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gao_NSIAD-99-21 | gao_NSIAD-99-21_0 | Previous GAO Reports on STEs
We have already published a number of reports on state trading issues, including (1) a July 1995 report that provides a brief summary of trade remedy laws available to investigate and respond to activities of entities trading with the United States, including STEs; (2) an August 1995 report on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (WTO) practices that apply to STEs and the effectiveness of those disciplines to date; and (3) a June 1996 report that focuses on the activities of three STEs, including the CWB, and their potential capabilities to distort trade in their respective commodity markets. In addition, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) remains concerned that the CWB may be using its monopoly to undercut U.S. wheat prices and that U.S. farmers continue to be hurt by increased Canadian wheat imports. We reviewed the following: (1) CWB operations, government assistance to the CWB and the Canadian farmer, and ongoing changes to the environment in which the CWB operates; (2) the availability of data to ascertain CWB pricing practices, and efforts to increase the amount of data available; and (3) the nature of trade remedies available to address the operations of STEs, and the frequency with which these remedies have been applied to STEs. 4). The government of Canada interprets these changes differently. Canadian Government Assistance to the Wheat and Barley Producers
The Canadian government also provides other subsidies to the grain sector through income support policies, income and crop insurance, and provision of railroad hopper cars. The CWB official in charge of U.S. marketing explained that at the same time the end of the rail subsidies made the United States a more attractive market, the decline of U.S. usage of the USDA’s Export Enhancement Program was working in an offsetting fashion, making the United States a less attractive market. However, the CWB declines to reveal other important information, such as the actual contract prices for its sales to foreign grain buyers. A Canadian grain company confirmed that sales to Canadian consumers are based on the MGE prices. USDA and Customs officials are discussing the possibility of collecting more detailed price information on Canadian wheat imports. U.S. officials believe that the new questionnaire does not go far enough in increasing the pricing transparency of the CWB and other STEs. In these countries, such as China or Russia, public information on their STEs is not always readily available. CWB and Other STE Involvement in Trade Remedy Actions
The CWB and other STEs have been involved in investigations under U.S. trade law, and their activities have been the subject of formal disputes under international trade agreements. The ITC conducted two investigations involving U.S. imports of Canadian grain, and USTR reported one CFTA dispute settlement action about CWB export pricing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Canadian grain exports to the United States, focusing on the operations of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the trade remedies applicable to the activities of state trading enterprises (STE).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the CWB is a STE with a monopoly on certain Canadian grain sales and receives Canadian government subsidies in a number of direct and indirect ways; (2) the Canadian government also provides other assistance to its wheat and barley farmers; (3) the CWB's operating environment is undergoing changes, some of which are expected to make the United States a more attractive market for Canadian grain; (4) at the same time, there is a greater presence of U.S. grain companies operating in Canada, and the CWB is dealing more frequently with private companies in the sale of Canadian grain; (5) little information on actual CWB contracts is publicly available; (6) although U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Agriculture collect a great deal of information on imports of Canadian grain into the United States, these data cannot be used to ascertain CWB export prices; (7) the format that countries use to report on their STEs' activities to the World Trade Organization has recently been revised; (8) however, U.S. officials are concerned that it does not go far enough to increase the openness of the pricing practices of certain STEs, such as the CWB; (9) trade remedies to combat disruptive or trade-distorting imports under U.S. trade laws do not treat STEs any differently from other entities involved in international trade; (10) these U.S. trade laws can address trade issues such as dumping, actionable subsidies, and surges in imports; (11) in addition, STE activities may be subject to dispute settlement provisions under international trade agreements if the activities are inconsistent with an obligation agreed to by the government of the STE; and (12) relatively few trade remedy actions have been taken involving STEs. |
gao_GAO-07-364 | gao_GAO-07-364_0 | In fiscal year 2006, IRS collected about $2.5 trillion in tax payments, processed hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and paid about $277 billion in refunds to taxpayers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of IRS’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported weaknesses at two data processing sites and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems located at three sites were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. IRS Made Limited Progress in Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
IRS has made limited progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses at two data processing sites. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 25 of the 73 weaknesses that we reported as unresolved at the time of our last review. Significant Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial and Taxpayer Information at Risk
Significant weaknesses in access controls and other information security controls continue to threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS’s financial and tax processing systems and information. A primary reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented its information security program. As a result, IRS’s ability to perform vital functions could be impaired and the risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and sensitive taxpayer information is increased. Access controls include those related to user identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, and physical security. IRS did not consistently audit and monitor security-relevant system activity on its applications. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system that is identified in the agency’s inventories; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. These deficiencies represent a material weakness in IRS’s internal controls over its financial and tax processing systems. A key reason for these weaknesses is that the agency has not yet fully implemented critical elements of its agencywide information security program. Until IRS (1) fully implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program that includes risk assessments, enhanced policies and procedures, security plans, training, adequate tests and evaluations, and a continuity of operations process for all major systems and (2) begins to address weaknesses across the service, its facilities, computing resources, and the financial and sensitive taxpayer information on its systems will remain vulnerable. I) on a draft of this report, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that IRS understands that information security controls are essential for ensuring information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disruption, or destruction. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected about $2.5 trillion in tax payments and paid about $277 billion in refunds. Because IRS relies extensively on computerized systems, effective information security controls are essential to ensuring that financial and taxpayer information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2006 and 2005 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) IRS's actions to correct previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies and procedures, guidance, security plans, reports, and other documents; tested controls over five critical applications at three IRS sites; and interviewed key security representatives and management officials.
What GAO Found
IRS has made limited progress toward correcting or mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses at two data processing sites, but 66 percent of the weaknesses that GAO had previously identified still existed. Specifically, IRS has corrected or mitigated 25 of the 73 information security weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved at the time of our last review. For example, IRS has improved password controls on its servers and enhanced audit and monitoring efforts for mainframe and Windows user activity, but it continues to (1) use inadequate account lockout settings for Windows servers and (2) inadequately verify employees' identities against official IRS photo identification. Significant weaknesses in access controls and other information security controls continue to threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS's financial and tax processing systems and information. For example, IRS has not implemented effective access controls related to user identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security, and other information security controls. These weaknesses could impair IRS's ability to perform vital functions and increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. Accordingly, GAO has reported a material weakness in IRS's internal controls over its financial and tax processing systems. A primary reason for the new and old weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented its information security program. IRS has taken a number of steps to develop, document, and implement an information security program. However, the agency has not yet fully or consistently implemented critical elements of its program. Until IRS fully implements an agencywide information security program that includes risk assessments, enhanced policies and procedures, security plans, training, adequate tests and evaluations, and a continuity of operations process for all major systems, the financial and sensitive taxpayer information on its systems will remain vulnerable. |
gao_GAO-06-705 | gao_GAO-06-705_0 | Steps Taken to Improve Oversight Activities but Some Previously Identified Weaknesses Remain
CMS has undertaken several steps to improve its Medicaid financial management activities including its efforts to oversee state claims for federal reimbursement and to identify payment errors. CMS hired about 90 funding specialists who are examining high-risk state funding practices and working with states to eliminate those practices that inappropriately increase federal costs. However, it is too soon to assess the impact they will have on improving overall financial management and addressing emerging issues that put federal Medicaid dollars at risk because some have just recently been initiated, and results are not known yet. Further, there are other previously identified weaknesses that the agency has not addressed. CMS also has not incorporated the use of the MSIS in its oversight of state claims or other systems projects intended to help improve its analysis capabilities. Further, CMS has not developed profiles to document information on state fraud and abuse controls to use in its oversight of state claims. Because these issues are important to further improving and sustaining CMS’s oversight activities, we reiterate our prior recommendations in these areas. Goal for Reducing Questionable Federal Reimbursement Helps Promote Accountability
CMS has recently developed a specific goal aimed at reducing questionable federal reimbursement and evaluating its oversight activities. CMS has improved its processes for tracking its financial management activities and the attainment of the goals it has set. Specifically, CMS has not instituted mechanisms to measure how the risk of inappropriate federal reimbursement has changed as a result of corrective actions taken. Finally, CMS has not developed a strategic plan specific to its Medicaid financial management activities. Use of HCFAC Funds to Enhance Medicaid Oversight Initiatives
During fiscal years 2003 through 2005, CMS received almost $46 million from the HCFAC account that it has used to help fund programs related to its oversight of Medicaid. The HCFAC account provided about $12 million to CMS for the funding specialists for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The funding specialists have been funded on an annual basis with appropriations from the HCFAC account. There is the chance that adequate funding might not be provided through the HCFAC process in any given year for the funding specialists; thus CMS officials have told us they would like to pursue ways of making the funding specialist positions permanent. Other Medicaid projects included in table 5 that CMS used HCFAC funds for include: interagency agreements between CMS and OIG for OIG audits of high-risk issues such as family planning services in managed care, skilled professional medical personnel, upper payment limits, school-based claims, home- and community-based services, and Medicaid administrative costs reported by state agencies other than the Medicaid single state agency; Medicare-Medicaid data match project developed to identify improper billing and utilization patterns by matching Medicare and Medicaid claims information on providers and beneficiaries; Payment Accuracy Measurement, PERM, and SCHIP Error Rate Pilot Projects, which allow states to test a methodology to determine improper payment error rates in their SCHIP and/or Medicaid programs; Transaction, Information, Inquiry and Program Performance System to develop and enhance an integrated financial management tool linking existing CMSO data systems and tools containing critical financial, statistical, administrative, and other data; an organizational study of Medicaid financial processes within CMS done by OIG under an interagency agreement with OIG; a project referred to as the Annuities Project, which used both qualitative and quantitative research methods to develop a comprehensive picture of states’ experience with the use of annuities as an asset-sheltering device by Medicaid applicants and their spouses; a Waiver Management System Database project, which updated a current Waiver Management System Database; and a project to research options for automating the Medicaid state plan process from the creation and submission of state plan amendments at the state level through approval at the central office and regional offices. While CMS’s actions address previously identified weaknesses and recommendations from our 2002 report related to (1) targeting resources to higher risk areas, (2) monitoring performance, (3) establishing mechanisms for ensuring accountability, (4) developing an approach to payment accuracy reviews and (5) incorporating advanced control techniques, it is too soon to assess the impact they will have on improving overall financial management and addressing emerging issues that put federal Medicaid dollars at risk because the results of some efforts are not known yet. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further improve and sustain CMS’s oversight of state claims, including its ability to identify and address emerging issues, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two additional actions: Create permanent funding specialist positions. To determine how CMS used funds from the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) account for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, we obtained from CMS a list of Medicaid projects that were funded from the HCFAC account in fiscal years 2003 through 2005. Medicaid Financial Management: Better Oversight of State Claims for Federal Reimbursement Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid--the federal-state health care financing program--covered over 56 million people at a cost of $295 billion in fiscal year 2004, the latest fiscal year for which complete data are available. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency responsible for overseeing states' Medicaid programs and ensuring the propriety of expenditures reported by states for federal reimbursement. In 2002, GAO reported on weaknesses in CMS's oversight of Medicaid financial management and made recommendations to CMS to strengthen its oversight process. In fiscal year 2003, CMS started receiving funds from the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) program to help improve Medicaid financial management. GAO was asked to evaluate CMS's financial management activities, including following up on prior recommendations. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which CMS has improved its ability to identify and address emerging issues that put federal Medicaid dollars at risk and (2) how CMS used funds for Medicaid from the HCFAC account.
What GAO Found
CMS has undertaken several steps to improve its Medicaid financial management activities, including its efforts to oversee state claims for federal reimbursement and to identify payment errors. CMS hired about 90 funding specialists, thus enhancing its ability to address high-risk state funding practices that inappropriately increase federal costs. CMS also created a new unit that centralized responsibility for approving state plan amendments related to reimbursement. CMS continued to identify billions of dollars in questionable federal reimbursement through focused financial reviews. CMS also set goals aimed at reducing questionable federal reimbursement and holding financial managers accountable and enhanced its internal processes for tracking results of its financial management activities. These and other efforts, such as CMS's approach for measuring payment errors under the Improper Payments Information Act, represent improvements in the processes that CMS uses in its oversight of states. While these actions also address previously identified weaknesses and recommendations from our 2002 report, it is too soon to assess the impact they will have on improving overall financial management and addressing emerging issues that put federal Medicaid dollars at risk because some have just recently been initiated and results are not known yet. Further, there are a number of previously identified weaknesses that the agency has not yet addressed. Specifically, CMS has not instituted mechanisms to measure how the risk of inappropriate federal reimbursement has changed as a result of corrective actions taken. In addition, CMS has not incorporated the use of the Medicaid Statistical Information System database into its oversight of states' claims or other systems projects intended to improve its analysis capabilities. Further, CMS has not developed profiles to document information on state fraud and abuse controls to use in its oversight of state claims. Finally, CMS has not developed a strategic plan specific to its Medicaid financial management activities. Because these issues are important to further improving and sustaining CMS's oversight activities, we reiterate and build on our prior recommendations in these areas. During fiscal years 2003 through 2005, CMS received almost $46 million from the HCFAC account that it used to help fund programs related to its oversight of the Medicaid program, including about $12 million for the funding specialists for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The funding specialist positions have been funded on an annual basis with appropriations from the HCFAC account. There is the chance that adequate funding might not be provided through the HCFAC process in any given year for the funding specialists; therefore, creating permanent funding specialist positions is important. CMS used the other $34 million for other projects such as researching options for automating the Medicaid state plan process, and interagency agreements with the OIG to conduct audits of high-risk areas. GAO obtained documentation to support the use of HCFAC funds for these projects. |
gao_GAO-09-410T | gao_GAO-09-410T_0 | For these and other reasons, the FCS program is recognized as being high risk and requiring special oversight. This statement is based on work we conducted between March 2008 and March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Specifically, the program has yet to show that critical technologies are mature, design issues have been resolved, requirements and resources are matched, performance has been demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. The Army will be challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review. There have been some demonstrations of early versions of the lightweight armor and an active protection system, but the feasibility of the FCS survivability concept remains uncertain. Army Plans to Proceed with Production Commitments before Solid Level of Knowledge Demonstrated to Decision-makers
At the milestone review, DOD will have to evaluate at least three programmatic options to shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which presents challenges. Third, the Army is considering altering the FCS strategy to follow an incremental approach, which is preferable to the current approach, but presents other challenges. The FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executable within current cost and schedule projections, given the significant amount of development and demonstration yet to be completed. For example, the Army has scheduled only 2 years between the critical design review and the production decision in 2013, leaving little time to gain knowledge between the two events. Further, when Congress is asked to approve funding for initial low-rate production of core FCS systems, the Army will not yet have proven that the FCS network and the program concept will work, a demonstration that is expected as part of Limited User Test 3 in 2012. Currently, the Army’s efforts to field spin out systems relies on a rushed schedule that calls for making production decisions before production- representative prototypes have clearly demonstrated a useful military capability. Army officials have said that they are considering an incremental or block acquisition approach to FCS in order to mitigate risks in four major areas: (1) immaturity of requirements for system survivability, network capability, and information assurance; (2) limited availability of performance trade space to maintain program cost and schedule given current program risks; (3) program not funded to Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimates and effect of congressional budget cuts; and (4) continuing challenges in aligning schedules and expectations for multiple concurrent acquisitions. First, it presents decision makers with another FCS strategy to consider, possibly after the fiscal year 2010 budget is submitted. Second, the approach must ensure that each increment stands on its own and is not dependent on future increments. Concluding Remarks
The 2009 milestone review is the most important decision on the Future Combat System since the program began in 2003. If the preliminary design reviews are successfully completed and critical technologies mature as planned in 2009, the FCS program will essentially be at a stage that statute and DOD policy would consider as being ready to start development. We recommended that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first increments should be justifiable on their own as worthwhile military capabilities that are not dependent on future capabilities for their value. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Future Combat System (FCS) program--which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network--is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The substantial technical challenges, the cost of the program, and the Army's acquisition strategy are among the reasons why the program is recognized as needing special oversight and review. This testimony is based on GAO's March 12, 2009 report and addresses knowledge gaps that will persist in the FCS program as Congress is asked to make significant funding commitments for development and production over the next several years.
What GAO Found
The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations--versus modeling and simulation results--have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual maturity of the program. Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available funds that will likely worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executable with remaining resources and calls for significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be completed before the production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to consider approving procurement funding for FCS core systems before most prototype deliveries, the critical design review, and key system tests have taken place. Second, the program to spin out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an incremental FCS strategy--that is, to develop and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that each increment be justifiable by itself and not dependent on future increments. |
gao_GAO-11-15 | gao_GAO-11-15_0 | In this way, NARA is to ensure continuing access to the essential documentation of the rights of American citizens and the actions of their government. NARA Is Improving its Oversight Activity, but More Remains to Be Done
The effectiveness of NARA’s oversight activity has been improved by recent initiatives. It has now completed its first governmentwide records management self-assessment survey, resumed agency inspections after a long gap, and increased its reporting. These new efforts have provided NARA with a fuller picture of governmentwide records management, including an assessment by agency of the risk of unauthorized destruction of federal records; as a result, it is in a better position to determine where records management improvements are most needed, develop and update guidance, and hold agencies accountable by publishing assessments of their records management programs. Following an extended effort to get agencies to submit schedules for unscheduled systems containing electronic records, NARA has increased the number of schedules it has approved per year, but nevertheless has an increased backlog of schedules awaiting approval. NARA faces the risk that its success in getting agencies to schedule their systems may result in more schedules being submitted than it can handle in a timely manner. NARA’s planning for its inspection program is at a high level and is still under development. 33 percent of agencies did not submit reports. NARA’s Ability to Preserve Federal Records Is Strained by Volume of Records, Finite Resources, and Technology
NARA faces challenges in preserving permanent records in its possession—both paper and electronic—largely because of the sheer volume of federal records, the finite resources available to deal with them, and the technological challenges posed by electronic records. NARA has a large and persistent backlog of records in paper and other media needing preservation actions. Until ERA and its electronic preservation capabilities are fully implemented, there is reduced assurance that NARA can ensure the preservation of all electronic records. In fiscal year 2009, NARA reported treating nearly 116,000 cubic feet of at-risk archival records. Nonetheless, as additional records were accessioned, the percentage of backlog remained essentially constant, and the actual amount of holdings requiring preservation action grew from about 2.4 million cubic feet in 2008 to about 2.6 million cubic feet in 2009. In Key Management Areas, NARA Has Policies and Procedures that Are Consistent with Its Strategic Planning, although Gaps Remain
NARA’s policies and procedures for key aspects of governance, human capital, and collaboration are generally aligned with its strategic planning, but selected areas have gaps. In addition, it has developed a strategic human capital plan that is consistent with our human capital strategic framework, but its implementation of the plan has been delayed, so that the agency is not yet managing human capital strategically. NARA has established or begun to establish collaborative efforts that are generally aligned with all these goals and strategies. Although it cannot by itself ensure that agencies are managing records appropriately (agencies control and are responsible for their own records), NARA can use its oversight activities to help determine where records management improvements are most needed and improve its ability to influence agencies to give more priority to records management programs. The Archivist stated that to address them, NARA plans to (1) develop and implement additional means to validate self-reported data from self- assessment surveys in fiscal year 2011, (2) develop a plan for systematically and strategically targeting inspections to maximize their value, (3) conduct a study of the risks associated with the backlog in its records scheduling process, and develop mitigation plans, (4) review the current strategic plan to make sure it can tie strategies to specific actions and targets, (5) roll out an enterprisewide internal controls program that uses risk assessment as an integral part of managing and monitoring internal controls, and (6) consider using an existing contract to draw in additional resources to assist NARA with completing its competency modeling initiative. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) effectiveness in overseeing the governmentwide management of records, including commenting on its capacity to identify risk of unlawful destruction of federal records; (2) describe its ability to preserve permanent records; and (3) assess its policies, procedures, and plans supporting key management and oversight capabilities: governance, human capital, and collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is to safeguard and preserve government records, ensuring continuing access to the essential documentation of the rights of American citizens and the actions of their government. However, in today's environment of fast-evolving information technology, federal agencies are creating vast and growing volumes of electronic records while continuing to create physical records in large numbers. Accordingly, GAO was asked to assess NARA's effectiveness in overseeing the governmentwide management of records, including commenting on its capacity to identify risk of unlawful destruction of federal records; describe its ability to preserve permanent records; and assess its policies, procedures, and plans supporting key management and oversight capabilities (collaboration, governance, and human capital). To do so, GAO analyzed NARA documentation in these areas, interviewed agency officials, and reviewed prior work.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of NARA's oversight has been improved by recent increases in its oversight activities: NARA has conducted its first governmentwide records management self-assessment survey, resumed agency inspections after a long gap, and expanded its reporting (including giving more complete information about specific agencies). These efforts have provided a fuller picture of governmentwide records management: in particular, NARA found that almost 80 percent of agencies were at moderate to high risk of unlawful destruction of records. Reporting of such results may also help influence agencies to give more priority to records management, which has historically been given low priority. However, these initiatives have limitations. For example, NARA's efforts to validate self-reported survey data are limited, as are its plans for inspections of agency records management; addressing these limitations could enhance the usefulness of these efforts as they continue to be developed. NARA also oversees agency records management through its review and approval of the schedules under which agencies may dispose of records. Following an extended effort to get agencies to schedule electronic records and systems, NARA increased the number of schedules approved per year. However, it has also increased the backlog of schedules awaiting its approval, increasing the risk that NARA's success in promoting scheduling could bring in more schedules than it can handle in a timely manner. NARA faces challenges in preserving permanent records largely because of their volume, the finite resources available, and the technological challenges posed by electronic records. NARA has a large and persistent backlog of records on paper and other media needing preservation actions. Although it treated nearly 116,000 cubic feet of at-risk archival records in fiscal year 2009, the percentage of backlog remained constant at about 65 percent, and holdings requiring preservation grew from about 2.4 million cubic feet in 2008 to about 2.6 million cubic feet in 2009. For electronic records, NARA has an electronic records archive system that is still under development and does not yet include planned preservation functions. Until the system and its preservation capabilities are fully implemented, there is reduced assurance that NARA can ensure the preservation of all electronic records. NARA's policies and procedures for collaboration, selected aspects of governance, and human capital are generally aligned with its strategic planning. For example, it is participating in numerous collaborative activities that support the goals and strategies in its strategic plan. However, more action is needed. For example, with regard to governance, although its organizational responsibilities are generally aligned with its strategic plan, NARA has not established an enterprise risk management capability, reducing its ability to anticipate future challenges and avoid potential crises. Finally, NARA has developed and begun to implement a strategic human capital plan, but this implementation has been delayed, which hinders the agency's ability to ensure that it has the workforce and skills it needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to help NARA build on its recent oversight activities and to fill gaps in its risk management and human capital management. In comments on a draft of the report, NARA concurred. |
gao_GAO-14-277 | gao_GAO-14-277_0 | For WFP, prepositioning food aid in overseas and domestic warehouses shortened delivery time frames by an average of almost a month. In addition, diversion of emergency food aid from the prepositioning process shortened delivery time frames by, on average, about 2 months for WFP and the other sponsors. For Other Cooperating Sponsors, Prepositioning Food Aid Shortened Average Delivery Time Frame by More than 2 Months
We estimated, using statistical modeling to control for various factors, that prepositioning food aid commodities in overseas and domestic warehouses in fiscal years 2007 through 2012 saved an average of about 67 days for nine of USAID’s cooperating sponsors, compared with USAID’s standard shipping process. In contrast, for standard shipments of emergency food aid, USAID transports the food directly from U.S. ports to recipient countries. USAID Generally Paid Higher Prices for Domestically Prepositioned Commodities Than for Standard Shipment Commodities
In fiscal years 2007 to 2012, USAID generally paid higher weighted annual average prices for commodities that it purchased for domestic prepositioning than for similar commodities that it purchased for standard shipping. For example, limited commodity supply and limited numbers of suppliers for domestic prepositioning purchases are two possible factors, according to U.S. officials and commodity vendors whom we interviewed. USAID Does Not Systematically Monitor Prepositioning to Maximize Time Savings and Cost Effectiveness
USAID has taken some steps to evaluate timeliness and costs associated with prepositioning. USAID Does Not Collect and Assess Data Needed to Systematically Monitor Delivery Time Frames for Prepositioned Commodities
Although USAID’s goal for prepositioning is to improve the timeliness of emergency food aid, USAID does not collect or assess data needed to systematically monitor delivery time frames for prepositioned emergency food aid shipments. Limitations in some data from several other cooperating sponsors. USAID Does Not Systematically Monitor the Total Cost of Prepositioning to Maximize Cost Effectiveness
Although USAID collects data on the cost of its international food aid programs, it does not use these data to systematically monitor the total cost of prepositioning in order to maximize the program’s cost effectiveness. According to USAID’s Automated Directives System, the agency should collect and analyze data to make necessary program adjustments and to guide higher-level decision making and resource allocation. Such data could also help USAID assess the tradeoffs between prepositioning’s timeliness and its additional warehouse, shipping, and commodity costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen USAID’s ability to help ensure that its food aid prepositioning program meets the goal of reducing delivery time frames in a cost-effective manner, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following three steps to systematically 1. collect, and ensure the reliability and validity of, data on delivery time frames for all emergency food aid shipments, including prepositioned food aid shipments; 2. monitor and assess data on delivery time frames for prepositioned food aid shipments; and 3. monitor and assess costs associated with commodity procurement, shipping, and storage for prepositioned food aid shipments. In its comments, USAID concurred with our recommendations. In addition, USAID stated that it is working to identify actions needed to ensure the collection of reliable data on delivery time frames for all emergency food aid. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the effects of USAID’s prepositioning on delivery time frames for emergency food aid shipments, (2) the effects of prepositioning on the costs of emergency food aid, and (3) the extent to which the agency monitors prepositioning to manage program resources effectively. In addition, the data indicate whether the shipment was diverted. World Food Program: Stronger Controls Needed in High-Risk Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through Title II of the Food for Peace Act, the United States provides U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs in foreign countries. In fiscal years 2007 to 2012, USAID delivered $9.2 billion in emergency food aid to recipient countries through cooperating sponsors. In 2000, Congress authorized USAID to order, transport, and store food for prepositioning in both overseas and domestic locations. Through prepositioning, the agency orders food before it is requested and stores it in warehouses in or near regions with historically high needs.
GAO was asked to examine U.S. international food aid procurement. This report examines (1) the effects of prepositioning on emergency food aid delivery time frames, (2) the effects of prepositioning on the costs of the food aid, and (3) the extent to which the agency monitors prepositioning to maximize time savings and cost effectiveness. GAO analyzed data on delivery time frames and costs; reviewed agency documents; and interviewed agency officials and representatives from WFP, other cooperating sponsors, and ocean freight contractors.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reduces the average delivery time frame for emergency food aid by prepositioning food domestically—that is, in warehouses in the United States—and overseas. GAO estimates that compared with USAID's standard shipping process, which can take several months, prepositioning food aid shortened delivery time frames by an average of almost a month for shipments to the World Food Program (WFP). GAO also estimates that prepositioning shortened delivery time frames by an average of more than 2 months for other organizations—“cooperating sponsors”—that receive USAID grants. In addition, USAID reduces delivery time frames when it diverts shipments en route to overseas prepositioning warehouses to areas with immediate needs. For all cooperating sponsors, GAO estimates that diversions saved, on average, about 2 months.
Prepositioning food can increase the cost of emergency food aid because of additional warehouse, shipping, and commodity costs. For example, in fiscal year 2012, USAID paid approximately $8 million for its overseas and domestic prepositioning warehouses. USAID also paid $13 million to ship food by ocean freight from overseas prepositioning warehouses to recipient countries, in addition to the cost of shipping from the United States to the warehouses. Further, USAID generally paid higher weighted annual average prices for domestically prepositioned commodities than for standard shipment commodities. U.S. officials and vendors noted that factors such as limited commodity supplies and few participating suppliers may have contributed to higher prices.
USAID has taken some steps to evaluate prepositioning, but the agency does not collect and analyze data needed to systematically monitor delivery time frames for prepositioned commodities. In addition, some available data are unreliable. Further, USAID does not systematically monitor the total cost of prepositioning. According to USAID policy and federal internal control standards, the agency should monitor its programs by collecting and analyzing data to guide higher-level decision making and allocate resources. Without such monitoring, USAID is limited in its ability to assess prepositioning's impact on delivery time frames and costs and to maximize emergency food aid's timeliness and cost effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID systematically collect, and ensure the reliability of, data for prepositioned food aid and systematically monitor and assess the effectiveness of food aid's delivery time frames and costs. USAID concurred with the recommendations and is working to improve both the collection of reliable data and its monitoring of prepositioning. |
gao_AIMD-96-27 | gao_AIMD-96-27_0 | Potential Adverse Actions Resulting From SEC Investigation and Bondholder Lawsuits
The City of Denver has advised us that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is conducting a formal investigation regarding the adequacy of the city’s disclosure of information in bond offering documents with respect to the automated baggage system and related delays in opening the airport. DIA’s Ability to Meet Its Financial Obligations
Based on our review of DIA’s long-term budgets and the data available on actual operations from its opening on February 28, 1995, through August 31, 1995, we found no significant issues which would lead us to believe that DIA will be unable to meet its financial obligations. Debt service costs are expected to remain relatively stable over the next 30 years. Operating costs are expected to rise with inflation over that time frame. We compiled DIA’s actual cash flows for March through May 1995 and found that DIA produced a positive cash flow of $1.5 million in its first 3 months of operations. DIA Cash Reserves
As of September 25, 1995, the date of DIA’s latest available reserve fund statement, DIA had an operating cash balance of $57 million and held $420 million in reserve funds. In the event of a temporary financial crisis, about $260 million of these reserve funds could be used, subject to certain restrictions. Operations and Maintenance Reserve Fund. GAO Comments
1. See the “Health of the Airline Industry and United Airlines” section of the report. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Denver International Airport's (DIA) financial condition, focusing on DIA: (1) cash reserves and estimated cash flows; and (2) ability to meet its financial obligations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) predicting the future financial performance of DIA is difficult, since it has been operating for less than 1 year; (2) the difficulties in projecting DIA financial performance relate to the volatility of the airline industry, unexpected construction delays and costs, and the city of Denver's ability to repay airport investors; (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission is formally investigating the adequacy of the city's disclosure of information in bond documents with respect to delays in opening the airport; (4) there is no evidence that DIA will be unable to meet its financial obligations, since DIA has generated positive cash flows in its first 6 months of operation despite operating at well below capacity; (5) DIA debt service costs are expected to remain stable over the next 30 years, while operating and maintenance costs are expected to rise with inflation; and (6) as of September 1995, DIA had an operating cash balance of $57 million and held $420 million in reserve funds, of which $260 million could be used in the event of a financial crisis. |
gao_GAO-08-880 | gao_GAO-08-880_0 | 1). The community benefit standard specified that nonprofit hospitals were not required to provide charity care to qualify for federal tax exemption, but they must provide a benefit to the community. IRS’s Standard Provides Broad Latitude for Nonprofit Hospitals to Determine Community Benefit Activities; State Requirements Vary Substantially in Scope and Detail
IRS’s community benefit standard to qualify for tax-exempt status allows nonprofit hospitals broad latitude to determine the services and activities that constitute community benefit. State Community Benefit Requirements That Nonprofit Hospitals Must Meet Vary Substantially in Scope and Detail
State community benefit requirements that hospitals must meet in order to qualify for state tax-exempt or nonprofit status vary substantially in scope and detail. Specifically, 15 of the states have community benefit requirements in statutes or regulations and 36 do not (see fig. Differences in the Activities Nonprofit Hospitals Define as Community Benefit Substantially Affect the Amount of Community Benefits They Report
Variations in the activities nonprofit hospitals define as community benefit lead to substantial differences in the amount of community benefits they report. Community Benefits May Include Charity Care, Bad Debt, Government Health Care Programs, and Other Activities That Benefit the Community
Activities that benefit the community and their associated expenses, as defined by the community benefit standards and guidance that nonprofit hospitals use, generally fall into one of four categories: charity care, care for patients whose accounts result in bad debt (referred to as bad debt for the rest of the report), care for beneficiaries of government health care programs and their associated unreimbursed costs, and other activities that benefit the community. While Consensus Exists to Define Means-Tested Programs, Such as Medicaid, as Community Benefit, the Unreimbursed Cost of Medicare, Which Is a Sizable Cost for Hospitals, Remains Contentious
Consensus exists among the standards and guidance nonprofit hospitals use to define the unreimbursed cost of means-tested government health care programs, such as Medicaid, as community benefit. Consensus does not, however, exist to define the unreimbursed cost of Medicare as community benefit. Differences in How Nonprofit Hospitals Measure Costs of Community Benefit Activities Can Affect the Amount of Community Benefits They Report
Nonprofit hospitals may use a variety of practices to measure the costs of community benefit activities, and differences in these practices can affect the amount of community benefits they report. For example, standards and guidance used by nonprofit hospitals specify a variety of levels at which hospitals can report their community benefit. With the added attention to community benefit has come a growing realization of the extent of variability among stakeholders in what should count and how to measure it. Given the large number of uninsured individuals, and the critical role of hospitals in caring for them, it is important that federal and state policymakers and industry groups continue their discussion addressing the variability in defining and measuring community benefit activities. CMS stated that it did not have any comments. IRS commented that in the concluding observations section, the phrase “at present, determination and measurement of activities as community benefit for federal purposes are still largely matters of individual hospital discretion” was unclear as to whether the statement that follows “at present” refers to the state of things before or after IRS released the new Schedule H. IRS further stated that while in the years prior to IRS’s Form 990, Schedule H, the determination and measurement of community benefit was largely a matter of individual hospital discretion, the new Schedule H provides clear standards. We interviewed officials from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). To examine the effects of these standards and guidance on reported community benefit, we analyzed 2006 state data from California, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Texas. Bad debt is generally defined as the uncollectible payment that the patient is expected to, but does not, pay. needs. 3. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nonprofit hospitals qualify for federal tax exemption from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if they meet certain requirements. Since 1969, IRS has not specified that these hospitals have to provide charity care to meet these requirements, so long as they engage in activities that benefit the community. Many of these activities are intended to benefit the approximately 47 million uninsured individuals in the United States who need financial and other help to obtain medical care. Previous studies indicated that nonprofit hospitals may not be defining community benefit in a consistent and transparent manner that would enable policymakers to hold them accountable for providing benefits commensurate with their tax-exempt status. GAO was asked to examine (1) IRS's community benefit standard and the states' requirements, (2) guidelines nonprofit hospitals use to define the components of community benefit, and (3) guidelines nonprofit hospitals use to measure and report the components of community benefit. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed federal and state laws; the standards and guidance from federal agencies and industry groups; and 2006 data from California, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Texas. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials, and industry group representatives. IRS stated that the report in general was accurate, but noted several concerns regarding the description of the community benefit standard. CMS did not have any comments.
What GAO Found
IRS's community benefit standard allows nonprofit hospitals broad latitude to determine the services and activities that constitute community benefit. Furthermore, state community benefit requirements that hospitals must meet in order to qualify for state tax-exempt or nonprofit status vary substantially in scope and detail. For example, 15 states have community benefit requirements in statutes or regulations, and 10 of these states have detailed requirements. GAO found that among the standards and guidance used by nonprofit hospitals, consensus exists to define charity care, the unreimbursed cost of means-tested government health care programs (programs for which eligibility is based on financial need, such as Medicaid), and many other activities that benefit the community as community benefit. However, consensus does not exist to define bad debt (the amount that the patient is expected to, but does not, pay) and the unreimbursed cost of Medicare (the difference between a hospital's costs and its payment from Medicare) as community benefit. Variations in the activities nonprofit hospitals define as community benefit lead to substantial differences in the amount of community benefits they report. Even if nonprofit hospitals define the same activities as community benefit, they may measure the costs of these activities differently, which can lead to inconsistencies in reported community benefits. For example, standards and guidance vary on the level at which hospitals may report their community benefit (e.g., at an individual hospital level or a health care system level) and the method hospitals may use to estimate costs of community benefit activities. State data demonstrate that differences in how nonprofit hospitals measure charity care costs and the unreimbursed costs of government health care programs can affect the amount of community benefit they report. With the added attention to community benefit has come a growing realization of the extent of variability among stakeholders in what should count and how to measure it. At present, determination and measurement of activities as community benefit for federal purposes are still largely a matter of individual hospital discretion. Given the large number of uninsured individuals, and the critical role of hospitals in caring for them, it is important that federal and state policymakers and industry groups continue their discussion addressing the variability in defining and measuring community benefit activities. |
gao_HEHS-95-46 | gao_HEHS-95-46_0 | Health care services provided by IHS to American Indians and Alaskan Natives are not a federal health care entitlement. In subsequent discussions with subcommittee staff, we agreed to focus our review on two areas: IHS’ efforts to ensure that temporary physicians working in IHS facilities are qualified and competent to perform assigned duties, and what happens when requested medical services are delayed. Instead, IHS requires only that a physician have a medical license without restrictions to practice medicine. IHS Contracts Do Not Always Require That Information Be Shared
IHS facilities generally do not include a requirement in their contracts with locum tenens companies to (1) verify all licenses that a physician may hold, (2) inform IHS of the status of all licenses, and (3) provide all performance and disciplinary data that they may have on a temporary physician. As a result, IHS does not always obtain complete credentials information and is not always aware of temporary physicians with performance or disciplinary problems. At present, IHS facilities do not have a formal mechanism to share information on the performance of temporary physicians who have worked in the IHS system. The result is reduced access to contract medical services for American Indians and Alaskan Natives. However, he is concerned about how scheduled staff reductions after fiscal year 1996 may affect IHS’ delivery of medical services and its expansion program. Contract Health Services Funds Used to Purchase Care From Non-IHS Providers
IHS distributes contract health services funds among its 12 area offices based primarily on the level of funding that the area received in previous years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on American Indians' access to quality health care services, focusing on the: (1) Indian Health Service's (IHS) efforts to ensure that temporary physicians working in IHS facilities are qualified and competent to perform assigned duties; and (2) extent that medical services are delayed under the IHS Contract Health Services Program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IHS patients may be receiving substandard care because IHS is not always aware of temporary physicians who have had performance or disciplinary problems; (2) although IHS requires that temporary physicians possess a current medical license without restrictions, it fails to verify all of the physicians' current or prior licenses; (3) most IHS facilities have contracts with companies that are not required to inform IHS of the status of their physicians' licenses; (4) IHS facilities do not possess a network to share information on the performance of its temporary physicians; (5) although IHS can purchase specialized medical services from non-IHS providers under the Contract Health Services program, preventive care is not always funded; and (6) IHS is implementing legislatively required staff reductions, however, officials are unsure of how these reductions will impact future medical services or expansion programs if appropriations are reduced as well. |
gao_GAO-04-47 | gao_GAO-04-47_0 | In addition, we obtained and analyzed FMS’s cross-servicing database for the period from inception of the cross- servicing program in fiscal year 1996 through February 28, 2003, to determine what collection actions in-house FMS collectors performed on debts that had been returned uncollected from its PCA contractors and whether the in-house FMS collectors properly identified all uncollected debts that could be reported to IRS, including amounts that had been forgiven through compromise. Passive collection entailed no further collection action other than minimal efforts through offsets, and certain debts in passive collection were not eligible for such offsets. Consequently, opportunities for maximizing collections or other recoveries were lost. FMS Did Not Perform Collection and Close-Out Reviews for All Debts Returned to Referring Agencies and Debts in Inactive Status
Through February 28, 2003, FMS returned to referring agencies about $1.1 billion of delinquent nontax debts that had been returned uncollected to FMS by secondary PCA contractors during fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002. Neither OMB nor FMS monitored or reported on the extent to which agencies governmentwide closed out debts and reported them to IRS. Specifically, as of February 28, 2003, only about $30 million of the approximately $6.6 billion of debts with FMS for cross-servicing were at DOJ. The queries, while conceptually good, did not cover most of FMS’s cross-servicing portfolio. According to FMS officials, in fiscal year 2002, FMS began to review repayment and compromise agreements made by its PCA contractors as part of its annual PCA contractor compliance reviews. This is a significant difference given that FMS officials consider the cross-servicing program to be fully mature and federal agencies should be referring eligible debts when they are over 180 days delinquent. Conclusions
FMS continues to have opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of its cross-servicing of delinquent nontax debt. In our August 2002 letter to the Secretary of the Treasury and our subsequent entrance conference with FMS officials in October 2002, we stated that our objectives were to evaluate (1) actions taken by FMS on uncollected nontax debts returned from its PCA contractors; (2) FMS’s efforts to ensure that eligible uncollectible nontax debts, which federal agencies rely on FMS to report on their behalf to IRS as income to the debtors, are promptly identified and accurately reported; and (3) actions taken, if any, by FMS to ensure that federal agencies are reporting their eligible uncollectible nontax debts to IRS as income to the debtors. Rather, we stated that many of the debts kept in TOP for passive collection were unlikely to yield any collections through offsets because they were beyond the 10-year statutory and regulatory limitations applicable to offset or had other barriers, such as bankruptcy, that would prevent offset of the debts. 3. 7. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reviewed facets of Treasury's Financial Management Service's (FMS) cross-servicing efforts. These reviews did not include FMS's handling of nontax debts that were returned to FMS uncollected by its private collection agency (PCA) contractors because FMS officials did not consider the cross-servicing program to be fully mature. During fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, FMS's PCA contractors returned about $3.9 billion of uncollected debts to FMS. This report focuses primarily on (1) actions taken by FMS on uncollected nontax debts returned from its PCA contractors and (2) actions taken, if any, by FMS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure that federal agencies are reporting their eligible uncollectible nontax debts to IRS as income to debtors.
What GAO Found
Although FMS has made progress in implementing its cross-servicing program and considers it to be fully mature, opportunities exist to improve the program. FMS had not reviewed most of the debts returned to it by its PCA contractors to determine whether any opportunities for collection or other recoveries remained, including those possible from reporting closed-out debts to IRS as income to debtors. For example, about $3.7 billion of the $6.6 billion of debts that were at FMS for cross-servicing as of February 28, 2003, were being kept in the Treasury Offset Program (TOP) for passive collection after they had been returned uncollected to FMS by PCA contractors. Passive collection entailed no further collection action on the part of FMS other than minimal efforts through offset, and collections on debts in passive collection through offset totaled only about $9 million through February 28, 2003. Various problems hindered collections through offset, including the fact that many of the debts were beyond the 10-year statutory and regulatory limitations for offset. GAO's analysis also showed that relatively few debts in cross-servicing were being referred to the Department of Justice for more aggressive enforced collection action. This analysis further showed that FMS continues to have problems with debt compromises and the reporting of a key cross-servicing performance measure. Finally, neither FMS nor OMB monitored or reported the extent to which federal agencies governmentwide were closing out all eligible uncollectible debts and reporting those amounts to IRS as income to debtors. |
gao_GAO-09-537 | gao_GAO-09-537_0 | Hemodialysis conducted in a facility typically consists of three dialysis treatments per week. Selected Dialysis Providers Reported Wide Variation in the Costs of Providing Dialysis at Home Compared to Facility Dialysis
The self-reported cost information we obtained from the six dialysis providers indicated variation in the cost to provide home dialysis when compared with dialysis provided in a facility. The six dialysis providers reported lower costs per treatment to provide home dialysis than to provide dialysis at a facility, though the amount by which home dialysis costs were lower varied widely among the providers. Because patients who dialyze at home typically receive dialysis treatments more than three times per week, some providers’ costs to provide home dialysis on a weekly basis can be higher than their costs to provide dialysis at a facility. Additionally, several dialysis providers indicated that, for home dialysis patients, the costs of a dialysis treatment with a training session were significantly higher than the costs of a dialysis treatment without a training session. Some Dialysis Providers Reported Higher Costs per Week for Home Dialysis Compared to Dialysis Provided in a Facility, While Other Dialysis Providers Reported Lower Costs per Week for Home Dialysis
All six dialysis providers in our review reported lower average costs per treatment for home dialysis when compared to dialysis provided in a facility; however, some dialysis providers reported higher costs per week for home dialysis compared with dialysis provided in a facility, while others reported lower costs per week for home dialysis. CMS Is Considering Factoring Current Home Dialysis Costs into the Expanded Bundled Payment, but Concerns Have Been Raised That Home Dialysis May Not Be Encouraged as CMS Expects
At the time of our review CMS officials indicated that they are considering factoring the costs of home dialysis treatments and training into the expanded bundled payment, but the details for the expanded bundled payment are still under development. CMS officials told us that the expanded bundled payment could create incentives for providers to offer home dialysis instead of dialysis in a facility, because although some costs associated with home dialysis may be higher for providers, other efficiencies will offset those costs. However, concerns have been raised that the way in which the expanded bundled payment may account for home dialysis costs might not encourage providers to offer home dialysis, as CMS expects. CMS officials indicated that it intends to assess the effect of the expanded bundled payment on home dialysis utilization rates, but CMS has not established formal plans to monitor this utilization. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which the costs of home dialysis differ from the costs of dialysis provided in a facility, and (2) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) plans to account for home dialysis costs in the expanded bundled payment for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) services. To meet our objectives, we conducted interviews with representatives from 12 dialysis providers—including large chain providers, small nonprofit providers, and a hospital-based provider. We also used the cost information reported to us to calculate the providers’ weekly costs for providing home dialysis and dialysis in a facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare covers dialysis--a process that removes excess fluids and toxins from the bloodstream--for most individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), a condition of permanent kidney failure. Most patients with ESRD receive dialysis in a facility, while some patients with ESRD are trained to self-perform dialysis in their homes. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency that administers the Medicare program--has taken steps to encourage home dialysis and is in the process of changing the way it pays for dialysis services. Effective 2011, CMS will pay for dialysis services using an expanded bundled payment. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 required GAO to report on the costs of home dialysis treatments and training. GAO examined (1) the extent to which the costs of home dialysis differ from the costs of dialysis received in a facility, and (2) CMS's plans to account for home dialysis costs in the expanded bundled payment. GAO obtained information from CMS, the U.S. Renal Data System, ESRD experts, and self-reported cost information from six dialysis providers.
What GAO Found
The self-reported cost information GAO obtained from dialysis providers--including a large chain provider, small nonprofit providers, and a hospital-based provider--indicated variation in the costs to provide home dialysis when compared with costs to provide dialysis in their facility. The six dialysis providers reported lower costs per treatment to provide home dialysis than to provide dialysis at a facility, though the amount by which home dialysis costs were lower varied widely among the providers. Because patients who dialyze at home typically receive dialysis treatments more than three times per week, some providers' costs to provide home dialysis on a weekly basis can be higher than their costs to provide dialysis at a facility. However, other dialysis providers reported lower costs per week to provide home dialysis compared with dialysis provided in a facility. Additionally, several dialysis providers indicated that, for home dialysis patients, the costs of a dialysis treatment with a training session were significantly higher than the costs of a dialysis treatment without a training session. At the time of GAO's review CMS officials said they are considering factoring the costs of home dialysis treatments and training into the expanded bundled payment, but the details for the expanded bundled payment are still under development and subject to change. CMS officials told GAO that the expanded bundled payment would create incentives for providers to offer home dialysis instead of dialysis at a facility, because although some costs associated with home dialysis may be higher for providers, other efficiencies will offset those costs. For example, although supply costs may be higher for home dialysis, other costs of providing home dialysis--such as drugs, staff, and overhead--will be lower, and thus, in CMS's view, will encourage providers to offer home dialysis. However, concerns have been raised that the way that CMS is considering accounting for the costs of home dialysis in the expanded bundled payment might not encourage providers to offer home dialysis, as CMS expects. For example, some dialysis providers raised concerns that because home dialysis generally consists of more than three dialysis treatments per week--which may result in higher weekly costs to provide home dialysis compared with dialysis received in a facility--providers may not be encouraged to offer home dialysis. CMS officials indicated that CMS intends to assess the effect of the expanded bundled payment on home dialysis utilization rates, but CMS has not established formal plans to monitor this effect. |
gao_GAO-09-657 | gao_GAO-09-657_0 | Although local, state, and federal governments have invested billions in wastewater infrastructure over the years, studies by EPA and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggest a potential gap exists between what is currently being spent on wastewater infrastructure and estimated future infrastructure needs. Stakeholders Identified Three Key Issues That Would Need to Be Addressed in Designing and Establishing a Clean Water Trust Fund
Three main issues would need to be addressed in designing and establishing a clean water trust fund, according to stakeholders. These issues include: how a trust fund should be administered and used; what type of financial assistance should be provided for projects; and what activities should be eligible for funding. Administration and use of a trust fund. A majority of stakeholders (15 of 20) responding to our questionnaire expressed the view that a trust fund should be administered through an EPA-state partnership like the current CWSRF program. About a third of stakeholders (7 of the 20) expressed the view that a trust fund should be used only to fund the existing CWSRF. Twenty-five percent of questionnaire respondents (5 of 20) supported using a trust fund to both fund the CWSRF and establish a separate and distinct program. Type of financial assistance. Only 2 stakeholders responded that a trust fund should be used to support operations and maintenance for wastewater utilities. Various Options for Funding a Clean Water Trust Fund Could Generate a Range of Revenues, but Each Option Poses Certain Obstacles
Although a variety of options have been proposed in the past to generate revenue for a clean water trust fund, generating $10 billion from any one of these alone may be difficult. In addition, each funding option poses various implementation challenges, including defining the products or activities to be taxed, establishing a collection and enforcement framework, and obtaining stakeholder support. A Variety of Options Are Available That Could Generate a Range of Revenue to Support a Trust Fund
Various funding options, including excise taxes on products that may contribute to the wastewater stream, an additional tax on corporate income, a water use tax, and an industrial discharge tax, could generate a range of revenues for a clean water trust fund. Increasing the current corporate income tax by levying an additional 0.1 percent on the $1.4 trillion in corporate taxable income reported in 2006, after adjusting for inflation, could raise about $1.4 billion annually. For a volume-based charge, levying a tax of 0.01 cent per gallon on the 13.4 trillion gallons of water that were delivered to domestic, commercial, and industrial users from public supplies in 2000 could raise $1.3 billion annually, while a tax of about 0.1 cent per gallon could raise about $13 billion annually. Each Funding Option Poses Certain Implementation Challenges
Implementing any of the funding options discussed above poses a variety of challenges, including defining the products or activities to be taxed and establishing a collection and enforcement framework, according to interviews we had with agency officials and other stakeholders. This questionnaire asked for their views on how a clean water trust fund should be administered, the types of activities it should fund, and how funding should be distributed. We received responses from 22 of these stakeholders. To identify and describe potential options for funding a clean water trust fund that could generate $10 billion annually, we reviewed past legislative proposals and position papers from wastewater industry groups that discussed specific funding options for such a fund. Appendix III: Stakeholders Responding to Questionnaire on a National Clean Water Trust Fund
The following stakeholders responded to our questionnaire regarding the issues that need to be addressed in designing and establishing a national clean water trust fund as well as potential funding options that could be used for this fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated that a potential gap between future needs and current spending for wastewater infrastructure of $150 billion to $400 billion could occur over the next decade. A number of entities are involved in planning, financing, building, and operating this infrastructure. Some of these stakeholders have suggested a variety of approaches to bridge this potential gap. One such proposal is to establish a clean water trust fund. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) obtain stakeholders' views on the issues that would need to be addressed in designing and establishing a clean water trust fund and (2) identify and describe potential options that could generate about $10 billion in revenue to support a clean water trust fund. In conducting this review, GAO administered a questionnaire to 28 national organizations representing the wastewater and drinking water industries, state and local governments, engineers, and environmental groups and received 22 responses; reviewed proposals and industry papers; interviewed federal, state, local, and industry officials; and used the most current data available to estimate the revenue that could potentially be raised by various taxes on a range of products and activities. GAO is not making any recommendations. While this report identifies a number of funding options, GAO is not endorsing any option and does not have a position on whether or not a trust fund should be established.
What GAO Found
In designing and establishing a clean water trust fund, stakeholders identified three main issues that would need to be addressed: how a trust fund should be administered and used; what type of financial assistance should be provided; and what activities should be eligible to receive funding from a trust fund. While a majority of stakeholders said that a trust fund should be administered through an EPA partnership with the states, they differed in their views on how a trust fund should be used. About a third of stakeholders responded that a trust fund should be used only to fund the existing Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), which is currently funded primarily through federal appropriations, while a few said it should support only a new and separate wastewater program. A few stakeholders supported using a trust fund to support both the CWSRF and a separate program, while others did not support the establishment of a trust fund at all. In addition, more than half of the stakeholders responded that financial assistance should be distributed using a combination of loans and grants to address the needs of different localities. Finally, although a variety of activities could be funded, most stakeholders identified capital projects as the primary activity that should receive funding from a clean water trust fund. A number of options have been proposed in the past to generate revenue for a clean water trust fund, but several obstacles will have to be overcome in implementing these options, and it may be difficult to generate $10 billion from any one option by itself. Funding options include a variety of excise taxes. In addition, Congress could levy a tax on corporate income. An additional 0.1 percent corporate income tax could raise about $1.4 billion annually. Congress also could levy a water use tax. A tax of 0.01 cent per gallon could raise about $1.3 billion annually. Regardless of the options selected, certain implementation obstacles will have to be overcome. These include defining the products or activities to be taxed, establishing a collection and enforcement framework, and obtaining stakeholder support for a particular option or mix of options. |
gao_GGD-96-91 | gao_GGD-96-91_0 | We also collected information on the number of returns filed and the number of returns audited each year by IRS’ regions and by the district offices within those regions. Trends in IRS’ Audit Rates
Between fiscal years 1988 and 1993, IRS’ audit rate for individuals decreased from 1.57 percent to 0.92 percent. During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the audit rate increased, reaching 1.67 percent by 1995. As shown in figure 2, two of these—returns selected because of DIF or potential tax shelters—declined by at least half, while the other two—returns involving potential nonfilers or unallowable items—at least tripled. As figure 3 shows, for fiscal year 1995 the rates tended to be highest in the western regions of the country and lowest in the middle regions. As figure 5 shows, from fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1994, additional taxes recommended per return (1) decreased among business individuals for the lowest-income group and increased for the highest-income group and (2) increased among nonbusiness individuals for the lowest-income group and decreased for the highest-income group. They basically agreed with the information presented in the report and provided additional explanations for some of the audit trends and results, such as (1) the downward trend in overall audit rates, as well as the rate for the highest-income nonbusiness individuals, from fiscal years 1988 to 1993; (2) the increases or decreases in additional taxes recommended for the highest-income business and nonbusiness individuals from fiscal years 1992 to 1994; (3) the decrease in additional taxes recommended for the lowest-income business individuals from fiscal years 1992 to 1994; and (4) the amount of additional tax recommended per direct hour for the highest-income individuals compared to that for the lowest-income individuals. Nonfilers
Audits initiated against known taxpayers who did not file a return with IRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) audits of individual taxpayers, focusing on: (1) IRS audit rates for individual returns; and (2) the overall results of IRS most recent audits of individual returns.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while the audit rate for individuals decreased between fiscal years (FY) 1988 and 1993 from 1.57 percent to .92 percent, it increased to 1.67 percent by FY 1995; (2) between FY 1992 and FY 1994, the number of audited computer-selected returns and returns with potential tax shelters declined by half, while the number of audited returns with potential nonfilers and returns with unallowable items tripled; (3) audit rates varied by region and district office; (4) between FY 1988 and FY 1995, audit rates were highest in the western region of the country and lowest in the central United States; (5) between FY 1988 and FY 1995, audit rates increased among those in the lowest-income group and decreased among those in the highest-income group; (6) audits of the highest-income group yielded the most recommended additional tax per return; and (7) between FY 1992 and 1994, additional taxes recommended for each direct audit hour increased for business individuals in the lowest and highest-income groups and nonbusiness individuals in the lowest-income group, and decreased for nonbusiness individuals in the highest-income group. |
gao_GAO-16-108 | gao_GAO-16-108_0 | Not All Selected Hospitals Tracked How They Used Revenues from Their Supplemental Payments, but Described Uses Included Uninsured Costs and Capital Purchases
Selected hospitals that received large UPL supplemental payments under state plans in three of four selected states did not account specifically for the use of revenue from these payments in their financial systems, as they were not required to do so. Officials from several hospitals described more than one purpose for which the UPL supplemental payments and resulting Medicaid surpluses were used. Hospital officials from seven of nine selected hospitals in these three states said they used the revenues from the large UPL supplemental payments they received in part to cover the costs of providing services to uninsured patients. For example, in 2009 this hospital had a Medicaid surplus of about $16 million. Selected Hospitals Receiving Large Medicaid Demonstration Supplemental Payments Were Required to Track Spending and Allowed to Use Payments for Purposes Such As Uninsured Costs
Under Medicaid demonstrations, states were approved to make Medicaid supplemental payments to hospitals for costs and activities not otherwise covered under Medicaid to promote Medicaid objectives, and hospitals were required to track how they used these payments. Further, the Florida demonstration allowed hospitals to include uncompensated care costs for underinsured individuals with private insurance as well as for the cost of operating poison control centers, costs that the state could not have covered without the demonstration. Hospitals in Texas receiving incentive payments for health care delivery system improvements under that state’s Medicaid demonstration were required to develop an implementation plan and report their progress in meeting designated milestones. Three Selected States Made Supplemental Payments Based on Ability of Hospitals or Local Governments to Finance the Payments; Federal Written Guidance On Appropriate Basis for Such Payments Is Lacking
The bulk of supplemental payments in three of four selected states we reviewed were distributed to hospitals based on the availability of funding from hospital or local government contributions toward the nonfederal share of the payments, rather than the volume of services each hospital provided. Three of Four Selected States Largely Based Their Supplemental Payments on the Availability of Local Financing Rather Than on Medicaid Services Provided
Our review of state documentation shows that in three of four selected states—New Mexico, Texas, and Florida—the bulk of the supplemental payments to hospitals were made contingent on these hospitals or the relevant local governments providing funds to finance the nonfederal share of the payments the hospitals received, rather than Medicaid services they provided. In 2009, about $2.3 billion in supplemental payments was distributed under these three programs. In 2012, among Texas hospitals that had uncompensated Medicaid and uninsured costs and were eligible to receive a demonstration supplemental payment for uncompensated care, the extent to which the hospitals’ uncompensated care costs were covered by the payments varied widely based on the availability of local funding, from 0 percent for the 7 hospitals that were otherwise eligible but did not receive a payment, to more than 100 percent for 44 other hospitals, based on data provided by the state. The absence of written guidance to states is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control. In addition to internal communications, management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders who may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. The lack of guidance may result in inconsistent application of CMS’s policy among states with overpayments to some providers and underpayments to others due to the unavailability of local funding. Conclusions
Under broad federal requirements, Medicaid payments are to be made for Medicaid-covered services delivered to Medicaid beneficiaries and should be economical and efficient and sufficient to ensure beneficiaries’ access to care. This can be partly attributed to the fact that CMS has not issued guidance to clearly articulate its policy for states on how they should be distributing supplemental payments or that payments should not be contingent on the availability of financing for the nonfederal share. As a result, CMS cannot ensure that states’ payments are based on the provision of Medicaid services or for demonstration purposes, and not based on the availability of provider and local government financing. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote consistency in the distribution of supplemental payments among states and with CMS policy, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: (1) issue written guidance clarifying its policy that requires a link between the distribution of supplemental payments and the provision of Medicaid-covered services, and (2) issue written guidance clarifying its policy that payments should not be made contingent on the availability of local funding. In its comments, HHS concurred with the first recommendation and agreed with our concerns regarding the second recommendation. GAO-12-694. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, GAO reported that 505 hospitals received Medicaid payments that resulted in Medicaid payment surpluses—that is, payments that exceeded the costs of providing services—of about $2.7 billion. These surpluses were due in part to the lump-sum supplemental payments hospitals received that were above their regular payments for individual services. States made them under broad Medicaid payment authorities that allow federal matching on payments up to an upper payment limit or under Medicaid demonstrations. These types of supplemental payments are authorized, but not required, by law.
GAO was asked to examine how hospitals used revenues from large supplemental payments and the states' basis for distributing the payments. For four selected states making large payments and 12 hospitals receiving them, GAO examined (1) how these hospitals used revenues from the payments and (2) the basis on which the states distributed the payments. GAO reviewed documents authorizing payments and interviewed hospital, state and federal officials. GAO also obtained payment data for 2009, the year hospitals were identified as having large payments, and for 2012, the most recent year available.
What GAO Found
Not all selected hospitals in the four states GAO reviewed tracked their use of revenues from the large supplemental payments they received and tracking of revenues is generally not required. Based on information obtained from hospital officials and a review of demonstration approval documents, GAO determined that the revenues were used for a broad range of purposes. For example,
Officials from nine selected hospitals that received large supplemental payments under three states' traditional state Medicaid programs reported using revenues—which resulted in average surpluses of about $39 million—to cover the costs of uninsured patients as well as funding general hospital operations, maintenance, and capital purchases, such as a helicopter.
Hospitals in two selected states that GAO reviewed that were approved to make supplemental payments under Medicaid demonstrations were subject to certain tracking requirements to ensure payment revenues were used for approved demonstration purposes. Documentation for one state showed that approved uses of revenues included hospitals' uncompensated costs of serving underinsured or uninsured individuals and operating poison control centers. In the other state, which moved during the study timeframe from making supplemental payments under a traditional Medicaid program to under a demonstration, payments were allowed for purposes such as incentivizing health care delivery system improvements and for uncompensated costs for physician and clinic services, and drugs.
Three selected states distributed Medicaid supplemental payments largely based on the availability of local government funds to finance the nonfederal share of the payments, rather than on the services the hospitals provided. Medicaid payments should be made for Medicaid services or, if under demonstrations, for demonstration purposes and be economical and efficient. GAO found that three states made supplemental payments based on the ability of hospitals, or their local governments, to finance the nonfederal share. Consequently, hospitals otherwise eligible for payments but whose local government could not finance them did not receive them. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, communicated in writing to one state two key principles regarding payment distribution: (1) payments should be distributed based on Medicaid or demonstration purposes, and (2) payments should not be made based on the availability of local financing. However, CMS has not provided written guidance to articulate or broadly communicate these requirements to all states. Federal internal controls standards stress the need for effective communications with external stakeholders that have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. The absence of written guidance may result in inconsistent application of CMS's policies among states, the distribution of supplemental payments that are counter to the agency's policies and not aligned with the program's purposes, and the potential for states to overpay or underpay providers depending on the availability of local government financing.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with the first recommendation and agreed with GAO's concerns regarding the second recommendation but did not explicitly concur with it.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS issue written guidance clarifying its policies that (1) supplemental payments should be linked to the provision of Medicaid services and (2) payments should not be contingent on the availability of local financing. |
gao_GAO-08-432 | gao_GAO-08-432_0 | The grant agreement stipulates the terms and conditions for the use of grant funds such as the period of time funds are available for the grantee’s use, as noted by a start and end date. The Payment Management System (PMS), operated by HHS, went online in 1984 and, as of 2006, was the largest of the nine civilian federal payment systems. Closeout procedures ensure that grantees have met all financial requirements, provided their final reports, and returned any unexpended balances. In this report, we refer to grants that were not closed after their end date as “expired” grants and PMS grant accounts that remained open after the grant’s end date as “expired grant accounts.”
PMS issues a quarterly report to its customers, referred to as the “closeout report,” listing expired grant accounts that remain open, and for each account includes data on the funds made available and the amount of funds disbursed (i.e., “drawn down” or “charged”). Undisbursed Balances in Expired Grant Accounts in PMS Were about $1 Billion during 2006
In our review of the closeout data for expired grants that executed payments through HHS’s PMS, we found the quarterly amount of undisbursed funding reported as remaining in expired grant accounts increased from about $600 million in 2003 to about $1 billion during 2006. These balances typically represented about 1 percent of the total funds made available for all expired grants in PMS during this period. Lastly, we found that over 325 different programs administered the expired grant accounts with undisbursed funding and that thousands of grantees were associated with these grants. We also found that, when taken together, they suggested the presence of undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts was a long-standing problem. In recent years, three federal agencies, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs (OJP), HHS’s National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have made concerted efforts to improve their grant closeout processes. They generally attributed the problems to inadequacies in awarding agencies’ grant management processes, including closeouts as a low management priority, inconsistent closeout procedures, poorly timed communications with grantees, or insufficient compliance or enforcement. By elevating this issue as a management priority in their annual performance plans and PARs, the three agencies made grant closeouts a priority for improving program and agency-wide performance. However, OMB circulars relating to grants management and performance reporting do not currently instruct federal agencies to track and annually report on undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director, OMB, instruct all executive departments and independent agencies to take the following two actions: (1) annually track the amount of undisbursed grant funding remaining in expired grant accounts; and (2) report on the status and resolution of the undisbursed funding in their annual performance plan and report in their annual PAR on the amount of undisbursed grant funding in expired grant accounts, why these funds were undisbursed, the actions taken to resolve the undisbursed funding and close the expired grants and related accounts, and outcomes associated with these actions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Information on Program Characteristics
Our objectives were to address the following: (1) to what extent are there undisbursed grant balances in expired grant accounts and do they share any program characteristics? ; and (2) do these expired grants share grant management challenges and what actions have federal agencies taken to improve grant closeout and diminish undisbursed balances? Review of Relevant OMB Circulars and Federal Regulations
We began our study by reviewing the key federal guidelines on grant closeouts: Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars No. PMS is the largest of the nine civilian federal payment systems and executes payments for nine federal departments, one independent agency, a government corporation and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which, in 2006, represented about 70 percent of all federal grant disbursements. Most of our analysis focused on those expired accounts with undisbursed balances. We were not able to compare these results to all closed federal grants or all closed grants in PMS due to the burden of collecting comparable data for all closed federal grants from the eight other federal civilian payments systems or for all closed grants from PMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the subcommittee concluded there was a need for increased accountability and transparency for unspent funds in federal programs and agencies, and requested GAO review the status of balances not drawn down by grantees by the time the grants' period of availability had ended. GAO was asked to answer these questions: (1) to what extent are there undisbursed grant balances in expired grant accounts and do they share any program characteristics?; and (2) do these expired grants share grant management challenges and how have federal agencies improved grant closeout and diminished undisbursed balances? To do this, GAO analyzed grant balance data from the largest federal grant payment system; reviewed grant management problems and corrective actions from more than 150 audit reports; and reviewed guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Code of Federal Regulations.
What GAO Found
During calendar year 2006, about $1 billion in undisbursed funding remained in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian payment system for grants--the Payment Management System (PMS). PMS is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services and makes payments for about 70 percent of grants and for 12 federal entities. Undisbursed funding is funding the federal government has obligated through a grant agreement, but which the grantee has not entirely spent. Among all of the expired grant accounts in PMS that remained open, these undisbursed funds typically represented about 1 percent of the total funds originally made available for these grants--meaning grantees had spent most of their available funds. However, when expired grant accounts with no funds remaining were excluded and the focus was narrowed to just expired grant accounts with undisbursed balances, GAO found the amount of undisbursed funding represented, on average, about 26 percent of the original funding made available. The expired but still open grant accounts were associated with thousands of grantees and over 325 different federal programs. GAO also found that expired grant accounts with the largest undisbursed balances in PMS for calendar years 2003 through 2006 shared a few common program characteristics. However, the results could not be compared to program characteristics for all closed federal grants or all closed grants using PMS, during this period, due to the burden of collecting comparable data for all closed federal grants from eight other federal civilian payments systems or for all closed grants from PMS. Past audits of federal agencies by GAO and Inspectors General and annual performance reports by at least 8 federal agencies in 2006 and 2007 suggested that grant management challenges including grant closeouts and undisbursed balances are a long-standing problem. Closeout procedures ensure grantees have met all financial requirements, provided final reports, and that unused funds are deobligated. The audits generally attributed the problems to inadequacies in awarding agencies' grant management processes, including closeouts as a low management priority, inconsistent closeout procedures, poorly timed communications with grantees, or insufficient compliance or enforcement. However, when federal agencies, such as the Departments of Health and Human Services and Justice, and the Environmental Protection Agency, took corrective actions, there were improvements in grant closeouts and resolution of undisbursed funding. The actions taken by these three agencies generally focused on making grant closeouts a higher agency management priority, as noted in their recent performance reports, and on improving overall closeout processing. Using federal payment systems to track undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts and including the status of grant closeouts in annual performance reports could raise the visibility of the problem both within the agency and governmentwide, and lead to improvements in grant closeouts and minimize undisbursed balances. OMB circulars do not currently require federal agencies to track and report on undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts. |
gao_GAO-02-580T | gao_GAO-02-580T_0 | With respect to that part of the budget request for information technology, IRS (1) did not adequately support the $1.63 billion requested for operation and maintenance of its information systems but (2) did adequately support its $450 million request for business systems modernization. These include (1) labor and nonlabor savings of 2,287 staff years and $157.5 million from various improvement projects and workload decreases that IRS plans to use elsewhere in the organization, and (2) additional savings of $38.5 million resulting from better business practices that have not yet been identified. In some respects, IRS’s congressional justification has good links between the resources being requested and IRS’s performance goals. Interim Results of IRS’s 2002 Filing Season Show Impact of the Rate Reduction Credit
So far this filing season, IRS has processed returns smoothly with one major exception, seen continued growth in electronic filing, and achieved some improvements in telephone service. The one exception to smooth processing has been the large number of errors taxpayers are making related to the rate reduction credit. While IRS has measures that provide useful information on some aspects of its service and is making efforts to improve its performance measures, some measures of telephone service are constructed in a way that misses important aspects of the activity being measured and IRS has delayed implementation of some accuracy measures for services provided at walk- in offices. IRS had planned to begin measuring the accuracy of account and return-preparation assistance in January 2002, but those plans have been delayed until June. One question and a related scenario was developed from each of four tax law categories that most prompted taxpayers to call IRS’s toll-free assistance lines in fiscal year 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) fiscal year 2003 budget request for the 2002 tax filing season.
What GAO Found
GAO found that IRS's plans for hiring and redirecting staff may be optimistic because budgets are prepared so far in advance of the fiscal year involved. IRS assumed (1) labor and nonlabor savings of 2,287 staff years and $157.5 million and (2) additional savings of $38.5 million from better business practices. IRS's justification does not always adequately link the resources being requested and the agency's performance goals. Although IRS provided adequate support to justify the $450 million request for its multiyear capital account for business systems modernization, it did not adequately support $1.63 billion of the $1.68 billion requested for its information systems. In the area of agency performance, GAO found that IRS has generally processed returns smoothly and seen continued growth in electronic filing. The one exception to smooth processing has been the large number of errors related to the rate reduction credit. IRS has had to correct millions of returns due to the credit, and taxpayers' call about the credit have greatly increased the demand on IRS's toll-free assistance lines. IRS's performance measures provide useful information to assess its success in assisting taxpayers. However, some measures of telephone service miss important aspects of the activity being measured, and plans to begin measuring some important aspects of IRS's walk-in service have been delayed. |
gao_NSIAD-97-172 | gao_NSIAD-97-172_0 | Furthermore, the Air Force’s projected attrition rates were not consistent with historical attrition experience with its existing primary trainer, and the Navy used a rate that differs from the rate that DOD now says is accurate. Until these inconsistencies are resolved, it is unclear how many JPATS aircraft should be procured. For example, the Navy’s calculations in 1996 used an attrition rate of 1.5 aircraft per 100,000 flight hours to calculate the required quantity of JPATS aircraft. According to the procurement plan, 18 aircraft are to be procured during fiscal year 1998 and 12 aircraft during fiscal year 1999, resulting in a total of 30 aircraft. For example, as shown in table 3, 30 aircraft can be procured more economically if 16, rather than 18, aircraft are procured in fiscal year 1998 and 14, rather than 12, aircraft are procured in fiscal year 1999. JPATS Aircraft Is Expected to Meet Female Cockpit Accommodation Requirement
The JPATS cockpit is expected to meet DOD’s requirement that it accommodate at least 80 percent of the eligible female pilot population. JPATS program officials estimate that the planned cockpit dimensions will accommodate approximately 97 percent of the eligible female population anthropometrically. The minimum design weight of the JPATS ejection seat (116 pounds) will accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female population. Because concerns have been raised about the ability of JPATS aircraft to accommodate female pilots, Congress directed DOD to conduct studies to determine the appropriate percentage of male and female pilots that could be accommodated in the cockpit. Furthermore, DOD’s schedule for procuring the aircraft does not take advantage of the most economical approach that would allow it to save money and permit more time for operational testing. We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine the appropriate attrition rates and mission capable rates to calculate JPATS requirements, taking into account the planned improvements in JPATS safety, reliability, and maintainability, and recalculate the requirements as appropriate and direct the Air Force to revise the JPATS procurement plan to take better advantage of price advantages in the contract, and upon successful completion of operational test and evaluation, acquire JPATS aircraft at the most economical target quantity unit prices provided by the contract. Scope and Methodology
To review service calculations of JPATS requirements, DOD’s procurement schedule for the aircraft, and efforts to design the JPATS cockpit to accommodate female pilots, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and reviewed relevant documentation at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington D.C.; the Training Systems Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Force Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; the Navy Chief of Naval Air Training Office, Corpus Christi, Texas; and the Raytheon Aircraft Company, Wichita, Kansas. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed: (1) the Air Force's and Navy's calculations of the quantity of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft needed to meet training requirements; (2) the impact of the Department of Defense's (DOD) procurement schedule on the aircraft's unit price; and (3) service efforts to design the JPATS cockpit to accommodate female pilots.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force and the Navy used inconsistent data to calculate the number of JPATS aircraft required for primary pilot training; (2) the Air Force used an attrition rate that was twice as high as the historical attrition rate for its existing primary trainer and the Navy used an attrition rate that differs from the rate that DOD now cites as accurate; (3) until inconsistencies in the mission capable rates and attrition rates are resolved, it is unclear how many JPATS aircraft should be procured; (4) DOD's procurement plan for acquiring JPATS aircraft does not take full advantage of the most favorable prices available in the contract; (5) for example, the plan schedules 18 aircraft to be procured during fiscal year (FY) 1998 and 12 aircraft during FY 1999, a total of 30 aircraft; (6) however, GAO found that these 30 aircraft could be procured more economically if 16 rather than 18 aircraft are procured in FY 1998 and 14 rather than 12 aircraft are procured in FY 1999; (7) this approach would save $1.36 million over the 2 fiscal years and permit more operational testing and evaluation to be completed; (8) furthermore, the procurement plan does not schedule a sufficient number of JPATS aircraft for procurement in fiscal year 2000 to achieve lower prices that are available under the terms of the contract; (9) because concerns had been raised about the ability of JPATS aircraft to accommodate female pilots, Congress directed DOD to study and determine the appropriate percentage of the female pilot population that the aircraft should physically accommodate; (10) based on its studies, DOD established the requirement that the JPATS aircraft be able to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female pilot population; (11) pilot size determines the percentage of pilots that can be accommodated in the JPATS cockpit; (12) planned cockpit dimensions are expected to accommodate about 97 percent of the eligible female pilot population; and (13) to permit safe ejection from the aircraft, the ejection seat minimum pilot weight is 116 pounds, which is expected to accommodate 80 percent of the eligible female pilot population. |
gao_GAO-02-501T | gao_GAO-02-501T_0 | In addition to establishing federal participation rate requirements, PRWORA specified that the required rates are to be reduced if a state’s TANF caseload declines. Since the implementation of welfare reform, states have experienced strong economic growth and welfare caseloads have declined dramatically, from 4.4 million in August 1996 to 2.1 million as of September 2001, marking a 52 percent decline in the number of families receiving cash welfare. However, once the caseload reduction credit is taken into account, the target rates can be greatly reduced. Twenty-two states exclude working families from time limits, either through the federal 20 percent extension or by using state-only funds. While States Had Excluded 11 Percent of Families with Adults from Time Limits as of Fall 2001, This Percentage May Increase as More Families Reach Their Time Limits
States have excluded from time limits 11 percent of the approximately 1.4 million families with adults receiving federal- or state-funded cash assistance. States’ Experiences with TANF Highlight Issues for Reauthorization
States’ experiences with implementing TANF time limits and work requirements for families receiving cash assistance highlight key issues related to reauthorization of TANF provisions. | What GAO Found
One-third of the 2.1 million cases of cash assistance provided under federal or state welfare programs in the fall of 2001 went to children. Because no adults in these families received either Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or state maintenance-of-effort funds, work requirements and time limits did not apply. Welfare reform legislation passed in 1996 included a caseload reduction credit that reduces each state's mandated participation rate if its welfare caseload declines. Because of the dramatic declines in welfare caseloads since 1996, states have generally seen greatly reduced participation rates for TANF programs. After accounting for cases involving only children, states excluded 11 percent of the remaining 1.4 million families with an adult from federal or state time limits. States' experiences with work requirements and time limits highlight key issues Congress may wish to consider when reauthorizing TANF provisions, including the relatively few families who have reached their time limit so far and the future adequacy of the federal 20-percent extension. |
gao_GAO-07-224 | gao_GAO-07-224_0 | Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with Future Accessions
The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned officers; but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough officers to meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to address these challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force generally met their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in 2005. The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. For example, Navy ROTC met its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001 and FY 2003. While all the services are contributing forces to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is providing most of the forces for these operations. The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its ROTC program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS accessions. Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions; however, its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. While ROTC and OCS both report to the same overall authority, they do not formally coordinate with one another or with USMA. Without such an alternative, given the decentralized management of the officer accession programs, and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army’s ability to meet future mission requirements is uncertain. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post- Cold War reduction in both force size and officer accessions. Without a plan to address both its accession and retention challenges, the Army will not have the information and tools it needs to effectively and efficiently improve its retention of officers in both the near term and beyond. Other Services Generally Met Their Past Retention Needs but Will Face Certain Retention Challenges in the Future
The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs and had higher continuation rates from their major accession programs than did the Army. Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational specialties. Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. Since at least 63 percent of Army’s current ROTC officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship, officials said that increasing the language requirement could make it more difficult to reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of having 80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language proficiency. Service officials recognize the impediments to foreign language training and are developing plans to implement DOD’s initiatives. Conclusions
While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge. DOD agreed that the Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and projected officer accessions and retention. Also, we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and future years. To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers and types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service- specific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive understanding of officer retention. Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools. | Why GAO Did This Study
Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.
What GAO Found
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement DOD's foreign language objectives. |
gao_GAO-04-704 | gao_GAO-04-704_0 | Search and rescue has traditionally been the stations’ top priority. The OIG found that the Coast Guard generally complied with the intent of the earmark but also concluded that improving operational readiness at stations would require a substantial and sustained investment. However, through a combination of data runs and unit surveys performed at our request, the Coast Guard was able to estimate staffing and personnel retention expenditures, and develop actual expenditure data for personal protection equipment (PPE). Using fiscal year 2002 data derived through similar analyses, we determined that estimated station expenditures for fiscal year 2003 exceeded fiscal year 2002 levels by at least $20.5 million—or $4.8 million more than the $15.7 million earmarked appropriation. Better Accountability of Expenditures Is Needed to Ensure That Earmarks Are Appropriately Spent
The Coast Guard did not have adequate processes in place to sufficiently account for the expenditure of the entire $15.7 million earmarked fiscal year 2003 appropriation or to provide assurance that these earmarked funds were used appropriately, as set forth by federal management and internal control guidelines. The purpose of an earmark is to direct an agency to spend a certain amount of its appropriated funds for a specific purpose. The plan, although useful as an indicator of the Coast Guard’s intentions, is not sufficient to show that the Coast Guard had expended the earmarked appropriation as directed. Conclusions
On the basis of available data and other information, the Coast Guard appears to have met the Congress’s requirement to spend at least $15.7 million more on multimission stations in fiscal year 2003 than in fiscal year 2002. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to congressional oversight and to provide greater assurance that earmarked funds are used appropriately, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop, in accordance with the fiscal year 2004 departmental guidelines, processes to accurately and completely account for the obligation and expenditure of earmarked appropriations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We used a variety of approaches in our work to determine the amount of the general appropriation the Coast Guard expended on multimission stations in fiscal year 2003 across the four areas covered by the earmark— staffing, personal protection equipment (PPE), personnel retention and training—and whether this amount exceeded by $15.7 million the level of effort expended in fiscal year 2002. Coast Guard officials provided data for three of the four categories. Staffing
The Coast Guard could not provide us with the actual amount of fiscal year 2003 appropriation funds spent on station staffing because the agency’s automated databases do not fully identify personnel expenditures at the station level. Personal Protection Equipment
According to the Coast Guard, the agency estimates it spent approximately $5 million more for PPE than it planned to spend during fiscal year 2002. However, some information indicates that levels of effort expended on training station personnel increased in fiscal year 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard conducts homeland security and search and rescue operations from nearly 200 shoreside stations along the nation's coasts and waterways. After several rescue mishaps that resulted in the deaths of civilians and station personnel, Congress recognized a need to improve performance at stations and appropriated additional funds to increase stations' readiness levels. For fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard received designated funds of $15.7 million specifically to increase spending for stations' staffing, personal protection equipment (such as life vests and cold weather protection suits), personnel retention, and training needs. Congress directed GAO to determine if the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2003 outlays for stations increased by this amount over fiscal year 2002 expenditure levels. GAO also assessed the adequacy of the processes used by the Coast Guard to account for the expenditure of designated funds.
What GAO Found
According to our analyses of available data, and anecdotal and other information, it appears that the Coast Guard spent at least $15.7 million more to improve readiness at its multimission stations in fiscal year 2003 than it did the previous year. However, this statement cannot be made with certainty, because the Coast Guard's databases do not fully identify expenditures at the station level. GAO worked with the Coast Guard to develop expenditure estimates for the stations, using budget plans and available expenditure data, and this effort produced full or partial estimates for three of the four categories--staffing, personal protection equipment, and personnel retention efforts. For these three categories, fiscal year 2003 expenditure estimates were at least $20.5 million more than the previous year, or about $4.8 million more than the $15.7 million designated appropriation. Although estimates could not be developed for training expenditures, other available information indicates that training levels increased in fiscal year 2003. Taken together, these results suggest that the Coast Guard complied with Congress' direction to increase spending for stations by $15.7 million. Federal management guidelines and internal control standards call for greater accountability for designated--earmarked--appropriations than was provided by the processes the Coast Guard had in place to track these funds. The purpose of an earmark is to ensure agencies spend a certain amount of their appropriated funds for a specific purpose. Guidelines and standards indicate that agencies should account for the obligation and expenditure of earmarked appropriations--a step the Coast Guard thoroughly implemented only for personal protection equipment. Coast Guard officials developed a plan showing how they planned to spend the earmark, but such a plan, while useful as an indication of an agency's intentions, is not sufficient to show that the earmark was expended in accordance with congressional direction. |
gao_RCED-98-136 | gao_RCED-98-136_0 | In addition, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. Reductions to Date Have Not Affected Most Farmers’ Positive Views of FSA’s Service
Despite recent office closings and staff reductions, most farmers continue to be very satisfied with the quality of service they have been receiving from USDA, according to a USDA survey and our discussions with farmers. As a result, FSA staff in these smaller offices will have less time to provide service to farmers than they did when county offices were staffed more fully. FSA officials recognize that additional staff reductions and office closings will reduce the level of personalized service to farmers and require them to accept greater responsibility for program requirements, including completing paperwork. At the same time, officials recognize that the 1996 act places more responsibility on farmers for planting and marketing decisions. In their comments, however, the officials noted that the services provided to farmers vary among the USDA programs. We were able to contact 60 of these farmers across the nation by telephone to obtain information on the quality of service in FSA county offices in 1997 compared with the quality of service in 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the impact of actual and proposed staff reductions and office closings by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) on the quality of service to farmers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FSA's staff reductions and office closures to date do not appear to have affected the quality of service provided to farmers; (2) according to the Department of Agriculture's 1997 customer survey and GAO's recent discussions with farmers and FSA officials, most farmers are highly satisfied with the service they receive from their local office of FSA; (3) farmers are still generally able to receive prompt service when they walk into their county office and have FSA staff complete most of their required paperwork; (4) if FSA's staffing continues to be reduced and county offices are closed, however, the traditional level of service provided to farmers is likely to decrease; and (5) among other things, farmers will be required to accept greater responsibility for program requirements, including completing paperwork; with less assistance from agency staff, however, this change is consistent with changes in the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, which reduces federal controls over production and places more responsibility on farmers for planting and marketing decisions. |
gao_GAO-16-446 | gao_GAO-16-446_0 | Federal Education Programs that Serve Young Children with Autism
Children with disabilities—including children with autism—can receive intervention services through IDEA, which is overseen at the federal level by Education. The limited coordination was particularly concerning given that we also found that 84 percent of the autism research projects funded by federal agencies from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 had the potential to be duplicative, because the projects were categorized to the same research objectives in the IACC strategic plan. Agencies Used a Variety of Mechanisms to Encourage Early Identification and Interventions
Agencies specifically solicited research on early autism identification and interventions, and funded research in this area as a result of these solicitations. Agencies Solicited and Funded Research on Early Autism Identification and Interventions
Through FOAs, four agencies—DOD, Education, NIH, and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), another HHS agency— solicited research proposals on early screening, diagnosis, and interventions for young children with autism from fiscal years 2012 through 2015. State and Federal Education and Health Care Programs Provide a Variety of Intervention Services to Young Children with Autism
Individualized intervention services are provided to young children with autism through IDEA early intervention and special education programs; additionally, the five states we examined and DOD have taken specific actions to help respond to the needs of children with autism that they serve. Children enrolled in federal health care programs— Medicaid, CHIP, or TRICARE—received a variety of intervention services through these programs. Young Children with Autism Enrolled in Selected States’ Medicaid or CHIP Programs, or TRICARE Received a Variety of Intervention Services
Medicaid and CHIP
Children enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP from our five selected states— Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Minnesota—received a variety of intervention services during fiscal year 2013. When services received are examined by age group, speech, language, and audiology services remain the most commonly received services; however, there is variation in the other categories of services received. HHS has recently taken actions required by the Autism CARES Act that could help coordinate federal autism research and implement our recommendations. First, as directed by the act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services designated an official to serve as the Autism Coordinator to oversee national autism research, services, and support activities and ensure that autism activities funded by HHS and other federal agencies are not unnecessarily duplicative. These data were made available in April 2016, while a draft of this report was at the department for comment. While we are not making additional recommendations, we believe that our 2013 recommendations remain valid, and that HHS’s continued fulfillment of the provisions in the Autism CARES Act could help the department implement our recommendations. In their comments on this report, Education and HHS disagreed that there was potential for duplication and questioned the basis of our analysis. We continue to believe that these methods are limited. At the time we began our review, these were the most recent fiscal years for which CMS’s and DOD’s data were available. We chose these five states based on the availability and reliability of their reported Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) data in MSIS. Appendix III: Selected Federal Health Expenditures for Intervention Services Provided to Children with Autism
We examined certain expenditures for the provision of intervention services to children ages 1 through 5 identified with autism and enrolled in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Medicaid program, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) TRICARE program. Federal Autism Activities: Better Data and More Coordination Needed to Help Avoid the Potential for Unnecessary Duplication. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research has shown that early intervention can greatly improve the development of a child with autism. Children with disabilities—including children with autism—can receive intervention services through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Low income children may also receive intervention services through Medicaid or CHIP, health care programs overseen at the federal level by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and administered by the states. Children of servicemembers may receive services through TRICARE, DOD's health care program.
GAO was asked to review federal autism efforts. This report describes (1) how federal agencies encourage early autism identification and interventions, and (2) the intervention services provided by federal education and health care programs. It also (3) examines steps taken by HHS and federal agencies to improve research coordination. GAO collected information on education programs in five states that were selected for size, activities, and variation in geographic location. GAO analyzed health care program data: fiscal year 2014 TRICARE data and fiscal year 2013 Medicaid and CHIP data—the most recent data available at the time of the review—from another five states selected based on the availability of reliable data. GAO also monitored the implementation of its 2013 recommendations to improve autism research coordination. Education and HHS provided comments on a draft of this report and disagreed that there is potential for unnecessary duplication. GAO continues to believe improved coordination is needed.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have taken various actions to encourage early autism identification and interventions, such as specifically soliciting research in these areas. From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015, the departments of Defense (DOD), Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS), awarded about $395 million for research on early identification and interventions for autism.
Federal programs provide a variety of intervention services to young children with autism. When examining the education programs administered by five states and DOD, GAO found that specific actions were taken to help respond to the individual intervention needs of children with autism. Children enrolled in federal health care programs—Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or TRICARE—received a variety of interventions. For example, GAO identified about 8,200 young children with autism in five states enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP and found that speech, language, and audiology services were the most common overall; however, the types of services commonly received varied, depending on the age of the child.
HHS has recently taken actions required by the Autism Collaboration, Accountability, Research, Education, and Support Act of 2014 (Autism CARES Act) that could help coordinate federal autism research and implement GAO's prior recommendations. For example, in April 2016, HHS designated an autism coordinator to oversee national autism research, services, and support activities. In 2013, GAO reported that there was limited coordination among agencies. This was especially concerning because GAO also found that 11 federal agencies funded autism research in the same areas—resulting in the potential for unnecessary duplication. At that time, GAO recommended that HHS improve the data it collects on autism research and that federal agencies develop methods to monitor and coordinate this research. GAO believes that HHS's continued fulfillment of certain provisions in the Autism CARES Act could help the department implement GAO's 2013 recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-609T | gao_GAO-06-609T_0 | The Fair Information Practices Are Widely Agreed to Be Key Principles for Privacy Protection
The Privacy Act of 1974 is largely based on a set of internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information known as the Fair Information Practices. Agencies Use Governmentwide Contracts to Obtain Personal Information from Information Resellers for a Variety of Purposes
The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, State, and the Social Security Administration reported approximately $30 million in contractual arrangements with information resellers in fiscal year 2005. The agencies reported using personal information obtained from resellers for a variety of purposes including law enforcement, counterterrorism, fraud detection/prevention, and debt collection. In all, approximately 91 percent of agency uses of reseller data were in the categories of law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). It collects data such as address and vehicle information for criminal investigations and background security checks. Resellers Take Steps to Protect Privacy, but These Measures Are Not Fully Consistent With the Fair Information Practices
Although the information resellers that do business with the federal agencies we reviewed have taken steps to protect privacy, these measures were not fully consistent with the Fair Information Practices. However, the information reseller industry presupposes that the collection and use of personal information is not limited to specific purposes, but instead can be made available to multiple customers for multiple purposes. However, while information resellers generally allow individuals limited access to their personal information, they generally limit the opportunity to correct or delete inaccurate information contained in reseller databases (relevant to the individual participation principle). Resellers do not make provisions to notify the individuals involved when they obtain personal data from their many sources, including public records. Resellers said they believe it is not appropriate or practical for them to provide notice or obtain consent from individuals because they do not collect information directly from them. Security safeguards. They used means such as company Web sites and brochures to inform the public of specific policies and practices regarding the collection and use of personal information. For example, resellers reported designating chief privacy officers to monitor compliance with internal privacy policies and applicable laws. Agencies Lack Policies on Use of Reseller Data, and Practices Do Not Consistently Reflect the Fair Information Practices
Agencies generally lacked policies that specifically address their use of personal information from commercial sources (although DHS Privacy Office officials have reported that they are drafting such a policy), and agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. This practice is consistent with the principle of data quality. Limitations in the Applicability of the Privacy Act and Ambiguities in OMB Guidance Contribute to an Uneven Adherence to the Purpose Specification, Openness, and Individual Participation Principles
The purpose specification, openness, and individual participation principles stipulate that individuals should be made aware of the purpose and intended uses of the personal information being collected about them, and, if necessary, have the ability to access and correct their information. Agencies Often Did Not Have Practices in Place to Ensure Accountability for Proper Handling of Information Reseller Data
According to the accountability principle, individuals controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for ensuring the implementation of the Fair Information Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies collect and use personal information for various purposes from information resellers--companies that amass and sell data from many sources. GAO was asked to testify on its report being issued today on agency use of reseller data. For that report, GAO was asked to determine how the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration use personal data from resellers and to review the extent to which information resellers' policies and practices reflect the Fair Information Practices, a set of widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal data. GAO also examined agencies' policies and practices for handling personal data from resellers to determine whether these reflect the Fair Information Practices.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2005, the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration reported that they used personal information obtained from resellers for a variety of purposes, including performing criminal investigations, locating witnesses and fugitives, researching assets held by individuals of interest, and detecting prescription drug fraud. The agencies spent approximately $30 million on contractual arrangements with resellers that enabled the acquisition and use of such information. About 91 percent of the planned fiscal year 2005 spending was for law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). The major information resellers that do business with the federal agencies GAO reviewed have practices in place to protect privacy, but these measures are not fully consistent with the Fair Information Practices. For example, the principles that the collection and use of personal information should be limited and its intended use specified are largely at odds with the nature of the information reseller business, which is based on obtaining personal information from many sources and making it available to multiple customers for multiple purposes. Resellers believe it is not appropriate for them to fully adhere to these principles because they do not obtain their information directly from individuals. Nonetheless, in many cases, resellers take steps that address aspects of the Fair Information Practices. For example, resellers reported that they have taken steps recently to improve their security safeguards, and they generally inform the public about key privacy principles and policies. However, resellers generally limit the extent to which individuals can gain access to personal information held about themselves, as well as the extent to which inaccurate information contained in their databases can be corrected or deleted. Agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. That is, for some of these principles, agency practices were uneven. For example, although agencies issued public notices when they systematically collected personal information, these notices did not always notify the public that information resellers were among the sources to be used. This practice is not consistent with the principle that individuals should be informed about privacy policies and the collection of information. Contributing to the uneven application of the Fair Information Practices are ambiguities in guidance from the Office of Management and Budget regarding the applicability of privacy requirements to federal agency uses of reseller information. In addition, agencies generally lack policies that specifically address these uses. |
gao_GAO-09-957 | gao_GAO-09-957_0 | Fraud, Waste, and Abuse of Controlled Substances in Medicaid Program in Selected States
We found tens of thousands of Medicaid beneficiaries and providers involved in potential fraudulent, wasteful, and abusive purchases of controlled substances through the Medicaid program in the selected states during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Tens of Thousands of Medicaid Beneficiaries Visit Multiple Medical Practitioners to Obtain Controlled Substances
Approximately 65,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in the five states investigated visited six or more doctors to acquire prescriptions for the same type of controlled substances in the selected states during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. These individuals incurred approximately $63 million in Medicaid costs for these drugs, which were painkillers, sedatives, and stimulants. In some cases, beneficiaries may have justifiable reasons for receiving prescriptions from multiple medical practitioners, such as visiting specialists or several doctors in the same medical group. In these situations, Medicaid beneficiaries were likely seeing several medical practitioners to support and disguise their addiction or to obtain drugs to fraudulently sell. First, the total we found does not include related costs associated with obtaining prescriptions, such as visits to the doctor’s office and emergency room. Controlled Substances Prescribed or Filled by Banned Providers
We found that 65 medical practitioners and pharmacies in the selected states had been barred from federal health care programs, excluded from these programs, or both, including Medicaid, when they wrote or filled Medicaid prescriptions for controlled substances during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition, our analysis also found that Medicaid paid about $500,000 in Medicaid claims based on controlled substance prescriptions “written” by over 1,200 doctors after they died. Examples of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse of Controlled Substances in Medicaid
In addition to performing the aggregate-level analysis discussed above, we also performed in-depth investigations for 25 cases of fraudulent, improper, and abusive actions related to the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances through the Medicaid program in the selected states. This included at least $2,870 for controlled substances that he received from the pharmacies. Improved Fraud Controls Could Better Prevent Abuse and Unnecessary Medicaid Program Expenditures
CMS Conducts Limited Oversight of Controlled Substances in Medicaid Program
Although states are primarily responsible for the fight against Medicaid fraud and abuse, CMS is responsible for overseeing state fraud and abuse control activities. We did not investigate these beneficiaries for fraud or abuse. In states with PDMPs, a state agency collects and maintains data relating to dispensed controlled substance prescriptions. Conclusions
Fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid exist in the five selected states. Recommendations for Executive Action
To establish an effective fraud prevention system for the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS evaluate our findings and consider issuing guidance to the state programs to provide assurance that claims processing systems prevent the processing of claims from providers and pharmacies debarred from federal contracts (i.e., on the EPLS), excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid programs (i.e., on the LEIE), or both; DUR and restricted recipient program requirements adequately identify and prevent doctor shopping and other abuses of controlled substances; effective claims processing system are in place to periodically identify both duplicate enrollments and deaths of Medicaid beneficiaries and to prevent the approval of claims when appropriate; and effective claims processing systems are in place to periodically identify deaths of Medicaid providers and prevent the approval of claims when appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
One significant cost to Medicaid is prescription drugs, which accounted for over $23 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2008, or about 7 percent of total Medicaid outlays. Many of these drugs are susceptible to abuse and include pain relievers and stimulants that are on the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Schedule of Controlled Substances. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the Medicaid program will receive about $87 billion in federal assistance based on a greater federal share of Medicaid spending. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether there are indications of fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid; (2) if so, examples of fraudulent, improper, and abusive activity; and (3) the effectiveness of internal controls that the federal government and selected states have in place to prevent fraud and abuse related to controlled substances. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed Medicaid controlled substance claims for fraud and abuse indications for FY 2006 and 2007 from five selected states. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and performed investigations.
What GAO Found
GAO found tens of thousands of Medicaid beneficiaries and providers involved in potential fraudulent purchases of controlled substances, abusive purchases of controlled substances, or both through the Medicaid program in California, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and Texas. About 65,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in the five selected states acquired the same type of controlled substances from six or more different medical practitioners during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 with the majority of beneficiaries visiting from 6 to 10 medical practitioners. Such activities, known as doctor shopping, resulted in about $63 million in Medicaid payments and do not include medical costs (e.g., office visits) related to getting the prescriptions. In some cases, beneficiaries may have justifiable reasons for receiving prescriptions from multiple medical practitioners, such as visiting specialists or several doctors in the same medical group. However, GAO found that other beneficiaries obtained these drugs to support their addictions or to sell on the street. In addition, GAO found that Medicaid paid over $2 million in controlled substance prescriptions during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 that were written or filled by 65 medical practitioners and pharmacies barred, excluded, or both from federal health care programs, including Medicaid, for such offenses as illegally selling controlled substances. Finally, GAO found that according to Social Security Administration data, pharmacies filled controlled substance prescriptions of over 1,800 beneficiaries who were dead at that time. GAO performed in-depth investigations on 25 Medicaid cases and found fraudulent, improper, or abusive actions related to the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances. These investigations uncovered other issues, such as doctors overprescribing medication and writing controlled substance prescriptions without having required DEA authorization. States are primarily responsible for the fight against Medicaid fraud; however, the selected states did not have a comprehensive fraud prevention framework to prevent fraud and abuse of controlled substances. CMS is responsible for overseeing state fraud and abuse control activities but has provided limited guidance to the states to prevent fraud and abuse of controlled substances. |
gao_GAO-07-700T | gao_GAO-07-700T_0 | To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad statutory right of access to agency records. These standards require that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for any related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all records and other information associated with these activities is needed for the effective and efficient performance of our work. We need to efficiently use the time available to complete our work to minimize the impact on the agency being reviewed and to meet the time frames of our congressional clients. DHS Has Implemented Burdensome Processes for Working with GAO
Unlike those of many other executive agencies, DHS’s processes for working with us includes extensive coordination among program officials, liaisons, and attorneys at the departmental and component levels and centralized control for all incoming GAO requests for information and outgoing documents. DHS Process for Working with GAO. GAO Has Experienced Difficulties Accessing DHS Information
In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, we stated that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow Congress to be sure that the department is effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of dollars of annual funding. We also noted that our work for Congress to assess DHS’s operations has been significantly hampered by long delays in obtaining access to program documents and officials. We emphasized that for Congress, GAO, and others to independently assess the department’s efforts, DHS would need to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations. Sometimes, despite GAO’s right of access to information, DHS delays providing information as it vets concerns internally, such as whether the information is considered deliberative or predecisional. We have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the lengths of delay are both varied and significant and have affected our ability to do our work in a timely manner. We have proposed to DHS that the department take several steps that would enhance the efficiency of its process. GAO’s Access-to- Records Authority
To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad statutory right of access to agency records. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, GAO stated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow Congress to be sure that the Department is effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of dollars of annual funding. GAO also noted that its work for Congress to assess DHS's operations has, at times, been significantly hampered by long delays in obtaining access to program documents. Following the aforementioned testimonies, GAO was asked to testify about its access issues. This testimony provides information on (1) the scope of GAO's work, (2) GAO protocols for accessing agency information, (3) DHS processes for working with GAO, (4) access issues GAO has encountered, and (5) steps GAO has taken to address these issues.
What GAO Found
To carry out its audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad statutory right of access to agency records. Auditing standards require that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for any related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all records and other information associated with these activities is needed for the effective and efficient performance of GAO's work. This is also necessary in order for the Congress to be able to conduct its constitutional responsibilities in a timely and effective manner. Since DHS began operations in 2003, GAO has provided major analyses of the department's plans and programs for transportation security, immigration, Coast Guard, and emergency management. GAO has also reported on DHS's management functions such as human capital, financial management, and information technology. GAO has processes it applies in working with departmental agencies across the federal government that work well. DHS's adopted processes have frequently impeded GAO's efforts to carry out its mission by delaying access to documents required to assess the department's operations. This process involves multiple layers of review by department- and component-level liaisons and attorneys and results in frequent and sometimes lengthy delays in obtaining information. GAO recognizes that the department has legitimate interests in protecting certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. GAO shares that interest as well and follows strict security guidelines in handling such information. GAO similarly recognizes that agency officials will need to make judgments with respect to the manner and the processes they use in response to GAO's information requests. However, to date, because of the processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able to do its work in a timely manner. GAO has been able to eventually obtain information and answer audit questions, but the delays experienced at DHS impede GAO's ability to conduct audit work efficiently and to provide timely information to congressional clients. |
gao_GAO-13-806 | gao_GAO-13-806_0 | Background
An adequate supply of health care professionals is necessary to ensure access to needed health care services. HRSA estimated that there were approximately 780,000 physicians and 261,000 physician assistants and advanced practice registered nurses engaged in patient care in 2010. At the federal level, HRSA is responsible for monitoring the supply of and demand for health care professionals and disseminating workforce data and analysis to inform policymakers and the public about workforce needs and priorities. To meet this responsibility, HRSA conducts and contracts for health care workforce research to document and project shortages and to examine trends that influence the supply and distribution of health care professionals, as well as the demand for their services. HRSA Has Taken Some Actions to Update National Projections, but Has Failed to Publish New Reports Since 2008
Since its last published report on physician supply and demand in 2008, HRSA has initiated work to produce new workforce models and reports, but has not published any new reports containing national workforce projections. Given that HRSA’s 2008 report was based on 2000 data, the most recent projections available from HRSA to Congress, researchers, and the general public to inform health care workforce policy decisions are based on data that are more than a decade old. From 2008 to 2012, HRSA awarded five contracts to three research organizations to update or create new workforce projection models, generate new national workforce projections, and produce reports. HRSA attributed the delay in publishing the clinician specialty report to data challenges and modeling limitations. HRSA officials said that the agency does not have a standard written work plan or set of procedures for accomplishing the tasks necessary to prepare a report for publication after final reports are delivered from contractors. Without standard procedures, agency officials may not be able to accurately predict how long products will take to review or to monitor their progress through the review process to ensure they are completed in a timely manner. While HRSA created a timeline for publishing new projection reports in 2012, the agency has since revised its timeline to postpone publication of two other health care workforce reports after failing to meet its December 2012 publication goal for a clinician specialty report projecting the supply of and demand for health care professionals through 2025. Recommendations
We recommend that the Administrator of HRSA take the following three actions:
Expedite the review of the report containing national projections to 2020 for the primary care workforce to ensure it is published in the fall of 2013 in accordance with HRSA’s revised timeline. Develop tools for monitoring the progress of projection reports through the review process to ensure that HRSA’s timeline goals for publication are met. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over a decade, government, academic, and health professional organizations have projected national shortages of health care professionals, which could adversely affect patients' access to care. However, there is little consensus about the nature and extent of future shortages, partly because of the complexity of creating projections and uncertainty about future health care system changes. Up-to-date workforce estimates are essential given the significant federal investment in health care training programs. Within HHS, HRSA is responsible for monitoring health care workforce adequacy; to do this, HRSA conducts and contracts for workforce studies.
GAO was asked to provide information about health care workforce projections. This report examines the actions HRSA has taken to project the future supply of and demand for physicians, physician assistants, and advanced practice registered nurses since publishing its 2008 report. GAO reviewed HRSA's contract documentation, select delivered products, and timeline goals for publication. GAO also interviewed HRSA officials, workforce researchers, and provider organizations.
What GAO Found
Since 2008, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has awarded five contracts to research organizations to update national workforce projections, but HRSA has failed to publish any new reports containing projections. As a result, the most recent projections from HRSA available to Congress and others to inform health care workforce policy decisions are from the agency's 2008 report, which is based on data that are more than a decade old. While HRSA created a timeline for publishing new workforce projection reports in 2012, the agency missed its goal to publish a clinician specialty report by December 2012 projecting the supply of and demand for health care professionals through 2025. HRSA officials attributed the delay in publishing this report to data challenges and modeling limitations. HRSA has also revised its timeline to postpone publication of two other health care workforce reports, as shown in the table below. HRSA officials said that the agency does not have standard written procedures for preparing a report for publication after final reports are delivered from contractors, which may impede its ability to accurately predict how long products will take to review and monitor their progress through the review process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of HRSA expedite the review and publication of HRSAs report on national projections for the primary care workforce, create standard written procedures for report review, and develop tools to monitor report review to ensure timeline goals for publication are met. HHS agreed with GAOs recommendations and provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-07-211 | gao_GAO-07-211_0 | DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Guide Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives
Although DOD has taken action to begin the development of joint seabasing, DOD has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to effectively guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment and integrate service initiatives. Specifically, DOD has not fully incorporated sound management practices—such as providing leadership, dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy—that our prior work has shown are found at the center of successful transformations. Without a management approach that contains these elements, DOD may be unable to guide and assess joint seabasing in an efficient and cost-effective manner. DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform Decisions About Joint Seabasing
DOD has not developed, implemented, or used an overarching joint experimentation campaign plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing. Many seabasing experimentation activities have taken place across DOD and the services; however, an overarching experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide joint seabasing experimentation does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command— DOD’s leader of joint warfighting experimentation—has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts. All of the services, combatant commands, and some defense entities have been involved with seabasing experimentation through war games, studies, workshops, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command said it is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing. Once the U.S. Joint Forces Command develops and implements the plan, which it intends to do by fiscal year 2008, it is also unclear the extent to which this plan will be able to guide and coordinate joint seabasing experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not have the authority to direct service and other DOD organizations’ experimentation plans. Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates is Uncertain
While some service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives. One part of the JCIDS analysis process is the Functional Solutions Analysis—an operationally based assessment of all potential approaches, including changes to doctrine, organization, training, as well as material solutions, to solve identified capability gaps. According to DOD officials, cost assessments for joint seabasing approaches have not yet begun and may not be completed for a year or more. Without a campaign plan to direct experimentation for joint seabasing, DOD and the services’ ability to evaluate and validate their solutions, coordinate efforts, perform analysis, and disseminate results could be compromised. Furthermore, establishing a joint seabasing capability could be the source of significant investment by DOD. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist decision makers in developing a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for force projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment and integrate service initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions to incorporate sound management principles into DOD’s management of joint seabasing: assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and coordinating supporting initiatives; establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to provide day-to-day management oversight over the services, combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing; and develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure communication between and among the services, combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to provide information on all joint seabasing activities across DOD. DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to ensure these initiatives are fully leveraged, properly focused, and complement each other. | Why GAO Did This Study
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land bases and could be the source of billions of dollars of investment. In future security environments, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to encounter situations of reduced or denied access to areas of operation. Even where forward operating bases are otherwise available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a comprehensive management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has developed a joint experimentation campaign plan for joint seabasing, and (3) DOD and the services have identified the costs of joint seabasing options. For this review, GAO analyzed joint requirements documents, experimentation efforts, and service acquisition plans.
What GAO Found
While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it has not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess joint seabasing. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives are outpacing DOD's analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not established an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to ensure joint seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that efforts are effective and coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that shares information among the organizations involved in seabasing. Without a comprehensive management approach containing these elements, DOD may be unable to coordinate activities and minimize redundancy among service initiatives. DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although many seabasing experimentation activities--including war games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations--have taken place across the services, combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation, although it has been tasked with developing a biennial joint experimentation campaign plan for future joint concepts. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing or will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Without a plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the services' ability to evaluate solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results could be compromised. While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based assessment process that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates for seabasing options. However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study that will identify potential approaches, including changes to doctrine and training as well as material solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD officials expect the study will not be complete for a year or more. Meanwhile, the services are actively pursuing a variety of seabasing initiatives, some of which are approaching milestones which will guide future program investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives. |
gao_GAO-10-597 | gao_GAO-10-597_0 | Since we first began auditing IRS’s financial statements in fiscal year 1992, IRS has taken a significant number of actions that enabled us to eliminate several material weaknesses and significant deficiencies and to close over 250 of our previously reported financial management–related recommendations. Specifically, IRS continues to face management challenges in (1) resolving its two remaining material weaknesses in internal control, (2) developing performance measures and managing for outcomes, and (3) addressing its remaining internal control issues, particularly those dealing with safeguarding of taxpayer receipts and information. Challenges in Resolving Two Long-standing Material Internal Control Weaknesses
As we reported in our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2009 financial statements, IRS’s efforts to address its internal control weaknesses resulted in our closure of a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting and a significant deficiency in internal control over tax revenue and refunds. Successfully addressing the remaining open recommendations would enhance IRS’s ability to effectively manage for outcomes. We also consider the majority of the recommendations outstanding from prior years to be short-term; however, a few, particularly those concerning the functionality of IRS’s automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to fully and effectively address. Appendix I presents a combined listing of (1) the 62 non-information- systems security–related recommendations based on our financial statement audits and other financial management–related work that we had not previously reported as closed and the 41 new recommendations based on our fiscal year 2009 financial audit, (2) IRS-reported corrective actions taken or planned as of April 2010, and (3) our analysis of whether the issues that gave rise to the recommendations have been effectively addressed, based primarily on the work performed during our fiscal year 2009 financial statement audit. Open Recommendations Grouped by Internal Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits and other financial management–related work, and the issues that gave rise to them, to internal control activities that are central to IRS’s tax administration responsibilities provides insight regarding their significance. Safeguarding of Assets and Security Activities
Given IRS’s mission, the sensitivity of the data it maintains, and its processing of trillions of dollars of tax receipts each year, one of the most important control activities at IRS is the safeguarding of assets. Resolving the following 18 recommendations in table 5 would assist IRS in improving its documentation of transactions and related internal control procedures. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management and internal control since its first financial audit, as evidenced by unqualified audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 10 years; resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and other control issues; and actions taken resulting in the closure of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work by many individuals throughout IRS and sustained commitment of IRS leadership. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the agency’s continuing financial management challenges—resolving material internal control weaknesses; developing outcome-oriented performance metrics that can facilitate managing operations for outcomes; and correcting numerous other internal control issues. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made and continue to make through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. IRS also commented that it is committed to implementing appropriate improvement to ensure that it maintains sound financial management practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility to annually collect trillions of dollars in taxes, process hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforce the nation's tax laws. Since its first audit of IRS's financial statements in fiscal year 1992, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in IRS's financial management operations. In related reports, GAO has recommended corrective actions to address those weaknesses. Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRS's financial statements, GAO makes recommendations to address any new weaknesses identified and follows up on the status of IRS's efforts to address the weaknesses GAO identified in previous years' audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide an overview of the financial management challenges still facing IRS, (2) provide the status of financial audit and financial management-related recommendations and the actions needed to address them, and (3) highlight the relationship between GAO's recommendations and internal control activities central to IRS's mission and goals.
What GAO Found
IRS has made progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial statement audit in 1992, as evidenced by 10 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and actions resulting in the closure of over 250 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work throughout IRS and sustained commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces significant financial management challenges in (1) resolving its remaining material weaknesses in internal control, (2) developing outcome-oriented performance metrics, and (3) correcting numerous other internal control issues, especially those relating to safeguarding tax receipts and taxpayer information. At the beginning of GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal year 2009 financial statements, 62 financial management-related recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the issues that gave rise to them. During the fiscal year 2009 financial audit, IRS took actions that GAO considered sufficient to close 18 recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional internal control issues resulting in 41 new recommendations. In total, 85 recommendations remain open. To assist IRS in evaluating and improving internal controls, GAO categorized the 85 open recommendations by various internal control activities, which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control categories: safeguarding of assets and security activities; proper recording and documenting of transactions; and effective management review and oversight. The continued existence of internal control weaknesses that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious obstacle that IRS needs to overcome. Effective implementation of GAO's recommendations can greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management and can help enable it to more effectively carry out its tax administration responsibilities. Most can be addressed in the short term (the next 2 years). However, a few recommendations, particularly those concerning the functionality of IRS's automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to effectively address.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft report, IRS stated that it is committed to implementing appropriate improvements to maintain sound financial management practices. |
gao_GAO-03-222 | gao_GAO-03-222_0 | The 16 states we reviewed often structured their Medicaid and SCHIP service delivery systems differently. In Medicaid Managed Care, States Focused More on Setting Plan Network Requirements than on Monitoring Plans or Analyzing Service Utilization
In attempting to ensure access to care in Medicaid managed care, states focused more on setting requirements for managed care plans than on monitoring compliance with these requirements or on analyzing beneficiaries’ use of services. State requirements for plans’ physician networks varied widely in their specificity, from broad statements that health plans must have “adequate” physician networks serving their enrolled members to very specific standards that set, for example, a maximum average number of beneficiaries per PCP or a maximum time frame for scheduling a first appointment. Among other things, the regulations require states to ensure that participating plans maintain and monitor their networks of providers to provide adequate and timely access to all services covered under their contracts with the states, including monitoring the numbers of network providers who are not accepting new Medicaid patients; ensure that network providers offer hours of operation that are no less than the hours offered to commercial enrollees or comparable to those of Medicaid FFS; make services included in the contract available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, when medically necessary; and establish mechanisms to ensure compliance by providers with state standards for access to care. For Medicaid FFS, State Requirements for Providers and Monitoring of Service Utilization Were More Limited
For states’ FFS-based Medicaid delivery systems, which continue to serve the majority of children in half of the states we reviewed, requirements for participating providers and monitoring of provider availability were significantly more limited than for managed care. For traditional FFS programs, beneficiaries may seek care from any providers participating in the Medicaid program and may change providers at any time if they are dissatisfied. Most Traditional FFS Programs Set Few Goals Regarding the Number of Providers, and Conducted Minimal Monitoring of Service Utilization
Despite the potential for low FFS rates to limit the number of providers willing to participate in the program, the nine states we reviewed with traditional FFS programs did not set specific goals for the number of physicians participating in their Medicaid programs and did not actively monitor the number and location of providers. States also did little to monitor service utilization by Medicaid beneficiaries participating in traditional FFS care despite having a ready source of data in their claims payment systems. Three states also included information related to primary and preventive services use. Although most of these states also had significant shares of their Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care, they set significantly fewer provider network requirements for their distinct SCHIP programs than for Medicaid and did less monitoring of providers enrolled in their SCHIP programs and of children’s use of services in SCHIP. States with SCHIP Programs Distinct from Medicaid Set Few Provider Requirements
The seven states that chose to serve all or most of their SCHIP beneficiaries through programs that were distinct from Medicaid used managed care delivery systems almost exclusively. This held true for their use of encounter data as well as for HEDIS measures and CAHPS beneficiary satisfaction survey data. Additionally, HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State Comments
Several states provided clarifying comments regarding their oversight of access to care in Medicaid and SCHIP. Overall, however, states with distinct SCHIP programs reported fewer efforts to monitor children’s access and use of services than in their Medicaid managed care programs. Medicaid and SCHIP: States’ Enrollment and Payment Policies Can Affect Children’s Access to Care. Children’s Health Insurance Program: State Implementation Approaches Are Evolving. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 25 million children have health insurance coverage through Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Coverage alone, however, does not guarantee that services will be available or that children will receive needed care. GAO was asked to evaluate states' efforts to facilitate and monitor access to primary and preventive services for children in these jointly funded federal-state programs. The study surveyed 16 states, covering over 65 percent of the Medicaid and SCHIP population. GAO analyzed requirements relevant to managed care and fee-for-service (FFS) delivery systems, including the number and location of physicians and their availability to see beneficiaries, monitoring of health plan or physician compliance with these requirements, and collection and analysis of beneficiary service utilization data.
What GAO Found
Overall, states imposed more access-related requirements on participating providers and more actively monitored children's use of services in their Medicaid managed care programs than in their Medicaid FFS or SCHIP programs. Medicaid managed care: State requirements for managed care plans ranged from very broad provisions that health plans must have "adequate" physician networks for serving their enrolled members to very specific standards, such as the number and geographic proximity of physicians and maximum time frames within which a new beneficiary receives a first appointment. States less often verified data that plans submitted to show compliance with these requirements or independently monitored physicians' availability. In one instance of verification, a state found that a third of a health plan's physician network was not accepting new Medicaid patients, thus limiting access for new beneficiaries. The value of plan-submitted data that states used to monitor children's use of services was often compromised by continuing problems with their completeness and reliability. Furthermore, information derived from beneficiary satisfaction surveys was not necessarily representative of all Medicaid managed care beneficiaries. Medicaid FFS: Most states did not set goals for or analyze the availability of participating primary care physicians even though a majority of Medicaid-eligible children in half of the states reviewed are still served in FFS programs. In most FFS programs, beneficiaries may seek care from any providers participating in the Medicaid program and may change providers at any time if they are dissatisfied. However, when FFS payment rates are lower than those paid by other purchasers--which was the case in most states reviewed--providers can be discouraged from participating in Medicaid and thus restrict beneficiaries' access. States did little to monitor the use of services by Medicaid-eligible children in FFS programs despite having a ready source of data in their claims payment systems. SCHIP: Nine of the 16 states used the same providers, administrative systems, and monitoring approaches for their SCHIP programs as they did for Medicaid. The remaining 7 states, whose SCHIP programs were distinct from Medicaid and used managed care almost exclusively, set few requirements for or monitored providers' availability to SCHIP-eligible children. States with distinct SCHIP programs also reported fewer efforts to monitor children's use of services than in their Medicaid programs. Comments on our report from the Department of Health and Human Services highlighted new federal requirements for state oversight of managed care, and design differences between Medicaid and SCHIP that can affect monitoring approaches. States we reviewed provided clarifying or technical comments regarding their oversight of access, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-24 | gao_GAO-02-24_0 | Factors Critical to Successful Information Sharing
The organizations identified several critical success factors that they viewed as essential to establishing, developing, and maintaining effective information-sharing relationships, which could benefit critical infrastructure protection efforts. All of the organizations agreed that trust had to be built over time and through personal relationships, and they had taken various steps to facilitate the process, such as the following: Most held regular—bimonthly, quarterly, or annual—meetings or forums to discuss issues and establish face-to-face contact. In addition, many organizations encouraged members to subordinate individual or individual organizations’ interests to the interests of the entire information-sharing group. These challenges included (1) initially establishing and maintaining trust relationships, (2) developing agreements on the use and protection of shared information, (3) obtaining adequate funding, (4) developing and retaining a membership base, and (5) developing and maintaining an organization staff with appropriate skills. | What GAO Found
Information sharing and coordination are key elements in any defense against cyber attacks. The organizations GAO reviewed identified factors they considered critical to their success in building successful information-sharing relationships with and among their members. All of the organizations identified trust as essential to successful relationships. They said that trust could only be built over time and through personal relationships. One of the most difficult challenges identified was the initial reluctance of new members to share information. Other challenges included (1) developing agreements on the use and protection of shared information, (2) obtaining adequate funding for websites and meetings while avoiding contributions intended primarily to promote the interests of an individual organization, (3) maintaining a focus on emerging issues of interest to members, and (4) maintaining appropriately skilled professional and administrative staff. |
gao_GAO-12-470 | gao_GAO-12-470_0 | Looking forward, USPS projects that First-Class Mail will decline significantly between now and 2020. Past Actions to Reduce Excess Capacity
From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, USPS data showed that it reduced mail processing and transportation costs by $2.4 billion—or 16 percent— by reducing the number of mail processing work hours, facilities, and employees as shown in table 1. United States Postal Service, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Continuing automation improvements: These improvements have enabled USPS to sort mail faster and more efficiently. USPS Plan to Consolidate Its Mail Processing Network
On December 15, 2011, USPS asked PRC to review and provide an advisory opinion on its proposal to change its delivery service standards, primarily by changing its delivery standards to eliminate overnight delivery service for most First-Class Mail and Periodicals. $5 billion in compensation and benefits; and 3. In March 2010, USPS presented a detailed proposal to PRC to move from a 6-day to a 5-day delivery schedule to achieve its workforce and cost savings reduction goals. Stakeholder Issues and USPS Challenges
Stakeholder Issues with Mail Processing Changes
Some business mailers have expressed concern that reducing processing facilities as a result of eliminating overnight delivery service could increase costs for business mailers who will have to travel farther to drop off their mail. Employee associations have expressed concern that USPS’s proposed changes may result in even greater losses in mail volume and revenue, which would further harm USPS financially. In contrast, however, other business mailers and Members of Congress have expressed support for consolidating the mail processing network to reduce costs. USPS responded that given the multibillion-dollar deficits that it has experienced in each of the last 5 years, and given the over $14 billion loss it expects in fiscal year 2012, capturing cost savings wherever possible will be vital to USPS’s financial viability. Pending legislation originating in the Senate (S.1789) includes provisions that would affect USPS’s ability to consolidate its networks by delaying USPS’s move to 5-day delivery by 2 years and requiring USPS to consider downsizing rather than closing facilities. Moreover, we have previously reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS’s financial viability. Consequently, we are not making new recommendations or presenting a matter for Congress to consider at this time. If Congress prefers to retain the current delivery service standards and associated network, decisions will be needed about how USPS’s costs for providing these services will be paid, including additional cost reductions or revenue sources. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to USPS for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) past actions the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has taken to reduce excess capacity, (2) USPS’s plans to consolidate its mail processing network, and (3) key stakeholder issues and challenges USPS faces in consolidating its mail processing network. Further, we reviewed USPS annual reports to Congress and its network plans as section 302 of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 requires USPS to submit; related GAO and USPS OIG reports, as well as other relevant studies relating to reducing excess capacity in USPS’s mail processing network. To examine USPS’s future plans to consolidate its mail processing network, we reviewed USPS’s December 2011 proposal to change delivery service standards and its plan to consolidate its mail processing network by reducing facilities, staff, equipment, and transportation resources. We also interviewed USPS officials, and reviewed stakeholder testimonies and published letters from Members of Congress commenting on USPS plans to change delivery service standards and close facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2006, the U.S. Postal Service has taken actions to reduce its excess capacity. Such actions have made progress toward consolidating the mail processing network to increase efficiency and reduce costs while meeting delivery standards. However, since 2006, the gap between USPS expenses and revenues has grown significantly. In February 2012, USPS projected that its net losses would reach $21 billion by 2016.
As requested, this report addresses (1) actions USPS has taken since 2006 to reduce excess capacity in facilities, staff, equipment, and transportation; (2) USPS plans to consolidate its mail processing network; and (3) key stakeholder issues and challenges related to USPSs plans. GAO reviewed relevant documents and data, interviewed USPS officials, reviewed proposed legislation, and reviewed stakeholder comments to USPS plans for changing delivery service standards.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has closed redundant facilities and consolidated mail processing operations and transportation to reduce excess capacity in its network, resulting in reported cost savings of about $2.4 billion. Excess capacity remains, however, because of continuing and accelerating declines in First-Class Mail volume, automation improvements that sort mail faster and more efficiently, and increasing mail preparation and transportation by business mailers, much of whose mail now bypasses most of USPSs processing network.
In December 2011, USPS issued a proposal for consolidating its mail processing network, which is based on proposed changes to overnight delivery service standards for First-Class Mail and Periodicals. Consolidating its network is one of several initiatives, including moving from a 6-day to a 5-day delivery schedule and reducing compensation and benefits, that USPS has proposed to meet a savings goal of $22.5 billion by 2016. This goal includes saving $4 billion by consolidating its mail processing and transportation network and reducing excess capacity as indicated in the table below. The Postal Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing USPSs proposal to change delivery service standards.
Stakeholder issues and other challenges could prevent USPS from implementing its plan for consolidating its mail processing network or achieving its cost savings goals. Although some business mailers and Members of Congress have expressed support for consolidating mail processing facilities, other mailers, Members of Congress, affected communities, and employee organizations have raised issues. Key issues raised by business mailers are that closing facilities could increase their transportation costs and decrease service. Employee associations are concerned that reducing service could result in a greater loss of mail volume and revenue that could worsen USPSs financial condition. USPS has said that given its huge deficits, capturing cost savings wherever possible will be vital. USPS has asked Congress to address its challenges, and Congress is considering legislation that would include different approaches to addressing USPSs financial problems. A bill originating in the Senate provides for employee buyouts but delays moving to 5-day delivery, while a House bill creates a commission to make operational decisions such as facility closures and permits USPS to reduce delivery days. If Congress prefers to retain the current delivery service standards and associated network, decisions will need to be made about how USPSs costs for providing these services will be paid, including additional cost reductions or revenue sources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report, as it has previously reported to Congress on the urgent need for a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPSs financial viability and has provided Congress with strategies and options to consider. USPS had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-13-621 | gao_GAO-13-621_0 | SEC’s Organizational Culture Hinders Agency’s Ability to Effectively Fulfill Its Mission
Based on our analysis of the views of many SEC employees, our previously issued reports on SEC, and recent studies from SEC and third parties, we have determined that the agency’s organizational culture is not constructive and could hinder its ability to effectively fulfill its mission. Within constructive cultures, employees also exhibit a stronger commitment to mission focus, accountability, coordination, and adaptability. In describing the agency’s culture, many current and four former SEC employees talked about low levels of employee morale, employees’ distrust of management, and the compartmentalized, hierarchical, and risk-averse nature of the organization. Improving Personnel Management Is Critical for SEC’s Effectiveness
SEC has not consistently or fully implemented practices for effective personnel management practices. SEC has taken some steps to address aspects of these deficiencies or limitations, but most of the agency’s efforts are in the early stages and could be enhanced. SEC Lacks Comprehensive Plans to Help Ensure Its Workforce Has the Necessary Skills
SEC has not yet developed a comprehensive workforce plan. Key principles for effective workforce planning from our past work also has shown that it is important for agencies to ensure that their strategic workforce planning efforts (1) involve top management, staff, and other stakeholders; (2) identify the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results, including evaluation of gaps; (3) develop strategies that are tailored to address skills gaps; (4) build the internal capability needed to address administrative, training, and other requirements important to support workforce planning strategies; and (5) include plans to monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward meeting its human capital goals. While SEC has taken steps towards identifying and addressing its workforce competency gaps, these efforts have not reflected all of the elements of effective workforce planning and strategies articulated in OPM guidance. Without comprehensive workforce and succession plans, SEC will be limited in its ability to make well- informed decisions about how to best meet agency needs today and into the future. Implementation of SEC’s Performance Management System Could Be Improved
The design of SEC’s performance management system reflects some characteristics of an effective system but could be improved. SEC staff expressed many concerns about the implementation of the performance management system. Furthermore, we could not identify additional SEC efforts to obtain staff input on other aspects of its performance management system, such as the performance appraisal process. For example, as noted earlier in this report, SEC’s IG has reported on how this lack of communication and collaboration may have contributed to past enforcement failures. SEC Has Not Developed a System to Monitor and Evaluate Its Personnel Management Activities
SEC has not developed an accountability system to monitor and evaluate its personnel management programs and systems (such as its workforce and succession planning functions and performance appraisal system). Until a system is put into place, SEC may be missing opportunities to take a more comprehensive approach to improving its personnel management. Moreover, without the information such a system generates, it will be difficult for SEC to identify systemic problems related to its personnel management or to correct them. Successfully transforming organizational culture requires an effective personnel management system. Because these are long-standing concerns, sustained leadership to improve communication and collaboration within SEC is important and exploring and implementing leading communication and collaboration practices could better position SEC to address these issues. SEC has started work to develop an accountability system. To help enhance the credibility of its performance management system, the Chairman of SEC should direct the COO and OHR to create mechanisms to monitor how supervisors use the performance management system to recognize and reward performance, provide meaningful feedback to staff, and effectively address poor performance; for example, by requiring ongoing feedback discussions with higher-level supervisors; and conduct periodic validations (with staff input) of the performance management system and make changes, as appropriate, based on these validations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) what is known about the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) organizational culture and (2) SEC’s personnel management challenges and its efforts to address these challenges. We also interviewed SEC’s Inspector General officials, four former SEC employees, SEC union leaders and members, two management consultants who previously worked with SEC, representatives from two industry trade groups, and two academics with knowledge of SEC personnel management issues to obtain their views on the agency’s organizational culture, personnel management challenges, and what, if anything, SEC can do to address these challenges. Section 962 of the Dodd- Frank Act mandated GAO to evaluate: (A) the effectiveness of supervisors in using the skills, talents, and motivation of the employees of the Commission to achieve the goals of the Commission; (B) the criteria for promoting employees of the Commission to supervisory positions; (C) the fairness of the application of the promotion criteria to the decisions of the Commission; (D) the competence of the professional staff of the Commission; (E) the efficiency of communication between the units of the Commission regarding the work of the Commission (including communication between divisions and between subunits of a division) and the efforts by the Commission to promote such communication; (F) the turnover within subunits of the Commission, including the consideration of supervisors whose subordinates have an unusually high rate of turnover; (G) whether there are excessive numbers of low-level, mid-level, or senior-level managers; (H) any initiatives of the Commission that increase the competence of the staff of the Commission; and (I) the actions taken by the Commission regarding employees of the Commission who have failed to perform their duties and circumstances under which the Commission has issued to employees a notice of termination. | Why GAO Did This Study
Personnel management is important to the mission of federal agencies. Several high-profile enforcement failures have raised concerns about SECs personnel management. Section 962 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandates GAO to report on SEC's personnel management. This report examines (1) SECs organizational culture and (2) its personnel management challenges and efforts to address these challenges.
GAO assessed SECs personnel management systems against OPM guidance and other criteria related to workforce planning and performance management (which includes appraisals and feedback); reviewed relevant reports; surveyed SEC employees and senior management (with 78 and 74 percent response rates, respectively) to gather their views on SECs organizational culture and personnel management practices; and spoke with former employees, the SEC Inspector General, representatives of the employees union, financial industry associations, consulting firms, and academics.
What GAO Found
Based on analysis of views from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) employees and previous studies from GAO, SEC, and third parties, GAO determined that SECs organizational culture is not constructive and could hinder its ability to effectively fulfill its mission. Organizations with constructive cultures are more effective and employees also exhibit a stronger commitment to mission focus. In describing SECs culture, many current and former SEC employees cited low morale, distrust of management, and the compartmentalized, hierarchical, and risk-averse nature of the organization. According to an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) survey of federal employees, SEC currently ranks 19th
SEC has not consistently or fully implemented effective personnel management. SEC has taken some steps, but most of its efforts were in the early stages and could be enhanced. GAO identified four key areas where continued improvement is needed: of 22 similarly sized federal agencies based on employee satisfaction and commitment. GAOs past work on managing for results indicates that an effective personnel management system will be critical for transforming SECs organizational culture.
Workforce planning. SEC has not yet developed a comprehensive workforce plan, including how it identifies its future leaders. Although SEC has taken some steps, such as identifying competency gaps and conducting leadership training, these efforts do not reflect all elements of effective workforce planning outlined in OPM guidance. OPM guidance calls on agencies to develop and implement plans to identify workforce needs and develop future leaders. Without fully implementing such practices, SEC will not be able to make well-informed decisions on how to best meet current and future agency needs.
Performance management. SECs implementation of its performance management system could be improved. SEC staff expressed many concerns about the system, such as an unclear link between their performance and ratings. SEC provided training to supervisors on how to use the system and obtained staff input on aspects of the system. However, SEC has not fully validated the system with its staff. Also, SEC does not have mechanisms in place to monitor supervisors use of the system. By not validating all aspects of the system and establishing mechanisms to hold supervisors accountable for appropriately using it, SEC is missing opportunities to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of its performance management system.
Communication and collaboration. SEC has made efforts to improve communication and collaboration (such as creating new subunits to facilitate joint work), but has not yet fully addressed barriers. Moreover, these efforts have not yet addressed all of the problems that the Inspector General found contributed to past enforcement failures. GAO has reported on leading practices that SEC could explore, including sustained management attention. Improving communication and collaboration within SEC is critical to its effectiveness.
Personnel management assessment. SEC has not implemented an accountability system to monitor and evaluate its personnel management. According to OPM guidance, such a system helps agencies assess whether personnel policies are effective. SEC officials explained that efforts were under way to develop a system. Until such an accountability system is implemented, it will be difficult for SEC to make necessary improvements and help ensure that its personnel management policies and programs align with its mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes seven recommendations to improve SECs personnel management, including developing comprehensive workforce plans, implementing mechanisms to monitor how supervisors use the performance management system, conducting periodic validations of the system, exploring collaboration practices of leading organizations, and regularly assessing these efforts. SEC agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-135T | gao_GAO-08-135T_0 | To manage this expanded role, the State Department’s budget has increased over fiscal years 2001 through 2006 from $13.7 billion to about $24 billion, an increase of about 75 percent (55 percent in constant dollars adjusted for inflation). For example, from 2001 to 2006, the State IG’s budget for oversight has increased from $29 million to $31 million, which when considered relative to inflation, is a budget decrease of approximately 6 percent over 6 years in constant dollars. Of the 318 authorized staff in the State IG’s fiscal year 2006 budget, the actual onboard staff averaged 182, or about 57 percent of the authorized level. #1.) Independence is one of the most important elements of an effective IG function. The IG Act requires IGs to perform audits in compliance with Government Auditing Standards. In addition, much of the act provides specific protections to IG independence for all the work of the IGs. Continuing Concerns regarding the State IG’s Independence
Two continuing areas of concern that we have with the independence of the office of the State IG involve (1) the appointment of management officials to head the State IG in an acting capacity for extended periods of time and (2) the use of Foreign Service staff to lead State IG inspections. The 1986 amendment requires the State IG continue to perform inspections of the department’s bureaus and posts, but also prohibits a career member of the Foreign Service from being appointed as the State IG. To address these concerns about the independence of the State IG Office, we recommended in our March 2007 report that the IG work with the Secretary of State to develop a succession planning policy that would prohibit career Foreign Service officers and other department managers from heading the State IG office in an acting capacity and to develop options to ensure that State IG inspections are not led by career Foreign Service officials or other staff who rotate to assignments within State Department management. Consequently, the State IG relies on inspections rather than audits to provide the primary oversight of the State Department. As a comparison, in fiscal year 2005, the statutory IGs issued a total of 443 inspection reports compared to 4,354 audit reports, a ratio of inspections to audits of about 1 to 10. A troubling outcome of the State IG’s heavy emphasis on inspections is the resulting gaps in audit coverage for high-risk areas we have identified and the management challenges reported annually by the State IG in the department’s performance and accountability reports. Also, auditing standards require independent external quality reviews of audits, or peer reviews, on a 3-year cycle, while inspection standards do not call for any such external quality reviews. We found that the inspectors relied heavily on questionnaires completed by management at each bureau or post that was inspected, official department documents, correspondence and electronic mail, internal department memorandums, interviews, and the inspection review summaries. Our March report provides examples of formal written agreements between (1) the U.S. Concluding Observations
The mission of the State IG is critical to providing independent and objective oversight of the State Department and identifying any mismanagement of scarce taxpayer dollars. However, the effectiveness of the IG’s oversight is limited by the lack of resources, the lack of an appearance of independence, gaps in audit coverage of high-risk areas, and the lack of assurance that investigations of internal department operations are performed by independent IG investigators. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to provide testimony about the effectiveness and reliability of the State Department's Office of Inspector General (State IG). We focused on the independence of the State IG, the use of inspections instead of audits to provide oversight of the department, and the effectiveness of the IG's investigative function. The testimony is based primarily on our March 2007 report, Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General (GAO-07-138).
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of the oversight provided by the State IG is limited by (1) a lack of resources, (2) structural independence issues, (3) gaps in audit coverage, and (4) the lack of assurance that the department obtains independent IG investigations. These limitations serve to reduce the credibility and oversight provided by the State IG. From fiscal years 2001 through 2006, the State Department's budgets have increased from $13.7 billion to about $24 billion, an increase of almost 75 percent (or 55 percent in constant dollars adjusted for inflation) in order to manage an expanding role in the global war on terrorism. During this same period, the State IG's budget increased from $29 million to $31 million, which when adjusted for inflation is a decrease of about 6 percent in constant dollars. In addition, of the 318 authorized staff in the State IG's fiscal year 2006 budget, the actual onboard staff averaged 182, or about 57 percent of the authorized level and about 20 percent less than in fiscal year 2001. We continue to identify concerns regarding the independence of the State IG that are similar to concerns we reported almost three decades ago. Independence is critical to the quality and credibility of all the work of the State IG and is one of the most important elements of the overall effectiveness of the IG function. Our concerns include (1) the appointment of line management officials to head the State IG in an acting capacity for extended periods, and (2) the use of ambassador-level Foreign Service staff to lead inspections of the department's bureaus and posts even though they may have conflicts of interest resulting from their roles in the Foreign Service. In addition, because the State IG provides oversight coverage of high-risk areas and management challenges primarily through inspections rather than audits, the department has significant gaps in audit oversight. Compared to audits, oversight provided by inspections is fundamentally limited. To illustrate, the Inspector General Act requires the State IG to follow Government Auditing Standards, while use of inspection standards are voluntary. In addition, unlike auditing standards, inspection standards do not require an external peer review of quality. The State IG's ratio of inspections to audits in fiscal year 2005 was 2 to 1 while the ratio for the statutory federal IG community was about 1 to 10. We reviewed 10 of the State IG's inspections performed over fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and found that they relied heavily on questionnaires completed by management at each bureau or post being inspected without verification or testing for accuracy. We also found that investigations of the State Department lack a formal written agreement between the State IG and DS. Such an agreement is critical to help ensure that investigations of internal department operations are performed by the IG and not by bureau investigators who report to department management. |
gao_NSIAD-98-41 | gao_NSIAD-98-41_0 | We noted that with few exceptions, the 60/40 rule had not affected past public-private without repeal of the 60/40 rule, the military departments would not be able to follow through on large-scale plans to compete depot maintenance workloads between public and private sector activities;
DOD’s report did not provide a complete, consistent, and accurate picture of depot maintenance workloads because it did not include (1) interim contractor support and contractor logistics support costs, (2) labor costs to install modification and conversion kits, and (3) software maintenance support, most of which was obtained from private sector firms using procurement funding; and
DOD’s reported public sector workload allocation included costs for parts and services the public depots purchased from private sector contractors, some of which were costs for government-furnished material provided to private contractors. In May 1997, OSD prepared a briefing for the Defense Depot Maintenance Council that showed the percentage of public and private sector depot maintenance workload distribution for each military department. DOD’s Analysis of Workload Distribution
DOD’s analysis of depot maintenance workload distribution showed that it provided funding of about $10.5 billion for depot maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1996, of which workload valued at $7.1 billion, or 68 percent, was assigned to public sector facilities and about $3.4 billion, or 32 percent, was assigned to the private sector. In addition, DOD’s data showed that it provided an additional $706 million for work acquired from the private sector through interim contractor support (ICS) and contractor logistics support (CLS) contracts. The percentage of public and private sector depot maintenance work reported by the military departments for fiscal years 1996 through 2002 and the potential impact of including ICS and CLS funding in the private sector workload distribution are shown in table 1. As a result, workload distribution data reported by the services was inconsistent and incomplete. Conclusion
DOD’s current approach for collecting information on the allocation of depot maintenance workload between the public and private sectors results in incomplete and inconsistent reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) guidelines and procedures for identifying depot maintenance workloads and quantifying the public- and private-sector share of depot maintenance funding, focusing on: (1) public and private workload distributions as reported by the military departments and defense agencies for fiscal years (FY) 1996 through 2002; and (2) the procedures DOD uses to define and quantify depot workload distribution.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's May 1997 report of public- and private-sector depot maintenance workload distribution for FY 1996 through 2002 did not provide a complete, consistent, and accurate assessment of DOD's public- and private-sector funding; (2) vague Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance and incomplete and inconsistent reporting of data by the military departments and defense agencies contributed to this condition; (3) the workload distribution analysis showed that in FY 1996 DOD spent $7.1 billion for work assigned to public-sector facilities and about $3.4 billion for work assigned to the private sector; (4) in addition, DOD's analysis shows that DOD provided an additional $706 million for depot maintenance-related work acquired from the private sector through interim contractor support and contractor logistics support arrangements; and (5) DOD's depot maintenance workload distribution and supporting data show that: (a) in some cases modification and conversion work obtained from private-sector contractors was not reported but similar work in public depots was included; (b) reporting of computer software maintenance work was inconsistent and perhaps incomplete; (c) public-sector depot maintenance funding included substantial expenditures for goods and services purchased from private-sector contractors, and resulted in inconsistent reporting of the allocation between the public and private sector; and (d) depot maintenance expenditures for equipment and software owned by various defense agencies were not reported. |
gao_GAO-07-505 | gao_GAO-07-505_0 | Inadequate IT Inventory Control and Accountability Pose Risk of Loss, Theft, and Misappropriation
Our tests of IT equipment inventory controls at four case study locations, including three VA medical centers and VA headquarters, identified a weak overall control environment and a pervasive lack of accountability for IT equipment items across the four locations we tested. Because of the lack of user-level accountability and the failure to consistently update inventory records for changes in inventory status and user location, VA officials at our test locations could not determine the user or type of data stored on the 53 missing IT equipment items that could have stored sensitive personal information and, therefore, the risk posed by the loss of these items. VA records management policy that implements federal records management law and NARA guidance requires the creation and maintenance of records of essential transactions, such as creating a timely record of newly acquired IT equipment in the property management system, and recording timely updates for changes in the status of IT equipment, including transfers, turn-ins, and replacement of equipment, and disposals. VA property management policy requires that sensitive items, including computer equipment, be subjected to annual physical inventories. As a result, our statistical tests did not include these items. Physical Inventories by Case Study Locations Identified Thousands of Missing IT Equipment Items Valued at Millions of Dollars
To assess the effect of the lax control environment for IT equipment, we asked VA officials at the case study locations covered in both our current and previous audits to provide us with information on the results of their physical inventories performed after issuance of recommendations in our July 2004 report, including Reports of Survey information on identified losses of IT equipment. As of February 28, 2007, the four case study locations covered in our current audit reported over 2,400 missing IT equipment items with a combined original acquisition value of about $6.4 million as a result of inventories they performed during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Further, missing IT equipment items were often not reported for several months and, in some cases several years, because most of the nine case study locations had not consistently performed required annual physical inventories or completed Reports of Survey promptly. According to VA Police and security specialists, it is very difficult to conduct an investigation at this point because the details of the incidents cannot be determined. This weak overall control environment presents an opportunity for theft, loss, or misappropriation to occur without detection. Our standards for internal control require federal agencies to have policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. For example, our tests of computer hard drives in the excess property disposal process found that hard drives at two of the four case study locations that had not yet been sanitized contained hundreds of names and Social Security numbers. Weaknesses in physical security heighten the risk of data breach related to sensitive personal information residing on hard drives in the property disposal process that have not yet been sanitized. Physical Security Weaknesses at IT Storage Locations Pose Risk of Data Breach
VA Handbook 0730/1, Security and Law Enforcement, prescribes physical security requirements for storage of new and used IT equipment. Although VA management has taken some actions to improve inventory controls, strengthening the overall control environment and establishing and implementing specific IT equipment controls will require a renewed focus, oversight, and continuing commitment throughout the organization. Management actions taken or under way to address previously identified IT equipment inventory control weaknesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2004, GAO reported that the six Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers it audited lacked a reliable property control database and had problems with implementation of VA inventory policies and procedures. Fewer than half the items GAO selected for testing could be located. Most of the missing items were information technology (IT ) equipment. Given recent thefts of laptops and data breaches, the requesters were concerned about the adequacy of physical inventory controls over VA IT equipment. GAO was asked to determine (1) the risk of theft, loss, or misappropriation of IT equipment at selected locations; (2) whether selected locations have adequate procedures in place to assure accountability and physical security of IT equipment in the excess property disposal process; and (3) what actions VA management has taken to address identified IT inventory control weaknesses. GAO statistically tested inventory controls at four case study locations.
What GAO Found
A weak overall control environment for VA IT equipment at the four locations GAO audited poses a significant security vulnerability to the nation's veterans with regard to sensitive data maintained on this equipment. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires agencies to establish physical controls to safeguard vulnerable assets, such as IT equipment, which might be vulnerable to risk of loss, and federal records management law requires federal agencies to record essential transactions. However, GAO found that current VA property management policy does not provide guidance for creating records of inventory transactions as changes occur. GAO also found that policies requiring annual inventories of sensitive items, such as IT equipment; adequate physical security; and immediate reporting of lost and missing items have not been enforced. GAO's statistical tests of physical inventory controls at four VA locations identified a total of 123 missing IT equipment items, including 53 computers that could have stored sensitive data. The lack of user-level accountability and inaccurate records on status, location, and item descriptions make it difficult to determine the extent to which actual theft, loss, or misappropriation may have occurred without detection. GAO also found that the four VA locations reported over 2,400 missing IT equipment items, valued at about $6.4 million, identified during physical inventories performed during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Missing items were often not reported for several months and, in some cases, several years. It is very difficult to investigate these losses because information on specific events and circumstances at the time of the losses is not known. GAO's limited tests of computer hard drives in the excess property disposal process found hard drives at two of the four case study locations that contained personal information, including veterans' names and Social Security numbers. GAO's tests did not find any remaining data after sanitization procedures were performed. However, weaknesses in physical security at IT storage locations and delays in completing the data sanitization process heighten the risk of data breach. Although VA management has taken some actions to improve controls over IT equipment, including strengthening policies and procedures, improving the overall control environment for sensitive IT equipment will require a renewed focus, oversight, and continued commitment throughout the organization. |
gao_GAO-08-26 | gao_GAO-08-26_0 | 2). Unless accompanied by offsets or protections, these reforms might reduce the income of disabled workers and dependents. Certain Benefit- Reducing Reform Elements Could Have a Substantial Impact on Disabled Workers and Dependents
Many reform elements could have a substantial impact on the benefits of Social Security recipients, including those of disabled workers and dependents. We considered six such elements that have been included in reform proposals to improve trust fund solvency. Though it would not generally affect initial benefit amounts, a change to Social Security’s cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) could also control costs and improve solvency by limiting the growth of an individual’s benefits over time. Most of the Social Security Reform Elements We Considered Would Reduce Benefits for Virtually All Beneficiaries
According to our projections for the 1985 cohort, four of the five reform elements that we analyzed would reduce total lifetime benefits for more than three-quarters of disabled workers and dependents, relative to currently scheduled benefits. Reform Elements Reduce Median Lifetime Benefits for Disabled Workers and Dependents to Varying Degrees
According to our simulations each of the reform elements we selected would reduce median lifetime benefits for both disabled workers and dependents relative to currently scheduled benefits (figs. In addition, we found that specific options to protect dependent benefits could be targeted to certain vulnerable beneficiaries, such as widows and dependent children. For example, while two protection options focus specifically on disabled adult children (DAC), others, such as partial exemptions could apply to any vulnerable population. Our projections showed that a partial exemption as described above would raise median lifetime benefits from their reduced levels by 7 percent (up to 96 percent of scheduled levels under current law). Protections for Dependent Benefits Could Be Targeted to Certain Vulnerable Beneficiaries, Including Survivors
While protections for disabled workers would generally cover all such beneficiaries, the options for protecting dependent benefits could be more targeted to specific dependents and not necessarily applied to the full range of dependents, which includes spouses, divorcees, widow(er)s, and child survivors. As such, it may be desirable to protect older widow(er)s—along with other individuals who receive benefits for a prolonged period of time—from the effect of a COLA reduction. Some Protection Options May Create New Costs and Unintended Incentives for the Social Security Program
The options for protecting the benefits of disabled workers and those of dependents come at a cost to the Social Security program in terms of its solvency. For example, protecting benefits of dependents by increasing the family maximum could affect an individual’s work decisions. Options Modeled to Protect Benefits of Disabled Workers
Full Exemption
To simulate the effects of fully exempting disabled workers from the various reform elements, we modified the simulation to exclude the benefits of disabled workers from the reform elements. Like other benefits, dependents’ benefits receive annual COLAs. Social Security Reform: Potential Effects on SSA’s Disability Programs and Beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many recent Social Security reform proposals to improve program solvency include elements that would reduce benefits currently scheduled for future recipients. To date, debate has focused primarily on the potential impact on retirees, with less attention to the effects on other Social Security recipients, such as disabled workers and dependents. As these beneficiaries may have fewer alternative sources of income than traditional retirees, there has been interest in considering various options to protect the benefits of disabled workers and certain dependents. This report examines (1) how certain elements of Social Security reform proposals could affect disability and dependent benefits, (2) options for protecting these benefits and how they might affect disabled workers and dependents, and (3) how protecting benefits could affect the Social Security program. To conduct this study, GAO used a microsimulation model to simulate benefits under various reform scenarios. GAO also interviewed experts and reviewed various reform plans, current literature, and GAO's past work.
What GAO Found
We considered several reform elements that could improve Social Security Trust Fund solvency by reducing the initial benefits received or the growth of individual benefits over time. According to our simulations, these reform elements would reduce median lifetime benefits for disabled workers by up to 27 percent and dependents by up to 30 percent of currently scheduled levels. While the size of the benefit reduction could vary across individuals, it could be substantial for the vast majority of these beneficiaries, depending upon the reform element. Options for protecting the benefits of disabled workers and dependents from the impact of reform elements include, among others, a partial exemption, whereby currently scheduled benefits are maintained until retirement age. For example, while simulations showed that one reform element could decrease median lifetime benefits of disabled workers to about 89 percent of currently scheduled levels, a partial exemption could restore them to about 96 percent. Further, these protections could be more targeted. For example, a larger cost of living adjustment would result in more rapid benefit growth for those disabled workers who receive benefits for a prolonged period of time. Some protections for dependent benefits could be targeted to a single group of dependents, such as widows, while others could affect multiple groups. For example, increasing the maximum benefit a family can receive could protect a wider group of beneficiaries, including children and spouses of disabled workers, and disabled adult children. While it may be desirable to protect the benefits of disabled workers and certain dependents, such protections would come at a cost to Social Security. Protecting benefits could lessen the impact that a reform element would have on solvency. In addition, such protections could create incentives to apply for Disability Insurance, if disability benefits remained stable while retirement benefits were reduced. |
gao_RCED-99-132 | gao_RCED-99-132_0 | (For more information on resistant bacteria, see app. Data Insufficient to Determine Full Extent of Public Health Burden Associated With Antibacterial Resistance
Although we found many sources of information about the public health burden in the United States attributable to resistant bacteria, each source provides data on only part of the burden. Data from laboratories that monitor for resistant bacteria, however, show that resistance in human and animal bacteria is increasing in four ways. Bacteria are becoming resistant to additional antibacterials. Antibacterial drugs are used in both people and animals. Antibacterial residues in some foods are monitored, but little is known about other residues. A Number of Federal and International Agencies Are Collecting Some Information About Antibacterial Resistance
A number of federal agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funds collect information about the number of resistant infections, the prevalence of resistant bacteria, the cost of treating resistant disease, and the use of antibacterials; some ongoing efforts involve collaboration among several agencies. Conclusions
Although many studies have documented cases of infections that are difficult to treat because they are caused by resistant bacteria, the full extent of the problem remains unknown. The development and spread of resistant bacteria worldwide and the widespread use of various antibacterials create the potential for the U.S. public health burden to increase. A number of federal and federally funded agencies are collecting information about different aspects of antibacterial resistance, and some ongoing efforts involve collaboration among agencies. However, there is little information about the extent of the following: common diseases that can be caused by resistant bacteria, are acquired in the community, and do not typically result in hospitalization, such as otitis media; the development of resistant properties in bacteria that do not normally cause disease but that can pass these properties on to bacteria that do; antibacterial use, particularly in animals, and antibacterial residues in places other than food; and the development of resistant disease and resistant bacteria and the use of antibacterials globally. Our focus is on what is known about the burden in the United States resulting from resistance, but we considered global developments in assessing the potential future burden. We did not attempt to examine all federal efforts related to antimicrobial resistance, but focused on efforts to collect and provide information on cases of resistant infections, resistance in bacteria, use of antibacterials, and the cost of treating resistant diseases. To conduct our work, we reviewed scientific and medical literature; identified sources of data; and consulted experts in government, including those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Health Care Financing Administration, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the World Health Organization. Many studies are also focused on bacteria isolated from patients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the potential threat to the public's health from antimicrobial resistant bacteria, focusing on: (1) what is known about the public health burden--in terms of illnesses, deaths and treatment costs--due to antimicrobial resistance; (2) potential future burden, given what is known about the development of resistance in microbes and usage of antimicrobials; and (3) federal efforts to gather and provide information about resistance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although many studies have documented cases of infections that are difficult to treat because they are caused by resistant bacteria, the full extent of the problem remains unknown; (2) GAO found many sources of information about the public health burden in the United States attributable to resistant bacteria, but each source has limitations and provides data on only part of the burden; (3) the public health burden attributable to resistant tuberculosis and gonorrhea is relatively well characterized because nationwide surveillance systems monitor these diseases; (4) little is known about the extent of most other diseases that can be caused by resistant bacteria, such as otitis media (middle ear infection), gastric ulcers, and cystitis (inflammation of the bladder) because they are not similarly monitored; (5) the development and spread of resistant bacteria worldwide and the widespread use of various antibacterials create the potential for the U.S. public health burden to increase; (6) data indicate that resistant bacteria are emerging around the world, that more kinds of bacteria are becoming resistant, and that bacteria are becoming resistant to multiple drugs; (7) while little information is publicly available about the actual quantities of antibacterials produced, used, and present in the environment, it is known that antibacterials are used extensively around the world in human and veterinary medicine, in agricultural production, and in industrial and household products and that they have been found in food, soil, and water; (8) a number of federal agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funds collect information about different aspects of antibacterial resistance, and some ongoing efforts involve collaboration among agencies; (9) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primary source of information about the number of infections caused by resistant bacteria; (10) CDC also collects information on resistance found in bacterial samples and the use of antibacterial drugs in human medicine; (11) CDC, the Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration are collaborating on efforts to monitor resistant bacteria that can contaminate the food supply; (12) the Department of Defense conducts surveillance for antibacterial resistance at 13 military sites in the United States and at its 6 overseas laboratories; and (13) the World Health Organization serves as a clearinghouse for data on resistance in bacteria isolated from people and animals from many different countries. |
gao_GAO-11-168 | gao_GAO-11-168_0 | As a result of the review, in August 2008, IRS began defining a new strategy to address the challenges confronting CADE and deliver improved individual tax processing capabilities sooner. CADE 2 Is Expected to Deliver Functionality in Three Phases (Transition States)
CADE 2 is expected to deliver its functionality incrementally through three phases known as transition states. IRS Has Established a New Management Structure for the CADE 2 Program
While the MITS organization has primary responsibility for developing, managing, and delivering the CADE 2 program, IRS has established a new governance approach for the program, including the CADE 2 PMO that is to manage the program and the relationship with the program’s stakeholders, define the solution specifications to meet the requirements and the delivery of the program scope, and specify the roles and responsibilities of all parties. IRS Has Identified Benefits and Set Most Related Targets for the First Phase but Has Yet to Do So for the Second Phase
For TS1, IRS has identified 20 benefits. These benefits span three categories: service; compliance; and other benefits, including reduced system costs and improved security benefits. Our past work at IRS established that quantitative targets can be useful for tracking program performance. While it may not always be possible to quantify targets, doing so helps to objectively measure the extent to which expected benefits have been realized. According to IRS, committing to what can be delivered in TS2 is contingent upon a number of decisions yet to be made. IRS’s Estimates the First Two Phases of CADE 2 Will Total About $1.3 Billion; Process for Developing Estimates Was Largely Consistent with Best Practices
In July 2009, IRS reported preliminary life cycle cost estimates for TS1 and TS2 of about $1.3 billion through 2024, including about $377 million for development and $922 million for operations and maintenance. Third, IRS did not conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules on its estimates. IRS officials stated they intend to include a sensitivity analysis in the revised cost estimates expected to be available by the completion of our audit. IRS’s risk management process for CADE 2 is generally consistent with best practices. These include moving certain activities up, performing others concurrently and adding checkpoints to monitor the program’s status. While these actions may increase the likelihood of meeting the schedule, some of them, such as performing activities concurrently, could potentially introduce more risk to CADE 2’s successful development and implementation. Similarly, addressing TS2 benefits and related targets as the design is being considered could influence design decisions and help identify early on how systems and processes might be affected. In developing cost estimates for the first two phases of CADE 2, IRS did not disclose all excluded costs, provide a rationale for documented excluded costs, adjust for inflation, or perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules. To its credit, IRS has established a risk management process that is generally consistent with best practices and has identified mitigation strategies to address each identified risk. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the appropriate officials to take the following five actions: to provide a better basis for measuring CADE 2 performance in achieving TS1 benefits, set the remaining quantitative targets where feasible as soon as possible in 2011; in conjunction with developing the approach for TS2 expected in May 2011, finalize the phase’s expected benefits, set quantitative targets where feasible, and identify how related systems and business processes might be affected; and to ensure the revised estimates for CADE 2 are credible, include inflation when calculating costs, include the costs IRS explicitly excluded or provide a rationale for excluding them, and include any business costs associated with moving to daily processing or document that these costs were excluded and provide a rationale for excluding them. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
IRS’s Commissioner provided written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in app. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed, our objectives were to 1. determine whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has identified the expected benefits of Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) 2 and set targets for measuring success, 2. examine the estimated costs of CADE 2 and assess IRS’s process for 3. assess IRS’s process for managing the risks associated with CADE 2 and describe the risks IRS has identified using this process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began defining a new strategy for modernizing the way it manages individual taxpayer accounts. The strategy, known as Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) 2, is expected to provide service, compliance, and other benefits to IRS and to taxpayers beginning in 2012. IRS expects to implement CADE 2 in three phases. The first phase is expected to be delivered in 2012, the second in 2014, and the third at a later yet to be determined date. GAO was asked to (1) determine whether IRS has identified the expected benefits of CADE 2 and set targets for measuring success, (2) examine the estimated costs and assess IRS's process for developing them, and (3) assess IRS's process for managing the risks associated with CADE 2 and describe the risks IRS has identified using this process. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant documentation, attended program review meetings, and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
IRS has identified 20 service, compliance, and other benefits for the first phase of CADE 2, including increasing the percentage of refunds processed daily and reducing the number of erroneous notices due to better account information, and has set quantitative targets for most of these benefits. GAO has previously reported that quantitative targets can be useful for tracking program performance. While it may not always be possible to quantify targets, doing so helps to objectively measure the extent to which expected benefits have been realized. However, IRS has not yet finalized expected benefits for the second phase or set related quantitative targets, because, according to officials, these are contingent upon yet to be made design and funding decisions. Nevertheless, addressing the second phase's benefits and related targets as the design is being considered could influence design decisions and help identify early on how systems and processes might be affected. IRS reported preliminary life cycle cost estimates for the first two phases of the CADE 2 program of about $1.3 billion through 2024. This includes about $377 million for development and $922 million for operations and maintenance. IRS's process for developing the preliminary estimates was generally consistent with best practices. However, the agency did not follow three practices intended to improve the credibility of cost estimates. Specifically, IRS did not (1) consistently document excluded costs or provide a rationale for excluding them; (2) use inflation in calculating costs; and (3) perform an analysis to examine the effects of changing ground rules and assumptions. While IRS stated it would perform the analysis of changing ground rules and assumptions in revised estimates to be available by the completion of our audit, until the agency implements all these practices its estimates may not be credible. IRS's process for managing the risks associated with CADE 2 is generally consistent with best practices. Through its process, IRS identified significant risks facing CADE 2, including that filing season and other top information technology investment priorities may result in contention for key resources, the delivery of the first phase of CADE 2 may be delayed if deficiencies identified in requirements are not corrected in a timely manner, and the risk that technical challenges and other risks to implementing the database identified as a result of prototyping efforts may not be addressed. To its credit, IRS has developed mitigation strategies for each identified risk. While IRS is working to ensure CADE 2 is successfully managed, the schedule for delivering the initial phase is nevertheless ambitious. IRS officials have acknowledged this and are taking actions to increase their chances of meeting it, including moving certain activities up, performing others concurrently, and adding checkpoints to monitor the program's status. While these actions may increase the likelihood of meeting the schedule, some of them, such as performing activities concurrently, could potentially introduce more risk to CADE 2's successful development and implementation. GAO's recommendations include (1) identifying all of the second phase benefits, setting the related targets, and identifying how systems and business processes might be affected; and (2) improving the credibility of revised cost estimates by including all costs or providing a rationale for excluded costs, and adjusting costs for inflation. In its comments on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-105 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-105_0 | Businesses
When the Congress passed title II of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992, it was concerned that the existing federal export promotion programs lacked coordination and an overall strategy. To improve export services, the Congress mandated, in the 1992 act, that the TPCC develop a governmentwide strategic plan that establishes priorities for federal activities supporting U.S. exports, and propose an annual unified federal trade promotion budget that supports the plan. Specifically, the TPCC expected that development of a government strategy would be helped by devising performance measures as a means to reallocate resources and attain a unified budget; establishment of partnerships with the public and private sectors would be assisted by such actions as simplifying federal services, setting up “one-stop shops” for exporters, and streamlining the export working capital programs of the Eximbank and the SBA; and provision of export services for U.S. exporters similar to those received by foreign competitors would help U.S. companies compete on a “level playing field” abroad. Results of Our Past Work on Government Efforts to Improve U.S. Export Promotion Programs
Our past work has focused on several elements of the governmentwide strategy to improve the delivery of export promotion programs. Steps Taken to Help U.S. Export Assistance Centers
In creating the nationwide network of one-stop shops, representatives of the Department of Commerce and the SBA—two federal agencies with extensive export promotion field networks—were combined and, in some cases, the Eximbank representatives were included as well. Since the Eximbank and the SBA have programs designed to increase the availability of export working capital for businesses, the TPCC recommended that the Eximbank and the SBA harmonize their programs and procedures to make them more streamlined, consistent, and simple. Past GAO work has addressed the nature and extent of U.S. foreign competitors’ export finance programs, a key U.S. effort to combat foreign competitor practices, and opportunities for reducing the cost of the Eximbank’s programs while remaining competitive with programs of competitor export credit agencies. However, a driving force behind the passage of the Export Enhancement Act was to identify areas of overlap and duplication among the various federal export promotion activities and propose means of eliminating them. While a number of initiatives have been taken, our past review of the export assistance centers raised several issues related to the integration of the delivery of services. The TPCC agencies have not since evaluated how effectively these centers are operating to achieve the intended objective of streamlining the delivery and quality of services to small- and medium-sized business. The TPCC plans to review the effectiveness of the centers in 1998. Export-Import Bank: Reauthorization Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-147, Apr. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed issues related to the U.S. government's role in promoting exports, focusing on the: (1) evolution of the government strategy designed to reshape federal export promotion activities; and (2) results and issues related to GAO's past work on U.S. government efforts to improve U.S. export promotion programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Congress, in enacting the Export Enhancement Act of 1992, required the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) to improve the delivery of export assistance to U.S. firms; (2) the TPCC efforts have focused on three broad areas: (a) devising a governmentwide strategy and a unified budget that would set priorities; (b) developing partnerships with all levels of government and the private sector; and (c) dealing with obstacles that U.S. businesses encounter as they compete against businesses supported by their foreign governments; (3) the TPCC has taken a number of steps in each of these areas, but some of their goals remain elusive; (4) with respect to the strategy, the cooperating agencies have established priority foreign markets and increased the visibility of the components and distribution of the aggregate federal expenditures on export promotion activities; (5) partnerships have been developed through a number of initiatives, including a network of export assistance centers to help unify the delivery of export promotion services, and making the U.S. Export-Import Bank's (Eximbank) and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) working capital program procedures more consistent and to enable exporters to receive financing more easily; (6) the TPCC has also worked to keep U.S. financing programs fully competitive; (7) GAO's work also suggests that outstanding issues remain regarding the effectiveness of the cooperative efforts of the agencies under the TPCC to achieve the congressional objectives of the 1992 legislation; (8) for example, while the expenditures of the 19 federal agencies are now clearly presented in one place, major challenges remain for achieving the unified budget that would align resources with national priorities and program performance; (9) while the Department of Commerce and the SBA have colocated in 19 cities, with some closer ties with Eximbank officials, no evaluation has been completed on how effectively these centers are operating to achieve the intended objective of streamlining the delivery and quality of services to small- and medium-sized businesses; and (10) the elapsing of 5 years since the passage of the Export Enhancement Act provides a good opportunity for Congress to assess the achievements and remaining challenges for the effort to strategize, streamline, and coordinate the wide array of federal export promotion efforts through the institutional mechanism of the TPCC. |
gao_GAO-07-212 | gao_GAO-07-212_0 | For example, in 2005 over 16 million BSA reports were filed by financial institutions. FinCEN and IRS Have Distinct Roles in Implementing BSA, but Share Some Responsibilities
FinCEN’s role is to oversee administration of BSA government wide. However, FinCEN also relies on other agencies in implementing the BSA framework, including (1) ensuring compliance with BSA requirements to report certain financial transactions, (2) conducting investigations of criminal financial activity, and (3) collecting and storing the reported information IRS is involved in all three of these areas. FinCEN and IRS Continue to Face Challenges in Identifying the Population of NBFIs Subject to BSA Requirements
Several efforts have been made to estimate the NBFI population, but all of these estimates have weaknesses. However, IRS and other knowledgeable observers agree that IRS has only identified a portion of the population. IRS has identified 107,000 potential NBFIs, but has not been able to determine how many of these businesses are subject to BSA. IRS Is Developing a Statistically Valid Risk- Based Approach to Selecting Businesses for Compliance Examinations, but Limitations Will Continue to Exist
IRS does not have a statistically valid risk-based approach for targeting NBFIs for BSA compliance examinations, but it is working on developing such an approach for a segment of MSBs. A risk-based approach is important for selecting NBFIs for compliance examinations because IRS only has resources to examine a small fraction of NBFIs each year. For example, in 2005, IRS completed 3,712 examinations— 3.5 percent of the 107,246 potential NBFIs in its database. IRS’s research project is a step in the right direction. IRS’s research study was not designed to be representative of all the potential MSBs identified by IRS. Identifying unknown NBFIs is inherently challenging and gradual—no easy solution exists for addressing this problem. FinCEN and IRS Lack a Documented and Coordinated Strategy for Improving NBFI Compliance with BSA Requirements
FinCEN and IRS have taken a number of steps to improve efforts to ensure that NBFIs comply with BSA, but they lack a documented and coordinated strategy for moving forward. Missed Opportunities for Effective Planning and Poor Project Management and Oversight Have Hampered FinCEN’s Efforts to Reengineer BSA Data Management Activities
In 2003 FinCEN began an effort to reengineer BSA data management activities However, the cornerstone of FinCEN’s reengineering effort, BSA Direct R&S, was permanently halted because of a multitude of problems. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should direct the Office of Fraud/BSA to build upon the study to validate compliance risk factors by developing a plan to assess the noncompliance risks posed by all NBFIs; establish time frames for finalizing and publishing the Internal Revenue Manual with updated BSA compliance program policies and procedures; develop a NBFI compliance examiner’s manual that examiners can use to guide examinations and businesses can use to ensure they are in compliance with BSA requirements, and establish time frames for its publication; create a more functional and secure mechanism for storing and accessing the information contained in the Title 31 database; and use the results of the forthcoming risk factor validation study to estimate the compliance rate for the population of MSBs from which the study sample was drawn. This plan, at a minimum, should take a broad and crosscutting approach to the reengineering effort, and not focus solely on one component, such as BSA Direct; include short- and intermediate-term goals for reengineering BSA data management processes, including the transition of IRS’s data management responsibilities to FinCEN; and incorporate collaboration strategies into the plan by clearly defining the role of IRS’s ECC-DET in the transition process and more actively involving it as a key stakeholder in the reengineering effort. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) related roles and responsibilities, we reviewed and summarized relevant legislative and regulatory authorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, over 16 million Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports were filed by more than 200,000 U.S. financial institutions. Enacted in 1970, BSA is the centerpiece of the nation's efforts to detect and deter criminal financial activities. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) play key roles in BSA compliance, enforcement, and data management. GAO was asked to describe FinCEN's and IRS's roles and assess their effectiveness at ensuring BSA compliance and efforts to reengineer BSA data management.
What GAO Found
FinCEN and IRS have distinct roles, but share some responsibilities in implementing BSA. FinCEN's role is to oversee the administration of BSA by numerous agencies including IRS. IRS's role is to (1) examine nonbank financial institutions (NBFI), such as money transmitters and check cashers, for compliance with BSA; (2) investigate potential criminal BSA violations; and (3) collect and store BSA reported data by all financial institutions. IRS continues to face challenges in identifying NBFIs subject to BSA and then using its limited resources to ensure compliance. First, IRS has identified approximately 107,000 potential NBFIs, yet FinCEN, IRS, and others agree there is a portion of the NBFI population IRS has not identified. Identifying NBFIs is inherently challenging and made even more difficult because FinCEN regulations about who is covered are confusing, especially for smaller businesses. Second, IRS currently lacks, but is working to develop, a statistically valid risk-based approach for selecting NBFIs for compliance examinations. IRS only examines a small fraction of NBFIs, less than 3.5 percent in 2005, highlighting the need for building risk into the selection process. IRS is statistically validating a risk-based approach for targeting compliance examinations on certain NBFIs suspected of noncompliance. IRS's validation study is a step in the right direction, but IRS's approach will continue to have limitations because the study was not designed to be representative of all potential NBFIs. And lastly, IRS established a new office accountable for BSA compliance, and is working to improve examination guidance. However, IRS's management of BSA compliance has limitations, such as a lack of a compliance rate measure and a comprehensive manual that NBFIs can use to develop anti-money laundering programs compliant with BSA. Addressing program challenges, such as identifying NBFIs and examining those of greatest risk of noncompliance will take time and require prioritizing actions and identifying resource needs. However, FinCEN and IRS lack a documented and coordinated strategy with time frames, priorities, and resource needs for improving NBFI compliance with BSA requirements. FinCEN has undertaken a broad and long-term effort to reengineer, and transition from the IRS, all BSA data management activities. FinCEN, however, missed opportunities to effectively plan this effort and to coordinate its implementation with IRS. For example, FinCEN began making significant investments in information technology projects before a comprehensive plan to guide the reengineering effort was in place. When a key project--BSA Direct Retrieval and Sharing--failed, it jeopardized the future of the broader reengineering effort. After investing over $14 million (nearly $6 million over the original budget) in a failed project, FinCEN is now reassessing BSA Direct but does not yet have a plan for moving forward with the broader effort to reengineer BSA data management activities. |
gao_GAO-01-155 | gao_GAO-01-155_0 | DPW is responsible for processing, accounting for, and reporting on the Fund’s financial activities. The following sections summarize the results of our review of information system general controls over the District financial systems used to manage Fund operations. Conclusions
Information system general controls are critical to the District’s ability to ensure the reliability of Fund and other District financial information and maintain the confidentiality of sensitive personnel and tax information. A primary reason for the District’s information system control problems is that it did not have a comprehensive security management program. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed information system general controls over the financial systems that process and account for the financial activities of the District of Columbia's Highway Trust Fund.
What GAO Found
GAO identified serious computer security weaknesses that place District information at risk of deliberate or inadvertent misuse. These general control problems affected the District's ability to (1) prevent or detect unauthorized changes to sensitive data and (2) control electronic and physical access to confidential information. The District's lack of a comprehensive computer management program was the primary reason for its information system control problems. |
gao_GAO-12-42 | gao_GAO-12-42_0 | EPA’s initial gains in productivity under the revised process have not been sustained. Initial Gains in Productivity under the Revised Process Have Not Been Sustained
Shortly after it implemented its revised IRIS assessment process in May 2009, EPA experienced a surge of productivity in terms of the number of IRIS assessments it issued. The increased productivity occurring after May 2009 does not appear to be entirely attributable to the revised IRIS assessment process. Beyond the 55 ongoing IRIS assessments and 14 on hold, the demand for additional IRIS assessments is unclear. With existing resources devoted to addressing its current workload of ongoing assessments, EPA has not been in a position to routinely start new assessments. EPA Faces Long- standing and New Challenges in Implementing the IRIS Program
EPA faces both long-standing and new challenges in implementing the IRIS Program. In July 2011, EPA announced that it planned to respond to the National Academies’ suggestions by implementing changes to the way it develops draft IRIS assessments. Therefore, current and accurate information regarding when an assessment will be started, which assessments are currently ongoing, and when an assessment is projected to be completed is presently not publicly available. Conclusions
The IRIS process reforms EPA began implementing in May 2009 have restored EPA’s control of the process and increased its transparency. Notably, EPA has addressed concerns we raised in our March 2008 report regarding the transparency of comments from both the interagency science consultation and discussion steps in the IRIS process. Progress in other areas, however, has been more limited. For example, even for its less challenging assessments, EPA took longer than its established time frames for accomplishing steps in the revised process— calling into question the feasibility and appropriateness of the established time frames in the IRIS assessment process for standard assessments. We note that EPA has not analyzed the time frames to determine whether the actual time taken for each step of the overall 23-month process is realistic. Consequently, as part of its independent scientific review of EPA’s draft IRIS assessment of formaldehyde, the National Academies also provided suggestions in a “roadmap for revision” that included suggestions for improving EPA’s development and presentation of draft IRIS assessments in general. Many of the issues raised in the National Academies’ report have been brought to the agency’s attention previously. It is unclear whether any independent entity with scientific and technical credibility, such as EPA’s Board of Scientific Counselors, will have a role in reviewing EPA’s planned response to the National Academies’ suggestions to ensure that EPA addresses these long-standing issues. To better ensure the credibility of IRIS assessments by enhancing their clarity and transparency, we recommend that the EPA Administrator require the Office of Research and Development to submit for independent review to an independent entity with scientific and technical credibility, such as EPA’s Board of Scientific Counselors, a plan for how EPA will implement the National Academies’ suggestions for improving IRIS assessments in the “roadmap for revision” presented in the National Academies’ peer review report on the draft formaldehyde assessment. To ensure that current and accurate information on chemicals that EPA plans to assess through IRIS is available to IRIS users—including stakeholders such as EPA program and regional offices, other federal agencies, and the public—we recommend that the EPA Administrator direct the Office of Research and Development to annually publish the IRIS agenda in the Federal Register each fiscal indicate in published IRIS agendas which chemicals EPA is actively assessing and when EPA plans to start assessments of the other listed chemicals; and update IRISTrack to display all current information on the status of assessments of chemicals on the IRIS agenda, including projected and actual start dates, and projected and actual dates for completion of steps in the IRIS process, and keep this information current. Specifically, EPA agreed that it should (1) assess the feasibility and appropriateness of the established time frames for each step in the IRIS assessment process by using available program performance measures collected since the current IRIS process was established to evaluate determine whether different time frames should be established, based on complexity or other criteria, for different types of IRIS assessments, (2) determine if different time frames are necessary, establish a written policy that clearly describes the applicability of the time frames for each type of IRIS assessment and ensures that the time frames are realistic and provide greater predictability to stakeholders, (3) continue to implement the 2011 suggestions for improving IRIS assessments in the “roadmap for revision” presented in the National Academies’ peer review report on the draft formaldehyde assessment and seek independent review through the Science Advisory Board to ensure that the agency is addressing the recommendations, (4) annually publish the IRIS agenda in the Federal Register each fiscal year, (5) indicate in published IRIS agendas which chemicals EPA is actively assessing and when EPA plans to start assessments of the other listed chemicals, and (6) update IRISTrack to display all current information on the status of assessments of chemicals on the IRIS agenda, including projected and actual start dates, and projected and actual dates for completion of steps in the IRIS process, and keep this information current. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to assess the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) management of its Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). For this review, our objectives were to evaluate (1) EPA’s progress in completing IRIS assessments under the May 2009 process and (2) the challenges, if any, that EPA faces in implementing the IRIS Program. In addition, we interviewed officials from EPA’s National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA) who manage the IRIS Program, including the Acting Center Director, the Associate Director for Health, and the IRIS Program Acting Director, to obtain their perspectives on, among other things, the May 2009 IRIS process and the effects of changes from the April 2008 IRIS process, the extent to which EPA has made progress in completing timely, credible chemical assessments, challenges EPA faces in completing assessments, and EPA’s process for responding to Data Quality Act challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) Program supports EPA's mission to protect human health and the environment by providing the agency's scientific position on the potential human health effects from exposure to various chemicals in the environment. The IRIS database contains quantitative toxicity assessments of more than 550 chemicals and provides fundamental scientific components of human health risk assessments. In response to a March 2008 GAO report on the IRIS program, EPA revised its IRIS assessment process in May 2009. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) EPA's progress in completing IRIS assessments under the May 2009 process and (2) the challenges, if any, that EPA faces in implementing the IRIS program. To do this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed EPA productivity data, among other things, and interviewed EPA officials.
What GAO Found
EPA's May 2009 revisions to the IRIS process have restored EPA's control of the process, increased its transparency, and established a new 23-month time frame for its less challenging assessments. Notably, EPA has addressed concerns GAO raised in its March 2008 report and now makes the determination of when to move an assessment to external peer review and issuance--decisions that were made by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the prior IRIS process. In addition, EPA has increased the transparency of the IRIS process by making comments provided by other federal agencies during the interagency science consultation and discussion steps of the IRIS process available to the public. Progress in other areas, however, has been limited. EPA's initial gains in productivity under the revised process have not been sustained. After completing 16 assessments within the first year and a half of implementing the revised process, EPA completed 4 assessments in fiscal year 2011. Further, the increase in productivity does not appear to be entirely attributable to the revised IRIS assessment process and instead came largely from (1) clearing the backlog of IRIS assessments that had undergone work under the previous IRIS process and (2) issuing assessments that were less challenging to complete. EPA has taken longer than the established time frames for completing steps in the revised process for most of its less challenging assessments. However, EPA has not analyzed its established time frames to assess the feasibility of the time frame for each step or the overall 23-month process. The agency's progress has also been limited in completing assessments that it classifies as exceptionally complex and reducing its ongoing assessments workload. Beyond the 55 ongoing IRIS assessments, the backlog of demand for additional IRIS assessments is unclear. With existing resources devoted to addressing its current workload of ongoing assessments, EPA has not been in a position to routinely start new assessments.
EPA faces both long-standing and new challenges in implementing the IRIS program. First, EPA has not fully addressed recurring issues concerning the clarity and transparency of its development and presentation of draft IRIS assessments. For example, as part of its independent scientific review of EPA's draft IRIS assessment of formaldehyde, the National Academies provided suggestions for improving EPA's development and presentation of draft IRIS assessments in general, including that EPA use a standardized approach to evaluate and describe study strengths and weaknesses and the weight of evidence. EPA announced that it planned to respond to the National Academies' suggestions by implementing changes to the way it develops draft IRIS assessments. Given that many of the issues raised by the National Academies have been long-standing, it is unclear whether any entity with scientific and technical credibility, such as an EPA advisory committee, will have a role in conducting an independent review of EPA's planned response to the suggestions. In addition, EPA has not addressed other long-standing issues regarding the availability and accuracy of current information to users of IRIS information, such as EPA program offices, on the status of IRIS assessments, including when an assessment will be started, which assessments are ongoing, and when an assessment is projected to be completed. GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA assess the feasibility of the established time frames for each step in the IRIS assessment process and make changes if necessary, submit for independent review to an entity with scientific and technical credibility a plan for how EPA will implement the National Academies' suggestions, and ensure that current and accurate information on chemicals that EPA plans to assess through IRIS is available to IRIS users. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted specific actions it will take to implement them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA assess the feasibility of the established time frames for each step in the IRIS assessment process and make changes if necessary, submit for independent review to an entity with scientific and technical credibility a plan for how EPA will implement the National Academies suggestions, and ensure that current and accurate information on chemicals that EPA plans to assess through IRIS is available to IRIS users. EPA agreed with GAOs recommendations and noted specific actions it will take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-05-144 | gao_GAO-05-144_0 | Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge TSA’s Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities and Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders
TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall, systematic assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. In addition, the FBI stated that intelligence indicates that terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft in the past to conduct attacks. To better focus its efforts and resources, TSA intends to implement a risk management approach to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation aircraft and airports, and conduct on- site vulnerability assessments only at those airports the agency determines to be nationally critical. However, TSA has not yet developed a plan with specific milestones for implementing these tools and assessments. Despite these plans, however, TSA has not developed an implementation plan with specific milestones for conducting its risk management efforts. For example, TSA has developed a regulation governing background checks of foreign candidates for flight training at U.S. flight schools and issued security guidelines for general aviation airports. FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and events, among other things, to guard against potential terrorist threats. We found limitations in the monitoring of these flight-training programs. Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General Aviation Security
Nonfederal stakeholders with an interest in general aviation security— including industry associations, state governments, general aviation airport operators (owners and managers), and users of general aviation airports and aircraft—have taken steps to strengthen the security of general aviation airports and operations. Industry associations have developed and provided recommendations on best practices for enhancing security around general aviation airports, have partnered with the federal government to develop federally endorsed security guidelines, and have sponsored and provided training for their own voluntary security programs. Some states also have suggested best practices, established regulations, and provided funding to general aviation airports to reduce security vulnerabilities. For example: The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, working with TSA, established and operates the Airport Watch program. While the federal government can provide guidance and some amount of funding for security enhancements, long-term success in securing general aviation depends on a partnership among the federal government, state governments, and the general aviation industry. In addition, FAA has not documented its process for reviewing and revalidating the need for continuing security-related flight restrictions on airspace that are established for indefinite periods. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what steps the federal government has taken to identify and assess threats to and vulnerabilities of general aviation, and communicate that information to stakeholders, we interviewed individuals in the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Transportation Security Policy, Office of Operations Policy, and General Aviation Operations and Inspections Office on TSA’s role in enhancing general aviation security. To determine what steps the federal government has taken to strengthen general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges the government faces in further enhancing security, we obtained and analyzed information from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including data on the number of flight restrictions that affect general aviation and the amount of federal funding that has been spent on enhancing general aviation security. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal intelligence agencies have reported that in the past, terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft (all aviation other than commercial and military) for terrorist acts, and that the September 11th terrorists learned to fly at general aviation flight schools. The questions GAO answered regarding the status of general aviation security included (1) What actions has the federal government taken to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities of, general aviation; and communicate that information to stakeholders? (2) What steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government face; and (3) What steps have non-federal stakeholders taken to enhance the security of general aviation?
What GAO Found
The federal and state governments and general aviation industry all play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal government provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and provides some funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport operators. Although TSA has issued a limited threat assessment of general aviation, and the FBI identified that terrorists have considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, to assess airport vulnerabilities, TSA plans to issue a self-assessment tool for airport operators' use, but it does not plan to conduct on-site vulnerability assessments at all general aviation airports due to the cost and vastness of the general aviation network. Instead, TSA intends to use a systematic and analytical risk management process, which is considered a best practice, to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation. However, TSA has not yet developed an implementation plan for its risk management efforts. TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to address security risks to general aviation through regulation and guidance, but still face challenges in their efforts to further enhance security. For example, TSA has promulgated regulations requiring background checks of foreign candidates for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security guidelines for general aviation airports. However, we found limitations in the process used to conduct compliance inspections of flight training programs. In addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special events. However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively affect the general aviation industry. Non-federal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the federal government and have individually taken steps to enhance general aviation security. For example, industry associations developed best practices and recommendations for securing general aviation, and have partnered with TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport Watch Program, similar to a neighborhood watch program. Some state governments have also provided funding for enhancing security at general aviation airports, and many airport operators GAO surveyed took steps to enhance security such as installing fencing and increasing police patrols. |
gao_GAO-05-536 | gao_GAO-05-536_0 | RRGs Have Had a Small but Important Effect on Increasing the Availability and Affordability of Commercial Liability Insurance
RRGs have had a small but important effect on increasing the availability and affordability of commercial liability insurance, specifically for groups that have had limited access to liability insurance. Difficulties in finding affordable commercial liability insurance prompted the creation of more RRGs from 2002 through 2004 than in the previous 15 years. Three-quarters of the RRGs formed in this period responded to a recent shortage of, and high prices for, medical malpractice insurance. 1). As a result, RRGs generally domicile in those states that permit their formation as captive insurance companies, rather than in the states in which they conduct most of their business. Most RRGs Have Domiciled in States That Charter Them as Captives but Have Conducted Most of Their Business in Other States
Regulatory requirements for captive insurers are generally less restrictive than those for traditional insurers and offer RRGs several financial advantages. Moreover, even among states that charter RRGs as captives, the financial reporting requirements for RRGs vary. Some Evidence Suggests That States Have Set Their Captive Regulatory Standards to Attract RRGs to Domicile in Their States
Some regulators, including those from New York, California, and Texas— states where RRGs collectively wrote about 26 percent of all their business but did not domicile—expressed concerns that domiciliary states were lowering their regulatory standards to attract RRGs to domicile in their states for economic development purposes. RRG Failures Have Raised Questions about the Sufficiency of LRRA Provisions for RRG Ownership, Control, and Governance
Because LRRA does not comprehensively address how RRGs may be owned, controlled, or governed, RRGs may be operated in ways that do not consistently protect the best interests of their insureds. Consequently, some regulators were concerned that RRGs were being chartered primarily for purposes other than self-insurance, such as making a profit for someone other than the collective insureds. Further, LRRA does not recognize that separate companies typically manage RRGs. Yet, past RRG failures suggest that sometimes management companies have promoted their own interests at the expense of the insureds. However, the regulation of RRGs by a single state, in combination with the recent increase in the number of states new to domiciling RRGs, the increase in the number of RRGs offering medical malpractice insurance, and a wide variance in regulatory practices, has increased the potential for future solvency risks. As a result, RRG members and their claimants could benefit from greater regulatory consistency. Yet, LRRA has no provisions that establish the insureds’ authority over management. Thus, the mandated development and implementation of uniform, baseline standards for the regulation of RRGs, and the establishment of governance protections, could make the success of RRGs more likely. Amendments to LRRA could require that a majority of an RRG’s board of directors consist of “independent” directors (that is, not be associated with the management company or its affiliates) and require that certain decisions presenting the most serious potential conflicts, such as approving the management contract, be approved by a majority of the independent directors; provide safeguards for negotiating the terms of the management contract— for example, by requiring periodic renewal of management contracts by a majority of the RRG’s independent directors, or a majority of the RRG’s insureds, and guaranteeing the right of a majority of the independent directors or a majority of the insureds to unilaterally terminate management contracts upon reasonable notice; and impose a fiduciary duty upon the management company to act in the best interests of the insureds, especially with respect to compensation for its services. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine the effect risk retention groups (RRG) have had on the availability and affordability of commercial liability insurance; (2) assess whether any significant regulatory problems have resulted from the Liability Risk Retention Act’s (LRRA) partial preemption of state insurance laws; and (3) evaluate the sufficiency of LRRA’s ownership, control, and governance provisions in protecting the interests of RRG insureds. Definitions of acronyms and terms used in this questionnaire Risk Retention Group (RRG): An RRG is a group of members with similar risks that join to create an insurance company to self-insure their risks. 1. In addition, in some states RRGs can be chartered under more than one set of laws. Traditional Insurance Laws/Regs c. Other (Specify): 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress authorized the creation of risk retention groups (RRG) to increase the availability and affordability of commercial liability insurance. An RRG is a group of similar businesses that creates its own insurance company to self-insure its risks. Through the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA), Congress partly preempted state insurance law to create a single-state regulatory framework for RRGs, although RRGs are multistate insurers. Recent shortages of affordable liability insurance have increased RRG formations, but recent failures of several large RRGs also raised questions about the adequacy of RRG regulation. This report (1) examines the effect of RRGs on insurance availability and affordability; (2) assesses whether LRRA's preemption has resulted in significant regulatory problems; and (3) evaluates the sufficiency of LRRA's ownership, control, and governance provisions in protecting the best interests of the RRG insureds.
What GAO Found
RRGs have had a small but important effect in increasing the availability and affordability of commercial liability insurance for certain groups. While RRGs have accounted for about $1.8 billion or about 1.17 percent of all commercial liability insurance in 2003, members have benefited from consistent prices, targeted coverage, and programs designed to reduce risk. A recent shortage of affordable liability insurance prompted the creation of many new RRGs. More RRGs formed in 2002-2004 than in the previous 15 years--and about three-quarters of the new RRGs offered medical malpractice coverage. LRRA's partial preemption of state insurance laws has resulted in a regulatory environment characterized by widely varying state standards. In part, state requirements differ because some states charter RRGs as "captive" insurance companies, which operate under fewer restrictions than traditional insurers. As a result, most RRGs have domiciled in six states that offer captive charters (including some states that have limited experience in regulating RRGs) rather than in the states where they conduct most of their business. Additionally, because most RRGs (as captives) are not subject to the same uniform, baseline standards for solvency regulation as traditional insurers, state requirements in important areas such as financial reporting also vary. For example, some regulators may have difficulty assessing the financial condition of RRGs operating in their state because not all RRGs use the same accounting principles. Further, some evidence exists to support regulator assertions that domiciliary states may be relaxing chartering or other requirements to attract RRGs. Because LRRA does not specify characteristics of ownership and control, or establish governance safeguards, RRGs can be operated in ways that do not consistently protect the best interests of their insureds. For example, LRRA does not explicitly require that the insureds contribute capital to the RRG or recognize that outside firms typically manage RRGs. Thus, some regulators believe that members without "skin in the game" will have less interest in the success and operation of their RRG and that RRGs would be chartered for purposes other than self-insurance, such as making profits for entrepreneurs who form and finance an RRG. LRRA also provides no governance protections to counteract potential conflicts of interest between insureds and management companies. In fact, factors contributing to many RRG failures suggest that sometimes management companies have promoted their own interests at the expense of the insureds. The combination of single-state regulation, growth in new domiciles, and wide variance in regulatory practices has increased the potential that RRGs would face greater solvency risks. As a result, GAO believes RRGs would benefit from uniform, baseline regulatory standards. Also, because many RRGs are run by management companies, they could benefit from corporate governance standards that would establish the insureds' authority over management. |
gao_GAO-16-24 | gao_GAO-16-24_0 | Veterans’ Access to Mental Health Care
VHA policy states that veterans are entitled to timely access to mental health care. Furthermore, veterans discharged from inpatient mental health stays are to receive timely access to follow-up outpatient mental health care. Most Veterans in Our Review Received Care within 30 Days of Their Preferred Dates, but VHA’s Method of Calculating Wait Times Does Not Always Reflect Overall Wait Times
Most Veterans Received Full Mental Health Evaluations within 30 Days of Their Preferred Dates, though VHA’s Access Policies Conflict
Most veterans included in our review received full mental health evaluations, which provide new veterans with an entry point to access mental health care, in an average of 4 days of their preferred dates. At the five VAMCs we visited, the average time in which a veteran received this full evaluation ranged from 0 to 9 days from the preferred date. By not clarifying which access policy currently applies to mental health care, VHA is limited in its ability to effectively manage timely access to mental health care. 2.) On average, our review of 100 new veteran records found that a veteran’s preferred date was 26 days after their initial request or referral for mental health care, though this varied by VAMC. We found this for 50 of the 100 new veterans whose records we reviewed. VHA Monitors Access to Mental Health Care, but Current Policies Cannot Ensure Reliable Data, Which Precludes Effective Oversight
VHA monitors access to mental health care through on-site reviews of clinic operations and sharing data, internally and externally, on mental health access, but the lack of clear policies for reliable data on veteran wait times and missed opportunities precludes effective oversight. These include: (1) the wait-time data-entry process has the potential for errors, (2) data may not be comparable over time, and (3) data may not be comparable across VAMCs. VHA has changed the definitions used to calculate various mental health wait-time measures; thus, these measures may not be comparable over time. VHA has not clearly communicated the definitions used or changes to the definitions, which limits the reliability and usefulness of the wait-time data and VHA’s ability to use these measures to determine progress in meeting stated objectives for veterans’ wait times. Data may not be comparable between VAMCs. blocks of time where veterans may see providers without a scheduled appointment). Without guidance on how appointment scheduling for open-access clinics is to be managed, VAMCs can continue to implement these appointments inconsistently, and place veterans on lists outside of VHA’s scheduling system, potentially leading to serious negative health outcomes for veterans that need mental health care. VHA’s Community Provider Pilot Program Expanded Access to Mental Health Care for a Limited Number of Veterans; VAMCs Reported Successes and Challenges
VHA’s Community Provider Pilot Program Provided Mental Health Care for a Limited Number of Veterans
In 2013, 10 VAMCs across VHA established partnerships with 23 community mental health clinics (CMHCs), as required by an August 2012 Executive Order in an effort to help VHA meet veterans’ mental health needs; these CMHCs provided mental health care to a limited number of veterans. In particular, the way in which VHA calculates the key wait-time measure for new veterans generally does not account for the full amount of time it takes veterans to receive their full mental health evaluations, which we found ranged from 0 days to more than 200 days from their initial requests or referrals. First, the existence of two conflicting access policies (14 days versus 30 days) for a full mental health evaluation, the primary entry point for mental health care, creates confusion among VAMC officials and providers about which policy they are expected to meet. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance VHA’s oversight of veteran mental health care and, in particular, improve and ensure the accuracy, reliability, and usefulness of its mental health data, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following three actions: Issue clarifying guidance on which of its access policies (e.g., 14 day or 30 day) should be used for scheduling new veterans’ full mental health evaluations. In its comments, VHA concurred with our three recommendations and described the agency’s plans to implement each, but disagreed with certain findings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 2005 and 2013, the number of veterans receiving mental health care from VHA increased 63 percent, outpacing overall growth in veterans receiving any VHA health care. In fiscal year 2014, VHA spent more than $3.9 billion providing outpatient specialty mental health care (mental health care) to more than 1.5 million veterans.
GAO was asked to examine VHA's efforts to provide timely access to mental health care for veterans. This report examines, among other things, (1) veterans' access to timely mental health care, and (2) VHA's related oversight. GAO conducted site visits to five VAMCs selected to provide variation in factors such as location and mental health care utilization rates; reviewed a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of 100 medical records (20 from each of the five selected VAMCs) for veterans new to mental health care who received treatment between July 1, 2014, and September 30, 2014; and interviewed VHA and VAMC officials on VHA's measures and oversight of access to mental health care. GAO evaluated VHA's oversight of access to mental health care against relevant federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
The way in which the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) calculates veteran mental health wait times may not always reflect the overall amount of time a veteran waits for care. VHA uses a veteran's preferred date (determined when an appointment is scheduled) to calculate the wait time for that patient's full mental health evaluation, the primary entry point for mental health care. Of the 100 veterans whose records GAO reviewed, 86 received full mental health evaluations within 30 days of their preferred dates. On average, this was within 4 days. However, GAO also found
veterans' preferred dates were, on average, 26 days after their initial requests or referrals for mental health care, and ranged from 0 to 279 days. Further, GAO found the average time in which veterans received their first treatment across the five VA medical centers (VAMC) in its review ranged from 1 to 57 days from the full mental health evaluation.
conflicting access policies for allowable wait times for a full mental health evaluation—14 days (according to VHA's mental health handbook) versus 30 days (set in response to recent legislation) from the veteran's preferred date—created confusion among VAMC officials about which policy they are expected to follow. These conflicting policies are inconsistent with federal internal control standards and can hinder officials' ability to ensure veterans are receiving timely access to mental health care.
VHA monitors access to mental health care, but the lack of clear policies on wait-time data precludes effective oversight. GAO found VHA's wait-time data may not be comparable over time and between VAMCs. Specifically
data may not be comparable over time. VHA has not clearly communicated the definitions used, such as how a new patient is identified, or changes made to these definitions. This limits the reliability and usefulness of the data in determining progress in meeting stated objectives for veterans' timely access to mental health care.
data may not be comparable between VAMCs. For example, when open-access appointments are used, data are not comparable between VAMCs. Open-access appointments are typically blocks of time for veterans to see providers without a scheduled appointment. GAO found inconsistencies in the implementation of these appointments, including one VAMC that manually maintained a list of veterans seeking mental health care outside of VHA's scheduling system. Without guidance stating how to manage and track open-access appointments, data comparisons between VAMCs may be misleading. Moreover, VAMCs may lose track of patients referred for mental health care, placing veterans at risk for negative outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA issue clarifying guidance on (1) access policies; (2) definitions used to calculate wait times; and (3) how open-access appointments are to be managed. VHA concurred with GAO's recommendations but disagreed with certain of its findings, for example, GAO's calculation of overall wait-times. GAO maintains its findings, as discussed in the report, are valid. |
gao_GAO-04-792 | gao_GAO-04-792_0 | Resource Sharing Activities Result in Better Access and Reduced Costs
VA and DOD are realizing benefits from sharing activities, specifically greater access to care, reduced federal costs, and better facility utilization at the 16 sites we reviewed. While all 16 sites were engaged in health resource sharing activities, some sites share significantly more resources than others. Through this agreement VA is able to utilize Navy facilities and reduce its reliance on civilian providers, thus lowering its purchased care cost by about $385,000 annually. Further, according to a VA official, the agreement has allowed VA to modify its plans to build a new hospital and instead build a clinic at significantly reduced cost to meet increasing veteran demand for health care services. For example, the sharing agreement at Los Angeles provided for the use of a nurse practitioner to assist with primary care and the sharing of a psychiatrist and a psychologist. See appendix II for the VA and DOD partners at each of the 16 sites and examples of the sharing activities taking place. VA and DOD Identified Two Obstacles that Impede Resource Sharing
The primary obstacle cited by officials at 14 of 16 sites we interviewed was the inability of computer systems to communicate and share patient health information between departments. Furthermore, local VA and DOD officials involved with sharing activities raised a concern that security check-in procedures implemented since September 11, 2001, have increased the time it takes to gain entry to medical facilities located on military installations during periods of heightened security. The inability of VA and DOD computer systems to share information forces the medical facilities involved in treating both agencies’ patient populations to expend staff resources to maintain patient records in both systems. VA and DOD generally agreed with our findings. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report describes the benefits that are being realized at 16 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Defense (DOD) sites that are engaged in health resource sharing activities. Nine of the sites were the focus of a February 2002 House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs report that described health resource sharing activities between VA and DOD. We selected seven other sites that actively participated in sharing activities to ensure representation from each service at locations throughout the nation. To gain information on the benefits of sharing and the problems that impede sharing at selected VA and DOD sites, we asked VA and DOD personnel at 16 sites to provide us with information on: shared services provided to beneficiaries including improvements or enhancements to delivery of health care to beneficiaries, reduction in costs, and their opinions on barriers or obstacles that exist either internally (within their own agency) or externally (with their partner service or agency). | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has long encouraged the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to share health resources to promote cost-effective use of health resources and efficient delivery of care. In February 2002, the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs described VA and DOD health care resource sharing activities at nine locations. GAO was asked to describe the health resource sharing activities that are occurring at these sites. GAO also examined seven other sites that actively participate in sharing activities. Specifically, GAO is reporting on (1) the types of benefits that have been realized from health resource sharing activities and (2) VA- and DOD-identified obstacles that impede health resource sharing. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials at DOD and VA to obtain information on the benefits achieved through sharing activities. The nine sites reviewed by the Committee and reexamined by GAO are: 1) Los Angeles, CA; 2) San Diego, CA; 3) North Chicago, IL; 4) Albuquerque, NM; 5) Las Vegas, NV; 6) Fayetteville, NC; 7) Charleston, SC; 8) El Paso, TX; and 9) San Antonio, TX. The seven additional sites GAO examined are: 1) Anchorage, AK; 2) Fairfield, CA; 3) Key West, FL; 4) Pensacola, FL; 5) Honolulu, HI; 6) Louisville, KY; and 7) Puget Sound, WA. In commenting on a draft of this report, the departments generally agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
At the 16 sites GAO reviewed, VA and DOD are realizing benefits from sharing activities, specifically better facility utilization, greater access to care, and reduced federal costs. While all 16 sites are engaged in health resource sharing activities, some sites share significantly more resources than others. For example, at one site VA was able to utilize Navy facilities to provide additional sources of care and reduce its reliance on civilian providers, thus lowering its purchased care cost by about $385,000 annually. Also, because of the sharing activity taking place at this site, VA has modified its plans to build a new $100 million hospital and instead plans to build a clinic that will cost about $45 million. However, at another site the sharing activity was limited to the use of a nurse practitioner to assist with primary care and the sharing of a psychiatrist and a psychologist. GAO found that the primary obstacle cited by almost all of the agency officials interviewed was the inability of VA and DOD computer systems to communicate and exchange patient health information between departments. VA and DOD medical facilities involved in treating both agencies' patient populations must expend staff resources to enter information on the health care provided into the patient records in both systems. Local VA officials also expressed a concern that security screening procedures have increased the time it takes for VA beneficiaries and their families to gain entry to facilities located on Air Force, Army, and Navy installations during periods of heightened security. |
gao_GAO-02-358 | gao_GAO-02-358_0 | Background
Several security incidents in the late 1990s highlighted the need for improvements at DOE. DOE and NNSA Have Implemented Many Initiatives, and Lessons Can Be Learned to Improve Future Initiatives
DOE and NNSA have implemented 64 percent of the 75 nuclear security initiatives developed since 1998. Of the remaining initiatives, most are to be completed by December 2002. NNSA Has Begun to Develop a Security Structure and Program, but Key Issues Need to Be Addressed
Since NNSA’s creation, its officials have taken some steps to develop a security structure and program, including staffing offices, developing guidance, reviewing security policies and procedures, and initiating actions to create a security-oriented culture. However, several key issues still need to be addressed to ensure an effective security structure and program. Along with these activities, NNSA has also initiated actions to create a security-oriented culture in its organization. DOE and NNSA have made progress in implementing many of the nuclear security initiatives developed since 1998. Completed. Completed. Completed. Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear Security Administration in Implementing Title 32. | What GAO Found
In response to persistent security weaknesses at nuclear weapons facilities during the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) undertook several initiatives and Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separate entity with DOE. DOE and NNSA have made progress in implementing many of the 75 initiatives undertaken since 1998. Lessons from these initiatives could help improve implementation of future efforts. DOE and NNSA have completed 64 percent of the initiatives, and most of the rest should be completed by December 2002. NNSA has begun a security organization and program to safeguard nuclear information and materials, but several key issues still need to be addressed to ensure the new program's effectiveness. NNSA has almost completed staffing the two new offices created to lead its security and counterintelligence activities and, with DOE, is completing a detailed review of security policies and procedures. NNSA has also begun specific activities, including training, to create a security-oriented culture in its organization. |
gao_GAO-05-670 | gao_GAO-05-670_0 | In keeping with its mission, each agency has a regulatory responsibility to protect investors by ensuring the integrity of the securities and commodity futures markets. SEC has made progress in addressing these two recommendations by discontinuing its use of DPTS, modifying CATS to capture financial information, and establishing an improved procedure for entering data into CATS. SEC plans to address this finding by strengthening its policies and its internal controls over existing processes. Agency staff estimate that it will not be fully complete until 2008. We reviewed a sample of 45 cases tracked in CATS and determined that SEC had complied with its policy for improving data entry, which is consistent with our previous recommendation. Opportunities Exist to Improve CATS’s Usefulness
During this review, we found—and SEC agrees—that opportunities exist to further improve CATS’s usefulness for key system users, including attorneys, case management specialists, and collection monitors in Enforcement. SEC Has Made Progress in Managing Its Collection Program but Needs to Take Further Steps
SEC has taken actions consistent with five of eight open recommendations from our previous studies (table 2). Moreover, we identified three new concerns related to SEC’s management of collection staff, including (1) the lack of a formal process for assessing the impact of collection staff efforts, (2) the need for additional routine training and guidance to ensure the effectiveness of collection staff’s efforts, and (3) the need for more formal communication and coordination protocols between the two units that track and maintain CATS data in order to improve the efficiency of collection activities. SEC Management Has Not Completed Actions to Evaluate the Performance of Its Collection Program
We found that SEC had made some progress in addressing our remaining three open recommendations related to (1) establishing performance measures to better track the effectiveness of SEC’s collection efforts; (2) tracking, on an aggregate and individual basis, both receivers’ fees and the amounts distributed to harmed investors to ensure that investor recovery is maximized; and (3) implementing collection guidelines and developing controls to ensure that staff follow the guidelines. First, SEC does not have a formal mechanism to assess whether the increased collection resources are being used effectively. SEC has issued guidance to its staff on interpreting and applying the provision—for example, explaining that ordering a disgorgement for as little as $1 can qualify a case as a Fair Fund case and make CMPs eligible for distribution. SEC Has Successfully Used Fair Funds, but Distribution Has Been Slow
According to agency documents, SEC staff have successfully applied the Fair Fund provision in at least 75 cases since 2002 and, as a result of these efforts, more than $4.8 billion in disgorgement and CMPs were designated for return to harmed investors as of April 2005. In its comments, SEC acknowledged that the Division of Enforcement’s efforts in data tracking and management practices are still in their early stages, but said that the agency is working diligently to strengthen its collection program. Specifically, SEC is in the process of (1) developing reports and training programs that will allow for consistent monitoring of the collection program nationwide, (2) developing a system by which OFM can notify Enforcement about data entered into SEC’s case tracking system, (3) determining the effectiveness of new collection processes and staff, (4) revising current performance measures to more effectively determine program performance, (5) collecting information on the amount of penalties and disgorgement distributed to investors and paid to receivers, and (6) developing systems to collect data on Fair Fund cases. Specifically, to evaluate the effectiveness of SEC’s procedures for referring delinquent cases to the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Financial Management Service (FMS) both before and after the collection guidelines were established, we interviewed SEC staff to discuss the activities they took recently to refer delinquent cases to FMS. To evaluate SEC’s implementation of the Fair Fund provision, we reviewed Section 308 (a–c) of the act and performed a legislative search and legal analyses. To describe the actions CFTC has taken to address previous recommendations, we interviewed relevant CFTC staff, reviewed collection documents they provided and relied on CFTC’s Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) work. Like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), CFTC also imposed significantly larger amounts of CMPs from September 2002 through December 2004 compared with previous years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) impose penalties, disgorgements, and restitution on proven and alleged violators of the securities and futures laws, respectively. GAO has issued a number of previous reports on agency collection efforts and made numerous recommendations for improvement. This report follows up on open issues from the previous reports and (1) discusses SEC's progress in improving its tracking of penalty and disgorgement collection data, (2) assesses the steps SEC has taken to improve collection program management, (3) evaluates SEC's implementation of the Fair Fund provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and (4) describes CFTC's actions to address previous GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
In response to GAO's previous recommendations, SEC has taken positive steps to improve its tracking of collection data, such as discontinuing its use of an unreliable tracking system, modifying its existing Case Activity Tracking System (CATS) to capture financial data, and establishing a policy for improved data entry. GAO's review of 45 cases tracked in CATS revealed that SEC complied with its policy for improved data entry, a step that contributes to improving the overall reliability of SEC's collection data. However, GAO identified additional actions that SEC can take to enhance CATS's usefulness for key users, such as attorneys, collection monitors, and case management specialists in the Division of Enforcement. SEC is currently addressing this issue through a multiyear effort to comprehensively upgrade CATS. Agency officials estimate that the upgrade, which will be completed in phases, will be fully complete in 2008. SEC has also addressed some previous recommendations made to strengthen management of its collection program, such as increasing its collection staff and referring eligible delinquent cases to the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Financial Management Service (FMS) on a timely basis. However, SEC must take further steps to address other recommendations designed to enhance management's evaluation of program performance. During this review, GAO identified new issues that warrant SEC management attention. For example, although SEC has increased the number of staff devoted to collection efforts, the agency has neither developed a method to ensure that adequate and consistent supervision is provided to them, nor has it formally assessed whether its additional resources are being used effectively. SEC also has not developed a procedure by which to ensure that two key units, both responsible for tracking collection activity, are effectively communicating and coordinating with one another. Since implementing Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (commonly known as the Fair Fund provision), SEC has instructed its staff to aggressively use the provision and estimates designating over $4.8 billion for return to harmed investors as a result of the provision's enactment. However, to date, only a small amount of the funds have been distributed. According to SEC, distribution is often a lengthy process that can be further complicated by external factors such as a pending criminal indictment on the violator. GAO also found that SEC lacked a reliable method by which to identify and collect data on Fair Fund cases. SEC took action to address this issue, but efforts were still in their early stages. SEC has yet to analyze the data it has collected in order to fully determine the provision's effectiveness in returning an increased fund amount to harmed investors. CFTC implemented both recommendations from previous GAO reports related to controls over fingerprinting procedures and timely referral of eligible delinquent cases to Treasury's FMS. |
gao_NSIAD-95-116 | gao_NSIAD-95-116_0 | Introduction
Operation Desert Storm marked the first time that the Navy’s Tomahawk Land Attack Missile and the Air Force’s Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) were used in combat. We also addressed the advantages of these missiles over tactical aircraft and the missiles’ potential impact on the requirements for future tactical weapon systems and forward presence. Cruise Missiles’ Capabilities Have Been Proven in Recent Conflicts
Both the Tomahawk and the CALCM contributed to the success of U.S. combat operations during Desert Storm and the 1993 strikes on Iraq. The Tomahawk also demonstrated limitations in its range and lethality. The limited ability of the CALCM’s warhead and its guidance system’s lower accuracy (compared with the Tomahawk’s) restricted the types of targets that the CALCM could successfully attack. Not all manned aircraft struck their intended targets. U.S. Central Command officials said that the Tomahawk was also chosen for this mission because it could strike the target without risking the loss of aircraft or aircrews. Although the Air Force is studying a proposal to upgrade the CALCM, it has not funded any improvements to the missile to address the limitations identified in Desert Storm due to competing funding priorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the performance of two cruise missiles during Operation Desert Storm, focusing on the missiles': (1) advantages over tactical aircraft; and (2) potential impact on future tactical weapons system requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) both the Navy's Tomahawk land attack missile and the Air Force's Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) contributed to the success of U.S. combat operations during Desert Storm, due to their high success rates of hitting their intended targets; (2) some problems with the Tomahawk included its limitations in its range, mission planning time, lethality, and difficulties in the desert terrain; (3) CALCM warhead and guidance limited the types of targets it could successfully attack; (4) the Navy has funded programs to address the Tomahawk's limitations and the Air Force is proposing two improved CALCM variants, but because of competing priorities, it has not requested any funds; (5) cruise missiles can be used in more conditions than tactical aircraft systems, can be used without additional resources, and can strike targets without risking loss of aircraft or crew members, but tactical aircraft systems can attack more mobile targets and cost less; and (6) fewer aircraft carriers may be required in the future because of the options available from cruise missiles. |
gao_GAO-02-495 | gao_GAO-02-495_0 | Standard-Setting Mechanisms, Implementation Roles Link States to National Regulatory Objectives
We identified five regulatory or standard-setting mechanisms and four patterns of implementation or enforcement that characterize areas in which the federal government and the states share regulatory objectives and responsibilities. The five mechanisms are: fixed federal standards that preempt all state regulatory action in the subject area covered; federal minimum standards that preempt less stringent state laws but permit states to establish standards more stringent than the federal; inclusion of federal regulatory provisions in grants or other forms of assistance; cooperative programs in which voluntary national standards are formulated by federal and state officials working together; and widespread state adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasi- official entities. The first two mechanisms involve preemption. The other three represent alternative approaches. The mechanisms also offer different options with respect to implementation or enforcement. Fixed federal standards and minimum federal standards permit three patterns of implementation: (1) direct implementation by the federal agency, (2) implementation by the states, approved by and under some degree of oversight by the federal agency, and (3) a combination of federal agency and federally approved state implementation. Regulatory Authority May Be Divided between the Federal Government and the States
In other instances, regulatory authority is divided between the federal government and the states. 106-102) involves NAIC in a different way. We discuss these advantages and limitations in terms of federal-state balance and in terms of operational challenges. Options for addressing these issues include the following: The state’s share can be preserved through the use of fiscal provisions such as maintenance of effort or matching requirements. | What GAO Found
Both federal and state governments exercise regulatory authority in many of the same policy areas. In enacting new legislation in these shared areas, Congress must provide federal protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate balance between federal and state regulatory authority and responsibility. State efforts can be directed toward federal or nationally shared regulatory objectives through various arrangements, each of which reflects a way to define and issue regulations or standards and assign responsibility for their implementation or enforcement. Regulatory and standard-setting mechanisms for achieving nationwide coverage include (1) fixed federal standards that preempt all state regulatory action, (2) minimum federal standards that preempt less stringent state laws but permit states to establish more stringent standards, (3) the inclusion of federal regulatory provisions in grants or other forms of assistance, (4) cooperative programs in which voluntary national standards are formulated by federal and state officials working together, and (5) widespread state adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasi-official entities. The first two of these mechanisms involve preemption; the other three represent alternative approaches. Each represents a different combination of federal and state regulatory authority. The mechanisms also offer different options to implementation or enforcement. Furthermore, each standard-setting mechanism offers advantages and disadvantages that reflect the key considerations of federal-state balance in the context of a given national regulatory objective. Shared implementation involves several operational challenges, such as finding the appropriate level of federal oversight, allocating costs between the federal government and the states, potentially increasing the vulnerability of federal agencies to sudden increases in responsibilities and costs, handling variations in implementation from state to state, and adjusting to the new federal-state balance. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-23 | gao_T-HEHS-98-23_0 | However, although the commissioners and former commissioners we interviewed generally agreed about which criteria they emphasized for project selection, they expressed very different views on how some of these criteria should be interpreted. Significant Gaps Exist in CPSC’s Data on All Selection Criteria, Including Product-Related Injuries and Deaths
CPSC has developed a patchwork of independent data systems to provide information on deaths and injuries associated with consumer products. Better Data and Methodology Are Needed to Improve CPSC’s Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment
CPSC uses two analytical tools—risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis—to assist in making decisions on regulatory and nonregulatory methods to address potential hazards. Because most of the agency’s projects do not involve regulation, relatively few CPSC projects conducted between January 1, 1990, and September 30, 1996, were subject to these requirements. This can sometimes make the risks assessed by CPSC—and the benefits of reducing those risks—appear greater. CPSC has not established internal procedures that require analysts to conduct comprehensive analyses and report them in sufficient detail. CPSC Has Established Procedures for Complying With Statutory Requirements for Releasing Manufacturer-Specific Information
To help minimize the possibility that a product might be unfairly disparaged, in section 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Congress imposed restrictions on CPSC’s disclosure of manufacturer-specific information. Information from three sources—industry sources, published legal cases, and data on retractions—suggests that CPSC complies with its statutory requirements concerning information release. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) procedures to protect consumers from unreasonable risk of injuries, focusing on CPSC's project selection, use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment, and information release procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although CPSC has established criteria to help select new projects, with the agency's current data, these criteria can be measured only imprecisely if at all; (2) CPSC has described itself as "data driven," but its information on product-related deaths and injuries is often sketchy, and its lack of systematized descriptive information on past or ongoing projects makes it more difficult for agency management to monitor current projects and to assess and prioritize the need for new projects in different hazard areas; (3) CPSC's data are often insufficient to support rigorous application of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis; (4) in addition, the cost-benefit analyses conducted by CPSC between 1990 and 1996 were frequently not comprehensive, and the reports on these analyses were not sufficiently detailed; (5) CPSC has established procedures to implement statutory requirements restricting the release of manufacturer-specific information; and (6) although industry representatives, consumer advocates, and CPSC expressed differing views on the merits of these restrictions, available evidence suggests that CPSC complies with these statutory requirements. |
gao_HEHS-96-65 | gao_HEHS-96-65_0 | Device Review Has Different Goals in United States and European Union
The U.S. and EU medical device regulatory systems share the goal of protecting public health, but the EU system has the additional goal of facilitating EU-wide trade. Another distinction between the two systems pertains to the criteria for reviewing devices. The U.S. medical device regulatory system exists within a public health context. In reviewing medical device applications FDA uses the two criteria mandated by law—safety and effectiveness. United States and EU Review Systems Structured Differently
The EU gives major regulatory responsibilities to public and private bodies; in contrast FDA has sole responsibility in the United States. Both systems link the level of medical device review to the degree of control needed to ensure device safety. However, the two systems use different procedures to reach approval or clearance decisions. Public Agencies and Private Notified Bodies Have Roles in EU Device Regulation
Governmental and private organizations both perform major functions in the EU system for regulating medical devices. EU Reviewers Subject to Less Comprehensive Conflict-of-Interest Rules Than FDA Reviewers
The EU medical device directives require the staff of NBs to be free of all pressures and inducements, particularly financial, that might influence their judgment or the results of their reviews, especially from anyone with an interest in the outcome of the review. Information Not Available to Compare Outcomes of New EU System and a Changing FDA
The EU medical device system is new and not yet fully operational. It is too early to evaluate the impact of those efforts on the length of FDA’s review process. At this time there are no data on the experience of the EU device review system that permit meaningful comparison with FDA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) and the European Union's (EU) systems for reviewing and approving medical devices, focusing on: (1) key differences between the two systems; (2) the outputs of the two systems; and (3) the feasibility of FDA adopting features of the EU system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) U.S. and EU medical device regulatory systems share the goal of protecting public health, but the EU system is designed to facilitate EU-wide trade; (2) while EU reviews medical devices for safety and performance, FDA reviews devices for safety, effectiveness, and benefit to patients; (3) while EU gives major medical device regulatory responsibilities to public agencies and private organizations, FDA has sole responsibility over device regulation in the United States; (4) both systems link the level of medical review to device risk, but the two systems use different procedures to reach approval or clearance decisions; (5) questions and concerns have arisen regarding possible conflicts-of-interest in the EU medical device review process because EU notified bodies carry out a regulatory function within the EU medical device system and conflict-of-interest rules for EU reviewers are less comprehensive than in the United States; (6) sufficient data does not exist on the EU medical device review system to permit meaningful comparison with FDA because the EU system is new and not yet fully operational; and (7) it is too early to evaluate the impact of new FDA streamlined review procedures. |
gao_GAO-02-5 | gao_GAO-02-5_0 | In 1990, Congress authorized federal agencies to enter into interagency agreements with the Graduate School for training and other related services (7 U.S.C. In examining the funding received by the Graduate School, we found a similar result: the agencies surveyed spent more on contracts with private companies—about $29 million—than on interagency agreements with the Graduate School—about $5.7 million. Graduate School’s Financial Statements Incorrectly Identified Interagency Agreement Revenue
The interagency agreement line item in the Graduate School’s fiscal year 1999 financial statements did not include all of the revenue received from interagency agreements. We stratified the population into four strata on the basis of the total of revenue billings for fiscal year 1999. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Graduate School provides extensive training opportunities to government employees and others. As a nonappropriated fund instrumentality, the Graduate School relies solely on income from the training it offers. During fiscal year 1999, the federal agencies GAO reviewed had 20 interagency agreements with the Graduate School totaling about $5.7 million. The agencies also had 531 contracts, totaling $29 million, with private companies for training and related services. The Graduate School's financial statements for fiscal year 1999 incorrectly identified the portion of revenue that was earned through interagency agreements. This misclassification occurred primarily because of the Graduate School's reporting policies. |
gao_T-GGD-98-69 | gao_T-GGD-98-69_0 | However, after it had closed its fiscal year 1997 books, PBS reported the actual budget impact of its overestimation to be $634.4 million for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and reduced its fiscal year 1998 overestimation to $28.3 million. Weaknesses in PBS’ Revenue Forecasting Process
As indicated, in January 1997, GSA informed Congress that it expected its total overestimate of rental revenue for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to be $847 million. PBS provided documentation supporting the amount of the overestimation for six of the seven reasons. Additional problems with PBS’ rental revenue estimation process have also been identified. GSA’s Efforts to Improve Its Revenue Projection Process
official, PBS will issue a directive on documenting the rental estimating process by April 1998. The fiscal year 1995 rental revenue estimate was generally higher than actual fiscal year 1995 revenues. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the General Services Administration's (GSA) overestimation of its rental revenue projects for the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) in fiscal years (FY) 1996, 1997, and 1998, and the actions it is taking to improve its future revenue projections.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GSA had documentation supporting the dollar amounts it attributed to six of the seven reasons it reported for the overestimation of rental revenue; (2) in addition, GAO and others identified several weaknesses in GSA's rental revenue estimation process; (3) GSA was aware of these problems and has taken corrective actions which GAO believes, if effectively implemented, should help improve future rental revenue estimates; and (4) further, GSA recently reported the actual budget impact of its rental revenue overestimation to be $634.4 million for FY 1996 and FY 1997, and reduced its FY anticipated overestimation substantially. |
gao_GAO-09-585 | gao_GAO-09-585_0 | Typically, the military services are using relocatable facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities. OSD Does Not Have Complete Oversight of the Services’ Use of Relocatable Facilities to Meet Infrastructure Needs
Although military services are relying on relocatable facilities to meet shortages in their physical infrastructure needs, OSD lacks oversight over how many of these facilities are being used on defense installations and how much DOD has spent on such facilities. Although the military services recently reported to OSD that they have bought or leased over 4,000 relocatable facilities over a 5-year period, our assessment of the data uncovered many discrepancies. At six of the seven installations we visited, including locations representing each of the military services, we found discrepancies between the number of relocatable facilities located on those installations and the number that the service headquarters had reported to OSD. At Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, officials told us that the installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which was about 80 more than Marine Corps headquarters had reported to OSD. Furthermore, Navy headquarters told us its data provided to OSD did not include all of its relocatable facilities located at its installations. When we talked to OSD officials in March 2008, these officials told us they did not have information about how many relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations had them, nor how much it had cost to acquire them. OSD Does Not Have a Strategy for Managing the Use and Disposal of Relocatable Facilities
OSD does not have a strategy for managing the military services’ use and disposal of relocatable facilities, even though many of these facilities most likely will be used for longer than the 3 years that is normally expected for relocatables. However, we found that relocatable facilities at many installations have already been in use for longer than 3 years. Services Plan to Replace Relocatable Facilities with Permanent Buildings, but Could Face Management Challenges
Although the services plan to eventually replace many of their relocatable facilities with permanent buildings, and military construction funds have been programmed to do so in fiscal years 2010 to 2013, some service officials expressed skepticism that the planned replacement funds will become available, potentially further prolonging the need for relocatables. For example, officials at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Drum, New York; and at Army Installation Management Command–West, Texas, told us that, if the proposed drawdown of troops from Iraq occurs as planned—on top of DOD’s other force structure initiatives—the influx of more military personnel could exacerbate the shortage of facilities at these and other installations. Without a comprehensive DOD strategy for managing relocatables—including the transfer of relocatables from one location to another—a military service could unnecessarily spend funds by simultaneously acquiring new facilities while another military service is incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities. Conclusions
The pace of growth at some installations is exceeding the ability of traditional military construction to provide permanent facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve OSD’s oversight and management of the military services’ use of relocatable facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take the following three actions: clarify its guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities; develop a mechanism for collecting and maintaining complete and reliable data on the number of relocatable facilities used by the military services and on the costs of acquiring them once OSD clarifies the guidance on the definition of relocatable facilities; and develop and implement a strategy to help effectively manage the use, disposal, and redistribution of relocatable facilities across all the services when redistribution is appropriate, including projected costs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing oversight of the military services’ use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on the authorization, acquisition, use, and disposition of relocatable facilities and the military services’ policies and procedures that implement DOD’s guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense (DOD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the ability of traditional military construction to provide enough permanent living and working space for servicemembers and other DOD personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable--or relocatable--facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet short-term needs. In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing oversight of the services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DOD has a strategy for managing such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from those identified as having a sizeable number of relocatable facilities.
What GAO Found
Although DOD considers the use of relocatable facilities a temporary measure to meet short-term physical infrastructure needs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not providing effective oversight of the number or cost of its relocatable facilities. OSD officials told GAO in March 2008 that they did not have information about how many relocatable facilities were being used, how many defense installations had them, or how much it has cost to acquire them. Subsequently, the military services reported to OSD that they have acquired over 4,000 relocatable facilities at an estimated cost of about $1.5 billion over a 5-year period. However, GAO's assessment of these data showed that the data were inaccurate and incomplete. At six of the seven installations visited, GAO found discrepancies between the number of relocatable facilities located on those installations and the numbers that the services had reported to OSD. For instance, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, installation officials told GAO the installation had about 170 relocatable facilities, which is about 80 more than the Marine Corps headquarters reported to OSD. Such discrepancies occurred in part because OSD has not provided the services with a clear definition of relocatable facilities. In addition, OSD lacks a mechanism for collecting and maintaining reliable data on these facilities. A clear, ongoing requirement for OSD to collect and maintain consistent data on relocatable facilities would better enable it to manage the use of these facilities to provide working and living space for military personnel. OSD has not developed a comprehensive strategy for managing relocatable facilities departmentwide. Although the military services plan to replace many of their relocatable facilities with permanent construction, some officials GAO spoke with expressed skepticism that the planned replacement funds will become available. In addition, GAO found that these facilities at many installations have been in use longer than the 3 years DOD's guidance states it normally expects. Furthermore, some Army officials told GAO that due to several force structure and infrastructure initiatives, it expects that the influx of more military personnel at some installations could exacerbate the shortage of facilities, which could mean more relocatable facilities might be needed. Meanwhile, some DOD installations may be planning to acquire new relocatable facilities at market cost at the same time that other installations are disposing of them. Although the Army is moving in the direction of centralizing its management of relocatable facilities, none of the other military service headquarters told GAO they have initiated similar efforts. Because OSD does not have a comprehensive DOD-wide strategy for managing the use of relocatable facilities--including the transfer of relocatables from one location to another--the services could unnecessarily spend DOD funds by simultaneously acquiring new facilities at some locations while auctioning off or incurring costs to store or demolish similar facilities at other locations. |
gao_GAO-14-39 | gao_GAO-14-39_0 | Carriers offer plans in which eligible individuals may enroll to receive health care coverage. The Healthcare & Insurance—Federal Employee Insurance Operations office, the contracting office, is responsible for administering the FEHBP, contracting with carriers, and overseeing carriers’ compliance. OPM’s Requirements and Guidance for FEHBP Carriers’ Fraud and Abuse Programs
OPM requires FEHBP carriers to establish programs to prevent, detect, and eliminate fraud and abuse. Each carrier is required by contract to: conduct a program to assess vulnerability to fraud and abuse; operate a system designed to detect, eliminate, and follow up on fraud submit a report on fraud and abuse by March 31 of each year; demonstrate that a statistically valid sampling technique is used routinely to compare FEHBP claims against the carrier’s quality assurance standards and its fraud and abuse prevention standards; maintain records of fraud prevention activities; implement any corrective actions ordered by an OPM contracting officer to correct a deficiency in its fraud prevention program; provide timely notification to the OIG of credible evidence of a violation of federal criminal law involving fraud found in Title 18 of the U. S. Code by a principal, employee, agent, or subcontractor; and provide timely notification to the contracting officer of any significant event, including fraud, that might reasonably be expected to have a material effect on the carrier’s ability to meet its obligations. OPM’s Contracting Office Monitors Compliance with Fraud and Abuse Program Requirements and Guidance by Reviewing Information and Conducting Site Visits
OPM’s contracting office staff conduct several activities to monitor carriers’ compliance with fraud and abuse program requirements and agency guidance, including reviewing carriers’ annual reports to OPM’s contracting office, conducting site visits, reviewing and resolving OIG audit findings, and reviewing disputed claims and enrollee complaints. Officials from OPM’s contracting office told us that they review this report and assess the information contained in the report against fraud and abuse program requirements to determine the extent to which carriers met, and were thus in compliance with, requirements. Officials from OPM’s contracting office told us that, as part of their oversight, contracting officers follow up with carriers whose reports suggest possible noncompliance for the purpose of bringing them into compliance. Site Visits of Carriers
OPM contracting office staff also assess carriers’ compliance with fraud and abuse program requirements and guidance during periodic site visits. Review and Resolution of OIG Audit Findings
OPM contracting office staff review and resolve OIG audit findings as part of their oversight of carriers’ fraud and abuse programs. Officials told us that contracting officers’ reviews of disputed claims may reveal suspicious patterns of drug utilization, multiple complaints involving a single provider, or other indicators of potential In addition to reviews of enrollees’ disputed claims, fraud or abuse.OPM contracting office staff review enrollees’ complaints about other aspects of the FEHBP, which could also indicate potential fraud or abuse, and they intervene as necessary. OPM Contracting Office Staff Review Fraud and Abuse Program Outcomes, but Several Factors Contribute to the Challenge of Assessing Program Effectiveness
OPM contracting office staff review certain outcomes of carriers’ fraud and abuse programs, but program outcomes do not provide complete information about program effectiveness. For example, in 2011, carriers reported that the outcomes of their fraud and abuse programs included 29 criminal convictions and more than $23 million in recoveries to FEHBP. However, program outcomes do not measure the success of strategies intended to prevent or minimize fraud and abuse such as systems for preauthorization or precertification. OPM contracting office staff reported that they have not adopted specific measures of program effectiveness for FEHBP fraud and abuse programs because they have not identified an appropriate way to measure the effectiveness of antifraud programs. Several factors contribute to difficulties in developing a measure of the effectiveness for health care antifraud programs. These factors include the following:
A lack of information about the baseline amount of fraud and abuse in health care. The difficulty of establishing a causal link between antifraud activities and the amount of health care fraud or abuse. The difficulty of measuring the effect of efforts to prevent or deter fraud and abuse. Agency Comments
OPM and the OPM OIG reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Requirements for Carriers and OPM to Report Information about Potential Fraud and Abuse
There are requirements and procedures for reporting potential fraud and abuse that apply to both the carriers that offer health care plans through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). | Why GAO Did This Study
The FEHBP provides health care coverage to millions of federal employees, retirees, and their dependents through health insurance carriers that contract with OPM. Carriers offer plans in which eligible individuals may enroll to receive health care benefits. OPM negotiates these contracts; requires that each carrier establish a program to prevent, detect, and eliminate fraud and abuse; and oversees carriers' fraud and abuse programs. Although the extent of fraud and abuse in the FEHBP is unknown, any fraud or abuse that does occur contributes to health care costs and may be reflected in the premiums for FEHBP enrollees.
GAO was asked to review OPM's oversight of FEHBP fraud and abuse programs. This report describes (1) oversight of fraud and abuse programs by OPM's contracting office and (2) the OPM contracting office's approach to measuring the effectiveness of FEHBP carriers' fraud and abuse programs. To do so, GAO reviewed documents that specify program requirements and guidance, such as carrier contracts and letters from OPM to carriers; documents that assist oversight of fraud and abuse programs, such as annual reports that OPM requires from carriers; and documents demonstrating oversight of carriers, such as memos to carriers from OPM contracting office staff regarding carriers' compliance. GAO also reviewed published work about measuring the effectiveness of antifraud programs. GAO interviewed OPM officials and officials from entities with expertise related to antifraud programs and measurement.
What GAO Found
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Healthcare & Insurance--Federal Employee Insurance Operations office, which we refer to as OPM's contracting office, monitors Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) carriers' compliance with requirements and other guidance for preventing, detecting, and eliminating fraud and abuse. These requirements include establishing a program to assess vulnerability to fraud and abuse, reporting annually on program outcomes, reporting potential fraud to OPM's Office of Inspector General (OIG), and implementing corrective actions to address deficiencies in fraud prevention programs. OPM's guidance encourages carriers to implement certain program standards, such as formal fraud awareness training for all employees. To monitor carriers' compliance with these requirements and other guidance, OPM's contracting office staff conducts the following activities.
Review carriers' annual reports: Staff review information contained in annual reports from carriers that describe the carriers' fraud and abuse programs and their outcomes. Officials told us that they assess information in carriers' annual reports against program requirements and guidance and follow up with carriers whose reports suggest possible noncompliance.
Conduct site visits: Staff also inspect and follow up on carriers' fraud and abuse programs during periodic site visits. Using a risk based site selection strategy, OPM contracting office staff conducted site visits of 27 carriers whose plans covered about 70 percent of FEHBP enrollees in 2012.
Review and resolve OIG audit findings: Staff review and resolve OIG audit findings that identified areas of carriers' noncompliance.
Review disputed claims and enrollee complaints: Staff review disputed claims and enrollee complaints to identify indicators of potential fraud or abuse, such as suspicious patterns of drug utilization.
OPM contracting office staff review certain outcomes of carriers' fraud and abuse programs, but several factors contribute to the challenge of assessing program effectiveness. Program outcomes in 2011 included 29 criminal convictions and more than $23 million in recoveries to the FEHBP, but program outcomes do not provide complete information about program effectiveness because they do not measure the success of efforts to prevent or minimize fraud and abuse. OPM contracting office staff reported that they have not adopted specific measures of program effectiveness for FEHBP fraud and abuse programs because they have not identified an appropriate way to measure the effectiveness of antifraud programs. Several factors contribute to difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of health care antifraud programs. These factors include lack of information about the baseline amount of fraud and abuse, difficulty establishing a causal link between antifraud activities and the amount of fraud and abuse, and difficulty measuring the effect of efforts to prevent or deter fraud and abuse.
OPM and the OPM OIG provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-692 | gao_GAO-04-692_0 | 1). In 1992, the Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (Fund) to pay for the costs of decontaminating and decommissioning the nation’s three uranium enrichment plants. DOE Has Taken Several Actions to Reduce Cleanup Costs
DOE has taken several steps to reduce cleanup costs by taking actions consistent with the National Academy of Sciences’ (Academy) cost reduction recommendations and by pursuing an accelerated, risk-based cleanup strategy at the uranium enrichment plants. For example, the Academy recommended that DOE develop three plans—namely, headquarters level, plant-complex level, and site level—that address and integrate the D&D of the facilities, environmental remediation activities, and the management of depleted uranium hexafluoride. DOE Is Pursuing an Accelerated, Risk-Based Cleanup Strategy at the Plants to Reduce Costs
DOE is pursuing an accelerated cleanup strategy at the Oak Ridge and Paducah plants. Based on Current Projected Costs and Revenues, the Fund Will Not Be Sufficient to Complete Cleanup at the Three Plants
Despite DOE efforts to reduce costs, we found that based on current projected costs and revenues, the Fund will be insufficient to cover authorized activities. However, our Baseline model demonstrated that by 2044, the most likely time frame for completion of cleanup at the three plants, cleanup costs will have exceeded revenues by $3.5 billion to $5.7 billion (in 2004 dollars). Importantly, we found that the Fund would be insufficient irrespective of which estimates we used, including models that estimated the final cleanup work at the plants under (1) accelerated time frames, (2) deferred time frames, or (3) baseline time frames, and with additional contributions to the Fund equaling the difference between the amounts that have been appropriated to date and the total amount authorized under the Energy Policy Act. Because the Paducah and Portsmouth plants are now estimated to cease operations by 2010 and 2006, respectively, DOE should be able to develop plans, including more precise cost estimates, for D&D of these plants. Extending the Fund by an additional 3 years would give DOE an opportunity to develop these plans and a better estimate of the costs to clean up the plants. With this information, DOE could better determine if further extensions to the Fund will be necessary. Reimbursements to uranium and thorium licensees. 2. Opportunities for Cost Reduction in the Decontamination and Decommissioning of the Nation’s Uranium Enrichment Facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decontaminating and decommissioning the nation's uranium enrichment plants, which are contaminated with hazardous materials, will cost billions of dollars and could span decades. In 1992, the Energy Policy Act created the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (Fund) to pay for the plants' cleanup and to reimburse licensees of active uranium and thorium processing sites for part of their cleanup costs. This report discusses (1) what DOE has done to reduce the cleanup costs authorized by the Fund, and (2) the extent to which the Fund is sufficient to cover authorized activities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has taken steps to reduce cleanup costs by taking actions that address recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences and by pursuing an accelerated, risk-based cleanup strategy at the plants. In some cases, however, DOE has only partially addressed the Academy's recommendations. For example, one recommendation suggested that DOE develop three plans--namely, headquarters level, plant-complex level, and site level--that address and integrate the decontamination and decommissioning of the facilities. Only one plant has developed a plan, however. Additionally, DOE is pursuing an accelerated, risk-based cleanup strategy at the plants that it believes will reduce cleanup costs. According to DOE officials, an accelerated, risk-based strategy will accelerate time frames for cleanup, and establish "realistic cleanup criteria" in DOE's regulatory cleanup agreements. Despite DOE efforts to reduce costs, we found that based on current projected costs and revenues, the Fund will be insufficient to cover the cleanup activities at the three plants. Specifically, our Baseline model demonstrated that by 2044, the most likely time frame for completing cleanup of the plants, costs will have exceeded revenues by $3.5 billion to $5.7 billion (in 2004 dollars). Importantly, we also found that the Fund would be insufficient irrespective of which model we used, including models that estimated the final decommissioning at the plants under (1) accelerated time frames, (2) deferred time frames, or (3) baseline time frames, and with additional revenues from federal government contributions as authorized under current law. Because the Paducah and Portsmouth plants are now estimated to cease operations by 2010 and 2006, respectively, extending the Fund by an additional 3 years would give DOE an opportunity to develop plans, including more precise cost estimates, for the cleanup of these plants and to better determine if further Fund extensions will be necessary. |
gao_GAO-06-106 | gao_GAO-06-106_0 | State Has Maintained Limited Oversight of Exchange Programs
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the programs. Moreover, some sponsors believe that the program regulations need updating, and State officials have expressed concerns about the enforceability of the sanction/revocation process provided for in the Exchange Visitor Program regulations. State has acknowledged problems, is establishing a compliance unit to monitor program activities, and is revising the regulations; however progress has been slow. A number of potential risks are associated with the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs, including the risk of participants using the programs to remain in the United States beyond their authorized time. There is also the potential for the Trainee Program being misused as an employment program, although State does not have data on the extent that such abuse occurs. However, these studies are not always statistically valid. Upon further investigation DHS found that the individual had brought 17 trainees to the United States to participate in the university’s training program. Occasionally, the exchange participants have negative experiences as a result of exploitation by a third party. However, State has not exercised sufficient management oversight of the programs to ensure that they operate as intended and are not abused. State has taken some action to address identified deficiencies, such as beginning efforts to revise the regulations; but progress has been slow. Assessing such risks is a necessary step to mitigating the risks. Scope and Methodology
To examine how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out under the programs, we reviewed previous GAO and OIG reports, program regulations and guidance, cables, sponsors’ annual reports, and other information pertaining to the programs; reviewed program files maintained by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation, for selected Summer Work Travel and Trainee sponsors to gain an understanding about the kinds of problems that the sponsors report to the Department of State (State) and how State has addressed them; interviewed State officials, including the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss how the U.S. government manages the programs; interviewed Department of Labor (Labor) officials about the impact of the programs on the U.S. labor market, and the Social Security Administration on issues related to Social Security cards for exchange visitors; and met with nine sponsors of the Summer Work Travel Program that accounted for 75 percent of the participants in 2004 and 13 sponsors of the Trainee Program that accounted for 54 percent of the participants in 2004, as well as an official of an association of exchange program sponsors to discuss how sponsors carry out their monitoring and oversight responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Exchange programs, which bring over 280,000 foreign visitors to the United States annually, are widely recognized as an effective way to expose citizens of other countries to the American people and culture. Past GAO and the Department of State (State) Office of Inspector General reviews have reported that some exchange visitors have participated in unauthorized activities and cited problems in the management and oversight of the programs. Strong management oversight is needed to ensure that the programs operate as intended and are not abused. This report examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out under the programs and identifies potential risks of the programs and the data available to assess these risks.
What GAO Found
State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the programs and has been slow to address program deficiencies. State attempts to ensure compliance with program regulations through its processes of approving and annually reviewing the organizations that sponsor exchange visitors. These processes, however, are not sufficient to ensure that visitors participate only in authorized activities because the procedures consist primarily of document reviews, and State rarely visits the sponsors or host employers of the exchange visitors to make sure they are following the rules to investigate complaints. Moreover, some sponsors have asserted that the program regulations need updating. Further, State officials believe that the sanctions provided in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State acknowledged that it has been slow to address identified deficiencies and update the regulations, but had indicated that it is beginning to revise the regulations and is establishing a unit to monitor exchange activities. However funding of the unit has not been secured. A number of potential risks are associated with the programs, including that exchange visitors might use it to remain in the United States beyond their authorized time. There is also the potential for the Trainee Program to be misused as an employment program. Further, negative experiences for exchange participants could undermine the purpose of the programs. However, State has little data to measure whether such risks to the program are significant. As a result, State cannot determine if additional management actions are needed to mitigate the risks. |
gao_HEHS-98-205 | gao_HEHS-98-205_0 | II for more information on testing procedures.) Risk of Infectious Units Entering Plasma Pools Is Somewhat Higher for Paid Plasma Donors Than for Volunteer Donors
We calculated the risk of incorporating an infectious unit of plasma into a plasma pool for HIV, HBV, and HCV for both volunteer and paid plasma donors. However, a number of safety initiatives have been instituted by paid plasma centers that greatly reduce the likelihood of infectious units being pooled for manufacturing. We also compared the residual risk of a potentially infectious plasma donation by a volunteer versus paid plasma donor actually entering a plasma pool by examining the effect of the length of the window period as well as the use of only “qualified donors” and the 60-day inventory hold program instituted by the paid plasma industry. Overall Comparison of Risks of Pooling Infectious Units
When comparing the overall residual risk of incorporating an infectious window period unit into a plasma pool for each of the three viruses examined in this study, the rates for HIV for volunteer and paid plasma donors are virtually identical (1 in 689,655 and 1 in 680,272, respectively); the rates for HCV are also similar (1 in 29,850 to 1 in 27,824). In response to these concerns, manufacturers have recently taken steps to reduce the size of the plasma pools they use for producing plasma derivatives. Modeling techniques indicate that this effort can have an impact on infrequent users by minimizing their exposure to a certain number of donors. However, for frequent users of plasma products, such as hemophilia patients, this limit has a negligible impact due to the large number of different pools to which they are exposed throughout their lifetime. As a policy, the American Red Cross has a 60,000-donor limit for plasma products that are further manufactured by Baxter Healthcare. For example, the recent transmission of HCV by a plasma derivative that had not undergone viral inactivation procedures showed that the risk of seroconversion of recipients of this product increased with the number of positive HCV lots infused and the quantity of HCV viral material infused. Risk of Infection Reduced Through Viral Inactivation and Removal Techniques
Since it is possible that certain infectious units could make it through the donor screening, deferral, and testing process, manufacturers have introduced additional steps in the fractionation process to inactivate or remove viruses and bacteria that may have made their way into plasma pools. These techniques virtually eliminate enveloped viruses, such as HIV, HBV, and HCV. It is based on the amount of virus that is killed or removed and, therefore, the extent to which these processes eliminate viruses through manufacturing. III for a more complete discussion of viral clearance.) Recent Noncompliance With Current Good Manufacturing Practices Could Jeopardize the Safety of Plasma Products
Although viral inactivation and removal techniques have been shown to be highly effective, they are only useful if the steps in the manufacturing process are carried out properly. Without strict adherence to these practices, the safety of plasma products could be compromised. If properly implemented, these actions by plasma manufacturers and FDA should help alleviate the problems related to adherence to current good manufacturing practices and quality assurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on blood plasma safety, focusing on: (1) comparing the risk of incorporating an infectious unit of plasma into further manufacturing from volunteer versus paid plasma donors for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B (HBV), and hepatitis C (HCV); (2) examining the impacts on frequent and infrequent plasma users when pooling large numbers of plasma donations into manufactured plasma products; (3) assessing the safety of end products from plasma after they have undergone further manufacturing and inactivation steps to kill or remove viruses; and (4) examining the recent regulatory compliance history of plasma manufacturers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) viral clearance techniques have made the risks of receiving an infected plasma product extremely low when manufacturers follow all the procedures in place to ensure safety; (2) while paid plasma donors are over one and a half times more likely to donate potentially infectious units (1 in every 3,834 units), a number of recent initiatives by the source plasma industry greatly reduce the chances of these units being pooled for manufacturing (to 1 in every 10,959 units); (3) even with these initiatives in place, the risks are still somewhat higher from plasma units donated by paid donors than from volunteer donors; (4) limiting the number of donors whose plasma is pooled for production into plasma products helps to reduce the risks of viral transmission for those receiving these products; (5) presently, a 60,000-donor limit has been established for each individual plasma product; (6) this effort has an impact on infrequent users by minimizing their exposure to a certain number of donors for the few times they would be infused with a plasma product; (7) for frequent users of plasma products, this donor limit has a negligible impact because of the large number of infusions that they receive and, thus, the large number of pools that they would be exposed to in the course of their lifetime; (8) a more significant step in reducing risk of infection occurs in manufacturing--where all plasma products for intravenous use undergo viral removal, inactivation procedures, or both--which virtually eliminates enveloped viruses such as HIV, HBV, and HCV; (9) this is supported by epidemiological data on the transmission of viruses through plasma products since the introduction of adequate viral removal and inactivation procedures in the late 1980s as well as laboratory data that characterize the effectiveness of viral clearance through these procedures; (10) certain advances are only effective if the processes used to produce finished plasma products adhere to current good manufacturing practices; (11) this, however, has not been the case with all of the major manufacturing companies that produce plasma products; and (12) without strict adherence to current good manufacturing practices related to the efficacy of viral removal and inactivation procedures, the safety of these plasma products could be compromised. |
gao_GGD-99-162 | gao_GGD-99-162_0 | The D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court in the District of Columbia. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information on staffing and workload levels for the D.C. courts from 1989 through 1998, assess how the D.C. courts evaluate the sufficiency of their nonjudicial case processing staff levels, and compare the D.C. courts’ methodologies to other available methodologies. FTEs in the Superior Court increased by approximately 10 percent between fiscal years 1989 and 1990; declined, with some fluctuations, by about 6 percent through fiscal year 1997; then decreased by about 14 percent in fiscal year 1998. Cases available for disposition in the Superior Court decreased 2.8 percent during this period, while cases pending increased 36.5 percent. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals said that, as with the Superior Court, staffing decisions are made on a functional basis for each division of the court, rather than for the court as a whole. The federal court system uses a databased system to distribute resources to the U.S. Appellate, District, and Bankruptcy Courts, and the Probation and Pretrial Services Offices. Under this system, officials determine how much time is taken up by different types of cases in the court or courts under study. Conclusion
While D.C. court officials apparently consider caseload data in judging whether staffing levels are adequate, they have not measured the amount of time required by case processing staff to process differing types of cases nor used such data to determine whether the size of the courts’ workforce is inadequate, adequate, or excessive for the work of the courts. Workload and formula-based methods of assessing the adequacy of case processing staffing levels do exist and are in use in the federal and state courts. Recommendation
We recommend that the D.C. courts review the amount of time required to process different types of cases and analyze other elements of the courts’ workload to determine what staffing levels are sufficient to process the D.C. courts’ caseload. We are also providing copies to the District of Columbia courts, the National Center for State Courts, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 3. 4. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on personnel management in the District of Columbia (D.C.) courts, focusing on: (1) staffing and workload levels for the courts from 1989 through 1998; (2) how the courts evaluate the sufficiency of the levels of nonjudicial staff who work on processing and disposition of cases; and (3) a comparison of the D.C. courts' staffing methodology to other available methodologies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall staffing levels in the D.C. courts increased between 1989 and 1990, declined slightly with some fluctuations through 1997, and then decreased below the 1989 level in 1998; (2) cases available for disposition increased slightly during this time in the D.C. Superior Court, the largest part of the courts, while its backlog increased substantially; (3) the cases available for disposition, and the backlog, of the far smaller D.C. Court of Appeals increased steadily over this period; (4) in both courts, the mix of different types of cases has changed over this period; (5) District of Columbia court officials said that they consider caseload data, along with other data, in judging whether staffing levels are appropriate; (6) according to court officials, staffing decisions are made on a year-by-year basis and are made individually for each division of the Superior Court and Court of Appeals; (7) the courts' methodology does not provide a comprehensive review of what staffing levels should be because it does not consider the amount of staff time and resources that are needed for case processing; (8) caseload trends alone do not show whether a unit is overstaffed or understaffed because they do not account for how much time is needed to process differing types of cases or for productivity improvements; (9) methodologies that consider the amount of staff time and resources required to process different types of cases in determining the sufficiency of staffing levels do exist; and (10) the National Center for State Courts has devised a database system to determine staffing levels needed for a given workload, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts uses a database system to distribute resources among the federal courts. |
gao_GAO-07-795T | gao_GAO-07-795T_0 | As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG spent close to $1.5 billion on public diplomacy programs in fiscal year 2006. Numerous experts, expert groups, policymakers, and business leaders have expressed concerns that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests in various ways. Anti-American sentiments may negatively affect American economic interests, U.S. foreign policy and military operations, and the security of Americans. Despite the fact that we cannot draw a direct causal link between anti-Americanism and specific outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing negative foreign public opinion does not help the United States achieve its economic, foreign policy, and security goals, and therefore U.S. public diplomacy efforts, which seek to counter anti-Americanism sentiment, have a critical role to play in supporting U.S. interests throughout the world. Among other things, we have recommended that (1) communication strategies be developed to coordinate and focus the efforts of key government agencies and the private sector, (2) the State Department develop a strategic plan to integrate its diverse efforts, (3) posts adopt strategic communication best practices, and (4) meaningful performance goals and indicators be established by both State and the BBG. State has begun to take credible steps towards instituting more systematic performance measurement practices, consistent with recommendations GAO and others have made. State officials have said that it also diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts, while several reports have concluded that a strategy is needed to synchronize agencies’ target audience assessments, messages, and capabilities. However, we identified some challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, including the lack of a strategy for assessing the impact of marking and publicity efforts on public awareness and the lack of governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing U.S. foreign aid. Language Deficiencies Continue, Especially in the Muslim World
In August 2006, GAO reported that the State Department continued to experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls in countries around the world. While MBN has taken steps to improve its process of program review and evaluation, it has not yet implemented our recommendations to improve its system of internal control or develop a comprehensive staff training plan. U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the world, and several groups have concluded that this trend may have harmed U.S. interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities undertaken by the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, are designed to counter such sentiments. Based on our prior reports, this testimony addresses (1) the negative consequences various groups have associated with rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper agency activities.
What GAO Found
Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism. According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on American economic interests, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy and military goals, and the security of Americans worldwide. Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a governmentwide communication strategy, as well as the need for an integrated State Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators for State and the BBG, and improvements in the BBG's audience research methodology. We also reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign assistance activities were not being consistently publicized and branded, and we recommended that State help develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing these efforts. State has responded to our recommendations and has taken actions to develop a more strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its programs. Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include additional performance indicators and is beginning to address our recommendations to adopt management improvements at its Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues continue to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in 2006 we reported that State continued to experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim world. The BBG faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of broadcasters. Also, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving program review, internal control, and training. |
gao_GAO-09-636T | gao_GAO-09-636T_0 | However, in making these decisions, prosecutors differed in their willingness to use DPAs or NPAs. DOJ plans to determine the need to require consistency in the use of the labels DPA and NPA. DOJ Prosecutors Cited Principles of Federal Prosecution as Influential in Their Decision on Entering into a DPA or NPA but Were Inconsistent in their Use and Labeling of Agreements
Prosecutors in all 13 DOJ offices we included in our review consistently said that they based their decision on whether to enter into a DPA or NPA rather than prosecute the company or decline to do so on the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. In choosing between a DPA and an NPA, prosecutors most frequently reported considering the same factors they did when deciding whether to enter into an agreement at all—namely, cooperation, collateral consequences, and the companies’ remedial actions. We will continue to assess this issue as part of our ongoing work. On the other hand, officials from 4 other companies said that the decision was a result of negotiations between DOJ and the company. In addition, prosecutors differ in whether they called their agreements DPAs and NPAs. The Morford Memo also states that clear and consistent use of these terms will help DOJ more effectively identify and share best practices and track the use of DPAs and NPAs. In addition, DOJ is aware that there may be agreements that share some of the elements of DPAs and NPAs but may not readily fit the Morford Memo definitions—for instance, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General explained that in one case the company had already been indicted on some of the criminal charges associated with the agreement prior to the agreement being reached, but had not been indicted on other charges associated with the agreement, and therefore it was not clear whether the agreement fit the definition of a DPA—in which charges are filed—or an NPA—in which charges are not filed. DOJ Considers Input from Company Negotiations and Other Factors, such as the Sentencing Guidelines, When Setting the Terms of DPAs and NPAs
Prosecutors in 11 of the 13 offices and officials from 14 of the 17 companies with whom we spoke reported that they negotiated at least one of the terms in their DPAs and NPAs, including monetary payments to victims or the government, the duration of the agreement, or compliance program requirements, as well as additional terms, such as monetary donations to foundations or educational institutions. DOJ Oversaw Companies’ Compliance through the Use of Independent Monitors, Coordination with Regulatory Agencies, and Other Means
In 26 of the 57 DPAs or NPAs we have reviewed to date, prosecutors required that the company hire, at its own expense, an independent monitor to assist the company in establishing a compliance program, review the effectiveness of a company’s internal control measures, and otherwise meet the terms of the agreements. Prosecutors We Contacted Varied in the Extent to which They Involved Companies in the Monitor Selection Process, and DOJ Does Not Require Documentation of the Process and Reasons for Selecting Monitors, Making It Difficult to Determine whether Monitor Selection Guidance Is Followed
We reviewed 26 agreements that required the company to hire a monitor. Although DOJ was not a party to the contracts between companies and monitors, DOJ generally took the lead in approving the monitors. In selecting the monitors, DOJ sometimes sought input from federal regulatory agencies. As this example demonstrates, without requiring documentation of the process used and the reasons for selecting a particular monitor, it may be difficult for DOJ to validate whether its monitors have been selected and approved across DOJ offices in a manner that is consistent with the Morford Memo, which established monitor selection principles intended to instill public confidence. As part of our ongoing review, we plan to obtain the perspectives of DOJ officials and monitors, in addition to companies, regarding the amount and scope of the monitors’ work and the most appropriate mechanisms companies can use to address any concerns they may have related to this issue. DOJ has increasingly employed the tools of DPAs and NPAs in order to carry out this mission, and has recognized the potential long-term benefits to the company and the public of assigning an independent monitor to oversee implementation of a DPA or NPA. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance DOJ’s ability to ensure that monitors are selected according to DOJ’s guidelines, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney General adopt internal procedures to document both the process used and reasons for monitor selection decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent cases of corporate fraud and mismanagement heighten the Department of Justice's (DOJ) need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime. Recently, DOJ has made more use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution, and may also require companies to hire an independent monitor to oversee compliance. This testimony provides preliminary observations on (1) factors DOJ considers when deciding whether to enter into a DPA or NPA and setting the terms of the agreements, (2) methods DOJ uses to oversee companies' compliance, (3) processes by which monitors are selected, and (4) companies' perspectives regarding the costs and role of the monitor. It also includes the results of GAO's recently completed work on DOJ's efforts to document the monitor selection process (discussed in objective 3). GAO reviewed DOJ guidance and 57 of the 140 agreements negotiated from 1993 (when the first 2 were signed) through May 2009; and interviewed DOJ officials, officials from 17 companies, and 6 monitors. While not generalizable, these results provide insight into decisions about DPAs and NPAs.
What GAO Found
Prosecutors in all 13 DOJ offices with whom GAO spoke said that they based their decision on whether to enter into a DPA or NPA on DOJ's principles for prosecuting business organizations, particularly those related to the company's willingness to cooperate, collateral consequences to innocent parties, and remedial measures taken by the company. However, prosecutors differed in their willingness to use DPAs or NPAs. In addition, prosecutors' varying perceptions of what constitutes a DPA or NPA has led to inconsistencies in how the agreements are labeled. In March 2008, DOJ issued guidance defining DPAs and NPAs, but this guidance is not consistently followed, in part because not all DOJ offices view it as mandatory. DOJ plans to determine the need to take additional steps to require consistency in the use of the labels DPA and NPA. While DOJ and companies generally negotiated the terms of DPAs and NPAs--such as monetary payments and compliance requirements--DOJ also considered other factors in its decisions, such as monetary gains to the company as a result of the criminal misconduct. To ensure that companies were complying with the terms of the DPAs and NPAs, DOJ employed several oversight mechanisms, including the use of independent monitors, coordination with regulatory agencies, and other means. Of the 57 agreements GAO reviewed, 26 required the company to hire, at its own expense, an independent monitor. In the remaining agreements, DOJ relied, among other things, on reports from regulatory agencies or from monitors hired by companies under separate agreements with these agencies, and company certifications of compliance. For the DPAs and NPAs GAO reviewed, even though DOJ was not a party to the contracts between companies and monitors, DOJ typically selected the monitor, and its decisions were generally made collaboratively among DOJ and company officials. Monitor candidates were typically identified through DOJ or company officials' personal knowledge or recommendations from colleagues and associates. In March 2008, DOJ issued guidance stating that for monitor selection to be collaborative and merit-based, committees should consider the candidates and the selection must be approved by the Deputy Attorney General. However, because DOJ does not require documentation of the process used or the reasons for particular monitor selection decisions, it will be difficult for DOJ to validate whether its monitor selection guidance-which, in part, is intended to instill public confidence-is adhered to. Some company officials GAO spoke with reported that they had little leverage to address concerns about the amount and scope of the monitors' work and, therefore, would like DOJ to assist them. GAO in its ongoing work will assess this and other issues about the use and oversight of DPAs and NPAs. |
gao_GAO-15-588 | gao_GAO-15-588_0 | As implemented, Interior’s BIA may use the Buy Indian Act procurement authority. BIA and IHS may use the Buy Indian Act to give preference to Indian-owned businesses when acquiring supplies and services to meet agency needs and requirements. Both BIA and IHS Have Buy Indian Act Policies in Place, but Insight into Implementation by Regional Offices is Limited
BIA and IHS have policies and procedures in place to implement the Buy Indian Act and to help ensure contractors’ compliance with key requirements. Although these regulations are in place, headquarters officials at both agencies reported limited insight into implementation of these regulations at their regional offices because they do not collect data concerning the Buy Indian Act from regional offices, nor does either agency have a specific review of Buy Indian Act contracts included in its regular procurement review process. A modified version of these regulations was later incorporated into the Department of Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation. Both agencies’ implementing regulations impose key requirements on contractors. First, both agencies require eligible firms to be 51 percent Indian-owned. Second, firms awarded a contract under the Buy Indian Act must give preference to Indians in employment and training opportunities under the contract, and to Indian firms in the award of any subcontracts. Specifically, both agencies’ regulations require that firms awarded a contract under the Buy Indian Act be at least 51 percent Indian owned, provide a preference to Indians in employment, training, and subcontracting, and not subcontract more than 50 percent of the work to other than Indian firms. Both BIA and IHS Rely on Self- Certification of Indian-Owned Status
Both agencies rely on firms to self-certify their status as Indian-owned. IHS handles challenges according to the protest procedures set out in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. A Small Percentage of BIA and IHS Obligations Go Towards Acquiring Various Goods and Services through the Act
Use of the Buy Indian Act comprises a small percentage of BIA and IHS contract obligations. However, both agencies also award contracts to Indian-owned firms using other authorities, thus increasing the percentage of obligations awarded to Indian-owned firms. Without knowledge of how the regions are implementing requirements related to the Act, both agencies may be missing opportunities to improve use of the Act. Such information could help ensure that both agencies are maximizing the benefits intended in terms of the growth and development of Indian industries. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure consistent implementation of the Buy Indian Act procurement authority across the agencies and to enhance oversight of implementation of the Act at regional offices, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services direct the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service respectively, to take the following three actions: (1) clarify and codify their policies related to the priority for use of the Buy Indian Act, including whether the Buy Indian Act should be used before other set-aside programs; (2) collect data on regional offices’ implementation of key requirements, such as challenges to self-certification; and (3) include Buy Indian Act contracts as a part of their regular procurement review process. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of the Interior; and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Buy Indian Act of 1910 and agencies' implementing regulations allow Interior's BIA and the Department of Health and Human Services' IHS to award federal contracts to Indian-owned businesses without using the standard competitive process. Among other requirements, eligible firms must be at least 51 percent Indian-owned and give preference to Indians in employment, training, and subcontracting.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of the Buy Indian Act. This report identifies (1) the policies and procedures at BIA and IHS to implement the Act; and (2) the funds obligated by BIA and IHS using the Buy Indian Act procurement authority.
GAO reviewed the Buy Indian Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and agency policies and regulations. GAO also analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation on BIA and IHS's contract obligations under the Act between fiscal years 2010 and 2014 and met with agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service (IHS) have requirements in place to implement the Buy Indian Act. Through supplements to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, both BIA and IHS have policies and procedures to implement key requirements:
Indian-owned status . Eligible firms must be 51 percent Indian-owned. The agencies rely on firms to self certify that they are Indian-owned and interested parties may challenge a firm's self-certification.
Indian preference . The agencies require that contractors give preference to Indians in employment and training opportunities, and use a contract clause to implement this requirement.
Subcontracting . The agencies require contractors to give preference to Indian firms in the award of any subcontracts.
However, BIA and IHS have limited insight into implementation of the Buy Indian Act at their regional offices, where the contracts are generally awarded. For example, officials at both agencies' headquarters had little knowledge as to how often challenges to self-certifications of Indian-owned status occur on contracts awarded at the regional offices. Neither agency collects data from regional offices on use of the Buy Indian Act, and neither agency includes a specific review of Buy Indian Act contracts in its regular procurement review process. Therefore, the agencies may be missing opportunities to maximize the intended benefits of the Act in terms of growth and development of Indian firms.
Use of the Buy Indian Act comprises a small percentage of the two agencies' annual contract obligations. However, these agencies also award contracts to Indian-owned firms using other authorities, thus increasing the percentage of obligations awarded to Indian-owned firms.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that Interior and Health and Human Services enhance their oversight of execution of the Act at regional offices by collecting additional data on key requirements and including Buy Indian Act contracts in procurement reviews. Interior and Health and Human Services agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-14 | gao_GAO-11-14_0 | Aircraft Certification
Aircraft Certification’s approximately 950 engineers and inspectors in 38 field offices issue approvals to the designers and manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft engines, propellers, parts, and equipment, including the avionics and other equipment required for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a federal effort to transform the U.S. national airspace system from a ground-based system of air traffic control to a satellite-based system of air traffic management. Flight Standards
Flight Standards’ nearly 4,000 inspectors issue certificates allowing individuals and entities to operate in the national airspace system. Extent of Variation in Interpretation Is Unknown but Potentially Stems from Factors Related to Performance-Based Regulations and FAA’s Processes
Extent of Variation in FAA’s Interpretation of Standards for Certification and Approval Decisions Is Unknown, but Stakeholders and Experts Indicate That Serious Problems Occur Infrequently
Studies we reviewed and aviation stakeholders and experts we spoke with indicated that variation in FAA’s interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions is a long-standing issue that affects both Aircraft Certification and Flight Standards, but the extent of the problem has not been quantified in the industry as a whole. Specifically, 10 of the 13 industry group and individual company representatives we interviewed said that they or members of their organization experienced variation in FAA’s certification and approval decisions on similar submissions; the remaining 3 industry representatives did not raise variation in interpretations and decisions as an issue. Industry Stakeholders Noted That Variation in Decisions Occurs as a Consequence of Performance-Based Regulations and FAA’s Exercise of Professional Judgment
Variation in FAA’s interpretation of standards and certification and approval decisions occurs as a result of factors related to performance- based regulations and the use of professional judgment by FAA inspectors and engineers, according to industry stakeholders. Key Stakeholders and Experts Said the Certification and Approval Processes Generally Work Well, but When They Do Not, It Can Be Costly for Industry
Stakeholders and Experts Said the Certification and Approval Processes Contribute to System Safety and Work Well Most of the Time
Many industry stakeholders and experts stated that FAA’s certification and approval processes contribute positively to the safety of the national airspace system. Industry stakeholders have also raised concerns about the effects of inefficiencies in the certification and approval processes on the implementation of NextGen. According to our October 2009 testimony on NextGen, airlines and manufacturers said that FAA’s certification processes take too long and impose costs on industry that discourage them from investing in NextGen equipment. The stakeholders said that these inefficiencies have resulted in costly delays for them. One of the goals for QMS is to reduce inconsistencies and increase standardization. Conclusions
FAA has taken actions to address variation in decisions and inefficiency in its certification and approval processes, although the agency does not have outcome-based performance measures and a continuous evaluative process to determine if these actions are having their intended effects. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FAA actions contribute to more consistent decisions and more efficient certification and approval processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FAA to take the following two actions:
Determine the effectiveness of actions to improve the certification and approval processes by developing a continuous evaluative process and use it to create measurable performance goals for the actions, track performance toward those goals, and determine appropriate process changes. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. It describes the processes and discusses (1) the extent of variation in FAA’s interpretation of standards with regard to the agency’s certification and approval decisions and (2) key stakeholder and expert views on how well the certification and approval processes work. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant studies, reports, and FAA documents and processes; convened a panel of aviation industry and other experts; and interviewed aviation industry members, an expert, and FAA officials. What is the most significant problem with the certification and approval processes? | Why GAO Did This Study
Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues thousands of certificates and approvals annually. These certificates and approvals, which FAA bases on its interpretation of federal standards, indicate that such things as new aircraft, the design and production of aircraft parts and equipment, and new air operators are safe for use in the national airspace system. Past studies and industry spokespersons assert that FAA's interpretations produce variation in its decisions and inefficiencies that adversely affect the industry. GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent of variation in FAA's interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions and (2) views of key stakeholders and experts on how well these processes work. To perform the study, GAO reviewed industry studies and reports and FAA documents and processes; convened a panel of aviation experts; and interviewed officials from various industry sectors, senior FAA officials, and unions representing FAA staff.
What GAO Found
Studies, stakeholders, and experts indicated that variation in FAA's interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions is a long-standing issue, but GAO found no evidence that quantified the extent of the problem in the industry as a whole. Ten of the 13 industry group and company officials GAO interviewed said that they or members of their organization had experienced variation in FAA certification and approval decisions on similar submissions. In addition, experts on GAO's panel, who discussed and then ranked problems with FAA's certification and approval processes, ranked inconsistent interpretation of regulations, which can lead to variation in decisions, as the first and second most significant problem, respectively, with these processes for FAA's Flight Standards Service (which issues certificates and approvals for individuals and entities to operate in the national airspace system) and Aircraft Certification Service (which issues approvals to the designers and manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft parts and equipment). According to industry stakeholders, variation in FAA's interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions is a result of factors related to performance-based regulations, which allow for multiple avenues of compliance, and the use of professional judgment by FAA staff and can result in delays and higher costs. Industry stakeholders and experts generally agreed that FAA's certification and approval processes contribute to aviation safety and work well most of the time, but negative experiences have led to costly delays for the industry. Industry stakeholders have also raised concerns about the effects of process inefficiencies on the implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--the transformation of the U.S. national airspace system from a ground-based system of air traffic control to a satellite-based system of air traffic management. They said that the processes take too long and impose costs that discourage aircraft operators from investing in NextGen equipment. FAA has taken actions to improve the certification and approval processes, including hiring additional inspectors and engineers and increasing the use of designees and delegated organizations--private persons and entities authorized to carry out many certification activities. Additionally, FAA is working to ensure that its processes are being followed and improved through a quality management system, which provides a mechanism for stakeholders to appeal FAA decisions. However, FAA does not know whether its actions under the quality management system are achieving the intended goals of reducing inconsistencies and increasing consistency and fairness in the agency's application of regulations and policies because FAA does not have outcome-based performance measures and a continuous evaluative process that would allow it to determine progress toward these goals. Without ongoing information on results, FAA managers do not know if their actions are having the intended effects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA develop a continuous evaluative process with measurable performance goals to determine the effectiveness of the agency's actions to improve its certification and approval processes. DOT did not comment on the recommendations but provided technical comments, which were included as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-866T | gao_GAO-14-866T_0 | Relatively Few Households Headed by Individuals 65 and Over Hold Student Loan Debt, but the Amount They Owe May Be Significant
According to the 2010 SCF, households headed by older individuals are much less likely than those headed by younger individuals to hold student loan debt. This compares to 24 percent for households headed by those under 65—representing about 22 million households. Although few older Americans have student debt, a majority of households headed by those 65 and older reported having some kind of debt, most commonly home mortgage debt, followed by credit card and vehicle debt. While relatively few older Americans have student debt, data from the SCF suggest that the size of such debt among older Americans may be comparable to that of younger age groups. Among all age groups, the median balances of student and other types of debt are dwarfed by median balances of home mortgage debt. Among households headed by those 65 and older, the estimated median student debt was about $12,000, and among those 64 and younger, about $13,000. 1). During the same period, the percentage of households headed by individuals 65 to 74 who had some student loan debt increased from just under 1 percent in 2004 to about 4 percent in 2010—more than a four-fold increase. 2). The total outstanding student debt for those 65 and older was and remains a small fraction of total outstanding federal student debt. However, debt for this age group grew at a much faster pace—from about $2.8 billion in 2005 to about $18.2 billion in 2013, more than a six-fold increase. Older Borrowers Hold Defaulted Federal Student Loans at a Higher Rate and Default Can Have Serious Consequences
Older Borrowers Hold Defaulted Federal Student Loans at a Higher Rate, Especially for Their Own Education
Although older borrowers hold a small portion of federal student loans, they hold defaulted loans at a higher rate than younger borrowers. These actions can have serious financial consequences for the borrower. For example, Education may charge collection costs up to 25 percent of the interest and principal of the loan. Of those borrowers, about 19 percent (6,000) were 65 or older. From 2002 through 2013, the number of borrowers whose Social Security benefits were offset has increased roughly 400 percent, and the number of borrowers 65 and over increased roughly 500 percent (see fig. The Social Security retirement or survivor benefits of about 33,000 Americans age 65 and older were reduced through offset to meet defaulted federal student loan obligations in 2013. Because the statutory limit at which monthly benefits can be offset has not been updated since it was enacted in 1998, certain defaulted borrowers with offsets are left with Social Security benefits below the poverty threshold. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To understand the extent to which older Americans have outstanding student loans and how this debt compares to other types of debt, we relied primarily on data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a survey that is conducted once every 3 years and gathers detailed information on the finances of U.S. families. this testimony. To understand the extent to which older Americans defaulted on federal student loans and the possible consequences of such a default, we relied on a number of data sources and agency documents related to federal student loans. For about 4.3 percent of offset payments, we were unable to determine the type of benefit, and we excluded these payments from the analysis of the type of benefit that was offset. To evaluate the extent to which Social Security benefits would have been offset if the $750 limit below which benefits are not offset had been adjusted for changes in the poverty threshold, we analyzed TOP data to impute the amount of a monthly Social Security benefit payment from the size of the offset that was taken from that payment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent studies have indicated that many Americans may be approaching their retirement years with increasing levels of various kinds of debt. Such debt can reduce net worth and income, thereby diminishing overall retirement financial security. Student loan debt held by older Americans can be especially daunting because unlike other types of debt, it generally cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. GAO was asked to examine the extent of student loan debt held by older Americans and the implications of default.
This testimony provides information on: (1) the extent to which older Americans have outstanding student loans and how this debt compares to other types of debt, and (2) the extent to which older Americans have defaulted on federal student loans and the possible consequences of default. To address these issues, GAO obtained and analyzed relevant data from the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances as well as data from the Department of the Treasury, the Social Security Administration, and the Department of Education. GAO also reviewed key agency documents and interviewed knowledgeable staff.
What GAO Found
Comparatively few households headed by older Americans carry student debt compared to other types of debt, such as for mortgages and credit cards. GAO's analysis of the data from the Survey of Consumer Finances reveals that about 3 percent of households headed by those aged 65 or older—about 706,000 households—carry student loan debt. This compares to about 24 percent of households headed by those aged 64 or younger—22 million households. Compared to student loan debt, those 65 and older are much more likely to carry other types of debt. For example, about 29 percent carry home mortgage debt and 27 percent carry credit card debt. Still, student debt among older American households has grown in recent years. The percentage of households headed by those aged 65 to 74 having student debt grew from about 1 percent in 2004 to about 4 percent in 2010. While those 65 and older account for a small fraction of the total amount of outstanding federal student debt, the outstanding federal student debt for this age group grew from about $2.8 billion in 2005 to about $18.2 billion in 2013.
Available data indicate that borrowers 65 and older hold defaulted federal student loans at a much higher rate, which can leave some retirees with income below the poverty threshold. Although federal student loans can remain unpaid for more than a year before the Department of Education takes aggressive action to recover the funds, once initiated, the actions can have serious consequences. For example, a portion of the borrower's Social Security disability, retirement, or survivor benefits can be claimed to pay off the loan. From 2002 through 2013, the number of individuals whose Social Security benefits were offset to pay student loan debt increased about five-fold from about 31,000 to 155,000. Among those 65 and older, the number of individuals whose benefits were offset grew from about 6,000 to about 36,000 over the same period, roughly a 500 percent increase. In 1998, additional limits on the amount that monthly benefits can be offset were implemented, but since that time the value of the amount protected and retained by the borrower has fallen below the poverty threshold.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this testimony from the Department of Education, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve System. GAO incorporated these comments into the testimony as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-1132T | gao_GAO-07-1132T_0 | 1.) For the decennial census, having a diverse workforce is particularly important. Recruiting for Temporary Decennial Workforce
The success of the 2010 Census depends, in part, upon the Bureau’s ability to recruit, hire, and train a very large temporary workforce that works for a very short period. Moreover, the advertisements were in a variety of languages to attract different ethnic groups, and were also targeted to different races, senior citizens, retirees, and people seeking part-time employment. In Census 2000, the Bureau first used a paid advertising campaign to create and produce an advertising campaign to inform and motivate the public to complete and return the census form by using a variety of media to stress the message that participating in the census benefits one’s community. The Bureau also included in the solicitation a requirement that the contractor have expertise and experience in marketing to historically undercounted populations, such as African Americans, Asians, Hispanics, American Indian and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders. The Bureau expects to award this communication campaign contract in September 2007. For the 2010 Census, the Bureau will continue a program first implemented for Census 2000 in which it partners with local, state, and tribal governments. In awarding and administering its contracts related to the 2010 Census, the Bureau will need to be mindful of its obligations to promote contracting opportunities for various categories of contractors, such as small businesses, women- owned businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, and others. For example, the solicitation for the advertising and outreach campaign requires that the contractor establish and adhere to a subcontracting plan that provides maximum practicable opportunity for small business participation in performing the contract. Our review of data pertaining to the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the Bureau’s upper-level management as well as the grades of those most likely to rise to that level of management shows that, the Bureau’s leadership ranks are generally as diverse as the federal government as a whole. As in 2000, for 2010 the Bureau intends to use an integrated communications strategy, including advertising, that is carried out by contractors and subcontractors that have the expertise and experiences in marketing to historically undercounted populations. It will be important for the Bureau to build on its efforts to ensure an accurate and cost-effective census by maximizing the potential offered by a diverse workforce and by ensuring that its contractors perform as promised. Human Capital: Diversity in the Federal SES and the Senior Levels of the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the 2010 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) faces the daunting challenge of cost-effectively counting a population that is growing steadily larger, more diverse, increasingly difficult to find, and more reluctant to participate in the decennial census. Managing its human capital, maintaining community partnerships, and developing advertising strategies to increase response rates for the decennial census are several ways that the Bureau can complete the 2010 Census accurately and within budget. This testimony, based primarily on past GAO work, provides information on (1) diversity in the Bureau's workforce, (2) plans for partnering with others in an effort to build public awareness of the census; and (3) certain requirements for ensuring contracting opportunities for small businesses.
What GAO Found
Diversity in senior leadership is important for effective government operations. GAO found that the racial, ethnic, and gender makeup of the Bureau's senior management and staff in grades most likely to rise to senior management is generally in line with that of the federal government as a whole. The success of the 2010 Census depends, in part, upon the Bureau's ability to recruit, hire, and train a temporary workforce reaching almost 600,000. In 2000, the Bureau used an aggressive recruitment strategy, including advertising in various languages to attract different ethnic groups and races, as well as senior citizens, retirees, and others seeking part-time employment. The Bureau intends to use a similar recruitment strategy for the 2010 Census. For 2010, the Bureau also intends to involve community and other groups to encourage participation in the census, particularly among certain populations, such as persons with limited English proficiency and minorities. Further, the Bureau plans to hire a contractor to develop an advertising campaign to reach undercounted populations. In its contract solicitation, the Bureau has included a requirement that the contractor establish goals for subcontracting with, amongst other groups, women-owned and small disadvantaged businesses, and a requirement that the contractor have experience in marketing to historically undercounted populations such as African Americans, Asians, Hispanics, American Indian and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders. This contract is expected to be awarded in September 2007. For the Bureau to leverage the benefit of its diversity and outreach efforts, it will be important for it to follow through on its intentions to recruit a diverse workforce, and utilize the experience of a diverse pool of partners, including community groups, state and local governments, and the private sector. |
gao_GAO-13-536 | gao_GAO-13-536_0 | For nonsupervisory providers, the reviews consist of a standard set of measures, including clinical, educational, and administrative competence; research and development; and personal qualities, such as dependability. VA’s Performance Pay Policy Has Gaps in Information Needed to Administer Performance Pay
VA’s Policy Allows Discretion in the Establishment of Performance Pay Goals, but Lacks an Overarching Purpose That the Goals Should Support
VA’s performance pay policy gives VA’s 21 networks and 152 medical centers discretion in the establishment of performance pay goals for providers. The Senate committee report and statements by members of Congress at the time the bill was passed provided that performance pay would recognize outstanding contributions to the medical center, to the care of veterans, or to the practice of medicine or dentistry, and it would motivate providers and ensure quality of care through the achievement of specific goals or objectives set for providers in advance.responsible for writing the performance pay policy also told us that the In addition, VA officials purpose of performance pay is to improve health care outcomes and quality; however, these goals are not documented in the policy. Table 1 includes examples of the types of goals established for a mental health provider at each of the four medical centers we visited. Because VHA has not reviewed the goals that have been set across medical centers and networks, it cannot have reasonable assurance that the goals established make a clear link between performance pay and providers’ performance. In contrast to the performance pay policy, VA’s performance award policy clearly states the purpose of these awards—specifically, that they are to recognize sustained performance of providers beyond normal job requirements as reflected in the provider’s most recent performance rating. VA policy also lists the measures supervisors are to use to determine the performance rating for providers in nonsupervisory positions, such as clinical competence. VHA’s Oversight Is Inadequate to Ensure Compliance with Performance Pay and Award Requirements
VHA does not provide adequate oversight to ensure that its medical centers are in compliance and remain in compliance with performance pay and award requirements. VHA’s Workforce Management and Consulting Office conducts annual Consult, Assist, Review, Develop, and Sustain (CARDS) reviews, which are consultative reviews that were initiated in 2011 to assist medical centers in complying with human resources requirements, including performance award requirements.According to VHA officials, the results of these reviews are provided to the medical centers. CARDS reviews use a standard list of elements to review other human resources requirements, including performance awards. In addition, the CARDS reviewers do not have the authority to require medical centers to resolve compliance problems they identify, and VHA has not formally assigned responsibility to an organizational component with the knowledge and expertise of human resources issues to do this, a condition that is inconsistent with internal control standards for control environment. We found that two of the four VA medical centers we visited did not always correct problems identified through CARDS reviews. For example, a May 2011 CARDS review of one of these two medical centers found that the medical center did not conduct a formal evaluation of its awards program, as required. A CARDS review of this same medical center about a year later found the identical problem. All of the providers we reviewed who were eligible for performance pay in fiscal year 2010 or 2011 received this pay, including providers who had performance-related personnel actions taken against them. Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify VA’s performance pay policy, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration to take the following four actions to specify in policy: the overarching purpose of performance pay; how medical centers should document that supervisors have discussed performance pay goals with providers within the first 90 days of the fiscal year; that medical centers should document approval of performance pay amounts and that the approval occurred before the required March 31 disbursement date; and how medical center officials should document whether performance- related personnel actions had an impact on providers’ achievement of performance pay goals, and as a result, affected performance pay decisions. To strengthen oversight of medical centers’ compliance with VA policy requirements for performance pay and awards, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions: ensure medical centers are in compliance with the requirements in the performance pay and award policies and assign responsibility to a VHA organizational component with the knowledge and expertise to ensure correction of medical centers’ noncompliance with VA’s performance pay and award policy requirements, including problems identified during CARDS reviews, and ensure that medical centers maintain compliance with these requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHA administers VA's health care system and strives to provide high-quality, safe care to veterans. Concerns continue about the quality of care VHA delivers, but many physicians and dentists, referred to as providers, receive performance-based pay and awards. In fiscal year 2011, about 80 percent of VHA's nearly 22,500 providers received approximately $150 million in performance pay, and about 20 percent received more than $10 million in performance awards. GAO was asked to review VHA's performance pay and award systems. This report examines (1) whether VA's performance pay and award policies ensure appropriate administration of this compensation and (2) VHA's oversight of medical centers' compliance with policy requirements. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed VA and VHA officials about the administration of performance pay and awards and VHA's oversight of the related policy requirements; analyzed data from a random sample of about 25 providers selected primarily from primary care, surgery, psychiatry, and dentistry at each of four medical centers GAO visited that had at least one provider who was the subject of an action related to clinical performance.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) performance pay policy has gaps in information needed to appropriately administer this type of pay. The performance pay policy gives VA's 152 medical centers and 21 networks discretion in setting the goals providers must achieve to receive this pay, but does not specify an overarching purpose the goals are to support. VA officials responsible for writing the policy told us that the purpose of performance pay is to improve health care outcomes and quality, but this is not specified in the policy. Moreover, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has not reviewed the goals set by medical centers and networks and therefore does not have reasonable assurance that the goals make a clear link between performance pay and providers' performance. Among the four medical centers GAO visited, performance pay goals covered a range of areas, including clinical, research, teaching, patient satisfaction, and administration. At these medical centers, all providers GAO reviewed who were eligible for performance pay received it, including all five providers who had an action taken against them related to clinical performance in the same year the pay was given. The related provider performance issues included failing to read mammograms and other complex images competently, practicing without a current license, and leaving residents unsupervised during surgery. Moreover, VA's policy is unclear about how to document certain decisions related to performance pay. For example, the policy does not provide clear guidance on what to document regarding whether a provider's performance-related action should result in the reduction or denial of the provider's performance pay. In contrast to the performance pay policy, VA's performance award policy clearly states the purpose of these awards-- specifically, that they are to recognize sustained performance of providers beyond normal job requirements as reflected in the provider's most recent performance rating.
VA policy also lists the measures, such as clinical competence, that providers' supervisors are to use to determine these providers' performance rating. VHA's oversight is inadequate to ensure that medical centers comply with performance pay and award requirements. VHA's annual consultative reviews, initiated in 2011, help medical centers comply with human resources requirements, including performance award requirements. Recently, these reviews began to also include performance pay requirements, but do not yet include a standard list of performance pay elements to review, which would be needed to ensure consistency of reviews across medical centers. Further, reviewers do not have the authority to require medical centers to resolve compliance problems they identify, and VHA has not formally assigned specific organizational responsibility to ensure medical centers resolve identified problems. As a result, VHA is unable to ensure that reviews consistently identify problems, and that these problems are corrected and do not recur. GAO found that two of the four medical centers visited did not always correct problems identified through these reviews. For example, a May 2011 review of one of these two medical centers found that the medical center did not conduct a formal evaluation of its performance award program, as required. A review of the same medical center about a year later found the identical problem.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that VA clarify the performance pay policy, by specifying the purpose and documentation requirements and that VHA review performance pay goals for consistency with the purpose, and improve oversight to ensure compliance. VA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-423 | gao_GAO-03-423_0 | Growing Number of Partnerships Involve a Relatively Small Portion of Depot Workload
DOD’s public-private partnerships for depot maintenance increased from 19 to 93 from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002 and involved 2.2 percent of DOD’s total depot maintenance program expenditures in fiscal year 2002. Of the 90 partnerships we reviewed, 28 either improved some aspects of repair performance or showed potential for doing so. On the other hand, 19 partnerships thus far have generated no work for the depots. Characteristics for Effective Partnerships Identified, but DOD Is Limited in Its Ability to Measure Partnerships’ Overall Success
DOD and contractor officials have identified 14 characteristics that they believe over time will contribute to a partnership’s success in achieving DOD’s objective of improved depot efficiency and viability, but DOD has not developed sufficient data and goals for assessing its partnering initiative. However, DOD’s ability to measure the partnerships’ overall success is limited because it has not yet developed baseline data and measurable goals for assessing the outcomes of its partnering efforts and the metrics that it has developed sometimes will not provide the clear data needed to fully assess the partnerships. Several Factors Could Affect DOD’s Planned Partnership Expansion
While DOD plans to expand its use of public-private partnerships to improve the efficiency and viability of its depots, several factors could affect the department’s expansion efforts. Partnering Opportunities May Be Limited by External Factors
The opportunities available for DOD to expand its use of public-private partnerships may be limited by external factors that the services cannot replicate or create at will. Although DOD expects private-sector partners to contribute to developing these capabilities, the extent to which the private sector will make such investments is uncertain. Our work found that these provisions have fostered the use of partnerships. Conclusion
Even with the significant increase in the number of DOD’s public-private partnerships from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the existing partnerships represent only 2.2 percent of DOD’s $19 billion depot maintenance program. Without initially establishing both clear and measurable goals to define success in improving the efficiency and viability of its depots and the metrics that provide the relevant data for the measurement, DOD has limited objective means to assess whether the partnerships are working as intended. Furthermore, while DOD is expecting private-sector investment in public depots to support the creation of capability to support new systems the extent to which this investment is likely to occur is uncertain. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
For several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Congress have encouraged the defense logistics support community to pursue partnerships with the private sector to combine the best commercial processes and practices with DOD's extensive maintenance capabilities. In January 2002, DOD issued policy encouraging the use of public-private depot maintenance partnerships to improve the efficiency and viability of its depots. GAO reviewed these partnerships and assessed the extent that DOD is participating in these partnerships, the characteristics needed to achieve effective partnerships and where DOD is in its ability to measure success, and the management challenges to DOD's planned expansion of partnerships.
What GAO Found
While the number of public-private partnerships that DOD is participating in has increased from 19 to 93 from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the existing partnerships represented only 2 percent of DOD's fiscal year 2002 $19 billion depot maintenance program. Even with the small amount of expenditures and workload associated with partnerships, some partnerships that GAO reviewed either improved some aspects of repair performance or showed potential for doing so. On the other hand, 19 partnerships have generated no work thus far. DOD and contractor officials have identified 14 characteristics that they believe over time will contribute to a partnership's success in achieving DOD's objective of improved depot efficiency and viability. However, DOD has a limited ability to measure the overall success of its partnering efforts because it has not yet developed measurable goals for the expected outcomes of the effort and the metrics that it has developed sometimes will not provide the data needed to fully assess the partnerships. Without initially establishing clear, measurable goals to define success in improving the efficiency and viability of its depots and metrics that provide the relevant data for the measurement, DOD has limited objective means to assess whether the partnerships are working as intended. Furthermore, DOD faces challenges in its efforts to expand its use of public-private partnerships. For example, opportunities available for DOD to expand its use of these partnerships may be limited by external factors that the services cannot replicate or create at will, such as one-time business opportunities. Also, while DOD is expecting private sector funding to support the establishment of capability for depot partnerships for new systems, the amount of private-sector investment to date is only $6.9 million, and the extent to which the private-sector will make additional investments is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-07-8 | gao_GAO-07-8_0 | Background
The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers two programs under the Social Security Act that provide benefits to people with disabilities: (1) Disability Insurance (DI) and (2) Supplemental Security Income (SSI). There was no statutory requirement for SSA to show that a beneficiary had improved medically in order to remove him or her from the programs. More beneficiaries leave the disability programs because they either die or convert to social security retirement benefits. In addition, while full medical CDRs are the agency’s most comprehensive tool for determining whether a beneficiary continues to have a disability, about 2.8 percent of those who receive these CDRs are found to no longer have a disability under the medical improvement standard. Of the individuals removed from the programs as a result of receiving a CDR between fiscal years 1999 and 2005, an average of about 13,800 individuals (or 2.8 percent of all CDRs conducted between fiscal years 1999 and 2005) were removed annually because SSA determined that they had improved medically, while an average of about 10,300 individuals (or about 2.1 percent) were removed each year for failure to cooperate. Several Factors Challenge SSA’s Ability to Assess Whether Beneficiaries Continue to Be Eligible for Benefits
Our review suggests that several factors associated with the standard pose challenges for SSA’s ability to assess whether beneficiaries continue to be eligible for benefits. First, limitations in SSA guidance may result in inconsistent application of the standard. For example, we found that SSA does not clearly define the degree of improvement needed to meet the standard, and the DDS directors we surveyed reported using different thresholds to show medical improvement. Second, we found that most DDSs are incorrectly conducting CDRs with the presumption that a beneficiary has a disability. Limitations in SSA Guidance for Applying the Medical Improvement Standard May Result in Inconsistent Disability Decisions
Our work shows that SSA does not clearly define the degree of improvement needed for examiners to determine if a beneficiary has improved medically. The DDS directors we surveyed reported that they interpret this guidance differently. While these problems raise concerns about the consistency of decisions when determining if medical improvement has occurred, the ultimate impact of presuming that an individual has a disability on CDR decisions is unknown because we were unable to empirically test how the presumption of a disability impacts CDR decisions to continue or discontinue benefits. Other factors, including inadequate documentation of evidence, are more difficult to address in the short term. The purpose of this survey was to assess the extent to which the standard impacts outcomes of CDRs and determine if the standard poses any special challenges for SSA when determining whether beneficiaries continue to be eligible for benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Act requires that the Social Security Administration (SSA) find an improvement in a beneficiary's medical condition in order to remove him or her from either the Disability Insurance (DI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. GAO was asked to (1) examine the proportion of beneficiaries who have improved medically and (2) determine if factors associated with the standard pose challenges for SSA when determining whether beneficiaries continue to be eligible for benefits. To answer these questions, GAO surveyed all 55 Disability Determination Services (DDS) directors, interviewed SSA officials, and reviewed pertinent SSA data.
What GAO Found
Each year, about 13,800 beneficiaries, or 1.4 percent of all the people who left the disability programs between fiscal years 1999 and 2005, did so because SSA found that they had improved medically. More beneficiaries leave because they convert to regular retirement benefits, die, or for other reasons--including having earnings above program limits. In addition, while continuing disability reviews (CDR) are SSA's most comprehensive tool for determining whether a recipient continues to have a disability, on average, 2.8 percent of beneficiaries were found to have improved medically and to be able to work following a CDR during this 7-year period. Several factors associated with the medical improvement standard (the standard) pose challenges for SSA when assessing whether beneficiaries continue to be eligible for benefits. First, limitations in SSA guidance may result in inconsistent application of the standard. For example, SSA does not clearly define the degree of improvement needed to meet the standard, and the DDS directors GAO surveyed reported that they use different thresholds to assess if medical improvement has occurred. Second, contrary to existing policy, disability examiners in a majority of the DDSs are incorrectly conducting CDRs with the presumption that a beneficiary has a disability rather than with a "neutral" perspective. Other challenges associated with the standard include inadequate documentation of evidence as well as the judgmental nature of medical improvement determinations. All these factors have implications for the consistency of CDR decisions. However, due to data limitations, GAO was unable to determine the extent to which these problems affect decisions to continue or discontinue benefits. |
gao_GAO-08-574T | gao_GAO-08-574T_0 | However, when the ore was depleted, miners often left behind a legacy of abandoned mines, structures, safety hazards, and contaminated land and water. Federal Agencies Have Spent At Least $2.6 Billion to Clean Up Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites Since 1998
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2007, the four federal agencies we examined—BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and OSM—spent at least $2.6 billion to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines on federal, state, private, and Indian lands. EPA has spent the most—$2.2 billion. Finally, OSM provided grants with an annual median value of about $18 million to states and Indian tribes through its SMCRA program for hardrock mine cleanups. The Forest Service was unable to provide this information by state. Prior State Estimates of the Number of Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites Vary Widely, but Our Data Show at Least 161,000 Sites, with Many Posing Hazards
Previous state estimates of the number of abandoned hardrock mine sites vary widely in the six studies that we reviewed because, in part, there is no generally accepted definition for a hardrock mine site and the studies rely on the states’ different definitions of hardrock mine sites. Using our consistent definition, 12 western states and Alaska estimated a total of at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in their states on state, private, or federal lands. According to this estimate, the Forest Service may have about 29,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites on its lands. Using a Consistent Definition, GAO Estimated at Least 161,000 Abandoned Sites
To estimate abandoned hardrock mining sites in the 12 western states and Alaska, we developed a standard definition for these mine sites. BLM Estimates That Operators Have Provided About $982 Million in Financial Assurances—About $61 Million Less Than Needed to Cover Estimated Reclamation Costs
As of November 2007, hardrock mining operators had provided financial assurances valued at approximately $982 million to guarantee the reclamation costs for 1,463 hardrock mining operations on BLM lands in 11 western states, according to BLM’s Bond Review Report. The report also indicates that 52 of the 1,463 hardrock mining operations had inadequate financial assurances—about $28 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. The $33 million difference between our estimated shortfall of nearly $61 million and BLM’s estimated shortfall of nearly $28 million occurs because BLM calculated its shortfall by comparing the total value of financial assurances in place with the total estimated reclamation costs. This calculation approach has the effect of offsetting the shortfalls in some operations with the financial assurances of other operations. However, the financial assurances that are greater than the amount required for an operation cannot be transferred to an operation with inadequate financial assurances. BLM officials agreed that it would be valuable for the Bond Review Report to report the dollar value of the difference between financial assurances in place and required for those operations where financial assurances are inadequate and have taken steps to modify LR2000. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the (1) federal funds spent to clean up abandoned hardrock mine sites since 1998, (2) number of abandoned hardrock mine sites and the number of associated hazards, and (3) value and coverage of the financial assurances operators use to guarantee reclamation costs on the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land, we interviewed officials at the BLM, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM); examined agency documents and data; and reviewed relevant legislation and regulations. We presented these data in 2008 constant dollars. Appendix IV: Information on BLM Financial Assurances and Their Adequacy to Cover Estimated Reclamation Costs
This appendix provides information from BLM’s November 2007 Bond Review Report, which includes information on the number of financial assurances in place for hardrock operations on BLM lands in 11 western states (table 7); the value of these financial assurances by state (table 8); the number of inadequate financial assurances for notice- and plan-level operations, by state (table 9); and BLM’s and our analyses of the differences between financial assurance requirements and actual value of financial assurances in place for notice- and plan-level operations by state (table 10). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Mining Act of 1872 helped foster the development of the West by giving individuals exclusive rights to mine gold, silver, copper, and other hardrock minerals on federal lands. However, miners often abandoned mines, leaving behind structures, safety hazards, and contaminated land and water. Four federal agencies--the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), the Forest Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)--fund the cleanup of some of these sites. To curb further growth in the number of abandoned hardrock mines on federal lands, in 1981 BLM began requiring mining operators to reclaim lands when their operations ceased. In 2001, BLM began requiring all operators to provide financial assurances to guarantee funding for reclamation costs if the operator did not complete the task as required. This testimony provides information on the (1) federal funds spent to clean up abandoned hardrock mine sites since 1998, (2) number of abandoned hardrock mine sites and hazards, and (3) value and coverage of financial assurances operators use to guarantee reclamation costs on BLM land. To address these issues, GAO, among other steps, asked 12 western states and Alaska to provide information on the number of abandoned mine sites and associated features in their states using a consistent definition.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2007, BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and OSM spent at least $2.6 billion (in 2008 constant dollars) to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines. BLM and the Forest Service have reclaimed abandoned hardrock mine sites on the lands they manage; EPA funds the cleanup of these sites, primarily on nonfederal lands through its Superfund program; and OSM provides some grants to states and Indian tribes to clean up these sites on their lands. Of the four agencies, EPA has spent the most--about $2.2 billion (in 2008 constant dollars) for mine cleanups. BLM and the Forest Service spent about $259 million (in 2008 constant dollars), and OSM awarded grants totaling about $198 million (in 2008 constant dollars) to support the cleanup of abandoned hardrock mines. Over the last 10 years, estimates of the number of abandoned hardrock mining sites in the 12 western states and Alaska have varied widely, in part because there is no generally accepted definition for a hardrock mine site. Using a consistent definition that GAO provided, 12 western states and Alaska provided estimates of abandoned hardrock mine sites. On the basis of these data, GAO estimated a total of at least 161,000 such sites in these states with at least 332,000 features that may pose physical safety hazards and at least 33,000 sites that have degraded the environment. According to BLM's information on financial assurances as reported in its November 2007 Bond Review Report, mine operators had provided financial assurances valued at approximately $982 million to guarantee reclamation costs for 1,463 hardrock operations on BLM land. The report also estimates that 52 mining operations have financial assurances that amount to about $28 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. However, GAO found that the financial assurances for these 52 operations are in fact about $61 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. The $33 million difference between GAO's estimated shortfall and BLM's occurs because BLM calculated its shortfall by comparing the total value of financial assurances in place with the total estimated reclamation costs. This calculation approach has the effect of offsetting the shortfalls in some operations with the financial assurances of other operations. However, financial assurances that are greater than the amount required for an operation cannot be transferred to another operation that has inadequate financial assurances. BLM officials agreed that it would be valuable for the Bond Review Report to report the dollar value of the difference between financial assurances in place and required for those operations where financial assurances are inadequate, and BLM has taken steps to correct this. GAO discussed the information in this testimony with officials from the four federal agencies, and they provided GAO with technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-887 | gao_GAO-03-887_0 | Deployed Ships’ Supply Goals Go Unmet As Only About Half of Needed Spare Parts Are Onboard
Only about 54 percent of spare parts requisitions for ships in 6 battle groups in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets deployed in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 could be filled from onboard sources—a supply effectiveness rate that fell below the Navy’s goal of 65 percent. When priority parts were not on board, ships had to wait an average of 18.1 days, more than 3 times the Navy’s wait-time goal of 5.6 days for ships outside the continental United States. The Navy has fallen short of meeting its ship supply performance goals for more than 20 years. Inaccurate Configuration and Demand Data Contribute to Unmet Supply Goals
Our analysis identified two key problems that contribute to the Navy’s inability to achieve its supply goals for deployed ships: inaccurate ship configuration records and incomplete, outdated, or erroneous historical parts demand data. However, because of data inaccuracies, the ships may stock all of the parts they are allowed to carry but still find they cannot fill a large number of parts requisitions from onboard inventories, thus failing to meet the Navy’s supply performance goals. This information is used in allowance models to prepare a Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL). Spare Parts Supply Problems Can Affect Ship Operations and Mission Readiness and Increase Costs
The Navy’s spare parts supply problems can delay the completion of needed maintenance and repair jobs on deployed ships and can affect their operations and mission readiness, although their precise impacts are not always well defined. The Navy also expends substantial funds—totaling nearly $25 million for the six ships we reviewed—to maintain large inventories that are not requisitioned during deployments because it has given low priority to identifying and purging unneeded spare parts from ship inventories. Our analysis of more than 50,000 maintenance work orders opened during 6 recent battle group deployments indicates that about 29,000 (almost 58 percent of the total) could not be completed because one or more needed repair parts were not on board ship. Data Unclear on Impact of Spare Parts Shortages on Ship Operations and Mission Readiness
A complete picture of the impact of the Navy’s spare part shortages, however, is unclear because the Navy’s two forms of reporting on the extent to which significant equipment malfunctions affect a ship’s operations and mission readiness are inconsistent. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve supply availability, enhance operations and mission readiness, and reduce operating costs for deployed ships, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop plans to conduct periodic ship configuration audits and to ensure that configuration records are updated and maintained in order that accurate inventory data can be developed for deployed ships; ensure that demand data for parts entered into ship supply systems are recorded promptly and accurately as required to ensure that onboard ship inventories reflect current usage or demands; periodically identify and purge spare parts from ship inventories to reduce costs when parts have not been requisitioned for long periods of time and are not needed according to current and accurate configuration and parts demand information; and ensure that casualty reports are issued consistent with high priority maintenance work orders, as required by Navy instruction, to provide a more complete assessment of ship’s readiness. Also, we reviewed the Navy’s criteria for assessing the effects of failed equipment on a ship’s ability to accomplish its mission, particularly the standards for determining what maintenance work orders result in casualty reports. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is conducting a series of reviews in response to a congressional request to identify ways to improve the Department of Defense's (DOD's) availability of high-quality spare parts for ships, aircraft, vehicles, and weapons systems. This report focuses on the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's spare parts support to deployed ships. It examines (1) the extent to which the Navy is meeting its spare parts supply goals, (2) the reasons for any unmet supply goals, and (3) the effects of spare parts supply problems on ship operations, mission readiness, and costs. To conduct the review, GAO looked at data on parts requisitions, maintenance work orders, and casualty reports for various Navy ship deployments between fiscal years 1999 and 2003.
What GAO Found
In typical 6-month deployments at sea, Navy ships are generally unable to meet the Navy's supply performance goals for spare parts. GAO's analysis of data for 132,000 parts requisitions from ships in 6 Atlantic and Pacific battle groups deployed in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 showed that 54 percent could be filled from inventories onboard ship. This supply rate falls short of Navy's long-standing 65 percent goal. When parts were requisitioned, maintenance crews waited an average of 18.1 days to get the parts--more than 3 times the Navy's wait-time goal of 5.6 days for ships outside the continental United States. The Navy recognizes it has not met its supply goals for over 20 years. Two key problems contribute to the Navy's inability to achieve its supply goals. Its ship configuration records, which identify the types of equipment and weapons systems that are installed on a ship, are often inaccurate because they are not updated in a timely manner and because audits to ensure their accuracy are not conducted periodically. In addition, the Navy's historical demand data are often out-of-date, incomplete, or erroneous because supply crews do not always enter the right information into the ships' supply system databases or do not enter it on a timely basis. Because configuration-record and demand data are used in models to estimate what a ship needs to carry in inventory, inaccuracies in this information can result in a ship's not stocking the right parts for the equipment on board or not carrying the right number of parts that may be needed during deployment. While precise impacts are not always well defined, the Navy's spare parts supply problems can affect a deployed ship's operations, mission readiness, and costs. GAO's analysis of data on 50,000 work orders from 6 deployed battle groups showed that 58 percent could not be completed because the right parts were not available onboard. More complete reporting of work orders identified as critical or important would have resulted in a more complete assessment of ship mission readiness. In addition, the Navy expends substantial funds--nearly $25 million for six ships GAO reviewed--to maintain large inventories that are not requisitioned during deployments. |
gao_GAO-16-286 | gao_GAO-16-286_0 | Several DOD organizations have responsibilities related to major DOD headquarters activities, including those summarized below. Department-Wide Efficiency Initiatives That Include Headquarters Are Under Way
Since 2014, and in part to respond to congressional direction, DOD has undertaken initiatives intended to improve the efficiency of its business processes, which include headquarters organizations, and identify related cost savings, but it is unclear to what extent these initiatives will help the department achieve the savings it has identified. Through this review, ODCMO identified $62 billion to $84 billion in potential cumulative savings opportunities across the six business processes for fiscal years 2016 through 2020. The four initiatives were not completed, or their results were not available, in time for us to assess their effect, and therefore it is unclear to what extent they will contribute toward the savings identified by the Core Business Process Review. DOD Does Not Have Reliable Data on Headquarters Functions and Costs, Which Hinders Assessment
DOD has taken steps to improve some available data on headquarters organizations, but does not have reliable data for assessing headquarters functions and associated costs. In addition, DOD is working to identify which organizations or portions of organizations meet a new definition of major DOD headquarters activities that was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and intends to revise its headquarters instruction upon completion of this effort. Finally, the department plans to update a key resource database, the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), to improve visibility of headquarters resources. However, the one department-wide data set that identifies specific DOD headquarters functions contains unreliable data because the department has not aligned these data with its definition of major headquarters activities, nor does it have plans to collect information on the costs associated with functions within headquarters organizations. DOD’s limited information on which positions perform which headquarters functions and their associated costs hinders its ability to identify potential cost savings associated with opportunities to consolidate and streamline these headquarters functions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further DOD’s efforts to identify opportunities for more efficient use of headquarters-related resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Chief Management Officer, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the military departments, and the heads of the defense agencies and DOD field activities, to take the following two actions: align DOD’s data on department-wide military and civilian positions that have headquarters-related DOD function codes with the revised definition of major DOD headquarters activities in order to provide the department with reliable data to accurately assess headquarters functions and identify opportunities for streamlining or further analysis; and once this definition is published in DOD guidance, collect reliable information on the costs associated with functions within headquarters organizations—through revisions to the IGCA Inventory or another method—in order to provide the department with detailed information for use in estimating resources associated with specific headquarters functions, and in making decisions, monitoring performance, and allocating resources. DOD concurred with these two recommendations. This report (1) describes the status of DOD’s initiatives since 2014 to improve the efficiency of headquarters organizations and identify related cost savings; and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has reliable data to assess headquarters functions and their associated costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facing budget pressures, DOD is seeking to reduce its headquarters activities by identifying streamlining opportunities. DOD has multiple layers of headquarters activities with complex, overlapping relationships, such as OSD, the Joint Staff, the military service secretariats and staffs, and defense agencies.
Committee reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included provisions for GAO to identify DOD's headquarters reduction efforts to date and patterns in functional areas related to DOD's headquarters activities. This report (1) describes the status of DOD's initiatives since 2014 to improve the efficiency of headquarters organizations and identify related cost savings, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has reliable data to assess headquarters functions and their associated costs.
GAO assessed DOD-wide headquarters-related efficiency efforts, and a DOD-wide data set that identifies positions with headquarters functions.
What GAO Found
Since 2014, and in part to respond to congressional direction, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken initiatives intended to improve the efficiency of headquarters organizations and identify related cost savings, but it is unclear to what extent these initiatives will help the department achieve the potential savings it has identified. In a 2015 review of its six business processes, DOD identified $62 billion to $84 billion in potential cumulative savings opportunities for fiscal years 2016 through 2020. According to DOD officials, the department is currently pursuing four headquarters-related initiatives, but these were not completed, or results were not available, in time for GAO to assess their effect. The table below provides a description of these initiatives.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. GAO-16-286
DOD has taken steps to improve some available data on headquarters organizations, but does not have reliable data for assessing headquarters functions and associated costs. Consistent with a GAO recommendation, DOD has established a framework for major DOD headquarters activities, is working to identify which organizations or portions of organizations meet a new definition of major DOD headquarters activities, and plans to update a key database to improve visibility of headquarters resources. However, the one department-wide data set that identifies military and civilian positions by specific DOD headquarters functions contains unreliable data because DOD has not aligned these data with its revised headquarters definition. Further, DOD does not have plans to collect information on costs associated with functions within headquarters organizations. This may hinder DOD's ability to conduct an in-depth review for purposes of consolidating and streamlining headquarters functions. Without alignment of headquarters function data with the revised headquarters definition and collection of reliable information on costs associated with headquarters functions, DOD may be unable to accurately assess specific functional areas or identify potential streamlining and cost savings opportunities.
What GAO Recommends
To further DOD's efforts to identify headquarters-related efficiency opportunities, GAO recommends that DOD align its data on positions that have headquarters-related DOD function codes with the revised definition of major DOD headquarters activities and collect information on costs associated with functions within headquarters organizations. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-37 | gao_GGD-95-37_0 | Finally, OCC also believed that First City would not be able to raise sufficient capital through stock issuances. The Second Resolution: First City Banks Were “Bridged” in 1992 and Sold in 1993
After being advised of OCC’s examination findings, FDIC considered two basic alternatives to provide for the orderly resolution of the First City banks: (1) liquidate them immediately or (2) place them under FDIC control and operate them as bridge banks until a sale could be arranged. Under the other alternative, FDIC could have provided open bank assistance to willing acquirers of the First City banks—as long as the estimated cost of assistance was less than the estimated cost of liquidation to the insurance fund. FDIC staff estimated resolution costs to BIF ranging from a low of about $700 million (bridge bank with loss sharing) to a high of over $1 billion (FDIC liquidation). Lesson on Closure Determinations
OCC could have better documented the bases for its closure decision had its examination reports and workpapers been clear, complete, and self-explanatory. DOR officials could have used the OCC examiners’ assessment of asset quality as a means of verifying the asset valuations estimated through its own techniques. We will provide copies of this report to the Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Comptroller of the Currency; the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; and the Acting Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision. Our objectives were to review the events leading up to First City’s 1988 open bank assistance and its 1992 bank failures to determine why FDIC provided open bank assistance in 1988 rather than close the First why the 1992 resolution estimate differed so much from the estimate resulting from the 1993 sale of the banks; whether the First City banks’ failures in 1992 are expected to result in additional costs to BIF; and whether the First City experience provides lessons relevant to the assistance, closure, and/or resolution of failing banks. First City Bancorporation of Texas typified this structure. We found that First City suffered about $300 million in losses on such loans. GAO Comments
1. 3. 4. 5. Therefore, FDIC believed bridge banks would provide for the most orderly resolution, which FDIC also determined to be the least costly resolution alternative available at that time. 6. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) resolution of the First City Bancorporation of Texas, focusing on: (1) why FDIC decided to resolve the corporation by providing financial assistance instead of using other available resolution alternatives; and (2) the additional cost to the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) as a result of the resolution.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1988, FDIC provided $970 million in financial assistance to recapitalize and restructure the banking organization; (2) FDIC chose this method of resolution because it was less costly than liquidating the banks in the event of insolvency; (3) FDIC estimated BIF costs to liquidate the banks to be about $1.74 billion, as opposed to the $970 million estimated for open bank assistance; (4) FDIC did not opt to sell the banks because it did not believe that it would be able to find acceptable buyers with sufficient capital to restore the banks to long-term viability; (5) FDIC placed the banks under its control for about 3 months and operated them as bridge banks to facilitate the orderly resolution of the banks; (6) FDIC relied on its best business judgment in estimating BIF costs at the time of the banks' failures; (7) FDIC considered loss estimates that ranged from $300 million to over $1 billion in making its least-cost resolution determination; (8) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency could have better supported its decision to close the largest bank by ensuring that its examination reports and underlying workpapers were clear, well documented, and self-explanatory; and (9) FDIC resolution officials could have used OCC examination findings as a means of verifying its valuation of the banks' assets. |
gao_GAO-13-174 | gao_GAO-13-174_0 | Agencies Have Made Progress Implementing Key Requirements for Priority Goals, but Some Information Is Incomplete
Agencies Have Implemented Several Requirements Related to Priority Goals
For each APG, agencies were required, by GPRAMA or OMB guidance, to make available to OMB for publication on Performance.gov and in their strategic plans or performance plans (1) a performance goal with a target level of performance to be achieved in a 2-year time frame; (2) an explanation of how the goal contributes to agency strategic goals; and (3) the identification of an agency official as the goal leader responsible for achieving the goal. Agencies identified external contributors for 73 of the 102 APGs. However, it was not always clear why external contributors were not identified for 29 of the 102 APGs. Similarly, although we did not analyze whether agencies included all relevant internal and external contributors for their APGs, our work on potential areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication helped identify several examples where agencies did not list relevant external contributors. Agencies Did Not Provide Milestones with Scheduled Completion Dates for Many Priority Goals
The act requires each APG to have clearly defined quarterly milestones— scheduled events signifying the completion of a major deliverable or a set of related deliverables or a phase of work. Without clearly defined milestones, agencies may have difficulty demonstrating that they have properly planned the actions needed, and are tracking progress, to accomplish their APGs. However, it is unclear when SBA intends to complete these actions. Agencies also did not always identify external contributors to their APGs. In addition, most agencies did not describe how their APGs contribute to CAP goals. OMB’s guidance does not adequately reflect that agencies should describe this linkage. Without clear targets, which enable a comparison of results against planned performance, it is unclear if agency managers have the information they need to determine if they are making sufficient progress toward each APG—a practice our past work has shown can actually lead to increased use of information and improved results. Although OMB’s 2012 A-11 guidance directs agencies to develop quarterly milestones for their APGs and outlines near-term and longer-term timeframes those milestones should cover, the guidance does not state that agencies should provide specific completion dates for their milestones. To ensure that agencies can (1) compare actual results to planned performance on a more frequent basis, as appropriate, and (2) demonstrate how they plan to accomplish their goals as well as contribute to the accomplishment of broader federal efforts, we recommend the Director of OMB revise relevant guidance documents to provide a definition of what constitutes “data of significant value;” direct agencies to develop and publish on Performance.gov interim quarterly performance targets for their APG performance measures when the above definition applies; direct agencies to provide and publish on Performance.gov completion dates, both in the near term and longer term, for their milestones; and direct agencies to describe in their performance plans how the agency’s performance goals—including APGs—contribute to any of the CAP goals. In addition, as OMB works with agencies to enhance Performance.gov to include additional information about APGs, we recommend that the Director of OMB ensure that agencies adhere to OMB’s guidance for website updates by providing complete information about the organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities—both within and external to the agency—that contribute to each APG; and a description of how input from congressional consultations was incorporated into each APG. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires us to review the act’s implementation at several critical junctures, and this report is part of a series of reviews planned around the requirement. Our specific objectives for this report were to (1) examine the extent to which agencies have implemented selected planning and reporting requirements and leading practices related to agency priority goals (APG); and (2) comment on the priority goals of several selected agencies based on our prior work and that of relevant agency inspectors general (IGs) and identify our relevant open recommendations and matters for congressional consideration. In addition, for the first objective, we reviewed and assessed the implementation of selected planning and reporting requirements for 102 of the 103 APGs developed by the 24 agencies selected by OMB and that were released concurrently with the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget on Performance.gov.requirements we used to assess implementation included whether the goal: (1) supports a federal government priority goal (also known as cross-agency priority or CAP goals); (2) contributes to agency strategic goals; (3) reflects input from congressional consultations; (4) identifies the federal organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities—both within and external to the agency—that contribute to the APG; (5) has a clearly identified agency official as the goal leader; (6) has targets for a 2-year timeframe; (7) has interim quarterly targets; and (8)
The key GPRAMA planning and reporting has clearly defined quarterly milestones. To address the second objective, we selected 5 of the 24 agencies that developed APGs—the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)— based on several factors, including the number and variety of types of federal programs involved in achieving the goals, such as direct service, grant, and regulatory programs, and whether the APGs were related to any of the CAP goals. In October 2012, HUD addressed these recommendations by issuing detailed guidance. GAO-12-34. VA agreed with this recommendation. Many of these weaknesses continue. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAOs work has repeatedly shown that federal agencies must coordinate better to achieve common outcomes. The act established a more crosscutting and integrated approach to achieving results and improving performance, including a requirement that agencies identified by OMB establish APGs. The act directs GAO to review its implementation at several junctures; this report is part of a series doing so. This report (1) examines the extent to which 24 agencies identified by OMB implemented selected requirements related to 102 APGs, and (2) comments on the 21 APGs of five selected agencies, based on prior GAO and IG work, including the status of relevant open recommendations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the acts requirements for APGs, OMB guidance, APG information from Performance.gov and related agency documents; and interviewed OMB officials. GAO selected DHS, HUD, DOT, VA, and OPM for their variety of APG program types and linkage to CAP goals. For each agency, GAO reviewed its past work, as well as that of IGs, related to the APGs and updated the status of open recommendations.
What GAO Found
For 102 agency priority goals (APGs) for 2012 to 2013 that GAO reviewed, agencies implemented three GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (the act) requirements. Agencies identified (1) a target level of performance within a 2-year time frame; (2) how their APGs contribute to their strategic goals; and (3) an agency official responsible for achieving each APG. These represent important accomplishments, but information about other requirements is incomplete:
Agencies did not fully explain the relationship between APGs and crosscutting efforts. The act directs agencies to identify federal organizations, programs, and activities that contribute to each APG. Agencies identified internal contributors to their APGs, but did not identify external contributors for 34 of 102 APGs. In some cases the APGs appeared to be internally focused; however, in others GAO's work has shown there are external contributors, but none were listed. In addition, the act requires agencies to identify how, if at all, an APG contributes to any cross-agency priority (CAP) goals set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Although 29 of 102 APGs appeared to support a CAP goal, only two described the link. When agencies do not identify external contributors or links to crosscutting efforts, it is unclear whether agencies are coordinating to limit overlap and duplication.
Most APGs had performance measures, but many lacked interim targets. The act requires agencies to develop quarterly targets for APGs if they provide data of significant value at a reasonable level of burden. However, OMB's guidance does not fully address this. Without interim targets when appropriate, agencies cannot demonstrate that they are comparing actual results against planned performance on a sufficiently frequent basis to address performance issues as they arise.
Agencies did not identify milestones with completion dates for many APGs. The act requires agencies to develop and publish milestones--scheduled events for completing planned actions--for their APGs. However, OMB's guidance does not direct agencies to provide specific completion dates for their milestones. For 39 of 102 APGs, agencies did not provide milestones with clear completion dates for the next quarter or the remainder of the goal period. Without milestones, agencies are unable to demonstrate that they have properly planned for the actions needed to accomplish their goals and are tracking progress.
Most agencies did not describe how APGs reflect congressional input. The act directs agencies to describe for each APG how input from consultations with Congress was incorporated. However, only one agency provided a description. Without transparency regarding congressional input, there is less assurance that meaningful consultations with Congress are occurring.
GAO commented on all 21 of the APGs from the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), based on past GAO and inspectors general (IG) work. The most frequent theme in the comments is that agencies continue to face the long-standing challenge of measuring performance and collecting accurate performance data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes recommendations to OMB to improve APG implementation by revising its guidance to better reflect interim target, milestone, and CAP goal alignment requirements; and ensure that agencies provide complete information about external contributors to their APGs and describe congressional input on APG development. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-690 | gao_GAO-12-690_0 | The Modernization, Information Technology and Security Services (MITS) PMO leads IT development for the program. The Health Care Counsel provides legal counsel and guidance (see fig. IRS Has Made Varying Degrees of Progress in Implementing Our Recommendations but Has More to Do on Project Planning, Cost Estimating, and Evaluating Risk Mitigation Strategies
Over half of the 47 provisions requiring action from IRS were statutorily effective in or prior to 2010, forcing IRS to conduct short-term implementations and long-term strategic planning simultaneously. These efforts have helped IRS gain a better understanding and vision for the implementation work and challenges remaining and how IRS would manage risks to the program’s success. IRS has implemented one of our four recommendations from June 2011 to strengthen PPACA implementation efforts by documenting a schedule for developing performance measures for PPACA that are to link to program goals (see table 2). Our June 2012 report on IRS’s fiscal year 2013 budget recommended that IRS revise its PPACA cost estimate by September 2012, which IRS agreed to do. IRS’s Risk Management Plan Meets Criteria for Three of Five Risk Framework Stages but Lacks Specific Guidance on the Evaluation and Selection of Mitigation Strategies
Our assessment of IRS’s revised risk management plan from February 24, 2012, indicated that IRS adheres to the criteria for three of the five stages of our framework for risk management. While this may be true, IRS’s risk plan does not offer guidance on factors like the probability of a risk’s occurrence that could affect the level of evaluation and amount of documentation to be done. IRS provided evidence of a weekly review meeting for risks. IRS officials acknowledged that the risk plan was not used for these provisions, noting that the provisions were not expected to have an impact on IRS operations. However, IRS did not have a formal system for managing risks when coordinating with HHS. IRS officials said that they received informal feedback from conversations with other tax stakeholders, such as groups representing taxpayers, tax software developers, and tax preparers. Additionally, without a shared system for tracking and monitoring risks with partner agencies, such as HHS, the agencies will be more likely to overlook potential challenges or duplicate efforts to mitigate risks. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the PPACA risk management plan, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue enhance guidance on evaluating risk mitigation alternatives to clarify who is responsible for doing the evaluation and making decisions based on the results as well as how they might do the evaluation, assure that resources are available for the chosen mitigation strategy, document the mitigation alternatives considered and rationale(s) for the decisions made. To ensure more consistent implementation of the risk management plan, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following two actions: ensure that the PPACA risk management plan is applied to provisions in which the Office of Chief Counsel assumes lead responsibility for implementation, and develop agreements with HHS (and other external parties as needed) on a system to record and track details on decisions made or to be made to ensure that risks are identified and mitigated. To assess IRS’s risk management plan for PPACA, we compared the contents of IRS’s Risk Management Plan, governance plan, and high- level action plans to the criteria outlined by GAO’s risk management approach. Appendix III: Provisions Evaluated for Consistent Use of Risk Management Plan
In evaluating IRS’s responses to a sample of nine PPACA provisions, we found that IRS generally followed the plan to identify, track and report risks. As discussed in our report, exceptions were (1) IRS did not consistently evaluate potential risk mitigation strategies in the Resolution/Mitigation stage of its risk plan, and (2) the risk plan was not used when the Office of Chief Counsel led the implementation of provisions related to a reinsurance program for early retirees and the economic substance doctrine. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: IRS Should Expand Its Strategic Approach to Implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA is a significant effort for IRS, with expected costs of $881 million from fiscal years 2010 to 2013 and work planned through 2018. To implement PPACA, IRSmust work closely with partner agencies to develop information technology systems that can share data with other agencies. Additionally, IRS is responsible for providing guidance to taxpayers, employers, insurers, and others to ensure compliance with new tax aspects of the law. Furthermore, it will be important for IRS to have systems to consistently identify, assess, mitigate, and monitor potential risks to the programs success.
As requested, this report (1) describes IRSs progress in addressing GAO recommendations from June 2011 on PPACA implementation, (2) assesses IRSs revised risk management plan, and (3) assesses how IRS applies its plan in practice. GAO compared IRSs revised risk plan to GAOs criteria for risk management and selected 9 provisions of the law in which IRS had a role to determine whether IRS used the risk plan consistently. Because selection focused on provisions that had the most risks and highest dollar impacts, the results are not generalizable but are relevant to how IRS managed risks.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has implemented one of GAOs four recommendations from June 2011 to strengthen the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) implementation efforts by scheduling the development of performance measures for the PPACA program. IRS has made varying degrees of progress on the other three recommendations:
develop program goals and an integrated project plan;
develop a cost estimate consistent with GAOs published guidance; and
assure that IRSs risk management plan identifies strategic level risks and evaluates associated mitigation options.
IRSs revised risk management plan meets three of five criteria for risk management plans, but the plan does not have specific guidance for evaluating and selecting potential risk mitigation options, such as how to
identify who conducts and reviews the analysis,
determine the availability of resources for a given strategy, and
document for future users the rationale behind decisions made.
IRS applied its risk management plan when identifying, tracking, and reporting on implementation risks. Although the risk plan calls for risk mitigation strategies to be evaluated, these evaluations have not been done. IRS officials said that evaluating these strategies would require varying levels of effort because the probability and magnitude of risks differ. However, the plan was silent on this point; it provided no guidance as to when and to what extent an evaluation should be done. Without evaluating potential strategies, IRS may not consider critical factors that impact the programs success.
IRSs risk management plan was not used when IRSs Office of Chief Counsel was responsible for implementing two provisions GAO reviewed. Although these provisions primarily required legal counsel and guidance, IRS officials said that one of the provisions also affected IRS operations and could have risks that need to be managed. Additionally, GAO did not find evidence that a risk plan was used to track and mitigate risks when coordinating with partner agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services. Without a system for tracking shared risks, IRS is more likely to overlook risks or duplicate efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS (1) enhance its guidance on evaluating risk mitigation alternatives and documenting decisions, (2) use a risk management plan for work led by its Office of Chief Counsel, and (3) develop agreements with external parties to record and track risks that threaten shared goals and objectives. IRS officials agreed with all of GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-518 | gao_GAO-10-518_0 | According to the Census Bureau’s 2006-2008 American Community Survey, about 12.4 million adults in the United States—or 5.5 percent of the total U.S. adult population—reported speaking English not well or not at all. Limited English Proficiency Can Create Challenges to Conducting Financial Affairs
Staff we spoke with at financial institutions, federal agencies, and community and advocacy organizations that work with non-English speaking populations consistently told us that, in their experience, a lack of proficiency in English can be a significant barrier to financial literacy. Service providers and consumers with limited English proficiency told us that most financial documents are available only in English, which limits the ability of individuals with limited English proficiency to complete applications, understand and sign contracts, and conduct other everyday financial affairs without assistance. Resolving problems. Although there is a multitude of print material, Web sites, broadcast media, and classroom curricula provided by government, nonprofit, and private sources aimed at improving financial education, these resources are not always available in languages other than English. Financial Products Often Use Language That Is Particularly Complex
Information and documents related to financial products tend to be very complex and can be hard to understand, even for native English speakers. Translation of Financial Information May Not Always Be Effective
In some cases, written financial materials are provided in languages other than English, but the translation may not be fully comprehensible if it is not written using colloquial or culturally appropriate language. Interpretation—that is, oral translation—can also be problematic. However, interpreters may not be reliable because they may not fully understand or be able to explain the material. Many Factors Other Than Language Influence the Financial Literacy of Individuals with Limited English Proficiency
Federal agency officials as well as financial literacy experts and staff from service providers such as nonprofit organizations, credit unions, and banks that work with immigrant communities informed us that factors other than language often serve as barriers to financial literacy for people with limited English proficiency. Some immigrants to the United States—some of whom are not proficient in English—lack familiarity with the U.S. financial system and its products, which may differ greatly from those in their native countries. Cultural differences can play a role in financial literacy and the conduct of financial affairs because different populations have dissimilar norms, attitudes, and experiences related to managing money. For example, in some cultures the practice of borrowing money and carrying debt is viewed negatively, which may deter immigrants from such cultures from taking loans to purchase homes or cars and build credit histories. Some studies have reported a correlation between income and financial literacy. Some service providers and advocates told us that because factors other than language affect the financial literacy of people with limited English proficiency, translations of financial products and financial education materials may not be sufficient to address obstacles to financial literacy. While overcoming language barriers is important, they said, efforts to improve the financial literacy and well-being of people with limited English proficiency must also address underlying cultural and socioeconomic issues. Consumers with Limited English Proficiency Are More Likely to Use Alternative Financial Services and May Be More Susceptible to Fraudulent and Predatory Practices
Evidence suggests that people with limited English proficiency are more likely than the U.S. population as a whole not to have accounts at banks and other mainstream financial institutions. Several service providers we spoke with said that financial education can play an important role in helping consumers with limited English proficiency avoid abusive and predatory practices. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our reporting objective was to examine the extent, if any, to which individuals with limited English proficiency are impeded in their financial literacy and conduct of financial affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to Census data, more than 12 million adults in the United States report they do not speak English well or at all. Proficiency in reading, writing, speaking, and understanding the English language appears to be linked to multiple dimensions of adult life in the United States, including financial literacy--the ability to make informed judgments and take effective actions regarding the current and future use and management of money. The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 mandated GAO to examine the relationship between fluency in the English language and financial literacy. Responding to this mandate, this report examines the extent, if any, to which individuals with limited English proficiency are impeded in their financial literacy and conduct of financial affairs. To address this objective, GAO conducted a literature review of relevant studies, reports, and surveys, and conducted interviews at federal, nonprofit, and private entities that address financial literacy issues and serve people with limited English proficiency. GAO also conducted a series of focus groups with consumers and with staff at community and financial organizations. GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Staff at governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations that work with non-English speaking populations consistently told us that, in their experience, a lack of proficiency in English can create significant barriers to financial literacy and to conducting everyday financial affairs. For example, service providers and consumers with limited English proficiency told us that because most financial documents are available only in English, individuals with limited English proficiency can face challenges completing account applications, understanding contracts, and resolving problems, such as erroneous bills. In addition, financial education materials--such as print material, Web sites, broadcast media, and classroom curricula--are not always available in languages other than English and, in some cases, Spanish. Further, information and documents related to financial products tend to be very complex and can use language confusing even to native English speakers. In some cases, written financial materials are provided in other languages, but the translation may not be clear if it is not written using colloquial or culturally appropriate language. Interpretation (oral translation) can also be of limited usefulness if the interpreter does not fully understand or is not able to explain the material, a problem exacerbated by the fact that adults with limited English proficiency often receive assistance from their minor children. Many factors other than language also influence the financial literacy of individuals with limited English proficiency. For example, immigrants may lack familiarity with the U.S. financial system and its products, which can differ greatly from those in their native countries. Cultural differences can also play a role in financial literacy because different populations have dissimilar norms, attitudes, and experiences related to managing money. For instance, in some cultures carrying debt is viewed negatively, which may deter immigrants from such cultures from taking loans to purchase homes or cars and building credit histories. In addition, some studies have reported a correlation between financial literacy and levels of income and education. As a result of these issues, some service providers and advocates suggested that efforts to improve the financial literacy of people with limited English proficiency go beyond translation and also address underlying cultural and socioeconomic factors. Evidence suggests that people with limited English proficiency are less likely than the U.S. population as a whole to have accounts at banks and other mainstream financial institutions. They are also more likely to use alternative financial services--such as payday lenders and check-cashing services--that often have unfavorable fees, terms, and conditions. Further, the Federal Trade Commission and immigrant advocacy organizations have noted that some populations with limited English language skills may be more susceptible to fraudulent and predatory practices. Several service providers we spoke with said that financial education can play an important role in helping consumers with limited English proficiency avoid abusive and predatory practices. |
gao_GAO-01-824 | gao_GAO-01-824_0 | In response, CMS has begun several modernization initiatives and has planned others that are intended to help the agency demonstrably boost the performance of its core functions. In recent years, when major Medicare legislation added new benefits and created new payment methods to improve the program’s fiscal health, many system changes had to be implemented. These orders are instructions sent by CMS for contractors to modify their claims processing systems. Systems Hinder Providing Timely, Relevant Data for Program Management
Program monitoring and oversight is another critical agency function that is fundamental to ensuring that Medicare beneficiaries have access to quality health care services and that the program is paying claims properly. CMS also collects and analyzes information to ensure that payments to managed care organizations are appropriate. CMS’ current plans for implementing modernization improvements include making incremental changes to some systems while replacing others with more advanced technology. At the same time, however, CMS has made limited use of performance measures to achieve accountability and results. This includes further developing the enterprise architecture documentation, particularly the agency’s information flows and data elements. With the certainty of longer term project funding tied to an increased expectation for performance and accountability, the likelihood of achieving success in modernizing Medicare’s information systems could be greatly improved. Because the absence of an effective enterprise architecture and IT investment management process hinders CMS’ ability to manage its IT environment, the Congress may wish to consider making the authority to obligate funds contingent upon the agency using the funds initially to support only ongoing program operations, maintenance of existing systems, and IT projects currently under way; efforts to develop an effective enterprise architecture and IT investment management process, as well as to obtain the human capital needed to modernize IT practices and operations; and statutorily required activities. Another contact and GAO staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review of CMS’ IT modernization efforts described aspects of CMS’ current IT environment and projects CMS has under way to improve its systems, examined the agency’s IT planning efforts and IT management process, and discussed the challenges that need to be addressed to meet the agency’s IT goals. 9, 2000). | What GAO Found
Congress has questioned whether the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), formerly the Health Care Financing Administration, adequately implemented new payment methods, effectively safeguarded program payments, and adequately oversaw the quality of care provided to beneficiaries. CMS depends on hundreds of information technology (IT) systems to help manage the Medicare program. With year 2000 systems renovations successfully completed, CMS has focused on modernizing its IT systems. The agency's information systems are crucial to carrying out Medicare's core missions of claims processing and payment, program oversight, and administration of participating health plans. Medicare's major systems are aged, however, and many are incompatible with one another. To address these problems, CMS intends to modify, replace, or redesign systems on which key Medicare missions depend. CMS plans to make incremental system improvements while maintaining current functions and accommodating changes mandated by legislation. The agency's IT planning and management processes--intended to increase the likelihood that new systems will be successful and cost-effective--have shortcomings. The agency's blueprint documenting its existing and planned IT environments, also known as its enterprise architecture, is missing essential detail in critical parts, including well-documented business functions, information flows, and data models. CMS is trying to strengthen its planning and has developed guidance for an improved management process, but will need to make considerable effort to ensure that modernization stays on track. These weaknesses in IT planning and management are part of larger agency management challenges. Resource gaps, both in funding and staff expertise, threaten the success of planned IT improvements. At the same time, CMS has made little use of performance measures to ensure accountability and increase the likelihood of achieving results. |
gao_GAO-09-433T | gao_GAO-09-433T_0 | Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a catastrophic disaster. Our findings about the response to Hurricane Katrina in a March 2006 testimony and a September 2006 report focused on the need for strengthened leadership, capabilities, and accountability to improve emergency preparedness and response. For most of the provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least preliminary efforts under way to address them. We also identified a number of areas that still required action, and noted that it was clear that FEMA and DHS had work remaining to implement the provisions of the act. Throughout this statement, unless otherwise noted, the actions reported that DHS and FEMA have taken to address provisions of the Post-Katrina Act are drawn from our November 2008 report. We further noted that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic disaster. Specifically, we reported that in the response to Hurricane Katrina there was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the NRP, including the roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security and two key federal officials with responsibility for disaster response—the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). Updating the National Response Framework and Clarifying the Role of the FEMA Administrator
The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA’s mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The Post-Katrina Act required that the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the FEMA Administrator, provide a clear chain of command in the NRF that accounts for the roles of the FEMA Administrator, the FCO, and the PFO. According to the NRF, the primary role and responsibilities of the FCO include four major activities: representing the FEMA Administrator in the field and discharging all FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way; administering Stafford Act authorities, including the commitment of FEMA resources and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal departments or agencies; coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the federal response, within the Unified Coordination Group at the Joint Field Office; and interfacing with the State Coordinating Officer and other state, tribal, and local response officials to determine the most urgent needs and set objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the Unified Coordination Group. The annex was revised and released in November 2008. The response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the limitations in the nation’s capabilities to respond to catastrophic disasters. Among other things, in 2006 we reported on problems during Hurricane Katrina with (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human capital. Among other provisions aimed at strengthening emergency communications capabilities, the Post-Katrina Act established an Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. Technical Assistance
Through the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to assess their communications infrastructure for gaps and determine technical requirements that can be used to design or enhance interoperable communications systems. Human Capital Issues
In 2006, we reported that the various Congressional reports and our own work on FEMA’s performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggest that FEMA’s human resources were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims. We reported in February 2006 that weak or nonexistent internal controls in processing applications left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse, such as duplicative payments. We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper payments in the provision of assistance to individuals and households. FEMA has established a process to identify and collect duplicative Individual and Households Program (IHP) payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements--leadership, capabilities, and accountability--of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but also identified a number of areas that required further action. This statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to (1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken to implement these provisions. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program officials.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA's mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The act also required that the FEMA Administrator provide a clear chain of command that accounts for these roles. In revising the National Response Plan--now called the National Response Framework--FEMA articulated specific roles for the PFO and FCO, which are described in GAO's November 2008 report. GAO reported in September 2006 that various congressional reports and GAO's own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA's capabilities were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the degree of damage and the number of hurricane victims. The capabilities issues GAO identified related to, among others, (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human capital. The Post-Katrina Act included a variety of provisions that related to these issues. For example, related to emergency communications, the act established an Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. GAO reported in November 2008 that, in response to specific responsibilities outlined in its authorizing provision, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to assess gaps in communications infrastructure and to determine technical requirements to enhance interoperable communications systems. GAO reported in February 2006 that accountability mechanisms--specifically, internal controls--were lacking or nonexistent in processing applications for individual and household assistance following Hurricane Katrina, which left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse. For example, GAO estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper payments. GAO reported in November 2008 that FEMA established a process to identify and collect duplicative payments by, among other things, enabling its disaster assistance database to check automatically for duplicate applications. |
gao_GAO-04-387 | gao_GAO-04-387_0 | The court also approved exit criteria for the Dixon lawsuit, which provide a basis for measuring the performance of the District’s mental health system and which must be met in order to end the Dixon case. The criteria cover four areas: 1. consumer satisfaction, which assesses consumers’ satisfaction with mental health services provided; 2. consumer functioning, which tracks consumers’ clinical, social, and other conditions upon entry into the mental health system and again after receiving services for a specified period of time; 3. consumer service delivery, which assesses the adequacy of the mental health system’s overall performance for consumers in a range of areas including treatment planning, coordination of care, and response to emergent and urgent needs; and 4. system performance, which demonstrates how well the community- based system of care is serving particular populations. DMH remains the largest provider of community-based services and continues to provide inpatient mental health care for the District at St. Elizabeths Hospital. DMH’s own community services agency is the largest provider of community-based services in the District, acting as the primary provider for 55 percent of all consumers enrolled in the District mental heath system as of October 2003. Enrollment and Billing System Is Designed to Coordinate Clinical, Administrative, and Financial Processes
In its first 2 years, DMH developed and implemented a comprehensive enrollment and billing system that coordinates clinical, administrative, and financial processes. Two key attributes of this system that were described in the final plan are that it (1) links payment with planning for individual treatment and the provision of services and (2) increases access to federal funds through the development of mental health rehabilitative services, which are community-based mental health services that a state’s Medicaid program can choose to provide. Problems managing cash flow were exacerbated because provider contracts with DMH were tied to the billing projections, which meant that DMH could not pay claims for providers who exceeded their projections until their contracts were changed. By August 2003, DMH made the necessary contract changes to allow providers to be paid for the remainder of the fiscal year and, according to senior officials, had a plan in process for fiscal year 2004 to prevent this problem from recurring. Consistent with this focus, DMH has established requirements in two key areas, consumer choice and consumer protection. However, DMH’s initial review of rehabilitative services provider records showed gaps in documentation of consumer participation, such as a lack of documentation of the consumers’ participation in—and agreement with—their treatment plans for 41 percent of the records reviewed. Consumer protection policies are also evolving, with DMH publishing a uniform consumer grievance policy in October 2003. Although the court monitor envisioned fiscal years 2004 and 2005 as the appropriate time frame for DMH to both measure and improve its performance, DMH faces major challenges to collecting and verifying the accuracy of the performance data, including developing methods to electronically collect the data, correcting known data deficiencies, and working with providers to submit accurate data. In commenting on a draft of this report, DMH noted that it was unable to identify comparable baselines from other jurisdictions. Developing the Capability to Measure and Meet Performance Targets Will Take Time
Meeting the exit criteria performance targets, and thus ending the Dixon case, is a multiyear effort that requires DMH to develop and carry out a plan that will satisfy the court on three levels: (1) developing policies and practices that address the requirements of the exit criteria and demonstrating that DMH monitors the extent to which these policies are implemented, (2) developing specific methods for DMH’s collection and verification of the accuracy of the data, and (3) meeting the required performance targets for one full year as defined by the court. DMH described six broad changes to the District’s mental health system in the court-ordered implementation plan. We believe that making a comprehensive assessment of the system’s performance before DMH begins reporting on the exit criteria is premature. As such, we reported on the status of the District’s effort to establish a community-based system of mental health care, with a focus on four key areas of reform that were confirmed by the court monitor to be central to compliance with the Dixon Decree. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1975, the District of Columbia has operated its mental health system under a series of court orders aimed at developing a community-based system of care for District residents with mental illnesses. Placed in receivership from 1997 to 2002, the District regained full control of its mental health system in 2002 but has been ordered to implement a courtapproved plan for developing and implementing a community-based mental health system. Additionally, the District must comply with exit criteria, which must be met in order to end the lawsuit. The court expects that it will take the District 3 to 5 years to implement the courtordered plan and begin measuring performance against the exit criteria, with year 1 beginning in July 2001. GAO was asked to report on the current status of the District's efforts to develop and implement (1) a mental health department with the authority to oversee and deliver services, (2) a comprehensive enrollment and billing system that accesses available funds for federal programs such as Medicaid, (3) a consumer-centered approach to services, and (4) methods to measure the District's performance as required by the court's exit criteria.
What GAO Found
The District created the Department of Mental Health (DMH) in 2001 to oversee the provision of mental health services. DMH methods of oversight have included establishing certification and making use of licensing standards for participating providers and beginning to monitor provider compliance. DMH also continues to deliver direct services, acting as the primary provider for 55 percent of all consumers enrolled in the mental health system as of October 2003, and operating over 500 beds at St. Elizabeths Hospital, the District-run institution specializing in inpatient care for people with acute, intermediate, and long-term mental health needs. DMH has also implemented a comprehensive enrollment and billing system designed to coordinate clinical, administrative, and financial processes. The system links payment to consumer treatment and increases access to federal funds by providing mental health rehabilitative services through the District's Medicaid program, which reimbursed DMH $17.5 million in federal Medicaid funds in fiscal year 2003. Providers have faced challenges managing cash flow in a fee-for-service system where service demand varies throughout the year. Also, because provider contracts were tied to the feefor- service billing projections, DMH could not pay claims for providers who were exceeding their projections until their contracts were changed, and providers did not always receive timely claims payments in fiscal year 2003. DMH senior officials noted that DMH has a plan in process to prevent this problem from recurring. DMH activities to increase the involvement of consumers in their own treatment and recovery process are evolving. While DMH has established a number of requirements in two key areas--consumer choice and consumer protection--its initial review of providers' records showed gaps in documentation of consumer participation in treatment planning for 41 percent of the records reviewed. Consumer protection policies are also evolving, as DMH instituted a consumer grievance policy that provides a uniform process for ensuring that all consumer grievances are tracked. DMH is developing data collection methods for 17 performance targets aimed at determining the system's performance against the court's exit criteria. Although the court monitor expects DMH to both measure and improve its performance in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, DMH faces major challenges in accurately measuring its performance, including establishing methods to collect electronic data, correcting known data deficiencies, and working with providers to submit accurate data. In its comments on a draft of the report, DMH indicated that the report did not reflect the entire spectrum of progress made since the creation of DMH. While the progress cited by DMH is important, GAO believes that focusing on DMH's status in meeting the exit criteria is an appropriate gauge of its overall compliance with the Dixon Decree. |
gao_GAO-05-20 | gao_GAO-05-20_0 | For fiscal year 2003, OIGs and their contract auditors reported that the systems of 17 of the 23 CFO Act agencies did not substantially comply with at least one of FFMIA’s three requirements—federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, or the SGL at the transaction level. In total, for 6 of the 23 CFO Act agencies, the auditors provided negative assurance by stating that nothing came to their attention that would indicate the systems did not comply with FFMIA for fiscal year 2003. However, the auditors identified and reported deficiencies that relate to the three FFMIA requirements. Nonintegrated Financial Management Systems
The CFO Act calls for agencies to develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management system that complies with federal systems requirements and provides for (1) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information that is responsive to the financial information needs of the agency and facilitates the systematic measurement of performance; (2) the development and reporting of cost management information; and (3) the integration of accounting, budgeting, and program information. Agencies Struggle to Implement New Financial Systems
In an effort to address problems such as nonintegrated systems, inadequate reconciliations, and lack of compliance with the SGL, a number of agencies have efforts under way to implement new financial management systems or to upgrade existing systems. Agencies anticipate that the new systems will provide reliable, useful, and timely data to support managerial decision making and assist taxpayer and congressional oversight. Our work at DOD, HHS, and NASA has shown that agencies face significant problems in implementing financial management systems and are not following the necessary disciplined processes for efficient and effective implementation of financial management systems. Disciplined processes have been shown to mitigate some of the risks associated with software development and acquisition efforts to acceptable levels. Conclusions
Long-standing problems with agencies’ financial systems continue to make it difficult for agencies to routinely produce reliable, useful, and timely financial information. VI) on a draft of this report, OMB agreed with our assessment that while federal agencies continue to make progress in addressing financial management systems weaknesses, many agencies still lack the ability to produce the data needed to efficiently and effectively manage day-to-day operations. Moreover, according to PMO, core financial systems certification does not mean that agencies that install these packages will have financial management systems that are compliant with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ability to produce the data needed to efficiently and effectively manage the day-to-day operations of the federal government and provide accountability to taxpayers has been a long-standing challenge to most federal agencies. To help address this challenge, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires the 23 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) applicable federal accounting standards, and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger (SGL) at the transaction level. FFMIA also requires GAO to report annually on the implementation of the act.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies continue to make progress in addressing their financial management weaknesses; however, for fiscal year 2003, auditors for 17 of the 23 CFO Act agencies still reported that agencies' financial management systems failed to comply with FFMIA. The nature and severity of the reported problems indicate that generally agency management lacked the full range of reliable, useful, and timely information needed for accountability, performance reporting, and decision making. Six main types of problems related to agencies' systems were consistently identified. As prescribed in OMB's reporting guidance, auditors for six agencies provided negative assurance on agency systems' FFMIA compliance for fiscal year 2003. This means that nothing came to their attention to indicate that financial management systems did not meet FFMIA requirements. GAO continues to believe that this type of reporting is not sufficient under the act and that report users may have the false impression that auditors have reported agency systems to be compliant. To address problems such as nonintegrated systems, inadequate reconciliations, and lack of SGL compliance, agencies are implementing or upgrading financial management systems. Agencies anticipate the new systems will provide reliable, useful, and timely data to support managerial decision making. However, our work at DOD, HHS, and NASA has shown significant problems exist in implementing financial management systems and that agencies are not following the necessary disciplined processes for efficient and effective implementation of these systems. Disciplined processes have been shown to reduce the risks associated with software development and acquisition efforts to acceptable levels and are fundamental to successful system acquisition and implementation. Moreover, governmentwide initiatives to improve financial management systems can help enhance the government's performance and services for citizens. |
gao_GAO-13-314 | gao_GAO-13-314_0 | Of those, OCIE, the Division of Corporation Finance, and the Division of Enforcement are subject to section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires SEC to submit a report to Congress (1) on the assessment of the effectiveness of its internal supervisory controls and the procedures applicable to staff who perform examinations, enforcement investigations, and reviews of financial securities filings; (2) a certification that SEC has adequate internal supervisory controls to carry out examinations, reviews of financial securities filings, and investigations; and (3) a summary of the Comptroller General’s findings on the adequacy and effectiveness of SEC internal supervisory controls. responsible for developing detailed policies and procedures to fit their agency’s operations. Specifically, SEC’s internal supervisory control framework includes the following elements: Identifying and assessing risks. This helps to ensure that applicable rules and regulations are reviewed and examinations are consistently performed. Offices’ Work Processes Incorporate Internal Supervisory Controls Designed to Address Identified Risks
As part of developing and applying the internal supervisory control framework, each office identified internal supervisory controls to address the risks identified through the risk assessment. These internal supervisory controls are built into the offices’ work processes—that is, the processes they use to carry out examinations, filing reviews, and investigations. The controls are intended to help ensure that objectives are being met and that the procedures applicable to staff carrying out these activities are conducted completely and consistently. They range from supervisory review and approval activities to information regularly provided to management to monitor the processes as a whole. According to staff, many of the offices’ internal supervisory controls existed prior to the development of SEC’s internal supervisory control framework in 2010. Others were developed through the process of developing the framework. Annual filing review goals. These control deficiencies may not prevent management from detecting whether the activities of the offices are conducted completely and in accordance with policy. The offices have addressed or have been taking steps to address all the 27 identified deficiencies. Other However, not enough time had passed to assess the effectiveness of these changes. Specifically, for these internal supervisory controls, the description of the control activity did not accurately reflect policy or practice; the documentation demonstrating execution of the control was not complete, clear, or consistent; or the control lacked clearly defined control activities. However, the similarity in the nature of the deficiencies across all three offices suggests that management attention to the design and operation of internal supervisory controls is warranted. Federal internal control standards state control activities should enable effective operation and have clear, readily available documentation. Taking steps to ensure that all controls have clearly defined activities and clear and readily available documentation demonstrating execution of the activity would provide SEC management with better assurances that policies were being executed as intended and strengthen SEC’s internal supervisory control framework. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that controls are properly designed and operating effectively, SEC should make certain that existing internal supervisory controls and any developed in the future have clearly defined activities and clear and readily available documentation demonstrating execution of the activities. In its letter, SEC agreed with our recommendation. While we found that OCIE, Corporation Finance, and Enforcement have established an internal supervisory control framework that is generally reflective of federal internal control standards, we also found deficiencies in the design or operating effectiveness of about half of the 60 internal supervisory controls we tested. We examined (1) the steps the offices have taken toward developing an internal supervisory control framework over the specified programs, (2) the internal supervisory controls each office has implemented and how these controls reflect established internal control standards, and (3) the extent to which the internal supervisory controls have operated as intended. To describe the steps each office has taken toward developing an internal supervisory control framework over the specified programs, we evaluated and analyzed documentation from (1) fiscal year 2011 assessments that OCIE, Corporation Finance, and Enforcement completed in accordance with requirements of section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; (2) SEC’s reports to Congress; and (3) documentation related to each office’s fiscal year 2011 testing of internal supervisory controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent high-profile securities frauds have raised questions about the internal controls that SEC has in place to help ensure that staff carry out their work completely and in a manner consistent with applicable policies and procedures. Section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs SEC to annually assess and report on internal supervisory controls for staff performing examinations, corporate financial securities filing reviews, and investigations. The act also requires GAO to review SEC's structure for internal supervisory control applicable to staff working in those offices. This report examines the (1) steps the offices took to develop an internal supervisory control framework; (2) internal supervisory controls each office has implemented; and (3) extent to which the internal supervisory controls have operated as intended. GAO reviewed each office's section 961 assessments and reports; analyzed the offices' internal supervisory control framework; and tested a sample of 60 supervisory controls using random samples and nonprobability selections.
What GAO Found
After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Division of Corporation Finance, and Division of Enforcement (herein "the offices") established a working group that developed an internal supervisory control framework. Internal supervisory controls include the processes established by management to help ensure that procedures applicable to staff are performed completely, consistent with applicable policies and procedures, and remain current. The overall control framework is generally consistent with federal internal control standards, which includes identifying and assessing risks, identifying and assessing internal controls, and reporting the results of testing to management and Congress.
As part of developing and applying an internal supervisory control framework, the offices each identified internal supervisory controls to mitigate risks that could undermine their ability to consistently and competently carry out their responsibilities. These internal supervisory controls are built into the offices' work processes--that is, the processes they use to carry out examinations, financial securities filing reviews, and investigations--and range from specific supervisory review and approval activities to management reports used to monitor the processes as a whole. For example, within Enforcement, supervisors must review and approve staff recommendations that a tip, complaint, or referral be closed without further investigation. Many of the offices' internal supervisory controls existed prior to the development of SEC's internal supervisory control framework; others were developed through the process of developing the framework.
GAO identified deficiencies in about half of the 60 internal supervisory controls it tested. Specifically, GAO found that for 27 internal supervisory controls (1) the description of the control activity did not accurately reflect policy or practice; (2) documentation demonstrating execution of the control was not complete, clear, or consistent; or (3) the controls lacked clearly defined control activities. These control deficiencies may not prevent management from detecting whether the activities of the offices are conducted completely and in accordance with policy. However, similarities in the nature of deficiencies across all three offices suggest that management attention to the design and operation of internal supervisory controls is warranted. Federal internal control standards state that control activities should enable effective operation and have clear, readily available documentation. The offices have addressed or have been taking steps to address all of the 27 identified deficiencies. Some steps have been taken based on the offices' section 961 assessments. SEC addressed other deficiencies during GAO's review after discussions with GAO detailing the identified deficiency. Not enough time has passed for GAO to assess the effectiveness of these changes. Ensuring that all internal supervisory controls have clearly defined activities and clear, readily available documentation demonstrating execution of the control would provide SEC management with better assurance that policies were being executed as intended and strengthen SEC's internal supervisory control framework.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that controls are properly designed and operating effectively, SEC should make certain that existing internal supervisory controls and any developed in the future have clearly defined activities and clear and readily available documentation demonstrating execution of the activities. SEC agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-521 | gao_GAO-02-521_0 | The act requires the stress test to simulate situations that expose the enterprises to extremely adverse credit and interest rate scenarios over a 10-year period and to calculate the cash flows and the amount of capital the enterprises would need to continue to operate for the entire period. New business accounts for a large share of the enterprise’s on- and off-balance sheet holdings and thus has a major impact on their activities and financial health. Specifying management’s behavior would be speculative, unlike the modeling of borrowers’ behavior in the stress test. In addition, because a significant proportion of the enterprises’ mortgages either prepay or default over a 10-year period and are replaced by new business, the assumptions about new business could easily dominate the cash and capital flows in the stress test over the 10- year period. New Business Assumptions Could Dominate the Capital Requirement Under the Stress Test
To incorporate new business assumptions into its stress test, OFHEO could develop plausible scenarios for how enterprise management and the market might respond in a stressful environment, but depending on the assumptions, the capital requirement could be increased or decreased. These pillars—risk-based capital requirements (discussed in this report), market discipline, and supervisory review— should also be used to address safety and soundness oversight of the enterprises. In addition, OFHEO can use supervisory review in conjunction with the stress test to help limit the potential risks associated with new business. Fannie Mae and OFHEO provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate. At the end of 2001, Fannie Mae’s total mortgage portfolio was $1.56 trillion, and Freddie Mac’s was $1.14 trillion. Capital Structure of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Development of the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Regulator. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed whether the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) should incorporate new business assumptions into the stress test used to establish risk-based capital requirements. The stress test is designed to estimate, for a 10-year period, how much capital the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) would be required to hold to withstand potential economic shocks, such as sharp movements in interest rates or adverse credit conditions. Incorporating new business assumptions into the stress test would mean specifying details about the types and quality that would be acquired during the 10-year stress period, the types of funding that would be used to acquire such mortgages, and other operating and financial strategies that would be implemented by Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's managements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that data for the enterprises show that new business conducted over a 10-year period accounts for a large share of their on- and off-balance sheet holdings of assets and liabilities at the end of each 10-year period. Because new business represents such a large share of enterprise holdings over time, it would have a major impact on the enterprises' financial condition, risks, and capital adequacy in the face of stressful events. However, determining the appropriate new business assumptions to include in the model would be difficult and inherently speculative. with OFHEO having to develop plausible scenarios for how enterprise management and the market would respond in a stressful environment. OFHEO can use supervisory review, which includes examination of the enterprises' ongoing business activities and enforcement actions, and should work in conjunction with the capital requirement to help ensure the safety and soundness of the enterprises. |
gao_GAO-02-463 | gao_GAO-02-463_0 | We reviewed FSA’s policies and procedures on debt referrals and examined the agency’s current and planned efforts to refer eligible delinquent debts. To determine whether FSA’s use of exclusions from referral requirements was appropriate, we used statistical sampling techniques to select 15 FSA field offices from the four states with the highest dollar amounts of reported debt excluded from TOP as of September 30, 2000. We did not review FSA’s process for identifying and referring debts to Treasury for cross-servicing because the agency had suspended all such referrals in April 2000 pending development of guidelines to implement a new referral policy. Thus, the old adage that “time is money” is very relevant for referrals of debts to FMS for collection action. About $295 million of the exclusions were judgment debts. We reviewed supporting documents for all 263 loans from these offices that were more than 180 days delinquent and had been excluded from referral to FMS as of September 30, 2000, to determine the extent to which exclusions in the four states were consistent with established criteria for excluding loans in bankruptcy, forbearance/appeals, foreclosure, and DOJ litigation. FSA lacks sufficient processes and controls to adequately identify and promptly refer all direct farm loan program loans eligible for referral to FMS. If FSA is to make significant progress in collecting on millions of dollars of delinquent farm loan program loans, the agency must give higher priority to fully complying with the debt collection provisions of DCIA. We will also provide copies to the secretary of agriculture, the inspector general of the Department of Agriculture, the administrator of the Farm Service Agency, and the secretary of the treasury. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 seeks to maximize the collection of billions of dollars of nontax delinquent debt owed to the federal government. The act requires agencies to refer eligible debts delinquent more than 180 days to the Department of the Treasury for payment offset and to Treasury or a Treasury-designated debt collection center for cross-servicing. The Treasury Offset Program includes the offset of benefit payments, vendor payments, and tax refunds. Cross-servicing involves locating debtors, issuing demand letters, and referring debts to private collection agencies. The Farm Service Agency (FSA) has initiatives to ensure the timely referral of all delinquent debt. However, the agency's failure to make the act a priority has left key provisions of the legislation unimplemented and has severely reduced opportunities for collection. FSA lacks effective procedures and controls to identify and promptly refer eligible delinquent debts to Treasury for collection action. GAO identified several obstacles to FSA's establishment and implementation of an effective and complete debt-referral process. In the four states with the highest dollar amounts of federal debt excluded from the Treasury Offset Program, GAO reviewed FSA's use of exclusions from referral requirements because of bankruptcy, forbearance/appeals, foreclosure and Department of Justice litigation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that about half of the exclusions in these states were inconsistent with established criteria. |
gao_GAO-01-284 | gao_GAO-01-284_0 | Considerable Cleanup Progress Has Been Made, but Much Work Remains, and Closure Costs May Exceed $7.5 Billion
By the end of fiscal year 2000, Kaiser-Hill had made significant strides in cleaning up the Rocky Flats site, but the vast majority of the work, and some of the most technically challenging, remained. The project’s total cost will grow, however, if additional work is required or if delays occur. After closure, costs will continue through at least 2070 for activities such as site monitoring and maintenance, and for contractor employee retirement benefits. If closure occurs by the target date, the contract cost will be about $4 billion. Kaiser-Hill and DOE Are Improving Management of the Project, but Concerns Remain About Implementation of DOE’s Plan
Although both Kaiser-Hill and DOE have made considerable progress on their respective plans for managing the Rocky Flats closure project, further improvements are needed to help ensure that they meet the target date for the site’s closure. Conclusions
Closing the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site by December 2006 is a laudable goal and a formidable challenge, especially given the magnitude and complexity of the cleanup project. Kaiser-Hill has made significant progress in the cleanup of the site on several fronts. To determine the management actions needed, if any, to improve the likelihood of the project’s success, we compared the major challenges affecting the closure of the site with Kaiser-Hill’s and DOE’s plans for addressing them. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed several aspects of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats Environmental Technology site cleanup and closure plan. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1) the status and cost of the Rocky Flats closure project, (2) the likelihood that the site will be closed by 2006, and (3) the management actions needed, if any, to improve the likelihood of the project's success.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in the more than five years that it has been the major contractor at the Rocky Flats site, Kaiser-Hill has made significant progress toward cleaning up the site, but the majority of the work--and the most complicated--remains to be done. Because of the project's difficulty, DOE entered into a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract with Kaiser-Hill. If completed on time, the project will cost about $7.5 billion from the signing of the first cleanup contract with Kaiser-Hill in July 1995 through the 2006 closure date, and about $1.4 billion more thereafter, for such activities as site monitoring and maintenance and for contractor employees' retirement benefits. These overall costs will increase if additional work is required or the 2006 target date is not achieved. Kaiser-Hill and DOE are unlikely to meet the December 2006 target closure date. A number of significant and complex challenges must be overcome first. Kaiser-Hill and DOE are developing their respective plans for managing the closure project, but DOE needs to take additional steps to effectively implement its plan. |
gao_GAO-08-58 | gao_GAO-08-58_0 | Third, Treasury or State can impose financial sanctions, including a freeze on assets and a prohibition on access to U.S. financial institutions, against parties who engage in proliferation or terrorism- related activities with any party, including Iran. In 2007, Syrian parties were sanctioned in 8 cases. Second, financial sanctions deny parties involved in Iran’s proliferation and terrorism activities access to the U.S. financial system and complicate their support for such activities. However, other evidence raises questions about the extent of reported economic impacts. In addition, sanctioned Iranian banks may be able to turn to other financial sources or fund their activities in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. U.S. Officials State that Iran Sanctions Act Has Contributed to Delays in Foreign Investment in Iran’s Petroleum Sector
U.S. officials and experts have stated that U.S. sanctions have played a role in slowing Iran’s progress in developing its oil and gas resources. We also found that since 2003 the Iranian government has signed contracts reported at approximately $20 billion with foreign firms to develop Iran’s energy resources. U.S. Officials Report that Financial Sanctions Deny Entities Involved in Proliferation and Terrorism Access to U.S. Financial System
State and Treasury officials have testified that financial sanctions deny designated individuals and entities access to the funds needed to sustain Iran’s proliferation. Although Iran halted its nuclear weapons program, it continues to enrich uranium, acquire advanced weapons, and support terrorism. Sanction Influence on Iran’s Behavior; UN Sanctions Have Recently Been Imposed
Iran’s global trade ties and leading role in energy production make it difficult for the United States to isolate Iran and deter its acquisition of advanced weapons technology and support for terrorism. First, Iran’s trade with the world—both imports and exports—has grown since the U.S. trade ban began in 1987. Although trade has fluctuated from year to year, most of the growth has occurred since 2002, coinciding with the rise in oil prices. This trade includes imports of weapons and nuclear technology. Iran’s Trade with the United States Decreased Substantially Following the Imposition of the Trade Ban
U.S. trade with Iran declined sharply immediately following the adoption of both the 1987 U.S. ban on imports from Iran and the 1995 ban on U.S. exports to and investment in Iran. This assessment should collect information, to the extent feasible, from various U.S. agencies and consider factors such as, but not limited to, the following: the number of goods seized, penalties imposed, and convictions obtained under the trade ban (Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, Justice); sensitive items diverted to Iran through transshipment points (Commerce and the intelligence community); the extent to which repeat foreign violators of Iran-specific sanctions laws have ended their sales of sensitive items to Iran (State and intelligence community); the amount of assets frozen resulting from financial sanctions (Treasury and the intelligence community); and the extent of delays in foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector (State, Energy, and the intelligence community). This comment reinforces our finding that the overall impact of sanctions is unclear. This report addresses (1) U.S. sanctions targeting Iran and their implementation, (2) the reported impact of the sanctions, and (3) factors that limit the ability of U.S. sanctions to reduce Iran’s proliferation and terrorism-related activities. Finally, we reviewed the November 2007 unclassified National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy stated that the United States faces challenges from Iran, including Iran's proliferation efforts and involvement in international terrorism. To address these concerns, the United States employs a range of tools, including diplomatic pressure, a military presence in the Gulf, and sanctions. A U.S. sanction is a unilateral restriction or condition on economic activity imposed by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security. We were asked to review (1) U.S. sanctions targeting Iran and their implementation, (2) reported sanction impacts, and (3) factors limiting sanctions. To conduct the review, we assessed trade and sanction data, information on Iran's economy and energy sector, and U.S. and international reports on Iran, and discussed sanctions with U.S. officials and Iran experts.
What GAO Found
Since 1987, U.S. agencies have implemented numerous sanctions against Iran. First, Treasury oversees a ban on U.S. trade and investment with Iran and filed over 94 civil penalty cases between 2003 and 2007 against companies violating the prohibition. This ban may be circumvented by shipping U.S. goods to Iran through other countries. Second, State administers laws that sanction foreign parties engaging in proliferation or terrorism-related activities with Iran. Under one law, State has imposed sanctions in 111 instances against Chinese, North Korean, Syrian, and Russian entities. Third, Treasury or State can use financial sanctions to freeze the assets of targeted parties and reduce their access to the U.S. financial system. U.S. officials report that U.S. sanctions have slowed foreign investment in Iran's petroleum sector, denied parties involved in Iran's proliferation and terrorism activities access to the U.S. financial system, and provided a clear statement of U.S. concerns to the rest of the world. However, other evidence raises questions about the extent of reported impacts. Since 2003, the Iranian government has signed contracts reported at about $20 billion with foreign firms to develop its energy resources. Further, sanctioned Iranian banks may fund their activities in currencies other than the dollar. Moreover, while Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, according to the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, it continues to enrich uranium, acquire advanced weapons technology, and support terrorism. Finally, U.S. agencies do not systematically collect or analyze data demonstrating the overall impact and results of their sanctioning and enforcement actions. Iran's global trade ties and leading role in energy production make it difficult for the United States to isolate Iran and pressure it to reduce proliferation and support for terrorism. For example, Iran's overall trade with the world has grown since the U.S. imposed sanctions, although this trade has fluctuated. Imports rose sharply following the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and then declined until 1995; most export growth followed the rise in oil prices beginning in 2002. This trade included imports of weapons and nuclear technology. However, multilateral UN sanctions began in December 2006. |
gao_GAO-09-1004T | gao_GAO-09-1004T_0 | Tens of Thousands of Medicaid Beneficiaries Visit Multiple Medical Practitioners to Obtain Controlled Substances
Approximately 65,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in the five states investigated visited six or more doctors to acquire prescriptions for the same type of controlled substances in the selected states during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Second, the selected states did not identify the prescriber for many Medicaid claims submitted to CMS. Controlled Substances Prescribed or Filled by Banned Providers
We found 65 medical practitioners and pharmacies in the selected states had been barred or excluded from federal health care programs, including Medicaid, when they wrote or filled Medicaid prescriptions for controlled substances during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, Medicaid approved the claims at a cost of approximately $2.3 million. The offenses that led to their exclusion from federal health programs included Medicaid fraud and illegal diversion of controlled substances. Medicaid Paid for Controlled Substance Prescriptions Filled for Dead Beneficiaries or “Written” by Dead Doctors
Our analysis of matching Medicaid claims in the selected states with SSA’s DMF found that controlled substance prescription claims to over 1,800 beneficiaries were filled after they died. Even though the selected state programs stated that beneficiaries were promptly removed from Medicaid following their deaths based on either SSA DMF matches or third party information, these same state programs paid over $200,000 for controlled substances during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 for postdeath controlled substance prescription claims. In addition, our analysis also found that Medicaid paid about $500,000 in Medicaid claims based on controlled substance prescriptions “written” by over 1,200 doctors after they died. Examples of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse of Controlled Substances in Medicaid
In addition to performing the aggregate-level analysis discussed above, we also performed in-depth investigations for 25 cases of fraudulent or abusive actions related to the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances through the Medicaid program in the selected states. We have referred certain cases to DEA and the selected states for further investigation. CMS has provided limited guidance to the states on how to improve the state’s control measures to prevent fraud and abuse of controlled substances in the Medicaid program. Selected States Lack Comprehensive Fraud Prevention Framework for Controlled Substances
The selected states did not have a comprehensive fraud prevention framework to prevent fraud and abuse of controlled substances paid for by Medicaid. The establishment of effective fraud prevention controls by the selected states is critical because the very nature of a beneficiary’s medical need—to quickly obtain controlled substances to alleviate pain or treat a serious medical condition—makes the Medicaid program vulnerable to those attempting to obtain money or drugs they are not entitled to receive. Preventive Controls: Fraud prevention is the most efficient and effective means to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse. Thus, controls that prevent fraudulent health care providers and individuals from entering the Medicaid program or submitting claims are the most important element in an effective fraud prevention program. Effective fraud prevention controls require that where appropriate, organizations enter into data-sharing arrangements with organizations to perform validation. System edit checks (i.e., built-in electronic controls) are also crucial in identifying and rejecting fraudulent enrollment applications or claims before payments are disbursed. Specifically, we recommended that the Administrator evaluate our findings and consider issuing guidance to the state programs to provide assurance on the following: (1) effective claims processing systems prevent the processing of claims of all prescribing providers and dispensing pharmacies debarred from federal contracts (i.e., EPLS) or excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid programs (LEIE); (2) DUR and restricted recipient program requirements adequately identify and prevent doctor shopping and other abuses of controlled substances; (3) effective claims processing system are in place to periodically identify both duplicate enrollments and deaths of Medicaid beneficiaries and prevent the approval of claims when appropriate; and (4) effective claims processing systems are in place to periodically identify deaths of Medicaid providers and prevent the approval of claims when appropriate. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on some of the issues addressed in our report on continuing indications of fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses (1) continuing indications of fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid; (2) specific case study examples of fraudulent, improper, or abusive controlled substance activity; and (3) the effectiveness of internal controls that the federal government and selected states have in place to prevent and detect fraud and abuse related to controlled substances. To identify whether there are continuing indications of fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid, we obtained and analyzed Medicaid claims paid in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 from five states: California, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and Texas. To identify indications of fraud and abuse related to controlled substances paid for by Medicaid, we obtained and analyzed Medicaid prescription claims data for these five states from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). To identify other potential fraud and improper payments, we compared the beneficiary and prescriber shown on the Medicaid claims to the Death Master Files (DMF) from the Social Security Administration (SSA) to identify deceased beneficiaries and prescribers. To identify claims that were improperly processed and paid by the Medicaid program because the federal government banned these prescribers and pharmacies from prescribing or dispensing to Medicaid beneficiaries, we compared the Medicaid prescription claims to the exclusion and debarment files from the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS OIG) and the General Services Administration (GSA). To develop specific case study examples in selected states, we identified 25 cases that illustrate the types of fraudulent, improper, or abusive controlled substance activity we found in the Medicaid program. To develop these cases, we interviewed pharmacies, prescribers, law enforcement officials, and beneficiaries, as appropriate, and also obtained and reviewed registration and enforcement action reports from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and HHS. To identify the effectiveness of internal controls that the federal government and selected states have in place to prevent and detect fraud and abuse related to controlled substances, we interviewed Medicaid officials from the selected state offices and CMS. More details on our scope and methodology can be found in our report that we issued today. We conducted this forensic audit from July 2008 to September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted our related investigative work in accordance with standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).
What GAO Found
We found 65 medical practitioners and pharmacies in the selected states had been barred or excluded from federal health care programs, including Medicaid, when they wrote or filled Medicaid prescriptions for controlled substances during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, Medicaid approved the claims at a cost of approximately $2.3 million. The offenses that led to their exclusion from federal health programs included Medicaid fraud and illegal diversion of controlled substances. Our analysis of matching Medicaid claims in the selected states with SSA's DMF found that controlled substance prescription claims to over 1,800 beneficiaries were filled after they died. Even though the selected state programs stated that beneficiaries were promptly removed from Medicaid following their deaths based on either SSA DMF matches or third party information, these same state programs paid over $200,000 for controlled substances during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 for postdeath controlled substance prescription claims. In addition, our analysis also found that Medicaid paid about $500,000 in Medicaid claims based on controlled substance prescriptions "written" by over 1,200 doctors after they died. In addition to performing the aggregate-level analysis discussed above, we also performed in-depth investigations for 25 cases of fraudulent or abusive actions related to the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances through the Medicaid program in the selected states. We have referred certain cases to DEA and the selected states for further investigation. The selected states did not have a comprehensive fraud prevention framework to prevent fraud and abuse of controlled substances paid for by Medicaid. The establishment of effective fraud prevention controls by the selected states is critical because the very nature of a beneficiary's medical need--to quickly obtain controlled substances to alleviate pain or treat a serious medical condition--makes the Medicaid program vulnerable to those attempting to obtain money or drugs they are not entitled to receive. Fraud prevention is the most efficient and effective means to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse. Thus, controls that prevent fraudulent health care providers and individuals from entering the Medicaid program or submitting claims are the most important element in an effective fraud prevention program. Effective fraud prevention controls require that where appropriate, organizations enter into data-sharing arrangements with organizations to perform validation. System edit checks (i.e., built-in electronic controls) are also crucial in identifying and rejecting fraudulent enrollment applications or claims before payments are disbursed. |
gao_GAO-13-578 | gao_GAO-13-578_0 | The goal of these agreements is generally to encourage additional mail volume and revenue. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) authorized USPS to create NSAs for two discrete categories of mail products, market dominant and competitive, as outlined in table 1. To increase or sustain mail volume and revenue, USPS has also provided short-term discounts, called sales or promotions, on specific mail products for groups of mailers, in contrast to NSAs, which are agreements with individual mailers for longer periods. Since 2007, USPS Has Developed Numerous NSAs, Sales, and Promotions That Have Generated a Small but Growing Portion of USPS’s Total Revenue
Number and Revenue Have Increased since 2007
The number of NSAs, sales, and promotions has increased in most years since the enactment of PAEA. USPS data show that revenue generated from NSAs, sales, and promotions has generally increased each year since the enactment of PAEA, with most of the revenue generated by competitive product NSAs. Four international competitive NSAs in fiscal year 2012, however, did not cover their costs. Since Enactment of PAEA, USPS Has Developed Few Market Dominant NSAs and Generated Limited, if Any, Net Revenue from Them
USPS has implemented few market dominant NSAs. Although USPS has estimated the financial result of promotions for the program period, it has not provided any estimates of the long-term financial results to PRC, as discussed in more detail later in this report. Opportunities for Increasing Revenue from NSAs, Sales, and Promotions Are Primarily from Competitive NSAs, though Challenges May Limit Revenue
Opportunities Exist to Generate Additional Revenue from Competitive NSAs but Will Likely Not Offset Declines from Other Products
Opportunities Exist Because of Continued Growth in E- Commerce
Opportunities exist to generate additional revenue through competitive product NSAs primarily because of merchandise shipments associated with the continued growth in e-commerce. USPS has taken actions to streamline the process for developing competitive NSAs. Opportunities to Generate Net Revenue from Market Dominant NSAs Are Limited by Low Demand and Other Challenges
Price Increases for Market Dominant Products May Generate More Revenue than Discounts in NSAs
Opportunities to generate net revenue through market dominant product NSAs are limited. As a result, PRC has not assessed USPS methodologies for evaluating the long-term financial results of promotions. Conclusions
To achieve financial sustainability, USPS has been working to generate additional revenue to cover its costs. Additionally, the benefits, including long-term financial results, of promotions are not well understood by PRC and other postal stakeholders because USPS does not provide detailed information on its data collection and analysis plans to PRC before implementation. As a result, PRC has not had an opportunity to evaluate USPS’s long-term goals and analysis plans for promotions. Though it can be difficult to collect and analyze data on the impact of promotions, given USPS’s dire financial situation, demonstrating how promotions may achieve positive long-term financial results can help USPS maximize the revenue generated by those postage rate discounts. Recommendations
Because USPS faces a deteriorating financial situation, we recommend that the following two actions be taken to help ensure that future promotions generate net revenue for USPS: The Postmaster General should direct staff to provide specific data- collection methods and analytical processes for estimating the net financial results of promotions to PRC as part of USPS’s request for PRC approval of all promotions. In USPS’s written response, USPS disagreed with the first recommendation and noted concerns regarding the characterizations of promotions, sales, and NSAs in the report. USPS stated that it does not believe the recommendation will significantly affect the PRC’s review process, improve the quality of USPS’s business decisions, or assure that promotions yield positive financial results. In particular, USPS noted that promotions are designed to help sustain mail volume and revenue over the long-term. To summarize the number of, and results from, USPS sales and promotions to date, we reviewed USPS documents filed with PRC requesting approval for sales and promotions as well as PRC’s Annual Compliance Determination Reports. To identify and assess any opportunities to generate additional revenue from NSAs, sales, and promotions, as well as challenges, if any, that could the hinder their development and implementation, we conducted interviews with a variety of stakeholders. The views of mailers and industry associations cannot be generalized to all mailers and industry associations because they were selected as part of a nonprobability sample. Factors
(1) the value of the mail service actually provided each class or type of mail service to both the sender and the recipient, including but not limited to the collection, mode of transportation, and priority of delivery; (2) the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to each class or type of mail service through reliably identified causal relationships plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable to such class or type; (3) the effect of rate increases upon the general public, business mail users, and enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters; (4) the available alternative means of sending and receiving letters and other mail matter at reasonable costs; (5) the degree of preparation of mail for delivery into the postal system performed by the mailer and its effect upon reducing costs to the Postal Service; (6) simplicity of structure for the entire schedule and simple, identifiable relationships between the rates or fees charged the various classes of mail for postal services; (7) the importance of pricing flexibility to encourage increased mail volume and operational efficiency; (8) the relative value to the people of the kinds of mail matter entered into the postal system and the desirability and justification for special classifications and services of mail; (9) the importance of providing classifications with extremely high degrees of reliability and speed of delivery and of providing those that do not require high degrees of reliability and speed of delivery; (10) the desirability of special classifications for both postal users and the Postal Service in accordance with the policies of this title, including agreements between the Postal Service and postal users, when available on public and reasonable terms to similarly situated mailers, that— (i) improve the net financial position of the Postal Service through reducing Postal Service costs or increasing the overall contribution to the institutional costs of the Postal Service; or (ii) enhance the performance of mail preparation, processing, transportation, or other functions; and (B) do not cause unreasonable harm to the marketplace. | Why GAO Did This Study
For several years USPS has not generated sufficient revenues to cover its expenses. Although much focus has been on USPS's costs as a way to close the gap between its revenues and expenses, generating additional revenue is also needed. To increase mail volume and revenue, USPS has implemented NSAs, sales, and promotions with a variety of products.
As requested, GAO reviewed (1) the trends and reported results of USPS's sales, promotions, and NSAs, as well as (2) any opportunities and challenges related to generating additional revenue from them. GAO reviewed USPS documents, PRC decisions, and annual reports, and interviewed officials from USPS and PRC. GAO also interviewed mailers, which were selected in part based on participation in NSAs, sales, and promotions. Their views cannot be generalized to all mailers.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has developed numerous negotiated service agreements (NSA), sales, and promotions since the enactment of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) in 2006, and they generate a small but growing portion of USPS total revenue. PAEA established two categories of products: "market dominant," where USPS has a monopoly, and "competitive," which includes all other products, such as shipping services. NSAs, sales, and promotions are generally designed to encourage additional mail volume and revenue through temporary discounts on specific mail products. For example, USPS has offered promotions to incentivize mailers to invest in technology that may increase the value of mail for those mailers over the long-term. No NSAs, sales, or promotions followed the enactment of PAEA until regulations were issued in late 2007. The number of NSAs, sales, and promotions has increased most years since. The revenue generated from NSAs, sales, and promotions has also increased overall. The most revenue was generated by competitive NSAs. Financial results of competitive NSAs are not reported publicly. According to the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), which exercises regulatory oversight over USPS, nearly all competitive NSAs have covered their costs. Market dominant NSAs generated little revenue, in part because few were done. Sales and promotions have also generated little revenue.
Opportunities for increasing revenue from NSAs, sales, and promotions are primarily with competitive NSAs, though challenges may limit revenue, and it will likely not offset declines from other products. Continued growth in e-commerce is creating opportunities to generate additional revenue through competitive NSAs. Opportunities to generate additional revenue through market dominant NSAs are limited by low demand for those products. Also, it is difficult for USPS to determine whether any volume and revenue increases directly result from market dominant NSAs because it is difficult to accurately estimate mailers' future mail volume. In addition, USPS and some mailers we spoke with noted that the process for developing both market-dominant and competitive NSAs can be burdensome, hindering the development of new agreements. USPS has taken actions, though, to streamline the process for developing competitive NSAs. Opportunities for generating revenue from sales and promotions are also limited by low demand as well as limited review of the long-term financial results before implementation. USPS has noted that promotions satisfy rate requirements by, for example, helping to generate revenues for USPS. In particular, promotions are used to encourage mail volume over the long term. However, USPS does not provide data and analysis about the potential long-term financial results when submitting promotions to PRC for its approval. As a result, PRC does not assess the methodologies for evaluating the long-term financial results of promotions before implementation. Given USPS's financial situation, USPS should demonstrate how promotions may achieve positive long-term financial results, in order to help maximize the revenue generated by those postage rate discounts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that when filing for approval, USPS provide information to PRC about USPS's data collection and analysis plans for estimating the longterm financial results of promotions. GAO also recommends that PRC evaluate USPS's data collection and analysis plans for promotions as part of its review. In commenting on the report, USPS disagreed with the first recommendation, and PRC agreed with both recommendations. USPS stated it does not believe the recommendation will significantly affect the PRC's review process or improve the quality of USPS's business decisions. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-07-841T | gao_GAO-07-841T_0 | In recent years, a number of serious accidents raised concerns about the level of safety in the railroad industry. For example, as you are aware, in 2005, a train collision in Graniteville, South Carolina, resulted in the evacuation of 5,400 people, 292 injuries, and 9 deaths. FRA Has Made Progress in Targeting Its Oversight Efforts on the Basis of Risk
In planning its safety oversight, FRA focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents through a number of initiatives. FRA’s May 2005 National Rail Safety Action Plan provides a reasonable framework for the agency’s efforts to target its oversight at the highest priority risks. FRA has also developed a new approach for planning its inspections, based on greater use of its accident and inspection data. While these initiatives are promising, it is too early to assess their impact. Recent FRA initiatives to reduce accidents caused by human factors include proposed regulations aimed at reducing the most common causes of these accidents, such as improper positioning of track switches; a 5-year pilot project to establish a confidential voluntary system for reporting and learning from close call incidents; a study to develop a fatigue model that could be used by railroads to improve train crew scheduling practices and prevent worker fatigue; and a proposed pilot project to establish voluntary risk reduction programs at participating railroad worksites to help reduce human factor accidents, as well as other types of accidents. FRA Relies Primarily on Direct Inspections to Identify Safety Problems and Does Not Oversee Railroads’ Management of Safety Risks
In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies a range of safety problems on railroad systems mainly through routine inspections to determine whether operations, track, and equipment are in compliance with safety standards. FRA’s inspections do not attempt to determine how well railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems. APTA, PHMSA, and Transport Canada have implemented approaches to oversee the management of safety risks by U.S. commuter railroads, U.S. pipelines, and Canadian railroads, respectively. 2.) 3.) However, because the number of FRA and state inspectors is small relative to the size of railroad operations, FRA inspections can cover only a very small proportion of railroad operations (0.2 percent). As a result, we did not recommend in our recent report that FRA adopt an approach for overseeing railroads’ management of safety risks. However, its ability to make informed decisions about its inspection and enforcement programs is limited because it lacks measures of the intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of these programs that would show how they are contributing toward the end outcomes, or ultimate safety improvements, that the agency seeks to achieve. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its enforcement approach. FRA also uses various other measures to manage its oversight efforts, such as numbers of inspections performed and enforcement actions taken. While FRA has developed a range of goals and measures related to its oversight of railroad safety, it lacks measures of the desired intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of its inspection and enforcement efforts—the correction of identified safety problems and improvements in compliance. In the report we issued in January, we recommended that FRA (1) develop and implement measures of the direct results of its inspection and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate the agency’s enforcement program to provide further information on its results, the need for additional data to measure and assess these results, and the need for any changes in this program to improve performance. The department stated that FRA lacks the resources to carry out our second recommendation but will consider requesting such resources for fiscal year 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the overall safety record in the railroad industry, as measured by the number of train accidents per million miles traveled, has improved markedly since 1980, there has been little sustained improvement over the past decade. Serious accidents resulting in injuries and deaths continue to occur, such as one in Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005 that resulted in 9 deaths and 292 injuries. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) develops safety standards and inspects and enforces railroads' compliance with these standards. On January 26, 2007, GAO reported on FRA's overall safety oversight strategy. (See GAO-07-149 .) The report discussed how FRA (1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents in planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad systems in carrying out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. GAO recommended that FRA (1) put into place measures of the results of its inspection and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate its enforcement program. In its response, the Department of Transportation stated that FRA agreed to develop such measures and would consider requesting additional resources to conduct an evaluation of its enforcement program. This statement is based on GAO's recent report.
What GAO Found
In planning its safety oversight, FRA is focusing its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents through initiatives aimed at addressing their main causes--human behaviors and defective track--as well as through improvements in its inspection planning approach. FRA's May 2005 National Rail Safety Action Plan, the agency's overall strategy for targeting its oversight at the greatest risks, provides a reasonable framework for guiding these efforts. FRA's initiatives to address the most common causes of accidents are promising, although the success of many of them will depend on voluntary actions by the railroads. In addition, under the action plan, FRA has adopted a new inspection planning approach in which inspectors focus their efforts on locations that data-driven models indicate are most likely to have safety problems. In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies a range of safety problems on railroad systems mainly by determining whether operating practices, track, and equipment are in compliance with minimum safety standards. However, FRA is able to inspect only about 0.2 percent of railroads' operations each year, and its inspections do not examine how railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems that could lead to accidents. Such an approach, as a supplement to traditional compliance inspections, is used in the oversight of U.S. commuter railroads and pipelines and of Canadian railroads. GAO did not recommend that FRA adopt this approach because the agency's various initiatives to reduce the train accident rate have not yet had time to demonstrate their effects on safety. FRA uses a range of goals and measures to assess the impact of its oversight, such as (1) goals to target its inspection and enforcement programs at reducing various types of railroad accidents and (2) related measures, such as rates of track-caused accidents, to monitor its progress. However, FRA's ability to make informed decisions about these programs is limited because it lacks measures of their direct results, such as the correction of identified safety problems. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its enforcement program. |
gao_GAO-10-484T | gao_GAO-10-484T_0 | Specifically, S&T is responsible for the basic and applied research and advanced development of new technologies, while TSA, through its Passenger Screening Program (PSP), identifies the need for new checkpoint screening technologies and provides input to S&T during the research and development of new technologies, which TSA then procures and deploys. Increased Deployment of AIT Highlights the Importance of Operational Testing and Cost-Benefit Analysis Prior to Deployment
TSA Plans to Procure and Deploy 1,800 AITs by 2014 and Use Them as a Primary Screening Measure
In response to the December 2009 attempted terrorist attack, TSA has revised its procurement and deployment strategy for the AIT, increasing the number of AITs it plans to procure and deploy. As we previously reported, TSA’s experience with the explosives trace portal (ETP), or “puffers,” demonstrates the importance of testing and evaluation in an operational environment. While TSA officials stated that the laboratory and operational testing of the AIT included placing explosive material in different locations on the body, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have been able to detect the weapon Mr. Abdulmutallab used in his attempted attack based on the preliminary TSA information we have received. We are in the process of reviewing these operational tests to assess the AIT’s detection capabilities and to verify that TSA successfully completed operational testing of the AIT. In addition, while TSA officials stated that the AITs performed as well as physical pat downs in operational testing, TSA officials also reported they have not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original or revised AIT deployment strategy. However, these officials reported that they had completed, earlier in the program, a life-cycle cost estimate and an analysis of alternatives for the AIT as required by DHS, which, according to agency officials, provides equivalent information to a cost-benefit analysis. We estimate that, based on TSA’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and current AIT deployment strategy, increases in staffing costs due to doubling the number of AITs that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over the expected service life of this investment. While we recognize that TSA is taking action to address a vulnerability of the passenger checkpoint exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, we continue to believe that, given TSA’s expanded deployment strategy, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of TSA’s AIT deployment is important. An updated cost-benefit analysis would help inform TSA’s judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, as well as provide information to inform the best path forward, considering all elements of the screening system, for addressing the vulnerability identified by this attempted terrorist attack. TSA Has Made Progress in Securing Air Cargo and Airport Access, but Challenges Remain
TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, but Faces Participation, Technology, Oversight, and Inbound-Cargo Challenges
As we previously reported in March 2009, based on preliminary observations from ongoing work, TSA has taken several key steps to meet the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010. We will continue to explore these issues as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s air cargo security efforts, to be issued later this year. TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces Challenges That Include Assessing Risk and Evaluating Worker Screening Methods
In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that TSA has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to strengthen the security of commercial airports. As we reported in September 2009, while TSA has taken numerous steps to enhance airport security, it continues to face challenges in several areas, such as assessing risk, evaluating worker screening methods, addressing airport technology needs, and developing a unified national strategy for airport security. DHS concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers. This testimony focuses on (1) the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA's efforts to strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on related products GAO issued from March 2009 through January 2010, selected updates conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on the AIT procurement, and ongoing work on air cargo security. For the ongoing work and updates, GAO obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding air cargo security and the procurement, deployment, operational testing, and assessment of costs and benefits of the AIT.
What GAO Found
In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest flight 253, TSA revised the AIT procurement and deployment strategy, increasing the planned deployment of AITs from 878 to 1,800 units and using AITs as a primary--instead of a secondary--screening measure where feasible; however, challenges remain. In October 2009, GAO reported on the challenges TSA faced deploying new technologies such as the explosives trace portal (ETP) without fully testing them in an operational environment, and recommended such testing prior to future deployments. TSA officials concurred and stated that, unlike the ETP, operational testing for the AIT was successfully completed late in 2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. While officials said AITs performed as well as physical pat downs in operational tests, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information GAO has received. GAO is verifying that TSA successfully completed operational testing of the AIT. In October 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA complete cost-benefit analyses for new passenger screening technologies. While TSA conducted a life-cycle cost estimate and an alternatives analysis for the AIT, it reported that it has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original deployment strategy or the revised AIT deployment strategy, which proposes a more than twofold increase in the number of machines to be procured. GAO estimates increases in staffing costs alone due to doubling the number of AITs that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over its expected service life. While GAO recognizes that TSA is attempting to address a vulnerability exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack, a cost-benefit analysis is important as it would help inform TSA's judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, and how best to address this vulnerability considering all elements of the screening system. TSA has also taken actions towards strengthening other areas of aviation security but continues to face challenges. For example, TSA has taken steps to meet the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, including developing a program to share screening responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. However, as GAO reported in March 2009, a number of challenges to this effort exist, including attracting participants to the TSA screening program, completing technology assessments, and overseeing additional entities that it expects to participate in the program. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's air cargo security program which GAO plans to issue later this year. Further, while TSA has taken a variety of actions to strengthen the security of commercial airports, GAO reported in September 2009 that TSA continues to face challenges in several areas, such as assessing risk and evaluating worker screening methods. In September 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA develop a national strategy to guide stakeholder efforts to strengthen airport perimeter and access control security, to which DHS concurred. |
gao_GAO-05-785 | gao_GAO-05-785_0 | Joint cross-service teams would analyze common business-oriented functions, and the military departments would analyze service-unique functions. The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. DOD’s Recommendations Would Have Varying Degrees of Success in Achieving Goals for the 2005 BRAC Round
The recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Defense would have varying degrees of success in achieving DOD’s BRAC 2005 goals of reducing infrastructure and achieving savings, furthering transformation objectives, and fostering joint activity among the military services. While DOD proposed a record number of closure and realignment actions, exceeding those in all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focus on the reserve component bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Some proposed actions represent some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, but progress in these efforts varied without clear agreement on transformational options to be considered, and many recommendations tended to foster jointness by consolidating functions within rather than across military services. DOD Projects Recommendations Would Produce Savings, but there are Limitations Associated with the Savings Estimates
DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly $50 billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion. Military Personnel Savings
Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) are associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel; but rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, limiting dollar savings available for other uses. DOD also incorporated into its analytical process several key considerations required by the BRAC legislation, including the use of certified data, basing its analysis on its 20- year force structure plan and emphasizing its military value selection criteria, which included homeland defense and surge capabilities. Several Aspects of DOD’s BRAC Recommendations and Rejected Proposals May Warrant Further Attention
We identified issues regarding DOD’s recommendations, and other actions considered during the selection process that may warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. Issues with DOD’s BRAC Recommendations
We identified a number of issues, most of which apply to a broad range of DOD’s recommendations, that may warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. In addition to the issue previously discussed regarding military personnel eliminations being claimed as savings to the department, other issues include (1) instances of lengthy payback periods (time required to recoup up-front investment costs), (2) inconsistencies in how DOD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving military construction projects, (3) uncertainties in estimating the total costs to the government to implement DOD’s recommended actions, and (4) potential impacts on communities surrounding bases that are expected to gain large numbers of personnel if DOD’s recommendations are implemented. Nevertheless, the savings could prove difficult to track over time. Our monitoring of the process from the start permitted us to assess the extent to which the process followed was logical, sequential, reasoned, and well documented. Because of time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together the unprecedented 837 closures and realignment actions across the country into 222 recommendations, we focused more on evaluating major issues affecting more than one recommendation than on implementation issues of individual recommendations. The majority of the candidate recommendations had various components derived from using the optimization model; however, a few of the recommendations did not. Surge requirements, where applicable, were determined by military judgment. Likewise, they noted that it was not used to select sites for the Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle training because there were limited sites selected for this training. Their objectives were to validate the data and the adequacy of the supporting documentation. DOD Inspector General’s and Service Audit Agencies’ Role in the Process
The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies reviewed the data and processes used by the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group to develop its recommendations. 2. 3. Arlington, Va.: June 8, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense submitted proposed base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to an independent commission for its review. The Commission must submit its recommendations to the President by September 8, 2005, for his acceptance or rejection in their entirety. Congress has final action to accept or reject these recommendations in their entirety later this year. The law requires that GAO issue a report on the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations and selection process by July 1, 2005. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD's proposals achieved its stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze whether the process for developing recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues with the recommendations that may warrant further attention. Time constraints limited GAO's ability to examine implementation details of most of the individual recommended actions.
What GAO Found
DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering transformation, and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a record number of closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally large, but most savings are derived from 10 percent of the recommendations. While GAO believes savings would be achieved, overall up-front investment costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and there are clear limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult to track over time. Some proposals represent efforts to foster jointness and transformation, such as initial joint training for the Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on various transformation options. DOD's process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented. DOD's process placed strong emphasis on data, tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military services and seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common business-oriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the unique aspects of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland defense needs. Data accuracy was enhanced by the required use of certified data and by efforts of the DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies in checking the data. Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad range of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in developing certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, or potential impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified certain candidate recommendations, including some that were changed by senior DOD leadership late in the process that may warrant attention. |
gao_GAO-14-437 | gao_GAO-14-437_0 | Specifically, for civilian institutions, the Corrosion Office has documented procedures for selecting projects, but it has not documented procedures for approving these projects. According to Corrosion Office officials, the procedures for some aspects of the TCC program are not documented because the program is still evolving and they would like flexibility to enable innovation in determining how to manage the program. The Corrosion Office Lacks Readily Available and Consistent Documentation on the Amount of Funds Used for the TCC Program
Corrosion Office officials provided the amount of funds for the TCC program for fiscal years 2008 to 2013, but lacked readily available or consistent documentation to support some of the funding data. As a result, it is unclear what the Corrosion Office has spent on the TCC program. Without tracking and maintaining accurate records and fully documenting funding information that is readily available for examination, Corrosion Office officials cannot ensure that they accurately account for and report the TCC program costs in the annual budget report to Congress. DOD Has Set Goals for the TCC Program, but Lacks a Process to Address Its Requirement to Transition Demonstrated Project Results to Military Departments
The Corrosion Office Has Established Two Goals for the TCC Program
DOD’s Corrosion Office has established two goals for the TCC program, and has a process in place to monitor the results of the program. According to the 2014 DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, TCC has the following goals: (1) develop individuals with education, training, and experience who will form the future core of the technical community within DOD and private industry that specializes in work on corrosion prevention or control; and (2) produce solutions (i.e., knowledge, technologies, processes, and materials) that tangibly reduce the effect of corrosion on DOD infrastructure and weapon systems. Corrosion Office officials track results and have cited the number of students and research papers that have been produced as a result of receiving TCC funds. The Corrosion Office Lacks a Process for Transitioning TCC’s Demonstrated Project Results to the Military Departments
The Corrosion Office has established a research goal for producing solutions that tangibly reduce the effect of corrosion on DOD infrastructure and weapon systems; however, the office has not established a process for transitioning any results of the demonstrated research projects to the military departments. Corrosion Office officials stated that it is difficult to transition results of the TCC projects to the military departments because outputs of TCC research are in the early stages of technology evolution and thus are not mature enough to be used by the military departments. Therefore, Corrosion Office officials acknowledged the need to establish a process to transition TCC results to the military departments. Until the Corrosion Office establishes a process to study and determine what, if any, TCC results could transition to the military departments, DOD will not be able to demonstrate the success of the TCC program and the extent to which TCC results are helping to prevent or mitigate corrosion. Without fully documenting its decision-making procedures for selecting and approving projects, the Corrosion Office cannot demonstrate how projects were selected and approved for the TCC program. To enhance DOD’s ability to make consistent and informed decisions in its management of the TCC program in accordance with internal control standards, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to document the procedures for approving projects within the TCC program for civilian institutions; document the procedures for selecting and approving projects within the TCC program for military academic institutions; document the procedures for selecting and approving military research labs supporting civilian and military institutions in conducting projects within the TCC program; and track and maintain accurate records that include amounts of funds used for the TCC program, and have them readily available for examination to ensure that funding data will be accurately accounted for and reported in future reports, such as the annual budget report to Congress. Additionally, DOD stated that the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan describes this collaborative effort. We noted in our report that DOD Instruction 5000.67, which implements Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code, requires the Corrosion Office to develop a long-term strategy for corrosion prevention and mitigation that, among other things, provides for a coordinated research and development program that includes the transition of new corrosion-prevention technologies to the military departments. To determine the extent to which DOD can provide information on the amount of funds it spent on the TCC program, we reviewed financial records such as documents that show funds the Corrosion Office provided to the universities and military research labs, and Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests. any successes to date cited by DOD. Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Annual Corrosion Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect maintenance cost, service life of equipment, and military readiness by diminishing the operations of critical systems and creating safety hazards. Pursuant to Section 2228 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, DOD's Corrosion Office is responsible for prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. To help identify technology to prevent or mitigate corrosion and educate personnel about corrosion prevention and control, DOD funds universities and military labs in the TCC program.
GAO was asked to review DOD's TCC program and its goals. In this report, GAO addressed the extent to which DOD (1) has established procedures for managing the TCC program, (2) can provide information on the amount of funds spent on the program to date, and (3) has established goals for the TCC program and transitioned demonstrated results from projects to military departments. GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans and met with DOD corrosion officials and TCC participants.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) has documented some, but not all, key procedures for the Technical Corrosion Collaboration (TCC) program. For civilian institutions, the Corrosion Office documented procedures for selecting projects, but has not done so for approving these projects. In addition, for military academic institutions, the office has not documented procedures for selecting and approving projects. Corrosion Office officials stated that procedures for some aspects of the TCC program are not documented because the program is still evolving and they would like flexibility to enable innovation in determining how to manage the program. However, without fully documenting its decision-making procedures for selecting and approving projects, the Corrosion Office cannot demonstrate how projects were selected and approved for the TCC program.
Corrosion Office officials provided data on the amount of funds spent on the TCC program for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, but in some cases the data were not readily available and were inconsistent for the same time frame. As a result, it is unclear what the Corrosion Office has spent on the TCC program. Section 2228 requires the Corrosion Office to include a description of the amount of funds used for the TCC program in its annual corrosion budget report to Congress. However, because the Corrosion Office does not track and maintain accurate records, it is unable to determine the amount of funds spent. In the absence of fully documented funding data that are readily available for examination, Corrosion Office officials cannot ensure that they will accurately account for and report TCC costs in the annual budget report to Congress.
DOD has set goals for the TCC program, but has not developed a process to transition demonstrated results from projects to military departments. According to the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan , TCC program goals are to: (1) develop individuals with education, training, and experience who will form the future core of the technical community within DOD and private industry; and (2) produce solutions that will reduce the effect of corrosion on DOD infrastructure and weapon systems. To track the goal of developing people, the Corrosion Office cited, among other things, the research papers that have been produced as a result of the TCC program. Section 2228 requires that the Corrosion Office coordinate a research and development program that includes a plan for the transition of new corrosion-prevention technologies to the military departments. To track the goal to produce solutions that will reduce corrosion, the Corrosion Office monitors TCC projects' results; however, the office has not established a process to transition demonstrated results of the research projects to the military departments. Corrosion Office officials stated that it is difficult to transition results because outputs of TCC research are in the early stages of technology evolution and thus are not mature enough to be used by the military departments. Therefore, Corrosion Office officials acknowledge the need to establish a process to transition TCC results to the military departments. Until the Corrosion Office establishes a process to study and determine what, if any, TCC results could transition to the military departments, DOD will not be able to demonstrate the success of the TCC program and the extent to which TCC results are helping to prevent or mitigate corrosion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends five actions to improve DOD's management of the TCC program. DOD partially agreed with two actions: to document procedures to select and approve labs, and to track and maintain accurate funding data. DOD did not agree with three recommendations to document procedures to select and approve projects, and to establish a process to transition project results to the military departments. GAO believes that these recommendations remain valid. |
gao_GAO-04-822 | gao_GAO-04-822_0 | Background
FAA’s Mission and Organizational Structure
As an agency of the Department of Transportation, FAA’s mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the national airspace. FAA’s Use of IT
FAA relies extensively on information technology to carry out its NAS operations. Prior Reviews Identified Weaknesses in the Agency’s IT Investment Management Process
In 1995, we designated FAA’s modernization of its air traffic control system, the principle technology component of the NAS, as a high-risk area because of the size and complexity of the program and FAA’s many failures in meeting projects’ cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, the ITEB has not yet implemented this aspect of its charter. FAA Has Established Many Key Practices for Managing NAS Investments but Lacks Oversight of Operational Systems
In order to have the capabilities to effectively manage IT investments, an agency should, at a minimum, (1) build an investment foundation by putting basic, project-level control and selection practices in place (Stage 2 capabilities) and (2) manage its projects as a portfolio of investments, treating them as an integrated package of competing investment options and pursuing those that best meet the strategic goals, objectives, and mission of the agency; and it should also conduct PIRs to maintain mature, integrated selection, control, and evaluation processes (Stage 3 capabilities). When FAA implements all of the key practices associated with building the investment foundation and managing its investments as a portfolio, the agency will have greater assurance that it has selected the mix of investments that best supports its strategic goals and that it will be able to manage the investments to successful completion. FAA Has Established an IT Management Structure to Manage Its NAS Investments
The establishment of decision-making bodies or boards is a key component of the IT investment management process. In-service NAS systems only return to the JRC if they are judged to require additional funds for correction. FAA Does Not Have a Process for Effectively Overseeing Investments in All Phases of Their Life Cycles
An organization should provide effective oversight for its IT projects throughout all phases of their life cycles. Until FAA develops a plan that would allow for the systematic prioritization, sequencing, and evaluation of improvement efforts, the agency risks not being able to effectively establish mature investment management processes. Also, FAA has yet to define and implement the practices it needs to select and control its non-NAS investments. But FAA has not developed a comprehensive plan to guide all improvement efforts. Such a plan would help coordinate and prioritize improvement efforts and help sustain commitment to the efforts under way. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) evaluate FAA’s capabilities for managing its IT investments, (2) determine what plans the agency might have for improving these capabilities, and (3) describe how DOT oversees FAA’s investments and investment process. The IT investment management decisions are then incorporated into the ARC Business Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the United States airspace system, commonly referred to as the National Airspace System (NAS). To maintain its ability to effectively carry out this mission FAA embarked, in 1981,on a multi-billion dollar effort to modernize its aging air traffic control (ATC) system, the principle technology component of the NAS. Yet the NAS modernization has continued to be plagued by cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. To gain insight into how FAA is meeting its management challenges, congressional requesters asked GAO to evaluate FAA's processes for making IT investment management decisions. The objectives of this review included (1) evaluating FAA's capabilities for managing its IT investments and (2) determining what plans, if any, the agency might have for improving these capabilities.
What GAO Found
Judged against the criteria of GAO's framework for information technology investment management (ITIM), which measures the maturity of an organization's investment management processes, FAA has established about 80 percent of the basic selection and control practices that it needs to manage its mission-critical investments. For example, business lines actively monitor projects throughout their life cycles. However, the agency's senior IT investment board does not regularly review investments that are in the "in-service management," or operational, phase of their life cycles, and this creates a weakness in FAA's ability to oversee more than $1 billion of its IT investments. In addition, the agency has not yet established the key practices that would allow it to manage all of its investments as one portfolio--an integrated set of competing options. Until FAA has established the practices that would enable it to effectively manage its annual IT budget of about $2.5 billion, agency executives lack assurance that they are selecting and managing the mix of investments that best meets the agency's needs and priorities. The agency has initiated efforts to improve its investment management processes, but it has not yet developed and implemented a comprehensive plan--supported by management--to guide all of its improvement efforts. Such a plan is crucial in helping FAA to coordinate and prioritize its improvement efforts and sustain its commitment to the efforts it already has under way. Without such a plan--and controls for implementing it--FAA will be unlikely to develop a mature investment management capability. |
gao_GAO-07-550T | gao_GAO-07-550T_0 | DOE’s Budget Authority for Renewable, Fossil, and Nuclear Energy R&D Has Declined by Over 85 Percent in Real Terms Since 1978
Despite growing dependence on foreign energy sources, DOE’s budget authority for renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy R&D dropped from $5.5 billion (in real terms) in fiscal year 1978 to $793 million in fiscal year 2005—a decline of over 85 percent. As shown in figure 3, renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy R&D budget authority each peaked in the late 1970s before falling sharply in the 1980s. DOE is exploring thin-film technologies to reduce the manufacturing costs of photovoltaic cells, which convert sunlight into electricity. Beginning in fiscal year 1999, DOE’s nuclear energy R&D program shifted from improving safety and efficiency of nuclear power reactors to developing advanced reactor technologies by focusing on (1) the Nuclear Power 2010 initiative in an effort to stimulate electric power companies to construct and operate new reactors; (2) the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, to develop and demonstrate technologies for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel that could recover the fuel for reuse, reduce radioactive waste, and minimize proliferation threats; and (3) the Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative, or Gen IV, to develop new fourth generation advanced reactor technologies intended to reduce disposal requirements and manufacture hydrogen by about 2020 to 2030. Advanced Renewable, Fossil, and Nuclear Energy Technologies Face Key Barriers to Market Deployment
Advanced renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy technologies all face key challenges to their deployment into the market. For advanced fossil technologies, the primary challenge is controlling emissions of mercury and carbon dioxide generated by conventional coal-fired plants by using coal gasification technologies that cost about 20 percent more to construct than conventional coal-fired plants and demonstrating the technological feasibility of the long-term storage of carbon dioxide captured by a large- scale coal-fired power plant. DOE is exploring technologies to use cellulosic biomass from, for example, agricultural residues or fast-growing grasses and trees. Ethanol also needs to become more cost competitive. For the wind industry to expand from high-wind sites to low-wind and offshore locations, DOE needs to also develop bigger wind turbines with longer blades mounted on taller towers, requiring improved designs and materials for blade and drive train components. The wind industry also faces concerns about environmental impacts, including bird and bat fatalities caused by wind turbines. Solar energy also faces a challenge of developing inexpensive photovoltaic solar cells. The States and Countries We Reviewed Have Implemented a Variety of Initiatives to Encourage the Development and Deployment of Advanced Energy Technologies
While federal R&D has declined in recent years, the states have enacted legislation or developed initiatives to stimulate the deployment of renewable energy technologies, primarily to address their growing energy demands, adverse environmental impacts, and their concern for a reliable, diversified energy portfolio. For example, renewable energy accounts for 3 percent of Texas’ electricity consumption because Texas enacted legislation in 1999 and 2005 that created a renewable portfolio standard requiring electric utilities to meet renewable energy capacity standards. Through mandates and incentives, Brazil initiated an ethanol program in 1975 that eventually led to an end to Brazil’s dependence on imported oil. Denmark focused on wind energy and, in 2005, derived 19 percent of its electricity from wind energy. However, it is unlikely that DOE’s current level of R&D funding or the nation’s current energy policies will be sufficient to deploy advanced energy technologies in the next 25 years. Specifically, government leadership is needed to overcome technological and market barriers to deploying advanced energy technologies that would reduce the nation’s vulnerability to oil supply disruptions and adverse environmental effects of burning fossil fuels. To meet the nation’s rising demand for energy, reduce its economic and national security vulnerability to crude oil supply disruptions, and minimize adverse environmental effects, our December 2006 report recommended that the Congress consider further stimulating the development and deployment of a diversified energy portfolio by focusing R&D funding on advanced energy technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, the nation has benefited from relatively inexpensive energy, but it has also grown reliant on fossil fuels--oil, natural gas, and coal. Periodic imported oil supply disruptions have led to price shocks, yet the nation's dependence on imported energy is greater than ever. Fossil fuel emissions of carbon dioxide--linked to global warming--have also raised environmental concerns. The Department of Energy (DOE) has funded research and development (R&D) on advanced renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy technologies. GAO's report entitled DOE: Key Challenges Remain for Developing and Deploying Advanced Energy Technologies to Meet Future Needs examined the (1) R&D funding trends and strategies for developing advanced energy technologies; (2) key barriers to developing and deploying advanced energy technologies; and (3) efforts of the states and six selected countries to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies. GAO reviewed DOE R&D budget data and strategic plans and obtained the views of experts in DOE, industry, and academia, as well as state and foreign government officials.
What GAO Found
DOE's budget authority for energy R&D, when adjusted for inflation, fell 85 percent from its peak in fiscal year 1978 to fiscal year 2005. Energy R&D funding in the late 1970s was robust in response to constricted oil supplies and an ensuing energy crisis, but R&D funding plunged when oil prices returned to their historic levels in the mid-1980s. DOE's R&D efforts have resulted in steady incremental progress in reducing costs for renewable energy, reducing harmful emissions of coal-fired power plants, and improving safety and efficiency for nuclear energy. Nevertheless, the nation's dependence on conventional fossil fuels remains virtually the same as 30 years ago. Further development and deployment of advanced renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy technologies face several key challenges. High Capital Costs: The high capital costs of advanced energy technologies worry risk-averse investors. For example, solar cells made to convert solar energy into electricity for homeowners and businesses have been typically too expensive to compete with fossil fuels. DOE's R&D efforts include developing new materials for solar cells that could decrease manufacturing costs. Environmental Concerns: Advanced energy technologies need to address harmful environmental effects, including bird and bat fatalities cause by wind turbines, carbon dioxide and mercury emissions by coal-fired power plants, and spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power reactors. Technology-Specific Challenges: Challenges that are unique to each technology also create barriers to development and deployment. Ethanol, for example, will need to be manufactured with more cost-competitive technologies using agricultural residues or other cellulosic materials in order to expand beyond corn. Other challenges include developing new wind technologies to expand into low-wind and offshore locations; developing advanced coal gasification technologies to further reduce harmful emissions and high capital costs; and working with the nuclear power industry to deploy a new generation of reactors and develop the next generation to enable reactors to reprocess highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel or produce hydrogen. Many states and foreign countries have forged ahead of the federal government by successfully stimulating the deployment of renewable energy technologies. For example, renewable energy accounts for 3 percent of Texas' electricity consumption because Texas enacted legislation in 1999 and 2005 requiring its electric utilities to meet renewable energy capacity standards. Similarly, Denmark has used mandates and financial incentives to promote wind energy, which provided 19 percent of its electricity in 2005. |
gao_NSIAD-97-194 | gao_NSIAD-97-194_0 | Missions Are Reengineering Their Operations in Line With USAID Reforms
Overseas missions have changed their processes to streamline the way they provide assistance in support of USAID’s strategic goals. We could not fully assess the impact of the missions’ operational changes for the following reasons: (1) missions are at varying stages of implementing changes; (2) the impact of these changes may not be seen for several years, especially those that affect the design of new projects; and (3) the missions we visited had not established baseline information on the efficiency or effectiveness of their management operations before reengineering their processes and therefore could not demonstrate many measurable improvements. To date, only a few new projects have been started. Many of the mission’s indicators for its economic growth objective had focused on results at the national level and not specifically on areas targeted in USAID’s activities. USAID is working to develop better ways to measure the extent of its contribution to a country’s development. Other observers have recently noted USAID’s difficulty in demonstrating its impact on broad development indicators. We noted that in these cases “it may be important to supplement performance measurement data with impact evaluation studies to provide an accurate picture of program effectiveness.”
Systematic evaluations of how a program was implemented can provide managers with important information about a program’s success or failure. Mission Performance Is Being Linked to Resource Allocation
USAID has begun using program performance in its resource allocation process in a more systematic manner. However, the process continues to evolve, and resource allocation decisions are affected primarily by foreign policy considerations of the executive branch and congressional priorities. New Management System Is Not Working
Although USAID will have spent about $100 million by the end of fiscal year 1998 to develop its New Management System (NMS), the system does not work as intended and has created serious problems in mission operations and morale. The system is designed to consolidate USAID’s accounting, budget, personnel, procurement, program operations, and property management into a single, integrated network that the agency’s missions and offices worldwide can access and to aid in the effective management and monitoring of its programs. In March 1997, USAID’s Inspector General reported that the system’s premature deployment had increased the risk of fraud and abuse, had not met users’ needs, and did not meet basic federal financial system requirements. Conclusions
It is too early to discern the full extent of the impact of reengineering efforts at USAID missions, as they have only recently made the investment and operational changes necessary to bring about long-term change. However, USAID’s reengineering efforts have produced some tangible benefits in the areas of planning, implementing, and monitoring assistance projects. Directed and Undirected Funds for Development Assistance and Related Accounts, Fiscal Years 1995-97
Chronology of USAID Reforms
March: Strategies for sustainable development announced
March: Agency strategic implementation guidelines issued
September: One-year experiment on reengineered program operation processes completed September: Agency strategic framework and indicators for FY 1995-96 issued October: New program operations procedures issued October: Agency Automated Directives System implemented October: Partial deployment of New Managment System (NMS)
March: Reengineering best practices report issued (based on test of reengineered processes in 10 missions)
July: NMS activated in Washington, D.C.
October: NMS deployed worldwide February: REFORM Advisory Group visits selected missions to assist with reengineering 3 mission closings planned Staff reduced by 417 (as of 6/30/97)
April: Two modules of NMS suspended at missions $5.9 billion (estimated) 7,609 employees (as of 6/30/97)
Comments From the U.S. Agency for International Development
Major Contributors to This Report
National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.
Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C.
Ernie E. Jackson The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effect of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) reforms on its overseas missions' operations and delivery of assistance, focusing on how: (1) USAID missions have reengineered their operations; (2) reengineering has affected the content of USAID's assistance program; (3) USAID monitors and evaluates the results of its projects; (4) USAID allocates funds for its projects; and (5) USAID's New Management System supports mission operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in reengineering the way assistance is delivered, USAID missions have only recently made the investment and operational changes necessary to bring about long-term change; (2) to date, USAID's reengineering efforts to improve its delivery of assistance have shown some benefits in the areas of planning, implementing, and monitoring projects; (3) notwithstanding this progress, USAID still has major obstacles to overcome in deploying its New Management System and establishing valid and reliable performance measures; (4) overseas missions have changed the way they manage assistance in support of USAID's strategic goals; (5) however, because missions had no baseline data on operations management prior to reengineering their processes, neither they nor GAO can identify measurable increases in efficiency or effectiveness of the delivery of assistance; (6) USAID missions have, to varying degrees, begun to establish more results-oriented indicators and report the results of their projects annually; (7) however, the missions still have difficulty linking their activities to the broad indicators of development--such as a country's rate of economic growth; (8) one way to provide a more complete picture of program performance could be to supplement performance measurement data with impact evaluation studies; (9) although the relative performance of mission programs is clearly a factor in USAID's resource allocation decisions, these decisions are still largely driven by other considerations, such as contributions to foreign policy and agency priorities, country need and commitment, and funding priorities of the executive branch and Congress; (10) USAID's New Management System, one of the agency's key tools in reforming its operations, is not working as intended; (11) this computer system, which is expected to cost at least $100 million by the end of fiscal year 1998, was designed to enable the agency to manage its resources and monitor results more effectively by consolidating accounting, budgeting, personnel, procurement, and program operations into a single, integrated network that can be accessed worldwide; (12) despite warnings that the system had not been tested and did not meet basic federal requirements, USAID activated the system in July 1996 in Washington and deployed it in October 1996 in its missions; (13) USAID suspended much of the system's operation in April 1997, after it failed to work properly; and (14) correcting system deficiencies will be critical to continued progress of the agency's reform effort. |
gao_GAO-09-606 | gao_GAO-09-606_0 | The Potential Benefits and Costs of HECMs Can Be Varied and Complex, and Concerns Exist That Some Consumers May Not Fully Understand the Product
While HECMs can provide senior homeowners with multiple types of benefits, including the flexibility to use the money received and protection against owing more than the value of the house when the loan comes due, HECM costs can be substantial. Consistent with this goal, HECMs allow senior homeowners to convert their home equity into cash advances, while maintaining ownership of their homes. Most HECMs have adjustable interest rates. Home values: The amount of home equity remaining for the borrower or heirs will be the value of the home, minus the amount owed on the HECM. Federal agency officials agreed that some of these advertisements raised concerns. For example, these regulators also formed a task force to examine consumer protections for reverse mortgages, including those related to reverse mortgage marketing. Extent of Misleading HECM Marketing Is Unknown, but Selected Materials Contained Some Potentially Misleading Claims
While the extent of misleading HECM marketing is unknown, our limited review of marketing materials found some examples of claims that were potentially misleading because they were inaccurate, incomplete, or employed questionable sales tactics. Development of HECM-Specific, Cross-Selling Regulations Is in Preliminary Stage, and States Have Uncovered Some Evidence of Inappropriate Cross- Selling
Concerns exist that reverse mortgage borrowers could be vulnerable to inappropriate cross-selling, a practice involving the sale of financial or insurance products that are unsuitable for the borrower’s financial situation using the borrower’s reverse mortgage funds. For example, federal agencies have had some role in informing HECM borrowers about the risks and costs of purchasing other financial products using HECM funds. HUD has responsibility for enforcing the cross-selling provisions in HERA, but the department is in the preliminary stages of developing regulations to implement them. The results of our limited testing of HECM counseling sessions found that counselors omitted information required by HUD, particularly on alternatives to HECMs and the financial implications of these loans. As a result of these control weaknesses, some prospective borrowers may not be receiving the information needed to make informed decisions about obtaining a HECM. GAO’s guidance entitled Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that agency objectives—in this case, ensuring that prospective HECM borrowers are well-informed—are being achieved. According to HUD officials, HUD’s internal controls include the following: 1. counseling standards as set forth in regulations, mortgagee letters, and 2. a counselor training and certification program; 3. a Certificate of HECM Counseling (counseling certificate) that, once signed by the counselor and the counselee, should provide HUD with assurance that counselors complied with counseling standards and that prospective borrowers were prepared to make informed decisions; 4. a monitoring process in which HOC staff oversee the performance of counseling agencies and HUD headquarters staff oversee grant agreements with HECM intermediaries; and 5. pre- and post-insurance checks by contractors and HUD field staff of HECM loan files to ensure that a signed counseling certificate is present for each loan. Counselors Did Not Cover All of the Required Information to Which the Counseling Certificate Refers
Although none of the 15 counselors covered all of the required topics, all of them provided useful and generally accurate information about reverse mortgages and discussed key program features. The counselor for the other session did not ask for any additional financial information. The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the potential benefits and costs of HECMs to borrowers, (2) federal agency responsibilities to protect consumers from misleading HECM marketing, (3) federal agency efforts to protect HECM borrowers from inappropriate cross-selling, and (4) HUD’s oversight of HECM counseling providers. 7. We also reviewed the cross-selling provisions in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and spoke with HUD officials about their planned implementation of these provisions. The U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires that homeowner(s) interested in pursuing a Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) receive information about the implications of and alternatives to a reverse mortgage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reverse mortgages--a type of loan against the borrower's home that is available to seniors--are growing in popularity. However, concerns have emerged about the adequacy of consumer protections for this product. Most reverse mortgages are made under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. HUD insures the mortgages, which are made by private lenders, and oversees the agencies that provide mandatory counseling to prospective HECM borrowers. GAO was asked to examine issues and federal activities related to (1) the potential benefits and costs of HECMs to borrowers, (2) misleading HECM marketing, (3) the sale of potentially unsuitable products in conjunction with HECMs, and (4) oversight of HECM counseling providers. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed program rules; examined HECM advertisements; analyzed consumer complaint data; performed limited tests of HUD's internal controls; and interviewed HECM borrowers and agency, industry, and nonprofit officials.
What GAO Found
HECMs can provide borrowers with multiple benefits, but they also have substantial costs and are relatively complex. HECMs allow seniors to convert their home equity into flexible cash advances while living in their homes. Additionally, the borrowers or their heirs can fully pay off the HECM by selling the home, even if the amount owed exceeds the current home value. However, HECMs also have large insurance and origination costs. Furthermore, the long-term financial implications of a HECM can be difficult to assess because the borrower's remaining home equity depends on the amount of cash advances and interest rate and house price trends. Various federal agencies have responsibilities for protecting consumers from the misleading marketing of mortgages. Although these agencies have reported few HECM marketing complaints, GAO's limited review of selected marketing materials for reverse mortgages found some examples of claims that were potentially misleading because they were inaccurate, incomplete, or employed questionable sales tactics. Federal agency officials indicated that some of these claims raised concerns. For example, the claim of "lifetime income" is potentially misleading because there are a number of circumstances in which the borrower would no longer receive cash advances. Federal agencies have had a limited role in addressing concerns about the sale of potentially unsuitable financial products in conjunction with HECMs ("inappropriate cross-selling"). For example, an annuity that defers payments for a number of years may be unsuitable for an elderly person. HUD is responsible for implementing a provision in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that is intended to restrict inappropriate cross-selling, but the agency is still in the preliminary stages of developing regulations. Some of the states GAO contacted reported cases of inappropriate cross-selling involving violations of state laws governing the sale of insurance and annuities. HUD's internal controls do not provide reasonable assurance that counseling providers are complying with HECM counseling requirements. GAO's undercover participation in 15 HECM counseling sessions found that while the counselors generally conveyed accurate and useful information, none of the counselors covered all of the topics required by HUD, and some overstated the length of the sessions in HUD records. For example, 7 of the 15 counselors did not discuss required information about alternatives to HECMs. HUD has several internal controls designed to ensure that counselors convey the required information to prospective HECM borrowers, but the department has not tested the effectiveness of these controls and lacks procedures to ensure that records of counseling sessions are accurate. Because of these weaknesses, some prospective borrowers may not be receiving the information necessary to make informed decisions about obtaining a HECM. |
gao_HEHS-98-119 | gao_HEHS-98-119_0 | Many states require that plans inform members about grievance procedures at least upon enrollment and sometimes annually. Timeliness, Decisionmaking Process, and Communication Are Important to a Complaint and Appeal System
A number of elements have been identified by regulatory, consumer, and industry groups as being important to a complaint and appeal system. These elements fall into three general categories: timeliness, integrity of the decisionmaking process, and effective communication with members. Several nationally recognized groups have developed guidelines for complaint and appeal systems. HMOs Had Most of the Important Elements, but Two Were Commonly Lacking
The HMOs in our review had most of the 11 elements identified by the groups in our study as being important to complaint and appeal systems, although they varied considerably in the mechanisms adopted to meet them. The extent to which HMOs in our study implement the policies they reported to us, however, is unknown. Not all 38 HMOs in our study, however, provided data on each of the elements. Consumer Groups Expressed Concerns Regarding Conflict of Interest and Communication Difficulties
Although the majority of HMOs’ complaint and appeal systems included most of the important elements, consumer advocates expressed concern that such systems are not fully meeting the needs of enrollees. Advocates specifically noted the lack of an independent, external review of plan decisions on appeals and noted members’ difficulty in understanding how to use complaint and appeal systems. There is limited experience with external review systems for HMO members. Complaint and Appeal Data Are Neither Comparable Nor Accessible
Publicly available data on the number and types of complaints and appeals, if defined and collected in a consistent fashion, could enhance oversight, accountability, and market competition. Such information would offer regulators, purchasers, and individual consumers a better opportunity to evaluate the relative performance of health plans. Data Collection and Documentation Systems Lack Uniformity, Making Comparisons Difficult
We asked HMOs to provide us with the number of complaints and appeals received from commercial members in 1996 and the nature of the complaints and appeals. HMOs Report That Complaint and Appeal Data Help Target Problem-Solving Efforts
All HMOs in our study told us that they analyze complaint and appeal data to identify systemic problems that the plan needs to address. HMOs generally reported using complaint and appeal data, together with data from other sources, in several ways: to make changes to the plan itself (such as changes to benefits or plan processes) or to promote change in members’ behavior and providers’ behavior. Better communication and information disclosure could improve the complaint and appeal process for the benefit of HMO members and plans. For example, ombudsman programs might be an alternative way to facilitate consumer knowledge about, and use of, these systems. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) what elements are considered important to a system for processing health maintenance organization (HMO) member complaints and appeals; (2) the extent to which HMOs' complaint and appeal system contain these elements; (3) what concerns consumers have regarding HMO complaint and appeal systems; (4) what information is available on the number and types of complaints and appeals HMOs receive from their members; and (5) how, if at all, HMOs use their complaint and appeal data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a majority of HMOs in GAO's study incorporated most criteria considered important for complaint and appeal systems, however, consumer advocates remain concerned that complaint and appeal systems do not fully meet member needs; (2) additionally, HMOs in GAO's study do not uniformly collect and report data on the complaints and appeals they receive to health care regulators, purchasers, or consumers; (3) nationally recognized regulatory, consumer, and industry groups have identified elements that are important to an enrollee complaint and appeal system; (4) 11 elements were identified by at least 2 of these groups and fall into 3 general categories: timeliness, integrity of the decisionmaking process, and effective communication with members; (5) the policies and procedures at the 38 HMOs in GAO's review contained most of the 11 important elements, although they varied considerably in the mechanisms adopted to meet them; (6) the lack of an independent, external review of plan decisions and the difficulty in understanding how to use plan complaint and appeal systems were of particular concern to consumer advocacy groups, who contend that plans' systems, therefore, do not adequately serve the needs of plan enrollees; (7) however, consumer concerns about the impartiality of HMO decisionmakers could be addressed by using independent, external review systems for HMO members; (8) consumer concerns about the difficulty in understanding how to use complaint and appeal systems might be addressed by revising written plan materials, which are often difficult to understand; (9) additionally, although experience to date is limited, such concerns are being addressed by ombudsman programs in some parts of the country; (10) publicly available data on the number and types of complaints and appeals, if consistently defined and uniformly collected, can enhance oversight, accountability, and market competition; (11) comparative data would provide regulators, purchasers, and individual consumers with a view of members' relative satisfaction with health plans, thereby supplementing other performance indicators; (12) all HMOs in GAO's study stated that they review complaint and appeal data to identify problems that the plan needs to address; and (13) several HMOs reported using complaint and appeal data, together with data from other sources, to make changes in benefits and plan processes, and to attempt changes in member and provider behavior as well. |
gao_GAO-05-859 | gao_GAO-05-859_0 | In addition, State provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers regarding visa policies and procedures. In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, including establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing national security concerns through the visa process; creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against potential terrorists; performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill requirements for visa operations; and revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more emphasis on detecting potential terrorists. For example, in February 2003, Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national security as the first priority of the visa process. However, the bureau has not consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual—State’s central Internet resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance—to reflect these changes. Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on certain interagency protocols. State has also increased its targeted recruitment of foreign language proficient officers, but gaps remain. To further clarify current visa policies and procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual on a regular basis to incorporate all changes in visa policies and procedures; and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, develop additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State in the visa process, including the roles and responsibilities of DHS personnel overseas who assist consular sections and DHS’s procedures at points of entry. To ensure consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance national security and promote legitimate travel, we also recommend that the Secretary of State develop a comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and shortages, foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud prevention needs, among other things—the plan should systematically determine priority positions that must be filled worldwide based on the relative strategic importance of posts and positions and realistic assumptions of available staff resources; report to Congress, within 1 year of this report, on the implementation of this plan; ensure that consular chiefs update interview wait-time data on a in consultation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, further expand consular training in terrorist travel trends, post-specific counterterrorism techniques, and fraud prevention, either at the Foreign Service Institute or at overseas posts. Although State and the FBI have taken steps to increase the amount of information available to consular officers in the visa process, further information from criminal history files would help facilitate visa adjudication for legitimate travelers. This was a serious deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with officers on their first tour. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, (1) develop a clear policy on the role of national security in the visa process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how consular officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3) fundamentally reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and expand consular training. This report examines State's and other agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, in the areas of policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and training; and information sharing.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear guidance on the importance of national security. We observed that consular officers at eight posts, including those of interest to antiterrorism efforts, regard security as their top priority, while recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel. State has also increased hiring of consular officers, targeted recruitment of foreign language speakers, revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have shared more information for consular officers' use in conducting name checks on visa applicants. Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we interviewed also said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key consular posts. In particular, staffing shortages at the supervisory level place a burden on new officers. In February 2005, we found that the visa sections in critical posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance. Further improvements in training and fraud prevention are also needed, and additional information from FBI criminal history files would allow consular officers to help facilitate efficient visa adjudication. |
gao_GAO-06-531T | gao_GAO-06-531T_0 | DOE and DOD Lack Clear OUO and FOUO Guidance in Key Aspects
Both DOE and DOD have established offices, designated staff, and promulgated policies to provide a framework for the OUO and FOUO programs. However, their policies lack sufficient clarity in important areas, which could result in inconsistencies and errors. However, our analysis of DOD’s FOUO policies shows that it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for the FOUO program, and whether personnel designating a document as FOUO should note the FOIA exemption used as the basis for the designation on the document. Also, both DOE’s and DOD’s policies are unclear regarding at what point a document should be marked as OUO or FOUO, and what would be an inappropriate use of the OUO or FOUO designation. In our view, this lack of clarity exists in both DOE and DOD because the agencies have put greater emphasis on managing classified information, which is more sensitive than OUO or FOUO information. The guide and the manual supplement the order. According to one senior DOE official, requiring the employee to cite a reason why a document is designated as OUO is one of the purposes of the stamp, and one means by which DOE’s Office of Classification encourages practices consistent with the order, guide, and manual throughout DOE. Neither DOE nor DOD Requires Training or Conducts Oversight
While both DOE and DOD offer training to staff on managing OUO and FOUO information, neither agency requires any training of its employees before they are allowed to identify and mark information as OUO or FOUO, although some staff will eventually take OUO or FOUO training as part of other mandatory training. As a result, some DOE employees may be identifying and marking documents for restriction from dissemination to the public or persons who do not need to know the information to perform their jobs, and yet may not be fully informed as to when it is appropriate to do so. The department relies on the individual services and field activities within DOD to determine the extent of training that employees receive. In closing, the lack of clear policies, effective training, and oversight in DOE’s and DOD’s OUO and FOUO programs could result in both over- and underprotection of unclassified yet sensitive government documents. Having clear policies and procedures in place can mitigate the risk of program mismanagement and can help DOE and DOD management assure that OUO or FOUO information is appropriately marked and handled. DOE and DOD have no systemic procedures in place to assure that staff are adequately trained before designating documents OUO or FOUO, nor do they have any means of knowing the extent to which established policies and procedures for making these designations are being complied with. These issues are important because they affect DOE’s and DOD’s ability to assure that the OUO and FOUO programs are identifying, marking, and safeguarding documents that truly need to be protected in order to prevent potential damage to governmental, commercial, or private interests. Appendix: FOIA Exemptions
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the interest of national security and personal privacy and for other reasons, federal agencies place dissemination restrictions on information that is unclassified yet still sensitive. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have both issued policy guidance on how and when to protect sensitive information. DOE marks documents with this information as Official Use Only (OUO) while DOD uses the designation For Official Use Only (FOUO). GAO was asked to (1) identify and assess the policies, procedures, and criteria DOE and DOD employ to manage OUO and FOUO information; and (2) determine the extent to which DOE's and DOD's training and oversight programs assure that information is identified, marked, and protected according to established criteria.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported earlier this month, both DOE and DOD base their programs on the premise that information designated as OUO or FOUO must (1) have the potential to cause foreseeable harm to governmental, commercial, or private interests if disseminated to the public or persons who do not need the information to perform their jobs; and (2) fall under at least one of eight Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions. While DOE and DOD have policies in place to manage their OUO or FOUO programs, our analysis of these policies showed a lack of clarity in key areas that could allow inconsistencies and errors to occur. For example, it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for the FOUO program, and whether personnel designating a document as FOUO should note the FOIA exemption used as the basis for the designation on the document. Also, both DOE's and DOD's policies are unclear regarding at what point a document should be marked as OUO or FOUO and what would be an inappropriate use of the OUO or FOUO designation. For example, OUO or FOUO designations should not be used to conceal agency mismanagement. In our view, this lack of clarity exists in both DOE and DOD because the agencies have put greater emphasis on managing classified information, which is more sensitive than OUO or FOUO. In addition, while both DOE and DOD offer training on their OUO and FOUO policies, neither DOE nor DOD has an agencywide requirement that employees be trained before they designate documents as OUO or FOUO. Moreover, neither agency conducts oversight to assure that information is appropriately identified and marked as OUO or FOUO. DOE and DOD officials told us that limited resources, and in the case of DOE, the newness of the program, have contributed to the lack of training requirements and oversight. Nonetheless, the lack of training requirements and oversight of the OUO and FOUO programs leaves DOE and DOD officials unable to assure that OUO and FOUO documents are marked and handled in a manner consistent with agency policies and may result in inconsistencies and errors in the application of the programs. |
gao_GAO-08-817 | gao_GAO-08-817_0 | To what extent are DB pension plans frozen, and what are the characteristics of such freezes? Frozen Plans Affect about One-Fifth of Active DB Plan Participants
Overall, an estimated 3.3 million active participants in our study population—or 21 percent of all active participants in the private, single- employer DB system—are affected by reported freezes. Under hard freezes, future benefit accruals cease for active participants. In contrast, soft freezes may reduce future benefit accruals for some or all active participants. Larger sponsors, those with 10,000 or more total participants, are significantly less likely than smaller sponsors to have implemented a hard freeze, with only 9.4 percent of plans under a hard freeze among larger sponsors compared with 25.4 percent of plans under a hard freeze among smaller sponsors. Of sponsors in the study population with one or more frozen plans, 83 percent offered a replacement retirement savings vehicle to affected participants in their largest frozen plans. An additional 6 percent of sponsors froze plans under extenuating circumstances that preclude the offering of a replacement plan (such as, a firm merger, bankruptcy, plant closure, multiple employer plan, or new-employee-only soft freeze). The remaining 13 reasons range in prevalence from 54 percent responding that “plan was frozen in anticipation of replacing it with an alternative retirement plan” to 12 percent for “other reason.”
About two-thirds of sponsors with frozen plans reported at least some level of confidence that their largest frozen plan was reasonably well- funded at the time of freeze. However, there are some limitations to these data. The anticipated outcome for a sponsor’s largest plan varies significantly by the type of frozen plan. Plan Freezes Have Various Implications for Key Stakeholders
The prevalence of frozen DB plans today has different implications for key stakeholders in the single-employer DB system—plan sponsors, participants, and the PBGC. For example, from 1990 to 2006, total annual standard terminations averaged about 7 percent of insured single-employer plans. For active plan participants, plan freezes imply a possible reduction in anticipated retirement income. Ultimately, no matter what the impact on its net financial position, the freezing of plans and the exiting from the single-employer DB system by sponsors do not indicate future plan growth for the PBGC. Given the prevalence of plans that are currently frozen and the relationship between plan freezes and plan termination, the shrinking of the single-employer insurance program plan base seems likely to continue. GAO staff who made contributions are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Frozen DB Plan Briefing Slides
GAO Freeze Survey: Sampling Summary
Liabilities (in billions)
Finding: Plan Freezes Are a Common Occurrence
For Sponsors’ Largest Plans, Just Over Half Were Frozen During or After 2005
Finding: Most Sponsors Who Froze a Plan Made an Alternative Replacement Plan Available
Finding: Sponsors Froze Plans for a Variety of Reasons
Top reasons sponsors reported for freezing a plan were:
– Cost of annual contributions needed to satisfy funding requirements and their impact on cash flow (72 percent) – Unpredictability/volatility of plan funding requirements (69 percent)
Finding: Sponsors of DB Plans Uncertain About Future Course of Action
For those sponsors with frozen plans:
Despite the widespread prevalence of plan
freezes, a rise in terminations has yet to materialize (notably among the largest plans)
A freeze may imply:
Freezes likely to have a slightly positive
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To achieve our objectives, we conducted a survey of sponsors of defined- benefit (DB) pension plans. We limited our study to this population of 7,804 larger sponsors (our study population) because it would be informative about the vast majority of covered participants and we expected a higher success rate in locating, contacting, and obtaining responses from this group than would have been obtained from the smallest sponsors. Despite these differences in approach and methodology, some may wish to compare PBGC’s estimate of 15.9 percent of plans were hard frozen in 2006 and our study population estimate of 23.3 percent of plans as hard frozen among sponsors with 100 or more participants in all plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Private defined benefit (DB) pension plans are an important source of retirement income for millions of Americans. However, from 1990 to 2006, plan sponsors have voluntarily terminated over 61,000 sufficiently funded single-employer DB plans. An event preceding at least some of these terminations was a so-called plan "freeze"--an amendment to the plan to limit some or all future pension accruals for some or all plan participants. Available information that the government collects about frozen plans is limited in scope and may not be recent. GAO conducted a stratified probability sample survey of 471 single-employer DB plan sponsors out of a population of 7,804 (with 100 or more total plan participants) to gather more timely and detailed information about frozen plans. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority as part of our ongoing reassessment of risks associated with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) single-employer pension insurance program, which, in 2003, we placed on our high-risk list of programs that need broad-based transformations and warrant the attention of Congress and the executive branch. Frozen DB plans have possible implications for PBGC's long-term financial position. This report examines (1) the extent to which DB pension plans are frozen and the characteristics of frozen plans; and (2) the implications of these freezes for plan participants, plan sponsors, and the PBGC.
What GAO Found
Frozen plans are fairly common today, with about half of all sponsors in our study population having one or more frozen DB plans. Overall, about 3.3 million active participants in our study population, who represent about 21 percent of all active participants in the single-employer DB system, are affected by a freeze. The most common type of freeze is a hard freeze--a freeze in which all future benefit accruals cease--which accounts for 23 percent of plans in our study population; however, an additional 22 percent of plans are frozen in some other way. Larger sponsors (i.e. those with 10,000 or more total participants) are significantly less likely than smaller sponsors to have implemented a hard freeze, with only 9 percent of plans under a hard freeze among larger sponsors compared with 25 percent of plans under a hard freeze among smaller sponsors. The vast majority of sponsors with frozen plans in our study population, 83 percent, have alternative retirement savings arrangements for these affected participants, but 11 percent of sponsors do not. (An additional 6 percent of sponsors froze plans under circumstances that preclude a replacement plan.) Plan sponsors cited many reasons for freezing their largest plans but most often noted two: the impact of annual contributions on their firm's cash flows and the unpredictability of plan funding. Sponsors of frozen plans generally expressed a degree of uncertainty about the anticipated outcome for their largest plan, but sponsors whose largest plan was hard frozen were significantly more likely to anticipate plan termination as the likely plan outcome. The implications of a freeze vary for sponsors, participants, and PBGC. For plan sponsors, while hard freezes appear to indicate an increased likelihood of plan termination, a rise in plan terminations has yet to materialize. For participants, a freeze generally implies a reduction in anticipated future retirement benefits, though this may be somewhat or entirely offset by increases in other benefits or a replacement retirement-savings plan. However, because the replacement plans offered to affected participants most frequently are defined contribution, the investment risk and responsibility for saving are shifted to employees. Finally, plan freezes may potentially improve PBGC's net financial position, but the degree to which it is accompanied by sponsor efforts to improve plan funding is unclear. In any event, the shrinking of the single-employer pension insurance program plan base seems likely to continue. |
gao_HEHS-96-62 | gao_HEHS-96-62_0 | In this report, we focus on Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—the two largest federal programs providing assistance to people with disabilities. DI and SSI are administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) with the assistance of state agencies. Caseloads Have Grown Rapidly and Changed Since the Mid-1980s
Between 1985 and 1994, the combined DI and SSI beneficiary population increased 70 percent and the inflation-adjusted cost of cash benefits grew 66 percent. These factors include eligibility expansion; program outreach; fewer continuing disability reviews; and occurrences external to the programs, for example, a downturn in the business cycle and demographic changes. 2.1). Beneficiary Population Presents Return-to-Work Challenges
Developing effective return-to-work strategies for people with disabilities presents challenges to policymakers. Some people may require a one-time medical intervention, while others may need ongoing and changing levels of medical support; some individuals may require remedial retraining, and others may need education and job coaching. Advances Increase Return-to-Work Potential
Although efforts to maximize the work potential of people currently on the disability rolls face many challenges, numerous technological and medical advances and economic changes have created more potential for some people with disabilities to engage in work. DI and SSI Work Incentives Provide Different Benefit Protections
The DI and SSI programs offer a number of work incentives to encourage beneficiaries to return to work. Studies have also found that beneficiaries generally do not understand work incentive provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, focusing on program weaknesses that impede the Social Security Administration (SSA) from identifying and expanding beneficiaries' return-to-work capabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between 1985 and 1994, the combined DI and SSI beneficiary population increased 70 percent and the inflation-adjusted cost of cash benefits grew 66 percent; (2) increases were due to eligibility expansion, program outreach, fewer continuing disability reviews, economic factors, and demographic changes; (3) the beneficiary population is also growing younger and more beneficiaries have longer-term impairments; (4) the development of effective return-to-work strategies for people with severe disabilities is challenging because individuals may require various and changing levels of medical intervention or support, remedial retraining, education, or job coaching; (5) technological and medical advances and economic and social changes have created more potential for some individuals with disabilities to engage in work; (6) the SSI and DI benefit structure, their focus on inabilities rather than abilities, and poor access to rehabilitation services further complicate the difficult process of making disability and work capability determinations; and (7) although the programs offer such work incentives as trial work periods, extended eligibility, earned income exclusion, work expense subsidies, continued health insurance coverage, and reentitlement, they are not appropriately designed or implemented to motivate beneficiaries to return to work. |
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