure progress made in meeting station needs. Effect of Homeland Security Responsibilities on Readiness Needs Not Yet Known
The Coast Guard has not yet determined the extent to which changes in post-September 11 mission priorities—specifically, increases in homeland security responsibilities—have affected station readiness needs. Second, because homeland security requirements have yet to be finalized, the Coast Guard has begun, but not yet completed, efforts to update station staffing standards and other requirements to reflect post- September 11 changes in mission priorities and station readiness needs. However, despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet existing readiness standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats and does not have adequate processes in place to help ensure the future funding of station PPE, a shortcoming that could result in an insufficient supply of PPE at stations in future years. However, the process may change once long-term homeland security requirements have been identified. Perhaps more significantly, it remains unclear where station readiness falls in the Coast Guard’s list of priorities, as evidenced by a lack of measurable annual goals related to stations and the lack of detail—in terms of both specific actions as well as necessary funding—in the Boat Forces Strategic Plan, the Coast Guard’s strategy for addressing station readiness issues. Recommendations
To help ensure that the Coast Guard and Congress have the information necessary to effectively assess station readiness needs and track progress in meeting those needs, and that multimission station personnel receive sufficient personal protection equipment to perform essential and hazardous missions as specified by Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland security requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following three actions: Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those needs. To assess the extent to which Coast Guard’s plans address station readiness needs, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, the agency’s strategy for maintaining and improving essential operations capabilities for all boat units, including multimission stations. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of changing missions on station needs, the progress made in addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans are in place for addressing any remaining needs.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity levels have been finalized. Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the future. The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these stations has not been updated to reflect increased security responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress. |
gao_GAO-08-84 | gao_GAO-08-84_0 | In October 2006, we reported slow progress in five key UN management reform areas—management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethics, review of programs and activities (known as mandates), and human rights. Progress on UN Management Reform Efforts Has Varied
Since October 2006, the progress of UN management reform efforts has varied from little or no progress to substantial progress in the five areas we reviewed—ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates). After almost 2 years of discussions that included negotiating its composition and responsibilities, member states established an Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) in June 2007. Since our October 2006 report, OIOS has worked to improve the capacity of individual divisions, including internal audit and investigations. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain OIOS’s ability to audit high-risk areas, and the General Assembly has not authorized OIOS’s financial and operational independence. The five members of the newly created IAAC were elected in November 2007, and the committee is expected to be operational in January 2008. Some Progress Has Been Made in Strengthening OIOS
The UN has made some progress in strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Some Progress Has Been Made in Developing a Training Program for UN Procurement Staff
The UN Procurement Division has made some progress in developing a comprehensive training program for procurement staff. Some progress has been made on issues involving human resources and information technology, while little or no progress has been made in reforming the UN’s internal justice system, reforming certain budgetary and financial management functions, and improving the delivery of certain services. Limited Steps Have Been Taken on the Review of UN Programs and Activities
Although UN member states agreed to continue a review of UN programs and activities (known as mandates) in 2007, no actions have been taken to eliminate or consolidate mandates. Various Factors Have Slowed the UN’s Management Reform Efforts
Various factors have slowed the UN’s efforts to improve the management of the Secretariat, and many remaining UN management reforms cannot move forward until these factors are addressed. During our review, we identified four key factors that hinder progress on UN management reforms: (1) disagreements among member states on UN management reform efforts, (2) lack of comprehensive implementation plans for some management reform proposals, (3) administrative policies and procedures that continue to complicate the process of implementing certain complex human resource initiatives, and (4) competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that limit the capacity of General Assembly members to address management reform issues. Participation in the United Nations report an assessment of the effectiveness of the reforms. To assess the progress of the UN reform efforts we reviewed, we developed the following three categories: Little or no progress: There is evidence that few or no steps have been taken on the reform effort. Substantial progress: There is evidence that the reform effort has been mostly or fully implemented. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has advocated reforms of United Nations (UN) management for many years. In October 2006, GAO reported that UN management reforms were progressing slowly and that many were still awaiting review by the General Assembly. For this review, GAO was asked to (1) determine the progress of UN management reform initiatives in five key areas--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates)--and (2) identify factors that have slowed the pace of reform efforts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents relating to UN management reform and interviewed U.S. and UN officials.
What GAO Found
The progress of UN management reform efforts has varied in the five areas that GAO reviewed--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates). To determine the status of these reform efforts, GAO developed three categories of progress, defined as follows: (1) Little or no progress = Few or no steps have been taken; (2) Some progress = Some steps have been taken, while others remain; and (3) Substantial progress = The reform effort has been mostly or fully implemented. The ethics office has made substantial progress in staffing its office and implementing a whistleblower protection policy, as well as some progress in developing ethics standards and collecting and analyzing financial disclosure forms. Member states made some progress in improving oversight at the UN when they created an Independent Audit Advisory Committee, which is expected to be operational by January 2008. Additionally, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) improved the capacity of individual divisions, including internal audit and investigations. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain the independence of OIOS and its ability to audit high-risk areas. Some progress has been made in the area of procurement, such as developing a comprehensive training program for procurement staff. However, the UN has made little or no progress in establishing an independent bid protest system. Some progress has been made in reforming management operations of the UN Secretariat, such as improving human resource functions and information technology. In contrast, little or no progress has been made in reforming the UN's internal justice system for resolving and adjudicating staff grievances and safeguarding the rights of staff members, certain budgetary and financial management functions, and the delivery of certain services. Finally, despite some limited initial actions, the UN's review of programs and activities (known as mandates) has not advanced due in part to a lack of support by many member states. Various factors have slowed the pace of UN management reforms, and a number of reforms cannot move forward until these factors are addressed. Four key factors that have slowed the pace include (1) disagreements among member states on the priorities and importance of UN management reform efforts, (2) the lack of comprehensive implementation plans for some management reform proposals, (3) administrative policies and procedures that continue to complicate the process of implementing certain complex human resource initiatives, and (4) competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that limit the capacity of General Assembly members to address management reform issues. |
gao_GAO-04-156 | gao_GAO-04-156_0 | Legislative Requirements for Improvements in the DOD Purchase Card Program
In response to the concerns we expressed about DOD’s management of the purchase card program, the Congress included Section 1007 in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 (Public Law 107-314) and Section 8149 in the fiscal year 2003 DOD Appropriations Act (Public Law 107-248) to require DOD to take specific actions to improve the management of the purchase card program, and in particular the weaknesses we identified. The report identified 182 cardholders who potentially used their purchase cards inappropriately or fraudulently. While the military services have generally taken strong disciplinary actions against cardholders who we identified as having made fraudulent or potentially fraudulent purchases, the military services generally have done little or nothing to discipline cardholders who have made improper, abusive, or questionable purchases. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This study responded to the legislative mandate in the conference report to the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, that directs the Comptroller General to review the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to comply with the requirements of Section 1007 of the act and submit a report on those actions to the congressional defense committees no later than December 2, 2003. To meet the objectives of this assignment, we requested that DOD and the military services provide us the (1) status of DOD and the military services’ efforts in implementing certain provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 and the fiscal year 2003 DOD Appropriations Act, (2) status of actions taken to implement the recommendations included in our four reports, and (3) administrative or disciplinary actions taken against individuals we identified as having made potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions. GAO observation on the status of recommendation 21. DOD is seeking additional legislative action required to implement credit checks. compromised purchase card accounts. Modify NAVSUP Instruction 4200.94 to include a schedule of disciplinary actions as a guide for taking action against cardholders who make improper or abusive acquisitions with the purchase card. | Why GAO Did This Study
This study responds to a legislative mandate, which directs the Comptroller General to review the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to implement provisions included in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 (Public Law 107-314) concerning management of the purchase card program. This study also discusses DOD efforts to implement provisions in the DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003 (Public Law 107-248) as well as recommendations and the status of disciplinary actions taken against individuals identified in prior GAO reports as having used the government purchase card for potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable purposes.
What GAO Found
DOD has initiated actions to implement all of the requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 and the DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003. While it has largely completed revamping its policies and other requirements, it still had considerable work to complete in order to implement managerial and oversight mechanisms, such as strategic sourcing, monitoring, and auditing. However, to implement the legislative requirement that DOD evaluate credit worthiness prior to issuing a purchase card, DOD is allowing cardholders to self-certify their credit worthiness rather than conducting credit checks on cardholders, as is typically done in the private sector. DOD started actions to implement nearly all of the 109 GAO recommendations, some of which may closely relate to the legislative provisions. DOD and the military services have taken disciplinary actions against cardholders whom a court of law determined had fraudulently used their purchase cards. They have also started to educate cardholders and approving officials on the proper use of the purchase card. The military services have not taken strong disciplinary actions against cardholders GAO identified as making improper and abusive or questionable purchase card acquisitions. The military services determined that many of these purchases did not directly violate existing policies. Consequently, the services modified these policies to provide a basis for disciplinary actions for similar purchases in the future. |
gao_GAO-09-900T | gao_GAO-09-900T_0 | While SBA has taken some steps toward implementing the Act, the agency still needs to take additional steps to completely address 8 provisions. According to SBA officials, the agency has not yet completely addressed some provisions that require new regulations because to do so, the agency must make extensive changes to current programs or implement new programs––such as the Immediate and Expedited Disaster Assistance Programs––to satisfy requirements of the Act. These programs, which require participation of private lenders, would be designed to provide businesses with access to short-term loans while they are waiting for long- term assistance. Moreover, as required by the Act, SBA has not issued an update of its comprehensive DRP that reflects recent changes resulting from the Act’s requirements, as well as SBA’s own reform efforts. Delays in updates to the DRP limit the agency’s ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. Also, SBA has not fully addressed the requirement for providing region-specific marketing and outreach and ensuring the information is made available to SBDCs and other local resources. We consistently heard from regional entities, such as SBDCs and emergency management groups, about the need for more up-front information on SBA’s Disaster Loan Program and their expected roles and responsibilities in disaster response efforts. By taking such actions, SBA could leverage the efforts and capacity of SBDCs, as well as state and local emergency management agencies, and ensure that it and they will be better prepared for future events, especially in disaster-prone areas. Furthermore, the Act established multiple new reporting requirements and while SBA has addressed some of these, the agency has failed to comply with the Act and issue a first annual report on disaster assistance––which was due in November 2008. Specifically, the Act requires that SBA report annually on the total number of SBA disaster staff, major changes to the Disaster Loan Program (such as changes to technology or staff responsibilities), a description of the number and dollar amount of disaster loans made during the year, and SBA’s plans for preparing and responding to possible future disasters. Failure to produce annual reports on schedule can lead to a lack of transparency on the agency’s progress in reforming the program. Additionally, 9 provisions set forth in the Act are subject to deadlines, which the agency has had limited success in meeting. The agency also has not developed a plan with expected time frames for addressing the remaining requirements. SBA’s not providing reports to Congress and not having an implementation plan in place for addressing the remaining requirements can lead to a lack of transparency about the agency’s Disaster Loan Program, program improvement, and capacity to reform the program, as well as its ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. SBA’s Response Following 2008 Disasters Aligned with Certain Components of its DRP, but SBA’s Response to Disaster Victims’ Feedback on the Application Process Could Be Improved
SBA’s initial response following the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with major components of its DRP, such as infrastructure, human capital, information technology, and communications. Additionally, individuals to whom we spoke affected by both disasters considered the agency’s overall performance somewhat positive, but believed the disaster loan process could be improved. As discussed in our report, while SBA has made progress, the agency has missed opportunities to further improve its Disaster Loan Program, and in particular improve the application process for future applicants. Specifically, we recommended that the Administrator of SBA: (1) develop procedures for regional entities that would enable SBA to meet all region-specific requirements of the Act and ensure regional entities, such as SBDCs, have this information and other Disaster Loan Program information readily available prior to the likely occurrence of a disaster; (2) complete the first annual report to Congress on disaster assistance and adhere to the time frame for subsequent reports; (3) expeditiously issue an updated DRP that reflects recent changes resulting from the Act’s requirements, as well as SBA’s own reform efforts; (4) develop an implementation plan and report to Congress on the agency’s progress in addressing the requirements of the Act, including milestone dates for completing implementation; and (5) develop and implement a process to address identified problems in the disaster loan application process for future applicants. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on reforms made to the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Disaster Loan Program and the impact those reforms had following recent disasters. SBA plays a critical role in assisting the victims of natural and other declared disasters. SBA provides financial assistance through its Disaster Loan Program to help homeowners, renters, businesses of all sizes, and nonprofits recover from disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Since the agency's inception in 1953, SBA has approved more than $46 billion in disaster loans for homeowners, businesses, and nonprofit organizations. After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), SBA faced an unprecedented demand for disaster loans, while also being confronted with a significant backlog of applications; therefore, hundreds of thousands of loans were not disbursed in a timely way. Many criticized SBA for what was perceived to be a slow and confusing response to the disasters and one that exposed many deficiencies in the agency's Disaster Loan Program and demonstrated the need for reform. For example, as we stated in our February 2007 report, SBA did not engage in or complete comprehensive disaster plans before the Gulf Coast hurricanes, and this limited logistical disaster planning likely contributed to the initial challenges the agency faced in responding to the 2005 hurricanes. As a result, Congress and SBA agreed that the program needed significant improvements. Since then, SBA has taken several steps to reform its Disaster Loan Program which include creating an online loan application, increasing the capacity of its Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS), and developing a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). In June 2008, Congress enacted the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act (Act) to expand steps taken by SBA and require new measures to ensure that SBA is prepared for future catastrophic disasters.
What GAO Found
While SBA has taken some steps toward implementing the Act, the agency still needs to take additional steps to completely address 8 provisions. According to SBA officials, the agency has not yet completely addressed some provisions that require new regulations because to do so, the agency must make extensive changes to current programs or implement new programs--such as the Immediate and Expedited Disaster Assistance Programs--to satisfy requirements of the Act. These programs, which require participation of private lenders, would be designed to provide businesses with access to short-term loans while they are waiting for long-term assistance. Moreover, as required by the Act, SBA has not issued an update of its comprehensive DRP that reflects recent changes resulting from the Act's requirements, as well as SBA's own reform efforts. Delays in updates to the DRP limit the agency's ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. Also, SBA has not fully addressed the requirement for providing region-specific marketing and outreach and ensuring the information is made available to Small Business Centers (SBDCs) and other local resources. We consistently heard from regional entities, such as SBDCs and emergency management groups, about the need for more up-front information on SBA's Disaster Loan Program and their expected roles and responsibilities in disaster response efforts. By taking such actions, SBA could leverage the efforts and capacity of SBDCs, as well as state and local emergency management agencies, and ensure that it and they will be better prepared for future events, especially in disaster-prone areas. Furthermore, the Act established multiple new reporting requirements and while SBA has addressed some of these, the agency has failed to comply with the Act and issue a first annual report on disaster assistance--which was due in November 2008. Specifically, the Act requires that SBA report annually on the total number of SBA disaster staff, major changes to the Disaster Loan Program (such as changes to technology or staff responsibilities), a description of the number and dollar amount of disaster loans made during the year, and SBA's plans for preparing and responding to possible future disasters. Failure to produce annual reports on schedule can lead to a lack of transparency on the agency's progress in reforming the program. Additionally, 9 provisions set forth in the Act are subject to deadlines, which the agency has had limited success in meeting. The agency also has not developed a plan with expected time frames for addressing the remaining requirements. SBA's not providing reports to Congress and not having an implementation plan in place for addressing the remaining requirements can lead to a lack of transparencyabout the agency's Disaster Loan Program, program improvement, and capacity to reform the program, as well as its ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. SBA's initial response following the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with major components of its DRP, such as infrastructure, human capital, information technology, and communications. Additionally, individuals to whom we spoke affected by both disasters considered the agency's overall performance somewhat positive, but believed the disaster loan process could be improved. |
gao_AIMD-96-23 | gao_AIMD-96-23_0 | Clear Goals Are the Cornerstone of the Privatization Process
We found that the government’s goals, either for its overall privatization agenda or for individual privatization initiatives, influenced what entities would be privatized, how they would be valued, what type of sale would be used, and who would be eligible to purchase the entity. All the governments we contacted undertook privatization for a variety of reasons but all stated that they used privatization primarily to increase economic efficiency and reduce the size of the public sector. Table 2 shows the entities controlling the privatization process in each of the governments we studied. The United Kingdom has primarily sold nationalized industries, which are already in a corporate form. Officials in most of the countries told us that because of this complexity, the centralized agencies responsible for the management of privatization hired financial advisors to assist with the valuation process. In Canada, the government uses valuation to assist in pricing rather than to determine whether or not to privatize an entity. All governments in this study retained some amount of debt associated with entities to be sold, and generally paid the balance on under-funded or unfunded employee obligations. Budget Display and Use of Sale Proceeds
Most of the governments in this study use any cash proceeds that result from privatization to reduce debt and interest costs and do not permit proceeds to be used to offset ongoing spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the divestiture experiences of other nations, focusing on the: (1) privatization process; (2) valuation and preparation of assets for sale; and (3) use and display of sale proceeds for budgetary purposes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in the nations studied, privatization goals influenced how and what entities would be offered for sale; (2) the nations studied used privatization mainly to increase economic efficiency and reduce the size of government; (3) a central agency is responsible for overseeing the privatization process in each of the nations studied; (4) the nations generally privatized entities already in a corporate form; (5) some nations used clawbacks to require buyers to return a share of profits to the government; (6) although the use of clawbacks helps protect taxpayers against undervaluation, they decrease sale prices and may constrain entities' commercial behavior; (7) although the nations used various valuation techniques, all governments hired financial advisors to assist in the valuation process; (8) most of the nations studied attempted to remove liabilities from entities being privatized by restructuring debt, paying unfunded employee obligations, or otherwise removing risks that would reduce the entity's sale price; and (9) most of the governments used any proceeds resulting from privatization to reduce debt and interest costs rather than to offset ongoing spending. |
gao_NSIAD-98-138 | gao_NSIAD-98-138_0 | On May 30, 1997, following a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the council’s Steering Board supported the more vigorous U.S. approach, issuing a statement, known as the Sintra Declaration, that confirmed the Steering Board’s long-term commitment to the peace process in Bosnia and reaffirmed that the international community would not tolerate a resumption of hostilities by anyone in the country in the future; emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain a united and sovereign country, consisting of two multiethnic entities, and that the international community will not tolerate any attempts at ethnic partition, in fact or in law, by anyone; demanded that Bosnia’s political leaders and national and entity governments significantly accelerate their work toward implementing the Dayton Agreement; set specific, near-term dates by which Bosnia’s political leaders and government institutions would have to accomplish specific tasks, such as pass citizenship and passport laws, that would link the country’s ethnic groups and their separate areas of control; and, in some cases, described diplomatic consequences if the parties did not accomplish the tasks by the specified date; acknowledged the High Representative’s authority to regulate Bosnia’s media, specifically to curtail or suspend any media network or program whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Dayton Agreement; and reemphasized that providing economic assistance to Bosnia would be conditioned at the municipal level on the parties’ complying with the Dayton Agreement, particularly those provisions dealing with surrendering indictees to the war crimes tribunal and accepting the peaceful return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes. Beginning in mid-1997, SFOR began to more actively support implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace operation. Our specific objectives were to determine what progress had been made in achieving the operation’s objectives since mid-1997. To do so, we focused on the operation’s four key goals, which are to create conditions that allow Bosnia’s political leaders to (1) provide a secure environment for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic country, to include the surrendering of indictees to the war crimes tribunal; (3) ensure the rights of people to return to their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy. Despite the progress made, the country remained a long way from achieving the overall objective: Most multiethnic institutions at all levels of government were largely not functioning or were functioning only as a result of heavy international involvement, the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs and Croats and their political leaders still wanted to be separate from Bosnia, and the human rights situation remained poor and ethnic intolerance strong. This intransigence is due in large part to hard-line Bosnian Croat leaders. 4.1). The plan recognized the difficulty of returning people to their homes across ethnic lines and therefore established a low estimate for minority returns, which was exceeded during the year. 5.1). 6.2). After the election of the new, moderate Republika Srpska government, the U.S. government pledged to provide increased assistance to Republika Srpska. However, as noted in the Executive Summary and throughout the report, this progress was achieved largely because of intense international pressure and involvement, the momentum for continued progress is not self-sustaining, and conditions will have to improve significantly before international military forces could substantially draw down. It is widely accepted in the international community that, even with the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are realized. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its review of the Bosnia peace operation, focusing on the progress made since mid-1997 in achieving the operation's objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the actions taken by the international community starting in mid-1997 accelerated the pace of progress toward reaching the Dayton Agreement's objectives; (2) during this period, with the military situation remaining stable, some advancements were made in providing security for the people of Bosnia, creating a democratic environment, establishing multiethnic institutions at all levels of government, arresting those indicted for war crimes, returning people to their prewar homes across ethnic lines, and rebuilding the infrastructure and revitalizing the economy; (3) moreover, there has been a weakening of hard-line Bosnian Serb control over police and the media and the election of a new, moderate Prime Minister in Republika Srpska; (4) however, the goal of a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia remains elusive, primarily due to the continued intransigence of Bosnia's political leaders; (5) almost all of the results were achieved only with intense international involvement and pressure, both political and military; (6) for example, the High Representative imposed numerous temporary solutions when Bosnia's political leaders could not reach agreement; (7) further, a substantial NATO-led force is still needed to provide security for the civil aspects of the operation; (8) conditions will have to improve significantly before international military forces could substantially draw down; even with the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are realized; and (9) Bosnia for all intents and purposes lacks functioning, multiethnic governments at all levels; the majority of those indicted for war crimes remain at large; about 1.4 million people have not yet been resettled as Bosnia's political leaders continue to prevent people from returning to their homes across ethnic lines; and few economic links have been reestablished among Bosnia's ethnic groups or between its two entities. |
gao_RCED-99-43 | gao_RCED-99-43_0 | The Simplified Food Stamp Program
The Simplified Food Stamp Program allows the states to determine eligibility and benefits under one set of program criteria for families receiving assistance from both the Food Stamp Program and TANF. Six states—Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Maine, North Carolina, and South Carolina—indicated that they were planning to implement the simplified program. As figure 2 shows, the states that have not implemented a simplified program cited a number of concerns that have discouraged its adoption. The most frequently cited concern for 34 of the states that had not implemented a simplified program was increasing caseworker burden because of an additional set of program criteria. Finally, the third most frequently cited factor discouraging program implementation for 24 of the states was that other Welfare Reform Act requirements had a higher priority. As figure 3 shows, according to 6 of the 7 states that had implemented a mini simplified program and 32 of the states that had not implemented a simplified program, the program would have little or no impact on the number of households receiving food stamps. Food stamp officials in Idaho told us that the minimal impact on food stamp participation and benefit levels in their state is due to the relatively small number of households that participate in the simplified program compared with the state’s total food stamp population. 5.) Specifically, we (1) identify the number of states that have adopted or are planning to adopt the Simplified Food Stamp Program, (2) describe the concerns that may be preventing other states from adopting the simplified program, and (3) examine the impacts that the adoption of the simplified program may have on households’ eligibility and benefits. Status of States’ Implementation of the Simplified Food Stamp Program as of July 1998
Arkansas Implements the Simplified Food Stamp Program
Arkansas was the first state to obtain FNS’ approval to implement a simplified program that merges several Food Stamp Program and TANF requirements. FNS officials did not approve this program change because, under the Welfare Reform Act, the recipient has to be eligible for TANF assistance before being eligible for benefits under the simplified program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the impact of welfare reform on the Food Stamp Program, focusing on: (1) the number of states that have adopted or are planning to adopt the Simplified Food Stamp Program; (2) the concerns that may be preventing other states from adopting the simplified program; and (3) the impacts that the adoption of the simplified programs may have on households' eligibility and benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's July 1998 survey indicated that seven states had implemented a limited, or mini, Simplified Food Stamp Program; (2) of the 45 states that had not implemented the simplified program, 6 were planning to do so; 30 indicated that they did not plan to do so; and the 9 remaining states were uncertain about their plans; (3) one of the six states--Arkansas--was planning to adopt the simplified program, but subsequently implemented a full, or more comprehensive, program that establishes a uniform set of eligibility requirements for both food stamp and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance; (4) the states that had not implemented the simplified program cited several concerns that discouraged them: (a) increasing caseworkers' burden by creating a third set of eligibility criteria for a simplified program that are different from those associated with the separately administered TANF and the Food Stamp Program; (b) restricting the options for designing a simplified program by requiring it to be cost neutral; and (c) other Welfare Reform Act requirements that had a higher priority; (5) the simplified program would have little or no impact on either the number of households participating in the Food Stamp Program or on the amount of their benefits, according to the majority of states that have and have not implemented a simplified program; (6) the simplified program has limited impact, according to one state, primarily because a relatively small number of households participate in it compared with the state's total food stamp population; and (7) according to another state, since most TANF households also receive assistance under the regular Food Stamp Program, there is little change in total benefit costs as a result of the state's adoption of the simplified program. |
gao_GAO-05-939T | gao_GAO-05-939T_0 | Regulatory Reform Initiatives Reveal Some Common Strengths and Weaknesses
Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of rules and regulations each year to implement statutes enacted by Congress. The public policy goals and benefits of regulations include, among other things, ensuring that workplaces, air travel, foods, and drugs are safe; that the nation’s air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes is collected. The costs of these regulations are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and the benefits estimates are even higher. Over the last decade, at the request of Congress, GAO has released over 60 reports and testimonies reviewing the implementation of various regulatory reform initiatives. Initiatives Increase Attention on Proposed Rules and Raise Expectations of the Rule- Making Process
Our reviews suggest at least four overall strengths or benefits that have been associated with existing regulatory reform initiatives: (1) increasing the attention directed to rules and rule making, (2) increasing expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules, (3) encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rule making, and (4) improving the transparency of the rule-making process. Second, several of the reform initiatives have increased the analytical requirements and expectations in the regulatory process. Our reviews have identified at least four general reasons that might explain why reform initiatives have not been more effective: (1) the limited scope and coverage of various requirements, (2) lack of clarity regarding key terms and definitions, (3) uneven implementation of the initiatives’ requirements, and (4) a predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process, agencies’ development of rules. Opportunities Exist to Refine Existing Reform Initiatives and Explore New Ways to Transform the Regulatory Process
As this subcommittee begins to develop its regulatory reform agenda, our body of work on regulatory issues, and also on results-oriented government management, suggests two general avenues of effort you may want to consider as useful starting points. One avenue is to revisit the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of existing initiatives to determine whether changes might be needed to better achieve their goals. Such evaluations could help to keep the regulatory process focused on results and identify ways to better meet emerging challenges. Finally, I want to emphasize that this is a particularly timely point to be reviewing the regulatory process because of the long-term fiscal imbalance facing the United States, along with other significant trends and challenges. The 21st century challenges that we have been highlighting this year establish the case for change and the need to reexamine the base of the federal government and all of its existing programs, policies, functions, and activities. No single approach or reform can address all of the questions and program areas that need to be revisited. However, federal regulation is a critical tool of government, and regulatory programs play a key part in how the federal government addresses many of the country’s needs. Asking the questions necessary to begin reexamining the federal regulatory process is an important first step in the long-term effort to transform what the federal government does and how it does it. Summary of Regulatory Reform Initiatives Implemented since 1980
Congresses and Presidents have taken a number of actions to refine and reform the regulatory process within the past 25 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of rules and regulations each year to achieve goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, and foods are safe; that the nation's air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes are collected. The costs of these regulations are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and the benefits estimates are even higher. Over the past 25 years, a variety of congressional and presidential regulatory reform initiatives have been instituted to refine the federal regulatory process. This testimony discusses findings from the large number of GAO reports and testimonies prepared at the request of Congress to review the implementation of regulatory reform initiatives. Specifically, GAO discusses common strengths and weaknesses of existing reform initiatives that its work has identified. GAO also addresses some general opportunities to reexamine and refine existing initiatives and the federal regulatory process to make them more effective. GAO's prior reports and testimonies contain a variety of recommendations to improve particular reform initiatives and aspects of the regulatory process.
What GAO Found
GAO's evaluations of regulatory reform initiatives indicate that some of these initiatives have yielded mixed results. Among the goals of the initiatives are reducing regulatory burden, requiring more rigorous regulatory analysis, and enhancing oversight. The initiatives have been beneficial in a number of ways, but they also were often less effective than anticipated. GAO's reviews suggest at least four overall strengths or benefits associated with existing initiatives: (1) increasing the attention directed to rules and rule making, (2) increasing expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules, (3) encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rule making, and (4) improving the transparency of the rule-making process. On the other hand, at least four recurring reasons help explain why reform initiatives have not been more effective: (1) limited scope and coverage of various requirements, (2) lack of clarity regarding key terms and definitions, (3) uneven implementation of the initiatives' requirements, and (4) a predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process, agencies' development of rules. As Congress develops its regulatory reform agenda, the lessons and opportunities identified by GAO's body of work suggest two avenues that might provide a useful starting point. The first would be to broadly revisit the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of existing initiatives to determine whether changes are needed to better achieve their goals. As a second avenue to explore, GAO's reviews found that the regulatory process could benefit from more attention to evaluations of existing regulations, although recognizing some of the difficulties associated with carrying out such evaluations. The lessons that could be learned from retrospective reviews could help to keep the regulatory process focused on results and inform future action to meet emerging challenges. This is a particularly timely point to be reviewing the regulatory process. The long-term fiscal imbalance facing the United States, along with other significant trends and challenges, establishes the case for change and the need to reexamine the base of the federal government and all of its existing programs, policies, functions, and activities. No single approach or reform can address all of the questions and program areas that need to be revisited. However, federal regulation is a critical tool of government, and regulatory programs play a key part in how the federal government addresses many of the country's needs. Therefore, reassessing the regulatory framework must be part of that long-term effort to transform what the federal government does and how it does it. |
gao_GAO-07-237 | gao_GAO-07-237_0 | As a result, they said, overall assessments for offshore cases are lower than they would be if IRS had more time to work these cases. Offshore Cases Take Longer for IRS to Develop and Examine
IRS officials told us that cases involving offshore tax evasion present special, time-consuming challenges that other types of cases do not. 3. Some Offshore Examinations Present Enforcement Problems Similar to Those Where Congress Granted Changes to the Statute
Some offshore examinations exhibit compliance problems similar to those where Congress granted a change or exception to the statute in the past. Offshore examinations take longer than nonoffshore examinations for IRS to develop and examine for reasons such as technical complexity and the difficulty of obtaining information from foreign sources, and as a result, IRS may not complete assessments of all taxes owed. If Congress wishes to change the statute for examinations where offshore compliance is the major issue, certain design options, such as limiting any examination and possible assessment to those issues attributable to offshore transactions or only suspending the statute while IRS is waiting for taxpayer responses to IRS data requests, might mitigate some of the disadvantages of the statute extension. For example, they mentioned the ability of IRS to look back at several tax years once an offshore scheme is identified as an advantage of such an exception. Specific suggestions that we heard included the following: Making an exception apply to all taxpayers having offshore accounts/entities may mitigate concerns about taxpayer uncertainty and lack of closure. Offshore tax evasion is special, though, in that the examinations that IRS pursues typically take much longer to develop and examine because of the inherent difficulty in identifying and obtaining information from foreign sources, the often dilatory and uncooperative tactics on the part of taxpayers and their representatives, and the technical complexity of the examinations. Additional time to complete examinations would give IRS greater flexibility in choosing which examinations to open and when to close them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the length of and recommended assessments yielded by offshore and nonoffshore examinations and determine the effect of the 3-year statute of limitations on recommended offshore assessments, (2) determine whether or not enforcement problems posed by offshore examinations are similar to those where Congress has previously granted an exception to the statute, and (3) identify possible advantages and disadvantages of an exception to the statute for offshore examinations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much offshore financial activity is not illegal, but numerous illegal offshore schemes have been devised to hide or disguise the true ownership of income streams and assets. IRS studies show lengthy development times for some offshore cases, which suggests that time or the lack thereof could be an impediment to effectively addressing offshore schemes. GAO was asked to (1) compare offshore and nonoffshore examination cases and determine whether the 3-year statute of limitations reduces offshore assessments, (2) compare enforcement problems posed by offshore cases to those where Congress has previously granted an exception to the statute, and (3) identify possible advantages and disadvantages of an exception to the statute for offshore cases. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed IRS data, reviewed examination files and other documents, and interviewed IRS officials and others in the tax practitioner and policy communities.
What GAO Found
Examinations involving offshore tax evasion take much more time to develop and complete than other examinations for reasons such as technical complexity and the difficulty of obtaining information from foreign sources. When examinations are completed, the resulting median assessment from an offshore examination is almost three times larger than from other types of examinations. However, due to the 3-year statute, the additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not to open one at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. Although data were not available to measure the effect of the statute on assessments, IRS agents and managers told GAO that overall assessments for offshore cases are lower than they would be if IRS had more time to work these cases. Some offshore examinations exhibit enforcement problems similar to those where Congress has granted a statute change or exception in the past. For example, Congress changed the statute for certain abusive tax shelters that involved technical complexity and dilatory tactics on the part of taxpayers. Through discussions with IRS officials and others in the tax practitioner and policy communities, GAO identified advantages and disadvantages to such an exception. Advantages included increased flexibility for IRS to direct enforcement resources to egregious cases of noncompliance and a possible deterrent to future noncompliance. Disadvantages included increased uncertainty and lack of closure for taxpayers. Our commenters also discussed design options to mitigate some of the disadvantages of a statute extension, such as making an exception apply to all taxpayers having offshore accounts/entities, and thereby, mitigating taxpayer uncertainty and lack of closure. |
gao_GAO-15-478 | gao_GAO-15-478_0 | Background
Congress first authorized the F2F program in the 1985 Farm Bill to provide for the transfer of knowledge and expertise of U.S. agricultural producers and businesses to middle-income countries and emerging democracies on a voluntary basis. In the 2014 Farm Bill, Congress increased the minimum annual F2F funding requirement to $15 million. USAID uses the agreements to establish objectives, tasks, and responsibilities for the implementing partners. All partners work with hosts to develop a scope of work for each assignment, interview candidates, and assess the volunteers’ performance. However, they have inconsistent practices for screening volunteer candidates against terrorist watch lists and do not have a means to systematically report negative assessments of volunteers to USAID or each other. Partners Generally Follow Consistent Practices to Design Volunteer Assignments, Recruit Volunteers, and Manage Volunteer Assignments
We found that the implementing partners that send volunteers follow consistent practices to design volunteer assignments, recruit volunteers, and manage volunteer assignments, which are outlined in USAID’s F2F program manual. The remaining three implementing partners do not screen candidates against watch lists. For the fiscal years 2009 through 2013 program cycle, USAID reported that 41 percent of the volunteers were repeat volunteers. In addition, partners risk fielding volunteers who received negative assessments on assignments with other implementers, which could undermine the program’s goals and reputation. USAID Used a Program-wide Evaluation to Adjust F2F, but Does Not Obtain Information on a Key Aspect of Program Implementation
USAID used a program-wide evaluation to adjust the program and conducts ongoing monitoring and evaluation, but USAID does not obtain information on a key aspect of the program’s implementation. After a 2012 program-wide evaluation, USAID revised program indicators, established a committee to discuss best practices, and increased training for implementing partner staff. Specifically, USAID does not review information on the extent to which volunteers meet the objectives identified in the scopes of work. This information could provide additional insight on the extent to which volunteers achieve established objectives and therefore whether volunteers are being effectively used. Specifically, four partners do not conduct any screening against terrorist watch lists as expected by USAID. However, USAID is not reviewing information on a key aspect of the program’s performance—the extent to which the specified objectives and activities in scopes of work are accomplished. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance USAID’s oversight of the program, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following four actions: ensure F2F implementing partners screen volunteer candidates against terrorist watch lists, as described in their cooperative agreements and USAID guidance; develop guidance for the implementing partners on the types of background checks they should perform as they screen volunteer candidates; update the F2F program manual to ensure that implementing partners systematically share negative volunteer assessment information with USAID and each other; and further develop its monitoring process to review the extent to which volunteers accomplish objectives and activities specified in the scopes of work. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this report, we examined (1) how the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administers the John Ogonowski and Doug Bereuter Farmer-to-Farmer (F2F) program, (2) how partners implement volunteer assignments and screen volunteers for the F2F program, and (3) the extent to which USAID uses monitoring and evaluation to manage the F2F program. In addition, we reviewed USAID data on the number of volunteer assignments. | Why GAO Did This Study
First authorized in the 1985 Farm Bill, the F2F program leverages U.S. agricultural expertise by sending volunteers on short-term assignments to provide technical assistance to farmers, farm groups, and agribusinesses in developing and middle-income countries. During fiscal years 2009 through -2013, F2F funded about 2,984 volunteer assignments and obligated an average of $11.5 million annually.
In the 2014 Farm Bill, Congress mandated that GAO conduct a review of the F2F program. GAO examined (1) how USAID administers the program, (2) how partners implement volunteer assignments and screen volunteers, and (3) the extent to which USAID uses monitoring and evaluation to manage the program. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed program documents and met with USAID F2F officials and current implementing partners. In addition, we conducted fieldwork in two countries that we selected based on factors, including the number of volunteers assigned.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Bureau for Food Security administers the Farmer-to-Farmer (F2F) program through implementing partners under 5-year cooperative agreements. USAID provides overall direction, but relies on partners to execute program activities. USAID uses the agreements to establish the partners' objectives, tasks, and responsibilities. Once selected, partners create work plans for USAID's approval that describe potential volunteer assignments, such as providing expertise on grain processing and storage or groundnut production.
Source: GAO. | GAO-15-478
USAID's partners follow consistent practices to implement volunteer assignments, but they have inconsistent practices for screening volunteer candidates against terrorist watch lists. All partners develop a scope of work for each assignment, interview candidates, and assess the volunteer's performance. However, only two partners screen candidates against the terrorist watch lists as expected by USAID. These partners and one other partner screen candidates against other watch lists. In addition, partners do not have a means to systematically report negative volunteer assessments to USAID or each other, even though 41 percent of volunteers in the last program cycle were repeat volunteers. Without conducting required checks and providing information on prior negative assessments, partners risk selecting volunteers who could undermine F2F's goals and reputation.
USAID uses its monitoring and evaluation process to adjust the program, but does not review information on a key aspect of the program's implementation. In response to a program-wide evaluation, USAID revised performance indicators, established a committee that discusses best practices, and increased training for implementing partner staff. However, USAID does not systematically review information on the extent to which volunteers meet the objectives identified in the scopes of work. Reviewing volunteer trip reports against scopes of work could improve USAID's understanding of the volunteers' performance and provide additional insight on implementation progress and whether volunteers are being effectively used.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that USAID (1) ensure F2F partners screen volunteer candidates against terrorist watch lists, (2) develop guidance on the other types of background checks implementing partners should perform, (3) ensure that implementing partners systematically share negative volunteer assessment information, and (4) monitor the extent to which the objectives and activities in the scopes of work are accomplished. USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-922 | gao_GAO-08-922_0 | According to DOD and other relevant guidance, acquisition management includes, among other things, such key IT management control areas as architectural alignment, economic justification, requirements management, risk management, security management, and system quality measurement. Thus far, key IT management controls associated with this framework have not been implemented on Navy Cash. As a result, the program, as defined, has not been shown to be the most cost-effective investment option. Even if investment in the proposed Navy Cash solution is shown to be a wise and prudent course of action, the manner in which Navy Cash is being acquired and deployed is not adequate because (1) requirements have not been adequately developed and managed; (2) program risks have not been effectively managed; (3) security has not been effectively managed; and (4) system quality has not been adequately measured. Program officials acknowledged these weaknesses and attributed them to, among other things, turnover of staff in key positions and their focus on deploying the system. As a result, it is important that all these weaknesses be addressed to reduce the risk of delivering a system solution that falls short of expectations. Moreover, it has not been economically justified on the basis of reliable estimates of cost and benefits over the system’s expected life. Navy Cash has not been assessed and defined in a way to ensure that it is not duplicative of the Eagle Cash and EZpay programs, both of which provide for the use of smart card technology for electronic retail transactions in support of the Air Force and the Army. This means that aspects of Navy Cash could be potentially duplicative of these other programs, and thus DOD may not be pursuing the most cost-effective solution to meet its mission needs. Moreover, it does not include FMS’s portion of the program’s cost, which is estimated to be about $100 million over a 14-year period. Specifically, program requirements have not been adequately developed and managed; program risks have not been effectively managed; security has not been adequately managed; and data needed to measure two aspects of system quality—trends in unresolved change requests and evaluation of user satisfaction with the system—have not been collected and used. As another example, a system requirement for automatically deploying software patches to operational systems was not defined. Navy Cash’s Risks Have Not Been Effectively Managed
Proactively managing program risks is a key acquisition management control that, if done properly, can increase the chances of programs delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. In particular, plans, processes, and procedures are not in place that provide for identifying, controlling, and disclosing risks, and risk management roles and responsibilities have not been assigned to key stakeholders. Recommendations
Because of the uncertainty surrounding whether Navy Cash, as defined, represents a cost-effective solution, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to limit further investment of modernization funding in the program to only (1) deployment to remaining ships of already developed and tested capabilities; (2) correction of information security vulnerabilities and weaknesses on ships where it is deployed and operating; and (3) development of the basis for an informed decision as to whether further development and modernization is economically justified and in the department’s collective best interests. As a result, we appropriately conclude in our report that such failures to effectively manage Navy Cash security places the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of deployed and operating shipboard devices, applications, and financial data at increased risk of being compromised. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of the Navy (DON) is effectively implementing information technology management controls on Navy Cash. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) multi-billion dollar business systems modernization efforts as high risk, in part because key information technology (IT) management controls have not been implemented on key investments, such as the Navy Cash program. Initiated in 2001, Navy Cash is a joint Department of the Navy (DON) and Department of the Treasury Financial Management Service (FMS) program to create a cashless environment on ships using smart card technology, and is estimated to cost about $320 million to fully deploy. As requested, GAO analyzed whether DON is effectively implementing IT management controls on the program, including architectural alignment, economic justification, requirements development and management, risk management, security management, and system quality measurement against relevant guidance.
What GAO Found
Key IT management controls have not been effectively implemented on Navy Cash, to the point that further investment in this program, as it is currently defined, has not been shown to be a prudent and judicious use of scarce modernization resources. In particular, Navy Cash has not been (1) assessed and defined in a way to ensure that it is not duplicative of programs in the Air Force and the Army that use smart card technology for electronic retail transactions and (2) economically justified on the basis of reliable analyses of estimated costs and expected benefits over the program's life. As a result, DON cannot demonstrate that the investment alternative that it is pursuing is the most cost-effective solution to satisfying its mission needs. Moreover, other management controls, which are intended to maximize the chances of delivering defined and justified system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget, have not been effectively implemented. System requirements have not been effectively managed. For example, neither policies nor plans that define how system requirements are to be managed, nor an approved baseline set of requirements that are justified and needed to cost-effectively meet mission needs, exist. Instead, requirements are addressed reactively through requests for changes to the system based primarily on the availability of funding. Program risks have not been effectively managed. In particular, plans, processes, and procedures that provide for identifying, mitigating, and disclosing risks have not been defined, nor have risk-related roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders. System security has not been effectively managed, thus putting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of deployed and operating shipboard devices, applications, and data at increased risk of being compromised. For example, the mitigation of system vulnerabilities by applying software patches has not been effectively implemented. Key aspects of system quality are not being effectively measured. For example, data for determining trends in unresolved system change requests, which is an indicator of system stability, as well as user feedback on system satisfaction, are not being collected and used. Program oversight and management officials acknowledged these weaknesses and cited turnover of staff in key positions and their primary focus on deploying Navy Cash as reasons for the state of some of these IT management controls. Collectively, this means that, after investing about 6 years and $132 million on Navy Cash and planning to invest an additional $60 million to further develop the program, the department has yet to demonstrate through verifiable analysis and evidence that the program, as currently defined, is justified. Moreover, even if further investment was to be demonstrated, the manner in which the delivery of program capabilities is being managed is not adequate. As a result, the program is at risk of delivering a system solution that falls short of cost, schedule, and performance expectations. |
gao_GAO-06-54 | gao_GAO-06-54_0 | CMS Has Processes for Checking Data Accuracy but Has No Ongoing Process to Check Completeness
CMS has processes for ensuring the accuracy of the quality data submitted by hospitals for the APU program, but has no ongoing process to assess whether hospitals are submitting complete data. Specifically, it reabstracts the quality data from medical records for a sample of five patients per quarter for each hospital and compares its results to the quality data submitted by hospitals. The data are deemed to be accurate if there is 80 percent or greater agreement between these two sets of results, a standard that hospitals had to meet for the APU-measure set to qualify for their full annual payment update for fiscal year 2006. However, these analyses did not address non-Medicare patient records and the approach that CMS took in these analyses was not capable of detecting incomplete data for all hospitals. We found a high overall baseline level of accuracy when we examined CMS’s assessment of the data submitted by hospitals for the first two calendar quarters of 2004. The median accuracy score exceeded 90 percent, which was well above the 80 percent accuracy threshold set by CMS, and about 90 percent of hospitals met or exceeded that threshold for both the first and the second calendar quarters of 2004. However, for approximately one-fourth to one-third of all the hospitals that CMS assessed for accuracy, the statistical margin of error for their accuracy score included both passing and failing accuracy levels. Consequently, for these hospitals, the small number of cases that CMS examined was not sufficient to establish with statistical certainty whether the hospital met the threshold level of data accuracy. No Data Were Available to Provide Baseline Assessment of Completeness of Hospital Quality Data
There were no data available from which to estimate a baseline level of completeness for the first two calendar quarters of data submitted for the APU program. In contrast to the system of quarterly reabstractions performed by CDAC to check the accuracy of quality data submitted by hospitals, CMS did not conduct any corresponding assessment of the extent to which all hospitals submitted data on all the cases, or a representative sample of such cases, that met CMS’s eligibility criteria for the first two calendar quarters of 2004. Other Reporting Systems Use Various Methods to Ensure Data Accuracy and Completeness, Notably an Independent Audit
Other reporting systems that collect clinical performance data have adopted various methods to ensure data accuracy and completeness, and officials from these systems stressed the importance of including an independent audit in these activities. Most other reporting systems that conduct independent audits incorporate three methods as part of their process that CMS does not use in its independent audit. Specifically, they (1) include an on-site visit as part of their independent audit, (2) focus their audits on a selected number of facilities or reporting entities, and (3) review a minimum of 50 patient medical records per reporting entity during the auditing process. Officials at other reporting systems we interviewed and an expert in the field stressed the importance of the independent audit. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order for CMS to help ensure the reliability of the quality data it uses to produce information on hospital performance, we recommend that the CMS Administrator undertake the following three actions: focusing on the subset of hospitals for which it is statistically uncertain if they met CMS’s accuracy threshold in one or more previous quarters, increase the number of patient records reabstracted by CDAC in a subsequent quarter so that the proportion of hospitals with statistically uncertain results is reduced; require hospitals to certify that they took steps to ensure that they submitted data on all eligible patients, or a representative sample thereof; and assess the level of incomplete data submitted by hospitals for the APU program to determine the magnitude of underreporting, if any, in order to refine how completeness assessments may be done in future reporting efforts. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the processes used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data submitted by hospitals for the Annual Payment Update program (APU program), we interviewed both CMS officials and staff at DynKePRO— which operates the Clinical Data Abstraction Center (CDAC)—and the Iowa Foundation for Medical Care (IFMC), two contractors that perform data collection and data quality monitoring tasks for the APU program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 directed that hospitals lose 0.4 percent of their Medicare payment update if they do not submit clinical data for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients needed to calculate hospital performance on 10 quality measures. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) instituted the Annual Payment Update (APU) program to collect these data from hospitals and report their rates on the measures on its Hospital Compare Web site. For hospital quality data to be useful to patients and other users, they need to be reliable, that is, accurate and complete. GAO was asked to (1) describe the processes CMS uses to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data submitted for the APU program, (2) analyze the results of CMS's audit of the accuracy of data from the program's first two calendar quarters, and (3) describe processes used by seven other organizations that assess the accuracy and completeness of clinical performance data.
What GAO Found
CMS has contracted with an independent medical auditing firm to assess the accuracy of the APU program data submitted by hospitals, but has no ongoing process in place to assess the completeness of those data. CMS's independent audit checks accuracy by comparing the quality data submitted by hospitals from the medical records for a sample of five patients per calendar quarter for each hospital to the quality data that the contractor has reabstracted from the same records. The data are deemed to be accurate if there is 80 percent or greater agreement between these two sets of results. CMS has established no ongoing process to check data completeness. For the payment updates for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, CMS compared the number of cases submitted by a hospital to the number of Medicare claims that hospital submitted. However, these analyses did not address non-Medicare patient records, and the approach that CMS took in these analyses was not capable of detecting incomplete data for all hospitals. Although GAO found a high overall baseline level of accuracy when it examined CMS's assessment of the data submitted for the first two quarters of the APU program, the results are statistically uncertain for up to one-third of hospitals, and a baseline level of data completeness cannot be determined. The median accuracy score of 90 to 94 percent--depending on the calendar quarter and measures used--was well above the 80 percent accuracy threshold set by CMS, and about 90 percent of hospitals met or exceeded that threshold for both the first and the second calendar quarters of 2004. However, for approximately one-fourth to one-third of all the hospitals that CMS assessed for accuracy, the statistical margin of error for their accuracy score included both passing and failing accuracy levels. Consequently, for these hospitals, the small number of cases that CMS examined was not sufficient to establish with statistical certainty whether they met the accuracy threshold set by CMS. With respect to completeness of data, CMS did not assess the extent to which all hospitals submitted data on all eligible patients, or a representative sample thereof, for the two baseline quarters. As a result, there were no data from which to derive an assessment of the baseline level of completeness of the quality data that hospitals submitted for the APU program. Other reporting systems that collect clinical performance data have adopted a range of activities to ensure data accuracy and completeness, which include some methods employed by all, such as checking the data electronically to identify missing data. Officials from some of the other reporting systems and an expert in the field stressed the importance of including an independent audit in the methods used by organizations to check data accuracy and completeness. Most of the other reporting systems incorporate three methods into their process that CMS does not use in its independent audit. Specifically, most include an on-site visit in their independent audit, focus their audits on a selected number of facilities, and review a minimum of 50 patient medical records during the audit. |
gao_GAO-03-342 | gao_GAO-03-342_0 | Existing Food Safety Statutes Do Not Provide Sufficient Authority to Regulate All Aspects of Security at Food- Processing Facilities
The food safety statutes do not specifically authorize FDA or USDA to require food processors to implement any type of security measures designed to prevent the intentional contamination of the foods they produce. While these agencies’ food safety statutes can be interpreted to provide authority to impose certain security requirements, as opposed to food safety requirements, neither agency believes it has the authority to regulate all aspects of security. USDA’s general counsel concluded that to the extent that security precautions pertain to activities closely related to sanitary conditions in the food preparation process, FSIS has the authority to require food processors to implement certain security measures. On the other hand, USDA believes that the “outside security” measures included in its guidelines, such as securing plant boundaries and providing guards, alarms, and outside lighting, have little to do with sanitation in the facility or the immediate food-processing environment and, therefore, could not be made mandatory under existing authorities. FDA and FSIS Issued Voluntary Security Guidelines to Food Processors but Do Not Track or Document the Extent to Which They Are Being Implemented
In response to the nation’s growing concerns regarding the potential for deliberate contamination of the food supply, FDA and USDA issued guidelines to the food-processing industry suggesting measures to enhance security at their facilities. Although both agencies have alerted their field inspection personnel to be vigilant about security issues, they have also told the inspectors that they are not authorized to enforce these measures and have instructed them not to document their observations regarding security because of the possible release of this information under the Freedom of Information Act and the potential for the misuse of this information. However, both FDA and USDA have instructed their field inspection personnel to refrain from enforcing any aspects of the security guidelines because the agencies generally believe that they lack such authority. Recently the agency modified its position regarding direct discussions of food security and now allows inspectors to discuss, but not interpret, security with facility management. Inspectors are still instructed not to document these conversations or enforce the adoption of any security measure. FDA and FSIS Survey Respondents Indicate That Processing Facilities Are Implementing a Range of Security Measures
FDA and FSIS survey respondents observed a range of security measures being implemented at food-processing facilities, although both FDA and FSIS respondents were able to provide more information about those security measures that were most visible during the course of their normal inspection duties. 3.) Both FDA and USDA have completed risk assessments. Finally, the lack of security training for FDA food inspectors on the voluntary security guidelines issued for food processors and the limited number of FSIS inspectors that have so far received training on the voluntary security guidelines hamper the inspectors’ ability to conduct informed discussions regarding security measures with facility personnel as they are currently instructed to do. FDA agreed with our recommendation that it provide all food inspection personnel with training on security measures. We also believe that possessing such information is important if it becomes necessary to advise food processors on needed security enhancements. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the current federal food safety statutes can be effectively used to regulate security at food-processing facilities, we analyzed the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) existing statutory authorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, have placed added emphasis on ensuring the security of the nation's food supply. GAO examined (1) whether FDA and USDA have sufficient authority under current statutes to require that food processors adopt security measures, (2) what security guidelines FDA and USDA have provided to industry, and (3) what security measures food processors have adopted.
What GAO Found
Federal food safety statutes give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) broad authority to regulate the safety of the U.S. food supply but do not specifically authorize them to impose security requirements at food-processing facilities. However, these agencies' food safety statutes can be interpreted to provide authority to impose certain security measures. FDA believes that its statutes authorize it to regulate food security to the extent that food security and safety overlap but observes that there is little overlap between security and safety. USDA believes that it could require food processors to adopt certain security measures that are closely related to sanitary conditions inside the facility. USDA also believes that the statutes, however, cannot be interpreted to authorize the regulation of security measures that are not associated with the immediate food-processing environment, such as requiring fences, alarms, and outside lighting. Neither agency believes that it has the authority to regulate all aspects of security at food-processing facilities. Both FDA and USDA issued voluntary security guidelines to help food processors identify measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of deliberate contamination. Because these guidelines are voluntary, neither agency enforces, monitors, or documents their implementation. Both FDA and USDA have asked their inspectors to be vigilant and to discuss security with managers at food-processing facilities, but the agencies have stressed that inspectors should not enforce the implementation of security measures or document any observations because of the possible release of this information under the Freedom of Information Act and the potential for the misuse of this information. Since FDA and USDA do not monitor and document food processors' implementation of security guidelines, the extent of the industry's adoption of security measures is unknown. According to officials of trade associations and the five facilities we visited, however, food processors are implementing a range of security measures. In addition, the FDA and USDA field inspectors we surveyed indicated that most facilities have implemented some security measures, such as installing fences. However, the inspectors were less able to comment on security measures that were not as obvious, such as accounting for missing stock and implementing proper mail-handling practices. The inspectors also noted that while USDA has provided some of its field supervisory personnel with security training on the voluntary security guidelines it issued, it has not provided most of its inspectors with such training. FDA has not provided its staff with any training on the security guidelines. Without training on the security guidelines, inspectors are limited in their ability to conduct informed discussions regarding security with managers at food-processing facilities. |
gao_GAO-17-577 | gao_GAO-17-577_0 | In June 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Energy approved an updated cost estimate range for the UPF of from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion. The agency generally agreed with these recommendations and has initiated various actions intended to implement them, including revising certain DOE orders, but it has not completed all actions needed to fully address the recommendations. NNSA Has Made Progress in Developing a Revised Scope of Work, Cost Estimate, and Schedule for the New UPF
NNSA documents we reviewed and program officials we interviewed indicate that NNSA has made progress in developing a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new UPF, potentially stabilizing escalating project costs and technical risks experienced under the previous strategy. According to NNSA’s 2014 high-level strategic plan for the uranium program, NNSA changed its strategy for managing the overall uranium program, including the UPF, that year, which resulted in the need to develop a new scope of work. As of May 2017, NNSA had developed and approved a revised formal scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline estimates for four of the seven subprojects. NNSA expects to approve such baseline estimates for the all of the remaining subprojects—including the two largest subprojects—by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. NNSA also plans to validate the estimates through an independent cost estimate at that time. NNSA Has Not Developed a Complete Scope of Work, Life-Cycle Cost Estimate, and Integrated Master Schedule for Its Overall Uranium Program
NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, or integrated master schedule for its overall uranium program, and it has no time frame for doing so. In particular, it has not developed a complete scope of work for repairs and upgrades to existing facilities, nor has it done so for other key uranium program elements. Scope of Work for Repairs and Upgrades to Existing Facilities of the Overall Uranium Program Is Not Complete
NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work to repair and upgrade existing facilities for the overall uranium program, even though these activities could be among the most expensive and complicated non- construction portions of the uranium program. NNSA Has Not Developed Life-Cycle Costs or an Integrated Master Schedule for the Uranium Program
Because NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, it does not have the basis to develop a life-cycle cost estimate or an integrated master schedule for the program. As noted previously, NNSA has made progress in developing a cost estimate for the new UPF, and this estimate will be an essential component of a life- cycle cost estimate for the overall program. For other program elements, discussed below, NNSA either has rough or no estimates of the total costs. Repairs and upgrades to existing facilities: NNSA’s contractor’s implementation plan includes a rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate of $400 million over the next 20 years—roughly $20 million per year—for repairs and upgrades to existing facilities. Our cost estimating guide states that a credible cost estimate reflects all costs associated with a system (program)—i.e., it must be based on a complete scope of work—and that the estimate should be updated to reflect changes in requirements (which affect the scope of work). Under federal standards for internal control, management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, and, among other characteristics, quality information is provided on a timely basis. Without NNSA setting a time frame for when it will (1) develop the complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, to the extent practicable, and (2) prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule, NNSA does not have reasonable assurance that decision makers will have timely access to essential program management information—risking unforeseen cost escalation and delays in NNSA’s efforts to meet the nation’s uranium needs. Conclusions
NNSA is making efforts to modernize uranium processing capabilities that are crucial to our nation’s ability to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile and fuel its nuclear-powered naval vessels. Without NNSA setting a time frame for when it will (1) develop a complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, to the extent practicable, and (2) prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule for the program, NNSA does not have reasonable assurance that decision makers will have timely access to essential program management information for this costly and important long-term program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe the status of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) efforts to develop a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project, we reviewed NNSA program planning documents, and any updates, concerning cost and budget and interviewed agency officials to determine the effect of uranium program strategy revisions on the UPF project’s scope of work, cost, and schedule. | Why GAO Did This Study
Uranium is crucial to our nation's ability to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA processes uranium to meet this need. In 2004, NNSA began plans to build a new UPF that would consolidate capabilities currently housed in deteriorating buildings; by 2012, the project had a preliminary cost of $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion. To control rising costs, NNSA changed its approach in 2014 to reduce the scope of the new UPF and move uranium processing capabilities once intended for the UPF into existing buildings. The broader uranium program also includes the needed repairs and upgrades to these existing buildings.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 as amended includes a provision for GAO to periodically assess the UPF. This is the fifth report and (1) describes the status of NNSA's efforts to develop a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the UPF project, and (2) examines the extent to which NNSA has developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the overall uranium program. GAO reviewed program documents on planning, strategy, cost, and implementation and interviewed program officials to examine the program's scope, cost and schedule.
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made progress in developing a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for its project to construct a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), according to NNSA documents and program officials. As of May 2017, NNSA had developed and approved a revised formal scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline estimates for four of the seven subprojects into which the project is divided. NNSA expects to approve such baseline estimates for the other three—including the two largest subprojects—by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. NNSA also plans to validate the estimates by then through an independent cost estimate.
NNSA, however, has not developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate (i.e., a structured accounting of all cost elements for a program), or integrated master schedule (i.e., encompassing individual project schedules) for the overall uranium program, and it has no time frame for doing so. In particular, it has not developed a complete scope of work for repairs and upgrades to existing buildings in which NNSA intends to house some uranium processing capabilities and has not done so for other key program elements. For example:
The scope of work for a portion of the upgrades and repairs will not be determined until after fiscal year 2018, when NNSA expects to conduct seismic and structural assessments to determine what work is needed to address safety issues in existing buildings.
NNSA has developed an initial implementation plan that roughly estimates a cost of $400 million over the next 20 years for the repairs and upgrades, but a detailed scope of work to support this estimate is not expected to be fully developed except on an annual basis in the year(s) that immediately precedes the work.
Because NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, it does not have the basis to develop a life-cycle cost estimate or an integrated master schedule. Successful program management depends in part on developing a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and an integrated master schedule, as GAO has stated in its cost estimating and schedule guides. In previous work reviewing other NNSA programs, GAO has found that when NNSA did not have a life-cycle cost estimate based on a complete scope of work, the agency could not ensure its life-cycle cost estimate captured all relevant costs, which could result in cost overruns. The revised cost estimate that NNSA is developing for the new UPF will be an essential component of a life-cycle cost estimate for the overall program. However, for other program elements, NNSA has either rough or no estimates of the total costs and has not set a time frame for developing these costs. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve an entity's objectives, and among other characteristics, such information is provided on a timely basis. Without setting a time frame to complete the scope of work and prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule for the program, NNSA does not have reasonable assurance that decision makers will have timely access to essential program management information—risking unforeseen cost escalation and delays.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NNSA set a time frame for completing the scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the overall uranium program. NNSA generally agreed with the recommendation and has ongoing efforts to complete these actions. |
gao_GAO-10-455 | gao_GAO-10-455_0 | USPS’s Business Model Is Not Viable
USPS’s business model is not viable due to its inability to reduce costs sufficiently in response to continuing declines in mail volume and revenue. Mail volume declined 36 billion pieces over the last 3 fiscal years, 2007 through 2009, due to the economic downturn and changing use of the mail, with mail continuing to shift to electronic communications and payments. USPS lost nearly $12 billion over this period, despite achieving billions in cost savings, reducing capital investments, and raising rates. However, USPS had difficulty in eliminating costly excess capacity, and its revenue initiatives had limited results. Making the necessary progress would require (1) taking more aggressive actions to reduce costs and increase revenues within its current authority, using the collective bargaining process to address wages, benefits, and workforce flexibility, and (2) congressional action to address legal restrictions and resistance to realigning USPS operations, networks, and workforce. They also include some provisions that allow USPS to make changes, such as relocating employees, but other provisions limit USPS’s flexibility to manage work efficiently and rightsize its workforce. Rising wages also increase benefit costs, such as pensions. Benefits cost USPS almost $17 billion in fiscal year 2009, over 23 percent of its total costs. The cost would have been nearly $21 billion if Congress had not reduced USPS payments for retiree health benefits by $4 billion to address a looming cash shortfall. Deferrals of funding such benefits would serve as financial relief. USPS projects that its revenue will stagnate in the next decade despite further rate increases. If USPS cannot be financially viable without reducing universal postal service, what changes would be needed? Actions Congress and USPS Can Take to Facilitate Progress toward Financial Viability
Action by Congress and USPS is urgently needed on a number of difficult issues to facilitate progress toward USPS’s financial viability by reducing costs, increasing efficiency, and generating revenues. The significant deterioration in USPS’s financial condition over the past 2 years, its increasing debt, and the grim forecast for declining volume over the next decade led GAO to add USPS’s financial condition to its high-risk list in July 2009. Thus, it is unclear what statutory or regulatory changes should be made at this time. USPS’s Action Plan says that it plans to expand access to retail service and, as customers shift to these new services, that it will reduce redundant retail facilities. Furthermore, Congress may want assurance through regular reports that any financial relief it provides is met with aggressive actions to reduce costs and increase revenues, and that progress is being made toward addressing its financial problems. If no action is taken, the risk of USPS’s insolvency and the need for a bailout by taxpayers and the U.S. Treasury increases. At the same time, to facilitate making progress in difficult areas, Congress should consider establishing (1) a panel of independent experts, similar to a BRAC-like commission, to coordinate with USPS and stakeholders to develop a package of proposed legislative and operational changes needed to reduce costs and address challenges to USPS’s business model and (2) procedures for the review and approval of these proposals by the President and Congress. Congress also should consider requiring USPS to provide regular reports to Congress to ensure that USPS is making progress to improve its financial condition. First, regarding revising USPS retiree health benefit funding, USPS said the prefunding requirement urgently needs to be restructured and agreed that it should continue to fund its retiree health benefits obligation to the maximum extent that its finances permit. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) of 2006 required us to report on strategies and options for the long-term structural and operational reform of the United States Postal Service (USPS). The objectives of this report are to assess (1) the viability of USPS’s business model, (2) strategies and options to address challenges to USPS’s current business model, and (3) actions Congress and USPS need to take to facilitate progress toward USPS’s financial viability. Related GAO Products
U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 required GAO to evaluate strategies and options for reforms of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPS's business model is to fulfill its mission through self-supporting, businesslike operations; however, USPS has experienced increasing difficulties. Due to volume declines, losses, a cash shortage, and rising debt, GAO added USPS's financial condition to its high-risk list in July 2009. GAO's objectives were to assess (1) the viability of USPS's business model, (2) strategies and options to address challenges to its business model, and (3) actions Congress and USPS need to take to facilitate progress toward financial viability. GAO primarily drew on its past work; other studies; USPS data; interviews with USPS, unions, management associations, Postal Regulatory Commission, and mailing industry officials; and stakeholder input.
What GAO Found
USPS's business model is not viable due to USPS's inability to reduce costs sufficiently in response to continuing mail volume and revenue declines. Mail volume declined 36 billion pieces (17 percent) over the last 3 fiscal years (2007 through 2009) with the recession accelerating shifts to electronic communications and payments. USPS lost nearly $12 billion over this period, despite achieving billions in cost savings by reducing its career workforce by over 84,000 employees, reducing capital investments, and raising rates. However, USPS had difficulty in eliminating costly excess capacity, and its revenue initiatives have had limited results. USPS also is nearing its $15 billion borrowing limit with the U.S. Treasury and has unfunded pension and retiree health obligations and other liabilities of about $90 billion. In 2009, Congress reduced USPS's retiree health benefit payment by $4 billion to address a looming cash shortfall, but USPS still recorded a loss of $3.8 billion. Given its financial problems and outlook, USPS cannot support its current level of service and operations. USPS projects that volume will decline by about 27 billion pieces over the next decade, while revenues will stagnate; costs will rise; and, without major changes, cumulative losses could exceed $238 billion. This report groups strategies and options that can be taken to address challenges in USPS's business model by better aligning costs with revenues (see table on next page). USPS may be able to improve its financial viability if it takes more aggressive action to reduce costs, particularly compensation and benefit costs that comprise 80 percent of its total costs, as well as increasing revenues within its current authority. However, it is unlikely that such changes would fully resolve USPS's financial problems, unless Congress also takes actions to address constraints and legal restrictions. Action by Congress and USPS is urgently needed to (1) reach agreement on actions to achieve USPS's financial viability, (2) provide financial relief through deferral of costs by revising USPS retiree health benefit funding while continuing to fund these benefits over time to the extent that USPS's finances permit, and (3) require that any binding arbitration resulting from collective bargaining would take USPS's financial condition into account. Congress may also want assurance that any financial relief it provides is met with aggressive actions by USPS to reduce its costs and increase revenues, and that USPS is making progress toward addressing its financial problems. USPS's new business plan recognizes immediate actions are needed, but USPS has made limited progress on some options, such as closing facilities. If no action is taken, risks of larger USPS losses, rate increases, and taxpayer subsidies will increase. To facilitate progress in these difficult areas, Congress could set up a mechanism, such as one similar to the military Base Realignment and Closure Commission, where independent experts could recommend a package of actions with time frames. Key issues also need to be addressed related to what changes, if any, should be made to delivery or retail services; to allow USPS to provide new products or services in nonpostal areas; and to realign USPS operations, networks, and workforce. |
gao_GAO-14-751T | gao_GAO-14-751T_0 | Establishes a minimum quantity of crude helium that BLM is required to offer for sale or auction each fiscal year in Phases A, B, and C. Specifically, the amount of crude helium to be offered must be the lesser of (1) the quantity of crude helium offered for sale by the Secretary of the Interior during fiscal year 2012 or (2) the maximum total production capacity of the federal helium system, which includes the pipeline. Specifically, as a condition of sale or auction to a refiner under Phase A sales and Phase B, the refiner must make excess refining capacity of helium available at commercially reasonable rates to persons who acquire helium from BLM after the act’s enactment. According to the act’s legislative history, this condition was intended to maximize participation in helium sales. BLM’s Initial Actions to Implement the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013
Since the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 was enacted in October 2013, BLM has taken a number of actions to begin implementing the act, including (1) estimating volumes of helium that can be produced from the reserve each fiscal year, (2) preparing for and conducting Phase A helium sales, and (3) initiating planning for Phase B sales and auctions. Under Phase A, BLM prepared for and conducted sales by determining sales volumes, setting the sale price, and implementing the act’s disclosure requirement, among other things. BLM officials told us they interpreted the “maximum total production capacity of the federal helium system” not as the full volume estimated by the model to be produced from the reserve this fiscal year, but rather as an amount equal to the production capacity of the reserve after (1) meeting federal users’ needs, (2) delivering a percentage of privately owned helium stored in the reserve to refiners for processing, and (3) holding back a contingency amount for possible production problems (see fig. These officials said this interpretation helps ensure that the agency can deliver the volumes of privately owned helium that remain in storage before the end of fiscal year 2021. BLM is in the process of planning for the required (1) Phase B auction of a portion of the helium that will be produced in fiscal year 2015, (2) Phase B sale of a portion of the helium that will be produced in fiscal year 2015, and (3) Phase B advanced one-time sale of a portion of the helium that will be produced in fiscal year 2016. BLM published its proposed implementation plan for the auction and sales in the Federal Register on May 16, 2014, for a 30-day comment period, and BLM is planning to hold the auction and sales in late July 2014 to comply with the August 1, 2014, statutory deadline. Specifically, for fiscal year 2015, BLM officials told us they will offer for sale or auction 928 million cubic feet of the 1.3 billion cubic feet that is estimated to be produced from the reserve, and to use the remaining production capacity to accommodate federal users’ needs and deliver a percentage of the privately owned helium stored in the reserve (see table 2). BLM Faces Challenges in Implementing the Act’s Tolling Provision and Incentivizing Tolling
BLM faces challenges in implementing the act’s tolling provision and incentivizing tolling. BLM’s Challenges in Implementing the Tolling Provision
The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 provides that refiners, as a condition of sale or auction, make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain entities. In implementing this provision, however, BLM faces challenges in knowing whether refiners (1) have excess refining capacity available and (2) if so, are offering tolling services to nonrefiners at commercially reasonable rates. Although BLM asked refiners to report excess refining capacity in January 2014 as part of the Phase A sales, BLM did not define the term “excess refining capacity” because, according to BLM officials, they were still in the process of interpreting the act. In our interviews with refiners, they described different methods for calculating the excess refining capacity that they reported to BLM. In preparation for Phase B and the fiscal year 2015 auction and sale, BLM officials said they are taking steps to improve their ability to determine whether refiners have accurately reported excess refining capacity. Therefore, we are not making any recommendations at this time. Until BLM identifies criteria or a definition of what constitutes a commercially reasonable rate, it is unclear how BLM would implement the tolling provision, if necessary. These officials said they received multiple comments from refiners, nonrefiners, and helium end users that support BLM’s “hands-off” approach to determining what is a commercially reasonable rate. We plan to conduct additional work after the July 2014 auction and sales on BLM’s implementation of the tolling provision. However, the agency’s ability to create incentives is restricted by the terms of existing storage contracts that predate the act and remain in effect until September 30, 2015. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government and the private sector use helium, a key nonrenewable resource, for a variety of purposes, including research and manufacturing. As of September 30, 2013, BLM was storing about 9 billion cubic feet of federally owned crude helium and almost 2 billion cubic feet of privately owned crude helium in an underground federal reserve. Helium produced from the reserve represents 40 percent of the total U.S. production.
The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 is intended to complete the privatization of the federal helium reserve in a competitive market fashion that ensures stability in the helium markets, while protecting the interests of American taxpayers. It establishes a phased process through fiscal year 2021 to dispose of the remaining helium. Phase A is a transition period of helium sales, and Phase B consists of auctions in addition to sales.
This testimony describes (1) BLM's initial implementation of the act and (2) challenges, if any, BLM faces in implementing and incentivizing tolling—when a helium refiner processes or refines another party's crude helium at an agreed upon price. GAO examined helium sales documents and BLM's proposed plan for implementing the act; visited BLM's Amarillo Field Office near the reserve to review documents and observe the helium facilities; interviewed BLM and other Interior officials; and interviewed representatives from four refiners and four nonrefiners that participated in recent sales.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has taken a number of actions to begin implementing the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013, including (1) estimating volumes of helium that can be produced from the federal helium reserve each year, (2) preparing for and conducting helium sales under the act's Phase A transition period, and (3) initiating planning for the act's Phase B, which introduces a competitive auction process for crude helium along with continued sales. First, BLM estimated the amount of crude helium that can be produced from the reserve each year based on a geologic model. Second, under Phase A, BLM determined sale volumes, set the sale price and required participants to disclose certain information, among other things. Third, BLM has begun planning for the required Phase B auction and sale of helium for fiscal year 2015 and a one-time sale of a portion of the helium that will be made available in fiscal year 2016. BLM plans to hold this auction and these sales in July 2014 to comply with an August 1, 2014, statutory deadline. BLM officials told us the agency plans to offer for auction or sale most of the helium estimated to be produced in fiscal year 2015 and use the remainder to meet federal users' needs and to deliver privately owned helium to refiners for processing. However, refiners disagree with the agency's approach, stating the act requires BLM to offer for auction or sale the maximum amount that it can produce from the reserve each year. BLM officials said they are taking this approach to help ensure that the agency can deliver the privately owned helium that remains in storage before the end of fiscal year 2021.
BLM faces challenges in implementing the act's tolling provision and identifying incentives. Under the provision, refiners, as a condition of sale or auction in Phases A and B, are to make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain entities. In implementing this provision, however, BLM faces challenges in knowing whether refiners (1) have excess refining capacity available and (2) if so, are offering tolling services to nonrefiners at commercially reasonable rates. For example, although BLM asked refiners to report excess refining capacity as a condition of the Phase A sales, BLM did not define the term “excess refining capacity” because, according to BLM officials, they were still in the process of interpreting the act. According to refiners GAO interviewed, they used different methods to calculate the excess refining capacity they reported to BLM. In preparation for Phase B and the fiscal year 2015 auction and sale, BLM has proposed a definition of excess refining capacity, although some nonrefiners noted that it leaves room for interpretation. Regarding rates, BLM has not defined or identified criteria for determining what is a commercially reasonable rate. BLM officials said they prefer to take a “hands off” approach, allowing the companies involved and the marketplace to determine what is commercially reasonable, but it is unclear how BLM would implement the tolling provision without a definition or criteria for what is commercially reasonable. Moreover, BLM officials told GAO that they are considering various ways to incentivize tolling by refiners, but the agency's ability to create incentives is limited by the terms of existing contracts governing helium delivery that remain in effect through fiscal year 2015. GAO plans to conduct additional work after the July 2014 auction and sales on BLM's implementation of the act's tolling provision. Therefore, GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-15-313 | gao_GAO-15-313_0 | states through the Medicaid Integrity Institute in April 2014. Indicators of Potentially Improper Medicaid Payments to Beneficiaries and Providers Highlight Potential Weaknesses in Selected State Controls
Of the approximately 9.2 million beneficiaries in the four states that we examined, thousands of cases from the fiscal year 2011 data analyzed showed indications of potentially improper payments, including fraud, to Medicaid beneficiaries and providers. The Medicaid benefits involved with these deceased providers totaled at least $240,000 for fiscal year 2011. We found that about 50 providers in the four states we examined had been excluded from federal health-care programs, including Medicaid; these providers were excluded from these programs when they billed for Medicaid services during fiscal year 2011. Federal agencies can place individuals or entities on SAM for a variety of reasons, including fraud, theft, bribery, and tax evasion. CMS Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Certain Medicaid Enrollment-Screening Controls, but Gaps Remain
Through regulation, CMS has taken steps since 2011 to make the Medicaid enrollment-verification process more data-driven. However, gaps in guidance and data sharing continue to exist, and additional opportunities for improvements are available for screening beneficiaries and providers. CMS Issued Regulations Requiring States to Access Additional Data Sources to Verify Medicaid Applicant Information
In response to PPACA, which was enacted in 2010, CMS issued federal regulations in 2013 to establish a more-rigorous approach to verify financial and nonfinancial information needed to determine Medicaid beneficiary eligibility. Specifically, under these regulations, states are required to use electronic data maintained by the federal government to the extent that such information may be useful in verifying eligibility. According to CMS, the hub can verify key application information, including household income and size, citizenship, state residency, incarceration status, and immigration status. Under CMS’s regulations, when states receive an application they are to use the hub to verify an individual’s eligibility. Gaps Remain for Screening Deceased Beneficiaries in Selected States
Medicaid services to individuals are to cease once a beneficiary dies. As a result, states may not be able to detect individuals who have moved to and died in other states and prevent payment of potentially fraudulent benefits. CMS Issued Guidance for Screening Provider Enrollment
PPACA authorized CMS to implement several actions to strengthen provider-enrollment screening. Each state is given “read only,” manual access to PECOS. According to CMS officials, as of October 2013, CMS began providing all interested states access to a monthly PECOS data-extract file that contains basic Medicare enrollment information; the state officials we interviewed were unaware that they could obtain automated data extracts from PECOS. Conclusions
The Medicaid program is a significant expenditure for the federal government and the states, representing over $310 billion in federal outlays in fiscal year 2014. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further improve efforts to limit improper payments, including fraud, in the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Acting Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: issue guidance to states to better identify beneficiaries who are deceased; and provide guidance to states on the availability of automated information through Medicare’s enrollment database—the Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS)—and full access to all pertinent PECOS information, such as ownership information, to help screen Medicaid providers more efficiently and effectively. HHS concurred with both of our recommendations. We do not state this in our report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) identify and analyze indicators of improper or potentially fraudulent payments to Medicaid beneficiaries and providers and (2) examine the extent to which federal and state oversight policies, controls, and processes are in place to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in determining eligibility for Medicaid beneficiaries and enrolling providers. To identify indicators of improper or potentially fraudulent payments to Medicaid beneficiaries and providers, we obtained and analyzed Medicaid claims paid in fiscal year 2011, the most-recent consistently comparable data, for four states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. Medicaid payments to these states constituted about 13 percent of all Medicaid payments made during fiscal year 2011. These four states were selected primarily because they had reliable data and were among states with the highest Medicaid enrollment. All of the states included in our review—Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey—had MCO arrangements in place. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is a significant expenditure for the federal government and the states, with total federal outlays of $310 billion in fiscal year 2014. CMS reported an estimated $17.5 billion in potentially improper payments for the Medicaid program in 2014.
GAO was asked to review beneficiary and provider enrollment-integrity efforts at selected states. This report (1) identifies and analyzes indicators of improper or potentially fraudulent payments in fiscal year 2011, and (2) examines the extent to which federal and state oversight policies, controls, and processes are in place to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in determining eligibility.
GAO analyzed Medicaid claims paid in fiscal year 2011, the most-recent reliable data available, for four states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. These states were chosen because they were among those with the highest Medicaid enrollment; the results are not generalizable to all states. GAO performed data matching with various databases to identify indicators of potential fraud, reviewed CMS and state Medicaid program-integrity policies, and interviewed CMS and state officials performing oversight functions.
What GAO Found
GAO found thousands of Medicaid beneficiaries and hundreds of providers involved in potential improper or fraudulent payments during fiscal year 2011—the most-recent year for which reliable data were available in four selected states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. These states had about 9.2 million beneficiaries and accounted for 13 percent of all fiscal year 2011 Medicaid payments. Specifically:
About 8,600 beneficiaries had payments made on their behalf concurrently by two or more of GAO's selected states totaling at least $18.3 million.
The identities of about 200 deceased beneficiaries received about $9.6 million in Medicaid benefits subsequent to the beneficiary's death.
About 50 providers were excluded from federal health-care programs, including Medicaid, for a variety of reasons that include patient abuse or neglect, fraud, theft, bribery, or tax evasion.
Since 2011, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken regulatory steps to make the Medicaid enrollment process more rigorous and data-driven; however, gaps in beneficiary-eligibility verification guidance and data sharing continue to exist. These gaps include the following:
In October 2013, CMS required states to use electronic data maintained by the federal government in its Data Services Hub (hub) to verify beneficiary eligibility. According to CMS, the hub can verify key application information, including state residency, incarceration status, and immigration status. However, additional guidance from CMS to states might further enhance program-integrity efforts beyond using the hub. Specifically, CMS regulations do not require states to periodically review Medicaid beneficiary files for deceased individuals more frequently than annually, nor specify whether states should consider using the more-comprehensive Social Security Administration Death Master File in conjunction with state-reported death data when doing so. As a result, states may not be able to detect individuals that have moved to and died in other states, or prevent the payment of potentially fraudulent benefits to individuals using these identities.
In 2011, CMS issued regulations to strengthen Medicaid provider-enrollment screening. For example, CMS now requires states to screen providers and suppliers to ensure they have active licenses in the state where they provide Medicaid services. CMS's regulations also allow states to use Medicare's enrollment database—the Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS)—to screen Medicaid providers so that duplication of effort is reduced. In April 2012, CMS gave each state manual access to certain information in PECOS. However, none of the four states GAO interviewed used PECOS to screen all Medicaid providers because of the manual process. In October 2013, CMS began providing interested states access to a monthly file containing basic enrollment information that could be used for automated screening, but CMS has not provided full access to all PECOS information, such as ownership information, that states report are needed to effectively and efficiently process Medicaid provider applications.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS issue guidance for screening deceased beneficiaries and supply more-complete data for screening Medicaid providers. The agency concurred with both of the recommendations and stated it would provide state-specific guidance to address them. |
gao_GAO-04-953T | gao_GAO-04-953T_0 | From 1997 to 2002, the Oil for Food program was responsible for more than $67 billion of Iraq's oil revenue. Despite concerns that sanctions may have worsened the humanitarian situation, the Oil for Food program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. According to the United Nations, the average daily food intake increased from around 1,275 calories per person per day in 1996 to about 2,229 calories at the end of 2001. Oversight Role
From 1997 through 2002, we estimate that the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues—$5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion in surcharges on oil sales and illicit charges from suppliers exporting goods to Iraq through the Oil for Food program. However, the Security Council allowed the Iraqi government, as a sovereign entity, to negotiate contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. This structure, in addition to the uncertain oversight roles of OIP and the sanctions committee, was an important factor in enabling Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and illicit commissions. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of program fraud. Summaries of internal audit reports provided to GAO pointed to some operational concerns in procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight. United Nations and Security Council Had Responsibility for Oversight of Program, but Iraq Contracted Directly with Purchasers and Suppliers
Both OIP, as an office within the U.N. Secretariat, and the Security Council’s sanctions committee were responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. While OIP was to examine each contract for price and value, it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee responded to illegal surcharges on oil purchases, but it is unclear what actions it took to respond to commissions on commodity contracts. The Sanctions Committee Had a Key Role in Enforcing Sanctions and Approving Contracts
The sanctions committee was responsible for three key elements of the Oil for Food program: (1) monitoring implementation of the sanctions, (2) screening contracts to prevent the purchase of items that could have military uses, and (3) approving Iraq’s oil and commodity contracts. These efforts may wish to further examine how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts. Current or planned efforts include an inquiry initiated by the United Nations, an investigation and audit overseen by the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit, and efforts undertaken by several U.S. congressional committees. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We used the following methodology to estimate the former Iraqi regime’s illicit revenues from oil smuggling, surcharges on oil, and commissions from commodity contracts from 1997 through 2002:
To estimate the amount of oil the Iraqi regime smuggled, we used Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates of Iraqi oil production and subtracted oil sold under the Oil for Food program and domestic consumption. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. The program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. From 1996 through 2001, the average daily food intake increased from 1,300 to 2,300 calories. From 1997-2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion of oil through the program and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase commodities. GAO (1) reports on our estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of U.N. sanctions and provides some observations on the administration of the program and (2) suggests areas for additional analysis and summarizes the status of several ongoing investigations.
What GAO Found
From 1997 through 2002, we estimate that the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues--$5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion in surcharges on oil sales and illicit charges from suppliers exporting goods to Iraq through the Oil for Food program. The United Nations, through the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) and the Security Council's Iraq sanctions committee, was responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food program. However, the Security Council allowed the Iraqi government, as a sovereign entity, to negotiate contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. This structure was an important factor in enabling Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. OIP was responsible for examining Iraqi contracts for price and value, but it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee was responsible for monitoring oil smuggling, screening contracts for items that could have military uses, and approving oil and commodity contracts. The sanctions committee took action to stop illegal surcharges on oil, but it is unclear what actions it took on the commissions on commodity contracts. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of program fraud. Summaries of internal audit reports provided to GAO pointed to some operational concerns in procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight. Ongoing investigations of the Oil for Food program may wish to further examine how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts. Current or planned efforts include an inquiry initiated by the United Nations, an investigation and audit overseen by the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit, and efforts undertaken by several U.S. congressional committees. |
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