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crs_R42381 | crs_R42381_0 | One question often asked after the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC , which struck down prohibitions in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures and electioneering communications, is whether businesses may deduct the amounts spent on these activities. Disallowance of Deduction for Political Expenditures
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) allows a deduction for "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. However, Section 162(e) generally prohibits taxpayers from deducting campaign and lobbying expenditures as a business expense. Amounts Spent on Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications
While there is minimal interpretative guidance for these provisions, it appears that many, but perhaps not all, of the direct campaign expenditures that corporations may now make post- Citizens United would be non-deductible under Section 162(e) as either "participation in, or intervention in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office" or "an[] attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to elections." Dues to 501(c)(6) Trade Associations
It is common for businesses to pay dues or make similar payments, primarily to trade associations that have federal tax-exempt status as 501(c)(6) organizations. If the group provides the notification, then its members are unable to deduct that portion of the dues. If the group chooses not to provide the notification, or otherwise fails to do so, then it must pay a tax (known as a "proxy tax") on the amount of non-deductible dues. The notification and proxy tax requirements do not apply to any amount on which the 501(c)(6) organization is taxed under IRC Section 527(f). Contributions to 527 and 501(c) Organizations
Contributions to tax-exempt groups that use the money for campaign activity would appear to be non-deductible under Section 162(e). First, it would seem that any donation to a Section 527 political organization engaged in electioneering, such as a political action committee (PAC, including a Super PAC), should be non-deductible. The tax treatment of donations to politically active 501(c) organizations (e.g., 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations) may be a little more complicated. Nonetheless, some tax experts have recently suggested that businesses might be including some contributions to 501(c) groups in their marketing or advertising budgets and then deducting them as ordinary and necessary business expenses. For anyone outside the IRS, determining whether this is actually happening is very difficult, if not impossible, because the necessary information is generally not publicly available. Constitutionality of IRC Section 162(e)
Some have suggested that the Supreme Court's analysis in Citizens United might raise questions about whether IRC Section 162(e) is constitutional. The arguments appear to be that the tax laws cannot disallow a deduction for activities that the Supreme Court has held are protected speech or provide beneficial tax treatment to only some types of speech (e.g., non-political business speech, the expenditures for which may be deductible). It is not clear that Citizens United changes this conclusion. In other words, it is not at all clear the holding in Citizens United that the government may not ban corporations from engaging in certain political speech requires the government to subsidize that speech. Thus, until a court speaks to the issue, it seems premature to conclude that Section 162(e) is unconstitutional based on Citizens United. | As the 2012 election cycle heats up, one question often asked is whether businesses may deduct amounts spent on political activities as a business expense. A related question is whether they may deduct dues paid to a 501(c)(6) trade association that then engages in such activities. These questions have greater significance in light of the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which struck down long-standing prohibitions in federal campaign finance law on corporations making certain types of campaign-related expenditures.
Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) generally prohibits corporations from deducting as a business expense the types of expenditures that they can now make post-Citizens United. The statute, which long predates the 2010 decision, prohibits taxpayers from deducting campaign-related and lobbying expenditures as a trade or business expense.
With respect to dues, the IRC generally permits a 501(c)(6) trade association to decide whether to notify its members of the portion of dues that are allocated to political activities and, therefore, not deductible. If the group provides the notification, then its members may not deduct that portion of the dues. If the group chooses not to provide the notification, or otherwise fails to do so, then it must generally pay a tax (known as a "proxy tax") on that amount. The notification and proxy tax requirements do not apply to any amount on which the 501(c)(6) organization is taxed under IRC Section 527(f). That section imposes a tax on 501(c) organizations that make an expenditure for influencing elections, among other activities.
Contributions to other types of tax-exempt groups that use the money for campaign activity would appear to be non-deductible under Section 162(e). It seems that donations to a Section 527 political organization engaged in electioneering, such as a political action committee (PAC, including a Super PAC), should not be deducted. The tax treatment of contributions to politically active 501(c) groups (e.g., 501(c)(4) organizations) may be a little more complicated, but it does appear that any amounts for campaign activity or lobbying should be non-deductible under Section 162(e). Nonetheless, some tax experts have recently suggested that businesses might be including some contributions to 501(c) groups in their marketing or advertising budgets and then deducting them as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Section 162. For anyone outside the IRS, determining whether this is actually happening would be very difficult, if not impossible, since the information is typically not publicly available.
Some have suggested that Citizens United calls into question the constitutionality of Section 162(e). The arguments appear to be that the tax code cannot disallow a deduction for activities that the Supreme Court has held are protected speech or provide beneficial tax treatment to only some types of speech (e.g., non-political business speech, the expenditures for which may be deductible). It is not clear this is true. Prior to Citizens United, the Supreme Court ruled that a regulatory provision similar to Section 162(e) was constitutional, explaining there is no requirement that the government subsidize a taxpayer's First Amendment rights by permitting a deduction for political expenditures. It is not at all clear that Citizens United changes this analysis. Therefore, until a court speaks to the issue, it seems premature to conclude that Section 162(e) is unconstitutional based on Citizens United. |
crs_RS22579 | crs_RS22579_0 | Background
H.R. 157 / S. 160 , the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009 introduced in the 111 th Congress, provided for a permanent increase in the size of the U.S. House of Representatives, from 435 seats to 437 seats. 157 ) or specifying that the seat would be allocated to Utah, the state which would have received the 436 th seat under the 2000 apportionment process. While both versions treated the District of Columbia as if it were a state for the purposes of the allocation of House seats, each bill restricted the District of Columbia to a single congressional seat under any future apportionments. In addition, Table 1 also shows the impact on the distribution of seats in the House if the District of Columbia were to be treated as if it were a state for apportionment purposes for both a House size of 435 seats and a House size of 437 seats. These are the actual seats to be allocated based on the results of the 2010 Census. | Two proposals (H.R. 157/S. 160, District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009) were introduced in the 111th Congress to provide for voting representation in the U.S. House of Representatives for the residents of the District of Columbia (DC). H.R. 157/S. 160, for purposes of voting representation, treated the District of Columbia as if it were a state, giving a House seat to the District, but restricting it to a single seat under any future apportionments. The bills also increased the size of the House to 437 members from 435, and gave the additional seat to the state that would have received the 436th seat under the 2000 apportionment, Utah.
This report shows the distribution of House seats based on the 2010 Census for 435 seats and for 437 seats as specified in the proposal. North Carolina, which would receive the 436th seat in the 2010 apportionment is substituted for Utah, assuming that any new, similar legislation would adopt the same language as H.R. 157. |
crs_R42094 | crs_R42094_0 | Founded and led by Joseph Kony, the LRA currently operates in the remote border areas between the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 ( P.L. The Administration's approach to the LRA, submitted to Congress in November 2010 as required under P.L. In October 2011, the Obama Administration announced the deployment of about 100 U.S. military personnel to act as advisors in support of Ugandan-led military efforts to capture or kill senior LRA leaders. The United States has provided significant logistical support for Uganda's counter-LRA operations beyond its borders since late 2008. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy groups have contributed to U.S. policymakers' interest in, and U.S. public awareness of, the LRA issue. The LRA's strength has significantly decreased since the U.S. advisors first deployed, and several senior LRA figures have been captured or killed by Ugandan troops in U.S.-supported operations. Despite these successes, Kony apparently remains at large, and the LRA "has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive." Key questions include
What is, or should be, the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other humanitarian, national security, and budgetary goals? What are the benchmarks for success and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces? Advocates of a continuing U.S. role in efforts to counter the LRA nevertheless warn that the group continues to pose a threat and could rebound, reporting that attacks and abductions attributed to the group increased in 2014, a trend that has continued into 2015, reversing a decline in 2011-2013. In 2005, following a request by the Ugandan government, the International Criminal Court (ICC) unsealed warrants for five LRA commanders, including Kony. A fourth, Dominic Ongwen, surrendered to U.S. forces in CAR in January 2015 and has been delivered to the ICC at The Hague, where he faces seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. U.S. involvement in counter-LRA efforts is largely premised on the group's infliction of widespread human suffering. In March 2014, the President notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Act," that he was deploying U.S. military aircraft to assist with counter-LRA operations, and that this would involve the deployment of additional military personnel to Uganda and LRA-affected countries to "principally operate and maintain U.S. aircraft to provide air mobility support to foreign partner forces." Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ( P.L. 113-291 , January 3, 2014). Expresses that the U.S. advise and assist operation in support of regional counter-LRA operations "has made significant progress in achieving its objectives" and that "the Department of Defense should continue its support of Operation Observant Compass, particularly through the provision of key enablers, such as mobility assets and targeted intelligence collection and analytical support, to enable regional partners to effectively conduct operations against Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army," Also requires that Operation Observant Compass be "integrated into a comprehensive strategy to support the security and stability in the region." 113-235 , December 16, 2014). The Administration's Strategy document does not define the relative importance of the LRA issue compared to other U.S. policy initiatives and priorities, although it does note that "the extent to which the United States is able to engage in the full range of objectives described in the strategy is dependent on the availability of resources." Congress has—as described above (" Legislation ")—authorized and/or appropriated funds for certain aspects of the U.S. response to the LRA, while other aspects have been funded through regional and country-specific programs or through the Administration's reallocation of funds initially appropriated for other purposes, in consultation with Congress. Some might question whether ongoing U.S. support to the Ugandan military is having unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region, for example in relation to Uganda's military role in the internal conflict in South Sudan. However, despite efforts by affected countries and multilateral entities to foster regional cooperation, African states have not fulfilled their troop commitments to the AU Regional Task force in full, and the coordination of counter-LRA efforts remains a thorny diplomatic issue. President Obama has waived in part the application of the Child Soldiers Protection Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-457 ; CSPA) to facilitate the participation of DRC and South Sudanese troops in counter-LRA operations. 111-172 and the LRA Strategy provide a possible model for responding to other groups responsible for mass atrocities? | The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, is a small, dispersed armed group active in remote areas of Central Africa. The LRA's infliction of widespread human suffering and its potential threat to regional stability have drawn significant attention in recent years, including in Congress. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy groups have contributed to policymakers' interest.
Since 2008, the United States has provided support to Ugandan-led military operations to capture or kill LRA commanders, which since 2012 have been integrated into an African Union (AU) "Regional Task Force" against the LRA. The Obama Administration expanded U.S. support for these operations in 2011 by deploying U.S. military advisors to the field. In 2014, the Administration notified Congress of the deployment of U.S. military aircraft and more personnel to provide episodic "enhanced air mobility support" to African forces. The United States has also provided humanitarian aid, pursued regional diplomacy, helped to fund "early-warning" systems, and supported multilateral programs to demobilize and reintegrate ex-LRA combatants. The Administration has referred to these efforts as part of its broader commitment to preventing and mitigating mass atrocities. Growing U.S. involvement may also be viewed in the context of Uganda's role as a key U.S. security partner in East and Central Africa. U.S. security assistance to Uganda, including for counter-LRA efforts, has continued despite U.S. officials' criticism of Ugandan efforts to enact laws that would make homosexuality punishable by life in prison.
The Administration's current strategy toward the LRA was formulated in response to the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act (P.L. 111-172), enacted by Congress in 2010. Congress has since supported the Administration's approach through legislation providing the executive branch with new funding and authorities to counter the LRA. Since the U.S. military advisors first deployed in 2011, LRA attacks have significantly decreased, as have population displacements related to LRA activity. Several senior LRA figures have been captured or killed by U.S.-supported Ugandan troops. Dominic Ongwen, one of five LRA commanders against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants in 2005, surrendered in January 2015 and was transferred to The Hague, where his trial is expected to begin in 2016. Kony, however, appears to remain at large, and the LRA has demonstrated a high degree of resilience. The LRA has been increasingly linked to poaching and illicit wildlife trafficking in recent years, and some observers fear that the group is exploiting insecurity in the region, including in the Central African Republic, to rebound.
The U.S. approach to the LRA raises a number of policy issues, some of which have implications far beyond Central Africa. Some observers view the U.S. response to the LRA as a possible model for addressing mass atrocities, and decisions on this issue could potentially be viewed as a precedent for U.S. responses to similar situations in the future. At the same time, a key question for some is whether the response is commensurate with the degree to which the LRA impacts U.S. national interests. Other potential issues for Congress include funding levels for counter-LRA efforts; the prospects and benchmarks for "success" and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; and the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other foreign policy and budgetary goals. Possible policy challenges include regional militaries' capacity and will to conduct U.S.-supported operations and these militaries' relative level of respect for human rights. President Obama has waived in part the application of the Child Soldiers Protection Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457) to facilitate the participation of troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan in counter-LRA operations. The FY2015 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) and National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291), and other recent authorization and appropriations measures, include relevant provisions. See also CRS Report R43377, Crisis in the Central African Republic. |
crs_RS22219 | crs_RS22219_0 | Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act, often described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides protections against discrimination for individuals with disabilities. Due to concern about the spread of highly contagious diseases such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), questions have been raised about the application of the ADA in such situations. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, this does not mean that an individual with a serious contagious disease would have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation if such an action would place other individuals at a significant risk. Such determinations are highly fact specific and the differences between the contagious diseases discussed by the courts (e.g., HIV infection, tuberculosis, and hepatitis) and pandemic influenza may give rise to differing conclusions. Each contagious disease has specific patterns of transmission that affect the magnitude and duration of a potential threat to others. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq., provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Due to concern about the spread of highly contagious diseases such as pandemic influenza and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), questions have been raised about the application of the ADA in such situations. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, this does not mean that an individual with a serious contagious disease would have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation if such an action would place other individuals at a significant risk. Such determinations are highly fact specific and the differences between the contagious diseases may give rise to differing conclusions since each contagious disease has specific patterns of transmission that affect the magnitude and duration of a potential threat to others. |
crs_R41294 | crs_R41294_0 | Background and Introduction
The teams of the National Football League (NFL or League) formed NFL Properties (NFLP) in 1963 to aid in the promotion of the NFL brand, including the manufacture, licensing, and marketing of team- and league-logoed, trademarked clothing and merchandise. In 2000, the teams authorized NFLP to solicit bids for, and then grant, a single, exclusive license for the manufacture of headwear; when the license was awarded to Reebok, American Needle, one of the non-renewed, non-exclusive licensees, sued the NFL, NFLP, the individual teams, and Reebok, alleging, in pertinent part, that the teams' actions in creating NFLP violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The NFL/team response was the assertion that as subsidiary members of an unincorporated association, the teams were legally incapable of conspiring either with each other or with the League. The case had been carefully watched, given that a Supreme Court ruling endorsing the NFL's "single entity" argument would likely have had an impact on the application of the antitrust laws not only to other (professional) sports leagues and their decisions concerning, for example, player services, ticket pricing, stadium parking fees, and merchandise sales; but also to any business entity—especially those in such areas as financial services, real estate services, or health care—participating or contemplating participation in joint activities. Although Section 1 prohibits, without exception, contracts or conspiracies "in restraint of trade," the courts have created two classes of antitrust analysis— per se and rule of reason. Not surprisingly, therefore, an entity with multiple members would prefer to be considered as a single entity amenable to prosecution only under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (the position, in fact, advanced by defendant/respondent NFL), rather than as multiple, separate entities that are legally capable of unlawful cooperation or agreement, and so always amenable to civil suit and/or criminal prosecution under Section 1 (plaintiff/appellant American Needle's argument). Throughout the American Needle case both parties relied on interpretations of the language and holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. to support their arguments. Copperweld addressed a situation in which a corporation (Copperweld) was alleged to have unlawfully conspired, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, with a division it created to house its acquisition of another corporation (Regal Tube). The officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Although the situation in Copperweld involved a corporate division, the Court also discussed the status of a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiar(ies), a scenario that the NFL sought to convince the American Needle Court was analogous to its own. American Needle in the Lower Federal Courts16
The District Court
The United States District Court for Northern Illinois seemed to make much of the fact that plaintiff American Needle "did not claim that the NFL and its 32 teams [had] … acted improperly" in the initial creation of NFLP and the delegation to it of "the authority to grant licenses" for the teams' intellectual property; allegations of conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 were confined to the decision by NFL Properties to grant an exclusive license. Having already noted that there might well be "competing interests" among the entities involved, even among bona fide divisions of the same company, the court of appeals was not persuaded that the ability of the NFL teams to compete with regard to the merchandising of their intellectual property (logos et al.) American Needle v. NFL in the Supreme Court
A unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, defined the issue:
As the case comes to us, we have only a narrow issue to decide: whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a "contract, combination … or conspiracy" as defined by § 1 of the Sherman Act …, or, as we have sometimes phrased it, whether the alleged activity by the NFL respondents "must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1." Copperweld …, 467 U.S. 752, 771 …. He emphasized the Court's view that "collective decisions" by the League and its teams are "perfectly sensible" given the "special characteristics" of the football industry. The need to examine the League/team collective action in licensing their respective and common trademarks under Section 1 led the Court to remand the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which will, in turn, likely remand to the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois for trial. | In a decision that had the potential to upset decades of antitrust law, and also to have a broad impact beyond the immediate consequences for the litigating parties, the Supreme Court ruled, on May 24, 2010, that the intellectual-property licensing activities of the National Football League (NFL or League) and its member teams must be treated as those of separate entities whose cooperation and joint decisions are amenable to antitrust prosecution under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts or conspiracies "in restraint of trade" (American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. ___ (2010)). There had been some concern that a contrary ruling—a finding that the NFL's member teams are but "divisions" of an unincorporated NFL and so are incapable of ever conspiring with either each other or the League itself—could have affected existing antitrust jurisprudence concerning the status of entities in sports leagues generally, and also of those entities involved in cooperative or joint venture activity in such diverse areas as real estate services, financial services, and health care.
The immediate issues in the case were the teams' creation in 1963 of NFL Properties (NFLP) to license and market their team-owned intellectual property (primarily team logos); and their subsequent authorization for NFLP to replace the multiple, non-exclusive contracts it had awarded for the manufacture of team-logoed headwear with a single, exclusive contract. American Needle, a holder of one of the former, non-exclusive contracts sued, alleging violation of Section 1. Both parties relied on interpretations of the 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (467 U.S. 752) to support their arguments. The League successfully argued in both the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that its structure should be considered analogous to the one analyzed in Copperweld; that case held that a parent corporation is incapable of conspiring, in violation of the antitrust laws, with its corporate division(s), or the divisions with each other, because all of those entities share a unity of economic interest. NFL teams, the League insisted, should be similarly viewed—as merely "divisions" of the unincorporated-parent NFL. American Needle had stressed the teams' status as "independently owned and controlled for-profit businesses that do compete, and are capable of competing with each other in numerous ways." The lower federal courts ruled in favor of the NFL because they believed that since team cooperation to produce the NFL product (football games) is indispensable, the teams, even though separately owned business corporations, are the practical equivalents of Copperweld's divisions of a corporate parent.
A unanimous American Needle Supreme Court disagreed with the NFL, reversing the lower-court decisions and remanding the case for trial. The Court was persuaded that the League's 32 teams, contrary to the NFL's characterization, are separately owned businesses that are engaged in competition for, for example, players, fans, and gate receipts; it quoted Copperweld to emphasize that because the teams are "separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests," they cannot possess the unity of economic interest that would save them from Section 1 scrutiny: the antitrust legality of their cooperative activity must be judged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, rather than under Section 2, which addresses the unilateral conduct of monopolists. At the same time, the Court specifically recognized that the teams' necessary and "perfectly sensibly justified" cooperation, for example, in the "production and scheduling of games," would provide the basis for rule of reason versus per se analysis of those or other cooperative agreements alleged to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Moreover, the opinion observed, the League's activities are not necessarily doomed to violation-of-Section-1-status because "joint ventures and other cooperative agreements are … not usually unlawful … where the agreement … is necessary to market the product at all." |
crs_R40148 | crs_R40148_0 | Overview of Products Liability
Products liability, which is primarily governed by state law, concerns the civil liability of a manufacturer, seller, or other party along a product's manufacturing or distribution chain for personal or property damages caused by a product to a consumer or third-party user of that product. Although products liability law derives from common law judicial decisions, many states have enacted legislation that codifies causes of action based on different theories of liability and/or that places limits on when or against whom claims are to be asserted. As a result, the strict liability standard makes it substantially easier for a plaintiff injured by a defective product to recover damages when compared to other causes of action described below. Consumer representatives and plaintiffs' attorneys generally oppose measures that would effectively limit an injured party's ability to recover in products liability suits. They consider the tort system necessary to provide incentives for the manufacture of safe products and to ensure adequate compensation for injured workers and consumers. The possibility of national uniformity, however, should not be overestimated. Federal Statutes Enacted
While Congress enacted a number of products liability laws in the 1980s and 1990s, there has been little legislation in recent years. Strict tort liability. | Products liability generally refers to the civil liability of a manufacturer or seller for injury caused by its product to the person or property of a buyer or third party. Legal developments starting in the 1960s, particularly the adoption of strict tort liability, have made it substantially easier for persons injured by defective products to recover for damages. Starting in the 1980s, however, many states enacted tort reform legislation that effectively places limits on an injured party's ability to recover. Advocates for consumers and plaintiffs view strong products liability law as necessary to ensure adequate compensation for injured workers and consumers and to furnish an incentive for the manufacture of safe products. Manufacturers and their insurers, by contrast, contend that many products liability judgments are unwarranted or excessive and that national uniformity in products liability law is needed. They have favored replacing the 50-state products liability laws with one federal law. While bills that are narrowly focused on a particular product or industry have been occasionally considered by Congress, no major products liability bills have been introduced during the 113th Congress. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R43742 | crs_R43742_0 | Introduction
In the United States, the modern electric utility industry began to emerge about 100 years ago and would be guided by a philosophy which came to be called the "regulatory compact." Under the compact, state and local governments generally granted utilities the monopoly right to provide electric power in a designated service territory, in exchange for an obligation to serve all electric power customers. Much of the nation's power generation and delivery infrastructure was built and maintained under this arrangement, with customers ultimately paying for the costs of electricity services. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) ( P.L. Nowadays, the electric utility model is under further pressure as the sector deals with issues such as the aging of power generation and other assets, the implementation of new environmental regulations leading to different choices in power generation fuels, and the development of technologies providing more and newer options for customers to self-generate electric power. Various states and jurisdictions have begun initiatives to look at what this new "regulatory compact" could specifically encompass. A growing amount of electric power is being generated by natural gas, and a convergence of electric power and natural gas utilities may eventually result in a new, customer-focused energy industry focused on providing consumer services. Nonetheless, the electric utility industry seems to be fully aware of the potential for change. The question is whether and how much the industry will embrace new technologies and market opportunities. Some companies may see DG as appealing to only a small number of customers, but in times of shrinking revenues, any real reduction of the customer base can be significant for some companies. The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) contemplates that the potential rise in DG could be a threat to the regulatory paradigm that allows costs of service to be recovered from the consumers who benefit from the investment (as discussed in the next section). Assuming that GHG reduction is the direction of future U.S. energy and environmental policy, a formal transition requiring federal policy guidance for the electric utility industry may be an option if, for example, the energy markets fail to transition smoothly to such a clean power future. Market failures of this sort have been discussed by industry observers in the past, with stranded assets and company bankruptcies posited as potential disruptions. Regulators will be challenged to recognize and plan for the possibilities of change, with its potential costs and implications for electricity industry structures. It may well be assumed that the current electric utility model will continue to evolve. A key to the future is likely to be cost control for many electric utilities, so that utility electricity prices will be competitive with other choices. The options for electric utilities to satisfy these customers in the future may even include support services for customer self-generation beyond merely providing backup power. Congress began to address the move of the electricity utility industry away from the regulatory compact concept by introducing competitive providers to the electric utility industry with PURPA, and reinforced competition as federal policy with EPACT92. Several congressional bills have contained provisions to further a range of technologies and paradigms, especially in the various states-must-consider standards. In the future, Congress may yet consider if a formal legislative initiative would be required to move the electric power industry to a clean energy power system should that be the goal. Congress may also consider legislation if a market failure is perceived or if consumer choice is seen to be unduly constrained. | In the United States, the modern electric utility industry began to emerge about 100 years ago, guided by a philosophy which came to be called the "regulatory compact." Under the compact, state and local governments generally granted the right to provide electric power in a designated service territory, in exchange for an obligation to serve all electric power customers. Much of the nation's power generation and delivery infrastructure was built under this arrangement, with customers ultimately paying for the costs of electricity services. However, the electric utility model nowadays is under pressure as the industry deals with issues such as the aging of power generation assets, the implementation of new environmental regulations favoring cleaner, low carbon emission power generation choices, and the development of technologies providing options for customers to self-generate electric power.
Some observers argue that new technologies are leading to a distributed generation (DG) future for customers, supported by utility base load generation and infrastructure. Various states and jurisdictions have begun initiatives to look at what a new "regulatory compact" could specifically encompass, with cleaner electric power and new services as the driving force behind utility investments. And the Environmental Protection Agency's regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions favors renewable electricity as the technology of choice for new power generation.
While the electric utility industry seems to be fully aware of the potential for change, the question is how much the industry will embrace it. Some companies may see DG as appealing to only a small segment of the market, but in times of shrinking revenues, any market share loss can be significant. The Edison Electric Institute contemplates that the potential rise in DG, and requirements for net metering payments (without "appropriate" compensation by net metering customers for use of the grid), could be a threat to the regulatory paradigm that allows costs of providing service to be recovered from the consumers who benefit from grid services. Regulators will be challenged to recognize and plan for the possibilities of change, with its potential costs and implications for electricity industry structures.
A key to the evolution of the current electric utility model is likely to be cost control for many utilities, so that prices will be competitive with other choices. Electric utilities may also have to offer enhanced service to consumers to entice them to stay utility customers, especially as it is becoming easier to go "off the grid." Utilities may even offer support services for customer self-generation beyond merely providing backup power. A convergence of electric power and natural gas utilities may possibly result in the future in a new, customer focused energy industry focused on providing consumer services. However, a formal transition requiring federal policy guidance for the electric utility industry may be required if, for example, the energy markets fail to transition smoothly to a clean power future, should that continue to be a policy goal. Market failures of this sort have been discussed in the past, with stranded assets and company bankruptcies posited as potential disruptions.
Congress began to address the move of the electricity utility industry away from the regulatory compact concept by introducing competitive providers to the electric utility industry with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, and reinforced competition as federal policy with the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Several laws enacted since then have contained provisions to further a range of technologies and paradigms in various "states-must-consider" standards. Congress may yet consider if a formal legislative initiative would be required to move the electric power industry to a clean energy power system should that be a goal. Congress may also consider legislation if a market failure is perceived or if consumer choice is seen to be unduly constrained. |
crs_RS21855 | crs_RS21855_0 | Government and Politics
Introduction and Situation before October 2009 Elections
The Greek city-state of Athens is believed to have developed the first known democracy around 500 B.C. Modern Greece has been a democracy since the toppling of a military junta in 1974. Since then, two large parties have alternated leadership of the government: the New Democracy (ND) party and the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). After the 2007 election, ND lost one seat in parliament and its position declined due partly to additional corruption scandals, a crisis of law and order, and the economic situation. At the same time, the European Commission estimated that Greece's 2009 budget deficit would be 8% of gross domestic product (GDP), well above the 3% ceiling that the EU mandates for members, and the national debt would be 110% of GDP. GDP has contracted for three consecutive quarters in 2009. Foreign Policy
Greece is a member of the EU and NATO. Greece is a signatory of the Treaty; Turkey is not. Relations with the United States
U.S.-Greek bilateral relations are good and are based on historical, political, cultural, military, economic, and personal ties. The Bush Administration supported the U.N.-assisted negotiations. | The Greek city-state of Athens is believed to have developed the first known democracy around 500 B.C. Modern Greece has been a democracy since the toppling of a military junta in 1974. Since then, the New Democracy (ND) party and the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) have alternated leadership of the government. ND ruled from March 2004 until October 4, 2009, when PASOK won national elections and a clear majority of the seats in parliament. PASOK's victory has been attributed to anti-ND public sentiment caused by the economic recession, corruption scandals, and law-and-order issues. On taking power, PASOK inherited a severe financial crisis: economic growth has contracted for three consecutive quarters in 2009, and the budget deficit is projected to be 12.7.% of gross domestic product (GDP) and debt to be 125% of GDP in 2010. Therefore, the economy is the dominating issue on the government's agenda.
The Greek government's foreign policy focuses on the European Union (EU), sometimes-strained relations with Turkey, reunifying Cyprus, resolving a dispute with Macedonia over its name, other Balkan issues, and sustaining good relations with the United States. Greece has assisted with the war on terrorism, but is not a member of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and has a limited presence with NATO in Afghanistan. See also CRS Report RL33497, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40093 | crs_R40093_0 | Introduction
After a period of diplomatic rancor earlier in the decade, Japan and China have demonstrably improved their bilateral relationship since 2006. The emerging détente has expanded to include breakthrough agreements on territorial disputes, various high-level exchanges, and reciprocal port calls by naval vessels. China-Japan economic interdependence has grown as trade and investment flows have surged over the past decade. China-Japan economic ties serve as an anchor for the overall bilateral relationship, and the two nations and have become the key players in a robust East Asian trade and investment network. On the other hand, military strategists in each country remain wary of the other's motives. Beijing is suspicious of any moves that hint at Japan developing a more assertive and active security posture, and Japanese defense planners note with alarm China's burgeoning military modernization. The détente, pursued with vigor by leaders in both Beijing and Tokyo, follows an exceedingly tense period in the relationship under former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006). The durability of the recent détente could have significant implications for U.S. interests. U.S. interests in the region are generally well served by pragmatic Sino-Japanese accommodation. Equanimity in the Tokyo-Beijing relationship not only fosters stability and prosperity, but also allows the United States to avoid choosing sides on delicate issues, particularly those related to history. Multilateral efforts such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program can be complicated by acute bilateral tension among the participants. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Straits, Japan would almost definitely play a role in a U.S. military response. Military to Military Relations
Even modest improvements in the defense relations between China and Japan are notable given the history of warfare—and particularly China's widespread accusations of the exceptional brutality of Japanese imperial forces during Japan's invasion and occupation of China. Potential Complications and Issues for U.S. Policy
U.S. Interests
In economic terms, China and Japan are very important to the United States. Fragility of Détente and Public Sentiment
Regional analysts, while optimistic about the immediate future of Sino-Japanese relations, remain cautious about the ultimate stability of the relationship. The United States declined to get involved in this dispute. Japanese press outlets have reported repeated naval incursions by Chinese vessels and submarines into Japanese territorial waters. | After a period of diplomatic rancor earlier this decade, Japan and China have demonstrably improved their bilateral relationship. The emerging détente includes breakthrough agreements on territorial disputes, various high-level exchanges, and reciprocal port calls by naval vessels. Over the past ten years, China-Japan economic interdependence has grown as trade and investment flows have surged. China -Japan economic ties serve as an anchor for the overall bilateral relationship and have become the center of a robust East Asian trade and investment network. On the other hand, military strategists on each side remain wary of each other's motives. Beijing is suspicious of any moves that hint at Japan developing a more active and assertive security posture, and Japanese defense planners note with alarm China's burgeoning military modernization.
The durability of the recent détente could have significant implications for U.S. interests. U.S. interests in the region are generally well served by pragmatic Sino-Japanese accommodation. Equanimity in the Tokyo-Beijing relationship not only fosters stability and prosperity, but also allows the United States to avoid choosing sides on delicate issues, particularly those related to historical controversies. Multilateral efforts such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be complicated by acute bilateral tension among the participants.
The history of post-war Sino-Japanese relations reveals why the relationship has been so difficult to manage for the past several decades. Japan's conquest of large swathes of China, and perceptions in China that Japan continues to downplay wartime atrocities committed by Japan's imperial forces, remain sensitive subjects. Historical grievances have framed much of the interaction between Beijing and Tokyo, including a particularly rocky period under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006). The United States has also played a major role in shaping relations between the Asian powers through its war-time involvement, post-war occupation and reconstruction of Japan, the "Nixon Shock" of the early 1970s, and its reaction to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Despite the promise of Sino-Japanese relations remaining strong in the short-to-medium term, there are multiple potential complications and issues of concern for the United States. Among these are the dynamics of economic and diplomatic rivalry in the region, the fragility of the relationship due to historical differences and skeptical public sentiment, sensitive sovereignty issues in territorial disputes, complications surrounding the Taiwan factor in East Asian geopolitics, ongoing military incursions by Chinese vessels, and suspicions in both Tokyo and Beijing.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL34064 | crs_RL34064_0 | Key Issues
The main points of contention among Iraqi politicians and citizen groups with regard to energy policy include the proper roles and authorities of federal and regional bodies, the terms and extent of potential foreign participation in oil and gas production and development, and potential formulas and mechanisms for equitably sharing oil and gas revenue. Concurrent negotiations regarding constitutional amendments have had direct implications for the hydrocarbon legislation debate, particularly efforts to clarify the specific authorities granted to federal and regional governments to regulate oil and gas development and export activities under Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi constitution. In the run-up to Iraq's March 2010 national elections, candidates' positions on oil- and natural gas-related policy questions received scrutiny from voters, although most candidates did not appear overly inclined to defend uncompromising positions on energy policy as a means of garnering popular support. Political, Legal, and Constitutional Questions
The Iraqi constitution's ambiguity about the roles and powers of federal, regional, and governorate authorities has fueled division between the national government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and other political actors. Hydrocarbon Sector Legislation
A package of hydrocarbon sector and revenue-sharing legislation originally proposed in 2007 remains stalled amid ongoing disputes about broader political questions. U.S. officials and lawmakers have viewed such legislation as an important benchmark that would indicate the Iraqi government's commitment to promoting political reconciliation and providing a sound basis for economic development. The IAMB provides periodic reports on Iraq's oil export revenue, Iraq's use of its oil revenues, and its oil production practices. However, the IMF estimated that Iraqi budget deficits in 2010 and 2011 would create a $5 billion financing gap after domestic resources have been tapped that will need to be met with international financial support. Article 112 of Iraq's constitution requires the Iraqi government to distribute revenues:
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law. Similarly, revenue distribution mechanisms that reward producing governorates may create resentment in non-producing areas. In the near term, experts and industry professionals are closely focused on the outcome of the March 2010 national elections, the makeup of the new Council of Representatives, and the formation of a new cabinet. While many expect that the new cabinet will continue along the oil sector management path outlined by the current government, some stakeholders harbor concerns that the terms for international investment in Iraq's oil and gas sector could be significantly revised under a new administration or under pressure from members of the new parliament. The current military strategy employed by U.S. forces in Iraq seeks to support Iraqi forces as they maintain a secure environment in which elected leaders can resolve core political differences. In light of the U.S. military commitment and persistent Iraqi political differences, Members of Congress and U.S. policymakers face a number of challenging questions: As the U.S. role in providing security in Iraq diminishes, how will the United States influence the pace and content of Iraqi energy policy debates? How can the United States effectively encourage Iraqis to adopt equitable revenue-sharing mechanisms? Congressional Benchmark and Other Legislation
In recent years, Congress has sought to ensure that appropriated funds are not used to control Iraq's oil resources and has sought to influence the development and course of U.S. policy in Iraq by requiring the Administration to report on key oil and oil revenue related benchmarks. Federal Oil and Gas Council
The central element of the draft hydrocarbon framework legislation is the creation of a Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC) to determine all national oil and gas sector policies and plans, including those governing exploration, development, and transportation. | Development in Iraq's oil and natural gas sector is proceeding, amid ongoing debates. Iraqis differ strongly on a number of key issues, including the proper role and powers of federal and regional authorities in regulating oil and gas development; the terms and extent of potential foreign participation in the oil and gas sectors; and proposed formulas and mechanisms for equitably sharing oil and gas revenue. Concurrent, related discussions about the administrative status of the city of Kirkuk and proposed amendments to articles of Iraq's constitution that outline federal and regional oil and gas rights also are highly contentious.
Both the Bush Administration and the 110th Congress considered the passage of oil and gas sector framework and revenue-sharing legislation as important benchmarks that would indicate the Iraqi government's commitment to promoting political reconciliation and providing a solid foundation for long-term economic development in Iraq. Obama Administration officials and some Members of the 111th Congress have expressed similar views. In the absence of new comprehensive legislation to manage the energy sector and distribute energy export revenues, interim revenue-sharing mechanisms have been implemented, while both the national government and the Kurdistan Regional Government have signed oil and natural gas contracts with foreign firms.
The central importance of oil and gas revenue for the Iraqi economy is widely recognized by Iraqis, and most groups accept the need to create new legal and policy guidelines for the development of the country's oil and natural gas resources. However, Iraq's current Council of Representatives (parliament) did not take action to consider proposed energy sector reform legislation because of broader political disputes. Observers and U.S. officials remain focused on the outcome of the March 2010 Iraqi national election as an indicator of future trends.
In January 2010, the Council of Representatives adopted Iraq's 2010 budget, which includes a deficit of more than $19 billion because of increased spending and stagnant oil production and export levels in Iraq. The budget also includes a controversial revenue distribution mechanism that will reward specific energy resource producing governorates. Iraq has secured a $3.6 billion stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a total of $500 million in loans from the World Bank to cover a portion of the expected 2010 deficit, as U.S. officials continue to warn that reduced revenues and spending may jeopardize Iraqi investments in infrastructure and security forces needed to fully stabilize the country.
The military strategy employed by U.S. forces in Iraq has sought to create a secure environment in which Iraqis can resolve core political differences as a means of ensuring national stability and security. However, it remains to be seen whether proposed oil and gas legislation and ongoing interim efforts to develop Iraq's energy resources will promote reconciliation or contribute to deeper political tension. U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress thus face difficult choices with regard to engaging Iraqis on various policy proposals, related constitutional reforms, and oil and natural gas development contracts, while encouraging Iraqi counterparts to ensure that the content of proposed laws, amendments, and contracts reflects acceptable political compromises. This report reviews policy proposals and interim contracts, analyzes the positions of various Iraqi political actors, and discusses potential implications for U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq. See also CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33280 | crs_RL33280_0 | Introduction
The fluoridation of drinking water often generates both strong support and opposition within communities. The practice is recommended by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to prevent tooth decay. The decision to fluoridate a public water supply is made by the state or local municipality and is not mandated by any federal agency. Opponents have expressed concern regarding potential adverse health effects of exposure to fluoride, and some view the practice as an undemocratic infringement on individual freedom. The medical and public health communities generally have supported water fluoridation, citing it as a safe, effective, and equitable way to provide dental health protection community-wide. With the increased use of products containing fluoride, such as toothpaste and rinses, questions have emerged as to whether current fluoridation practices and levels are necessary and offer the most appropriate way to provide the beneficial effects of fluoride while avoiding adverse effects (such as tooth mottling or dental fluorosis) that can result from exposure to too much fluoride. Moreover, research gaps regarding the potential health effects of exposure to increased amounts of fluoride and among different age groups continue to add controversy to decisions regarding water fluoridation. Although many communities add fluoride to drinking water to strengthen teeth, others must treat their water to remove excess amounts of fluoride, which often is present naturally in water. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the maximum amount of fluoride that may be present in public drinking water supplies to protect against certain adverse health effects. In 1986, EPA issued a drinking water regulation for fluoride that includes an enforceable standard (a maximum contaminant level, or MCL) and a non-enforceable health-based maximum contaminant level goal (MCLG) of 4 milligrams per liter (mg/L) to protect against adverse effects on bone structure. EPA acknowledged that the standard did not protect infants and young children against dental fluorosis, which EPA considered a cosmetic effect rather than a health effect. To address concerns, EPA included in the regulation a secondary (advisory) standard of 2 mg/L to protect children against dental fluorosis and adverse health effects. As part of its ongoing review of the fluoride regulation, EPA asked the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences to review the health risk data for fluoride and to assess the adequacy of EPA's standards. On March 22, 2006, NRC released its study and concluded that EPA's 4 mg/L MCLG should be lowered. It also discusses the regulation of fluoride in drinking water to protect against adverse health effects from exposure to higher levels of fluoride, and it reviews the status of federal efforts to update the health risk assessment for fluoride and the primary drinking water standard for fluoride. In 2010, CDC reported that more than 204.2 million (73.9%) of the people in the United States who received their water from public water systems received fluoridated water. One of CDC's national health goals is to increase the proportion of the U.S. population served by community water systems with "optimally" fluoridated drinking water to 79.6% by 2020. To make a determination to revise the standard, EPA must not only review scientific information, but also must evaluate analytical methods for testing for fluoride at lower levels, treatment feasibility (including cost), occurrence, and exposure. In 2011, HHS proposed that community water systems use a fluoridation level of 0.7 milligrams per liter, which is the lower end of the current recommended range of 0.7 mg/L to 1.2 mg/L. | According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2010, 73.9% of the people in the United States who receive their water from a public water system received fluoridated water (roughly 204.3 million people). One of CDC's national health goals is to increase the proportion of the U.S. population served by community water systems with "optimally" fluoridated drinking water to 79.6% by 2020. The decision to add fluoride to a water supply is made by local or state governments. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had long recommended an optimal fluoridation level in the range of 0.7 to 1.2 milligrams per liter (mg/L) to prevent tooth decay.
The fluoridation of drinking water often generates both strong support and opposition within communities. This practice is controversial because fluoride has been found to have beneficial effects at low levels and is intentionally added to many public water supplies; however, at higher concentrations, it is known to have toxic effects. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the amount of fluoride that may be present in public water supplies to protect against fluoride's adverse health effects. Fluoridation opponents have expressed concern regarding potential adverse health effects of fluoride ingestion, and some view the practice as an unjustified infringement on individual freedom. The medical and public health communities generally have recommended water fluoridation, citing it as a safe, effective, and equitable way to provide dental health protection community-wide.
Because the use of fluoridated dental products and the consumption of food and beverages made with fluoridated water have increased since HHS recommended optimal levels for fluoridation, many people now may be exposed to more fluoride than had been anticipated. Consequently, questions have emerged as to whether current water fluoridation practices and levels offer the most appropriate ways to provide the expected beneficial effects of fluoride while avoiding adverse effects (most commonly, tooth mottling or pitting—dental fluorosis) that may result from ingestion of too much fluoride when teeth are developing. Also, scientific uncertainty regarding the health effects of exposure to higher levels of fluoride adds controversy to decisions regarding water fluoridation. In 2011, HHS proposed to reduce the recommended level to 0.7 mg/L.
Although fluoride is added to water to strengthen teeth, some communities must treat their water to remove excess amounts of fluoride that is present either naturally or from pollution. In 1986, EPA issued a drinking water regulation for fluoride that includes an enforceable standard—a maximum contaminant level (MCL)—and an MCL goal (MCLG) of 4 mg/L to protect against adverse effects on bone structure. EPA acknowledged that the standard did not protect infants and young children against dental fluorosis, which EPA considered a cosmetic effect rather than a health effect. To address this concern, EPA included in the regulation a secondary (advisory) standard of 2 mg/L to protect children against dental fluorosis and adverse health effects. As part of its current review of the fluoride regulation, EPA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to review the health risk data for fluoride and to assess the adequacy of EPA's standards. In March 2006, NRC released its study and concluded that EPA's 4 mg/L MCLG should be lowered.
In 2011, EPA released new risk and exposure assessments for fluoride. The agency announced its intent to use this science and additional research to review the primary and secondary drinking water standards for fluoride and to determine whether to revise them. To make a regulatory determination, EPA also must consider analytical methods for testing for fluoride at lower concentrations, treatment feasibility (including cost), occurrence, and exposure. |
crs_RL31146 | crs_RL31146_0 | In the midst of an economic downturn, colleges and universities in the United States are finding themselves confronting economic difficulties. Foreign students have historically been an important source of revenue for colleges and universities because unlike many of their native counterparts, foreign students frequently do not receive financial aid from the university—particularly at the undergraduate level. Despite the financial justifications for admitting large numbers of foreign students, critics of foreign student admissions generally raise two objections. The first objection is that foreign students are potentially displacing United States citizens at top-tier institutions, thereby putting the United States labor force at a competitive disadvantage. The second objection is that foreign students could potentially constitute a security risk. The tension over whether to legislate foreign student admissions levels is part of a broader set of competing policy agendas surrounding economic development and national security. Foreign students sit at the nexus of these competing policies due to their linkage to both the emerging labor force and their historical ties to security-based vulnerabilities. Thus, a potential issue for the 111 th Congress is whether foreign student visas should be numerically limited, or if they should remain uncapped. Additionally, Congress may need to consider whether it should legislate programs that either promote or deter additional admissions of foreign students to the United States. The three visa categories generally used by foreign students are F visas for academic study; M visas for vocational study; and J visas for cultural exchange. The student's arrival is reported to the Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) for entry in to the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). Trends and Characteristics
Foreign students have been coming to study in the United States for almost a century, and the numbers admitted have more than doubled over the past two decades. In FY1979, the total number of F and J visas issued by DOS consular officers was 224,030 and comprised 4% of all nonimmigrant visas issued. By FY2008, DOS issued 767,266 visas to F, J, and M nonimmigrants, and these categories made up 11% of all nonimmigrant visas issued. Legislation introduced in previous Congresses has focused on attracting more students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Thus, it is likely that similar legislation will be introduced in the 111 th Congress. | In the midst an economic downturn, colleges and universities in the United States are finding themselves confronting economic difficulties. Foreign students have historically been an important source of revenue for colleges and universities because unlike many of their native counterparts, foreign students frequently do not receive financial aid from the university—particularly at the undergraduate level. Despite the financial justifications for admitting large numbers of foreign students, critics of foreign student admissions generally raise two objections. The first objection is that foreign students are potentially displacing United States citizens at top-tier institutions, thereby putting the United States labor force at a competitive disadvantage. The second objection is that foreign students could potentially constitute a security risk.
The tension over whether to legislate foreign student admissions levels is part of a broader set of competing policy agendas surrounding economic development and national security. Foreign students sit at the nexus of these competing policies due to their linkage to both the emerging labor force and their historical ties to security-based vulnerabilities. Thus, a potential issue for the 111th Congress is whether foreign student visas should be numerically limited, or if they should remain uncapped. Additionally, Congress may need to consider whether it should legislate programs that either promote or deter additional admissions of foreign students to the United States.
All nonimmigrant students are issued visas from one of three categories, and are monitored and tracked by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The three visa categories used by foreign students are F visas for academic study; M visas for vocational study; and J visas for cultural exchange. The numbers admitted have more than doubled over the past two decades. In FY1979, the total number of foreign student and cultural exchange visas issued by DOS consular officers was 224,030 and comprised 4% of all nonimmigrant visas issued. In FY2008, DOS issued 767,266 visas to F, J, and M nonimmigrants, making up 11.6% of all nonimmigrant visas issued. The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) aims to manage the tracking and monitoring of foreign students. Participation in the SEVIS program is now mandatory for all higher education institutions enrolling foreign students.
A diverse set of issues related to foreign students, including foreign student funding and English-language competency, has raised concerns with some universities, advocacy groups, and other observers. Additionally, legislation introduced in previous Congresses have focused on attracting more students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Thus, it is likely that similar legislation will be introduced in the 111th Congress.
This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_RS21464 | crs_RS21464_0 | After a total of eight negotiating rounds, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Moroccan Minister Taib Fassi-Fihri reached agreement on March 2, 2004 on a comprehensive FTA. Both the Senate and House approved implementing legislation in July 2004, and President Bush signed the legislation into law ( P.L. 108-302 ) on August 3, 2004. The Moroccan Parliament ratified the agreement on January 18, 2005, but subsequently had to legislate changes in the country's intellectual property laws to implement its FTA obligations. Each agreement is intended to be an integral part of President Bush's strategy to create a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. Background
Morocco is a moderate Arab state which maintains close relations with Europe and the United States. Why Morocco? As Morocco is one of the strongest U.S. allies in the war on terrorism in the Middle East, the FTA is intended as a reward for its support, as well as send a signal to the rest of the Arab world that the United States wants closer ties. Key Provisions of the FTA13
The agreement provides that more than 95% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products will become duty-free immediately, and all other remaining tariffs will be eliminated within nine years. | The United States and Morocco reached agreement on March 2, 2004 to create a free trade agreement (FTA). The Senate approved implementing legislation ( S. 2677 ) on July 2, 2004 by a vote of 85-13 and the House approved identical legislation ( H.R. 4842 ) on July 22, 2004 by a vote of 323-99. The next day, the Senate passed House approved H.R. 4842 without amendment by unanimous consent. The legislation was signed by President Bush into law ( P.L. 108-302 ) on August 3, 2004. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 2006, a year later than planned due to the need for Morocco's Parliament to pass amendments to its intellectual property laws. The FTA is intended to strengthen bilateral ties, boost trade and investment flows, and bolster Morocco's position as a moderate Arab state. More than 95% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products became duty-free upon entry into force, while most other remaining barriers are to be phased out over a number of years. This report will be updated later this year. |
crs_RL32094 | crs_RL32094_0 | The current debate about consular identification cards in the United States has centeredaround the matrÃcula consular, the consular card issued by the Mexican government to its citizensin the United States when they register with a consulate. Additionally,12 states recognize the card as one of the acceptable proofs of identity to obtain a driver's license. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, approved inDecember 2004 in response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, requires the Secretary ofHomeland Security to propose, subject to congressional approval, minimum standards foridentification documents to be used by airline passengers (and, after a report, for entry to designatedfederal facilities) and establishes strict default standards in the event of congressional disapproval. On February 10, 2005, the House passed H.R. 418 , the REAL ID Act of 2005(Sensenbrenner), that would establish identity card standards for the issuance of drivers' licenses thatwould seem to preclude the use of consular ID cards for those purposes. 1268 )as Division B on March 16, 2005. 1268 was passed with thespecified provisions by the House and Senate in early May 2005, and it was signed into law ( P.L.109-13 ) on May 11, 2005. They maintain that acceptance of thecard is necessary in a post-September 11, 2001 America in which photo identification is required toconduct daily business and that such acceptance is beneficial not only for the holders but for thebanks and other institutions as well. Supporters argue that the card is a secure, fraud-resistantdocument that reliably identifies the bearer. Opponents argue that domestic acceptance of the card threatens homeland security. Proponents of the matrÃcula consular argue that consular identification cards make it easierfor U.S. law enforcement officials to notify consulates of the detention of foreign nationals, andthereby improve the likelihood that U.S. citizens under arrest abroad will have the benefit of consularnotification and protection. The major measure inthat area was the Transportation-Treasury Appropriations for FY2005, incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 ( H.R. As enacted, the measure restored funding, without the previouslypassed prohibitions, for Treasury Department implementation of regulations permitting financialinstitutions to accept the matrÃcula consular cards as identity documents for banking purposes. 4818 / P.L. 108-447 . S. 2845 / P.L. 108-458 . Section 3006 would have providedthat for the purpose of establishing identity to any federal employee, an alien in the United Statescould present (1) any document issued by the U.S. Attorney General or the Secretary of HomelandSecurity under the authority of an immigration law, (2) a domestically issued document that theSecretary of Homeland Security had designated as reliable and that could not be issued to an alienunlawfully present in the United States, or (3) any unexpired, lawfully issued foreign passport asdetermined by the Secretary of State. Following conference, H.R. 109-13 includes provisions that require a determination that the applicant is lawfully present in the UnitedStates and that specify that an official passport is the only acceptable foreign identity document. 368 would establishidentity card standards for federal recognition and the issuance of drivers' licenses. (22) The bill was attached to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2005( H.R. | The current debate about consular identification cards in the United States has centeredaround the matrÃcula consular, the consular identification card issued by Mexican consulates toMexican citizens in the United States. In May 2003, the Treasury Department issued regulationsallowing acceptance of the cards as proof of identity for the purpose of opening a bank account, andthe cards are accepted for other purposes as well, including issuance of drivers licenses.
Consular identification cards raise issues for domestic policy and foreign policy. Withrespect to domestic policy, supporters argue that acceptance of the cards is necessary in apost-September 11, 2001 America, where photo identification is required to conduct daily business. They maintain that the card is a secure and fraud-resistant document that improves security andbrings people into the open financial community where transactions can be monitored more easily. Opponents argue that the cards are not secure and are needed only by aliens who are illegally presentin the United States and serve to undermine U.S. immigration policy.
In the area of foreign policy, supporters maintain that U.S. acceptance of the cards hasimproved bilateral relations with an important neighboring country. They argue that the cards helpU.S. officials to notify consulates of the detention of foreign nationals and improve the likelihoodthat U.S. citizens will have the benefit of consular notification. Opponents contend that regulationof the cards is necessary to reinforce immigration policy and to defend against terrorism.
On February 10, 2005, the House passed H.R. 418 , the REAL ID Act of 2005 that would, among other things, establish standards for the issuance of drivers' licenses that wouldseem to preclude the acceptance of consular ID cards, The bill includes provisions that require adetermination that the applicant is lawfully present in the United States and that specify that anofficial passport is the only acceptable foreign identity document. This measure was attached by theHouse to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2005 ( H.R. 1268 ) asDivision B on March 16, 2005. Following conference, H.R. 1268 was passed with thespecified provisions by the House and Senate in early May 2005, and it was signed into law ( P.L.109-13 ) on May 11, 2005.
Last year, in November 2004, Congress passed the Transportation-Treasury Appropriationsfor FY2005 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 ( H.R. 4818 / P.L.108-447 ), after restoring funding for Treasury Department implementation of regulations permittingfinancial institutions to accept consular ID cards as identity documents for banking purposes. InDecember 2004, Congress also passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 ( S. 2845 / P.L. 108-458 ), with requirements that the Secretary of HomelandSecurity propose minimum standards for identification documents to be used by airline passengersand minimal standards for the issuance of drivers' licenses. This report will be updated as legislativedevelopments occur. |
crs_RL34465 | crs_RL34465_0 | 110-85 ) was signed into law on September 27, 2007. The law reauthorizes four expiring Food and Drug Administration (FDA) programs and expands the agency's authority to ensure the safety of prescription drugs and biologics, medical devices, and foods. The primary impetus for the legislation was the renewal of FDA's authority for two key user fee programs that were set to expire at the end of FY2007: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA, last reauthorized in 2002; P.L. 107-188 ), and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA, enacted in 2002; P.L. The law also reauthorizes two other expiring authorities, which are related to pediatric pharmaceuticals: the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA, last reauthorized in 2002; P.L. 107-109 ), and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA, enacted in 2002; P.L. 108-155 ). In addition to the reauthorizations, FDAAA contains several other FDA-related provisions. These include provisions designed to enhance drug safety, spark the development of pediatric medical devices, expand the types of trials and the substance of information in clinical trial databases, create a new nonprofit entity to assist FDA with its mission, improve food safety, and affect a number of other areas related to public health. In performing that role, as refined by FDAAA, FDA's regulation of medical products affects their quality, availability, and cost within the health care system. Legislative Background: S. 1082 and H.R. These were the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act ( S. 1082 ), and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 ( H.R. Each section introduces the topic, surveys the ways in which new provisions changed the law, provides links to relevant CRS reports, and presents a detailed table comparing FDAAA-enacted provisions to any existing previous law. Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007
Title I of FDAAA, the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007 (referred to as PDUFA IV), provides a five-year extension of FDA's authority to collect user fees from manufacturers of drug and biological products and expands the authorized uses of fee revenue. Reauthorization and Report Requirements. 107-250 ). FDA's authority to collect medical device user fees was due to expire on October 1, 2007. MDUFA 2007 became effective on October 1, 2007. P.L. | On September 27, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA; H.R. 3580) was signed into law (P.L. 110-85). The comprehensive law reauthorizes four expiring Food and Drug Administration (FDA) programs and expands the agency's authority to regulate the safety of prescription drugs and biologics, medical devices, and foods. Understanding the way in which FDAAA changed the law governing the agency informs policy discussions aimed at additional FDA reform and reorganization, as well as those related more broadly to the quality, availability, and cost of medical products in the health care system.
At its core, FDAAA renews the authority for two key user fee programs that were set to expire on October 1, 2007: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA; P.L. 107-188) and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA; P.L. 107-250). In FY2007, the year in which FDAAA was enacted, these programs accounted for 91% of FDA's user fee revenue and 18% of FDA's total budget. Without the reauthorizations, and absent a substantial increase in FDA's annual appropriations, the agency would have lost a significant amount of funding.
In addition to user fee programs, FDAAA reauthorizes two other FDA authorities related to prescription drugs for pediatric populations, which were also due to expire on October 1, 2007: the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA; P.L. 107-109) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA; P.L. 108-155). These laws provide marketing exclusivity incentives and requirements for studying pediatric use of drugs. FDAAA also contains provisions related to drug safety, pediatric medical devices, clinical trial databases, the creation of a new nonprofit entity to assist FDA with its mission, and food safety.
This report presents a detailed summary of provisions in FDAAA. Each section of the report begins with background information about the FDA relevant to the passage of FDAAA and some references, if appropriate, to the two bills that formed its basis (S. 1082 and H.R. 2900), and a law that amended it (P.L. 110-316); describes FDAAA's contents; and analyzes how FDAAA changed the law. The report also contains links to pertinent CRS reports. This report, which is intended for reference use, will not be updated other than to reflect any technical changes that Congress might enact. |
crs_R40874 | crs_R40874_0 | Less frequently addressed in proposed legislation is emission reduction for non-CO 2 greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide (N 2 O). However, N 2 O reduction efforts have the potential to mitigate climate change. No new legislation needs to be passed to regulate N 2 O for climate protection and ozone recovery. The five non-CO 2 greenhouse gases regularly monitored but not entirely regulated by EPA (methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexaflouride) accounted for approximately 17% of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2009, as measured by total tons of CO 2 equivalent. N 2 O emission reduction could thus play a compelling role in recovery of the ozone layer as well as in greenhouse gas emission reduction. The agriculture sector is the primary anthropogenic source of nitrous oxide. Once released, N 2 O lingers in the atmosphere for decades (its atmospheric lifetime is approximately 114 years) and is 310 times more effective at trapping heat in the atmosphere over a 100-year time frame than carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Sources of N2O Emissions
Nitrous oxide is emitted from anthropogenic (manmade) and natural sources. Agricultural soil management (e.g., fertilization, application of manure to soils, drainage and cultivation of organic soils) is responsible for more than two-thirds of anthropogenic U.S. N 2 O emissions. In 2009, N 2 O emissions from agricultural soil management totaled more than 200 million metric tons of CO 2 e. Other anthropogenic sources of N 2 O are combustion by mobile sources (cars, trucks, etc. Policy Options for Nitrous Oxide Emission Reduction
Congress has begun to investigate the reduction of non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions, including N 2 O emissions, as one strategy to mitigate climate change. Congress could approach N 2 O emissions reduction as part of a comprehensive GHG emission strategy offering economically attractive abatement alternatives to discourage actions leading to climate change. With or without ODP substance listing, Congress may find it useful to incorporate the ozone depletion impacts of N 2 O into its climate change policy proposals both to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to further ozone recovery achievements. | Gases other than carbon dioxide accounted for approximately 17% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2009, yet there has been minimal discussion of these other greenhouse gases in climate and energy legislative initiatives. Reducing emissions from non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide (N2O), could deliver short-term climate change mitigation results as part of a comprehensive policy approach to combat climate change.
Nitrous oxide is 310 times more potent than carbon dioxide in its ability to affect the climate; and moreover, results of a recent scientific study indicate that nitrous oxide is currently the leading ozone-depleting substance being emitted. Thus, legislation to restrict nitrous oxide emissions could contribute to both climate change protection and ozone recovery.
The primary human source of nitrous oxide is agricultural soil management, which accounted for more than two-thirds of the N2O emissions reported in 2009 (approximately 205 million metric tons CO2 equivalent). One proposed strategy to lower N2O emissions is more efficient application of synthetic fertilizers. However, further analysis is needed to determine the economic feasibility of this approach as well as techniques to measure and monitor the adoption rate and impact of N2O emission reduction practices for agricultural soil management.
As the 112th Congress considers legislation that would limit greenhouse gas emissions, among the issues being discussed is how to address emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Whether such emissions should be subject to direct regulation, what role EPA should play using its existing Clean Air Act authority, and what role USDA should play in any N2O reduction scheme are among the issues being discussed. How these issues are resolved will have important implications for agriculture, which has taken a keen interest in climate change legislation. |
crs_RL31149 | crs_RL31149_0 | According to the National Parks Conservation Association, use of snowmobiles outside of Alaska has mostly been concentrated in five units of the park system: Yellowstone National Park, Voyageurs National Park, Rocky Mountain National Park, Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore, and the John D. Rockefeller Memorial Parkway. Snowmobile visits to Yellowstone increased during the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 winter seasons, peaking at 87,206 in the latter winter. Park Service Policy on Snowmobile Access
Although recreational access by snowmobiles has been permitted in units of the national park system, the Park Service, in the late 1990s, concluded that such use has generally been in violation of Executive Orders 11644 and 11989, issued by Presidents Nixon and Carter respectively. Upon completion of the study, the Clinton Administration promulgated a final rule in January 2001, banning snowmobiles from Yellowstone, Grand Teton, and the Rockefeller Parkway beginning in the winter of 2003-2004, but allowing continued visitor access through the use of "snowcoaches"—guided tour-vans that run on rubber treads. The machines themselves would have been required to achieve a 90% reduction in hydrocarbon emissions and a 70% reduction in carbon monoxide under the 2003 rules. The most recent version, released in February 2008, contains 26 models. (The Wyoming court vacated and remanded the Clinton rules on October 14, 2004.) Snowcoaches are also allowed. The snowmobiles would be required to meet best available technology requirements for emissions and noise, and it would require that snowmobilers be accompanied by commercial guides. On September 15, 2008, Judge Emmett Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the plan, finding it "arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by the record, and contrary to law." With the rule vacated, it is unclear what limits will apply in the coming winter season. Clean Air Act and Noise Control Act Regulation
In reversing the Clinton Administration rules on Yellowstone access, the National Park Service set limits on emissions and noise from the snowmobiles that would be allowed in the three Yellowstone area park units. In one hour, a typical snowmobile emits as much hydrocarbon as a 2008 model automobile emits in 54,000 miles of driving. In a day of use, a snowmobile may emit as much hydrocarbon as an automobile emits over its entire lifetime. As noted, the National Park Service promulgated noise standards applicable to snowmobiles entering its three Yellowstone area park units beginning December 17, 2003, under the winter use rule that was vacated; it restated these standards in its Temporary Winter Use Plan that took effect in 2004. On June 1, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. In its October 5, 2001 Federal Register notice, which proposed the snowmobile standards, the Agency identified 7 areas in Alaska, Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Montana that have significant populations of snowmobiles and have failed to attain the air quality standard for CO.
Manufacturers of snowmobiles and other nonroad vehicles note, however, that carbon monoxide concentrations have declined [chiefly as a result of auto emission standards] and that none of the 7 areas identified by the Agency has exceeded the CO standard in recent years, even if they were still formally classified as nonattainment at the time of the proposal. Congress and the NPS have provided a temporary resolution of the Yellowstone access issue since 2004, but the issue is now returning to the limelight, as a federal district court has vacated final regulations for Yellowstone access for a third time. The development of these rules showed that public interest in snowmobile issues remains significant, and that the National Park Service's preferred alternatives for snowmobile access to Yellowstone remain overwhelmingly unpopular. Among those opposed, environmental groups and individuals that want snowmobiles banned from the park form a solid majority. | For at least a decade, the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone and other national parks has been controversial because of the potential impacts on wildlife and, until recently, the absence of standards for snowmobile emissions and noise. The National Park Service has attempted to address the issue by developing Winter Use Plans that establish regulations and limits at individual park units. These plans have been the subject of numerous legal challenges. On September 15, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the National Park Service's most recent Winter Use Plan for Yellowstone National Park. The plan would have allowed up to 540 snowmobiles per day into the park beginning in the 2008-2009 winter season, provided that they met noise and emission standards and that the riders were accompanied by commercial guides. The NPS plan was opposed by environmental groups and the vast majority of public commenters. With the rule vacated, it is unclear what limits will apply in the coming winter season.
Current model snowmobiles emit significant quantities of pollution. In one hour, a new model snowmobile emits as much hydrocarbon as a 2008 model auto emits in about four years (54,000 miles) of driving. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated regulations limiting air emissions from snowmobiles in 2002, but the regulations have the effect of allowing the machines to emit as much hydrocarbon pollution in a day as a new auto emits in its lifetime. Snowmobiles also emit significant amounts of noise. EPA has no snowmobile noise standards.
The National Park Service has allowed snowmobile use in 43 units of the national park system, in many cases in apparent violation of Executive Orders from the Nixon and Carter years. Outside of Alaska (where snowmobiles are permitted in most national parks by law), the most popular national park for snowmobiling has been Yellowstone, which saw more than 87,000 snowmobile visits in the 2001-2002 winter season. Under the Clinton Administration, the Park Service decided that the emissions and noise from snowmobiling were incompatible with protecting the park, and promulgated rules that would have phased out snowmobiles from Yellowstone by the winter of 2003-2004. The Bush Administration revisited these rules and announced modifications in March 2003 that would have allowed continued use of snowmobiles. The 2003 rules and the Clinton Administration action have been the subject of conflicting court rulings: a federal court in Wyoming has vacated and remanded the Clinton Administration's phaseout, while a D.C. federal court has vacated and remanded the Bush Administration rules. For the last four winters, Yellowstone and two neighboring park units have operated under a temporary plan that permits 720 snowmobiles per day in Yellowstone, but sets standards for their emissions and requires snowmobilers to be accompanied by commercial guides. Under these rules, snowmobile visits have declined by two-thirds.
Efforts to reduce snowmobile emissions and noise remain contentious. This report discusses snowmobile access to the parks, snowmobile emissions, EPA's emission standards, and congressional efforts to address these issues. |
crs_RS22764 | crs_RS22764_0 | Section 302 of the DWRRA provides a mechanism by which holders of existing leases can apply for royalty relief, which is to be granted by the Secretary of the Interior if the lease would otherwise be uneconomic. The Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007
On August 4, 2007, the House passed H.R. 3221 . The Impact of the Kerr-McGee Ruling on the Proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007
Since the Kerr-McGee ruling was issued on October 30, 2007, there has been extensive congressional interest in the impact of the ruling on the proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007, as described above. The recent ruling by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, if upheld, would effectively eliminate the distinction between the 1998 and 1999 deep water leases, which do not include price thresholds, and the 1996, 1997 and 2000 deep water leases, which contain price thresholds that are not enforceable because they are in violation of congressional intent in enacting section 304 of the DWRRA. As noted above, section 7504(d)(1) defines a "covered lease" as "a lease for oil or gas production in the Gulf of Mexico that is ... issued by the Department of the Interior under Section 304 of the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act ... and ... not subject to limitations on royalty relief based on market prices that are equal to or less than the price thresholds" described in the DWRRA. If Congress does wish to encourage recovery of royalties on all leases issued pursuant to section 304 of the DWRRA between 1996 and 2000 that are limited by both price and volumetric thresholds, it could likely do so by passage of the proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007 as it is currently worded in sections 7501-7505 of H.R. 3221 . | On October 30, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana issued a ruling in Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred that rebuffed efforts of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) to collect royalties from offshore oil and gas production leases based on so-called "price thresholds" for previously granted royalty relief.
There has been considerable interest in the impact of this ruling on ongoing congressional efforts related to certain "missing" royalty payment requirements in leases issued by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the DOI in 1998 and 1999, including the proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007, as found at sections 7501-7505 of H.R. 3221. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3221 on August 4, 2007. This report (1) provides background on the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), pursuant to which royalty-free leases, including the controversial 1998 and 1999 leases, were issued; (2) summarizes relevant portions of the proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act, which attempts to encourage the renegotiation of the controversial 1998 and 1999 leases; (3) summarizes the recent ruling in the Kerr-McGee matter; and (4) analyzes the potential impact of that recent ruling on the proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act and any similar legislative efforts. This analysis is restricted to a discussion of the potential impact of the recent ruling on section 7504 of H.R. 3221, which would place restrictions on holders of leases that lack price thresholds. It does not address section 7503 of H.R. 3221, which seeks to "clarify the authority" of the Secretary of the Interior to include price thresholds on royalty relief in offshore leases pursuant to section 304 of the DWRRA. |
crs_RL33532 | crs_RL33532_0 | Many Members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the use of Armed Forces that might lead to war. On November 7, 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution ( P.L. 93-148 ) over the veto of President Nixon. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) states that the President's powers as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces. Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia
The issue of war powers and whether congressional authorization is necessary for U.S. participation in U.N. action was also raised by efforts to halt fighting in the former territory of Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia. Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty, ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically authorizes such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Kosovo
The issue of presidential authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional authorization, under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of significant controversy in late March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo. This action has become the focus of an ongoing policy debate over the purpose and scope of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. A war powers issue for years was whether the use of U.S. force in Iraq in the period after the early 1991 Desert Storm conflict had been authorized by Congress. On September 5, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress on U.S. military actions in Iraq to obtain compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions, especially in light of attacks by Iraqi military forces against the Kurdish-controlled city of Irbil. Such actions, in the past, were reported under P.L. 102-1 would in the future be included in the reports required by P.L. Since he announced the end of major combat operations against Iraq on May 1, 2003, the President has made periodic reports on the current situation in Iraq "consistent with" P.L. As enacted, Section 8147 of P.L. On October 7, the President consulted with congressional leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy and also announced that U.S. forces would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. In addition, on November 9, 1993, the House adopted H.Con.Res. 292 , expressing the opinion of the House, among other things, that "the President shall not deploy, establish or maintain the presence of units and members of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in Libya," except to rescue a member of the Armed Forces from imminent danger, and that the President shall within 14 days after passage of this resolution provide a report to the House detailing information about Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector, and a report answering a number of questions detailing U.S. security interests and objectives, and the activities of United States Armed Forces, in Libya since March 19, 2011. Instances Formally Reported Under the War Powers Resolution
Presidents have submitted 132 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution. The U.S. also continues to deploy military forces in support of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. Issues for Congress
An immediate issue for Congress when the President introduces troops into situations of potential hostilities is whether to invoke Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and trigger a durational limit for the action unless Congress authorizes the forces to remain. 107-243 ). Prior to using force under this statute the President is required to communicate to Congress his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not "adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions" and that the use of force is "consistent" with the battle against terrorism. | Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces Armed Forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of Armed Forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. This report does not deal with the substantive merits of using Armed Forces in specific cases, but rather with congressional authorization for military action, and the application and effectiveness of the WPR. The purpose of the WPR (P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973) is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may get the United States involved in hostilities. Compliance becomes an issue whenever the President introduces U.S. forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities. Criteria for compliance include prior consultation with Congress, fulfillment of the reporting requirements, and congressional authorization. If the President has not complied fully, the issue becomes what action Congress should take to bring about compliance or to influence U.S. policy. A related issue has been congressional authorization of U.N. peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions.
For over three decades, war powers and the War Powers Resolution have been an issue in U.S. military actions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Europe. Presidents have submitted 136 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Congress invoked the WPR in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, enacted in January 1991, authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces in response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the WPR. On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the WPR to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. War powers have been at issue in former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti. Authorizing military actions in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, through P.L. 107-40 directly involved war powers. The continued use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions remained a war powers issue from the end of the Gulf War on February 28, 1991, until the enactment of P.L. 107-243 in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003, and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq. Most recently, issues associated with presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution have arisen over his use of U.S. military forces to support a U.N. sanctioned "no-fly zone" in Libya, without obtaining congressional authorization for such action.
Debate continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions that might get the United States involved in a significant military conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the resolution. None have been enacted to date. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22809 | crs_RS22809_0 | Overview: Ghana and the United States
U.S.-Ghanaian relations are warm, as signaled by President Barack Obama travel to Ghana from July 10 to 11, 2009 (see " President Obama's Trip to Ghana "). His trip followed an early 2008 trip by former President George W. Bush to Ghana, which in 2006 signed a $547 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact. It is seen as a model for many of the outcomes that U.S. development assistance programs in Africa have sought to achieve over multiple Congresses and presidential administrations. It is also a stable country in an often volatile sub-region and, along with the United States, has helped to mediate several political and/or military conflicts in West Africa over the last quarter century. These conflicts have caused widespread displacement and humanitarian suffering, which the United States has repeatedly sought to mitigate through the provision of often large amounts of humanitarian assistance. Ghana is also praised for its steady contribution of troops to international peacekeeping operations in Africa and elsewhere and is a recipient of U.S. training aimed at supporting such deployments. Ghana has also drawn attention because of its recent discovery of sizable reserves of crude oil, and its possible role in contributing to global and U.S. energy security. Its reserves promises to boost Ghana's national income and development prospects, but ― based on the experience of many other oil-rich developing countries—may also pose substantial good governance and resource management challenges. Ghana, like the United States, also faces challenges with respect to illicit narcotics trafficking, notably with respect to a rise in recent years of cocaine being transported from South America to Europe via West Africa. Shared interest in countering such trafficking is a growing area of U.S.-Ghanaian cooperation. The elections had drawn widespread international attention because they marked Ghana's fifth consecutive democratic national election, preceded its second democratic transfer of power from one political party to another and, at the presidential level, were reportedly among the closest ever in post-colonial Africa. The resulting transfer of state power from one political party to another, a historically uncommon occurrence in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa, signified Ghana's further maturation as a democracy following a transition from "no-party" rule that began in 1992, and provided a sharp contrast to recent counter-democratic developments in Africa. It was cast as the last of a four-part thematic series of major overseas speeches laying out some of President Obama's key foreign policy views. The speech centered on the integral relationship between democracy, good governance, and development in Africa and in the wider developing world. Oil Sector Issues and Controversies
Development of Jubilee has been controversial and has at times threatened to become an impediment in U.S.-Ghanaian relations, primarily in relation to the nature of Kosmos Energy's entry into the Ghanaian oil sector, and in relation to efforts by the U.S.-owned firm to sell its stake in Jubilee. In January 2009, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) opened a permanent regional cooperation office in Ghana. Ghana became a President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) country in FY2008. FY2011 Development Assistance plans call for a major emphasis on increasing agricultural productivity and utility, in large part under a new development effort called the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI). On the DEA's role and other U.S. efforts to help counter drug trafficking in Ghana, see Illicit Drugs" section, above. | This report provides information on current developments in Ghana and Ghanaian-U.S. relations, which are close. Warm bilateral relations were signaled by President Barack Obama's July 2009 trip to Ghana. Ghana was chosen for his first travel as president to Africa because of its democratic and economic development successes. In Ghana, President Obama made the last of a four-part thematic series of major overseas speeches on key foreign policy issues. The speech in Ghana, to the national parliament, centered on the integral relationship between democracy, good governance, and development in Africa and in the wider developing world. Close ties were also signaled by a trip to Ghana by former President George W. Bush in 2008. While Ghana has not been the focal subject of recent U.S. legislation, hearings, or other major Congressional actions it regularly hosts travel by Members and is widely seen as a key U.S. partner in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana's national elections in late 2008 drew international attention because they marked Ghana's fifth consecutive democratic national election, preceded its second democratic transfer of power from one political party to another and, at the presidential level, were reportedly among the closest ever in post-colonial Africa. They signified Ghana's further maturation as a democracy following a transition from "no-party" rule that began in 1992, and were seen as a benchmark for democratic consolidation in Africa following a series of highly contested, volatile elections and other democratic setbacks on the sub-continent.
Ghana is also a stable country in an often volatile sub-region and, along with the United States, has helped to mediate several political and/or military conflicts in West Africa over the last quarter century. These conflicts have caused widespread displacement and humanitarian suffering, which the United States has helped to mitigate through the provision of large amounts of humanitarian assistance. Ghana is also praised for its steady contribution of troops to international peacekeeping operations in Africa and elsewhere and is a recipient of U.S. training aimed at supporting such deployments.
Ghana is often seen as a model for many of the outcomes that U.S. development assistance programs in Africa have long sought to achieve, and hosts bilateral and regional U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions. It is a recipient of U.S. assistance under the Obama Administration's new Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI) as well as a President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) country. In 2006, Ghana signed a $547 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact.
Ghana is currently drawing attention because of its recent discovery of sizable reserves of crude oil, and its possible role in contributing to global and U.S. energy security. Oil promises to boost national income and development prospects, but, based on the experience of other oil-rich developing countries, may also pose substantial good governance and resource management challenges, which Ghana is taking measures to address. Oil sector development has caused bilateral commercial friction, principally regarding an attempt by a U.S. oil firm, Kosmos Energy, to sell its stakes in two Ghanaian oil fields. Oil sector issues are discussed at length in this report.
Ghana, like the United States, faces an illicit drugs trafficking threat, notably relating to a rise in cocaine being transported from South America to Europe via West Africa. Shared interest in countering such trafficking is a growing area of U.S.-Ghanaian cooperation. The U.S. embassy in Accra hosts a DEA regional cooperation office, and has established a vetted counternarcotics unit, the first in sub-Saharan Africa, in cooperation with the DEA. |
crs_RS22131 | crs_RS22131_0 | The farm bill is an omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. The farm bill is renewed about every five years. The Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. It was enacted in February 2014 and expires mostly in 2018. It succeeded the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. The 2014 farm bill contains 12 titles encompassing commodity price and income supports, farm credit, trade, agricultural conservation, research, rural development, energy, and foreign and domestic food programs, among other programs. Provisions in the 2014 farm bill reshaped the structure of farm commodity support, expanded crop insurance coverage, consolidated conservation programs, reauthorized and revised nutrition assistance, and extended authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) discretionary programs through FY2018. When the current farm bill was enacted in February 2014, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the total cost of mandatory programs would be $489 billion for the 12-title farm bill over the five years FY2014-FY2018. Four titles accounted for 99% of anticipated farm bill mandatory outlays: nutrition, crop insurance, conservation, and farm commodity support. The nutrition title, which includes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), comprised 80% of the total. The remaining 20% was mostly geared toward agricultural production across several other titles ( Table 1 ). In the years since enactment of the farm bill, CBO has updated its projections of government spending several times a year based on new information about the economy and program participation. Outlays for FY2014-FY2016 have become final (actual), estimates are available for FY2017, and updated projections for FY2018 have generally reflected lower farm commodity prices and lower costs for SNAP. The new five-year estimated cost of the 2014 farm bill, as of April 2018, is $455 billion for the four largest titles, compared with $484 billion for those same four titles four years ago (right side of Table 1 ). This is $28 billion less than what was projected at enactment (-6%). The result of these new projections is that SNAP outlays are projected to be $26 billion less for the five-year period FY2014-FY2018 than was expected in February 2014 (-7%). Crop insurance is projected to be $10 billion less for the five-year period (-25%) and conservation programs about $5 billion less (-19%). In contrast, farm commodity and disaster program payments are projected to be about $13 billion higher than was expected at enactment (+55%) due to lower commodity market prices (which raises counter-cyclical payments) and higher livestock payments due to disasters. | The farm bill is an omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. Titles in the most recent farm bill encompassed farm commodity price and income supports, agricultural conservation, farm credit, trade, research, rural development, bioenergy, foreign food aid, and domestic nutrition assistance. Because it is renewed about every five years, the farm bill provides a predictable opportunity for policymakers to comprehensively and periodically address agricultural and food issues.
The most recent farm bill—the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79; 2014 farm bill)—was enacted into law in February 2014 and expires in 2018. It succeeded the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. Provisions in the 2014 farm bill reshaped the structure of farm commodity support, expanded crop insurance coverage, consolidated conservation programs, reauthorized and revised nutrition assistance, and extended authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) discretionary programs through FY2018.
When the 2014 farm bill was enacted, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the total cost of mandatory programs would be $489 billion over the five years FY2014-FY2018. Four titles accounted for 99% ($483.8 billion) of anticipated farm bill mandatory program outlays: nutrition, crop insurance, conservation, and farm commodity support. The nutrition title, which includes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), comprised 80% of the total. The remaining 20% was mostly geared toward agricultural production across several other titles.
CBO has updated its projections of government spending based on new information about the economy and program participation. Outlays for FY2014 to FY2017 are completed, and updated projections for FY2018 have generally reflected lower-than-expected farm commodity prices in the near term and lower-than-expected participation in SNAP. The new five-year estimated cost of the 2014 farm bill, as of April 2018, is now $455 billion for the four largest titles, compared with $484 billion for those same four titles four years ago. This is $28 billion less than what was projected at enactment.
SNAP outlays are projected to be $26 billion less for the five-year period FY2014-FY2018 than was expected in February 2014. Crop insurance is projected to be $10 billion less for the five-year period and conservation about $5 billion less. In contrast, farm commodity and disaster program payments are projected to be about $13 billion higher than was expected at enactment due to lower commodity market prices (which raises counter-cyclical payments) and higher livestock payments due to disasters. |
crs_RL32270 | crs_RL32270_0 | Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the enforcement of our nation's immigration laws has received a significant amount of attention. Some observers contend that the federal government has scarce resources to enforce immigration law and that state and local law enforcement entities should be utilized. Still, many continue to question what role state and local law enforcement agencies should have in light of limited state and local resources and immigration expertise. States and localities have traditionally only been permitted to directly enforce certain criminal provisions that fall under their jurisdictions, whereas the enforcement of the civil provisions has been viewed as a federal responsibility with states playing an incidental supporting role. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. In previous Congresses, several proposals had been introduced, however, that would appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil regulatory aspects of immigration law (i.e., identifying and detaining deportable aliens for purposes of removal). This potential expansion has prompted many to examine the legal authority by which state and local law enforcement agencies may enforce immigration law, particularly the civil enforcement measures. This report examines the role of state and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration law. Accordingly, the court concluded that the authority of state officials to enforce the provisions of the INA "is limited to criminal provisions." Section 1252c(a) states in part:
[T]o the extent permitted by relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who— (1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and (2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual and only for such period of time as may be required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of deporting or removing the alien from the United States. Civil Rights
One of the overriding concerns with state and local police involvement in the enforcement of immigration law is the potential for civil rights violations. Pro/Con Analysis of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials Enforcing Immigration Law
Determining what the proper role of state and local law enforcement officials is in enforcing immigration law is not without controversy. | Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the enforcement of our nation's immigration laws has received a significant amount of attention. Some observers contend that the federal government does not have adequate resources to enforce immigration law and that state and local law enforcement entities should be utilized. Others, however, question what role state and local law enforcement agencies should have in light of limited state and local resources and immigration expertise.
Congress defined our nation's immigration laws in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which contains both criminal and civil enforcement measures. Historically, the authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law has been construed to be limited to certain criminal provisions of the INA that also fall under state and local jurisdictions; by contrast, the enforcement of the civil provisions, which includes apprehension and removal of deportable aliens, has strictly been viewed as a federal responsibility, with states playing an incidental supporting role. In previous Congresses, several proposals had been set forth that would appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil enforcement aspects of the INA.
Congress, through various amendments to the INA, has gradually broadened the authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law, and some recent statutes have begun to carve out possible state roles in the enforcement of civil matters. Indeed, several jurisdictions have signed agreements (INA §287(g)) with the federal government to allow their respective state and local law enforcement agencies to perform new, limited duties relating to immigration law enforcement. Still, the enforcement of immigration laws by state and local officials has sparked debate among many who question what the proper role of state and local law enforcement officials should be in enforcing such laws. For example, many have expressed concern over proper training, finite resources at the local level, possible civil rights violations, and the overall impact on communities. Some communities have taken steps to define or limit the involvement of local authorities in the implementation of immigration law.
This report examines some of the policy and legal issues that may accompany an increased role of state and local law officials in the enforcement of immigration law. It will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41722 | crs_R41722_0 | These programs typically seek to pair new businesses and more experienced businesses in mutually beneficial relationships. Protégés may receive financial, technical, or management assistance from mentors in obtaining and performing federal contracts or subcontracts, or serving as suppliers under such contracts or subcontracts, whereas mentors may receive credit toward subcontracting goals, reimbursement of certain expenses, or other incentives for assisting protégés. Four federal agencies have SBA-approved mentor-protégé programs:
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). Mentor-protégé programs seek to assist small businesses in various ways. For example,
the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program assists "small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" participating in the SBA's Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) program) in obtaining and performing contracts with executive-branch agencies; the SBA's all small business Mentor-Protégé Program is "a government-wide mentor-protégé program for all small business concerns, consistent with the SBA's mentor-protégé program for participants in the SBA's 8(a) Business Development program." the DOD Mentor-Protégé Program assists various types of small businesses and other entities in performing as subcontractors or suppliers on DOD contracts; and other agency-specific mentor-protégé programs, such as that of the DHS, provide mentor firms incentives to subcontract agency prime contracts with small businesses. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the SBA to establish mentor-protégé programs for small businesses owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, small businesses owned and controlled by women, and small businesses located in a HUBZone "modeled" on the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program. P.L. 112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, authorized the SBA to establish a mentor-protégé program for "all" small businesses that is generally "identical" to the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program. In an effort to promote uniformity, the act, with some exceptions, prohibits agencies from carrying out mentor-protégé programs that have not been approved by the SBA. On July 25, 2016, the SBA published a final rule in the Federal Register establishing, effective August 24, 2016, the new, government-wide mentor-protégé program for all small businesses. The SBA began to accept applications for the all small business Mentor-Protégé Program on October 1, 2016. The SBA noted in the final rule that because its new small business mentor-protégé program will apply to all federal small business contracts and federal agencies, "conceivably other agency-specific mentor-protégé programs would not be needed." These changes
required that assistance provided through the mentor-protégé relationship be tied to the protégé's SBA-approved business plan; allowed mentors to have up to three protégés; allowed firms seeking to become mentors to submit audited financial statements or other evidence to demonstrate their "favorable financial health" (this provision was revised in 2016); explicitly recognized nonprofits as potential mentors (this provision was eliminated in 2016); permitted protégés to have a second mentor in certain circumstances; prohibited SBA from approving a mentor-protégé agreement if the proposed protégé has less than six months remaining in its term in the 8(a) program (this provision was eliminated in 2016); permitted firms to request reconsideration of SBA's denial of a proposed mentor-protégé agreement; required firms whose proposed mentor-protégé agreement is rejected to wait at least 60 calendar days before submitting a new mentor-protégé agreement with the same proposed mentor; authorized SBA to recommend the issuance of a "stop work" order on any executive branch contract performed by a mentor-protégé joint venture when it determines that the mentor has not provided the protégé with the development assistance set forth in the mentor-protégé agreement; and prohibited mentors who are terminated for failure to provide assistance under their mentor-protégé agreement from serving as a mentor for two years. P.L. Because these programs are not based in statute, unlike the SBA and DOD programs discussed above, they generally rely upon existing authorities (e.g., authorizing use of evaluation factors) or publicity to incentivize mentor participation. | Mentor-protégé programs typically seek to pair new businesses with more experienced businesses in mutually beneficial relationships. Protégés may receive financial, technical, or management assistance from mentors in obtaining and performing federal contracts or subcontracts, or serving as suppliers under such contracts or subcontracts. Mentors may receive credit toward subcontracting goals, reimbursement of certain expenses, or other incentives.
The federal government currently has several mentor-protégé programs to assist small businesses in various ways. For example, the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program is a government-wide program designed to assist small businesses "owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" participating in the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) program) in obtaining and performing federal contracts. Toward that end, mentors may (1) form joint ventures with protégés that are eligible to perform federal contracts set aside for small businesses; (2) make certain equity investments in protégé firms; (3) lend or subcontract to protégé firms; and (4) provide technical or management assistance to their protégés. The Department of Defense (DOD) Mentor-Protégé Program, in contrast, is agency-specific. It is designed to assist various types of small businesses and other entities in obtaining and performing DOD subcontracts and serving as suppliers on DOD contracts. Mentors may (1) make advance or progress payments to their protégés that DOD reimburses; (2) award subcontracts to their protégés on a noncompetitive basis when they would not otherwise be able to do so; (3) lend money to or make investments in protégé firms; and (4) provide or arrange for other assistance.
Other agencies also have agency-specific mentor-protégé programs designed to assist various types of small businesses or other entities in obtaining and performing subcontracts under agency prime contracts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, has a mentor-protégé program wherein mentors may provide protégés with rent-free use of facilities or equipment, temporary personnel for training, property, loans, or other assistance. Because these programs are not based in statute, unlike the SBA and DOD programs, they generally rely upon preexisting authorities (e.g., authorizing use of evaluation factors) or publicity to incentivize mentor participation. See Table A-1 for a summary comparison.
P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the SBA to establish mentor-protégé programs for small businesses owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, small businesses owned and controlled by women, and small businesses located in a HUBZone. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, authorized the SBA to establish a mentor-protégé program for all small businesses, and generally prohibits agencies from carrying out mentor-protégé programs that have not been approved by the SBA.
Based on the authority provided by these two laws, the SBA published a final rule in the Federal Register on July 25, 2016, modifying the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program and establishing, effective August 24, 2016, "a government-wide mentor-protégé program for all small business concerns, consistent with the SBA's mentor-protégé program for participants in the SBA's 8(a) Business Development program." The all small business Mentor-Protégé Program began accepting applications on October 1, 2016.
The SBA noted in the final rule that because the new all small business mentor-protégé program applies to all federal small business contracts and federal agencies, "conceivably other agency-specific mentor-protégé programs would not be needed." Since then, several federal agencies have ended their mentor-protégé programs and encouraged interested parties to consider the SBA's all small business Mentor-Protégé program. |
crs_RL31909 | crs_RL31909_0 | One procedure, used only in the House of Representatives, is the resolution of inquiry , which "is a simple resolution making a direct request or demand of the President or the head of an executive department to furnish the House of Representatives with specific factual information in the possession of the executive branch." Resolutions of inquiry are often much more effective in obtaining information from the executive branch than one would expect from viewing committee and floor action. As examples in this report demonstrate, the sponsor of a resolution will often support an adverse report and tabling action because the Administration has substantially complied with the resolution. These early investigations differed in scope and procedure from the House resolution of inquiry, which depends not on Congress operating as the "Grand Inquest" but by a special rule that grants privileged status to a lawmaker's motion to obtain documents from the executive branch. The resolution is privileged and may be considered at any time after it is properly reported or discharged from committee. The privileged status of the resolution applies only to requests for facts within the Administration's control and not for opinions or investigations. Recent Congresses have shown an increase in the use of these privileged resolutions. | The resolution of inquiry is a simple House resolution that seeks factual information from the executive branch. Such resolutions are given privileged status under House rules and may be considered at any time after being properly reported or discharged from committee. Such resolutions apply only to requests for facts—not opinions—within an Administration's control. This report explains the history, procedure, specific uses of resolutions of inquiry, and notes recent increases in their usage.
The examples in this report demonstrate that, historically, even when a resolution of inquiry is reported adversely from a committee and tabled on the floor, it has frequently led to the release of a substantial amount of information from the Administration. Data from more recent Congresses suggest a potential change in the use and efficacy of these privileged resolutions.
For other CRS reports regarding legislative techniques for obtaining information from the executive branch, see CRS Report 95-464, Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of Congressional Inquiry, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42461 | crs_R42461_0 | Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to free oil and natural gas trapped underground in low-permeability rock formations by pumping a fracturing fluid under high pressure in order to crack the formations. The composition of a fracturing fluid varies with the nature of the formation, but typically contains mostly water; a proppant to keep the fractures open, such as sand; and a small percentage of chemical additives. Although some of these chemical additives may be harmless, others may be hazardous to health and the environment. This report provides an overview of current and proposed laws and regulations at the state and federal levels that require the disclosure of the chemicals added to the fluid used in hydraulic fracturing. Although a few provisions of federal law require some disclosure of information about the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing, none of them requires that detailed information about the chemical composition of a fracturing fluid be provided. In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama said he would obligate "all companies that drill for gas on public lands to disclose the chemicals they use," citing health and safety concerns. In May 2012, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published a proposed rule that would require disclosure of the content of fracturing fluids used on lands managed by the agency. In addition, there were legislative efforts in the 112 th Congress. H.R. 1084 and S. 587 , the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act), would have created more broadly applicable disclosure requirements for parties engaged in hydraulic fracturing. For a table summarizing some of the hydraulic fracturing fluid chemical disclosure laws and proposals described in this report, see Appendix B . In addition, environmental advocacy groups have petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate hydraulic fracturing chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act and to require the oil and gas extraction industry to report the toxic chemicals it releases under the EPA's Toxics Release Inventory. On August 4, 2011, Earthjustice and more than 100 other environmental advocacy organizations petitioned the EPA to promulgate rules under sections 4 and 8 of TSCA for chemical substances and mixtures used in oil and gas exploration or production (E&P Chemicals). 1084 would have created a new statutory obligation requiring anyone conducting hydraulic fracturing to
disclose to the State (or the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] if the Administrator has primary enforcement responsibility in the State)—(I) prior to the commencement of any hydraulic fracturing operations at any lease area or portion thereof, a list of chemicals intended for use in any underground injection during such operations, including identification of the chemical constituents of mixtures, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers for each chemical and constituent, material safety data sheets when available, and the anticipated volume of each chemical; and (II) not later than 30 days after the end of any hydraulic fracturing operations the list of chemicals used in each underground injection during such operations, including identification of the chemical constituents of mixtures, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers for each chemical and constituent, material safety data sheets when available, and the volume of each chemical used. Appendix A provides a glossary of some of the terms used in this section. The Shale Gas Production Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board has recommended the public disclosure, on a well-by-well basis, of all of the chemical ingredients added to fracturing fluids—even those ingredients that do not meet OSHA's standards for hazardous chemicals requiring MSDSs. Chemical disclosure laws at the state level vary widely. Of the 15 laws examined in this report, fewer than half require direct public disclosure of chemical information by mandating that parties post the information on the FracFocus chemical disclosure website. The level of detail required to be disclosed often depends on how states protect trade secrets, as these protections may allow submitting parties to withhold information from disclosure at their discretion or to submit fewer details about proprietary chemicals, except, perhaps, in emergencies. Even if a disclosure law does not protect information from public disclosure, other state laws, such as an exemption in an open records law, may do so. | Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to free oil and natural gas trapped underground in low-permeability rock formations by injecting a fluid under high pressure in order to crack the formations. The composition of a fracturing fluid varies with the nature of the formation, but typically contains mostly water; a proppant to keep the fractures open, such as sand; and a small percentage of chemical additives. Some of these additives may be hazardous to health and the environment.
The Shale Gas Production Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board has recommended public disclosure, on a well-by-well basis, of all of the chemical ingredients added to fracturing fluids, with some protection for trade secrets. Although a few provisions of federal law require some disclosure of information about the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing, none of them requires that detailed information about the chemical composition of a fracturing fluid be provided. In August 2011, environmental groups petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate rules under sections 4 and 8 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for chemical substances and mixtures used in oil and gas exploration or production. In October 2012, environmental groups asked the EPA to require the oil and gas extraction industry to report the toxic chemicals it releases under the Toxics Release Inventory.
In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama said he would obligate "all companies that drill for gas on public lands to disclose the chemicals they use," citing health and safety concerns. In May 2012, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published a proposed rule that would require companies employing hydraulic fracturing on lands managed by BLM to disclose the content of the fracturing fluid. In addition, there were legislative efforts in the 112th Congress. H.R. 1084 and S. 587, the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act), would have created more broadly applicable disclosure requirements for parties engaged in hydraulic fracturing.
Chemical disclosure laws at the state level vary widely. Of the 15 laws examined in this report, fewer than half require direct public disclosure of chemical information by mandating that parties post the information on the FracFocus chemical disclosure website. The level of detail required to be disclosed often depends on how states protect trade secrets, as these protections may allow submitting parties to withhold information from disclosure at their discretion or to submit fewer details about proprietary chemicals, except, perhaps, in emergencies. Even if a disclosure law does not protect information from public disclosure, other state laws, such as an exemption in an open records law, may do so. States also have varying laws regarding the timing of these disclosure requirements.
This report provides an overview of current and proposed laws and regulations at the state and federal levels that require the disclosure of the chemicals added to the fluid used in hydraulic fracturing. Appendix A provides a glossary of many of the terms used in this report. Appendix B contains a table summarizing some of the fracturing chemical disclosure requirements described in this report. For an overview of the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), see CRS Report R41760, Hydraulic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41431 | crs_R41431_0 | The structure of a family plays an important role in children's well-being. Even though there is general agreement among policymakers and the public regarding the importance of the father in improving the well-being of his children, federal welfare programs have to a large extent minimized or underplayed the role of fathers in the lives of children. That is, the report does not provide information on the characteristics of noncustodial fathers, but rather provides the economic and social trends generally affecting men that have a bearing on the ability of noncustodial fathers to help support their children. In 2011, the child poverty rate for related children in female-headed families (usually headed by a single mother) was 48%. The improvements in poverty rates for children in the late 1990s were limited. During the 2000s, child poverty rates increased again. This increase occurred even before the onset of the deep recession that began in December 2007. Living Arrangements of Children
A contributing factor to the high rates of child poverty over the long term, and the increase in child poverty during the period from 2001 to 2007, was the increasing likelihood of children living in families headed by a single female. However, about one-third of all children lived in families without their biological fathers present. Over the past three decades, changes in the labor market have led to less employment and lower typical wages for men. Criminal justice policies have changed, leading to increases in the rate of incarceration of men. The proportion of men with at least that level of schooling increased for both white men and African American men, with greater improvement for African American men. Employment rates for other racial and ethnic groups also declined. These options include modifying the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to make noncustodial parents eligible for a larger benefit; examining strategies for reducing child support arrearages; changing the financing structure of child support enforcement (CSE) access and visitation programs for noncustodial parents; enhancing or expanding job training and education programs to assist low-income men and youth, which in turn can help them in providing for their (current or future) families; redefining eligibility for certain programs so that disadvantaged young adults can receive more holistic training and other services that may better prepare them for adulthood; and encouraging states to serve noncustodial parents in their TANF programs. As previously discussed, many of the policies put in place in the mid-1990s and continuing to this day were aimed to "make work pay" more than welfare through supporting low-wage work. Concluding Remarks
Although social science research and analysis acknowledge the importance of the father in improving the well-being of his children, federal welfare programs have to varying degrees minimized, undervalued, or overlooked the role of fathers in the lives of children. In addition, other federal programs and/or systems that include many men on their rolls (such as employment and training programs and the criminal justice system) have not fully addressed the unique needs and circumstances of fathers, particularly those that do not have custody of their children. According to some estimates, about half of all children who are currently under age 18 will spend or have spent a significant portion of their childhood in a home without their biological father. | The structure of a family plays an important role in children's well-being. A contributing factor to the high rates of child poverty over the long term, and the increase in child poverty during the period from 2001-2007, was the increasing likelihood of children living in families headed by a single female. In 2012, about one-third of all children lived in families without their biological father present. According to some estimates, about 50% of children (who are currently under age 18) will spend or have spent a significant portion of their childhood in a home without their biological father.
In 2011, the poverty rate for children living in female-headed families (usually headed by a single mother) was 48%, compared to 11% for children living in married-couple families. Policies enacted in the mid-1990s focused on moving single mothers from the welfare rolls to work; with these policies in place and the economic expansion of the late 1990s, child poverty rates fell. However, these gains in the economic well-being of children were limited and temporary, as child poverty increased again in the 2000s, even before the onset of the recession that spanned from December 2007 to June 2009.
An option to improve the well-being of children living in single-mother families is to seek greater financial and social contributions from fathers, particularly noncustodial fathers. However, the ability of noncustodial fathers to support their children has been complicated by certain economic and social trends. Over the past three decades, changes in the labor market have led to less employment and lower typical wages for men. The wages of men with lower levels of educational attainment have fallen since the mid-1970s. Criminal justice policies have changed, leading to increases in the rate of incarceration of men. These trends, while affecting all racial and ethnic groups, had a disproportionate impact on African American men. The most recent recession has hit men's employment hard; and it has hit employment of young, African American men particularly hard.
Although social science research and analysis acknowledge a father's influence on the overall well-being of his children, federal welfare programs have to a large extent minimized or underplayed the role of fathers in the lives of children. Noncustodial fathers and other men are largely invisible to these programs as clients or recipients. They become visible only in their role as family income producers (e.g., payers of child support). Other federal programs and/or systems that have included many men on their rolls (such as employment and training programs and the criminal justice system) have not fully addressed the unique needs and circumstances of fathers, particularly those who do not have custody of their children.
The potential for revisions to the tax code in 2013 raises the issue of whether policies to "make work pay" for low-wage earners—an important part of the welfare reforms of the 1990s for custodial parents—could be extended to noncustodial parents. Additional potential policy options might include examining strategies for reducing child support arrearages; changing the financing structure of Child Support Enforcement (CSE) access and visitation programs for noncustodial parents; enhancing or expanding job training and education programs to assist low-income men and youth, which in turn can help them in providing for their (current or future) families; and redefining eligibility for certain programs so that disadvantaged young adults can receive more holistic training and other services that can better prepare them for adulthood. |
crs_RL32400 | crs_RL32400_0 | These price disparities in some instances have encouraged individuals and firms, as well as state and local governments, to attempt to import comparable medications from abroad in order to realize cost savings. The practice of importing patented prescription drugs outside the distribution channels established by the brand-name drug company is commonly termed "parallel importation." This practice may also raise significant intellectual property concerns, however. Many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. As a result, even if a foreign drug is judged safe and effective for domestic use, brand-name firms may nonetheless be able to block the unauthorized importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights. In particular, this bill would amend the Patent Act of 1952 to provide that it is not an act of patent infringement to import into the United States a drug that was first sold abroad by or under authority of the owner or licensee of such patent. In this context, the term "parallel imports" refers to patented products that are legitimately distributed abroad, and then sold to consumers in the United States without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer. Under this view, because the importer lawfully purchased authentic goods from the patent holder or its representative, the U.S. patent right is subject to "international exhaustion" due to the sale, despite the fact that the sale technically took place under a foreign patent. In its 2001 decision in Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") rejected the "international exhaustion" position and instead limited the exhaustion doctrine to sales that occur within the United States. As a result, brand-name drug companies may potentially block imports of patented medications into the United States even if the imported good is the patent owner's own product, legitimately sold to a customer in a foreign jurisdiction. This report next considers three of these issues: the status of state and local governments that have either themselves imported, or have encouraged others to import, patented medications from foreign jurisdictions; the potential use of label licenses on patented drugs; and the implications of international trade rules established by World Trade Organization (WTO). The Eleventh Amendment provides that a federal court is without power to entertain a suit by a private person against a state, except under certain limited circumstances. In addition, Congress may in some cases overcome state Eleventh Amendment immunity through legislation pursuant to another constitutional authority, such as the Fourteenth Amendment. If the possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed sound, then no action need be taken. Legislation introduced before the 110 th Congress, S. 1082 , takes this approach with respect to patented pharmaceuticals, specifying that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or to import into the United States any patented invention under section 804 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that was first sold abroad by or under authority of the owner or licensee of such patent. In addition, the issue of drug importation may provide an impetus for clarification of the patent infringement liability of state governments. | Prescription drugs often cost far more in the United States than in other countries. Some consumers have attempted to import medications from abroad in order to realize cost savings. The practice of importing prescription drugs outside the distribution channels established by the brand-name drug company is commonly termed "parallel importation." Parallel imports are authentic products that are legitimately distributed abroad and then sold to consumers in the United States, without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer.
Parallel importation may raise significant intellectual property issues. Many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. In the Jazz Photo decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed that the owner of a U.S. patent may prevent imports of patented goods, even in circumstances where the patent holder itself sold those goods outside the United States. The Jazz Photo opinion squarely declined to extend the "exhaustion" doctrine—under which patent rights in a product are spent upon the patent owner's first sale of the patented product—to sales that occurred in foreign countries. The court's ruling will in some cases allow brand-name pharmaceutical firms to block the unauthorized parallel importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights.
Several state and local governments are either themselves importing, or encouraging others to import, patented medications from foreign jurisdictions. The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that a federal court may not adjudicate a lawsuit by a private person against a state, except under certain limited circumstances. The ability of a private party to obtain a remedy for patent infringement against a state government is therefore uncertain. Eleventh Amendment immunity may in some cases extend to political subdivisions of a state as well.
In addition to any patent rights they possess, brand-name drug companies may place label licenses on their medications. It is possible to draft a label license restricting use of a drug to the jurisdiction in which it was sold. As a result, in addition to a charge of patent infringement, an unauthorized parallel importer may potentially face liability for breach of contract.
Legislation introduced before the 110th Congress, S. 1082, addresses the importation of prescription drugs. Titled the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act, this bill would amend the Patent Act of 1952 to provide that importation into the United States of a regulated pharmaceutical sold abroad by a patent proprietor or its representative is not a patent infringement. Introduction of an "international exhaustion" rule restricted to pharmaceuticals does not appear to be prohibited by the provisions of the so-called TRIPS Agreement, which is the component of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements concerning intellectual property. Another possible legislative response is the immunization of specific individuals, such as pharmacies or importers, from patent infringement liability. Alternatively, no legislative action need be taken if the current possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed satisfactory. |
crs_RL33550 | crs_RL33550_0 | Introduction
Countervailing duty laws attempt to provide relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury as a result of imported goods sold in the U.S. market that have been found to be subsidized by a foreign government or public entity. Prior to a 2007 CVD investigation on coated free sheet (CFS) paper from China, the ITA determined that it would not apply CVD laws to nonmarket economy (NME) countries, including China, because the agency believed that there was no adequate way to measure market distortions caused by subsidies in an economy that is not based on market principles. The 2007 subsidy decision was a China-specific determination, and thus is not applicable to other NME countries. The continuing U.S. trade deficit with China ($227 billion in 2009) and the alleged adverse impact of Chinese imports on competing U.S. industries and workers has led some in Congress to support increased use of U.S. trade remedy laws against Chinese products. Countervailing Duty Legislation
At the time the 1983-1984 investigations were initiated, the United States had in force two countervailing duty laws. ... "As a result ... the CVD law cannot be applied to the PRC fan industry" and the ITA issued final negative determination in the case. The CIT, in its detailed opinion, addressed each of the four grounds on which the ITA had based its determination of nonapplicability of countervailing procedure to NME countries: (1) the view that a subsidy cannot be conferred in a nonmarket economy "because a subsidy, by definition , means an act which distorts the operation of a [free] market " (both italics in the original); (2) congressional "silence" on the issue and the apparent preference for other trade remedial procedures; (3) consensus of academic opinion as to nonapplicability of CVD law to NME countries; and (4) the ITA's asserted broad discretion to determine the existence or nonexistence of subsidies. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (801 F. 2d 1308-1318)
The U.S. government appealed the CIT decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which—focusing on the potash cases—reviewed in detail the legislative history and development of relevant trade remedy laws and concluded that the CVD statute under which these investigations were conducted (Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930) had remained "substantially unchanged from the first general countervailing duty statute the Congress enacted [in 1897] ...."
Since Congress had not "defined the terms 'bounty' and 'grant' as used in section 303," the appellate court concluded it could not "answer the question whether that section applies to nonmarket economies by reference to the language of the statute" nor could it, on the other hand, answer it by concluding that, on the basis of the statutory language, "Congress has not attempted to exclude nonmarket economies from what the court believed to be the sweeping reach of the section." In the 110 th Congress, several bills that sought to apply countervailing duty law to NME countries were introduced: S. 364 (Rockefeller, introduced January 23, 2007); H.R. 496 , the "Trade Enforcement Act of 2009" (Rangel, introduced January 14, 2009 and H.R. Final subsidy amounts ranged from 7.40% to 44.25%. As of this writing, countervailing duties have been placed on 13 products from China, and at least 8 investigations are pending. | Concern regarding the level of low-cost imports from China and other countries and its impact on U.S. firms and workers, combined with China's limiting of the appreciation of its currency, have led some in Congress to introduce legislation proposing to make countervailing duty laws applicable to China and other nonmarket economy countries.
Countervailing duty laws provide for the assessment of additional duties on imports whose production and/or importation are found to be subsidized by a public entity in their country of origin and are injurious to a U.S. producer of similar merchandise. Antidumping, another kind of trade remedy action, addresses products sold in the United States at less than their fair value (as defined by law) in a similar manner. Although antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws and procedures generally parallel each other, CVD laws contain no specific provisions for investigations on imports from nonmarket economy (NME) countries, while the AD statute does provide such guidelines.
Initial administrative attempts in 1983 to apply countervailing remedies to allegedly subsidized imports from several NME countries led to determinations by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce (the U.S. agency charged with determining the existence and extent of subsidies) that subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing law, cannot be found in nonmarket economies. These ITA determinations were challenged in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), which held that they were "not in accordance with the law," reversed them, and remanded the cases to the ITA. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, and reinstated the ITA's original determinations—thus affirming that the ITA has the discretion not to apply the CVD law to NME countries.
The ITA reevaluated this decision, with respect to China only, during a countervailing investigation on coated free sheet (CFS) paper. On October 18, 2007, the ITA made a final affirmative determination of subsidies in the investigation, finding net countervailable subsidies ranging from 7.40% to 44.25%. Although the International Trade Commission (the U.S. agency charged with determining whether the U.S. industry suffered material injury as a result of the subsidy) made a negative injury determination in the investigation, meaning that no CVD duties were assessed, other industries pursued countervailing investigations as a result of the ITA's decision. As of this writing, countervailing duties have been placed on 13 products from China, and at least 8 investigations are pending.
Legislation seeking to apply CVD action to NME countries introduced in the 111th Congress includes H.R. 496 and H.R. 499, both introduced on January 14, 2009. |
crs_R42672 | crs_R42672_0 | Introduction
In 1984, the Crime Victims Fund (CVF, or the Fund) was established by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA, P.L. 98-473 ) to provide funding for state victim compensation and assistance programs. Since 1984, VOCA has been amended several times to support additional victim-related activities. These amendments established within the CVF
discretionary grants for private organizations; the Federal Victim Notification System; funding for victim assistance staff in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); funding for the Children's Justice Act Program; and assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism. In 1988, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) was formally established within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to administer the CVF. The OVC also distributes CVF money to specially designated programs, such as the Children's Justice Act Program and the Federal Victim Notification System (see Figure 1 ). Rather, deposits to the CVF come from a number of sources including criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, penalties, and special assessments collected by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, federal courts, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons from offenders convicted of federal crimes. 107-56 ) established that gifts, bequests, or donations from private entities could also be deposited to the CVF. The largest source of deposits into the CVF is criminal fines. Cap on Deposits
In 1984, Congress placed a cap on how much could be deposited into the CVF for the first eight years. Obligation Cap
From FY1985 to FY1998, deposits collected in each fiscal year were distributed in the following fiscal year to support crime victims services. In 2000, Congress established an annual obligation cap on the amount of CVF funds available for distribution to reduce the impact of fluctuating deposits and ensure the stability of funds for programs and activities. Congress establishes the CVF cap each year as a part of the appropriations for DOJ. Changes to the CVF Obligation Cap
In FY2015, Congress set the CVF obligation cap at $2.361 billion, a 216.9% increase over the FY2014 cap. In FY2016, Congress set the cap at $3.042 billion, a further increase to the cap; however, $379 million was transferred to the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) for purposes outside of VOCA and $10 million was designated for the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for oversight and auditing purposes. In FY2017, however, Congress set the cap at $2.573 billion, a 15.4% decrease compared to the FY2016 cap. From this amount, $326 million was transferred to OVW (again for purposes outside of VOCA) and $10 million was again designated for the DOJ OIG for oversight and auditing purposes. Distribution of the Crime Victims Fund
As previously stated, the OVC awards CVF money through formula and discretionary grants to states, local units of government, individuals, and other entities. These issues include using the CVF for purposes other than those explicitly authorized by VOCA, making adjustments to the CVF cap such as eliminating the cap, and amending VOCA to accommodate new programs or to adjust the allocation formula. Congress may also decide to rescind funds from the balance of the CVF, as it did in November 2015 through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ). This law required the rescission and permanent cancellation of $1.5 billion from the balance of the CVF. As mentioned, the FY2017 obligation cap was calculated based on a three-year average of collections into the CVF. | In 1984, the Crime Victims Fund (CVF, or the Fund) was established by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA, P.L. 98-473) to provide funding for state victim compensation and assistance programs. Since 1984, VOCA has been amended several times to support additional victim-related activities. These amendments established within the CVF (1) discretionary grants for private organizations, (2) the Federal Victim Notification System, (3) funding for victim assistance staff within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, (4) funding for the Children's Justice Act Program, and (5) assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism.
In 1988, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) was formally established within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to administer the CVF. As authorized by VOCA, the OVC awards CVF money through grants to states, local units of government, individuals, and other entities. The OVC also distributes CVF money to specially designated programs, such as the Children's Justice Act Program and the Federal Victim Notification System.
Deposits to the CVF come from criminal fines, forfeited appearance bonds, penalties and special assessments collected by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, federal courts, and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Since 2002, Congress has allowed gifts, bequests, and donations from private entities to be deposited into the CVF. Of note, the largest source of deposits into the CVF is criminal fines. At the end of FY2016, the CVF had a balance of more than $9 billion.
When the CVF was created in 1984, Congress placed a cap on how much money could be deposited into the CVF each year. Congress eliminated the cap for deposits in 1993. From FY1985 to FY1998, deposits collected in each fiscal year were distributed in the following fiscal year to support crime victim services. In FY2000, Congress established an annual obligation cap on CVF funds available for distribution to reduce the impact of fluctuating deposits and to ensure the stability of funds for crime victims programs and activities. Since 2000, Congress has established the annual obligation cap in appropriations law.
In FY2015, Congress set the CVF obligation cap at $2.361 billion, a 216.9% increase over the FY2014 cap. In FY2016, Congress set the cap at $3.042 billion, a further increase to previous caps; however, $379 million was transferred to the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW; for purposes outside of VOCA) and $10 million was designated for the DOJ Office of the Inspector General for oversight and auditing purposes. In FY2017, however, Congress set the cap at $2.573 billion, a 15.4% decrease compared to the FY2016 cap. From this amount, $326 million was transferred to OVW (again for purposes outside of VOCA) and $10 million was designated for the DOJ Office of the Inspector General for oversight and auditing purposes.
Over the past few years, Congress has taken a number of unprecedented actions involving the CVF. In the 114th Congress, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) included a provision (§702) that required the rescission and permanent cancellation of $1.5 billion from the balance of the Crime Victims Fund. In addition, in FY2017 Congress calculated the obligation cap based on a three-year average of collections into the CVF.
In considering the CVF allocation and future caps, there are several issues on which policymakers may deliberate. Congress may consider whether to adjust the manner in which the CVF is allocated, amend VOCA to accommodate additional victim activities or groups, further adjust the cap and allow use of the CVF for grant programs other than those explicitly authorized by VOCA (as they did for FY2016 and FY2017), or make other adjustments to the CVF cap—such as eliminate the cap altogether. |
crs_R41307 | crs_R41307_0 | Overview: Key Current Issues and Developments
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; stability in neighboring Afghanistan; domestic political stability and democratization; nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights protection; and economic development. Pakistan remains a vital U.S. ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Pakistan's troubled economic conditions, fluid political setting, and perilous security circumstances present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. While there, the U.S. Vice President reiterated his and President Obama's view that Pakistan is "absolutely vital" to U.S. interests, and he took the opportunity to correct some key misconceptions held among Pakistanis, including that the United States represents a threat to their sovereignty ("I would respectfully suggest that it's the extremists who violate Pakistan's sovereignty and corrupt its good name"), that America disrespects or is an enemy of Islam, that U.S. policies favor India in ways that could lead to Pakistan's weakening, and that the U.S. will "abandon" Pakistan. The Obama Administration Strategy
A key aspect of the Obama Administration's approach to Pakistan has been development of a more coherent policy to include a tripling annual nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, with a particular focus on conflict-affected regions, and on focusing increased U.S. military aid to Islamabad on counterinsurgency goals while conditioning such aid on that government's progress in combating militancy. Because of this, progress toward attainment of U.S. goals in its engagement with Pakistan is likely to remain difficult, and serious mutual distrust persists in the relationship. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Designation of Pakistan-Based Terrorists
In 2010, the U.S. government accelerated its official designation of terrorists and terrorist groups, as well as their financial support networks operating in Pakistan. Moreover, as tensions between Pakistan and India remain tense more than two years after the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, Secretary Gates warned that groups under Al Qaeda's Pakistan "syndicate" are actively seeking to destabilize the entire South Asia region, perhaps through another successful major terrorist attack in India that could provoke all-out war between the region's two largest and nuclear-armed states. Pakistan's mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. India's presence in Afghanistan exacerbates Pakistani fears of encirclement. Some analysts insist that resolution of outstanding Pakistan-India disputes, especially that over Kashmir, is a prerequisite for gaining Pakistan's full cooperation in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies
Fighting between Pakistani government security forces and religious militants intensified in 2008. Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals266
Attempted Times Square Bombing
Long-standing worries that American citizens were being recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements have become more concrete in recent months. Deteriorated Economic Circumstances
Soaring inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, elicit considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan and weigh heavily on the civilian government. All of these existing problems were hugely exacerbated by devastating flooding in mid-2010. U.S. Foreign Assistance and Congressional Action
Pakistan is today among the world's leading recipients of U.S. aid. Since the 2001 renewal of large U.S. assistance packages, Pakistan by the end of FY2010 had obtained more than $10.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including about $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid, and some $4.4 billion for security-related programs. (This does not include reimbursements for militarized counterterrorism efforts. | A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. Pakistan is praised by U.S. leaders for its ongoing cooperation with U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad's commitment to some core U.S. interests. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory. Pakistan's troubled economic conditions and political setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of troubled relations with neighbors to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. The development hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India rivalry that threatens the entire region's stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements have become more acute in the past year, especially following a failed May 2010 bombing attempt in New York City that was linked to the "Pakistani Taliban."
A bilateral Pakistan-India peace process was halted after a November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai was traced to a Pakistan-based terrorist group. This process, strongly supported by the United States, remains moribund, and serious mutual animosities persist. Pakistan is wary of India's presence in Afghanistan, where Islamabad seeks a friendly and perhaps malleable neighbor, and has had troubled relations with the Kabul government. A perceived Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia.
Pakistan's political setting remains fluid, with a weak ruling coalition struggling to stay in power. While the most recent iteration of direct military rule ended in 2008, Pakistan's military and intelligence institutions are seen to possess inordinate political power. Rampant inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, elicit considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan. These pressures were hugely exacerbated by unprecedented devastation resulting from mid-2010 flooding. The U.S. government and international financial institutions are among those strongly urging Islamabad to more quickly institute economic reform.
The Obama Administration continues to pursue close and mutually beneficial relations with Islamabad. As part of its strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, the Administration's Pakistan policy includes a tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as the conditioning of U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government's progress in combating militancy and in further fostering democratic institutions. A Special Representative was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is among the world's leading recipients of U.S. aid and by the end of FY2010 had obtained about $10.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received more than $8 billion in military reimbursements for its support of and engagement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts against Islamist militants. This report reviews key current issues and developments in Pakistan and in U.S.-Pakistan relations. It will be updated periodically. |
crs_RS21693 | crs_RS21693_0 | Background
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. The most significant portion of the Court's decision is the 119 page majority opinion coauthored by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in which the Court upheld two critical features of BCRA: the limits on raising and spending previously unregulated political party soft money, and the prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds—which is unregulated soft money—to finance electioneering communications. Instead, BCRA requires that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds, also known as hard money. Indeed, in 2007, the Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) determined that BCRA's "electioneering communications" provision was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run, thereby limiting the law's application. The Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision. Subsequently, in the 2007 decision FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), the Supreme Court held that Title II of BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run. While not expressly overruling its 2003 ruling in McConnell v. FEC, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and, therefore, cannot be regulated. Prohibition on Campaign Contributions by Minors Age 17 and Under Invalidated
The Court invalidated BCRA's prohibition on individuals age 17 or younger making contributions to candidates and political parties. | McConnell v. FEC, a 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision, upheld the constitutionality of key portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) against facial challenges. (BCRA, which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA], codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., is also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law). A 5 to 4 majority of the Court upheld restrictions on the raising and spending of previously unregulated political party soft money, and a prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications," requiring that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds. The Court also invalidated a requirement that parties choose between making independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures on behalf of a candidate, and a prohibition on minors age 17 and under making campaign contributions. A 2007 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), while not expressly overruling McConnell, narrowed the application of BCRA. Finding that the BCRA "electioneering communications" provision was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run, the Court in WRTL II held that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate cannot be regulated. For further discussion of WRTL II, see CRS Report RS22687, The Constitutionality of Regulating Political Advertisements: An Analysis of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43399 | crs_R43399_0 | Such an agreement, the working group urged, should provide for "the promotion of more compatible approaches to current and future regulation and standard-setting and other means of reducing non-tariff barriers to trade." One month later, President Obama notified Congress that the United States would enter into negotiations with the EU to seek a free trade agreement, referred to as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The formal TTIP negotiations began in July 2013. How the United States and the EU Set Standards
The processes by which the United States and the EU establish vehicle safety, fuel efficiency, and emission standards have evolved in different ways. A National Traffic Safety Agency was established to carry out the provisions; it was renamed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1970. It provides that "A manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall certify to the distributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies with applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter.... Certification of a vehicle must be shown by a label or tag permanently fixed to the vehicle ..."
The law also makes manufacturers responsible for testing of vehicles and liable for recalls and penalties if they are later found not to meet NHTSA's standards. U.S. Emission standards for engines and vehicles, including emission standards for greenhouse gases, are currently established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In addition to exhaust emission standards, U.S. regulations address many other emission-related issues. This approval process differs from the self-certification used by NHTSA and is closer to the EU type approval system for safety and emissions regulations. Comparison of U.S. and EU Vehicle Emission Standards
Vehicle emissions standards established by the EU and the United States are not directly comparable because of the differences in the testing procedures and approval processes. Both the European and the U.S. systems of compliance are based on a version of "type approval." Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
U.S. Standards Process
In the United States, establishing fuel economy standards is a function of direct statutory authority from Congress, with NHTSA administering the congressionally established standards. The first carbon dioxide emission targets for new passenger cars in Europe were set in 1998-99 through voluntary agreements between the European Commission and the automotive industry. A similar bilateral regulatory initiative has been under way since 2011 with Canada. Pathways to Convergence
There are different ways in which the United States and the EU could address convergence of automotive regulations under TTIP. Harmonization need not mean having identical rules in both regions. From the viewpoint of auto manufacturers, it means minimizing unnecessary differences in regulations so that a "single vehicle standard can be built to satisfy all requirements." F orward-looking rules . If the TTIP effort to obtain mutual recognition or harmonization affects agencies' authority or changes the ways in which automotive regulations are developed and implemented, Congress may well be asked to modify the underlying statutes that govern motor vehicle safety, emissions, and fuel efficiency. U.S. emissions standards are shown in Table A-1 . Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Standards
U.S. Fuel Economy and GHG Standards and Implementation
The 2012 CAFE and GHG vehicle standards call for combined passenger car and light truck greenhouse gas emissions of no more than 163 grams per mile by 2025. EU GHG Standards and Implementation
The EU does not issue fuel economy standards similar to the U.S. CAFE standards. | In March 2013, President Obama notified Congress that his Administration would seek a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union (EU). In addition to addressing tariffs and other trade restrictions, the negotiations seek to reduce regulatory barriers to transatlantic commerce. Among the barriers under discussion are those affecting motor vehicles. Although many automakers build and sell cars in both regions, they must comply with very different safety, fuel economy, and emissions standards, as well as different regulatory processes. TTIP negotiators are seeking to identify ways to narrow the regulatory differences, potentially reducing costs and spurring additional trade in vehicles. U.S. and EU automakers support this initiative, which they see as furthering economic and vehicle design trends already under way. The complexity of complying with different greenhouse gas emissions regulations is also a factor in the industry's support.
This report looks at ways in which TTIP might lead to a convergence of motor vehicle regulatory regimes on both sides of the Atlantic. These regimes govern three distinct aspects of vehicle manufacturing and involve a number of U.S. and EU agencies.
Safety. U.S. automakers self-certify that they are meeting U.S. vehicle standards. In Europe, vehicles must obtain "type approval" from a government before an automaker can bring out a new model. Emissions. U.S. and EU emissions regulations are administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the European Commission (EC), respectively. While U.S. and EC rules address a similar range of pollutants, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, and non-methane organic oxides, allowable emissions levels in the EU are different from those in the United States—and they are stricter in more than a dozen U.S. states than in the other states. The United States and the EU have similar "type approval" systems for new engine models. Fuel Efficiency. Auto manufacturers selling in the United States must meet the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards enforced by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Under the Obama Administration, greenhouse gases (GHG) in vehicle emissions are being regulated for the first time, making fuel economy standard-setting a joint venture between NHTSA and EPA. The EU does not directly set fuel economy standards, but it effectively does so by regulating greenhouse gas emissions of new vehicles.
There are several different ways a TTIP agreement could promote convergence of automobile regulation, from harmonizing existing U.S. and EU rules to providing for mutual recognition of some or all automotive standards. If a TTIP agreement is reached, it will be subject to congressional approval. To the extent that such an agreement would require changes in motor vehicle regulatory processes or standards, it is possible that Congress will be asked to modify statutes that govern motor vehicle safety, emissions, and fuel economy. |
crs_R42533 | crs_R42533_0 | Background and Context
This report answers frequently asked questions about presidential primaries and caucuses, and the national party nominating conventions that follow them. Despite its complicated nature, the presidential nominating process is simply a race among presidential candidates to accumulate a majority of delegates, in order to claim the nomination at the national convention. Over the past 25 years, an increasing number of states and state parties scheduled events at the beginning of the primary season to attract candidate and media attention, resulting in a calendar that featured a large cluster of early primaries and caucuses. In a direct primary election, the delegates may be awarded on a proportional basis, according to the vote for presidential candidates, and elected within each presidential candidate preference according to their own individual vote totals. Front-loading came about largely because of the prominence of the New Hampshire primary and the Iowa caucuses in the nominating process. The trend was reversed to an extent in 2012 and even more so for 2016—as the result of cooperation between the two major parties regarding the calendar, as shown in Figure 1 . The effort to reduce front-loading for the 2012 election was largely successful. As a result, the front-loading problem that has characterized the primary process for many election cycles has been reduced for 2016 and, except for the exempt states, primary and caucus contests have been contained within the calendar design that the two parties have agreed to follow. Republicans
For Republicans, the national party sets certain general parameters for the nominating process in The Rules of the Republican Party and the Call of the Convention , but leaves many of the details of delegate selection to the state parties. A number of new Republican party rules changes were adopted for the 2012 presidential primary season that may also impact the 2016 election. The changes shaped the contest for the first three months and led to pronouncements that the nomination would be unresolved until the national convention in September. As the result of a revision to Rule 16 of The Rules of the Republican Party , delegate selection events cannot be held before the first Tuesday in March, with exceptions for Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, which can hold their events on or after February 1. Many state parties used winner-take-all in the past. Furthermore, national Republican Party rules state that:
Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state's delegation to the national convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters. Further instructions say that:
Delegates at large and their alternate delegates and delegates from Congressional districts and their alternate delegates to the national convention shall be elected, selected, allocated, or bound in the following manner:
(1) In accordance with any applicable Republican Party rules of a state, insofar as the same are not inconsistent with these rules; or
(2) To the extent not provided for in the applicable Republican Party rules of a state, in accordance with any applicable laws of a state, insofar as the same are not inconsistent with these rules; or
(3) By a combination of the methods set forth in paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this rule; or
(4) To the extent not provided by state law or party rules, as set forth in paragraph (e) of this rule (which outlines the national party rules for electing national convention delegates in congressional district and state conventions). The program was eliminated with the enactment of P.L. 113-94 in April 2014. Although some observers speculated that a contested convention could occur at the 2012 Republican national convention, that did not occur. In recent decades, the role of the national conventions has been to ratify, rather than select, the party nominees. The last major party convention to require more than one ballot to choose the nominee was in 1952, when Democrats needed three ballots to nominate Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson. Republicans will meet in Cleveland, OH, from July 18-21, and Democrats will meet in Philadelphia, PA from July 26-28. | This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about the presidential nominating process, including how the delegates to the national conventions are chosen, the differences between a caucus and a primary, national party rules changes for 2016, and the national conventions themselves. It is not a comprehensive report on all aspects of the presidential nominating process.
The Nominating Process
The presidential nominating process is a subject of enduring congressional and national interest. Presidential elections are the only nationwide elections held in the United States and the initial phase of primaries and caucuses is subject to change every four years. Congress has a legislative, as well as a practical and political, interest in the presidential nominating process. Presidential nominees lead the party ticket in the fall election; the elected President will set many policy and political goals in the ensuing four years; and many Members of Congress will serve as delegates to the major party conventions. No legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress to reform the presidential nominating process; taxpayer financing of the national party conventions was eliminated with the enactment of P.L. 113-94 in April 2014.
The Rules
Republican Party rules changes for 2012 set the background for the 2016 presidential primary season. The 2012 election featured a protracted contest for Republicans that began in January and continued until the end of May, partly due to two new Republican Party rules that led to a comparatively long primary battle. In an effort to decrease the large cluster of contests at the beginning of the primary and caucus calendar—the phenomenon known as front-loading—the Republican Party adopted two important changes to national party rules for 2012:
delegate selection events could not be held before the first Tuesday in March, with exceptions for Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, which could hold their events on or after February 1 (regardless, Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina scheduled January events for 2012); and states that held contests before April 1 were required to allocate delegates on a proportional basis, according to primary or caucus results. Many state parties had used winner-take-all in the past, but the new rule required that delegates be awarded to presidential candidates in proportion to their primary vote totals, in some fashion.
The rules changes reduced front-loading, but they also prolonged the contest in comparison to past primary cycles and led to speculation that the Republican convention might need more than one ballot to choose the nominee, an unprecedented occurrence in recent decades. That possibility did not occur. Republicans made additional revisions to party rules for 2016 that might impact the contest for the nomination. The proportional allocation of delegates is required for events held between March 1 and 14, rather than for the entire month, as was done in 2012. Delegates are bound according to the results, either on a proportional or winner-take-all basis (permitted after March 14). Finally, the calendar window imposed for only the second time by Republicans (Democrats have imposed a window for many years) appears to have contained efforts by some state parties to "front-load" the calendar by scheduling events early in the year in order to attract media and candidate attention.
The National Conventions
The national party conventions have evolved over the past half century and now serve as the forum for officially ratifying the results of the primary season, rather than the place where the nominee is actually chosen. The last time more than one ballot was required to nominate a presidential candidate—a so-called "brokered" convention—occurred in 1952. Even so, the conventions remain important as media events that launch each major party's general election campaign. In 2016, the major parties' nominations will be officially conferred when Republicans meet in Cleveland from July 18-21 and Democrats meet in Philadelphia from July 26-28. |
crs_R41335 | crs_R41335_0 | Introduction
In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq . Thirty-five years of experience with TSCA implementation and enforcement have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions in Title I. On April 15, 2010, Senator Lautenberg introduced comprehensive legislation ( S. 3209 ) to amend TSCA, and Representatives Waxman and Rush posted draft TSCA reform legislation on the home page of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 5820 . This report compares key provisions of S. 3209 , as introduced, H.R. 5820 , as introduced, and current law. For example, both proposals would shift the burden of demonstrating the safety of chemicals from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to manufacturers and processors, and would prohibit manufacture, processing, and distribution of any chemical substance or mixture for any use for which safety had not been demonstrated to EPA's satisfaction. In addition, the proposals would require data development and submission to EPA for all chemicals in commerce, rather than only for chemicals that EPA has found "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" and for which EPA has demonstrated a data need, as required under current law. Based on the data received, EPA would be directed to target chemicals with particular characteristics (for example, persistence in the environment) for early evaluation and possible risk management. 5820 . The authority provided by S. 3209 is specific to three international agreements, while the authority provided by H.R. One provision, for example, would require definition and listing of localities with populations that are "disproportionately exposed" to toxic chemicals. EPA would be directed to develop an action plan to reduce exposure in such "hot spots." Children's environmental health also is addressed by the bills. "Green chemistry and engineering" also would be promoted through grants. Finally, the proposed amendments would direct EPA to minimize use of animals in toxicity testing. Alternative Approaches to Reform
The proposals differ in many details (which will not be discussed here) and in several noteworthy ways that are summarized in Tables 1 through 6. For all existing chemicals that have not been placed on a priority list, data sets must be submitted within 14 years of the date of enactment of S. 3209 . H.R. In contrast, current law requires that a chemical not pose "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment," and that regulation should control any unreasonable risk to the extent necessary using the "least burdensome" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing. The proposals also treat the identification of chemicals of highest concern differently. H.R. 5820 directs EPA to expedite action for 19 specified chemicals. | On April 15, 2010, Senator Lautenberg introduced legislation (S. 3209) to amend the core provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Title I. Representatives Waxman and Rush introduced comprehensive legislation to amend TSCA (H.R. 5820) on July 22, 2010. This report compares key provisions of S. 3209, as introduced, H.R. 5820, as introduced, and current law (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).
Both bills would amend the 35-year-old law to shift the burden of demonstrating safety for chemicals in commerce from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to manufacturers and processors of chemicals. Both bills also would prohibit manufacture, processing, and distribution of any chemical substance or mixture for which safety has not been demonstrated. Although they propose somewhat different safety standards for EPA to enforce, both bills suggest a health-based standard. In contrast, current law requires that a chemical not pose "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment," and that any regulation should control unreasonable risk to the extent necessary using the "least burdensome" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing. To facilitate safety assessment, the proposals would require data development and submission to EPA for all chemicals in commerce.
TSCA amendments would direct EPA to target chemicals with particular characteristics (for example, persistence in the environment) for earlier evaluation and possible risk management. Any regulatory action would be expedited, for example, by allowing EPA to issue orders rather than rules. The bills also would add new sections to TSCA. Of particular significance is a section authorizing actions that would allow U.S. implementation of three international agreements, which the United States has signed but not yet ratified. Other new sections would provide authority for EPA to support research in so-called "green" engineering and chemistry, promote alternatives to toxicity testing on animals, encourage research on children's environmental health, and require biomonitoring of pregnant women and infants. A "hot spots" provision would require EPA to identify locations where residents are disproportionately exposed to pollution and to develop strategies for reducing their risks.
The proposals differ in many details and in several noteworthy ways. For example, for all existing chemicals that have not been placed on a priority list, data sets must be submitted within 14 years of the date of enactment of S. 3209, but within five years of enactment of H.R. 5820. The proposals also treat the identification of chemicals of highest concern differently. H.R. 5820 directs EPA to expedite action for 19 specified chemicals, while S. 3209 leaves identification of such chemicals to the Administrator's discretion. These and other provisions of the two legislative proposals are compared with current law in Tables 1 through 6. |
crs_RL34458 | crs_RL34458_0 | Despite the significant reduction in costs, critics continue to raise concerns about the franking privilege. In particular, mass mailings—franked mailings of 500 or more substantially similar pieces of unsolicited mail sent by individual Members during the same session of Congress —have come under increased scrutiny as critics argue that the vast majority of franked mail is unsolicited and, in effect, publicly funded campaign literature. At the direction of the Committee on House Administration, in January 2009 the House began reporting the volume and cost of individual mass communications instead of mass mailings. Mass communications include all unsolicited mailings or communications of substantially identical content distributed to 500 or more persons, regardless of media. Methodology
Data
Data on Member mass mailings and mass communications were compiled using the quarterly Statement of Disbursement s of the House , which report the number of pieces of mail sent by each Member of the House in mass mailings (1997-2008, 2011-2015) and mass communications (2009-2015) during the preceding quarter and the total postage cost of the quarter's mass mailings or mass communications. Examples of mass communications include radio, television, newspaper, and Internet advertisements; automated phone calls; mass facsimiles; and mass emails distributed to a non-subscriber emailing list. Between 1997 and 2013, an annual average of 81% of House Members sent at least one mass mailing. As shown in Table 2 , House Members sent a calendar year average of 573.1 million pieces of mass communication, costing an average of $43.8 million. Between 2009 and 2011, an annual average of 92% of House Members sent at least one mass communication. Among Members who sent at least one mass communication, the average calendar year number of pieces of communication sent by a Member was 1,407,364 at a cost of $107,431. Mass Communications (Not Including Mass Mailings), 2012-2015
House Members sent 1.11 billion pieces of mass communication in 2012, at a total cost of $7.4 million, 801 million pieces of mass communication in 2013, at a total cost of $5.7 million, 623 million pieces of mass communication in 2014, at a total cost of $5.1 million, and 568 million pieces of mass communication in 2015, at a total cost of $5.7 million. Comparing Mass Mailings and Mass Communication Volumes and Costs
As shown in Table 1 and Table 2 , the average number of pieces of mass communication sent annually between 2009 and 2011 was about 500% greater than the average number of annual pieces of mass mail sent between 1997 and 2008. Quarterly Variation
Mass Mailings, 1997-2008
Although the overall amount and cost of House mass mailing remained relatively constant between 1997 and 2008, significant variations occurred within these years. Although mass mail costs do rise in the quarters prior to the pre-election prohibited period (as shown in Figure 1 ), the structure of the fiscal calendar is also important in creating large disparities between election-year and non-election-year mail costs. Thus comparisons of fiscal year mass mail data tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, since they also capture the effect of the December spike in mail costs. First, the franking privilege is financially wasteful and, second, the franking privilege gives unfair advantages to incumbents in congressional elections. Proponents of the franking privilege argue that the frank allows Members to fulfill their representational duties by providing for greater communication between the Member and individual constituents. | Despite significant reductions in congressional mail postage costs over the past 25 years, critics continue to raise concerns about the franking privilege. While proponents of the franking privilege argue that the frank allows Members to fulfill their representational duties by providing for greater communication between the Member and individual constituents, critics argue that it is both financially wasteful and gives an unfair advantage to incumbents in congressional elections. In particular, mass mailings have come under increased scrutiny as critics argue that the vast majority of franked mail is unsolicited and, in effect, publicly funded campaign literature.
This report provides an analysis of House Member mass mailings (1997-2008, 2012-2015) and mass communications (2009-2015). A mass mailing is defined by statute as a franked mailing of 500 or more substantially similar pieces of unsolicited mail sent in the same session of Congress. Mass communications include all unsolicited mailings or communications of substantially identical content distributed to 500 or more persons, regardless of media. Examples of mass communications include radio, television, newspaper, and Internet advertisements; automated phone calls; mass facsimiles; and mass emails distributed to a non-subscriber emailing list.
Between 1997 and 2008, House Members sent 1.34 billion pieces of mass mail at a total postage cost of $224.5 million, producing a calendar-year average of 111.6 million pieces of mass mail costing an average of $18.7 million (Table 1). Most Representatives sent mass mailings. During each calendar year 1997-2008, an average of 84% of House Members sent at least one mass mailing. Among Members who sent at least one mass mailing, the average annual number of pieces of mail sent by a Member was 303,270 at a postage cost of $50,834.
Although the annual number of pieces of mail sent remained relatively constant between 1997 and 2008, significant quarterly variations occurred within each Congress (Figure 1). These expenditures continue a historical pattern of Congress spending less on official mail costs during non-election years than during election years (Table 3). However, analysis of quarterly data on Member mass mailing costs indicates that, due to the structure of the fiscal year calendar, comparisons of election-year and non-election-year mailing data tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, since they also capture the effect of a large spike in mass mailings from the fourth quarter of the previous calendar year.
At the direction of the Committee on House Administration, in January 2009, the House began reporting the volume and cost of individual mass communications instead of only mass mailings. Between 2009 and 2011, House Members sent 1.27 billion pieces of mass communication at a total cost of $131.5 million, producing a calendar-year average of 573.1 million pieces of mass communication costing an average of $43.8 million (Table 2). During 2009 and 2010, an annual average of 92% of House Members sent at least one mass communication.
Beginning with the second quarter of calendar year 2011, the House began separately reporting the volume and cost of both mass mailings and mass communications. Since 2012, House Members have sent 3.1 billion pieces of mass communication, at a total cost of $23.9 million, and 183.7 million total pieces of mass mail, at a total cost of $70.5 million.
See also CRS Report RL34188, Congressional Official Mail Costs; CRS Report RS22771, Congressional Franking Privilege: Background and Recent Legislation; and CRS Report RL34274, Franking Privilege: Historical Development and Options for Change. |
crs_R44910 | crs_R44910_0 | Introduction
Since FY2008, federal highway user taxes and fees have been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. New federally assisted roads, bridges, and tunnels may be tolled. The vast majority of existing federally assisted roads, bridges, and tunnels may be converted to toll facilities but must meet reconstruction or replacement requirements. This report explains current federal policies governing tolling and discusses issues related to increasing the use of tolls as a source of revenue for surface transportation projects. Over time, toll roads came to be regarded as obstacles to the free flow of commerce. Section 1 of the Federal-Aid Road Act (39 Stat. 355) provided that "all roads constructed under the provision of this Act be free from tolls of all kinds." Federal Conditions for Tolling of Highways, Bridges, and Tunnels
The legal ability to toll is based on exceptions to the 1958 "Freedom from Tolls" provision of 23 U.S.C. 100-17 ) requires that bridge tolls "shall be just and reasonable." The FAST Act involved the federal government in toll rates for the first time, mandating that intercity buses serving the public have the same access to and pay the same rates as public transportation buses, and requiring public authorities operating high-occupancy toll lanes on the Interstate System to consult with affected metropolitan planning organizations on the placement and amount of tolls
Use of Toll Revenues
Although the requirement for upfront tolling agreements under Section 129 no longer exists, there continue to be restrictions on the use of toll revenues. Section 129(a)(3), which requires that the public authority with jurisdiction over a toll facility use toll revenues only for
debt service with respect to the projects on or for which the tolls are authorized, including funding of reasonable reserves and debt service on refinancing; a reasonable return on investment of any private person financing the project, as determined by the state or interstate compact of states concerned; any costs necessary for the improvement and proper operation and maintenance of the toll facility, including reconstruction, resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation; payments that the party holding the right to toll revenues owes another party under a public-private partnership agreement; or any other purpose for which federal funds may be obligated by a state under Title 23 (including certain transit projects), provided the public authority certifies annually that the tolled facility is being adequately maintained. Financial Realities of Toll Roads
Whether it is built or operated by a government agency or by private investors, a toll road must have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to cover construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs if it is to be financially successful. Most roads on the federal-aid system are not likely to pass that test. In rural areas, highways often do not have enough traffic to cover the cost of building toll-collection infrastructure and collecting tolls. Collecting federal motor fuels taxes is estimated to cost less than 1% of the amount collected. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the demand for federal expenditures on roads. These factors suggest that imposing tolls on individual transportation facilities is likely to be of only limited use in helping states overcome reductions in federal grants should Congress deal with the shortfall in motor fuels tax revenue by reducing the size of the federal surface transportation program. Hypothetically, if all Interstate highways could be instantly converted to a self-sustaining toll network and received no further federal funding, expenditures under the remaining federal-aid highway program would fall from an average of about $45 billion per year to around $33 billion. In recent years, Congress has encouraged the use of innovative financing mechanisms such as P3s, which may use toll revenues in several ways. The creation of a well-funded National Infrastructure Bank could thus lead to an expansion of toll roads. This approach would have the advantage of assuring that all states would begin imposing tolls at roughly the same time, and federal leadership would likely not allow the outbreak of "toll wars" among the states, whereby states attempt to impose toll rates in a way that shifts the burden of the toll to their neighbors or interstate travelers generally. Emerging Issues
Some states may be tempted to collect tolls at state borders rather than at internal locations where more residents would be affected, effectively taxing interstate travel at higher rates than in-state travel and in some cases putting out-of-state companies at a competitive disadvantage against local companies. | The Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 355), which provided federal funds to states for highway construction, included the requirement that all roads funded under the act be "free from tolls of all kinds." Following the funding of the Interstate System in 1956, the "freedom from tolls" policy was reaffirmed (23 U.S.C. §301). Although the provision still exists, exceptions to the general ban on tolls now cover the vast majority of federal-aid roads and bridges. New roads, bridges, and tunnels may be tolled, and most existing roads, bridges, and tunnels may be tolled if they are reconstructed or replaced. Yet growth in the extent of toll facilities has been slow, and some new toll projects have struggled financially.
The failure, beginning in 2008, of federal highway user taxes and fees to provide sufficient revenues to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress has renewed interest in expanding toll financing. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that annual highway revenues, mostly from motor fuels taxes, will fall an average of $20 billion short of the amount needed to sustain the current federal surface transportation program between FY2021 and FY2025, and some Members of Congress see an expansion of tolling as a way to reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads.
Congress could achieve an expansion of tolling in several ways. At one extreme, it could simply encourage tolling pilot projects on Interstate System highways, of which relatively few have been implemented to date. At the other extreme, Congress might authorize states to toll federal-aid highways as they see fit, or even require that Interstate highway segments be converted to toll roads as they undergo reconstruction, eventually turning all Interstates into toll roads.
One obstacle to increased use of tolling is that tolls are a relatively inefficient way of raising revenue. The costs of toll collection on many existing toll roads exceed 10% of revenues even if all tolls are collected electronically, not including the cost of toll collection infrastructure. This compares unfavorably to the cost of collecting the existing federal motor fuels tax, estimated to be less than 1% of revenues. In addition, many roads may not have sufficient traffic willing to pay a high enough toll to fully cover financing, construction, maintenance, and toll collection costs. Due to these factors, as well as their political unpopularity, tolls are likely to play a limited role in funding surface transportation projects in the near future.
Beyond a requirement that toll rates on bridges "shall be just and reasonable" and a provision limiting tolls on over-the-road buses, current federal law provides no role for the federal government in regulating toll rates or practices. States do not need to ask for permission from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) prior to imposing tolls but must be careful to adhere to the legal requirements, especially in regard to the use of revenues. However, there have been controversies in a number of states over toll schedules that favor in-state residents over others; over attempts to collect tolls at state borders, where more nonresidents would be affected, rather than at internal locations; and over trucking industry complaints that truck tolls are excessive compared to auto tolls. If tolling becomes more widespread, the extent to which tolling should be subject to federal oversight may become a more prominent question. |
crs_R44077 | crs_R44077_0 | Child support orders almost always are expressed in fixed dollar amounts, and over time the needs of the child and the financial circumstances of one or both parents may change. However, without periodic modifications, child support obligations can become inadequate and/or inequitable, or they may not correspond to the noncustodial parent's income or ability to pay. The rationale behind review and modification of child support orders is to ensure that child support orders are equitable, sufficient, and commensurate with a parent's income and/or ability to pay. When child support modification policies and procedures are not effective, child support debt increases. In FY2014, $114.8 billion in child support arrearages was owed to families receiving CSE services, but less than 7% ($7.6 billion) of those arrearages was actually paid. Child support debt, in the aggregate, negatively impacts children, custodial parents, and noncustodial parents, and it forces states to expend greater resources on collection and enforcement efforts. Current Policy
Under current law (pursuant to P.L. 109-171 ), states are required to review and, if appropriate, adjust child support orders at least once every three years in cases in which the family is receiving TANF assistance. In the case of a non-TANF family, the CSE agency is to review the child support order at least once every three years at the request of either parent. 1. 2. 3. Address temporary changes in circumstances. 4. As mentioned earlier, child support arrearages are unpaid child support. Large child support arrearages may
result in millions of children receiving less than they are owed in child support; cause a reduction in the cost-effectiveness of the CSE program; result in a perception that the CSE program does not consider the financial situation of low-income noncustodial parents, many of whom may be in dire economic situations; hinder a noncustodial parent's ability to make regular child support payments in full and on time; become a source of uncollectible debt; cause added friction in the relationship with the child's other parent, which may negatively impact the noncustodial parent-child relationship; and block work opportunities for noncustodial parents because past-due child support obligations are reported to credit reporting agencies, which provide the information, upon request, to employers. Public Policy Concerns
One of the stated goals of OCSE's strategic plan for the CSE program is to ensure reliable payment of child support. There is widespread agreement that preventing the buildup of unpaid child support through early intervention rather than traditional enforcement methods is essential to the future success of the CSE program. Although many custodial parents agree to a certain extent that some noncustodial parents are "dead broke" rather than "deadbeats," they contend that the states and the federal government need to proceed with caution in lowering child support orders for low-income noncustodial parents. They argue that child support is a source of income that could mean the difference between poverty and self-sufficiency for some families. They emphasize that lowering the child support order is likely to result in lower income for the child. They argue that even if a noncustodial parent is in dire financial straits, he or she should not be totally released from financial responsibility for his or her children. For low-income noncustodial parents who are unemployed or underemployed, the current garnishment limits may be too high. | Child support orders are almost always expressed in fixed dollar amounts, and over time the needs of the child and the financial circumstances of one or both parents may change. However, without periodic modifications, child support obligations can become inadequate and/or inequitable or may not correspond to the noncustodial parent's income and/or ability to pay.
Under current law (pursuant to P.L. 109-171, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005), states are required to review and, if appropriate, adjust child support orders at least once every three years in cases in which the family is receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits. In the case of a non-TANF family, one of the parents has to request a review within the three-year time frame for a review and modification to occur. If a request for review and modification is made outside the three-year cycle, the requesting party must demonstrate that there was a substantial change in circumstances. Child support modifications must be in accordance with a state's child support guidelines. The rationale behind review and modification of child support orders is to ensure that these orders are equitable, sufficient, and commensurate with a parent's income and/or ability to pay.
When child support modification policies and procedures are not effective, child support debt increases. In FY2014, $114.8 billion in child support arrearages (i.e., past-due child support—the amount of child support that remains unpaid) was owed to families receiving Child Support Enforcement (CSE) services, but less than 7% ($7.6 billion) of those arrearages was actually paid. Child support debt, in the aggregate, negatively impacts children, custodial parents, and noncustodial parents, and it forces states to expend greater resources on collection and enforcement efforts.
Large child support arrearages result in millions of children receiving less than they are owed in child support, reduced cost-effectiveness of the CSE program, and a perception that the CSE program does not consider the financial situation of low-income noncustodial parents, many of whom may be in dire economic situations. Child support arrearages often (1) hinder the noncustodial parent's ability to make regular child support payments in full and on time; (2) become a source of uncollectible debt; (3) cause added friction in the relationship with the child's other parent, which may negatively impact the noncustodial parent-child relationship; and (4) block work opportunities for noncustodial parents because past-due child support obligations are reported to credit reporting agencies, which provide the information, upon request, to employers.
Although many custodial parents agree to a certain extent that some noncustodial parents are "dead broke" rather than "deadbeats," they contend that the states and the federal government need to proceed with caution in lowering child support orders for low-income noncustodial parents. They argue that child support is a source of income that could mean the difference between poverty and self-sufficiency for some families. These custodial parents emphasize that lowering the child support order is likely to result in lower income for the child and argue that even if a noncustodial parent is in dire financial straits, he or she should not be totally released from financial responsibility for his or her children.
There is widespread agreement that preventing the buildup of unpaid child support through early intervention rather than traditional enforcement methods is essential to the future success of the CSE program. Other public policy concerns include examining whether garnishment limits are too high; deciding whether incorporating work-oriented services into the basic CSE program would result in more consistent and timely child support payments; and providing equitable enhanced services and assistance to vulnerable noncustodial parents, regardless of whether they are in jail or prison, unemployed, underemployed, or injured or sick. Commentators maintain that addressing these concerns may help many low-income children. |
crs_RL34452 | crs_RL34452_0 | Background
During the first several months of 2008, a number of lenders curtailed or ceased their participation in the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, citing reasons that include difficulties in raising capital through the securitization of student loan debt and reductions in lender subsidies enacted under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84 ). Concerns were raised that if lender participation in the FFEL program decreased substantially or if a substantial portion of lenders ceased lending to students who attend certain institutions of higher education, large numbers of students might face difficulty in obtaining FFEL program loans. Concerns were also raised about access to borrowing opportunities for students who have come to rely on private (non-federal) student loans because they have exhausted their eligibility for federal student loans. Legislation pertaining to federal student loans was active in the 110 th Congress. On October 27, 2007, the CCRAA was enacted, which made numerous changes to the federal student loan programs. Both bills would amend the HEA to address concerns about the continued availability of federal student loans. On May 7, H.R. 5715 was enacted as P.L. The ECASLA grants temporary authority to the Secretary of Education (the Secretary), until July 1, 2009, to purchase student loans previously made under the FFEL program. It also makes other changes to the FFEL, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL), and American Competitiveness Grant programs (discussed below). 110-315 ) was enacted to amend, extend, and establish new programs under the Higher Education Act. The HEOA includes several amendments to provisions that had been enacted under the ECASLA. Most recently, the temporary authority of the Secretary of Education to purchase FFEL program loans was extended through July 1, 2010, under P.L. 110-350 . Overview of the Federal Student Loan Programs
The federal government operates two major student loan programs: the FFEL program, authorized under Title IV, Part B of the Higher Education Act (HEA), and the DL program, authorized under Title IV, Part D of the HEA. Under the FFEL program, loan capital is provided by private lenders, and the federal government guarantees lenders against loss through borrower default, death, permanent disability, or, in limited instances, bankruptcy. Under the DL program, the federal government provides the loans to students and their families, using federal capital (i.e., funds from the U.S. Treasury). The Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 also expresses a sense of Congress that institutions such as the Federal Financing Bank, the Federal Reserve, and Federal Home Loan Banks, in consultation with the Secretaries of Education and the Treasury, should consider using available authorities to assist in ensuring continued access to federal student loans for students and their families; and that any action taken by these entities should not limit the Secretary's authority with regard to the LLR program, nor the Secretary's authority to purchase loans previously made under the FFEL program. P.L. | Federal student loans are made available under two major loan programs authorized under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, authorized by Title IV, Part B, of the HEA; and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, authorized by Title IV, Part D, of the HEA. Under the FFEL program, private lenders make loans and the federal government guarantees lenders against loss due to borrower default, death, permanent disability, or, in limited instances, bankruptcy. Under the DL program, the federal government lends directly to students and their families, using federal capital (i.e., funds from the U.S. Treasury). The FFEL program is the successor program to the guaranteed student loan (GSL) program, originally enacted under Title IV, Part B, of the HEA. It is the older and larger of the two major federal student loan programs.
During the first several months of 2008, a number of FFEL program lenders curtailed or ceased their participation in the FFEL program, citing reasons that include difficulties in raising capital through the securitization of student loan debt and reductions in lender subsidies enacted under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84). Concerns were raised that if lender participation in the FFEL program decreased substantially or if a substantial portion of lenders ceased lending to students who attend certain institutions of higher education (IHEs), large numbers of students might face difficulty in obtaining FFEL program loans. In addition, concerns were raised about access to borrowing opportunities for students who have come to rely on private (non-federal) student loans because they had exhausted their eligibility for federal student loans.
Legislation pertaining to federal student loans was active in the 110th Congress. On October 27, 2007, the CCRAA was enacted, which made numerous changes to the federal student loan programs. On May 6, 2008, H.R. 5715, the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (ECASLA; P.L. 110-227) was enacted to grant the Secretary of Education temporary authority, through July 1, 2009, to purchase student loans made under the FFEL program and to make other programmatic changes. On August 14, 2008, the HEA was amended and extended under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315). The HEOA amended certain provisions that had been enacted under the ECASLA. The temporary authority of the Secretary of Education to purchase FFEL program loans was extended through July 1, 2010, under P.L. 110-350. The Secretary of Education has established several loan purchase programs under the authority granted by the ECASLA, as amended.
This report reviews changes to the federal student loan programs initiated under the ECASLA to address concerns about the continued availability of federal student loans. It will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41847 | crs_R41847_0 | Opponents of DNA databases suggest that DNA databases are "Orwellian" because of the amount of information about private citizens that they put into the control of the government. Federal courts have generally held that compulsory DNA collection from a person who has been convicted of a felony or other qualifying crime and placed under the supervision of the criminal justice system does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Scientific research on junk DNA is still emerging, and some research suggests that junk DNA contains more genetic information than previously assumed. Congress has demonstrated concern toward some aspects of DNA databanking by requiring expungement of a DNA profile in certain circumstances, prohibiting most non-forensic uses of DNA profiles and databases, and restricting familial searching. However, in general, Congress has taken a supportive attitude toward DNA databanking and incentivized the development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases. As DNA database programs have widened in scope and grown in numbers, their consistency with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has increasingly been challenged. In the context of compulsory DNA collection, courts have widely upheld laws mandating the collection of DNA from persons who were convicted and are subject to the penal system's custody or supervision. Far fewer cases have given the federal courts an opportunity to decide whether DNA collection from arrestees is also constitutional. The two federal circuit courts of appeals to hear the question upheld the mandatory DNA profiling of indicted arrestees, but no federal court has assessed the constitutionality of profiling arrestees in the absence of a judicial finding of probable cause. Courts have generally upheld the indefinite use and storage of a lawfully databanked DNA profile after its source's conviction. However, not all courts agree that any post-conviction use of those profiles is constitutionally acceptable. In particular, observers are now raising questions about the Fourth Amendment consistency of using databases for non-forensic purposes and for familial searching. Currently, these concerns are largely confined to the scholarly literature—they have not come before a federal court—and primarily centered on state database programs. Unlike some state DNA databases, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) and the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) can not be used for either non-forensic research or intentional familial searching. However, the increase in states that authorize familial searching suggests that it may not be long before the constitutionality of familial searching comes before a federal court. | Over the past few decades, state and federal lawmakers have promoted the development of databases containing DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) profiles for individuals who are under the supervision of the criminal justice system due to their known or suspected involvement in a felony or other qualifying crime. Congress has demonstrated concern toward some aspects of DNA databanking by requiring expungement of a DNA profile in certain circumstances, prohibiting most non-forensic uses of DNA profiles and databases, and restricting familial searching. However, in general, Congress has taken a supportive attitude toward DNA databanking and has incentivized the development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases.
As DNA database programs have widened in scope and grown in numbers, their consistency with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has increasingly been challenged. In the context of compulsory DNA collection, courts have widely upheld laws mandating the collection of DNA from persons who were convicted and are subject to the penal system's custody or supervision. Far fewer cases have addressed whether DNA collection from arrestees is also constitutional. The two federal circuit courts of appeals to hear the question upheld the mandatory DNA profiling of indicted arrestees, but no federal court has assessed the constitutionality of profiling arrestees in the absence of a judicial finding of probable cause.
Courts have generally upheld the use and permanent storage of a lawfully databanked DNA profile. However, not all courts agree that any post-conviction use of those profiles is constitutionally acceptable. In particular, observers are now raising questions about the Fourth Amendment consistency of using databases for non-forensic purposes and for familial searching—that is, using the DNA databases to locate potential relatives of an unidentified suspect. Currently, these concerns are largely confined to the scholarly literature—they have not come before a federal court—and are primarily centered on state database programs. Unlike some state DNA databases, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) and the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) can not be used for either non-forensic research or intentional familial searching. However, the increase in states that authorize familial searching suggests that it may not be long before the constitutionality of familial searching comes before a federal court.
As these issues percolate up to the courts, new advances and revelations in the science of forensic analysis and databanking may have potentially significant legal implications. Several courts have suggested that new forensic techniques and scientific findings would require them to reevaluate their legal conclusions and analysis. In particular, research into the scope and nature of the information revealed by the "junk" DNA used in forensic analysis may alter how courts measure the intrusiveness of DNA profiling if it suggests that "junk" DNA reveals more sensitive information about its source than scientists previously thought. |
crs_RL32056 | crs_RL32056_0 | Together, these provisions provide authority for a lease that departs from normal proceduresfor major DOD acquisition programs by:
specifying that a particular acquisition method can be used (i.e., a lease of acommercial asset, which would make it an operating rather than a capital lease or aprocurement);
specifying the number and type of aircraft to be leased (100 Boeing 767s and4 Boeing 737s);
exempting the lease from requirements and limitations that normally governDOD leases of ships and aircraft which are established in 10 USC 2401 and 2401a, includingfunding of termination liability;
exempting the lease from a limit established in 31 USC 1553(b)(2) on theamount of appropriations that, under certain circumstances, may be charged to closed-outappropriation accounts;
exempting the Air Force from the "Buy American" requirements of the BerryAmendment (10 USC 2533a);
establishing a special congressional approval process for the lease whereapproval would be either through authorization and appropriation language, or through a new startnotification to be approved by the four congressional defense committees at anytime. TheSenate Armed Services Committee has not yet signaled its approval or disapproval. Is There an Urgent Need to Replace the KC-135? by [author name scrubbed]
(707-2577)
Much of the Air Force's argument for leasing 100 KC-767s is based on its assessment thatit has an urgent need to replace the oldest KC-135s: that operations and support costs are too high,that mission availability is too low, that the aircraft is wearing out prematurely due to high operationstempo, and that it is vulnerable to catastrophic problems. (11) The Air Force argues that leasing the KC-767 will result in fasterdeliveries -- under the Air Force's self-imposed funding limits - than will purchasing them, whichmay be important if the need to recapitalize is urgent. (42) This unanticipated use,KC-767 lease proponents say, is wearing out the 42 year old aircraft even faster than anticipated justthree years ago. The KC-767 ismore flexible and more capable than the KC-135, supporters argue. Inmany ways, lease opponents admit, the KC-767 does compare favorably to the KC-135. KC-767 lease critics say that re-engining the KC-135E has many merits that should beconsidered as an alternative to leasing 100 new aircraft. (60)
The second advantage of this approach is cost. Viability of the 767 Production Line. (73)
Beyond February 2006, the viability of the 767 production line is less certain. Several of these factors could individually shiftthe result of the NPV analysis by hundreds of millions of dollars. If they put it atsomething lower than $100 million, thus would make the comparison more favorable to theprocurement option. The proposed tanker lease raises a number of broader policyissues, particularly, the visibility of full cost of planned defense programs in the Congressionaloversight process. Use of a Special Purpose Entity decreases visibility . Deviation from full-funding of the government's contractual liability. Locking in Resources When Program Costs AreUncertain. Appropriateness of Using An OperatingLease. As discussed previously, other changes in other assumptions that would affectthe comparison of costs made in the Air Force analysis were debated within theAdministration, including:
whether to assume a progress payment rate closer to standardrates for Air Force aircraft programs rather than the rates desired byBoeing;
whether to compute inflation based on progress payments ratherthan compounded to the amount experienced at the time when the entire set ofaircraft was completed as the Air Force assumed; and
whether to decrease the government's imputed cost of insurancebelow commercial rates to reflect lower risk. In the case of the tanker lease, Congress provided special authorities for thetanker lease and exempted the Air Force from the requirement to budget fortermination liability with the following requirements:
the Air Force must submit a report that outlines the terms andconditions of the proposed contract and "expected savings, if any," between a leaseand a purchase as well as annual reports thereafter;
a contract cannot be signed until at least 30 calendar days haveelapsed since submission of the report;
the present value of the total payments of the lease cannotexceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the aircraft as required by OMBCircular A-11;
the Air Force must accept delivery and return aircraft in acommercial configuration; and
aircraft cannot be modified unless special authority is providedin an appropriations act or the aircraft is transferred to the Air Force, which requiresseparate authorization. Section 8159, FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act ( P.L. | The Air Force wishes to replace its KC-135E aircraft by leasing 100 new Boeing KC-767tankers. The Air Force indicates that leasing is preferred because it will result in faster deliveriesthan outright purchasing. Air Force leaders argue that a lease will allow them to husband scarceprocurement dollars by making a small down payment. Although Congress authorized the proposedlease in the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act, it stipulated that the defense oversight committeesmust approve the lease -- only the Senate Armed Services Committee has yet to approve. The leaseproposal has been controversial and issues raised thus far include:
Whether there is an urgent need to replace the KC-135 fleet. The Air Force states that replacingthe KC-135 is urgent, citing high costs, aircraft vulnerability to catastrophic problems, and theimminent closing of the 767 production line. Opponents of the lease state that operating costs arecontrollable and will be far lower than the overall costs of leasing the 767; that the vulnerability isno more than depicted in a two-year old study which the Air Force found acceptable; and that the767 production line is viable until 2006-2008.
Whether the KC-767 is the right airplane. If acquired, the KC-767 may be in DOD's inventoryfor 50 years. The Air Force says that the KC-767 is much more capable than the KC-135. Opponents say that other aircraft are even better than the KC-767 in meeting the Air Force'srequirements. The Air Force opposes re-engining KC-135Es, but opponents say it merits attention,as does outsourcing aerial refueling.
Whether the Air Force cost comparison is authoritative. The Air Force's report to Congresscalculates that a 767 lease would cost $150 million more than a purchase on a net present valuebasis. This calculation, however, is sensitive to many assumptions. CRS analysis shows that severalassumptions built into the calculation, if treated differently than in the Air Force report, could changethe calculation by hundreds of millions of dollars each. Although some could change the calculationto favor either the lease or the purchase, others -- such as the discount rate used to calculate netpresent value and whether to use multi-year procurement for the purchase option -- could be morelikely to alter the comparison more in favor of the purchase option.
Whether this lease has implications for congressional budget oversight. The proposed leaseappears to be an unprecedented method of funding a major new defense procurement. Critics pointout that this approach is coupled with exemptions from longstanding laws on budgeting and defenseprocurement. The proposed lease raises policy issues regarding the visibility of full costs for DoDprograms in the congressional oversight process, including questions concerning locking inbudgetary resources when costs are uncertain, appropriateness of using an operating lease for thisproposal, the impact of a Special Purpose Entity, and the potential for deviation from full-fundingof the government's contractual liability.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40703 | crs_R40703_0 | Poor governance, corruption, weak or nonexistent infrastructure, and other factors have prevented Guinea's population from benefiting from its rich natural resource endowments, and average living conditions are poor even by regional standards in West Africa. The ongoing Ebola outbreak in West Africa has highlighted stark gaps in Guinea's healthcare infrastructure. The outbreak has affected Guinea's economy, social relations, and politics. Longtime opposition leader Alpha Condé was elected president in the country's first ever open elections organized by an independent electoral commission. The United States played a key role in Guinea's 2010 political transition by isolating the military junta and providing high-level support for elections. U.S. bilateral aid has since decreased, and is overwhelmingly focused on health. In 2008, President Lansana Conté, who came to power in a military coup in 1984, died after a long illness. In June 2010, Guineans voted in their country's first presidential elections organized by an independent electoral commission and without an incumbent candidate. Opposition leaders, however, assert that a 2013 political agreement between the government and opposition requires local elections to be held before the presidential vote. For example, EU observers stated that "the transmission of results suffered from a lack of transparency" and reported that a number of problems had "a negative impact on the quality of operations and lessened public confidence in electoral administration," including "the absence of detailed data on the revision of the electoral registry, the release of provisional voter lists that had not been purged or corrected, the unilateral and tardy announcement of a new map of polling stations that did not conform to legal requirements, concerns regarding the contractor in charge of the electoral registry, the inversion of key steps in the process, and the removal of proxy voting a week before the polls." U.S. Relations and Aid
According to the State Department, "U.S. policy seeks to encourage Guinea's democratic reforms, its positive contribution to regional stability, and sustainable economic and social development." Guinea's large mineral deposits represent potential strategic and commercial interests for U.S. actors. Guinea's extractive industries have also drawn attention from the U.S. Department of Justice for potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977. Foreign Assistance
U.S. bilateral aid to Guinea is predominantly focused on health assistance ( Table 1 ), in addition to separate Ebola-related programs. Recent Congressional Actions
The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 113-235 , Division J, Section 7042 [e]) restricts Guinea's ability to receive International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance for purposes other than "training related to international peacekeeping operations and expanded IMET," with a further exception for maritime security assistance. Similar restrictions have been contained in previous annual appropriations measures. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-81 ) authorized Guinea, among several West African countries, to receive Defense Department-administered counter-narcotics assistance. During the 111 th Congress, two resolutions condemning the "stadium massacre" of protesters in 2009 passed their respective chambers: H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen) passed in the House; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer) passed in the Senate. Such tensions are likely to increase further ahead of presidential elections scheduled for October 2015. | Guinea is one of three countries most affected by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which has affected the country's economy, social relations, food security, and politics. A former French colony on West Africa's Atlantic coast with a population of about 11 million, Guinea is rich in natural resources, but poverty is widespread. President Alpha Condé, a former opposition leader, was voted into office in 2010 in Guinea's first ever presidential election organized by an independent electoral commission and without an incumbent candidate. His inauguration brought an end to a turbulent period of military rule that followed the death in 2008 of longtime leader Lansana Conté (who himself came to power in a military coup).
As president, Condé has focused on containing the political influence of the military and improving economic governance, including by overhauling the mining code. However, state institutions remain weak; living conditions remain overwhelmingly poor; ethnic tensions have risen; and opposition activists accuse Condé of authoritarian tendencies. Political unrest appears likely ahead of presidential elections scheduled for October 2015, in which Condé is seeking a second term. Local-level elections have been repeatedly delayed and are the subject of a stand-off between the government and opposition over electoral procedures.
U.S. engagement in Guinea is focused on health assistance, military professionalization, counter-narcotics issues, and concerns about regional peace and stability. Following the 2008 military coup, the United States identified Guinea's political transition as a key policy goal in West Africa and made significant diplomatic and financial contributions toward the success of Guinea's 2010 election process. U.S. bilateral aid is now overwhelmingly focused on health issues. Guinea's large mineral deposits, including the world's largest known reserves of bauxite (an ore used in producing aluminum), represent potential strategic and commercial interests for U.S. actors. Guinea's extractive industries have also drawn recent attention from the U.S. Department of Justice for potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Congress plays a role in shaping U.S. engagement through its authorization and appropriation of aid funding, and its oversight of U.S. policies and aid programs. The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) restricts Guinea's ability to receive International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, except for certain purposes. Similar restrictions have been contained in previous annual foreign aid appropriations measures. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) authorized Guinea, among several West African countries, to receive Defense Department-administered counter-narcotics assistance. During the 111th Congress, two resolutions condemning a massacre of civilian protesters in the capital, Conakry, in September 2009, passed their respective chambers: H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen) passed in the House; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer) passed in the Senate.
See also CRS Report R43807, FY2015 Funding to Counter Ebola and the Islamic State (IS), coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10022, The Global Health Security Agenda and International Health Regulations, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43736, Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola or EVD): Experts List, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40545 | crs_R40545_0 | This makes understanding food price changes and their effects on consumers an important matter for Congress. This report provides information on the current status and outlook for U.S. food prices, measuring their changes and how such changes relate to U.S. consumers. The fourth section, " Recent Food Price Inflation ," examines retail food price inflation, including a review and discussion of the level of food price inflation registered by the consumer price index for all-food, at-home-food, and away-from-home-food purchases as well as for major food groups. Summary
For households with low disposable income levels where food expenditures are a large share of the budget, rising food prices result in greater responsiveness and may force more difficult budgetary tradeoffs than in higher-income households with smaller food-budget shares. The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
The CPI is perhaps the most widely reported measure of U.S. price inflation. The Food-at-Home CPI reflects changes in the prices of foods consumed at home. Rapidly Inflating Global Commodity Markets, 2006 to 2008
Several economic factors emerged in late 2005 that began to gradually push market prices higher for both raw agricultural commodities and energy costs. Driven largely by these demand forces, both general inflation and food price inflation began to accelerate in 2007 and reached a peak in 2008 when the All-Items CPI reached 3.8%, highest since 1991, and the All-Food CPI peaked at 5.5%, highest since 1990 ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 ). The 2008 Financial Crisis Triggers a Severe Recession and Price Deflation
The situation of sharply rising prices through the first half of 2008 came to a sudden halt when the financial crisis hit U.S. and global commodity and financial markets in mid-2008 leading to a severe economic recession in 2009. As a result, annual retail food price inflation peaked at 5.5% in 2008 before falling to 1.8% in 2009 and 0.8% in 2010 ( Figure 8 ). According to USDA, U.S. food price inflation is projected in the 2% to 3% range in 2015 ( Table 4 and Figure 8 ). The 11-month MA series reveals three recent pronounced inflationary-deflationary trends for retail food prices that have occurred since 2005:
1. a strong upward inflationary trend that began at the end of 2005 and persisted through June 2008—in line with the demand-driven price rises in global markets for agricultural commodities as well as for energy, transportation, and raw materials; followed by a severe deflationary price pattern from late 2008 until mid-2009, driven by the U.S. and global financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath; 2. another upward trend starting in late 2010 as U.S. and global economic conditions slowly improved, followed by a decline in inflationary pressure in mid-2011 into 2013—again due largely to sluggish economic growth, stagnant wages, and persistently high unemployment, which combined to weaken consumer purchasing power; and finally 3. food price inflation returning in 2014 due to a strengthening U.S. economy and strong employment gains; followed once again by an apparent economic downturn heading into 2015. At-Home Versus Away-from-Home Food Price Inflation
As shown earlier ( Figure 6 ), At-Home food prices are substantially more volatile than Away-from-Home food prices (see also Table 1 ). Price Inflation Escalator Clauses Often Respond with a Lag
Many wages and salaries, as well as federal programs (including several domestic food assistance programs), are linked to price inflation through escalation clauses in order to retain their purchasing power. However, even for households with escalation clauses that adjust incomes or benefits for price inflation, there is a time lag between the time the price inflation is measured and the time when the wage or program benefit is adjusted upward to compensate. | The heightened price volatility of global commodity markets in 2008, the devastating U.S. drought of 2012, China's growing demand for international commodities, and almost routine media reports of daunting world population growth all raise the specter of food price inflation and generate many questions about farm and food price movements. Understanding food price changes and their effects on consumers is an important matter for Members of Congress and their constituents. This report provides information on the current status and outlook for U.S. food prices, measuring their changes and how such changes relate to U.S. consumers.
Despite the hype associated with media coverage of international catastrophes, historical evidence suggests that prices for retail food products are driven more by consumer demand (strongly linked to general economic conditions), than by price changes in raw commodity markets, although this linkage varies with the degree of raw commodity content in the retail product. For a discussion of the relationship between farm and retail prices, and the major factors influencing farm-level and wholesale food prices, see CRS Report R40621, Farm-to-Food Price Dynamics.
During the 1991 to 2006 period, U.S. food prices were fairly stable—annual food price inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All Food (excluding alcoholic beverages), averaged a relatively low 2.5%. However, several economic factors emerged in late 2005 that began to gradually push market prices higher for both raw agricultural commodities and energy costs, and ultimately retail food prices. U.S. food price inflation increased at a rate of 4% in 2007 and at 5.5% in 2008—the highest since 1990 and well above the general inflation rate of 3.8%. The situation of sharply rising prices came to a sudden halt in late 2008, when the financial crisis led to a severe global economic recession. Annual food price inflation dropped to 1.8% in 2009 and 0.8% in 2010, driven by the global financial crisis and its aftermath. In 2011, improving U.S. and global economic conditions led to a 3.7% rise in average food prices. However, since 2012, food price inflation has averaged 2.5%—due in part to continued sluggish economic growth and stagnant wages, which combined to weaken consumer purchasing power. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects that annual U.S. food price inflation will be in the 2% to 3% range in 2015 compared with 2.4% in 2014.
For households with low disposable income levels where food expenditures are a large share of the budget, rising food prices result in diminished purchasing power and may force difficult budgetary tradeoffs. To help food-deficient households during periods of rising prices, many domestic food assistance programs are linked to price inflation through escalation clauses, in order to retain consumer purchasing power during periods of rising food prices. However, even for programs with escalation clauses, a time lag usually occurs between the time the price inflation is measured and the time when the wage or program benefit is adjusted upward to compensate.
The All-Food CPI has two components—Food-at-Home and Food-Away-from-Home. The Food-at-Home CPI is most representative of retail food prices and is significantly more volatile than the Food-Away-from-Home index. However, both indexes, Food-at-Home and Food-Away-from-Home, are projected at 2% to 3% for 2015. |
crs_R42369 | crs_R42369_0 | Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and autism are general terms for a group of developmental disabilities that cause impairments in social skills and communication, and are often characterized by certain atypical behaviors. The federal government has a role in the financing (through Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Programs) and delivery (through funding of developmental disabilities programming in schools, Title V Maternal and Child Health funding, and other sources) of treatment for ASD. The number of cases and their appropriate diagnosis and treatment affect federal and state expenditures. As such, Congress has shown interest in financing research on ASD prevalence, causes, and optimal treatment for individuals with ASD. 109-416 ), and the recent enactment of the Combating Autism Reauthorization Act (CARA, P.L. This report presents an overview of the CAA and CARA, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) funding and activities under the CAA and CARA, other federal activities related to autism, and selected issues for Congress. Under the CHA, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) was authorized to expand and intensify its autism research efforts and to establish Centers of Excellence for autism research. Enacted in 2006 and subsequently reauthorized by the Combating Autism Reauthorization Act of 2011, the CAA is intended to address growing concern about the increasing prevalence of autism spectrum disorders, and to stimulate research into possible autism causes and treatments. It authorized funding from FY2007 through FY2011 for autism research, screening, early intervention, and education. At the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the CAA authorizes expanded federal efforts in autism education, early detection, and intervention. The CAA also authorizes the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC) at NIH to coordinate all ASD research, screening, intervention, and education efforts within HHS. Combating Autism Reauthorization Act (CARA)
Funding for CAA programs was authorized through FY2011; the Combating Autism Reauthorization Act (CARA), which extends funding at current levels through FY2014, was signed into law on September 30, 2011. The table includes authorizations of appropriations from FY2007 through FY2014. Full-year appropriations for FY2013 have yet to be enacted and therefore are not included in Table 2 . However, the six-month FY2013 CR ( P.L. 112-175 , signed into law on September 28, 2012) provided funding at FY2012 levels, increased by 0.612%. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Under the Combating Autism Act, the CDC is responsible for ASD and developmental disabilities surveillance and epidemiological research. Under the CAA, NIH-funded researchers are tasked with studying potential risk factors and causes of autism, and to coordinate and consolidate its research on ASD and other developmental disabilities with other agencies. The CAA does not authorize appropriations for these agencies. | Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and autism are general terms for a group of developmental disabilities that cause impairments in social skills and communication, and are often characterized by certain atypical behaviors. The federal government has a role in the financing (through Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance Programs) and delivery (through funding of developmental disabilities programming in schools, Title V Maternal and Child Health funding, and other sources) of treatment for ASD. The number of autism cases and their appropriate diagnosis and treatment affect federal and state expenditures. As such, Congress has shown interest in financing research on ASD prevalence, causes, and optimal treatment for individuals with ASD.
On September 26, 2011, the 112th Congress passed the Combating Autism Reauthorization Act (CARA, P.L. 112-32), which reauthorized funding for autism research authorized under the Combating Autism Act of 2006 (CAA, P.L. 109-416). The CAA was enacted to address public and congressional concern with growing rates of autism; to increase existing autism research funding authorizations; and to stimulate state-level coordination of health, education, and disability programs. The CAA authorizes funding for ASD surveillance, research, and education at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
The CAA authorizes funding for CDC to administer a grant program for states and other entities to conduct surveillance on ASD and developmental disabilities, and to establish regional centers of excellence in ASD epidemiology. The CAA also authorizes funding for HRSA to support autism education, intervention, and early detection. NIH is authorized under the CAA to conduct and fund basic scientific research on autism and other developmental disabilities. In addition, NIH is tasked with the coordination of all research, screening, intervention, and education efforts through the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee.
The Combating Autism Act authorized appropriations for these activities from FY2007 through FY2011. The Combating Autism Reauthorization Act of 2011 extends authorizations of appropriations at FY2011 levels for FY2012 through FY2014. Funding for research authorized by CARA is discretionary and subject to the annual appropriations process. Full-year appropriations for FY2013 have yet to be enacted. However, a six-month government-wide continuing resolution (CR) was signed into law on September 28, 2012 (P.L. 112-175), which generally maintained funding for discretionary programs at their FY2012 levels, increased by 0.612%.
This report presents an overview of the CAA and CARA, HHS funding and activities under the CAA and CARA for FY2007 through FY2013, other federal activities related to autism, and selected issues for Congress. |
crs_96-452 | crs_96-452_0 | Regarding voting, clause 3 of the same section provides in part that "the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal." As a regular practice, however, the Senate presumes that it is complying with the Constitution. Therefore, it presumes that a quorum always is present unless and until the absence of a quorum is suggested or demonstrated:
The Senate operates on the presumption that a quorum is present at all times, under all circumstances, unless the question to the contrary is raised, or the absence of a quorum is officially shown, or until a point of no quorum is made even though a voice vote is taken and announced in the meantime. Under the Senate's standing rules, if no other Senator has the floor, any Senator (including a Senator who is presiding) may "suggest the absence of a quorum." Once the quorum call has begun, the Senate may not resume the conduct of business until a majority of Senators respond to this call, or unless the Senate agrees by unanimous consent to "dispense with further proceedings under the quorum call." Because most quorum calls are intended to suspend the Senate's floor proceedings, Senators feel under no obligation to come to the floor to record their presence. Quorum calls allow for such informal consultations, which may take place either on or off the Senate floor. Only if he or she finds that a quorum is not present does the presiding officer direct the clerk to call the roll. However, if the clerk finishes calling the roll and the presiding officer announces that a majority of Senators have failed to respond, the Senate cannot resume its business, including debate, nor can it dispense with the quorum call by unanimous consent, because the absence of a quorum has been established. In that event, the Senate usually has only two options: to adjourn or to take steps necessary to establish a quorum. The usual recourse is for the majority leader to make a motion directing the sergeant at arms to request the attendance of absent Senators. A voice or division vote is considered valid, no matter how many or how few Senators participated, unless a Senator takes the initiative to challenge the vote, before the result is announced, for violating the constitutional requirement that a quorum must be present for the Senate to do business:
Until a point of no quorum has been raised, the Senate operates on the assumption that a quorum is present, and even if only a few Senators are present, a measure may be passed or a nomination agreed to ... Voice votes may be taken on the passage of a bill and if no question of a quorum is raised, that action is final, even though a majority of the Senators did not participate; the Senate operates on the absolute assumption that a quorum is always present until a point of no quorum is made. Consequently, at least 11 Senators—one-fifth of the minimal quorum of 51 Senators—must raise their hands to support a request for a rollcall vote. It is not at all unusual, for example, for a Senator to offer an amendment and then immediately ask for the yeas and nays on that amendment even before the debate on it has commenced. Conducting Rollcall Votes
If a roll call has been ordered, when the time to vote arrives, the presiding officer states that "the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll." If the yeas and nays are not ordered on the pending question, that usually indicates that there is no uncertainty among Senators about what the outcome will be. | The Constitution states that "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a quorum to do business.... " The Senate presumes that it is complying with this requirement and that a quorum always is present unless and until the absence of a quorum is suggested or demonstrated. This presumption allows the Senate to conduct its business on the floor with fewer than 51 Senators present until a Senator "suggests the absence of a quorum."
Except when the Senate has invoked cloture, the presiding officer may not count to determine if a quorum is present. When the absence of a quorum is suggested, therefore, the presiding officer directs the clerk to call the roll. The Senate cannot resume its business until a majority of Senators respond to the quorum call or unless, by unanimous consent, "further proceedings under the quorum call are dispensed with" before the last Senator's name has been called. If a quorum fails to respond, the Senate may adjourn or take steps necessary to secure the attendance of enough Senators to constitute a quorum. It usually takes the latter course by agreeing to a motion that instructs the sergeant at arms to request the attendance of absent Senators.
More often than not, however, quorum calls are unrelated to attendance on the floor. Senators "suggest the absence of a quorum" to suspend the Senate's formal floor proceedings temporarily. There are many purposes for such quorum calls. For example, they can be used to permit informal discussions that are intended to resolve a policy disagreement or procedural problem, or to allow a Senator to reach the floor in order to make a speech or begin consideration of a bill. When a quorum call is provoked for such a purpose, it usually is ended by unanimous consent before the call of the roll has been completed.
The Constitution also provides that "the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal." Any Senator who has been recognized may "ask for the yeas and nays" on whatever question the Senate is considering. If the yeas and nays are ordered at the request of at least 11 Senators (one-fifth of the minimum quorum of 51), that determines the manner in which the vote will be conducted (if it is conducted). The timing of the vote is not determined by this request. A Senator may offer an amendment and immediately ask for the yeas and nays, even if the vote is not expected to take place until hours or days later.
If the yeas and nays are not ordered, the Senate votes on questions by voice vote. Alternatively, if the presiding officer believes that the outcome is not in doubt, he or she may say that, "without objection, the amendment (or motion, etc.) is agreed to." If any Senator does object, a formal vote ensues. |
crs_RL33907 | crs_RL33907_0 | This report discusses actions taken by Congress and the Administration that have affected this program, describes the decision-making process for choosing countermeasures, describes the countermeasures for which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has contracted, and discusses accounting discrepancies between the President's Budget and HHS reporting of Project BioShield awards. Overview of Project BioShield
The Project BioShield Act of 2004 ( P.L. The third authorizes a 10-year program to encourage the development and production of new countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. It acts as a guarantee that the federal government will buy successfully developed countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). 108-90 ) provided an advance appropriation of $5.593 billion to procure civilian medical countermeasures for a 10-year period (FY2004-FY2013). 108-276 ). P.L. Two separate rescissions have removed a total of $25 million from the Project BioShield special reserve fund. However, Congress retains the power to make both specific appropriations and rescissions to this account and could thus directly increase or decrease the amount available for Project BioShield obligations. Acquisitions
The HHS has reported awarding $2.331 billion worth of Project BioShield contracts ( Table 3 ). These contracts address four material threats: Bacillus anthracis (the bacteria which cause anthrax), smallpox, botulinum toxin, and radiological and nuclear agents. While HHS has made additional requests for information from companies developing CBRN countermeasures, none have resulted in contract offers. On December 17, 2006, HHS terminated an anthrax countermeasure contract for failure to meet a contract milestone. In 2004, after the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 provided the advance appropriation, but before the Project BioShield Act was enacted, HHS obligated $50 million from this account to support the botulinum antitoxin program. Differences in HHS Contract Awards and Annual Budget Document Accounting
The Project BioShield special reserve fund, established by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, is managed by DHS. Taking this recovery into account, $1.889 billion would be available for obligation in FY2007-FY2008 and $4.064 billion would be available until the end of the program in FY2013. Many stakeholders, industry leaders, and policymakers have criticized the rate at which DHS completes Material Threat Determinations. Appropriators set limits on how much could be obligated during specified periods of time. P.L. 109-417 included authorization for approximately $1 billion to support this type of activity for FY2007 through FY2008. It remains to be seen whether these concerns will be allayed through the management changes being implemented subsequent to: the establishment of the Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) and publication of its strategy; the enactment of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act ( P.L. | The Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276) established a 10-year program to acquire civilian medical countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents for the Strategic National Stockpile. Provisions of this act were designed to encourage private companies to develop these countermeasures by guaranteeing a government market for successfully developed countermeasures.
Congress has expressed concern about the implementation of Project BioShield. It has held multiple oversight hearings and considered several pieces of legislation to improve the execution of this program, including the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417), H.R. 1089, and H.R. 1684. Stakeholders and policymakers have criticized specific contract award decisions and the rate at which they are made. Additionally, contract awards reported by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) do not directly correspond with figures provided in the President's annual budget documents, which may suggest problems with interagency coordination and communication.
Both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and HHS have responsibilities in this program. Funds for this program are appropriated to DHS, while contracts are executed through HHS. The interagency process responsible for deciding which countermeasures to procure has changed multiple times since this program's inception.
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) provided an advance appropriation of $5.6 billion to acquire CBRN countermeasures over a 10-year period (FY2004-FY2013). This act also limited the amount that could be obligated during specified time periods. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276) assigned the $5.6 billion advance appropriation to Project BioShield countermeasure acquisitions. Two separate rescissions reduced the total amount available for Project BioShield by a total of $25 million. Congress retains the power to make additional appropriations and rescissions to this account.
HHS has awarded Project BioShield contracts for a countermeasures against anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, and radiological or nuclear agents. These awards total approximately $2.331 billion. However, the largest contract, $878 million for an anthrax vaccine, was cancelled in December 2006 for failure to meet a contract milestone. Taking this into account, approximately $1.889 billion remains available for obligation through FY2008 and $4.064 billion available for obligation through the end of the program in FY2013.
This report discusses actions taken by Congress and the Administration that have affected this program, describes the decision-making process for choosing countermeasures, describes the countermeasures for which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has contracted, and discusses accounting discrepancies in Project BioShield budget documents. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42066 | crs_R42066_0 | Background on Synthetic and Designer Drugs
Synthetic drugs, as opposed to natural drugs, are chemically produced in a laboratory. Their chemical structure can be either identical to or different from naturally occurring drugs, and their effects are designed to mimic or even enhance those of natural drugs. When produced clandestinely, they are not typically controlled pharmaceutical substances intended for legitimate medical use. Designer drugs are a form of synthetic drugs. They slightly modify the molecular structures of illegal or controlled substances to circumvent existing drug laws. Concern over the reported increase in use of certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants led some to call on Congress to legislatively schedule specific substances. This is, in part, because congressional action could place certain substances onto Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) more quickly than might occur through administrative scheduling actions by the Attorney General and Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as authorized by the CSA. In June 2012, Congress passed the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012—Subtitle D of Title XI of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act ( P.L. Under this law, a controlled substance analogue is defined as a substance if
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II. In May 2013, the DEA placed three synthetic cannabinoids on the list of controlled substances under Schedule I of the CSA. Law enforcement and policymakers—at both the state and federal levels—have taken an interest in and responded to the increasing use of certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the global emergence of certain synthetic cathinones and cannabinoids from 2009 to 2011. As shown in Figure 1 , these calls decreased from 2011 to 2013, but have risen again over the last two years. The Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey first reported on the rise in synthetic cannabinoid use in its 2011 survey. In June 2012, Congress passed legislation to permanently schedule these five synthetic cannabinoids (and other synthetic substances). Since enactment of the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, the DEA has temporarily placed 10 additional synthetic cannabinoids on Schedule I. Pursuant to the temporary scheduling authority, as expanded under the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 ( P.L. This number climbed to 6,137 calls in 2011 and has declined each year since 2011. In 2015, there were 520 reported calls to poison control centers about exposure to bath salts. Then in April 2013, then-Attorney General Holder—through the DEA and in consultation with the Secretary of HHS—took administrative action to permanently place methylone on Schedule I of the CSA. Notably, all 50 states have banned chemical substances contained in synthetic stimulants such as bath salts. 112-144 ). Under this act, a cannabimimetic agent is defined as one of five structural classes of synthetic cannabinoids (and their analogues). Issues
Congress may confront several issues when considering whether to schedule certain synthetic substances. These issues include potential implications on the federal criminal justice system, the influence of research on scheduling, possible effects of scheduling on future medical research, and the ability to use the Analogue Enforcement Act to enforce drug laws for synthetic substances of concern. Congress may consider whether or not placing certain synthetic drugs on Schedule I will hinder future research on these substances. Options for Congress
In considering enforcement challenges identified by the DEA, Congress may consider a number of options in addressing the continuing sales of synthetic drugs. Congress may amend the CSA in several ways to better facilitate enforcement action against the illicit synthetic drug industry. | Synthetic drugs, as opposed to natural drugs, are chemically produced in a laboratory. Their chemical structure can be either identical to or different from naturally occurring drugs, and their effects are designed to mimic or even enhance those of natural drugs. When produced clandestinely, they are not typically controlled pharmaceutical substances intended for legitimate medical use. Designer drugs are a form of synthetic drugs. They contain slightly modified molecular structures of illegal or controlled substances, and they are modified in order to circumvent existing drug laws. While the issue of synthetic drugs and their abuse is not new, Congress has demonstrated a renewed concern with the issue.
From 2009 to 2011, synthetic drug abuse was reported to have dramatically increased. During this time period, calls to poison control centers for incidents relating to harmful effects of synthetic cannabinoids (such as "K2" and "Spice") and stimulants (such as "bath salts") increased at what some considered to be an alarming rate. The number of hospital emergency department visits involving synthetic cannabinoids more than doubled from 2010 to 2011. In 2012 and 2013, however, the number of calls to poison control centers for incidents relating to harmful effects of synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic stimulants decreased. Calls regarding bath salts have declined each year since 2011, while calls regarding synthetic cannabinoids have increased since the drops in 2012 and 2013. The Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey results from 2015 indicate that annual prevalence rates for use of synthetic cannabinoids are down over the last two years while bath salt use remained low. Government and media reports indicate that fentanyl, a synthetic opioid 50-100 times stronger than morphine, is rising in popularity as well as various synthetic cannabinoids.
The reported harmful effects of synthetic substances range from nausea to drug-induced psychosis. Due to the unpredictable nature of synthetic drugs and of human consumption of these drugs, the true effects of many of these drugs are unknown. Many states have responded to synthetic drug abuse by passing laws banning certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants.
In 2011, the Attorney General—through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—used his temporary scheduling authority to place five synthetic cannabinoids and three synthetic stimulants on Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Concern over the reported increase in use of certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants resulted in legislative action to schedule specific substances. The Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012—Subtitle D of Title XI of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (P.L. 112-144)—added five structural classes of substances in synthetic cannabinoids (and their analogues) as well as 11 synthetic stimulants and hallucinogens to Schedule I of the CSA. In addition, the act extended the DEA's authority to temporarily schedule substances. In April 2013, then-Attorney General Holder—through the DEA and in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—took administrative action to permanently place methylone on Schedule I of the CSA. A number of administrative scheduling actions have since taken place.
In considering permanent placement of synthetic substances on Schedule I of the CSA, there are several issues on which Congress may deliberate. Policymakers may consider the implications on the federal criminal justice system of scheduling certain synthetic substances. Another issue is whether Congress should schedule certain synthetic substances or whether these substances merit Attorney General (in consultation with the Secretary of HHS) scheduling based on qualifications specified in the CSA. Congress may also consider whether placing additional synthetic drugs on Schedule I may hinder future medical research. In addition, policymakers may consider whether it is more efficient to place these drugs on Schedule I of the CSA or to treat them as analogue controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act. In considering enforcement challenges identified by the DEA, Congress may consider whether to amend the CSA to better facilitate enforcement action against the illicit synthetic drug market. |
crs_RS22826 | crs_RS22826_0 | Over half (57%) are for utilities and fuel to operate, heat, and cool homes; the remaining 43% are for gasoline and motor oil. Petroleum-based products like fuel oil, propane, and gasoline comprise about 50% of household energy expenditures. Energy prices to consumers have increased 70% between 2000 and 2007 as compared to a 20% rise in overall prices over the same time period. Yet, they are disproportionately affected by higher energy costs. Although in actual dollar terms older households spend slightly less on energy-related consumption than households headed by a person under age 65, they spend a higher share of their income on energy-related expenditures. Older households with less than $15,000 in household income spent approximately 20% of their income for energy-related expenditures, as compared to 7.3% for elderly households with incomes over $15,000 in 2006. These estimates are for 2006 and do not reflect the additional 17% increase in energy prices that occurred in 2007. Over time, growth in energy expenditures has increased faster than income of older households (see Figure 1 ). Implications for Public Programs
The key public program that provides energy assistance to low-income households is the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). In FY2004 (the most recent year for which data are available), 40% of low-income households eligible for LIHEAP had a member aged 60 or older. | Energy-related expenditures include spending for utilities and fuel to operate, heat, and cool homes and spending for gasoline and motor oil for private transportation. Energy prices to consumers have increased 70% between 2000 and 2007, driven largely by growth in prices for energy commodities such as petroleum. Petroleum-based products such as fuel oil, propane and gasoline comprise about 50% of household energy expenditures.
Older Americans are disproportionately affected by higher energy costs. As a share of income, households headed by a person age 65 or older spend more on energy-related expenditures than their younger counterparts. In addition, low-income households (those with less than $15,000 in household income) spent nearly 20% of their household income on energy-related expenditures in 2006 (the latest year for which data are available). This compares to 7.3% spent by older households with incomes above $15,000. These estimates are for 2006 and do not reflect the additional 17% increase in energy prices that occurred in 2007.
The key public program that provides energy assistance to low-income households is the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Approximately 40% of low-income households that were eligible for LIHEAP have a household member aged 60 or older. Funding for the LIHEAP Program has not kept pace with recent increases in energy costs of older Americans. This report will explore the burden of rising energy costs on older Americans and discuss implications for public policies.
This report will be updated when new data is released. |
crs_R42731 | crs_R42731_0 | Policymakers have considered a number of options for raising additional federal revenues (see the text box below). Two concurrent resolutions introduced in the House ( H.Con.Res. A tax based on carbon content of fuels is different from a tax based on energy content, such as a Btu tax (see the text box below). Design and Implementation
When establishing a carbon tax, there are several implementation decisions to be considered. The point of taxation does not necessarily reveal who bears the cost of the tax, as the cost may be passed on to intermediate producers or consumers. Rate of Taxation
Although setting the carbon tax rate would likely involve political considerations, several economic approaches could be used to inform the debate. For example, Congress could set a tax rate based on the estimated benefits associated with avoiding climate change impacts. The following sections analyze a generic carbon tax option using the criteria listed below:
adequacy— the ability to generate a desired amount of revenues; economic efficiency— the potential to enhance or diminish the productivity of the U.S. economy; equity— the subjective determination of a proposal's fairness; o perability— the combination of multiple factors, including administrative ease, transparency, avoidance of perverse outcomes, and consistency with federal and international norms and standards; and political feasibility— the likelihood of enactment given a tax's visibility to the public and public opinion, differential regional implications, contribution to deficit reduction or other objectives, pledges made by some lawmakers not to raise taxes, etc. Adequacy—the Potential to Generate Revenues
The revenues that would be generated under a carbon tax vary greatly depending on the design features of the tax, namely the tax scope (i.e., base) and rate, as well as such independent factors as prices in global energy markets. Economic Efficiency
Economic theory suggests that a carbon tax could improve the efficiency of the economy by at least three means:
first, markets could produce a more optimal mix of goods and services if the costs of emitting GHG while manufacturing products, providing services, or using goods were "internalized" into market prices; producers and consumers would more fully respond to the full costs of their decisions, resulting in a more economically efficient outcome; second, a tax on an activity that yields pollutants, such as GHG emissions, would discourage the polluting activity and therefore could be more efficient than an alternative tax that yields the same revenues but discourages a beneficial activity (e.g., investment); and third, adding a smaller tax on a new activity, such as potential carbon emissions, could be less distortionary to production and consumption than increasing the tax rate on currently taxed activities. Under CBO's alternative fiscal scenario, the same carbon tax would have a smaller impact on budget deficits. However, one revenue use necessarily forgoes the opportunity to apply that level of revenue to support other objectives, like deficit reduction. Therefore, in deciding how to allocate carbon tax revenues, policymakers would encounter trade-offs among objectives. Distribute Carbon Tax Revenues to Households
If Congress were to consider a carbon tax system, a key debate would likely involve the degree to which carbon tax revenues would be returned to households to alleviate the expected financial burden imposed by the carbon tax. Economic studies indicate that using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in distortionary taxes—labor, income, and investment—would be the most economically efficient use of the revenues and yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall. Assist Carbon-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries
Carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries would likely face disproportionate impacts within a U.S. carbon tax system. Concluding Observations
Carbon taxes, or fees on emissions of some or all GHG emissions, have been proposed for many years by economists and some Members of Congress. In addition, specific industries may experience disproportionate impacts. | In the context of budget deficit and fiscal policy debates, policymakers have considered a number of options for raising additional federal revenues, including a carbon tax. A carbon tax could apply directly to carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, or to the inputs (e.g., fossil fuels) that lead to the emissions. Unlike a tax on the energy content of each fuel (e.g., Btu tax), a carbon tax would vary with a fuel's carbon content, as there is a direct correlation between a fuel's carbon content and its CO2 emissions.
Carbon taxes have been proposed for many years by economists and some Members of Congress, including in the 113th Congress. However, based on concerns regarding the potential negative economic impacts of a carbon tax, some Members have introduced concurrent resolutions opposing a carbon tax.
If Congress were to establish a carbon tax, policymakers would face several implementation decisions, including the point and rate of taxation. Although the point of taxation does not necessarily reveal who ultimately bears the cost of the tax, this decision involves trade-offs, such as comprehensiveness versus administrative complexity.
Several economic approaches could inform the debate over the tax rate. Congress could set a tax rate designed to accrue a specific amount of revenues. Some would recommend setting the tax rate based on estimated benefits associated with avoiding climate change impacts. Alternatively, Congress could set a tax rate based on the carbon prices estimated to meet a specific GHG emissions target.
Carbon tax revenues would vary greatly depending on the design features of the tax, as well as market factors that are difficult to predict. A study from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a tax rate of $20 per metric ton of CO2 would generate approximately $88 billion in 2012, rising to $144 billion by 2020. The impact such an amount would have on budget deficits depends on which budget deficit projection is used.
When deciding how to allocate revenues, policymakers would encounter key trade-offs, such as minimizing the costs of the carbon tax to "society" overall versus alleviating the costs borne by subgroups in the U.S. population or specific domestic industries. Economic studies indicate that using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in existing taxes—labor, income, and investment—could yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall. However, the approaches that yield the largest overall benefit often impose disproportionate costs on lower-income households.
In addition, carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries may face a disproportionate impact within a unilateral carbon tax system. Policymakers could alleviate this burden through carbon tax revenue distribution or through a border adjustment mechanism. Both approaches may entail challenges in implementation.
Moreover, other stakeholders may advocate tax revenues be used to further other goals, including energy efficiency efforts or technology development. However, one revenue use necessarily forgoes the opportunity to apply that level of revenue to support other objectives. |
crs_RL33290 | crs_RL33290_0 | This report provides background and discussion of policy issues relating to U.S. ethanol production, especially ethanol made from corn. It discusses U.S. fuel ethanol consumption both as a gasoline blending component and as an alternative to gasoline. The biggest use of fuel ethanol in the United States is as an additive in gasoline. 109-58 ) established a renewable fuels standard (RFS), which mandates the use of ethanol and other transportation renewable fuels. About 1% is consumed as "E85" (85% ethanol and 15% gasoline), and alternative to gasoline. Critics of the ethanol industry in general—and specifically of the ethanol tax incentives—have argued that the tax incentives for ethanol production equate to "corporate welfare" for a few large producers. Further, they concluded that the level of concentration has been decreasing in recent years. Under various federal and state laws and incentives, consumption has increased from 1.8 billion gallons per year in 2001 to 6.8 billion gallons per year in 2007. Higher the corn prices lead to lower profits for ethanol producers; higher gasoline prices lead to higher profits. Recently, high corn prices have cut into corn ethanol producers' profits. It is expected that much of this requirement will be met with ethanol. Another obstacle is that, as stated above, fuel ethanol is often more expensive than gasoline or diesel fuel. Other potential benefits from the development of cellulosic ethanol include lower greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions and a higher energy balance than corn-based ethanol. Further, starting in 2016, and increasing share of the RFS must come from "advanced biofuels," such as cellulosic ethanol, ethanol from sugar cane, and biodiesel. The 108 th Congress replaced this exemption with an income tax credit of 51 cents per gallon of pure ethanol used in blending ( P.L. Proponents of the tax incentive argue that ethanol leads to better air quality and reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and that substantial benefits flow to the agriculture sector due to the increased demand for corn to produce ethanol. Energy Consumption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Energy Balance
A frequent argument for the use of ethanol as a motor fuel is that it reduces U.S. reliance on oil imports, making the U.S. less vulnerable to a fuel embargo of the sort that occurred in the 1970s. 109-58 ) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ), signed by President Bush on December 19, 2007, significantly expanded the RFS, requiring the use of 9.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008, increasing to 36 billion gallons in 2022. 110-140 requires an increasing amount of the mandate be met with "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch (and with 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than petroleum fuels). The incentives allow fuel ethanol to compete with other additives, since the wholesale price of ethanol is so high. Proponents of ethanol argue that the incentives lower dependence on foreign imports, promote air quality, and benefit farmers. Enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the renewable fuels standard will continue to drive growth in the ethanol market, as it mandates a minimum annual amount (increasing yearly) of renewable fuel in gasoline. Any discussion of U.S. energy policy includes promotion of alternatives to petroleum. | Ethanol plays a key role in policy discussions about energy, agriculture, taxes, and the environment. In the United States it is mostly made from corn; in other countries it is often made from cane sugar. Fuel ethanol is generally blended in gasoline to reduce emissions, increase octane, and extend gasoline stocks. Recent high oil and gasoline prices have led to increased interest in alternatives to petroleum fuels for transportation. Further, concerns over climate change have raised interest in developing fuels with lower fuel-cycle greenhouse-gas emissions. Supporters of ethanol argue that its use can lead to lower emissions of toxic and ozone-forming pollutants, and greenhouse gases, especially if higher-level blends are used. They further argue that ethanol use displaces petroleum imports, thus promoting energy security. Ethanol's detractors argue that various federal and state policies supporting ethanol distort the market and amount to corporate welfare for corn growers and ethanol producers. Further, they argue that the energy and chemical inputs needed to turn corn into ethanol actually increase emissions and energy consumption, although most recent studies have found modest energy and emissions benefits from ethanol use relative to gasoline, depending on how the ethanol is produced.
The market for fuel ethanol is heavily dependent on federal incentives and regulations. Ethanol production is encouraged by a federal tax credit of 51 cents per gallon. This incentive allows ethanol—which has historically been more expensive than conventional gasoline—to compete with gasoline and other blending components. In addition to the above tax credit, small ethanol producers qualify for an additional production credit. It has been argued that the fuel ethanol industry could scarcely survive without these incentives.
In addition to the above tax incentives, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) established a renewable fuel standard (RFS). This RFS was expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), and requires the use of 9.0 billion gallons of renewable fuels in 2008, increasing each year to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Much of this requirement will likely be met with ethanol. In addition, the bill requires that an increasing share of the mandate be met with "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch. Potential "advanced biofuels" include domestic ethanol from cellulosic material (such as perennial grasses and municipal solid waste), ethanol from sugar cane, and diesel fuel substitutes produced from a variety of feedstocks. The United States consumed approximately 6.8 billion gallons of ethanol in 2007, mostly from corn. A significant supply of cellulosic ethanol is likely several years off. Some analysts believe the RFS could have serious effects on motor fuel suppliers, leading to higher fuel prices.
Other issues of congressional interest include support for purer blends of ethanol as an alternative to gasoline (as opposed to a gasoline blending component), promotion of ethanol vehicles and infrastructure, and imports of ethanol from foreign countries. This report supersedes CRS Report RL30369, Fuel Ethanol: Background and Public Policy Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (out of print but available from the authors). |
crs_RL32745 | crs_RL32745_0 | Introduction: The 9/11 Commission Report and Long-Standing Contradictions in U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan and South Asia(1)
In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the military-dominatedgovernment of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country's nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two long-standing dilemmasconcerning U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained securityrelationship spanning more than five decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives haveseldom been congruent. Pakistan has viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry withIndia, whereas U.S. policymakers have tended to view it from the perspective of regional stabilityand U.S. global security interests. (2) Second, U.S.nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinatedto other important U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aidto the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receiveannually some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan'sdifferent agenda, some of the radical Islamists favored by its military intelligence service laterformed the core of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. During the 108th Congress, these concerns wereraised by some Members of Congress in committee hearings and in proposed legislation that did notreceive action. This report briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile conflicting American regionalsecurity and nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents A.Q.Khan's role, whether with or without official involvement, in supplying nuclear technology to"rogue" states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considersissues regarding the nature, objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headedby President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines a series of unilateral and multilateral U.S. options,with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each, for gaining further nuclearnonproliferation cooperation from Pakistan and forestalling future exports from Pakistan of nuclearand dual-use components, materials, and technology. This report will not be further updated. intelligence officials have not been able to gain access to Khan. Transfers to North Korea. Pakistani Government Response to U.S. Beg denies all claims that he sought to provide nuclear assistance to Iran. (118)
Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf Government As a Long-Term U.S. Security Partner(119)
The critical importance of gaining cooperation against terrorism has been the BushAdministration's main justification for largely setting aside U.S. nonproliferation concerns in the caseof Pakistan. At the same time, questions remain about Pakistan's nuclear policies. Khan's activities and networks. Khan case and other activitieslinking Pakistan to nuclear proliferation. | In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the military-dominatedgovernment of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country's nuclear proliferation activities,The 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two long-standing dilemmas concerning U.S. policytowards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained security relationship spanning more thanfive decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives have seldom been congruent. Pakistanhas viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry with India, whereas Americanpolicymakers have viewed it from the perspective of U.S. global security interests. Second, U.S.nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinatedto other important U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aidto the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receivesome $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan's differentagenda, some of the radical Islamists favored by its military intelligence service later formed thecore of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
A crucial U.S. policy challenge is to gain Pakistani cooperation in shutting down theextensive illicit nuclear supplier network established in the 1990s by the self-designated "father" ofPakistan's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadir Khan, which provided nuclear enrichment technology to Iran,Libya, and North Korea, while at the same time supporting stability in Pakistan and gaining itsmaximum cooperation against terrorism. To date, the Administration appears largely to haveacquiesced in Pakistan's refusal to allow access to Khan by U.S. intelligence officials. TheAdministration has been equally reluctant to publicly criticize the Musharraf government's apparentuse of international arms dealers to obtain controlled U.S. dual-use technology for its own nuclearweapons program, in violation of U.S. law.
The 109th Congress has been asked by the Administration to provide some $698 million inmilitary and economic assistance to Pakistan for FY2006, part of a five-year, $3 billion aid package. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that, as during the 1980s, the urgent need forPakistan's cooperation will prevent the Administration from dealing forcefully with its nuclearproliferation activities, and have introduced legislation that seeks to make U.S. assistance contingenton Pakistan's cooperation on nuclear proliferation.
This report: (1) briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile American nuclearnonproliferation and other security objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents A.Q. Khan's role,whether with or without official involvement, in supplying nuclear technology to "rogue" states andhow these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues regardingthe objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government of President Pervez Musharraf;and, (4) outlines and evaluates several U.S. options for seeking to gain more credible cooperationfrom Pakistan's regarding its nuclear activities while still maintaining effective counterterroristcooperation. This report will not be further updated. |
crs_R40811 | crs_R40811_0 | Many assert that the threat of severe wildfires and the cost of suppressing fires have grown because many forests have unnaturally high amounts of biomass to fuel the fires, as well as because of climate change and the increasing numbers of homes in and near forests (the wildland-urban interface ). Issues for Congress
Severe wildfires have been burning more structures and more area. The principal tools to reduce biomass fuels are prescribed burning—deliberate use of fire primarily to eliminate fine fuels—and thinning—cutting some vegetation to reduce understory growth, the density of the forest canopy, and the fuel ladders that can allow fires to move from the surface into the canopy. Also, information on funding (from annual appropriations and mandatory accounts) used for thinning and other activities that are substantially intended for wildfire protection, and reporting on results, are inadequate to compare the benefits and costs of these activities and funds. Biomass Fuels for Wildfires
All biomass is potentially fuel for wildfires. Some wildfires are low-intensity, surface fires that burn the surface fuels (e.g., grasses, needles, leaves). Continuity is the other key measure of fuel distribution. Vertical continuity is also important. Fuel Quantity
The quantity of biomass fuels—the fuel load—varies widely. Thus, in many places in the West, these ecosystems currently have fuel loads much higher than was historically natural, with fuel ladders where there were traditionally none. Activities that reduce fuel loads and remove fuel ladders have been documented to reduce wildfire severity (intensity and damage) in surface-fire ecosystems. It is unclear whether fuels are at unnatural levels, sizes, and distributions, and thus it is unclear whether these ecosystems might experience abnormal levels and intensities of crown fires. It is, however, not appropriate for all ecosystems. Some observers have cautioned, however, that such activities do not always reduce the risk of crown fires:
Thinning and prescribed fires can modify understory microclimate that was previously buffered by overstory vegetation … Thinned stands (open tree canopies) allow solar radiation to penetrate to the forest floor, which then increases surface temperatures, decreases fire fuel moisture, and decreases relative humidity compared to unthinned stands—conditions that can increase surface fire intensity …[and] may increase the likelihood that overstory crowns ignite.…
Prescribed Burning
Prescribed burning is the deliberate use of fire in specific areas within prescribed fuel and weather conditions (e.g., fuel moisture content, relative humidity, wind speed). Burning and decomposition are the only means for reducing fine and small fuels. This practice is, in effect, allowing a wildfire to burn with monitoring, but not aggressive suppression efforts, when the location and conditions are appropriate. The slash must be treated to contribute to fuel reduction. Thinning With Prescribed Burning
A common proposal is to combine thinning with prescribed burning—thinning first to eliminate ladder fuels and reduce crown density, followed by prescribed burning to eliminate the fine and small fuels in thinning slash. Logging does reduce crown density (completely in clearcutting), but does little for fuel ladders and leaves substantial volumes of slash. The BIA has the most explicit direction; Indian forest land management activities are defined to include
(C) forest land development, including forestation, thinning, tree improvement activities and the use of silvicultural treatments to restore or increase growth and yield to the full productive capacity of the forest environment; [and]
(D) protection against losses from wildfire, including … construction of firebreaks, hazard reduction, prescribed burning ... [emphasis added]
Despite the general, broad, generic authority for biomass fuel reduction activities (prescribed burning, thinning, and more), the agencies have both specific funding programs and the authority to use general management funds for these types of activities. Although this sub-account is the primary source of funds for prescribed burning, it can be used for other fuel reduction activities, such as thinning, as well. The FS has three mandatory spending accounts that also provide funds for activities that can reduce biomass fuels. Other fuel reduction activities, such as thinning, are funded through general land and resource management accounts for each of the DOI agencies. The FS also has other technical and financial assistance programs that might be used to assist in reducing fuels on nonfederal lands. | Severe wildfires have been burning more acres and more structures in recent years. Some assert that climate change is at least partly to blame; others claim that the increasing number of homes in and near the forest (the wildland-urban interface) is a major cause. However, most observers agree that wildfire suppression and historic land management practices have led to unnaturally high accumulations of biomass in many forests, particularly in the intermountain West. While high-intensity conflagrations (wildfires that burn the forest canopy) occur naturally in some ecosystems (called crown-fire or stand-replacement fire ecosystems), abnormally high biomass levels can lead to conflagrations in ecosystems when such crown fires were rare (called frequent-surface-fire ecosystems). Thus, many propose activities to reduce forest biomass fuels.
The characteristics of forest biomass fuels affect the nature, spread, and intensity of the fire. Fuel moisture content is critical, but is generally a function of weather patterns over hours, days, and weeks. Fuel size is also important—fine and small fuels (e.g., needles, grasses, leaves, small twigs) are key to fire spread, while larger fuels (e.g., twigs larger than pencil-diameter, branches, and logs) contribute primarily to fire intensity; both are important to minimizing fire damages. Fuel distribution can also affect damages. Relatively continuous fuels improve burning, and vertically continuous fuels—fuel ladders—can lead a surface fire into the canopy, causing a conflagration. Total fuel accumulations (fuel loads) also contribute to fire intensity and damage. Thus, activities that alter biomass fuels—reducing total loads, reducing small fuels, reducing large fuels, and eliminating fuel ladders—can help reduce wildfire severity and damages.
Several tools can be used to reduce forest biomass fuels. Prescribed burning is the deliberate use of fire in specific areas under specified conditions. It is the only tool that can eliminate fine fuels, but is risky because it burns any fuel available. Wildland fire use is the term used for allowing a wildfire to be used like a prescribed burn (i.e., within specified areas and conditions). Thinning is a broader forestry tool useful for eliminating fuel ladders and total fuels in the crown, but it does not eliminate fine fuels, and it concentrates fuels in a more continuous array on the surface. The combination of thinning with prescribed burning is often proposed to combine the benefits, but it also combines the cost of both. Logging does little to reduce fuel loads.
The federal land management agencies undertake all of these activities under general authorities for wildfire protection and land and resource management. Fuel reduction, primarily via prescribed burning, is funded with direct annual appropriations for wildfire management. Other activities, particularly thinning, are funded through other annual appropriations accounts, such as vegetation management. Also, several mandatory spending accounts provide funds for related activities, such as treating logging and thinning debris. In addition, wildfire assistance funding allows the Forest Service to provide technical and financial aid for reducing forest biomass fuel loads on nonfederal lands, among other things.
The issues for Congress include the appropriate level of funding for prescribed burning and thinning for fuel reduction and the appropriate reporting of accomplishments. Current reporting does not identify ecosystems being treated and the effectiveness of the treatments. Similarly, current appropriations and reporting do not distinguish thinning for fuel reduction from thinning for other purposes, such as enhancing timber productivity. More complete reporting could allow Congress to better target its appropriations for fuel reduction to enhance wildfire protection. |
crs_RL34118 | crs_RL34118_0 | This report focuses on the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA). Recent legal, scientific, and technological developments are prompting legislators to reexamine TSCA; it has been the subject of a hearing and several legislative proposals in the 111 th Congress. The basic TSCA Title I provisions concerning chemical regulation have never been amended. Policies, Intent, and Scope
TSCA established three general federal policies with respect to chemical substances and mixtures in U.S. commerce, "... that—
• [A]dequate data should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment and that the development of such data should be the responsibility of those who manufacture and those who process such chemical substances and mixtures;
• [A]dequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and to take action with respect to chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards; and
• [A]uthority over chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling the primary purpose of this act to assure that such innovation and commerce in such chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." It identified approximately 62,000 chemicals that manufacturers and importers reported had been produced in, or imported into, the United States for commercial purposes after January 1, 1975. Two of these regulations were later superseded by regulations under other environmental laws. State Laws and Local Ordinances
Many states and localities have enacted laws restricting the sale or use of various chemicals or categories of substances that are federally managed under TSCA. Some California legislators have been modeling proposals based on the laws of other nations. International commerce in chemicals has grown significantly during the 30 years of TSCA's existence, and most of the largest chemical manufacturers, processors, and distributors now operate internationally. To implement the international agreements, TSCA would have to be amended to permit regulation of chemical production for export, at least in the case of the chemicals specified in the treaties. Others reject the approach taken by REACH and defend TSCA, arguing that the U.S. approach continues to provide the leading example of chemical regulation based on sound, risk-based science. The resulting genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are useful for various purposes. 6100 and S. 3040 , would have amended TSCA, adding a new title to the end of the act, to significantly reshape U.S. chemical assessment and management. Known as the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 2008, H.R. H.R. Some analysts, and most in the regulated community, believe that generally TSCA has performed as intended, and they support TSCA in its current form, although most admit it needs minor adjustments. They praise TSCA as a flexible, efficient, and effective limit to over-regulation. Other policy analysts and legal commentators want to amend TSCA, because they think that it has not accomplished the tasks laid out for it by Congress and is unlikely to do better in the future, especially given recent and emerging changes in science and technology. The available evidence indicates that EPA has had limited success using TSCA to gather information about new chemicals, but has demonstrated creativity and expertise in making use of available information to categorize such chemicals based on hazard potential, thereby reducing risks potentially associated with exposure to chemicals entering U.S. commerce. 6903 would have banned many asbestos-containing materials. Numerous states also have acted to control risks from chemicals that are not regulated under TSCA. In addition, many nations have joined together to regulate persistent, organic, pollutants and persistent, bioaccumulative toxic substances in ways that the United States cannot under the current provisions of TSCA. | The basic structure of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976 has never been amended, but recent legal, scientific, and technological changes are prompting some policy makers to reexamine the law. The Kid-Safe Chemicals Act (H.R. 6100/S. 3040 in the 110th Congress) would have reshaped risk assessment and management of industrial chemicals in U.S. commerce. TSCA currently regulates potential risks based on three policies: (1) Chemical manufacturers are responsible for testing chemicals to determine their potential effects on health and the environment; (2) EPA should regulate chemicals that present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment; and (3) EPA's implementation of the law should not create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation. Few have expressed concern about the last TSCA purpose, but TSCA's progress in achieving the first two goals has been debated: where some see success, others see failure, and both groups point to EPA's history of implementation and voluntary initiatives in support of their views. EPA has compiled an inventory of roughly 82,000 chemicals that have been produced in, or imported into, the United States at some time since 1976. The agency has promulgated regulations to restrict production or use of five chemicals under TSCA.
Recently, many states and localities have acted to regulate chemicals not regulated under TSCA using state or local authority. A few states are considering broad new laws to regulate chemicals more generally. Some large chemical manufacturers, processors, and distributors object to the emerging legal patchwork. The U.S. Congress also has considered, and in several cases enacted, legislation restricting use of specific chemicals. For example, in the 110th Congress, S. 742 and H.R. 6903 would have banned many asbestos-containing materials from U.S. commerce. Multinational companies also are faced with a variety of national laws restricting international commerce in chemicals. International cooperation to harmonize regulations, and to eliminate certain persistent pollutants, has led to several international agreements that aim to ease the legal confusion, but amendments to TSCA would be required if the United States were to fully implement the agreements. New laws in other nations also have provided alternative models for chemical regulation, which some would prefer to TSCA. Others defend the current U.S. approach, arguing that TSCA is based on sound, risk-based science.
Recent progress in science and technology also pose challenges to EPA implementation of TSCA. Scientists now know that the timing and duration of exposure to a chemical can determine its effects, as can the age, gender, and heritable traits of people who are exposed. Biotechnology and nanotechnology have created genetically modified organisms and nanomaterials, respectively, which EPA must categorize as "existing" or "new" and manage as "chemical substances" under TSCA.
Faced with these challenges to TSCA, some analysts, and many in the regulated community, nevertheless believe that TSCA has performed as intended, and they support TSCA in its current form. They praise TSCA as a flexible, efficient, and effective limit to over-regulation. Other legal commentators, analysts, and some policy makers want to amend TSCA which, they contend, has not accomplished the tasks laid out for it by Congress, and is unlikely to do better in the future. |
crs_R41732 | crs_R41732_0 | Faced with distressed state budgets and lower revenue, many governors and state legislatures have focused on the collective bargaining rights of public employees as a way to control expenses. Legislation that would limit such rights has reportedly been introduced in at least 22 states. In general, the sponsors of such legislation contend that unionized state and local employees enjoy unsustainable salaries and benefits as a result of collective bargaining. This report examines the collective bargaining rights of federal, state, and local workers, and discusses the constitutional concerns that may be raised by state legislation that attempts to invalidate existing collective bargaining agreements. Federal Employees
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 26.8% of all federal employees are members of a union. A slightly higher percentage of state employees—31.1%—are union members. While all of these employees engage in some form of collective bargaining through their unions, the scope of such bargaining is generally different for federal and state and local workers. In addition, because the collective bargaining rights of state and local employees are defined by state law, other variations in bargaining may exist among these workers. Subjects that are negotiable in one state, for example, may not be negotiable in another state. In Michigan, for example, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act ("Fiscal Accountability Act") was adopted on March 16, 2011. Under the Fiscal Accountability Act, the governor may appoint an emergency manager if he determines that a local government financial emergency exists. If the emergency manager were to reject, modify, or terminate one or more terms and conditions of an existing agreement, constitutional concerns would likely be raised under the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Section 19(1)(k) of the Michigan law states, in relevant part,
The rejection, modification, or termination of 1 or more terms and conditions of an existing collective bargaining agreement under this subdivision is a legitimate exercise of the state's sovereign powers if the emergency manager and state treasurer determine that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) The financial emergency in the local government has created a circumstance in which it is reasonable and necessary for the state to intercede to serve a legitimate public purpose. | Faced with distressed state budgets and lower revenue, many governors and state legislatures have focused on the collective bargaining rights of public employees as a way to control expenses. Legislation that would limit such rights has reportedly been introduced in at least 22 states. In general, the sponsors of such legislation contend that unionized state and local employees enjoy unsustainable salaries and benefits as a result of collective bargaining.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 26.8% of all federal employees are members of a union. A slightly higher percentage of state employees—31.1%—are union members. At the local government level, 42.3% of employees are union members. Although all of these employees engage in some form of collective bargaining through their unions, the scope of such bargaining is generally different for federal and state and local workers. In addition, because the collective bargaining rights of state and local employees are defined by state law, other variations in bargaining may exist among these workers. Subjects that are negotiable in one state, for example, may not be negotiable in another state.
This report examines the collective bargaining rights of federal, state, and local workers. The report also discusses the constitutional concerns that may be raised by state legislation that attempts to invalidate existing collective bargaining agreements. In Michigan, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act ("Fiscal Accountability Act") was adopted on March 16, 2011. Under the Fiscal Accountability Act, the governor may appoint an emergency manager if he determines that a local government financial emergency exists. The emergency manager would have broad powers to rectify the financial emergency, including the ability to reject, modify, or terminate one or more terms and conditions of an existing collective bargaining agreement. If the emergency manager were to reject, modify, or terminate one or more terms and conditions of an existing agreement, constitutional concerns would likely be raised under the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits a state from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." |
crs_RL34705 | crs_RL34705_0 | Introduction
An estimate of the quantity and type of offset projects that might be available in a cap-and-trade system would provide for a more informed debate over the design elements of a cap-and-trade system. An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. If Congress enacts a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction program, such as a cap-and-trade system, the treatment of offsets would be a critical design element. However, offsets have fueled considerable debate, primarily for the concern that illegitimate offsets could undermine the ultimate objective of a cap-and-trade program: emission reduction. Although economic models have generated estimates of offsets developed and used in a cap-and-trade system, the estimates are rife with uncertainty. This report examines the multiple variables that help shape offset supply. Factors Affecting Offset Supply
It is difficult to estimate the supply of offsets that might be available in a cap-and-trade system, because the supply is determined by many variables, including policy choices. Some of the activities included in mitigation potential estimates would likely not qualify as offsets in a cap-and-trade system. However, these offset supply estimates are imperfect, because the underlying data—mitigation potential estimates—contain considerable uncertainty. More projects would become economically competitive as the emission allowance price rises. In addition, the degree to which international offsets are allowed would have considerable impact on domestic offsets. A critical factor is the development and market penetration of low- and/or zero-carbon technologies. These technologies could lower the costs of the cap-and-trade program. If these technologies are available earlier than predicted (by models), the " Emission Allowance Price " (discussed below) would likely decrease, making fewer offset projects cost effective. In addition to the core structural design of the cap-and-trade program, the allowance price would be dependent on the program's treatment of offsets: which types would be allowed; whether international offsets could be used; whether covered sources would be limited (e.g., as a percentage of their allowance submission) in their use of offsets. Other Factors
An EPA study stated that "other non-price factors, such as social acceptance, tend to inhibit mitigation option installation in many sectors." Information dissemination may play a role. | If allowed as a compliance option in a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction program (e.g., a cap-and-trade system), offsets have the potential to provide considerable cost savings and other benefits. However, offsets have generated considerable controversy, primarily over the concern that illegitimate offsets could undermine the ultimate objective of a cap-and-trade program: emission reduction.
An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. An estimate of the quantity and type of offset projects that might be available as a compliance option would provide for a more informed debate over the design elements of a cap-and-trade program. It is difficult to estimate the supply of offsets that might be available in a cap-and-trade system, because the supply is determined by many variables, including:
Mitigation potential. Mitigation potential estimates are the raw data that feed into models estimating offset use in a cap-and-trade program. Recent estimates contain considerable uncertainty.
Policy choices. The design of the cap-and-trade system would be critical to offset supply. Particularly relevant design choices include which sources are covered; which types of offset projects are allowed; whether or not offset use is limited; and the degree to which set-aside allowances are allotted to activities that may otherwise qualify as offsets. Policymakers' treatment of international offsets would play a major role.
Economic factors. The development and market penetration of low- and/or zero-carbon technologies would likely have substantial effects. These technologies could lower the costs of the cap-and-trade program, making fewer offset projects cost effective.
Emission allowance price. The allowance price would determine the supply and type of offsets that would be economically competitive in a cap-and-trade system. As the price increases, more (and different types of) projects would become cost effective. Allowance price estimates are difficult to predict, as they are dependent on numerous variables, including offset treatment.
Other factors. Non-market factors, such as social acceptance, may influence offset use. In addition, information dissemination would likely be an issue, because some of the offset opportunities exist at smaller operations, such as family farms.
Although economic models have generated estimates of offsets that would be developed and used in a cap-and-trade system, the estimates are rife with uncertainty. This report examines the multiple variables that would help shape offset supply. |
crs_RL33543 | crs_RL33543_0 | Tactical aircraft are a major component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant portion of U.S. defense spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps collectively had an inventory of about 3,500 tactical aircraft. Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. A second key issue concerns the future of the U.S. industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft. Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls
Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018. Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan
On May 18, 2009—11 days after the submission to Congress of the proposed FY2010 defense budget—the Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the retirement of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A-10s, so as to generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs. Issues for Congress
Affordability of Tactical Aircraft Modernization Plans
A Longstanding Concern
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft in general is the overall affordability of DOD's plans for modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for an eventual budget "train wreck" as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition. FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. REPORT ON 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER PROCUREMENT. Regarding this section, the committee's report states:
The committee expects that the analyses submitted [under Section 1032] will include details on all elements of the force structure discussed in the QDR report, and particularly the following:
(1) A description of the factors that informed decisions regarding the fighter force structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, including: the assumed threat capabilities to include fighter force capabilities as well as air defense capabilities; the modeling simulations and analysis used to determine fighter force structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; the extent to which unmanned aerial vehicle inventories compensate for manned fighter aircraft inventory; and the quantifiable operational risks associated with the planned fighter fleets, based on requirements of combatant commanders, and measures planned to address those risks;... (Pages 387-388)
Sectio n 1047 would prohibit the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the combat air forces restructuring plan announced by the Air Force on May 18, 2009, until 90 days after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) of H.R. 2647 / P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009, contains a provision (Section 131) that requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a report to Congress on the procurement of "4.5"-generation fighter aircraft. Section 1052 would require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 2647 ( H.Rept. Section 1076 expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure. 1075. (Page 682)
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report ( H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24 2009) on H.R. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on H.R. 3326 , the Senate approved, by a vote of 91-7 (Record Vote Number 309), an amendment ( S.Amdt. 2596 ) that prohibits the Air Force from retiring any tactical aircraft as announced in the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan announced on May 18, 2009, until the Air Force submits to the congressional defense committees the report that provides, among other things, a detailed plan for how the Air Force will fill the force structure and capability gaps resulting from the retirement of those aircraft. | Tactical aircraft are a major component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant portion of U.S. defense spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps collectively had an inventory of about 3,500 tactical aircraft. Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. For discussions of issues relating specifically to these three programs, see CRS Reports RL30563, RL31673, and RL30624, respectively.
Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018. On May 18, 2009, the Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the retirement of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A-10s, so as to generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs.
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft is the overall affordability of DOD's plans for modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for an eventual budget "train wreck" as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition. A May 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report examines several potential options for modernizing the U.S. tactical aircraft force. A second key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft concerns the future of the U.S. industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft.
FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference version (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) contains a provision (Section 131) that requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a report to Congress on the procurement of "4.5"-generation fighter aircraft. Section 1052 would require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The House report on H.R. 2647 (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) stated that the report on 4.5-generation fighter aircraft is to include, among other things, a description of the factors that informed decisions regarding the fighter force structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Section 1075 of H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 prohibits the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the combat air forces restructuring plan until 30 days after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. Section 1076 expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure.
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: The House and Senate Appropriations Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009, and S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009, respectively) on the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), include report language discussing the combat air forces restructuring plan and the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall. On October 6, the Senate approved, by a vote of 91-7 (Record Vote Number 309), an amendment (S.Amdt. 2596) that prohibits the Air Force from retiring any tactical aircraft as announced in the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan announced on May 18, 2009, until the Air Force submits to the congressional defense committees the report that provides, among other things, a detailed plan for how the Air Force will fill the force structure and capability gaps resulting from the retirement of those aircraft. |
crs_R44513 | crs_R44513_0 | Overview
Since 2014, the United States and a coalition it leads have partnered with a politically diverse set of Kurdish groups to combat the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL or by the Arabic acronym Da'esh ). In Iraq, the U.S. military has worked with fighters who come under the official authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (see Figure 1 ). In Syria, U.S. forces have partnered with fighters from or allied with the Democratic Union Party (PYD)/People's Protection Units (YPG) (see Figure 2 ). As Administration officials and Members of Congress assess how to reconcile U.S. coordination with Kurdish groups with overall U.S. objectives, their considerations include:
The extent to which Kurdish groups should be involved in military operations and post-conflict security in areas with predominantly Sunni Arab or other non-Kurdish populations. Legal authorities enacted by Congress and the President permit the Administration to provide some arms and some anti-IS-related funding for Iraq and Syria to Kurdish groups under certain conditions, as discussed below. In April 2016, U.S. officials announced that they would provide more than $400 million to pay and otherwise sustain Iraqi Kurdish fighters with the consent of the Iraqi government. U.S. military trainers and advisors have been based in KRG-controlled areas (along with other areas in Iraq) since 2014, and the U.S. government has acknowledged that advisors have periodically engaged in direct action missions in both Iraq and Syria. In April 2016, the Defense Department announced that the United States would provide more than $400 million in assistance to Kurdish peshmerga in coordination with the Iraqi government. In late 2015, approximately 50 U.S. Special Forces personnel reportedly were deployed in northern Syria primarily in an advisory capacity. Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns129
While Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria work with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, various humanitarian and human rights concerns have affected Kurdish-populated communities and the surrounding areas where Kurdish forces have been active. Means for better providing U.S. and international humanitarian assistance to support the needs of displaced persons in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria. Conclusion: Future of the U.S.-Kurdish Partnership
As anti-IS operations continue, U.S. officials appear inclined to embrace the capabilities of various Kurdish ground forces in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, U.S. officials seem to focus on addressing and resolving limitations or complications that may arise from U.S.-Kurdish partnerships. For example, officials may be seeking to leverage and augment the Kurds' military successes by empowering non-Kurdish forces that may be more able to command political legitimacy among local populations in predominantly Sunni Arab areas such as Mosul and Raqqah. U.S. officials may also be looking to minimize disruptions in U.S. relations with other partners—such as the Iraqi and Turkish governments. | Since 2014, the United States and members of a coalition it leads have partnered with a politically diverse set of Kurdish groups to combat the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL or by the Arabic acronym Da'esh). For background information on these groups and their relationships in the region, see CRS In Focus IF10350, The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
The capabilities of various Kurdish ground forces have advanced some U.S. objectives in connection with ongoing anti-IS operations. At the same time, as these operations increasingly focus on predominantly Sunni Arab areas such as Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqah, Syria, U.S. officials are encouraging Kurdish forces to support and empower the combat and post-conflict administration profile of non-Kurdish forces that may have greater ethnic and political legitimacy with local populations. U.S. officials also seek to avoid having U.S. cooperation with Kurds significantly disrupt U.S. relations with other partners, including the Iraqi central government and NATO ally Turkey in light of those partners' respective concerns and operations on the ground in Iraq and northern Syria.
Legal authorities enacted by Congress and the President permit the Administration to provide some arms and some Iraq/Syria anti-IS-related funding to Kurdish groups under certain conditions. In April 2016, the Defense Department announced that it would provide more than $400 million in assistance to pay and otherwise sustain Iraqi Kurdish fighters as part of an ongoing partnership that delivers U.S. assistance to Iraqi Kurds with the consent of the Iraqi national government. Some Members of Congress proposed legislation in the 114th Congress that would have extended or expanded U.S. cooperation with Kurdish groups under certain conditions.
This report examines:
the roles played by Iraqi Kurdish groups affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and by the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)/People's Protection Units (YPG) in U.S. and coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State; interactions Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have with other actors; benefits and challenges the Kurdish role presents for U.S. interests in the region; the outlook for military operations (such as against Mosul in Iraq and Raqqah in Syria) and political outcomes; humanitarian concerns regarding displaced persons in Kurdish-controlled areas, and human rights concerns regarding Kurdish forces' treatment of civilians in areas they capture; specific U.S. policy questions regarding current and future U.S.-Kurdish cooperation; and the broader trajectory of the U.S.-Kurdish partnership.
U.S. military trainers and advisors have been based in KRG-controlled areas (along with other areas in Iraq) since 2014. The U.S. government has acknowledged that these advisors have periodically engaged in direct action missions in both Iraq and Syria. Since late 2015, U.S. officials have announced additional "advise and assist" deployments in Iraq and Syria. |
crs_R44404 | crs_R44404_0 | Although a methodologically rigorous total for these investments has not been calculated, an understanding of how the federal government applies resources to enhance its cybersecurity is necessary for Congress to provide constructive oversight and prevent waste. Rather than attempting to explore the "full range" of activities in the above US-CERT definition, this report will focus on a more limited range of activities: those involved in the protection of U.S. public and private sector data and networks from cyberattacks. How the Federal Government Invests in Cybersecurity
For this report, federal government spending on cybersecurity will be analyzed in three ways:
Agency spending to protect its own systems, networks, and data; Agency spending to protect other governmental systems, networks, and data; and Agency spending to protect non-federal IT systems, networks, and data. Specific Federal Agency Responsibilities for Internal Cybersecurity
Several cabinet-level departments and federal agencies have unique responsibilities in promoting internal cybersecurity within the federal government. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in exercising its management role, requires agencies to implement cybersecurity protocols. The Department of Justice (DOJ) investigates and prosecutes crimes involving federal information technology. As such, neither the President's nor the agency budget justifications, nor the FISMA report (both discussed below) can be considered complete and accurate representations of how much the federal government is spending on cybersecurity. Existing Assessments of Federal Cybersecurity Spending
Each February, the administration is expected to submit to Congress the following:
The President's Budget for the fiscal year; Agency budget justifications; and The Annual Report to Congress: Federal Information Security Management Act. Each of these submissions includes a manner of accounting for cybersecurity spending. Other agencies make distinct investments for managerial systems and mission-execution systems. Considerations for Congress
Assessing Federal Government Cybersecurity Investments
For Congress to perform oversight of the federal government's investments in cybersecurity efforts as a whole, one could posit that four elements are necessary: an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy, a plan to execute that strategy, metrics that allow Congress to assess progress against the strategy's goals, and consistent reporting across agencies on how that strategy is being carried out. In these latter cases budget justification documents may not allow Congressional staff to identify specific levels of cybersecurity investment, and additional questioning of the department or agency may be necessary. An understanding of what risks an agency faces and what strategies the agency currently uses to combat those risks is a foundational element in examining an agency's internal cybersecurity. Understanding the risks organizations in the non-.gov domain face and their relationship with the federal government will inform the Congress and allow them to assess further levels of investment. | The federal government invests significant resources in cybersecurity across every agency through a variety of activities. Although a methodologically rigorous total for these investments has not been calculated and may not be possible, an understanding of how the federal government applies resources to protect U.S. public and private sector data and networks from cyberattacks is necessary for Congress to provide constructive oversight of those efforts.
This report considers federal cybersecurity investments in three broad categories:
Agency spending to protect its own systems, networks, and data; Agency spending to protect other governmental systems, networks, and data; and Agency spending to protect non-federal IT systems, networks, and data.
Each department and agency has some level of participation in cybersecurity activities. However, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense have unique responsibilities established by statute—either for their role in assisting other departments and agencies, or, as in the case with the Department of Defense, for their unique responsibility for their own information technology.
Each February the administration releases three sets of documents which describe some facets of the government's investments in cybersecurity:
The President's Budget; Congressional Budget Justifications from each department or agency; and The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) report to Congress.
These reports provide some valuable insights into how or why the government makes certain investments associated with promoting cybersecurity. However, on their own, none of these documents provides a complete and precise representation of how much the federal government is spending on cybersecurity. This is in part because of how they are developed; they are developed from agency submissions based on administration guidance that does not require methodologically consistent reporting on cybersecurity spending—or even provide a common definition for what cybersecurity is.
Even if such an authoritative top-line figure for federal cybersecurity investments were available, without detail and context it would not effectively inform the Congressional decision-making process. Understanding the risks an individual agency faces, and what strategies they have for confronting those risks given their size, complexity, and mission is vital to determining the appropriate level of future cybersecurity investments for that agency. Armed with an understanding of those factors, Congress may choose to assess cybersecurity investments of a federal agency independently. Congress may alternatively choose to assess internal cybersecurity investments by an agency relative to similar federal agencies, and external investments relative to, and supporting, the non-".gov" sector. |
crs_R44783 | crs_R44783_0 | Introduction
The electric power industry is in the process of transformation. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging, and uncertainty exists around how to modernize the electric grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Questions about transmission expansion and grid reliability are arising from potential cyber and physical security threats, and continuing interest in harnessing renewable energy and other low carbon sources of electricity. Concerns about reliability and electricity prices are being affected by new environmental regulations, and the rising availability of natural gas for the production of electric power. The Federal Power Act (FPA) has been the primary vehicle that Congress has used to modify national policies affecting the U.S. electricity industry. It will be the most likely vehicle for Congress to consider in initiating new policies for the modernization of this industry. On September 7, 2016, the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Energy and Power subcommittee (E&P subcommittee) made efforts to reevaluate the relevance of the FPA in the context of a changing electricity industry, with a hearing on historical perspectives of the act. The act created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate the construction and operation of nonfederal hydropower projects. In 1935, Congress passed the Public Utility Act (PUA) which sought to end the abuses of market power at that time. As new federal energy policies have emerged in the subsequent years since the FPA's initial passage, a number of new sections have been added to the FPA by legislative amendments. Competition in the Electric Power Industry
Electric utilities were originally vertically integrated companies responsible for power generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to end-use customers. Congress began to move the electric power industry towards competition with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT92; P.L. 102-486 ). In 1996, the Commission exercised its authority under the FPA, issuing two regulations intended to encourage an open and efficient marketplace for wholesale electric power. In RTO regions, electricity utilities were restructured, moving power generation from a rate-regulated to a competitive regime, with transmission of power regulated by FERC, and distribution systems remaining largely under state regulation. Congress has followed the development of electricity markets, and gave FERC additional authority to ensure market transparency with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05; P.L. The efficient functioning of RTO electricity markets may be an issue for Congress to consider in the context of the FPA and FERC's regulatory authority. Just a few years later, FERC would strengthen its push for coordinated independent regional transmission in Order No. 2000. RTO markets have enabled a variety of products and services including derivatives and hedges for market participants, ostensibly to reduce risks from volatile prices. 109-58 ) attempted to address some of the concerns associated with these derivative products and speculative trading by prohibiting "any entity" from using "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or electric energy (or the purchase or sale of related transportation or transmission services) in transactions subject to FERC jurisdiction. The 2000-2001 Western energy crisis showed that electricity markets were (and are still) susceptible to market manipulation. FERC continues to refine its approach to these and other wholesale electricity market issues. But the emergence and of new technologies and energy conservation schemes will likely bring new pressures to change how the electricity industry operates. As electricity markets continue to evolve, Congress may examine whether changes to the FPA are necessary to ensure the economic and reliable operation of the U.S. electricity markets. | The electric power industry is in the process of transformation. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging; uncertainty exists around how to modernize the grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Unresolved questions are arising about market structure, potential cyber and physical security threats, and continuing interest in harnessing low carbon sources of electricity. Concerns about reliability and electricity prices are being affected by new environmental regulations, and the rising availability of natural gas for the production of electric power.
On September 7, 2016, the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Energy and Power subcommittee (E&P subcommittee) made efforts to re-evaluate the relevance of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in the context of a changing electricity industry, with a hearing on historical perspectives of the act. The FPA has been the primary vehicle that Congress has used to modify national policies affecting the U.S. electricity industry. It will be the most likely vehicle for Congress to consider in initiating new policies for the modernization of this industry.
In 1935, Congress passed the Public Utility Act (PUA) seeking to end the abuses of market power evident at that time. Title II of the PUA created the Federal Power Act. Part I of the FPA addressed licensing of nonfederal hydropower projects on navigable waters. Part II of the FPA addressed the regulation of electric utilities engaged in interstate commerce, delineating federal and state jurisdiction, respectively, with respect to wholesale and retail sales. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) regulatory authority derives from the FPA.
Electric utilities were originally vertically integrated companies responsible for power generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to end-use customers. Congress began to move the electric power industry towards competition with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT92; P.L. 102-486). In 1996, the Commission exercised its authority under the FPA, issuing two regulations intended to inaugurate an open and efficient marketplace for electric power. A few years later, FERC took the next step encouraging the formation of independent regional transmission organizations (RTOs) in Order No. 2000. In RTO regions, electricity utilities were restructured, shifting power generation from a rate-regulated to a competitive regime, with FERC regulating the transmission of power. Under restructuring, states continued to regulate distribution. RTO electricity markets provide about 60% of power nationwide supplied to distribution utilities.
A number of conceptual, structural, and policy issues have emerged with RTO operations and energy markets. Some RTOs are being confronted with concerns over whether there will be adequate levels of competitive generation to participate in the markets, and sufficient future capacity in the marketplace. FERC has been involved in recent court proceedings to ensure that state actions to incentivize new power plant construction do not unduly inhibit competitive price formation in RTO markets.
Other concerns involve the use of market power and price manipulation. FERC was tasked by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) with prohibiting "any entity" from using "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or electric energy in transactions subject to FERC jurisdiction. The 2000-2001Western energy crisis showed that electricity markets are susceptible to market manipulation. RTO markets have enabled a variety of products and services, including derivatives and other tools for market participants, ostensibly to reduce risks from volatile prices. Regulating such products and services still faces a number of issues.
FERC continues to refine its approach to these and other wholesale electricity market issues. But the emergence and of new technologies and energy conservation schemes will likely bring new pressures to change how the electricity industry operates. As the electricity markets continue to evolve, Congress may examine whether changes to the FPA are necessary to ensure the economic and reliable operation of the U.S. electricity system. |
crs_R44556 | crs_R44556_0 | G eographical indications (GIs) are place names used to identify products that come from these places, and to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product originating in a certain region. The term is most often applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. Examples of registered or established GIs include Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma ham from the Parma region of Italy, Toscano olive oil from Tuscany, Roquefort cheese, Champagne from the region of the same name in France, Irish Whiskey, Darjeeling tea, Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, and Napa Valley Wines. Some food producers benefit from the use of GIs by giving certain foods recognition for their distinctiveness, differentiating certain foods from other foods in the marketplace. In this manner, GIs can be commercially valuable. GIs may also be eligible for relief from acts of infringement or unfair competition. GIs may also protect consumers from deceptive or misleading labels. The use of GIs, particularly for some wines and dairy products, has become a contentious international trade issue. Many U.S. food manufacturers view the use of common or traditional names as generic terms and view the European Union's (EU's) protection of its registered GIs as a way to monopolize the use of certain wine and food terms and as a form of trade protectionism. Laws and regulations governing GIs differ between the United States and EU, which further complicates this issue. GIs are among the agricultural issues that have been raised in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), a potential reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA) that the United States and the EU are negotiating. These approaches differ with respect to the conditions for protection or the scope of protection, but they share some common features in that both establish rights for collective use by those who comply with defined standards. In the United States, GIs are generally treated as a subset of trademarks, whereas the EU protects GIs through a series of established "quality schemes." Protection of GIs in the EU
In the EU, a series of regulations governing GIs was initiated in the early 1990s covering agricultural and food products, wine, and spirits. Legislation adopted in 1992 covered agricultural products (not including wines and spirits), but it was replaced by changes enacted in 2006 following a WTO panel ruling that found some aspects of the EU's scheme inconsistent with WTO rules. The new rules came into force in January 2013. Protection of GIs in the United States
In the United States, GIs are treated as brands and trademarks and administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). In addition, labeling requirements for wine, malt beverages, beer, and distilled spirits are under the jurisdiction of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). Specifically, several industry groups have expressed concern that the EU is using GIs to impose restrictions on the use of common names for some foods—such as parmesan, feta, and provolone cheeses and certain wines—and limit U.S. food companies from marketing these foods using these common names. Complicating this issue further are GI protections afforded to registered products in third country markets. This has become a concern for U.S. agricultural exporters following a series of recently concluded trade agreements between the EU and countries such as Canada, South Korea, South Africa, and other countries that are, in many cases, also major trading partners with the United States. Some Members of Congress have long expressed their concerns about EU protections for GIs, which they claim are being misused to create market and trade barriers. They are also concerned about the implementation of GI protections in other trade agreements that have been or are being negotiated by the EU with other countries. | Geographical indications (GIs) are place names used to identify products that come from these places and to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product originating in a certain region. The term is most often applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. Some food producers benefit from the use of GIs by giving certain foods recognition for their distinctiveness, differentiating them from other foods in the marketplace. In this manner, GIs can be commercially valuable. GIs may be eligible for relief from acts of infringement or unfair competition. GIs may also protect consumers from deceptive or misleading labels. Examples of registered or established GIs include Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma ham from the Parma region of Italy, Toscano olive oil from Tuscany, Roquefort cheese, Champagne from the region of the same name in France, Irish Whiskey, Darjeeling tea, Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, and Napa Valley Wines.
The use of GIs has become a contentious international trade issue, particularly for U.S. wine, cheese, and sausage makers involved in trade between the United States and the European Union (EU). Accordingly, GIs are among the agricultural issues that have been raised in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations, a potential reciprocal free trade agreement that the United States and the EU are negotiating. Many U.S. food manufacturers view the use of common or traditional names as generic terms and the EU's protection of its registered GIs as a way to monopolize the use of certain wine and food terms and as a form of trade protectionism. Specifically, several industry groups have expressed concern that the EU is using GIs to impose restrictions on the use of common names for some foods—such as parmesan, feta, and provolone cheeses and certain wines—and limit U.S. food companies from marketing these foods using these common names. Complicating this issue further are GI protections afforded to registered products in third country markets. This has become a concern for U.S. agricultural exporters following a series of recently concluded trade agreements between the EU and countries such as Canada, South Korea, South Africa, and other countries that are, in many cases, also major trading partners with the United States.
Laws and regulations governing GIs differ between the United States and EU, which further complicates this issue. In the United States, GIs are generally treated as brands and trademarks, whereas the EU protects GIs through a series of established quality schemes. These approaches differ with respect to the conditions for protection or the scope of protection, but both establish rights for collective use by those who comply with defined standards. In the United States, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) administers GI protections, along with labeling requirements for wine, malt beverages, beer, and distilled spirits under the jurisdiction of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau. In the EU, a series of regulations governing GIs was initiated in the early 1990s covering agricultural and food products, wine, and spirits. Legislation adopted in 1992 covered agricultural products (not including wines and spirits), but it was changed in 2006 following a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel ruling that found some aspects of the EU's scheme inconsistent with WTO rules. The new rules came into force in January 2013. GIs are also protected by agreements of the WTO as part of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Some Members of Congress have long expressed their concerns about EU protections for GIs, which they claim are being misused to create market and trade barriers. However, they are also concerned about the implementation of GI protections in other trade agreements that have been or are being negotiated by the EU with other countries. |
crs_RS21920 | crs_RS21920_0 | Introduction
In its discussion of strategies for aviation security, the 9/11 Commission recommended that:
The TSA [Transportation Security Administration] and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. Congressional interest in this topic continues, particularly as the 110 th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. Several technologies have been developed and deployed on a test or pilot basis. Policy Issues
Any strategy for deploying and operating passenger explosives detection portals must consider a number of challenges. Standards, Certification, Regulation, and the Establishment of Screening Procedures
Standards for the performance of passenger explosives trace detection equipment, procedures for evaluation and certification of the equipment, and regulations for its use are all yet to be established. If passenger throughput is drastically decreased, then alternatives for passenger screening may need to be considered. | The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4. |
crs_R43803 | crs_R43803_0 | Reauthorization of USGSA
Most of the United States Grain Standards Act (USGSA) is permanently authorized, including mandatory inspection and weighing of exported grain, and federal authority to establish and amend grain standards of quality. However, several key provisions of the law were set to expire on September 30, 2015. While the expiring provisions would not necessarily have brought official grain inspections and weighing to a halt, a lapse could have affected funding and disrupted the current grain inspection and weighing program. The USGSA was reauthorized on September 30, 2015, with the enactment of the Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-54 ). Four expiring provisions—authority for appropriations, authority to charge fees, an administrative/supervisory cost cap, and authority for an advisory committee—were extended until September 30, 2020. Besides extending the four provisions, the act included provisions addressing disruptions in inspection and weighing services, geographic service boundaries, and inspection and weighing authorities that were included in the House ( H.R. 2088 ) and/or Senate ( S. 1417 ) reauthorization bills. )—authorizes the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish official marketing standards (not health and safety standards) for certain grains and oilseeds. FGIS promotes the uniform application of U.S. grain standards by official inspection personnel. Specifically, to encourage the marketing of high-quality grain for an agriculture sector that is highly dependent upon export demand, the USGSA requires that exported grains and oilseeds be officially inspected (if sold by grade) and weighed. As authorized by the USGSA, all official inspections are financed by user fees, with the federal portion of fee revenue maintained in a trust fund. FGIS activities such as developing grain standards and improving techniques for measuring grain quality are financed with congressionally appropriated funds. Grain Inspection System6
FGIS inspects or oversees the inspection of more than half of the grain produced in the United States. For exports, FGIS directly inspects about two-thirds of exported grain and oversees the inspection of the remainder. Official inspections and weighing services are performed by either FGIS or official agencies under FGIS supervision. Additional Policy Issues
Besides expiring authorities, several policy issues were considered as Congress reviewed the reauthorization of the USGSA. 114-54 ) requires USDA to take immediate action to address a disruption of inspection and weighing services, but leaves the decision about how to resume services to the Secretary. Enacted Provisions
The final reauthorization act ( P.L. 114-54 ) requires that state agencies be certified every five years. Within one year of enactment, USDA is to develop a certification process for delegating authority to state agencies. | Under the United States Grain Standards Act (USGSA) of 1916, the federal government is authorized to establish official marketing standards (not health and safety standards) for grains and oilseeds, and to provide procedures for grain inspection and weighing. To encourage the marketing of high-quality grain for an agriculture sector that is highly dependent on export demand, the USGSA requires that exported grains and oilseeds be officially inspected (if sold by grade) and weighed. Domestic shipments do not require official inspection and weighing, but the service is available and is often performed. As authorized by the USGSA, all official services are financed by user fees, with the federal portion of fee revenue maintained in a trust fund. Activities such as developing grain standards and procedures for measuring quality are financed with congressionally appropriated funds.
The Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) promotes the uniform application of U.S. grain standards by official inspection personnel. FGIS inspects or oversees the inspection (by official state or private agencies) of more than half of the grain produced in the United States. FGIS directly inspects about two-thirds of exported grain and oversees the inspection (by state agencies) of the remainder.
Most of the USGSA is permanently authorized, including mandatory inspection and weighing of exported grain, as well as authority to amend grain standards of quality. However, several provisions were set to expire on September 30, 2015. A lapse in authorization could have disrupted the current grain inspection and weighing program, but it would not necessarily have halted official grain inspections.
The USGSA was reauthorized on September 30, 2015, with the enactment of the Agriculture Reauthorizations Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-54). Four expiring provisions—authority for appropriations, authority to charge fees, an administrative/supervisory cost cap, and authority for an advisory committee—were extended until September 30, 2020.
Besides extending the four expiring provisions, the act addressed several policy issues. These policy issues were included in either the original House (H.R. 2088) or Senate (S. 1417) reauthorization bills, or both.
For example, the final reauthorization act (P.L. 114-54) included provisions on disruptions in inspection and weighing services. The act requires USDA to take immediate action to address a disruption of inspection and weighing services, but leaves the decision about how to resume services to the Secretary. The act also requires USDA to keep Congress informed should there be other disruptions in service. P.L. 114-54 also allows customers to utilize inspection and weighing services outside of exclusive geographic boundaries if certain conditions are met. In addition, the act requires that delegated state agencies be certified every five years and UDSA has one year to establish a notice-and-comment process for certifying delegated state agencies. |
crs_R41809 | crs_R41809_0 | Implications of the Death of Osama bin Laden
Issues and questions related to the killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) are multifaceted and may have operational, regional, and policy implications. Operational policy issues include congressional notification, legal considerations, and current and future military activities. Al Qaeda, Regional, and Country Implications
The killing of OBL nearly 10 years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States poses many questions about the continuing destructive capabilities of AQ, the effects on regional affiliates, and U.S. policy implications in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some argue that OBL's role in AQ at the time of his death was largely inspirational, as his ability to communicate with followers and offer strategic and operational guidance and support had increasingly been degraded since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Others argue that OBL remained an active participant in both the strategic direction and operational activities of all aspects of the AQ movement. The development has made much more acute already-existing doubts about Pakistan's role as a U.S. ally in counterterrorism (CT) efforts. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the U.S. Still, no media outlets are known to have openly expressed sympathy for OBL, and in only a single instance was his death referred to as "martyrdom." U.S. Strategy and Security Implications
Near- and long-term security and foreign policy considerations may be reassessed with the killing of OBL. National Security Considerations64
In the wake of OBL's death, many practitioners and observers have expressed interest in the implications for U.S. national security strategy—whether and to what extent the U.S. government's prioritization of CT relative to other national security imperatives, the distribution of CT efforts among U.S. government agencies, and the relative balance of emphasis between CT and other concerns within key U.S. government agencies, ought to be adjusted. Possible Implications for the Homeland73
It is unknown how OBL's death will affect AQ-inspired homegrown jihadist terrorists targeting the United States. Long-Term Implications for U.S. Security Interests
If it is determined that OBL remained an active decision-maker in the development of core AQ strategy and terrorist operations, his death may have negative implications for the organization's ability to continue as a viable threat to U.S. interests. While some analysts suggest that OBL may have provided some level of support to AQ-affiliated organizations, most of these entities appear to be self-sufficient and it is likely regionally focused terrorism-related activities would not be affected. Some fear that the death of OBL could lead to a further degradation of the standing of core AQ, which in turn may lead to an attempt by a leader of an affiliated AQ organization to pursue a more aggressive global terrorist agenda in hopes of rising to place of prominence. Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East
While some experts argue that OBL's limited ideological appeal and operational role in AQ suggest that the implications of his death will also be limited, senior U.S. counterterrorism officials view the death of OBL as the possible beginning of the end of AQ. | The May 1, 2011, killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) by U.S. forces in Pakistan has led to a range of views about near- and long-term security and foreign policy implications for the United States. Experts have a range of views about the killing of OBL. Some consider his death to be a largely symbolic event, while others believe it marks a significant achievement in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Individuals suggesting that his death lacks great significance argue that U.S. and allied actions had eroded OBL's ability to provide direction and support to Al Qaeda (AQ). For these analysts, OBL's influence declined following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to a point where prior to his death he was the figurehead of an ideological movement. This argument reasons that a shift of terrorist capability has occurred away from the core of AQ to affiliated organizations. Still others argue that OBL pursued a strategy of developing the AQ organization into an ideological movement thus making it more difficult to defeat. They contend that, even if OBL were no longer involved in the decision-making apparatus of AQ, his role as the inspirational leader of the organization was far more important than any operational advice he might offer. As such, his death may not negatively affect the actions of the ideological adherents of AQ and as a martyr he may attract and inspire a greater number of followers.
Individuals suggesting that his death is a major turning point in U.S. counterterrorism efforts contend that OBL remained an active participant in setting a direction for the strategy and operations of AQ and its affiliates. In addition to disrupting AQ's organizational activities some believe his death may serve as a defining moment for the post 9/11 global counterterrorism campaign as current and potential terrorists, other governments, and entities that wish to threaten U.S. interests will take note of the U.S. success in achieving a long-held security goal. The death of OBL may have near- and long-term implications for AQ and U.S. security strategies and policies.
The degree to which OBL's death will affect AQ and how the U.S. responds to this event may shape the future of many U.S. national security activities. Implications and possible considerations for Congress related to the U.S. killing of OBL in Pakistan are addressed in this report. As applicable, questions related to the incident and U.S. policy implications are also offered. They address:
Implications for AQ (core, global affiliates, and unaffiliated adherents) Congressional notification Legal considerations National security considerations and implications for the homeland Military considerations Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan Implications for U.S. security interests and foreign policy considerations
The death of OBL is a multifaceted topic with information emerging frequently that adds perspective and context to many of the issues discussed in this report. This report is based on open-source information and will be updated as necessary. |
crs_RL34019 | crs_RL34019_0 | The issue of restricting plantings of fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on base acres in the farm commodity programs is a topic of debate in the 2007 farm bill. The purpose of the targeted restriction is to protect growers of unsubsidized fruits and vegetables from competing production on subsidized land. As reasonable as this justification may appear, there have been problems with the policy (see below). Restrictions on planting fruits and vegetables are viewed positively by fresh fruit and vegetable growers, mostly negatively by growers of processing fruits and vegetables, and negatively in the context of world trade rules. First, some midwestern producers who grew primarily vegetables for processing (canned and frozen) have reduced their plantings since soybeans became a program crop in 2002. Companion bills have been introduced in the House and Senate of the 110 th Congress that would allow any producer to use base acres to grow fruits and vegetables for canning and freezing as long as they give up program payments on those acres for one year, but without additional penalties (Farming Flexibility Act of 2007— H.R. 1371 , Baldwin, and S. 1188 , Lugar). Second, in a high-profile case brought to the WTO by Brazil against the United States regarding its cotton program, a settlement panel found that the current restriction on planting specialty crops makes direct payments ineligible for treatment as a nondistorting (green box) subsidy payment for international trade purposes. The Administration proposes that the 2007 farm bill eliminate the fruit and vegetable planting restriction, largely to meet WTO obligations. Retain the current restrictions (status quo). If direct payments are eliminated, the planting restriction issue is irrelevant. Direct compensation. The amount of the payment could be based on the level of direct payments received by program crop growers. Summary of Academic and Industry Studies
Following is a side-by-side comparison of five academic and industry studies on the effects of removing the restriction on planting fruits and vegetables on base acres under the 2002 farm bill. General Conclusions
As indicated by these studies, eliminating the current planting restriction could have an economic effect on certain crops within certain producing areas. However, differences in research approach and scope (e.g., regional versus national; plantings of permanent, perennial crops versus easily rotated, annual crops) complicate a direct comparison across all five studies. Such differences also make it difficult to generalize about the possible economic effects of lifting the current restriction. They reported estimated revenue losses to existing fruit and vegetable growers ranging from about $1.7 billion to $4.0 billion, respectively, in the first year of lifting the restriction. The other three studies did not provide quantitative estimates of the market impacts. However, both the USDA and Michigan State studies indicate that the effects of removing the current restriction likely would be limited to individual producers, commodities, and regions, and that the total industry effects of removing the restriction would be low. | Owners of cropland with a history of growing "program crops" receive federal subsidy payments without regard to what crops are currently being produced on these base acres. In other words, these "direct payments" are decoupled from crop planting decisions. While the direct payments program is characterized as giving producers the flexibility to make planting choices based on actual market conditions instead of subsidy rules, there are restrictions. There is a prohibition on planting fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on program crop base acres. This planting restrictions policy is now under challenge as Congress debates a 2007 farm bill.
The purpose of the fruit and vegetable planting restriction is to protect growers of unsubsidized fruits and vegetables from competing production on subsidized cropland. As reasonable as this justification may appear, there have been problems with the policy. First, producers primarily of processing vegetables (canned and frozen) in the Midwest sharply curtailed production after soybeans became a program crop in the 2002 farm bill. Second, in a high-profile case by Brazil against the U.S. cotton program, the World Trade Organization (WTO) determined that the prohibition on planting fruits and vegetables was not consistent with the rules required of a minimally distorting subsidy. This determination jeopardizes the "green box" classification of direct payments for all program crops. Largely to meet WTO obligations, the Administration proposes that the 2007 farm bill eliminate the fruit and vegetable planting restriction.
Companion bills have been introduced in the House and Senate that would allow any producer to use base acres to grow fruits and vegetables for canning and freezing as long as they give up program payments on those acres for one year, but without additional penalties (Farming Flexibility Act of 2007—H.R. 1371, Baldwin, and S. 1188, Lugar). This partial approach likely would not satisfy WTO concerns. Other options include retaining the status quo, eliminating the restrictions entirely, or eliminating the underlying direct payment. Most fresh fruit and vegetable growers oppose eliminating the restriction without some type of compensation.
This report summarizes and examines five academic and industry studies on the economic effects of removing the fruit and vegetable planting restrictions. These studies indicate that lifting the planting restriction could have an economic effect on certain crops within certain producing areas. However, differences in approach and scope (e.g., regional versus national; plantings of permanent, perennial crops versus easily rotated, annual crops) complicate a direct comparison across all five studies, and make it difficult to generalize about the possible economic effects of lifting the planting restriction. Only two of the studies provide estimates of revenue losses to existing fruit and vegetable growers (ranging from about $1.7 billion to $4.0 billion in the first year of lifting the current restriction). The other three studies do not make quantitative estimates of the impacts, but indicate that adverse effects of removing the restriction likely would be small relative to the overall industry, although there could be larger impacts on individual producers, commodities, and regions. |
crs_R40969 | crs_R40969_0 | As a result of the implementation of the Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), some taxpayers may have unexpectedly found that their 2009 or 2010 income tax refunds were lower than anticipated or that they owed income tax instead of receiving a refund. Some taxpayers ineligible for the MWP credit had been receiving the credit but were not able to claim it when filing their 2009 and 2010 income tax returns. In addition, some pensioners may also have found that their 2011 take-home pay was different compared with the 2009 and 2010 amounts. Expiration of the Making Work Pay Tax Credit and Increased Tax Withholding for Pensioners
Individuals who received income from pensions may have seen an increase in the amount of their federal income tax withholding and therefore lower after-tax income ("take home") in 2011. This was a result of the expiration of the MWP tax credit on December 31, 2010. The MWP tax credit provided individuals a federal income tax credit of 6.2% of wages up to a maximum credit of $400 ($800 for married couples filing jointly) in tax years 2009 and 2010. Expiration of the MWP Tax Credit and the Payroll Tax Holiday in 2011 and 2012
Although the MWP tax credit expired on December 31, 2010, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 112-78 , signed by President Barack Obama on December 23, 2011, extended the 2% reduction in Social Security payroll taxes through February 29, 2012. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) extended the 2% reduction through the end of 2012. Low Wage Earners
Workers who made less than $20,000 in wages may find that the reduction in Social Security payroll taxes in 2011 was less than the amount they received under the MWP tax credit in 2010. 772 , the Extended Tax Relief for All Act of 2011, introduced by Representative Rosa DeLauro on February 17, 2011, would have extended the MWP tax credit through December 31, 2011, and would have reduced the amount of the credit by the amount of the Social Security Payroll Tax reduction. Thus, taxpayers would have received the larger of the MWP tax credit or the Payroll Tax reduction. | The Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit provided a refundable tax credit of up to $400 for individuals and up to $800 for married taxpayers filing joint returns in 2009 and 2010. The MWP tax credit expired on December 31, 2010. As a result of the expiration of the MWP tax credit, some taxpayers are finding that the amount of their income tax withholding had increased in 2011. In 2009 and 2010, as a result of the implementation of the MWP tax credit, some taxpayers may have found that their 2009 and 2010 income tax refunds were lower than they anticipated or that they owed taxes when they were expecting a refund. This is because some individuals who were ineligible for the MWP tax credit nonetheless received it.
The MWP credit was implemented as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) and provided a temporary tax credit in 2009 and 2010. Individuals received the MWP credit through lower income tax withholding throughout the 2009 and 2010 tax years. Ineligible taxpayers were not able to claim the tax credit on their 2009 or 2010 income tax filings, resulting in higher tax liability. The change in withholding tables may affect some pensioners' take-home pay throughout the year, although their 2011 tax liability has not changed. Although the MWP tax credit was not extended, certain other ARRA tax provisions were extended and a 2% reduction in Social Security payroll taxes was implemented for 2011. H.R. 772 would have extended the MWP tax credit for 2011 and would have reduced the amount of the MWP by the amount of the reduction in payroll taxes. P.L. 112-78, signed by President Barack Obama on December 23, 2011, extended the 2% reduction in Social Security payroll taxes through February 29, 2012. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) extended the 2% reduction through the end of 2012.
This CRS report describes how some taxpayers might have been affected by the implementation and expiration of the MWP tax credit and which taxpayer groups might have had their income tax underwithheld. The report also describes the circumstances in which some workers may have received more under the Making Work Pay tax credit compared with the 2% reduction in Social Security payroll tax. |
crs_R40437 | crs_R40437_0 | Background
The Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory is a radio and radar telescope located on approximately 120 acres of federally owned land in Barrio Esperanza, Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Currently, the Arecibo Observatory is managed, operated, and maintained by SRI International. (SRI International partners with the Universities Research Association, and the Universidad Metropolitana, San Juan, and the University of Puerto Rico). Report of NSF's Senior Review
In 2005-2006, NSF's AST conducted a Senior Review of its portfolio of facilities. The Senior Review was to, among other things, identify potential reinvestment in the highest priority existing programs in AST and to restructure the operational efficiency of the existing AST-operated facilities. The committee reported that the scientific value of the telescope was modest when compared to other existing and proposed projects funded primarily by the NSF. The Senior Review recommended decreasing the Arecibo's annual $12.0 million budget to $9.0 in FY2009 and securing partnerships for the remaining necessary funding. It stated that if alternative funding sources or partnerships could not be obtained by 2011, the Observatory should be dismantled. In February 2011, the Senior Review Committee stated that the "AST Division must consider carefully the relative priorities of continuing to operate its older facilities and transitioning to the increased cost of operating the new facilities." The report also estimated that closure and decommissioning the Arecibo could cost an estimated $88.0 million, approximately eight times its current annual operating cost. In June 2011, NSF announced that it awarded a $42.0 million, five-year contract to SRI International to manage, operate, and maintain the Arecibo. The Arecibo will, among other things, expand its research on the study of the ionosphere, the remains of imploded stars, and also search within and beyond the Milky Way for asteroids and pulsars. The Administration's FY2013 budget request for NSF provides a total of $8.2 million for the Arecibo Observatory—$5.0 million from the AST and $3.2 million from the AGS. | The Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory is a radio and radar telescope located in Barrio Esperanza, Arecibo, Puerto Rico. The Arecibo Observatory is managed, operated, and maintained by SRI International, under contract with the National Science Foundation (NSF). In 2005-2006, NSF's Division of Astronomical Sciences (AST) conducted a Senior Review of its portfolio of facilities. Among other things, the Senior Review was to identify potential reinvestment in the highest priority existing programs in AST and restructure the operational efficiency of the existing facilities. The Review reported that the scientific value of the Arecibo was modest when compared to other existing and proposed projects and recommended decreasing the telescope's annual $12.0 million budget to $9.0 million in FY2009, and securing partnerships for the remaining necessary funding. If alternate funding sources or partnerships could not be obtained by 2011, the Review recommended dismantling the facility.
In February 2011, a report of the Senior Review estimated that closure of the Arecibo could approach $88.0 million, approximately eight times its current operating cost. The Review determined that AST should carefully examine the priorities of continuing to operate older facilities while simultaneously transitioning to newer facilities. The issue before the 112th Congress is whether the Arecibo is more cost-effective than replacing it with newer, available technology.
In June 2011, NSF announced that it awarded a $42.0 million, five-year contract to SRI international to manage, operate, and maintain the Arecibo. SRI International will partner with the Universities Research Association, the Universidad Metropolitana, San Juan, and the University of Puerto Rico. The Arecibo will, among other things, expand its research on the study of the ionosphere, the remains of imploded stars, and also search within and beyond the Milky Way for asteroids and pulsars.
The Administration's FY2013 budget request for the Arecibo in the NSF totals $8.2 million; the FY2012 estimate is $8.7 million. Requested funding for the Arecibo Observatory in the FY2013 request includes $5.0 million from the AST, and $3.2 million from the Division of Atmospheric and Geospace Sciences (AGS). |
crs_R41040 | crs_R41040_0 | The federal government is the largest single purchaser of energy in the United States. Advocates for improving energy efficiency, achieving energy independence, and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions believe the federal government can show leadership by reducing its federal energy use. Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) authorized under the act, offered federal agencies indirect incentives to make energy efficiency improvements through private funding that agencies pay back with energy savings. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) mandated further energy savings measures throughout government operations and facilities, and permanently reauthorized "energy savings performance contracts." Executive Order 13423 (Strengthening Federal Environmental Energy, and Transportation Management) directed federal agencies to reduce GHG emissions by reducing energy intensity. Executive Order 13514 (Federal leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance) followed with GHG reduction goals for federal agencies. Policy Considerations—Barriers to Achieving Energy Efficiency and GHG Reduction Goals
The GHG emission reduction goals of EO 13514 represent new initiatives that the federal government may only realize in the near term through incremental improvements in energy efficiency or reduced energy use. Spending on electricity represented the equivalent of one-third of 1% of the federal discretionary budget. In the case of ESPCs, agencies "locked-in" the pre-improvement budget for energy in order to pay for the energy improvement, which also allows the agencies to retain the balance of their energy savings. The federal government's prospect of seeing energy reduction translated into a budget reduction may be low. However, policy makers may want to weigh the direct monetary savings against the clean energy benefits of renewable energy in terms of avoided emissions of regulated pollutants and greenhouse gases to the environment. Policy makers may wish to question whether further improvements may come in smaller increments at increasingly higher costs. Recent Laws and Executive Orders
Two recent laws have provisions aimed at improving energy efficiency in federal facilities: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). 109-58 )
EPAct 2005 included three provisions to reduce energy consumption and improve energy efficiency in federal agencies: smart meters to monitor electricity use, efficiency standards to reduce energy consumption in new buildings, and increased renewable energy use. Section 512 ( Financing flexibility ) authorized federal agencies to use a combination of appropriated funds and private financing for Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC). Executive Order 13514—Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance
EO 13514 (2009) establishes an integrated strategy to advance "sustainability" in the federal government and a priority to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for federal agencies. | This report identifies incentives for and barriers to federal agencies achieving the energy efficiency goals and greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets outlined in recent laws and executive orders.
The federal government is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States, but consumes only 1% of the total energy used. Federal energy spending represents upwards of 1% of its total budget (discretionary and mandatory spending). Since the 1970s, Congress has enacted various laws that reduce energy consumption in the federal sector by improving energy efficiency. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) included measures to reduce energy and water in congressional buildings, install advanced meters to reduce electricity use in federal buildings, enact performance standards to improve federal buildings, and to reduce the federal government's electric energy consumption through renewable energy offsets (P.L. 109-58). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) mandated further energy savings measures in government operations, including energy upgrades to the Capitol complex, permanent authority to use "energy savings performance contracts," and federal procurement of energy efficient products and renewable fuels (P.L. 110-140).
Two recent executive orders guide federal agencies in reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions. In 2007, Executive Order 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental Energy, and Transportation Management directed federal agencies to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing energy intensity. In 2009, Executive Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance established GHG emissions reduction goals for federal agencies.
Federal agencies can take advantage of several financing mechanisms to make energy efficiency improvements without increasing their operating budgets. These include Energy Savings Performance Contracts, Utility Energy Savings Contracts, and Power Purchase Agreements. In some cases, agencies may share in the savings gained from reduced energy costs made through the improvements. New authority to combine appropriated funds with energy savings performance contracts could further energy efficiency improvements, but the lack of federal rules delays implementation. However, federal agencies may be reluctant to participate in this financing option if it reduces their opportunity to retain savings from the improvements.
The new GHG reduction goals come after three decades of effort to reduce energy consumption. GHG emissions associated with operating federal buildings result from consuming fossil fuels used in generating electricity and heating. Significant energy reduction resulted early from easily achievable, low-cost improvements that translate into GHG reductions. The opportunity for GHG reductions in the future may come through smaller, more difficult to achieve reductions in energy consumption based on high-tech solutions.
The prospect of reducing the federal budget by reducing energy consumption may be low. However, policy makers may wish to weigh direct monetary savings against the benefits of clean energy in terms of avoided emissions of regulated pollutants and greenhouse gases. |
crs_R41970 | crs_R41970_0 | These decreases in revenue collection and increases in spending resulted in higher budget deficits. Central findings of this analysis include the following:
A comparatively small share of federal spending is for direct provision of domestic government goods and services, which many people may think of when considering federal spending. Because this spending is normally about 10% of total federal spending and about 2% of GDP, whereas deficits excluding interest are projected to be 2% to 7% by FY2039, cutting this type of spending alone cannot realistically contain the problem of unsustainable deficits. Transfers and payments to persons and to state and local governments constitute most of federal spending, about 70% or more. Defense spending, accounting for about 20% of federal spending, has declined as a share of output over the past 35 years, but it also tends to vary depending, in part, on the presence and magnitude of international conflicts. Until the recent recession, most types of nondefense spending had been constant or declining as a percentage of output, but spending on programs for the elderly and health care have been rising. The problem with the debt lies not in the past but in the future, as growth in spending for health and Social Security is projected to continue. Reductions in discretionary spending are insufficient to reduce the deficit to a sustainable level, so limiting taxes as a percentage of output or constraining the overall size of the government to current levels would likely require significant cuts in mandatory spending, including entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Preserving entitlements would likely require significant increases in taxes, such as raising rates, reducing tax expenditures, increasing other taxes, or introducing new revenue sources. Tax expenditures may be difficult to eliminate, but they may be a reasonable source of new revenue if not used to lower rates. Addressing the eventual Social Security trust fund shortfall largely with tax increases would smooth the burden of accommodating longer lives across both working and retirement years. This argument might apply in part to Medicare and Medicaid issues. Because the federal government provides about one-fifth of the revenue for state and local governments, cutbacks in transfers to these governments may, in part, shift the burden of providing services from the national to subnational governments rather than altering the overall size of government services. Nondefense discretionary funding, although small as a share of the budget and of GDP, is largely the spending that many people think of when they think of the direct provision of goods and services by the federal government. By FY1993, debt held by the public had reached 49.3% of GDP. CBO projects it will stabilize before rising again. Defense, nondefense discretionary, and other mandatory programs are projected to amount to 6.9% of GDP in FY2039. Interest payments also were to fall. Therefore, it is realistic to expect that tax collections would have to rise to restore the path of future deficits to sustainability. | A small share of federal spending is for direct provision of domestic government services, which many people may think of when considering federal spending. Because this spending is normally about 10% of total federal spending and about 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) and deficits are projected to be 2.8% of GDP and rising in the future, cutting this type of spending can make only a limited contribution to reducing the deficit. (Note that direct provision of domestic services by the federal government is smaller than the total of nondefense discretionary spending, about 17% of spending, because it excludes transfers. Discretionary spending is spending that requires appropriations.) Transfers and payments to persons and state and local governments constitute most of federal spending, about 70%. Defense spending, currently accounting for about 20% of spending, has declined over the past 35 years but tends to vary depending, in part, on the presence and magnitude of international conflicts.
Recently, issues concerning the level of federal debt have become a significant source of debate in Congress. As a result of the recent recession (December 2007 to June 2009), along with policies enacted in response to it, federal debt held by the public rose from 36% of GDP in 2007 to 74% in 2014. Although the debt held by the public is projected to be relatively stable over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects it will rise to 106% of GDP by 2039. This increase in debt is mainly due to growth in federal spending on health care programs and Social Security, as well as increasing interest payments that typically accompany rising budget deficits. Although spending on these programs is rising, other types of federal spending have remained constant or declined. These trajectories are projected to continue under current policy.
Because reductions in the spending allocated for federal provision of goods and services appear inadequate to reduce the future deficit and debt to a sustainable level, limiting taxes as a percentage of output or constraining the overall size of the government to current levels would likely require significant cuts in transfers, which include entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
Preserving entitlements would eventually require increases in taxes; CBO's baseline projection shows spending on Social Security, health, and interest will absorb virtually all revenue collected by 2039, leaving little room for any discretionary and other mandatory spending. Options to put the federal budget on a more sustainable path include raising tax rates, reducing tax expenditures, increasing other taxes, or introducing new revenue sources. Tax expenditures may be difficult to eliminate, but if not used to lower rates they may be a source of additional revenue. If Congress were to address the eventual Social Security trust fund shortfall largely with tax increases, it would smooth the burden of accommodating longer lives across both working and retirement years. This argument might also apply, in part, to Medicare and Medicaid.
The federal government provides about one-fifth of the revenue for state and local governments. Reducing the long-term deficit and debt may require cutbacks in transfers to these governments that could, in part, shift the burden of providing services from the national to subnational governments rather than altering the overall size of government services. |
crs_R42016 | crs_R42016_0 | Introduction
On February 2, 2012, the Senate passed S. 2038 , the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act). 2572 , which the House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved on December 1 of last year. The House, however, stripped Title II from S. 2038 , and the bill was enacted into public law without it. The bills would expand the scope of these and related federal statutes, increase the penalties for those convicted, and amend related procedures to facilitate prosecution. Several would extend the reach of federal anti-corruption statutes read more narrowly in Skilling , Sun Diamond , and Valdes . Application of the statutes to public corruption was based on the theory that the mail and wire fraud statutes protected both tangible as well as intangible property and that such intangible property included the right of an employer or the public to the honest services of an employee or public official:
An increasing number of courts ... have held that a recreant employee can be prosecuted [for mail fraud] under §1341 if he breaches his allegiance to his employer by accepting bribes or kickbacks in the course of his employment, since such conduct defrauds the employer of his right to the employee's honest and faithful services. H.R. 2572 and Title II would each expand the mail and wire fraud definition of the term "scheme to defraud" to include a scheme "by a public official to engage in undisclosed self-dealing." Bribery and Gratuity Changes
Section 201
The bills also seek to overcome Sun Diamond and Valdes , two judicial interpretations of the basic federal bribery and illegal gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. H.R. The statute of limitations for certain securities fraud cases, for instance, is six years. The bills would amend the venue statute to add language italicized above that would permit trial of an offense, involving use of the mail or interstate commerce or entry of individual or goods into the United States, "in any district in which an act in furtherance of the offense is committed." Bribery of federal officials, mail fraud, and wire fraud are already predicate offenses. H.R. 2572 would increase the maximum term of imprisonment for bribery under subsection 201(b) to 20 years and the maximum term for illegal gratuities under subsection 201(c) to five years. 2572 , unlike Title II, would also limit all other Section 201 bribery or illegal gratuities offenses to cases involving $1,000 or more. Section 641 now prohibits the theft or embezzlement of federal property. H.R. | The House Judiciary Committee has approved an amended version of the Clean Up Government Act (H.R. 2572). The Senate has passed nearly identical provisions as Title II of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (S. 2038). Title II, however, was dropped from the bill prior to its enactment as P.L. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). Among other things, Title II and H.R. 2572 would each:
Expand the scope of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to reach undisclosed self-dealing by public officials—in response to Skilling. Amend the definition of official act for bribery purposes—to overcome the Valdes decision. Adjust the federal gratuities provision to reach "goodwill" gifts—in response to Sun Diamond. Increase the criminal penalties that attend various bribery, illegal gratuities, embezzlement statutes, and related provisions. Extend the statute of limitations from five to six years for several corruption offenses. Authorize the trial of perjury and obstruction charges in the district of the adversely effected judicial proceedings. Authorize the trial of multi-district cases in any district in which an act in furtherance is committed. Increase the number of public corruption offenses considered and wiretap predicate offenses.
H.R. 2572, alone, would:
Increase the maximum penalties under the federal bribery and illegal gratuities statute. Amend the federal law criminalizing the theft or embezzlement of federal property to include property of the District of Columbia. Limit the prosecution of bribery and illegal gratuity cases under 18 U.S.C. 201 to cases involving $1,000 or more.
This report is available in an abridged version, as CRS Report R42015, Prosecution of Public Corruption: An Abridged Overview of Amendments Under H.R. 2572 and S. 2038, by [author name scrubbed], which lacks the footnotes, attributions, and citations to authority found in this report. Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R40852, Deprivation of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41930, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22823 | crs_RS22823_0 | Inclusion of labor provisions in bilateral U.S. trade agreements has evolved. The first two U.S. FTAs with Israel, 1985, and Canada, 1988, did not include labor provisions. Second, it became increasingly accepted that labor issues were related to trade and trade policy. Labor Enforcement in U.S. Free Trade Agreements
Since 1993, the United States has negotiated 13 FTAs that include 19 countries. Labor and enforcement provisions in these various trade agreements can be categorized into four different models. These are (1) a fully enforceable commitment that Parties to free trade agreements would adopt and maintain in their laws and practices the ILO Declaration ; (2) a fully enforceable commitment prohibiting FTA countries from lowering their labor standards; (3) new limitations on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement" discretion (i.e., countries cannot defend failure to enforce laws related to the five basic core labor standards on the basis of resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues); and (4) the same dispute settlement mechanisms or penalties available for other FTA obligations (such as commercial interests). Model 3 has relatively similar procedures for violations under both types of provisions. | Since 1993, the Administration has negotiated and Congress has approved 13 free trade agreements (FTAs) with labor provisions, and is considering additional FTAs. Based on similarity of language, these FTAs can be sorted into four groups, or "models," which have evolved to contain successively greater levels of enforceability. This report first identifies the enforceable labor provisions in each model. Second, it identifies two types of labor enforcement issues: (1) those that relate to the FTA provisions themselves, including their definitions and their enforceability, and (2) those that relate to executive branch responsibilities, such as resource availability and determining dispute settlement case priorities. This report does not address other labor issues in the various free trade agreements, including cooperative consultation and capacity-building provisions. |
crs_R44573 | crs_R44573_0 | Overview of Bank Prudential Regulation
Lending is inherently risky. As part of safety and soundness regulation, banks are required to maintain sufficient capital reserves to buffer against losses associated with default (credit), funding (liquidity), and systemic-risk events. The Basel Capital Accords
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's (BCBS's) work on the first Basel Capital Accord, Basel I, provided an international consensus framework for bank safety and soundness regulation. In other words, international regulators were concerned that banks might prefer to domicile in countries with the most relaxed safety and soundness requirements. Unless capital reserve requirements are internationally harmonized, variation in standards may also lead to competitive disadvantages for some banks with competitors in other countries. Pillar 1 of Basel III modifies the regulatory capital and liquidity requirements established in Basel I and Basel II, requiring more and higher quality capital. On September 12, 2010, the 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities approved the requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III. Banks must comply with the Basel III enhanced requirements by 2019. On July 9, 2013, federal banking regulators issued a final rule (the Regulatory Capital Rule) to implement most of the Basel III recommendations. Regulators have since adopted additional requirements on larger U.S. banking firms, discussed in Appendix B , Appendix C , and Appendix D .
Enhanced Safety and Soundness Requirements Under Dodd-Frank
The Regulatory Capital Rule also implements some provisions from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) that addressed capital reserve requirements for banks. Section 171: The Collins Amendment
The Collins Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act provides for the development of consistent capital requirements for all insured depository institutions, depository institution holding companies, and systemically important nonbank financial companies. The Regulatory Capital Rule applies to all banks and bank holding companies domiciled in the United States. The leverage-ratio requirements for U.S. banks appear below. On April 8, 2014, the federal banking regulators issued a final rule (the Enhanced Supplemental Leverage Ratio) that would add an additional capital buffer of at least 2% to the current supplementary leverage ratio of 3% for bank holding (parent) companies with more than $700 billion in total consolidated assets or $10 trillion in total assets, thus raising the total supplementary leverage ratio requirement to a 5% minimum. On October 10, 2014, the federal banking agencies announced a final rule to implement the BCBS's LCR, calling for depository banking institutions with $50 billion or more in assets to hold more HQLA in their portfolios. Some Implications of Greater Prudential Capital and Liquidity Standards
Higher capital requirements and stress testing requirements (discussed in Appendix C ) may result in a larger cushion to absorb unexpected losses and reduce the vulnerability of banking institutions to insolvency (i.e., failure). Higher liquidity requirements may reduce vulnerability to sudden reversals in cash flow. By comparison, a systemic-risk event typically involves multiple financial institutions that simultaneously experience financial distress. Prudential requirements for the banking system may become less effective at mitigating financial risks when a significant amount of lending occurs outside the regulated banking system. When large amounts of lending activity occur in parts of the financial system that are not regulated for safety and soundness, raising prudential requirements for depository institutions would not necessarily address the rise in the various types of financial risks in the economy. Legislative Developments
The 114 th Congress is considering bills that would affect the prudential regulation of the banking system. S. 1484 , the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, was reported without amendment to the Senate on June 2, 2015. In October 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve separately announced final rules requiring national banks and federal savings associations with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more to conduct annual stress tests. These stress tests are referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST). | The Basel III international regulatory framework, which was produced in 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements, is the latest in a series of evolving agreements among central banks and bank supervisory authorities to promote standardized bank prudential regulation (e.g., capital and liquidity requirements, transparency, risk management) to improve resiliency during episodes of financial distress. Because prudential regulators are concerned that banks might domicile in countries with the most relaxed safety and soundness requirements, capital reserve requirements are internationally harmonized, which also reduces competitive disadvantages for some banks with competitors in other countries.
Capital serves as a cushion against unanticipated financial shocks (such as a sudden, unusually high occurrence of loan defaults), which can otherwise lead to insolvency. Holding sufficient amounts of liquid assets serves as a buffer against sudden reversals of cash flow. Hence, the Basel III regulatory reform package revises the definition of regulatory capital, increases capital requirements, and introduces new liquidity requirements for banking organizations. The quantitative requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010, and endorsed by the G20 leaders on November 12, 2010. Basel III recommends that banks fully satisfy these enhanced requirements by 2019. The Basel agreements are not treaties; individual countries can make modifications to suit their specific needs and priorities when implementing national bank capital requirements.
In the United States, Congress mandated higher bank capital requirements as part of financial-sector reform in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203, 124 Stat.1376). Specifically, the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act amends the definition of capital and establishes minimum capital and leverage requirements for banking subsidiaries, bank holding companies, and systemically important non-bank financial companies. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act requires greater prudential requirements on larger banking institutions.
This report summarizes the higher capital and liquidity requirements for U.S. banks regulated for safety and soundness. Federal banking regulators announced the final rules for implementation of Basel II.5 on June 7, 2012, and for the implementation of Basel III on July 9, 2013. On April 8, 2014, federal regulators adopted the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio for bank holding companies with more than $700 billion of consolidated assets or $10 trillion in assets under custody as a covered bank holding company. On October 10, 2014, the federal banking agencies (i.e., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) announced a final rule to strengthen liquidity regulations for banks with $50 billion or more in assets. Additional requirements that have since been proposed or finalized particularly for the larger and more complex financial institutions are described in various appendices of this report. In addition, the 114th Congress is considering bills that would affect the banking system's prudential regulation, including S. 1484, the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, which would affect bank capital regulation.
Greater prudential requirements for most U.S. banking firms may reduce the insolvency risk of the deposit insurance fund, which is maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), because more bank equity shareholders would absorb financial losses. A systemic-risk event, however, refers to multiple institutions simultaneously experiencing financial distress. For example, higher bank capital reserves may absorb greater losses associated with the financial distress of an individual institution, but a systemic-risk event exhausts the capital reserves of the industry, thus threatening the level of financial intermediation conducted by the banking system as a whole. Higher capital reserves in the banking industry are also incapable of buffering losses associated with financial activity that occurs outside of the banking system. |
crs_R40453 | crs_R40453_0 | U.S. 1646 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY2003 ( P.L. 107-228 , at Title VI, Subtitle B), as "The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002" (TPA). In addition to establishing a number of U.S. principles with respect to human rights, religious freedom, political prisoners, and economic development projects in Tibet, the TPA establishes in statute the State Department position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues; requires a number of annual reporting requirements on Sino-Tibetan negotiations, both by the State Department and by the congressionally established Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC); mandates the provision of Tibetan language training to interested foreign service officers in the U.S. government; and urges the State Department to seek establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa. 621)
The TPA's primary provision mandates that a U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues be maintained within the Department of State, with the central objective of encouraging and promoting dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC government in Beijing. 620)
The Act states that the U.S. Implementation
Various views exist on how effective the Tibetan Policy Act has been since its enactment, including different views on the objectives the TPA sets forth for U.S. policy; the attainability of those objectives; the achievements of the Special Coordinators; and the manner of the Act's implementation. A number of people who follow Tibetan issues closely were interviewed for this report to gauge their assessment of the TPA's effectiveness. This view holds that placing dialogue with the Dalai Lama at the center of U.S. policy objectives in Tibet raises unrealistic expectations among Tibetans; prompts recurring PRC crackdowns that contribute to a worsening situation in Tibet; and ultimately may be counterproductive to fulfilling other legitimate interests of Tibetans in Tibet. Other portions of the TPA are being implemented as the Act requires. For instance, U.S. government officials maintain they have continually raised with the PRC government the issue of political and religious prisoners (Sec. Finally, there has been no productive progress on the goal of establishing an additional U.S. Consulate in the PRC (Sec. 616)—some observers suggest that the problematic implementation of these principles is subject to the Special Coordinator's inability to task other government agencies. | U.S. policy on Tibet is governed by the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA), enacted as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY2003 (P.L. 107-228). In addition to establishing a number of U.S. principles with respect to human rights, religious freedom, political prisoners, and economic development projects in Tibet, the TPA established in statute the State Department position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues; required a number of annual reporting requirements on Sino-Tibetan negotiations, both by the State Department and by the congressionally established Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC); mandated the provision of Tibetan language training to interested foreign service officers in the U.S. government; required U.S. government officials to raise issues of religious freedom and political prisoners; and urged the State Department to seek establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa.
Since the TPA's enactment, opinions on the effectiveness of the Act have varied. These views include assessments on the nature of the objectives the TPA sets forth for U.S. policy; the attainability of those objectives; the achievements of the Special Coordinators; and the manner of the Act's implementation.
A number of people who follow Tibetan issues closely were interviewed for this report in an effort to assess the TPA's effectiveness. A commonly held view was that the Act was being implemented as intended and that those who had filled the Special Coordinator position created by the Act had been diligent in carrying out their responsibilities. In instances where the Act's objectives had not been achieved, such as the establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa or a meeting with the 11th Panchen Lama, the lack of achievements generally were ascribed to obstacles put in place by Beijing rather than failures in implementation on the U.S. side. Some suggestions were raised for improvements in the Act, including an expansion of the Special Coordinator's authority to task other U.S. government agencies and a broadening of issues to be included in annual reporting. A minority view held that the Act's principle objective – to encourage PRC dialogue with the Dalai Lama – was inherently flawed. According to this view, placing dialogue with the Dalai Lama at the center of U.S. policy objectives raises unrealistic expectations among Tibetans; prompts recurring PRC crackdowns that contribute to a worsening situation in Tibet; and ultimately may be counterproductive to fulfilling other legitimate interests of Tibetans in Tibet.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34431 | crs_RL34431_0 | By mid-March of 2008, gasoline prices exceeded $3.39/gallon (gal) while diesel fuel prices were $3.97/gal, a differential of almost $0.60/gal. This has prompted questions of why the historic gap between gasoline and on-highway diesel prices has widened so greatly and over such a relatively brief period of time. Among these are strong international demand for diesel fuel; product mix decisions by refiners, and refinery investment to meet more stringent limits on the sulfur content of diesel fuel; the similarities between diesel fuel and home heating oil; and the effect on retail prices from local market conditions. Refining and Supply of Gasoline and Middle Distillates
A barrel of crude oil is a composite of hydrocarbons of varying densities. Diesel fuel and home heating oil come from the portion of the barrel that is termed "middle distillates" because the feedstock for these fuels settle out roughly in the middle of the distillation tower. Diesel and Gasoline Prices
The retail prices of gasoline and diesel fuel have four major components: the price of the crude feedstock; federal and state taxes; the cost of refining, reflected in what is referenced as the "refiner margin"; and the costs of distribution (transportation) and marketing. Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the reason for the shift in the relative prices of gasoline and diesel fuel cannot be easily be identified through cost growth at any particular stage of the production process. In a world market where the major producers sell their products in virtually every geographic and product segment, price effects will have a tendency to move from one part of the market to another. This could be true even in times when the price of diesel fuel is above the price of gasoline. As a result, it may be that a major priority of the oil companies supplying the U.S. market is to avoid shortages. To avoid shortages, the U.S. imports gasoline and gasoline blending components. Heating Oil/Seasonality
Home heating oil and diesel fuel are essentially the same product from the refining point of view, and as such, their prices are related in the market. In addition, the linkages between the domestic diesel fuel market and international markets suggest that cold weather which increases heating oil demand anywhere in the world is likely to contribute to higher heating oil and diesel fuel prices in the United States. However, owing to the primary use of diesel fuel in the commercial sector for the delivery of goods and some services, demand for diesel is likely to be less elastic because, as has been noted, those costs will be passed on to consumers. | Over time, gasoline has typically been more expensive than diesel fuel. However, their relative prices have now reversed. In mid-March of 2008, gasoline prices exceeded $3.39/gallon (gal) while diesel fuel prices were above $3.97/gal, a differential of almost $0.60/gal. This has prompted questions of why the historic gap between gasoline and on-highway diesel prices has widened so greatly and over such a relatively brief period of time.
Crude oil, when refined, produces a mix of products. Diesel fuel and home heating oil are derived from the portion of the barrel that produces what are termed "middle distillates." Another part of the barrel furnishes the feedstock for gasoline. Refiners process barrels of crude oil of differing quality, depending on the relative prices for oil of different qualities, and their available technology. Within technology-defined limits refiners can vary the proportions of middle distillate and gasoline production. Because the entire range of petroleum products derive from the same barrel, it is difficult to attribute general refining costs to any single product, making it also difficult to ascertain the relative cost proportions. The exception to this would be when the investment costs of changing product specifications to meet seasonal or environmental requirements can be measured.
A number of specific factors may be identified that have contributed to the shifting relative prices of gasoline and diesel fuel. It is important to recognize that the U.S. market for these fuels is part of a broader world market. World demand patterns are shifting as diesel fuel becomes a primary consumer transportation fuel in Europe and other parts of the world. World price differentials are transmitted to the U.S. market.
Other factors affecting diesel prices include refinery investment costs, as well as investment costs in the product distribution system to accommodate new specifications for diesel fuel that require lower allowable sulfur content; the seasonality of home heating oil demand, a similar product, which transmits the price effects of cold weather from the heating market to the on-highway diesel fuel market; world market effects that might affect the pricing and output mix decisions of refiners; and circumstances affecting the local market at point of purchase.
One other factor should be noted. The primary demand sectors for gasoline and diesel fuel are different in the United States. Gasoline is a mass consumer good and home heating oil an important regional and seasonal residential product, while diesel fuel is used in a wide variety of commercial and industrial applications. Diesel fuel is often part of the cost of delivering goods and providing services. As a consequence, demand for diesel fuel may be less elastic, and therefore, likelier to be passed on to consumers. |
crs_R43880 | crs_R43880_0 | Introduction
Enacted in response to concerns that the United States could lose its historical advantages in scientific and technological innovation, the 2007 America COMPETES Act ( P.L. Containing eight titles and dozens of provisions affecting at least a half-dozen federal agencies, the principal policy contributions of the America COMPETES Act were the establishment of the doubling path policy for certain federal physical sciences and engineering (PS&E) research accounts and the authorization (or reauthorization) of various federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs. 111-358 ), have expired. Most of the funding authorizations in the America COMPETES Act spanned the three-year period between FY2008 and FY2010. Bills were introduced, but not enacted, in the 113 th Congress. This report provides an overview of the COMPETES Acts for readers seeking background and legislative context. It was written to serve as both a primer and a reference document. It includes a description and legislative history of the acts, a summary of the broad policy debate, and an examination of the implementation status of selected COMPETES-related programs and policies. This report also provides analysis of major bills to reauthorize the COMPETES Acts from the 113 th and 114 th Congresses. For authorized and appropriated funding for COMPETES-related accounts through FY2013, see CRS Report R42779, America COMPETES Acts: FY2008 to FY2013 Funding Tables , by [author name scrubbed]. The possibility that the United States has or could lose its historic strengths in scientific and technological advancement—and therefore has or could lose the prosperity and security attributed to that advancement—has become the central rationale for a portfolio of otherwise disparate federal programs, policies, and activities. In particular, the law established what is commonly referred to as the "doubling path policy" for PS&E research. Some of the STEM education and innovation-related programs and policies authorized by the act include the Math Now program at the Department of Education (ED), the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program at NIST, and the Advanced Research Project Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) at DOE. Other provisions in the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 allow federal agencies to offer innovation prizes and direct the Department of Commerce (DOC) to establish a new loan guarantee program for manufacturers, as well as a regional innovation program. For example, they noted that changes in the industrial bases and educational attainment rates of rapidly developing countries like China and India have led many analysts to conclude that these countries are able to compete for a growing percentage of the world's high-value jobs and industries. For the most part, actual appropriations to the targeted accounts did not reach authorized levels during either of the COMPETES Acts' authorization periods. 110-69 ). 111-358 ). America COMPETES Act
In general, the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. NSF's implementation of America COMPETES Act-authorized STEM education programs was also mixed. The DOE has implemented ARPA-E. Public Access to Federally Funded Research
Section 103 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. Efforts to Reauthorize in the 114th Congress
At least three bills have been introduced to reauthorize selected provisions of the COMPETES Acts in the 114 th Congress: H.R. STEM Education . 4159 ) was introduced to "provide for investment in innovation through research and development and STEM education, to improve the competitiveness of the United States, and for other purposes." Funding for Targeted Accounts. | Scientific and technological advancement played a central role in ensuring U.S. prosperity and power in the 20th century. From the first flight of the Wright brothers in 1903 to the creation of Google in the 1990s, U.S. scientific and technological innovations have reshaped the global economy and provided both economic mobility and national security for generations of Americans.
Whether the United States will maintain its preeminence over the course of the 21st century is an open question. Some observers assert that U.S. leadership is at risk. They argue that the United States underinvests in physical sciences and engineering (PS&E) research and underperforms in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. (PS&E research and STEM education are believed to be central pillars in the foundation supporting U.S. scientific and technological achievement.) At the same time, other nations are increasing their commitments to research and education in the STEM fields and, as a result, can compete for a growing percentage of the world's high-value jobs and industries.
Concern that the United States has fallen or could fall behind in the global race to innovate propelled passage of the 2007 America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) and its successor, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). The COMPETES Acts authorized increasing funding for targeted federal accounts that support PS&E research (commonly referred to as the "doubling path policy") and authorized (or reauthorized) certain federal STEM education programs. The acts also established the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), allowed federal agencies to use prize competitions to spur innovation, and directed the executive branch to coordinate policies providing access to federally funded research—among many other provisions.
Neither of the COMPETES Acts has been fully funded or implemented. Actual funding for the targeted PS&E research accounts did not reach authorized levels, and most of the STEM education programs established by the acts were not realized. On the other hand, existing STEM education programs that were reauthorized by the acts generally continued to operate. ARPA-E, which was established by the acts, was implemented and continues to operate. Federal agencies are also using the act's prize authority—at least 100 competitions have been initiated under the authority of P.L. 111-358.
Most of the funding authorizations in the COMPETES Acts have expired. Legislation to reauthorize all or portions of the acts was introduced, but not enacted, in the 113th Congress. Legislators have introduced bills to reauthorize all or portions of the acts in the 114th Congress. This report provides an overview of the acts for readers seeking background and legislative context. It serves both as a primer and a reference document, including a description and legislative history of the acts, a summary of the broad policy debate, and an examination of the implementation status of selected COMPETES-related programs and policies. This report also highlights major bills to reauthorize the acts from the 113th and 114th Congresses.
For authorized and appropriated funding for COMPETES-related accounts, see CRS Report R42779, America COMPETES Acts: FY2008 to FY2013 Funding Tables, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31134 | crs_RL31134_0 | Most of these provisions were made permanent by P.L. 112-240 , the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012; bonus depreciation was extended through 2013. Increased interest in providing business tax cuts to stimulate the economy followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which heightened concerns about an economic slowdown. Among the tax proposals that were discussed in the 107 th Congress were a corporate rate cut and an investment credit. An investment credit could be considered on either a temporary or a permanent basis. 3090 , which included temporary partial expensing (for three years), a provision similar to an investment credit. Bonus depreciation expired at the end of 2004. As the economy recovered, interest in short run stimulus measures diminished. Dividend relief and lower capital gains rates were extended in legislation passed in 2006, through 2010, although not on the grounds of short-term stimulus. The stimulus proposal adopted in February 2008 ( P.L. Bonus depreciation has been extended and expanded in recent legislation. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) extended bonus depreciation through 2010; provisions further extended bonus depreciation (in P.L. 111-240 and P.L. 111-315 ), expanded it to 100% for 2011 in P.L. 110 - 185 ) returned to bonus depreciation as a stimulus. When Is Fiscal Policy Needed? Because of lags in decision-making and administrative lags in getting tax cuts to individuals, a fiscal stimulus enacted through a tax cut can be poorly timed. Although a fiscal stimulus delivered through direct spending has a relatively straightforward effect, a fiscal stimulus delivered via a personal tax cut tends to have a more muted effect on the economy because only part of it will be spent. That is, government spending and tax reductions financed by deficits tend to crowd out investment. This last estimate is a much higher estimate than had previously been found and reflects some important advances in statistical identification of the response. Yet, it is not at all clear that this elasticity would apply to stimulating investment in the aggregate during a downturn when firms have excess capacity. Some evidence suggests that the temporary bonus depreciation enacted in 2002 had little or no effect on business investment. Type of Business Tax Cut: Corporate Rate vs. Investment Subsidy
Generally, an investment credit (or other subsidy confined to investment, such as accelerated depreciation) has more "bang for the buck" than a corporate rate cut (or dividend relief) because it does not reduce taxes on the flow of income to existing capital assets. Theoretically, a temporary investment subsidy, like the investment credit, would have a more pronounced effect on investment in the short run than a permanent one, and, of course, would cost much less. As noted above, the empirical evidence suggests that even a temporary subsidy was not very effective as an economic stimulus, although the reasons for that are not entirely clear and studies face many difficulties. It can also easily produce negative tax rates. Accelerated depreciation methods can be designed to be more neutral, and there are several types of investment subsidies that are relatively neutral at least across the assets they apply to (including partial expensing, allowing credits only for investment in excess of depreciation, or varying credits with asset durability). Permanent investment subsidies, while more effective than corporate rate cuts in the short run, will distort the allocation of investment in the long run. Thus the cost of a rate reductions is du (cK - Izg) where zg is the depreciation formula discounted at the growth rate g. Since I equals the effect on today's investment per present value of revenue loss is:
Therefore the ratio of the cost of an investment credit to the cost of a corporate rate reduction is somewhat complicated, but when depreciation is economic depreciation, the ratio simplifies to:
(5)
[where CoIC = Cost of Investment Credit, CoCRC = Cost of Corporate Rate Cut]. In the case of a depreciating asset, the relationship between pre-tax return and after tax return in the corporate sector is determined by the rental price formula:
(6)
where is the pre-tax real return, is the after tax discount rate of the firm, d is the economic depreciation rate, u is the statutory tax rate of the firm (equal to the corporate tax rate for corporate production and equal to the individual tax rate for non-corporate production), z is the present value of depreciation deductions for tax purposes, k is the investment tax credit rate, and m is the fraction of k that reduces the basis for depreciation purposes. | Business tax cuts were part of the economic stimulus, included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), provisions that were subsequently extended (in P.L. 111-240 and P.L. 111-315) by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, P.L. 112-240. The most important provision is bonus depreciation, which extends to the end of 2013.
Bonus depreciations provisions were enacted in 2002, as increased interest in providing business tax cuts to stimulate the economy followed the terrorist attacks of 2001, which heightened concerns about an economic slowdown. Among the tax proposals discussed at that time were a corporate rate cut and an investment subsidy. A March 2002 tax cut contained temporary partial expensing (bonus depreciation) for equipment. Interest in this issue continued, including proposals by President Bush for reductions in taxes on corporations through temporary dividend relief, which were enacted in May 2003. The temporary bonus depreciation expired at the end of 2004. Dividend relief was extended through 2010 in legislation passed in 2006. Temporary bonus depreciation was also part of a recent fiscal stimulus package adopted in 2008 (P.L. 110-185) and 2009 (P.L. 111-5) and has subsequently been extended and expanded.
Some economists doubt the efficacy of fiscal policy in general even when a stimulus is needed, especially in an open economy and given the difficulties of achieving proper timing. Also, deficit financing of a tax cut has potential negative long run effects because it crowds out investment; a stimulus designed to increase investment spending (rather than consumption spending) would, if successful, reduce that negative effect. Investment subsidies had largely been abandoned as counter-cyclical devices over the last two decades, in part because of lack of evidence from statistical studies relating investment spending to the cost of capital. Some recent empirical evidence has found some larger effects, at least with some studies, although not enough to suggest that all of the tax cut is spent (especially with corporate rate reductions). Moreover, the average behavioral response identified in these studies may be larger than responses during a downturn when many firms have excess capacities, and planning lags may make investment responses poorly timed. Recent studies of the 2002 temporary investment stimulus tended to find it a relatively ineffective stimulus measure.
An investment subsidy has more "bang-for-the-buck" than a corporate rate cut (or dividend relief), since the latter benefits existing as well as new capital. A corporate rate cut is estimated to produce as little as two-thirds of the investment induced by an investment credit with an equivalent revenue loss. The historically most common investment subsidy is the investment credit, although the same effect could be achieved with accelerated depreciation or partial expensing. A temporary investment credit should be more effective than a permanent one, and a temporary investment credit could also be made incremental. (It is not possible to structure a permanent incremental credit.) One disadvantage of a permanent investment credit is that it distorts the allocation of investment and can easily produce negative tax rates. A 10% investment credit would produce negative tax rates in excess of 100% for short-lived assets. Arguments were made for a corporate tax rate cut because of estimated large effects on the stock market. These calculations are overstated because they do not account for the adjustment process and of interest rate increases. Given the uncertainty about the size of stock market effects or their beneficial effect on the economy, there is a case for not considering stock market effects an important factor in choosing an investment subsidy. This report will be updated to reflect major legislative developments. |
crs_R44764 | crs_R44764_0 | Introduction
On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an Obama Administration initiative, was being rescinded. A related memorandum released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that same day rescinded the 2012 memorandum that established the DACA process. DACA was created to provide temporary relief from removal from the United States for individuals without a lawful immigration status who were brought to the United States as children and met other criteria. In addition to rescinding the 2012 DACA memorandum, the September 2017 memorandum states that DHS will "execute a wind-down" of DACA, during which it will "adjudicate certain requests for DACA and associated applications meeting certain parameters." The memorandum also states that DHS will not terminate previously issued grants of deferred action or employment authorization "solely based on the directives in this memorandum." The eligibility criteria are
under age 16 at the time of entry into the United States; under age 31 on June 15, 2012; continuous residence in the United States for at least five years before June 15, 2012 (that is, since June 15, 2007); physical presence in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the request for consideration of deferred action; not in lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012; not convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and not otherwise a threat to national security or public safety; and in school, graduated from high school or obtained general education development certificate, or honorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces or the Coast Guard. An individual must have filed the following three forms with DHS's U.S. USCIS's decision on a DACA request is discretionary. The period has closed. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. How many DACA requests have been approved to date? As of March 31, 2017, a total of 787,580 initial DACA requests and 799,077 renewal requests had been approved. For renewal requests accepted and decided by March 31, 2017, the approval rate was approximately 99% and the denial/termination/withdrawal rate was 1%. Has Congress enacted any legislation on DACA? Several bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress to provide different forms of immigration protection to unauthorized childhood arrivals who satisfy specified eligibility criteria. 496 ) and the Securing Active and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Act ( S. 127 ), would provide temporary protection from removal and employment authorization to eligible individuals. 3440 ), would establish pathways for eligible individuals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). | On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, an Obama Administration initiative, was being rescinded. A related memorandum released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that same day rescinded the 2012 memorandum that established DACA and described how DHS would "execute a wind-down of the program." According to the September 2017 memorandum, DHS will continue to adjudicate certain DACA requests and will not terminate previously issued grants of deferred action or employment authorization "solely based on the directives in this memorandum."
DACA was established in June 2012, when DHS announced that certain individuals without a lawful immigration status who were brought to the United States as children and met other criteria would be considered for temporary relief from removal. To request DACA (initial or renewal), an individual has to file specified forms with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and pay associated fees. USCIS's decision on an initial DACA request or a renewal request is discretionary. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. They are, however, considered to be lawfully present in the United States during the period of deferred action.
Cumulatively, through March 31, 2017, USCIS approved 787,580 initial DACA requests and 799,077 renewal requests. The overall approval rates for DACA requests accepted and decided by March 31, 2017, were approximately 92% for initial requests and 99% for renewals.
To date, Congress has considered, but never enacted, legislation on the DACA initiative. Several bills introduced in the 115th Congress would provide different forms of immigration protection to unauthorized childhood arrivals who satisfy specified eligibility criteria. Some of these bills would provide temporary protection from removal and employment authorization to eligible individuals, while other measures would establish pathways for eligible individuals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs).
This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about the DACA initiative. |
crs_RL33213 | crs_RL33213_0 | M embers of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies. These schools are the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), West Point, N Y; the U.S. The fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), New London, CT, does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. Upon graduation, service academy graduates are commissioned as officers in the active or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine for a minimum of five years. The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform community outreach and other representational activities. In some states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of nominations allocated. Consequently, some congressional offices may need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other constituent service activities such as casework. Congressional Approaches
The nomination authorities, number of appointments, and criteria establishing the qualifications of potential service academy appointees are set in statute, federal regulations, and policies established by each academy. No laws or regulations govern congressional nomination processes, as long as nominations are submitted by deadlines established by the academies, provide the information requested in the format required by the academies, and comply with chamber ethics rules. Each congressional office with nominating authority has the opportunity to develop its own process for managing its service academy nominations. Some offices handle nominations internally, assigning the task of managing applicant files and developing nomination recommendations to a staff member. Other offices assign staff to oversee nomination-related activities but delegate the screening and development of nomination recommendations to a volunteer panel, which could be charged with screening or interviewing applicants. A subsequent section describes qualifications of potential nominees to service academies established by statute, federal regulations, and each academy. Appendixes to the report include sample documents that may be used by congressional offices at various stages of the nomination selection process. These documents, which are based on information and examples found on service academy and congressional websites, provide basic information and can be customized to fit the specific needs of individual office policies. The number of positions, or charges, subject to congressional nomination at each DOD academy includes
10 from each state, 5 of whom are nominated by each Senator from that state; 5 from each congressional district, nominated by the Representative from the district; 5 from the District of Columbia, nominated by the Delegate from the District of Columbia; 4 from the U.S. Virgin Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands; 5 from Puerto Rico, nominated by the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico; 4 from Guam, nominated by the Delegate from Guam; 3 from American Samoa, nominated by the Delegate from American Samoa; and 3 from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. | Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies. These schools are the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. The fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. These institutions prepare college-age Americans to be officers of the U.S. uniformed services. Upon graduation, service academy graduates are commissioned as officers in the active or reserve components of the military or merchant marine for a minimum of five years.
The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform community outreach and other representational duties. In some states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of nominations allocated. Consequently, some congressional offices might need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other constituent service work such as casework.
The nomination authorities, number of appointments, and criteria establishing the qualifications of potential service academy appointees are set by statute, federal regulations, and policies established by each academy. No laws or regulations govern congressional nomination processes, as long as nominations are submitted by deadlines established by the academies and comply with chamber ethics rules. Each congressional office with nominating authority may develop its own process for managing its service academy nominations. Some offices handle nominations internally, assigning the task of managing applicant files and developing nomination recommendations to a staff member. Other offices assign staff to oversee nominations-related activities but delegate the screening and development of nomination recommendations to a volunteer panel, which could be charged with screening or interviewing applicants.
This report describes statutory requirements for allocating congressional nominations to service academies. It also identifies the qualifications that must be met by potential nominees, as established by statute and each academy. Finally, sample documents that could be used by congressional offices at various stages of the nomination selection process are included. These documents provide basic information and can be customized to fit the specific needs of individual office policies. |
crs_R43127 | crs_R43127_0 | Ultimately, if EPA is to reduce the nation's GHG emissions, as the President has committed to do, it will have to issue emission standards for broad categories of existing stationary sources. In a June 25, 2013, memorandum to the EPA Administrator, the President directed the agency to re-propose those standards by September 20, 2013, finalize them "in a timely fashion after considering all public comments," and propose guidelines for existing EGUs by June 1, 2014. The re-proposed standards for new sources were announced on September 20, 2013. The standards are to reflect the degree of emission limitation achievable through application of the best "adequately demonstrated" system of emission reduction. The Administrator can take costs, health impacts, environmental impacts, and energy requirements into account in setting the standards; she can distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources; and she must review the standards at least every eight years. Using the guidelines, states would be required to develop performance standards for existing sources. These standards could be less stringent than the NSPS, taking into account, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing source to which the standard applies. To understand what issues the agency has addressed in the re-proposed standards, this report discusses both the 2012 proposal and the September 2013 re-proposal. Emission Limits9
The re-proposed standard would set a limit of 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generated for coal-fired EGUs, and a standard of 1,000 or 1,100 lbs/MWh (depending on the size of the unit) for new natural gas-fired plants. The standards can be met by new natural gas combined cycle plants without add-on emission controls. Coal-fired plants, however, would find it impossible to meet the 1,100 lb. standard without controls to capture and store some of the CO 2 they produce. Questions Regarding the Re-proposed Rule
Many in the electric power and coal industries view the proposed and re-proposed standards, if either were finalized, as effectively prohibiting the construction of new coal-fired power plants other than those granted exemptions. Whether carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology has been "adequately demonstrated" is the key question they raise. Has CCS Been Adequately Demonstrated? EPA maintains that the components of CCS technology have been demonstrated on numerous facilities. Other than demonstration projects supported by DOE or other incentives, EPA sees no new coal-fired units incorporating CCS in the next 10 years: given the low cost and projected abundance of natural gas, all new fossil-fueled units are likely to be powered by gas. As EPA noted in the preamble to the 2012 proposal, in setting standards for conventional pollutants or air toxics, it was not appropriate to combine coal-fired and gas-fired units in a single category, because "although coal-fired EGUs have an array of control options for criteria and air toxic air pollutants to choose from, those controls generally do not reduce their … emissions to the level of conventional emissions from natural gas-fired EGUs." Guidelines for Existing Power Plants
The potential impacts of the NSPS rule extend beyond new sources, because the agency is obligated under Section 111(d) of the act to promulgate guidelines for existing sources within a category whenever it promulgates GHG standards for new sources. Using these guidelines, states will be required to develop performance standards for existing sources. But the standards could have far greater impact than the NSPS, given that existing plants account for one-third of total U.S. GHG emissions. Congressional Responses
Many in Congress oppose EPA standards for GHG emissions. Its real significance is that without the promulgation of a rule for new sources, EPA cannot, under the Clean Air Act, proceed to regulate existing sources. | As President Obama announced initiatives addressing climate change on June 25, 2013, a major focus of attention was the prospect of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards for fossil-fueled—mostly coal-fired—electric generating units (EGUs). EGUs (more commonly referred to as power plants) are the largest anthropogenic source of greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for about one-third of total U.S. GHGs. If the country is going to reduce its GHG emissions by significant amounts, as the President has committed to do, emissions from these sources will almost certainly need to be controlled.
The President addressed this issue by directing EPA to re-propose GHG emission standards for new EGUs by September 20, 2013. He also directed the agency to propose guidelines for existing power plants by June 2014, and finalize them a year later.
EPA had already proposed standards for new sources in April 2012, but the public comment period had generated more than 2.5 million comments—the most ever for a proposed EPA rule—and the agency had not yet finalized the rule.
The re-proposed standards were released September 20. They would set an emissions limit of 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide (CO2) per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generated by new coal-fired EGUs, and a standard of either 1,000 or 1,100 lbs/MWh (depending on size) for new natural gas-fired plants. Coal-fired plants would find it impossible to meet the standard without controls to capture, compress, and store underground about 40% of the CO2 they produce—a technology referred to as carbon capture and storage (CCS).
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator has a great deal of flexibility in setting these standards. The statute requires that New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) reflect the degree of emission limitation achievable through application of the best system of emission reduction that has been "adequately demonstrated." The Administrator can take costs, health impacts, environmental impacts, and energy requirements into account in determining what has been adequately demonstrated.
Many in the electric power and coal industries maintain that CCS has not been adequately demonstrated. Given the high cost and energy use of CCS components, they view the re-proposed standards as effectively prohibiting the construction of new coal-fired power plants.
EPA, on the other hand, states that the components of CCS technology have been demonstrated on numerous facilities. Details are provided in the preamble to the proposed rule. Despite this, the agency concludes that no coal-fired EGUs (other than DOE-sponsored or other demonstration projects) will be built in the next 10 years regardless of whether the rule is finalized, and therefore no units will be required to use CCS before EPA must review the standard. Given the projected low cost and abundance of natural gas, all new fossil-fueled units are likely to be powered by gas, according to EPA. The standard proposed for these facilities (combined cycle natural gas units) can be met without add-on emission controls, according to the agency.
Although the September 20 proposal would only affect new EGUs, the potential impacts of the rule's issuance extend beyond these sources, because the agency is obligated under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to promulgate guidelines for existing sources within a category when it promulgates GHG standards for new sources. The President directed EPA to propose such guidelines by June 2014 and to finalize them a year later. Using these guidelines, states will be required to develop performance standards for existing sources. These could be less stringent than the NSPS—taking into account, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing source—but the standards could have far greater impact than the NSPS, given that they will affect all existing sources.
Many in Congress oppose GHG emission standards. In the 113th Congress, hearings have been held and several bills to prohibit or limit EPA GHG standards have been introduced. The proposed standards have stirred new interest in congressional action. |
crs_R44563 | crs_R44563_0 | Al Qaeda's bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and subsequent attacks demonstrated the group's reach and ability to recruit from Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign fighter flows from the continent, primarily from North Africa—first to Afghanistan and the Balkans, then to Iraq, and now to Syria, Iraq, and Libya—have long been of international concern. The pace of high-profile extremist attacks on the continent has intensified in recent years. Assaults on prominent soft targets such as the Westgate Mall in Kenya and hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners appear to be on the rise, heightening concerns among foreign governments about the security of their citizens traveling or working in Africa. In 2015, U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper reported to Congress that "Sunni violent extremists are gaining momentum and the number of Sunni violent extremist groups, members, and safe havens is greater than at any other point in history." Africa, described by Clapper in 2014 as "a hothouse for the emergence of extremist and rebel groups," has drawn increasing attention as groups in Nigeria and Somalia have expanded their reach and lethality, and as new North African groups have emerged. Some Africa-based extremists have affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS or ISIL), but many appear to operate autonomously. Nevertheless, some African groups have attacked Western interests in Africa, and U.S. officials view some groups, like Al Shabaab, as potentially capable of inspiring or carrying out attacks in the United States, despite a primarily regional focus. There has been comparatively greater international focus on violent Islamist extremism occurring in, and emanating from, the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa, but in recent years the death toll from violent Islamist terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa has rivaled that of other regions. This report seeks to provide some context for current terrorism trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and a discussion of some key issues for Congress. Eleven groups based on the continent are now designated by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs); nine have been listed since 2013 (see Appendix A , and see Figure 1 for the areas in which they are active). Al Qaeda affiliates, including Al Shabaab and the Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, may view the Islamic State as a rival for recruits and resources, or may differ with its ideology or tactics. Nigeria's Boko Haram was identified as the world's deadliest terrorist group for civilians in 2014, outpacing the Islamic State, to which it pledged allegiance in 2015. Across the Sahel region, contests over resources and political representation fuel intercommunal conflict, including between herding and farming communities, notably in Nigeria and Sudan, but also in Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. Al Shabaab's ability to recruit abroad and the presence in Somalia of foreign fighters, among them U.S. citizens, have been of significant concern to U.S. policymakers. Its ties with other terrorist groups, most notably Al Qaeda and its Yemen-based affiliate, and its threats against international targets also elevate its profile among extremist groups on the continent and have made it a target of direct counterterrorism operations by the United States and other Western countries. North-West Africa: Group Proliferation and Fragmentation
Armed Islamist groups have proliferated in North and West Africa since 2011, amid political upheaval in the Arab world, governance and security crises in Libya and Mali, and an Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria. Many of these groups appear primarily focused on a domestic or regional agenda, but some have targeted U.S. or other foreign interests in the region and some may aspire to more international aims. The oldest continuously active transnational Islamist terrorist group in the region is AQIM, which grew out of Algeria's 1990s civil conflict and began to carry out attacks in West Africa's Sahel region in the early 2000s (prior to its affiliation with Al Qaeda in 2006-2007). More recently, it has sought ties with extremist groups in Tunisia and Libya. In North Africa, numerous reports suggest that Libya has become a hub for regional terrorist actors, and Tunisia has faced increasingly large-scale attacks by individuals who reportedly trained there. Libya and Algeria are home to groups whose pledges of allegiance to the Islamic State have been publicly accepted by IS leadership. The International Response
In addition to various country-specific responses to terrorist threats on the continent, African countries have established several multinational mechanisms to address certain regional extremist threats, including AMISOM, the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), an AU-led military intervention in Mali in late 2012 (subsequently re-hatted as a U.N. operation), a multinational joint operations center in southern Algeria known as the CEMOC, the Lake Chad Basin Commission's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to counter Boko Haram, and a separate, nascent effort to create a joint military force among five West African countries known as the "G-5 Sahel." Overall, African-led responses to terrorist threats remain constrained by limited resources, institutional weaknesses, conflicting political agendas, corruption, sensitivities over domestic sovereignty, regional rivalries, and uneven engagement among affected states. Consistent with the Administration's National Strategy for Counterterrorism , its Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (issued in 2012) indicates a goal of "disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents in Africa," in part by strengthening the capacity of "civilian bodies to provide security for their citizens and counter violent extremism through more effective governance, development, and law enforcement efforts." U.S. program officers and policymakers have faced challenges in seeking to implement both State Department and DOD "partner capacity-building" programs in Africa, such as when host-government preferences for certain types of assistance do not match U.S. assessments of what is needed. Military Operations
U.S. Africa Command's Theater Campaign Plan for FY2016-FY2020 identifies five key lines of effort for the U.S. military in Africa: (1) neutralize Al Shabaab and transition the mandate of the AMISOM to the Somali government; (2) degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel-Maghreb and contain instability in Libya; (3) contain Boko Haram; (4) interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa; and (5) build African peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacities. The Administration broadened its justification for direct U.S. military action in Somalia in 2015, indicating in a notification to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution that its operations in Somalia were carried out not only "to counter Al Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab" (as previously reported), but also "in support of Somali forces, AMISOM forces, and U.S. forces in Somalia." As this report describes, as the level of activity by terrorist groups in Africa has increased in recent years, U.S. security assistance for counterterrorism purposes has grown significantly. With terrorist attacks on soft targets increasing, are African police, investigators, and prosecutors sufficiently trained and equipped to respond? Additionally, some analyses of counterterrorism partnerships in Somalia suggest that while the United States and its partners in AMISOM may share a common foe, the objectives and actions of Somalia's neighbors (all of which are AMISOM troop contributors) may, in some cases, undermine other U.S. aims and create risks for the country's long-term stability. It may also inhibit efforts to examine whether U.S. efforts to counter terrorism and extremism in Africa strike the appropriate balance between support to African militaries and law enforcement or justice sectors, between government-to-government programs and community engagement, or between programs that seek to prevent radicalization versus those that seek to contain its impact. Limited access to funding data may also obscure U.S. policy dilemmas. Further, local militaries reportedly continue to play significant roles in politics and governance in several top U.S. security partner countries, including Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Uganda. Measuring this impact is challenging, however. | The pace of high-profile terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa has intensified in recent years, and the death toll now rivals that of other regions where violent Islamist extremist groups are active. This report provides context for these trends, including a summary of sub-regional dynamics, factors affecting radicalization, and U.S. responses. It focuses primarily on Sunni Islamist terrorism, given the ideological underpinnings of the African groups currently designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Select issues for Congress are also explored. Information on the major Africa-based groups is provided in an Appendix.
Over the past two decades, Congress has appropriated increasing funding to counter terrorism in Africa and has demonstrated interest in the nature of terrorist threats and efforts to counter them. Members have raised questions regarding
the threat violent extremist groups in Africa may pose to U.S. citizens and U.S. interests; the counterterrorism capacities of African countries and the impact of U.S. efforts to bolster them; the role of the U.S. military in countering violent extremist groups in Africa; the level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts; and the extent to which U.S. programs are successful in seeking to prevent or mitigate radicalization, recruitment, and support for violent extremist groups.
Some Africa-based groups have affiliated with Al Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, but many seem to operate autonomously. While many extremists on the continent appear to be driven primarily by local political and socioeconomic dynamics, some African groups have sought to attack Western interests in Africa, and some, like Somalia's Al Shabaab, apparently seek to inspire or carry out attacks in the United States and elsewhere. The spillover effects from areas where terrorist groups operate—most notably Libya, Mali, northeast Nigeria, and Somalia—are of increasing concern to neighboring states and the broader region.
Several emerging trends in violent Islamist extremist activity on the continent are impacting how governments in the region, local communities, and international actors respond:
Proliferation of African-Led Groups. Al Qaeda's first avowed African affiliate, Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was long assumed to have limited appeal among West African Muslims, and its interest in criminal activities often seemed to eclipse its ideological commitment. However, the rise of relatively potent, locally led violent Islamist groups in Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali over the past decade challenges past assumptions about the limited prospects for Islamist terrorism on the continent. Africa also appears to have become an arena for competition between Al Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State over recruits, affiliates, and perceived legitimacy.
The Push and Pull of North Africa. State collapse in Libya and political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt have provided new opportunities for armed groups to establish safe havens for training, expand their geographic reach, recruit followers, and equip themselves. Protecting and sustaining Tunisia's nascent democratic government has become a focus for U.S. policymakers in light of these trends. Contrary to some hopes, however, increased political openness has not inoculated Tunisia against domestic radicalization and recruitment. Conflict in Libya has spilled over its borders, generating new flows of arms and combatants into Tunisia and West Africa's Sahel region. Instability in North Africa has also drawn African recruits seeking to join groups based in Libya, or seeking to transit through North Africa en route to other global hotspots. Mutual distrust among North and Sub-Saharan African governments has inhibited counterterrorism cooperation, as have bureaucratic divisions within some donor governments.
From Holding Territory to Asymmetric Attacks. Years before the "Islamic State" announced its caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2014, Islamist extremist groups in Africa sought to hold, and in some cases govern, territory. Al Shabaab began to assert territorial control in Somalia in the mid-2000s, as did AQIM and two local affiliates in Mali in 2012, followed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State-linked groups in Libya in 2014. Military offensives by regional forces (in Somalia, Nigeria, and Libya) and French forces (in Mali) have reversed this trend, but gains are fragile. In response, extremists have reverted to asymmetric tactics and expanded the scope of their targets.
Attacks on Urban "Soft Targets" by a Resurgent AQIM. For much of the past decade, AQIM focused primarily on lucrative kidnap-for-ransom operations, attacks on local military and police posts, and insurgent operations in remote areas. As of 2013, the group appeared to have been weakened by internal divisions and by French military operations in Mali that killed or captured several key figures. However, three recent AQIM-linked attacks on hotels and restaurants popular with Western expatriates—in Mali (November 2015), Burkina Faso (January 2016), and Côte d'Ivoire (March 2016)—were among the group's deadliest ever, killing dozens of Western civilians and placing AQIM back at the center of regional terrorism dynamics. AQIM and its former rival splinter movement Al Murabitoun jointly claimed responsibility, signaling their apparent renewed merger. These attacks also appeared to signal a shift in tactics, piquing concerns about the vulnerability of cosmopolitan cities with large expatriate communities, such as Dakar, Accra, and Abidjan. As a result, local governments and donors, including the United States, are considering new programs to bolster West African urban crisis response capabilities, in addition to ongoing military train-and-equip counterterrorism programs.
Challenges. African-led responses to terrorist threats have been constrained by limited resources and capacity, institutional weaknesses, conflicting political agendas, corruption, sensitivities over domestic sovereignty, regional rivalries, and uneven engagement among affected states. These challenges have also undermined the effectiveness of efforts by concerned international actors and donors—including the United States—to respond. U.S. policymakers face a number of dilemmas, including how to prioritize U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa (both within the continent and compared to other regions); how to define a threshold for the use of U.S. military force against terrorist groups on the continent; whether and how to balance a large infusion of military aid to affected African countries with investments in law enforcement, development, and governance; and how to measure and assess the impact of U.S. efforts. The question of how and when to partner with authoritarian states for counterterrorism purposes—and what consequences this may have on long-term regional stability and the pursuit of other U.S. policy objectives—is particularly thorny.
Further CRS Reading: CRS In Focus IF10172, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun; CRS In Focus IF10170, Al Shabaab; CRS Report R43558, Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions; CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10116, Mali: Transition from Conflict?; CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia; CRS Report RL33964, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy; CRS Report R42967, U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues; CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress. |
crs_R44647 | crs_R44647_0 | It analyzes historical and recent trends in aid to the region, the Obama Administration's FY2017 request for aid administered by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and legislative developments on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations. Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2014, the United States provided the region with nearly $165 billion in constant 2014 dollars (or more than $79 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted dollars). U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts (see Figure 2 ). U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean decreased each year between FY2010 and FY2014. Obama Administration's FY2017 Foreign Assistance Request8
According to the State Department, U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere during the Obama Administration sought "to advance durable institutions and democratic governance, defend human rights, improve citizen security, enhance social inclusion and economic prosperity, secure a clean energy future, and build resiliency to climate change." Although the overall amount of aid provided to the region would remain relatively flat compared to FY2016 under the Administration's request, the allocation of assistance within the region would change in several ways, as discussed below. U.S. assistance provided through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) also would decline under the Administration's FY2017 request. Legislative Developments
On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-254 ) that funds most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901%, until April 28, 2017. The measure replaced a previous continuing resolution ( P.L. 114-223 ) that funded most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, between October 1, 2016, and December 9, 2016. 114-223 also included $145.5 million in supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health assistance to address the Zika virus outbreak in Latin America and the Caribbean. As the 115 th Congress considers appropriations for the remainder of FY2017, it may draw from the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures that were reported out of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees on June 29 and July 15, 2016, respectively. Colombia . H.R. Mexico . For example, both FY2017 foreign aid appropriations bills advanced during the second session of the 114 th Congress would have required the Administration to withhold assistance for several Latin American and Caribbean nations until those nations took certain actions:
Section 7045(a)(3) of S. 3117 would have required 75% of the funds for the "central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras" to be withheld until the Secretary of State certified that those governments were "taking effective steps" to address 16 concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, increasing government revenues, and investigating and prosecuting security force personnel credibly alleged to have violated human rights. The FY2017 NDAA ( P.L. | Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. During the Obama Administration, U.S. policy toward the region chiefly sought to strengthen democratic governance, defend human rights, improve citizen security, enhance social inclusion and economic prosperity, and foster clean energy development and resiliency to climate change. The United States has provided foreign assistance to the region to advance those priorities.
Assistance Trends
Since 1946, the United States has provided nearly $165 billion of assistance to the region in constant 2014 dollars (or more than $79 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted dollars). Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century. Aid appropriations for the region declined in each of the four fiscal years between FY2011 and FY2014 before increasing slightly in FY2015 and FY2016.
FY2017 Request
The Obama Administration's FY2017 foreign aid budget request included $1.7 billion to be provided to Latin America and the Caribbean through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the request, the amount of aid provided to the region would remain relatively flat compared to FY2016, but the allocation of assistance within the region would change in several ways. The request would provide additional assistance to Central American nations to address the root causes of emigration from the subregion and additional assistance to Colombia to help end its five-decade internal armed conflict. Conversely, the request would reduce funding for U.S. security initiatives in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.
Legislative Developments
On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) that funds most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901%, until April 28, 2017. The measure replaced a previous continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) that funded most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, between October 1, 2016, and December 9, 2016. P.L. 114-223 also included $145.5 million in supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health assistance to address the Zika virus outbreak in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The 115th Congress will need to complete action on FY2017 appropriations for the balance of the fiscal year. It may draw from the FY2017 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures, S. 3117 and H.R. 5912, which were reported out of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees during the second session of the 114th Congress but never received floor consideration. |
crs_R44554 | crs_R44554_0 | Introduction
Section 956 of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) requires financial regulators to adopt new rules placing certain limitations on the use of incentive or incentive-based compensation at financial firms. Section 956 was a response to the widely held but contested notion that incentive-based compensation (i.e., variable performance-based compensation) at financial firms, including commercial and investment banking firms, helped encourage executives and various operatives to take excessive risks that ultimately contributed to financial setbacks at individual firms, which contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and since. As an example, in September 2016, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was fined $185 million for illegal sales practices, which might have been motivated by incentive-based compensation arrangements. In addition to the fine, at issue is whether the Wells Fargo incident highlights the potential usefulness of the Dodd-Frank incentive-based compensation clawback provision. An initial 2011 proposal to implement Section 956 was issued by financial regulators (collectively, the Agencies ): the National Credit Union Association (NCUA), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS, later disbanded and merged into the OCC). Incentive Compensation and the Financial Crisis
Incentive compensation or incentive-based compensation refers to the portion of an employee's pay that is not guaranteed (as is the salary). Incentive compensation takes the form of variable compensation that is contingent on the performance of designated metrics with respect to the employing firm, the employee's departmental unit, the employee, or some combination of these. The section requires the Agencies to jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines aimed at prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements in financial institutions that they determine encourage inappropriate risks by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to a material financial loss. To be finalized and adopted, the proposal will require the approval of each of them. The CFIs are grouped into three categories based on average total consolidated assets:
Level 1—$250 billion or more in consolidated assets; Level 2—$50 billion or more and less than $250 billion in consolidated assets; and Level 3—$1 billion or more and less than $50 billion in consolidated assets. There are specific requirements for how the records should be maintained:
the CFI's senior executive officers and significant risk-takers, listed by legal entity, job function, organizational hierarchy, and line of business; the incentive-based compensation arrangements for senior executive officers and significant risk-takers, including information on the percentage of incentive-based compensation deferred and form of award; any forfeiture and downward adjustment or clawback reviews and decisions for senior executive officers and significant risk-takers; and any material changes to the CFI's incentive-based compensation arrangements and policies. Deferrals
Under the proposed rules, a Level 1 institution would be required to defer at least 60% of a senior executive officer's and 50% of a significant risk-taker's qualifying incentive-based compensation for at least four years. Further, senior executive officers' and significant risk-takers' incentive-based compensation awarded under the long-term incentive plan would be deferred by 60% and 50%, respectively, for at least two years. A Level 2 institution would be required to defer at least 50% of a senior executive officer's and 40% of a significant risk-taker's qualifying incentive-based compensation for at least three years. Downward Adjustments and Forfeitures
Under the proposal, Level 1 and Level 2 CFIs would also have to consider adopting corporate protocols that would allow for the downward adjustment and forfeiture of senior executives' and significant risk-takers' incentive compensation when certain events occur, including
poor financial performance that is attributable to a significant deviation from risk parameters in the CFI's policies and procedures; inappropriate risk-taking; material risk management or control failures; and failure to comply with statutory, regulatory or supervisory standards resulting in an enforcement or legal action or a requirement that the CFI report a financial restatement to correct a material error; other trigger events as defined by the CFI. Comments on the Potential Impact of the Proposal
The Agencies will accept formal public comments on the perceived impact of the incentive-compensation proposal through July 22, 2016. | Incentive compensation or incentive-based compensation refers to the portion of an employee's pay that is not fixed in contrast to an annual or monthly salary. Incentive compensation takes the form of variable contingent compensation, particularly cash bonuses, that are based on the attainment of certain firm or employee performance metrics. Such pay has been a significant component of compensation for executives and other key personnel at many firms in the financial sector. Many argue that such compensation contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis by incentivizing pivotal financial firm personnel to take excessive, and in retrospect, dangerous risks that were financially problematic for their firms. They argue that such compensation could still potentially pose problems and encourage firm personnel to take excessive risks. As an example, in September 2016, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was fined $185 million for illegal sales practices, which might have been motivated by incentive-based compensation arrangements. In addition to the fine, at issue is whether the Wells Fargo incident highlights the potential usefulness of the Dodd-Frank incentive-based compensation clawback provision.
In July 2010, in response to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203). Section 956 of the law directed financial regulators to adopt new rules that jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines aimed at prohibiting incentive compensation arrangements that might encourage inappropriate risks at financial institutions. These regulators, the Agencies, are the National Credit Union Association, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In April 2016, after releasing an ultimately unimplemented proposal in 2011, the Agencies proposed new rules to implement Section 956. The proposal has a three-tiered protocol in which the stringency of incentive compensation limits grow as an entity's consolidated asset total increases: Level 1, $250 billion and up; Level 2, $50 billion to $250 billion; and Level 3, $1 billion to $50 billion. Public comment period for the proposal was through July 22, 2016. The proposal will then require the approval of each agency in order to be finalized and adopted.
Level 1 and Level 2 institutions must comply with enhanced requirements as to the structure of their incentive compensation for senior executive officers (i.e., various top corporate leaders, including the president, the chief executive officer, and the chief operating officer) and significant risk-takers (i.e., top paid non-senior employees). For example, a Level 1 institution would be required to defer at least 60% of a senior executive officer's qualifying incentive-based compensation and 50% of a significant risk-taker's qualifying incentive-based compensation for up to four years. Senior executive officers' and significant risk-takers' incentive-based compensation awarded under the long-term incentive plan would be deferred by 60% and 50%, respectively, for at least two years. A Level 2 institution would be required to defer at least 50% of a senior executive officer's qualifying incentive-based compensation and 40% of a significant risk-taker's qualifying incentive-based compensation for at least three years.
Senior executives and significant risk-takers at Level 1 and 2 institutions would also be subject to reductions in previously earned incentive compensation (i.e., forfeiture and downward adjustment) in the event of certain behaviors, including when (1) deviation from risk parameters causes a firm's poor financial performance, or (2) inappropriate risk-taking occurs regardless of the impact on the firm's financial performance. Those employees could also have their vested incentive compensation clawed back by their employer under conditions determined by the employer, including (1) the existence of significant financial or reputational harm caused by the employee's actions; (2) fraudulent conduct by the employee; or (3) intentional misrepresentations on the part of the employee. |
crs_RL32580 | crs_RL32580_0 | On November 1, 2008, Bolivian President Evo Morales announced an indefinite suspension of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Bolivia after accusing some DEA agents of espionage. On October 21, 2008, after a multiparty congressional commission agreed to over 100 changes to the draft text passed by the Constituent Assembly in December 2007, the Bolivian Congress ratified the new draft constitution and passed a law that will enable a referendum on that constitution to be held on January 25, 2009. As enacted, P.L. 110-436 extends Andean trade preferences until December 31, 2009 for Colombia and Peru, and until June 30, 2009 for Bolivia and Ecuador. On September 26, 2008, President Bush directed the United States Trade Representative to publish a public notice proposing to suspend Bolivia's Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA) benefits because of the Morales government's failure to cooperate in counternarcotics matters. On September 10, 2008, President Morales accused the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Goldberg, of supporting opposition forces, declared him persona non grata, and expelled him from the country. Two opposition prefects were voted out of office. Political Situation
Morales Administration
In December 2005, Evo Morales, an indigenous leader and head of Bolivia's coca growers' union, and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), won a convincing victory in Bolivia's presidential and legislative elections. Opposition delegates in the assembly pushed for increased regional autonomy from the central government. President Morales put his plans to convoke a national referendum on the draft constitution on hold until after a national recall referendum was held on August 10, 2008 to determine whether he and the prefects should remain in office. The country was split as the four wealthy eastern provinces voted strongly in support of increased autonomy, while the other five provinces opposed the measure. According to the constitutional accord approved by the Bolivian Congress on October 22, 2008, the autonomy statutes drafted by the eastern departments will have to be brought into compliance with the new constitution. U.S. officials expressed concerns about the Morales government's commitment to combating illegal drugs, its ties with Venezuela and Cuba, and its nationalization of Bolivia's natural gas industry. In 2007, there continued to be periodic friction in U.S.-Bolivian relations. Bilateral relations reached their lowest point in recent memory in mid-September 2008, when President Morales accused U.S. Within a day, the U.S. State Department followed suit, expelling Bolivia's U.S. Ambassador. This willingness has been replaced by increasing frustration on the part of the U.S. government with Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts. On September 16, 2008, President Bush determined that Bolivia, along with Venezuela and Burma, had failed demonstrably to live up to its obligations under international narcotics agreements, but waived sanctions so that U.S. bilateral assistance programs could continue. In FY2008, Bolivia received an estimated $99.5 million, including roughly $47.1 million in counternarcotics assistance. A continuing resolution ( H.R. 2638 / P.L. 110-329 ) will provide funding for U.S. programs in Bolivia at FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. On November 25, 2008, President Bush announced his decision to suspend Bolivia's ATPA benefits effective December 15. | Bolivia has experienced a period of political volatility, with the country having had six presidents since 2001. Evo Morales, an indigenous leader and head of Bolivia's coca growers' union, and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), won a convincing victory in the December 18, 2005, presidential election with 54% of the votes. Early in his term, President Morales moved to decriminalize coca cultivation and nationalized the country's natural gas industry. His efforts to reform the Bolivian constitution have, until recently, been stymied by a strong opposition movement led by the leaders (prefects) of Bolivia's wealthy eastern provinces who are seeking greater regional autonomy.
In December 2007, the Constituent Assembly elected in mid-2006 passed a draft constitution without the presence of opposition delegates. In late August 2008, President Morales, buoyed by the strong support he received in a national recall referendum held on August 10, 2008, proposed to convoke a referendum on the draft constitution in December 2008. He later agreed to seek congressional approval for that referendum. Several opposition prefects were angered by Morales' proposal, and launched protests and blockades, which turned violent in mid-September. On October 20, 2008, after multiparty negotiations on the draft constitution's text, the Bolivian Congress approved legislation convoking a constitutional referendum on January 25, 2009. The new constitution was approved by a 61% to 39% vote following a peaceful election. Four eastern provinces, however, all voted against the constitution suggesting a strong possibility of continued opposition and discord.
U.S.-Bolivian relations have been strained by the Morales government's drug policy and its increasing ties with Venezuela. Bilateral relations hit their lowest point in recent memory on September 10, 2008, when President Morales accused the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia of supporting opposition forces and expelled him from the country. The U.S. government responded by expelling Bolivia's U.S. Ambassador. On September 16, 2008, President Bush designated Bolivia as a country that had failed to live up to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. That decision was closely followed by a Bush Administration proposal to suspend Bolivia's trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA). On November 1, 2008, Bolivian President Morales announced an indefinite suspension of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Bolivia after accusing some DEA agents of espionage.
Concerns regarding Bolivia in the 110th Congress focused largely on counternarcotics and trade issues. Bolivia received an estimated $99.5 million in U.S. foreign aid in FY2008, including roughly $47 million in counternarcotics assistance, significantly lower than in previous years. An enacted continuing resolution H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 will provide funding for U.S. programs in Bolivia at FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. In October 2008, Congress enacted legislation to extend ATPA trade preferences for Bolivia until June 30, 2009 (P.L. 110-436). However, on November 25, 2008, President Bush announced his decision to suspend Bolivia's ATPA trade preferences effective December 15, citing Bolivia's failure to cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics efforts. The 111th Congress is likely to continue to focus on trade and drug issues as these concerns remain central to U.S. relations with Bolivia. |
crs_RS21412 | crs_RS21412_0 | Each of these authorities is discussed below. Position-Specific Temporary Appointment Provisions
In some cases, Congress has expressly provided for the temporary filling of vacancies in a particular advice and consent position. Consultants
At times, a nominee could be hired as a consultant while awaiting confirmation, but he or she may serve only in an advisory capacity and may not be installed in the office to which he or she has been nominated. Delegation of Duties to Another Official
As discussed in this report, the temporary filling of an advice and consent position is governed by the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and position-specific statutes. However, when the time limitations of the Vacancies Act have been exhausted, it may be possible for the functions of a vacant office to be carried out indefinitely by another individual, usually the first assistant, pursuant to a delegation of authority by the agency head. In such instances, the official carries out these functions without assuming the vacant office. | A vacant presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed position (herein, "advice and consent position") can be filled temporarily under one of several authorities that do not require going through the Senate confirmation process. Under specific circumstances, many executive branch vacancies can be filled temporarily under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 or by recess appointment. In some cases, temporary filling of vacancies in a particular position is specifically provided for in statute. Generally, designation or appointment under one of these methods confers upon the official the legal authority to carry out the duties of the office. Alternatively, an individual may be hired by the agency as a consultant. A consultant does not carry the legal authority of the office, and may act only in an advisory capacity.
In many instances, the functions of a vacant advice and consent office may be carried out indefinitely by another official, usually the first assistant, under the terms of an administrative delegation order of the agency head. In such instances, the official carries out these functions without assuming the vacant office. |
crs_R44247 | crs_R44247_0 | Consistent with this grant of power, most committees have adopted in their own rules subpoena provisions containing procedures for exercising this power. Committee rules may cover authorization, issuance, and service of subpoenas; may cover just one or two of these actions; or may be silent on exercise of the subpoena power. A subpoena must be authorized pursuant to committee rules—a decision to approve this legal order to a person to appear or to provide documents. Once authorized, if the committee wishes to take the next step, a subpoena must be issued pursuant to committee rules—signed and given to an individual to deliver the subpoena to the person named in it. To deliver a subpoena to the person named is to serve the subpoena. Most House and Senate committees have specifically included in their rules one or more provisions on committees' and subcommittees' power to authorize subpoenas by majority vote. Most House committees have also delegated to their chair the power to authorize subpoenas. Many of these rules delegating authority also require the chair to consult or notify the committee's ranking minority member. Most Senate committees' subpoena rules delegate to the chair and ranking minority member together the power to authorize subpoenas. In addition to rules on authorizing subpoenas, the rules of most committees in both chambers also address issuing subpoenas. Most House committees' rules delegate authority to issue subpoenas to the chair, and allow another committee member who has been designated by the committee to sign a subpoena. What constraints are placed on a chair's exercise of subpoena authority delegated to the chair? House Rules on Subpoenas
Rule XI, clause 2(m)(1) and (3) authorizes committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. Most committees' rules have also delegated authority to issue subpoenas to their chair, but many committees with such a rule also require the chair to consult or notify the ranking minority member. Some committees' rules are not explicit on procedures for subcommittees to authorize subpoenas. Senate Rules on Subpoenas
Senate committees and subcommittees are authorized to subpoena witnesses and documents (Rule XXVI, paragraph 1). The Ethics Committee has rules in addition that
by a recorded vote of no fewer than four members, may prohibit committee members and staff and outside counsel from publicly identifying a subpoenaed witness prior to the day of the witness's appearance, except as authorized by the chair and vice chair acting together; allow the respondent in an adjudicatory hearing to "apply to the Committee" for the subpoena of witnesses and documents in the individual's behalf; allow a subpoenaed witness to request, subject to the committee's approval, not to be photographed at a hearing or to have the witness's testimony broadcast or reproduced while testifying; require a subpoena to be served sufficiently in advance of a scheduled appearance to provide the witness with "a reasonable period of time" to prepare and to obtain counsel; and permit service of a subpoena by any person 18 years of age or older designated by the chair or vice chair. Committees' other procedural rules affect scheduling and conducting meetings to authorize a subpoena. These other rules deal with the notice for and agenda of a meeting, the quorum to conduct business, voting, and consideration. | House Rule XI, clause 2(m)(1) and (3) authorizes House committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 1 authorizes Senate committees and subcommittees to subpoena witnesses and documents. In turn, most House and Senate committees have adopted in their own rules subpoena provisions containing procedures for exercising this grant of power from their parent chamber.
Committee rules may cover authorization, issuance, and service of subpoenas; may cover just one or two of these actions; or may be silent on exercise of the subpoena power. A subpoena must be authorized pursuant to committee rules—a decision to approve this legal order to a person to appear or to provide documents. Once authorized, if the committee wishes to take the next step, a subpoena must be issued pursuant to committee rules—signed and given to an individual to deliver the subpoena to the person named in it. To deliver a subpoena to the person named is to serve the subpoena.
Most House and Senate committees have specifically included in their rules one or more provisions on committees' and subcommittees' power to authorize subpoenas by majority vote. Most House committees have also delegated to their chair the power to authorize subpoenas. Many of these rules delegating authority also require the chair to consult or notify the committee's ranking minority member.
Most Senate committees' subpoena rules delegate to the chair and ranking minority member together the power to authorize subpoenas.
In addition to rules on authorizing subpoenas, the rules of most committees in both chambers also address issuing subpoenas. Most House committees' rules delegate authority to issue subpoenas to the chair, and allow another committee member who has been designated by the committee to sign a subpoena. Most Senate committees' rules delegate authority to issue subpoenas to the chair, and allow another committee member designated by the chair to sign a subpoena.
Some committees' rules are explicit on procedures for subcommittees to authorize subpoenas; other committees' rules are not explicit.
Committees in both chambers have other rules on subpoenas than the prevailing approach in one chamber. Requirements or limitations pertaining to subpoenas may appear in committees' rules, such as conditions placed on a chair's exercise of subpoena authority delegated to the chair or on a ranking minority member's role in authorizing a subpoena. The distinctions among committees' subpoena rules are varied and nuanced.
Committees' other procedural rules affect scheduling and conducting meetings to authorize a subpoena. These other rules may deal with the notice for and agenda of a meeting, the quorum to conduct business, and voting. |
crs_RL32935 | crs_RL32935_0 | This report addresses Congress's oversight authority over individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices. Congressional oversight authority, although broad, is limited to subjects related to the exercise of legitimate congressional power. While Congress has the power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its power over the judicial acts of individual judges or Justices is more restricted. For instance, Congress has limited authority to remove or discipline a judge for decisions made on the bench. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that judges have "good behavior" tenure, which effectively has come to mean lifetime tenure for Article III judges subject to removal only through conviction on impeachment. However, impeachment of a judge or justice requires a finding that such judge or Justice has engaged in a "High Crime or Misdemeanor." Thus, an investigation into decisions or other acts by a particular judge pursuant to an impeachment would appear to require some connection between an alleged "High Crime or Misdemeanor" and a particular case or cases. Of course, review and consideration of particular court decisions or other judicial acts are well within the purview of Congress's legislative authority. For instance, Congress has the legislative authority to amend statutes that it believes were misinterpreted by court cases, or to propose amendments to the Constitution that it believes would rectify erroneous constitutional decisions. However, investigating the judge or Justices behind such decisions may require something more. This report reviews a number of circumstances in which Congress may be authorized to either pursue or otherwise influence an investigation of individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices. The report first addresses the general powers and limitations on Congress's oversight authority. Second, the report examines the Senate approval process for the nominations of individual judges or Justices, and the Senate's ability to obtain information on judicial acts by individual judges or Justices during that process. The report also considers the limits of existing statutory authority for judicial discipline within the Judicial Branch, and how Congress has influenced such procedures. It discusses the issue of how far congressional investigatory powers can be exercised regarding possible judicial impeachments. Finally, it treats investigations regarding the individual actions of a judge outside of the above contexts, such as how a judge imposes sentences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. | This report addresses Congress's oversight authority over individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices. Congressional oversight authority, although broad, is limited to subjects related to the exercise of legitimate congressional power. While Congress has the power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its power over the judicial acts of individual judges or Justices is more restricted. For instance, Congress has limited authority to remove or discipline a judge for decisions made on the bench. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that judges have "good behavior" tenure, which effectively has come to mean lifetime tenure for Article III judges subject to removal only through conviction on impeachment. However, impeachment of a judge or Justice requires a finding that such judge or Justice has engaged in a "High Crime or Misdemeanor." Thus, an investigation into decisions or other actions by a particular judge pursuant to an impeachment would appear to require some connection between an alleged "High Crime or Misdemeanor" and a particular case or cases.
Of course, review and consideration of particular court decisions or other judicial acts are well within the purview of Congress's legislative authority. For instance, Congress has the legislative authority to amend statutes that it believes were misinterpreted by court cases, or to propose amendments to the Constitution that it believes would rectify erroneous constitutional decisions. However, investigating the judge or Justices behind such decisions may require something more. This report reviews a number of circumstances in which Congress may be authorized to either pursue or otherwise influence an investigation of individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices.
First the report addresses the general powers and limitations on Congress's oversight authority. Second, the report examines the Senate approval process for the nominations of individual judges or Justices, and the Senate's ability to obtain information on judges or Justices during that process. The report also considers the limits of existing statutory authority for judicial discipline and how Congress has influenced such procedures. It discusses the issue of how far the congressional investigatory powers can be exercised regarding possible judicial impeachments. Finally, it treats investigations regarding the individual actions of a judge outside of the above contexts, such as how a judge imposes sentences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. A separate report, CRS Report RL32926, Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], addresses Congress's legislative authority over the courts. |
crs_R42138 | crs_R42138_0 | Border security has remained a persistent topic of congressional interest since then, and enforcement programs and appropriations have grown accordingly, as described in this report. Despite a growing enforcement response, however, unauthorized migration continued to increase over most of the next three decades. After 2005, unauthorized migrant apprehensions began to decline, suggesting a decrease in unauthorized migration. In 2014, the Obama Administration announced executive actions to "fix" the immigration system. These actions address several issues, including a security plan at the southern border. In March 2004, the Border Patrol unveiled the National Border Patrol Strategy, which placed greater emphasis on interdicting terrorists and featured five main objectives:
establishing the substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry; deterring unauthorized entries through improved enforcement; detecting, apprehending, and deterring smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; leveraging "Smart Border" technology to multiply the deterrent and enforcement effect of agents; and reducing crime in border communities, thereby improving the quality of life and economic vitality of those areas. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced a comprehensive multi-year plan, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), to secure U.S. borders and reduce unauthorized migration. Surveillance technology . Tactical infrastructure . CBP Consequence Delivery System
Although not the subject of a formal public policy document like those discussed above, an additional component of CBP's approach to border control in recent years has been an effort to promote "high consequence" enforcement for unauthorized Mexicans apprehended at the border. This section reviews trends in each of these areas. Falling apprehensions may reflect fewer unauthorized inflows between 2006 and 2012, though the degree to which reduced inflows were a result of effective enforcement versus other factors like the recent U.S. economic downturn remains subject to debate (see " How Secure is the U.S. Border? The agency has used these data since 2006 to inform tactical decision making and to allocate resources across Southwest border sectors, but the Border Patrol has not published them or viewed them as reliable metrics of border security because of challenges associated with measuring got aways and turn backs across different border sectors. Border security metrics are used at both the strategic and operational levels. First, the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate, is used to capture USBP's ability to deter migrants from re-entering the United States. While no single metric accurately and reliably describes border security, most analysts agree, based on available data, that the number of unauthorized border crossers fell sharply between about 2005 and 2011, with some rise in unauthorized flows from 2012 to 2014, and a decrease in 2015. Disentangling the effects of enforcement from other factors influencing migration flows is particularly difficult in the current case because many of the most significant new enforcement efforts—including a sizeable share of new border enforcement personnel, most border fencing, new enforcement practices at the border, and many of the new migration enforcement measures within the United States—all have occurred at the same time as the most severe recession since the 1930s. Thus, to the extent that border enforcement successfully deters unauthorized flows, enforcement benefits the environment by reducing these undesirable outcomes. For these reasons, successful border enforcement may benefit border communities by reducing unauthorized inflows. Yet immigration enforcement occasionally has been a source of bilateral tension. Conclusion: Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Border Enforcement between Ports of Entry
The United States has focused substantial resources along its land borders to prevent and control unauthorized migration since the 1980s, with investments in personnel, fencing, and surveillance assets all up significantly in the post 9/11 period, in particular. On the other hand, there is also some evidence that migrants have adapted to more difficult conditions at the border by using other means to enter the United States and by remaining longer. In the context of immigration policy and a possible immigration reform bill, Members of Congress may choose to focus on the total number of unauthorized migrants in the United States, in addition to border flows, since border enforcement is just one of many factors (along with interior enforcement, visa policies, etc.) | Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security's effort to control unauthorized migration, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the lead agency along most of the border. Border enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when unauthorized immigration to the United States first registered as a serious national problem; and border security has received additional attention in the years since the terrorist attacks of 2001.
Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy of "prevention through deterrence"—the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized migrants from attempting to enter the United States. Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat unauthorized migrant entries and disrupt migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain unauthorized migrants, a set of policies eventually described as "enforcement with consequences." Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to "high consequence" enforcement outcomes.
Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology. In addition to increased resources, the USBP has implemented several strategies over the past several decades in an attempt to thwart unauthorized migration. In 2014, the Obama Administration announced executive actions to "fix" the immigration system. These actions address several issues, including a revised security plan at the southern border.
The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes; this report describes trends in border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated "got aways" and "turn backs." Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure unauthorized border flows or the degree to which the border is secured. Thus, the report also describes methods for estimating border security at the strategic and operational levels.
Drawing on multiple data sources, the report reviews the state of border security. Robust investments at the border were not associated with reduced unauthorized inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but a range of evidence suggests a substantial drop in unauthorized inflows from 2007 to 2011, followed by a rise from 2012 to 2014 and a decrease in 2015. Enforcement, along with the 2007 economic downturn in the United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown.
Enhanced border enforcement also may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters unauthorized entries, such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that migrants are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. |
crs_RL33417 | crs_RL33417_0 | Background
The federal government spends approximately $70 billion annually on information technology (IT) goods and services. An enterprise architecture (EA) serves as a blueprint of the business operations of an organization, and the information and technology needed to carry out these operations, both currently and prospectively. As such, it is an information technology management and planning tool. EA planning represents a business-driven approach to IT management that emphasizes interoperability and information sharing. FEA Leadership
Ongoing activities related to the development of the FEA are carried out through the FEA Program Management Office (FEA PMO), which was established in February 2002 and is part of OMB. Reference Models
The FEA is composed of five reference models: Performance, Business, Service, Data, and Technical. Each of the reference models represents specific aspects of the FEA, and provides a framework, or a shared language, for departments and agencies to develop technology solutions that can be used by the federal government collectively. The five areas included Financial Management, Human Resources Management, Grants Management, Case Management, and Federal Health Architecture. These initiatives were chosen, in part, because they represent core business functions common to many departments and agencies, and/or have the potential to reap significant efficiency and efficacy gains. They include IT Infrastructure Optimization, Geospatial Systems, and Budget Formulation and Execution. In contrast to the first six Lines of Business initiatives, which emphasize the consolidation of activities at shared service centers, the most recent three Lines of Business initiatives instead focus more on the development of common practices and information standards to facilitate cross-agency interoperability and collaboration. Oversight Issues for Congress
As the federal enterprise architecture initiative continues to evolve, Congress may decide to consider several issues related to implementation and oversight. These issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
the overall effectiveness of the federal enterprise architecture at improving federal IT management and reducing IT spending; the progress of ongoing efforts to update and enhance the five reference models, and how effective they are at identifying cross-agency redundancies; how well the enterprise architectures of the individual departments and agencies align with the federal enterprise architecture; how OMB is using the FEA to evaluate the IT business cases submitted by agencies with their yearly budget requests and how much money has been saved through this process; how the federal enterprise architecture is being used to address federal information security problems; how the federal enterprise architecture is facilitating and benefitting large-scale IT projects such as agency-level technology modernization efforts, the federal government's adoption of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), the 24 Quicksilver e-government initiatives, and government-wide information sharing; the development and performance of the next generation of collaborative e-government initiatives based on the Lines of Business; whether current funding arrangements and interagency procurement regulations will constrain the ability of the centers of excellence to make necessary upgrades over time and to compete effectively in public-private competitive sourcing situations; potential collaboration opportunities and/or lessons to be learned from state government EA effort; and the continuity and future direction of FEA efforts with the upcoming transition of presidential administrations. | Congressional policymakers are concerned about potential inefficiencies and inefficacies in the operation of the federal government, particularly as it relates to decisions regarding information technology (IT) investments. These concerns have increased as federal IT spending has grown to approximately $70 billion annually. One approach being implemented to reduce duplicative spending and improve cross-agency collaboration is the use of enterprise architecture (EA) planning across the federal government. An EA serves as a blueprint of the business operations of an organization, and the information and technology needed to carry out these functions.
As an information technology management and planning tool, EA planning represents a business-driven approach to information technology management that emphasizes interoperability and information sharing. The Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) was started in 2002 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and continues to be developed today. The FEA is composed of five reference models: Performance, Business, Service, Data, and Technical. Each of the reference models represents specific aspects of the FEA and provides a "common language" for departments and agencies to use in developing shared technology solutions.
To focus efforts on specific areas that may yield savings, OMB has identified several "Lines of Business" (LoB), which represent non-core business functions common to many departments and agencies. Some of the current LoBs include Financial Management, Grants Management, Case Management, Human Resources Management, Federal Health Architecture, and Information Systems Security. Within each of the LoB initiatives, the longer term goal is to shift the locus of activity for these non-core business functions from being replicated by each individual department and agency, to consolidated shared service centers, or centers of excellence as they are also referred to, which serve as common service providers for the other departments and agencies. Departments and agencies are selected to serve as centers of excellence through a competitive process managed by OMB. Three other LoBs (Budget Formulation and Execution, Geospatial, and Information Technology Infrastructure Optimization) focus on the development of common practices and information standards to facilitate cross-agency interoperability and collaboration.
Some of the congressional oversight issues related to the FEA include, but are not limited to, ongoing updates of the reference models, the status of efforts to align the EAs of individual departments with the FEA, the role of the FEA in developing a second generation of e-government initiatives, and progress and implications of consolidating specific business functions across the federal government. In anticipation of an upcoming presidential administration transition, Congress may also wish to consider the broader issues of the continuity and future direction of FEA efforts. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21690 | crs_RS21690_0 | 1350 as Passed by the House and Senate, 108th Congress
Updated June 8, 2004
Background
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a conditionfor the receipt of suchfunds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (2) The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE andincludes a provisionfor attorneys' fees. (3)
Congress is presently considering reauthorizing IDEA. H.R. 1350 , 108th Congress, passed the House on April 30, 2003, by a vote of 251 to 171. On May 13, 2004, theSenate incorporated S. 1248 in H.R. 1350 and passed H.R. 1350 in lieu of S. 1248 by a vote of95 to 3. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding forthe education of children with disabilities andrequires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE).The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure theprovision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. Congress is presently considering reauthorizing IDEA. H.R. 1350, 108th Congress, passed the House onApril 30, 2003, by a vote of 251 to 171. On May 13, 2004, the Senate incorporated S. 1248 in H.R. 1350and passed H.R. 1350 in lieu of S.1248 by a vote of 95 to 3. This report will discuss current IDEA provisions on attorneys' fees and the differingprovisions in the House and Senate bills. This report will not beupdated. |
crs_RL30677 | crs_RL30677_0 | CALEA is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently, despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services by the telecommunications industry. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance. CALEA (47 U.S.C. First Report and Order
On August 5, 2005, the FCC ruled that providers of certain broadband and interconnected VoIP services must accommodate law enforcement wiretaps. The FCC found that these services can be considered replacements for conventional telecommunications services currently subject to wiretap rules, including circuit-switched voice service and dial-up Internet access. The rules are limited to facilities-based broadband Internet access service providers and VoIP providers that offer services permitting users to receive calls from, and place calls to, the public switched telephone network—these providers are called interconnected VoIP providers. Second Report and Order
On May 3, 2006, the FCC addressed several issues regarding CALEA implementation, specifically, the Order:
Affirms the May 14, 2007, CALEA compliance deadline for facilities-based broadband Internet access and interconnected VoIP services (as established by the First Report and Order) and clarifies that the date will apply to all such providers. Explains that the FCC does not plan, at this time, to intervene in the standards-setting process in this matter. Permits telecommunications carriers the option of using Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) to assist in meeting their CALEA obligations. Restricts the availability of compliance extensions to equipment, facilities, and services deployed prior to October 25, 1998. Finds that the commission may, in addition to law enforcement remedies available through the courts, take separate enforcement action under section 229(a) of the Communications Act against carriers that fail to comply with CALEA. Concludes that carriers are responsible for CALEA development and implementation costs for post-January 1, 1995, equipment and facilities, and declines to adopt a national surcharge to recover CALEA costs. Court Challenge
In June 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision concluding that VoIP and facilities-based broadband Internet access providers have CALEA obligations similar to those of telephone companies. | The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103-414, 47 U.S.C. 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions.
Since 2004, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been considering a number of questions as to how to apply CALEA to new technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). In August 2005, in response to a March 2004 petition by a group of law enforcement agencies, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling which required providers of certain broadband and interconnected VoIP services to accommodate law enforcement wiretaps. The FCC found that these services could be considered replacements for conventional telecommunications services already subject to wiretap rules, including circuit-switched voice service and dial-up Internet access. The Order is limited to facilities-based broadband Internet access service providers and VoIP providers that offer services that use the public switched telephone network ("interconnected VoIP providers).
In May 2006, the FCC addressed several outstanding issues regarding CALEA implementation. Among other clarifications, the FCC (1) affirmed its May 14, 2007 compliance deadline for facilities-based broadband Internet access and interconnected VoIP services, and clarified that the date applied to all such providers; (2) explained that the FCC does not plan to intervene in the standards-setting process in this matter; (3) permitted telecommunications carriers the option of using Trusted Third Parties to assist in meeting their CALEA obligations; (4) restricted the availability of compliance extensions to equipment, facilities, and services deployed prior to October 25, 1998; (5) found that the FCC may enforce action under section 229(a) of the Communications Act against carriers that fail to comply with CALEA; and (6) concluded that carriers are responsible for CALEA development and implementation costs for post-January 1, 1995, equipment and facilities, and declined to adopt a national surcharge to recover CALEA costs.
In June 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision concluding that VoIP and facilities-based broadband Internet access providers have CALEA obligations similar to those of telephone companies. |
crs_R41545 | crs_R41545_0 | Introduction
This report presents data on average Member tenure over time, analyzes several factors that affect tenure in any given Congress, and examines historical patterns of congressional service, including the distribution of years served within each Congress, and the cross-chamber experience of Representatives and Senators. During much of the 19 th century, the average tenure of Representatives and Senators remained relatively steady, with incoming Representatives generally averaging between two and three years of prior service in most Congresses, and Senators averaging between three and five years. Beginning in the late 19 th and through much of the 20 th century, average tenure for Members in both chambers steadily increased. The average years of service for Members of the 116 th Congress, as of January 3, 2019, when the Congress convened, was 8.6 years for the House and 10.1 years for the Senate. The report also examines two further issues related to Member tenure, including the distribution of Member service over time, as well as Members' cross-chamber experience. Although the average tenure of Members has increased since the late 19 th century, a substantial portion of Representatives and Senators in recent Congresses have served for six years or less in their respective chambers. With respect to cross-chamber experience, while a small proportion of Representatives have historically had previous Senate experience, a sizable percentage of Senators throughout congressional history have had previous House experience. Average Service Tenure
As shown in Figure 1 below, the average years of service of Members in both chambers has generally increased over time. Around the turn of the 20 th century, the average began to increase, rising from just over four years at the beginning of the century, to approximately nine years in each of the three most recent prior Congresses. At the start of the 116 th Congress, the average years of prior service for Representatives was 8.6 years. Factors Affecting Average Tenure
Among the many factors that may affect variation in Member seniority over time, two are examined in this report: the decision of sitting Members whether or not to seek reelection to the next Congress, and the success rate of Members who do seek reelection. Discussion
The data presented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 align with scholarly assessments of congressional history, which conclude that during the early history of Congress, turnover in membership was frequent and resignations were commonplace, and that during the 20 th century, congressional careers lengthened as turnover decreased and Congress became more professionalized. | The average service tenure of Members of the Senate and House of Representatives has varied substantially since 1789. This report presents data on Member tenure over time, analyzes factors that affect average tenure in any given Congress, and examines historical patterns of congressional service, including the distribution of years served in each Congress, and the cross-chamber experience of Representatives and Senators.
During much of the 19th century, the average tenure of Representatives and Senators remained relatively steady, with incoming Representatives generally averaging between two and three years of prior service in most Congresses, and the Senators averaging between three and five years. Beginning in the late 19th and through much of the 20th century, average tenure for Members in both chambers steadily increased. Senators' average years of prior service has increased from just under five years during the early 1880s to approximately 10 years in the most recent Congress. Similarly, the average tenure of Representatives has increased from approximately three years during the early 1880s to approximately nine years in the most recent Congress.
The average years of service for Members of the 116th Congress, as of January 3, 2019, when the Congress convened, was 8.6 years for the House and 10.1 years for the Senate. In comparison, the average years of service for Members of the 115th Congress, as of January 3, 2017, when the Congress convened, was 9.4 years for the House and 10.1 years for the Senate.
This report analyzes two factors that influence variation over time in the average years of service for Members of Congress: the decision of sitting Members whether or not to seek election to the next Congress, and the success rate of Members who do seek reelection. Observed increases in the proportion of Members seeking reelection and decreases in the proportion of Members defeated for reelection align with previous scholarly assessments of congressional history, which conclude that during the early history of Congress, turnover in membership was frequent and resignations were commonplace, and that during the 20th century, congressional careers lengthened as turnover decreased and Congress became more professionalized.
The report also examines two further issues related to Member tenure, including the distribution of Member service over time, as well as Members' cross-chamber experience. Although the average service tenure of Members has increased since Congress's early years, a substantial portion of Representatives and Senators in recent Congresses have served for six years or less in their respective chambers. With respect to cross-chamber experience, while a small proportion of Representatives historically have had previous Senate experience, a sizable percentage of Senators throughout congressional history have had previous House experience. |
crs_RL34651 | crs_RL34651_0 | For example, Congress has enacted laws dealing with child pornography, child luring, and child sexual exploitation. This is especially true with the relatively new crime of Internet "harassment." The term Internet harassment usually encompasses "cyberstalking," "cyberharassment," and/or "cyberbullying." Recent high-profile cases involving teen suicides demonstrate the potentially severe consequences of this emotional harm. These are just some of the questions legislators may consider in addressing the problem of Internet harassment of children. There are three categories of activities subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. Internet Harassment
Internet harassment is a new phenomenon that presents a challenge for law enforcement, legislators, educators, and parents. If one were to categorize these activities based on danger or greatest potential harm, cyberstalking would be the most dangerous, followed by cyberharassment and then cyberbullying. Generally, cyberstalking includes a credible threat of harm, while the other two do not. Cyberharassment and/or cyberbullying may cause embarrassment, annoyance, or humiliation to the victim. Some individuals use the terms cyberharassment and cyberbullying interchangeably, while others reserve the term cyberbullying to describe harassment between minors, usually within the school context. However, the law has been expanded to prosecute cyberstalkers. Cyberharassment
While cyberstalking laws exist at both the federal and state levels, they are generally inapplicable in situations referred to as cyberharassment and/or cyberbullying, depending upon the jurisdiction. Courts have yet to address this statute as it applies to Internet "harassment." To address the problem of cyberbullying, H.R. This bill would amend title 18 of the United States Code by making cyberbullying a federal crime with a punishment of up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine. § 1983, claiming that the student's icon was protected speech under the First Amendment and not a true threat. The aforementioned principles are also applicable in the school setting. As Internet harassment may cause its victims emotional harm as opposed to physical harm, legislators must determine what level, if any, of harassment should be criminalized. Statutes and school policies must be narrow enough not to infringe upon protected speech. | While Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has authority to regulate the Internet, Internet "harassment" presents new challenges for legislators in terms of defining and prosecuting such activity. Definitions for these terms vary based upon jurisdiction. Internet harassment usually encompasses "cyberstalking," "cyberharassment," and/or "cyberbullying." If one were to categorize these offenses based on danger or greatest potential harm, cyberstalking would be the most dangerous, followed by cyberharassment and then cyberbullying. Generally, cyberstalking includes a credible threat of harm, while the other two do not. Cyberharassment and/or cyberbullying may cause embarrassment, annoyance, or humiliation to the victim. Some individuals use the terms cyberharassment and cyberbullying interchangeably, while others reserve the term cyberbullying to describe harassment between minors, usually within the school context.
While laws that address cyberstalking exist at both the federal and state levels, the question of how to handle situations that do not involve a credible threat of harm against minors has drawn congressional interest. Recent high-profile cases involving teen suicides illustrate the harmful effects of Internet harassment on young people. To address the problem, H.R. 1966 was introduced in the 111th Congress. This bill would amend title 18 of the United States Code by making cyberbullying a federal crime with a punishment of up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine.
Legislators have traditionally enacted laws prohibiting child pornography, child luring, and child sexual exploitation. However, Internet harassment potentially causes emotional harm to its victims as opposed to the physical harm inflicted by the aforementioned activities. In addressing these concerns, legislators strive to maintain a balance between enacting statutes broad enough to cover undesirable behavior, while simultaneously narrow enough to prevent infringement upon an individual's right to express oneself under the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects certain forms of speech, but this protection is limited within the school environment. While school administrators have more flexibility in disciplining children whose speech disrupts the learning environment, this flexibility does not cover all forms of Internet harassment. As Internet harassment is a relatively new phenomenon, courts are just beginning to determine the constitutionality and scope of these school policies and statutes. This report discusses Internet crimes, such as cyberbullying, cyberharassment, and cyberstalking, along with the limitations of such laws in the current environment. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31386 | crs_RL31386_0 | Background
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by President George Bush onDecember 17, 1992, has been in effect since January 1994. After almost ten years ofimplementation, there is some evidence that NAFTA has achieved many of the trade and economicbenefits that proponents claimed it would bring, although there have been adjustment costs at thesectoral level. (1) As the United States considers free trade initiatives with other Latin American countries, the effectsof NAFTA may provide policymakers some indication of how these initiatives might affect U.S.industries and the overall U.S. economy. To address concerns regarding worker dislocations, Congressincluded two adjustment assistance programs, designed to ease trade-related problems, in theimplementing legislation for NAFTA: the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance(NAFTA-TAA) Program and the U.S. Community Adjustment and Investment Program (USCAIP). The NAFTA-TAA Program was consolidated with the former Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program under the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ) and is now part of a new reformed TAAProgram. The previous NAFTA-TAA program provided assistance, including employment servicesand training, to workers who have lost their jobs due to import competition or production shifts toMexico or Canada. Most of the trade-related effects of NAFTA may be attributed to changes in U.S. trade and investment patterns with Mexico. At the time of NAFTA implementation, the U.S.-Canada FreeTrade Agreement already had been in effect for five years and some industries in the United Statesand Canada were already highly integrated. The report indicates that the increase in U.S. trade with Mexico since 1994 was alsoaffected by currency fluctuations, economic growth in the United States and Mexico, and animproved general business climate in North America. How Has NAFTA Affected U.S. Industries? The automotive, chemical products, textile, and apparel industries have experienced themost significant changes in trade flows, which may also have affected employment levels in theseindustries. U.S. Exports by Country. U.S. Imports by Country. Thesenumbers could suggest that Mexico may be supplying the U.S. market with goodsthat would have otherwise been supplied by Asian countries. Since NAFTA, Mexico has become a more significant trading partner in the U.S. motor vehicle market. As mentioned previously, data on the effects of NAFTA isvery limited and the effect on specific U.S. industries is difficult to quantify. Trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends thatwere ongoing prior to NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the tradeagreement. Another program connected with the passage of NAFTA that provides assistance to communities with significant job losses due to changes in trade patternswith Canada or Mexico is the USCAIP, which is administered for the United Statesgovernment by the Los Angeles Office of the NADBank. (33)
Conclusion
After almost ten years of implementation, the full effects of NAFTA on the U.S.economy are still unclear. The trade effects of NAFTA are of significance because of the possibilities of a U.S. trade agreements with Chile and also the Free Trade Area of the Americasinitiative. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by President George Bush on December 17, 1992, has been in effect since January 1994. After eight years of implementation, thefull effects of NAFTA on the U.S. economy are still unclear. There are numerous indications thatNAFTA has achieved many of the trade and economic benefits that proponents claimed it wouldbring, although there have been adjustment costs. However, there is not enough evidence to quantifythe impacts on specific U.S. industries. Some studies show that the agreement has had an overallpositive effect on the U.S. economy, but that some industries have experienced losses. As the UnitedStates considers further free trade initiatives with Latin American countries, the effects of NAFTAmay provide policymakers some indication of how these initiatives might affect U.S. industries andthe overall U.S. economy.
Most of the trade effects related to NAFTA are due to changes in U.S. trade and investment patterns with Mexico. At the time of NAFTA implementation, the U.S.-Canada Free TradeAgreement already had been in effect for five years and some industries in the United States andCanada were already highly integrated. Since NAFTA, the automotive, textile, and apparelindustries have experienced some of the more significant changes in trade flows, which may alsohave affected U.S. employment in these industries. U.S. trade with Mexico has increasedconsiderably more than U.S. trade with other countries, and Mexico has become a more significanttrading partner with the United States since NAFTA implementation. Consequently, Mexico's shareof total U.S. trade has increased while that of other countries has decreased. Some data on U.S.imports suggest that Mexico may be supplying the U.S. market with goods that may have otherwisebeen supplied by Asian countries.
Not all changes in trade patterns since 1994, however, can be attributed to NAFTA becausetrade was also affected by other unrelated economic factors such as economic growth in the UnitedStates and Mexico, and currency fluctuations. Also, trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTAmay have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to NAFTA and may not be totally attributableto the trade agreement.
To address concerns about worker dislocations related to NAFTA, Congress included two employment adjustment assistance programs in the implementing legislation: the NAFTATransitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) Program and the U.S. Community Adjustmentand Investment Program (USCAIP). The NAFTA-TAA program is now part of a new consolidatedTrade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program passed under the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ). The NAFTA-TAA program provides assistance, such as employment services and training, toworkers who have lost their jobs because of increased import competition or by production shifts. The USCAIP provides assistance to communities with significant job losses due to changes in tradepatterns with Canada or Mexico. While the programs have been successful in providing assistanceto communities who have had significant job losses, the overall effectiveness of the programs hasbeen limited. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34706 | crs_RL34706_0 | This practice, commonly referred to as "burrowing in," is permissible when laws and regulations governing career appointments are followed. While such conversions may occur at any time, frequently they do so during the transition period when one Administration is preparing to leave office and another Administration is preparing to assume office. The tenure of noncareer and career employees also differs. Selected Law and Regulations
Appointments to career positions in the executive branch are governed by law and regulations that are codified in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations . In taking a personnel action, each department and agency head is responsible for preventing prohibited personnel practices; for complying with, and enforcing, applicable civil service laws, rules, and regulations and other aspects of personnel management; and for ensuring that agency employees are informed of the rights and remedies available to them. Such actions must adhere to the nine merit principles and twelve prohibited personnel practices that are codified at 5 U.S.C. §2301(b) and §2302(b), respectively. These principles and practices are designed to ensure that the process for selecting career employees is fair and open (competitive), and without political influence. During the period June 1, 2012, through January 20, 2013, defined as the Presidential Election Period, certain appointees are prohibited from receiving financial awards. OPM, on an ongoing basis, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), periodically, each conduct oversight related to conversions of employees from noncareer to career positions to ensure that proper procedures have been followed. Oversight by Congress During the 2008 Transition
As part of its oversight of government operations, Congress also monitors conversions. In the 110 th Congress, staffing at the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ), was of particular interest, especially in the wake of the leadership and management deficiencies at DHS during and after Hurricane Katrina, and improper procedures used by DOJ staff in selecting and removing United States attorneys. Both DHS and DOJ received letters from Members of Congress reminding them to examine conversions. With regard to personnel actions at the Department of Justice, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Charles Schumer, members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, reportedly wrote a letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey on July 24, 2008. On December 19, 2008, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, sent a letter to the OPM Acting Director, Michael Hager, requesting that data on conversions from noncareer to career positions during the period April 1, 2008, through December 19, 2008, and information on the number of staff responsible for reviewing and approving the pre-appointment requests for FY2005 through FY2009, be provided to the committee by January 9, 2009. Considerations to Enhance Oversight
In assessing the current situation, Congress may decide that the existing system of oversight is sufficient. If Congress determines that additional measures are needed to further ensure that conversions from appointed (noncareer) positions to career positions are conducted according to proper procedures and transparent, the following options could be considered:
OPM could be directed to report to Congress on the operation of its current policy governing pre-appointment reviews, including recommendations on whether Section 1104 of Title 5, United States Code should be amended to codify the policy. Congress could amend Title 5 United States Code to increase the penalties for violating Civil Service laws by "creat[ing] a misdemeanor offense for agency personnel who violate or contribute to the violation of the federal hiring statutes." | The term "burrowing in" is sometimes used to describe an employment status conversion whereby an individual transfers from a federal appointed (noncareer) position to a career position in the executive branch. Critics of such conversions note that they often occur during the transitional period in which the outgoing Administration prepares to leave office and the incoming Administration prepares to assume office. Conversions are permissible when laws and regulations governing career appointments are followed, but they can invite scrutiny because of the differences in the appointment and tenure of noncareer and career employees.
Appointments to career positions in the executive branch are governed by law and regulations that are codified in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and are defined as personnel actions. In taking a personnel action, each department and agency head is responsible for preventing prohibited personnel practices; for complying with, and enforcing, applicable civil service laws, rules, and regulations and other aspects of personnel management; and for ensuring that agency employees are informed of the rights and remedies available to them. Such actions are required to adhere to the merit principles and prohibited personnel practices that are codified at 5 U.S.C. §2301(b) and §2302(b), respectively. These principles and practices are designed to ensure that the process for selecting career employees is fair and open (competitive), and without political influence. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), on an ongoing basis, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), periodically, each conduct oversight related to conversions of employees from noncareer to career positions to ensure that proper procedures have been followed. Certain senior politically appointed officers are prohibited from receiving financial awards during the Presidential Election Period, defined in statute and currently covering June 1, 2012, through January 20, 2013.
As part of its oversight of government operations, Congress also monitors conversions. In the 110th Congress, staffing at the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) was of particular interest, especially in the wake of the leadership and management deficiencies at DHS during and after Hurricane Katrina, and improper procedures used by DOJ staff in selecting and removing United States attorneys. Both departments received letters from Members of Congress reminding them to examine conversions: the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Representative Bennie Thompson, wrote to the DHS Secretary in February 2008, and Senators Dianne Feinstein and Charles Schumer, members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, wrote to the Attorney General in July 2008 about this issue. In a December 19, 2008, letter to OPM, Senator Joseph Lieberman requested information on conversions that occurred during the period April 1, 2008, through December 19, 2008. In February 2009 (111th Congress), Senator Feinstein sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense related to conversions within the Office of Detainee Affairs.
In assessing the current situation, Congress may decide that the existing oversight is sufficient. If Congress determines that additional measures are needed, OPM could be directed to report to Congress on the operation of its current policy governing pre-appointment reviews, including recommendations on whether Section 1104 of Title 5, United States Code should be amended to codify the policy. The GAO and OPM could be asked to explore options that might result in their recommending and taking timely remedial actions that are seen as necessary to address conversions that occurred under improper procedures. Congress could amend Title 5, United States Code to increase the penalties for violating Civil Service laws. This report will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_R43833 | crs_R43833_0 | Introduction
In March 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in King v. Burwell , a case addressing an important issue of implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The lawsuit involves the provision of premium tax credits, which became available in 2014 and are intended to help certain individuals pay their premiums for private health insurance plans offered through insurance "exchanges" established under ACA. This report provides background on relevant provisions of ACA. It then answers questions concerning the litigation and potential implications of the Court's decision in King . The premium assistance credit amount is defined as the amount equal to the lesser of
(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in the individual market within a State which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any dependent ⦠of the taxpayer and which were enrolled in through an exchange established by the State under 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , or
(B) the excess (if any) ofâ
(i) the adjusted monthly premium for such month for the applicable second lowest cost silver plan with respect to the taxpayer, over
(ii) an amount equal to 1/12 of the product of the applicable percentage and the taxpayer's household income for the taxable year. In May 2012, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued final regulations related to the premium tax credit that make the credits available to taxpayers who obtain coverage in both state and federally facilitated exchanges. As noted above, following issuance of the IRS regulations, at least four lawsuits were filed claiming the agency overstepped its authority when it interpreted the statute to allow premium tax credits to individuals participating in federally facilitated exchanges. What is that? The Court's opinion in the King case may address this scenario. Commentators have also noted that if the Supreme Court invalidates the IRS rule, this could have a debilitating effect on the federally run exchanges. | Legal challenges that may have a substantial impact on the implementation and operation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) concern whether premium tax credits are available for millions of individuals participating in federally administered health insurance exchanges. These credits, which became available in 2014, are intended to help individuals pay the premiums for private health plans offered through the insurance exchanges established under the act. In addressing who may receive this credit, ACA refers to individuals who are "enrolled in [a plan] through an exchange established by the State" under ACA. Following the issuance of IRS regulations that allow for these credits to be available in both state and federally run exchanges, lawsuits were filed claiming that the language of ACA prohibits the credits from being available to individuals who obtain coverage in federally run exchanges. The Supreme Court is currently reviewing this issue in King v. Burwell . The Court heard oral arguments in the King case on March 4, 2015, and a decision is expected by the end of the Court's term in June 2015 at the latest.
This report provides background on provisions of ACA relevant to this issue. It then answers questions concerning the legal challenges and potential implications of the Court's decision in King . |
crs_RL33661 | crs_RL33661_0 | In 2007, however, the national unemployment rate averaged just 4.6%. This suggests the presence of tight labor market conditions that are related to long-running demographic trends. The oldest members of the baby-boom generation will reach 60 years of age by the end of 2006, and every year thereafter, more of the 76 million persons born between 1946 and 1964 will move into their early 60s, when most workers traditionally have retired. The slowdown in the supply of labor that employers have begun to encounter has led them to worry about how much harder it will become to hire replacements for baby-boomers as more of them reach the retirement phase of their lives during the coming decades. However, even industries in which total employment is projected to decrease might need to replace employees who retire from particular occupations. Public administration also appears to have many baby-boom dependent occupations. Thus, many industries throughout the economy are very dependent on baby-boom workers and seemingly face the prospect of tightening labor market conditions as these individuals move toward the typical retirement ages. Employers with older workforces that seek not only to replace all baby-boomers exiting occupations critical to their operations, but also to increase employment in those fields, could face especially intense competition for labor in the short run. An actual shortage of labor is unlikely in the long run, however, because businesses can be expected to raise wages, thereby
prompting some pension-eligible baby-boomers to continue working, enticing those outside the labor force (e.g., discouraged workers) to enter, or those employed part-time to increase their work hours, encouraging individuals qualified for jobs that are in particularly high demand, but who are employed in other fields, to change positions, and motivating youngsters attending school and unemployed persons, among others, to prepare for these now more lucrative occupations. An "Adequate" Number of Workers
An underlying assumption of the labor shortage scenario is that, in order for the U.S. economy to continue growing, companies must have more workers on their payrolls in the future than at present. Proponents of this viewpoint essentially are arguing that the rate of economic growth is closely and directly linked to the pace of labor force growth. The U.S. economy generally has been able to expand faster than the labor supply, however, by more efficiently utilizing the available pool of workers. The Supply of Labor Domestically and Internationally
The Baby-Boom Generation in "Retirement"
Another assumption underlying the labor shortage scenario is that members of the baby-boom generation will sharply curtail their involvement in the labor force once in their 60s. Companies have asserted that amending the law to permit in-service pension payments would make them more willing to provide phased-retirement arrangements. The much smaller cohort that immediately followed the baby-boomers into the workforce is not the only source of replacements for retirees, however. Employers continue to urge Congress to reexamine the H-1B visa program to enable them to bring into the country greater numbers of skilled guest workers. Businesses similarly have turned to temporary and immigrant labor to fill jobs in other occupations when U.S. workers are deemed to be in short supply (e.g., landscape laborers and nurses). | The unemployment rate in 2007 averaged just 4.6%, which is low by historic standards and suggests the presence of tight labor market conditions that are related to long-running demographic trends. The oldest members of the baby-boom generation turned age 60 at the end of 2006, and every year thereafter, more of this large birth-cohort will move into the ages when workers traditionally have retired. Consequently, the business community in particular has asserted that the future supply of labor will fall short of employer demand and that U.S. economic growth and competitiveness would be put in jeopardy.
Based upon a CRS analysis of the current employment patterns of baby-boomers across industries and occupations and of occupational employment projections within industries, many industries throughout the economy (e.g., insurance, manufacturing, mining, public administration, real estate, transportation, wholesale trade, utilities) appear to be highly dependent on baby-boom workers and to face the prospect of tightening labor market conditions as more of them move into the traditional retirement ages. Baby-boom dependent industries that seek both to replace all boomers who retire from occupations critical to their operations and to increase employment in those fields could face the most intense competition for workers in the near term (e.g., educational services and health care services).
An actual shortage of workers is unlikely in the long run because companies can be expected to take various actions in response to the accelerating slowdown in labor force growth—although it appears few have yet done so. A key assumption of the labor shortage scenario is that firms must have more workers in the future than at present for the economy to continue to grow. Proponents of this viewpoint thus are asserting that rates of output growth and labor force growth are closely and directly linked. But, the economy historically has been able to expand faster than the labor supply by more efficiently utilizing the available pool of workers.
Another assumption underlying the shortage scenario is that baby-boomers will sharply curtail their work activity once in their sixties. The degree to which older persons participate in the workforce already has risen due, in part, to changes that Congress made to the Social Security retirement system and age discrimination law. Some have urged Congress to make further modifications to encourage more older individuals to continue working and more employers to hire and retain them. Similarly, Congress has been urged to further amend immigration law to permit more foreign labor to be brought into the country to fill jobs for which U.S. workers are deemed to be in short supply.
Additionally, those who assert that the need to replace retiring baby-boomers will result in a shortage of workers usually consider only the labor supplied by the baby-bust generation. This 45 million birth-cohort, which immediately followed the 76 million baby-boomers into the labor force, is not the only source of replacement workers: the 72 million members of the echo-boom began to enter the workforce during the 1990s. Access to foreign labor through offshore outsourcing, in addition to guest worker programs, also is often overlooked in the context of shortages. |
crs_R43408 | crs_R43408_0 | Federal Drought and Emergency Water Assistance
States, along with local governments and water providers, generally are responsible for preparing and planning for drought conditions. The federal agencies authorized to assist with non-agricultural water supplies emergencies are:
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS), through various water system loan and grant programs (FY2014 funds: $1.3 billion in loans, $374 million in grants). USDA Rural Utilities Service4
RUS provides grants and loans for rural community and household water. Some of the programs are tailored for emergency situations, while others may prioritize loans and grants for rural communities and households facing drought-related declines in water quantity or quality. For RUS programs, rural communities are often defined as those with populations less than 10,000. While most of these funds are provided for assisting with rural community water and waste systems broadly, systems affected by drought may receive a priority. Bureau of Reclamation5
Reclamation's authorities to assist with emergency water supplies and conservation stem primarily from the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief (RSEDR) Program (43 U.S.C. The RSEDR program consists of a number of different authorities, including direct Reclamation water assistance and loans to reduce drought losses through temporary measures (except for certain wells), water purchases, temporary water contracts, drought planning grants, actions to facilitate water purchases and transfers, and technical assistance. Reclamation can provide much of this assistance to water users (including municipalities and water districts), private entities, tribes, and states. Most of the RSEDR program's authority is limited to the 17 western states and Hawaii, with the exception being that technical assistance is available nationally. RSEDR emergency actions often are provided by Reclamation at 100% federal expense, although some nonfederal reimbursement is authorized. These emergency actions are available to communities and water providers, regardless of their size, but are prioritized by need and congressional direction. As of mid-February 2014, RSEDR funding was $0.5 million for FY2014. Army Corps of Engineers
The Corps (USACE) has authority to assist in the provision and transport of emergency water supplies when state resources have been exceeded and there is an imminent public health threat. While USACE is authorized to assist political subdivisions, farmers, and ranchers with non-irrigation water, this authority has largely been used for assisting tribes with drinking water supplies. These activities have generally been funded through reprogramming of agency funds. The agency also has authority to participate in temporary contracts to provide limited quantities of water (if available) for municipal and industrial purposes (33 U.S.C. Drought Disasters: Federal Declarations and Programs
Additionally, if the effects of a drought overwhelm state or local resources, the President, at the request of the state governor or tribal governing body, is authorized under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to issue major disaster or emergency declarations resulting in federal aid to affected parties. However, requests by U.S. states for Stafford Act drought-related declarations and related assistance since the 1980s have been denied. Therefore, the emergency assistance typically available to mitigate and respond to the impacts of drought on non-agricultural water supplies is primarily through the USDA's Rural Utilities Service, the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency Drought Relief Program, and in limited circumstances the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers emergency water authorities. Grants are determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. As of mid-February 2014, RSEDR activities had received $0.5 million in appropriations for FY2014. | Drought conditions often fuel congressional interest in federal assistance. While drought planning and preparedness are largely individual, business, local, and state responsibilities, some federal assistance is available to mitigate drought impacts. While much of the federal assistance is targeted at mitigating impacts on the agricultural economy, other federal programs are authorized to provide non-agricultural water assistance. Interest in these non-agricultural programs often increases as communities, households, and businesses experience shrinking and less reliable water supplies. Authorized federal assistance is spread across a variety of agencies, and each has limitations on what activities and entities are eligible and the funding that is available.
Rural Utilities Service (RUS): The U.S. Department of Agriculture's RUS provides grants and loans for rural water systems in communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants; its programs are for domestic water service, not water for agricultural purposes. Some of the programs are tailored to emergency situations, while others may prioritize loans and grants for communities and households facing drought-related declines in water quantity or quality. As of mid-February 2014, around $1.3 billion in loans and $370 million in grants are available for rural community water and waste systems. While these funds are provided for assisting with rural water systems broadly, systems affected by drought may receive priority. Also for FY2014, the RUS Household Water Well System Grants had received $1 million in appropriations, and the Administration had reprogrammed to the RUS Emergency Community and Water Assistance Grants program $3 million for California's rural communities.
Bureau of Reclamation: Reclamation's authorities to assist with emergency water supplies and conservation stem primarily from the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief (RSEDR) Program. RSEDR consists of various authorities, including direct Reclamation water assistance to reduce drought losses, water contract authority, technical assistance, drought planning grants, and actions to facilitate water purchases and transfers. Reclamation can provide much of this assistance to water users (including municipalities and water districts), private entities, tribes, and states. Most of the RSEDR program's authority is limited to the 17 western states and Hawaii. RSEDR emergency actions often are provided by Reclamation at 100% federal expense, although some nonfederal reimbursement is authorized. These emergency actions are available to communities and water providers, regardless of their size, but are prioritized by need and congressional direction. As of mid-February 2014, RSEDR funding was $0.5 million for FY2014.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE): The Corps has authority to assist emergency water supplies and their transport when state resources are exceeded and a public health threat is imminent. This authority has largely been used for assisting tribes with imminent drinking water supply issues. These activities have generally been funded through reprogramming of available agency funds. The agency also has authority to contract for provision of limited quantities of water (if available) from its reservoirs for municipal and industrial purposes.
Role of States and Other Federal Authorities. If a drought's effects overwhelm state or local resources, the President, at the request of a governor or tribal governing body, is authorized under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to issue major disaster or emergency declarations resulting in federal aid to affected parties. Since the 1980s, however, requests by U.S. states for Stafford Act drought-related declarations and related assistance for drinking water supplies have been denied. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has overseen most federal drought response through agricultural disaster assistance. |
crs_RL32202 | crs_RL32202_0 | Many of these weapons were located outside Russia, but have since beenreturned to storage areas in Russia. It includes a brief listing of the cooperative programs and assistance theUnited States has provided to Russia and the other former Soviet states in an effort to addressconcerns about the safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials. (1)
Sources of Concern
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it possessed, according to most estimates, more than 27,000 nuclear weapons. Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics
Source: U.S. Department of Defense. Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security
Many in the United States and Russia have voiced concerns about safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons in Russia. These concerns center on three general areas -- concerns aboutweaknesses in Russia's command and control system; concerns about the possible loss of nuclearwarheads due to lax security or accounting at nuclear weapons facilities; and concerns about the lossor theft of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons facilities. In early 1997, Russia's Defense MinisterRodionov stated that he feared a loss of control over Russian strategic nuclear forces in the futureif additional funding were not available to maintain and modernize the communications links in thenuclear command and control structure. Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads. Many in the United Statesremain concerned about the level of security at these facilities and some fear that, as a result of poorsecurity and inadequate record-keeping, Russia may not be able to keep track of all its warheads. General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, visited nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia to observe safety and security procedures on twooccasions, in October 1997 and June 1998. Some in Congress have also expressed concern about Russia's stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They also denied, on several occasions,that any Russian nuclear weapons were missing. The United States provides nearly $1 billion per year inassistance, through programs in the State Department, Energy Department, and Defense Department,to help the former Soviet states secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, tohelp secure and eliminate the materials used in these weapons, and to help provide alternativeemployment for the scientists and engineers who had been a part of the Soviet Union's weaponscomplex. Department of Energy Programs
Although the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, in its early years, focused on securing nuclear weapons, it did include some funding for materials control and protection. Many observers praised this agreement as an overduesign that the United States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies. | When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it reportedly possessed more than 27,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons were deployed on the territories of several of the former Sovietrepublics. All of the nuclear warheads have now been moved to Russia, but Russia still has around5,500 strategic nuclear weapons and perhaps as many as 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclearweapons.
Many analysts in the United States and Russia have expressed concerns about the safety, security, and control over these weapons. Some of these concerns focus on Russia's nuclearcommand and control structure. Financial constraints have slowed the modernization andreplacement of many aging satellites and communications links, raising the possibility that Russiamight not be able to identify a potential attack or communicate with troops in the field if an attackwere underway. Some fear that the misinterpretation of an ambiguous event might lead to thelaunch of nuclear weapons. Some also expressed concern that the year 2000 computer bug couldaffect Russia's command and control system, but it did not.
Some concerns are also focused on the safety and security of nuclear warheads in storage facilities in Russia. Press reports and statements by Russian officials about possible missingwarheads have added to these concerns. However, General Eugene Habiger, former Commander-in-Chief of theU.S. Strategic Command, stated that he had no major concerns about security at Russiannuclear storage facilities after he visited several storage sites in Oct. 1997 and June 1998.
The United States and Russia are cooperating in many fora to improve the safety, security, and control over Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) Program, the U.S. Department of Defense has provided assistance worth nearly$2 billion to help Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus safely transport and store weapons andeliminate launchers under the START Treaties. The Department of Energy's Materials Protection,Control and Accounting Program is helping Russia and other former Soviet republics secure nuclearmaterials at research and other facilities in the former Soviet Union. The nations have also heldbilateral meetings to identify ways in which they might cooperate to improve security and resolveconcerns.
This report will not be updated. For current information on U.S. and Russian efforts to address concerns about the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons and materials see CRS Report RL31957 , Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former SovietUnion. |
crs_R45012 | crs_R45012_0 | 3922 ). On October 30, 2017, the House Rules Committee posted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 3922 . The amendment considered by the House struck the text of the CHAMPION Act and replaced it with the text of the amendment in the nature of the substitute. The amendment in the nature of a substitute is entitled the Continuing Community Health And Medical Professional Programs to Improve Our Nation, Increase National Gains, and Help Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act). In revising the language of the CHAMPION Act, the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act includes revised language for the CHAMPION Act in Division A. Division A would extend funding for several public health programs that had received directed appropriations through FY2017. It would also make a number of changes to these programs and would provide offsets for the proposed funding extensions. Division B of this act would, among other things, extend funding for the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). On November 1, 2017, the House Rules Committee adopted an amendment to this bill that would lessen the amount that would be reduced from the Public Health and Prevention Fund (PPHF). The House passed the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act on November 3, 2017, by a vote of 242 to 174. On December 13, 2017, the chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Representative Rodney Frelinghuysen, introduced H.J.Res 124 . This measure would extend temporary continuing appropriations for most federal agencies (Division A) and provide full-year appropriations for the Department of Defense (Division B). Division C, Subdivision 1 (§§21001-21202), of this measure is largely identical to the text of Division A of the House-passed CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act ( H.R. This report summarizes the provisions in Division A of the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act that would extend funding for certain public health programs and provide offsets for these funding extensions. Division B—the extension of CHIP funding—is discussed in CRS Report R44989, Comparison of the Bills to Extend State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Funding . | On October 30, 2017, the House Rules Committee posted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Community Health And Medical Professionals Improve Our Nation Act of 2017 (CHAMPION Act, H.R. 3922). The amendment considered by the House struck the text of the CHAMPION Act and replaced it with the text of the amendment in the nature of the substitute.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute is entitled the Continuing Community Health And Medical Professional Programs to Improve Our Nation, Increase National Gains, and Help Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act). In revising the language of the CHAMPION Act, the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act includes revised language for the CHAMPION Act in Division A. Division A would extend funding for several public health programs that had received directed appropriations through FY2017. It would also make a number of changes to these programs and would provide offsets for the proposed funding extensions. Division B of this act would, among other things, extend funding for the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP).
On November 1, 2017, the House Rules Committee adopted an amendment (H.Res. 601) to this bill that would lessen the amount that would be reduced from the Public Health and Prevention Fund (PPHF), one of the offsets included in Division A. The House passed the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act on November 3, 2017, by a vote of 242 to 174.
On December 13, 2017, the chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Representative Rodney Frelinghuysen, introduced H.J.Res 124. This measure would extend temporary continuing appropriations for most federal agencies (Division A) and provide full-year appropriations for the Department of Defense (Division B). Division C, Subdivision 1 (§§21001-21202), of this measure is largely identical to the text of Division A of the House-passed CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act (H.R. 3922).
This report summarizes provisions in Division A of the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act. CRS Report R44989, Comparison of the Bills to Extend State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Funding, summarizes provisions in Division B. |
crs_R40564 | crs_R40564_0 | Background
In February 2009, Kyrgyzstan announced that it was terminating an agreement permitting U.S. forces to use portions of the Manas International Airport and adjoining areas near the capital of Bishkek to support coalition military operations in Afghanistan. U.S. forces faced leaving the airbase by late August 2009. Major U.S. concerns raised by the Kyrgyz announcement included working out alternative logistics routes and support functions for the Obama Administration's planned surge in U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan and possibly cooler security ties with Kyrgyzstan that would set back U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and other U.S. interests in Central Asia. Implications for U.S. | In February 2009, Kyrgyzstan announced that it was terminating an agreement permitting U.S. forces to upgrade and use portions of the Manas international airport near the capital of Bishkek to support coalition military operations in Afghanistan. U.S. forces faced leaving the airbase by late August 2009. Major U.S. concerns included working out alternative logistics routes and support functions for a surge in U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan and possibly cooler security ties with Kyrgyzstan that could set back U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and other U.S. interests in Central Asia. After reportedly intense negotiations, the United States and Kyrgyzstan reached agreement in June 2009 on modalities for maintaining U.S. and NATO transit operations at Manas. For more on Central Asia, see CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44462 | crs_R44462_0 | The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) was enacted on December 19, 2014. The law outlines seven areas of reform that affect how federal agencies purchase and manage their information technology (IT) assets, including—
enhancing the authority of agency chief information officers (CIOs); improving transparency and risk management of IT investments; setting forth a process for agency IT portfolio review; refocusing the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) from only consolidation to optimization; expanding the training and use of "IT Cadres," as initially outlined in the "25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Management Technology"; maximizing the benefits of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI); and creating a govemment-wide software purchasing program, in conjunction with the General Services Administration. On June 10, 2015, OMB published guidance to implement the requirements of FITARA and harmonize existing policy and guidance with the new law. In addition to implementing FITARA, OMB Memorandum M-15-14, "Management and Oversight of Federal Information Technology," also harmonizes the requirements of FITARA with existing law, primarily the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the E-Government Act of 2002. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year for IT investment. In FY2017, that investment will be more than $89 billion. Unfortunately, these investments often incur "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays," may contribute little to mission-related outcomes, and in some cases fail altogether. What agencies are covered by FITARA? Generally, agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as well as their subordinate divisions and offices, are subject to the requirements of FITARA ( Table 1 ). The DOD, the Intelligence Community, and portions of other agencies that operate systems related to national security are subject to only certain portions of FITARA. The OMB develops and promulgates guidance based on the codified requirements of FITARA and monitors agency implementation of that guidance. Additionally, Congress monitors the progress of FITARA implementation through audits conducted by GAO and hearings by relevant House and Senate committees. OMB imposed an April 30, 2016, deadline for agencies to submit updated FITARA common baseline self-assessments and GAO has reported that as of May 2016, 22 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had made their plans publicly available. | Federal agencies rely on information technology (IT) to conduct their work, requiring extensive investments in both updating existing IT and developing new IT. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year for IT investment. In FY2017, that investment will be more than $89 billion. Unfortunately, these investments often incur "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays," may contribute little to mission-related outcomes, and in some cases fail altogether. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) (P.L. 113-291) was enacted on December 19, 2014, to address this problem. FITARA outlines seven areas of reform to how federal agencies purchase and manage their information technology (IT) assets, including—
enhancing the authority of agency chief information officers (CIOs); improving transparency and risk management of IT investments; setting forth a process for agency IT portfolio review; refocusing the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) from only consolidation to optimization; expanding the training and use of "IT Cadres," as initially outlined in the "25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Management Technology" issued by the CIO of the United States; maximizing the benefits of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI); and creating a govemment-wide software purchasing program, in conjunction with the General Services Administration.
Not all federal agencies are covered by FITARA. Generally, agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as well as their subordinate divisions and offices, are subject to the requirements of FITARA. The Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and portions of other agencies that operate systems related to national security are subject to only certain portions of FITARA.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published guidance to implement the requirements of FITARA in June 2015 (OMB Memorandum M-15-14). In addition to implementing FITARA, this guidance also harmonizes the requirements of FITARA with existing laws, primarily the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106) and the E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). The OMB also monitors agency implementation of FITARA. Congress also monitors the progress of FITARA implementation through audits conducted by GAO and hearings by relevant House and Senate committees. Since FITARA was signed into law, the Senate and House have each held two hearings on overall agency FITARA implementation.
OMB imposed an April 30, 2016, deadline for agencies to submit updated FITARA common baseline self-assessments and GAO has reported that as of May 2016, 22 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had made their plans publicly available. |
crs_R45183 | crs_R45183_0 | Four current programs have an exclusive focus on teenage pregnancy prevention education:
the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, which is authorized under appropriations law; the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act; the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, which is authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act (and formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program); and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, which is authorized under appropriations law. This report will refer to the latter two programs as the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, respectively, to avoid confusion. The four programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This report begins with a brief discussion of recent developments in funding for the four teen pregnancy prevention programs. Table A-2 in Appendix A describes the changes made by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA of 2018, P.L. The PREP program requires most grantees to place "substantial emphasis on both abstinence and contraception for the prevention of pregnancy among youth and sexually transmitted infections." Multiple HHS offices worked together to establish the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Evidence Review process following enactment of the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. P.L. 111-117 also authorized the TPP program and required it to use models that are proven effective through rigorous evaluation in reducing teen pregnancy and related outcomes. Despite the connection to the TPP program, the review is intended to more broadly inform the teen pregnancy prevention field. The TPP Evidence Review seeks to identify which teen pregnancy prevention models have been shown to be effective based on studies from the past 20 years. Additional Research
HHS has taken additional steps to develop research on teen pregnancy prevention interventions. 111-117 ) established and provided annual funding for the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program. However, HHS is in the process of discontinuing funding for the current cohort of TPP program grantees. Of the remaining amount, the appropriations laws have further stated the following:
75% is for grants to replicate programs that have been proven through rigorous evaluation to be effective in reducing teenage pregnancy, behavioral factors underlying teen pregnancy, or other related risk factors. 25% is for research and demonstration grants to develop, replicate, and refine additional models and innovative strategies for reducing teenage pregnancy. Tier 1B grantees are entities that are replicating evidence-based programs to scale in communities with populations in the greatest need. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 115-123 ) with mandatory funding of $75 million for each of FY2015 through FY2019. Recipients of PREP funds must fulfill requirements outlined in the law, including that they must implement programs that
provide youth with information on at least three of six specified adulthood preparation subjects (healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills); are "medically-accurate and complete"; include activities to educate youth who are sexually active regarding responsible sexual behavior with respect to both abstinence and the use of contraception; and provide age-appropriate information and activities, while ensuring these are delivered in the most appropriate cultural context for the individuals served in the program. Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education Program
The 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. P.L. HHS has directed grantees to the TPP Evidence Review, though has not require grantees to use the models identified in the review. The appropriations laws have specified that Sexual Risk Avoidance Education grants are to
be awarded by HHS on a competitive basis; use medically accurate information; "implement an evidence-based approach integrating research findings with practical implementation that aligns with the needs and desired outcomes for the intended audience;" and "teach the benefits associated with self-regulation, success sequencing for poverty prevention, healthy relationships, goal setting, and resisting sexual coercion, dating violence, and other youth risk behaviors such as underage drinking or illicit drug use without normalizing teen sexual activity." | Congress has an interest in preventing pregnancy among teenagers because of the long-term consequences for the families of teen parents and society more generally. Since the 1980s, Congress has authorized—and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has administered—programs with a focus on teen pregnancy prevention. This report intends to assist Congress with tracking developments in four teen pregnancy prevention programs that are currently funded. The report provides detailed information about each program and includes a table that can illustrate the ways in which the programs are both similar and different.
The four current programs are the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program. Despite their similar names and purposes, the latter two programs have different authorizing laws and funding mechanisms. Generally, the four programs serve vulnerable young people in schools, afterschool programs, community centers, and other settings. Grantees include states, nonprofits, and other entities.
The TPP program was established and funded by the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). Subsequent appropriations laws have also provided discretionary funding. As required in appropriations law, the majority of TPP program grants (Tier 1) must use evidence-based education models that have been shown to be effective in reducing teen pregnancy and related risk behaviors. A smaller share of funds is available for research and demonstration grants (Tier 2) that implement innovative strategies to prevent teenage pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the TPP program is $101 million. HHS has taken steps to discontinue the current cohort of grants.
PREP was established under Section 513 of the Social Security Act by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) in 2010. The program receives mandatory funding and is designed to educate adolescents on both abstinence and contraception for preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, and on selected adult preparation subjects. The PREP authorizing law requires most grantees to replicate evidence-based programs that are proven to change behavior related to teen pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million.
The Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program is authorized at Section 510 (Title V) of the Social Security Act. It was formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program, which was authorized by the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) renamed the program and made other changes. The program focuses on implementing sexual risk avoidance, meaning voluntarily refraining from sex before marriage. Grantees may set aside some of their funding to conduct rigorous and evidence-based research on sexual risk avoidance. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million.
The Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program (not to be confused with the Title V program of the same name) was established and funded by the FY2016 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 114-113). Other appropriations laws have since provided discretionary funding. Grantees are to use funding for education on voluntarily refraining from non-marital sexual activity, and they are encouraged to implement evidence-based approaches that teach the benefits associated with resisting risk behaviors. FY2018 funding for the program is $25 million.
Multiple HHS offices worked together to establish the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Evidence Review process following enactment of the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). The review is intended to inform the teen pregnancy prevention field about which prevention models have been shown to be effective based on studies from the past 20 years. TPP Tier 1 grantees must use models identified in the review. HHS encourages grantees for the other teen pregnancy prevention programs to use models identified in the review as well. |
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