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gao_GAO-05-970 | gao_GAO-05-970_0 | In addition, U.S. officials said that Colombia had existing infrastructure that facilitated the program’s restart, such as air bases and a national air command center. Since 2002, the United States has provided $68.4 million and surveillance aircraft for the ABD program (see table 1) and plans to provide an additional $25.9 million in fiscal year 2006. United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety Requirements
In response to the findings of the Peru investigation and other determinations, the United States and Colombia developed new safeguards for the renewed ABD program which were implemented consistently in the interdiction missions we observed. In response, safeguards were developed to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve communication channels. The pilot of the suspicious aircraft in Peru was unaware that he was being called over the radio by the ABD aircrew. Both Colombian and U.S. program managers review the video to determine if the checklist was followed. In addition, the Congress requires an annual report from the President on the program’s resources and procedures used to intercept drug trafficking aircraft. Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program Lacks Well- Defined Performance Measures
Our analysis of available data—the number of suspicious tracks and law enforcement activities—indicates that the ABD program’s progress to date is mixed. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in tracks indicates that the program is deterring drug traffickers from transporting drugs by air, and is allowing the Colombian government to meet its goal of regaining control of its airspace, but performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes linking the reduction of suspicious tracks to the overall goal have not been developed. For example, personnel consider whether the aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path or the aircraft’s altitude is unusually low. Only one ABD mission resulted in a drug seizure—0.6 metric tons (about 1,300 pounds) of cocaine. We found the results of the ABD program mixed. Although the number of suspicious aircraft tracks has apparently declined—from about 49 to 30 per month, the Colombian Air Force seldom locates the suspicious aircraft. Out of about 390 suspicious tracks pursued since the start of the program, the Colombian Air Force located 48; law enforcement or military authorities went to the scene of 14, including four that were already on the ground. Besides calling the Colombian National Police during a mission, as required by the procedural checklist, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police. Moreover, many of the suspicious aircraft tracks detected in recent months are along Colombia’s border regions with Brazil and Venezuela where ABD aircraft are often too far away to threaten the trafficking mission. To evaluate the program’s progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives, we examined data regarding law enforcement activities; suspicious tracks; aircraft pursued, located, and fired at. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 1990s, the United States operated a program in Colombia and Peru called Air Bridge Denial (ABD). The ABD program targeted drug traffickers that transport illicit drugs through the air by forcing down suspicious aircraft, using lethal force if necessary. The program was suspended in April 2001 when a legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S. citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in August 2003 after additional safeguards were established. To date, the United States has provided about $68 million in support and plans to provide about $26 million in fiscal year 2006. We examined whether the ABD program's new safeguards were being implemented and its progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives.
What GAO Found
The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve communication channels. We found the safeguards were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In addition, the program managers perform periodic reviews and evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program, and have made efforts to improve civilian pilots' awareness of the ABD program's procedures. Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program's results are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily assessed because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist. The stated objective for the program--for the Colombian National Police to take control of suspicious aircraft--seldom happens. During October 2003 through July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48 aircraft out of about 390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military or police took control of just 14 aircraft--four were already on the ground. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the suspicious aircraft land in remote locations controlled by insurgent groups that require time to enter safely. Yet, the air force rarely involves the police besides calling them at the start of a mission and before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In addition, many of the suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil and Venezuela, which is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to intercept without refueling. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks has apparently declined from 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be consistent over time because they are based on subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace. |
gao_GAO-10-212T | gao_GAO-10-212T_0 | Efforts of Host Governments and Donors, including the United States, toward Halving Hunger by 2015 Have Been Insufficient, especially in Sub- Saharan Africa
Despite their commitment to halve global hunger by 2015, efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to accelerate progress toward that goal have been insufficient, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, multilateral and donor aid to African agriculture generally declined from the 1980s to around 2005. Host Governments in Sub- Saharan Africa Provide Limited Agricultural Spending
Although African countries pledged in 2003 to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture, only 8 out of 38 governments had met this pledge as of 2007, according to the most current available data from the International Food Policy Research Institute. 2). In recognition of the growing global food security problem, in July 2009, the United States and assembled leaders at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, agreed to a $20 billion, 3-year commitment to reverse the declining trend in ODA funding for agriculture. Launched in 2002, the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA)—which represented the U.S. strategy to help fulfill the MDG goal of halving hunger by 2015—was constrained in funding and limited in scope. The U.S. share of the G8 commitment of $20 billion, or $3.35 billion, includes $1.36 billion for agriculture and related programming in fiscal year 2010 to establish food security, representing more than double the fiscal year 2009 budget request level. Consistent with GAO’s Recommendations, Efforts to Develop a U.S. Governmentwide Strategy to Address Global Food Security Are in Progress
In our May 2008 report, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) work in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide strategy that defines each agency’s actions and resource commitments to achieve food security, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures to monitor and evaluate progress toward the implementation of this strategy and (2) report on progress toward the implementation of the first recommendation as part of the annual U.S. International Food Assistance Report submitted to Congress. USAID concurred with the first recommendation but expressed concerns about the vehicle of the annual reporting. The Departments of Agriculture, State, and Treasury generally concurred with the findings. In late September 2009, State issued a consultation document—a work in progress—that delineates a proposed comprehensive approach to food security based on country- and community-led planning and collaboration with U.S. partners. Although the document outlines broad objectives and principles, it is still a work in progress and should not be considered the integrated governmentwide strategy that we called for in our 2008 recommendation. A comprehensive strategy would define the actions with specific time frames and resource commitments that each agency undertakes to achieve food security, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures to monitor and evaluate progress toward implementing the strategy. USAID officials stated that they plan to update Congress on progress toward implementation of such a strategy as part of the agency’s 2008 IEHA report, which is forthcoming in 2009. Foreign Assistance: U.S. Foreign Assistance: Donation of U.S. Food Security: Preparations for the 1996 World Food Summit. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of undernourished people worldwide now exceeds 1 billion, according to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest prevalence of food insecurity, with 1 out of every 3 people undernourished. Global targets were set at the 1996 World Food Summit and reaffirmed in 2000 with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) when the United States and more than 180 nations pledged to halve the number and proportion of undernourished people by 2015. In a May 2008 report, GAO recommended that the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in collaboration with the Secretaries of Agriculture, State, and the Treasury, (1) develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that defines actions with specific time frames and resource commitments, enhances collaboration, and improves measures to monitor progress and (2) report annually to Congress on the implementation of the first recommendation. USAID concurred with the first recommendation but expressed concerns about the vehicle of the annual reporting. The Departments of Agriculture, State, and Treasury generally concurred with the findings. In this testimony, based on prior reports and ongoing work, GAO discusses (1) host government and donor efforts to halve hunger, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, by 2015, and (2) the status of U.S. agencies' implementation of GAO's 2008 recommendations.
What GAO Found
Efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have been insufficient due to a variety of reasons. First, host governments' agricultural spending levels remain low--the most current data available show that, as of 2007, only 8 of 38 countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donor aid for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa was generally declining as a share of overall official development assistance (ODA) until 2005. Third, U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in sub-Saharan Africa were constrained in funding and limited in scope. These efforts were primarily focused on emergency food aid and did not fully integrate U.S. and other donors' assistance to the region. To reverse the declining trend in ODA funding for agriculture, in July 2009, the Group of 8 (G8) agreed to a $20 billion, 3-year commitment. The U.S. share of this commitment, or $3.35 billion in fiscal year 2010, represents more than double the fiscal year 2009 budget request for agriculture and related programming. Consistent with GAO's first recommendation, U.S. agencies are in the process of developing a governmentwide strategy to achieve global food security. In September 2009, State issued a consultation document that delineates a proposed comprehensive approach to food security. Although the document outlines broad objectives and principles, it is still a work in progress and should not be considered the integrated governmentwide strategy that GAO recommended. It does not define the actions, time frames, and resource commitments each agency will undertake to achieve food security, including improved collaboration with host governments and other donors and measures to monitor and evaluate progress in implementing the strategy. Regarding GAO's second recommendation, USAID officials plan to update Congress on progress toward the implementation of such a strategy as part of the agency's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa 2008 report, which is forthcoming in 2009. |
gao_GAO-05-866 | gao_GAO-05-866_0 | For the purposes of this report, we are using the same definition. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, data mining has been used increasingly as a tool to help detect terrorist threats through the collection and analysis of public and private sector data. While the characteristics of each data mining effort can vary greatly, data mining generally incorporates three processes: data input, data analysis, and results output. These systems use information that the agency collects directly, as well as information provided by other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, and private sector sources, such as credit card companies. Agencies Addressed Many Required Privacy Provisions, but None Addressed All Requirements
While the agencies responsible for the five data mining efforts took many of the key steps needed to protect the privacy and security of personal information used in the efforts, none followed all the key procedures. However, the notice did not describe how to identify which contact would be appropriate. The agencies responsible for two of the five efforts we reviewed generally fulfilled the Privacy Act requirements regarding providing notice at the time of collection, one partially fulfilled these requirements, and two agencies claimed exemptions from these requirements. However, none of the lenders demonstrated that they provided adequate notice to insurance agents or adjusters, who also provided personal information used by RMA. In the five efforts we reviewed, agency compliance with the security and data quality requirements was inconsistent. FBI and IRS claimed an allowable exemption because their records are used for criminal law enforcement. However, the assessment did not analyze these decisions, as required by OMB’s guidance. Until agencies fully comply with the Privacy Act, they lack assurance that individual privacy rights are appropriately protected. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to provide the required Privacy Act notices to individuals, including producers, insurance agents, and adjusters, when personal information is collected from them; apply the appropriate information security measures defined in OMB and NIST guidance to the systems used in the RMA data mining effort, specifically, the development of a complete system security plan, a tested contingency plan, and regular testing and evaluation of the systems used in the effort; develop and implement procedures that ensure the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of personal information used in the RMA data mining effort to make determinations about individuals; revise the privacy impact assessment for the RMA data mining effort to comply with OMB guidance, including analyses of the intended use of the information it collects, with whom the information will be shared, how the information is to be secured, opportunities for impacted individuals to comment, and the choices made by the agency as a result of the assessment; have the completed privacy impact assessment approved by the chief information officer or equivalent official; and make the completed privacy impact assessment available to the public, as appropriate. Data from outside sources, including nonpartner government agencies and commercial entities, are typically acquired on an as-needed basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Data mining--a technique for extracting knowledge from large volumes of data--is being used increasingly by the government and by the private sector. Many federal data mining efforts involve the use of personal information, which can originate from government sources as well as private sector organizations. The federal government's increased use of data mining since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has raised public and congressional concerns. As a result, GAO was asked to describe the characteristics of five federal data mining efforts and to determine whether agencies are providing adequate privacy and security protection for the information systems used in the efforts and for individuals potentially affected by these data mining efforts.
What GAO Found
The five data mining efforts we reviewed are used by federal agencies to fulfill a variety of purposes and use various information sources, including both information collected on behalf of the agency and information originally collected by other agencies and commercial sources. Although the systems differed, the general process each used was basically the same. Each system incorporates data input, data analysis, and results output. While the agencies responsible for these five efforts took many of the key steps required by federal law and executive branch guidance for the protection of personal information, they did not comply with all related laws and guidance. Specifically, most agencies notified the general public that they were collecting and using personal information and provided opportunities for individuals to review personal information when required by the Privacy Act. However, agencies are also required to provide notice to individual respondents explaining why the information is being collected; two agencies provided this notice, one did not provide it, and two claimed an allowable exemption from this requirement because the systems were used for law enforcement. In addition, agency compliance with key security requirements was inconsistent. Finally, three of the five agencies completed privacy impact assessments--important for analyzing the privacy implications of a system or data collection--but none of the assessments fully complied with Office of Management and Budget guidance. Until agencies fully comply with these requirements, they lack assurance that individual privacy rights are being appropriately protected. |
gao_GAO-07-1251T | gao_GAO-07-1251T_0 | ANC Trends in and Use of 8(a) Contracting
8(a) ANC contracting represents a small amount of total federal procurement spending. However, dollars obligated to ANC firms through the 8(a) program grew from $265 million in fiscal year 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004. Overall, during the 5-year period, the government obligated $4.6 billion to ANC firms, of which $2.9 billion, or 63 percent, went through the 8(a) program. During this period, six federal agencies—the departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, State, and Transportation and NASA—accounted for almost 85 percent of total 8(a) ANC obligations. Obligations for 8(a) sole- source contracts by these agencies to ANC firms increased from about $180 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $876 million in fiscal year 2004. ANCs use the 8(a) program as one of many tools to generate revenue with the goal of benefiting their shareholders. Some ANCs are heavily reliant on the 8(a) program for revenues, while others approach the program as one of many revenue-generating opportunities, such as investments in stocks or real estate. ANCs are using the congressionally authorized advantages afforded to them, such as ownership of multiple 8(a) subsidiaries, sometimes in diversified lines of business. From fiscal year 1988 to 2005, numbers increased from one 8(a) subsidiary owned by one ANC to 154 subsidiaries owned by 49 ANCs. ANCs use their ability to own multiple businesses in the 8(a) program, as allowed by law, in different ways. Contract Execution Shortfalls
Our review of 16 large sole-source contracts awarded by 7 agencies found that agency officials view contracting with 8(a) ANC firms as a quick, easy, and legal way to award contracts while at the same time helping their agencies meet small business goals. We found that contracting officials had not always complied with requirements to notify SBA when modifying contracts, such as increasing the scope of work or the dollar value, and to monitor the percentage of the work performed by the 8(a) firms versus their subcontractors. SBA Lacks Oversight of 8(a) ANC Activity
We reported in 2006 that SBA had not tailored its policies and practices to account for ANCs’ unique status and growth in the 8(a) program, even though officials recognize that ANC firms enter into more complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants. SBA’s oversight fell short in that it did not: track the primary business industries in which ANC subsidiaries had 8(a) contracts to ensure that more than one subsidiary of the same ANC was not generating the majority of its revenue under the same primary industry code; consistently determine whether other small businesses were losing contracting opportunities when large sole-source contracts were awarded to 8(a) ANC firms; adhere to a statutory and regulatory requirement to ascertain whether 8(a) ANC firms, when entering the 8(a) program or for each contract award, had, or were likely to obtain, a substantial unfair competitive advantage within an industry; ensure that partnerships between 8(a) ANC firms and large firms were functioning in the way they were intended under the 8(a) program; and maintain information on ANC 8(a) activity. Equally important, we stated, significant improvements were needed in SBA’s oversight of the program. We recommended that the Administrator of SBA: 1. 2. 3. 8. SBA response: SBA has implemented this recommendation by revising the partnership agreements with the procuring agencies. We also recommended that procuring agencies provide guidance to contracting officers to ensure proper oversight of ANC contracts. The procuring agencies generally agreed with the recommendation. The Department also provided training on the 8(a) program, to include contracting with ANC firms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Alaska Native corporations (ANC) were created to settle land claims with Alaska Natives and foster economic development. In 1986, legislation passed that allowed ANCs to participate in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program. Since then, Congress has extended special procurement advantages to 8(a) ANC firms, such as the ability to receive sole-source contracts for any dollar amount and to own multiple subsidiaries in the 8(a) program. We were asked to testify on an earlier report where we identified (1) trends in the government's 8(a) contracting with ANC firms, (2) the reasons agencies have awarded 8(a) sole-source contracts to ANC firms and the facts and circumstances behind some of these contracts, and (3) how ANCs are using the 8(a) program. GAO also evaluated SBA's oversight of 8(a) ANC firms. GAO made recommendations aimed at improving SBA's oversight of 8(a) ANC contracting activity and ensuring that procuring agencies properly oversee 8(a) contracts they award to ANC firms. SBA has either taken action or plans to take action on the recommendations. The procuring agencies generally agreed with our recommendation to them. We believe implementation of our recommendations will provide better oversight of 8(a) ANC contracting activity and provide decision makers with information to know whether the program is operating as intended.
What GAO Found
While representing a small amount of total federal procurement spending, obligations for 8(a) contracts to ANC firms increased from $265 million in fiscal year 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004. Over the 5-year period, agencies obligated $4.6 billion to ANC firms, of which $2.9 billion, or 63 percent, went through the 8(a) program. During this period, six federal agencies--the departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, State, and Transportation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--accounted for over 85 percent of 8(a) contracting activity. Obligations for 8(a) sole source contracts by these agencies to ANC firms increased from about $180 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $876 million in fiscal year 2004. ANCs use the 8(a) program as one of many tools to generate revenue with the goal of providing benefits to their shareholders. Some ANCs are heavily reliant on the 8(a) program for revenues, while others approach the program as one of many revenue-generating opportunities. GAO found that some ANCs have increasingly made use of the congressionally authorized advantages afforded to them. One of the key practices is the creation of multiple 8(a) subsidiaries, sometimes in highly diversified lines of business. From fiscal year 1988 to 2005, ANC 8(a) subsidiaries increased from one subsidiary owned by one ANC to 154 subsidiaries owned by 49 ANCs. In general, acquisition officials at the agencies reviewed told GAO that the option of using ANC firms under the 8(a) program allows them to quickly, easily, and legally award contracts for any value. They also noted that these contracts help them meet small business goals. In reviewing selected large sole-source 8(a) contracts awarded to ANC firms, GAO found that contracting officials had not always complied with certain requirements, such as notifying SBA of contract modifications and monitoring the percentage of work that is subcontracted. SBA, which is primarily responsible for implementing the 8(a) program, had not tailored its policies and practices to account for ANCs' unique status and growth in the 8(a) program, even though SBA officials recognized that ANCs enter into more complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants. Areas where SBA's oversight fell short included determining whether more than one subsidiary of the same ANC was generating a majority of its revenue in the same primary industry, consistently determining whether awards to 8(a) ANC firms had resulted in other small businesses losing contract opportunities, and ensuring that the partnerships between 8(a) ANC firms and large firms were functioning in the way they were intended. |
gao_RCED-97-41 | gao_RCED-97-41_0 | Ongoing Efforts to Enhance Minority Farmers’ Participation in Farm Programs
FSA’s efforts to achieve equitable treatment for minority farmers are overseen by the agency’s Civil Rights and Small Business Development Staff. During fiscal years 1995 and 1996, the Staff closed 28 cases in which discrimination was alleged on the basis of race or national origin. In addition to investigating individual complaints of discrimination, the Staff periodically evaluates state and county offices’ compliance with EEO and civil rights requirements as part of its routine assessments of these offices’ overall operations. None of the evaluations concluded that minority farmers were being treated unfairly. More recently, in July 1996, FSA created an outreach office to increase minority farmers’ knowledge of, and participation in, the Department’s agricultural programs. Employment of Minority Staff in County Offices and Representation of Minority Farmers on County Committees
In the 101 counties with the highest numbers of minority farmers, representing 34 percent of all minority farmers in the nation, FSA employees and county committee members were often members of a minority group. Eighty-nine percent of these employees were county executive directors, who manage the operations of FSA’s programs, or program assistants, who, among other things, provide information on programs to farmers. In these 101 counties, minority farmers make up about 17 percent of the farmer population. Reasons Provided for Disapprovals of ACP and Direct Loan Applications
According to FSA’s data, applications for the ACP for fiscal year 1995 and for the direct loan program from October 1994 through March 1996 were disapproved at a higher rate nationwide for minority farmers than for nonminority farmers. To assess the differences in disapproval rates, we examined the direct loan applications for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 at five district loan offices.Table 2 shows the number of applications for direct loans during this period for minority and nonminority farmers in each of the five districts, as well as the number and percent of applications disapproved. Our review of the direct loan program files in these locations showed that FSA’s decisions to approve and disapprove applications appeared to follow USDA’s established criteria. These criteria were applied to the applications of minority and nonminority farmers in a similar fashion and were supported by materials in the files. Finally, we obtained information on the equal employment opportunity and civil rights training the Staff has provided to the Farm Service Agency’s (FSA) employees. To examine minority staffing in county offices and minority representation on county committees, we first used the 1992 Census of Agriculture to identify the 101 counties with the highest numbers of minority farmers.We then used the Department’s databases to obtain information on the number of minority staff serving the 101 counties and the number of minority farmers on the county committees in each of these counties. To examine the treatment of minority farmers at the local level, we visited county offices and district loan offices that either had higher disapproval rates for minority than nonminority farmers for the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) in fiscal year 1995 and for the direct loan program from October 1994 to March 1996 or had high numbers of minority farmers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Farm Service Agency's (FSA) efforts to conduct farm programs in an equitable manner, focusing on: (1) FSA efforts to treat minority farmers in the same way as nonminority farmers in delivering program services; (2) minority representation in county office staffing and on county committees in the counties with the highest numbers of minority farmers; and (3) the disposition of minority and nonminority farmers' applications for participation in the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) and the direct loan program at the national level and in five county and five district loan offices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FSA's Civil Rights and Small Business Development staff oversees the agency's efforts to achieve equitable treatment for minority farmers; (2) in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, the staff closed 28 complaints of discrimination against farmers on the basis of race or national origin, and found discriminatory practices in 2 of the 28 cases; (3) in addition, as part of its routine assessments of FSA's overall operations in 13 states, the staff assessed the performance of the agency's employees in treating all farmers equitably, but none of the evaluations found that minority farmers were being treated unfairly; (4) the staff has also trained about one-half of FSA'S employees in equal employment opportunity and civil rights matters and expects to finish training all of the employees by the end of 1997; (5) in July 1996, FSA created an outreach office to increase minority farmers' participation in, and knowledge of, the Department's agricultural programs; (6) at the time of GAO's review, 32 percent of FSA's employees serving the 101 counties with the highest numbers of minority farmers were members of a minority group; (7) about 90 percent of these employees were county executive directors or program assistants involved in conducting and managing FSA programs; (8) minority farmers make up about 17 percent of the farmer population in these counties; (9) at the national level, FSA data show that applications for the ACP in fiscal year 1995 and for the direct loan program from October 1994 through March 1996 were disapproved at a higher rate for minority farmers than for nonminority farmers; (10) three of the five county offices GAO visited had higher disapproval rates for minority farmers than for nonminority farmers applying to the ACP, and three of the five district loan offices GAO visited had higher disapproval rates for minority farmers than for other farmers applying for the direct loan program; and (11) GAO's review of the information in the application files in these offices showed that decisions to approve or disapprove applications were supported by information in the files and that decision-making criteria appeared to be applied to minority and nonminority applicants in a similar fashion. |
gao_GAO-06-557T | gao_GAO-06-557T_0 | U.S. and Foreign Rail Transit Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist
U.S. rail transit operators have taken numerous actions to secure their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. We also identified three rail security practices—covert testing, random screening of passengers and their baggage, and maintaining a centralized clearinghouse on rail security technologies—used in foreign countries but not, at the time or our review, domestically. U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices
Both U.S. and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their systems. Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited use covert testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities. DHS and DOT Help Fund Security Efforts, and Some Funding Decisions Are Risk- Based
Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit security grants. These programs have provided over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for certain security activities since fiscal year 2003. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. DHS and DOT Help Fund Rail Transit Security Efforts
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, the Office of Grants and Training, became the primary federal source for security funding for passenger rail systems. For example, transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds—which is FTA’s largest grant program—on security improvements. Targeting resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. Coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs and new security initiatives, such as TSA’s deployment of its rail inspectors. For example, in our September 2005 report on rail security, we noted that TSA provided limited opportunities for other federal agencies and the rail industry to collaborate in the development of its passenger rail security directives, which were issued in May 2004 to provide a consistent baseline standard of protective measures for all passenger rail operators. These annexes are to delineate the specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. Another area requiring continued coordination is the funding of rail transit security activities. Nevertheless, it is important that we take steps to identify and mitigate risks to passenger rail systems. While domestic rail agencies have implemented a number of security practices that are generally consistent with those of foreign rail operators, they have not adopted some practices used in other countries, including covert testing, random screening, and information clearinghouses for new security technologies and best practices. Despite the potential political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges that implementing these additional practices in the United States could pose, we continue to believe that the practices may warrant further examination, and we stand by our September 2005 recommendations that DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, evaluate the feasibility of implementing them. With the execution of the MOU and transit security annex, DHS and DOT have taken important steps forward in improving coordination among the federal entities involved in rail transit security matters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part of its 2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries.
What GAO Found
Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of their security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both domestic and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide security-related activities and spending. However, GAO also observed security practices that were used by certain foreign passenger rail operators, but were not employed in the United States at the time of GAO's review. For example, some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers. Centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors, and best practices are also maintained in some foreign countries. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant further examination. Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary source of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003 to 2006. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. As we have noted in previous reports, using assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund rail transit security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit agencies and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security improvements. To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues. In GAO's view, these actions are positive steps forward in addressing the coordination problems GAO previously identified. For instance, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with TSA's May 2004 security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs and new security initiatives. |
gao_GAO-07-650 | gao_GAO-07-650_0 | NWS Initiated a 2-Year Prototype and Then Suspended It
Following the Corporate Board’s decision to proceed, NWS initiated the first of three phases of its prototype, which it planned to continue over the next 2 years. During the second phase, which NWS expected to take place between August 2007 and February 2008, the agency planned to have 20 weather offices share forecasting responsibilities in 2-office pairs. On March 23, 2007, Commerce’s Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere directed NWS’s director to place all activities associated with NWS’s concept of operations on hold pending a review by the Deputy Under Secretary. Moreover, the prototype plan identifies qualitative benefits of the new concept of operations—including increased efficiency and time for other activities (such as outreach and research), the ability to switch to a backup site more quickly when a weather forecast office is disabled due to loss of power or communications, and an improved ability to focus on high-impact events. By not conducting a cost-benefit analysis before beginning the prototype, NWS lacked assurance that its approach was cost-effective. If NWS decides to proceed with the prototype without conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the agency will have little basis to ensure that its investment is sound or that the options it is undertaking provide the greatest return on investment. NWS Lacks a Rigorous Evaluation Plan for Assessing Its Prototype
In its prototype plan, NWS identified goals and selected measures to evaluate during its prototype activities, but it did not establish a rigorous evaluation plan. Specifically, the agency had not defined a comprehensive set of measures, how it planned to compare prototype results with baseline performance, or how its measures supported the goals of the prototype. If NWS were to proceed with its prototype without a rigorous evaluation plan, the agency would run an increased risk that it could not sufficiently measure the impact of planned changes on its performance, and would subsequently make decisions affecting the nation’s weather service on the basis of incomplete and flawed data. Looking forward, an NWS official stated that they also would ensure that there would be no degradation of service if the Corporate Board decided to implement this alternative concept of operations on a national basis after the prototype was completed. Agency officials explained that the agency would use its standard procedures for testing and validating systems and software to ensure that there would be no degradation of service before moving them into operations. Furthermore, the agency involved internal stakeholders in planning for its prototype, but it did not seek input from external stakeholders or establish a plan for stakeholder involvement throughout the prototype. If NWS decides to proceed with its prototype, we recommend the Secretary direct the Assistant Administrator for the National Weather Service to develop a cost-benefit analysis for the clustered peer approach before implementing the prototype in any weather forecasting office; develop an evaluation plan that includes a comprehensive set of measures that are linked to prototype goals and identifies the baseline performance that the prototype will be compared with before implementing the prototype in any weather forecasting office; and develop a plan for internal and external stakeholder involvement, which includes a list of relevant stakeholders, roles and responsibilities for these stakeholders, and a schedule for when stakeholders should be involved before implementing the prototype in any weather forecasting office. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the current status of and plans for the prototype, (2) evaluate whether the justification for the prototype is sufficient, (3) determine whether the National Weather Service’s (NWS) plans to evaluate the prototype are adequate, (4) evaluate whether NWS is sufficiently involving stakeholders in its prototype plans, and (5) determine how NWS plans to ensure that there will be no degradation of service during and after the prototype. The NOAA Global Systems Division office in Boulder was chosen because of its participation in the first laboratory exercise. NWS established a program manager to oversee the prototype. | Why GAO Did This Study
Using advanced systems and trained specialists located in 122 weather forecast offices throughout the country, the National Weather Service (NWS) provides storm and flood warnings and weather forecasts to protect life and property and to enhance the national economy. To improve the efficiency of its operations, in November 2006, NWS approved an effort to develop a prototype of an alternative way of operating. Under this prototype, weather forecasting offices would share selected responsibilities. GAO (1) determined the status of and plans for the prototype, (2) evaluated whether the prototype's justification was sufficient, (3) determined whether NWS's plans to evaluate the prototype are adequate, (4) evaluated whether NWS is sufficiently involving stakeholders in its prototype plans, and (5) determined how NWS plans to ensure that there will be no degradation of service during and after the prototype. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documentation and interviewed program officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
NWS's prototype is currently on hold pending a reevaluation of the agency's approach. The agency had just begun the first phase of its three-phased prototype to demonstrate a new concept of operations over a 2-year period when, in late March 2007, the Department of Commerce's Under Secretary suspended the prototype because of concerns about the agency's approach. In the first phase, NWS established a program manager and began planning for the next two phases. During the remaining phases, NWS planned to have 20 weather forecasting offices share responsibilities in 2-office pairs and then in 4-office clusters. NWS then planned to decide whether to implement the new concept of operations on a national basis. The justification for the prototype was not sufficient. Before the prototype was suspended, the agency had approved moving forward with its prototype without conducting a cost-benefit analysis. NWS estimated that the prototype would cost approximately $9.3 million and would offer qualitative benefits, such as increased efficiency and an improved ability to focus on severe weather events, but did not quantify benefits or the expected return on its investment. If NWS were to proceed with the prototype without a cost-benefit analysis, it would lack assurance that its approach would be a cost-effective investment for the agency. NWS identified goals and selected measures to evaluate during its prototype activities, but it did not establish a rigorous evaluation plan. Specifically, NWS did not define a full set of needed measures, how it planned to compare prototype results with baseline performance, or how its selected measures supported the prototype goals. If NWS were to proceed without a rigorous evaluation plan, the agency would run an increased risk of not sufficiently measuring the impact of changes on its performance and could make decisions affecting the nation's weather on the basis of incomplete or flawed data. Although NWS involved internal stakeholders in planning its prototype, it did not (1) involve external stakeholders or (2) establish a plan that identified key stakeholders, the stakeholders' responsibilities, and a time line for involving stakeholders and addressing their comments. If NWS were to proceed with its prototype without such a plan, it could not ensure that stakeholder interests would be identified and addressed. NWS planned to mitigate the risk of degradation during and after the prototype by conducting laboratory exercises to understand the impact of the prototype, using a dedicated workstation in each office so that the office could switch to original systems if warranted, and monitoring its systems and products during the prototype. NWS officials stated that should the agency decide to implement the prototype on a national basis, it has standard procedures for testing and validating systems and software to avoid any degradation of service. |
gao_GAO-15-84 | gao_GAO-15-84_0 | On April 27, 2011, Executive Order 13571, Streamlining Service Delivery and Improving Customer Service, was issued to strengthen customer service and require agencies to develop and publish a customer service plan, in consultation with OMB. As a result, we identified performance goals as a key element for effective customer service standards. None of the agencies in our review had standards that included all of the key elements (see table 3). Without all of the key elements present in their standards, agencies may not be able to inform customers, provide accountability, measure progress, or improve customer service. Forest Service and NPS do not have criteria or guidance for when to elevate customer comments from the local level up to the agency level. Forest Service. Identification of Customer Service as a Cross-Agency Priority Goal May Provide Additional Focus Needed to Further Improve the Customer Experience Governmment-wide
OMB has taken several steps to facilitate the improvement of agencies’ customer service initiatives. The PIC, however, did not have an active role in assisting agencies with the development of their plans. However, moving forward, OMB stated that if plans on involving the PIC in the CAP goal implementation plan for customer service. Conclusions
All five agencies established customer service standards. However, only CBP and VBA’s disability compensation had a formal or systematic process for reviewing customer feedback. Recommendations for Executive Action
Recognizing that moving toward a more customer-oriented culture within federal agencies is likely to be a continuous effort, we recommend that the: Secretary of Agriculture direct the Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment to take the following four actions to improve Forest Service’s customer service standards and feedback review: ensure standards include performance targets or goals; ensure standards include performance measures; ensure standards are easily publicly available; and develop a feedback mechanism to collect comments agency-wide, which should include guidance or criteria to elevate customer feedback from local and regional offices to identify the need for and to make service improvements; Secretary of Education direct Federal Student Aid’s Chief Operating Officer to take the following two actions to improve Federal Student Aid’s customer service standards and feedback review: ensure standards are easily publicly available and develop a feedback mechanism that includes guidance or criteria for service providers to elevate customer feedback to identify the need for and to make service improvements; Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following two actions to improve CBP’s customer service standards: ensure standards include performance targets or goals and ensure standards include performance measures; Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to take the following four actions to improve the National Park Service’s customer service standards and feedback review: ensure standards include performance targets or goals; ensure standards include performance measures; ensure standards are easily publicly available; and develop a feedback mechanism that includes guidance or criteria to review and elevate customer feedback from local and regional offices to identify the need for and to make service improvements; Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Veterans Benefits Administration to improve disability compensation customer service standards by making the standards easily publicly available; and Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Veterans Benefits Administration to take the following two actions to improve Veterans’ Group Life Insurance’s customer service standards and feedback review: ensure standards are easily publicly available and develop a feedback mechanism that includes guidance or criteria for service providers to elevate customer feedback and identify the need for and to make service improvements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to address the extent to which (1) selected agencies and their services are using customer service standards and measuring performance results against these standards, and how selected agencies are communicating standards and using customer feedback to improve customer service; and (2) the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Performance Improvement Council are facilitating federal agencies’ use of tools and practices to improve customer service. To address our two objectives, we selected agencies and their services for our review based on prior work in which we surveyed 12 federal agencies (which are among those with the most widespread contact with the public) about 13 services they provided. In addition, we compared agency information to relevant executive orders, presidential and OMB memorandums, and OMB guidance consistent with GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) provisions related to customer service (see table 11). | Why GAO Did This Study
Providing customer service has been a long-standing challenge for federal agencies. GPRAMA requires that agencies establish a balanced set of performance indicators to be used in measuring progress toward performance goals, including customer service. This report is part of GAO's response to its mandate to evaluate the implementation of GPRAMA. It evaluates (1) the extent to which selected agencies and their services are using customer service standards and measuring performance results against these standards, and how selected agencies are communicating standards and using customer feedback to improve customer service; and (2) the extent to which OMB and the PIC are facilitating federal agencies' use of tools and practices to improve customer service. GAO selected five agencies and their services based on prior work in which it surveyed 12 federal agencies that are among those with the most widespread contact with the public. GAO reviewed and compared agency customer service documents to federal legislation and guidance, and interviewed agency officials about customer service.
What GAO Found
GAO reviewed the customer service standards at Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Forest Service, Federal Student Aid (FSA), the National Park Service (NPS), and two services in the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—disability compensation and Veterans' Group Life Insurance (VGLI). GAO found that none of the agencies' standards included all of the key elements of customer service standards (see table). GAO identified key elements of effective customer service standards by reviewing the requirements of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) and executive orders that focused on providing greater accountability, oversight, and transparency. Without all of the key elements present, agencies may not be able to easily communicate performance targets or goals to customers, measure their progress towards meeting those goals, and pinpoint improvement opportunities.
GAO found that all five agencies provide customers with opportunities to submit feedback, including comments and complaints. CBP and VBA's disability compensation had formal mechanisms for reviewing customer feedback, but the other agencies did not. For example, Forest Service and NPS do not have guidance for when to elevate customer comments from the local level up to the agency level. As a result, these agencies may not be effectively reviewing and addressing customer concerns across the agency.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has taken steps to facilitate the improvement of agencies' customer service initiatives. For example, OMB issued guidance to assist agencies in their implementation of Executive Order 13571, Streamlining Service Delivery and Improving Customer Service which was issued to strengthen customer service and require agencies to develop and publish a customer service plan. OMB formed a task force to assist agencies with the development of customer service plans. Moving forward, OMB has identified customer service as a cross-agency priority (CAP) goal in 2014 in an effort to elevate the importance of customer service by the federal government and intends to have the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) play a role in the CAP goal implementation planning for customer service.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the five agencies update their customer service standards and that Forest Service, NPS, FSA, and VBA's VGLI implement formal feedback mechanisms to improve customer service. CBP, Forest Service, FSA, NPS, and VBA all agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-180 | gao_GAO-15-180_0 | HHS and USDA vary in the amount of detail they provide on their crosscutting food safety efforts in their individual strategic and performance planning documents. 1 and 2.) For example, FDA and FSIS officials both told us that they colead the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System, which tracks whether foodborne and other bacteria are resistant to the antibiotics used to treat and prevent the spread of illness. Agency Strategic and Performance Planning Documents Do Not Provide an Integrated Perspective on Federal Food Safety Performance
Fully addressing crosscutting food safety efforts in individual strategic and performance planning documents is an important first step toward providing a comprehensive picture of the federal government’s performance in overseeing food safety. Without a government-wide performance plan for food safety, Congress, program managers, and other decision makers are hampered in their ability to identify agencies and programs addressing similar missions and However, OMB has not taken action in almost 4 years to to set priorities, allocate resources, and restructure federal efforts, as needed, to achieve long-term goals. In addition, without such a plan, federal food safety efforts are not clear and transparent to the public. FDA and FSIS Have Mechanisms in Place to Facilitate Interagency Coordination, but None Provides Centralized, Broad- Based Collaboration
Our analysis identified numerous collaborative mechanisms involving FDA and FSIS, but these mechanisms focus on specific issues and do not provide for broad-based, centralized collaboration that would allow FDA, FSIS, and other agencies to look across their individual food safety programs and determine how they all contribute to federal food safety goals. The FSWG served as a centralized mechanism for broad-based collaboration on food safety and resulted in a number of accomplishments, such as improved interagency coordination. However, our review indicated that the FSWG is no longer meeting. For example, FDA and FSIS are collaborating with CDC through IFSAC to improve estimates of the most common sources of foodborne illnesses. Experts Agreed That a Centralized Mechanism for Broad-Based Collaboration Could Enhance Food Safety Oversight
Nearly all—10 of the 12—experts in food safety we interviewed agreed that a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety is important to foster effective interagency collaboration and could enhance food safety oversight. For example, none provides a forum for food safety agencies to reach agreement on a set of broad-based food safety goals and objectives. Conclusions
HHS and USDA have both taken steps to implement GPRAMA’s crosscutting requirements for their food safety efforts. In March 2011, we recommended that OMB, in consultation with the federal agencies having food safety responsibilities, develop a government-wide performance plan for food safety. Experts on food safety suggested that a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety—like the FSWG—could provide sustained leadership across food safety agencies over time if it were formalized in statute. Without such formalization, centralized collaborative mechanisms for food safety may continue to be short-lived. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that their food safety goals are complementary and strategies are mutually reinforcing, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services continue to build upon their efforts to implement GPRAMA requirements to address crosscutting food safety efforts, including by more fully describing in their strategic and performance planning documents how they are working with other agencies to achieve their food safety-related goals and objectives. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Because challenges associated with the fragmented federal food safety system are long-standing, decision makers do not have an integrated perspective on federal food safety performance, and centralized mechanisms for broad-based collaboration have not been sustained, Congress should consider directing OMB to develop a government-wide performance plan for food safety that includes results oriented goals and performance measures and a discussion of strategies and resources, and formalizing the FSWG through statute to help ensure sustained leadership across food safety agencies over time. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of Agriculture. HHS, OMB, and USDA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review provides information on: (1) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) implementation of GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requirements for addressing crosscutting efforts in their food safety strategic and performance planning, and (2) the extent to which the two agencies primarily responsible for federal food safety oversight—HHS’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)—have a centralized mechanism in place to collaborate broadly across federal food safety regulations and programs. We also interviewed OMB staff and officials from HHS and USDA regarding federal food safety strategic and performance planning and crosscutting efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, GAO has reported on the fragmented federal food safety system. In 2007, GAO added federal oversight of food safety to its list of high-risk areas because of risks to the economy and to public health and safety.
GAO conducted this work under the authority of the Comptroller General to assist Congress with its food safety oversight responsibilities. This report examines (1) HHS and USDA implementation of GPRAMA requirements for addressing crosscutting efforts in their food safety strategic and performance planning and (2) the extent to which FDA and FSIS have a centralized mechanism in place to collaborate across federal food safety programs. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and agency documentation; analyzed responses from food safety experts; and interviewed OMB staff and officials from FDA and FSIS.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have taken steps to implement GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requirements but could more fully address crosscutting food safety efforts. For example, GPRAMA requires agencies to describe in their strategic and performance planning how they are working with other agencies to achieve their goals. HHS and USDA vary in the amount of detail they provide on their crosscutting food safety efforts. In addition, they do not include several relevant crosscutting efforts, such as the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System, which tracks whether foodborne bacteria are resistant to the antibiotics used to treat and prevent illness.
Fully addressing crosscutting efforts in individual strategic and performance planning documents is an important first step toward providing a comprehensive picture of federal food safety performance. However, individual agencies' documents do not provide an integrated perspective on federal food safety performance. In 2011, GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the federal agencies having food safety responsibilities, develop a government-wide performance plan for food safety. OMB has not acted on that recommendation. Without such a plan, Congress, program managers, and other decision makers are hampered in their ability to identify agencies and programs addressing similar missions and to set priorities, allocate resources, and restructure federal efforts, as needed, to achieve long-term goals. In addition, without such a plan, federal food safety efforts are not clear and transparent to the public. GAO continues to believe that a government-wide performance plan for food safety is necessary.
HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) have mechanisms in place to facilitate interagency coordination on food safety that focus on specific issues, but none provides for broad-based, centralized collaboration. For example, FDA and FSIS are collaborating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through the Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration to improve estimates of foodborne illness sources. However, this and other mechanisms do not allow FDA, FSIS, and other agencies to look across their individual programs and determine how they all contribute to federal food safety goals. Nearly all the experts GAO interviewed agreed that a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety is important to foster effective interagency collaboration and could enhance food safety oversight. The Food Safety Working Group (FSWG) served as a centralized mechanism for broad-based food safety collaboration and resulted in a number of accomplishments, including improved coordination. However, the FSWG is no longer meeting. A prior centralized mechanism for broad-based collaboration on food safety also was not sustained. Without a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety, there is no forum for agencies to reach agreement on a set of broad-based food safety goals and objectives. Experts suggested that a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety--like the FSWG--could provide sustained leadership across agencies over time if it were formalized in statute. Without such formalization, centralized collaborative mechanisms on food safety may continue to be short-lived.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS and USDA build upon their efforts to implement GPRAMA requirements to fully address crosscutting food safety efforts. Congress should consider (1) directing OMB to develop a government-wide food safety performance plan and (2) formalizing the FSWG through statute to help ensure sustained leadership across food safety agencies over time. GAO provided a draft of this report for review and comment to HHS, OMB, and USDA. HHS and USDA agreed with the recommendation. HHS, OMB, and USDA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-603 | gao_GAO-06-603_0 | In recent years, IRS studies show that the majority of capital asset transactions and capital gains and losses were for securities transactions, including sales of corporate stock, mutual funds, bonds, options, and capital gain distributions from mutual funds. Misreported Basis Was a Primary Type of Noncompliance That Caused Taxpayers to Inaccurately Report Their Capital Gains or Losses from Securities Sales
Based on information in the files we reviewed, a primary type of noncompliance that caused taxpayers to inaccurately report their capital gains or losses from securities sales in tax year 2001 was misreporting the basis of the securities they sold. For taxpayers who misreported basis, a greater percentage failed to accurately report basis for long-term securities holdings (35 percent of taxpayers who misreported securities sales) than for short-term holdings (21 percent). IRS Attempts to Reduce the Individual Capital Gains Tax Gap for Securities through Enforcement and Taxpayer Service Programs, but Various Challenges Limit Their Impact
IRS uses both enforcement and taxpayer service programs in attempting to reduce the individual capital gains tax gap for securities. IRS also offers service programs to provide taxpayers with assistance in fulfilling their capital gains tax obligations. Examiners also may use other resources, such as online services, to help them determine the basis of taxpayers’ securities. This misconception required IRS to clarify on its Web site that taxpayers could continue to report the details of their transactions on attached statements as long as all transactions were included and they reported aggregate information on Schedule D.
The Extent to Which IRS Enforcement Programs Have Reduced the 2001 Capital Gains Tax Gap for Securities Is Not Known
Through its enforcement programs, IRS assessed additional taxes for taxpayers who misreported their securities gains and losses for tax year 2001; however, neither IRS nor we know the extent to which these assessments reduced the securities tax gap for that year. Reporting of Cost Basis Could Reduce the Individual Capital Gains Tax Gap for Securities, but Implementation Challenges Would Need to Be Addressed
Expanded reporting of cost basis information has the potential to reduce the individual capital gains tax gap for securities. Information reporting of adjusted cost basis to taxpayers and IRS would likely help reduce the tax gap from securities sales by improving taxpayers’ voluntary compliance and IRS’s ability to cost effectively address noncompliant taxpayers. Consistent reporting of basis information would involve challenges that would need to be, and to some extent can be, mitigated. However, some taxpayers did not know they had to report gains or losses and others did not understand how to determine basis. Expanding Basis Reporting Involves Implementation Challenges That Would Need to Be Addressed
Expanding information reporting on securities sales to include basis information would involve challenges for brokers and IRS. Some brokers use a system to transfer basis among one another, but the system is not used by all brokers. Representatives from the securities industry told us that in order to implement basis reporting, a set of rules would need to be developed to clearly establish, for example, what types of securities transactions would be covered by any requirement and how a system to transfer basis would be standardized. Of those erring, an estimated 64 percent underreported their income and 33 percent overreported income. However, we could not produce meaningful estimates of the total amount of net misreported capital gain income from securities or determine the securities tax gap, in part because (1) in selecting our sample, we could not distinguish which cases included misreported securities transactions as opposed to misreported transactions for other types of capital assets, (2) some cases with large amounts of misreported capital gains or losses were due to noncompliance for assets other than securities, (3) 53 of the cases we requested from IRS from our first substratum, which represented a large percentage of the total amounts of misreported capital gains or losses, were not provided in time to include in our review, and (4) taxpayers misreported a wide range of dollar amounts from the transactions. To identify options with the potential to improve taxpayers’ voluntary compliance for reporting securities gains and losses and IRS’s ability to find noncompliance related to the individual capital gains tax gap for securities, we reviewed prior GAO reports and other documents on capital gains reporting and compliance such as those from IRS compliance programs and industry reports on securities holdings and information reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
For tax year 2001, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a tax gap of at least $11 billion from individual taxpayers misreporting income from capital assets (generally those owned for investment or personal purposes). IRS did not estimate the portion of this gap from securities (e.g., stocks, bonds, and mutual fund capital gains distributions). GAO was asked for information on (1) the extent and types of noncompliance for individual taxpayers that misreport securities capital gains, (2) actions IRS takes to reduce the securities tax gap, and (3) options with the potential to improve taxpayer voluntary compliance and IRS's ability to address noncompliant taxpayers. For estimates of noncompliance, GAO analyzed a probability sample of examination cases for tax year 2001 from the most recent IRS study of individual tax compliance.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that 38 percent of individual taxpayers with securities transactions misreported their capital gains or losses in tax year 2001. A greater estimated percentage of taxpayers misreported gains or losses from securities sales (36 percent) than capital gain distributions from mutual funds (13 percent). This may be because taxpayers must determine the taxable portion of securities sales' income whereas they need only add up their capital gain distributions. Among individual taxpayers who misreported securities sales, roughly two-thirds underreported and roughly one-third overreported. Furthermore, about half of these taxpayers who misreported failed to accurately report the securities' cost, or basis, sometimes because they did not know the basis or failed to adjust the basis appropriately. IRS attempts to reduce the securities' tax gap through enforcement and taxpayer service programs, but challenges limit their impact. Through enforcement programs, IRS contacts taxpayers who may have misreported capital gains or losses and seeks to secure the correct tax amount. IRS also offers services to help taxpayers comply with capital gains tax obligations, such as guidance on how to determine securities' gains and losses. Challenges that limit these programs' impact include the lack of information on basis, which IRS needs to verify most gains and losses, and uncertainty as to whether taxpayers use or understand the guidance. Expanding the information brokers report on securities sales to include adjusted cost basis has the potential to improve taxpayers' compliance and help IRS find noncompliant taxpayers. IRS research shows that taxpayers report their income much more accurately when it is reported to them and IRS. Basis reporting also would reduce taxpayers' burden. For IRS, basis reporting would provide information to verify securities gains or losses and to better target enforcement resources on noncompliant taxpayers. However, basis reporting would raise challenges that would need to be addressed. For instance, brokers would incur costs and burdens--even as taxpayers' costs and burdens decrease somewhat--and many issues would arise about how to calculate adjusted basis, which securities would be covered, and how information would be transferred among brokers. However, industry representatives said that many brokers already provide some basis information to many of their clients and some use an existing system to track and transfer basis and other information about securities. Many of the challenges to implementing basis reporting also could be mitigated. For example, many of the challenges could be addressed by only requiring adjusted basis reporting for future purchases, and by developing consistent rules to be used by all brokers. To the extent that actions to mitigate the challenges to basis reporting delay its implementation or limit coverage to only certain types of securities, the resulting improvements to taxpayers' voluntary reporting compliance would be somewhat constrained. |
gao_GAO-08-445T | gao_GAO-08-445T_0 | Diversity in the Financial Services Industry at the Management Level Did Not Change Substantially
EEO-1 data for 1993 through 2006 generally do not show substantial changes in representation by minorities and women at the management level in the financial services industry, but some racial/ethnic minority groups experienced more change in representation than others. Figure 1, which is based on information that we obtained in preparation for our June 2006 report, shows that overall management-level representation by minorities increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent from 1993 through 2004. Specifically, African-Americans increased their representation from 5.6 percent to 6.6 percent, Asians from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent, Hispanics from 2.8 percent to 4.0 percent, and American Indians from 0.2 to 0.3 percent. In preparation for this testimony, we contacted EEOC to obtain and analyze EEO-1 for 2006 and found that diversity remained about the same at the management level in the financial services industry (see fig. 3) as it had in previous years. However, it is too soon to assess the impact of this change on diversity measures at the senior management level. Financial Services Firms Have Implemented a Variety of Diversity Initiatives
Minorities’ rapid growth as a percentage of the overall U.S. population, as well as increased global competition, have convinced some financial services firms that workforce diversity is a critical business strategy. Officials from several banks said that they had developed scholarship and internship programs to encourage minority students to consider careers in banking. Some firms and trade organizations have also developed partnerships with groups that represent minority professionals and with local communities to recruit candidates through events such as conferences and career fairs. A 2005 industry trade group study and some officials also noted that some companies were linking managers’ compensation with their progress in hiring, promoting, and retaining minority and women employees. Retaining minority and women candidates that are hired for key management positions. Initiatives to promote management diversity at all levels within financial services firms appear to face several key challenges, such as recruiting and retaining candidates and achieving the “buy-in” of middle managers. Without a sustained commitment to overcome these challenges, management diversity in the financial services industry may continue to remain generally unchanged over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the U.S. workforce has become increasingly diverse, many private and public sector organizations have recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining minority and women candidates for key positions. However, previous congressional hearings have raised concerns about a lack of diversity at the management level in the financial services industry, which provides services that are essential to the continued growth and economic prosperity of the country. This testimony discusses findings from a June 2006 GAO report and more recent work on diversity in the financial services industry. Specifically, GAO assesses (1) what the available data show about diversity at the management level from 1993 through 2006 and (2) steps that the industry has taken to promote workforce diversity and the challenges involved. To address the testimony's objectives, GAO analyzed data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); reviewed select studies; and interviewed officials from financial services firms, trade organizations, and organizations that represent minority and women professionals.
What GAO Found
GAO's June 2006 report found that, from 1993 through 2004, overall diversity at the management level in the financial services industry did not change substantially, but some racial/ethnic minority groups experienced more change in representation than others. EEOC data show that management-level representation by minority women and men increased overall from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent during the period. Specifically, African-Americans increased their representation from 5.6 percent to 6.6 percent, Asians from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent, Hispanics from 2.8 percent to 4.0 percent, and American Indians from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent. In preparation for this testimony, GAO collected EEOC data for 2006, which shows that diversity at the management level in the financial services industry remained about the same as it had in previous years. Financial services firms and trade groups have initiated programs to increase workforce diversity, but these initiatives face challenges. The programs include developing scholarships and internships, partnering with groups that represent minority professionals, and linking managers' compensation with their performance in promoting a diverse workforce. Some firms have developed indicators to measure progress in achieving workforce diversity. Industry officials said that among the challenges these initiatives face are recruiting and retaining minority candidates, as well as gaining the "buy-in" of key employees, such as the middle managers who are often responsible for implementing such programs. Without a sustained commitment to overcoming these challenges, diversity at the management level may continue to remain generally unchanged over time. |
gao_GAO-04-869T | gao_GAO-04-869T_0 | Compliance with Competition Requirements
We found that the agencies responsible for rebuilding Iraq generally complied with applicable requirements governing competition when awarding new reconstruction contracts in fiscal year 2003. We reviewed 14 new contracts that were awarded in fiscal year 2003 using other than full and open competition: a total of 5 sole-source contracts awarded by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Field Support Command, and USAID; and 9 limited competition contracts awarded by the Department of State, the Army Contracting Agency, and USAID. With respect to issuing a task order under an existing contract, the competition law does not require competition beyond that obtained for the initial contract award, provided the task order does not increase the scope of the work, period of performance, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued. In light of the exigent circumstances, such a justification was likely possible but needed to be made and documented to comply with the law and protect the taxpayer’s interests. DOD’s Use of Logistics Support Contracts
I will now turn to discussing our ongoing work on DOD’s use of global logistics support contracts. Within this overall context, we found mixed results in each of the four areas we reviewed—planning, oversight, efficiency and personnel—with variations occurring among the four contracts and among the various commands using them. Our report, which will be issued later this year, will make a number of recommendations to address the shortcomings we identified in these areas. Conversely, we found that the use of LOGCAP in Kuwait and Iraq was not adequately planned, nor was it planned in accordance with applicable Army guidance. In some cases, we saw military commands actively looking for ways to save money in the contracts. In others, however, most notably the LOGCAP contract in Iraq and Kuwait, we saw very little concern for cost considerations. Personnel and Training
We found that shortages of personnel have also made contract oversight difficult. Logistics support contracts have developed into a useful tool for the military services to quickly obtain needed support for troops deployed to trouble spots around the world. Because of the military’s continuing and growing reliance on these contracting vehicles, it is important that improvements be made and that oversight be strengthened. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Accounting Office (GAO) discussed some of the work the it is undertaking to address various operations and rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Specifically, GAO has a body of ongoing work looking at a range of issues involving Iraq, including Iraq's transitional administrative law, efforts to restore essential services to the Iraqi people, and the effectiveness of logistics activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, among others. Importantly, given the challenging security environment in Iraq and the various other accountability organizations involved in the oversight process, it is attempting to coordinate its engagement planning and execution with other organizations as appropriate. In this testimony it discussed (1) its report (GAO-04-605) that was released yesterday on the contract award procedures for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2003 to help rebuild Iraq and (2) its preliminary findings on the military's use of global logistics support contracts. These support contracts have emerged as important tools in providing deployed military services with a wide range of logistics services.
What GAO Found
With regard to the award of fiscal year 2003 Iraq reconstruction contracts, GAO found that agencies generally complied with applicable laws and regulations governing competition when using sole-source or limited competition approaches to award new contracts. However, they did not always do so when issuing task orders under existing contracts. In several instances, GAO found that contracting officers issued task orders for work that was not within the scope of the underlying contracts and which should have been awarded using competitive procedures or, because of the exigent circumstances involved, supported by a justification for other than full and open competition in accordance with legal requirements. With regard to DOD's use of global logistics support contracts, GAO found mixed results in each of the four areas it reviewed: planning, oversight, efficiency, and personnel. GAO also found that while some military commands actively looked for ways to save money, others exhibited little concern for cost considerations. Finally, shortages in personnel trained in contract management and oversight is also an issue that needs to be addressed. The report will make a number of recommendations to address these shortcomings. |
gao_GAO-09-763T | gao_GAO-09-763T_0 | As required by statute, the administration uses the FTA evaluation and rating process, along with the development phases of New Starts projects, to decide which projects to recommend to Congress for funding. Previous GAO Work Has Identified Key Challenges in Managing New Starts Program
Frequent Changes to the New Starts Program Have Sometimes Led to Confusion and Delays
Numerous changes have been made to the New Starts program over the last decade. These changes include statutory, regulatory, and administrative changes to the program. New evaluation criteria introduced: Given past concerns that the evaluation process did not account for a project’s impact on economic development, SAFETEA-LU added economic development to the list of project justification criteria that FTA must use to evaluate and rate New Starts projects. Although the impetus for each change varied, FTA officials stated that, in general, all of the changes the agency has initiated were intended to make the process more rigorous, systematic, and transparent. FTA officials have acknowledged these limitations, but noted that improvements in local travel models are needed to resolve some of these issues. In 2008, we made a series of recommendations designed to address the limitations of FTA’s current evaluation process, including recommending that (1) the Secretary of Transportation seek additional resources to improve local travel models in the next authorizing legislation to improve the New Starts evaluation process and the measures of project benefits; (2) FTA establish a timeline for issuing, awarding, and implementing the result of its request for proposals on short- and long-term approaches to measuring highway user benefits from transit improvements; (3) the Administrators of FTA and Federal Highway Administration collaborate in efforts to improve the consistency and reliability of local travel models; and (4) the Administrator of FTA establish a timeline for initiating and completing its longer-term effort to develop more robust measures of transit projects’ environmental benefits. Striking Appropriate Balance between Maintaining a Robust Evaluation Process and Minimizing Complexity Is Challenging
We reported in 2008 that experts and some project sponsors we spoke with generally support FTA’s quantitatively rigorous process for evaluating proposed transit projects but are concerned that the process has become too burdensome and complex, and as noted earlier, may underestimate certain project benefits. In response to such concerns, FTA has tried to simplify the evaluation process in several ways. FTA also commissioned a study by Deloitte in June 2006 to review the project development process and identify opportunities for streamlining or simplifying the process. Potential Options to Expedite Project Development in the New Starts Program
As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing existing research, including past GAO reports, analyzing data on the length of time it takes for projects to complete the New Starts process, and interviewing project sponsors, industry stakeholders and consultants, and transportation experts to identify options to expedite project development in the New Starts program. While each option could help expedite project development, each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider and some options could require legislative changes. Tailor the New Starts evaluation process to risks posed by the projects: Project sponsors, consultants, and experts we interviewed suggested that FTA adopt a more risk-based evaluation process for New Starts projects based on the project’s costs or complexity, the federal share of the project’s costs, or the project sponsor’s New Starts experience. Consider greater use of letters of intent and early systems work agreements: The linear, phased evaluation process of the New Starts program hampers project sponsors’ ability to utilize alternative project delivery methods, such as design-build, according to project sponsors. However, this policy change does not apply to projects approved for entry into preliminary engineering, which is the New Starts project development phase that has the most requirements for project sponsors and the phase where project sponsors told us that frequent changes to the project by sponsors and to the New Starts process by FTA result in additional costs and delays. | Why GAO Did This Study
The New Starts program is an important source of new capital investment in mass transportation. As required by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) must prioritize transit projects for funding by evaluating, rating, and recommending projects on the basis of specific financial commitment and project justification criteria, such as cost-effectiveness, economic development effects, land use, and environmental benefits. To be eligible for federal funding, a project must advance through the different project development phases of the New Starts program, including alternatives analysis, preliminary engineering, and final design. Using the statutorily identified criteria, FTA evaluates projects as a condition for advancement into each project development phase of the program. This testimony discusses the (1) key challenges associated with the New Starts program and (2) options that could help expedite project development in the New Starts program. This testimony is based on GAO's extensive body of work on the New Starts program and ongoing work--as directed by Congress. For this work, GAO reviewed FTA documents and interviewed FTA officials, sponsors of New Starts projects, and representatives from industry associations. The FTA reviewed the information in this testimony and provided technical comments.
What GAO Found
Previous GAO work has identified three key challenges associated with the New Starts program. First, frequent changes to the New Starts program have sometimes led to confusion and delays. Numerous changes have been made to the New Starts Program over the last decade, such as revising and adding new evaluation criteria and requiring project sponsors to collect new data and complete new analyses. Although FTA officials told GAO that changes were generally intended to make the process more rigorous, systematic, and transparent, project sponsors said the frequent changes sometimes caused confusion and rework, resulting in delays in advancing projects. Second, the current New Starts evaluation process measures do not capture all project benefits. For example, FTA's cost-effectiveness measure does not account for highway travel time savings and may not capture all economic development benefits. FTA officials have acknowledged these limitations, but noted that improvements in local travel models are needed to resolve some of these issues. FTA is also conducting research on ways to improve certain evaluation measures. Third, striking the appropriate balance between maintaining a robust evaluation and minimizing a complex process is challenging. Experts and some project sponsors GAO spoke with generally support FTA's quantitatively rigorous process for evaluating proposed transit projects but are concerned that the process has become too burdensome and complex. In response to such concerns, FTA has tried to simplify the evaluation process in several ways, including hiring a consulting firm to identify opportunities to streamline or simplify the process. As part of ongoing work, GAO has preliminarily identified options to help expedite project development within the New Starts program. These options include tailoring the New Starts evaluation process to risks posed by the projects, using letters of intent more frequently, and applying regulatory and administrative changes only to future projects. While each option could help expedite project development in the New Starts process, each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. For example, by signaling early federal support of projects, letters of intent and early systems work agreements could help project sponsors use potentially less costly and time-consuming alternative project delivery methods, such as design-build. However, such early support poses some risk, as projects may stumble in later project development phases. Furthermore, some options, like combining one or more statutorily required project development phases, would require legislative action. |
gao_GAO-13-93 | gao_GAO-13-93_0 | Federal Reentry Grant Programs Are Fragmented but Minimally Overlapping, Reducing the Risk for Duplication
Nine Reentry Grant Programs Are Fragmented across Three Federal Agencies
DOJ, Labor, and HHS separately provided new or continuation grant funding to support direct services to the adult reentry population through nine grant programs in fiscal year 2011. Since more than one federal agency is involved in this same broad area of national interest, these programs are fragmented. Grant Program Overlap Is Minimal and the Risk of Duplication Is Low
When considering, collectively, which applicants are eligible for the grant programs, the extent to which the reentry population is the sole target of the grant programs’ services, and the primary services these grant programs fund, we found that overlap across the nine programs was minimal. Therefore, the risk of duplication—when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities, provide the same services to the same beneficiaries, or provide funding for the same purpose—is low. However, one allowed only state and local government applicants, and another allowed only private, nonprofit, or community-based applicants. For example, Labor’s reentry program limits eligibility to private, nonprofit organizations that will use the funds primarily to assist current or former inmates—residing in or released from any facility—with their employment needs. In contrast, one of DOJ’s reentry programs limits eligibility to governmental entities that will use the funds primarily to assist current or former inmates—residing in or released from state, local, or tribal facilities—with their substance abuse treatment needs. Another grantee received a HHS Healthy Marriage Promotion and Responsible Fatherhood Grant in fiscal year 2011, and also received a RExO grant in 2012. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Coordinate Their Reentry Programs and Further Reduce the Potential for Unnecessary Duplication in Funding
Agencies Have Acknowledged Where Overlap Exists and Have Taken Steps to Coordinate Efforts
With acknowledgment of some overlap, DOJ, Labor, and HHS have taken a variety of steps to coordinate their reentry efforts as a means to prevent unnecessary duplication and share promising practices. For example, officials from all three agencies said they are sharing some draft grant solicitations with one another to obtain feedback before issuing them. Other efforts to share promising practices across agencies. Agencies Have Taken Action, or Have Actions Under Way, to Further Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
In addition to the steps that DOJ, Labor, and HHS have taken— independently and through the Federal Interagency Reentry Council—to coordinate reentry efforts, they have also taken, or plan to take, further action to reduce the potential that grantees are using funds from different agencies or programs for the same purpose. Instead, officials stated that they compare the results individual grantees report in reducing recidivism with the average across all SCA grantees. Agencies Analyze Grantee Performance Data to Improve Operations but Additional Information Sharing Could Be Beneficial
DOJ, Labor, and HHS analyze recidivism data to improve grant program operations in a variety of ways, but agencies could enhance information sharing about the methods they use to collect and analyze data to determine and report on overall program effectiveness. However, DOJ, Labor, and HHS officials have not formally shared information on the relative strengths and limitations of the respective grant management systems and their unique approaches to monitoring outcomes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better utilize the performance information they collect from grantees, enhance the capacity of their respective grant management systems, and improve overall management of reentry programs designed to reduce recidivism, we recommend that the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services maximize existing information-sharing forums, such as the Federal Interagency Reentry Council, to (1) share details on how agencies collect and analyze their data, as well as how they determine program effectiveness, and (2) consider the feasibility of adapting any promising practices in the future. Labor and HHS did not specifically state whether they concurred with our recommendation. At that meeting, the council adopted a mission statement to (1) make communities safer by reducing recidivism and victimization, (2) assist those returning from prison and jail in becoming productive citizens, and (3) save taxpayer dollars by lowering the direct and collateral costs of incarceration. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 700,000 inmates are released from federal and state custody each year, and another 9 million are booked into and released from local jails. Former inmates face challenges as they transition into, or reenter, society, such as finding housing and employment. According to the most recent data available, more than two-thirds of state prisoners are rearrested for a new offense within 3 years of release, and about half are reincarcerated. Federal reentry grants are available for state and local providers, as successful reentry reduces rearrest or reincarceration, known as recidivism. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across federal reentry grant programs; (2) the coordination efforts federal grant-making agencies have taken to prevent unnecessary duplication and share promising practices; and (3) the extent to which federal grant-making agencies measure grantees effectiveness in reducing recidivism. GAO identified and analyzed the grant programs and agencies that supported reentry efforts in fiscal year 2011; analyzed agency documents, such as grant solicitations; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Labor (Labor), and Health and Human Services (HHS) separately administered nine fragmented but minimally overlapping reentry grant programs with low risk of duplication. Specifically, GAO found that these grant programs are fragmented since more than one federal agency is involved in administering the programs. Further, GAO found that overlap across the nine programs was minimal because the programs varied in (1) their applicant eligibility criteria, (2) the extent to which their funds solely benefit the reentry population, and (3) their primary services funded. For example, Labor's reentry program limits eligibility to private, nonprofit organizations that will use the funds primarily to assist current or former inmates--residing in or released from any facility--with their employment needs. In contrast, one of DOJ's reentry programs limits eligibility to governmental entities that will use the funds primarily to assist current or former inmates--residing in or released from state, local, or tribal facilities--with their substance abuse treatment needs. Given the variance across eligible applicants, beneficiaries, and primary services, the overlap across the nine programs is minimal and the risk of duplication--when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities, provide the same services to the same beneficiaries, or provide funding for the same purpose--is low.
DOJ, Labor, and HHS have acknowledged where some overlap exists and therefore have taken steps to coordinate their reentry efforts to further prevent unnecessary duplication and share promising practices. For example, in 2011, the U.S. Attorney General convened the Federal Interagency Reentry Council--a group of federal agencies whose mission is to make communities safer; assist those returning from prison and jail in becoming productive, taxpaying citizens; and save taxpayer dollars by lowering the direct and collateral costs of incarceration. Further, agency officials from all three agencies reported that they share grant solicitations with one another before issuing them, and in 2009, DOJ and HHS established a memorandum of agreement to formally coordinate funding activities related to reentry. In addition, all three agencies have taken action, or have actions under way, to require their grant applicants to report other federal funds they are receiving, or plan to receive, and consider this information before they will make new award decisions.
DOJ, Labor, and HHS are measuring grantee performance and conducting program evaluations, but they could enhance information sharing about the methods they use to collect and analyze data to determine how effectively grantees reduce recidivism. To monitor grantee performance, DOJ, Labor, and HHS collect different performance information, such as rearrest, reincarceration, and employment rates, through several web-based grant management systems, each with varying strengths and limitations. However, the agencies have not formally discussed these systems with one another, or how they analyze the data they collect, despite engaging in collaborations during which such discussions would be practical and useful. Consistent with effective interagency coordination practices, sharing information like this could help the agencies better leverage existing practices and improve their approaches to determining and reporting on grantee effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ, Labor, and HHS enhance their information sharing on approaches for determining how effectively grantees reduce recidivism. In response, DOJ, Labor, and HHS reported that they would take actions to address our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-859T | gao_GAO-09-859T_0 | Background
To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, FPS has become increasingly reliant on its guard force. Before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility at a federal facility, FPS requires that all guards undergo background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 hours of training provided by the contractor or FPS, including 8 hours of x-ray and magnetometer training. FPS is also required to actively monitor and verify the contractors’ performance and ensure that the terms of the contract are met. Many FPS Guards Do Not Appear to Have the Training and Certifications Required to Stand Post at Federal Facilities in Some Regions
FPS Is Not Providing Guards With All of the Required Training in Some Regions
FPS does not fully ensure that its guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal facility. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required 8 hours of x-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these guards continue to control access points at federal facilities in this region. Lapses and weaknesses in FPS’s x-ray and magnetometer training have contributed to several incidents at federal facilities in which the guards were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a level IV federal facility in a major metropolitan area, an infant in a carrier was sent through the x-ray machine. This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected their assigned responsibilities. We found that 62 percent, or 411 of the 663 guards who were deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired certification, including for example, firearms qualification, background investigation, domestic violence declaration, or CPR/First Aid training certification. Moreover, five of the six regions we visited did not have current information on guard training and certifications. FPS Has Limited Assurance that Guards Comply with Post Orders
FPS Is Not Consistently Inspecting Guards Posts
FPS has limited assurance that its 13,000 guards are complying with post orders. FPS does not have specific national guidance on when and how guard inspections should be performed. FPS’s inspections of guard posts at federal facilities are inconsistent and the quality and rigor of its inspections varies across regions. We also found that in the 6 regions we visited that guard inspections are typically completed by FPS during regular business hours and in cities where FPS has a field office. For example, as shown in figure 2, at a level IV facility, an armed guard was found asleep at his post after taking the pain killer prescription drug Percocet during the night shift. However, FPS has found incidents at level IV facilities where guards were not in compliance with post orders. A guard failed to recognize or did not properly x-ray a box containing semi-automatic handguns at the loading dock at one federal facility we visited. FPS only became aware of the situation because the handguns were delivered to FPS. Covert Testing of FPS’s Guard Program Reveals Weaknesses
We identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS’s guard program. Each time they tried, in April and May 2009, our investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS’s guards, with the components for an IED concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Of the 10 level IV facilities we penetrated, 8 were government owned and 2 were leased facilities. The facilities included field offices of a U.S Senator and U.S. Representative as well as agencies of the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Justice, State and others. FPS’s Recent Actions to Improve Its Oversight of Guards May Be Challenging to Implement
Because of the sensitivity of our review, we have already briefed FPS and GSA on the results of our covert testing at 10 level IV facilities and other preliminary findings regarding the guard program. | Why GAO Did This Study
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,200 full time employees, and about 13,000 contract security guards. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the extent to which FPS ensures that its guards have the required training and certifications before being deployed to a federal facility, (2) the extent to which FPS ensures that its guards comply with their assigned responsibilities (post orders) once they are deployed at federal facilities, and (3) security vulnerabilities GAO recently identified related to FPS's guard program. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions, interviewed numerous FPS officials, guards, contractors, and analyzed FPS's policies and data. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
What GAO Found
FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal facility. FPS requires that all prospective guards complete about 128 hours of training including 8 hours of x-ray and magnetometer training. However, in one region, FPS has not provided the x-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these guards are assigned to posts at federal facilities. X-ray training is critical because guards control access points at facilities. Insufficient x-ray and magnetometer training may have contributed to several incidents where guards were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a level IV facility, an infant in a carrier was sent through an x-ray machine due to a guard's negligence. Moreover, GAO found that FPS does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying guard training and certification requirements. GAO reviewed 663 randomly selected guard records and found that 62 percent of the guards had at least one expired certification including a declaration that guards have not been convicted of domestic violence, which make them ineligible to carry firearms. FPS has limited assurance that its guards are complying with post orders. FPS does not have specific national guidance on when and how guard inspections should be performed. FPS's inspections of guard posts at federal facilities are inconsistent and the quality varied in the six regions GAO visited. GAO also found that guard inspections are typically completed by FPS during regular business hours and in locations where FPS has a field office; and seldom on nights and on weekends. However, on an occasion when FPS did conduct a post inspection at night it found a guard asleep at his post after taking the pain killer prescription drug Percocet. FPS also found other incidents at level IV facilities where guards neglected or inadequately performed their assigned responsibilities. For example, a guard failed to recognize or did not properly x-ray a box containing handguns at the loading dock at a facility. FPS became aware of the situation because the handguns were delivered to FPS. GAO identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program. GAO investigators carrying the components for an improvised explosive device successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS's guards at each of the 10 level IV federal facilities where GAO conducted covert testing. Of the 10 level IV facilities GAO penetrated, 8 were government owned, 2 were leased, and included offices of a U.S. Senator and U.S. Representative, as well as agencies such as the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice. Once GAO investigators passed the control access points, they assembled the explosive device and walked freely around several of floors of these level IV facilities with the device in a briefcase. In response to GAO's briefing on these findings, FPS has recently taken some actions including increasing the frequency of intrusion testing and guard inspections. However, implementing these changes may be challenging, according to FPS. |
gao_GAO-16-758 | gao_GAO-16-758_0 | The Actual Number of Section 202 Properties Having Service Coordinators Is Unknown because HUD’s Data Are Incomplete
While limitations in HUD’s data make an accurate assessment difficult, we estimate that roughly half of Section 202 properties have HUD-funded service coordinators. However, HUD’s data likely underestimate the number of properties with service coordinators. Federal internal control standards note that it is important for management to obtain relevant data from reliable internal and external sources in a timely manner based on identified information requirements. If HUD does not have complete and accurate information about the presence and funding source of service coordinators in Section 202 properties, it risks not taking all required steps to monitor all of these properties to help ensure they are connecting residents with the supportive services needed to age in place successfully. For example, several of these stakeholders told us that property managers are well-positioned to know their residents, and have some insight into their needs. Some Section 202 property managers told us that Area Agencies on Aging can coordinate services for residents. HUD Lacks Guidance on Monitoring Supportive Services Requirements and Does Not Analyze Performance Data
HUD requires its staff to monitor Section 202 properties’ adherence to program requirements but does not have written guidance for staff with monitoring responsibilities on the level and type of activity a Section 202 property must perform to demonstrate meeting the program’s requirement to help residents obtain supportive services. Federal internal control standards note the importance of documenting responsibilities through policies. Without written policies and procedures that specifically delineate the roles and responsibilities of HUD staff in monitoring Section 202 properties’ compliance with the program’s supportive services requirements, HUD cannot be assured that the elderly residents of these properties are receiving the assistance with obtaining supportive services that the program is intended to provide. Further, federal internal control standards note the importance of evaluating data for reliability. Until HUD develops and implements policies and procedures for analyzing the performance information that it requires from Section 202 properties with service coordinators, its ability to use that information to monitor whether service coordinators are performing effectively and helping to fulfill the goals of the Section 202 program will likely be limited. For example, the plans note that the guidance will focus on Section 202 properties with grant-based service coordinators. By taking steps to verify the accuracy of performance information and analyze the information collected, HUD could increase its understanding of the extent to which service coordinators help elderly residents of Section 202 properties age in place, a goal of both the Section 202 and service coordinator programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly (Section 202) properties have service coordinators, (2) how properties without service coordinators make services available to residents and reasons why some properties do not have service coordinators, (3) the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) monitoring of Section 202 properties’ efforts to make services available to residents, and (4) HUD’s efforts to preserve Section 202 properties given recent trends in annual funding. Use of Section 202 Data to Determine Number of Service Coordinators
To determine the number of Section 202 properties that have a service coordinator and the characteristics of such properties and their residents, we obtained and analyzed HUD data on Section 202 properties, service coordinators, and tenant characteristics as of the end of fiscal year 2014, the most recent year for which data were available at the time of our review. We also compared HUD’s data with results from GAO’s survey of a generalizable sample of Section 202 property managers (described below). Use of Survey to Learn More about Properties Not Identifiable in HUD Data as Having Service Coordinators
We conducted a self-administered, web-based questionnaire survey of a sample of managers of Section 202 properties to determine how well HUD’s data captured the presence of HUD-funded service coordinators in Section 202 properties, to identify steps that properties that do not have a HUD-funded service coordinator take to connect their residents with services, and to learn about Section 202 properties’ experiences with HUD monitoring and oversight. We conducted pretests by telephone with five Section 202 property managers (one in each of HUD’s five Multifamily Housing regions). HUD’s Monitoring of Section 202 Properties’ Efforts to Link Residents to Services
To assess HUD’s monitoring of Section 202 properties’ efforts to connect residents to services, we obtained and reviewed available documentation of monitoring-related policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. population of persons age 65 and older is expected to grow to 73 million by 2030. With age, people are increasingly likely to face physical and cognitive limitations. HUD's Section 202 program funds supportive rental housing for very low-income elderly households. Section 202 property owners are expected to coordinate the provision of services to help residents live independently and age in place.
GAO was asked to review how Section 202 properties connect residents to services and HUD's related monitoring efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which Section 202 properties have service coordinators, (2) how properties without coordinators connect residents with services and why they may not use coordinators and (3) HUD's monitoring of Section 202 properties' efforts to connect residents with supportive services, among other objectives. GAO analyzed HUD's fiscal year 2014 data (the latest available) on Section 202 properties and service coordinators; surveyed a generalizable sample of Section 202 properties not identifiable in HUD data as having service coordinators; reviewed monitoring policies, program descriptions, and agency notices; and interviewed HUD officials from each of HUD's five Multifamily Housing regions and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
While limitations in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) data make an accurate assessment difficult, GAO estimates that roughly half of the 7,229 Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly (Section 202) properties have HUD-funded service coordinators—staff who link residents to supportive services such as transportation assistance or meals. HUD's data indicate that 38 percent of Section 202 properties have a HUD-funded service coordinator, but these data likely underestimate the true number. GAO surveyed a generalizable sample of Section 202 properties not identifiable in HUD's data as having a service coordinator and, on this basis, estimates that an additional 12 percent of Section 202 properties actually had one—bringing the actual total of Section 202 properties with service coordinators to about 50 percent. Federal internal control standards note that it is important for management to obtain relevant data from reliable sources. Properties with service coordinators are subject to additional monitoring, but without accurate information, HUD risks not taking steps to monitor Section 202 properties with service coordinators to help ensure they are connecting residents to supportive services.
Properties without service coordinators connect residents to services in a variety of ways—for example, property managers may serve this function themselves, or they may utilize other local organizations. Several stakeholders told GAO that property managers are well-positioned to know their residents, and have some insight into their needs. Others noted that property managers generally lack the time and expertise to effectively manage this responsibility, and that the manager's role can conflict with that of the service coordinator. Through GAO's survey and site visits, managers of Section 202 properties without service coordinators cited a variety of reasons for not employing them, including lack of funding and having too few units to justify hiring someone to focus on supportive services for the elderly residents.
HUD requires its staff to monitor Section 202 properties' adherence to program requirements. However, HUD lacks written policies and procedures that describe how its staff should monitor the requirement for Section 202 property managers to coordinate the provision of supportive services. Available guidance describes general monitoring procedures for multifamily properties but does not address Section 202 specifically. HUD officials told GAO they plan to develop guidance on monitoring Section 202 properties with service coordinator grants by December 2016. Federal internal control standards note the importance of documenting responsibilities through policies. Without written policies and procedures, HUD cannot be assured that elderly residents are receiving assistance obtaining services. In addition, HUD collects performance data, such as the number of services provided, from Section 202 properties that have service coordinators but does not have policies or procedures in place to verify the accuracy of the data or for analyzing the data collected. Federal internal control standards also note the importance of evaluating data for reliability and processing data into quality information to evaluate performance. Until HUD takes steps to assess service coordinator performance data for reliability and analyze the data reported, its ability to use that information to monitor whether service coordinators are performing effectively and helping to fulfill the goals of the Section 202 program will likely be limited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD (1) improve the accuracy of its data on Section 202 properties with service coordinators, (2) develop written guidance on assessing compliance with supportive services requirements, and (3) develop procedures for verifying and analyzing performance data. HUD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-248 | gao_GAO-09-248_0 | On February 27, 2003, the President announced FutureGen as a cost- shared project between DOE and industry to create the world’s first coal- fired, zero emissions electricity and hydrogen production power plant. DOE stated that it would demonstrate CCS at multiple commercial-scale power plants, including retaining the integration of CCS and IGCC. DOE referred to this new approach as the restructured FutureGen program. Eighteen of the 49 respondents indicated that the 90 percent goal would be too restrictive for industry participants because of the additional energy required to capture and compress CO However, the restructured program, a DOE commercial demonstration project, seeks to accelerate the commercial deployment of CCS (that is, generating and selling electricity to earn profits) by implementing CCS at one or more commercial facilities by 2015— approximately five years earlier than the original program’s commercial operations could begin. First, the original program would have developed knowledge about CCS at IGCC plants, while the restructured program could allow for opportunities to learn about CCS at both IGCC and other types of coal plants. Four of these five CCS programs do not integrate all key components of CCS and concentrate on developing one or two related components of CCS, such as CO storage, or CO Round III of CCPI seeks to demonstrate, at a commercial scale, advanced coal-based technologies that capture and store carbon, or put CO emissions to beneficial reuse, such as to enhance oil recovery. The Restructured FutureGen Differs from Most Other DOE CCS Programs
from coal-fired power plants, including possibly capturing 500,000 metric tons of CO storage in deep oil-, gas-, coal-, and saline-bearing formations. The injection of CO capture and compression technologies to assist existing coal-fired power plants. While DOE had reason to be concerned about the escalating costs of the original FutureGen, it made its decision to cancel that program and replace it with the restructured FutureGen based, in large part, on a comparison of cost estimates that were not comparable. In May 2008, the Secretary of Energy testified before Congress that FutureGen was conceived as a $950 million venture and that its estimated cost had increased to roughly $1.8 billion; however, the Secretary’s prepared statement did not indicate that the first estimate was in constant dollars, while the second was in current dollars. However, they stated that they did not have any written or comprehensive analysis. In addition, we do not consider the draft strategic planning document to be comprehensive because it did not assess: 1. whether costs for the original FutureGen would escalate substantially 2. the relative costs, benefits, and risks for all of the types of plants for which the restructured FutureGen was eligible to receive proposals, such as conventional pulverized-coal and oxyfuel combustion plants, but only contemplated proposals for IGCC plants; 3. the risk that industry respondents might not propose an IGCC plant for 4. the risk that industry respondents might not propose enough viable projects for the restructured FutureGen; 5. the costs, benefits, and risks of making incremental changes to the original FutureGen alongside the relative costs, benefits, and risks of the restructured FutureGen; and 6. any potential overlap between the restructured FutureGen and other DOE programs. A comprehensive analysis could have supported DOE’s decision making in several ways. For example, prior to the decision to restructure FutureGen, FE identified and analyzed 13 options for changes to the original program, such as reducing the COrecommended or noted that DOE should be willing to consider several options with potential savings from $30 million to $55 million each. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined (1) the goals of the original and restructured FutureGen programs, (2) the similarities and differences between the restructured FutureGen and other Department of Energy (DOE) carbon capture and storage programs, and (3) the extent to which DOE used sufficient information to support its decision to restructure the FutureGen program. In particular, we interviewed DOE officials from the Office of Fossil Energy’s (FE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) and Office of Clean Coal. We made DOE’s editorial correction. Rather, our report states that DOE’s decision was based on a desire to limit its exposure to increased costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Coal-fired power plants generate about one-half of the nation's electricity and about one-third of its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which contribute to climate change. In 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated FutureGen--a commercial-scale, coal-fired power plant to incorporate integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), an advanced generating technology, with carbon capture and storage (CCS). The plant was to capture and store underground about 90 percent of its CO2 emissions. DOE's cost share was 74 percent, and industry partners agreed to fund the rest. Concerned about escalating costs, DOE restructured FutureGen. GAO was asked to examine (1) the original and restructured programs' goals, (2) similarities and differences between the new FutureGen and other DOE CCS programs, and (3) if the restructuring decision was based on sufficient information. GAO reviewed best practices for making programmatic decisions, FutureGen plans and budgets, and documents on the restructuring of FutureGen. GAO contacted DOE, industry partners, and experts.
What GAO Found
The original FutureGen program and the new restructured FutureGen program attempt to use CCS at coal-fired power plants to achieve near-zero CO2 emissions and to make CCS economically viable. However, they take different approaches that could affect CCS's commercial advancement. First, the original program aimed at developing knowledge about the integration of IGCC and CCS at one plant; in contrast, the new program could provide opportunities to learn about CCS at different plants, such as conventional ones that use pulverized coal generating technology. Second, the original program was operated by a nonprofit consortium of energy companies at one plant, while the new program called for CCS projects at multiple commercial plants. The new, restructured FutureGen differs from most DOE CCS programs. The new FutureGen would develop and integrate multiple CCS components at coal-fired plants (including CO2 capture, transportation, and storage underground). Other programs concentrate on only one CCS component and/or a related component (e.g., capture or capture and compression). However, Round III of DOE's Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) is a cost-shared partnership with industry that funds commercial CCS demonstrations at new and existing coal-fired plants. The new FutureGen is most like CCPI in that both fund CCS commercial demonstrations at several plants to accelerate CCS deployment and require that participants bear 50 percent of the costs, but DOE expects the new FutureGen to have more funding for commercial demonstrations than CCPI. Moreover, the new FutureGen targets a higher amount of CO2 to be captured and stored (at least 1 million metric tons of CO2 annually per plant) than CCPI (300,000 metric tons). Contrary to best practices, DOE did not base its decision to restructure FutureGen on a comprehensive analysis of factors, such as the associated costs, benefits, and risks. DOE made its decision, largely, on the conclusion that costs for the original FutureGen had doubled and would escalate substantially. However, in its decision, DOE compared two cost estimates for the original FutureGen that were not comparable because DOE's $950 million estimate was in constant 2004 dollars and the $1.8 billion estimate of DOE's industry partners was inflated through 2017. As its restructuring decision did not consider a comprehensive analysis of costs, benefits, and risks, DOE has no assurance that the restructured FutureGen is the best option to advance CCS. In contrast to the restructuring decision, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy had identified and analyzed 13 options for incremental, cost-saving changes to the original program, such as reducing the CO2 capture requirement. While the Office of Fossil Energy did not consider all of these options to be viable, it either recommended or noted several of them for consideration, with potential savings ranging from $30 million to $55 million each. |
gao_GAO-06-338 | gao_GAO-06-338_0 | FCC required that (1) by April 1998, or within 6 months of a request from a PSAP, wireless carriers be prepared to provide the PSAP with the wireless phone number of the caller and the location of the cell site receiving the 911 call (Phase I information); and (2) by October 2001, or within 6 months of receiving a request from a PSAP, wireless carriers be prepared to provide the PSAP with the geographic coordinates of the caller’s location with greater precision, generally within 50 to 300 meters (Phase II information). Significant Progress Has Been Made toward Nationwide Wireless E911 Implementation but Full Deployment is Years Away
Significant progress has been made in implementing wireless E911 services since our last report on this topic in November 2003. At that time, using data from NENA, we reported that nearly 65 percent of PSAPs nationwide had implemented Phase I wireless E911 services and 18 percent of PSAPs had implemented Phase II wireless E911 with at least one wireless carrier. As of January 2006, NENA reports that nearly 80 percent of PSAPs nationwide had implemented Phase I wireless E911 services and 57 percent had implemented Phase II with at least one wireless carrier. Thirteen state contacts provided a range of 1 to 5 years for Phase II to be implemented, with three state contacts responding that it would take more than 5 years. We found, based on our survey results and NENA data, that 48 states and the District of Columbia collect surcharges to cover the costs of implementing wireless E911 (see fig. The other two states do not impose surcharges on wireless subscribers, but still have a wireless E911 funding mechanism in place. Specifically, the state E911 contact for Missouri told us that the state uses funds from the local general revenue, local 911 taxes, and wireline funds for E911 implementation; and the Vermont state E911 contact said the state uses funds from the state’s Universal Service Fund, which supports various telecommunications programs. Responses to our survey indicated that the per-subscriber surcharges varied from state to state and ranged from $0.20 to $3.00 per month. States Employ Different Methods for Managing and Disbursing Funds
States and local governments have the authority to determine how they will manage and disburse their E911 funds. Most States Have Written Criteria on the Allowable Use of E911 Funds
As part of our survey, we asked the state E911 contacts if their states had established written criteria on the allowable uses of funds collected for the purposes of wireless E911 implementation. According to our survey results, audits were the most common approach used to oversee the use of E911 funds. A Few States Reported Using Wireless E911 Funds for Unrelated Purposes
Based on the responses of the 44 state E911 contacts who completed our survey, four states that collected funds for the purposes of wireless E911 implementation made those funds available or used them for purposes unrelated to E911 during 2005. For the six states and the District of Columbia that did not respond to our survey, we do not know whether they used any of their E911 funds for unrelated purposes. Four other states were unsure if their wireless E911 funds have been used for unrelated purposes because the funds are collected and maintained at the local level. For the four states that reported E911 funds were made available or used for purposes not related to E911 during 2005, the state contacts reported that the E911 funds were transferred to their state’s general fund. For example, the E911 contact for North Carolina reported that E911 funds were transferred to the general fund to help balance the state budget. According to the E911 contact for Virginia, funds were transferred to both the general fund and to the state police, which responds to emergency calls in some areas of the state. In response, FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. As such, we are reporting on (1) the progress made in implementing wireless E911 services throughout the country, (2) the states and localities that have established taxes, fees, or charges for wireless E911 implementation, and (3) the states or localities that have used funds collected for the purposes of wireless E911 for unrelated purposes. Of the population of 51 state E911 contacts who were asked to participate in our survey, we received 44 completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 86 percent. Other than this, we did not independently verify the survey results. | Why GAO Did This Study
"Enhanced 911" (E911) service refers to the capability of public safety answering points to automatically receive an emergency caller's location information. An industry association estimates that nearly 82 million 911 calls are placed each year by callers using mobile phones. Wireless E911 technology provides emergency responders with the location and callback number of a person calling 911 from a mobile phone. The ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 called for GAO to study state and local use of funds collected for the purpose of wireless E911 implementation. We are reporting on (1) the progress made in implementing wireless E911 services throughout the country, (2) the states and localities that have established taxes, fees, or charges for wireless E911 implementation, and (3) the states or localities that have used funds collected for the purposes of wireless E911 for unrelated purposes. To address these issues, we surveyed state-level E911 contacts on the collection and use of E911 funds. Of the 51 state E911 contacts (including the District of Columbia) who were asked to participate in our survey, we received 44 responses. We provided the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with a draft of this report and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated.
What GAO Found
Significant progress has been made towards implementing wireless E911 throughout the country since our November 2003 report. Deployment of wireless E911 usually proceeds through two phases: Phase I provides general location information by identifying the cell tower or cell site that is receiving the wireless call. Phase II provides more precise caller-location information, within 50 to 300 meters in most cases. We reported in November 2003, that nearly 65 percent of the more than 6,000 public safety answering points nationwide were capable of receiving Phase I information with wireless 911 calls and 18 percent had implemented Phase II wireless E911 with at least one wireless carrier. Currently, according to the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), nearly 80 percent of public safety answering points are capable of receiving Phase I location information and 57 percent have implemented Phase II for at least one wireless carrier. However, based on our survey results, full implementation is still several years away in many states. In response to our survey, three state E911 contacts reported that it will take more than 5 years to have wireless E911 completely implemented in their states, and five others said that the technology might never be fully implemented in their states. Based on our survey results and NENA data, we found that nearly all states--48 states and the District of Columbia--require the wireless carriers to collect surcharges from their subscribers to cover the costs associated with implementing wireless E911. Responses to our survey showed the per-subscriber surcharges ranged from $0.20 to $3.00 per month. The two states that do not impose surcharges fund E911 through general revenue or the state's Universal Service Fund, which was established to support various telecommunications programs. States have the discretion to determine how they will manage and distribute the funds and we found the management of the funds and methods of disbursement varied. According to our survey results, many of the states that responded have written criteria on the allowable uses of E911 funds. Allowable uses of the E911 funds include purchasing equipment upgrades and software packages. Four state E911 contacts responded to our survey that their states did not use all of the funds collected for E911 on E911 implementation purposes during 2005. Six states, and the District of Columbia, did not respond to our survey so we do not know whether those states used E911 funds or made them available for other purposes. Four other states reported that they were unsure if all E911 funds were used solely for E911 purposes because the funds are collected and managed at the local level. The four states that reported that E911 funds were made available or used for purposes not related to E911 indicated that the E911 funds were transferred to their state's general fund. For example, one state told us that E911 funds were transferred to the general fund to help balance the state budget. Another state reported that some E911 funds were transferred to the state police since they answer emergency calls in some areas of the state. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-136 | gao_T-AIMD-99-136_0 | Key Actions Remain to Ensure That VA Can Deliver Benefits and Health Care Into the Next Century
Like many organizations, VA faces the possibility of computer system failures at the turn of the century due to incorrect information processing relating to dates. To address these areas and to reduce the likelihood of delayed or interrupted benefits and health care services, we recommended that VA reassess its Y2K mission-critical efforts for the compensation and pension online application and the Beneficiary Identification and Record Locator Sub-System, as well as other information technology initiatives, such as special projects, to ensure that the Y2K efforts have adequate resources, including contract support, to achieve compliance in time; establish critical deadlines for the preparation of business continuity and contingency plans for each core business process or program service so that mission-critical functions affecting benefits delivery can be carried out even if software applications and commercial-off-the- shelf (COTS) products fail, including a description of resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for implementation; and ensure rapid development of business continuity and contingency plans for each medical facility so that mission-critical functions affecting patient care can be carried out if software applications, COTS products, and/or facility-related systems and equipment do not function properly, including a description of resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for implementation. Despite their importance, VHA has not yet completed its assessment of facility systems. Its goal is to provide a comprehensive, centralized source of information on the Y2K compliance status of biomedical equipment used in the United States and make this information publicly available on a web site. More recently, VHA’s Chief Biomedical Engineer told us that VHA medical facilities are not requesting test results for critical care/life support biomedical equipment; they also are not currently reviewing the test results available on manufacturers’ web sites. VHA Pharmaceutical Operations Also Face Y2K Risks
Another critical component to VA’s ability to deliver health care at the turn of the century is ensuring that the automated systems supporting VHA’s medical facility pharmacies and its consolidated mail outpatient pharmacies (CMOP) are Y2K compliant. For example, the CMOP electronically receives a prescription for a veteran through the medical center. VA Taking Action to Determine Y2K Readiness of Pharmaceutical and Medical-Surgical Manufacturers
VA, like other users of pharmaceutical and medical-surgical products, needs to know whether it will have a sufficient supply of these items for its customers. In summary, VBA and VHA continue to make progress in preparing their mission-critical systems for the year 2000. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) year 2000 readiness, focusing on: (1) VA's ability to deliver benefits and health care services through the turn of the century; and (2) the readiness of automated systems that support such delivery, the compliance status of biomedical equipment used in patient care, and the year 2000 readiness of the pharmaceutical and medical-surgical manufacturers upon which VA relies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA continues to make progress in its year 2000 readiness; (2) however, key actions remain to be performed; (3) for example, the Veterans Benefits Administration and Veterans Health Administration (VHA) have not yet completed testing of their mission-critical systems to ensure that these systems can reliably accept future dates--such as January 1, 2000; (4) also, VHA has not completed assessments for its facility systems, which can be essential to ensuring continuing health care; (5) in addition, neither VA nor the Food and Drug Administration have implemented GAO's prior recommendation to review the test results for biomedical equipment used in critical care/life support environments; (6) further, VHA's pharmaceutical operations are at risk because the automated systems supporting its consolidated mail outpatient pharmacies are not year 2000 compliant; (7) VHA does not know if its medical facilities will have a sufficient supply of pharmaceutical and medical-surgical supplies on hand, because it does not have complete information on the year 2000 readiness of these manufacturers; and (8) it is critical that these concerns be addressed if VA is to continue to reliably deliver benefits and health care. |
gao_GAO-04-640 | gao_GAO-04-640_0 | In recognizing the extent of DOD’s corrosion problem, Congress enacted legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 that directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an officer or organization to be responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. These initiatives are: (1) expansion of the emphasis on corrosion prevention and mitigation within DOD to include coverage of infrastructure; (2) application uniformly throughout DOD of requirements and criteria for the testing and certification of new corrosion-prevention technologies for equipment and infrastructure with similar characteristics, similar missions, or similar operating environments; (3) implementation of programs, including supporting databases, to ensure that a focused and coordinated approach is taken throughout DOD to collect, review, validate, and distribute information on proven methods and products that are relevant to the prevention of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure; and (4) establishment of a coordinated research and development program for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion for new and existing military equipment and infrastructure that includes a plan to transition new corrosion prevention technologies into operational systems. Strategy Does Not Identify Specific Funding and Personnel Resources
While DOD’s corrosion strategy generally addresses the issue of funding, it does not include any estimates of the specific dollar amounts that are needed for its near- or long-term implementation. The officials said they expect to have firm estimates by December 2004. These estimates projected that DOD and the military services would need a total of about $1.9 billion in departmentwide corrosion prevention and mitigation resources for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. In terms of personnel resources, the strategy generally provided an assessment of the personnel necessary to manage the corrosion program effectively in DOD and the services, but the strategy did not identify the level of personnel resources needed to implement the strategy. Lack of Outcome-Based Performance Measures and Baseline Study Hamper Tracking Progress and Setting Priorities
While DOD’s corrosion strategy includes performance measures and milestones, they are not the outcome-oriented metrics that are needed to successfully monitor the department’s progress in mitigating corrosion and its impacts. However, while the long-term strategy acknowledges the critical importance of developing a baseline of corrosion costs, including those related to safety and readiness, DOD does not plan to complete such a baseline until 2011. While the strategy contains a policy memorandum that sets up a review process for corrosion-related issues for major weapon systems programs (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter), it does not extend this review to non-major weapon systems (e.g., Torpedo Defense System Program) and infrastructure programs. In addition, DOD’s new corrosion strategy does not include any corrosion planning or review requirements for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Focused Logistics Capabilities Board. However, because the strategy falls short of providing the basic elements of an effective management plan, DOD’s ability to implement it successfully remains at risk. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the DOD Comptroller, take the following actions: Establish a date to complete the corrosion baseline study well before its original estimated completion date of 2011 in order that cost-effective resource priorities and results-oriented performance measures can be established to monitor progress in reducing corrosion and its impacts on equipment and infrastructure; Establish a funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy that would be consistent with the strategy’s long-term focus; and Submit to Congress, as part of the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, a report identifying the long-term funding and personnel resources needed to implement the strategy, a status report of corrosion reduction projects funded in fiscal year 2005, and the status of a baseline study. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $20 billion to repair the damage to military equipment and infrastructure caused by corrosion. Furthermore, corrosion profoundly impacts military readiness as well as the safety of military personnel. In the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress directed that DOD develop a long-term corrosion strategy, including specific requirements, and that GAO assess it. DOD submitted its strategy in December 2003. This report assesses the potential of the corrosion strategy (in terms of three elements--resources, performance metrics, and policy guidance) to effectively prevent and mitigate corrosion and its effects on military equipment and infrastructure.
What GAO Found
While DOD's new long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the requirements in the congressional mandate, it falls short of representing a comprehensive plan needed to implement successfully the strategy and manage DOD's extensive corrosion problems in the future. An effective, results-oriented strategy identifies resources required to achieve its goals and outcome-based performance metrics that can measure progress toward achieving those goals. Without addressing certain key elements, the strategy is unlikely to serve as an effective tool in preventing and mitigating corrosion and its effects on military equipment and infrastructure. These shortcomings could lead to the loss of billions of dollars in avoidable maintenance costs and the degradation of safety and readiness. GAO's review of three key elements showed the following. Funding and personnel resources--The strategy does not identify the level of funding and personnel resources needed to implement the corrosion reduction plan in the near- or long-term. Officials in DOD's corrosion office said that resource needs are still being determined and firm estimates should be available in December 2004. However, preliminary projections made by the corrosion task force indicated that the DOD-wide corrosion reduction program would require about $1.9 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. DOD and the services, however, have not included any funds for fiscal year 2004 and less than 10 percent of the task force's fiscal year 2005 estimates. While the strategy calls for a mechanism that ensures sustained, long-term funding, DOD has been using a year-by-year funding approach. Performance measures and milestones--While the strategy includes some performance measures and milestones, they are not the resultsoriented metrics needed to successfully monitor the program's progress. In addition, DOD does not plan to complete a critically needed, corrosion cost baseline study until 2011 because of limited funding. Without results-oriented metrics and a baseline, DOD will not be in a sound position to establish cost-effective resource priorities or monitor progress toward corrosion reduction. Policy guidance--While the strategy strengthens DOD's policy guidance on corrosion prevention and mitigation, improvements can be made. The new guidance establishes a review process for corrosion prevention plans for major weapon systems programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. However, the guidance does not extend the review to non-major weapons systems and infrastructure programs, which are under the purview of the military services. The guidance also does not require the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Review to consider corrosion prevention planning when it reviews project requirements. |
gao_RCED-96-11 | gao_RCED-96-11_0 | 1.) Thus, centralized servicing could reduce staff costs. RHCDS believes the system will substantially lower servicing costs, saving over $100 million per year by fiscal 2000 and each year thereafter. RHCDS officials agree that changing the law to allow direct loan borrowers to refinance their direct loans using RHCDS guaranteed loans, providing incentives, and eliminating policies that prohibit considering loans with balances of less than $5,000 and small subsidy payments for graduation should incrementally improve graduation rates. However, these changes would also likely reduce the number of borrowers of direct RHCDS loans who graduate to private credit. Opportunities for Cost Savings and Management Improvements in the Multifamily Area
RHCDS and others have proposed program changes aimed at reducing the cost of the multifamily program. We and others have also found that the process for funding individual projects for multifamily rental housing does not ensure that the neediest areas receive assistance from the program. Net savings could be achieved by shortening the term of the loan from 50 to 40 years. Eliminate certain equity loans. Each year, RHCDS allocates a portion of its loan program appropriation to fund some of these equity loans. 3.) Opportunities to Reduce Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in the Multifamily Program
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Inspector General (IG) has found instances of fraud, waste, and abuse by a number of participants in the Rural Housing and Community Development Service’s multifamily housing loan program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Rural Housing and Community Development Service's (RHCDS) housing loan programs, focusing on opportunities for cost savings and management improvements in the loan programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RHCDS is improving its loan programs' operations, but improving program delivery could save the federal government money and benefit borrowers and tenants in the programs; (2) centralized servicing of RHCDS loans could save over $100 million per year through staff reductions and greater staff productivity; (3) the number of direct loan program borrowers graduating to private credit could be increased by allowing borrowers to refinance their loans with commercial lenders and considering all loans for graduation, but RHCDS has few mechanisms in place to force loan graduation; (4) RHCDS could reduce multifamily housing program costs by shortening the terms of loans, eliminating certain equity loans made to owners, and funding more projects not requiring rental assistance; and (5) the process used to fund individual projects does not ensure that the neediest areas receive program assistance. |
gao_HEHS-99-64 | gao_HEHS-99-64_0 | Few Data Are Available on Burn Injuries Involving Children’s Sleepwear
The number of burn injuries associated with children’s sleepwear is uncertain, and few data are available. For example, over the period 1990-98, NEISS reported a total of only 13 cases. This included a maximum of four sleepwear cases annually, and in some years, including 1998, no cases were reported at all. Consequently, although the overall risk of injury appears to be small, these data cannot produce precise national estimates, making it difficult or impossible to observe trends in the number of injuries over time. Costly Additional Information Would Be Needed to Draw Firm Conclusions About the Effect of the Changes to the Sleepwear Standard
Without valid and precise information on injuries associated with different types of sleepwear both before and after the amendments, it is not possible to use injury data to draw firm conclusions about the actual effect of the changes to the children’s sleepwear standard. Even if these basic data were available, assessing the effect of the sleepwear standard would be particularly difficult because multiple factors contribute to burn injuries, including the ignition source, the child’s behavior, and the fabric and fit of the child’s clothing. Moreover, using injury information to compare the risks associated with different types of sleepwear (such as snug-fitting cotton versus flame-resistant polyester) would require information on how many consumers actually use each type. In the absence of these key data, and without baseline data for comparison, it is not possible on the basis of injury data to determine whether one type of sleepwear or clothing is truly more hazardous than another. In its response, the agency stated that CPSC’s burn injury data are comprehensive and reliable and demonstrate that children’s burn injuries have not increased since the amendments to the sleepwear standard. CPSC’s data include only 13 observations over 9 years—a period that extends from before the changes to the standard and the stay of enforcement were proposed to 2 years after the amendments were enacted. Without such data, it would be difficult or impossible to distinguish the type of sleepwear associated with the most injuries from the type of sleepwear most commonly used. Comments From the Consumer Product Safety Commission
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the data available on burn injuries to children and the implications of these data for the effect of the recent amendments to the children's sleepwear standard, focusing on: (1) how many burn injuries involving children's sleepwear occurred annually before and after the amendments; and (2) what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from these data about the effect of the changes to the sleepwear standard on the risk of injury.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the exact number of burn injuries associated with children's sleepwear before and after the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) amended its standard is uncertain; (2) although CPSC collects some burn injury data from a sample of hospital emergency rooms, few sleepwear-related injuries are reported annually; (3) for example, over the period 1990-1998, CPSC's sample of about 100 hospital emergency rooms reported a total of only 13 burn injuries that involved children's sleepwear; (4) this included a maximum of four cases in any one year, and in some years, including 1998, no cases were reported at all; (5) consequently, although the overall risk of injury appears to be small, these data cannot produce precise national estimates, making it difficult or impossible to observe trends in the number of injuries over time; (6) even if more precise data were available, it would not be possible to draw firm conclusions from burn injury data about the effect of the changes to the standard without other equally crucial but unobtainable information; (7) assessing the effect of the sleepwear standard would be particularly difficult because multiple factors contribute to burn injuries, including the ignition source, the child's behavior, and the fabric and fit of the child's clothing; (8) furthermore, using injury information to compare the risks associated with different types of sleepwear (such as snug-fitting cotton versus flame-resistant polyester) would also require information on how many consumers actually use each type; (9) without such data, it would be difficult or impossible to distinguish the type of sleepwear associated with the most injuries from the type of sleepwear most commonly used; (10) however, this information was not gathered for the period before the changes in the standard, and it is not yet available for the period since the final changes to the standard were made; and (11) in the absence of these key data, and without baseline data for comparison, it is not possible to determine the effect of the sleepwear amendments on the risk of injury to children. |
gao_GAO-06-981T | gao_GAO-06-981T_0 | Undercover Acquisitions of Sensitive Excess Military Items Identifies National Security Risk
Posing as private citizens, our undercover investigators purchased several sensitive excess military equipment items that were improperly sold to the public at DOD liquidation sales. These items included three ceramic body armor inserts identified as small arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are the ceramic inserts currently in demand by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan; a time selector unit used to ensure the accuracy of computer- based equipment, such as global positioning systems and system-level clocks; 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft; guided missile radar test sets used to check the operation of the data link antenna on the Navy’s Walleye (AGM-62) air-to-ground guided missile; and numerous other electronic items. Our investigators also posed as DOD contractor employees, entered DRMOs in two east coast states, and obtained several other items that are currently in use by the military services. Sensitive Excess Military Items Purchased at DOD Excess Property Liquidation Sales
Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover investigator applied for and received an account with DOD’s liquidation sales contractor. During the undercover penetration at DRMO A, our investigators obtained numerous sensitive military items that were required to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. These items included two guided missile launcher mounts for shoulder-fired missiles, six Kevlar body armor fragmentation vests, a digital signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, and an all- band antenna used to track aircraft. Waste Associated with Sales of A- Condition Excess Items that Military Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations
Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items still being purchased or in use by the military services are being disposed of through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover investigator to pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase several of these items for a fraction of what the military services are paying to obtain these same items from DLA supply depots. However, as demonstrated by our tests of security controls over sensitive excess military equipment, DOD does not yet have effective controls in place to prevent unauthorized parties from obtaining these items. Further, liquidation sales of items that military units are continuing to purchase at full cost from supply inventory demonstrates continuing waste to the taxpayer and inefficiency in DOD’s excess property reutilization program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of GAO's past three testimonies and two reports on problems with controls over excess DOD property, GAO was asked to perform follow-up investigations to determine if (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military services.
What GAO Found
GAO investigators posing as private citizens purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency counter, two guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including two launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and six circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO's warehouse security penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency. |
gao_GAO-04-879 | gao_GAO-04-879_0 | The Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) is responsible for administering IDEA. Education’s system for monitoring state compliance with IDEA has been evolving for more than 5 years. To Monitor Compliance with IDEA, Education Uses a Risk-Based System That Relies Upon State-Provided Information
Education uses a risk-based system to focus its monitoring efforts, but some data it uses are weak. However, some of the data are not uniformly measured or are difficult for states to collect. Education has identified areas of IDEA noncompliance through these screens. Education identified a total of 253 noncompliance findings in 30 of the 31 states visited during this period, with an average of approximately 8 findings per state. Our analysis showed that 52 percent of the findings involved state failures to directly ensure that students were receiving required special education services. The remaining 48 percent of Education’s findings were for compliance failures that we classified as procedural in nature, that is, activities that did not directly provide or immediately facilitate a service to students. The department has also made limited use of sanctions to address longstanding issues with noncompliance, but in these cases, too, resolution has been protracted. State officials commented, and Education officials confirmed, that this standard 1-year timeframe for correction may not, in some cases, provide an adequate period of time in which to implement a remedy and demonstrate its effectiveness. To Effect Compliance, Education Typically Provided Technical Assistance and Required State Correction Plans, but Most Cases of Noncompliance Remained Open for Years without Resolution
To resolve the deficiencies identified in 30 of the 31 states visited from 1997-2002, Education offered technical assistance to states and required them to develop corrective action plans and submit them to the department for approval. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Education develop and provide states with additional guidance for collecting and reporting three measures that Education considers key to positive outcomes for students with disabilities: early childhood transitions, post-secondary transitions, and parental involvement; expedite the resolution of noncompliance by improving response times throughout the monitoring process, particularly in reporting noncompliance findings to states, and track changes in response times under the new monitoring process; impose firm and realistic deadlines for states to remedy findings of noncompliance; and when correction of noncompliance is expected to take more than 1 year, make greater use of Education’s authority to initiate compliance agreement proceedings rather than imposing special conditions on grants. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
As requested, our review focused on the Department of Education’s monitoring of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Part B, those aspects of the law that regulate the provision of services to disabled school-aged and preschool children. While in each state, we analyzed state monitoring documents and met with officials at states’ Departments of Education, including the State Directors of Special Education and members of their staff responsible for monitoring efforts. We interviewed these officials about their experiences with Education’s monitoring processes and gathered information about the systems used by their states to monitor local compliance with IDEA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) ensures the education of the nation's disabled children. As a condition of receiving IDEA funds, states must provide educational and related services that facilitate learning to students with disabilities based on their individual needs. The Department of Education (Education) is responsible for ensuring state compliance with the law. In recent years, questions have been raised about Education's oversight of IDEA. GAO agreed to determine how Education monitors state compliance with IDEA for children aged 3-21, the extent and nature of noncompliance found, and how Education has ensured that noncompliance is resolved once identified. GAO analyzed Education monitoring documents, interviewed state and federal officials, and visited 5 state special education offices.
What GAO Found
To monitor compliance with IDEA provisions that affect children aged 3-21, Education annually reviews special education data submitted by all states and uses a risk-based approach to identify those states in need of further inspection. This monitoring system relies upon collaboration with states, as each state is responsible for assessing and reporting its performance on the provision of special education services. However, some of the data used by Education, such as information about how parents are included in their children's education and students' experiences after they leave school, are weak in that they are not uniformly measured or are difficult for states to collect. In states Education visited for further inspection from 1997-2002, the department identified roughly equal amounts of noncompliance for failing to adequately provide services to students as noncompliance for not adhering to IDEA's procedural regulations, according to GAO analysis. Education found a total of 253 compliance failures in 30 of the 31 states visited during this period, with an average of approximately 8 across the 30 states. GAO found 52 percent of compliance failures to be directly related to providing student services, for instance counseling and speech therapy. The remaining 48 percent involved a failure to meet certain IDEA procedural requirements. Once deficiencies were identified, Education has sought resolution by providing states with technical assistance and requiring them to develop corrective action plans that would ensure compliance within 1 year. However, GAO found that most cases of noncompliance had remained open for 2 to 7 years before closure, and some cases still remain open. GAO's examination of Education documents showed that a considerable amount of time elapsed in each phase of the correction process, including Education's issuance of noncompliance findings and approval of correction plans. On occasion, Education has also made use of sanctions to address longstanding issues with noncompliance, but in these cases, too, resolution has been protracted. States expressed concerns about the standard 1-year timeframe Education imposes for correction, and Education officials acknowledged that it is sometimes not feasible for states to remedy noncompliance and demonstrate effectiveness in that length of time. |
gao_GAO-15-50 | gao_GAO-15-50_0 | A QRT conducts individual quality reviews of claims processors’ work for performance assessment purposes. In 2013, VBA revised its approach and began using questionnaires as its primary means for assessing consistency. VBA’s Approach to Measuring and Reporting Accuracy of Claim Decisions Has Limitations
VBA Does Not Follow Accepted Statistical Practices and Thus Generates Imprecise Accuracy Data
When calculating accuracy rates, VBA does not always follow generally accepted statistical practices. For example, VBA does not weight the results of its STAR reviews to reflect its approach to selecting claims by regional office, which can affect the accuracy of estimates. 1). 2). According to our analysis of fiscal year 2013 regional office workload and accuracy results, VBA could reduce the overall number of claims it reviews annually by about 39 percent (over 5,000 claims) and still achieve its desired precision for its regional office accuracy estimates. More efficient sampling could allow VBA to select fewer cases for review and free up limited resources for other important quality assurance activities, such as additional targeted accuracy reviews on specific types of error-prone or complex claims. Such underrepresentation may inflate VBA’s reported accuracy rate because redistributed claims have historically had lower accuracy rates than non-redistributed claims. Further, VA has not explained in public reports that its accuracy measures are estimates that have distinct confidence intervals and limitations. VBA Has Enhanced and Coordinated Its Quality Assurance Activities, Though Gaps in Implementation May Limit Their Effectiveness
VBA Has Taken Steps to Enhance and Coordinate Key Quality Assurance Activities
In addition to its STAR reviews, VBA’s quality assurance framework includes other complementary activities, which have been enhanced to help meet its goal of 98 percent accuracy in fiscal year 2015. In addition, at the four offices we contacted, quality reviewers are available to answer questions and provide guidance to claims processors as needed. VBA also has taken steps to coordinate its quality assurance efforts in several ways, such as systematically disseminating information on national accuracy and consistency results and trends to regional office management and QRTs, which in turn share this information with claims processing staff. Pre-testing is a generally accepted practice in sound questionnaire development for examining the clarity of questions or the validity of the questionnaire results. Guidance: Federal internal control standards highlight the need for pertinent information being captured and distributed in a form that allows people to perform their duties efficiently. This, in turn, could affect the accuracy with which they decide claims. Finally, VBA’s efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of its quality assurance activities have been limited. Also, VBA identified 13 regional offices whose issue-based accuracy rates improved between the first and third quarters of fiscal year 2014, attributing these improvements to actions taken by However, it was not clear quality assurance staff in fiscal year 2014.from the documentation VBA provided whether and how it monitored the effectiveness of these actions for all regional offices. With respect to consistency studies, VBA also has not evaluated—and lacks plans to evaluate—the efficacy of using consistency questionnaires relative to the more resource-intensive IRR studies. VBA has enhanced and coordinated other aspects of its quality assurance framework, but shortcomings in implementation and evaluation detract from their overall effectiveness. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the quality of VBA’s disability compensation claim decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to:
Leverage appropriate expertise to help VBA do each of the following: weight its accuracy estimates to reflect the sample design for determine and report the confidence intervals associated with its reported accuracy estimates; and re-examine its approach to calculating the regional office sample size for STAR. Review the multiple sources of policy guidance VBA provides to determine ways to consolidate them or otherwise improve their availability and accessibility for use by staff in regional offices. Regarding our recommendation to take steps to ensure that any future upgrades to local data systems allow QRTs to pause the claims process when errors are detected and enable QRTs to better track error trends, VA stated that VBA is designing a new database that will incorporate all types of quality reviews (i.e., regional office reviews, STAR, and consistency studies) and provide VBA with more data analysis capabilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the extent to which the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) effectively measures and reports the accuracy of compensation claim decision-making, and (2) whether VBA’s other quality assurance activities are coordinated and effective. Review of Systematic Technical Accuracy Review (STAR)
To assess VBA’s measurement and reporting of the accuracy of compensation claim decision-making, we focused on the STAR process for reviewing disability compensation claims that VBA identifies as rating- related—that is, requiring a decision on the claimant’s eligibility for benefits and the monthly benefit amount. Coordination and Effectiveness of Quality Assurance Activities
To determine whether VBA’s quality assurance activities are coordinated and effective, we reviewed VBA quality assurance policies, reports, and guidance to identify key quality assurance activities. At each office, we spoke with service center managers and quality assurance staff, as well as representatives of local veteran service organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a backlog of disability compensation claims, VBA faces difficulties in improving the accuracy and consistency of the claim decisions made by staff in its 57 regional offices. To help achieve its goal of 98 percent accuracy by fiscal year 2015, VBA recently implemented a new way of measuring accuracy and changed several quality assurance activities to assess the accuracy and consistency of decisions and to provide feedback and training to claims processors. GAO was asked to examine VBA's quality assurance activities.
This report evaluates (1) the extent to which VBA effectively measures and reports the accuracy of its disability compensation claim decisions and (2) whether VBA's other quality assurance activities are coordinated and effective. GAO analyzed VBA claims and STAR accuracy data from fiscal year 2013 (the most recent fiscal year for which complete data are available); reviewed relevant federal laws, VBA guidance, and other documents relevant to quality assurance activities; and interviewed VBA staff from headquarters and four VBA regional offices (selected to achieve variety in geography, workload, and accuracy rates), as well as veteran service organization officials.
What GAO Found
The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—within the Department of Veterans Affairs—measures and reports the accuracy of its disability compensation claim decisions in two ways: (1) by claim and (2) by disabling condition, though its approach has limitations. When calculating accuracy rates for either measure through its Systematic Technical Accuracy Review (STAR), VBA does not always follow generally accepted statistical practices, resulting in imprecise performance information. For example, VBA does not adjust its accuracy estimates to reflect that it samples the same number of claims for review from each regional office—despite their varying workloads—and thus produces imprecise estimates of national and regional accuracy. Further, VBA reviews about 39 percent (over 5,000) more claims nationwide than is necessary to achieve its desired precision in reported accuracy rates, thereby diverting limited resources from other important quality assurance activities, such as targeted reviews of error-prone cases. In addition to issues with its statistical practices, VBA's process for selecting claims for STAR review creates an underrepresentation of claims that are moved between regional offices, which may inflate accuracy estimates because these claims have had historically lower accuracy rates. Finally, VBA has not clearly explained in public reports the differences in how its two accuracy measures are calculated or their associated limitations, as suggested by best practices for federal performance reporting.
VBA has taken steps to enhance and coordinate its other quality assurance activities, but GAO found shortcomings in how VBA is implementing and evaluating these activities. To improve local accuracy, VBA created regional office quality review teams (QRTs) with staff dedicated primarily to performing local accuracy reviews. QRTs assess individual claims processor performance and conduct special reviews to forestall certain types of errors. In addition, VBA began using questionnaires for assessing decision-making consistency, which are more efficient to administer than VBA's prior approach to conducting consistency studies. VBA also coordinates quality assurance efforts by disseminating national accuracy and consistency results, trends, and related guidance to regional offices for use in training claims processors. Further, VBA uses STAR results to inform other quality assurance activities, such as focusing certain QRT reviews on commonly made errors. However, GAO identified implementation shortcomings that may detract from the effectiveness of VBA's quality assurance activities. For example, contrary to accepted practices for ensuring the clarity and validity of questionnaires, VBA did not pre-test its consistency questionnaires to ensure the clarity of questions or validity of the expected results, although VBA officials indicated that they plan to do so for future questionnaires. In contrast with federal internal control standards that call for capturing and distributing information in a form that allows people to efficiently perform their duties, staff in the four regional offices that we visited had trouble finding the guidance they needed to do their work, which could affect the accuracy as well as the speed with which staff decide claims. Federal standards also call for knowing the value of efforts such as quality assurance activities and monitoring their performance over time; however, VBA has not evaluated the effect of its special QRT reviews or certain consistency studies on improving targeted accuracy rates, and lacks clear plans to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations to VA to improve its measurement and reporting of accuracy, review the multiple sources of policy guidance available to claims processors, enhance local data systems, and evaluate the effectiveness of quality assurance activities. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-522 | gao_GAO-13-522_0 | The postpayment claims review process involves selection of the claims to be reviewed, the review itself, communicating with providers during and about the review, and a process for assuring quality of the contractor’s reviews and decisions. If the contractor requires additional documentation, the provider must submit the requested documents within a specified time frame. Other contractors that review claims are given a set amount of funding to conduct reviews. Changes in Medicare’s Contracting Authority Resulted in Four Medicare FFS Contractor Types
Although contractors have been used for Medicare since the beginning of the program, several statutory changes since the 1990’s increased CMS’s resources and authority to use new types of contractors—MACs, RAs, ZPICs, and CERT contractors—to conduct postpayment claims reviews in order to help detect and recoup overpayments or repay underpayments, and to investigate potential fraud. Although HHS had begun estimating the extent of improper payments in Medicare FFS claims in 1996, the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) requires executive-branch federal agencies to annually review all programs and activities to identify those that are susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the annual amount of improper payments for these programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce improper payments for programs with estimates that exceed $10 million. In fiscal year 2003 as part of its IPIA compliance efforts, CMS established the CERT program to measure improper payment rates for Medicare FFS claims, including one CERT contractor that is responsible for reviewing a random sample of claims nationwide, with their related medical records and other documentation to determine if they are proper. ZPICs. not make recoupments or repayments. RAs. As in the demonstration, under the national program the RAs are paid on a contingency fee basis, but CMS officials indicated that the percentage is smaller. The RAs conducted nearly five times as many complex reviews in fiscal year 2012 as the other three contractors combined—over 1.1 million complex postpayment claims reviews and nearly 1 million automated review denials. However, the 2.3 million reviews performed by these contractors accounted for less than 1 percent of the over 1 billion FFS claims paid annually, and about 1.4 million were complex reviews. Many CMS Requirements for Postpayment Claims Review Differ across Contractor Types, Which Can Impede Effectiveness and Efficiency
CMS has different requirements for postpayment claims reviews across different contractor types, and some of these differences can sometimes impede effectiveness and efficiency by increasing administrative burden on providers. Due in part to CMS’s experience with the RA demonstration and issues raised by providers during the demonstration, CMS sets more limits through claims review requirements on RAs than on other contractors. CMS has begun an effort to examine whether its claims reviews activities add administrative burden for providers. Other requirements unique to the RAs include submitting to CMS for review and approval descriptions of the billing issues that they propose to review and the basis for assessing whether the claims for those services are proper prior to widespread use, posting notice of billing issues targeted for postpayment review on reimbursing certain providers for the expense entailed in providing requested medical records, making claims reviewers’ credentials available upon provider request, providing access to RA staff physicians for discussion of claim denials upon provider request, and giving providers 40 days to request an opportunity to provide additional documentation to the contractor and informally discuss any revision prior to having to file an appeal. Other Differences in CMS Requirements across Contractors Can Impede Effectiveness and Efficiency by Complicating Providers’ Responses to and Understanding of Claims Reviews
Many of the other requirements CMS developed for postpayment review activities, including documentation submission, staffing, and quality assurance, vary across the four contractor types. According to CMS officials, differences in requirements generally developed because the contracts or requirements were written at different times by staff within different parts of CMS, or the contractors’ functions and activities have changed over time. In addition, ensuring consistency in common processes is consistent with OMB guidance on streamlining service delivery and a strong control environment. Conclusions
Differences in CMS’s postpayment claims review requirements for the four types of contractors may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of claims reviews by complicating providers’ compliance with the requirements. In addition, some of these differences could have come about because different types of contractors and associated requirements are managed by different parts of CMS. We recommend that the Administrator of CMS: 1. examine all postpayment review requirements for contractors to determine those that could be made more consistent without negative effects on program integrity, 2. communicate publicly CMS’s findings and its time frame for taking 3. reduce differences in postpayment review requirements where it can be done without impeding the efficiency of its efforts to reduce improper payments. In its comments, HHS concurred with our three recommendations and agreed to take steps to reduce differences in postpayment review requirements where appropriate. HHS indicated that standardizing the minimum number of days a contractor must give a provider to respond to an ADR before the contractor has the authority to deny the claim could help minimize provider confusion. Appendix I: List of Provider Associations GAO Interviewed
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Related GAO Products
GAO’s 2013 High-Risk Update: Medicare and Medicaid. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, CMS estimated that $32.4 billion in Medicare FFS payments were improper. CMS uses several types of contractors to conduct postpayment claims reviews to identify improper payments. Recently, questions have been raised about the efficiency and effectiveness of these contractors' efforts and the administrative burden on providers. This report (1) describes these contractors and (2) assesses the extent to which requirements for postpayment claims reviews differ across the contractors and whether differences, if any, could impede effective and efficient claims reviews. GAO reviewed CMS's requirements for claims reviews in manuals and contracts, interviewed CMS officials and selected provider associations, and assessed the requirements against internal control standards and executive-agency guidance on streamlining service delivery. GAO also obtained data on numbers of claims reviewed, and appealed.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) contractors that conduct postpayment reviews on Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims were established by different legislative actions; are managed by different offices within CMS; and serve different functions in the program. These contractors include (1) Medicare Administrative Contractors that process and pay claims and are responsible for taking actions to reduce payment errors in their jurisdictions; (2) Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC) that investigate potential fraud, which can result in referrals to law enforcement or administrative actions; (3) Recovery Auditors (RA) tasked to identify improper payments on a postpayment basis; and (4) the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) contractor that reviews a sample of claims nationwide and related documentation to determine a national Medicare FFS improper payment rate. All four types of contractors conduct complex reviews, in which the contractor examines medical records and other documentation sent by providers to determine if the claims meet Medicare coverage and payment requirements. RAs are paid fees contingent on the amount of the claims that are found improper and recouped or adjusted, whereas the other contractors' reimbursement is not dependent on the amount of their claims reviews. The RAs conducted almost five times as many reviews as the other three contractors combined. Overall, compared to over one 1 billion claims processed in 2012, all four types of contractors combined reviewed less than one 1 percent of claims, about 1.4 million reviews, for which providers might be contacted to send in medical records or other documentation.
Although postpayment claims reviews involve the same general process regardless of which type of contractor conducts them, CMS has different requirements for many aspects of the process across these four contractor types. Some of these differences may impede efficiency and effectiveness of claims reviews by increasing administrative burden for providers. There are differences in oversight of claims selection, time frames for providers to send in documentation, communications to providers about the reviews, reviewer staffing, and processes to ensure the quality of claims reviews. For example, while the CERT contractor must give a provider 75 days to respond to a request for documentation before it can find the claim improper due to lack of documentation, the ZPIC is only required to give the provider 30 days. CMS places more limits on the RAs in its requirements for reviews conducted by them than by other contractors. For example, RAs must submit the criteria that they will use to determine if a service is paid improperly to CMS for approval. The additional requirements for RAs are due in part to CMS's experience during an initial demonstration testing the use of RAs. CMS officials indicated that other requirement differences across contractors generally developed due to setting requirements at different times by staff in different parts of the agency. Providers indicated that some differences hindered their understanding of and compliance with the claims review process. Having inefficient processes that complicate compliance can reduce effectiveness of claims reviews, and is inconsistent with executive-agency guidelines to streamline service delivery and with having a strong internal control environment. CMS has begun to examine differences in requirements across contractors, but did not provide information on any specific changes being considered or a time frame for action.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS (1) examine all contractor postpayment review requirements to determine those that could be made more consistent, (2) communicate its findings and time frame for taking action, and (3) reduce differences where it can be done without impeding efforts to reduce improper payments. In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations, agreed to reduce differences in postpayment review requirements where appropriate, and noted that CMS had begun examining these requirements. |
gao_GAO-13-306 | gao_GAO-13-306_0 | CPSC Has Used Various Approaches to Inform the Public about SaferProducts.gov, but Has Not Established Metrics to Assess Its Efforts
CPSC’s efforts to promote SaferProducts.gov formed part of a larger effort to increase the public’s awareness of the agency. Officials said that media stories promoting the use of SaferProducts.gov have had the benefit of promoting CPSC as a resource not only for information about product recalls (for which the agency is most commonly known), but also as a place where consumers can raise concerns about the safety of consumer products. Before launching SaferProducts.gov, CPSC hosted a web conference on January 11, 2011, to inform interested stakeholders such as consumer groups and the public about the site’s search function and the information required to submit an incident report.2011, CPSC promoted the new website through print and other media. However, CPSC does not collect any data about who is using the site to search for information. In particular, CPSC has not sought to collect demographic data, such as age, gender, or income. In mandating this report, Congress required us to assess whether a broad range of the public uses the site. CPSC collects some data about the categories of persons using SaferProducts.gov to submit incident reports but does not collect additional data such as age, gender, or income level of the submitters or others who use the site to search for information. In addition, standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies should have timely, relevant information for management decision-making purposes.result of its limited data collection about users of the site, CPSC has been limited in its ability to target its marketing and outreach efforts on specific groups, populations, or areas to achieve the goal of increasing use of the site. During the usability tests, consumers experienced fewer challenges using the reporting function than the search function. For example, some consumers found information about product recalls the most useful component of the site and said they would give more weight to this information. Although CPSC has employed many of the key practices for consumer education planning, it has not established metrics to measure the success of its efforts. By establishing such metrics, the agency would be better able to determine which of its outreach efforts had the most impact on increasing awareness and use of the site and thus could more effectively target its limited resources to increase use of the site. By improving the site in these areas, CPSC could help ensure that consumers take advantage of all the features of the site and are able to search for and report information in an easy and convenient manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the awareness, use, and usefulness of SaferProducts.gov, CPSC should take the following three actions: establish and incorporate metrics to assess efforts to increase awareness and use of SaferProducts.gov, look for cost-effective ways of gathering additional data about the users and their use of SaferProducts.gov, and implement cost-effective usability improvements to SaferProducts.gov, taking into account the results of any existing usability testing or any new testing CPSC may choose to conduct. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) efforts to inform the public about SaferProducts.gov, (2) who has been using the website and to what extent, and (3) the extent to which consumers have found the website to be useful. In addition, we reviewed various other website usability resources and criteria, including Usability.gov, to understand the key practices for making websites easy to use and helpful. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of increased product recalls in 2007-2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA). Among other things, CPSIA required CPSC to establish a database on the safety of consumer products that is publicly available, searchable, and accessible through the CPSC website. In response, CPSC launched SaferProducts.gov (http:// www.saferproducts.gov ) in March 2011, which has two main functions--to provide (1) a mechanism for online reporting of product safety issues and (2) the ability to search for these issues or others, such as recalls. CPSIA also required GAO to study the general utility of the website. This report examines (1) CPSC's efforts to inform the public about SaferProducts.gov, (2) who is using the website and to what extent, and (3) the extent to which consumers have found the website to be useful. To do this, GAO analyzed agency documents and data from 2011 to 2012; interviewed CPSC officials, researchers, and consumer and industry groups; reviewed federal standards, guidance, and best practices for website usability; and conducted website usability tests with 37 consumers in three locations.
What GAO Found
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has used various approaches to inform the public about SaferProducts.gov, including using social media, public service announcements, and printed materials, and promoting the site during speeches and events. CPSC's efforts to inform the public about SaferProducts.gov have been part of a larger effort to raise awareness about the agency as a whole. While CPSC has employed many key practices for consumer education planning, it has not established metrics for measuring the success of its efforts. Without such metrics, the agency cannot determine which efforts have had the most impact on increasing awareness and use of the site.
While CPSC collects some data on the category of persons, such as consumers or health care professionals, who submit reports (one of the main functions of the site), it does not collect data about who is using the site to search for information (the other main function). In addition, to minimize the reporting burden on users, CPSC has not asked for demographic data about the users (such as their age, gender, or income level). Therefore, it was difficult for GAO to assess, as mandated by Congress, whether a broad range of the public has used the site. Moreover, without such data, CPSC has been limited in its ability to target its marketing and outreach efforts to increase use of the site.
Many consumers in GAO's usability tests thought the site generally was easy to use and had helpful information, but identified areas for improvement. The consumers generally could perform basic searches and follow instructions to report an unsafe product, and although none were aware of the site before the tests, most said they would use the site again. However, some of the search functions posed challenges. In addition, some consumers expressed concern about registering with the site and said this might prevent them from completing a report. Other consumers were not clear about the site's purpose, thinking it would focus on safe rather than unsafe products. By addressing the usability challenges GAO identified, CPSC could help users take full advantage of all the available features of SaferProducts.gov. Furthermore, cost-effective federal resources exist across the government to help agencies improve the usefulness of their sites.
What GAO Recommends
CPSC should (1) establish and incorporate metrics to assess efforts to increase awareness and use of SaferProducts.gov, (2) look for cost-effective ways of gathering additional data about site use, and (3) implement cost-effective usability improvements to the site. CPSC supported these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-599T | gao_GAO-02-599T_0 | Highlights of Major Issues Relating to the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2000
As I mentioned earlier, as has been the case for the past 4 fiscal years, a significant number of material weaknesses related to financial systems, fundamental recordkeeping and financial reporting, and incomplete documentation continued to (1) hamper the government’s ability to accurately report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs, (2) affect the government’s ability to accurately measure the full cost and financial performance of certain programs and effectively manage related operations, and (3) significantly impair the government’s ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions. Also, disclosure of certain financial information was not presented in the consolidated financial statements in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Our reports have engendered major improvements in internal control. | What GAO Found
As in the past four years, GAO was unable to express an opinion on the federal government's consolidated financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 because of material weaknesses in internal control and accounting and reporting issues. These conditions prevented GAO from providing Congress and American citizens with an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements are fairly stated in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Until these problems are adequately addressed, the government will continue to have difficulty (1) reporting its assets, liabilities, and costs; (2) adequately measuring the full cost and financial performance of programs and effectively manage related operations; and (3) adequately safeguarding significant assets and and properly recording transactions. |
gao_GAO-14-89 | gao_GAO-14-89_0 | State Veterans’ Nursing Homes Provided Care for over Half of VA’s Total Nursing Home Workload, and Workload in All Three Settings Was Mostly Long Stay
Of the three VA nursing home settings, state veterans’ nursing homes provided care for just over half of VA’s nursing home workload in fiscal year 2012. CLCs provided care for 28 percent of the total workload, and community nursing homes provided care for 19 percent of the workload. Workload in All Three Nursing Home Settings Was Primarily Long Stay
Overall, long-stay care accounted for nearly 90 percent of VA’s total nursing home workload in fiscal year 2012 (31,750 of the 36,250 residents for whom VA provided or paid for care each day), and long-stay care accounted for at least three-quarters of all workload in each of VA’s three nursing home settings. Discretionary Veterans and Veterans Age 65 to 84 Accounted for Most of VA’s Nursing Home Workload
Nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of VA’s nursing home care in fiscal year 2012 was provided to discretionary veterans, while just over one-third (35 percent) was provided to mandatory veterans. State veterans’ nursing homes provided the highest proportion of discretionary care compared to the other nursing home settings— 84 percent of workload in state veterans’ nursing homes was for care provided on a discretionary basis, compared to 48 percent of workload in CLCs and just 18 percent in community nursing homes. However, VA does not currently publish data on nursing home workload disaggregated by length of stay and resident characteristics in its budget justification. Seventy-one percent ($3.5 billion) of VA’s total expenditures was spent on care provided in CLCs (see fig. Conversely, VA spent 16 percent (about $800 million) for nursing home care in state veterans’ nursing homes, although state veterans’ nursing homes accounted for 53 percent of VA’s nursing home workload. However, VA does not currently include expenditure data disaggregated by length of stay and resident characteristics in its budget justification, and therefore does not provide information on unit costs to the maximum extent possible as encouraged by OMB to justify staffing and other requirements. As a result, congressional stakeholders have incomplete information on the budget that is approved for VA nursing home care, including the proportion of expenditures that is allocated for long-stay and short-stay care, as well as expenditures by resident characteristics. The lack of such information could hinder congressional decision making and oversight of budgeting of VA nursing home care staffing and resource needs for care, which accounts for a significant portion of VA’s health care budget and serves a vulnerable population. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide more complete data for Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs supplement nursing home workload and expenditure data currently included in VA’s budget justification with the following information:
Average daily census by length of stay and resident characteristics, including veterans’ eligibility status and age. In its written comments—reproduced in appendix IX—VA concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will provide supplemental data on both nursing home workload and expenditures by length of stay and resident characteristics upon release of its fiscal year 2015 budget. Appendix I: Percentage of Nursing Home Workload by Network and Setting, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix II: Percentage of Nursing Home Workload by Network and Length of Stay, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix III: Percentage of Nursing Home Workload by Network and Eligibility Status, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix IV: Percentage of Nursing Home Workload by Network and Resident Age, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix V: Percentage of Nursing Home Expenditures by Network and Setting, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix VI: Percentage of Nursing Home Expenditures by Network and Length of Stay, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix VII: Percentage of Nursing Home Expenditures by Network and Eligibility Status, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix VIII: Percentage of Nursing Home Expenditures by Network and Resident Age, Fiscal Year 2012
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, James C. Musselwhite, Assistant Director; Iola D’Souza; Linda Galib; Drew Long; and Hemi Tewarson made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, about $4.9 billion of VAs $54 billion health care services budget was spent on nursing home care. To inform Congress of its budgeting priorities, VA prepares a budget justification, which is reviewed by OMB, that includes data on nursing home workload and expenditures in the three settings. VA also collects data on length of stay (long- and short-stay) and resident characteristics, including eligibility status, as VA is required to pay for mandatory veterans nursing home care and may pay for discretionary care as resources permit. These data are important for Congress to understand how funding is allocated for long- and short-stay care and for residents in each setting.
GAO was asked to examine VAs nursing home program. Among other things, GAO examined (1) VAs nursing home workload in each setting, by length of stay and resident characteristics; and (2) VAs expenditures for nursing home care in each setting, by length of stay and resident characteristics. GAO analyzed VA nursing home workload and expenditure data, including fiscal year 2012, by setting, length of stay, and resident characteristics; and interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2012, the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) nursing home workload--the average number of veterans receiving nursing home care per day--was 36,250 across all of the three nursing home settings in which VA provided or paid for veterans' nursing home care. The three settings include Community Living Centers (CLCs), which are VA-owned and operated; community nursing homes with which VA contracts to provide care for veterans; and state veterans' nursing homes, which are owned and operated by states. Over half (53 percent) of this workload was provided in state veterans' nursing homes, 28 percent in CLCs, and 19 percent in community nursing homes. Nearly 90 percent of total workload was long-stay (91 days or more for residents with chronic conditions), and at least 75 percent of care provided in each of VA's three settings was long-stay. In addition, 62 percent of VA's total workload was provided to discretionary veterans (those veterans without certain levels of service-connected disabilities).
In fiscal year 2012, VA spent $3.5 billion (71 percent) of its total nursing home expenditures on care provided in CLCs, 16 percent in state veterans' nursing homes and 13 percent in community nursing homes. Seventy-five percent of total spending was for long-stay care, and at least 70 percent of spending in each setting was for long-stay care. About half of total VA spending was for discretionary veterans.
GAO found that VA does not provide nursing home workload and expenditure data by length of stay and resident characteristics in its budget justification, although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) encourages agencies to provide such information to the maximum extent possible to justify staffing and other requirements and improve congressional decision making. As a result, VA does not provide complete information, which could hinder Congress' budgeting and oversight of VA's nursing home staffing and resource requirements.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance congressional oversight of VA's nursing home program, GAO recommends that VA supplement data currently included in its budget justification with workload and expenditures by length of stay and resident characteristics. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated it will provide these data upon release of its fiscal year 2015 budget. |
gao_GAO-08-409 | gao_GAO-08-409_0 | Software. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)/Warfighter Information Network- Tactical (WIN-T). Software will be used to control how JTRS radios will work. Unclear If or When the Army Can Develop, Build, and Demonstrate the FCS Network
The Army is faced with significant management and technological challenges that place development of the FCS network at risk. Among others, network risks include: Enterprise network performance and scalability. The development of waveforms remains a technically challenging and lengthy effort, which involves complex software development and integration work. Compounding this inherent difficulty on FCS were the program’s poorly defined requirements, indicative of its immaturity. Since May 2003, projected SLOCs have increased by 61.4 million to an estimated 95.1 million lines of computer software code, almost triple in size compared to original estimates. Army officials maintain that these increases will not have a major impact on the program. Taking the latest code estimate into consideration, the total size of FCS’s software is about four times larger than the next largest software-intensive defense programs. Seventy-five percent of the FCS software is being developed by 14 software developers (all certified at CMMI level 3 or above) who are developing 52 major software packages. The continuing evolution of FCS system-level requirements, including that caused by Army decisions on what it can afford to develop, and the aggressive pace of the program, are causing disruptions at the software developer level. The growth results in requirements provided to software developers that are poorly defined, late, or unstable. Uncertainty about Network Development and Demonstration Present Challenges for Decisionmakers at Key Program Events
It is unclear if network requirements, including software to be developed, will be adequately defined and designs completed at the preliminary design review scheduled for February 2009. At the time of the FCS milestone review in 2009, the extent of network demonstration is expected to be very limited. Major Demonstration of FCS Network Scheduled in 2012 after Vehicle Designs Are Set
The first major demonstration of the FCS network is limited user test 3 scheduled for fiscal year 2012, which will be at least a year after critical design review and about a year before the start of low-rate initial production for the core FCS program scheduled to begin in 2013. One of the key objectives of that test will be to use FCS prototypes to identify the contributions and limitations of the network on the ability of the FCS brigade combat team to conduct missions across the full spectrum of operations. This is a significant risk as the software, which supports the information network, is critical to the design and performance of the platforms and is expected to control about 95 percent of FCS’s functionality. Conclusions
The advanced information network is the linchpin to the Army’s FCS concept; yet, it is unclear whether, how, or when the Army will be able to demonstrate that the network performs as needed. However, network and software requirements are not yet stable at the system level and below, which has caused rework and deferred functionality. We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in setting expectations for the 2009 milestone review, include a thorough analysis of network technical feasibility and risks, synchronization of network development and demonstration with that of other elements of FCS such as the manned ground vehicles, and a reconciliation of the differences between independent and Army estimates of network and software development scope and cost. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s network and software challenges and technological risks, assess whether disciplined software practices have been effectively implemented, and determine whether the Army will have the necessary network and software at key program events, we interviewed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; officials from the Army’s Software Engineering Directorate; and Lead Systems Integrator One Team contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS) requires a software-based advanced information network to meld people, sensors, and weapons into a cohesive fighting force. As software controls 95 percent of FCS's functionality, it determines the success or failure of the program. The Army contracted with the Boeing Company as a lead systems integrator (LSI) to define, develop and integrate FCS, including software development. GAO must by law report annually on FCS. This is one of two reports to meet this requirement. It addresses risks facing the development of network and software, the practices being used to manage software, and the timing of key network demonstrations. In conducting our work, GAO has contacted numerous DOD, Army, and contractor offices; reviewed technical documents on software and network development and plans; attended meetings; and spoken to Army and other officials on various aspects of FCS network and software development. GAO also performed detailed work at five FCS software developers.
What GAO Found
Almost 5 years into the program, it is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated by the Army and LSI. Significant management and technical challenges have placed development of the network and software at risk. These risks include, among others, network performance and scalability, immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS with Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter Information Network Tactical programs that have significant technical challenges of their own. Software being developed for the network and platforms is projected to total 95.1 million lines of computer code, almost triple the size since the program began in 2003. FCS's software is about four times larger than the next two largest software-intensive defense programs. Although several disciplined practices are being used to develop FCS's network and software, the program's immaturity and aggressive pace during development have delayed requirements development at the software developer level. For example, software developers for 5 major software packages that GAO reviewed report that high-level requirements provided to them were poorly defined, late, or omitted in the development process. This caused the software developers to do rework or defer functionality out to future builds. In turn, these poor or late requirements had a cascading effect that caused other software development efforts to be delayed. It is unclear when or how it can be demonstrated that the FCS network will work as needed, especially at key program junctures. For example, in 2009, network requirements, including software, may not be adequately defined nor designs completed at the preliminary design review; and at the FCS milestone review later that year, network demonstration is expected to be very limited. The first major FCS network demonstration--the limited user test in 2012--will take place at least a year after the critical design review and only a year before the start of FCS production. That test will seek to identify the impact of the contributions and limitations of the network on the ability to conduct missions. This test will be conducted after the designs have been set for the FCS ground vehicles, which poses risks because the designs depend on the network's performance. A full demonstration of the network with all of its software components will not be demonstrated until at least 2013 when the fully automated battle command system is expected to be ready. |
gao_GAO-06-326 | gao_GAO-06-326_0 | Federal law requires that registered sex offenders be tracked on a national and state level; however, parolees are generally monitored and supervised by each state. It also does not include all registered sex offenders, as states have had varying degrees of difficulty submitting their records to the NSOR because of technical problems, lack of resources, or inability to provide the required FBI number for certain offenders. Because there is no national data source on parolees that includes address information, we also obtained parolee databases from the eight states we reviewed and identified 204 offenders on parole for non-sex offenses living in long-term care facilities. The risk of abuse within nursing homes or ICFs-MR by residents with prior convictions is unclear because states we reviewed do not report the prior convictions of residents who commit abuse; however, facility administrators we interviewed more frequently expressed concern about the potential for abuse by residents with cognitive impairments or mental illness than by residents with prior convictions. Most Sex Offenders Identified Were Male, Were under Age 65, and Resided in a Small Number of Nursing Homes and ICFs- MR
Using the NSOR, we identified 683 registered sex offenders living in long- term care facilities during 2005, representing about 0.05 percent of the total 1.5 million residents of nursing homes and ICFs-MR. (See app. Of the approximately 16,000 nursing homes and 6,600 ICFs-MR that participate in Medicare or Medicaid, we identified 3 percent of nursing homes (470) and 0.7 percent of ICFs-MR (46) as housing at least 1 registered sex offender during 2005. The NSOR included about 57 percent of sex offenders registered in these states, with submission rates ranging from 1 to 83 percent. For example, Utah had submitted about 1 percent of its registry to the NSOR. States Required to Notify Community about Registered Sex Offenders, but Extent of Notification Varies
Federal law requires state law enforcement agencies to release relevant information about registered sex offenders when necessary to protect the public, but we did not identify a similar federal requirement pertaining to the parolee population. Consequently, the extent to which states’ community notification laws apply to all registered sex offenders or explicitly include nursing homes and ICFs-MR varies. For example, New Jersey classifies its registered sex offenders into three categories based on their assessed risk of re-offending. Four states we reviewed—California, Illinois, Minnesota, and Oklahoma— passed laws in summer and fall 2005 that specified long-term care facilities as entities to be notified for at least some registered sex offenders who entered them.28, 29 Notification in these states is conducted by individual facility officials, state or law enforcement officials, or registered sex offenders themselves. Even if long-term care facility officials wanted to impose different supervision and separation requirements on offenders, numerous factors could affect their ability to do so. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the prevalence of registered sex offenders residing in long- term care facilities nationwide, we matched the addresses of registered sex offenders listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) as of January 3, 2005, with the addresses of nursing homes and intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation (ICF-MR) listed in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Online Survey, Certification and Reporting system (OSCAR) database. We also interviewed Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights officials about the applicability of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Privacy Rule to the notification of facilities about residents who are sex offenders or parolees. To determine whether states we reviewed have laws or long-term care facilities have practices that provide for notification of these individuals and to determine the extent to which these individuals are subject to supervision and separation requirements that differ from those for other residents, we reviewed laws and interviewed state officials responsible for long-term care facility licensing, industry officials, long-term care ombudsmen, and the administrators at 29 long-term care facilities, which were chosen based on the criteria discussed above. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 23,000 nursing homes and intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation (ICF-MR) receive federal Medicare and Medicaid funding. Media reports have cited examples of convicted sex offenders residing in long-term care facilities and, in some cases, allegedly abusing other residents. Given concerns about resident safety, GAO was asked to assess (1) the prevalence of sex offenders and others on parole for non-sex offenses living in long-term care facilities and the extent of any abuse they may have caused, (2) the legal requirements for notifying facilities and others when offenders are residents, and (3) the extent to which facilities have different supervision and separation requirements for offenders. GAO analyzed a national database for sex offenders and analyzed state databases in a sample of eight states for sex offenders and parolees.
What GAO Found
By analyzing the FBI's National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR), which is a compilation of sex offender registries submitted by all states, GAO identified about 700 registered sex offenders living in nursing homes or ICFs-MR during 2005. Most identified sex offenders were male, under age 65, and living in nursing homes, and represented 0.05 percent of the 1.5 million residents of nursing homes and ICFs-MR. About 3 percent of nursing homes and 0.7 percent of ICFs-MR housed at least 1 identified sex offender during 2005. However, these estimates are understated due to data limitations. For example, because of a lack of resources or an inability to comply with certain FBI reporting requirements, states have had varying degrees of difficulty submitting their full state registries to the NSOR. While the FBI does not track NSOR submission rates, GAO compared sex offender registry data from seven of the eight states reviewed to NSOR data and found that the NSOR data included about 57 percent of sex offenders registered in these states, with submission rates ranging from 1 percent to 83 percent. Because a national data source on parolees that included address information was not available, GAO also obtained parolee databases from the eight reviewed states and identified 204 offenders on parole for non-sex offenses living in long-term care facilities. GAO could not determine the overall risk that registered sex offenders and parolees pose to other residents in long-term care facilities because offender status is not tracked with abuse reporting. Facility administrators expressed greater concern over the risk posed by cognitively impaired or mentally ill residents. Federal law requires state law enforcement agencies to release relevant information about registered sex offenders when necessary to protect the public, but GAO did not identify a similar federal law for the parolee population. States have broad discretion in how to implement the requirement for registered sex offender notification. Therefore, the extent to which states' community notification laws apply to all registered sex offenders or explicitly include long-term care facilities varies. For example, four of the eight states GAO reviewed--California, Illinois, Minnesota, and Oklahoma--had laws that specified long-term care facilities as entities to be notified for at least some registered sex offenders who entered them. However, some facility administrators GAO contacted were uncertain as to whether they could share information with staff and others about residents who were known offenders in light of the Privacy Rule issued under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Long-term care facilities GAO contacted do not routinely impose different supervision or separation requirements on residents who are offenders based solely on their prior convictions. Instead, these facilities base such decisions on the demonstrated behaviors of residents. Even if long-term care facilities wanted to impose different supervision and separation requirements on offenders, their ability to do so is limited because they are not always aware of residents' prior convictions. |
gao_GAO-02-769 | gao_GAO-02-769_0 | Unlike compliance study audits, enforcement audits are not random. According to IRS, return selection formulas—first used to select 1968 tax returns for audit—have reduced the number of audits that resulted in no change to tax liability. Under NRP, IRS will review randomly selected individual tax returns to determine whether the taxpayer has complied with statutory income, expense, and tax reporting requirements. IRS has termed this comparison a “calibration” of the study results. NRP Is on Track To Meet Objectives, but Critical Cadre Development and NRP Testing Steps Remain
Based on our assessment of NRP in light of government guidance on performance measurement and data reliability, IRS appears likely to meet the objectives the agency has set for NRP. The data IRS plans to capture includes the sort of detailed information that the agency will need to determine overall compliance levels, update selection formulas, and identify specific compliance problems. The sample of about 49,000 returns is designed to be representative of the population of about 129 million Form 1040 returns. Conclusions
IRS needs accurate and up-to-date information on taxpayers’ compliance with the tax laws in order to help it understand the effectiveness of its programs to promote and enforce compliance and target its enforcement audits on noncompliant returns. Appendix III: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service | What GAO Found
The U.S. tax system is based on taxpayers voluntarily complying with the tax laws. However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) last measured taxpayers' rate of compliance using 1988 tax returns. As time has passed, IRS has become concerned that its ability to understand the effectiveness of its programs and target audits on noncompliant returns has deteriorated, potentially resulting in poorer service to taxpayers, reduced confidence in the fairness of the tax system, and unnecessary audits of compliant taxpayers. IRS is now planning a new compliance study called the National Research Program (NRP). NRP is designed to review 49,000 individual tax returns randomly selected from the population of over 129 million. According to the NRP plan, IRS will review each sampled return to determine whether the taxpayer has complied with statutory income, expense, and tax reporting requirements. Unlike past compliance studies, not all of the reviews will include contacting taxpayers. Based on GAO's assessment of the NRP in light of government guidance on performance measurement and data reliability, research design guidelines, and IRS's goals for the program, NRP's design is likely to yield the sort of detailed information that IRS needs to measure overall compliance, develop formulas to select likely noncompliant returns for audit, and identify compliance problems to address. |
gao_GAO-14-538 | gao_GAO-14-538_0 | OSD partially concurred with our first recommendation because it stated that it had some actions already underway to address the recommendation. However, at that time, OSD did not specify what actions it had undertaken to date or the time frames for completing efforts to improve the collection and reporting of utilization data. OSD Has Made Some Improvements, but Facility Utilization Data Continue to Be Incomplete and Inaccurate; Data Limitations Affect Use of Departments’ Databases to Identify Consolidation Opportunities
OSD Has Made Some Improvements, but Facility Utilization Data Continue to Be Incomplete and Inaccurate
In our analysis of OSD’s Real Property Assets Database over the past 4 fiscal years, we found that although the department has made some progress in improving its real property records, OSD continued to collect incomplete utilization data for its real property assets. The percentage of total real property assets with a reported utilization rate increased from 46 percent to 53 percent over the past 4 fiscal years, as shown in table 3. For example, we found that OSD corrected its real property records for those reported with a utilization rate greater than 100 percent. OSD Does Not Have a Strategic Plan to Manage DOD’s Real Property Efficiently and Facilitate the Identification of Opportunities for Consolidating Unutilized or Underutilized Facilities
OSD does not have a strategic plan to manage DOD’s real property efficiently and facilitate the department in identifying opportunities for consolidating unutilized or underutilized facilities. According to DOD Directive 4165.06, it is DOD policy that DOD real property shall be managed to promote the most efficient and economic use of DOD real property assets and in the most economical manner, consistent with defense requirements. In addition, our prior work has shown that organizations need sound strategic management planning in order to identify and achieve long-range goals and objectives. While OSD has established a directive and a number of instructions for the management of real property, including for the maintenance of data elements about their facilities, OSD has not developed a strategic plan nor established department-wide goals, strategies to achieve the goals, or metrics to gauge progress for how it intends to manage its real property in the most economical and efficient manner. Such goals could be focused on correcting inaccurate and incomplete facility utilization-rate data in OSD’s Real Property Assets Database to provide better visibility on the status of the utilized, unutilized, and underutilized facilities. We continue to believe that fully implementing our 2011 recommendation to develop and implement a methodology for calculating and recording utilization data for all types of facilities, and to modify processes to update and verify the accuracy of reported utilization data to reflect a facility’s true status, would help provide reasonable assurance that the utilization data are complete and accurate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better enable DOD to manage its real property inventory effectively and efficiently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment to establish a strategic plan as part of a results-oriented management framework that includes, among other things, long-term goals, strategies to achieve the goals, and use of metrics to gauge progress to manage DOD’s real property and to facilitate DOD’s ability to identify all unutilized or underutilized facilities for potential consolidation opportunities. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for official review and comment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has improved the completeness and accuracy of facility utilization data in its Real Property Assets Database and the military services use the data contained in their respective real property inventory databases to identify potential consolidation opportunities, we obtained selected data fields containing the military services’ real property records from OSD’s Real Property Assets Database. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated DOD's Support Infrastructure Management as a high-risk area in part due to challenges DOD faces in reducing excess infrastructure. DOD manages a global real property portfolio of over 557,000 facilities DOD estimates to be valued at about $828 billion as of September 30, 2012. In September 2011, GAO found that DOD was limited in its ability to reduce excess inventory because OSD did not maintain accurate and complete data on the utilization of its facilities in its Real Property Assets Database.
House Report 113-102 mandated GAO to review DOD efforts to improve these data. This report examines the extent to which OSD has (1) improved the completeness and accuracy of facility-utilization data in its Real Property Assets Database and the military departments' use of data to identify consolidation opportunities, and (2) a strategic plan to manage DOD's real property efficiently and to facilitate the identification of unutilized and underutilized facilities. GAO analyzed OSD's real property data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, visited 11 active DOD installations from the four services to reflect those with high numbers of buildings, and interviewed officials. While not generalizable, the interviews provided perspectives about facility utilization.
What GAO Found
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has made some improvements, but OSD's utilization data continue to be incomplete and inaccurate; and data limitations affect the military departments' use of their databases to identify consolidation opportunities. GAO's analysis found that the percentage of total real property assets with a reported utilization rate in OSD's Real Property Assets Database increased from 46 to 53 percent over the past 4 fiscal years. OSD made some improvements in addressing inaccuracies in the utilization rates in its real property records, such as correcting records for those facilities reported with a utilization rate greater than 100 percent. The military departments use databases to a certain degree to identify opportunities to consolidate facilities, but primarily only in response to specific events, such as requests for space. Officials at all 11 installations GAO visited stated that inaccurate and incomplete data in the departments' databases limited opportunities to identify these opportunities. In September 2011, GAO recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) develop and implement a methodology for calculating and recording utilization data, and modify processes to update and verify the accuracy of reported data. OSD partially concurred because it stated that it had some actions already underway to address the recommendation. However, at that time, OSD did not specify what actions it had undertaken. Moreover, the recommendation has not yet been fully implemented. Fully implementing GAO's recommendation would help provide reasonable assurance that the utilization data are complete and accurate and better position the department to use the databases to identify consolidation opportunities.
OSD does not have a strategic plan, with goals and metrics, to manage DOD's real property efficiently and facilitate identifying opportunities for consolidating unutilized or underutilized facilities. According to a DOD directive, it is DOD policy that DOD real property shall be managed to promote the most efficient and economic use of DOD real property assets, and in the most economical manner consistent with defense requirements. However, OSD officials stated that there is currently no OSD strategic plan to manage DOD's real property nor established department-wide goals, strategies to achieve the goals, or metrics to gauge progress for how it intends to manage its real property in the most efficient manner. Such goals could focus on correcting inaccurate and incomplete facility utilization data to provide better visibility on the status of facilities and to identify opportunities for consolidating unutilized or underutilized facilities and reducing operations and maintenance costs. GAO's prior work has shown that organizations need sound strategic planning to identify and achieve long-range goals and objectives. Without a strategic plan, it will be difficult for OSD to effectively manage its facilities and utilize them efficiently.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OSD establish a strategic plan to identify unutilized and underutilized facilities. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-377 | gao_GAO-05-377_0 | BLM Identified 11 Types of Financial Assurances Valued at Approximately $837 Million, but These Financial Assurances May Not Fully Cover Reclamation Costs
BLM reported that, as of July 2004, hardrock operators were using 11 types of financial assurances, valued at approximately $837 million, to cover reclamation costs on BLM land in 12 western states. BLM reported that it had approximately 2,500 existing notice- and plan- level hardrock operations as of July 2004 and that some of these operations do not have financial assurances, and some have no or outdated reclamation plans and/or cost estimates on which financial assurances should be based. Surety bonds. Letters of credit. BLM reported that the most recent cost estimates for reclamation required by applicable plans and federal regulations for 43 of these operations totaled about $136 million, with no adjustment for inflation; it did not report reclamation cost estimates for the other 5 operations. However, as of July 2004, financial assurances had provided or were guaranteeing $69 million, and federal agencies and others had provided $10.6 million to pay estimated reclamation costs for the 48 operations, leaving $56.4 million of reclamation costs unfunded. In addition, for about half of the remaining 23 operations, cost estimates may be understated because the cost estimates may not have been updated to reflect inflation or other factors that could increase reclamation costs. Specifically, these financial assurances were not adequate for 25 of the 48 operations because (1) operators did not provide financial assurances for 10 hardrock operations, (2) the financial assurances that were provided were less than the most recent cost estimates for 13 operations, and/or (3) the financial assurance providers declared bankruptcy and did not have the funds to pay all reclamation costs for two other operations. However, these corporate guarantees lost all their value when the operator went bankrupt. BLM’s LR2000 Is Not Reliable and Sufficient for Managing Financial Assurances for Hardrock Operations
BLM’s LR2000 is not reliable and sufficient for managing financial assurances to cover reclamation costs for BLM land disturbed by hardrock operations because staff do not always update information, and LR2000 is not currently designed to track certain critical information. Specifically, staff have not entered information on every hardrock operation and, for those hardrock operations included in LR2000, information is not always current. This information includes the basic status of operations, some types of allowable financial assurances, and state- and county-held financial assurances. Given these limitations, it is not surprising that BLM’s reliance on LR2000 to manage financial assurances is mixed. In part to compensate for LR2000 limitations, some BLM offices use informal record-keeping systems to help manage financial assurances. BLM has taken some steps and identified others to improve LR2000 for managing financial assurances for hardrock operations. At the headquarters level, BLM does not always rely on information in LR2000. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that hardrock operations on BLM land have adequate financial assurances, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to take the following two actions: require the BLM state office directors to establish an action plan for ensuring that operators of hardrock operations have required financial assurances and that the financial assurances are based on sound reclamation plans and current cost estimates, so that they are adequate to pay all of the estimated costs of required reclamation if operators fail to complete the reclamation, and modify LR2000 to ensure that it tracks critical information on hardrock operations and associated financial assurances so that BLM headquarters and state offices can effectively manage financial assurances nationwide to ensure regulatory requirements are met. Specifically, we were asked to determine the (1) types, amount, and coverage of financial assurances operators currently use to guarantee reclamation costs; (2) amount that financial assurance providers and others have paid to reclaim operations that had ceased and not been reclaimed since BLM began requiring financial assurances and the estimated costs of completing reclamation for such operations; and (3) reliability and sufficiency of BLM’s automated LR2000 information system for managing financial assurances for hardrock operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the General Mining Act of 1872, billions of dollars in hardrock minerals, such as gold, have been extracted from federal land now managed by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM). For years, some mining operators did not reclaim land, creating environmental, health, and safety risks. Beginning in 1981, federal regulations required all operators to reclaim BLM land disturbed by these operations. In 2001, federal regulations began requiring operators to provide financial assurances before they began exploration or mining operations. GAO was asked to determine the (1) types, amount, and coverage of financial assurances operators currently use; (2) extent to which financial assurance providers and others have paid to reclaim land not reclaimed by the operator since BLM began requiring financial assurances; and (3) reliability and sufficiency of BLM's automated information system (LR2000) for managing financial assurances for hardrock operations.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's survey of BLM state offices, as of July 2004, hardrock operators were using 11 types of financial assurances, valued at about $837 million, to guarantee reclamation costs for existing hardrock operations on BLM land. Surety bonds, letters of credit, and corporate guarantees accounted for most of the assurances' value. However, these financial assurances may not fully cover all future reclamation costs for these existing hardrock operations if operators do not complete required reclamation. BLM reported that, as of July 2004, some existing hardrock operations do not have financial assurances and some have no or outdated reclamation plans and/or cost estimates, on which financial assurances should be based. BLM identified 48 hardrock operations on BLM land that had ceased and not been reclaimed by operators since it began requiring financial assurances. BLM reported that the most recent cost estimates for 43 of these operations totaled about $136 million, with no adjustment for inflation; it did not report reclamation cost estimates for the other 5 operations. However, as of July 2004, financial assurances had paid or guaranteed $69 million and federal agencies and others had provided $10.6 million to pay for reclamation, leaving $56.4 million in reclamation costs unfunded. Financial assurances were not adequate to pay all estimated costs for required reclamation for 25 of the 48 operations because (1) some operations did not have financial assurances, despite BLM efforts in some cases to make the operators provide them; (2) some operations' financial assurances were less than the most recent reclamation cost estimates; and (3) some financial assurance providers went bankrupt. Also, cost estimates may be understated for about half of the remaining 23 operations because the estimates may not have been updated to reflect inflation or other factors. BLM's LR2000 is not reliable and sufficient for managing financial assurances for hardrock operations because BLM staff do not always update information and LR2000 is not currently designed to track certain critical information. Specifically, staff have not entered information on each operation, and for those operations that are included, the information is not always current. Also, LR2000 does not track some critical information--operations' basic status, some types of allowable assurances, and state- and county-held financial assurances. Given these limitations, BLM's reliance on LR2000 to manage financial assurances is mixed: headquarters does not always rely on it and BLM state offices' reliance varies. To compensate for LR2000's limitations, some BLM offices use informal record-keeping systems to help manage hardrock operations and financial assurances. BLM has taken some steps and identified others to improve LR2000 for managing financial assurances for hardrock operations. |
gao_GAO-15-465T | gao_GAO-15-465T_0 | As noted in figure 2, during the week ending March 3, 2015, 28 percent of passengers nationwide received expedited screening were issued TSA PreTM boarding passes, but were provided expedited screening in a standard screening lane, meaning that they did not have to remove their shoes, belts, and light outerwear, but they had to divest their liquids, gels, and laptops. TSA Uses Three Methods to Assess Risk for Participation in Expedited Screening
As we found in 2014, TSA determines a passenger’s eligibility for or opportunity to experience expedited screening at the airport using one of three risk assessment methods. Passenger Eligibility based on TSA PreTM Lists of Known Travelers
TSA has determined that the individuals included on the TSA PreTM lists of known travelers are low risk by virtue of their membership in a specific group or based on group vetting requirements. TSA determined that active duty military members were low risk and appropriate candidates to receive expedited screening because the Department of Defense administers common background checks of its members. Passenger Eligibility Based on Real Time Threat Assessments Using Managed Inclusion Process
As we found in December 2014, Managed Inclusion is designed to provide expedited screening to passengers not deemed low risk prior to arriving at the airport. In addition, TSA developed Managed Inclusion to improve the efficiency of dedicated TSA PreTM screening lanes as well as to help TSA reach its internal goal of providing expedited screening to at least 25 percent of passengers by the end of calendar year 2013. Specifically, these layers include (1) the Secure Flight vetting TSA performs to identify high-risk passengers required to undergo enhanced screening at the checkpoint and to ensure these passengers are not directed to TSA PreTM expedited screening lanes, (2) a randomization process that TSA uses to include passengers into TSA PreTM screening lanes who otherwise were not eligible for expedited screening, (3) BDOs who observe passengers and look for certain high-risk behaviors, (4) canine teams and ETD devices that help ensure that passengers have not handled explosive materials prior to travel, and (5) an unpredictable screening process involving walk-through metal detectors in expedited screening lanes that randomly select a percentage of passengers for additional screening. In our November 2013 report on TSA’s behavior detection and analysis program, we concluded that although TSA had taken several positive steps to validate the scientific basis and strengthen program management of behavior detection and analysis program, TSA had not demonstrated that BDOs can reliably and effectively identify high- risk passengers who may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system. Further we analyzed the extent to which TSA deployed canine teams using a risk-based approach and determined their effectiveness prior to deployment. As a result of this work, we recommended in January 2013, among other things, that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. TSA Has Not Tested the Overall Effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion Process
As we reported in December 2014, according to TSA, it designed the Managed Inclusion process using a layered approach to security when providing expedited screening to passengers via Managed Inclusion. We reported in 2014 that according to officials, TSA anticipated that testing would begin in October 2014 and estimated that testing could take 12 to 18 months to complete. TSA scheduled a pilot for testing BDOs which was set to begin October 2014 and run through May 2015. Further, the schedule TSA provided indicates that a proof of concept for Canine Covert Testing was scheduled for November 2014 and that operational testing of canines was scheduled to begin in June 2015 and be completed in March 2016. We have previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing studies and protocols to test the effectiveness of security systems and programs in accordance with established methodological practices. In our December 2014 report we concluded that ensuring the planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices would help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the effectiveness testing will yield reliable results. As a result, we recommended that to ensure that TSA’s planned testing yields reliable results, the TSA Administrator take steps to ensure that TSA’s planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices. DHS concurred with our recommendations and began taking steps to ensure that its planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening to selected passengers and has expanded the availability of such screening to increasing numbers of passengers as part of its overall emphasis on risk-based security. Passengers who qualify for expedited screening enjoy varying levels of benefits, including not having to remove their shoes, light outerwear, jackets, belts, liquids, gels and laptops for X-ray screening at airport security checkpoints. By determining passenger risk prior to travel, TSA intended to focus its screening resources on higher-risk passengers while expediting screening for lower-risk passengers. Further, TSA developed the Managed Inclusion process, designed to provide expedited screening to passengers not deemed low risk prior to arriving at the airport.
This testimony addresses (1) how TSA assesses the risk of passengers to determine their eligibility to receive expedited screening and (2) the extent to which TSA determined the effectiveness of its Managed Inclusion process. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in December 2014 and selected updates from March 2015. Among other things, GAO analyzed TSA policies and procedures and interviewed TSA security officials.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented its expedited screening program—known as TSA Pre✓ TM —in 2011.TSA uses the following methods to assess whether a passenger is low risk and therefore eligible for expedited screening.
(1) Approved TSA Pre✓ TM lists of known travelers —These lists are comprised of individuals whom TSA has determined to be low risk by virtue of their membership in a specific group, such as active duty military members, or based on group vetting requirements.
(2) Automated TSA Pre✓ TM risk assessments of all passengers —Using these assessments, TSA assigns passengers scores based upon information available to TSA to identify low risk passengers eligible for expedited screening for a specific flight prior to the passengers' arrival at the airport.
(3) Real-time threat assessments through Managed Inclusion —These assessments use several layers of security, including procedures that randomly select passengers for expedited screening, behavior detection officers who observe passengers to identify high-risk behaviors, and either passenger screening canine teams or explosives trace detection devices to help ensure that passengers selected for expedited screening have not handled explosive material. TSA developed Managed Inclusion as a tool to improve the efficiency of dedicated TSA Pre✓ TM screening lanes as well as to help TSA reach its internal goal of providing expedited screening to at least 25 percent of passengers by the end of calendar year 2013.
TSA has tested the effectiveness of individual Managed Inclusion security layers and determined that each layer provides effective security. However, GAO has previously identified challenges in several of the layers used in the Managed Inclusion process, raising concerns regarding their effectiveness. For example, in November 2013, GAO found that TSA had not demonstrated that behavioral indicators can be used to reliably and effectively identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security. TSA is taking steps to revise and test the behavior detection program, but the issue remains open. In December 2014, GAO reported that TSA planned to begin testing Managed Inclusion as an overall system in October 2014 and TSA estimated that testing could take 12 to 18 months to complete. GAO has previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing studies to test the security effectiveness of other programs in accordance with established methodological practices such as ensuring an adequate sample size or randomly selecting items in a study to ensure the results can be generalizable—key features of established evaluation design practices. In March 2015, TSA officials noted that a pilot for testing behavior detection officers was scheduled to run from October 2014 through May 2015, and testing of canines was scheduled to begin in June 2015 and be completed in March 2016. Ensuring its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices will help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the testing will yield reliable results.
What GAO Recommends
In its December 2014 report, GAO recommended that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation and is taking action to address it. |
gao_GAO-04-448 | gao_GAO-04-448_0 | For oil in Wyoming, MMS has taken royalties in kind since October 1998. Savings in Auditing RIK Occur, but Overall Impact on Royalty Administration Costs Cannot Be Completely Quantified
While there are substantial administrative savings in auditing royalty collections that are attributable to the RIK pilots, there are no quantified savings in the overall administration of royalty collections. While MMS has redirected auditing resources it saved to auditing more cash payments, it is not yet able to determine the benefit of this increased audit effort on overall royalty collection. Finally, when MMS does select a company to audit, there are fewer companies to select because of the recent mergers of the large oil and gas companies. A review of the auditing and compliance costs for oil and gas leases in the Gulf of Mexico and Wyoming—two locations in which MMS received both cash and in-kind royalty payments during fiscal year 2003— showed that the costs to audit cash sales per lease were substantially higher than the costs to audit in-kind royalties in both areas. Instead MMS relies primarily upon the Department of the Interior’s Solicitor’s Office, which does not track specific types of litigation costs for MMS. The Revenue Impact of RIK Sales Is Mixed
Our analysis of sales in three RIK pilots indicates a mixed performance when comparing RIK sales revenue to what might have been collected under cash royalty payments. Specifically, (1) RIK sales in Wyoming increased revenues by about 2.6 percent, for an estimated gain of $967,000 on sales of about $37 million; (2) a 6-month oil sale in the Gulf of Mexico decreased revenues by 5.5 percent, for an estimated loss of $7.2 million on sales of about $131 million; and (3) natural gas sales in the Gulf of Mexico produced more revenues than would have been collected from cash royalty payments—an increase of about 2 percent, for an estimated gain of $4 million on revenues of $210 million. These sales represented about 11 percent of the gas and 57 percent of the oil that MMS took in kind from inception of the pilots through November 2003. Data Limitations Prevent a More Comprehensive Analysis of RIK Sales
In analyzing RIK sales, we identified specific limitations in MMS’s financial data that inhibited our analysis and precluded us from conducting a comprehensive computer-based assessment of all RIK sales. Fourth, a lengthy management review process limits the usefulness of analyses that are conducted. Conclusions
RIK can be an important tool for managing the collection of royalty revenues from federal oil and gas leases. Also, completely quantifying the administrative efficiency of these RIK sales continues to be a challenge. We interviewed MMS personnel on the costs of appeals, and we interviewed attorneys in the Department of the Interior’s Solicitor’s Office to obtain information on the impact of RIK sales on litigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2003, the federal government collected $5.6 billion in royalties from oil and gas production on federal lands. Although most oil and gas companies pay royalties in cash, the Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) has the option to take a percentage of the oil and gas produced and sell this product-- known as "taking royalties in kind (RIK)." MMS has taken royalties in kind continuously since 1998 with the goal of achieving administrative savings while maintaining revenue. GAO attempted to (1) quantify the administrative savings that may be attributable to the RIK sales and (2) compare the sales revenues from RIK sales to what would have been collected in cash royalty payments.
What GAO Found
Although data on administrative savings are limited, there are substantial audit savings attributable to RIK sales, but there are no quantified savings in the overall administration of royalty collections. MMS has anticipated savings in auditing and litigation expenses. While MMS data showed that auditing costs for RIK sales were less than auditing costs for cash sales on a per lease basis, MMS redirected the resources it saved to auditing additional leases. At this time, MMS cannot quantify the benefit from additional auditing. The costs of litigation, which the Solicitor's Office in the Department of the Interior performs for MMS, are not tracked. However, officials with the Solicitor's Office were unable to attribute any savings in litigation to the increased use of RIK and said that future litigation costs are difficult to predict. Finally, MMS must weigh these benefits against additional costs required to conduct RIK sales. Despite limitations in MMS's analyses and revenue data that prevented a more comprehensive assessment of all RIK sales, our estimate of the revenue impacts from RIK sales in three areas indicates a mixed performance. Specifically, RIK oil sales in Wyoming increased revenues by 2.6 percent, for a gain of $967,000 on sales of $37 million. RIK oil sales in the Gulf of Mexico decreased revenues by $7.2 million, for a loss of 5.5 percent on sales of $131 million. RIK gas sales in the Gulf increased revenues by $4 million, for a gain of 2 percent on revenues of $210 million. However, these sales only represent 11 percent of the gas and 57 percent of the oil that MMS took in kind from inception of the pilots through November 2003. MMS does not analyze all sales because there is no requirement to do so, staff considers existing information on sales sufficient, few staff are assigned to analyzing sales, and MMS management has a lengthy review process for finalizing sales analyses. |
gao_NSIAD-99-57 | gao_NSIAD-99-57_0 | Corrective actions to improve the safety of Ranger training were also prescribed by the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. In response to the mandated 90-percent level, the Army excepted the Brigade from normal Army staffing priorities and raised the Brigade’s officer distribution and enlisted personnel authorizations to 90 percent of the required numbers. The Brigade staffing level has improved since the accident, even though the Army has not maintained staffing at the mandated level. Mandated Officer and Enlisted Personnel Levels Have Not Been Sustained
Although in the aggregate, the Brigade was assigned 96 percent of its required personnel in February 1997, it had only 88 percent of the required number of officers. Although the number of assigned officers was below the act’s requirement, it was significantly higher than it was at the time of the accident, when only 38 officers were assigned. If the services had met their instructor requirements, the Army would have achieved the mandated enlisted personnel level in most months since February 1997. Army Plans to Staff Safety Cells With Civilians
The act specified that safety cell personnel at each location must have sufficient continuity and experience to be knowledgeable of local terrain, weather, and other conditions. Currently, members of the Brigade and the battalions’ chains of command, including the Brigade and battalion commanders, serve in the safety cells and supervise daily training safety decisions. Army officers usually rotate to new units every 2 years, enlisted personnel about every 3 years. However, in September 1998, TRADOC reconsidered this approach and began work on a plan to authorize hiring four civilians for the safety cells at the Brigade and at each of the three training battalions. Specifically, the Brigade continued to apply safety improvements at the Florida Ranger camp, such as command and control systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions, and to conduct waterborne training exercises in designated training lanes outside of high-risk areas. At all three training locations, medical evacuation procedures had been revised, rehearsed, and inspected; and physician assistants had been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions. In addition, the Brigade has improved safety and the supervision of training by requiring that its training companies be commanded by experienced and branch-qualified captains. A complete description and status of all corrective actions are included in appendixes II through V.
Safety Inspections Do Not Evaluate or Document Compliance With Training Safety Controls
Our preliminary report assessing Ranger training safety recommended that TRADOC, the Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, the Ranger Training Brigade, and organizations outside the chain of command, such as the Army Inspector General, conduct periodic inspections to determine compliance with the safety controls implemented after the 1995 accident. We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of the Army continue the current 90-percent officer distribution planning level for the direct that future inspections of the Brigade include evaluations of training safety controls and that the inspections’ results are documented. The Brigade Commander has increased meals provided Ranger students from 1-1/2 to 2 per day based on Army nutritional studies. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the corrective actions taken by the Army following the deaths of four Ranger students in a 1995 training accident, focusing on the status of: (1) Army Ranger training manning levels required by the fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act; (2) establishing safety cell organizations required by the act; (3) corrective safety actions instituted after the accident; and (4) inspections of identified safety controls.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) even though the Army placed the Ranger Training Brigade on the list of units excepted from normal Army personnel priorities and raised the Brigade's personnel distribution to 90 percent of required numbers, it was not able to meet the act's required personnel levels; (2) in February 1997, when the Army planned to first meet the act's requirement, the Brigade had 97 percent of required enlisted personnel but only 88 percent of the required number of officers; (3) the Brigade's personnel strength was below the mandated 90-percent level for both officers and enlisted personnel from October 1997 through September 1998; (4) while Brigade officer staffing levels were below the mandate, they were significantly higher than they were at the time of the accident; (5) if the Army continues the current 90-percent officer distribution planning level for the brigade, it is not necessary to continue the mandated personnel levels in law; (6) the Army has established safety cells with personnel knowledgeable about local terrain and weather conditions, but the frequency of personnel rotations may make it difficult to provide sufficient continuity that the act requires; (7) specifically, the Brigade and battalion chains of command who serve as the safety cell members and supervise daily training safety decisions generally rotate to new units every 2-3 years; (8) because of the act's requirement that safety cell personnel have sufficient continuity and experience, the Army has recently authorized the addition of four civilian personnel to the safety cells at the Brigade and the three training battalions; (9) the Army plans to fill these positions by September 1999; (10) the Army has completed and institutionalized most of the recommended corrective actions, and they appear to be functioning effectively; (11) the Brigade has improved safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp by developing systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions; (12) it has moved waterborne training exercises outside high-risk areas and eliminated discretion to deviate from established training lanes; (13) at all three training phases, medical evacuation procedures have been revised, rehearsed, and inspected, physician assistants have been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions, and a Brigade communications officer has been assigned; (14) in addition, the Brigade now requires that its training companies be commanded by branch-qualified captains; and (15) although frequent inspections have been conducted since the accident, they did not evaluate continued compliance with the training safety controls, nor were the results of the inspections adequately documented. |
gao_GAO-13-378 | gao_GAO-13-378_0 | OMB and the Federal CIO Established the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative
Concerned about the size of the federal data center inventory and the potential to improve the efficiency, performance, and the environmental footprint of federal data center activities, OMB, under the direction of the Federal CIO, established FDCCI in February 2010. Agencies are still required to update their data center inventories by the end of June 2013 and report quarterly on consolidation progress. Consolidation of Federal Data Centers is Under Way, but Initiativewide Cost Savings Have Not Been Determined
Progress Made on Data Center Closures, but Size of Facilities Is Not Reported
The 24 agencies have collectively made progress towards OMB’s data center consolidation goal to close 40 percent, or approximately 1,253 of the 3,133 data centers, by the end of 2015. The weaknesses in oversight are due, in part, to OMB not ensuring that assigned responsibilities are being executed. Improved oversight could better position OMB to assess progress against its cost savings goal and minimize agencies’ risk of not realizing anticipated cost savings. However, the Task Force has not provided oversight of the agency consolidation peer review process. In addition, the Task Force did not provide agencies with guidance for executing their peer reviews, including information regarding the specific aspects of agency plans to be reviewed and the process for providing feedback. However, the GSA FDCCI Program Management Office has not executed its responsibilities related to analyzing agencies’ inventories and plans and reviewing these documents for errors. OMB Has Partially Reported Agencies’ Consolidation Progress, but Has Not Approved Agency Plans or Tracked Cost Savings
After establishing FDCCI in 2010, OMB has taken several actions to manage the initiative and to facilitate and oversee agencies’ consolidation progress. In this regard, OMB launched a publically available electronic dashboard to track and report on agencies’ consolidation progress and, starting in fiscal year 2012, required agencies to report quarterly via an online portal on their completed and planned data center consolidation efforts. This is important because, in July 2011 and July 2012, we reported that agencies’ consolidation plans had significant weaknesses and that nearly all were incomplete. Until OMB reviews and approves agencies’ consolidation plans on the basis of their completeness, OMB and the FDCCI agencies may remain unaware of any gaps between these plans and OMB’s requirements, furthering the risk that agencies will move ahead with consolidation efforts that do not fully support OMB’s anticipated cost savings goal. Additionally, OMB has not reported on agencies’ progress against its key performance goal of achieving $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. As previously mentioned, OMB has not yet started to track agencies’ progress against its cost savings goal because the agency is working to identify a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings. Specifically, we are recommending that the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO to track and annually report on key data center consolidation performance measures, such as the size of data centers being closed and cost savings to date; extend the time frame for achieving cost savings related to data center consolidation beyond the current 2015 horizon, to allow time to meet the initiative’s planned cost savings goal; and establish a mechanism to ensure that the established responsibilities of designated data center consolidation oversight organizations are fully executed, including responsibility for the documentation and oversight of the peer review process, the review of agencies’ updated consolidation inventories and plans, and approval of updated consolidation plans. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate agencies’ reported progress against the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) planned consolidation and cost savings goals and (2) assess the extent to which the oversight organizations put in place by OMB for the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) are adequately performing oversight of agencies’ efforts to meet these goals. In addition, we interviewed OMB staff about their efforts to track consolidation cost savings. To assess the extent to which the oversight organizations put in place by OMB for FDCCI are adequately performing oversight of agency consolidation efforts, we analyzed OMB memoranda,Center Consolidation Task Force Charter, and other related documentation to determine the roles and responsibilities of key oversight organizations, including OMB, the General Services Administration FDCCI Program Management Office, and the Data Center Consolidation Task Force. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, as focal point for information technology management across the government, OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer launched the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiativean effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers. In July 2011 and July 2012, GAO evaluated 24 agencies progress and reported that nearly all of the agencies had not completed a data center inventory or consolidation plan and recommended that they do so.
As requested, GAO reviewed federal agencies continuing efforts to consolidate their data centers. This report (1) evaluates agencies' reported progress against OMBs planned consolidation and cost savings goals and (2) assesses the extent to which the oversight organizations put in place by OMB for the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative are adequately performing oversight of agencies' efforts to meet these goals. GAO assessed agencies progress against OMBs goals, analyzed the execution of oversight roles and responsibilities, and interviewed OMB, GSA, and Data Center Consolidation Task Force officials about their efforts to oversee agencies consolidation efforts.
What GAO Found
The 24 agencies participating in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) made progress towards the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) goal to close 40 percent, or 1,253 of the 3,133 total federal data centers, by the end of 2015, but OMB has not measured agencies' progress against its other goal of $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. Agencies closed 420 data centers by the end of December 2012, and have plans to close an additional 548 to reach 968 by December 2015--285 closures short of OMB's goal. OMB has not determined agencies' progress against its cost savings goal because, according to OMB staff, the agency has not determined a consistent and repeatable method for tracking cost savings. This lack of information makes it uncertain whether the $3 billion in savings is achievable by the end of 2015. Until OMB begins tracking and reporting on performance measures such as cost savings, it will be limited in its ability to oversee agencies' progress against key initiative goals. Additionally, extending the horizon for realizing planned cost savings could provide OMB and data center consolidation stakeholders with input and information on the benefits of consolidation beyond OMB's initial goal.
Pursuant to OMB direction, three organizations--the Data Center Consolidation Task Force, the General Services Administration (GSA) Program Management Office, and OMB--are responsible for federal data center consolidation oversight activities; while most activities are being performed, several weaknesses exist. Specifically,
While the Data Center Consolidation Task Force has established several initiatives to assist agencies in their consolidation efforts, such as holding monthly meetings to facilitate communication among agencies, it has not adequately overseen its peer review process for improving the quality of agencies' consolidation plans. For example, the Task Force did not provide agencies with guidance for conducting peer reviews and did not provide oversight to ensure that all agencies exchanged plans.
The GSA Program Management Office has collected agencies' quarterly data center closure updates and made the information publically available on an electronic dashboard for tracking consolidation progress, but it has not fully performed other oversight activities, such as conducting analyses of agencies' inventories and plans.
OMB has implemented several initiatives to track agencies' consolidation progress, such as establishing requirements for agencies to update their plans and inventories yearly and to report quarterly on their consolidation progress. However, the agency has not approved the plans on the basis of their completeness or reported on progress against its goal of $3 billion in cost savings.
The weaknesses in oversight of the data center consolidation initiative are due, in part, to OMB not ensuring that assigned responsibilities are being executed. Improved oversight could better position OMB to assess progress against its cost savings goal and minimize agencies risk of not realizing anticipated cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer track and report on key performance measures, extend the time frame for achieving planned cost savings, and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities. OMB agreed with two of GAOs recommendations and plans to evaluate the remaining recommendation related to extending the time frame. |
gao_GAO-07-832T | gao_GAO-07-832T_0 | DOD Increasingly Relies on Contractor- Provided Services
Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to provide a range of mission-critical services from operating information technology systems to providing logistical support on the battlefield. The growth in spending on services clearly illustrates this point. DOD’s obligations on service contracts, expressed in constant fiscal year 2006 dollars, rose from $85.1 billion in fiscal year 1996 to more than $151 billion in fiscal year 2006, a 78 percent increase. Overall, however, our work found that to a large degree, this growth simply happened and was not a managed outcome. As the amount and complexity of contracting for services have increased, the size of the civilian workforce has decreased. More significantly, DOD carried out this downsizing without ensuring that it had the requisite skills and competencies needed to manage and oversee service acquisitions. That model will be deployed this year. Too often, the department obtains services based on poorly defined requirements and inadequate competition. Further, DOD’s management and use of contractors supporting deployed forces suffers from the lack of clear and comprehensive guidance, among other shortfalls. Collectively, these problems expose DOD to unnecessary risk, complicate efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor acquisition outcomes, and increase the potential for fraud, waste, or abuse of taxpayer dollars. For example, we noted in April 2006 that DOD awarded contracts for security guard services supporting 57 domestic bases, 46 of which were done on an authorized, sole-source basis. The sole-source contracts were awarded by DOD despite recognizing it was paying about 25 percent more than previously paid for contracts awarded competitively. If surveillance is not conducted, not sufficient, or not well documented, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner and potentially paying too much for the services it receives. The lack of visibility on the extent of services provided by contractors to deployed forces contributes to this condition. Our work, as well as that of the Inspectors General, found competition- related issues on DOD’s use of interagency contracting vehicles. We identified several causes for the lack of sound practices. DOD’s current approach to acquiring services suffers from the absence of key elements at the strategic and transactional levels and does not position the department to make service acquisitions a managed outcome. In particular, DOD noted that it is reassessing its strategic approach to acquiring services, including examining the types and kinds of services it acquires and developing an integrated assessment of how best to acquire such services. At this point, DOD does not know how well its services acquisition processes are working, which part of its mission can best be met through buying services, and whether it is obtaining the services it needs while protecting DOD’s and the taxpayer’s interests. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is relying more and more on contractors to provide billions of dollars in services. Congress has pushed DOD to employ sound business practices when using the private sector for services. This testimony discusses DOD's (1) increasing reliance on contractors; (2) efforts to follow sound business practices when acquiring services; and (3) actions to improve its management and oversight of services. This testimony is based on GAO's work spanning several years as well as recent reports issued by the Inspectors General.
What GAO Found
Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to provide a range of mission-critical services from operating information technology systems to providing logistical support on the battlefield. The growth in spending on services clearly illustrates this point. DOD's obligations on service contracts, expressed in constant fiscal year 2006 dollars, rose from $85.1 billion in fiscal year 1996 to more than $151 billion in fiscal year 2006, a 78 percent increase. While obligations increased, the size of the civilian workforce decreased. Moreover, DOD carried out this downsizing without ensuring that it had the requisite skills and competencies needed to manage and oversee service acquisitions. Overall, our work found that to a large degree, this growth in spending on services simply happened and was not a managed outcome. The lack of sound business practices--poorly defined requirements, inadequate competition, the lack of comprehensive guidance and visibility on contractors supporting deployed forces, inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and inappropriate use of other agencies' contracts and contracting services--expose DOD to unnecessary risk, waste resources, and complicate efforts to hold contractors accountable for poor service acquisition outcomes. For example, DOD awarded contracts for security guard services supporting 57 domestic bases, 46 of which were done on an authorized, sole-source basis. The sole-source contracts were awarded by DOD despite recognizing it was paying about 25 percent more than previously paid for contracts awarded competitively. Further, the lack of sufficient surveillance on service contracts placed DOD at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner and potentially paying too much for the services it receives. Overall, DOD's management structure and processes overseeing service acquisitions lacked key elements at the strategic and transactional levels. DOD has taken some steps to improve its management of services acquisition, including developing a competency model for its contracting workforce; issuing policies and guidance to improve its management of contractors supporting deployed forces and its use of interagency contracts; and developing an integrated assessment of how best to acquire services. DOD leadership will be critical for translating this assessment into policy and, most importantly, effective frontline practices. At this point, DOD does not know how well its services acquisition processes are working, which part of its mission can best be met through buying services, and whether it is obtaining the services it needs while protecting DOD's and the taxpayer's interests. |
gao_GAO-10-80 | gao_GAO-10-80_0 | Both NTIA and RUS have experience with similar broadband grant or loan programs. 1). NTIA and RUS Have Taken Steps to Address Challenges, Including Scheduling and Staffing, Associated With Evaluating Applications and Awarding Funds; However, Some Risks Remain
NTIA and RUS face scheduling, staffing, and data challenges in evaluating applications and awarding funds. The agencies have taken steps to meet these challenges, including the adoption of a two-step evaluation process, utilization of nongovernmental personnel, and publication of information on the applicant’s proposed service area. While these steps address some challenges, the agencies’ remaining schedule may pose risks to the review of applications. Under the provisions of the Recovery Act, NTIA and RUS must award all funds by September 30, 2010. 2). Technology Opportunities Program. To evaluate applications, NTIA is using a review system, in which three unpaid, independent expert reviewers examine and score applications. Publish applicant information. Continued lack of broadband data and plan. NTIA and RUS Face Staffing Challenges in Overseeing Funded Projects, and Despite Steps Taken, Several Risks to Project Oversight Remain
NTIA and RUS will need to oversee a far greater number of projects than in the past, including projects with large budgets and diverse purposes and locations. In doing so, the agencies face the challenge of monitoring these projects with far fewer staff per project than were available in similar grant and loan programs they have managed. To address this challenge, NTIA and RUS procured contractors to assist with oversight activities and will require funding recipients to complete quarterly reports and, in some cases, obtain annual audits. These risks include insufficient resources to actively monitor funded projects beyond fiscal year 2010 and a lack of updated performance goals for NTIA and RUS. In addition, NTIA has yet to define annual audit requirements for commercial entities funded under BTOP. In particular, the agencies have 18 months to establish their respective programs, solicit and evaluate applications, and award funds. To reduce the risk of awarding funds to projects that may not be sustainable or do not meet the priorities of the Recovery Act delay the issuance of the second NOFA in order to provide time to analyze application and evaluation processes and apply lessons learned from the first funding round, and provide review time in the second funding round comparable with other broadband grant and loan programs. 2. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Commerce and Agriculture, to OMB, and to FCC for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to broadband service is seen as vital to economic, social, and educational development, yet many areas of the country lack access to, or their residents do not use, broadband. To expand broadband deployment and adoption, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) provided $7.2 billion to the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) for grants or loans to a variety of program applicants. The agencies must award all funds by September 30, 2010. This report addresses the challenges NTIA and RUS face; steps taken to address challenges; and remaining risks in (1) evaluating applications and awarding funds and (2) overseeing funded projects. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed relevant laws and program documents and interviewed agency officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
NTIA and RUS face scheduling, staffing, and data challenges in evaluating applications and awarding funds. NTIA, through its new Broadband Technology Opportunities Program, and RUS, through its new Broadband Initiatives Program, must review more applications and award far more funds than the agencies formerly handled through their legacy telecommunications grant or loan programs, including NTIA's largest legacy grant program, Public Safety Interoperable Communications. NTIA and RUS initially proposed distributing these funds in three rounds, but recently adopted two rounds. To meet these challenges, the agencies have established a two-step application evaluation process that uses contractors or unpaid, independent experts for application reviews and plan to publish information on applicants' proposed service areas to help ensure the eligibility of proposed projects. While these steps address some challenges, the upcoming deadline for awarding funds may pose risks to the thoroughness of the application evaluation process. In particular, the agencies may lack time to apply lessons learned from the first funding round and to thoroughly evaluate applications for the remaining rounds. NTIA and RUS will oversee a significant number of projects, including projects with large budgets and diverse purposes and locations. In doing so, the agencies face the challenge of monitoring these projects with far fewer staff per project than were available for their legacy grant and loan programs. To address this challenge, NTIA and RUS have hired contractors to assist with oversight activities and plan to require funding recipients to complete quarterly reports and, in some cases, obtain annual audits. Despite these steps, several risks remain, including a lack of funding for oversight beyond fiscal year 2010 and a lack of updated performance goals to ensure accountability for NTIA and RUS. In addition, NTIA has yet to define annual audit requirements for commercial entities funded under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program. |
gao_GAO-07-896T | gao_GAO-07-896T_0 | As public use of the Internet grew from the mid-1990s onward, Internet access and electronic commerce became potential targets for state and local taxation. Some state and local governments raised additional tax revenues and applied existing taxes to Internet transactions. Congress addressed this concern when, in 1998, it adopted the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which bars state and local taxes on Internet access, as well as multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. To determine the impact of the moratorium on state and local revenues, we worked in stages. However, some providers and state officials have expressed a different view, believing the moratorium barred taxing acquired services in addition to bundled access services. These services are subject to tax. A tax on acquired services is not a tax directly imposed on the service of providing Internet access. We acknowledge that others have different views about the scope of the moratorium. Some States Have Applied the Moratorium to Acquired Services
As noted above, some providers and state officials have construed the moratorium as barring taxation of acquired services. Others said that acquired services were taxable when we contacted them but would become tax exempt in November 2005 under the 2004 amendments, the date they assumed that taxes on acquired services would no longer be grandfathered. While the Revenue Impact of Eliminating Grandfathering Would Be Small, the Moratorium’s Total Revenue Impact Has Been Unclear and Any Future Impact Would Vary by State
According to CBO data, grandfathered taxes in the states CBO studied were a small percentage of those states’ tax revenues. According to Information in CBO Reports, States Would Lose a Small Fraction of Their Tax Revenues if Grandfathered Taxes on Dial-up and DSL Services Were Eliminated
In 2003, CBO reported how much state and local governments that had grandfathered taxes on dial-up and DSL services would lose in revenues if the grandfathering were eliminated. For instance, Kansas’s total includes about $2 million for localities. Timing of Moratorium Might Have Precluded Many States from Taxing Access Services, with Unclear Revenue Implications
Because it is difficult to predict what states would have done to tax Internet access services had Congress not intervened when it did, it is hard to estimate the amount of revenue that was not raised because of the moratorium. Any Future Impact of the Moratorium Will Vary by State
Although as previously noted the impact of eliminating grandfathering would be small in states studied by CBO or by us, any future impact related to the moratorium will vary on a state-by-state basis for many reasons. North Dakota and Texas taxed only services delivered to retail consumers. A broader view of what could be included in Internet access bundles would result in potential revenue losses much greater than we indicated. However, as explained in the appendix, we believe that what is bundled must be reasonably related to accessing and using the Internet. On the other hand, the moratorium does not bar taxes on acquired services. Thus, if a telecommunications carrier sells wholesale telecommunications services to an Internet service provider that intends to use those telecommunications services to provide Internet access, then the exemption would apply.”
At the time the 2003 report was drafted, the sentence of concern in the draft legislation read, “Such term does not include telecommunications services, except to the extent such services are used to provide Internet access.” As adopted, the wording became, “The term ‘Internet access’ does not include telecommunications services, except to the extent such services are purchased, used, or sold by a provider of Internet access to provide Internet access.” The amended language thus focuses on the package of services offered by the access provider, not on the act of providing access alone. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to one report, at the end of 2006, about 92 million U.S. adults used the Internet on a typical day. As public use of the Internet grew from the mid-1990s onward, Internet access became a potential target for state and local taxation. In 1998, Congress imposed a moratorium temporarily preventing state and local governments from imposing new taxes on Internet access. Existing state and local taxes were grandfathered. In amending the moratorium in 2004, Congress required GAO to study its impact on state and local government revenues. The objectives of the resulting 2006 report were to determine the scope of the moratorium and its impact, if any, on state and local revenues. This testimony is based on that report (GAO-06-273).
What GAO Found
The Internet tax moratorium bars taxes on Internet access services provided to end users. GAO's interpretation of the law is that the bar on taxes includes whatever an access provider reasonably bundles to consumers, including e-mail and digital subscriber line (DSL) services. The moratorium does not bar taxes on acquired services, such as high-speed communications capacity over fiber, acquired by Internet service providers (ISP) and used to deliver Internet access. However, some states and providers have construed the moratorium as barring taxation of acquired services. Some officials told GAO when it was preparing its report that their states would stop collecting such taxes as early as November 1, 2005, the date they assumed that taxes on acquired services would lose their grandfathered protection. According to GAO's reading of the law, these taxes are not barred since a tax on acquired services is not a tax on Internet access. In comments, telecommunications industry officials continued to view acquired services as subject to the moratorium and exempt from taxation. As noted above, GAO disagrees. In addition, Federation of Tax Administrators officials expressed concern that some might have a broader view of what could be included in Internet access bundles. However, GAO's view is that what is included must be reasonably related to providing Internet access. The revenue impact of eliminating grandfathering in states studied by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) would be small, but the moratorium's total revenue impact has been unclear and any future impact would vary by state. In 2003, when CBO reported how much states and localities would lose annually by 2007 if certain grandfathered taxes were eliminated, its estimate for states with grandfathered taxes in 1998 was about 0.1 percent of those states' 2004 tax revenues. Because it is hard to know what states would have done to tax access services if no moratorium had existed, the total revenue implications of the moratorium are unclear. In general, any future moratorium-related impact will differ by state. Tax law details and tax rates varied among states. For instance, North Dakota taxed access service delivered to retail consumers, and Kansas taxed communications services acquired by ISPs to support their customers. |
gao_GAO-07-638T | gao_GAO-07-638T_0 | This area is commonly called the greater Yellowstone area or ecosystem and is home to numerous species of wildlife, including the largest concentration of free-roaming bison in the United States. In July 1990, the National Park Service, Forest Service, and Montana’s Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks formed an interagency team to examine various alternatives for the long- term management of the Yellowstone bison herd. Later, the interagency team was expanded to include USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the Montana Department of Livestock. “maintain a wild, free-ranging population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis transmission to protect the economic interest and viability of the livestock industry in Montana.”
Although managing the risk of brucellosis transmission from bison to cattle is at the heart of the IBMP, the plan does not seek to eliminate brucellosis in bison. Bison attempting to leave the park are herded back to the park. In order to progress to step two, cattle can no longer graze in the winter on certain private lands north of Yellowstone National Park and west of the Yellowstone River. Step two, which the partner agencies expected to reach by the winter of 2002/2003, would use the same management methods on bison attempting to leave the park as in step one, with one exception—a limited number of bison, up to a maximum of 100, that test negative for brucellosis exposure would be allowed to roam in specific areas outside the park. The overall purpose of the conservation project was to preserve critical wildlife migration and winter range habitat for a variety of species, protect geothermal resources, and improve recreational access. The one remaining step to achieve the condition of cattle no longer grazing in this area is for the partner agencies to acquire livestock grazing rights on the remaining private RTR lands. Until cattle no longer graze on these lands, no bison will be allowed to roam beyond the park’s northern border, and the agencies will not be able to proceed further under the IBMP. Although unsuccessful, Interior attempted to acquire livestock grazing rights on the remaining RTR lands in August 1999. More recently, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks has re- engaged Church officials in discussions regarding a lease arrangement for Church-owned livestock grazing rights on the private RTR lands. Federal Land and Easement Acquisitions Sought to Provide Critical Habitat for Many Species, But Bison Access to These Lands Remains Limited
The lands and conservation easement acquired by the federal government through the RTR land conservation project sought to provide critical habitat for a variety of wildlife species including bighorn sheep, antelope, elk, mule deer, bison, grizzly bear, and Yellowstone cutthroat trout; however, the value of this acquisition for the Yellowstone bison herd is minimal because bison access to these lands remains limited. Through the RTR land conservation project, the federal government acquired from the Church a total of 5,263 acres of land and a 1,508-acre conservation easement using $13 million in Land and Water Conservation Fund appropriations. The letter stated that “the funds for phase two should only be allocated by the agencies when the records of decision for the ‘Environmental Impact Statement for the Interagency Bison Management Plan for the State of Montana and Yellowstone National Park’ are signed and implemented.” The letter also stated that the Forest Service and Interior were to continue to consult with and gain the written approval of the governor of Montana regarding the terms of the conservation easement. Under the easement, numerous development activities, including the construction of commercial facilities and road, are prohibited. As previously noted, under the IBMP, until cattle no longer graze on private RTR lands north of the park and west of the Yellowstone River, no bison are allowed to migrate onto these private lands and the partner agencies are responsible for assuring that the bison remain within the park boundary. | Why GAO Did This Study
Yellowstone National Park, in northwest Wyoming, is home to a herd of about 3,600 free-roaming bison. Some of these bison routinely attempt to migrate from the park in the winter. Livestock owners and public officials in states bordering the park have concerns about the bison leaving the park because many are infected with brucellosis--a contagious bacterial disease that some fear could be transmitted to cattle, thus potentially threatening the economic health of the states' livestock industry. Other interested groups believe that the bison should be allowed to roam freely both within and outside the park. In an effort to address these concerns, five federal and Montana state agencies agreed to an Interagency Bison Management Plan (IBMP) in December 2000 that includes three main steps to "maintain a wild, free-ranging population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis transmission to protect the economic interest and viability of the livestock industry in Montana." This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations on the progress that has been made in implementing the IBMP and the extent to which bison have access to lands and an easement acquired for $13 million in federal funds. It is based on GAO's visit to the greater Yellowstone area, interviews with federal and state officials and other interested stakeholders, and review of related documents.
What GAO Found
More than 6 years after approving the IBMP, the five federal and state partnering agencies--the federal Department of the Interior's National Park Service and Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Forest Service, and the state of Montana's Departments of Livestock and of Fish, Wildlife and Parks--remain in step one of the three-step plan primarily because cattle continue to graze on certain private lands. A key condition for the partner agencies to progress further under the plan requires that cattle no longer graze in the winter on certain private lands north of Yellowstone National Park and west of the Yellowstone River to minimize the risk of brucellosis transmission from bison to cattle; the agencies anticipated meeting this condition by the winter of 2002/2003. Until this condition is met, bison will not be allowed to roam beyond the park's northern border in this area. While a prior attempt to acquire grazing rights on these private lands was unsuccessful, Montana's Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks is currently negotiating with the private land owner to acquire grazing rights on these lands. Yellowstone bison have limited access to the lands and conservation easement that federal agencies acquired north of the park. In 1998 and 1999, as part of a larger conservation effort to provide habitat for a variety of wildlife species, protect geothermal resources, and improve recreational access, federal agencies spent nearly $13 million to acquire 5,263 acres and a conservation easement on 1,508 acres of private lands north of the park's border--lands towards which bison frequently attempt to migrate in the winter. The conservation easement prohibits development, such as the construction of commercial facilities and roads, on the private land; cattle grazing rights were retained by the land owner. The Yellowstone bison's access to these lands will remain limited until cattle no longer graze on the easement and certain other private lands in the area. |
gao_GAO-04-1022 | gao_GAO-04-1022_0 | Each fiscal year, FDA obligates funds for postmarket compliance activities and inspections related to medical devices and radiological products. FDA may (1) issue an order approving the application, which allows the manufacturer to begin marketing the device; (2) send the manufacturer an approvable letter pending a GMP inspection, which indicates that FDA should be able to approve the device after the agency finds that the manufacturer’s device establishment is in compliance with GMP requirements; (3) send the manufacturer an approvable letter indicating that the agency should be able to approve the device if the manufacturer can make minor corrections or clarifications to the application; (4) issue a “not approvable” letter informing the manufacturer that FDA does not believe that the application can be approved because the data provided by the manufacturer do not demonstrate that the device is reasonably safe and effective; or (5) issue an order denying approval of the application, which informs the manufacturer that the agency has completed its scientific review, identified major safety and effectiveness problems, and decided not to approve the application. Limited Data to Measure FDA’s Performance against the MDUFMA Performance Goals
FDA had limited data that could be used to measure the agency’s performance against most of the MDUFMA performance goals. Thus, it is uncertain whether FDA will meet the MDUFMA performance goals for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. However, as of March 31, 2004, only one application was subject to a cycle action tied to one of the two MDUFMA performance goals. For fiscal year 2004, there were no applications subject to the cycle action tied to the two fiscal year 2004 MDUFMA performance goals. In addition, the likelihood of FDA meeting the fiscal year 2005 MDUFMA performance goals is uncertain because FDA had performance data for some, but not all, of the MDUFMA performance goals that will be effective in fiscal year 2005. Limited Data to Measure FDA’s Performance against the MDUFMA Performance Goals Established for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004
Limited data exist to measure FDA’s performance against the two MDUFMA performance goals established for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Therefore, FDA’s performance results are preliminary. Because FDA’s performance against the MDUFMA performance goals is based on the percentages of actions the agency takes on applications within required review times, FDA’s performance results could change as the agency completes actions on all applications for which the performance goals apply. Data were not readily available from FDA on the status of all pending applications within the review process. For example, from the fiscal year 2003 cohort, data were available to compare FDA’s performance against 17 of the 20 performance goals for fiscal year 2005. FDA took actions on applications tied to 14 of the 17 performance goals within the established goal time frames. We found that FDA took actions on applications tied to each of the 11 performance goals within the established goal time frames. As previously mentioned, many of the applications from the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 cohorts are awaiting actions by FDA or responses from manufacturers. FDA Obligated over $128 Million for Postmarket Medical Device Compliance Activities and Inspections in Fiscal Year 2002
In fiscal year 2002, FDA obligated about $128 million for postmarket medical device compliance activities, which include inspections of device manufacturers’ establishments. FDA obligated about $109 million for compliance activities and about $19 million for inspections. Outreach coordination included funds for guidance to field staff on matters such as the reporting of problems with medical devices, epidemiology studies, device recalls, and other activities. Obligations for applied research included funding for activities such as the development of domestic and international standards to help provide reasonable assurance that medical devices are safe and effective. These inspections included routine surveillance inspections to determine compliance with medical device regulations, inspections resulting from the reporting problems with devices or product recalls, and compliance inspections to collect evidence for pending enforcement actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA reviews applications from manufacturers that wish to market medical devices in the United States. To ensure prompt approval of new devices and clearance of devices that are substantially equivalent to those legally on the market, the Congress passed the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA). The act authorizes FDA to collect user fees and, in return, requires FDA to meet performance goals that are tied to the agency's review process. The goals set actions FDA may take on applications and specify the time that FDA should take in certain phases of the review process. MDUFMA requires GAO to report on FDA's performance against the MDUFMA performance goals established for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and to determine whether FDA is likely to meet the fiscal year 2005 performance goals. MDUFMA also requires GAO to report on the amounts FDA obligated in fiscal year 2002 for medical device compliance activities and inspections of manufacturers after their devices are marketed. GAO analyzed data provided by FDA that are based on actions taken on applications FDA received from October 1, 2002, through March 31, 2004. GAO also analyzed data on the amounts FDA obligated for medical device compliance and inspection activities for fiscal year 2002.
What GAO Found
FDA had limited data that could be used to measure the agency's performance against most of the MDUFMA performance goals. Thus, it is uncertain whether FDA will meet the MDUFMA performance goals for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, there were two performance goals in effect for each year. As of March 31, 2004, only one application was subject to the action tied to one of the two MDUFMA performance goals. On this application, FDA completed its review and made the decision to approve the application within the goal's established time frame. To determine the likelihood of meeting the 20 MDUFMA performance goals for fiscal year 2005, FDA is collecting data on its performance against these goals. GAO found that FDA had performance data for some, but not all, of the MDUFMA performance goals. From fiscal year 2003 applications, data were available to compare FDA's performance against 17 of the 20 fiscal year 2005 performance goals. FDA took actions tied to 14 of the 17 goals within the goals' established time frames. From fiscal year 2004 applications, data were available to compare FDA's performance against 11 of the 20 performance goals. FDA took actions tied to the 11 goals within the goals' established time frames. The results of FDA's performance against MDUFMA performance goals are preliminary, however, because 8 percent and 49 percent, respectively, of the applications FDA accepted in fiscal year 2003 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2004 were awaiting action by FDA or responses from manufacturers. Because FDA's performance against the MDUFMA performance goals is based on the percentages of actions the agency takes within required review times, FDA's results could change as the agency completes its actions on all applications for which the goals apply. FDA obligated about $128 million for postmarket medical device compliance activities and inspections in fiscal year 2002. FDA obligated about $109 million for compliance activities for outreach coordination, such as guidance to field staff on reporting problems with medical devices, laboratory analyses, and research, such as the development of domestic and international standards to provide reasonable assurance that medical device products are safe and effective. FDA obligated about $19 million for inspections of device manufacturers' establishments, including routine surveillance inspections to determine compliance with medical device regulations and inspections resulting from device problem reporting or product recalls. |
gao_GGD-97-50 | gao_GGD-97-50_0 | CFTC Used Its Exemptive Authority to Reduce or Eliminate the Legal Risk Surrounding the Enforceability of Most OTC Derivatives
Before 1993, swaps and other OTC derivatives contracts faced the legal risk of being deemed illegal off-exchange futures and thus unenforceable under the CEA. However, a narrow group of swaps that are ineligible for the exemption continue to face the risk of being illegal futures. In addition, certain unregulated forwards have become increasingly difficult to distinguish from regulated futures, resulting in legal risk. Congress Granted CFTC Exemptive Authority to Reduce the Legal Risk Facing Swaps and Other OTC Derivatives
Following the court’s finding that certain OTC energy contracts were futures and recognizing the broader implications of that decision for other OTC derivatives, Congress granted CFTC exemptive authority under the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992. In granting its exemptions, CFTC did not determine that the OTC derivatives covered by the exemptions were or were not futures or otherwise excluded from the act’s jurisdiction. It noted that this could result in substantial losses and a market disruption. Issues Remain Related to the Appropriate Regulation for the OTC Derivatives and Exchange-Traded Futures Markets
Notwithstanding CFTC’s success in reducing or eliminating the legal risk of unenforceability that most OTC derivatives faced, issues remain that raise a broader policy question about the appropriate regulation for OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures, including their markets and market participants. These issues concern the (1) appropriate regulation for the OTC foreign-currency market under the Treasury Amendment, (2) appropriate regulation for the evolving swaps market, and (3) rationalization of regulatory differences between the OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures markets. CFTC has interpreted the amendment to exclude from the act’s regulation certain OTC foreign-currency transactions between sophisticated participants, but not similar transactions involving unsophisticated participants. Before the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dunn v. CFTC, considerable debate occurred over the meaning of the phrase “transactions in,” which defines the scope of the exclusion. The bill defines board of trade in the context of the Treasury Amendment as “any facility whereby standardized contracts are systematically marketed to retail investors.”
The Appropriate Regulation for the Evolving Swaps Market Is an Unresolved Issue
The potential for the exempted swaps market to evolve beyond the conditions of the swaps exemption raises the issue of how to accommodate market developments and address attendant risks and other regulatory concerns. In 1995, CFTC also granted the exchanges an exemption from certain regulations to enable them to compete more effectively against the less regulated OTC derivatives market. These options include (1) expanding the act’s jurisdiction to cover specified swaps and other OTC derivatives but tailoring their regulation to the circumstances under which they trade and other appropriate factors; (2) excluding swaps and other specified OTC derivatives from the act’s jurisdiction and providing for their oversight, as appropriate, by other federal regulators; and (3) tailoring the level of regulation for exchange-traded futures to the nature of the market participants and/or other appropriate factors. CFTC has exempted most swaps and other OTC derivatives from virtually all the CEA’s requirements to provide them with greater legal certainty, but a question remains about whether swaps are futures and subject to the CEA. As we discuss, the possibility that swaps are futures continues to be a source of legal risk for equity swaps. 6. 7. 8. 4. 5. 9. 10. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the legal and regulatory issues surrounding the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), focusing on: (1) the extent to which the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has reduced the legal risk surrounding the enforceability of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives under the CEA; and (2) issues related to the appropriate regulation for exchange-traded futures and OTC derivatives contracts, including their markets and market participants.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under the authority provided by the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, CFTC exempted most swaps and other OTC derivatives contracts from the CEA's exchange-trading requirement and thus reduced or eliminated the legal risk that they could be unenforceable; (2) in granting the exemptions, CFTC was not required to, and did not, determine that OTC derivatives were futures; (3) as a result, a question has remained about whether OTC derivatives are futures and can be regulated under the act: (4) the possibility that swaps are futures continues to be a source of legal risk for so-called equity swaps that are ineligible for exemption from the act's requirements; (5) legal risk also remains for certain agricultural forwards that are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from futures and that may not be eligible for the swaps exemption; (6) although CFTC reduced or eliminated the legal risk of being unenforceable for most swaps and other OTC derivatives, a broader policy question remains about the appropriate regulation for OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures, including their markets and market participants; (7) the first issue concerns regulation for the OTC foreign-currency market under CEA; (8) the act excludes from its regulation certain OTC foreign-currency transactions, but the scope of the exclusion, called the Treasury Amendment, has been the subject of disagreement among federal regulators and the courts; (9) a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision resolved that the exclusion covers all transactions in foreign currency, including foreign-currency options and futures; (10) as a result, the extent to which the Treasury Amendment excludes transactions involving unsophisticated market participants may still be subject to debate; (11) the second issue concerns the potential for the swaps market to evolve beyond its exemption and raise additional regulatory concerns; (12) CFTC exempted swaps from virtually all CEA requirements, but imposed conditions on the exemption that restricted their design and trading procedures; (13) the swaps market might develop in ways that are inconsistent with these conditions; (14) the third issue concerns the rationale for the regulatory differences between the OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures markets; and (15) CFTC recently granted the exchanges an exemption to enable them to better compete against the less regulated OTC derivatives market, however, under the exemption, regulation of the two markets will continue to differ substantially. |
gao_GGD-98-169 | gao_GGD-98-169_0 | According to lenders, borrowers have used HLTV loans primarily to consolidate credit card debt or to make home improvements. HLTV Loans Are Hybrid Loans
HLTV loans have characteristics of both mortgage loans and unsecured consumer loans. According to FirstPlus officials, the average HLTV loan they made in 1997 was for about $30,000 with a 25-year term. Also, in the same year, FirstPlus charged an average contract interest rate of 13 to 14 percent on its HLTV loans, but any origination fees or “points charged” would raise the effective interest rate of the loan. According to interviews with numerous industry officials and our review of limited available industry data, 10 institutions have collectively led the HLTV market since 1995. According to public and private sector officials, regulated depository institutions were not heavily involved in originating HLTV loans from 1995 to 1997. The degree of involvement of these institutions would be important to assess any potential exposure of federal deposit insurance funds to defaults on HLTV loans. HLTV Lending Is Growing but Still Represents Only a Small Percentage of the Total Mortgage and Unsecured Lending Markets
Data on the volume of HLTV loans are limited to those loans that were subsequently sold to investors as securities. According to private sector officials, the total securitized volume of HLTV lending has more than doubled from year to year from 1995, the year it was introduced, through 1997. The officials also expected total securitized HLTV lending to increase in 1998, with estimates of total volume of $12 billion or higher. However, based on the characteristics of the loans and available performance data on HLTV loans, public and private sector officials identified many inherent trade-offs between the benefits and the risks associated with HLTV lending that face borrowers, lenders, and investors. Limited Data Available to Identify Losses on HLTV Loans
Public and private sector officials told us that data on losses from HLTV loans experienced by institutions making loans were limited for a variety of reasons, such as that the loans (1) were a recent lending practice adopted in 1995 (and losses are usually experienced over longer periods of time); (2) were offered during a period of strong economic growth; and (3) were not specifically tracked by regulators because HLTV loans were generally made by unregulated, nondepository institutions. The combined value of the HLTV loan and first mortgage often exceeds the value of the house. Officials representing securities firms also noted several ways in which the lenders would retain some risk. Our objectives were to provide information regarding (1) the characteristics of HLTV loans; (2) the major organizations that provided HLTV lending; (3) the volume of HLTV lending in 1995, 1996, and 1997, and the expected volume in 1998; and (4) the benefits and risks of HLTV lending for borrowers, lenders, investors, and regulated depository institutions. We did not independently verify this industry data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on high-loan-to-value (HLTV) loans, focusing on the: (1) characteristics of HLTV loans; (2) major organizations that provided HLTV lending; (3) volume of HLTV lending in 1995, 1996, and 1997, and the expected volume in 1998; and (4) benefits and risks of HLTV lending for borrowers, lenders, investors, and regulated depository institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HLTV loans are considered hybrid loans because they have characteristics of both mortgage loans and unsecured consumer loans; (2) like mortgages, HLTV loans are secured by a lien on a house; (3) however, the lien itself may have less financial value than the amount of the loan in the event of a borrower's defaulting since the value of the HLTV loan and the original mortgage may exceed the value of the house; (4) thus, as with unsecured consumer loans, HLTV lenders rely more heavily on borrowers' creditworthiness; (5) according to industry officials, most borrowers use HLTV loans primarily to consolidate credit card debt or make home improvements; (6) while comprehensive industry data were not available, data provided by a lender responsible for about one-third of HLTV lending showed that, in 1997, HLTV loans averaged about $30,000; (7) the data also showed that the average contract interest rate was between 13 and 14 percent, with an average loan term of 25 years; (8) according to industry officials and GAO's review of the limited available industry data, from 1995 to 1997, HLTV loans were made or managed primarily by 10 institutions; (9) according to public- and private-sector officials, regulated depository institutions were not heavily involved in originating HLTV loans; (10) the involvement of these institutions would be important to any assessment of the potential exposure of federal deposit insurance funds to defaults of HLTV loans; (11) data indicate that HLTV lending has grown since its introduction in 1995 but remains small relative to other consumer lending; (12) data on the volume of HLTV loans were limited to those loans that were subsequently packaged into loan pools used to back securities sold to investors; (13) the volume of securitized HLTV lending has more than doubled from year to year from 1995 through 1997; (14) industry and securities firm representatives expected HLTV lending to increase again in 1998 to $12 billion or higher; (15) public- and private-sector officials pointed to several benefits and risks associated with HLTV lending to the borrower, lender, and investors; (16) while lenders and investors have benefited from the high rate of return on these loans, it is uncertain how these loans would perform during any future economic downturn; (17) if defaults were to increase, the rate of return would decrease; and (18) officials representing the two largest government-sponsored enterprises did not believe that HLTV lending posed greater risks to their portfolios than the existing credit card lending that the HLTV lending generally refinances. |
gao_GAO-11-933T | gao_GAO-11-933T_0 | In fact, all of the DOD programs on GAO’s High-Risk List relate to business operations, including systems and processes related to management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, and support infrastructure, as well as weapon systems acquisition. Long-standing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s financial management and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on the financial status and cost of DOD activities to Congress and DOD decision makers; (2) adversely impacted its operational efficiency and mission performance in areas of major weapons system support and logistics; and (3) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management’s ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. Other business operations, including the high-risk areas of contract management, supply chain management, support infrastructure management, and weapon systems acquisition are directly impacted by the problems in financial management. DOD also requests billions of dollars each year to maintain its weapon systems, but it has limited ability to identify, aggregate, and use financial management information for managing and controlling operating and support costs. DOD’s Past Strategies for Improving Financial Management Were Ineffective but Recent Initiatives are Encouraging
Over the years, DOD has initiated several broad-based reform efforts to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses. In May 2009, we identified several concerns with the adequacy of the FIAR Plan as a strategic and management tool to resolve DOD’s financial management difficulties and thereby position the department to be able to produce auditable financial statements. The DOD Comptroller directed the DOD components participating in the FIAR Plan—the departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency—to use a standard process and aggressively modify their activities to support and emphasize achievement of the priorities. In May 2010, DOD introduced a new phased approach that divides progress toward achieving financial statement auditability into five waves (or phases) of concerted improvement activities (see appendix I). Numerous Challenges Must Be Addressed In Order For DOD to Successfully Reform Financial Management
Improving the department’s financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and the Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that the current initiatives being led by the DOD DCMO and the DOD Comptroller be continued and provided with sufficient resources and ongoing monitoring in the future. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, the current initiatives may falter, similar to previous efforts. Below are some of the key challenges that the department must address in order for the financial management operations of the department to improve. Committed and sustained leadership. Effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses. Competent financial management workforce. In developi the plan, the department identified financial management as one of its enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Accountability and effective oversight. Well-defined enterprise architecture. Successful implementation of the ERPs. Appendix I: FIAR Plan Waves
The first three waves focus on achieving the DOD Comptroller’s interim budgetary and asset accountability priorities, while the remaining two waves are intended to complete actions needed to achieve full financial statement auditability. | Why GAO Did This Study
As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving serious problems in its financial management and related business operations and systems. DOD is required by various statutes to (1) improve its financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and oversight bodies, and (2) to produce audited financial statements. Over the years, DOD has initiated numerous efforts to improve the department's financial management operations and to try to achieve an unqualified (clean) opinion on the reliability of its reported financial information. These efforts have fallen short of sustained improvement in financial management or financial statement auditability. The Subcommittee has asked GAO to provide its perspective on the status of DOD's financial management weaknesses and its efforts to resolve them.
What GAO Found
DOD financial management has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1995 and, despite several reform initiatives, remains on the list today. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management's ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key business operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes related to the management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, support infrastructure, and weapon systems acquisition. These operations are directly impacted by the problems in financial management. In addition, the long-standing financial management weaknesses have precluded DOD from being able to undergo the scrutiny of a financial statement audit. DOD's past strategies for improving its financial management were ineffective, but recent initiatives are encouraging. In 2005, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan for improving financial management and reporting. In 2009, the DOD Comptroller directed that FIAR efforts focus on financial information in two priority areas: budget and mission-critical assets. The FIAR Plan also has a new phased approach that comprises five waves of concerted improvement activities. The first three waves focus on the two priority areas, and the last two on working toward full auditability. The plan is being implemented largely through the Army, Navy, and Air Force military departments and the Defense Logistics Agency, lending increased importance to the commitment of component leadership. Improving the department's financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that current initiatives related to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial management have the support of DOD leaders and that of DOD's Deputy Chief Management Officer and Comptroller continue with sustained leadership and monitoring. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, current initiatives may falter. Below are some of the key challenges that DOD must address for its financial management to improve to the point where DOD is able to produce auditable financial statements: (1) committed and sustained leadership, (2) effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses, (3) competent financial management workforce, (4) accountability and effective oversight, (5) well-defined enterprise architecture, and (6) successful implementation of the enterprise resource planning systems. |
gao_GAO-12-693 | gao_GAO-12-693_0 | Once the relevant rental periods expire or a beneficiary decides to select a contract supplier, the grandfathered supplier can no longer provide the CBP-covered items and services to the beneficiary. Outcomes of CMS’s Implementation of the CBP Round 1 Rebid
The number of bidding suppliers and the number of contracts awarded in the CBP round 1 rebid were very similar to CBP round 1. Nearly the Same Number of Suppliers Bid As in Round 1, and About the Same Percentage of Submitted Bids Resulted in Contracts
Nearly the same number of suppliers bid in both CBP round 1 (1,010 suppliers) and the CBP round 1 rebid (1,011 suppliers). While CMS improved the CBP bidding process, many suppliers still had difficulty complying with bid submission requirements, and had particular difficulty with financial documentation requirements. Although the majority of suppliers with disqualified bids that contacted CMS with questions were found to have been correctly disqualified, some suppliers were later found to have incorrectly disqualified bids and were offered contracts. Effects on Suppliers of the First Year of the CBP Round 1 Rebid
Both contract and non-contract suppliers have been affected by the first year of the CBP round 1 rebid. In the first months of 2011, few CBP contract suppliers had their contracts terminated by CMS, voluntarily canceled their contracts, or were involved in ownership changes. Since the CBP round 1 rebid began, many non-contract suppliers have chosen to be grandfathered suppliers for certain CBP rental DME. Some contract and non-contract suppliers have entered into subcontracting agreements to provide certain services to beneficiaries in CBP competitive bidding areas. 3.) Although some of these efforts have limitations, in the aggregate, they provide useful information to CMS regarding beneficiary access and satisfaction. CBP Inquiries and Complaints Decreased During CBP’s First Year 2011
Information collected from CMS’s monitoring of inquiries to 1-800-MEDICARE suggests that CBP has not adversely affected beneficiary access to or satisfaction with DME. 4.) Early Data Indicate Some Decreases in DME Utilization
CMS data show that fewer distinct beneficiaries in competitive bidding areas received CBP-covered DME items in 2011 than in 2010 for the six However, we do not assume that product categories that we analyzed.the utilization in 2010 was the appropriate level of Medicare utilization and the decline in the number of beneficiaries served between 2010 and 2011 does not necessarily indicate that beneficiaries did not have access to needed DME. The decrease is evident when comparing changes in the number of distinct CBP-covered beneficiaries served in 2011 compared to 2010 in both the nine competitive bidding areas and non-competitive bidding areas.beneficiaries served does not necessarily indicate beneficiaries do not have access to needed DME as CMS told us that possible reasons for the decline in utilization may be the result of: However, such decline in the number of
CBP’s round 1 rebid competitive bidding areas were selected by CMS, in part because they had high utilization, implying that some utilization may have been unnecessary. However, CMS estimates that CBP savings to Medicare and to beneficiaries are greater than its costs. CMS also reported that CBP resulted in savings for beneficiaries. First, HHS noted that the CBP round 1 rebid resulted in savings of more than $200 million in its first year, and that the Department anticipates additional savings of more than $25 billion to the Medicare program between 2013 and 2022 as CBP expands in round 2. Concluding Observations
Although the first year of the CBP round 1 rebid’s contracts has been completed, it is important to continue to closely monitor the CBP as the program expands into 91 additional areas in round 2. It is too soon to determine the full effects the CBP may have on Medicare beneficiaries and DME suppliers. We found that, in general, the round 1 rebid was successfully implemented. Utilization of selected DME items declined in the round 1 rebid competitive bidding areas; however, we do not assume that all pre-CBP utilization was appropriate and CBP may have reduced unnecessary utilization of DME, particularly because CMS chose to implement the CBP round 1 rebid in areas with what it suspected were relatively high levels of unnecessary utilization. More experience with DME competitive bidding is needed, particularly to see if evidence of beneficiary access problems emerges. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Medicare: CMS Has Addressed Some Implementation Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program for the Round 1 Rebid, GAO-10-1057T. | Why GAO Did This Study
To achieve Medicare savings for DME, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required that CMS implement the CBP for certain DME. In 2008, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) terminated the first round of supplier contracts and required CMS to repeat the CBP round 1referred to as the round 1 rebid, resulting in the award of contracts to suppliers with payments that began January 1, 2011. CMS has estimated that the rebid will lead to significant savings for Medicare.
MIPPA requires GAO to examine certain aspects of the CBP. In this report, GAO reviews (1) the outcomes of the CBP round 1 rebid process; (2) the effect of the CBP round 1 rebid on DME suppliers; (3) how the CBP round 1 rebid has affected Medicare beneficiary access to and satisfaction with selected DME; and (4) the extent to which the CBP round 1 rebid has affected the utilization of selected DME items.
To examine CBP outcomes and effects, GAO analyzed data from CMS and its feedback provided to bidding suppliers, analyzed 2011 CBP data about different types of suppliers, and interviewed CMS and CBP contractor officials, DME industry groups, and suppliers. To examine CBPs effects on beneficiary access, GAO analyzed Medicare claims data for the first six months of 2011 because the data for those months were the most complete, and compared it to the same months in 2010.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), implemented the durable medical equipment (DME) competitive bidding programs (CBP) bidding process for the round 1 rebid. Nearly the same number of suppliers submitted a similar number of bids for both the CBP round 1 rebid and round 1. Many suppliers continued to have difficulty complying with financial documentation requirements; however, the number of bids disqualified in the round 1 rebid was significantly less than for round 1. After being notified of their bid results, some suppliers were found to have bids that were disqualified incorrectly and were subsequently offered round 1 rebid contracts. About one-third of the bidding suppliers were awarded CBP contracts.
Relatively few CBP contract suppliers (those awarded CBP contracts) had their contracts terminated by CMS, voluntarily canceled their contracts, or were involved in ownership changes. Under the CBP, non-contract suppliers (those not awarded CBP contracts) can grandfather certain rental DME for beneficiaries they were servicing prior to the implementation of CBP until CBP-covered beneficiaries rental periods expire. Also, some CBP contract suppliers entered into subcontracting agreements with non-contract suppliers to furnish certain services to CBP-covered beneficiaries in the round 1 rebid.
CMSs ongoing multiple monitoring activities generally indicate that beneficiary DME access and satisfaction have not been affected by CBP. Although some of these efforts have limitations, in the aggregate, they provide useful information to CMS regarding beneficiary access and satisfaction.
Early data indicate that utilization has decreased in some CBP-covered DME categories. GAOs review of Medicare claims data found that fewer beneficiaries in competitive bidding areas received some CBP-covered items in any of the first six months of 2011 than in the same month of 2010.
Although the first year of the CBP round 1 rebid has been completed, it is too soon to determine its full effects on Medicare beneficiaries and DME suppliers. GAO found that, in general, the round 1 rebid was successfully implemented. GAO also found that utilization of selected DME declined in the CBP areas; while there are many possible reasons for this, it does not necessarily indicate that beneficiaries have not had access to needed DME. GAO does not assume that all pre-CBP utilization was appropriate and the CBP may have reduced unnecessary utilization of DME. More experience with DME competitive bidding is needed, particularly to see if evidence of beneficiary access problems emerges. For that reason, it is important to continue monitoring changes in the number of suppliers serving CBP-covered beneficiaries.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS noted that the CBP round 1 rebid resulted in savings of more than $200 million in its first year. HHS also cited the results of CMSs monitoring of beneficiaries access to DME in CBP areas as evidence that the CBP did not affect beneficiaries adversely. |
gao_GAO-09-278 | gao_GAO-09-278_0 | Since fiscal year 2000, EPA has added five DOD sites to the NPL. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Enforcement. EPA Evaluates All Potentially Contaminated DOD Sites for Listing, but Does Not Oversee Cleanup at Most Hazardous Waste DOD Sites
While EPA oversees and evaluates DOD’s preliminary assessments of all DOD sites suspected of having a hazardous release, the agency has little to no oversight of the cleanup of most of these sites because most are not on the NPL. Few Hazardous Waste DOD Sites Considered for Listing Are Ultimately Placed on the NPL
Of the 985 DOD sites contaminated with hazardous substances, EPA placed 140 sites—about 15 percent—on the NPL; the remaining 845 sites are generally overseen by a cleanup authority other than EPA. EPA regional officials were unable to provide a rationale for EPA’s decision to not list almost one-half of the 389 sites that we reviewed because site file documentation was inconclusive or missing. More than a Decade after Listing, 11 DOD NPL Sites Do Not Have IAGs, Impeding EPA’s Ability to Enforce Cleanup Actions at Those Sites
Although EPA has IAGs in place with DOD for 129 of the 140 DOD sites on the NPL, IAGs have not been finalized at the remaining 11 sites remaining. According to DOD, some of these sites are nearly cleaned up. EPA Proposes Few Contaminated DOD Sites Based on EPA Policy and DOD’s Maturing Inventory of Hazardous Waste Sites
Since the 1990s, EPA has proposed fewer DOD sites for the NPL than in previous years for three key reasons. First, EPA defers the majority of DOD sites to other statutory authorities for cleanup under state oversight, and to avoid duplicating efforts, it does not list these sites. Second, over the years, DOD has discovered fewer hazardous substance releases, resulting in fewer sites for assessment and potential proposal for the NPL. Since then, EPA has generally not proposed listing contaminated DOD sites that are being cleaned up under other federal or state programs. States May Object to EPA’s Proposal to List Contaminated DOD Sites
EPA policy recommends states’ governors to be included in the decision whether to list sites on the NPL and, in cases where a state does not agree that EPA should list a site, EPA’s policy recommends that a region work closely with the state to resolve the state’s concerns. Four sites were not listed because the states’ governors did not support listing. Although these five sites were not listed, EPA regional officials said that all five sites are being cleaned up, have a remedy in place that is protective of human health and the environment, or the site has been cleaned up to the point that it no longer meets the requirements for placement on the NPL. Trichloroethylene (TCE) has been found in soil and near groundwater. OMB encouraged EPA to defer listing the site for 6 months to provide DOD with time to address personnel and contractor changes and demonstrate remediation progress. Although EPA officials told us that cleanup at Chanute has progressed slowly, milestones were met and EPA did not list the site. 4.) GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) the extent of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) oversight during assessment and cleanup at Department of Defense (DOD) National Priority List (NPL) and non-NPL sites and (2) why EPA has proposed fewer DOD sites for inclusion on the NPL since the early 1990s. To examine the extent of EPA’s oversight during assessment and cleanup of DOD NPL and non-NPL sites, we reviewed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and other legislation governing the cleanup of federal hazardous waste sites, as well as EPA Superfund program policy and guidance, to determine the roles and responsibilities of EPA and federal agencies, such as DOD, to implement the CERCLA process and assess and clean up hazardous waste. We interviewed EPA and DOD officials on contaminated DOD sites that EPA proposed for the NPL, why some were not listed, and the status of cleanup at these sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prior to the 1980s and the passage of environmental legislation--particularly the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) governing environmental cleanup--Department of Defense (DOD) activities contaminated millions of acres of soil and water on and near DOD sites. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which enforces CERCLA, places the most contaminated sites on its National Priorities List (NPL) and requires that they be cleaned up in accordance with CERCLA. EPA has placed 140 DOD sites on the NPL. Disputes have recently arisen between EPA and DOD on agreements to clean up some of these sites. In addition, most sites were placed on the NPL before 1991; since fiscal year 2000, EPA has added five DOD sites. In this context, we agreed to determine (1) the extent of EPA's oversight during assessment and cleanup at DOD sites and (2) why EPA has proposed fewer DOD sites for the NPL since the early 1990s. GAO interviewed officials at EPA and DOD and reviewed site file documentation at four EPA regions.
What GAO Found
EPA evaluates DOD's preliminary assessments of contaminated DOD sites but has little to no oversight of the cleanup of the majority of these sites because most are not on the NPL. Of the 985 DOD sites requiring cleanup of hazardous substances, EPA has oversight authority of the 140 on the NPL; the remaining 845 non-NPL sites are overseen by other cleanup authorities--usually the states. Our review of 389 non-NPL DOD sites showed that EPA decided not to list 56 percent because it determined the condition of the sites did not satisfy the criteria for listing or because it deferred the sites to other programs, most often the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act--another federal statute that governs activities involving hazardous waste. However, EPA regional officials were unable to provide a rationale for not listing the remaining 44 percent because site files documenting EPA's decisions were missing or inconclusive. In addition, EPA has agreements with DOD for cleaning up 129 of the 140 NPL sites and is generally satisfied with the cleanup of these sites. However, DOD does not have agreements for the remaining 11 sites, even though they are required under CERCLA. It was not until more than 10 years after these sites were placed on the NPL that EPA, in 2007, pursued enforcement action against DOD by issuing administrative orders at 4 of the 11 sites. Since the mid-1990s, EPA has placed fewer DOD sites on the NPL than in previous years for three key reasons. First, EPA does not generally list DOD sites that are being addressed under other federal or state programs to avoid duplication. Second, DOD and EPA officials told us that, because DOD has been identifying and cleaning up hazardous releases for more than two decades, and improved its management of waste generated during its ongoing operations, DOD has discovered fewer hazardous substance releases in recent years, making fewer sites available for listing. Third, in a few instances, state officials or others have objected to EPA's proposal to list contaminated DOD sites, and EPA has usually declined to proceed further. For example, in five instances EPA proposed contaminated DOD sites for the NPL that were not ultimately placed on the list. At four of these sites, the states' governors did not support listing, citing the perceived stigma of inclusion on the NPL and potential adverse economic effect. EPA did not list the fifth site because, according to EPA regional officials, DOD objected and appealed to the Office of Management and Budget, which recommended deferring this listing for 6 months to give DOD time to address personnel and contractor changes and demonstrate remediation progress. EPA officials recently told us that cleanup has taken place at these sites and that it was unlikely or unclear whether they would qualify for placement on the NPL based on their current condition. |
gao_GAO-08-219 | gao_GAO-08-219_0 | CBP issued new policies and procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators
While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at air and land ports of entry. Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country through air and land ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. An effective internal control environment is a key method to help agency managers achieve program objectives and enhance their ability to address identified weaknesses. To address staffing, CBP developed a staffing model to identify the resources needed at the nation’s ports of entry. In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model. CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures
Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program
CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that track what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is intercepting inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP’s key strategic objectives. Recommendations for Executive Action
To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we recommended in our October 5, 2007 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take the following four actions: implement internal controls to help ensure that field office directors communicate to agency management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can be analyzed and necessary actions taken to ensure that new traveler inspection procedures are carried out in a consistent way across all ports of entry; develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency management is in a better position to measure progress toward achieving training goals; incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency in performing those tasks; and formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program that identifies CBP’s effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in conducting traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry. To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials, including those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Human Resource Management, and Training and Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses, subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July 2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections. CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills. CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, a key strategic goal. |
gao_GAO-04-712 | gao_GAO-04-712_0 | Legislation Authorizes IRS to Penalize Employers Who File Inaccurate SSNs
Internal Revenue Code Section 6721 authorizes IRS to penalize employers for failure to file an information return by the required filing date, failure to include complete information, and failure to include correct information including accurate SSNs. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, IRS was authorized to assess penalties for failure to file information returns including wage statements filed by employers. The 1986 Act also established the amount of a penalty, $5 per information return, limited those penalties to a maximum of $20,000 per filer in any calendar year except in cases of intentional disregard, and included the reasonable cause waiver. The second provision limits total penalties assessed against an employer to a maximum dollar amount in any calendar year. IRS Does Not Have a Dedicated Compliance Program to Penalize Employers Who File Wage Statements with Inaccurate SSNs
According to IRS officials, IRS has the capability to identify employers who file wage statements with inaccurate SSNs but does not have a dedicated compliance program for penalizing them. IRS’s regulations for implementing the penalty provisions include the steps an employer can take to demonstrate that any filing of wage statements with inaccurate SSNs was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. In addition, IRS has been conducting an assessment of 100 “egregious” employers who filed large numbers of wage statements with inaccurate SSNs or had a high rate of such filings to determine whether and how to implement a penalty program that would create incentives for employers to improve the accuracy of SSNs included on wage statements. Although IRS’s Regulations Meet Statutory Requirements, It Is Unlikely Employers Will Be Penalized; IRS Will Consider Changes
IRS’s regulations for penalizing employers who file wage statements with inaccurate SSNs meet the statutory requirements; however, under current regulations, employers are unlikely to be penalized for filing wage statements with inaccurate SSNs and IRS has no record of ever penalizing an employer for inaccurate SSNs on wage statements. IRS officials then said that they would consider a range of changes to improve the accuracy of SSNs on wage statements. However, the criteria for meeting the reasonable cause waiver included in the regulations are easy to meet making penalization of employers very unlikely. As previously described, to qualify for a reasonable cause waiver, an employer is responsible only for soliciting an SSN from each employee from one to three times depending on when the employer has been contacted by the IRS and told that the SSN provided on the wage statement is inaccurate. An earlier pilot test of a voluntary employment verification system illustrates other issues that may affect employers and other federal agencies if IRS requires SSN verification. IRS officials said they will design the evaluation after a penalty program is adopted. Conclusions
Inaccurate SSNs on wage statements contribute to growth in the SSA Earnings Suspense File, increase IRS’s workload to ensure that wages are properly identified for the individual earning them, and burden individuals who must work with SSA and IRS to resolve disputes that may affect their tax obligations and social security benefits. Both Acts emphasize the use of penalties as a tool to help ensure that employers file information returns with complete and accurate information but also include a reasonable cause provision under which penalties can be waived. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our first objective was to describe the statutory provisions authorizing the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to penalize employers who file Forms W-2 (Wage and Tax Statements), hereafter referred to as wage statements, with inaccurate social security numbers (SSNs). | Why GAO Did This Study
Inaccurate social security numbers (SSN) on wage statements contribute to growth in the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Earnings Suspense File, increase the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) workload to ensure that wages are properly identified for those earning them, and burden individuals who must work with SSA and IRS to resolve disputes that may affect their social security benefits and tax obligations. IRS's ability to penalize employers for submitting inaccurate SSNs on wage statements is intended to promote SSN accuracy. Items GAO was asked to describe included: (1) the statutory provisions authorizing IRS to penalize employers who file wage statements with inaccurate SSNs; (2) IRS's program to penalize such employers; and (3) the extent IRS's program meets legislative requirements, the likelihood of any penalties, and any program changes being considered.
What GAO Found
IRS is authorized to penalize employers who fail to file information returns or fail to include complete and correct information on them. Prior to 1986, IRS was authorized to assess penalties for failure to file information returns. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added penalties for failure to include complete and correct information, established penalty amounts, and had two provisions limiting those penalties--the "reasonable cause waiver" and a maximum of $20,000 in penalties per filer per calendar year. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989 increased the penalty amounts and the maximum total penalty amounts, ranging from $25,000 to $250,000 per filer per calendar year and added a third limit--a "de minimis provision" limiting the number of penalties that can be assessed. These statutes apply to employers who submit wage statements with inaccurate SSNs. Both acts authorize penalties as a tool to help ensure that information returns include complete and accurate information. According to IRS officials, IRS has the capability to identify employers who file wage statements with inaccurate SSNs but does not have a dedicated compliance program for penalizing them. Currently employers may be penalized based on an employment tax examination. IRS regulations define the steps an employer needs to take to demonstrate that any filing of wage statements with inaccurate SSNs was due to reasonable cause. If reasonable cause exists, any potential penalty will be waived. To qualify for the reasonable cause waiver, employers must be able to demonstrate they solicited an SSN from each employee one to three times, depending on the circumstances, and that they used this information to complete the wage statements. Employers are not responsible for verifying the accuracy of an SSN. IRS is conducting a review of 100 "egregious" employers who filed large numbers or percentages of wage statements with inaccurate SSNs to determine whether and how to implement a penalty program. IRS's regulations that implement the penalty provisions meet the statutory requirements; however, the criteria for meeting the reasonable cause waiver is such that few if any employers are likely to be penalized for filing inaccurate SSNs. IRS has no record of ever penalizing an employer, including the employers who were contacted during IRS's review of "egregious" employers. IRS officials said they would consider changes, including requiring employers to verify SSNs provided by employees, as part of the "egregious" employer study. Requiring SSN verification, however, may affect employers and other federal agencies with roles related to federal immigration policy since some portion of inaccurate SSNs on wage statements is attributable to illegal aliens using invalid SSNs. IRS officials said they would likely take the views of other agencies into account after drafting regulations. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-180 | gao_T-HEHS-97-180_0 | Background
HHS is charged with ensuring that HHAs meet conditions of participation in the Medicare program that are adequate to protect the health and safety of beneficiaries. These initial surveys often take place so soon after an HHA begins operating that surveyors have little information with which to judge the quality of care an HHA provides or the HHA’s potential for providing such care. officials said that this would not be a reasonable requirement for all HHAs seeking certification. Few HHAs Are Involuntarily Terminated
Once certified as a Medicare provider, an HHA is virtually assured of remaining in the program even if repeatedly found to be violating Medicare’s conditions of participation and associated standards. Until the advent of ORT, the likelihood of an HHA’s being terminated from the Medicare program was remote. HCFA’s HHA survey and certification process, however, fails to provide beneficiaries with reasonable assurance that their HHA meets Medicare’s conditions of participation and provides quality care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed how Medicare: (1) controls the entry of home health agencies (HHA) into the Medicare Program; and (2) ensures that HHAs in the program comply with Medicare's conditions of participation and associated standards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is finding that Medicare's survey and certification process imposes few requirements on HHAs seeking to serve Medicare patients and bill the Medicare program; (2) the certification of an HHA as a Medicare provider is based on an initial survey that takes place so soon after the agency begins operating that there is little assurance that the HHA is providing or capable of providing quality care; and (3) moreover, once certified, HHAs are unlikely to be terminated from the program or otherwise penalized, even when they have been repeatedly cited for not meeting Medicare's conditions of participation and for providing substandard care. |
gao_GAO-15-348 | gao_GAO-15-348_0 | The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) included provisions aimed at improving the information available from states on the quality of health care furnished to children in both CHIP and Medicaid. In addition, CHIPRA required HHS to identify quality measures, known as the Child Core Set measures, to serve as a tool for states to use to monitor and improve the quality of health care provided to children enrolled in CHIP and Medicaid. Assessments of National Data Largely Show Positive Effect of CHIP on Coverage and Access, and Identify Areas for Improvement
Available assessments of national data we reviewed identify positive effects of CHIP, including a reduction in the rate of uninsured children and children’s improved access to care, and these findings are often consistent with our prior work. Mandated Evaluation Highlights Reduction in the Rate of Uninsured Children and Improved Access to Health Care
HHS’s mandated evaluation identified several positive effects of CHIP across states, particularly with regard to children who are uninsured. In particular, when compared with uninsured children, we found that CHIP enrollees fared better, and the differences we identified were statistically significant in most cases. When the mandated evaluation compared CHIP enrollees with the privately-insured group, it also found that CHIP enrollees experienced comparable access and service use for many, but not all, measures, and that parents of children enrolled in CHIP experienced less financial burden in paying their children’s medical bills. For our assessment of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we also compared CHIP enrollees’ access and service use with children who were privately-insured, and our findings were consistent with some of the findings in the mandated evaluation. HHS Has Ongoing Efforts to Enhance State Reporting of Quality Measures and Identify Areas for Improvement to Care Provided in CHIP
HHS publishes data that states report on the Child Core Set measures in its annual quality report. 2.) For example, a mean of 96 percent of children aged 12 to 24 months enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid had at least one primary care physician visit during fiscal year 2013. For example, a mean of 46 percent of children received at least one preventive dental service, and a mean of 25 percent of children (See table 2.) For the most recent annual quality report, 40 of the 42 states that contract with managed care plans to deliver services to CHIP and Medicaid enrollees Based on its review of these submitted external quality review reports.reports, HHS found that the most frequently reported performance measures from states’ external quality reports—which included well-child care, primary care access, childhood immunization rates, and prenatal/postpartum care—mirrored states’ most frequently reported Child Core Set measures in fiscal year 2013. Cost, Coverage, and Access to Care Are Key Considerations in Determining the Reauthorization of CHIP Funding
Our prior work has identified important considerations related to cost, coverage, and access when determining the ongoing need for CHIP, many of which were echoed by officials from the 10 states we reviewed. With regard to cost, our prior work comparing CHIP plans to states’ benchmark plans, which were the models for health plans available under health insurance exchanges established under PPACA, found that costs—defined as deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and premiums—were almost always less for CHIP plans. Officials from five selected states also expressed concerns about the higher costs of QHP coverage and the implications this would have for families. We also previously reported that coverage is a relevant consideration, and that separate CHIP and benchmark plans were generally similar in terms of their coverage of selected services and the services on which they imposed limits, with some variation. Officials from several selected states pointed out that CHIP coverage was more comprehensive than QHPs for certain services, particularly for services needed by children with special health care needs. With regard to access, our work found that CHIP enrollees generally reported positive responses in their ability to obtain care that was generally comparable to those with private insurance, with some exceptions, including lower utilization of dental and orthodontia services. Some of the states we reviewed also raised concerns related to access to care if CHIP funding is not reauthorized. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Children’s Health Insurance: Cost, Coverage, and Access Considerations for Extending Federal Funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
CHIP is a joint federal-state program that finances health insurance for over 8 million children. Since the program's inception, the percentage of uninsured children nationwide has decreased by half, from 13.9 percent in 1997 to 6.6 percent in the first three months of 2014. This year, Congress will decide whether to extend CHIP funding beyond 2015.
GAO was asked to provide information on the effect of CHIP on children's coverage, and what key issues may be considered in determining the ongoing need for CHIP. In this report, GAO examines (1) what assessments of CHIP suggest about its effect on children's health care coverage and access; and (2) what key issues identified by GAO's work the Congress may wish to consider in determining whether to extend CHIP funding.
For the assessments of CHIP's effect, GAO reviewed reports on CHIP, including a mandated evaluation and annual HHS reports on quality, which publish data that states report on Child Core Set measures, which are quality measures identified by HHS that states can use to monitor health care provided to children in CHIP and Medicaid. GAO also reviewed relevant federal statutes and regulations. To identify key issues that the Congress may wish to consider, GAO reviewed its own relevant reports and testimony; reviewed letters from state governors regarding CHIP; and interviewed CHIP officials in 10 states, which were selected based on variation in location, program size, and design.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Assessments of national data GAO reviewed identify positive effects of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the quality measures reported by states help identify areas needing improvement.
A mandated evaluation of CHIP published in 2014 noted that CHIP enrollees (1) had substantially better access to care, service use, and preventive care when compared with uninsured children; and (2) experienced comparable access and service use when compared with privately insured children. These findings are generally consistent with prior GAO work, which used national survey data to compare CHIP enrollees' access and service use with children who were uninsured or privately insured. When comparing CHIP enrollees with privately insured children, the mandated evaluation and prior GAO work differed regarding the utilization of certain services, such as emergency room use and dental services, which may be due to differences in when the data were collected and the particular measures that were used.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also publishes data on quality measures that states voluntarily report annually. These Child Core Set measures show mixed results regarding service utilization among CHIP and Medicaid enrollees. For example, states reported that nearly all children aged 12 to 24 months enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid had at least one primary care physician visit during fiscal year 2013. However, states reported that far fewer children obtained dental prevention or treatment services, with a mean of 46 percent of children receiving a preventive dental service, and a mean of 25 percent receiving dental treatment services. HHS officials said that they use these data to help identify areas for improvement in the care provided in CHIP and Medicaid.
GAO's prior work has identified important issues related to cost, coverage, and access that Congress may wish to consider when determining the ongoing need for CHIP, many of which were similar to issues raised by officials from the 10 states GAO reviewed.
With regard to cost, GAO's prior work found that costs—defined as deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and premiums—were almost always less for selected CHIP plans when compared with states' benchmark health plans, which were the models for health plans available in health insurance exchanges established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Officials in five states expressed concerns about the higher cost of exchange plans compared with CHIP and the implications for families' finances.
With regard to coverage, GAO previously reported that selected CHIP and state benchmark plans were generally similar in terms of their coverage of selected services and the services on which they imposed limits. However, officials from several of the 10 states pointed out that for many services needed by children with special health care needs, CHIP coverage was more comprehensive than exchange plans.
With regard to access, several states raised concerns about negative implications for children's coverage if CHIP funding is not reauthorized, including concerns that their states would lose gains made in covering children, who would also lose access to providers and dental care. |
gao_GAO-15-794 | gao_GAO-15-794_0 | In addition to the need for more nurses due to an increasing number of veterans, VHA anticipates that changes in veteran demographics, including an aging population, will increase the need for nurses to provide more complex types of services to care for veterans. 1.) VHA Has Multiple Nurse Recruitment and Retention Initiatives, but Some Medical Centers Face Challenges That Limit the Initiatives’ Usefulness
VHA has multiple system-wide initiatives to recruit and retain its nurse workforce, but some VA medical centers face challenges in offering them to nurses and with recruitment and retention more broadly. VHA’s initiatives focus primarily on providing (1) education and training, and (2) financial benefits and incentives. The four VA medical centers in our review varied in the number of initiatives they offered from FY 2010 through FY 2014. In addition to offering VHA’s initiatives, three of the four medical centers in our review developed local recruitment and retention initiatives. Officials from three of the four medical centers in our review reported that VHA’s initiatives helped improve their ability to recruit and retain nurses, as shown in the following examples:
Officials from one medical center reported that they hired 9 of the 10 nurses who participated in the VHA Post-Baccalaureate Nurse Residency as full-time nurses in academic year 2012-2013, the first year the medical center offered the initiative. These challenges—lack of sufficient administrative support, competition with private sector medical facilities for qualified and skilled nurses, the rural location of the medical center, and employee dissatisfaction—may affect medical centers’ ability to effectively and efficiently recruit and retain nurses. VHA’s Oversight of Its Nurse Recruitment and Retention Initiatives Is Limited
VHA Conducts Limited Monitoring of VA Medical Centers’ Compliance with Nurse Recruitment and Retention Initiatives
VHA conducts limited monitoring of VA medical centers to ensure they are in compliance with its key nurse recruitment and retention initiatives. Consistent with federal internal control standards, monitoring should be ongoing in the course of normal program operations and provide reasonable assurance of compliance with applicable laws and regulations. With limited monitoring taking place as part of its oversight, VHA lacks assurance that its medical centers are complying with the recruitment and retention initiatives’ policies and requirements, and that any problems can be identified and resolved in a timely and appropriate manner. VHA Has Conducted Limited Evaluations of the Training Resources Provided and Overall Nurse Recruitment and Retention Initiatives
Although three VA medical centers in our review reported that VHA’s key recruitment and retention initiatives for nurses have been helpful, VHA has conducted limited evaluations to determine any needed training resources or to determine the initiatives’ effectiveness system-wide and whether any changes are needed. Consistent with federal internal control standards, measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making towards program goals and objectives, and provides managers important information on which to make management decisions and resolve any problems or program weaknesses. According to a VHA official, there is currently no face-to-face training provided by VHA specifically for nurse recruiters, but there is regular training available to those assigned to a human resources office as part of training available to all human resources staff. Representatives of a national nursing organization reported that the clinical nurse recruiters at VA medical centers often feel overwhelmed and unprepared in the position because of a lack of training and human resources-related information, which may have resulted in turnover in that position. Furthermore, VHA has not conducted any evaluations of the overall effectiveness of the key initiatives in meeting VHA’s system-wide nurse recruitment and retention goals. VHA has a number of key initiatives to help medical centers recruit and retain nurses; however, challenges, including competition with the private sector for qualified and skilled nurses and the lack of sufficient administrative support, may limit their effectiveness. Further, without system-wide evaluations of its collective initiatives, VHA is unable to determine to what extent its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives are effective in meeting VHA polices and Choice Act provisions, or ultimately, whether VHA’s initiatives are sufficient to meet veterans’ health care needs. Develop a periodic reporting process to help monitor VA medical center compliance with the policies and procedures for each of its key recruitment and retention initiatives; 2. Evaluate the adequacy of training resources provided to all nurse recruiters at VA medical centers to ensure that they have the tools and information to perform their duties efficiently and effectively; and 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO and others have highlighted the need for an adequate and qualified nurse workforce to provide quality and timely care to veterans. VHA faces challenges such as increased competition for skilled clinicians in hard-to-fill occupations such as nurses. As GAO has previously reported, recruitment and retention is particularly difficult for nurses with advanced professional skills, knowledge, and experience, which is critical given veterans' needs for more complex specialized services.
GAO was asked to provide information on the recruitment and retention of nurses within VHA. This report reviews (1) the initiatives VHA has to recruit and retain its nurse workforce and (2) the extent to which VHA oversees its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from VHA, four VA medical centers selected to reflect variation in factors such as nurse turnover, and regional offices for these medical centers. GAO used federal internal control standards to evaluate VHA's oversight. GAO also interviewed selected stakeholder organizations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has multiple system-wide initiatives to recruit and retain its nurse workforce, but three of the four VA medical centers in GAO's review faced challenges offering them. VHA identified a number of key initiatives it offers to help medical centers recruit and retain nurses, which focus primarily on providing (1) education and training, and (2) financial benefits and incentives. VA medical centers generally have discretion in offering these initiatives. The four medical centers in GAO's review varied in the number of initiatives they offered, and three of these medical centers developed local recruitment and retention initiatives in addition to those offered by VHA. GAO also found that while three of the four medical centers reported improvements in their ability to recruit and retain nurses through their offering of VHA's initiatives; they also reported challenges. The challenges included a lack of sufficient administrative support for medical centers, competition with private sector medical facilities, reduced pool of nurses in rural locations with advanced training, and employee dissatisfaction.
VHA's oversight of its key system-wide nurse recruitment and retention initiatives is limited. Specifically, GAO found that VHA conducts limited monitoring of medical centers' compliance with its initiatives. For example, in the past, VHA conducted site visits in response to a medical center reporting difficulty with implementation of one of its initiatives, and to assess compliance with program policies, but it is no longer conducting these visits. Consistent with federal internal control standards, monitoring should be ongoing and should identify performance gaps in a policy or procedure. With limited monitoring, VHA lacks assurance that its medical centers are complying with its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives, and that any problems are identified and resolved in a timely and appropriate manner. In addition, VHA has not conducted evaluations of the training resources provided to nurse recruiters at VA medical centers or the overall effectiveness of the initiatives in meeting its nurse recruitment and retention goals, or whether any changes are needed. Consistent with federal internal control standards, measuring performance tracks progress towards program goals and objectives, and provides important information to make management decisions and resolve any problems or program weaknesses. For example, GAO found that VHA does not know whether medical centers have sufficient training to support its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives. In particular, there is currently no face-to-face training provided by VHA specifically for nurse recruiters, but there is regular training available to those assigned to a human resources office as part of training available to all human resources staff. Representatives from a national nursing organization reported that clinical nurse recruiters at VA medical centers often feel more unprepared for the position than those assigned to human resources offices, but no evaluation of this disparity or its effects has occurred. Without evaluations of its collective system-wide initiatives, VHA is unable to determine to what extent its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives are effective in meeting VHA policies and the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act provisions, or ultimately whether VHA has an adequate and qualified nurse workforce at its medical centers that is sufficient to meet veterans' health care needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends VA (1) develop a process to help monitor medical centers' compliance with its key nurse recruitment and retention initiatives; (2) evaluate the adequacy of training resources provided to nurse recruiters; and (3) conduct a system-wide evaluation of its key nurse recruitment and retention initiatives. VA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-570T | gao_GAO-01-570T_0 | Highlights of Major Issues Relating to the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 2000
As was the case for fiscal years 1997 through 1999,our report on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2000 states that certain significant financial systems weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping and financial reporting, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls continued to hamper the government’s ability to accurately report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs. Information to compile agency financial statements should flow from their financial management systems. As a result, USDA has been unable to implement the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and related accounting standards. In addition, these problems materially affect USDA’s budget submissions because the same cost estimates are generally used for both budget preparation and financial reporting. In closing Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore the importance of the President and the new Administration emphasizing and giving priority to (1) addressing the problems preventing us from being able to express an opinion on the government’s consolidated financial statements, (2) having effective internal control, and (3) modernizing financial management systems. | What GAO Found
The Comptroller General discusses GAO's report on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2000. This is the fourth consecutive year that GAO has been unable to express an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. Material weaknesses in internal control and accounting and reporting issues prevented GAO from being able to provide Congress and the American people with an opinion as to whether the government's consolidated financial statements are fairly stated in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. These material weaknesses also affected the reliability of information in the Management's Discussion and Analysis included in the financial report and other financial management information--including information used to manage the government and budget information reported by agencies--which is taken from the same data sources as the financial statements. |
gao_GAO-05-886 | gao_GAO-05-886_0 | Labor has given this authority to 27 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories. Council-monitored states not only have more programs, but these programs are more likely to be jointly sponsored by employers and unions than sponsored by employers alone. Labor does collect aggregate data on apprentices and programs from these states. Labor’s Monitoring of Registered Apprenticeship Programs Is Limited
Although OATELS is responsible for overseeing thousands of apprenticeship programs in the states where it has direct oversight, it reviews few of these programs each year. Federal apprenticeship directors in these states reported they conducted 379 quality reviews in 2004, covering only about 4 percent of the programs under their watch. While Labor Collects Much Information about Apprenticeship Programs, It Does Not Systematically Use Data to Focus Its Oversight
Although Labor collects information to compute completion rates and track participants who do not complete programs in the time expected, it does not use these data to focus its oversight efforts on programs with poor performance. Labor Has Reviewed Council-Monitored States Infrequently, Provided Little Feedback, and Not Collected Data That Would Allow for a National Picture of Apprenticeships
Labor has infrequently reviewed states to which it has delegated oversight responsibility. While incompatible data systems may suggest that it would be difficult or costly to obtain more than aggregate counts, in collecting data for this report, we found many of the council-monitored states—including 10 with large numbers of apprentices—were both willing and capable of providing us data on apprentices by industry and by occupation as well as information on completion rates, completion times, and some wage data for occupations that we had specified. Construction Apprenticeship Completion Rates and Wages Vary by Program Sponsor
Construction apprentices in programs sponsored jointly by employers and unions (joint programs) generally completed at a higher rate and in greater numbers than those enrolled in programs sponsored by employers alone (non-joint programs). Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor take steps to (1) better utilize information in Labor’s database, such as indicators of program performance, for management oversight, particularly for apprenticeship programs in occupations with expected future labor shortages; (2) develop a cost-effective strategy for collecting data from council-monitored states; (3) conduct Labor’s reviews of apprenticeship activities in states that regulate their own programs on a regular basis to ensure that state activities are in accord with Labor’s requirements for recognition of apprenticeship programs; and (4) offer substantive feedback to states from its reviews. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Labor monitors the operations and outcomes of registered apprenticeship programs in the states where it has direct oversight, (2) its oversight activities for council-monitored states, and (3) outcomes for construction apprentices in programs sponsored jointly by employers and unions in relation to those sponsored by employers alone. To examine the outcomes for apprentices in the construction industry, we analyzed data from Labor’s RAIS database. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 2002 and 2012 nearly 850,000 jobs will open in the construction industry; experts predict that there will not be enough skilled workers to fill them. This has heightened concerns about program outcomes and program quality in the nation's apprenticeship system and the U.S. Department of Labor's oversight of it. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which Labor monitors registered apprenticeship programs in the states where it has direct oversight, (2) its oversight activities in states that do their own monitoring, and (3) the outcomes for construction apprentices in programs sponsored by employers and unions in relation to programs sponsored by employers alone.
What GAO Found
Labor's monitoring of programs it directly oversees has been limited. We found that in 2004 Labor reviewed only 4 percent of programs in the 23 states where it has direct oversight. According to federal program directors in those states, limited staff constrained their ability to do more reviews. Also, Labor has focused in recent years on registering new programs and recruiting apprentices. Although Labor collects much data about the programs it oversees, it has not employed its database to generate information indicative of program performance, such as completion rates, that might allow it to be more efficient in its oversight. Labor does not regularly review council-monitored states or collect data from them that would allow for a national picture of apprenticeships. Labor is responsible for conducting formal reviews of the 27 states and the District of Columbia that established apprenticeship councils to monitor their own apprenticeship programs; but, according to directors in these states, the reviews have been infrequent and not necessarily useful. While Labor collects only aggregate data on apprentices from these states, we identified 10 states with large numbers of apprentices that were willing and capable of providing GAO data on apprentices by occupation as well as some information on completion rates, completion times, and wages. Data in Labor's apprenticeship database and from council-monitored states show that completion rates and wages for construction apprentices in programs sponsored jointly by employers and unions were higher than those for programs sponsored by employers alone. We found that completion rates for apprentices in programs jointly sponsored by unions and employers were 47 percent on average compared with 30 percent in programs sponsored solely by employers. Completion rates declined under both types of sponsorship for the period we examined, but Labor, as part of its oversight, does not track reasons for noncompletion, making it difficult to determine what lies behind this trend. |
gao_GAO-13-588 | gao_GAO-13-588_0 | Background
U.S. Agency Roles and Responsibilities
U.S. agencies have different responsibilities related to international regulatory cooperation. 2. 3. 4. Reducing foreign regulatory barriers to trade is a key U.S. trade objective. U.S. These activities include U.S. agencies and foreign counterparts sharing scientific data, developing and using the same international regulatory standards, and recognizing each other’s regulations as equivalent. Cooperation can address both existing and avoid future regulatory differences. Agencies’ efforts to cooperate on regulatory programs through cooperative activities may also have the effect of facilitating trade and supporting the competitiveness of U.S. businesses. In addition, U.S. agency officials said that when they participate in international standards development, an existing U.S. regulation or policy approach may be used as the basis for the international standard. When other countries adopt U.S. approaches to regulations, it can lower compliance costs and support competitiveness for U.S. businesses. OMB officials also said that the RWG is developing guidance to implement the executive order. Beyond these forums for interagency coordination, regulatory agency officials we interviewed said the current processes could benefit from better information sharing among agencies on the implementation of international regulatory cooperation activities and lessons learned. Without some enhancements to the current forums for regulators and trade officials to collaborate, opportunities to share practices and improve safety and regulatory efficiencies and to reduce trade barriers could be missed. Agencies Consider International Regulatory Cooperation and Competitiveness during Rulemaking in Different Ways International Regulatory Cooperation Activities Inform Different Phases of Rulemaking
Agency officials we interviewed reported that the outcomes from international regulatory cooperation can inform all phases of the rulemaking process, from affecting an agency’s decision whether or not to regulate in a particular area to implementing and enforcing regulations. For example, U.S. agencies share scientific and technical information with their foreign counterparts, which can inform all stages of the rulemaking process. Agency officials said competitiveness impacts for some rulemakings are likely to be indirect and may not rise to the level of inclusion in the rulemaking record. NHTSA does not have tools for analyzing the effects of its safety standards on the competitiveness of U.S. businesses. U.S. Some of these factors can facilitate agencies’ efforts if present in international regulatory cooperation activities while others can also act as a barrier when absent. Established processes. High-level leadership. Some agency officials and nonfederal stakeholders reported challenges to stakeholder involvement. Statutory authority. An official from EPA OCSPP said that an important Early and ongoing coordination. While the executive order on promoting international regulatory cooperation focuses on reducing trade barriers by reducing unnecessary differences in regulations with U.S. trading partners, we found in our review that U.S. agencies carry out numerous and diverse international regulatory cooperation activities to improve the effectiveness of regulations, gain efficiencies, and avoid duplicating work. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that U.S. agencies have the necessary tools and guidance for effectively implementing international regulatory cooperation, we recommend that the Regulatory Working Group, as part of forthcoming guidance on implementing Executive Order 13609, take the following action:
Establish one or more mechanisms, such as a forum or working group, to facilitate staff level collaboration on international regulatory cooperation issues and include independent regulatory agencies. In an email received on July 30, 2013, the Deputy General Counsel, Office of Management and Budget, stated that OMB had no comments on the recommendation in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide an overview of regulatory agencies’ international cooperation activities, (2) examine ways that agencies incorporate outcomes from international regulatory cooperation activities and consider competitiveness during rulemaking, and (3) examine factors identified by agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that act as facilitators or barriers to international regulatory cooperation and considering competitiveness. To address these objectives, we selected seven U.S. regulatory agencies out of 60 U.S. agencies that are included in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), that issued regulations with international impacts and four U.S. agencies with government-wide international coordination responsibilities. These views are not generalizable to all U.S. agencies. Furthermore, using criteria based on our September 2012 report on interagency collaborative efforts, we also compared agencies’ documents and testimonial evidence about their international regulatory cooperation activities to the seven key features that we found agencies should consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms to corroborate the agencies’ findings. The examples below illustrate the types of activities that agencies engage in to fulfill their regulatory missions and are not meant to be a comprehensive catalog of agency activities in this area. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trade has increased as a share of the economy for several years, but U.S. companies can face difficulties competing in foreign markets when countries apply different regulatory requirements to address similar health, safety, or other issues. GAO was asked to examine what U.S. agencies are doing to engage in international regulatory cooperation. This report (1) provides an overview of U.S. regulatory agencies' international cooperation activities; (2) examines ways that U.S. agencies incorporate outcomes from international regulatory cooperation activities and consider competitiveness during rulemaking; and (3) examines factors identified by U.S. agencies and stakeholders that act as facilitators or barriers to international regulatory cooperation. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from seven U.S. agencies that regulate products traded internationally and four U.S. agencies with government-wide roles and responsibilities. GAO also interviewed officials from 11 organizations representing business and consumer advocacy perspectives that reported or publicly commented on international regulatory cooperation. The scope of this study is not intended to be a complete catalog of agencies' activities and is not generalizable to all entities that have interests in this area.
What GAO Found
All seven U.S. regulatory agencies that GAO contacted reported engaging in a range of international regulatory cooperation activities to fulfill their missions. These activities include the United States and its trading partners developing and using international standards, recognizing each other's regulations as equivalent, and sharing scientific data. U.S. agency officials GAO interviewed said they cooperate with foreign counterparts because many products they regulate originate overseas and because they may gain efficiencies--for example, by sharing resources or avoiding duplicative work. Cooperation can address both existing and avoid future regulatory differences. Officials also explained how cooperative efforts enhance public health and safety, facilitate trade, and support competitiveness of U.S. businesses. Several U.S. interagency processes require or enable interagency collaboration on international cooperation activities. The Regulatory Working Group (RWG), chaired by OMB and the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) are forums that have different responsibilities related to the regulatory and trade aspects of international regulatory cooperation. U.S. regulatory agency officials said the current processes could benefit from better information sharing among agencies on the implementation of international cooperation activities and lessons learned. Without enhancements to current forums, opportunities to share practices and improve outcomes could be missed. Executive Order 13609, issued in May 2012, tasked the RWG with enhancing coordination and issuing guidance on international regulatory cooperation, which the RWG is developing. Nonfederal stakeholders GAO interviewed reported challenges to providing input on U.S. agencies' international regulatory cooperation activities, in particular that they are not always aware of many of these activities and participation can be resource intensive.
Officials GAO interviewed said the outcomes from international regulatory cooperation inform all phases of the rulemaking process, from helping an agency decide whether to regulate to implementing and enforcing regulations. U.S. agencies are not required to conduct a separate analysis on the competitiveness impacts on U.S. businesses when developing regulations. However, five of the seven U.S. agencies told GAO they do consider competitiveness. Officials we interviewed also pointed out that any analysis of impacts may not rise to the level of inclusion in the rulemaking record. In addition, U.S. agencies' use of international standards in regulations can lower costs for U.S. businesses and reduce barriers to trade.
Officials from all of the U.S. agencies GAO interviewed said they consider international standards during rulemaking partly in response to requirements in trade agreements, U.S. statutes, and executive orders. Officials from all of the U.S. agencies GAO interviewed identified seven key factors that affect the success of international regulatory cooperation activities: (1) dedicated resources, (2) established processes, (3) high-level leadership, (4) scientific and technical exchanges, (5) stakeholder involvement, (6) statutory authority, and (7) early and ongoing coordination. When present, these factors can facilitate U.S. agencies' efforts, but they can also act as barriers when absent. GAO found that these factors also reflect the seven key features for implementing collaborative mechanisms previously identified in its September 2012 report on interagency collaboration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the RWG include in forthcoming guidance on Executive Order 13609 tools to enhance collaboration, such as mechanisms to facilitate staff level dialogues. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did not have comments on the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-687T | gao_GAO-08-687T_0 | This water infrastructure in the District of Columbia, like in many older cities, is aging and will require substantial funding over the next several years for replacement or rehabilitation. WASA Has Reduced Lead in Drinking Water But Faces Many Other Challenges to its Water and Wastewater Infrastructure
A June 17, 2004, administrative order for compliance on consent between EPA and WASA required WASA to take a number of corrective actions that, by necessity, enhanced its coordination with EPA and the D.C. Department of Health. Most importantly, with the introduction of orthophosphate to the drinking water supply, WASA met, and has continued to meet, federal standards for lead in drinking water. WASA’s most recent report on lead levels in D.C. drinking water was delivered to EPA in January 2008. To resolve its lead problem in the long-term, however, WASA decided that it needed to undertake a program to replace the public portions of all its customers’ lead service lines (roughly 35,000 lines) by 2016. Perhaps the most important complication facing WASA’s lead service line replacement program is that ownership of lead service lines in the District of Columbia is shared—WASA owns the portion from the water main to the property line, and homeowners own the portion from the property line to the home. WASA established a program to encourage homeowners to replace their portion of lead service lines. Through the length of WASA’s lead service line replacement program, beginning in fiscal year 2003 and running through the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, of the 14,260 lead service lines replaced in public space, only 2,128 homeowners replaced the private portion of their lead service line. A study presented at the 2006 American Water Works Annual Conference summarizing the experience of partial lead service line replacement by the Greater Cincinnati Water Works found that partial replacements of lead lines resulted in much higher lead levels in the water for up to 1 month after replacement, even though the system was optimized for corrosion control. In light of these problems, WASA is now considering whether its current lead line replacement program should be restructured, particularly given its high cost and the competing demands on its budget. WASA has estimated the cost of this effort to reach $2.2 billion dollars. WASA’s Water Infrastructure Problems Mirror the Challenges Water Utilities Face Nationwide
WASA’s challenges are mirrored across the country, where projected needs for investment in drinking water and wastewater infrastructure range from $485 billion to nearly $1.2 trillion over 20 years. For example, in August 2002, based on a nationwide survey of large drinking water and wastewater utilities, we reported that more than one- third of the utilities had 20 percent or more of their pipelines nearing the end of their useful life. The adequacy of the available funding, in particular, has been a key determinant of how well utility infrastructure has been maintained. However, according to our nationwide survey, a significant percentage of the utilities serving populations of 10,000 or more—29 percent of the drinking water utilities and 41 percent of the wastewater utilities—were not generating enough revenue from user charges and other local sources to cover their full cost of service. Our survey also raised questions about whether utility managers have enough information about their capital assets to effectively plan their future investment needs. Comprehensive Asset Management Can Be an Effective Tool for Managing Infrastructure and Optimizing Investments When Resources Are Constrained
Growing infrastructure needs, combined with local pressure to keep user rates low, make it imperative that utilities manage their resources as cost effectively as possible. Our 2004 report identified a number of asset management practices that could help water utilities better manage their infrastructure and target their investments to achieve the maximum benefit. Whether the problem is replacing lead service lines, as is the case for WASA, meeting new regulatory requirements, or paying the price for years of deferred maintenance, many utilities are facing huge investments to add new capital assets and replace others that are reaching the end of their useful life. | Why GAO Did This Study
The discovery in 2004 of lead contamination in the District of Columbia's drinking water resulted in an administrative order between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District's Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), requiring WASA to take a number of corrective actions. WASA also took additional, longer-term measures, most notably a roughly $400 million program to replace what may be 35,000 lead service lines in public space within its service area. As in WASA's case, water utilities nationwide are under increasing pressure to make significant investments to upgrade aging and deteriorating infrastructures, improve security, serve a growing population, and meet new regulatory requirements. In this context, GAO's testimony presents observations on (1) WASA's efforts to address lead contamination in light of its other pressing water infrastructure needs, and (2) the extent to which WASA's challenges are indicative of those facing water utilities nationwide. To address these issues, GAO relied primarily on its 2005 and 2006 reports on lead contamination in drinking water, as well as other recent GAO reports examining the nation's water infrastructure needs and strategies to address these needs.
What GAO Found
With the introduction of orthophosphate to its drinking water WASA has consistently tested below the federal action level for lead. However, WASA is reevaluating its roughly $400 million, longer-term solution for replacement of what may be 35,000 lead service lines within its jurisdiction. In addition to the program's high cost, a key problem WASA faces is that, by law, it may only replace the portion of the service line that it owns; replacing the portion on private property is at the homeowner's discretion. Accordingly, WASA has been encouraging homeowners to participate in the program by replacing their own portion of the lead lines. Despite these efforts, however, homeowner replacement of lead service lines remains limited. Of the 14,260 lead service lines WASA replaced through the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, there were only 2,128 instances in which the homeowner participated in private side replacement. Many questions remain about the benefits of partial lead service line replacement. In fact, some research to date suggests that partial service line replacement results in (1) short-term spikes in lead levels immediately after partial replacement and (2) little long-term reduction in lead levels. WASA's dilemma over this program is taking place within the context of its other staggering infrastructure needs. Most notably, WASA is undertaking a $2.2 billion effort to meet the terms of a consent decree with EPA requiring the utility to control its sewer overflow problems. WASA's challenges in addressing its lead contamination problems and other infrastructure demands are mirrored across the country, where infrastructure needs are estimated to range from $485 billion to nearly $1.2 trillion nationwide over the next 20 years. In particular, many utilities have had difficulty in raising funds to repair, replace, or upgrade aging capital assets; comply with regulatory requirements; and expand capacity to meet increased demand. For example, based on a nationwide survey of several thousand drinking water and wastewater utilities, GAO reported in 2002 that 29 percent of the drinking water utilities and 41 percent of the wastewater utilities were not generating enough revenue from user rates and other local sources to cover their full cost of service. GAO also found that about one-third of the utilities (1) deferred maintenance because of insufficient funding, (2) had 20 percent or more of their pipelines nearing the end of their useful life, and (3) lacked basic plans for managing their capital assets. Other GAO work suggests that the nation's water utilities could more effectively manage their infrastructure at a time when huge investments are needed. In 2004, for example, GAO cited "comprehensive asset management" as one approach that could help utilities better identify and manage their infrastructure needs. While by no means a panacea to their fundamental fiscal challenges, water utilities can use comprehensive asset management to minimize the total cost of designing, acquiring, operating, maintaining, replacing, and disposing of capital assets over their useful lives, while achieving desired service levels. |
gao_GAO-11-615T | gao_GAO-11-615T_0 | Our Campus Recruitment Program Has Led to Strong Partnerships with Schools
About a decade ago we implemented a campus recruitment program to increase GAO’s visibility on campuses and help us attract highly-qualified and diverse candidates. We have established ongoing relationships with many colleges and universities across the country. While we advertise all of our new positions publicly, currently we have relationships with about 70 colleges and universities, including private and public colleges and universities, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic-serving institutions, and other minority-serving institutions. These targeted schools have academic programs relevant to our skill needs (e.g., public policy, accounting, business or computer science) and that prepare students well for success at GAO. Our relationship-building over the years has been based primarily on visiting many of these schools to participate in on- campus events. We Have Taken Actions to Enhance Our Campus Recruitment Program
As part of overall efforts to focus more attention on our strategic human capital management, we have taken proactive steps to improve our recruitment program. Specifically, we (1) established stronger linkages between our recruitment efforts and organizational workforce needs, (2) increased diversity of and enhanced supports for our staff serving as recruiters, and (3) instituted stronger program management and accountability processes. We have seen positive outcomes from these efforts. Our Programs and Policies Help Support New Staff
Along with attracting and hiring high-quality, diverse staff, we have implemented programs and policies to support new staff once they arrive at GAO. The support for our entry-level staff comes predominantly through their participation in our highly regarded, 2-year, Professional Development Program (PDP). This program provides new employees with the foundations to be successful because it teaches them about our core values, how we do our work, and the standards by which we assess our performance. All entry-level analyst or analyst-related new hires are assigned advisers to assist in their development and provide support, although staff are also strongly encouraged to take an active role in their own career development by crafting Individual Development Plans and assessing their own strengths and growth areas. Staff receive multiple assignments while in the program so they can gain firsthand experience with the wide range of our work. They also receive a rigorous regimen of classroom and on-the-job training to learn about our work processes and requirements. Staff in the PDP program also receive formal feedback every 3 months and twice-yearly performance appraisals that can result in salary increases. In addition, actions of our senior leaders as well as several policies and other programs help our new hires make a successful adjustment to GAO. In addition, the Comptroller General and others meet with new employees during their first few months to answer any questions about GAO or our relationship with Congress. Other senior managers, including Managing Directors and directors in each GAO team, are encouraged not only to meet with new staff but take an active role in their development and day-to-day work environment. We also have policies in place to foster an inclusive and supportive work environment and help all staff balance work and life. We also have a student loan repayment program to help eligible staff defray educational costs. PDP staff, as all staff at GAO, can take advantage of a mentoring program to assist staff in becoming effective leaders, managing their work environments, and developing their careers. These programs and policies have helped make GAO a great place to work, as evidenced by our employees’ decisions to stay with GAO and results from our employee feedback surveys. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's campus recruitment program. As an organization committed to having a high-performing, diverse workforce, GAO places great importance on attracting, hiring, training, and retaining employees with the skills needed to support GAO's mission to serve Congress and the American public. GAO has a multi-disciplinary workforce, with most staff having backgrounds in public policy, public administration, law, business, computer science, accounting, social sciences, or economics. While our current and future hiring will be shaped by today's constrained budget environment, over the past 5 years, on average, GAO has hired about 300 employees each year. The majority of these hires were for analyst and analyst-related positions at the entry level. GAO also has a robust paid student intern program each year. Many of these interns return as entry-level analysts. Having a strong campus recruitment program has played a key role in attracting highly qualified candidates for our permanent and intern positions and building our workforce. In response to congressional request, the remarks will focus on (1) the strong partnerships developed through our campus recruitment program, (2) recent actions GAO has taken to enhance the program and the positive outcomes GAO has experienced, and (3) the programs and policies we have in place to support new staff.
What GAO Found
Through our campus recruitment program, we have established ongoing relationships with many colleges and universities across the country. While we advertise all of our new positions publicly, currently we have relationships with about 70 colleges and universities, including private and public colleges and universities, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic-serving institutions, and other minority-serving institutions. These targeted schools have academic programs relevant to our skill needs (e.g., public policy, accounting, business or computer science) and that prepare students well for success at GAO. Our relationship-building over the years has been based primarily on visiting many of these schools to participate in on-campus events. As part of overall efforts to focus more attention on our strategic human capital management, we have taken proactive steps to improve our recruitment program. Specifically, we (1) established stronger linkages between our recruitment efforts and organizational workforce needs, (2) increased diversity of and enhanced supports for our staff serving as recruiters, and (3) instituted stronger program management and accountability processes. We have seen positive outcomes from these efforts. Along with attracting and hiring high-quality, diverse staff, we have implemented programs and policies to support new staff once they arrive at GAO. The support for our entry-level staff comes predominantly through their participation in our highly regarded, 2-year, Professional Development Program (PDP). This program provides new employees with the foundations to be successful because it teaches them about our core values, how we do our work, and the standards by which we assess our performance. All entry-level analyst or analyst-related new hires are assigned advisers to assist in their development and provide support, although staff are also strongly encouraged to take an active role in their own career development by crafting Individual Development Plans and assessing their own strengths and growth areas. Staff receive multiple assignments while in the program so they can gain firsthand experience with the wide range of our work. They also receive a rigorous regimen of classroom and on-the-job training to learn about our work processes and requirements. Staff in the PDP program also receive formal feedback every 3 months and twice-yearly performance appraisals that can result in salary increases. In addition, actions of our senior leaders as well as several policies and other programs help our new hires make a successful adjustment to GAO. The Comptroller General and others meet with new employees during their first few months to answer any questions about GAO or our relationship with Congress. Other senior managers, including Managing Directors and directors in each GAO team, are encouraged not only to meet with new staff but take an active role in their development and day-to-day work environment. We also have policies in place to foster an inclusive and supportive work environment and help all staff balance work and life. We also have a student loan repayment program to help eligible staff defray educational costs. PDP staff, as all staff at GAO, can take advantage of a mentoring program to assist staff in becoming effective leaders, managing their work environments, and developing their careers. These programs and policies have helped make GAO a great place to work. |
gao_GAO-08-868T | gao_GAO-08-868T_0 | To increase homeland security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002, and signed the Homeland Security Act in November 2002 creating DHS. The act centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in implementing the strategy. DHS Has Issued and Revised National- Level Preparedness Policies to Define Roles and Responsibilities
DHS Has Taken Action to Revise National Preparedness Policies But Should Plan for Better Integrating Stakeholders in the Future
DHS has taken action to define national roles and responsibilities and capabilities for preparedness and response which are reflected in several key policy documents: the National Response Framework, (what should be done and by whom); the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (how it should be done), and the National Performance Guidelines (how well it should be done). To implement requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8, DHS issued initial versions of these documents in 2004 (NIMS and the National Response Plan) and 2005 (National Preparedness Goal) and has developed and issued revisions intended to improve and enhance these national-level policies. Most recently, the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, became effective in March 2008; it describes the doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. As political appointees depart, it is therefore essential that there be career senior executives who are clearly designated to lead their respective department and agency responsibilities for emergency response and continuity of operations. DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to map key roles and responsibilities for responding to disasters during the transition between administrations. Two essential supplements to the new National Response Framework—Federal Partner Response Guides and DHS’s Integrated Planning System—are still under development. DHS Still Developing Ways to Define and Measure Federal Agencies’ Capabilities
DHS issued an update to the national goal for preparedness in National Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007 to establish both readiness metrics to measure progress, and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness and response capabilities. However, DHS has not yet completed efforts to implement the system and has not yet developed a complete inventory of all federal response capabilities. According to the September 2007 Guidelines, DHS was still establishing a process to measure the nation’s overall preparedness based on the Target Capabilities List (TCL), which accompanies the Guidelines. The measures and metrics are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, the Guidelines do not direct development of capabilities to address national priorities to federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to “Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities” the Guidelines state that interoperable and operable communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established in the TCL; federal agencies’ interoperability is not addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Homeland Security Act was enacted in November 2002, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve homeland security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The act centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in implementing this national strategy. This testimony discusses the status of DHS's actions in fulfilling its responsibilities to (1) establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between presidential administrations, and (2) develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for disaster planning and response. This testimony is based on prior GAO work performed from September 2006 to June 2008 focusing on DHS's efforts to address problems identified in the many post-Katrina reviews.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in key policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between presidential administrations. DHS prepared initial versions of key policy documents that describe what should be done and by whom (National Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the National Incident Management System in 2004) and how well it should be done (the interim National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently developed and issued revisions to these documents to improve and enhance its national-level policies, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 which was the successor to the interim National Preparedness Goal. Most recently, DHS developed the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, which became effective in March 2008. This framework describes the doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be especially critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in planning to execute an efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for the Department and its homeland security partners for responding to disasters during the transition between administrations. DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal agencies' response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response Framework--response guides for federal partners and an integrated planning system--are still under development. Also, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation's overall preparedness based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities. The measures and metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, DHS policy does not direct development of these capabilities to address national priorities for federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to "Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities" the National Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted capabilities; federal agencies' interoperability is not addressed. |
gao_GAO-17-553 | gao_GAO-17-553_0 | Require Agencies to Review Use of SSNs. However, these actions have had limited success. OPM published a draft regulation to limit federal collection, use, and display of SSNs but withdrew the proposed rule because no alternate federal employee identifier was available that would provide the same utility as SSNs. Agencies Reported Reducing Their Use and Display of SSNs and Cited Ongoing Challenges; Moreover, Poor Planning and Ineffective Monitoring Have Limited Their Efforts
In their responses to our questionnaire on SSN reduction efforts, the 24 CFO Act agencies reported successfully curtailing the collection, use, and display of SSNs, thereby reducing individuals’ exposure to the risk of identity theft. Moreover, poor planning by many of the 24 agencies and ineffective oversight by OMB have limited SSN reduction efforts. Three key challenges were frequently cited: (1) statutes and regulations that mandate the collection of SSNs, (2) requirements for using SSNs in interactions with other federal and external entities, and (3) technological impediments to implementing changes in agency systems and processes. Lacking direction from OMB, many agencies’ reduction plans did not include key elements, such as timeframes and performance indicators, calling into question the plans’ utility. In addition, OMB has not required agencies to maintain up-to-date inventories of SSN collections and has not established criteria for determining when SSN use or display is “unnecessary,” leading to inconsistent definitions across the agencies. OPM’s effort to define an alternate identifier ended when it withdrew its proposed rulemaking on the use of SSNs, and SSA’s clearinghouse of key SSN reduction practices is no longer available online. Lacking OMB direction to do so, not all agencies have developed effective SSN reduction plans. Until OMB adopts more effective practices for guiding agency SSN reduction processes, overall governmentwide reduction efforts will likely remain limited and difficult to measure, and the risk of SSNs being exposed and used to commit identity theft will remain greater than it need be. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve the consistency and effectiveness of governmentwide efforts to reduce the unnecessary use of SSNs and thereby mitigate the risk of identity theft, we are recommending that the Director of OMB take the following five actions: specify elements that agency plans for reducing the unnecessary collection, use, and display of SSNs should contain and require all agencies to develop and maintain complete plans; require agencies to modify their inventories of systems containing PII to indicate which systems contain SSNs and use the inventories to monitor their reduction of unnecessary collection and use of SSNs; provide criteria to agencies on how to determine unnecessary use of SSNs to facilitate consistent application across the federal government; take steps to ensure that agencies provide up-to-date status reports on their progress in eliminating unnecessary SSN collection, use, and display in their annual FISMA reports; and establish performance measures to monitor agency progress in consistently and effectively implementing planned reduction efforts. OMB did not provide comments on the draft report or our recommendations. In addition, SSA, along with eight other agencies, provided technical comments or information on their current SSN reduction policies, which have been incorporated into the final report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what governmentwide initiatives have been undertaken to assist agencies in eliminating their unnecessary use of SSNs and (2) the extent to which agencies have developed and executed plans to eliminate the unnecessary use and display of SSNs and have identified challenges associated with those efforts. To determine what governmentwide initiatives have been undertaken to assist agencies in eliminating their unnecessary use of SSNs, we examined key governmentwide guidance documents, including reports issued by the Identity Theft Task Force and identified roles and responsibilities assigned to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Social Security Administration (SSA). | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government uses SSNs as unique identifiers for many purposes, including employment, taxation, law enforcement, and benefits. However, SSNs are also key pieces of identifying information that potentially may be used to perpetrate identity theft.
GAO was asked to review federal government efforts to reduce the collection and use of SSNs. This report examines (1) what governmentwide initiatives have been undertaken to assist agencies in eliminating their unnecessary use of SSNs and (2) the extent to which agencies have developed and executed plans to eliminate the unnecessary use and display of SSNs and have identified challenges associated with those efforts. To do so, GAO analyzed reports and guidance on protecting SSNs. GAO also analyzed SSN reduction plans and other documents, administered a questionnaire, and interviewed officials from the 24 CFO Act agencies.
What GAO Found
Governmentwide initiatives aimed at eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of Social Security Numbers (SSN) have been underway in response to recommendations that the presidentially appointed Identity Theft Task Force made in 2007 to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Social Security Administration (SSA). However, these initiatives have had limited success. In 2008, OPM proposed a regulation requiring the use of an alternate federal employee identifier but withdrew it in 2010 because no such identifier was available. OMB required agencies to develop SSN reduction plans and requires annual reporting on agency SSN reduction efforts. SSA developed an online clearinghouse of best practices for reducing SSN use; however, it is no longer available online. Based on responses to GAO's questionnaire, the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act use SSNs for various purposes (see figure).
All 24 CFO Act agencies developed SSN reduction plans and reported taking actions to curtail the use and display of SSNs. For example, the Department of Defense replaced SSNs, which previously appeared on its identification cards, with new identification numbers. Nevertheless, the agencies cited impediments to further reductions, including (1) statutes and regulations mandating SSN collection, (2) use of SSNs in necessary interactions with other federal entities, and (3) technological constraints of agency systems and processes.
Further, poor planning by agencies and ineffective monitoring by OMB have also limited efforts to reduce SSN use. Lacking direction from OMB, many agencies' SSN reduction plans did not include key elements, such as time frames and performance indicators, calling into question their utility. In addition, OMB has not required agencies to maintain up-to-date inventories of their SSN holdings or provided criteria for determining “unnecessary use and display,” limiting agencies' ability to gauge progress. OMB also has not ensured that agencies update their progress in annual reports or established performance metrics to monitor agency efforts. Until OMB requires agencies to adopt better practices for managing their SSN reduction processes, overall governmentwide reduction efforts will likely remain limited and difficult to measure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB require complete plans for ongoing reductions in the collection, use, and display of SSNs, require inventories of systems containing SSNs, provide criteria for determining “unnecessary” use and display, ensure agencies update their progress in annual reports, and monitor agency progress based on clearly defined performance measures.
OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendations. We received written comments from SSA and technical comments from eight other agencies, which were incorporated into the final report as appropriate. The other 15 agencies did not provide comments. |
gao_GAO-02-812T | gao_GAO-02-812T_0 | As part of this package, China agreed to ensure that its legal measures would be consistent with its WTO obligations. About 10 percent of the more than 600 commitments that we identified in China’s accession package specifically obligate China to enact, repeal, or modify trade-related laws and regulations. China also has made a substantial number of important, specific commitments in the rule of law-related areas of transparency, judicial review, uniform enforcement of legal measures, and nondiscrimination in its commercial policy. Furthermore, China’s plans for reform go beyond conforming its laws and regulations to China’s WTO commitments and include a broad legal review, as well as reforms of judicial and administrative procedures. Chinese Officials Identified the Need for More Technical Assistance
Many Chinese officials we interviewed emphasized the importance of the steps they had taken at both the national and subnational levels to increase the training of government officials about WTO rules. When asked to identify the three commitments that were most important to their companies, two WTO rule of law-related areas received the greatest number of responses in our written survey — consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices; and enforcement of intellectual property rights. A majority of businesses answering our survey expected these rule of law commitments to be difficult for China to implement relative to its other WTO commitments. Nevertheless, U.S. businesses in China believe that the Chinese leadership is strongly committed to reform and that the leadership has communicated this commitment publicly. | What GAO Found
This testimony describes China's development of rule of law practices related to the commitments China made to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it joined in November 2001. When China joined the WTO, it agreed that its legal measures would be consistent with its WTO obligations. GAO found 60 commitments that specifically obligate China to enact, repeal, or modify trade-related laws or regulations. In addition, China has made a substantial number of other WTO commitments related to the rule of law in transparency, judicial review, uniform enforcement of laws, and nondiscriminatory treatment. Chinese government officials described how their efforts for reform go beyond China's WTO commitments and include broad reforms of laws and regulations at the national and provincial levels, as well as reforms of judicial and administrative procedures. However, Chinese officials acknowledged the challenges they face in completing the necessary reforms and identified the need for outside training assistance. According to GAO's survey, U.S. businesses in China consider rule of law-related WTO commitments to be important, especially the consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices in China, and enforcement of intellectual property rights. However, a majority of businesses answering the survey anticipated that these rule of law commitments would be difficult for the Chinese to implement, and they identified some concerns over specific implementation issues. |
gao_GAO-01-1139T | gao_GAO-01-1139T_0 | Third, some frequently used dietary supplements can have dangerous interactions with prescription or over-the-counter drugs that are being taken concurrently. Fourth, dietary supplements may contain harmful contaminants. Some scientific studies have found that there may be significantly more active ingredient in some herbal and specialty supplement products than is indicated on the label. Seniors May Spend Millions of Dollars on Unproven or Poorly Manufactured Products
Some unproven anti-aging products can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars apiece. At the state level, agencies are working to protect consumers of health products by enforcing state consumer protection and public health laws, although anti- aging and alternative products have received limited attention. Both FDA and FTC sponsor educational activities that focus on health fraud and seniors. According to FDA officials, an estimated 800,000 of these devices were sold between 1994 and 1997, with many purchased by senior citizens. Conclusions
The risk of harm to seniors from anti-aging and alternative health products has not been specifically identified as a top public health priority or a leading enforcement target for federal and state regulators. However, evidence demonstrates that many senior citizens use anti-aging products and that consumers who suffer from aging-related health conditions may be at risk of physical and economic harm from some anti-aging and alternative health products, including dietary supplements, that make misleading advertising and labeling claims. The medical literature has identified products that are safe under most conditions, but can be harmful for consumers with certain health conditions. I will be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have. | What GAO Found
Dietary supplements marketed as anti-aging therapies may pose a potential for physical harm to senior citizens. Evidence from the medical literature shows that a variety of frequently used dietary supplements can have serious health consequences for seniors. Particularly risky are products that may be used by seniors who have underlying diseases or health conditions that make the use of the product medically inadvisable or supplements that interact with medications that are being taken concurrently. Studies have also found that these products sometimes contain harmful contaminants or much more of an active ingredient than is indicated on the label. Although GAO was unable to find any recent, reliable estimates of the overall economic harm to seniors from these products, it did uncover several examples that illustrate the risk of economic harm. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have identified several products that make advertising or labeling claims with insufficient substantiation, some costing consumers hundreds or thousands of dollars apiece. The potential for harm to senior citizens from health products making questionable claims has been a concern for public health and law enforcement officials. FDA and FTC sponsor programs and provide educational materials for senior citizens to help them avoid health fraud. At the state level, agencies are working to protect consumers of health products by enforcing state consumer protection and public health laws, although anti-aging and alternative products are receiving limited attention. This testimony summarized a September report (GAO-01-1129). |
gao_GAO-14-596T | gao_GAO-14-596T_0 | However, as we have described in numerous reports, although a variety of best practices exist to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Given the importance of transparency, oversight, and management of the government’s IT investments, in June 2009, OMB established a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on 760 major IT investments at 27 federal agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. 2.) According to the former Federal CIO, the efforts of OMB and federal agencies to improve management and oversight of IT investments have resulted in almost $4 billion in savings. OMB believes that this initiative has the potential to provide about $3 billion in savings by the end of 2015. IT Reform Plan. Opportunities Exist to Improve Acquisition and Management of IT Investments
Given the magnitude of the federal government’s annual IT budget, which is expected to be more than $82 billion in fiscal year 2014, it is important that agencies leverage all available opportunities to ensure that their IT investments are acquired in the most effective manner possible. To do so, agencies can rely on IT acquisition best practices, incremental development, and initiatives such as OMB’s IT Dashboard and OMB- mandated TechStat sessions. However, we have issued a series of reports highlighting deficiencies with the accuracy and reliability of the data reported on the Dashboard. Further, while we reported in 2011 that the accuracy of Dashboard cost and schedule data had improved over time, more recently, in December 2013 we found that agencies had removed investments from the Dashboard by reclassifying their investments—representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency and accountability. Additionally, as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months because OMB does not revise it as the President’s budget request is being created. Nevertheless, the rating issues that we identified with performance reporting and annual baselining, some of which are now corrected, serve to highlight the need for agencies’ continued attention to the timeliness and accuracy of submitted information in order to allow the Dashboard to continue to fulfill its stated purpose. We continue to believe that our recommendations are valid. In particular, in 2010 OMB called for IT investments to deliver functionality every 12 months, and since 2012 has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. Specifically, almost three-quarters of the selected investments we reviewed did not plan to deliver functionality every 6 months and less than half planned to deliver functionality in 12-month cycles. In the report being released today, we recommend that OMB develop and issue realistic and clear guidance on incremental development, and that Defense, HHS, DHS, and Transportation update and implement their incremental development policies, once OMB’s guidance is made available. Four agencies—Defense, HHS, DHS, VA—generally agreed with the report or had no comments and one agency—Transportation—did not agree that its recommendation should be dependent on OMB first taking action. Among other things, we recommended that OMB require agencies to report on how they validated the outcomes. Continued Oversight Needed to Consolidate Federal Data Centers and Achieve Cost Savings In an effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers, in 2010, OMB launched a consolidation initiative intended to close 40 percent of government data centers by 2015, and, in doing so, save $3 billion. Among other things, we recommended that OMB track and report on key performance measures, such as cost savings to date, and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities. We also recommended that agencies complete inventories and plans. OMB agreed with these two recommendations, and most agencies agreed with our recommendations to them. Specifically, as of May 2013, agencies had reported closing 484 data centers by the end of April 2013 and were planning to close an additional 571 data centers—for a total of 1,055—by September 2014. Agencies’ PortfolioStat Efforts Have the Potential to Save Billions of Dollars OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative in March 2012, which required 26 executive agencies to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending and demonstrate how their IT investments align with the agencies’ mission and business functions. In addition, we made several recommendations to improve agencies’ implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with these recommendations, and responses from 20 of the agencies commenting on the report varied. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government reportedly plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. Given the scale of such planned outlays and the criticality of many of these systems to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that OMB and federal agencies provide appropriate oversight and transparency into these programs and avoid duplicative investments, whenever possible, to ensure the most efficient use of resources.
GAO has previously reported and testified that federal IT projects too frequently fail and incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Numerous best practices and administration initiatives are available for agencies that can help them improve the oversight and management of IT acquisitions.
GAO is testifying today on the results and recommendations from selected reports that focused on how best practices and IT reform initiatives can help federal agencies better manage major acquisitions and legacy investments.
What GAO Found
GAO recently reported on nine critical factors underlying successful major information technology (IT) acquisitions. Factors cited included (1) program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders and (2) prioritized requirements.
One key IT reform initiative undertaken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the IT Dashboard, which provides information, including ratings of risk, on 760 major investments at 27 federal agencies. As of April 2014, according to the Dashboard, 559 investments were low or moderately low risk, 159 were medium risk, and 42 were moderately high or high risk.
GAO has issued a series of reports on Dashboard accuracy and, in 2011, found that, while there were issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data, the accuracy of these data had improved over time. However, a recent GAO report found that agencies had removed major investments from the Dashboard, representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency. GAO also reported that, as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months. GAO made recommendations to ensure that the Dashboard includes all major IT investments and increase its availability. Agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments.
An additional key reform initiated by OMB emphasizes incremental development in order to reduce investment risk. In 2010 it called for agency investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and since 2012 has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. However, in its report released today, GAO found that almost three-quarters of investments reviewed did not plan to deliver capabilities every 6 months and less than half planned to deliver capabilities in 12-month cycles. GAO recommended that OMB develop and issue clearer guidance on incremental development and that selected agencies update and implement their associated policies. Most agencies agreed with GAO recommendations, while others disagreed or had no comment. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid.
In an effort to consolidate the number of federal data centers, OMB launched a consolidation initiative intended to close 40 percent of data centers by 2015, and in doing so, save $3 billion. GAO reported that agencies planned to close 1,055 data centers by the end of fiscal year 2014, but also highlighted the need for continued oversight. Among other things, GAO recommended that OMB improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities, with which OMB agreed.
To better manage the government's existing IT systems, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which, among other things, requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of their IT investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication. GAO reported that agencies continued to identify duplicative spending as part of PortfolioStat and that this initiative has the potential to save at least $5.8 billion by fiscal year 2015, but that weaknesses existed in agencies' implementation of the initiative's requirements. Among other things, GAO made several recommendations to improve agencies' implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with these recommendations, and most of the other 20 agencies agreed to implement them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to OMB and federal agencies on key aspects of IT management, including the IT Dashboard and efforts to consolidate federal data centers. Additionally, in its report being released today, GAO also recommended that agencies take actions to improve their incremental development approaches. |
gao_GAO-13-605 | gao_GAO-13-605_0 | Table 1 describes NIJ’s initiatives funded from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 through the DNA and forensic program appropriation that directly benefit state and local government DNA-related efforts to reduce backlogs and build capacity. NIJ Has Allocated Funding for Various DNA and Other Forensic Science Activities, and the Majority Goes Directly to Reducing the DNA Backlog
From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, Congress appropriated approximately $691 million to NIJ to provide grant and other awards for state and local governments to reduce the DNA backlog and increase DNA lab capacity, as well as for other forensic science purposes. As a result, NIJ allocated funds for both its DNA backlog initiatives and other forensic science initiatives based on NIJ’s mission and annual budgeting priorities. NIJ officials stated that funding from some of these initiatives may have indirect or long-term benefits for reducing the DNA backlog. The remainder of the funding, $38 million, went toward other activities, such as management and administration. We further analyzed the 64 percent of appropriated funding that went toward the DNA Backlog Reduction Program and other DNA backlog initiatives over the 5-year period. NIJ Has a Process in Place to Determine DNA and Forensic Program Funding Priorities, but Decisions Are Not Clearly Documented
NIJ has a process in place for determining its annual priorities for the allocation of DNA and forensic program appropriation funds; however, NIJ does not clearly document this process. However, according to our review, these documents do not consistently or adequately demonstrate NIJ’s rationale for how funding priorities are determined. While these memos show the final amounts NIJ decided to allocate to various initiatives, they do not provide details on the justifications for how funding levels were determined for each initiative. According to NIJ officials, the budget briefing slides for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 and the funding memos for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 are the only documents the agency uses to show its rationale for prioritization of the DNA and forensic program appropriation. However, without a clearly documented process that demonstrates the rationale for how NIJ is prioritizing its DNA and forensic program appropriation, there is limited transparency regarding how and why the agency is allocating its funding. Verification of Data Reliability and Revision of Its Performance Measure Could Help NIJ Better Assess Performance of the DNA Backlog Reduction Program
NIJ has processes in place to assess progress of the DNA Backlog Reduction Program, but does not have an approach to verify performance data submitted by grantees so as to reduce error rates. NIJ Assesses Performance, but Verifying Performance Data Could Help NIJ Better Assess Results
NIJ assesses performance of the DNA Backlog Reduction Program by requiring grantees to submit reports every 6 months outlining their progress in, among other things, meeting the program goals and objectives established in their initial applications for funding. The performance measure, reported as “percent of reduction in DNA backlog casework,” is a projection of DNA casework that grantees expect to complete as opposed to an actual tabulation of completed cases. According to NIJ officials, the agency is unable to develop a performance measure that reports actual cases completed (on the fiscal year basis called for in OJP’s annual budget submission) under the DNA Backlog Reduction Program because grantees have up to 3 years to complete their work and the completed number of cases for the entire grant period is not known until the grant period closes. In order to assist Congress and NIJ management and stakeholders to better assess whether NIJ’s DNA Backlog Reduction Program is having a measurable impact in reducing the DNA backlog, we recommend that the Director of NIJ take the following two actions: develop a cost-effective approach to verify performance data submitted by grantees to provide reasonable assurance that such data are sufficiently reliable to report progress in reducing the DNA backlog, and, revise the “percent of reduction in DNA backlog casework” performance measure to include casework actually completed as part of the measure instead of casework that is projected. DOJ agreed with all three of the recommendations and outlined steps to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2008, Congress has appropriated more than $100 million each year to the Department of Justice (DOJ) that may be used, among other things, to reduce DNA backlogs and enhance crime laboratory capacity. NIJ, within DOJ, is responsible for, among other things, providing awards for DNA analysis and forensic activities. NIJ's DNA Backlog Reduction Program was established to provide grants to state and local governments with the intent, in part, of reducing the backlog of DNA samples. The conference report accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, mandated GAO to examine, among other things, DNA analysis funds. This report addresses (1) how NIJ has allocated its DNA and forensic program appropriation over the past 5 fiscal years, (2) the extent that NIJ has a process to determine its funding priorities for its DNA and forensic program appropriation, and (3) the extent that NIJ verifies data on grant results submitted by grantees and measures the outcomes of the DNA Backlog Reduction Program. GAO reviewed relevant appropriations, NIJ funding documentation, and data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, and interviewed NIJ officials.
What GAO Found
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) allocated funding for various DNA and other forensic science activities, with the majority of the available $691 million from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 going to state and local governments to reduce the DNA backlog. Specifically, over this 5-year period, 64 percent was allocated through initiatives that directly benefit state and local efforts to reduce DNA backlogs and build DNA analysis capacity. The largest initiative was NIJ's DNA Backlog Reduction Program, and other DNA backlog initiatives included DNA analysis of cold cases, among others. A smaller portion (31 percent) went to other forensic sciences initiatives, such as research and development and training, although NIJ officials stated that funding these initiatives may have long-term benefits for reducing the DNA backlog. The remainder of the funding went toward other activities, such as management and administration.
NIJ has a process in place to determine DNA and forensic program funding priorities, but its decisions regarding these priorities are not clearly documented. According to NIJ officials, the rationale for funding the DNA Backlog Reduction Program versus other initiatives is documented in briefing slides, but these documents do not show NIJ's rationale for how funding priorities are determined. For example, while the budget documents for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 show the final amounts NIJ decided to allocate to various initiatives, these documents do not provide details on the justifications for how funding levels were determined for each initiative. Without a clearly documented process that demonstrates the rationale for NIJ's annual funding priorities, there is limited transparency regarding how and why the agency is allocating its funding.
NIJ could verify data and revise its performance measure to better assess the DNA Backlog Reduction Program. NIJ assesses performance of this program by requiring grantees to submit reports every 6 months that, in part, outline their progress in meeting program goals and objectives. However, NIJ does not have an approach to verify the reliability of the data--testing data to ensure data quality--and as a result, faces continuing data errors. Verifying these data would help ensure that the data are reliable enough to show that the program is successfully meeting its goals. In addition, NIJ has a performance measure to assess the results of this program--percent of reduction in DNA backlog casework--but it is a projection of DNA casework that grantees expect to complete as opposed to an actual tabulation of completed cases. While measuring annual performance for multiyear grants can be challenging because the completed number of cases is not known until after the grant period closes, taking steps to analyze performance data on actual cases completed could help NIJ to better assess actual results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NIJ clearly document the rationale for annual funding priorities, develop a cost-effective approach to verify the reliability of grantee performance data, and revise its performance measure to reflect actual completed cases. DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendations and outlined steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-493 | gao_GAO-15-493_0 | Prior to the current instability, to assist in countering the AQAP threat, since fiscal year 2006, State and DOD have collectively allocated over $500 million in security assistance to Yemen through DOD’s Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) programs and State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. State has committed $34 million of the $95 million FMF funds allocated to Yemen. Corrected DOD Data Reveal That Most Security Assistance Items Were Timely, but Delays Affected Nearly All Section 1206 and 1207(n) Projects
After correcting errors in DOD data, we determined that since 2009, at least 60 percent of overall assistance was on time; however, delays affected 10 of 11 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. However, the inaccurate data limit the ability of DOD and others to effectively assess the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance is transferred to Yemen on time or report to Congress on the status of assistance projects. The 4 Percent of Items That Were Late Were Arrayed among 10 of 11 Section 1206 and 1207(n) Projects
The deadlines for the four fiscal year 2014 projects have yet to pass, but for the remaining 11 projects for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DOD notified Congress that all equipment and training should have been completely transferred to Yemeni security forces by the end of 2014. However, 10 of the 11 projects did not meet established deadlines. Partner country factors. DOD Plans for Short- Term Maintenance of Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance and Has Resumed Requesting the Source of Long-Term Maintenance Funds
DOD includes 2 years of spare parts for short-term maintenance needs of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and has resumed requesting the source and extent of anticipated U.S. funds, such as FMF, that are needed for longer-term needs. A presidential directive and DOD guidance require planning for the maintenance of security assistance equipment, regardless of the host nation’s capability to maintain it. In some cases where maintenance has not been performed, some equipment was no longer fully operational. While the fiscal year 2015 guidance called for detailed sustainment plans, the fiscal year 2015 project proposal template only solicited information on general sustainment costs and the partner nation’s ability to contribute to sustaining the project. Conclusions
AQAP terrorists based in Yemen continue to be a threat to the United States and Yemen’s national security. However, we found that DOD’s data systems used to track related security assistance contain inaccurate information regarding when projects clear the congressional notification period. Recommendation for Executive Action
To further improve the ability of U.S. government agencies and others to assess the timeliness of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to improve the accuracy of data used to track when Section 1206 projects are congressionally cleared for implementation. DOD concurred with our recommendation to improve the accuracy of data used to track congressional notification clearance dates. DOD noted steps taken since fiscal year 2013 to improve data collection. In addition, after reviewing a draft of our report, DOD provided updated documentation that included the fiscal year 2016 Section 1206 project proposal template, which reinstated a request for information on the amount of anticipated long-term maintenance funds, if any. This report examines (1) the disbursement of funds allocated for key security assistance programs for Yemen since 2009, (2) the timeliness of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance, and (3) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans for maintaining equipment provided to Yemen under Section 1206 and 1207(n). For two-thirds of these projects, DOD data contained inaccurate congressional notification clearance dates—the initial step in the 18-month shipment and transfer process. Discussions with DOD officials and review of DOD documents indicated that some of these items were ultimately transferred on time and some were transferred late, but the transfer dates were not included in the data. Appendix II: Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance Programs
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) allocated $401 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to Yemeni security forces through its Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) security assistance programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is one of the top U.S. national security threats. AQAP is based in Yemen, where political conflict, including a Houthi insurgency, has complicated stability. Since fiscal year 2006, DOD and State have allocated over $500 million to provide training and equipment to the Yemeni security forces to assist Yemen in combating AQAP. Such assistance has been provided through three main programs: Section 1206 and Section 1207(n), which have been used to build Yemeni capacity, and FMF, which has been used to maintain equipment provided to Yemen.
A Senate report included a provision for GAO to review U.S. security assistance to Yemen. GAO examined (1) the disbursement of funds allocated to key security assistance programs for Yemen since fiscal year 2009, (2) the timeliness of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance, and (3) DOD plans for maintaining equipment provided to Yemen under Section 1206 and 1207(n), including the use of FMF. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed DOD and State data, and met with U.S. officials based in Washington, D.C., and Sanaa, Yemen.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) has disbursed almost $256 million of the $401 million allocated to Yemen under the Section 1206 and 1207(n) security assistance programs, while the Department of State (State) has committed $34 million of the $95 million allocated under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. In light of Yemen's currently unstable situation, security assistance programs to Yemen are temporarily suspended.
After correcting errors in DOD data, GAO determined that at least 60 percent of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 was timely, but delays affected 10 of 11 projects. DOD notified Congress that all training and equipment for each project would be transferred to Yemeni security forces within DOD's established deadline of 18 months. However, DOD's data contained inaccurate information regarding when the congressional notification period ended, which clears DOD to implement these projects. The inaccurate data limit DOD's and third parties' ability to readily assess the extent to which these projects met the 18-month deadline or to report to Congress on the status of assistance projects. Specifically, after correcting errors in DOD data, GAO found that at least 60 percent of the items were transferred on time, 4 percent of the items were late, and the remaining 36 percent of items were shipped but DOD's data system did not have information on when they were transferred to Yemen. The 4 percent of late items were arrayed among 10 of 11 projects.
DOD plans for short-term (i.e., 2 years) maintenance needs for Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects and has resumed requesting the source and amount of long-term maintenance funds. A presidential directive and DOD guidance call for long-term maintenance planning, regardless of the partner country's ability to contribute. From fiscal years 2011 through 2014, DOD requested specific information on the amount and source of anticipated U.S. maintenance funding, if any, in the Section 1206 project proposal template. The fiscal year 2015 template did not request such information, but after reviewing a draft of GAO's report, DOD provided a copy of its fiscal year 2016 template, which requests additional information on long-term maintenance plans. DOD officials noted that several factors impede maintenance efforts and some equipment is not fully operational.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take steps to improve the accuracy of data regarding Section 1206 congressional notification clearance. DOD concurred and noted steps it took in fiscal year 2013 to improve overall data collection, but did not discuss improving data on congressional notification clearance dates. GAO continues to maintain that DOD should take steps to improve the accuracy of its data on congressional notification clearance dates. |
gao_GAO-12-378 | gao_GAO-12-378_0 | DHS Faces Challenges Managing Its Efforts to Conduct Security Surveys and Vulnerability Assessments on High- Priority Assets
DHS conducted about 2,800 security surveys and vulnerability assessments during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. We also identified an additional 106 security surveys and 23 vulnerability assessments that were potential matches with assets on the NCIPP lists of priority assets, but we could not be certain that the assets were the same because of inconsistencies in the way the data were recorded in the two different databases. These officials acknowledged that the two databases do not match and explained that they have had to match the data manually because of the inconsistencies. However, DHS did not provide milestones and time frames for completing these efforts. This creates a big credibility problem for me with my stakeholders who are looking for the results.” The NIPP states that in order to have an effective environment for information sharing, CIKR partners need to be provided with timely and relevant information that they can use to make decisions. DHS Could Better Measure Security Survey and Vulnerability Assessment Results to Improve Program Management
DHS has taken actions to determine whether asset owners or operators have made security improvements based on the results of security surveys. Consistent with the standards for project management, by having a road map with time frames and milestones for revisiting these time frames, IP could be better positioned to provide a more complete picture of its overall progress making these decisions and a basis for determining what, if any, additional actions need to be taken or data inputs need to be made. DHS could also use this opportunity to consider how it can capture key information that could be used to understand why certain improvements were or were not made by assets owners and operators that have received surveys and assessments. Additional information on the cost of improvements made and the reasons why improvements were or were not made could also assist DHS in understanding the trade-offs asset owners and operators face when making decisions to address vulnerabilities identified as a result of DHS security surveys and enhancements. Further, developing a road map with milestones and time frames for (1) taking and completing actions needed to resolve issues associated with data inconsistencies and matching data on the list of high-priority assets with data used to track the conduct of security surveys and vulnerability assessments, (2) completing protocols to systematically collect data on the reasons why some owners and operators declined to participate in the voluntary surveys and assessments, and (3) improving the timely delivery of the results of security surveys and vulnerability assessments could better position DHS to target high-priority assets and provide them with the information they need to make decisions related to security and resiliency. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that DHS’s efforts to promote security surveys and vulnerability assessments among high-priority CIKR are aligned with institutional goals, that the information gathered through these surveys and assessments meet the needs of stakeholders, and that DHS is positioned to know how these surveys and assessments could be improved, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security, take the following seven actions: develop plans with milestones and time frames to resolve issues associated with data inconsistencies and matching data on the list of high-priority assets with data used to track the conduct of security surveys and vulnerability assessments; institutionalize realistic performance goals for appropriate levels of participation in security surveys and vulnerability assessments by high-priority assets to measure how well DHS is achieving its goals; design and implement a mechanism for systematically assessing why owners and operators of high-priority assets decline to participate and a develop a road map, with time frames and milestones, for completing this effort; develop time frames and specific milestones for managing DHS’s efforts to ensure the timely delivery of the results of security surveys and vulnerability assessments to asset owners and operators; revise its plans to include when and how SSAs will be engaged in designing, testing, and implementing DHS’s web-based tool to address and mitigate any SSA concerns that may arise before the tool is finalized; develop a road map with time frames and specific milestones for reviewing the information it gathers from asset owners and operators to determine if follow-up visits should remain at 180 days for security surveys and whether additional follow-ups are appropriate at intervals beyond the follow-ups initially performed; and consider the feasibility of expanding the follow-up program to gather and act upon data, as appropriate, on (1) security enhancements that are ongoing and planned that are attributable to DHS security surveys and vulnerability assessments and (2) factors, such as cost and perceptions of threat, that influence asset owner and operator decisions to make, or not make, enhancements based on the results of DHS security surveys and vulnerability assessments. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its partners—including other federal agencies. We obtained and analyzed DHS data on the conduct of voluntary programs for fiscal years 2009 through 2011—which are maintained in DHS’s Link Encrypted Network System (LENS) database and compared those records with the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) list of the high-priority CIKR assets—to determine the extent to which DHS performed security surveys and vulnerability assessments at high-priority assets. The facility does not have time or resources to participate. 30. Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and terrorist attacks, such as the 2005 bombings in London, highlight the importance of protecting CIKRassets and systems vital to the economy or health of the nation. DHS issued the NIPP in June 2006 (updated in 2009) to provide the approach for integrating the nations CIKR. Because the private sector owns most of the nations CIKRfor example, energy production facilitiesDHS encourages asset owners and operators to voluntarily participate in surveys or vulnerability assessments of existing security measures at those assets. This includes nationally significant CIKR that DHS designates as high priority. In response to a request, this report assesses the extent to which DHS has (1) taken action to conduct surveys and assessments among highpriority CIKR, (2) shared the results of these surveys and assessments with asset owners or operators, and (3) assessed the effectiveness of surveys and assessments and identified actions taken, if any, to improve them. GAO, among other things, reviewed laws, analyzed data identifying high-priority assets and activities performed from fiscal years 2009 through 2011, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has conducted about 2,800 security surveys and vulnerability assessments on critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). DHS directs its protective security advisors to contact owners and operators of high-priority CIKR to offer to conduct surveys and assessments. However, DHS is not positioned to track the extent to which these are performed at high-priority CIKR because of inconsistencies between the databases used to identify these assets and those used to identify surveys and assessments conducted. GAO compared the two databases and found that of the 2,195 security surveys and 655 vulnerability assessments conducted for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, 135 surveys and 44 assessments matched and another 106 surveys and 23 assessments were potential matches for high-priority facilities. GAO could not match additional high-priority facilities because of inconsistencies in the way data were recorded in the two databases, for example, assets with the same company name had different addresses or an asset at one address had different names. DHS officials acknowledged that the data did not match and have begun to take actions to improve the collection and organization of the data. However, DHS does not have milestones and timelines for completing these efforts consistent with standards for project management. By developing a plan with time frames and milestones consistent with these standards DHS would be better positioned to provide a more complete picture of its progress.
DHS shares the results of security surveys and vulnerability assessments with asset owners or operators but faces challenges doing so. A GAO analysis of DHS data from fiscal year 2011 showed that DHS was late meeting its (1) 30-day time frameas required by DHS guidancefor delivering the results of its security surveys 60 percent of the time and (2) 60-day time frameexpected by DHS managers for delivering the results of its vulnerability assessmentsin 84 percent of the instances. DHS officials acknowledged the late delivery of survey and assessment results and said they are working to improve processes and protocols. However, DHS has not established a plan with time frames and milestones for managing this effort consistent with the standards for project management. Also, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which emphasizes partnering and voluntary information sharing, states that CIKR partners need to be provided with timely and relevant information that they can use to make decisions. Developing a plan with time frames and milestones for improving timeliness could help DHS provide asset owners and operators with the timely information they need to consider security enhancements.
DHS uses a follow-up tool to assess the results of security surveys and assessments performed at CIKR assets, and are considering upgrades to the tool. However, DHS could better measure results and improve program management by capturing additional information. For example, key information, such as why certain improvements were or were not made by asset owners and operators that have received security surveys, could help DHS improve its efforts. Further, information on barriers to making improvementssuch as the cost of security enhancementscould help DHS better understand asset owners and operators rationale in making decisions and thereby help improve its programs. Taking steps to gather additional information could help keep DHS better informed for making decisions in managing its programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, DHS develop plans for its efforts to improve the collection and organization of data and the timeliness of survey and assessment results, and gather and act upon additional information from asset owners and operators about why improvements were or were not made. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1081T | gao_GAO-07-1081T_0 | DHS began operations in March 2003. A variety of factors have affected DHS’s efforts to implement its mission and management functions. Our Report Assesses DHS’s Progress in Implementing Its Mission and Management Functions
Our report assesses DHS’s progress across 14 mission and management areas. DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing Mission and Management Functions but Has Faced Difficulties in Its Implementation Efforts
Our report shows that since March 2003, DHS has attained some level of progress in implementing the performance expectations in all of its major mission and management areas, but the rate of progress among these areas has varied. Overall, DHS has made more progress in its mission areas than in its management areas, reflecting an understandable focus on implementing efforts to secure the homeland. Within its mission areas, DHS has made more progress in developing strategies, plans, and programs than in implementing them. As shown in table 5, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security and found that DHS has generally achieved 17 of them and has generally not achieved 7 others. The creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge, and DHS faces a formidable task in its transformation efforts as it works to integrate over 170,000 federal employees from 22 component agencies. Despite these efforts, we reported earlier this year that DHS implementation and transformation remains high-risk because DHS has not yet developed a comprehensive management integration strategy and its management systems and functions⎯especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and information management⎯are not yet fully integrated and wholly operational. Several DHS component agencies have taken steps toward integrating risk- based decision making into their decision-making processes. DHS has taken some steps to implement its information-sharing responsibilities. For example, DHS implemented a network to share homeland security information. Concluding Observations
Given the leading role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department’s mission programs and management systems and functions operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the more than 4 years since its establishment, the department has taken important actions to secure the border and the transportation sector and to defend against, prepare for, and respond to threats and disasters. DHS has had to undertake these critical missions while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. As it moves forward, DHS will continue to face the challenges that have affected its operations thus far, including transforming into a high- performing, results-oriented agency; developing results-oriented goals and measures to effectively assess performance; developing and implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with homeland security partners. While this testimony contains no new recommendations, in past products GAO has made approximately 700 recommendations to DHS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent 4-year anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made. The creation of DHS was one of the largest federal reorganizations in the last several decades, and GAO has reported that it was an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions has found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. This testimony is based on our August 2007 report evaluating DHS's progress since March 2003. Specifically, it addresses DHS's progress across 14 mission and management areas and key themes that have affected DHS's implementation efforts.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment in March 2003, DHS has made varying levels of progress in implementing its mission and management areas, as shown in the following table. In general, DHS has made more progress in its mission areas than in its management areas. Within its mission areas, DHS has made progress in developing plans and programs, but has faced challenges in its implementation efforts. Key underlying themes have affected DHS's implementation efforts. These include strategies to achieve agency transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination. For example, we have designated DHS's implementation and transformation as high-risk. While DHS has made progress in transforming its component agencies into a fully functioning department, it has not yet addressed elements of the transformation process, such as developing a comprehensive transformation strategy. DHS also has not yet fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and management functions. Some DHS component agencies have taken steps to do so, but this approach is not yet used departmentwide. In addition, DHS has taken steps to share information and coordinate with homeland security partners but has faced difficulties in these partnership efforts. Given DHS's leading role in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department's mission and management programs operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has taken important actions to secure the border and transportation sectors and to prepare for and respond to disasters. DHS has had to undertake these missions while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable better accountability. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to effectively address those obstacles. |
gao_GAO-16-174T | gao_GAO-16-174T_0 | Modernization of the Electricity Infrastructure
As the electricity industry has matured and technology has advanced, utilities have begun taking steps to update the electricity grid—the transmission and distribution systems—by integrating new technologies and additional IT systems and networks. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is the federally designated U.S. Electric Reliability Organization, and is overseen by FERC. In addition, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 established federal policy to support the modernization of the electricity grid and required actions by a number of federal agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), FERC, and the Department of Energy. For example, cybersecurity experts have demonstrated that certain smart meters can be successfully attacked, possibly resulting in disruption to the electricity grid. Actions Have Been Taken to Secure the Electricity Grid, but Continued Attention Is Required
As we have previously reported, multiple entities have taken steps to help secure the electricity grid, including NERC, NIST, FERC, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy. NERC also had enforced compliance with mandatory cybersecurity standards through its Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program, including assessing monetary penalties for violations. In 2014, NIST issued updated guidelines, which address the relationship of smart grid cybersecurity to cyber-physical attacks and cybersecurity testing and certification. As the lead agency responsible for critical infrastructure protection efforts in the energy sector, the Department of Energy, as we reported in December 2011, was involved in efforts to assist the electricity subsector in the development, assessment, and sharing of cybersecurity standards, according to department officials. Monitoring implementation of cybersecurity standards. In our report, we noted that FERC had not developed an approach coordinated with other regulators to monitor, at a high level, the extent to which industry follows the voluntary smart grid standards it adopts. We recommended that FERC, in coordination with state regulators and groups that represent utilities subject to less FERC and state regulation, periodically evaluate the extent to which utilities and manufacturers are following voluntary interoperability and cybersecurity standards and develop strategies for addressing any gaps in compliance with standards that are identified as a result of this evaluation. However, FERC has not implemented this recommendation. Clarifying regulatory responsibilities. Experts also noted concern about the ability of regulatory bodies to respond quickly to evolving cybersecurity threats. Clarifying these responsibilities could help improve the effectiveness of efforts to protect smart grid technology from cyber threats. Taking a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. Ensuring that smart grid systems have built-in security features. By ensuring that smart grid systems are securely designed, utilities could enhance their ability to detect and analyze attacks, reducing the risk that attacks will succeed and helping to prevent them from recurring. Effectively sharing cybersecurity information. However, the electric industry lacked an effective mechanism to disclose information about cybersecurity vulnerabilities, incidents, threats, lessons learned, and best practices. Establishing metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The electric industry, however, was challenged by a lack of cybersecurity metrics, making it difficult to determine the extent to which investments in cybersecurity improve the security of smart grid systems. In our January 2011 report, we recommended that FERC, working with NERC as appropriate, assess whether any cybersecurity challenges identified in our report should be addressed in commission cybersecurity efforts. First, in 2011, it began evaluating whether cybersecurity challenges, including those identified in our report, should be addressed under the agency’s existing cyber security authority and efforts. As a part of this effort, the commission directed NERC to revise the electricity industry’s critical infrastructure protection (CIP) standards with the aim of addressing, among other things, cybersecurity challenges identified in our report. In November 2013, NERC issued updated CIP standards to address these and other cybersecurity challenges. Moreover, without monitoring the implementation of voluntary cybersecurity standards in the industry, FERC does not know the extent to which such standards have been adopted or whether they are effective. Given the increasing use of information and communications technology in the electricity subsector and the evolving nature of cyber threats, continued attention can help mitigate the risk these threats pose to the electricity grid. | Why GAO Did This Study
The electric power industry—including transmission and distribution systems—increasingly uses information and communications technology systems to automate actions with the aim of improving the electric grid's reliability and efficiency. However, these “smart grid” technologies may be vulnerable to cyber-based attacks and other threats that could disrupt the nation's electricity infrastructure. Several federal entities have responsibilities for overseeing and helping to secure the electricity grid. Because of the proliferation of cyber threats, since 2003 GAO has designated protecting the systems supporting U.S. critical infrastructure (which includes the electricity grid) as a high-risk area.
GAO was asked to provide a statement on opportunities to improve cybersecurity for the electricity grid. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previous work on efforts to address cybersecurity of the electric sector.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in 2011 that several entities—the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Energy (DOE)—had taken steps to help secure the electric grid. These included developing cybersecurity standards and other guidance to reduce risks.
While these were important efforts, GAO at that time also identified a number of challenges to securing the electricity grid against cyber threats:
Monitoring implementation of cybersecurity standards : GAO found that FERC had not developed an approach, coordinated with other regulatory entities, to monitor the extent to which the electricity industry was following voluntary smart grid standards, including cybersecurity standards.
Clarifying regulatory responsibilities: The nature of smart grid technology can blur traditional lines between the portions of the grid that are subject to federal or state regulation. In addition, regulators may be challenged in responding quickly to evolving cybersecurity threats.
Taking a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity: Entities in the electricity industry (e.g., utilities) often focused on complying with regulations rather than taking a holistic and effective approach to cybersecurity.
Ensuring that smart grid systems have built-in security features: Smart grid devices (e.g., meters) did not always have key security features such as the ability to record activity on systems or networks, which is important for detecting and analyzing attacks.
Effectively sharing cybersecurity information: The electricity industry did not have a forum for effectively sharing information on cybersecurity vulnerabilities, incidents, threats, and best practices.
Establishing cybersecurity metrics: The electricity industry lacked sufficient metrics for determining the extent to which investments in cybersecurity improved the security of smart grid systems.
Since 2011, additional efforts have been taken to improve cybersecurity in the sector. For example, in 2013, NERC issued updated standards to address these and other cybersecurity challenges. NIST also updated its smart grid cybersecurity standards in 2014. It has also developed a cybersecurity framework for critical infrastructure, and DHS and DOE have efforts under way to promote its adoption. In addition, FERC assessed whether these and other challenges should be addressed in its ongoing cybersecurity efforts. However, FERC did not coordinate with other regulators to identify strategies for monitoring compliance with voluntary cybersecurity standards in the industry, as GAO had recommended. As a result, FERC does not know the extent to which such standards have been adopted or whether they are effective. Given the increasing use of information and communications technology in the electricity subsector and the evolving nature of cyber threats, continued attention can help mitigate the risk these threats pose to the electricity grid.
What GAO Recommends
In its 2011 report, GAO recommended that (1) NIST improve its cybersecurity standards, (2) FERC assess whether challenges identified by GAO should be addressed in ongoing cybersecurity efforts, and (3) FERC coordinate with other regulators to identify strategies for monitoring compliance with voluntary standards. The agencies agreed with the recommendations, but FERC has not taken steps to monitor compliance with voluntary standards. |
gao_GAO-03-481 | gao_GAO-03-481_0 | Background
RECA established a procedure to make partial restitution to individuals who contracted serious diseases, such as certain types of cancers, presumably resulting from their exposure to radiation from aboveground nuclear tests or as a result of their employment in the uranium industry. On November 2, 2002, the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act was enacted. Since Fiscal Year 2000, RECA Claims Increased Significantly, Processing Time Has Slowed, and the Number of Pending Claims Has Grown
The enactment of the RECA Amendments of 2000 was followed by a significant increase in the number of claims. Of the total 14,987 claims filed, RECP reached a disposition on 12,333. Number of Pending Claims Is Growing
Since the amendments of 2000, RECA claims are coming in more rapidly, and the processing of these claims is taking longer. Funds Appropriated to the RECA Trust Fund for the Next 10 Fiscal Years
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 provided funding for the RECA Trust Fund to cover a 10-year period—fiscal years 2002 through 2011 up to a specified maximum amount per fiscal year. According to a budget official, this has led to upward pressure on the overall costs to administer the program. Administrative Expenses May Have Exceeded Its Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002
Since fiscal year 1993, funding for DOJ administration of the program has been provided in a separate appropriation account for Radiation Exposure Compensation administrative expenses. The administrative expense appropriation for the program was $1.996 million each for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Specifically, whereas fiscal year 2002 appropriations provided for “necessary administrative expenses in accordance with the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, $1,996,000,” the fiscal year 2003 appropriation provides, in part, that “not less than $1,996,000 shall be available for necessary administrative expenses in accordance with the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act.” In accompanying Conference Report language, the conferees said that they “expect the Civil Division to absorb any additional requirements for processing RECA claims from other resources available to the Civil Division.”
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. Conclusions
Funding available to pay claims under the RECA may be inadequate to meet projected needs. Since the end of fiscal year 2000, the number of unadjudicated claims has grown 300 percent from 653 to 2,654, and nearly 3,200 new claims are anticipated during fiscal year 2003. Both CBO and DOJ estimate that money in the Trust Fund will be insufficient to pay all the claims that are projected to be approved over the 2003-2011 period. | Why GAO Did This Study
On October 15, 1990, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) was enacted providing for payments to individuals who contracted certain cancers and other serious diseases presumably as a result of their exposure to radiation released during aboveground nuclear weapons tests or as a result of their employment associated with the uranium mining industry during the Cold War era. The RECA Amendments of 2000 required that GAO report to the Congress on the Department of Justice's administration of RECA not later than 18 months after the enactment of the amendments and every 18 months thereafter. GAO originally reported on the status of the program in September 2001. The objectives of this report are to update information on claims processing, payments from the Trust Fund, and administrative expenses.
What GAO Found
Since the enactment of the RECA Amendments of 2000, which expanded eligibility for benefits, the RECA program has experienced a significant increase in the number of claims filed. Claims also are taking longer to process, and the number of pending claims has grown sharply. Since we last reported in September 2001, claims have increased from 7,819 to 14,987. Pending claims have increased 300 percent, from 653 to 2,654. About 3,200 new claims are anticipated in fiscal year 2003. In addition, the average time to process claims increased for each category of claimant. Given these circumstances, current funding for the RECA program to pay claims may be inadequate to meet projected needs. In fiscal year 2002, RECA was appropriated funds to cover a 10-year period--fiscal years 2002 through 2011 up to a specified amount per year--totaling $655 million. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) estimate that funding levels appropriated to the Trust Fund are insufficient to meet the projected claims. As a result, claims may be delayed, particularly through 2007. Since 1993, funding for DOJ administration of the program has been provided in a separate appropriation account for Radiation Exposure Compensation administrative expenses. There has been upward pressure on the program's administrative costs in recent years. For fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the RECA program may have exceeded its budget authority for administrative expenses. According to a program budget official, the RECA program spent about $100,000 in fiscal year 2001 and about $1 million for fiscal year 2002 in administrative expenses over the $1.996 million appropriated to the Radiation Exposure Compensation administrative expenses account in those fiscal years. |
gao_GAO-09-738 | gao_GAO-09-738_0 | The IG noted that State had yet to agree upon language formalizing the responsibilities of the three bureaus in its FAM 5 years after the merger. State Cannot Demonstrate That It Achieved the Objectives of Its 2005- 2006 Reorganization
Although State restructured the bureaus to better focus on post-September 11 challenges and priorities and combined related offices to streamline staff, it cannot demonstrate that it reduced inefficiencies and top-heavy management or that it eliminated mission overlap among the offices. The Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism was to develop policy guidance and a diplomatic strategy. State Reduced the Overall Number of Offices and Functions Assigned to the Reorganized Bureaus but Did Not Reduce Overall Staff Levels
Overall, State combined 30 offices and functions present in the three- bureau structure into 26 offices and functions present under the new two- bureau structure. State did not define what constituted bureaucratic inefficiencies, nor did it determine how reductions in the number of offices or personnel would improve efficiency. Nevertheless, workload mismatches persisted after the reorganization. Absent Clearly Defined Goals, State Cannot Demonstrate That It Achieved Its Objective of Making Management Less Top-heavy
In its July 2005 notification to Congress, State noted as its third objective that the merger would reduce top-heavy management. As a result, State lacks reasonable assurance that the reorganization achieved its objectives or that it can identify any lessons learned. Based on our identified key practices for implementing organizational transformations and mergers, we found that State generally addressed one key practice, partially addressed two practices, and did not address the remaining five. In addition, State’s July 2005 notification to Congress also described reasons to justify merging the two bureaus, including the need to address post-September 11 challenges and combine related offices to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies. State did not establish a coherent mission and integrated goals to guide the transformation. Conclusion
State cannot demonstrate that it achieved all of the stated objectives for the 2005-2006 reorganization of its arms control and nonproliferation functions. For example, State intended to address the previously identified deficiency of overlapping and uncertain roles and responsibilities among the arms control, nonproliferation, and verification bureaus. In particular, by establishing a results-oriented reporting framework with a defined end state with clear and measurable goals, State would be better able to gauge progress toward its goals and assess the results of restructuring. To better understand what State did and did not achieve, we examined State’s workforce allocations, staffing patterns, aForeign Service Officer (FSO) promotion rates and civil service and FSO attrition data for the affected bureaus before and after the reorganization, as well as a study of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s (ISN) workforce conducted in May 2006. To assess the extent to which State’s 2005-2006 reorganization addressed eight key transformation practices, we obtained and analyzed State’s methodology for implementing the reorganization, as well as e-mail, memos, and letters describing the decision-making process and concerns about the manner in which State implemented the reorganization. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Department of State (State) Inspector General (IG) concluded that State's three-bureau structure for conducting arms control and nonproliferation policy did not adequately address post-September 11 challenges, including possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. The IG also noted that State had yet to formalize the responsibilities of the three bureaus in its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), which sets out agency organization and functions. Between late 2005 and early 2006, State created a new two-bureau structure to better address these issues and improve efficiency GAO was asked to assess the extent to which State addressed (1) the objectives of its 2005-2006 reorganization and (2) key transformation practices. For this effort, GAO reviewed State documents pertaining to the reorganization and staffing data for the affected bureaus in the periods before and after the reorganization and interviewed former and current State officials in Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
State cannot demonstrate that the 2005-2006 restructuring of its Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Verification and Compliance bureaus achieved all of its objectives because it did not clearly define the objectives and lacked metrics to assess them. State's objectives were to enable it to better focus on post -September 11 challenges; reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and top-heavy management; and eliminate overlap. State sought to achieve its first objective by creating new offices and roles to address terrorism and counterproliferation issues. To meet its second objective, State merged three bureaus having 30 offices and functions into two bureaus having 26 offices and functions and freed up staff slots for these new roles, but problems with workload mismatches persisted after the reorganization as State employees noted it left some offices overworked and some offices underworked. State cannot demonstrate that it met its third objective, reducing top-heavy management, as its goals were undefined. Although it reduced the number of senior executives from 27 to 20 and reduced office directorships, the overall number of higher-ranking employees increased from 91 to 100 and executive office staff increased from 44 to 50. Moreover, concerns about mission overlap persist, in part because bureau roles remain undefined in the FAM. State's reorganization addressed few of the key practices for organizational mergers and transformations that GAO developed in 2002. These practices are found to be at the center of successful mergers and transformations. As illustrated below, State generally addressed one key practice, partially addressed two, and did not address the remaining five. For example, State did not address establishing coherent mission and strategic goals because it did not define an end state with measurable goals, nor did it devise a means to gauge progress toward such goals or assess the results of actions taken. As a result, State lacks reasonable assurance that the reorganization achieved its objectives or that it can identify any lessons learned. |
gao_GAO-06-113T | gao_GAO-06-113T_0 | While DOD maintains military forces with unparalleled capabilities, timely supply support is critical to sustaining these forces as they are trained and deployed to protect our national security. For example, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), DOD moved more than 2 million tons of cargo—including equipment, spare parts, supplies, and other items— thousands of miles to the Persian Gulf. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2004, DOD had approximately $77.4 billion worth of items in its inventory, an increase of over $15 billion since fiscal year 2001, when DOD had approximately $62.3 billion worth. DOD estimates that the annual costs of supplies and associated operations for fiscal year 2005 are expected to be $51.4 billion, or about 12 percent of DOD’s $419 billion requested budget. Supply Chain Management Is a High-Risk Area Because of Long- Standing Weaknesses
For 15 years, DOD’s supply chain management processes have been on our list of high-risk areas needing urgent attention because of long-standing systemic weaknesses that we have identified in our reports. These problems included excess inventory levels, inadequate controls over items, and cost overruns. Since then, our work has shown that the problems adversely affecting supply support to the warfighter— such as requirements forecasts, use of the industrial base, funding, distribution, and asset visibility—were not confined to the inventory management system, but also involved the entire supply chain. DOD’s Plan Is a Good Start toward Resolving Supply Chain Management Weaknesses that Will Require Continued Diligence to Succeed
DOD’s plan to improve supply chain management provides a good start and framework for addressing long-term systemic weaknesses in DOD’s supply chain management and for focusing the multiyear effort that will be needed to improve supply support to the warfighter. Our assessment of DOD’s plan to improve its supply chain management is based on work we have performed, prior recommendations, and the criteria cited in our November 2000 report on determining performance and accountability challenges and high risks. We use these criteria to assess an agency’s progress toward resolving a high-risk problem and determine whether to remove the high-risk designation. Does DOD’s plan demonstrate a strong commitment and top leadership support to improve supply chain management? Therefore, it is important for the department to obtain the necessary resource commitments from the military services; the Defense Logistics Agency; and other organizations, such as U.S. Transportation Command, to ensure that the numerous initiatives on which the multiyear plan depends are properly supported. DOD’s plan for improving supply chain management addresses some of the root causes for problems in three key areas with potentially effective solutions that it may be able to fully implement over the next few years. By committing to improve requirements forecasting, material distribution, and asset visibility in this plan, DOD has focused its efforts on three areas we frequently identified as impeding effective supply chain management. DOD’s second step is to rely on independent groups, such as contractors and the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, to validate the data, and GAO to monitor the department’s progress in improving supply chain management as part of its planned audits. GAO Has Plans to Follow Up on DOD’s Supply Chain Improvement Efforts
As part of our periodic reassessment of high-risk areas across the federal government, we will be assessing DOD’s progress in resolving supply chain management and its other high-risk areas. We plan to follow up on DOD’s supply chain management improvement efforts in three ways. First, as a matter of routine practice we will continue assessing DOD’s progress in implementing the recommendations made in our prior reports. Second, we also anticipate evaluating several of DOD’s supply management activities as part of our planned engagements over the next 2 years. We expect to meet periodically with these representatives in the future to coordinate audit coverage of the initiatives, performance metrics, and data system validity while minimizing audit duplication. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990 the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management processes have been on GAO's list of high-risk areas needing urgent attention and fundamental transformation to ensure that they function in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Recently in collaboration with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD developed a plan to address some of the systemic weaknesses as a first step toward removing supply chain management from the list. DOD's plan focuses on three areas for improvement: accuracy of supply requirements forecasts, distribution of material, and asset visibility. GAO was asked to provide its views on (1) the importance of supply chain management in DOD, (2) why GAO listed it as a high-risk area, (3) GAO's assessment of DOD's plan to improve supply chain processes, and (4) GAO's plans to follow up on DOD's efforts. This testimony contains GAO's views on what remains to be done to improve DOD's supply chain management and bring about lasting solutions. Continued efforts to complete and implement DOD's plan as well as continued oversight by Congress are essential.
What GAO Found
It is important for DOD to have effective supply chain management because of (1) its impact on military readiness and operations and (2) the substantial investment in inventory. While DOD maintains military forces with unparalleled capabilities, timely supply support is critical to sustaining them. For example, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD moved more than 2 million tons of cargo, but shortages of items such as vehicle track shoes and tires hampered operations. In addition, DOD spends billions on supplies. For example, its supply inventory levels have grown in recent years from $62.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $77.4 billion in fiscal year 2004. DOD expects to spend approximately $50 billion in fiscal year 2005 for such items and associated operations. In 1990, we identified DOD's inventory management processes as "high risk" because of long-standing problems such as excess inventory levels, inadequate controls, and cost overruns. Since then, GAO's work has shown that the problems adversely affecting supply support to the warfighter involved the entire supply chain. As a first step toward removing supply chain management from GAO's high-risk list, DOD in cooperation with OMB prepared a plan to address weaknesses in three key areas: accuracy of supply requirements forecasts, distribution of material, and asset visibility. DOD's plan to improve supply chain management provides a good start and framework for addressing long-term systemic weaknesses and in focusing the multiyear effort to improve supply support to the warfighter. However, successful resolution of DOD's supply chain management problems will require continued efforts to complete and successfully implement the plan. Based on GAO's criteria for removing programs from the high-risk designation, it is important for DOD to sustain top leadership commitment and long-term institutional support for the plan; obtain necessary resource commitments from the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other organizations; implement proposed improvement initiatives across the department to address root causes; identify performance metrics and valid data to use in monitoring the initiatives; and demonstrate progress toward meeting performance targets. As part of GAO's periodic reassessment of high-risk areas across the federal government, GAO will be assessing DOD's progress in resolving supply chain management and its other high-risk areas. GAO plans to follow up on DOD's actions to improve supply chain management in three ways. First, GAO will assess DOD's progress in implementing recommendations made in prior GAO reports. Second, GAO anticipates evaluating several of DOD's supply management activities as part of our planned engagements over the next 2 years. Third, GAO expects to work with other audit agencies,, as well as DOD and OMB, to coordinate audit coverage of the initiatives, metrics, and data system validity. |
gao_GAO-04-760 | gao_GAO-04-760_0 | On the basis of the force structure plan, the infrastructure inventory and the economic analysis, the Secretary was required to certify whether the need existed for further closures and realignments and, if so, that an additional round would result in annual net savings for each military department, beginning not later than 2011. The legislation also stipulated that if the certifications were provided in DOD’s report to Congress, we were to evaluate the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and the final selection criteria, and the need for an additional BRAC round. DOD’s Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively Required Information
DOD’s report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913 for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection Criteria
While DOD’s worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force structure plan, and selection criteria are all important in setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in guiding BRAC analyses for the 2005 round. The full analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their application, as DOD completes its data collection and analysis for the 2005 round. The unclassified report provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions) reflecting limited changes across the military services, even though the services have a number of initiatives under way that could affect force structure and infrastructure requirements, and which will need to be considered by DOD as it performs its 2005 round analyses. Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in DOD’s Report
Other BRAC-related issues included in DOD’s report—excess infrastructure capacity, estimated savings for the 2005 round, and the economic impact of prior BRAC actions on communities—are of widespread interest to Congress and the public and important to DOD’s certification regarding the need for a BRAC round. DOD Analysis Indicates Excess Infrastructure Capacity Exists
While DOD’s analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 report, which was completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, gives some indication of excess capacity across certain functional areas through fiscal year 2009, the methodology for that analysis has some limitations that could cause the results to be either overstated or understated, and raises questions about use of the methodology to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. Extent of Savings from 2005 Round Are Unknown but Could Be Achieved by 2011
DOD’s financial data would suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those of the 1993 and 1995 rounds, the net annual savings for each of the military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011, as certified by the Secretary in DOD’s report. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to result from the 2005 BRAC round, it is difficult to conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because there simply are too many unknowns, such as the specific timing of individual closure or realignment actions and the extent to which DOD’s efforts to maximize joint utilization and further its transformation efforts, would impact savings. Conclusion
While we found no basis to question the Secretary’s certification of the need for an additional BRAC round, we identified some limitations with the department’s assessment of excess capacity, completed outside the BRAC process, to meet the 2004 reporting requirement. While clear limitations exist in DOD’s assessment of excess capacity, it does nonetheless point to some areas that warrant additional analysis—and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so. Today’s security environment is evolving, as are force structure requirements along with technology advancements, and defense transformation efforts. DOD Responsiveness to Legislative Requirements
We evaluated DOD’s responsiveness to the legislative reporting requirements by comparing individual requirements as presented in the legislation with DOD’s presentation of information in its report and final selection criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, required the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base realignment and closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC round to proceed. The requirements included reporting on a 20-year force structure plan, an inventory of military installations, and separately adopting selection criteria for the upcoming round. The legislation also required DOD to certify whether an additional BRAC round was needed, and, if so, that annual net savings would be realized not later than fiscal year 2011. If the certifications were provided, GAO was required to evaluate DOD's submissions and report to Congress. DOD reported on March 23, 2004, and provided the certifications. In this report GAO evaluates (1) DOD's responsiveness to legislative requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and selection criteria; (3) other key issues included in DOD's report; and (4) DOD's certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round.
What GAO Found
DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with requirements under Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. The degree of coverage on some reporting requirements was limited to avoid prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 round. As directed, GAO analyzed DOD's worldwide installation inventory, force structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important in setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The unclassified portion of the 20-year force structure plan, extending through 2009, provides a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions), and reflects limited changes across the military services, even though the services have initiatives under way that could affect future force structure and infrastructure requirements. Today's security environment is evolving, as are force structure requirements along with technology advancements, and defense transformation efforts. The department must consider these factors in its BRAC analyses with appropriate allowances for future uncertainties. DOD's selection criteria closely parallel criteria used in previous rounds, while incorporating the provisions required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round. The analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their application in the ongoing BRAC process. GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to DOD's certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD's excess capacity analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations that could result in either overstating or understating excess capacity across various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indications of excess capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete assessment in the BRAC process. That process will also consider joint base use with the potential for better identifying excess capacity. DOD's historical financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 2011, as stipulated by the mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings from the upcoming round, it is difficult to conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because there are too many unknowns at this time. Additionally, improvements are needed in DOD's accounting for savings after BRAC decisions are made. GAO found no basis to question DOD's certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DOD's assessment of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant additional analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so. |
gao_T-RCED-98-74 | gao_T-RCED-98-74_0 | The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) provided that facilities discovered after the act was passed should be evaluated for placement on the NPL within 4 years of the site’s discovery if EPA determines on the basis of a site inspection or preliminary assessment that such an evaluation is warranted. For our reviews, we asked EPA to provide us with data on the length of time taken (l) to evaluate sites for possible placement on the NPL and (2) to complete cleanups of listed sites. To measure the time taken to evaluate sites for listing, we identified sites that were added to the NPL each year and calculated the time between their listing and their “discovery,” i.e., their entry into CERCLIS. Cleanup Completion Times Have Lengthened
For sites with completed cleanups, the average time between the sites’ placement on the NPL and the completion of the cleanup increased in 1986 to 1996. In 1996, cleanup completions averaged 10.6 years for nonfederal operable units. As mentioned earlier, in 1993 EPA set an expectation for its regions to complete a cleanup within 5 years of a site’s listing. The increase in overall cleanup times was accompanied by a marked increase in the time to select cleanup remedies—the study phase of the cleanup process and the time during which attempts are made to reach settlements with the parties responsible for site contamination. We found that, as of July 1, 1997, remedial action had been completed at 13 percent (95) of the 752 sites placed on the NPL in fiscal years 1986 through 1994. Assuming that all remedial actions at these “in process” sites had been completed on July 1, 1997, the average cleanup duration for all sites listed on the NPL during the 9-year period would have been 7.9 years, almost as long as EPA’s 8-year estimate of the cleanup time for recently listed sites. But because such a large proportion of the sites are still in process, the average cleanup time for these sites will exceed 8 years, possibly by a substantial margin. A major factor was that the Superfund program started with a backlog of sites awaiting evaluation. The probability of long time frames for future site listings is indicated by the large number of sites that are awaiting a listing decision (about 3,000) and the small number of sites that have been admitted to the Superfund program in recent years (an average of 16 per year in fiscal years 1992 through 1996). EPA challenged the fairness of our methodology, said that our report was inconsistent with earlier GAO reports, and said that it had recently accelerated the cleanup process. Time Taken to Accomplish the Principal Steps in the Process of Cleaning Up Sites
In addition to measuring the total time taken from the placement of a site on the National Priorities List (NPL) to the completion of its cleanup, we examined the time taken to complete two of the principal intermediate steps: (1) the preparation of the record of decision, which documents the final remedy selected after the completion of the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), and (2) the preparation of the remedial design, which includes the technical drawings and specifications for the selected remedy. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed two of its recent reports on the pace of cleanup in the Superfund program, focusing on the: (1) time taken to evaluate hazardous waste sites for possible placement on the National Priorities List (NPL) and the time to clean them up after the listing; and (2) status of cleanup for sites listed from 1986 to 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's March 1997 report stated that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took an average of 9.4 years--calculated from the date of each site's discovery--to evaluate and process the nonfederal sites it added to the NPL in 1996; (2) this evaluation and processing time was generally longer than for prior years; (3) the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) requires EPA to evaluate nonfederal sites for listing, when warranted, within 4 years of their discovery; (4) listing decisions were made within 4 years of their discovery for 43 percent of the 8,931 nonfederal sites discovered in 1987 through 1991--the last year for which an analysis could be done at the time of GAO's review; (5) a number of factors contributed to the increased time to list a site, including a backlog of sites awaiting evaluation and a reduction in the annual number of sites being added to the NPL; (6) GAO's March report also stated that cleanup times have also lengthened for completed projects; (7) nonfederal cleanup projects completed in 1986 through 1989 were finished, on average, 3.9 years after the sites were placed on the NPL; (8) by 1996, however, nonfederal cleanup completions averaged 10.6 years; (9) although SARA did not set deadlines for completing cleanups within a certain number of years, EPA set an expectation for 1993 for its regions to complete a cleanup within 5 years of a site's listing; (10) much of the time to complete cleanups is attributable to the early planning phases of the cleanup process when the decision is made on the selection of cleanup remedies; (11) actual construction work at sites is being done quicker than the selection of cleanup remedies; (12) EPA officials attributed the increased completion times for cleanups to the growing complexity of sites, efforts to reach settlements with parties responsible for site contamination, and resource constraints; (13) GAO's September report stated that because a large portion--87 percent--of the sites listed on the NPL in fiscal years 1986 through 1994 were still in the Superfund cleanup process as of July 1, 1997, the average cleanup time for this group of listed sites will exceed 8 years, possibly by a substantial margin; (14) EPA stated that the methodology used in GAO's March 1997 report was biased in favor of showing increasing completion times and that the report was inconsistent with GAO's earlier Superfund reports; (15) it claimed to have recently speeded up the Superfund process; and (16) GAO believes that its March 1997 report fairly portrays trends in the program and is consistent with its earlier reports. |
gao_GAO-02-249 | gao_GAO-02-249_0 | CMS communicates information describing its billing requirements, as well as other relevant regulations and policies, to physicians primarily through its carriers. CMS and its carriers also sponsor a variety of provider education activities, such as workshops and on-line training courses, to help familiarize physicians with billing rules and other aspects of the program and to update them on program changes. Carrier Communications Are Often Difficult to Use, Out of Date, Inaccurate, and Incomplete
Medicare information provided by carriers for physicians is often difficult to interpret and use, out of date, inaccurate, and incomplete. Knowing the appropriate code for a medical service is essential to properly billing Medicare. The lack of specific standards, sufficient technical assistance, and best practice guidance creates an environment in which, as one CMS business function expert said, each carrier must develop its own communication strategies, resulting in duplication of carriers’ efforts and variations in the quality of their service to physicians. It is working to issue new Medicare rules and regulations on a more consistent and predictable schedule, expand information resources available to physicians, and obtain more physician feedback relating to Medicare policies and communications. CMS is attempting to improve the consistency of information that carriers provide to physicians and has both short-term and long-term projects under way. For example, they are developing a standard template for carrier bulletins. CMS is also addressing information that it provides directly to the physician community. Because the majority of Medicare communications to physicians are issued by carriers on behalf of CMS, we focused on the three main methods these carriers use to communicate with physicians—carrier bulletins, carrier provider assistance call centers, and carrier Web sites. Agency officials also identified their current and planned efforts to improve its process for communicating with Medicare providers. | What GAO Found
Unlike other federal programs that make expenditures under the direct control of the government, Medicare constitutes a promise to pay for covered medical services provided to its beneficiaries by about one million providers. Given this open-ended entitlement, it is essential that appropriate and effective rules and policies be specified so that only necessary services are provided and reimbursed. Congress and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have promulgated an extensive body of statutes, regulations, policies, and procedures on what shall be paid for and under what circumstances. Information that carriers give to physicians is often difficult to use, out of date, inaccurate, and incomplete. Medicare bulletins that carriers use to communicate with physicians are often poorly organized and contain dense legal language. Similarly, other means of communicating with physicians, such as toll-free provider assistance lines and websites, have problems with accuracy and completeness. Although all carriers issue bulletins, operate call centers, and maintain websites, each carrier develops its own communications policies and strategies. This approach results in a duplication of effort as well as variations in the quality of carrier communications. CMS provides little technical assistance to help carriers develop effective communication strategies. Neither CMS carrier oversight nor self-monitoring by the carriers is comprehensive enough to provide sufficiently detailed information that could either pinpoint specific communication problems or identify poorly performing carriers. CMS is working to improve its physician communications by consolidating new instructions and regulations and issuing them on a more predictable schedule to lessen the burden of frequent policy changes that physicians cannot anticipate. CMS is also enhancing its education programs for both physicians and carrier staffs and expanding its efforts to obtain physician feedback. Finally, CMS is improving its national website and intends to develop a single web-based source of information for physicians. |
gao_GAO-10-344 | gao_GAO-10-344_0 | In all, 34 states reported declines in the average monthly number of children served by CCDF from fiscal year 2006 to 2008, and the remaining states reported increases. In addition to the recent decline in the numbers served by CCDF, from fiscal year 2006 to 2007, a key performance measure also shows a decline in the estimated proportion of potentially eligible children whose families receive child care subsidies funded by several federal block grants. As shown in table 1, all of these estimates indicate that about one-third or fewer of the potentially eligible children have received child care subsidies funded by CCDF, TANF, and SSBG between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. Multiple Factors Could Have Contributed to the Recent Decline in the Number of Children Served by State Child Care Subsidy Programs, but Some States Have Taken Steps to Expand Access
HHS, state officials, and experts we contacted cited multiple factors as potential influences on the overall decline in the numbers served by CCDF from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, which occurred even as some states took steps to expand access. The potential factors fell into three groups: state decisions that affect resource allocation, such as availability of TANF for child care or trends toward higher provider payments; changes in provider supply and requirements; and, economic factors that may affect parents’ ability to meet work-related eligibility criteria for subsidies or their child care choices. However, 17 states individually saw increases in the number served during this same time period. 10). States gave various reasons for the increases in income eligibility limits, such as keeping up with changes in the federal poverty level, which would not necessarily affect the number of children eligible, although the number of children in poverty has increased since 2006. In addition, two of these studies looked at the relationship between federal or state funding for child care subsidies and employment outcomes. While studies have found similar results related to the direction of the effect of child care subsidies or decreases in child care prices on low- income mothers’ employment, their results varied in the size of these subsidies’ effects on employment, due in part to differences in data, scope, and methodology. Studies we reviewed and experts we spoke to also indicated that the extent of these subsidies’ effects on employment can vary due to multiple factors, such as the child care options and employment flexibilities available to families. Experts we interviewed suggested that when child care prices increase, mothers may change their scheduled work hours or shift to lower-quality child care, for example, rather than simply exiting the labor force. In its comments HHS generally agreed with GAO’s findings. HHS also provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) trends in federal estimates of the number and proportion of eligible children and families who receive child care subsidies, (2) factors that may affect trends in estimates of the number of children served, and (3) what is known about the extent to which access to child care subsidies supports low-income parents’ employment. Coverage Rate Estimates for Child Care Subsidies
To address our first objective, we spoke with U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials from the Child Care Bureau to learn about Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) administrative data that the agency uses to develop coverage rate estimates. In addition, we obtained information on state data collection efforts from our survey of state child care administrators and interviews with state child care and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program administrators in four selected states. The survey was directed to state child care administrators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. As required by federal statute, states must report to HHS on the numbers of children and families served by CCDF, including TANF funds transferred to CCDF. | Why GAO Did This Study
As Congress considers reauthorization of the laws which provide funding for the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), there is interest in understanding what accounts for recent trends in child care subsidy receipt among eligible families and what research says about subsidies' effects on parents' ability to obtain and maintain employment. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers CCDF, but states have flexibility in its implementation. As requested, GAO examined: (1) trends in federal estimates of the number and proportion of eligible children and families who receive child care subsidies, (2) factors that may affect trends in estimates of the number of children served, and (3) what is known about the extent to which access to subsidies supports low-income parents' employment. To address these issues, GAO reviewed recent federal estimates of the number and proportion of eligible children and families served; conducted a survey of state child care administrators in 50 states and the District of Columbia; interviewed HHS officials, state officials in four selected states, and researchers and experts in child care subsidies; and reviewed research on the relationship between subsidy receipt and employment outcomes. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. HHS generally agreed with the report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
From 2006 to 2008, the estimated average monthly number of children served by CCDF declined by about 170,000 (10 percent), after remaining relatively stable for a number of years. However, state data vary, as 34 states reported decreases in the number served during this period, while 17 states reported increases. Along with a decline in the number served by CCDF, an estimate for a key performance measure also shows a decline in the proportion of eligible children whose families received subsidies funded by key federal programs from 2006 to 2007. Overall, estimates indicate that annually about one-third or fewer of eligible children received subsidies funded by CCDF and other federal programs between 2004 and 2007. Estimates occur at this level partly because many states cannot serve all eligible families with available resources and partly because eligible families do not always seek subsidies. HHS, state officials, and experts cited multiple factors that could have influenced the recent overall decline in children served by CCDF. These include state decisions about resource allocation, such as increasing provider payments, as reported in GAO's survey, or decreasing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds transferred to CCDF, as shown by expenditure data. Also, changes in state-level requirements and the recession may have affected the availability of providers. Finally, economic factors can affect the demand for subsidies, and the recession may have affected parents' child care choices or their ability to meet work-related requirements. However, since 2006, some states took actions that could increase access to subsidies, such as increasing income eligibility limits or extending eligibility to unemployed parents. Research has linked access to child care subsidies to increases in the likelihood of low-income mothers' employment. Study results have varied in the extent to which subsidies affect employment, in part due to differences in data, scope, and methodology. Some research reviewed and experts interviewed indicated that the size of the effect on employment outcomes may vary based on other factors, such as child care options and employment flexibilities available to families. Experts also suggested that when child care prices increase, mothers may change their work hours or shift to lower-cost providers, for example, rather than exiting the labor force altogether. |
gao_GAO-06-1090T | gao_GAO-06-1090T_0 | Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits. In 2002, we reported that eliminating the program would increase State’s resource requirements as millions of visa waiver travelers who have benefited from visa-free travel would need to obtain a visa to travel to the United States if the program did not exist. Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law Enforcement, and Immigration Interests
The Visa Waiver Program, however, can also pose risks to U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration interests because some foreign citizens may exploit the program to enter the United States. 1). Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with fraudulent passports at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver country. DHS Lacks a Clearly- Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess Risks of Visa Waiver Program
Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of the program, we identified several problems with the mandated biennial country assessment process, by which DHS assesses the risks posed by each of the visa waiver countries’ continued participation in the program. For the 2004 assessments, we found the following: Some key stakeholders were excluded from the process. The reviews lacked clear criteria to make key judgments. DHS Cannot Effectively Monitor Ongoing Concerns in Visa Waiver Countries
OIE is limited in its ability to achieve its mission because of insufficient staffing. However, though the law has required the timely reporting of blank passport thefts for continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program since 2002, DHS has not established and communicated time frames and operating procedures to participating countries. DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
As previously mentioned, during the 2004 assessment process, the working group identified security concerns in several participating countries, and DHS took actions to mitigate some of these risks. While most visa waiver countries use and contribute to Interpol’s database, four do not. However, according to DHS, State, and Justice officials, because Interpol’s data on lost and stolen travel documents is not automatically accessible to border inspectors at primary inspection, it is not currently an effective border screening tool. Recommendations to Improve Program Oversight and DHS’s Response
In our report, we made a series of recommendations to improve the U.S. government’s process for assessing the risks in the Visa Waiver Program, including recommending that DHS provide additional resources to strengthen OIE’s visa waiver monitoring unit; finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for the biennial country assessments and provide these protocols to stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas; create real-time monitoring arrangements for all 27 participating countries; and establish protocols for direct communication between overseas posts and OIE’s Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit. In addition, we made recommendations to improve U.S. efforts to mitigate program risks, including requiring that all visa waiver countries provide the United States and Interpol with non-biographical data from lost or stolen issued passports, as well as from blank passports; developing clear standard operating procedures for the reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passport data; and developing and implementing a plan to make Interpol’s stolen travel document database automatically available during primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million people entered the country under the program. After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the risk that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. This testimony discusses our recent report on the Visa Waiver Program. Specifically, it (1) describes the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examines the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assesses the actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries and reviewed relevant procedures and reports on participating countries
What GAO Found
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. DHS's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, the review process lacked clear criteria and guidance to make key judgments, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, the monitoring unit cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the department has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries report to Interpol's database, four do not. Further, DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because U.S. border inspectors do not automatically access the data at primary inspection. |
gao_GAO-11-607 | gao_GAO-11-607_0 | Table 1 shows the time and temperature controls implemented in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas on May 1, 2010. There are currently four methods for processing oysters after they have been harvested to reduce V. vulnificus to nondetectable levels: (1) high-pressure processing, (2) a mild heat treatment known as cool pasteurization, (3) cryogenic quick freezing, and (4) irradiation. FDA and the ISSC Do Not Currently Agree on a V. Vulnificus Illness Reduction Goal
In October 2009, a senior FDA official announced in a speech before the ISSC that, under FDA’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point rules, beginning in May 2011, FDA intended to require postharvest processing of all Gulf Coast oysters harvested during warmer months, when higher levels of V. vulnificus are more likely to be present, to reduce V. vulnificus to nondetectable levels. In a November 2009 letter to FDA, the ISSC expressed disappointment that FDA had unilaterally decided to announce its intent to change its policy and had not followed the 1984 memorandum of understanding that calls for FDA and the ISSC to exchange information concerning the shellfish safety program and resolve problems of interpretation and policy. The Approach FDA and the ISSC Use for Measuring Progress toward Their Illness Rate Reduction Goal Has Limitations That Undermine Its Credibility
The approach FDA and the ISSC have been using to measure progress toward their 60 percent illness rate reduction goal established in 2001 has three main limitations that undermine its credibility: the limited number of states used in determining V. vulnificus illness reduction, overstatement of the effectiveness of the primary V. vulnificus illness reduction strategies, and not controlling for the effect of such factors as natural and man-made disasters. In addition, although the V. vulnificus risk calculator developed by FDA estimates that time and temperature controls can reduce V. vulnificus illnesses, FDA and the ISSC have not directly evaluated the effectiveness of the May 2010 time and temperature controls that the ISSC approved, with FDA concurrence, for the states to use in reducing consumption-related V. vulnificus illnesses. Although data are unavailable regarding oyster industry compliance with time and temperature controls, our discussions with state officials and oyster industry members suggest full compliance is highly unlikely. As a result, even assuming 80 percent compliance in the summer months, it is unlikely that these controls will lead to the level of illness reduction estimated by the risk calculator. However, we identified six issues of concern regarding the RTI report’s economic analysis that call into question the completeness of its cost and timeline estimates. Overall, the RTI report concluded that it will take a minimum of 2 to 3 years and, depending on the postharvest processing method used, about $6 million to $32 million in initial investment costs (excluding land purchase and construction costs for new centralized facilities) to develop the infrastructure required to ensure the Gulf Coast oyster industry has adequate capacity to use postharvest processing on all Gulf Coast oysters intended for raw consumption that are harvested during warmer months. In its response, FDA agreed with our recommendation, and the ISSC agreed that it did not have a detailed plan to ensure postharvest processing capacity. For example, the report does not include information on costs associated with purchasing land needed to expand existing postharvest processing facilities or construct new centralized facilities. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has collaborated with the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC) for years to reduce V. vulnificus illness through improving consumer education and refrigeration practices, but these practices have failed to achieve measurable reductions of V. vulnificus illnesses nationally. FDA’s responses to GAO’s recommendation are set forth below: GAO Recommendations To better ensure the safety of oysters from the Gulf of Mexico that are sold for raw consumption, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA work with the Executive Board of the ISSC to take the following four actions: agree on a nationwide goal for reducing the number of V. vulnificus illnesses caused by the consumption of Gulf Coast raw oysters and develop strategies to achieve that goal, GENERAL COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S (GAO) DRAFT REPORT ENTITLED, “FOOD SAFETY: FDA NEEDS TO REASSESS ITS APPROACH TO REDUCING AN ILLNESS CAUSED BY EATING RAW OYSTERS” (GAO-11-607) recognizing that consumer education and time and temperature controls have not resulted in achievement of the 60 percent V. vulnificus illness rate reduction goal and that the capacity to use post-harvest processing (PHP) on Gulf Coast oysters harvested from April through October that are intended for raw consumption does not currently exist; FDA Response The ISSC has attempted to achieve the 60% illness reduction goal that had been established in 2001 through improved refrigeration practices, limited PHP and consumer education, but these efforts have not succeeded. regularly evaluate the effectiveness of V. vulnificus illness reduction strategies, such as consumer education and time and temperature controls, to determine whether they are successful and should be continued or are ineffective and should be stopped; GENERAL COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) ON THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S (GAO) DRAFT REPORT ENTITLED, “FOOD SAFETY: FDA NEEDS TO REASSESS ITS APPROACH TO REDUCING AN ILLNESS CAUSED BY EATING RAW OYSTERS” (GAO-11-607)
FDA Response FDA agrees with GAO that the approach that has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of illness reduction strategies has limitations that undermine its credibility, including the limited number of states used in determining V. vulnificus illness reduction, and the overstatement of the effectiveness of the primary V. vulnificus illness reduction strategies, consumer education and time and temperature controls—by including V. vulnificus illness data from California. The four (4) states of California, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas were used to measure effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Vibrio vulnificus (V. vulnificus) is a bacterium that occurs naturally in the Gulf of Mexico. On average, since 2000, about 32 individuals a year in the United States have become ill from eating raw or undercooked oysters containing V. vulnificus, and about half have died. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring oyster safety and works with the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC), which includes representatives from FDA, states, and the shellfish industry to establish guidelines for sanitary control of the shellfish industry. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which FDA and the ISSC agree on the V. vulnificus illness reduction goal, use a credible approach to measure progress toward the illness rate reduction goal, have evaluated the effectiveness of their actions in reducing V. vulnificus illnesses, and whether the Gulf Coast oyster industry has adequate capacity to postharvest process oysters harvested April through October. GAO reviewed data and documents and interviewed officials in FDA, the ISSC, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas.
What GAO Found
FDA and the ISSC do not agree on a common V. vulnificus illness reduction goal. In October 2009, FDA announced its intention to change its approach to V. vulnificus illnesses from reducing them to largely eliminating them. To do so, FDA would require states to use postharvest processing methods, which include a mild heat treatment known as low temperature pasteurization. FDA's announced approach was a change from the 60 percent illness rate reduction goal established by the ISSC in 2001, with FDA concurrence. In a November 2009 letter to FDA, the ISSC expressed disappointment that FDA had not followed a 1984 memorandum of understanding that calls for FDA and the ISSC to consult on such matters. If FDA and the ISSC are not in agreement on the illness reduction goal and strategies to achieve it, it will be difficult for the Gulf Coast states to move forward to significantly reduce the number of consumption-related V. vulnificus illnesses. The approach FDA and the ISSC have been using to measure progress toward the previously agreed upon V. vulnificus illness rate reduction goal established in 2001 has limitations that undermine its credibility. For example, the ISSC continues to include California's results in its illness rate reduction calculation along with Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Doing so overstates the effectiveness of consumer education and time and temperature controls--FDA's and the ISSC's primary strategies for reducing V. vulnificus illnesses--because California, unlike these other states, requires that all raw Gulf Coast oysters harvested during the summer and sold in the state be processed to reduce V. vulnificus to nondetectable levels, which has reduced V. vulnificus illnesses to nearly zero. FDA and the ISSC have taken few steps to evaluate the effectiveness of their consumer education efforts since 2004. Likewise, they have not directly evaluated the effectiveness of the time and temperature controls implemented in 2010, which call for harvesters to ensure that oysters are cooled to specific temperatures within certain times to reduce V. vulnificus growth. Although data are not available, our discussions with state and oyster industry officials suggest 100 percent compliance with the controls is highly unlikely. Moreover, our analysis shows--even assuming 80 percent compliance in the summer months-- it is unlikely that these controls will lead to the level of illness reduction estimated by a model developed by FDA. The Gulf Coast oyster industry does not have sufficient capacity to process all of its oysters intended for raw consumption that are harvested from April through October to reduce V. vulnificus to nondetectable levels, according to an FDA-commissioned report. The report concluded that it will take a minimum of 2 to 3 years to develop the infrastructure needed to process these oysters. However, the report has some limitations that call into question the completeness of its cost and timeline estimates. For example, the report's cost estimates did not include some construction costs and costs associated with purchasing land needed to expand existing processing facilities or build new ones. Without this information, the full cost of developing sufficient processing capacity will not be known.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA work with the ISSC to agree on an illness reduction goal, improve its approach to measuring progress in reducing V. vulnificus illnesses, regularly evaluate its illness reduction strategies, and address the limitations in the FDA-commissioned report. FDA and the ISSC generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-489T | gao_GAO-16-489T_0 | DOD’s Approach to Managing Follow-on Modernization May Hinder Transparency and Oversight
The F-35 program has begun planning and funding the development of new capabilities, known as follow-on modernization, but our ongoing work indicates that DOD’s current plan for managing the development of these new capabilities may limit transparency and oversight. Although the requirements are not yet final and no official cost estimate has been developed for Block 4, DOD’s fiscal year 2017 budget request indicates that the department expects to spend nearly $3 billion on these development efforts over the next 6 years (see figure 1). Our preliminary analysis indicates that F-35 Block 4 development costs of this magnitude would exceed the statutory and regulatory thresholds for what constitutes a major defense acquisition program (MDAP), and it would be larger than many of the MDAPs in DOD’s current portfolio. However, in August 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum directing the F-35 program office to manage Block 4 development under the existing F-35 acquisition program baseline and not as a separate incremental acquisition program. Best practices recommend an incremental approach in which new development efforts are structured and managed as separate acquisition programs and that a business case should match requirements with resources—proven technologies, sufficient engineering capabilities, time, and funding—before undertaking a new product development. In March 2005 we found that the Air Force was managing its multi-billion dollar F-22 modernization efforts as part of the program’s existing acquisition baseline and had not established a separate knowledge-based business case. As a result, the F-22 baseline and schedule were adjusted to reflect the new timeframes and additional costs, comingling the funding and some content for the baseline development and modernization efforts—some content that had not been achieved under the baseline program were deferred into the modernization program. Program Continues to Face Affordability Challenges
Although the estimated F-35 program’s total acquisition costs have decreased since 2014, the program continues to face affordability challenges. The program expects to reach peak production rates for U.S. aircraft in 2022, at which point DOD expects to spend more than $14 billion a year on average for a decade. At the same time, DOD will be operating and sustaining an increasing number of fielded F-35 aircraft. Developmental Flight Testing Is Nearing Completion with Challenging Mission Systems Software Testing Remaining
The F-35 program is nearing the completion of the initial developmental test program with about 20 percent of its flight sciences and mission systems testing remaining; however our ongoing work indicates that the remaining testing is likely to be challenging as it will require complex missions and stressing environments. Ongoing Manufacturing and Reliability Progress Continue
Our ongoing work has shown that the F-35 airframe and engine contractors continue to report improved efficiency and supply chain performance, and program data indicates that reliability and maintainability are also improving. In conclusion, our preliminary results indicate that, although the F-35 development program is nearing completion, the program is not without risks. DOD’s plan to manage Block 4 under the current acquisition program baseline presents oversight challenges because key reporting requirements and oversight mechanisms will not be initiated; therefore, the two efforts will be comingled. Without setting up the modernization as a separate program with its own baseline and regular reporting as best practices recommend, it will be difficult for Congress to hold DOD accountable for achieving F-35 Block 4 cost, schedule, and performance goals. In light of our ongoing work, we are not making any recommendations to DOD at this time. We plan to issue our final report in April 2016. We look forward to continuing to work with the Congress as we to continue to monitor and report on the progress of the F-35 program. | Why GAO Did This Study
With estimated acquisition costs of nearly $400 billion, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—also known as the Lightning II — is DOD's most costly acquisition program. Since 2001, GAO has reported extensively on the F-35 program's cost, schedule, and performance problems. The program plans to begin increasing production rates over the next few years.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 contains a provision for GAO to annually review the F-35 acquisition program. Today's testimony is based on ongoing work for the first report under this mandate, which GAO expects to issue in April 2016.This testimony focuses on GAO's preliminary observations regarding the F-35 program's (1) future modernization (2) affordability, remaining development, and ongoing manufacturing plans.
GAO analyzed program documentation including management reports, test data and results, and internal DOD program analyses. GAO collected data on F-35 development and test progress, and analyzed total program funding requirements. GAO also collected and analyzed production and supply chain performance data, and interviewed DOD, program, and contractor officials.
In light of its ongoing work, GAO is not making any recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) program shows that the Department of Defense (DOD) has begun planning and funding significant new development work to add to the F-35's capabilities, an effort known as Block 4. The funding needed for this effort is projected to be nearly $3 billion over the next 6 years (see figure below), which would qualify it as a major defense acquisition program in its own right.
DOD does not currently plan to manage Block 4 as a separate program with its own acquisition program baseline but rather as part of the existing baseline. As a result, Block 4 will not be subject to key statutory and regulatory oversight requirements, such as providing Congress with regular, formal reports on program cost and schedule performance. A similar approach was initially followed on the F-22 Raptor modernization program, in which the funding and content were comingled making it difficult to separate the performance and cost of the modernization from the baseline program. Best practices recommend an incremental approach in which new development efforts are structured and managed as separate acquisition programs with their own requirements and acquisition program baselines. The F-22 eventually adopted such an approach. If the Block 4 effort is not established as a separate acquisition program, cost, schedules, and the scope of the baseline and modernization efforts will be comingled. Therefore, it will be difficult for Congress to hold DOD accountable for achieving its cost, schedule, and performance requirements.
GAO's ongoing work indicates that although the F-35 total program acquisition costs have decreased since 2014, the program continues to face significant affordability challenges. DOD plans to begin increasing production and expects to spend more than $14 billion annually for nearly a decade on procurement of F-35 aircraft. Currently, the program has around 20 percent of development testing remaining, including complex mission systems software testing, which will be challenging. Program officials continued to address many of the key technical risks, but the Autonomic Logistics Information System continues to be a challenge. At the same time, the contractors that build the F-35 airframes and engines continue to report improved manufacturing efficiency and supply chain performance. |
gao_GAO-05-340 | gao_GAO-05-340_0 | Background
Federal agency use of ESPCs was authorized by the Congress to provide an alternative to direct appropriations for funding energy-efficiency improvements in federal facilities. Twenty Agencies Used ESPCs
During fiscal years 1999 through 2003, 20 agencies undertook 254 ESPC projects to finance investments in energy-efficiency improvements. The ESPCs commit the federal government to annual payments totaling about $2.5 billion over the terms of these contracts, conditional on either the savings guaranteed in the contracts being verified or as stipulated in the contracts. Agencies receive other benefits through ESPCs as well, such as environmental improvements and better mission capability resulting from replacing aging infrastructure with more reliable equipment. ESPC-Financed Projects Have Reduced Energy Use and Agencies Expect to Achieve Energy Savings Worth At Least $2.5 Billion
Over the life of the ESPC financed projects included in our review, agencies expect to achieve energy savings worth at least $2.5 billion and amounting to over 9 million MMBTUs, as shown in table 2. Agencies may also benefit from substantial energy and financial savings once the contracts are paid for. Upfront Funds Could Provide These Benefits But Are Often Not Available on a Timely Basis
Although the benefits from ESPC financed projects discussed above could be achieved using upfront funding, agencies have found that sufficient amounts of such funding were generally not available—making it necessary for the agencies to use ESPCs to supplement the upfront funding they receive in order to obtain these benefits. Agencies Believe Financial Savings Cover Costs, but Whether Savings Actually Do So Is Uncertain
Agencies generally believe that ESPCs’ financial savings cover the costs because they design their contracts to cover costs and because they must obtain verification reports from the energy services companies that confirm this point or take steps to correct shortfalls in savings. Poor documentation adds to the problem of ensuring that savings cover costs. Agencies’ Differing Interpretations of the Components of Costs That Must Be Covered by Savings under the ESPC Legislation Add to Uncertainty That Savings Cover Costs
The statute governing ESPCs provides that “aggregate annual payments” under an ESPC may not exceed the amount the agency would have paid for energy without such a contract. Agencies Are Concerned About Officials’ Lack of Necessary Expertise and Information and About Competitiveness of the Super ESPCs
Agencies expressed concerns about the expertise and information needs of the agencies and insufficient competition among financiers and energy services companies, all of which can affect agencies’ ability to protect the government’s financial interests in using ESPCs. Agencies Expressed Concerns About Competition Among Finance Companies and Energy Services Companies
Some agency officials we spoke with expressed concerns that there may not be enough competition among finance companies and that this could lead to higher than necessary financing costs for ESPCs. Our recommendations focus on the areas of information, expertise, and audits: Collect and use ESPC-related data more effectively by (1) compiling information on key contract terms—such as interest rates and markups for energy-efficiency equipment—for each ESPC and as a key part of best practices make information accessible to agency officials in negotiating subsequent ESPCs and (2) tracking actual costs, verified savings, and any changes to ESPC projects that may affect these costs and savings. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Objectives
We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which federal agencies used ESPCs; (2) what energy savings, financial savings, and other benefits agencies expect to achieve; (3) the extent to which actual financial savings from ESPCs cover costs; and (4) what areas, if any, require steps to protect the government’s financial interests in using ESPCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is the nation's largest energy consumer, spending, by latest accounting, $3.7 billion on energy for its 500,000 facilities. Upfront funding for energy-efficiency improvements has been difficult to obtain because of budget constraints and competing agency missions. The Congress in 1986 authorized agencies to use Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) to privately finance these improvements. The law requires that annual payments for ESPCs not exceed the annual savings generated by the improvements. GAO was asked to identify (1) the extent to which agencies used ESPCs; (2) what energy savings, financial savings, and other benefits agencies expect to achieve; (3) the extent to which actual financial savings cover costs; and (4) what areas, if any, require steps to protect the government's financial interests in using ESPCs.
What GAO Found
Although comprehensive data on federal agencies' use of ESPCs are not available, in fiscal years 1999 through 2003, we found that 20 federal agencies undertook 254 ESPCs to finance investments in energy-saving improvements for 5 to 25 years. Through the ESPCs, federal agencies plan to make annual payments amounting to at least $2.5 billion spread over the lifetime of the contracts. Agencies expect to achieve benefits that include energy savings worth at least $2.5 billion over the life of the contracts, as well as other benefits that cannot be easily quantified, such as improved reliability of the newer equipment over the aging equipment it replaced, environmental improvements, and additional energy and financial savings once the contracts have been paid for. While these benefits could be achieved using upfront funds and with lower financing costs, agencies stated that they generally have not received sufficient funds upfront for doing so and see ESPCs as a necessary supplement to upfront funding in order to achieve the benefits cited. Agencies believe that ESPCs also provide unique benefits such as a partial shift of risk from agencies to private energy services companies and a more integrated approach to providing efficiency measures. Agencies structure ESPCs so that financial savings cover costs and they reported that many do. However, GAO could not verify that conclusion using the data on ESPCs, and GAO work and agency audits disclosed ESPCs in which unfavorable contract terms, missing documentation, and other problems caused GAO to question how consistently savings cover costs. Furthermore, differing interpretations of the law establishing ESPCs about what components of costs must be paid for from the savings generated by the project or may be paid for using other funding sources have contributed to uncertainties about whether savings are appropriately covering costs. GAO identified concerns in the areas of expertise and related information and competition that are fundamental to ensuring that savings cover costs and to protecting the government's financial interests in using ESPCs. According to agency officials, they often lacked the technical and contracting expertise and information (such as interest rates and markups) to negotiate ESPCs and to monitor contract performance in the long term. The officials also think there may be insufficient competition among finance and energy services companies and that this could lead to higher costs for ESPCs. |
gao_GAO-16-316 | gao_GAO-16-316_0 | Another approach to financing insurance coverage is through post-event funding, which involves collecting reimbursement for actual losses and associated expenses after an event has occurred. Seven of the 16 programs we reviewed have a multilayered structure in which insurers and governments provide coverage for terrorism risk, and in some cases the government administers the programs. Reinsurance. Reinsurers do not provide a layer of coverage in the program. Insurers and Reinsurers Provide All the Coverage for Terrorism Risk in Some Programs
In some programs we reviewed the insurance industry provides all the coverage for terrorism risk, and the government provides no financial backstop to the program. Programs in this category include those in Austria, Bahrain, India, Russia, South Africa, and Switzerland. In other programs, such as those in Austria, Bahrain, Russia, and Switzerland, insurance companies have established reinsurance arrangements with each other to cover losses, and their governments have no financial or administrative roles. Program Has Layers of Coverage from Insurers and the Government, but Its Structure Does Not Include Reserves and Reinsurance
Like many of the foreign programs we reviewed, the structure of the U.S. terrorism risk insurance program includes multiple layers of coverage, with insurers and the government providing layers of coverage. Under Most Arrangements Private Sector and Program Funds Would Cover Initial Losses, and Most Programs Fund Losses and Costs Up Front
For the six programs we reviewed in-depth, the private sector and program reserves would cover initial losses and governments are often responsible for a potentially large share of losses in more extreme events. Additionally, private sector coverage is generally larger for those programs in countries with larger economies, as measured by GDP. In the event of a terrorist attack, insurers in the United States could pay more than the total coverage provided by the other five countries’ national programs. The participants involved and their share of losses vary across programs, but according to program officials, private sector participants and program reserves likely would cover commercial and property losses from most conventional terrorist events. In the event of a large terrorist attack that exhausted coverage from the other participants, the governments of Australia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States would be responsible for a potentially significant proportion of losses. In the United Kingdom, although the government backstop is also unlimited, the program has private reserves and has a line of credit that is expected to be repaid. All Five Foreign Programs Collect Funds Up Front to Cover Losses, in Contrast to the U.S. Up-front funds related to Austria’s program are based on market share. Spain. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For terrorism risk insurance programs in the United States and selected foreign countries, the objectives of our report were to (1) compare the organizational structures and the role of government and (2) examine the loss-sharing arrangement between the government and private sector and the methods by which the programs are funded. In addition, we conducted a number of interviews. For example, our criteria included selecting countries representing different types of programs, such as at least one country with a national terrorism risk insurance program that did not include any government financial support as part of the insurance coverage, at least one country with a national terrorism risk insurance program that was not a member of OECD, and at least one country with a national terrorism risk insurance program that was developed prior to 2001. We also included the program in the United States in the review for this objective. To analyze the administrative costs of the five selected foreign terrorism risk insurance programs and how such costs were incorporated into program fees or premiums, we reviewed the programs’ audited financial statements, where available. Further, we reviewed annual reports and other program documentation and interviewed officials from the terrorism risk insurance programs of Australia, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom to identify terrorist attacks in their countries since 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
A number of countries have established national terrorism risk insurance programs to respond to market shortages for such insurance resulting from attacks either in their own or other countries. Many programs were created following the events of September 11, 2001, but some existed earlier. In 2002, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act established a program to ensure the availability of terrorism risk insurance in the United States.
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to review how other countries have structured and funded their terrorism risk insurance programs. This report compares the structures of and the role of government in selected foreign terrorism insurance programs and examines the loss-sharing arrangements between the government and private sector. Of the 16 programs identified through a literature review, GAO selected 6 representing a range of structures to examine in-depth—programs in Australia, Austria, India, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the six programs, GAO reviewed program financial statements, annual reports, and documentation from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and interviewed officials from terrorism insurance programs, agencies, reinsurance companies, and trade associations.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to Treasury and the five selected programs for their review and received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The structures of the 16 terrorism insurance programs GAO reviewed generally fell into three broad categories. Programs in the first category have a multilayered structure, with insurers, reinsurers (which offer insurance for insurers), and governments providing coverage. Several programs, including those in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), use this approach. In the second category, which includes Spain and Israel, government entities provide all the coverage for terrorism risk, and insurers and reinsurers do not take on any risk. The third category includes programs, such as those in Austria and India, in which insurers and reinsurers are entirely responsible for providing coverage and the government has no financial role. In comparison, the U.S. program involves coverage from the government and insurers, but it differs from many programs as its program does not include the purchase of reinsurance.
Among the six programs GAO reviewed in-depth, the loss-sharing arrangements among program participants vary, but program reserves and the private sector likely would be able to cover losses from most conventional terrorist events before public funds are needed, according to program officials. However, in the event of a very large terrorist attack, governments that have a role would potentially be responsible for a substantial proportion of losses. As shown in the figure, programs in which the government provides a layer of financial support have greater total amounts of coverage compared to those with only private sector participation. Additionally, private sector coverage is larger under programs in countries with larger economies, as measured by gross domestic product. In the event of a large terrorist attack, insurers in the United States could pay more than the total coverage provided by the other five countries' national programs. Most of the selected programs collect premiums up front to cover losses and program costs; the United States, in contrast, collects reimbursement for actual losses and associated expenses after an event occurs.
Note: In the UK, the government share is an unlimited line of credit to the private program that is expected to be repaid. Spain's funds include program reserves for terrorism and other catastrophic events and an unlimited government backstop. The unlimited government shares are portrayed as matching the program funds, but the actual size could differ depending on the type and size of terrorist attack. Austria's program is entirely private. |
gao_RCED-97-63 | gao_RCED-97-63_0 | The vitrification and uranyl projects are of similar size and complexity as some of the projects that DOE will undertake in the future. For the uranyl project, many of the required project management documents were not prepared until late or not prepared at all, contributing to the cost growth and schedule delays. Furthermore, for its most important projects, DOE has increased the frequency with which it meets with the contractor to discuss the status of the projects. Cost overruns and schedule slippages similar to those of these two projects exist Departmentwide. For example, the Board found in 1992 and 1993 that the Area Office had inadequate plans to supervise the contractor’s activities, did not have the technical staff to ensure that safety requirements were adhered to, and did not stay on top of the daily activities of the contractor. Some Weaknesses Exist in Performance and Financial Systems
Fluor Daniel Fernald’s compliance with procedures that we reviewed in the performance and financial systems was mixed, but some weaknesses make it difficult for both DOE’s and the contractor’s managers to exercise effective control and oversight of the contractor’s costs and performance. DOE has directed the contractor to make numerous changes to address the weaknesses identified in recent reviews of the contractor’s financial and performance management, but it is too early to assess the impact. DOE Is Implementing Contract and Management Initiatives to Improve Oversight
DOE recognizes that its management and contracting problems are Departmentwide and is implementing major reform efforts to improve these areas. These practices make it difficult for DOE and the contractor’s managers to exercise effective control and oversight of the contractor’s costs and performance. Information on Allegations Concerning Management of Two Cleanup Projects at Fernald
The following discusses the purpose and status of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) vitrification pilot plant (VITPP) and uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) projects and information relevant to the allegations published by the Cincinnati Enquirer about these projects. DOE has established internal project milestones for the construction and testing of VITPP. This problem has been noted in two reports on Fernald. Subsequently, the contractor did not process a proposal to change the baseline. Safety and Health Oversight and Incidents
To determine how DOE’s management and oversight processes at Fernald ensure that Fluor Daniel Fernald is fulfilling DOE’s safety and health requirements, we obtained and reviewed (1) DOE’s safety and health procedures and guidelines applicable to the site, (2) the assessments of Fluor Daniel Fernald’s safety and health activities done by DOE’s Fernald Area Office, and (3) the assessments of the Fernald Area Office’s safety- and health-related programs done by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and by DOE headquarters’ Office of Environment, Safety and Health and Office of Environmental Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) is providing effective management and oversight of two key cleanup projects at its Fernald site--the vitrification pilot plant project and the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate project--that were reported on in the Cincinnati Enquirer; (2) DOE's oversight of safety and health activities at the site; (3) the contractor's compliance with certain performance and financial system procedures; and (4) DOE's overall contracting and management initiatives and how they may resolve any problems identified at Fernald.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE has not exercised adequate management and oversight of the vitrification and uranyl projects or of the contractor's safety and health activities; (2) for example, DOE provided limited oversight during the early stages of the two projects and did not prepare many of the required project management documents for the uranyl project; (3) these and other DOE oversight weaknesses contributed to a total of $65 million in estimated cost overruns and almost 6 years of schedule slippages for the two projects; (4) in the safety and health area, from 1993 to 1995, serious concerns were raised about DOE's ability to ensure the contractor's compliance with safety and health requirements; (5) for example, DOE did not have adequate plans to supervise the contractor's activities and was not conducting the required safety and health assessments; (6) in the performance and financial management area, some of the contractor's practices for maintaining key systems make it difficult for DOE and the contractor to exercise effective control and oversight of the contractor's costs and activities; (7) DOE recognizes that contracting and management problems exist throughout the Department and is implementing major reforms to change the way it does business at Fernald and other sites; (8) at Fernald, DOE has made some improvements in the areas that GAO reviewed; (9) for example, in project management, DOE has increased the frequency with which it meets with the contractor to discuss the status of its most important projects; (10) in the safety and health area, DOE has increased the number of assessments and is making other changes that are not far enough along to evaluate; (11) DOE has directed the contractor to make changes to address weaknesses identified in recent reviews of the contractor's financial and performance management; (12) these actions address some of the weaknesses GAO identified; (13) however, it is too soon to assess the overall effectiveness of these improvements and reforms; and (14) their implementation at Fernald will be a real test of DOE's reforms. |
gao_GAO-01-484 | gao_GAO-01-484_0 | For all taxpayers and by taxpayer categories, the audit rate equals the proportion of IRS audits closed in a fiscal year compared to returns filed in the previous calendar year. This allowed us to describe the changes and update the audit rate trends in earlier reports. To describe what is known about the potential effects of changes in the audit rates on tax compliance, we used our previous and ongoing work on IRS audits, other IRS enforcement programs, and tax compliance. Individual Audit Rates Have Been Declining Overall and Across Various Categories
From fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the overall income tax audit rate of individuals declined. The declines in audit rates were spread uniformly across IRS’ four regions. First, IRS had fewer auditors for individual returns for reasons that include a decline in staff and decisions to change staffing priorities to focus on customer service. Third, audits took longer due to additional requirements, such as more written communications with taxpayers about the status of their audit. With respect to changes in the audit rate by income levels, IRS officials cited an increase in the number of high-income tax returns and an audit focus on noncompliance by earned income credit claimants, who are usually lower income individuals. However, due to time constraints, we did not analyze the data to determine the extent to which IRS’ reasons explained the changes in audit rates. Part of the reason for the decline in auditing is that revenue agents and tax auditors spent increasingly more time providing taxpayer assistance between fiscal years 1996 and 2000. IRS Cited Other Reasons for the Varying Individual Audit Rates by Income Levels
IRS officials offered two reasons why the audit rates for lower income individuals exceeded the rates for higher income individuals in selected years among the nonbusiness and business groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does various compliance checks to ensure the accuracy of information reported on taxpayers' returns. In recent years, the audit rate--the proportion of tax returns that IRS audits each year--has drawn attention because of a long-term decline in audit rates and the differences in audit rates for lower and higher income individuals. This report (1) describes the changes in audit rates for individual income tax returns overall and for categories, such as major sources (i.e., nonbusiness versus business) and levels of income for fiscal years 1996 through 2000; (2) discusses IRS' reasons and related data explaining the changes in audit rates; and (3) describes what is known about the effects of changes in the audit rates on tax compliance.
What GAO Found
In comparing fiscal years 1996 and 2000, GAO found that the overall tax audit rate of individuals declined about 70 percent. These rates declined regardless of the individual taxpayer's income level. IRS cited the following three reasons for the decline in audit rates for fiscal years 1996 to 2000: (1) the number of IRS auditors for individual returns declined by more than half due to a decline in total staff and decisions to change staffing priorities to focus on customer service; (2) the remaining auditors were used in other areas, such as assisting taxpayers; and (3) audits took longer due to additional audit requirements, such as more written communications with taxpayers about the status of their audit. To explain the changes in the audit rates by income levels, IRS officials cited increases in the number of high-income tax returns and an audit focus on noncompliance by earned income credit claimants, who are lower income individuals. Finally, neither IRS nor external observers know how the decline in audit rates affects voluntary tax compliance. |
gao_GAO-15-115 | gao_GAO-15-115_0 | This annual inventory submission includes, among other things, the number of contractor full time equivalents and the associated direct labor cost for these positions. The section 808 requirement to reduce funding for closely associated with inherently governmental functions and staff augmentation expired in September 2013; however, Congress modified the requirements in section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, extending the time period for DOD to implement the full 20 percent reduction for both the closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions through fiscal year 2014. DOD Exceeded the Contract Services Spending Limit in 2012 and Adhered to the Limit in 2013, but Varied Implementation of Fiscal Controls Hampered Some Efforts
DOD exceeded its spending limit by $1.72 billion in fiscal year 2012 and spent approximately $500 million less than its limit in fiscal year 2013. After exceeding the spending targets in fiscal year 2012, some components improved planning and implemented stronger fiscal controls over contract services, such as monitoring spending during the year and prioritizing mission needs to assist in funding decisions, helping DOD meet its spending limit for fiscal year 2013. We found that budget officials from the components that met their spending targets in fiscal year 2013 implemented improved planning and oversight of contract services spending. An Army manpower official said commands have generated contract services spending estimates through the Army’s inventory of contracted services that could have been used by the budget office to inform contract services targets. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for government agencies to take actions to ensure accountability and stewardship of the government’s resources. Improved planning and consistent implementation of fiscal controls across the department could better enable DOD to manage contract services spending and achieve future savings. Accuracy of Funding Reductions for Closely Associated with Inherently Governmental Functions Could Not Be Determined
Comparable and timely data are not available to determine if DOD implemented the mandated funding reductions for contractor performance of closely associated with inherently governmental functions. However, two years of obligation data will not be available until after the statutory requirement has expired in September 2014. The Extent to Which DOD Has Implemented Staff Augmentation Reductions Is Not Yet Known
DOD has not yet determined if funding reductions in staff augmentation— contractors under the direction of a government official other than a contracting officer—were implemented due to insufficient guidance and management attention. In response to section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 that requires DOD to implement reductions in 2014 if they were not achieved in 2012 and 2013, DOD issued supplemental guidance in May 2014 instructing components to report on actions taken to implement staff augmentation reductions in their fiscal year 2013 inventory review certification letters. However, this guidance did not provide any direction to the components on how to apply the statutes definition of staff augmentation or the data that should be used to measure compliance with the requirement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives for this review were to determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the requirements of section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to (1) limit its service contract spending, (2) reduce funding for closely associated with inherently governmental functions by 10 percent each year, and (3) reduce funding for staff augmentation contracts by 10 percent each year. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, DOD reported spending more than $170 billion on contract services—contractors performing functions such as information technology support or maintenance of military equipment—constituting more than half of DOD's total acquisition spending. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, section 808, limited DOD's contract services spending for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and required reductions in select contract services. Subsequent revisions to the NDAA extended the spending limits through fiscal year 2014.
Congress requested and mandated GAO to review DOD's implementation of the required reductions. This report addresses the extent to which DOD implemented, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013: (1) contract services spending limits, (2) 10 percent funding reductions for closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and (3) 10 percent funding reductions for staff augmentation contracts. GAO reviewed relevant guidance; analyzed DOD financial, inventory, and other contract services data; and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) exceeded its identified limit on contract services by $1.72 billion in 2012 and spent $500 million less than the limit in 2013. GAO found that all military departments exceeded their Comptroller-provided spending targets in fiscal year 2012 due to late guidance. In fiscal year 2013, some components improved planning and implemented stronger fiscal controls over contract services, such as monitoring spending during the year, helping DOD meet its limit for fiscal year 2013. However, the Army exceeded its spending target in 2013 due to inaccurate budget estimates and weaknesses in planning by not soliciting inputs on commands' contract services spending plans.
Federal internal control standards call for effective control activities that enforce guidance to help ensure stewardship of government resources. Improved planning and consistent implementation of fiscal controls across the department could better position DOD to manage contract services spending.
Comparable and timely data are not available to determine if DOD implemented the mandated funding reductions for contracts with closely associated with inherently governmental functions—those that put the government at risk of contractors inappropriately influencing government decisions. DOD's guidance calls for reliance on data from the annual inventory of contracted services—an identification of the number of contractors and associated costs for services provided to DOD—to measure required reductions; however, these data did not include the obligation data needed to measure funding reductions in closely associated with inherently governmental functions. DOD updated its inventory guidance in 2013 to collect such information, but these data will not be comparable to previous years due to changes in methodology and will not be available until fiscal year 2015, after the statutory requirement has expired.
Similarly, data are not available to determine if DOD met the required funding reductions for staff augmentation contracts—contractors under the direction of a government official. DOD's guidance did not establish a baseline for staff augmentation or identify the data that should be used to determine if the reductions were achieved. DOD issued supplemental guidance in May 2014 instructing components to report in October 2014 on steps taken to implement these reductions. However, the current statutory requirement expired in September 2014.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider extending the time period for DOD's implementation of funding reductions in select contract functions. Further, GAO recommends that DOD improve planning and consistently implement fiscal controls to better manage contract services, among other actions. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1229T | gao_GAO-07-1229T_0 | Health Effects
Numerous studies have documented the physical and mental health effects of the WTC attacks. WTC Federal Responder Screening Program Has Had Difficulties Ensuring the Availability of Screening Services, and NIOSH Was Considering Expanding the Program to Include Monitoring
HHS’s WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has had difficulties ensuring the uninterrupted availability of services for federal responders. After resuming screening examinations in December 2005 and conducting them for about a year, HHS again placed the program on hold and suspended scheduling of screening examinations for responders from January 2007 to May 2007. This interruption in service occurred because there was a change in the administration of the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, and certain interagency agreements were not established in time to keep the program fully operational. However, the program stopped scheduling and paying for these specialty diagnostic services in April 2006 because the program’s contract with a new provider network did not cover these services. If federal responders do not receive this type of monitoring, health conditions that arise later may not be diagnosed and treated, and knowledge of the health effects of the WTC disaster may be incomplete. NIOSH Has Not Ensured the Availability of Services for Nonfederal Responders Residing outside the NYC Metropolitan Area
NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. AOEC experienced challenges in providing these screening services. Mount Sinai’s subcontract with AOEC ended in July 2004, and from August 2004 until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund any organization to provide services to nonfederal responders outside the NYC metropolitan area. In June 2005, NIOSH began its second effort by awarding $776,000 to the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide both screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. DCC, however, had difficulty establishing a network of providers that could serve nonfederal responders residing throughout the country—ultimately contracting with only 10 clinics in seven states to provide screening and monitoring services. NIOSH Awarded Funding for Treatment Services to Four WTC Health Programs
In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded and set aside funds totaling $51 million from its $75 million appropriation for four WTC health programs in the NYC metropolitan area to provide treatment services to responders enrolled in these programs. In addition to the $44 million it awarded for outpatient services, NIOSH set aside about $7 million for the FDNY WTC program and NY/NJ WTC Consortium to pay for responders’ WTC-related inpatient hospital care as needed. NIOSH, the administrator of the program, has been considering expanding the program to include monitoring but has not done so. Therefore we recommended in July 2007 that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the attack on the WTC, regardless of who their employer was or where they reside. As of early September 2007 the department has not responded to this recommendation. Appendix I: Abbreviations
Related GAO Products
September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders. GAO-07-892. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2007. September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
Six years after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), concerns persist about health effects experienced by WTC responders and the availability of health care services for those affected. Several federally funded programs provide screening, monitoring, or treatment services to responders. GAO has previously reported on the progress made and implementation problems faced by these WTC health programs. This testimony is based on and updates GAO's report, September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders ( GAO-07-892 , July 23, 2007). In this testimony, GAO discusses the status of (1) services provided by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, (2) efforts by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to provide services for nonfederal responders residing outside the New York City (NYC) area, and (3) NIOSH's awards to WTC health program grantees for treatment services. For the July 2007 report, GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed HHS officials, grantees, and others. In August and September 2007, GAO updated selected information in preparing this testimony.
What GAO Found
In July 2007, following a re-examination of the status of the WTC health programs, GAO recommended that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the WTC attack, regardless of who their employer was or where they reside. As of early September 2007 the department has not responded to this recommendation. As GAO reported in July 2007, HHS's WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has had difficulties ensuring the uninterrupted availability of screening services for federal responders. From January 2007 to May 2007, the program stopped scheduling screening examinations because there was a change in the program's administration and certain interagency agreements were not established in time to keep the program fully operational. From April 2006 to March 2007, the program stopped scheduling and paying for specialty diagnostic services associated with screening. NIOSH, the administrator of the program, has been considering expanding the program to include monitoring, that is, follow-up physical and mental health examinations, but has not done so. If federal responders do not receive monitoring, health conditions that arise later may not be diagnosed and treated, and knowledge of the health effects of the WTC disaster may be incomplete. NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. In late 2002, NIOSH arranged for a network of occupational health clinics to provide screening services. This effort ended in July 2004, and until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund screening or monitoring services for nonfederal responders outside the NYC area. In June 2005, NIOSH funded the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide screening and monitoring services; however, DCC had difficulty establishing a nationwide network of providers and contracted with only 10 clinics in seven states. In 2006, NIOSH began to explore other options for providing these services, and in May 2007 it took steps toward expanding the provider network. NIOSH has awarded treatment funds to four WTC health programs in the NYC area. In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded $44 million for outpatient treatment and set aside $7 million for hospital care. The New York/New Jersey WTC Consortium and the New York City Fire Department WTC program, which received the largest awards, used NIOSH's funding to continue outpatient services, offer full coverage for prescriptions, and cover hospital care. |
gao_GAO-04-371 | gao_GAO-04-371_0 | 1). An SAO based on sensitive technology transfer concerns is known as a Visas Mantis and, according to State officials, is the most common type of SAO applied to science applicants. Length of Time to Adjudicate Visas Is Unknown; Security Check Is Major Contributing Factor
The length of time for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa is not known, but a key factor in the time frame can be attributed to whether an applicant must undergo a Visas Mantis check. Since State could provide information on individual cases, we conducted our own sample of Visas Mantis cases that we obtained from State for the period between April and June 2003 and found that for these applicants, it took an average of 67 days for the security check to be processed and for State to notify the post of the results. In addition, officials at posts we visited told us they were unsure whether they were adding to the lengthy waits by not having clear guidance on when to apply the Visas Mantis process and not receiving feedback on the amount of information they provided in their Visas Mantis requests. Of these cases, about 28 percent had been pending more than 60 days. Post Officials Seek Clearer Guidance and Feedback on Visas Mantis Cases to Expedite Process
During our fieldwork, some consular officials expressed concern that they could be contributing to the time it takes to process Visas Mantis requests because they lacked clear guidance on determining Visas Mantis cases and feedback on whether they were applying checks appropriately and providing enough data in their Visas Mantis requests. Wait for an Interview Can Add Significant Time
In addition to the time needed for Visas Mantis checks, another contributing factor in the length of time it takes to adjudicate a visa is how long an applicant must wait to get an interview appointment at post. State does not have data or criteria for the length of time applicants at its overseas posts wait for an interview, but at the posts we visited in September 2003, we found that it generally took 2 to 3 weeks. Officials from State’s Consular Affairs and the FBI told us they are coordinating efforts to identify and resolve outstanding Visas Mantis cases. However, challenges remain. FBI officials told us that the name check component of the FBI’s system would not immediately be interoperable with State’s new system, but that they are actively working with State to seek solutions to this problem. We were not able to assess the new system since it was not yet functioning at the time of our review. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help improve the process and reduce the length of time it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa, we are recommending that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a plan to improve the Visas Mantis process. The Federal Bureau of Investigation did not comment on our recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine (1) how long it takes a science student or scholar from another country to obtain a visa and the factors that contribute to the length of time and (2) what measures are under way to improve the visa issuance process and decrease the number of pending cases, we collected data from agencies in Washington, as well as at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas, and conducted interviews with agency officials. We conducted fieldwork at seven visa-issuing posts in three countries— China, India, and Russia. We chose these countries because they are leading places of origin for international science students and scholars visiting the United States. We modified the draft to reflect that State Department data are not available on how long it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year thousands of international science students and scholars apply for visas to enter the United States to participate in education and exchange programs. They offer our country diversity and intellectual knowledge and are an economic resource. At the same time, the United States has important national security interests in screening these individuals when they apply for a visa. At a hearing held by the House Committee on Science on March 26, 2003, witnesses raised concern about the length of time it takes for science students and scholars to obtain a visa and about losing top international students to other countries due to delays in the visa process. GAO reviewed 1) how long it takes a science student or scholar from another country to obtain a visa and the factors contributing to the length of time, and 2) what measures are under way to improve the process and decrease the number of pending cases.
What GAO Found
State Department (State) data are not available on how long it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. While State has not set specific criteria or time frames for how long the visa process should take, its goal is to adjudicate visas as quickly as possible, consistent with immigration laws and homeland security objectives. During this review, GAO found that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa depends largely on whether an applicant must undergo a security check known as Visas Mantis, which is designed to protect against sensitive technology transfers. Based on a random sample of Visas Mantis cases for science students and scholars sent from posts between April and June 2003, GAO found it took an average of 67 days for the security check to be processed and for State to notify the post. In addition, GAO's visits to posts in China, India, and Russia in September 2003 showed that many Visas Mantis cases had been pending 60 days or more. GAO also found that the way in which Visas Mantis information was disseminated at headquarters made it difficult to resolve some of these cases expeditiously. Furthermore, consular staff at posts GAO visited said they were unsure whether they were contributing to lengthy waits because they lacked clear guidance on when to apply Visas Mantis checks and did not receive feedback on whether they were providing enough information in their Visas Mantis requests. Another factor that may effect the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars is the wait for an interview. The wait time at posts GAO visited was generally 2 to 3 weeks but could be longer depending on the time of the year. While State and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials acknowledged there have been lengthy waits, they report having measures under way that they believe will improve the process and that they are collaborating to identify and resolve outstanding Visas Mantis cases. In addition, State officials told GAO they have invested about $1 million to upgrade the technology for sending Visas Mantis requests. According to State officials, the new system will help to reduce the time it takes to process Visas Mantis cases. But despite State's plans to improve the Visas Mantis process, challenges remain. For example, the FBI's systems will not immediately be interoperable with State's. GAO was unable to assess State's new system since it was not yet functioning at the time of the review. |
gao_GAO-13-538SP | gao_GAO-13-538SP_0 | Help America Vote Act of 2002
HAVA, which contains a number of provisions to help increase voting accessibility for people with disabilities, establishes the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and grants the Attorney General enforcement authority. To satisfy this requirement, each polling place must have at least one direct recording electronic or other voting system equipped for people with disabilities. Characteristics of Long- term Care Facility Residents
As the proportion of older Americans in the country increases, the number of voters residing in long-term care facilities who may face challenges voting at polling places on Election Day due to their physical and mental condition could also increase. The Proportion of Polling Places Without Potential Impediments Increased Between the 2000 and 2008 Elections
In comparison to our findings in 2000, the proportion of polling places with no potential impediments increased in 2008. In 2008, we estimated that 27 percent of polling places had no potential impediments in the path from the parking area to the voting area—up from 16 percent in 2000. Specifically, polling places with four or more potential impediments decreased significantly—from 29 percent in 2000 to 16 percent in 2008 (see fig. 1). Figure 2 shows some key polling place features that we examined in our 2008 review of polling places. We did not assess polling places’ legal compliance with HAVA accessible voting system requirements. Justice Assessed States’ Implementation of HAVA Requirements for the 2006 Deadline, but Its Oversight Had Some Gaps
Justice’s Outreach, Guidance, and Oversight
From shortly after the passage of HAVA until 2006, Justice officials provided educational outreach and guidance on polling place accessibility and conducted an initial assessment of states’ compliance with HAVA’s January 2006 deadline for accessible voting systems.guidance on the new HAVA voting system requirements while the EAC Justice provided was being formed. For example, Justice supervised polling place observations for federal elections on Election Day 2008, primarily to assess compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. However, Justice did not systematically assess the physical accessibility of the polling places or the level of privacy and independence provided to people with disabilities by the accessible voting system, which limited the department’s ability to identify potential accessibility issues facing voters with disabilities. In addition, Justice initiated a small number of annual community assessments—called Civic Access assessments—of ADA compliance in public buildings, including buildings designated as polling places, but these assessments included a small portion of polling places nationwide and were generally not conducted on Election Day. Between 2000 and 2008, Justice entered into 69 Civic Access settlement agreements containing one or more recommendations aimed at polling place provisions, but given the small number of Civic Access assessments conducted annually, they did not provide a national perspective on polling place accessibility. In addition, since these assessments were not conducted during elections, they did not assess any special features of voting areas and accessible voting systems that are set up only on Election Day. Implementation of Recommended Monitoring and Oversight Would Reduce Potential Voting Impediments and Other Challenges
In our 2009 report on polling place accessibility, we recommended that the Department of Justice look for opportunities to expand its monitoring and oversight of the accessibility of polling places for people with disabilities in a cost-effective manner. This effort might include: working with states to use existing state oversight mechanisms and using other resources, such as organizations representing election officials and disability advocacy organizations, to help assess and monitor states’ progress in ensuring polling place accessibility, similar to the effort used to determine state compliance with HAVA voting system requirements by the 2006 deadline; expanding the scope of Election Day observations to include an assessment of the physical access to the voting area and the level of privacy and independence being offered to voters with disabilities by accessible voting systems; and expanding the Americans with Disabilities Act: ADA Checklist of Polling Places to include additional information on the accessibility of the voting area and guidance on the configuration of the accessible voting system to provide voters with disabilities with the same level of privacy and independence as is afforded to other voters. Justice generally agreed with this recommendation in commenting on the draft report, and when we reached out for an update in preparation of this testimony, indicated it has taken steps towards addressing the recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Voting is fundamental to our democracy and federal law generally requires polling places to be accessible to all eligible voters, including those with disabilities and the elderly. However during the 2000 federal election, GAO found that only 16 percent of polling places had no potential impediments to voting access for people with disabilities. To address these and other issues, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which required each polling place to have an accessible voting system by 2006. Congress asked GAO to reassess voting access on Election Day 2008, and also to study voter accessibility at long-term care facilities.
This statement focuses on (1) progress made from 2000 to 2008 to improve voter accessibility in polling places, including relevancy to long-term care facilities and (2) steps the Department of Justice (Justice) has taken to enforce HAVA voting access provisions.
To prepare this statement, GAO relied primarily on its prior products on polling place accessibility ( GAO-09-941 ) and voting in long-term care facilities ( GAO-10-6 ).
What GAO Found
Compared to 2000, the proportion of polling places in 2008 without potential impediments increased and almost all polling places had an accessible voting system as states and localities made various efforts to help facilitate accessible voting. In 2008, based upon GAO's survey of polling places, GAO estimated that 27 percent of polling places had no potential impediments in the path from the parking to the voting area--up from16 percent in 2000; 45 percent had potential impediments but offered curbside voting; and the remaining 27 percent had potential impediments and did not offer curbside voting. All but one polling place GAO visited had an accessible voting system--typically, an electronic machine in a voting station--to facilitate private and independent voting for people with disabilities. However, 46 percent of polling places had an accessible voting system that could pose a challenge to certain voters with disabilities, such as voting stations that were not arranged to accommodate voters using wheelchairs. In GAO's 2008 state survey, 43 states reported that they set accessibility standards for polling places, up from 23 states in 2000. Further, 31 states reported that ensuring polling place accessibility was challenging. Localities GAO surveyed in 2008 reported providing voting services directly to long-term care facility residents who may face challenges voting in a polling place. For example, close to one-third of localities GAO surveyed reported designating long-term care facilities as Election Day polling places.
From shortly after the passage of HAVA until 2006, Justice provided guidance on polling place accessibility and conducted an initial assessment of states' compliance with HAVA's January 2006 deadline for accessible voting systems. After implementation of HAVA, Justice's oversight of HAVA's access requirements was part of two other enforcement efforts, but gaps remained. While Justice provided guidance on polling place accessibility, this guidance did not address accessibility of the voting area itself. In 2009, Justice conducted polling place observations for federal elections that identified whether accessible voting systems were in place, but it did not systematically assess the physical accessibility of polling places or the level of privacy and independence provided to voters with disabilities. Justice also conducted a small number of annual community assessments of Americans with Disabilities Act compliance of public buildings, which included buildings designated as polling places. However, these assessments did not provide a national perspective on polling place accessibility or assess any special features of the voting area and the accessible voting system that are set up only on Election Day.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that Justice expand its monitoring and oversight of polling place accessibility. Justice generally agreed with our recommendation and has reported taking some steps towards addressing it, such as expanding Election Day observations to include an assessment of physical accessibility. |
gao_GAO-12-764 | gao_GAO-12-764_0 | An individual is eligible to receive DI benefits if he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that (1) has lasted (or is expected to last) at least 1 year or is expected to result in death and (2) prevents the individual from engaging in SGA. SGA is defined as work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities performed for pay or profit. The amount of earnings that generally demonstrates SGA can vary from year to year. As directed by federal law, SSA must reduce DI benefits for individuals receiving certain other government disability benefits, such as worker’s compensation. Concurrent DI and UI Payments Resulted in Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Overlapping Benefit Payments
In fiscal year 2010, 117,000 individuals received concurrent cash benefit payments of more than $850 million. As shown in figure 2, these individuals represented less than 1 percent of the total beneficiaries of both programs. However, estimated overlapping cash benefits paid to these individuals totaled over $281 million from the DI program and more than $575 million from the UI program. As mentioned, SSA’s definition of a disability involves work that does not rise to the level of SGA. For 2010, a non-blind person who is earning more than a $1,000 a month is ordinarily considered to be engaging in SGA. In contrast, states’ determination of “able and available for work” criteria for UI benefits may include performing work that does not rise to the level of SGA. As a result, some individuals may have a disability under federal law but still be able and available for work under state law, thus eligible to receive DI and UI concurrently. Because these overlapping payments may be allowed under both programs’ eligibility requirements, and no federal law authorizes an automatic reduction or elimination of benefits if a recipient receives both payments, neither SSA nor DOL have any processes to identify these overlapping payments. While the DI and UI programs generally serve separate populations and provide separate services—thus not meeting our definition for overlapping programs—the concurrent cash benefit payments made to individuals eligible for both programs are an overlapping service for the replacement of their lost earnings. Although current program rules allow overlapping benefits under certain circumstances, concurrent receipt of DI and UI benefits can also be an indicator of improper payments. earnings may be related to work that makes this individual ineligible for UI benefits. Six of the individuals we selected for further investigation received overlapping DI and UI benefits for 18 months or more. However, both trust funds face serious fiscal sustainability challenges, prompting the need to examine opportunities for potential cost savings. Reducing or eliminating this overlap and potential improper payments could offer substantial savings, though actual savings are difficult to estimate because the potential costs of establishing mechanisms to do so are not readily available. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor work with the Commissioner of SSA to (1) evaluate the circumstances under which individuals are receiving overlapping DI and UI payments, taking appropriate action, as necessary, for any payments determined to be improper, and (2) assess whether cost savings or other benefits might be achieved by reducing or eliminating overlapping DI and UI cash benefit payments being made within the existing laws and regulations, seeking congressional authority to do so as appropriate. DOL and SSA agreed with our recommendation that DOL work with SSA to evaluate overlapping DI and UI benefits, taking appropriate action for any payments determined to be improper, and assessing whether cost savings or other benefits might be achieved by reducing or eliminating overlapping DI and UI cash benefit payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DI and UI trust funds face serious fiscal sustainability challenges. In addition to other services, both programs provide cash benefits to their targeted populations to replace lost earnings. DI is available to workers who are unable to engage in SGA because of physical or mental impairments expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. SGA is defined as work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities performed for pay or profit. UI provides temporary cash benefits to eligible workers who are able to work but remain involuntarily unemployed.
GAO was asked to determine the extent to which individuals received DI and UI benefits concurrently. To do so, GAO matched unemployment files with SSA disability files for fiscal year 2010. GAO also reviewed DI and UI case files for a nongeneralizable selection of 8 individuals 4 from the top 50 recipients of concurrent DI and UI benefits in fiscal year 2010, and 4 who received UI benefits based on wages from multiple states. These examples cannot be generalized beyond those presented.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2010, 117,000 individuals received concurrent cash benefit payments from the Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs of more than $850 million, which is allowable in certain circumstances under current program authority. While these individuals represented less than 1 percent of the total beneficiaries of both programs, the cash benefits they received totaled over $281 million from DI and more than $575 million from UI. One individual GAO selected for further investigation received over $62,000 in overlapping benefits in a year. Based on GAO inquiries, state UI officials are reviewing the persons UI eligibility because of earnings that may be related to work that makes the person ineligible for UI benefits.
Under certain circumstances, individuals may be eligible for concurrent cash benefit payments due to differences in DI and UI eligibility requirements. Specifically, the Social Security Administrations (SSA) definition of a disability involves work that does not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity (SGA). In 2010, a monthly income of $1,000 or more for a non-blind beneficiary generally demonstrated SGA. In contrast, the Department of Labor allows states determination of able and available for work eligibility criteria for UI benefits to include work that does not rise to the level of SGA. Therefore, some individuals may have a disability under federal law but still be eligible for UI under state law because they are able and available for work that does not rise to the level of SGA. Although DI and UI generally provide separate services to separate populationsand thus are not overlapping programsthe concurrent cash benefit payments for individuals eligible for both programs are an overlapping benefit when both replace lost earnings. While SSA must reduce DI benefits for individuals receiving certain other government disability benefits, such as workers compensation, no federal law authorizes an automatic reduction or elimination of overlapping DI and UI benefits. As a result, neither SSA nor DOL has any processes to identify these overlapping payments. Reducing or eliminating overlapping or improper payments could offer substantial savings, though actual savings are difficult to estimate because the potential costs of establishing mechanisms to do so are not readily available.
What GAO Recommends
DOL should work with SSA to (1) evaluate overlapping DI and UI cash benefit payments, taking appropriate action for any improper payments, and (2) assess whether cost savings or other benefits might be achieved by reducing or eliminating overlapping DI and UI cash benefit payments being made within the existing laws and regulations, seeking congressional authority to do so as appropriate. DOL and SSA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-96-123 | gao_T-GGD-96-123_0 | Progress in Achieving IRS’ Business Vision
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to assist you in your continuing review of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Tax Systems Modernization (TSM). In March 1996, we appeared before this Committee to discuss the managerial and technical weaknesses of TSM. Today, our testimony focuses on IRS’ progress in achieving important programmatic aspects of its business vision for 2001 and how TSM supports that vision. While IRS predicted that it would need many fewer staff to maintain existing work levels, it anticipated investing the staff savings made available from TSM back into its customer service and enforcement programs. IRS planned to implement this system at all 10 service centers. Return-Free Filing
As part of its vision for 2001, IRS planned to provide a return-free filing capability for a limited number of taxpayers by 2001. IRS Lacks a Cost-Effective Strategy for Obtaining the Taxpayer Data That May Be Needed for Customer Service and Compliance
Our message regarding IRS’ progress in achieving its business vision for processing tax returns is really no different than it was in 1992—IRS’ strategy for returns processing needs to be based on a clear definition of its downstream business requirements for customer service and compliance and an analysis of the cost and benefits of providing those requirements under some of the different scenarios that IRS is currently considering as a part of its reengineering effort. Until such an analysis is completed, IRS has no assurance that its technology investments for submission processing are sound. Improving Information Systems
In addition to organizational and work process changes, IRS’ customer service vision depends on increasing the use of and implementing new information systems. Managerial, Technical, and Human Resource Challenges Remain
IRS’ strategy for improving customer service offers promise as it is designed to improve taxpayers’ ability to get assistance from IRS and provide IRS employees access to the information they need to help taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) progress in achieving its business vision for 2001 and how its Tax Systems Modernization (TSM) supports that vision.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as part of its business vision, IRS will increase the number of returns it receives electronically, consolidate its paper processing operations, and provide return-free filing; (2) without a returns processing strategy based on its customer service and compliance needs and a cost analysis, IRS has no assurance that its TSM investments are sound; (3) IRS plans to improve customer service by reorganizing its customer service centers according to the work performed, expanding and simplifying telephone interaction with customers, and using information systems to provide the information IRS employees need to assist customers; (4) while IRS customer service improvements appear promising, IRS must continue to handle its current workload through the conversion, train its customer service employees, and develop the necessary information systems; (5) IRS plans to improve enforcement and voluntary compliance; (6) while access to good data and more staff could improve enforcement and voluntary compliance, IRS does not plan to use its savings from TSM to hire more employees; and (7) managerial and technical weaknesses could jeopardize TSM investments. |
gao_GAO-10-960 | gao_GAO-10-960_0 | Background
FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of food and medical products marketed in the United States. To enhance FDA’s activities in this regard, the centers and ORA also engage with foreign regulators and industry through a variety of activities, such as conducting and attending training workshops. The stated mission of the offices is to engage with foreign stakeholders to develop information that FDA officials can use to make better decisions about products manufactured in foreign countries for the U.S. market. In China and India, FDA also placed investigators, who conduct inspections. FDA staff agreed to be posted overseas for an initial 2-year rotation. In a February 2010 report, we noted that FDA was not fully utilizing practices for effective strategic and workforce planning. FDA’s Overseas Offices Have Taken Steps to Assist Regulatory Oversight, but Challenges Could Limit Their Effectiveness
FDA’s overseas offices are establishing relationships with foreign stakeholders and U.S. federal agencies located overseas, gathering information to assist regulatory decision making, conducting establishment inspections, and providing capacity building to foreign stakeholders in an effort to help ensure the safety of imported products. FDA officials said that prior to the opening of the overseas offices, the agency had little knowledge of the regulatory structures in some countries with which the overseas offices interact or lacked points of contact with some of their regulatory counterparts. Some of these officials also told us that they have not been able to develop relationships with foreign stakeholders to the same extent as their colleagues in the overseas offices. Because of this, officials from other U.S. agencies located in these countries said that FDA will probably have to establish relationships with multiple layers of government officials. FDA officials said that they plan to obtain feedback on these documents from centers and offices once they are complete. Officials from the India, China, Latin America, and Middle East Offices have engaged in activities related to helping countries develop their regulatory systems. FDA Is in the Early Stages of Long-Term Strategic Planning and Has Not Developed a Long- Term Workforce Plan for the Overseas Offices
FDA planning for the overseas offices initially focused on guiding early activities and the agency is now developing a 5-year strategic plan, which it expects to complete by October 2010. FDA has not yet developed a long- term workforce plan to help ensure that it is prepared to address potential recruitment and retention challenges. FDA Has Not Developed a Strategic Workforce Plan to Prepare for Potential Staffing Challenges for Its Overseas Offices
FDA has not yet developed a long-term workforce plan to ensure that future overseas office staffing needs are met. FDA staff and staff from other federal agencies with overseas staff have identified potential challenges associated with staffing overseas offices that could impact recruitment and retention. Although it is still early and the impact of the overseas offices on the safety of imported products is not yet clear, overseas FDA staff, domestic FDA staff, and foreign stakeholders have pointed to several immediate benefits. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that FDA’s overseas offices are able to fully meet their mission of helping to ensure the safety of imported products, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following two actions: Ensure, as it completes its strategic planning process for the overseas offices, that it develops a set of performance goals and measures that can be used to demonstrate overseas office contributions to long-term outcomes related to the regulation of imported products and that overseas office activities are coordinated with the centers and ORA. Develop a strategic workforce plan for the overseas offices to help ensure that the agency is able to recruit and retain staff with the experience and skills necessary for the overseas offices and to reintegrate returning overseas staff into FDA’s domestic operations. Food and Drug Administration: Opportunities Exist to Better Address Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
An increasing volume of food and medical products marketed in the United States are produced in foreign countries. This globalization has challenged the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for ensuring the safety of these products. In late 2008 and early 2009, FDA established overseas offices comprised of 42 total staff covering particular countries or regions--China, Europe, India, Latin America, and the Middle East. The offices are to engage with foreign stakeholders to develop information that FDA officials can use to make better decisions about products manufactured in foreign countries, among other activities. GAO examined (1) the steps overseas offices have taken to help ensure the safety of imported products and (2) the extent to which FDA has engaged in long-term strategic and workforce planning for the overseas offices. GAO reviewed documentation of overseas office activities and planning. GAO also visited offices in China, India, and Latin America to interview FDA officials, officials from other U.S. agencies overseas, and foreign regulators and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
FDA's overseas offices have engaged in a variety of activities to help ensure the safety of imported products, but officials report challenges that could limit their effectiveness, due to an increasing workload and other factors. A primary activity for the offices has been establishing relationships with foreign stakeholders (such as foreign regulators and industry) and U.S. agencies overseas. FDA officials and foreign stakeholders said they had limited contact prior to the opening of the offices, and each noted that the overseas offices are beneficial for relationship building, although relationship building can be time consuming. FDA overseas officials have also gathered information about regulated products and shared it with U.S. officials to assist with decision making. Although FDA has used some of this information to take regulatory actions, some FDA overseas officials told us that they lack feedback regarding the utility of much of the information that they submit to the agency. FDA's offices in China and India include investigators who inspect foreign establishments. In these two countries, as of June 2010, the overseas investigators conducted 48 inspections since they were posted overseas. The FDA overseas officials have also started to provide training, responses to queries, and other assistance to foreign stakeholders to help them improve their regulatory systems and better understand FDA regulations. These officials said, however, that an increasing interest in this type of assistance from foreign stakeholders, while important, could lead to an unmanageable workload. Although FDA staff and others have pointed to several immediate benefits of the offices, it is early and their impact on the safety of imported products is not yet clear. FDA is in the process of long-term strategic planning for the overseas offices and has not developed a long-term workforce plan. FDA expects to complete a 5-year strategic plan to manage office activities by October 2010. Officials said that they intend to include performance goals and measures for the offices in the strategic plan, but that it will be difficult to quantify office contributions toward long-term outcomes. Also, coordination of the overseas offices with other parts of FDA has been a challenge, and strategic planning efforts can help ensure this coordination. FDA has not yet developed a long-term workforce plan to help ensure that it is prepared to address potential overseas office staffing challenges. Overseas staff agree to 2-year rotations, and workforce planning has focused on preparing to fill any 2011 vacancies. FDA has experienced challenges staffing some office locations and officials from FDA and other agencies with overseas staff have identified potential recruitment and retention challenges that could affect FDA's mission. They said that recruiting staff with language skills and reintegrating returning staff into domestic operations may be difficult. Certain FDA staff experienced a reduction in their pay when they went overseas. Workforce planning could help FDA prepare for potential staffing challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of FDA take steps to enhance strategic planning to ensure coordination between overseas and domestic activities and develop a workforce plan to help recruit and retain overseas staff. FDA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-262 | gao_GAO-14-262_0 | After school districts certify household eligibility for school-meals program benefits, they must annually verify a sample of household applications approved for free or reduced-price school-meals benefits to determine whether the household has been certified to receive the correct level of benefits—we refer to this process as “standard verification.” As dictated by statute, school districts are required to verify a random sample of applicants. USDA Has Taken Steps to Help Identify and Prevent Ineligible Participants from Receiving Benefits
USDA Has Increased the Use of Direct Certification
To address the high improper-payment rates in the school-meals programs, among other actions, USDA worked with Congress to develop the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 (CNR).required school districts to directly certify students that receive SNAP benefits for free meals in all school districts by the 2008-2009 school year. Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 increased the frequency of these reviews from every 5 years to every 3 years. § 210.18, Prior to the 2013-2014 school year, these reviews were referred to as Coordinated Review Efforts. Administrative review reports from 11 school districts cited some incorrect eligibility determinations. In February 2012, USDA distributed guidance to state administrators to clarify that school districts have the authority to review approved applications for free or reduced-price meals for school-district employees when known or available information indicates school-district employees may have misrepresented their incomes on their applications. Standard Verification Limited to Small Portion of Beneficiaries
As described earlier in this report, with the exception of for-cause verification, standard verification is generally limited to approved applications considered “error-prone.” Error-prone is statutorily defined as approved applications where stated income is within $100 of the monthly or $1,200 of the annual applicable income-eligibility guideline. For fiscal year 2013, USDA reported NSLP and SBP certification errors of approximately 8.8 percent and 9.5 percent as part of its improper payment estimation. However, our review of a nongeneralizable sample of 25 households found 9 applications that were ineligible for benefits, 7 of which would have been excluded from standard verification. Expanded Verification of Applications That Indicate Categorical Eligibility Could Enhance Program Integrity
We found that ineligible households may be receiving free school-meals benefits by submitting applications that falsely state that a household member is categorically eligible for the program due to participating in certain public-assistance programs—such as SNAP or TANF—or meeting an approved designation—such as foster child or homeless. For example, USDA could have school districts select a sample of applications indicating categorical eligibility and verify the information with the appropriate agency. Develop and assess a pilot program to explore the feasibility of computer matching school meal participants with other sources of household income, such as state income databases, to identify potentially ineligible households—those with income exceeding program-eligibility thresholds—for verification. Explore the feasibility of verifying the eligibility of a sample of applications that indicate categorical eligibility for program benefits and are thus not subject to standard verification. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) what steps, if any, has the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) taken to help identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving benefits in school-meals programs, and (2) what opportunities, if any, exist to strengthen USDA’s oversight of the school-meals programs? To do this, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 48 households participating in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) for further review and investigation. We used federal-employee payroll data to develop case studies due to the unavailability of other data sources containing salary information for nonfederal employees. For the 25 households that submitted a school-meals application, we requested and reviewed the available applications from the 2010-2011 school year to see what the applicant listed as his or her household income and household size. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, over 31.6 million children participated in USDA's National School Lunch Program (NSLP) at a cost of about $11.6 billion. In fiscal year 2013, USDA estimated NSLP certification errors of more than 8 percent, or $996 million. GAO was asked to review possible beneficiary fraud within the program.
This report assesses (1) steps taken to help identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving benefits in school-meal programs and (2) what opportunities exist to strengthen USDA's oversight of the school-meals programs.
GAO reviewed NSLP policies, interviewed program officials, and randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample that included 25 of 7.7 million approved household applications from 25 of 1,520 school districts in the Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D.C., regions. GAO performed limited eligibility testing using civilian federal-employee payroll data from 2010 through 2013 due to the unavailability of other data sources containing nonfederal employee income. GAO also conducted interviews with households. Ineligible households were referred to the Inspector General.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken several steps to implement or enhance controls to identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving school-meals benefits. For example:
USDA worked with Congress to develop legislation to automatically enroll students who receive Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program benefits for free school meals; this program has a more-detailed certification process than the school-meals program.
Starting in the 2013-2014 school year, USDA increased the frequency with which state agencies complete administrative reviews of school districts from every 5 years to every 3 years. As part of this process, state agencies review applications to determine if eligibility determinations were correctly made.
In 2012, USDA issued guidance to clarify that school districts have the authority to verify approved applications for school-district employees when information indicates that the applicant misrepresented his or her income.
GAO identified opportunities to strengthen oversight of the school-meals programs while ensuring legitimate access, such as the following:
Exploring the feasibility of computer matching external income data, such as state payroll data, with participant information to identify households whose income exceeds eligibility thresholds for verification could help identify ineligible participants. Currently, school districts verify a sample of approved applications deemed “error-prone”—statutorily defined as those with reported income within $1,200 of the annual income levels specified in program- eligibility guidelines—to determine whether the household is receiving the correct level of benefits (referred to as standard verification in this report). In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications, GAO found that 9 of 19 households that self-reported household income and size information were ineligible and only 2 could have been subject to standard verification.
Verifying a sample of categorically eligible applications could help identify ineligible households. Currently, school-meal applicants who indicate categorical eligibility (by participating in certain public-assistance programs or meeting an approved designation, such as foster children) are eligible for free meals and are generally not subject to standard verification. In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications, 6 households indicated categorical eligibility, 2 of which were ineligible, and another may have been eligible for reduced-price meals instead of free school meals.
Results of GAO's Analysis of a Nongeneralizable Sample of 25 Approved Household Applications from the 2010-2011 School Year
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture develop a pilot program to explore the feasibility of using computer matching to identify households with income that exceeds program-eligibility thresholds for verification, and explore the feasibility of verifying a sample of categorically eligible households. USDA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-84 | gao_NSIAD-96-84_0 | Background
According to federal laws and Department of Defense (DOD) policy, servicemembers are entitled to permanent change-of-station (PCS) benefits—paid moving expenses—when assigned to a location for longer than 20 weeks. PCS Entitlements Are Provided by Law, and Few Opportunities Exist to Reduce Costs
The military services have limited control over the costs of relocating servicemembers because most relocation entitlements are provided in U.S. laws and DOD policies. Services Have Taken Steps to Reduce PCS Costs
The services acknowledge that limiting the frequency of PCS moves would reduce costs and improve the quality of life for servicemembers. Consequently, the services are reviewing and revising their PCS policies and practices. In some instances, changes have been made. The goal is to reduce the number of positions with maximum tour lengths. Only one of the alternatives studied reduced the number of PCS moves and saved costs. In commenting on a draft of this report, service officials agreed that some contracting is possible. Number of PCS Moves Declined With the Size of the Force, but Variations Exist by Category and Military Service
For fiscal years 1987 through 1995, total PCS moves declined with the size of the force and changes in U.S. overseas presence. Figure 1 shows that service end strengths declined from 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987 to 1.5 million in fiscal year 1995, while the number of PCS moves declined from 1,145,442 to 846,570. We stated that policies for relocating personnel returning from Europe and general downsizing created personnel imbalances at some U.S. military installations that needed to be corrected. When the cost data were adjusted for inflation, however, total costs decreased slightly and the cost per move still increased. Personnel officers in the other services noted that their services also experienced an increase in the number of servicemembers moving with dependents, but to a lesser degree than the Navy. PCS Moves Have Limited Impact on Unit Readiness
While personnel changes within a military unit (including PCS reassignments) influence that unit’s readiness, PCS moves are not a major contributor to readiness problems. A major cause of personnel turbulence in recent years has been deployments for operations other than war. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the services' practices for relocating personnel, focusing on whether: (1) opportunities exist to reduce the costs of permanent change-of-station (PCS) moves; (2) the number of moves and related costs have decreased in proportion to the reductions in military end stregnths; and (3) frequent reassignments significantly impair military readiness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) few opportunities exist to reduce PCS costs because federal laws entitle servicemembers to certain relocation benefits; (2) overseas commitments and other laws also require the services to move a large number of servicemembers each year; (3) despite these constraints, the services are taking steps to reduce the number of PCS moves and thereby reduce annual costs; (4) each service has already made at least one major assessment of its PCS policies and practicies and has changed some of them to create efficiencies; (5) to further reduce costs, the services are encouraging consecutive assignments in certain geographic locations and increasing tour lengths where possible; (6) according to an Octover 1995 Department of Defense (DOD) task force report, DOD could futher decrease its overseas military requirements and costs by hiring overseas contractors; (7) the number of relocations, but not their costs, decreased in proportion to the large reductions in military end strengths from fiscal year 1987 (the beginning of military downsizing) through fiscal year 1995; (8) some variation exists among categories of PCS moves and the military services, for example, PCS moves within the Unites States increased slightly in recent years because of turbulence caused by military downsizing and personnel returning from Europe; (9) the main reasons PCS costs did not decrease were inflation, changes in some entitlements, and an increase in the number of servicemembers with dependents; and (10) according to service officials, the frequency of PCS moves is only a minor contributor to readiness problems in military units and other factors, especially the increase in deployments for operations other than war, have a greater impact on readiness. |
gao_GAO-11-591T | gao_GAO-11-591T_0 | Selected VA Reprocessing Requirements Are Inadequate to Help Ensure Veterans’ Safety
We found that the VA reprocessing requirements we selected for review are inadequate to help ensure veterans’ safety. While VA requires VAMCs to develop device-specific training on reprocessing RME, VA headquarters officials provided VAMCs with conflicting guidance on how they should develop this training. VA’s lack of specificity and conflicting guidance regarding its requirement to develop device-specific training for reprocessing RME may have contributed to delays in developing this training at several of the VAMCs we visited. VA headquarters officials told us that they are aware of the lack of specificity and conflicting guidance provided to VAMCs regarding the development of training for reprocessing RME and were also aware of inefficiencies resulting from each VAMC developing its own training for reprocessing types of RME that are used in multiple VAMCs. The officials also told us that VA headquarters is planning to develop device-specific training available to all VAMCs for certain critical and semi-critical RME for which RME manufacturers have not developed this training, such as dental instruments. Despite Changes Intended to Improve VA’s Oversight of VAMCs’ Compliance with Selected Reprocessing Requirements, Weaknesses Continue to Exist
We found that VA recently made changes to its oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with selected reprocessing requirements; however, this oversight continues to have weaknesses. Prior to fiscal year 2011, VISNs were generally not required to report this information to VA headquarters. However, VA headquarters does not analyze information to identify the extent of noncompliance across all VAMCs, including noncompliance that occurs frequently or poses high risks to veterans’ safety. Similarly, because VA headquarters does not analyze information from VAMCs’ corrective action plans to address noncompliance with VA reprocessing requirements, it is unable to confirm, for example, whether VAMCs have addressed noncompliance with its operational reprocessing requirement to separate clean and dirty RME. VA headquarters officials told us that VA plans to address the weaknesses we identified in its oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with reprocessing requirements. In conclusion, weaknesses exist in VA’s policies for reprocessing RME that create potential safety risks to veterans. Moreover, weaknesses in oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with the selected reprocessing requirements do not allow VA to identify and address areas of noncompliance across VAMCs, including those that occur frequently, pose high risks to veterans’ safety, or have not been addressed by VAMCs. We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following actions: Develop and implement an approach for providing standardized training for reprocessing all critical and semi-critical RME to VAMCs. Use the information on noncompliance identified by the VISNs and information on VAMCs’ corrective action plans to identify areas of noncompliance across all 153 VAMCs, including those that occur frequently, pose high risks to veterans’ safety, or have not been addressed, and take action to improve compliance in those areas. In responding to a draft of the report from which this testimony is based, VA concurred with these recommendations. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses patient safety incidents at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers and potential strategies to address the underlying causes of those incidents. VA operates one of the largest integrated health care delivery systems in the United States, providing care to over 5.5 million veterans annually. Organized into 21 Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), VA's health care system includes 153 VA medical centers (VAMC) nationwide that offer a variety of outpatient, residential, and inpatient services. In providing health care services to veterans, clinicians at VAMCs use reusable medical equipment (RME), which is designed to be reused for multiple patients and includes such equipment as endoscopes and some surgical and dental instruments. Because RME is used when providing care to multiple veterans, this equipment must be reprocessed--that is, cleaned and disinfected or sterilized--between uses. VA has established requirements for VAMCs to follow when reprocessing RME, which are designed, in part, to help ensure the safety of the veterans who receive care at VAMCs. This testimony, based on our May 2011 report, which is being released today, examines issues related to veterans' safety, including (1) selected reprocessing requirements established in VA policies, based on their relevance to patient safety incidents and (2) VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with these selected requirements.
What GAO Found
In summary, we found that the VA reprocessing requirements we selected for review are inadequate to help ensure the safety of veterans who receive care at VAMCs. Although VA requires VAMCs to develop devicespecific training for staff on how to correctly reprocess RME, it has not specified the types of RME for which this training is required. Furthermore, VA has provided conflicting guidance to VAMCs on how to develop device-specific training on reprocessing RME. This lack of clarity may have contributed to delays in developing the required training. Without appropriate training on reprocessing, VAMC staff may not be reprocessing RME correctly, which poses potential risks to veterans' safety. VA headquarters officials told us that VA has plans to develop training for certain RME, but VA lacks a timeline for developing this training. We also found that despite changes to improve VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with selected reprocessing requirements, weaknesses still exist. These weaknesses render VA unable to systematically identify and address noncompliance with the requirements, which poses potential risks to the safety of veterans. Although VA headquarters receives information from the VISNs on any noncompliance they identify, as well as VAMCs' corrective action plans to address this noncompliance, VA headquarters does not analyze this information to inform its oversight. According to VA headquarters officials, VA intends to develop a plan for analyzing this information to systematically identify areas of noncompliance that occur frequently, pose high risks to veterans' safety, or have not been addressed across all VAMCs.
What GAO Recommends
To address the inadequacies we identified in selected VA reprocessing requirements, GAO recommends that VA develop and implement an approach for providing standardized training for reprocessing all critical and semi-critical RME to VAMCs and hold VAMCs accountable for implementing this training. To address the weaknesses in VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with selected requirements, GAO recommends that VA use information on noncompliance identified by the VISNs and information on VAMCs' corrective action plans to identify areas of noncompliance across all 153 VAMCs and take action to improve compliance in those areas. |
gao_NSIAD-98-91 | gao_NSIAD-98-91_0 | Background
Although there is no generally agreed upon definition of partnering, for purposes of this report, partnering arrangements include, but are not limited to (1) use of public sector facilities and employees to perform work or produce goods for the private sector; (2) private sector use of public depot equipment and facilities to perform work for either the public or private sector; and (3) work-sharing arrangements, using both public and private sector facilities and/or employees. In the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD states that it will use in-house facilities to partner with industry to preserve depot-level skills and use excess capacity. Statutory Authority Exists Under Which Partnering Can Occur
A number of statutory provisions enacted primarily during the 1990s provide, within limitations, the authority and framework for partnering. Central among these limitations is that any goods or services sold by the depots must not be available commercially. The Army has entered into partnering arrangements under the legislation covering sales of goods and services. The Army has designated which depots may sell articles and service outside of DOD and has issued specific implementing guidance. The Secretary of Defense has delegated to the Secretary of the Air Force the authority to designate which depots may sell articles and services outside of DOD. However, the Air Force Secretary has not made any such designations nor developed criteria to determine whether a good or service is available from a domestic commercial source. Air Force officials state that 10 U.S.C. 4543 and subcontracting under 10 U.S.C. Under this partnering arrangement, United Defense Limited Partnership contracted with the depot to perform grit blasting on the vehicle hulls and the depot provided use of its test track facilities pursuant to a subcontract with the contractor under 10 U.S.C. None of the Army’s partnering arrangements reviewed included the leasing of excess or nonexcess depot equipment or facilities as permitted under sections 2471 and 2667 of title 10. In April 1997, AFMC denied the request because it believed that it did not have the authority to enter into such a partnering arrangement since the Secretary of the Air Force had not designated any depots to enter into such arrangements nor issued implementing guidance to use in determining commercial availability. A legal framework and the authority to enter into partnering arrangements exist in title 10. The Air Force, on the other hand, has not initiated any partnering arrangements, citing the lack of a designation from the Secretary of the Air Force identifying which logistics centers may use the sales statutes and the legislative requirement that the good or service provided by the depot not be commercially available. We surveyed the services to determine what partnering arrangements were ongoing or had been proposed at their depots, and the services’ views of such arrangements. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the use of partnering arrangements between the Department of Defense (DOD) and private-sector contractors to use excess capacity at military service repair depots, focusing on the: (1) legal framework under which partnering can occur; and (2) types of current partnering arrangements and the services' and industry's views of such arrangements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a number of statutory provisions enacted primarily during the 1990s provide, under certain conditions, the authority and framework for partnering arrangements; (2) various provisions of title 10 of the United States Code allow the services to sell articles and services outside DOD for limited purposes and under certain conditions; (3) the Army has this authority for many of its industrial facilities under section 4543 of title 10; (4) the Army controls the sales authority under this provision; (5) the authority for the remaining DOD industrial facilities, including those of the Air Force, is contained in 10 U.S.C. 2553; (6) it requires the Secretary of Defense to designate which facilities will have the authority to sell articles and services outside of DOD; (7) under both provisions, the goods or services sold must not be available commercially in the United States and providing these goods and services must not interfere with a facility's military mission; (8) due in part to these differing authorities, the extent to which the Army and the Air Force pursue partnering arrangements varies; (9) the Army has designated depots that may sell articles and services outside of DOD and has developed criteria for determining when such goods and services are not commercially available; (10) at the time of GAO's review the Army had established 13 partnering arrangements using both the sales statutes in title 10 and worksharing arrangements not requiring specific legislation; (11) Army and private-sector officials state that partnering has improved operational efficiencies at their respective facilities and that they are pursuing additional partnering opportunities; (12) the Secretary of Defense has delegated to the Secretary of the Air Force the authority to designate which facilities may sell articles and services outside of DOD; (13) however, the Air Force Secretary has not made any such designations nor developed criteria to determine whether a good or service is available from a domestic commercial source; (14) there have been several private-sector and depot proposals to enter into partnering arrangements but none have been approved; and (15) the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command states that he is not opposed to partnering, but he is not willing to enter into such arrangements unless savings can be demonstrated. |
gao_GAO-06-596 | gao_GAO-06-596_0 | The WTO ministerial conference held in Hong Kong, China, from December 13–18, 2005, was the sixth since the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Formally launched at the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, the negotiations are the latest in a series of global trade talks (negotiating rounds) dating back nearly six decades. To avoid another failed meeting, such as at the last ministerial in Cancún, Mexico, expectations for the Hong Kong ministerial were lowered. Some Technical Progress Achieved but Key Milestones Missed
In early 2005, at a mini-ministerial meeting in Davos, Switzerland, and subsequently at a February meeting among all WTO members, WTO members agreed that the goal of the Hong Kong ministerial was to set the stage for the final phase of the Doha negotiations, which would enable the round to conclude in 2006. Other U.S. priorities, however— notably services and NAMA—made little progress at the ministerial. In doing so, they agreed to a new deadline for completing the round by the end of 2006 and interim deadlines under a compressed schedule by which to reach agreement on the difficult issues that had eluded them thus far. For example, they set April 30, 2006, as the deadline for WTO members to agree on modalities for cutting tariffs and subsidies for agricultural and nonagricultural goods. According to the EU, these would restore needed “balance” among the key players’ market access interests. The draft commitment schedules in agriculture and NAMA are to be completed by July 31, 2006. The agreement itself must be entered into before July 1, 2007. No results in the round. Concluding the round with modest results within TPA’s timeframe. Other experts warned that hard decisions were necessary and time was short if an outcome living up to Doha’s promises were to be achieved. Progress in 2005 through the Hong Kong ministerial, however, was considerably less than WTO members hoped. With nearly all tough decisions put off until 2006, the tension between members’ original high ambitions and the TPA time frame has become acute. U.S. officials often call the Doha Round a “once in a generation opportunity” because the last global trade round took a decade to launch and complete and another decade to implement. With just over a year left to produce an agreement that qualifies for TPA, it remains unclear whether the WTO can create an environment where members perceive it is in their interest to make the significant changes in their current positions, and other decisions, that cumulatively would fulfill the vision of the Doha Development Agenda. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) provide the status of the Doha negotiations on the eve of the Hong Kong ministerial, (2) review the outcome of the Hong Kong ministerial, and (3) discuss the prospects for concluding the Doha Round before U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expires in July 2007. To assess the status of the Doha negotiations before Hong Kong, we met with a variety of U.S. government agencies, including the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and State, to obtain information on progress on the negotiations and on the issue areas and factors affecting the negotiations. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. officials often call the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Development Agenda or "Round" of global trade talks, launched in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, a "once in a generation opportunity" to expand trade. President Bush has identified their success as his administration's top trade priority. Due to various U.S. notification and consultation requirements, concluding the negotiations in 2006 is essential for a Doha agreement to qualify for congressional consideration under U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expires July 1, 2007. A ministerial meeting among the WTO's 149 members was held on December 13-18, 2005, in Hong Kong, China, to make decisions needed to advance the talks. Given the importance of the WTO Doha Round to the United States, GAO was asked to provide an update on the status of the negotiations. In this report, the latest in a series on the negotiations, we (1) provide the status of the Doha negotiations on the eve of the Hong Kong ministerial, (2) review the outcome of the Hong Kong ministerial, and (3) discuss the prospects for concluding the Doha Round before TPA expires in July 2007.
What GAO Found
WTO members made little progress in 2005 toward their goal of completing the steps needed to set the stage for finalizing the Doha Round of global trade talks. The key milestones for progress through July were missed. Despite new proposals on agricultural subsidy and tariff cuts submitted in October 2005, it was clear by November that key players were too far apart to achieve the major decisions planned for the December ministerial. To avoid a failure, members agreed to lower expectations for the meeting. The Hong Kong ministerial resulted in modest agreements on a narrow range of agricultural and development issues. Ministers made little progress on the broader Doha negotiating agenda, including two other U.S. priorities--services and nonagricultural market access. Nevertheless, WTO members renewed their resolve to successfully conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2006 and set new interim deadlines under a compressed schedule to meet that goal. Critical decisions that will determine each member's cuts in tariffs and other barriers were due April 30 and July 31, 2006, but the April 30 deadline will be missed. WTO members continue to profess commitment to accomplish the ambitious agenda set at Doha. However, with nearly all tough decisions put off, the tension between members' original high ambitions and the U.S. TPA timeframe has become acute. Since the Hong Kong ministerial, members have taken concrete steps to help build consensus. Yet, the ongoing impasse on core areas such as agriculture, and the difficult political decisions needed to resolve it, cause many experts to be skeptical. Numerous time-consuming steps still must be completed in the little more than a year left before TPA expires. While holding out hope for an agreement that lives up to Doha's promise, experts say outright collapse, substantial delay, or modest results are all possible outcomes. |
gao_NSIAD-95-29 | gao_NSIAD-95-29_0 | Related to these concerns is a question about the ability of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) readiness reporting system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall readiness. DOD’s current system for reporting readiness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). DOD’s Current Approach to Measuring Readiness Has Limitations
According to JCS and DOD officials, the definition and measures of readiness that are currently available in SORTS are no longer adequate in today’s national security environment. Finally, SORTS does not provide data with which commanders can adequately assess joint readiness. A More Comprehensive Assessment of Readiness Is Possible
To supplement data currently reported in SORTS and facilitate readiness assessments at the unit level, the military commands in all four services independently monitor literally hundreds of additional indicators. Military commanders and outside defense experts agreed that many of the indicators are not only critical to a comprehensive readiness assessment at the unit level but also have some degree of predictive value regarding readiness changes within the services. Several commanders suggested readiness indicators related to operating tempo, funding levels, and individual/unit proficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effect of declining defense budgets on military readiness, focusing on whether: (1) the definition and indicators of readiness adequately reflect the many complex components that contribute to overall military readiness; and (2) there are readiness indicators that can predict positive or negative changes in readiness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) system for measuring readiness, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), has limitations; (2) SORTS was never intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall military readiness; (3) SORTS only measures individual service readiness because there are no indicators available to measure joint readiness; (4) SORTS does not assess operating tempo or troop morale; (5) to supplement SORTS data and facilitate readiness assessments at the unit level, the military commands independently monitor additional indicators that are critical to a comprehensive readiness assessment at the unit level and have some degree of predictive value; and (6) DOD can improve its comprehensive readiness assessments by incorporating unit level indicators, but these indicators will require further refinement to improve their usefulness. |
gao_GAO-01-916 | gao_GAO-01-916_0 | First, the Congress enacted the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which established an 18-year statute of repose for lawsuits against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft, parts, and components. GARA was enacted in 1994 with the goal of revitalizing the industry by limiting product liability costs. Manufacturing and Activity Indicators Declined in the 1980s and Early 1990s
In the years prior to GARA, general aviation manufacturing indicators declined significantly. 3.) There was, however, limited growth in certain segments. Trends Suggest That Since GARA, Product Liability Costs Have Fallen and Aircraft Manufacturing Has Rebounded
The Congress passed GARA in 1994 in an attempt to reverse the downward trends in general aviation manufacturing by limiting the financial burden created by product liability concerns. 7.) Airport Infrastructure
The amount of federal funding available for capital development at general aviation airports has consistently been below what has been requested by airport officials to support their airports’ planned projects. However, there is not enough federal money available to fund all planned projects; the annual capital development that has been planned for these airports and that is eligible for federal funding would cost at least $884 million more than the federal funding provided in 2000. More than two-thirds of general aviation accidents, both fatal and nonfatal, are caused by pilot error, including mistakes related to procedure, skill, and judgment. Safety of General Aviation Has Improved More Rapidly Than Safety of Scheduled Commercial Aviation
In 1998, the accident rate for general aviation—the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours—was about 24 times higher that for scheduled commercial airlines, accounting for 97 percent of the accidents and 99 percent of the deaths. One broad initiative, Safer Skies, was developed with the general aviation industry to improve the safety record of commercial and general aviation. Most initiatives and recommendations seek to enhance safety through improvements in three areas: training, technology, and the procedures that are designed to govern operations such as takeoffs, landings, and flight patterns. | What GAO Found
Over the past decade, the booming growth in scheduled commercial airline traffic has tended to obscure developments in another part of the aviation industry--general aviation. General aviation covers all civil aircraft not flown by commercial airlines or the military. In 1994, concerned that general aviation was in decline, Congress passed the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which sought to boost the industry by placing limitations on product liability lawsuits against aircraft manufacturers. Trends show that there was a decline in most general aviation indicators prior to the 1994 enactment of GARA and that this decline reversed in the years after GARA--sharply in manufacturing indicators and to a lesser extent in flying activity indicators. Trends in general aviation since GARA was enacted suggest that the law has reduced manufacturers' liability concerns, leading to a rebound in the manufacturing industry. The amount of federal funding available for capital development at general aviation airports has consistently been below what has been requested by the airport officials to fund their airports' planned projects. In 2000, for example, the amount of federal funding available was almost $900 million short of what was requested to fund airports' eligible planned projects. The safety of general aviation has been improving. The total number of accidents declined from 3,233 in 1982 to 1,989 in 1998--a decrease of 41 percent--while the accident rate fell from about 10 to about 7 accidents for every 100,000 flight hours. More than two-thirds of general aviation's accidents, both fatal and nonfatal, are caused by pilot error, including mistakes related to procedure, skill, and judgment. Besides determining the requirements for pilot certification, the Federal Aviation Administration oversees the safety of general aviation by working with federal agencies and industry groups to identify safety improvements. Most initiatives seek to enhance safety in one of three areas: training, technology, and the procedures that are designed to govern such operations as takeoffs, landings, and flight patterns. |
gao_GAO-07-563 | gao_GAO-07-563_0 | Like all other employers, exempt organizations with employees are required to pay payroll taxes that they withhold from employees’ wages “in trust” for the federal government, as well as other applicable federal taxes. Payroll taxes withheld from employees consist of income taxes; Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), commonly referred to as Social Security; and Medicare. Exempt Organizations Had Nearly $1 Billion in Unpaid Federal Taxes
As of September 2006, nearly 55,000 exempt organizations had nearly $1 billion in unpaid payroll and other federal taxes. All of these nearly 1,500 exempt organizations owed over $100,000 each, with some owing more than $10 million. Amount of Unpaid Federal Taxes Is Understated for Exempt Organizations
Although the nearly $1 billion in unpaid federal taxes we identified that were owed by exempt organizations as of September 30, 2006, is a significant amount, it understates the full extent of unpaid taxes. Selected Exempt Organizations Were Involved in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
For all 25 cases involving exempt organizations with delinquent tax debts that we audited and investigated, we found abusive activity, potentially criminal activity, or both related to the federal tax system. All 25 exempt organizations had unpaid payroll taxes, some dating as far back as the late 1980s. Rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS as required by law, the officials responsible for these exempt organizations diverted the money to fund the organizations’ operations, which sometimes included millions of dollars in management fees to related entities, or for personal benefits, such as their own salaries. Further, 4 of the 25 case study organizations we investigated had key officials and other employees who were convicted of criminal activities, including tax evasion and operating an illegal gambling establishment, at the same time the organizations continued to benefit from a tax exempt status. We are referring all 25 cases we examined to IRS for further collection activity and criminal investigation, if warranted. Despite continuing to abuse the federal tax system, all of the 25 case study organizations continued to retain their tax exempt status. Existing federal statutes do not authorize IRS to revoke exempt status based on an organization’s tax delinquency. Tax Delinquent Exempt Organizations Received Billions in Federal Grants
Based on our analysis, we determined that of the nearly 55,000 exempt organizations with federal tax debt, more than 1,200 received over $14 billion in federal grants from HHS, Education, the Department of Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other federal agencies in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Figure 3 provides excerpts of an SF 424 for this organization where the applicant appears to have violated the False Statements Act by not disclosing its delinquent tax debt. However, our work has shown that tens of thousands of exempt organizations and their officers have taken advantage of the opportunity to avoid paying their federal taxes, in part because IRS does not have the authority to revoke exempt status for failure to pay taxes. The oral comments highlighted several planned actions to enhance exempt organizations’ tax compliance efforts. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether and, if so, to what extent (1) exempt organizations have unpaid federal taxes, including payroll taxes; (2) selected case study organizations and their executives are involved in abusive or potentially criminal activity; and (3) exempt organizations with unpaid federal taxes received direct grants from certain federal agencies. On April 6, 2007, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the Commissioner of IRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 2006, nearly 1.8 million entities were recognized as tax exempt organizations by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As such, they do not have to pay federal income taxes. Exempt organizations are still required to remit amounts withheld from employees' wages for federal income tax, Social Security and Medicare, as well as other taxes. Previous GAO work identified numerous government contractors, Medicare providers, and charities participating in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) with billions in unpaid federal taxes. To follow up on the CFC work, the subcommittee requested that GAO determine whether and to what extent (1) exempt organizations have unpaid federal taxes, including payroll taxes; (2) selected case study organizations and their executives are involved in abusive or potentially criminal activity; and (3) exempt organizations with unpaid federal taxes received direct grants from certain federal agencies. GAO reviewed unpaid taxes and exempt organization data from IRS and selected 25 case studies for audit and investigation. GAO also reviewed data from 3 major grant disbursement systems. GAO referred all 25 cases to IRS for collection activity and criminal investigation, if warranted. In its oral comments on a draft of this report, IRS noted several actions it is taking to enhance exempt organizations' tax compliance.
What GAO Found
Nearly 55,000 exempt organizations had almost $1 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2006. About 1,500 of these entities each had over $100,000 in federal tax debts with some owing tens of millions of dollars. The majority of this debt represented payroll taxes and associated penalties and interest dating as far back as the early 1980s. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. tax law. The $1 billion figure is understated because some exempt organizations have understated tax liabilities or did not file tax returns. GAO selected 25 exempt organizations for investigation based primarily on amount of tax debt and number of periods delinquent. For the 25 cases investigated GAO found abusive and potentially criminal activity, including repeated failure to remit payroll taxes withheld from employees. Officials diverted the money to fund their operations, including paying themselves large salaries ranging from hundreds of thousands of dollars to over $1 million. Many of the 25 case studies accumulated substantial assets, such as million-dollar homes and luxury vehicles. Key officials and employees at 4 exempt organizations were engaged in criminal activities, including attempted bribery of an IRS official and illegal gambling. Despite repeatedly abusing the federal tax system, these entities continued to retain their exempt status. IRS does not have the authority to revoke an organization's exempt status because of unpaid federal taxes. Over 1,200 of these exempt organizations with unpaid federal taxes received over $14 billion in federal grants in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Six of the 25 exempt organizations GAO investigated received grants; of those 6 entities, 5 appear to have violated the False Statement Act by not disclosing their tax debt as required. For example, one entity that received millions of dollars in grants did not disclose unpaid taxes on multiple applications. Taxpayer privacy statutes prevent granting agencies from verifying an applicant's tax status with IRS unless the taxpayer authorizes such disclosure. |
gao_GAO-08-262 | gao_GAO-08-262_0 | The order directed the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, and the Interior, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to carry out natural resource and environmental laws in a manner that facilitates “cooperative conservation.” The order defined this as “actions that relate to the use, enhancement, and enjoyment of natural resources, protection of the environment, or both, and involve collaborative activity among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, private for-profit and nonprofit institutions, other nongovernmental entities and individuals.” The Executive Order is being carried out by CEQ, in its role coordinating federal environmental efforts and working with agencies in the development of environmental policies and initiatives. Experts Generally View Collaborative Resource Management as an Effective Approach for Improving the Management of Natural Resources, but a Few Question Collaboration Involving Federally Managed Lands
Experts whose literature we reviewed consider collaborative resource management to be effective in managing natural resources because it can reduce or avert conflict and litigation, while at the same time improving natural resource conditions and strengthening community relationships. The experts note that successful groups that are able to achieve these benefits use various collaborative practices. Identify or develop a common goal. According to many experts, to be effective, the participants in groups need to be accountable to their constituencies and to the process that they have established. First, the process of collaboration, which involves bringing people together to work on a problem and moving the group forward to reach a decision, can be difficult and time-consuming, particularly in the initial stages when the group is getting started, and thus require large amounts of resources, including staff and money. Most Collaborative Efforts We Studied Reduced or Averted Resource Conflicts, Completed Projects, and Improved Natural Resource Conditions to an Extent That Could Not Be Determined
Overall, the collaborative resource management efforts that we studied were successful in achieving participation and cooperation among their members and sustaining or improving natural resource conditions, the two criteria the experts identified to gauge the success of collaborative groups. Six of the seven collaborative efforts we studied have reduced or averted the kinds of conflicts that often arise when dealing with contentious natural resource problems, particularly those that cross property boundaries, such as threatened and endangered species, lack of wildland fire, invasive species, degraded wildlife habitat, or similar problems. All seven efforts we studied used several of the collaborative practices identified by the experts—such as seeking inclusive participation; using collaborative processes; pursuing flexibility, openness, and respect; and finding leadership—and six of the efforts were successful in reducing or averting conflicts. All but one of these groups uses a consensus process to make decisions. Identify a Common Goal. Cooperative Conservation Policies and Actions Address Some of the Challenges Faced by Federal Agencies Participating in Collaborative Efforts, but Opportunities Exist for Further Action
Federal land and resource management agencies face several challenges to participating in collaborative resource management efforts, according to the experts, federal officials, and participants in collaborative efforts we interviewed. However, additional opportunities exist to develop tools, examples, and guidance that would strengthen federal participation in collaborative efforts and better structure and direct the Cooperative Conservation initiative to achieve its vision. In the case of the federal agencies, measuring participation and monitoring results help show how an agency’s participation in a group has helped to achieve some important resource management goal for the agency. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this study were to determine (1) experts’ views of collaborative resource management as an approach for addressing complex natural resource management problems; (2) the extent to which selected collaborative resource management efforts have addressed land use conflicts and improved natural resource conditions; and (3) what challenges, if any, federal land and resource management agencies face in participating in collaborative resource management efforts and how the Cooperative Conservation initiative has addressed the challenges. Participants describe trust as the most significant outcome of their efforts. As a result, the U.S. The group is working on a method for monitoring range conditions more broadly across the whole planning area. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. Members of the U.S. Several members of the Council and others told us that many conflicts might have been resolved had BLM received these funds. GAO. Office of Management and Budget and Council on Environmental Quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
Conflict over the use of our nation's natural resources, along with increased ecological problems, has led land managers to seek cooperative means to resolve natural resource conflicts and problems. Collaborative resource management is one such approach that communities began using in the 1980s and 1990s. A 2004 Executive Order on Cooperative Conservation encourages such efforts. GAO was asked to determine (1) experts' views on collaborative resource management, (2) how selected collaborative efforts have addressed conflicts and improved resources, and (3) challenges that agencies face as they participate in such efforts and how the Cooperative Conservation initiative has addressed them. GAO reviewed experts' journal articles, studied seven collaborative groups, and interviewed group members and federal and other public officials.
What GAO Found
Experts generally view collaborative resource management that involves public and private stakeholders in natural resource decisions as an effective approach for managing natural resources. Several benefits can result from using collaborative resource management, including reduced conflict and litigation and improved natural resource conditions, according to the experts. A number of collaborative practices, such as seeking inclusive representation, establishing leadership, and identifying a common goal among the participants have been central to successful collaborative management efforts. The success of these groups is often judged by whether they increase participation and cooperation or improve natural resource conditions. Many experts also note that there are limitations to the approach, such as the time and resources it takes to bring people together to work on a problem and reach a decision. Most of the seven collaborative resource management efforts GAO studied in several states across the country were successful in achieving participation and cooperation among their members and improving natural resource conditions. In six of the cases, those involved were able to reduce or avoid the kinds of conflicts that can arise when dealing with contentious natural resource problems. All the efforts, particularly those that effectively reduced or avoided conflict, used at least several of the collaborative practices described by the experts. For example, one effort obtained broad community representation and successfully identified a common goal of using fire, after decades of suppression, to restore the health of a large grasslands area surrounding the community. Also, members of almost all the efforts studied said they have been able to achieve many of their goals for sustaining or improving the condition of specific natural resources. However, for most of these efforts no data were collected on a broad scale to show the effect of their work on overall resource conditions across a large area or landscape. Federal land and resource management agencies--the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, and the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service--face key challenges to participating in collaborative resource management efforts, according to the experts, federal officials, and participants in the efforts GAO studied. For example, the agencies face challenges in determining whether to participate in a collaborative effort, measuring participation and monitoring results, and sharing agency and group experiences. As a part of the interagency Cooperative Conservation initiative led by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the federal government has made progress in addressing these challenges. Yet, additional opportunities exist to develop and disseminate tools, examples, and guidance that further address the challenges, as well as to better structure and direct the initiative to achieve the vision of Cooperative Conservation, which involves a number of actions by multiple agencies over the long term. Failure to pursue such opportunities and to create a long-term plan to achieve the vision may limit the effectiveness of the federal government's initiative and collaborative efforts. |
gao_GAO-16-544 | gao_GAO-16-544_0 | PRIIA mandated new responsibilities for FRA to plan, award, and oversee the use of federal funds for intercity passenger rail. FRA’s Grants Management Approach Has Evolved to Administer the Section 305 Equipment Procurement Projects
FRA’s management of the grants funding the section 305 equipment procurement projects has evolved from a general grants management approach to include additional project-level oversight. For example, FRA provides grantees with administrative, programmatic, and technical assistance as needed. As the Bi-level Project Encountered Challenges, FRA’s Approach for the Section 305 Equipment Procurement Projects Evolved to Include Additional Project-Level Oversight
As the section 305 procurement projects have progressed, the bi-level car project has encountered challenges that jeopardize project completion by the expenditure deadline. In August 2015, the bi-level car schedule encountered an additional setback after the bi-level car shell suffered a structural failure during testing and production stopped for car shell redesign. As of April 2016, the bi-level production schedule is on hold and the final project equipment delivery date is unknown. FRA Does Not Have Performance Measures Directly Linked to Project Goals and Does Not Fully Evaluate Results of Monitoring Activities
An effective grants management framework includes establishing a process that ensures project goals are identified, tracked, and fulfilled and deliverables received. FRA partially follows the performance monitoring leading practice area because while FRA developed a strategic vision for the HSIPR program and outlined a monitoring process in its Grants Manual, it does not have project goals or performance measures linked to the grants funding the section 305 equipment procurement projects and it does not fully evaluate the results of monitoring activities. Without explicit project goals and associated performance measures, it may be challenging for decision-makers to track and assess a project’s progress, make decisions about future efforts, and keep grantees accountable for outcomes. According to FRA officials, they use internal reports—separate from the routine and scheduled monitoring—to inform agency management about any issues related to a project’s scope, schedule, and budget. FRA Developed Internal Documentation for Grants Management Policies and Procedures, but Has Not Developed Written Guidance For Grantees
An effective grants management framework includes developing and maintaining written documentation as a means to obtain and retain organizational knowledge and to ensure accountability for achieving agreed-upon results. A lack of guidance could result in FRA’s not receiving sufficient and necessary information from its grantees to carry out its grant oversight activities. Enhance the process outlined in the Grants Manual to monitor project performance for future grants to include: (1) performance measures directly linked to project goals, and (2) fully incorporating timely and actionable information on grantee performance into FRA’s review process to help determine whether current efforts are in line with the overall project goals. 2) To what extent has FRA’s approach to grants management for the PRIIA section 305 equipment procurements met leading practices and whether FRA’s grants management practices could be improved? To determine how FRA has carried out its grants management roles and responsibilities for the grants funding the section 305 equipment procurement projects, we reviewed FRA policies and other guidance established to outline the agency’s responsibilities, such as the August 2015 Grants Management Manual and the 2013 Program Management Plan. Appendix II: Grants Management Leading Practices with GAO Assessments
We assessed the extent to which the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) approach to grants management for the grants funding the section 305 equipment procurement projects met leading practices and supporting characteristics for grants management that we identified in the areas of performance monitoring, written documentation, training, and communication. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) expanded FRA's role by, among other things, authorizing grant programs for intercity passenger rail. Section 305 of PRIIA established a Next Generation Equipment Committee to design, develop specifications, and procure standardized rail equipment. FRA awarded approximately $800 million in grant funding for two locomotive and bi-level passenger car procurement projects.
GAO was asked to review issues related to FRA's oversight of the grants funding the PRIIA section 305 equipment procurements. This report examines: (1) how FRA has carried out its grants management roles and responsibilities for the PRIIA section 305 equipment procurement projects, and (2) the extent to which FRA's approach has met leading practices and whether FRA's grants management practices could be improved. GAO reviewed grants management policies and practices and identified relevant and applicable leading practices to be used as criteria in assessing FRA's grants management.
What GAO Found
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) initially used a regional oversight and monitoring approach outlined in its Grants Management Manual (Grants Manual) to manage the grants funding the section 305 equipment procurement projects, but in the face of challenges that approach evolved to include additional project-level oversight. When FRA began awarding the grants for the section 305 equipment procurement projects in 2010, its grants management approach was defined by the Grants Manual —including routine and scheduled monitoring—and by the terms of the grant agreements funding the locomotive and bi-level passenger car projects (see figure). As the bi-level car project encountered significant challenges—including major schedule delays—FRA moved to a project structure including increased contractor support to better oversee the locomotive and bi-level car projects in response to problems identified in the bi-level car project's schedule. In August 2015, the bi-level car suffered a structural testing failure, and as of April 2016, production of the bi-level car was on hold, and the final equipment delivery date was unknown.
FRA's grants management approach partially follows GAO-identified leading practices for performance monitoring, communication, training, and written documentation, but FRA's approach could be improved by better alignment with those practices. For example, while FRA stated that project progress is measured by tracking scope, schedule, and budget, it has not documented a process to identify project-specific goals and associated performance measures. Establishing a process that ensures project goals are identified, tracked, and fulfilled is a leading practice of effective grants management. Without explicit project goals and associated performance measures, it may be challenging for decision makers to track and assess a project's progress, make decisions about future efforts, and keep grantees accountable for outcomes. In addition, FRA has not provided documentation outlining grantees' expectations or developed written guidance specific to the section 305 equipment procurement projects. An effective grants management framework includes developing and maintaining written documentation as a means to obtain and retain organizational knowledge and to ensure accountability. According to FRA officials, the agency informs grantees of expectations through routine monitoring and technical assistance. However, the lack of written guidance, goals, and performance measures could result in FRA's not receiving sufficient and necessary information from its grantees to carry out its grant oversight activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of Transportation direct FRA to enhance its process for monitoring project performance to include project goals and performance measures that directly link to those goals, and develop and provide written guidance to grantees outlining agency expectations and deliverables. The department concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-283 | gao_GAO-05-283_0 | Drought conditions since 2000 have complicated Reclamation’s efforts to balance the irrigation water demands on the Project with the requirements for specific river flows and lake levels for threatened and endangered species. Reclamation acquired water for the water bank by contracting with irrigators for the water needed to augment Klamath River flows as required by the biological opinion. As it gained more experience each year, Reclamation modified its water bank operations to better meet the increasing obligations and to mitigate costs. Through these contracts irrigators agreed to either (1) forego irrigation altogether (crop idling), (2) irrigate using only well water (groundwater substitution), or (3) pump well water into the irrigation canals for others to use (groundwater pumping), thus making water available to augment river flows. In 2004, Reclamation found no intentional violations. Water Bank Costs Could Exceed $65 Million through Fiscal Year 2011
Reclamation’s water bank expenditures through fiscal year 2004 exceeded $12 million and could total more than $65 million through 2011. Furthermore, Reclamation has not provided stakeholders with systematic and clear information concerning the water bank’s status or operations, and its decision to use river flow data unavailable to stakeholders limited stakeholders’ ability to independently monitor water bank activities. This has led to confusion and doubts among stakeholders on whether Reclamation actually met its water bank obligations. The Water Bank Appears to Have Increased the Availability of Water for River Flows by Reducing Irrigation Use, but the Extent of Its Impacts is Unclear
Reclamation’s water bank appears to have increased the availability of water to enhance river flows by reducing irrigation water use on the Project, but there is uncertainty regarding the extent of its impacts on river diversions and groundwater resources. However, USGS and Oregon state officials have since found evidence that groundwater aquifers under the Project, already stressed by drought conditions, are being pumped by an increasing number of wells and refilling at a slower than normal rate, prompting Reclamation to consider lessening its future reliance on groundwater substitution and pumping. To help it quantify the actual results of the water bank, Reclamation has turned to other organizations for assistance. This study concluded that without effective flow measurement equipment and monitoring data for the Project it could not precisely estimate the impact of the water bank in reducing Upper Klamath Lake and Klamath River diversions to the Project. Reclamation officials are considering lessening their reliance on groundwater pumping and substitution for the 2005 water bank but are uncertain whether they can meet their water bank obligations, particularly for spring flows, while significantly increasing their reliance on crop idling. Limited Information Is Available Regarding Alternative Approaches for Achieving Water Bank Objectives
While several alternative approaches for achieving the water bank’s objectives have been identified by Reclamation and other stakeholders, limited information is available with which to reliably judge the feasibility or costs of these alternatives. Possible alternatives to the water bank include permanently retiring Project land from irrigation, expanding Upper Klamath Lake storage, or building a new reservoir separate from the lake. In the interim, Reclamation and NMFS have an ongoing dialogue regarding water bank management and will likely reconsult on Klamath Project operations, including the water bank, in 2006. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) operated the water bank and how much it cost, we analyzed Reclamation’s water bank planning, contracting, and expenditure documentation. For each year of the water bank program, we reviewed and analyzed data on water bank contracts to determine whether Reclamation met its water bank acquisition obligations, and we reviewed and analyzed scheduled base Klamath River flows, as well as the daily average Klamath River flows, using both U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and PacifiCorp-generated data to calculate the augmented flows to determine whether Reclamation met its water bank delivery obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drought conditions along the Oregon and California border since 2000 have made it difficult for the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) to meet Klamath Project irrigation demands and Klamath River flow requirements for threatened salmon. To augment river flows and avoid jeopardizing the salmon's existence, Reclamation established a multiyear water bank as part of its Klamath Project operations for 2002 through 2011. Water banks facilitate the transfer of water entitlements between users. This report addresses (1) how Reclamation operated the water bank and its cost from 2002 through 2004, (2) whether Reclamation met its annual water bank obligations each year, (3) the water bank's impact on water availability and use in the Klamath River Basin, and (4) alternative approaches for achieving the water bank's objectives.
What GAO Found
Reclamation has changed how it operates the Klamath Project water bank, as it has gained more experience, to help it meet its growing obligations and mitigate costs. For example, Reclamation initially obtained most of the water for the water bank by contracting with irrigators to either forego irrigation altogether (crop idling), or use only well water (groundwater substitution). It later added the option to pump well water into the irrigation canals for others to use (groundwater pumping). For the period 2002 through 2004, Reclamation's water bank expenditures totaled over $12 million, and the cumulative cost could exceed $65 million through 2011. GAO's analysis of water bank contracts and river flow records found that Reclamation met its water bank obligations by acquiring and delivering the required amount of water for 2002 through 2004. However, Reclamation has not provided stakeholders with systematic and clear information concerning the water bank's management and status and its decision to use river flow data that are not publicly available limited stakeholders' ability to monitor water bank activities. This has led to confusion and doubt among stakeholders on whether Reclamation met its water bank obligations. The water bank appears to have increased the availability of water to enhance river flows by reducing the amount of water diverted for irrigation, but the actual impacts are difficult to quantify because Reclamation lacks flow measurement equipment and monitoring data for the Klamath Project. Reviews by external experts of the impacts of the 2002 and 2003 crop idling contracts indicate that significantly less water may have been obtained from these contracts than Reclamation estimated. Given the uncertainty surrounding how much water can be obtained from crop idling, in 2004 Reclamation officials decided to rely primarily upon metered groundwater wells for the water bank. However, Reclamation has since learned that groundwater aquifers under the Klamath Project, already stressed by drought conditions, have shown significant declines in water levels and are refilling at a slower than normal rate in recent years. As a result, Reclamation is considering lessening its reliance on groundwater for the 2005 water bank but is uncertain if it can meet its water bank obligations, particularly for spring flows, while increasing its reliance on crop idling. Although several alternative approaches for achieving the water bank's objectives have been identified by Reclamation and other stakeholders, limited information is available regarding their feasibility or costs. Some alternatives to the water bank include permanently retiring Klamath Project land from irrigation or adding new short-term or long-term storage. Each alternative has been considered to varying degrees, but significant analysis is still needed on most alternatives before any implementation decisions can be made. Meanwhile, Reclamation and the National Marine Fisheries Service have an ongoing dialogue regarding the water bank and will likely reconsult on Klamath Project operations, including the water bank, in 2006. |
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