id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
crs_RL32243 | crs_RL32243_0 | At the conference, donors pledged over $522million in relief and reconstruction assistance for Liberia; $200 million of this amount was pledgedby the United States. The NTGL, inauguratedon October 14, 2003, was formed in accordance with a peace agreement signed in Accra, Ghana,which formally ended the Liberian conflict. Peace Accord. The signing of the CPA on August 18, 2003 followed two and a half months of negotiations mediated by the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). (5) Other keyprovisions of the accord include
The stipulated establishment of various political processes, legal authorities, mandates, and bodies, including an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and a NationalCommission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) toimplement the peace accord, and a timetable for this purpose;
Military and police restructuring;
Release of political prisoners and prisoners of war;
The apportionment of key government leadership positions among accordsignatories;
"Consideration" of "a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons andparties engaged or involved in military activities during the Liberian civil conflict";
Naming of a new supreme court; and
The creation of a Contracts and Monopolies Commission (CMC), aGovernance Reform Commission (GRC), an Independent National Commission on Human Rights(INCHR), a National Electoral Commission (NEC), a National Transitional Legislative Assembly(NTLA), and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Humanitarian Conditions. During and after the first Liberian civil war, many factional opponents of Taylor and civilians --many from ethnic groups, notably the Mandingo, who feared mistreatment by the Taylor government-- sought refuge in Guinea. In doing so, it cited concerns that the cease-fire and CPA were "not yetbeing universally implemented throughout Liberia"; that much of its territory remained outside theauthority of the NTGL, particularly where UNMIL had yet to deploy; that there continued to belinkages between the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources like diamonds and timber,leading to a the proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms, and the fueling and exacerbation ofconflicts in Liberia and other areas of West Africa; and that the situation in Liberia, the proliferationof arms and armed non-state actors and mercenaries in the subregion continued to constitute a threatto international peace and security in Liberia and the region. It authorized an MNF and labeled as "critical" President Taylor's departure from power, tobe followed by the installation of a transitional government in Liberia and the subsequentdeployment of a U.N. stabilization successor force to the country by October 1, 2003. U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Other current peace and security-related operational issues that face the NTGL, UNMIL, and Liberia's international donors include continued implementation of the CPA, particularly with regardto maintenance of security; completion of DDRR; progress in preparing for elections; and resolutionof the status of Charles Taylor, both as an exile in Nigeria and as a war crimes indictee. As of mid-October 2004, $354 million of $520 million in donorpledges made in February 2004 had been received. Despite suchchallenges, the NTGL has taken a number of steps to re-establish basic government processes. NTGL Posts. Over 95,000 combatants, more than double the initial UNMIL projection of 38,000, have beendemobilized to date. Disarmament has occurred in most areas of the country, including some remote borderzones. This has led to two criticisms of theDDRR process. Status of Charles Taylor
Taylor Indictment. Nigeria. Several U.S. legislative provisions pertain to Taylor's asylum. A second U.S. military team was dispatched to ECOWAS member states to assess the force readiness andmilitary logistical and equipment needs of these countries prior to their anticipated deployment ofa joint intervention force to Liberia, and to assess a possible U.S. role in supporting such a force (63) . Current U.S. Assistance Programs
In addition to supporting the operation of UNMIL, current U.S. Liberia-related assistance funds a variety of programs meant to consolidate Liberia's transition to peace. Representative Ron Paul, for instance, introduced H.Con.Res. H.R. Other Liberia-related bills that passed into law during the 108th Congress include:
H.J.Res. H.R. 2673 (Bonilla). H.Con.Res. H.Con.Res. 255 (Paul). H.R. S. 656 (Reed). H.R. H.R. H.R. 4511 (Waters). H.R. 4793 (Waters). Appropriations bills introduced in the 108th Congress that contain Liberia-specific provisions include:
S. 1426 (McConnell). H.R. H.R. H.R. 4818 (Kolbe). | This report, which is updated periodically, covers recent events in Liberia and related U.S. policy. In 2003, Liberia began a post-conflict transition process to achieve enduring peace,socio-economic reconstruction and democratic governance. This process resulted from the signingof a peace accord and the resignation of then-president Charles Taylor in August 2003, after monthsof international mediation. The accord ended a civil war that burgeoned in 2000 which pitted theforces of Taylor against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war led to an extreme deteriorationin political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights conditions in Liberia. It also affectedneighboring states, from which anti-Taylor forces operated; against which the Taylor regimesponsored acts of armed aggression; and in which large numbers of Liberians sought refuge.
Liberia's security situation, though periodically volatile, has improved steadily since August 2003. A disarmament and demobilization program, which encountered repeated initial difficulties,has inducted over 95,000 ex-combatants to date. This process is jointly supervised by the UnitedNations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL),which received over $522 million in aid pledges at a February 2004 donor conference. UNMILbegan operations on October 1, 2003. The NTGL, formed under the August accord and installed onOctober 14, 2003, is mandated with re-establishing government authority and preparing for electionsin late 2005. The transition faces many challenges, most related to the socio-economic effects ofwar; the dominant role within the NTGL of former armed factions, which are prone to internaldissension; and limited state capacities. UNMIL has reached full force strength, and has deployedpeacekeepers to most areas of the country, but insecurity remains a challenge in many rural areas.Implementation of the peace accord and of the NTGL's mandate have been beset by disagreementsover the allocation of positions, accusations of corruption, and leadership rivalries within the NTGL. The legal status of Taylor, who is living in exile in Nigeria and is under indictment by the SpecialCourt for Sierra Leone for war crimes related to his alleged involvement in war crimes in SierraLeone, remains unresolved. U.S. legislation urges Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the court.
Considerable public and congressional debate over possible U.S. intervention in Liberia occurred in mid-2003. The United States did not intervene militarily, but it did: deploy limitedmilitary forces to Liberia to bolster U.S. security interests; assist an the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) military force to deploy to Liberia prior to UNMIL; help mediatethe August accord; and provide International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) ($200 million)and support for UNMIL ($250 million). In addition to H.R. 4818 , the ForeignOperations FY2005 Appropriations bill, current Liberia-related bills pertain to proposals to changethe immigration status of certain Liberian nationals and to cancel certain Liberian national debts.Liberia-related bills introduced in the 108th Congress include H.Con.Res. 240 ; H.Con.Res. 233 ; H.Con.Res. 255 ; H.J.Res. 2 ; H.R. 2673 ; H.R. 1930 ; H.R. 3918 ; H.R. 3289 ; H.R. 2800 ; H.R. 4511 ; H.R. 4793 ; H.R. 4818 ; H.R. 4885 ; S. 2812 ; S. 1426 ; and S. 656 . |
crs_RL33709 | crs_RL33709_0 | North Korea Conducts a Nuclear Test
On October 9, 2006, North Korea (formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. President Bush and other U.S. officials immediately condemned the test and called for a swift response from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states' compliance with the guidelines. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China; China reportedly supplies about 70% of North Korea's fuel. Possible North Korean Motivations
Determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon now. Possible Medium and Long-term Implications
The short-term implications of North Korea's nuclear test are clear: whether a technical success or failure, North Korea's willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates that it is willing to endure the potential consequences. The ministry added, "We made nuclear weapons because of a nuclear threat from the United States." Nuclear Arms Race in Asia
Many regional experts fear that the nuclear test will stimulate an arms race in the region. Goals and Policy Options
The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack—either nuclear or conventional—on the United States or on its allies in the region. The policy involves a combination of diplomatic and economic pressures on the regime. Following North Korea's announcement of a test, President Bush stated that "The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action." | On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war. China and South Korea, the top aid providers to and trade partners with the North, supported the resolution itself, but have been unwilling to cut off other economic cooperation and aid considered crucial to the regime. The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states' compliance with the guidelines. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China, which reportedly supplies about 70% of North Korea's fuel.
Determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon. Possible motivations include an attempt to engage the United States in bilateral talks, to ensure the security of the regime, and to satisfy hard-line elements within the Pyongyang government, as well as technical motivations for carrying out a nuclear test.
The short-term implications of North Korea's nuclear test are clear: whether a technical success or failure, North Korea's willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates that it is willing to endure the potential consequences. Analysts fear that the medium and long-term implications could include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, a nuclear arms race in Asia, and the transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or groups hostile to the United States. There are also strong concerns about the impact on the global nonproliferation regime, particularly to other states poised to develop their own nuclear weapon programs.
The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack—either nuclear or conventional—on the United States or on its allies in the region. The options available to U.S. policymakers to pursue these goals include the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power, bilateral or multilateral negotiations, heightened legal and economic pressure on North Korea, adoption of a regime change policy through non-military means, military action or threats, and withdrawal from the conflict.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL34742 | crs_RL34742_0 | The role for Congress in this financial crisis is multifaceted. The overall issue seems to be how to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets to promote the general well-being of the country while protecting taxpayer interests and facilitating business operations without creating a moral hazard. Congress also has a role to play in preventing future crises through legislative, oversight, and domestic regulatory functions. Congress also plays a role in measures to reform the international financial system, in recapitalizing international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, in replenishing funds for poverty reduction arms of the World Bank (International Development Association) and regional development banks, and in providing economic and humanitarian assistance to countries in need. In Congress, numerous bills have been introduced that deal with issues such as establishing a commission/select committee to investigate causes of the financial crisis, provide oversight and greater accountability of Federal Reserve and Treasury lending activity, deal with problems in the housing and mortgage markets, provide funding for the International Monetary Fund, address problems with consumer credit cards, provide for improved oversight for financial and commodities markets, deal with the U.S. national debt, and establish a systemic risk monitor. The third G-20 Summit was held in Pittsburgh on September 24-25, 2009. On June 17, 2009, the Department of the Treasury presented the Obama Administration proposal for financial regulatory reform. The proposals focus on five areas (and proposed legislation) as indicated below. a. 4173 , The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that addresses many of the issues raised by the financial crisis. Systemic Risk Regulator . Derivatives Regulation . 3126 would establish a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). Four Phases of the Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis as it has played out in countries across the globe has been manifest in four overlapping phases. Nearly every industrialized country and many developing and emerging market countries have pursued some or all of these actions. 1424 / P.L. Coping with Macroeconomic Effects
The second phase of this financial crisis is less uncommon except that the severity of the macroeconomic downturn confronting countries around the world is the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In order to coordinate reforms in national regulatory systems and give such proposals political backing, world leaders began a series of international meetings to address changes in policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement. In this third phase, the immediate issues to be addressed by the United States and other nations center on "fixing the system" and preventing future crises from occurring. Dealing with Political, Social, and Security Effects65
The fourth phase of the financial crisis is in dealing with political, social, and security effects of the financial turmoil . On June 24, 2009. New Challenges and Policy in Managing Financial Risk83
The Challenges
The actions of the United States and other nations in coping with the global financial crisis first aimed to contain the contagion, minimize losses to society, restore confidence in financial institutions and instruments, and lubricate the economic system in order for it to return to full operation. China's rebound has been particularly striking. Numerous sectors have been hard hit. This approach has been adopted by the Obama administration. December 1 . "We are not now interested in that." Emerging and developing economies. All profits came from the financial sector. Expropriation would be a last resort only. 111-5 . The U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( H.R. January . | The world appears to be recovering from the global recession that has caused widespread business contraction, increases in unemployment, and shrinking government revenues. Although the industrialized economies have stopped contracting, for many, unemployment is still rising. The United States likely hit bottom in June 2009, but numerous small banks and households still face huge problems in restoring their balance sheets, and unemployment has combined with sub-prime loans to keep home foreclosures at a high rate. Nearly all industrialized countries and many emerging and developing nations avoided dropping into another "Great Depression" by implementing sizable economic stimulus and/or financial sector rescue packages, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Several countries have resorted to borrowing from the International Monetary Fund as a last resort. The crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses in financial systems worldwide, demonstrated how interconnected and interdependent economies are today, and has posed vexing policy dilemmas.
The process for coping with the crisis by countries across the globe has been manifest in four basic phases. The first has been intervention to contain the contagion and restore confidence in the system. The second has been coping with the secondary effects of the crisis, particularly the global recession and flight of capital from countries in emerging markets and elsewhere that have been affected by the crisis. The third phase of this process is to make changes in the financial system to reduce risk and prevent future crises. In order to give these proposals political backing, world leaders have called for international meetings to address changes in policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement. On September 24-25, 2009, heads of the G-20 nations met in Pittsburgh to address the global financial crisis. The fourth phase of the process is dealing with political, social, and security effects of the financial turmoil. One such effect is the strengthened role of China in financial markets.
The role for Congress in this financial crisis is multifaceted. While the recent focus has been on combating the recession, the ultimate issue perhaps is how to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets to promote the general well-being of the country while protecting taxpayer interests and facilitating business operations without creating a moral hazard. In addition to preventing future crises through legislative, oversight, and domestic regulatory functions, On June 17, 2009, the Obama Administration presented a proposal for financial regulatory reform that focuses on five areas and includes establishing the Federal Reserve as a systemic risk regulator, creating a Council of Regulators, regulating all financial derivatives, creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, improving coordination and oversight of international financial markets, and other provisions. The reform agenda now has moved to Congress with legislation that addresses many of the issues in the Obama plan but also includes other financial issues. Among the numerous bills in Congress addressing the financial crisis, H.R. 4173 (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, passed the House on December 1, 2009) addresses many of the concerns raised. Congress also plays a role in measures to reform and recapitalize the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks.
This report provides a historical account and analysis of the crisis through January 2010. For information on current aspects of the crisis, see other CRS reports. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS21687 | crs_RS21687_0 | Political and Economic Situation
In the past decade, Ecuador has weathered a number of political and economic crises. In late 1999, then-president Jamil Mahuad abandoned the country's domestic currency in favor of the U.S. dollar as a last-ditch effort to stop hyperinflation. The Correa Presidency
On January 15, 2007, Rafael Correa, a left-leaning, U.S.-trained economist, began a four-year term as President of Ecuador. Constituent Assembly
President Correa has carried out his campaign pledge to enact constitutional reform. On April 15, 2007, 82% of Ecuadorians approved a referendum to convene a Constituent Assembly with the power to rewrite the country's constitution and dismiss its current elected officials. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in September 2007. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Correa's populist tendencies, his ties with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and his state-centered economic policies. On October 16, 2008, the 110 th Congress enacted legislation to extend ATPA trade preferences until December 31, 2009 for Colombia and Peru, and until June 30, 2009 for Bolivia and Ecuador ( P.L. | Ecuador, a small, oil-producing country in the Andean region of South America, has experienced ten years of political and economic instability. On January 15, 2007, Rafael Correa, a left-leaning, U.S.-trained economist, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term, becoming the country's eighth president in ten years. President Correa has fulfilled his campaign pledge to call a Constituent Assembly to reform the country's constitution. The Assembly, which had a majority of delegates elected from Correa's party, drafted a new constitution that was approved by 64% of voters in a referendum held in late September 2008. New presidential, legislative, and municipal elections are scheduled for April 26, 2009. Some observers are concerned that the new constitution concentrates too much power in the Ecuadorian presidency. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about President Correa's populist tendencies, ties with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and trade and energy policies. Despite those concerns, Congress enacted legislation in October 2008 to extend U.S. trade preferences for Ecuador through June 2009. For more information, see CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_98-288 | crs_98-288_0 | The chart below lists various federal excise taxes on retailers and manufacturers, the location of the tax in the Internal Revenue Code, a general rule as to who has to pay the tax, and a listing of statutory exemptions, with an indication of whether there are special exemptions for federal agencies. The extent to which each of these exemptions applies to the relevant excise taxes is noted below. | This report consists of a chart of selected federal excise taxes that apply to sales of goods and services. The chart is divided into two columns. The first indicates how the taxes are imposed, and the second contains a general listing of statutory exemptions, with a special emphasis on whether there are statutory exemptions for federal agencies. This report does not cover such details as how the tax revenues are used, tax rates, effective dates, or sunset dates. The report does not cover payroll taxes such as social security, Medicare, or unemployment taxes, nor does it include excise taxes which are used to regulate tax-exempt organizations or the excise tax on greenmail. The report does not cover expired taxes, such as those known as the superfund taxes.
If available, CRS Reports containing more detailed information are cited in connection with each tax mentioned. |
crs_RL32511 | crs_RL32511_0 | The law allows U.S. pharmacists and wholesalers to do so only if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) first certifies that those drugs would be safe and that the program lowered drug costs for U.S. consumers. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007
For the past few years, Members have tried to use the agriculture appropriations bill (which includes FDA) to get around administrative blocks to prescription drug importation. The act required that, before publishing implementing regulations to put the import provisions into effect, the Secretary must first:
... demonstrate[s] to Congress that the implementation of this section will (1) pose no additional risk to the public's health and safety; and (2) result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer. The Secretary would have to promulgate regulations that:
allow a pharmacist or a wholesaler to import prescription drugs from Canada; waive the law's restrictions on personal use imports, so an individual could import a 90-day supply of a prescription drug from Canada; and continue the ban on the importation of personal-use drugs from any other country unless the Secretary granted, by regulation or on a case-by-case basis, personal-use waivers to individuals. Encouragement from States and Municipalities
Several states and municipalities are looking at ways to control expenditures for prescription drugs in their Medicaid budgets and for employees and retirees. They are pursuing legislative, judicial, and administrative approaches. Some states—such as Minnesota and Wisconsin—have created websites to direct U.S. consumers to Canadian sources; several Governors have proposed pilot import programs to gain information about the savings benefits. As public discussions of the bills introduced in the 110 th Congress build, updates of this report will reflect them. A striking difference between these bills and current law is their elimination of the provision that has so far been the chief obstacle to imports: HHS Secretary certifications about risk and cost. Opponents of legalization say it would. Registration . Enforcement includes ongoing and onsite physical monitoring of a drug's manufacturer, registered exporters and importers, and records of all transactions involving the drug. Several bills require that medications from overseas come in anti-tampering and anti-counterfeit packaging. The Dorgan-Emerson bills mandate that the FDA, during inspections, verify the chain of custody of a statistically significant sample of the drugs that are to be imported. How would they react to the new laws? Variables concerning patent law and international trade agreements may influence decisions despite being seemingly unrelated to FDA's responsibility for drug safety and efficacy and some Members of Congress and the public's concerns about drug cost to consumers. Australia is listed as a "permitted country" in two of the three pairs of import bills discussed in this report. If Congress wants to lower the cost of drugs to U.S. consumers, there are options—some more feasible than others—other than importation. These include encouraging the use of generics and disease management techniques, providing research and development incentives to industry, studying the comparative effectiveness of similar drugs and applying that information judiciously in benefit package and prescribing decisions, instituting price controls or other regulatory measures on prescription drugs in this country, encouraging more market action (such as with purchasing agreements), encouraging reciprocal arrangements with other nations' regulatory authorities, and promoting or providing insurance coverage for pharmaceuticals to a wider population than have it today. | Can purchases from abroad lower the cost of prescription drugs to U.S. consumers? Current law allows pharmacists and wholesalers to import prescription drugs from Canada commercially, and codifies the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) current practice of allowing imports of prescription drugs by individuals under certain defined circumstances. There is, however, one proviso. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must first certify that the drugs to be imported under the program would "pose no additional risk to the public's health and safety; and result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer"—a step no Secretary has been willing to take.
FDA has argued that it is impossible to monitor the millions of transactions and guarantee that these drugs would be safe. Meanwhile, some states and municipalities, looking at ways to control their expenditures for prescription drugs, have created websites to direct U.S. consumers to Canadian sources, and several state Governors have proposed pilot import programs. In October 2006, Congress took limited action regarding personal-use importation. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, blocks Customs and Border Protection from using those funds to stop an individual's importing, for personal use, a limited supply of a drug that meets FDA standards.
Drug importation was addressed in three pairs of comprehensive bills in the 109th Congress, none of which saw legislative action. To date, two revised versions have been introduced in the 110th (S. 242/H.R. 380 and S. 251). All would allow commercial and personal-use imports and replace the need for HHS Secretary certification with different ways to assure safety and effectiveness, among them requiring tamper-resistant and anti-counterfeit packaging; inspecting samples of imported drugs; requiring registration of importers, exporters, and Internet pharmacies; and enforcing extensive chain-of-custody monitoring and documentation. They also present different approaches for influencing industry response. Updates of this report will address bills and continuing discussions in the 110th Congress.
Opponents of the legislation raise concerns about safety, added costs, the feasibility of imports as a long-term solution to high domestic prices, and whether, beyond the short term, U.S. consumers would pay less for their prescription drugs. Other points of contention include issues of patent law and international trade agreements.
This report examines these issues, spells out how they are treated from bill to bill, and refers to the following alternatives to importation that might ease the burden of prescription drug costs on consumers: use of generics and disease management techniques; research and development incentives to industry; study of the drugs' comparative effectiveness and judicious application of the findings to benefit package and prescribing decisions; and assumption of some of the consumers' cost. |
crs_R44591 | crs_R44591_0 | The Tamar Field off the Israeli coast was the first of a series of large-scale natural gas discoveries in the region. Significant subsequent discoveries have been made in Israel (Leviathan), Cyprus (Aphrodite), and Egypt (Zohr), while Lebanon has been actively trying to assess its resources. For the Eastern Mediterranean, this has meant a slowdown in developing some of the natural gas that has been discovered, delaying the exploration for new discoveries, and requiring greater effort to find markets for the region's natural gas. Most electricity in Cyprus is generated by oil-fired power plants. Cyprus currently has no natural gas infrastructure. The lack of natural gas infrastructure on the island makes it difficult and potentially costly for Cyprus to utilize gas from the Aphrodite Field domestically. Doing so would require the construction of both overland pipelines in Cyprus to deliver the gas and power plants or industrial facilities that could use the gas. Oil is also a major component of Egypt's domestic energy mix. Zohr Field—A Big Find
The supergiant Zohr Field was discovered in August 2015 by Eni SPA, an Italian company. Repeated attacks on the Arab Gas pipeline from Egypt, which has supplied Lebanon with gas in the past, have made it infeasible for Lebanon to import natural gas. There are a number of factors in Lebanon that could potentially inhibit future progress on the exploration and development of possible gas resources. It is possible that the disputed area could be the cause of additional tension between Israel and Lebanon as Israel continues to develop its gas reserves. The discovery of the Tamar, Dalit, and Leviathan fields by U.S.-based Noble Energy in 2009 and 2010 created the potential for Israel to become a net exporter of natural gas. It could also increase Israel's energy security in the long term by creating the potential for Israel to become a net exporter of natural gas. There are a number of possible destinations in the region for Israeli natural gas exports, which may have geopolitical benefits. Egypt is seeking additional sources of gas, and the Tamar consortium, which includes U.S. Noble Energy, has already signed an agreement with a private Egyptian firm promising to provide Egypt with natural gas via an undersea pipeline. Although Israeli gas imports are politically unpopular in Egypt, Cairo has indicated that it will not intervene in private agreements to import Israeli gas. Exporting gas to Turkey via pipeline could allow Israeli gas to reach the European market and supply markets in Turkey. U.S. Interest in the Region's Natural Gas Development
Although the United States is essentially independent in its natural gas resources, it has expressed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources, particularly in the development of Israel's resources. Congress and the Obama Administration have undertaken a variety of efforts in regard to the region's natural gas. The State Department has been actively engaged in mediating the maritime dispute between Lebanon and Israel. | Since 2009, a series of large natural gas discoveries in the Levant Basin have altered the dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean region. Israel's discovery of the Tamar Field and subsequent discovery of the larger Leviathan Field created the potential for the country to become a regional player in the natural gas market. Since the initial Israeli discoveries, Cyprus and Egypt have also found new gas deposits in the Mediterranean. The Aphrodite Field was discovered by U.S. firm Noble Energy in Cypriot waters in late 2011 and the massive Zohr Field was found in Egyptian waters by Italian firm Eni in 2015.These discoveries create the potential for Cyprus to export gas and for Egypt to meet more of its domestic gas needs. Lebanon has not yet discovered recoverable gas reserves, but geologic data indicates that there is the potential for Lebanon to possess significant gas resources. Israeli gas discoveries have been contested by Lebanon, which disputes an area of about 300 square miles along the countries' unsettled maritime border. The Administration has sought to mediate the maritime dispute between Israel and Lebanon.
New gas reserves could change how energy is used in the region. Since the Tamar find, Israel's electricity energy mix has begun to shift from oil to natural gas-fired power plants. Gas-fired plants emit less carbon than oil-fired plants, and continuing to convert oil plants could help Israel meet long-term carbon emissions goals. The development of gas infrastructure in Cyprus could also help the country transition from oil to gas-fired power generation. A similar shift could also occur in Lebanon should gas be discovered and related infrastructure developed. Lebanon currently uses no natural gas.
Israel now has the potential to become a gas exporter. There are a number of potential buyers for Israeli gas. Egypt, currently facing an energy crisis, will need to import gas to cover domestic demand in the near future. While Israeli gas imports are politically unpopular in Egypt, private Egyptian firms have already begun to negotiate agreements with Noble Energy to import Israeli gas. Jordan is another possible destination for Israeli gas. Repeated attacks on Egypt's Arab Gas Pipeline have decreased Jordan's energy security and increased the need for it to find alternate, reliable sources of gas. Finally, recent progress on improving diplomatic relations has opened the possibility of Israeli gas exports to Turkey. These exports could either be shipped by the construction of a direct pipeline or by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers crossing the Mediterranean.
Although the United States is essentially independent in its natural gas resources, it has expressed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources, particularly in the development of Israel's resources. Congress and the Obama Administration have undertaken a variety of efforts in regard to the region's natural gas. Legislation has been introduced in both Houses of Congress, and has become law, during the last couple of sessions that address the region's natural gas resources. |
crs_RL34504 | crs_RL34504_0 | It included $39 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). House and Senate Consideration
On June 20, 2008 , the Transportation-HUD subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations approved a draft FY2009 HUD appropriations bill by voice vote. According to a press release issued by the subcommittee, the draft bill included the following:
$110 million for new incremental vouchers: $75 million to fund 10,000 new housing vouchers for homeless veterans and $30 million for 4,000 new housing vouchers for the disabled; $75 million for foreclosure counseling and assistance to assist more than 200,000 families at risk of losing their homes; $1.69 billion for Homeless Assistance Grants ($55 million above the President's request); $4 billion for Community Development Block Grants ($1 billion above the President's request); $765 million for housing for the elderly ($225 million above the Administration's request) and $250 million for disabled housing ($90 million above the President's request); and $4.5 billion for the public housing operating account, $2.5 billion for the public housing capital account, and $120 million for HOPE VI (combined, $896 million more than the Presidents' request for the public housing accounts). On July 10, 2008 , the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved its version of the FY2009 Transportation-HUD appropriations bill, following subcommittee approval the previous day ( S. 3261 ). Continuing Resolution, Emergency Funding and Stimulus Legislation
On September 30, 2008 , President Bush signed a continuing resolution (CR) funding most government agencies—including HUD—at their FY2008 levels ( P.L. 110-329 ). Division B of the act provided FY2008 emergency supplemental disaster funding, including:
$85 million to provide new Section 8 vouchers to households affected by the 2005 hurricanes; $50 million in new project-based Section 8 vouchers to be used in areas affected by the 2005 hurricanes; $15 million to redevelop public housing developments damaged by the 2005 hurricanes; and $6.5 billion in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding for communities affected by presidentially declared disasters declared in 2008. 1 , an economic stimulus plan, which included emergency supplemental funding for several HUD programs. Congress did not enact final appropriations before the expiration of the CR, so a second CR was enacted on March 6, 2009 . Surplus FHA funds have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. As a result, the increase in total non-emergency budget authority for HUD from FY2002-FY2008 is not fully attributable to increases in appropriations for HUD's programs and activities; rather, part of the increase in total budget authority is attributable to decreases in the amount available in offsetting receipts. For example, in FY2007, Congress provided $39 billion in regular appropriations for HUD's programs and activities. The 110 th Congress adjourned before work on the FY2009 appropriations acts was complete. That CR was extended through March 11, 2009. On March 11, 2009, a FY2009 omnibus appropriations bill was signed into law, funding HUD for the remainder of the fiscal year ( P.L. 111-8 ). In FY2008, Congress enacted a rescission from the advance appropriations provided in FY2007 for use in FY2008. 111-5 ). HOPE VI
In each budget since FY2003, President Bush requested no new funding for the HOPE VI public housing revitalization program. It also extends the program through the end of FY2009. In addition to requesting reduced funding for CDBG formula grants, the Administration's FY2009 budget proposed eliminating funding for several other community development related programs, including Rural Housing and Economic Development Grants, Community Development Block Grant Section 108 loan guarantees, and Brownfields Economic Development Initiatives. The Bush Administration's FY2009 budget—as in previous years—recommended termination of the Brownfields Redevelopment program. §1701q) and the Section 811 Housing for Persons with Disabilities program (42 U.S.C. President Bush's FY2009 budget requested $51 million for the fair housing programs, an increase of $1 million over the FY2008 level. HUD Funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009 ( P.L. The bill provided over $300 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations. | The FY2009 appropriations process began with President Bush's FY2009 budget request. It included $39 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), an increase of 4% in net budget authority from the FY2008 non-emergency level. That requested increase in net budget authority was largely attributable to a decline in the amount available to offset the HUD budget. The President's budget request would have resulted in an overall decline in appropriations for HUD's programs and activities of just over 1% from the FY2008 level.
Despite the request for an overall decline in appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, the President's FY2009 budget did request increased appropriations in several areas, including project-based Section 8 rental assistance, the HOME Investment Partnerships block grant program, and Homeless Assistance grants. The President's FY2009 budget requested reductions in funding for several programs, including the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program and the Section 811 Housing for Persons with Disabilities program. It proposed eliminating funding for several programs that were funded in FY2008, including the HOPE VI public housing revitalization program, the Brownfields Redevelopment program, Section 108 loan guarantees, and the Rural Housing and Economic Development block grant program. President Bush had also requested no new funding for each of these programs in his FY2004-FY2008 budget requests, although Congress continued to fund them in each of those years.
On June 20, 2008, the Transportation-HUD Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations approved a draft FY2009 Transportation-HUD appropriations bill. The text of that bill was never released. On July 9, 2008, the Transportation-HUD Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved its version of the FY2009 Transportation-HUD appropriations bill; the bill was approved the following day (July 10, 2008) by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (S. 3261). On September 30, 2009, President Bush signed a continuing resolution funding most government agencies, including HUD, at their FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). The CR also provided $150 million in emergency supplemental assisted housing funds for use in areas affected by the 2005 hurricanes and $6.5 billion in emergency supplemental CDBG funding to be used to respond to presidentially declared disasters that took place in 2008.
The final FY2009 appropriations legislation was not enacted before the close of the 110th Congress and the end of the Bush Administration. The 111th Congress enacted a second continuing resolution before the expiration of the first, providing funding through March 11, 2009.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Among other provisions, the bill contained emergency supplemental FY2009 funding for several HUD accounts.
On March 11, 2009, the regular FY2009 appropriations process was completed when an omnibus appropriations bill was signed into law (P.L. 111-8). It provided $41.5 billion for HUD, an increase of 10% in net budget authority from the FY2008 non-emergency level. |
crs_RS22576 | crs_RS22576_0 | It has since spread to Europe and Africa. Health officials are concerned that it could change sufficiently to cause a global human pandemic. Beginning in FY2004, Congress has provided funding specifically for pandemic flu preparedness, through both regular and emergency supplemental appropriations. This report describes federal funding for pandemic flu, primarily to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This report will be updated. The law as enacted provided funds to USAID and the Department of the Interior for avian flu control. | The spread of H5N1 avian influenza ("flu"), and the human deaths it has caused, raise concern that the virus could morph and cause a global human pandemic. Congress has provided specific funding for pandemic flu preparedness since FY2004, including $6.1 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for FY2006. These funds bolster related activities to prepare for public health threats, and to control seasonal flu. This report discusses appropriations for pandemic flu, primarily to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS21168 | crs_RS21168_0 | Introduction
Founded in 1961, the Peace Corps sends American volunteers to serve at the grassroots level in villages and towns across the globe to meet its three-point legislative mandate of promoting world peace and friendship by improving the lives of those they serve, helping others understand American culture, and sharing their experience with Americans back home. As of the end of September 2017, 7,376 volunteers were serving in 65 nations. In 2018, the 115 th Congress may consider the President's FY2019 funding request for the Peace Corps, changes to the Peace Corps authorization legislation, and related issues. 115-256 ). Safety and Security
The safety and security of volunteers has long been a prime concern of the Peace Corps. A victims advocate position is established to assist sexually assaulted volunteers and facilitate access to available services. 83 , P.L. The Sam Farr and Nick Castle Peace Corps Reform Act of 2018, which became law in October 2018, requires the Peace Corps to consult with experts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention about recommended malaria prophylaxis and authorizes the Peace Corps to provide medical benefits to returned volunteers who are injured during their service for 120 days after termination of service. | Founded in 1961, the Peace Corps has sought to meet its legislative mandate of promoting world peace and friendship by sending American volunteers to serve at the grassroots level in villages and towns in all corners of the globe. As of the end of September 2017, about 7,376 volunteers were serving in 65 nations.
In 2018, the 115th Congress has considered and may again consider several issues related to the Peace Corps, including the President's annual funding request for the Peace Corps and changes to the Peace Corps authorization legislation. The Sam Farr and Nick Castle Peace Corps Reform Act of 2018, P.L. 115-256, signed into law on October 9, 2018, includes provisions to improve volunteer medical care, both at post and after service; extend the allowable period of service for certain Peace Corps positions; establish the frequency, scope, and reporting requirements for impact surveys of volunteers; and improve advocacy for volunteers who are the victims of crimes, among other things.
Current issues include the extent to which there is available funding for Peace Corps expansion, whether volunteers are able to function in a safe and secure environment, volunteer access to abortion, and other issues. |
crs_RL32907 | crs_RL32907_0 | (1) Although the Senate bill is more detailed, they address many of the same issues, most of which relateto the USA PATRIOT Act -- roving Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretaps, delayednotification of "sneak and peek" search warrants, library and similar exemptions from FISA tangibleitem orders and communications related to national security letters, the definition of "domesticterrorism," and expansion of the sunset provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. Limitations on Delayed Notice Search Warrants. Amend. Reports. Both bills restrict the temporary FISA tangible things access orders to instances where thereare specific and articulable reasons to believe that the records pertain to a foreign power or one ormore of its agents, proposed 50 U.S.C. The Senate bill alone provides that the ordermay be no more sweeping than a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued in the context of anespionage or international terrorism investigation ( i.e. TheSenate bill adds: (1) exceptions and 180 day time limits to the nondisclosure feature (with thepossibility of 180 day extensions), (2) a procedure to allow a recipient to quash or modify an order,and (3) use provisions comparable to those that apply to the use of information generated by FISAsurveillance and physical search orders, proposed 50 U.S.C. H.R. Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended three of the four provisions (18 U.S.C.2709, 12 U.S.C. 1526. H.R. 1681u) to the list of USA PATRIOT Actprovisions that expire on December 31, 2005. S. 737. Within each of the national security letter statutes, it:
- reestablishes the demand that the information sought be based on specific and articulablefacts that suggest that the information sought pertains to a foreign power or one or more ofits agents;
- sets a 90 day time limit for the gag orders based on exigent circumstances (with thepossibility of 180 day extensions available from the court on the same basis);
- permits recipients to challenge both the request and gag orders in court;
- holds the letters to same standards that apply to grand jury subpoenas duces tecum issuedin espionage or international terrorism cases ( i.e. H.R. (S. 737 only) Privacy Protections for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices. 1526. C. S. 737. (H.R. Section 224 of the USAPATRIOT Act creates an expiration date (December 31, 2005) for the sections found in Title II ofthe Act, but exempts from termination several including sections 213 (delayed notification of theexecution of search warrant (sneak and peek warrants)), 216 (use of trap and trace devices and penregisters for law enforcement purpose), 219 (nation-wide service of terrorism search warrants). (S. 737 only) Public Reporting of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. -- As used in this section . | Two SAFE Acts, S. 737 and H.R. 1526 address some of the issuesraised by the USA PATRIOT Act. They amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)to require that FISA surveillance orders particularly identify either the target or the facilities or placestargeted. They limit delayed notification of sneak and peek searches to cases involving exigentcircumstances (injury, flight, destruction of evidence, witness intimidation risks) and cap the extentof permissible delay. Both bills restrict FISA access orders to instances where there are specific andarticulable reasons to believe that the records pertain to a foreign power or one or more of its agents.
S. 737 alone provides that the order may be no more sweeping than a grand jurysubpoena duces tecum issued in the context of an espionage or international terrorism investigation. It also adds: exceptions and time limits to the nondisclosure feature, a procedure to allow a recipientto quash or modify an order, and use provisions comparable to those that apply to the use ofinformation generated by FISA surveillance and physical search orders. H.R. 1526 exempts libraries from the national security letter (nsl) coverage of 18 U.S.C. 2709, and adds section505 of the USA PATRIOT Act to the list of provisions that expire on December 31, 2005. S. 737 rewrites each of the four nsl statutes with enhanced standards, time limits, gagorder restrictions, scope, and suppression features.
Both bills incorporate the definition of federal crimes of terrorism into the definition ofdomestic terrorism.
S. 737 expands the safeguards associated with the court approved use of penregisters and trap and trace devices. H.R. 1526 adds four sections to the inventory ofexpiring USA PATRIOT Act sections (213 (delayed notice of sneak and peek searches), 216 (trapand trace devices and pen registers for law enforcement purpose), 219 (boundless service ofterrorism search warrants), and 505 (national security letters)). S. 737 amends FISA torequire more extensive public reports concerning its use.
This report appears in abridged form as CRS Report RS22140 , The SAFE Acts of 2005: H.R.1526 and S. 737 -- A Sketch . |
crs_R40590 | crs_R40590_0 | Researchers do not know all risks at the time FDA first approves a drug for marketing. Balanced . The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA, P.L. 110-85 ) included some of those provisions, such as new industry fees for the advisory review of DTC television ads; expanded authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to require certain disclosures and statements; and civil monetary penalties for false or misleading ads. In 2007, they accounted for over 90% of spending. In 1962, Congress added Section 502(n) to the FFDCA to give the FDA the authority to regulate not only labeling, but also prescription drug advertising, including DTC advertisements, and other descriptive printed matter. However, Congress prohibited ("except in extraordinary circumstances") FDA from issuing any regulations that would require prior approval of the content of any advertisement. Under them, advertisements had to have four basic attributes:
(1) they could not be false or misleading;
(2) they had to present a fair balance of information about the drug's risks and benefits;
(3) they had to contain facts relevant to the product's advertised uses; and
(4) in general, the advertisement's "brief summary" of the drug had to include every risk listed in the product's approved labeling. When FDA wrote the 1969 regulations, industry advertised its drugs to physicians through print ads in medical journals. The guidance made clear that DTC broadcast advertisements had to include what FDA called the "major statement"—the product's most important risks. This had to be in the audio portion of the advertisement, and could be in the video portion as well. Letters. Does DTC advertising lead to better diagnosis, treatment, or disease management? Industry wants to increase sales, and consumers want to actively participate in decisions about their own health. Legislators with concerns about DTC advertising still have a range of options to address those concerns. Activities for Which FDA Already Has Authority
Congress could urge FDA to act more aggressively in its review of ad content, consumer education, and enforcement. Increase Post-Publication Review
Although the law explicitly prohibits FDA from requiring pre-publication review and approval of an ad, it does require the manufacturer to submit the ad to FDA upon its release. FDA could:
Do a more complete and timely post-publication review of all DTC ads. Expand Industry-Independent Consumer Education
Critics who question the educational component of DTC advertisement have suggested alternatives to consumers' relying on the benefit and risk information gained through submitted DTC ads. FDA could also use that information to provide patients with medication guides outlining the risks of particular drugs. Congress could encourage FDA to take such steps more often, use the new FDAAA-authorized tools, and even set target goals for increased enforcement activity. The most extreme would be a total ban on DTC drug advertising. These include additional warnings to inform consumers that this drug was approved based on testing of only a few thousand people and that it may be dangerous to your health in ways that this limited research has not yet revealed; a statement that FDA does not certify that this drug is more effective, safer or cheaper than other drugs in its class; changes to the tax code to make DTC advertising expenses not deductible and to add a windfall profits tax to fund NIH-controlled comparative effectiveness studies and their dissemination. Require Pre-Release Review and Approval
Congress could mandate that FDA review and approve all or a subset of DTC ads prior to their release to the public. | A phenomenon that has become more and more important over the last decade, direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising has grown from about $800 million in 1996 to over $4.7 billion in 2007. Its supporters point to more informed consumers who then visit their doctors and become more involved in their own treatment, leading to better and earlier diagnosis of undertreated illnesses. The critics believe that industry's presentation of the balance of drug benefit and risk information may encourage the inappropriate use of advertised products and lead to higher than necessary spending. In addition to concerns with accuracy and balance, health professionals point out that DTC ads rarely mention alternative treatments, such as other or generic medications or non-drug interventions.
In 1962, Congress gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) certain authorities to regulate prescription drug advertising. Except in extreme circumstances, the law does not allow FDA to require pre-release review of ads. Regulations—written at a time when most ads were printed in medical journals for a physician audience—require that all drug ads disclose all of a drug's known risks.
However, as drug makers considered moving into broadcast advertising and wanted to get their messages to consumers, they noted, without explicit guidance from FDA, the difficulty in including all risks in the format of a 30-second commercial. FDA issued guidance in 1999 stipulating that broadcast ads had to include the advertised product's most important risks in the audio portion of the advertisement and should give sources where more complete risk information about a drug would be available.
FDA reviews ads once they are launched, and its enforcement options are notice-of-violation and warning letters, criminal prosecution (through the Department of Justice), civil monetary penalties, product seizures, and withdrawal of approval for sale. Despite these activities, Members of Congress and the public ask what FDA could do differently in light of the safety problems involving some heavily advertised medications.
Congress could consider a variety of options to allay concerns about DTC drug advertising. It could encourage FDA to expand activities allowed under current legislative authority, including provisions in P.L. 110-85 (the FDA Amendments Act of 2007): FDA could increase post-publication review of ads, expand its role in consumer education, and increase its enforcement activities. Other possible options would require Congress to grant new authority so that FDA could require pre-release review and approval; require changes to ads; use stronger enforcement tools; require data collection; require public posting of risk information; prohibit DTC ads when a drug is first approved; and set limits on the timing and placement of ads. Congress could go beyond FDA to encourage other industry-independent entities to provide public education or set standards; it could also use tax and other financial incentives to make DTC advertising less profitable to industry.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL31871 | crs_RL31871_0 | One "think tank" report on Iraq stated thatsecurity needs in the post-war period "cannot be underestimated." (10)
What Security Tasks Must Be Performed? (13) Especially inearly post-conflict situations, protecting civilians andproperty from common crime may require a mix of military and policing skills. One crucial issue for U.S. policymakers will be who is to perform these tasks, particularly if U.S. armed forces do not? Related questions are when and to what degree Iraqimilitary and police, and possibly U.S. contracted or international police, partner with U.S. forces ortake over the various security tasks. Police Forces. (18)
In addition to the military forces and military police contributed by many countries to peacekeeping operations, several other types of forces have been used to provide security. Military Occupation Forces: How Large? How Long? The size of a military occupation force, and the length of time that it should remain in place in support of an occupation government depends on many factors. occupation, and cooperation from local police forces was high. (37) ) The use of such forces hasvaried in previous peacekeeping operations. (38) These are: (1) the appropriate role forthe United Nations in the transition; (2) the feasibility of establishing democracy in Iraq; and (3) theappropriate time frame and stages in which a transition to full Iraqi rule would occur, particularlythe length of time in which the U.S. military would head an occupation government. Who Should Form a Post War Government for Iraq? The debate on the appropriate role for the United Nations is influenced by (1) considerations as to whether the United Nations Security Council's resistance to endorsing coalition military actionagainst Iraq is a significant indicator of its behavior in post-Hussein Iraq, (2) the comparativeadvantages of the United Nations and of the United States in harnessing international support fora future government, and (3) the United Nations' performance in past and current peacebuildingoperations. Proponents of a continuing U.S. lead in Iraq's political development believe that the United Nations has previously demonstrated a lack of the political will necessary to deal with securitythreats posed by the Hussein regime, and would prove an obstacle to securing U.S. security goals ifit were to play a deciding role in Iraq's political future. (47)
What are the Possibilities of and Means to Achieving Democracy? Others,however, point to Iraq's lack of significant prior experience with democratic institutions as aliability. (49)
Since the early 1980s, there has been a growing international interest in assisting the development of democratic institutions and practices, of which assistance through peacebuildingoperations has been a recent manifestation. In addition to the security tasks listed in the previous section, some analysts of peacekeeping and peacebuildingoperations cite the immediate creation of institutions to guarantee the rule of law as essential to theestablishment of a secure climate in which democracy can prosper. (59)
Role of Civic Society and Local Participation. Some analysts now argue that the Afghan arrangementscan provide a model for the formation of a government in Iraq. And, onefundamental requirement for such effective peacekeeping, according to some analysts, is that suchoperations include all "local stakeholders -- including those who have been the victims of war aswell as those who have been the perpetrators of war -- [and put them] at the center of externalsupport for rebuilding..." (74) In Iraq, too,powersharing arrangements may be useful in gaininglegitimacy for a new government and in curbing potential strife or violence among contendingfactions. (80)
How Long Is a Peacebuilding Presence Necessary? | In the immediate aftermath of the coalition victory in Iraq, U.S. policymakers face a number of decisions regarding security and government in post-war Iraq. While there are significantdifferences between the Iraq situation and other post-war experiences, observations and "lessonslearned" from such experiences might be relevant. This report will discuss six security andgovernance issues raised by previous experiences, with particular reference to U.S. post-World WarII occupation experiences and also peacekeeping experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It maybe updated as new issues arise for which assessments of previous experiences might be useful.
Previous experience suggests three key decisions on security in post-war Iraq which policymakers must take. These are: (1) what security tasks must be performed, (2) who shouldperform them, and (3) how large should an occupation military force be, and how long should itremain? Many tasks must be performed in order to guarantee the security of citizens and propertyin the post-conflict environment, several of which require "constabulary" forces, i.e., thosepossessing both military and policing skills. In previous major U.S. occupations, U.S. soldiersinitially performed most policing tasks, turning them over to indigenous police as the situationallowed. In the 1990s, peacekeepers increasingly assumed policing functions as the need toguarantee security for property and citizens in the aftermath of conflict became apparent. Manyanalysts have argued that policing functions are not appropriate for U.S. forces, as they can erodewarfighting and many also believe that appropriately trained civilian police are often preferable. The lack of such personnel, however, has been a problem in current peacekeeping operations. Thesize of an occupation force, and the length of time that it should remain in place during anoccupation government depends on many factors, including in particular the tasks it undertakes andthe cooperation it receives from Iraqis.
Policymakers must also decide what type of assistance to provide Iraq in creating a new government and supporting institutions to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the Husseingovernment. Three issues are: (1) who should form a post-war government for Iraq, (2) what arethe possibilities of and means to achieving democracy in Iraq, and (3) how long is a peacebuildingpresence necessary? While the U.S. government has taken charge of the formation of a new Iraqigovernment, with the intent of encouraging the creation of democratic institutions and practices,some analysts believe that the possibilities for creating a viable and democratic Iraqi governmentwould be enhanced if the United Nations were to assume that role. Some senior U.S. officials hadcontemplated an occupation of some two years, which some experience suggests may be inadequateto create stable institutions. Studies of past peacekeeping experiences point to the special need forconsiderable attention to building capacities to assure the rule of law, conducting elections at anappropriate time, and possibly providing for interim powersharing arrangements. Some have alsoadvocated creating or supporting channels for political participation by civic society and localgroups. |
crs_R41509 | crs_R41509_0 | The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), is authorized to exchange land or interests in land under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), as amended by the Federal Land Exchange Facilitation Act of 1988 (FLEFA), as well as under other authorities. Additional information is contained in BLM's Land Exchange Handbook and various agency instruction memoranda. Additionally, Congress sometimes enacts legislation authorizing and governing specific land exchanges. Legislated land exchanges generally follow the process and procedures outlined in this report, unless the statute provides otherwise. Pros and Cons of Land Exchanges
Exchanges can be used to change the "checkerboard" pattern of federal, state, and privately owned lands in the West that resulted from early land grants. Land consolidation can increase the efficiency of land management and decrease management costs. Audits were performed by GAO, the DOI Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Appraisal Foundation (TAF). Public Interest
Land exchanges must be in the public interest. Equal Value
Under FLPMA, the values of the lands exchanged are to be equal or, if they are not equal, they are to be equalized by the payment of money up to 25% of the value of the federal lands conveyed in the exchange. Costs
Typically, BLM and other parties share equally in the administrative costs of an exchange, for instance, by sharing the cost of land appraisal, mineral examinations, and cultural resource surveys and by addressing deficiencies preventing highest and best use of the land. Assembled Land Exchanges
BLM regulations define an assembled land exchange as consolidation of multiple parcels of federal or nonfederal land for the purpose of one or more exchange transactions over a period of time. Management of Exchanged Lands
Lands acquired by BLM by exchange become public lands and are to be managed under existing law, regulations, and land-use plans. The exchange process typically occurs in five phases: (1) development of a land exchange proposal, (2) feasibility evaluation, (3) processing and documentation, (4) decision analysis and approval, and (5) title transfer. This phase includes title review; public notice and comment; identification and resolution of environmental issues under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA); assessments of mineral, cultural, and other resources; Native American consultations; threatened and endangered species consultations; and preparation and review of appraisals. The environmental analysis under NEPA and the appraisal often are the most challenging and time-consuming activities. Prior to 2009, concerns centered on the benefits to the public, determinations of market value, and contradictions in policies and procedures. For instance, with regard to appraisals, a Secretarial Order signed on May 21, 2010, made changes in the organization and operation of the appraisal services function. Issues for Congress
A key issue for Congress is the extent to which the reorganization of the appraisal function and the implementation of other appraisal and exchange reforms addressed perceived problems and improved land transactions. Despite the reforms implemented by BLM and DOI, continuing questions include whether to amend the FLPMA exchange authority or to discontinue exchanges. | The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conducts land exchanges with other land owners to acquire and dispose of land. The agency is authorized to conduct land exchanges under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976. Additionally, Congress sometimes enacts legislation authorizing and governing specific land exchanges.
FLPMA governs how administrative exchanges are to occur. For instance, land exchanges must be in the public interest, and the federal and nonfederal lands in the exchange are to be in the same state. Further, the values of the lands exchanged are to be equal, although payments to equalize value may be made under specified terms. Typically, BLM and the other parties share equally in the administrative costs. While some exchanges involve single parcels, assembled land exchanges consist of a consolidation of multiple parcels for one or more exchanges over time. Lands acquired by BLM by exchange become public lands managed under existing authorities.
The land exchange process generally has five phases: development of an exchange proposal, feasibility evaluation, processing and documentation, decision analysis and approval, and title transfer. Each phase typically involves multiple actions. For example, processing and documentation includes title review; public notice and comment; identification and resolution of environmental issues; assessments of mineral, cultural, and other resources; Native American consultations; threatened and endangered species consultations; and preparation of land appraisals. The appraisal and environmental analysis often are the most challenging and time-consuming parts of the process. Legislated exchanges generally follow this process as well, unless otherwise directed by Congress.
In the past, some BLM land exchanges were controversial. Concerns during the 2000-2009 decade centered on benefits to the public, determinations of market value, contradictions in policies and procedures, delays in appraisals, and various aspects of the exchange process. These topics were the subject of various governmental and nongovernmental reports, for instance by the Government Accountability Office (2000, 2006, and 2009), the Appraisal Foundation (2002), Interior appropriators (2009), and the Office of Inspector General of the Department of the Interior (DOI, 2009). In response, BLM and DOI implemented changes to the appraisal and exchange processes. For instance, BLM formed and adopted the recommendations of the Appraisal and Exchange Workgroup. Later, BLM also issued instruction memoranda on land exchanges containing additional policies and guidance. As another example, the Secretary of the Interior changed the organization and operation of the appraisal services function.
A key issue for Congress is the extent to which the reforms to the exchange process and appraisal function addressed perceived problems and improved land transactions. Other issues for Congress are whether to amend BLM's exchange authority or to discontinue BLM's administrative exchanges. Opponents of exchanges view them as inherently difficult and thus favor other authorities to sell or exchange land. Supporters continue to view administrative exchanges as useful to change the "checkerboard" pattern of land ownership in the West and to increase the efficiency of land management while decreasing management costs. |
crs_R42049 | crs_R42049_0 | On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed legislation that effectively overturned two recent decisions by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims finding that they have jurisdiction over protests challenging the issuance of task and delivery orders of any size under civilian agency contracts, even if these orders do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Prior to these decisions, executive branch agencies and many commentators had construed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008, as authorizing only protests concerning the issuance of orders under civilian agency contracts that (1) increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract or (2) were valued in excess of $10 million, as well as granting GAO temporary exclusive jurisdiction over protests involving the latter. However, GAO and the court rejected this interpretation, finding that what expired on May 27, 2011, were limitations on their jurisdiction imposed by FASA, as amended by the NDAA for FY2008. FASA and Subsequent Amendments
The decisions by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims arose from questions regarding the meaning of certain provisions of FASA and amendments made to it by the NDAA for FY2008 and the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011. Before FASA was enacted, disappointed bidders and offerors could generally protest agency conduct in the award, or proposed award, of federal contracts that was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law" before GAO, the federal courts, or procuring agencies. However, before this date arrived, the 111 th Congress amended FASA's provisions regarding protests of orders issued under defense contracts to extend the sunset date and clarify that it applies only to GAO's exclusive jurisdiction over protests of "large" orders. The 111 th Congress did not make similar changes to the provisions of FASA codified in Title 41 of the United States Code governing protests of orders under civilian agency contracts. Based upon this interpretation of "subsection," GAO found that what expired in May 2011 were the limitations on its jurisdiction under FASA, as amended by the expansion of its jurisdiction under the NDAA for FY2008. Thus, it concluded that, because of the expiration of these limitations, its jurisdiction "revert[ed] to that originally provided in CICA," and it could hear protests concerning orders of any value under civilian agency contracts, regardless of whether the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Subsequently, in its August 19, 2011, decision in Med Trends, Inc. v. United States , the Court of Federal Claims also found that it had jurisdiction over protests of orders of any value issued under civilian agency contracts. The court did so, in part, because it, like GAO, found that the word "subsection" referred to the entirety of FASA's provisions regarding protests of task and delivery orders issued under civilian agency contracts, not just those provisions regarding GAO's jurisdiction over "large" orders issued under civilian agency contracts. Had the 112 th Congress not enacted legislation extending the sunset date, these decisions would have resulted in protests of orders issued under civilian agency contracts being treated differently than protests of similar orders under defense contracts, and could also have increased the number of bid protests. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012
The NDAA for FY2012 amended Title 41 of the United States Code so that it reads like Title 10:
(1) A protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for –
(A) a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued; or
(B) a protest of an order valued in excess of $10,000,000. | On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012. This act amends Title 41 of the United States Code to extend the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) jurisdiction over protests involving "large" orders issued under civilian agency contracts and clarifies that protests of such orders may not be heard after September 30, 2016, if this jurisdiction is not reauthorized (P.L. 112-81, § 813). Title 41's provisions regarding the protests of "large" orders previously had a May 27, 2011, sunset date. However, the language of these provisions was such that GAO and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims construed them to mean that they could hear protests of orders of any size issued under civilian agency contracts after May 27, 2011. These cases arose because of amendments that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 made to the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act.
Before FASA was enacted, GAO, the federal courts, and procuring agencies had jurisdiction over protests alleging that agency conduct in the issuance of orders under federal contracts was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. However, FASA limited this jurisdiction, barring all protests regarding the issuance of orders except those alleging that the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Later, the NDAA for FY2008 amended FASA to expand the grounds upon which the issuance of orders could be protested, authorizing GAO to hear protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million that did not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. The NDAA for FY2008 also included a sunset provision, specifying that this "subsection" expired on May 27, 2011. Executive branch agencies and many commentators construed this language to mean that GAO's jurisdiction over protests of "large" orders expired on May 27, 2011. However, GAO and, later, the Court of Federal Claims disagreed.
First, in Technatomy Corporation, GAO relied upon the statute's "plain meaning" to find that "subsection" meant the entirety of FASA's provisions regarding protests of orders, as amended, and not just the amendments made to these provisions by the NDAA for FY2008. According to GAO, what expired on May 27, 2011, were the limitations on its jurisdiction over protests that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract, as amended by the expansion of its jurisdiction to include protests of "large" orders. Thus, it concluded that it may hear protests of orders of any size issued under civilian agency contracts, regardless of whether the protest alleges that the order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. Later, in Med Trends, Inc. v. United States, the court similarly relied upon the "plain meaning" of FASA, as amended by the NDAA for FY2008. However, the court also explicitly rejected the government's argument that the legislative history of the NDAA for FY2008 supported construing "subsection" to mean only those provisions of FASA granting GAO jurisdiction over protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million.
These decisions would have resulted in protests of orders under civilian agency contracts being treated differently than protests of similar orders under defense contracts, and could also have increased the number of bid protests. The 111th Congress (P.L. 111-383, § 825) had previously amended Title 10 of the United States Code, which governs the procurements of defense agencies, with language identical to that in P.L. 112-81. |
crs_RL33588 | crs_RL33588_0 | Compared with House-passed funding, the FY2007 Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation seeks an increase of $66.1 million (5%). Table 3 shows other differences, most notably those for Biomass & Biorefinery, Geothermal, Hydro, and Weatherization programs. concludes that the lower-than-projected market penetration and flat market share were due primarily to declining fossil fuel and electricity prices during most of that period. In FY2006, as part of a restructuring of the appropriations committees, Congress merged appropriations accounts for the DOE Energy Efficiency Program, which previously had been under the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, with the appropriations accounts for the DOE Renewable Energy Program under the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill. The DOE request seeks $359.2 million for renewables, which is $84.0 million, or 30.5%, more than the FY2006 appropriations (excluding inflation). The Administration's request includes funding for an Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI) as part of its American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI), which includes accelerated funding for the Solar America and Biorefinery initiatives under DOE's Renewable Energy Program. Second, under the Department of State, the Clean Energy program was created to support the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. A major issue erupted over the Cape Wind Associates proposal for a $1 billion offshore development that would install 450 megawatts (millions of watts) of wind turbine capacity in federal waters, the Horseshoe Shoal area, near Cape Cod in Massachusetts. This is to remain in effect until the completion of the study and publishing of the Congressional Report. On June 28, the Sierra Club filed suit against DOD for delaying the study of wind farm impact on radar mandated by the Defense Authorization Act. The British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has supported studies of the radar problem for wind farms in the United Kingdom. This study recommended that the problem could be addressed by modifying the design and installation of both the turbines and the radar systems. Biomass-Generated Synthetic Natural Gas (Syngas)
Continuing high natural gas prices have created interest in using renewables to dampen natural gas demand. Both DOE and USDA are conducting research to improve this technology and reduce costs. In July 2006, DOE announced a partnership between EERE and the Office of Science to pursue use of biotechnology to produce cellulosic ethanol. The House approved $20 million and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommends $25 million. Global Climate Change. The Interconnection of Wind Energy and Other Alternative Technologies . Solar Energy Development Policy . | High gasoline and natural gas prices have rekindled interest in the role that renewable energy may play in producing electricity, displacing fossil fuel use, and curbing demand for power transmission equipment. Also, worldwide emphasis on environmental problems of air and water pollution and global climate change, the related development of clean-energy technologies in western Europe and Japan, and technology competitiveness may remain important influences on renewable energy policymaking.
The Bush Administration's FY2007 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Renewable Energy Program seeks $359.2 million, which is $84.0 million, or 30.5%, more than the FY2006 appropriation. In support of the President's proposal for an Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), the request includes major funding increases for solar energy (to support the Solar America initiative) and biomass (to support the Biorefinery Initiative). The main increases are for Solar Photovoltaics ($79.5 million) and Biomass ($59.0 million). Some significant cuts were also proposed, and the request sought to eliminate earmarks.
Appropriations actions by the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee have approved most of the requested FY2007 funding increases for AEI and greatly reduced earmark funding. Compared with House-passed funding, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation seeks an increase of $66.1 million (5%). Table 3 shows other differences, most notably those for Biomass & Biorefinery, Geothermal, Hydro, and Weatherization programs.
Important regulatory issues have surfaced for wind energy. A major debate has erupted over the safety and economic and environmental aspects of a proposal by Cape Wind Associates to develop an offshore wind farm near Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The parties to the debate are waiting for the results of a Department of Interior (DOI) environmental impact statement and a Coast Guard study of navigational safety aspects. Also, concern that large wind turbines may disrupt radar systems led to federal actions to halt several wind farm developments, pending the results of a study by the Department of Defense (DOD) that was due in early May 2006. In late June 2006, the Sierra Club filed suit to compel completion of the DOD radar study. An agency of the United Kingdom has studied modifications to turbines and radar systems that may help solve the problem.
Also, high gasoline prices have stimulated a DOE proposal for aggressive development of cellulosic ethanol as an alternative to gasoline and corn-based ethanol. The focus is on using biotechnology to simplify processes and reduce costs.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32945 | crs_RL32945_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed the FY2006 Department of Defenseappropriations bill into law ( P.L. 109-148 ). The bill also provided$2.8 billion in supplemental funding to the Department of Transportation for response to theconsequences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. On November 30, 2005, President Bush signed H.R. 3058 into law ( P.L.109-115 ). The bill had been passed by Congress on November 18. (1) The bill provided $60.7 billionin net budgetary resources for the Department of Transportation, less than either the House or Senateversions, but $1.0 billion (1.6%) more than the FY2005 enacted level and $2.4 billion (4.1%) morethan the Administration requested. On October 20, 2005, the Senate passed H.R. The Senate provided $64.2 billion for theDepartment of Transportation, $4.2 billion over the FY2005 enacted level and $5.9 billion over theAdministration's request for FY2006. Status of FY2006 Department of TransportationAppropriations (H.R. These figures reflect the 0.83% across-the-board rescission included in P.L.108-447 . (2) Themajor funding changes from FY2005 are in the requests for Amtrak ($1.2 billion(100%) below FY2005) and in the Federal Aviation Administration's AirportImprovement Program ($500 million (14%) below FY2005). (3)
The FY2006 budget also reflects a statutory change to one of the DOT'sAdministrations. The Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special ProgramsImprovement Act, which was enacted as P.L. The House approved two transportation-relatedamendments to the bill, increasing the level of funding for Amtrak beyond theCommittee-recommended level, and striking the Committee-recommended provisionbarring federal funding for Amtrak routes with per-passenger subsidy levels of $30or more. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $64.2 billion;increases over the House proposal were provided for the Federal HighwayAdministration (FHWA) the Federal Railroad Administration (mostly for Amtrak),while less funding was proposed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) andthe Federal Transit Administration (FTA) than was proposed by the House. The conference agreementprovided $2.5 billion. The House provided $1.3 billion, adding $626 million througha floor amendment increasing funding for Amtrak. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $1.45 billion forAmtrak, $274 million more than the House-passed figure. The Committee alsorecommended several provisions affecting Amtrak operations. 108-426 , 118 Stat. The statute creates two new operatingadministrations in place of the Research and Special Programs Administration(RSPA). The Administration requested $6.3 million for RITA in the FY2006 budgetto carry out DOT's priorities for innovation and research in transportationtechnologies and concepts, up from a comparable level of $4.3 million in FY2005.The House Committee on Appropriations recommended $4.3 million for FY2006;the House concurred. 107-71 ), legislation whichcreated the Transportation Security Administration within the DOT
BRR: Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation program (FHWA)
BTS: Bureau of Transportation Statistics
CMAQ: Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality program (FHWA)
DOT: Department of Transportation
EAS: Essential Air Service (FAA)
F&E: Facilities and Equipment program (FAA)
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAHP: Federal-Aid Highway Program (FHWA)
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration
FTA: Federal Transit Administration
Hazmat: Hazardous materials (safety program in PHMSA)
HPP: High Priority Projects (FHWA)
HTF: Highway Trust Fund
IM: Interstate Maintenance program (FHWA)
ITS: Intelligent Transportation Systems (FHWA)
MCSAP: Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (FMCSA)
New Starts: part of the FTA's Capital Grants and Loans Program which funds newfixed-guideway systems or extensions to existing systems
NHS: National Highway System; also a program within FHWA
NHTSA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NMCSA: National Motor Carrier Safety Administration
O&M: Operations and Maintenance program (FAA)
OIG: Office of the Inspector General
OST: Office of the Secretary of Transportation
PHMSA: Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
RABA: Revenue-Aligned Budget Authority
RITA: Research and Innovative Technology Administration
RD&T: Research, Development and Technology program (FHWA)
RE&D: Research, Engineering and Development program (FAA)
RSPA: the former Research and Special Projects Administration
SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: ALegacy for Users ( P.L. 109-59 ). | The Department of Transportation (DOT) is funded through annual appropriations acts. ForFY2006, the Administration requested $58.3 billion for the Department of Transportation. This is$1.4 billion (2%) less than the $59.7 billion provided for FY2005. The major proposed reductionswere the Administration's zeroing out of Amtrak (down from $1.2 billion in FY2005) and areduction in funding for the Airport Improvement Program (to $3.0 billion, $500 million (14%)below FY2005's $3.5 billion).
The FY2006 budget also reflected a statutory change to one of the DOT's operatingadministrations. The Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act ( P.L.108-426 ; 118 Stat. 2423) created two new operating administrations in place of the former Researchand Special Programs Administration (RSPA): the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials SafetyAdministration (PHMSA) and the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA).
On June 30, 2005, the House passed H.R. 3058 , the FY2006 appropriations billfunding the Department of Transportation (and several other agencies). The House provided $63.5billion for the Department, $3.7 billion over FY2005's enacted level and $5.2 billion over theAdministration request. The bill increased funding (beyond the requested levels) for the FederalAviation Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration,and Amtrak. The House approved two amendments relating to Amtrak; one added $626 million tothe $550 million recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations, bringing Amtrak'sFY2006 funding to $1.2 billion; the other eliminated the prohibition on federal funding for routeswith a per-passenger subsidy of $30 or more proposed by the Appropriations Committee.
On October 20, 2005, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 3058 . The Senateprovided $64.2 billion for the Department of Transportation, $4.3 billion over FY2005 and $770million over the House-passed figure. The Senate bill provided more funding than the Houseapproved for highway programs and Amtrak, and less for aviation and transit programs. The Senatealso passed several provisions affecting Amtrak operations.
The conference version of H.R. 3058 was passed by Congress on November 18,2005; the President signed the bill into law on November 30, 2005 ( P.L. 109-115 ). The conferencebill provided $60.7 billion for the Department of Transportation, less than either the House or Senateversion, but $1.0 billion over FY2005 funding and $2.4 billion more than requested. On December30, 2005, the President signed the FY2006 Department of Defense appropriations bill ( P.L.109-148 ), which included a one percent across-the-board rescission of non-emergency federaldiscretionary funding for FY2006 and $2.8 billion in supplemental funding to DOT for response tothe consequences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45077 | crs_R45077_0 | Background
Introduction
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the safety and effectiveness of animal drugs. FDA's review of brand-name and generic a nimal drug applications is funded through a combination of annual discretionary appropriations from Congress and user fees collected from the regulated industry. Authority to collect user fees for brand-name (pioneer) animal drugs has been written to sunset at five-year intervals, and was reauthorized in 2008 and 2013 in laws referred to as ADUFA II and ADUFA III, respectively. Congress first authorized FDA's collection of user fees for generic animal drugs for FY2009 in the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act of 2008 (AGDUFA I, P.L. 110-316 ), coincident with ADUFA II. Under both its brand-name and generic animal drug authorities, FDA shall use fee revenue for the costs of "the process for the review" of the respective animal drug type, which includes the following: review of applications and other submissions; facility inspections; oversight of research to support the application/submission; issuance of regulations, policies, standards, and action letters; and review of labeling and advertising prior to approval. Neither authority permits postmarket review activities under current law. As a result, user fee reauthorizations are often considered "must pass," and Congress has consistently reauthorized ADUFA and AGDUFA before their sunset dates. 2. 100-670 ) created an expedited pathway for the review of generic animal drugs. Authorities that address FDA's regulation of animal drugs used in food-producing animals are generally permanent. They are not part of the statutory language in FFDCA Title VII that authorizes user fees and is subject to sunset. However, ADUFA /AGDUFA reauthorization offers a rare legislative focus on animal drug issues, and amendments dealing with these and other aspects of animal drug use are often considered by Congress during the reauthorization process. Animal Drug User Fee Programs
Brand-Name (Pioneer) Animal Drugs and ADUFA
Congress first authorized user fees for brand-name animal drug review in 2003 in response to the same concerns from animal drug sponsors that had spurred establishment of a user fee program for human drugs a decade earlier. Minutes of all negotiation meetings between FDA and industry must be posted on the FDA website. According to the agency's section by section summary of the proposed statutory changes, the proposed ADUFA IV, in addition to codifying several of the proposals in the draft agreement, would amend (1) the definition of "animal drug application" to include an application for conditional approval under FFDCA Section 571, and (2) the definition of "process for the review of animal drug applications" to include certain activities related to implementation of the US-European Union GMP Mutual Inspection Agreement. In exchange for the authority to collect user fees, AGDUFA requires FDA to pursue certain performance goals negotiated between the agency and industry. Reauthorization
FFDCA Section 742(d), as amended by AGDUFA II, sets forth the process for reauthorization of AGDUFA II, directing FDA to develop recommendations for the following five fiscal years in consultation with specified congressional committees, scientific and academic experts, veterinary professionals, patient and consumer advocacy groups, and the regulated industry. | The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) review of brand-name and generic animal drug applications is funded through a combination of annual discretionary appropriations from Congress and user fees collected from the regulated industry.
The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. 108-130) gave FDA initial authority to collect user fees from sponsors to improve the timeliness of review of animal drug applications. ADUFA I did not cover generic animal drugs. In 2008, in response to concerns regarding generic drug application review times and a backlog of applications, Congress passed legislation that reauthorized ADUFA and created a new user fee program for generic animal drugs. Title II of P.L. 110-316, the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act (AGDUFA I), provided FDA with authority to collect user fees for the review of generic animal drug applications.
Under both its brand-name and generic animal drug authorities, FDA may use fee revenue only for the costs of "the process for the review" of the respective animal drug type, which includes the following: review of applications and other submissions; facility inspections; oversight of research to support the application/submission; issuance of regulations, policies, standards, and action letters; and review of labeling and advertising prior to approval. Neither authority permits postmarket review activities under current law.
Authority to collect user fees for animal drug review has been written to sunset at five-year intervals; as a result, reauthorization is often considered to be "must pass" legislation. Congress last reauthorized ADUFA and AGDUFA through September 30, 2018, via the Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-14). ADUFA and AGDUFA reauthorization consists of two parts: (1) statutory language that reauthorizes the programs, and (2) the negotiated agreement on performance goals and procedures between FDA and industry for the upcoming five-year interval. FDA is tasked by law with specific responsibilities in the reauthorization process.
As required for the upcoming reauthorization, in May 2016 FDA held two public meetings, one each for ADUFA and AGDUFA, to begin the process. For the next several months through early 2017, FDA held separate negotiations with the brand-name and generic animal drug industries, and met with other stakeholder groups (scientific and academic experts, veterinary professionals, patient and consumer advocacy groups). On October 25, 2017, FDA published in the Federal Register the "ADUFA IV" and "ADGUFA III" reauthorization proposals, including commitments negotiated with industry. On November 2, 2017, the agency held two public meetings, one each for ADUFA and AGDUFA, to discuss the proposed recommendations and commitments. Pursuant to the statute, these recommendations must be submitted to Congress by January 15, 2018.
Unlike user fee authorities which sunset every five years, provisions in law that address FDA's regulation of animal drugs are typically permanent. They are not part of the statutory language that authorizes user fees, and they are not subject to sunset. However, ADUFA /AGDUFA reauthorization offers a rare, "must pass" legislative focus on animal drug issues. Amendments dealing with other animal drug issues of interest to Congress, such as the use of antimicrobial drugs in food-producing animals, are often considered during the reauthorization process. |
crs_R42743 | crs_R42743_0 | Overview1
Muslims in a number of countries have responded in recent days with anger at the United States that many observers describe as a response to a privately produced film circulating on the Internet that denigrates Islam and the prophet Mohammed. In some cases, this outrage has taken the form of public expressions by relatively small groups of demonstrators, and in other countries the demonstrations have been larger. In the most extreme cases, such demonstrations have been accompanied by violent attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel and diplomatic facilities. Pre-existing anti-U.S. sentiment and domestic political frustrations also appear to be contributing to the unrest. On September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. interim diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, killed four U.S. personnel, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Vandalism and violence against U.S. facilities in Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan indicates the potency of the issue, as does the spread of clashes between protestors and local security forces elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa and in some countries in South and Southeast Asia. The geographic scope of the protests and the reportedly broadly shared outrage of participants have overshadowed important distinctions in political context, divergences in host government responses, and the fact that the groups demonstrating, particularly those committing violent acts, are small relative to much larger and diverse populations. Appendix. | Muslims in a number of countries have responded in recent days with anger at the United States that many observers describe as a response to a privately produced film circulating on the Internet that denigrates Islam and the prophet Mohammed. In some cases, this outrage has taken the form of public expressions by relatively small groups of demonstrators, and in other countries the demonstrations have been larger. In the most extreme cases, such demonstrations have been accompanied by violent attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel and diplomatic facilities. Pre-existing anti-U.S. sentiment and domestic political frustrations also appear to be contributing to the unrest. On September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. interim diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, killed four U.S. personnel, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Vandalism and violence against U.S. facilities in Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan indicates the potency of the issue, as does the spread of clashes between protestors and local security forces elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa and in some countries in South and Southeast Asia. The geographic scope of the protests and the reportedly broadly shared outrage of participants have overshadowed important distinctions in political context, divergences in host government responses, and the fact that the groups demonstrating, particularly those committing violent acts, are small relative to much larger and diverse populations.
This report provides background information and analysis about the recent wave of protests and includes a summary appendix of select incidents and international responses organized geographically by country. The report discusses several issues of potential interest to Congress, including emerging debates on foreign assistance funding for countries affected by unrest, intelligence and diplomatic security policies, war powers considerations, and the potential effects of the current controversy on long-running international debates on religion and freedom of expression. |
crs_RL34703 | crs_RL34703_0 | Conscience clause laws allow medical providers to refuse to provide services to which they have religious or moral objections. Earlier conscience clause laws permitted providers to opt out only of the actual provision of such services. Recent Legislation and its Effect on Existing Law
The Abortion Non-Discrimination Act (ANDA) has been introduced in every Congress since the 107 th Congress. Conscience Rule
On December 19, 2008, HHS issued a new rule to implement the Church Amendment, Section 245 of the PHSA, and the Weldon Amendment. Conscience Protection and Health Reform
Legislation that attempts to reduce the number of uninsured individuals and restructure the private health insurance market has been passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. H.R. H.R. | Conscience clause laws allow medical providers to refuse to provide services to which they have religious or moral objections. In some cases, these laws are designed to excuse such providers from performing abortions. While substantive conscience clause legislation, such as the Abortion Non-Discrimination Act, has not been approved, appropriations bills that include conscience clause provisions have been passed. This report describes the history of conscience clauses as they relate to abortion law and provides a legal analysis of the effects of such laws. The report also discusses the issuance of a new rule to implement some of the existing conscience clause laws, and recent efforts to rescind that rule. Finally, the report reviews the conscience protection provisions of the House- and Senate-passed health reform measures, H.R. 3962 and H.R. 3590. |
crs_RL33739 | crs_RL33739_0 | One of the most significant provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA 1935). The statute was administered by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 repealed PUHCA 1935, thus revoking the SEC's authority to oversee mergers and other transactions of public utility holding companies. PUHCA 2005 expands the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to oversee transactions and other financial activities of public utility holding companies through grants of access to those companies' books and records. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are both charged with enforcing the applicable antitrust statutes, § 7 of the Clayton Act and the pre-merger provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. PUHCA 1935 regulated "holding companies" that had subsidiaries that were electric utility companies or that engaged in the retail distribution of natural gas or manufactured gas. Under the statute, public utility holding companies faced substantial restrictions on their operations. PUHCA 1935 also placed restrictions on many transactions related to public utility corporate structure. Congress repealed the entirety of PUHCA 1935 in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. These important exemptions include passive investors (mutual funds and other collective investment vehicles); broker/dealers, underwriters and fiduciaries who buy and sell securities in the ordinary course of business; utilities that have no captive customers; transactions in which the holding company affirmatively certifies that it will not charge, bill, or allocate to the public utility or natural gas company in its holding company system any costs or expenses and will not engage in financing transactions with the public utility or natural gas company; transactions between or among affiliates that are independent of and do not include a public utility or natural gas company; electric power cooperatives; and local gas distribution companies. The Continuing Regulatory Authority of FERC, FTC, and DOJ
As FERC has stated, the change in PUHCA law granting it new authority to review books and records did not affect the Commission's
... primary means of protecting customers served by jurisdictional companies that are members of holding company systems: the [Federal Power Act (FPA)] and the [Natural Gas Act (NGA)]. As the previous paragraphs describe, although the repeal of PUHCA 1935 removes extensive restrictions on transactions involving public utilities and their holding companies previously enforced by the SEC, it does not affect the regulation of these entities by FERC. | The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA 1935) was repealed in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Prior to repeal, PUHCA 1935 required "holding companies" (i.e., companies with subsidiaries engaged in the electric utility business or the retail distribution of natural or manufactured gas) to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), satisfy certain disclosure requirements, and comply with strict operational limitations. These operational limitations imposed significant geographic and corporate holdings restrictions upon holding companies and effectively limited ownership of public utilities to a small subset of companies focused specifically on the industry.
Pursuant to the repeal, the SEC no longer has oversight authority for electric and gas holding companies, and many of the procedural and substantive requirements placed upon public utility holding companies by PUHCA 1935 have been repealed. The burden of oversight of the financial transactions of public utility companies, including mergers and acquisitions, now falls more heavily on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC's oversight authority over public utilities, previously established in the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), was enhanced by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which included the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005. This new legislation requires holding companies and their affiliates to provide the Commission (as well as state regulators) access to their books and records and also grants the Commission additional authority for oversight of holding company transactions.
In addition, the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will continue to enforce generally applicable laws as they apply to public utility holding company transactions. These laws, which were unaffected by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, prevent transactions that would substantially impede competition and can require pre-merger notification.
This report will describe the current state of federal oversight of public utility holding companies and transactions involving public utilities. It will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R43802 | crs_R43802_0 | Introduction
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides two types of assistance for winter incidents: (1) "snow assistance," and (2) assistance for "severe winter storms." Both types of assistance are triggered by a presidential disaster declaration. The criteria used by FEMA to determine whether to recommend a declaration depend on the type of winter incident. Snow assistance determinations are based on snow accumulations. Determinations for severe winter storms are based on the severity and magnitude of the event and the capabilities of the state and affected local governments to respond to the incident. Requests for snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms must also include the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance associated with the incident. FEMA divides the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance by the statewide population to give some measure of the per capita impact the incident has had on the state. This report describes snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms, the declaration process, the criteria used to make eligibility determinations, and the types of assistance that are provided after the President has issued a major disaster declaration for the incident. This report also provides some historical data on winter incidents obligations for the incidents from FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is the main account used to fund a wide variety of programs, grants, and other forms of emergency and disaster assistance to states, local governments, certain nonprofit entities, and families and individuals affected by disasters. Eligible Period and Costs for Snow Assistance
Snow assistance is available for all eligible costs incurred over a continuous 48-hour period. State and tribal governments may select a 48-hour period during which the highest eligible costs have been incurred. The 48-hour period selected cannot be changed after it has been submitted. Eligible Assistance
The types of eligible assistance for severe winter storms vary according to the nature and severity of the incident. Generally, snow removal is a precursor to the performance of otherwise eligible emergency work. | The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides two types of assistance for winter incidents: (1) snow assistance, and (2) assistance for severe winter storms. The assistance is triggered by a presidential disaster declaration. The criteria used by FEMA to determine whether to recommend a declaration depend on the type of winter incident. Snow assistance is based on record, or near record snowfall according to official government reports on snow accumulations. Acceptable government reports are snowfall amounts measured and published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Climatic Data Center, or measurements made by observers from the National Weather Service. Determinations for severe winter storms are based on the severity and magnitude of the event and the capabilities of the state and affected local governments to respond to the incident. Both requests for snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms must also include the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance associated with the incident. FEMA divides the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance by the statewide population to give some measure of the per capita impact the incident has had on the state.
Snow assistance is available for all eligible costs incurred over a continuous 48-hour period. State and tribal governments may select a 48-hour period during which the highest eligible costs have been incurred. The 48-hour period selected cannot be changed after it has been submitted. As with most major disaster declarations, the types of assistance for severe winter storms vary according to the nature and severity of the incident. Generally, only a limited amount of snow removal is provided for severe winter storms. This is done to perform otherwise eligible emergency work (for example, to repair utility lines).
This report describes snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms, the declaration process, the criteria used to make eligibility determinations, and the types of assistance that are provided after the President has issued a major disaster declaration for the incident. This report also provides some historical data including obligations for the incidents from FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is the main account used to fund a wide variety of programs, grants, and other forms of emergency and disaster assistance to states, local governments, certain nonprofit entities, and families and individuals affected by disasters. |
crs_R42813 | crs_R42813_0 | Introduction
The federal crop insurance program provides producers with risk management tools to address crop yield and/or revenue losses on their farms. Farmers can purchase subsidized policies that pay an indemnity when their production or revenue falls below a guaranteed level. The crop insurance program has expanded in recent decades, and policies are available now for a wide range of commodities, including crops covered by federal farm programs (e.g., wheat and corn) as well as specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables. While additional policies have been introduced in the last 10 years, producers and some Members of Congress would like to enhance crop insurance for specialty crop producers. Several legislative proposals have been introduced in the 112 th Congress, including provisions in the Senate-passed farm bill ( S. 3240 ) and the House Agriculture Committee-reported farm bill ( H.R. 6083 ). In 2009, specialty crop policies covered more than 7 million acres, which was roughly one-half to three-quarters of specialty crop area, depending on how total area is calculated. In total, crop insurance is available for over 80 specialty crops. Crop Insurance Program Authority and Operation
The federal crop insurance program is permanently authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.). The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Risk Management Agency (RMA) operates the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which is the funding mechanism for the program. Insurance policies are sold and completely serviced through approved private insurance companies. The insurance companies' losses are reinsured by USDA, and their administrative and operating costs are reimbursed by the federal government. Types of Policies for Specialty Crops
Several types of federal crop insurance policies are available for specialty crops. For most yield-based policies, a producer can receive an indemnity if there is a yield loss relative to the farmer's "normal" (historical) yield. Insurable causes of loss include drought, excess precipitation, hail, frost, freeze, fire (if due to natural causes), and insects and disease. Revenue-based policies protect against crop revenue loss resulting from declines in yield, price, or both. Whole-farm insurance protects against losses in whole farm revenue rather than just for an individual crop. An endorsement is available in some areas for protecting against loss due to quarantine established to control a specific pest that requires destruction of insured crops. The Local Farms, Food, and Jobs Act of 2011 ( H.R. The Rural Economic Farm and Ranch Sustainability and Hunger (REFRESH) Act of 2011 ( S. 1658 and H.R. Selected provisions in both bills with potential benefit for specialty crop producers would
require USDA to (1) conduct more research on whole farm revenue insurance with higher coverage levels than currently available, and (2) conduct a study on insuring specialty crop producers for food safety and contamination-related loss; enhance the Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP), which offers catastrophic coverage for crops not insurable under the crop insurance program, by making available additional coverage at 50% to 65% of established yield and 100% of average price; allow producers to purchase a second crop insurance policy called "Supplemental Coverage Option" or SCO, which is designed to cover part of the deductible under the producer's underlying policy; SCO is intended for crops, including specialty crops, that have sufficient data needed for policy development and implementation; revise the value of crop insurance for all organic crops to reflect prices of organic (not conventional) crops (specific provision in S. 3240 ); and subsidize the purchase of existing private-sector index-based weather insurance, which insures against specific weather events and not actual loss ( S. 3240 only). | The federal crop insurance program provides farmers with risk management tools to address crop yield and/or revenue losses on their farms. Farmers can purchase subsidized policies that pay an indemnity when their production or revenue falls below a guaranteed level.
Historically, the federal crop insurance program primarily has covered traditional farm program crops such as wheat, corn, and soybeans. However, the crop insurance program has expanded in recent decades, and policies are available now for a wide range of commodities, including specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables. In 2009, specialty crop policies covered more than 7 million acres, which was roughly one-half to three-quarters of specialty crop area, depending on how total area is calculated. In total, crop insurance is available for over 80 specialty crops, making the program the primary financial safety net for specialty crop producers.
The federal crop insurance program is permanently authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.). The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Risk Management Agency (RMA) operates the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which is the funding mechanism for the program. Insurance policies are sold and completely serviced through approved private insurance companies. The insurance companies' losses are reinsured by USDA, and their administrative and operating costs are reimbursed by the federal government.
Federal crop insurance policies for specialty crops (and other crops as well) are generally either yield-based or revenue-based. For most yield-based policies, a producer can receive an indemnity if there is a yield loss relative to the farmer's "normal" (historical) yield. Insurable causes of loss include drought, excess precipitation, hail, frost, freeze, fire (if due to natural causes), and insects and disease. Revenue-based policies protect against crop revenue loss resulting from declines in yield, price, or both. Nursery crop producers can be protected against loss of an "asset" due to weather damage (but not price loss). Also relevant for specialty crop producers is whole-farm insurance, which protects against losses in whole farm revenue rather than just for an individual crop. An endorsement is available in some areas for protecting against loss due to quarantine.
While additional policies have been introduced in the last 10 years, producers and some Members of Congress would like to enhance crop insurance for specialty crop producers. In the 112th Congress, several legislative proposals have been introduced. The Local Farms, Food, and Jobs Act of 2011 (H.R. 3286/S. 1773) would enhance whole farm insurance and insurance for organic crops. The Rural Economic Farm and Ranch Sustainability and Hunger (REFRESH) Act of 2011 (S. 1658 and H.R. 3111) would also enhance whole farm insurance. The Specialty Crop Insurance Act of 2011 (S. 1905) would support the development of new policies.
In the 112th Congress, specialty crop provisions in these and other proposals have been included in the Senate-passed farm bill (S. 3240) and the House committee-passed farm bill (H.R. 6083). The bills require USDA to conduct more research on higher coverage levels for whole farm revenue insurance and study insurance for food safety and contamination-related losses. A provision would revise the value of crop insurance for all organic crops to reflect prices of organic (not conventional) crops. For crops not insurable with crop insurance, additional coverage would become available under the existing Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP). Finally, a provision in S. 3240 would subsidize the purchase of existing private-sector index-based weather insurance, which protects against specific weather events and not actual loss. |
crs_R42891 | crs_R42891_0 | The Presidential Inauguration
The next public inauguration ceremony is to take place on January 21, 2013. The 20 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20 th day of January ...," but when January 20 falls on a Sunday, following historic precedent, the public ceremony is held on the following Monday. The White House will organize a private swearing-in on January 20. Funding for the 2009 Inauguration and Festivities
Public Funding
In 2009, public funds supported the inaugural swearing-in ceremony, security, maintenance, construction, bleachers, fencing, and cleanup. Determining the total costs of an inauguration, however, is difficult. Also included is a link to "Facts & Firsts," which provides historical information on past presidential inaugurations from George Washington to Barack H. Obama. Inaugural Cavalcade . | On January 20, 2013, President Barack Obama is to be sworn in for his second term. Because January 20 is on a Sunday, however, the ceremonial swearing-in and public inaugural ceremonies will take place on Monday, January 21, 2013.
This report responds to a variety of questions relating to the presidential inauguration: legislation concerning the inauguration; inauguration day as a federal holiday; the major costs of the 2009 inauguration; the expenditures of recent inaugural festivities (private funding only provided); historical facts on past presidential inaugurations; the various inaugural committees supporting the inauguration; and historical information on the parade, the swearing-in, and other events. |
crs_RL33656 | crs_RL33656_0 | The 2003 rule was challenged by multiple parties—environmental groups and agriculture industry groups—and in February 2005, a federal court issued a ruling that upheld major parts of the rule, vacated other parts, and remanded still other parts to EPA for clarification, leaving all parties unsatisfied to at least some extent. Industry groups challenged the 2008 revised rule, and in March 2011, a federal court vacated a portion of that regulation. The 2003 Rule
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any "point source" to waters of the United States unless authorized under a national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit that is issued by EPA or a qualified state. NPDES permits limit the type and quantity of pollutants that can be discharged from a facility and specify other requirements, such as monitoring and reporting. The specific discharge limitations in the permit are derived from effluent limitation guidelines and standards (ELGs) that are separately promulgated by EPA for specific categories of industrial sources. The act expressly defines CAFOs as point sources. The 2003 rule did not redefine what a CAFO is, but it revised the way in which discharges of manure, wastewater, and other process wastes from CAFOs are regulated, and it modified both the NPDES permitting requirements and applicable ELGs. The Waterkeeper Alliance Decision and EPA's 2008 Revised Rule
The 2003 rule was challenged in court by a number of groups. Environmental groups, on the other hand, strongly criticized the proposal, arguing that the Waterkeeper Alliance court left in place several means for the agency to accomplish much of its original permitting approach, but instead EPA chose not to do so. They focused on key parts that they argued would greatly increase the administrative and resource burden on states. The issues are (1) the "duty to apply" requirement, which was challenged by industry plaintiffs; (2) procedures regarding review of and public access to nutrient management plans, challenged by environmental groups; and (3) aspects of the effluent limitation guidelines, also challenged by environmental groups. Duty to Apply for a Permit
The "duty to apply" provisions of the 2003 rule were among the most controversial, and they remained so, even as revised in 2008—farm industry groups' challenge to the 2003 rule focused on this requirement and, as discussed below, so did these groups' subsequent challenge to the 2008 revised rule. The environmental plaintiffs argued to the federal court that the NMP part of the 2003 rule was unlawful under the Clean Water Act and the Administrative Procedure Act because it failed to require that the terms of the NMP must be reviewed and be included in the NPDES permit (inclusion in the permit would make the NMP enforceable by the government and private citizens) and because it allowed permitting authorities to issue permits in the absence of any meaningful government or public review of this aspect of the permit. Agricultural Stormwater Discharges
One issue that the federal court upheld in 2005 concerns the rule's treatment of a regulatory exemption for agricultural stormwater discharges. In the earlier litigation on the 2003 rule, agriculture industry groups had challenged a provision of that rule that explicitly required all CAFOs to apply for an NPDES permit, or to demonstrate that they have no potential to discharge. In July 2012, EPA modified the 2008 CAFO regulations to conform to the court's 2011 ruling. Both agriculture groups and environmental groups criticized EPA's proposal. Congressional Interest
Congress has shown some interest in CAFO issues in the past, primarily through oversight hearings in 1999 and 2001, before issuance of the 2003 and 2008 CWA rules. | In October 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a regulation to revise a 2003 Clean Water Act rule governing waste discharges from large confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs). The 2008 action was necessitated by a 2005 federal court decision (Waterkeeper Alliance et al. vs. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 [2nd Cir. 2005]), resulting from challenges brought by agriculture industry groups and environmental advocacy groups, that vacated parts of the 2003 rule and remanded other parts to EPA for clarification.
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any "point source" to waters of the United States unless authorized under a permit that is issued by EPA or a qualified state, and the act expressly defines CAFOs as point sources. Permits limiting the type and quantity of pollutants that can be discharged are derived from effluent limitation guidelines promulgated by EPA. The 2003 rule, updating rules that had been in place since the 1970s, revised the way in which discharges of manure, wastewater, and other process wastes from CAFOs are regulated, and it modified both the permitting requirements and applicable effluent limitation guidelines. It contained important first-time requirements: all CAFOs must apply for a discharge permit, and all CAFOs that apply such waste on land must develop and implement a nutrient management plan.
EPA's 2008 revised regulation addressed those parts of the 2003 rule that were affected by the federal court's ruling: (1) it eliminated the "duty to apply" requirement that all CAFOs must either apply for discharge permits or demonstrate that they have no potential to discharge, which was challenged by industry plaintiffs; (2) it added procedures regarding review of and public access to nutrient management plans, challenged by environmental groups; and (3) it modified aspects of the effluent limitation guidelines, also challenged by environmental groups. The 2008 rule also modified a provision of the 2003 rule that the court upheld, clarifying the treatment of a regulatory exemption for agricultural stormwater discharges. CAFOs were to apply for permits and develop nutrient management plans by February 2009. After that date, sources had three years to actually get permit coverage.
EPA's efforts to revise the 2003 rule were controversial, particularly regarding the "duty to apply" for a permit and agricultural stormwater exemption provisions. Environmental groups strongly criticized EPA's actions, arguing that the Waterkeeper Alliance court had left in place several means for the agency to accomplish much of its original permitting approach, but instead EPA chose not to do so. State permitting authorities also had a number of criticisms, focusing on key parts that they argued would greatly increase the administrative and resource burden on state regulators. Farm industry groups were generally supportive of the 2008 rule. Nevertheless, some of them brought a legal challenge. In 2011, a federal court agreed with the industry petitioners and vacated a portion of the 2008 rule concerning the "duty to apply" requirement. EPA revised the rule in 2012 in response to this ruling. Environmental groups have initiated several legal actions as they continue to criticize most of EPA's efforts to reduce pollution from CAFOs. Congress has shown some interest in CAFO issues in the past, primarily through oversight hearings before issuance of the 2003 and 2008 rules. |
crs_R41163 | crs_R41163_0 | The M.O. In response, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The Court held that although Congress had in general authorized the use of military commissions, such commissions were required to follow procedural rules as similar as possible to courts-martial proceedings, as required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Department of Defense (DOD) issued regulations for the conduct of military commissions pursuant to the MCA 2006 and restarted the military commission proceedings, which resulted in three convictions under the Bush Administration. The latter two convictions were reversed on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. The government sought and was granted a rehearing en banc in the Bahlul case to appeal the decisions. No challenge to military commissions under the MCA 2006 reached the Supreme Court. President Obama halted the proceedings upon taking office in January 2009 in order to review whether to continue their use. One case was moved to a federal district court. In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was considering restarting the military commission system with some changes to the procedural rules. The Senate passed the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009) as part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010, S. 1391 , to provide some reforms the Administration supported and to make other amendments to the Military Commissions Act, as described below. 111-84 . Jurisdiction
The MCA establishes jurisdiction for military commissions somewhat more narrowly than that asserted in President Bush's M.O. To date, no resident aliens have been charged for trial before a military commission under the MCA. Circuit. The MCA empowers military commissions to maintain decorum during proceedings. To the extent that the exclusion of the press and public is based on the discretion of the military judge without consideration of the constitutional requirements relative to the specific exigencies of the case at trial, the procedures may implicate the First Amendment rights of the press and public. The following charts provide a comparison of general courts-martial to the military tribunals under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 as initially enacted and as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009. Chart 2 , which compares procedural safeguards, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts , by [author name scrubbed], in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court, the international military tribunals that tried World War II crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and contemporary ad hoc tribunals set up by the UN Security Council to try crimes associated with hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. | On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November 2004 against four persons declared eligible for trial, but the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the military commissions as improper under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). To permit military commissions to go forward, Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the UCMJ and possibly U.S. international obligations. Military commissions proceedings were reinstated and resulted in three convictions under the Bush Administration.
Upon taking office in 2009, President Obama temporarily halted military commissions to review their procedures as well as the detention program at Guantánamo Bay in general, pledging to close the prison facilities there by January 2010, a deadline that passed unmet. One case was moved to a federal district court.
In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was considering restarting the military commission system with some changes to the procedural rules. Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009) as part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010, P.L. 111-84, to provide some reforms the Administration supported and to make other amendments to the Military Commissions Act, as described in this report. The plan to transfer five "high value detainees" to New York for trial in federal court, announced in November 2009, was halted due to resistance from Congress and some New York officials. Military commissions resumed under the new statute, resulting in an additional five convictions, although two of the previous convictions were reversed on appeal. The government was granted a rehearing en banc at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for one case, which resulted in the partial reinstatement of a conspiracy conviction pending further review by the original panel of judges.
This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions as envisioned under the revised MCA to those established by the MCA 2006. After reviewing the history of the implementation of military commissions in the armed conflict against Al Qaeda and associated forces, the report provides an overview of the procedural safeguards provided in the MCA. Finally, the report provides two charts comparing the MCA as amended by the MCA 2009 to the original MCA enacted in 2006 and to general courts-martial. The first chart describes the composition and powers of the military tribunals, as well as their jurisdiction. The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards in courts-martial to the MCA as enacted and as amended, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, as well as CRS Report R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in Federal Criminal Court, both by [author name scrubbed], to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and international criminal tribunals. |
crs_RL32004 | crs_RL32004_0 | Current Policy
Background
The Social Security program provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their dependents, and to the survivors of deceased workers. Foreign nationals who work in Social Security-covered employment must pay Social Security payroll taxes, including those who are in the United States working temporarily and those who may be working in the United States without authorization. There are some exceptions. In general, the work of aliens who are citizens of a country with which the United States has a "totalization agreement" (see below) is not covered by Social Security if they work in the United States for less than five years. In addition, by statute, the work of aliens under certain visa categories (such as H-2A agricultural workers, F and M students) is not covered by Social Security. 108-203 restricts the payment of Social Security benefits to certain noncitizens who file an application for benefits based on an SSN assigned on or after January 1, 2004. Specifically, a noncitizen who files an application for benefits based on an SSN assigned on or after January 1, 2004, is required to have work authorization at the time an SSN is assigned, or at some later time, to gain insured status under the Social Security program. All of the individual's Social Security-covered earnings are counted toward insured status (and for benefit computation purposes), regardless of his or her work authorization status. In such cases, a noncitizen may receive benefits while residing outside the United States (including benefits based on work performed in the United States without authorization) if he or she meets one of the exceptions to the alien nonpayment provision under Section 202(t) of the Social Security Act. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) prohibited the payment of Social Security benefits to aliens in the United States who are not lawfully present, unless nonpayment would be contrary to a totalization agreement or Section 202(t) of the Social Security Act (the alien nonpayment provision). Social Security Cards and Noncitizens
All U.S. citizens are eligible for SSNs. In addition, noncitizens (aliens) authorized to work in the United States are eligible for SSNs. | Concerns about the number of unauthorized (illegal) aliens residing in the United States have fostered considerable interest in the eligibility of noncitizens for U.S. Social Security benefits. The Social Security program provides monthly cash benefits to qualified retired or disabled workers, their dependents, and survivors. Generally, a worker must have 10 years of Social Security-covered employment to be eligible for retirement benefits (less time in covered employment is required for disability and survivor benefits). Most U.S. jobs are covered under Social Security, and as a result, noncitizens authorized to work in the United States are eligible for a Social Security number (SSN). Noncitizens who work in Social Security-covered employment must pay Social Security payroll taxes, including those who are in the United States working temporarily or without authorization. There are some exceptions. In general, the work of aliens who are citizens of a country with which the United States has a "totalization agreement," coordinating the payment of Social Security taxes and benefits for workers who divide their careers between two countries, is not covered if they work in the United States for less than five years. In addition, by statute, the work of aliens under certain visa categories is not covered by Social Security.
The Social Security Protection Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-203) requires an alien whose application for benefits is based on an SSN assigned January 1, 2004, or later to have work authorization at the time an SSN is assigned, or at some later time, to gain insured status under the Social Security program. Aliens whose applications are based on SSNs assigned before January 1, 2004, may count all covered earnings toward insured status, regardless of work authorization. The Social Security Act also prohibits the payment of benefits to aliens in the United States who are not "lawfully present"; however, under certain circumstances, alien workers as well as their dependents and survivors may receive benefits while residing outside the United States (including benefits based on unauthorized work). |
crs_RL32464 | crs_RL32464_0 | After several years during which Jacques Chirac contested elements of George W. Bush Administration policy, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has sought to improve bilateral relations. Nonetheless, differences between the United States and France in the approach to foreign policy are likely to persist. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage most international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union (EU). Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. Most core interests remain similar. Both countries' governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded EU and NATO. Each has also recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats today. French and German efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO and the United States emerged and evolved in this period. During the George W. Bush Administration, France, with other European allies, pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France, where possible, normally attempts to engage elements of the international community in responding to such threats, and to "legitimize" actions ranging from economic sanctions to political censure to military action at the United Nations. Most notably, in April 2009, Sarkozy announced France's full reintegration into NATO's military command structure as part of a broader realignment and modernization of French security and defense policy. Trade and investment ties between the countries are extensive, providing each side a big stake in the vitality and openness of their respective economies. Through trade in goods and services, and, most importantly, through foreign direct investment, the economies of France and the United States have become increasingly integrated. Other areas of complementarity include the ongoing NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya, peace operations in the Balkans, the Middle East Peace Process and efforts to counter the Iranian nuclear program, and the fight against terrorism—all challenges where France has played a central role. A major split occurred over Iraq, however, with many countries either supporting or independently sharing French ideas of greater international involvement. This report examines the key factors that shape French foreign policy. Factors Shaping French Foreign Policy
A Global Perspective
France, like the United States, believes that it has a special role in the world. Rather, today, the Gaullists believe that France can best exert its power through the EU. At the same time, France wishes to maintain a powerful position within the Union. This includes deemphasizing France's traditionally strong role in sub-Saharan Africa, and shifting focus toward the Middle East. However, it had only very limited participation in the alliance's military decision-making structures after then-President de Gaulle withdrew the country from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966. | The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries' governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union (EU) and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today.
Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union. European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. However, more recently, policymakers in France, Europe and the United States have come to view a stronger European defense arm as a complement to rather than a substitute for NATO.
From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to "legitimize" actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations.
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency in May 2007 appears to have contributed to improved U.S.-French relations. Sarkozy has taken a more practical approach to issues in U.S.-French relations than his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. Perhaps most notably, in April 2009, Sarkozy announced France's full reintegration into NATO's military command structure, more than 40 years after former President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his country from the integrated command structure and ordered U.S. military personnel to leave the country.
Sarkozy is a traditional Gaullist in his desire to see France play a major role in the world. At the same time, he asserts that France should exert its power through the European Union, and that Paris must play a leading role in shaping the EU's foreign and security policy. He deemphasizes France's traditionally strong role in sub-Saharan Africa, and has sought to shift France's foreign policy focus toward the Middle East.
Trade and investment ties between the United States and France are extensive, and provide each government a large stake in the vitality and openness of their respective economies. Through trade in goods and services, and, most importantly, through foreign direct investment, the economies of France and the United States have become increasingly integrated.
Other areas of complementarity include the ongoing NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya, peace operations in the Balkans, the Middle East Peace Process and efforts to counter the Iranian nuclear program, and the fight against terrorism—all challenges where France has played a central role. A major split occurred over Iraq, however, with many countries either supporting or independently sharing French ideas of greater international involvement. |
crs_RL32185 | crs_RL32185_0 | However, the Senate took no action. In the 110 th Congress, UNCLOS was reported on December 19, 2007, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (S.Exec.Rept. In the 111 th Congress, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 13, 2009, acknowledged that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would be an Obama Administration priority. Later in this confirmation hearing, then-Senator John Kerry, the committee chair, confirmed that UNCLOS would also be a committee priority. However, the Senate took no action on UNCLOS during the 111 th Congress. In the 112 th Congress, the Administration continued to encourage Senate action on UNCLOS, but again no action was taken. In the 113 th Congress, there has been little or no mention of UNCLOS and no actions have been taken to ratify the treaty. Policy issues relating to areas beyond living resources that are likely to draw Senate attention are discussed more fully in CRS Report RS21890, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Developments Since October 2003 , by [author name scrubbed], and include
the dispute settlement process set forth in UNCLOS and the U.S. declarations on dispute settlement; the relationship between U.S. law and various parts of UNCLOS regarding use of the world's oceans; U.S. acceptance of the UNCLOS/Agreement interpretation and application of the common heritage of mankind concept; the provisional application procedures as a precedent in the U.S. treaty process; the nature of U.S. commitments undertaken by a decision of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) Council—what does a council decision commit the U.S. government to do? UNCLOS could provide several new privileges, primarily related to participation in commissions developing international ocean policy. It appears that no new domestic legislation would be required to implement the living resources provisions of UNCLOS. Conclusion
As presently understood and interpreted, the LOS provisions generally appear to reflect current U.S. policy with respect to living marine resource management, conservation, and exploitation. Based on these interpretations, the living resource provisions of UNCLOS are generally not seen as imposing significant new U.S. obligations, commitments, or encumbrances involving living resources and their management. One possible benefit of U.S. ratification would be the international community's anticipated positive response to such U.S. action. On the other hand, some U.S. interests view U.S. ratification as potentially complicating enforcement of domestic marine regulations. These uncertainties reflect the absence of any comprehensive assessment of the social and economic impacts of UNCLOS implementation by the United States. Although early ITLOS cases do not indicate a problem, some in the United States remain concerned that UNCLOS's language concerning arbitrary refusal of access to surplus (unallocated) living resources might be a potential source of conflict. Proponents of UNCLOS maintain that U.S. participation in the development of policies and practices of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and the International Seabed Authority could help to forestall future problems related to living marine resources. In addition, they indicate that the Senate could choose to address some of the intentional ambiguities of UNCLOS drafters with its power to make declarations and statements as provided for in Article 310. Such declarations and statements can be useful in promulgating U.S. policy and putting other nations on notice of U.S. interpretation of UNCLOS. | The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea established a comprehensive international legal framework for governing activities related to the world's oceans. UNCLOS was agreed to in 1982, but the United States never became a signatory nation. This report describes provisions of UNCLOS relating to living marine resources and discusses how these provisions comport with current U.S. marine policy. As presently understood and interpreted, these provisions generally appear to reflect current U.S. policy with respect to living marine resource management, conservation, and exploitation. Based on these interpretations, they are generally seen as not imposing significant new U.S. obligations, commitments, or encumbrances, and are seen as providing several new privileges, primarily related to participation in commissions developing international ocean policy. No new domestic legislation appears to be required to implement the living resources provisions of UNCLOS.
A possible benefit of U.S. ratification would be the international community's anticipated positive response to such U.S. action. In addition, early U.S. participation in the development of policies and practices of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and the International Seabed Authority could help to forestall future conflicts related to living marine resources. On the other hand, some U.S. interests view U.S. ratification as potentially complicating enforcement of domestic marine regulations, and remain concerned that UNCLOS's language concerning arbitrary refusal of access to surplus (unallocated) living resources might be a potential source of conflict (in addition to concerns about other provisions of the Convention). These uncertainties reflect the absence of any comprehensive assessment of the social and economic impacts of UNCLOS implementation by the United States.
The Senate may choose to address the ambiguities of UNCLOS with its power to make declarations and statements, as provided for in Article 310 of the Convention. Such declarations and statements can be useful in promulgating U.S. policy and putting other nations on notice of U.S. interpretation of UNCLOS.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported UNCLOS on December 19, 2007, but no action was taken by the entire Senate. In the 111th Congress, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 13, 2009, acknowledged that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would be an Obama Administration priority. Later in this confirmation hearing, then-Senator John Kerry, the committee chair, confirmed that UNCLOS would also be a committee priority. However, the Senate took no action on UNCLOS during the 111th Congress. In the 112th Congress, the Administration continued to encourage Senate action on UNCLOS, and Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was guardedly optimistic, but no action was taken. In the 113th Congress, there has been little or no mention of UNCLOS and no actions have been taken to ratify the treaty. |
crs_RL32683 | crs_RL32683_0 | Introduction
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) establishes requirements and a framework to ensure that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state and local governments, and the private sector will work together to control and, if necessary, respond to releases of hazardous chemicals to the environment. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C. 11001-11050) was enacted in 1986 as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ( P.L. 99-499 ). Subtitle A: Emergency Planning and Notification
EPCRA established a national framework for EPA to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their communities. Subtitle A requires local planning to respond to sudden releases of chemicals that might occur in the event of a spill, explosion, or fire. Under Section 301, each state is required to create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), to designate emergency planning districts, and to establish local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for each district. Section 302 requires EPA to list extremely hazardous substances and to establish threshold planning quantities for each substance. The law directs each facility to notify the LEPC for its district if it stores or uses any "extremely hazardous substance" in excess of its threshold planning quantity. Section 303 directs LEPCs to work with facilities handling specified "extremely hazardous substances" to develop response procedures, evacuation plans, and training programs for people who will be the first to respond in the event of an accident. Section 304 requires that facilities immediately report a release of any "extremely hazardous substance" or any "hazardous substance" (a much broader category of chemicals defined under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Section 102(a)) that exceeds the reportable quantity to appropriate state, local, and federal officials. (For more on CERCLA, see CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], which includes a summary of CERCLA.) Section 313 mandates development of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a computerized EPA database of "toxic chemical" releases to the environment by manufacturing facilities. EPA makes TRI data available in "raw" and summarized forms to the general public. Trade Secrets
Section 322 authorizes reporting facilities to withhold the identity of a chemical if it is a trade secret, and they follow procedures established by EPA. Citizens are given the authority to bring civil action against a facility, EPA, a governor, or an SERC by Section 326. | This report summarizes the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the major regulatory programs that mandate reporting by industrial facilities of releases of potentially hazardous chemicals to the environment, as well as local planning to respond in the event of significant, accidental releases. The text is excerpted, with minor modifications, from the corresponding chapter of CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], which summarizes major environmental statutes.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C. 11001-11050) was enacted in 1986 as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (P.L. 99-499). In Subtitle A, EPCRA established a national framework for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for chemical accidents in their communities. EPCRA required each state to create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), to designate emergency planning districts, and to establish local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for each district. EPA is required to list extremely hazardous substances, and to establish threshold planning quantities for each substance. The law directs each facility to notify the LEPC for its district if it stores or uses any "extremely hazardous substance" in excess of its threshold planning quantity. LEPCs are to work with such facilities to develop response procedures, evacuation plans, and training programs for people who will be the first to respond in the event of an accident. EPCRA requires that facilities immediately report a sudden release of any hazardous substance that exceeds the reportable quantity to appropriate state, local, and federal officials.
Subtitle B directs covered facilities annually to submit information about the chemicals that they have present to the LEPC, SERC, and local fire department. In addition, manufacturers and other facilities designated by EPA must estimate and report to EPA annually on releases from their facilities of certain toxic chemicals to the land, air, or water. EPA must compile those data into a computerized database, known as the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Generally, all information about chemicals that is required to be reported to LEPCs, SERCs, or EPA is made available to the general public, but EPCRA authorizes reporting facilities to withhold the identity of a chemical if it is a trade secret. Citizens are given the authority to bring civil action against a facility, EPA, a governor, or an SERC for failure to implement EPCRA requirements. |
crs_RS22819 | crs_RS22819_0 | This largest U.S. meat recall ever came after USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) found that the facility did not always notify it about cattle that had become nonambulatory after they had been inspected, but before slaughter for food. USDA inspectors reportedly had failed to detect that these animals became nonambulatory after they received antemortem inspection—causing some to question the use or effectiveness of recent increased appropriations from Congress for more aggressive enforcement of the federal Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA; 7 U.S.C. After a cow imported from Canada was found to have BSE in late 2003, FSIS issued a number of rules aimed at keeping BSE-infected beef from entering the food supply, including a prohibition on the slaughter of any nonambulatory cattle, regardless of the reason, or of when they became disabled. The final rule was published in final form on March 18, 2009 (74 Federal Register , pp. The rule, effective April 17, 2009, now specifically requires establishments to notify FSIS inspectors when cattle become nonambulatory disabled after passing ante-mortem inspection; all such cattle must be condemned and properly disposed of. In Congress
In the 111 th Congress, Senate supporters of a ban on downer cattle sought to include such a provision in economic stimulus legislation ( H.R. 1 ), but it was removed by conferees on the measure. The provision (Section 104) in the Senate-passed version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1 ) would have permanently prohibited the use of federal funds to pass through USDA inspection any nonambulatory disabled cattle for use as human food, regardless of the reason or time the animal became nonambulatory. | Revelations in early 2008 that cattle were mistreated at a California slaughter plant raised questions about enforcement of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. Evidence emerged that the plant had permitted nonambulatory ("downer") cattle to be slaughtered for human food, also potentially jeopardizing food safety. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced the largest meat recall ever, alerted school food authorities to destroy any unconsumed products from the plant, and launched an investigation. Since then, animal welfare activists have alleged additional cases of mistreatment at livestock markets. The 110th Congress responded with hearings and proposals to alter current policy, but no statutory changes were enacted.
In the 111th Congress, the Senate-passed version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1) included a provision to permanently prohibit the use of federal funds for inspecting any nonambulatory disabled cattle for use as human food, regardless of the reason or time the animal became nonambulatory. (Uninspected cattle cannot enter the food supply.) However, the provision was removed by House-Senate conferees prior to final enactment (as (P.L. 111-5); the House version lacked the provision. Additional bills are possible in the 111th Congress.
Meanwhile, USDA published a final rule in the March 18, 2009, Federal Register that now specifically requires cattle slaughter establishments to notify FSIS inspectors when cattle become nonambulatory disabled even if they have already passed ante-mortem inspection; all such cattle must be condemned (diverted from the human food supply) and properly disposed of. USDA already was condemning them if they were nonambulatory at the time of ante-mortem inspection, as a safeguard against the introduction into the human food supply of the agent that causes bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease"). |
crs_R43097 | crs_R43097_0 | Introduction
For several years, some Members of Congress have favored "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent immigration, and legalization for some unauthorized aliens residing in the country. Leaders in both chambers have identified immigration as a legislative priority in the 113 th Congress. While the House Committee on the Judiciary has ordered reported several distinct pieces of legislation that aim to reform immigration law thus far in the 113 th Congress, the debate in the Senate has focused on a single CIR bill: the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ). On June 27, 2013, the Senate passed S. 744 , as amended, by a yea-nay vote of 68-32. This report summarizes major provisions of S. 744 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and as modified and passed on the Senate floor. CRS's analysis focuses on eight major policy areas that encompass the U.S. immigration debate: comprehensive reform "triggers" and funding; border security; interior enforcement; employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement; legalization of unauthorized aliens; immigrant visas; nonimmigrant visas; and humanitarian provisions. The initial $46.3 billion effectively would be an appropriation to the CIR Trust Fund and would be made available immediately for obligation and expenditure for the following purposes:
$30 billion over a 10-year period for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to hire and deploy at least 19,200 additional trained full-time active duty U.S. Border Patrol agents along the Southern Border; $4.5 billion over a five-year period for DHS to carry out the Comprehensive Security Strategy; $2 billion over a 10-year period for DHS to enact recommendations of the Southern Border Security Commission (see "Border Security Strategies and Metrics") and for administrative expenses directly associated with convening and providing summaries of public hearings required by Section 3(c)(2); $8 billion over a five-year period for DHS to procure and deploy fencing, infrastructure, and technology pursuant to the Fencing Strategy, with not less than $7.5 billion being used to deploy, repair, or replace fencing; $750 million over a six-year period for DHS to expand and implement the mandatory employment eligibility verification system in INA Section 274A as amended by Section 3101 of the bill (see "Employment Eligibility Verification"); $900 million over an eight-year period for the Department of State to pay for one-time and startup costs to implement the bill; and $150 million over a two-year period to be transferred to the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and Justice for their initial costs of implementing the bill. Border Security35
S. 744 includes a number of sections designed to strengthen border security, including mandates for new border security strategies; increased border security personnel, equipment, and infrastructure; DHS waiver authority and access to certain federal lands; provisions related to immigration-related crimes and prosecutions; and efforts to strengthen the entry-exit system. The bill would rewrite INA Section 275 (unlawful entry) to increase civil and misdemeanor penalties for first-time offenses, impose felony penalties when aggravating circumstances exist (e.g., re-entry following a voluntary departure order), and also to eliminate criminal liability for attempted unlawful entry. The U.S. Provisions in S. 744 would amend the INA's interior enforcement provisions in several ways. Subtitle E of Title III would provide additional resources to immigration courts (see " Immigration Courts "). The bill would create additional grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, while also broadening judges' discretion to waive certain such grounds (see " Grounds of Inadmissibility, Deportability, and Relief from Removal "). S. 744 also would encourage alternatives to detention and strengthen DHS detention standards as well as congressional oversight of immigrant detention (see " Immigrant Detention "). Subtitle H of Title III of S. 744 establishes special procedures to protect children who are affected by immigration enforcement (see " Protection of Children during Immigration Enforcement "). S. 744 proposes to establish a general legalization program for unauthorized aliens in the United States (see "Registered Provisional Immigrants (RPIs)"), with special pathways for aliens who entered the country as children (See "DREAM Act") and for agricultural workers (see "Agricultural Worker Legalization"). Adjustment of Status to Lawful Permanent Residence
S. 744 would add a new section (245F) to the INA to provide for the adjustment of status of aliens with blue card status to LPR status. The basic worldwide limits on family- and employment-based preference (i.e., numerically-capped) visas would be unchanged at 480,000 and 140,000, respectively; but the bill would allow the allocation of unused roll-over and recaptured visas from previous years, would eliminate the per-country ceiling for employment-based preferences, and would increase the per-country ceiling for family-based preferences from 7% to 15%, in addition to other changes to these systems (see "Family-Based Immigration" and Employment-based Immigration"). Foreign nationals who have pending LPR petitions or who acquire RPI status would not be eligible for Track One visas. S. 744 would make extensive revisions to nonimmigrant categories for professional specialty workers (see " H-1B Professional Specialty Workers "), intra-company transferees (see "L Visa Intra-Company Transferees"), and other skilled workers (see "Other Skilled and Professional Worker Visas"). Additional nonimmigrant provisions in S. 744 would be designed to promote tourism (see "Tourism Related Provisions") and would make changes to student and other nonimmigrant visas (see " Other Nonimmigrant Visa Changes "). S. 744 would amend the E-3 visa category so that nationals of Ireland would be eligible. S. 744 would increase the number of H-2B workers eligible to be admitted in a year, while also imposing additional requirements on H-2B employers. S. 744 would address this policy goal by creating a new "W" nonimmigrant visa category, which would accommodate ongoing employment in lower-skilled agricultural and non-agricultural positions. Congressional Budget Office Analysis of S. 744
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the changes to immigration resulting from S. 744 as passed by the Senate would result in a net increase of 9.6 million LPRs in the first decade after enactment. | For several years, some Members of Congress have favored "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent immigration, and legalization for some unauthorized aliens residing in the country. The omnibus legislative approach contrasts with incremental revisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that would address some but not all of these elements, and with sequential reforms that would tackle border security and interior enforcement provisions prior to revising legal immigration or enacting legalization pathways.
Leaders in both chambers have identified immigration as a legislative priority in the 113th Congress. While the House Committee on the Judiciary has ordered reported several distinct pieces of legislation that aim to reform immigration law thus far in the 113th Congress, the debate in the Senate has focused on a single CIR bill: the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744). This report summarizes major provisions of S. 744, which the Senate amended and passed by a yea-nay vote of 68-32 on June 27, 2013.
CRS's analysis of S. 744 focuses on eight major policy areas that encompass the U.S. immigration debate: comprehensive reform "triggers" and funding; border security; interior enforcement; employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement; legalization of unauthorized aliens; immigrant visas; nonimmigrant visas; and humanitarian provisions.
Among the border and enforcement-related provisions in Senate-passed S. 744 are a number of provisions aimed at strengthening border security, including increased border security personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. The bill would mandate new border security strategies and the development of new border metrics that would be designed to achieve "effective control" of the Southern border. Most notably, S. 744 would authorize $44.5 billion in spending for additional border patrol agents, border fencing, and an electronic exit system to collect machine readable data at air and sea ports of entry.
The legislation would also authorize $750 million for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement a mandatory electronic employment verification system to be used by all employers. Furthermore, S. 744 would amend the INA to create additional grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, while broadening judges' discretion to waive some of these grounds. For certain immigration offenses, the bill would increase civil and misdemeanor penalties for first-time offenses and impose felony penalties when aggravating circumstances exist. The bill would amend INA provisions on unlawful reentry to increase criminal penalties. S. 744 would provide additional resources to immigration courts and would encourage alternatives to detention and strengthen detention standards and congressional oversight of immigrant detention. Special provisions would be included to protect children who are affected by immigration enforcement.
In turn, S. 744 would amend the INA to provide pathways for unauthorized aliens to adjust their immigration status to one of the proposed new statuses—"registered provisional immigrant" (RPI) status and "blue card" status—and ultimately legal permanent resident (LPR) status after specified border security and interior enforcement criteria are met. In addition to these legalization provisions, S. 744 would also accelerate the admission of an estimated 4 to 7 million foreign nationals who have pending petitions to become LPRs. S. 744 would substantially revise the categories for the admission of LPRs, eliminating the category for siblings of U.S. citizens, shifting the allocation of the other family-based categories, permitting more categories of LPRs to enter without numerical limits, and increasing the number of employment-based LPRs. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the changes to the legal immigration system would result in an increase of 9.6 million LPRs in the first decade after enactment.
Senate-passed S. 744 would revise and expand nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary immigration) programs for high- and low-skilled workers, as well as for tourists, students, and other nonimmigrants. The bill would increase the cap on professional specialty workers (H-1B workers), while also imposing new requirements on businesses that employ H-1B workers, as well as those that employ intra-company transferees (L visas). Reforms would be made to the existing H-2B visa for lower-skilled non-agricultural workers in temporary or seasonal employment, while the H-2A visa for agricultural workers would be phased out. New nonimmigrant visas (the proposed W visas) would be established for lower-skilled agricultural and non-agricultural workers that would be more flexible for employers, while also expanding certain rights for workers. Additional nonimmigrant visa changes would facilitate temporary immigration by doctors, investors, and aliens from certain countries with U.S. trade agreements; encourage tourism within the United States; and strengthen oversight of foreign students and summer-work study exchanges, among other changes.
An accompanying report, CRS Report R43099, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Short Summary of Major Legislative Proposals, offers an overview of S. 744 as well. |
crs_R42583 | crs_R42583_0 | The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) is the most recent federal law to provide job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals, including youth. All youth job training programs and related services are authorized under Title I of WIA and are carried out by the Department of Labor (DOL). These programs include the WIA Youth Activities (Youth) formula program, Job Corps, and YouthBuild. Although the programs have distinct activities and purposes, each program seeks to connect youth to educational and employment opportunities, as well as leadership development and community service activities. WIA authorized funding through September 30, 2003; however, WIA programs continue to be funded through annual appropriation acts. Youth Programs Authorized Under Title I of the Workforce Investment Act
Job training and employment services for youth under WIA include
WIA Youth Activities , a formula program that includes employment and other services that are provided year-round; Job Corps , a program that provides job training and related services primarily at residential centers maintained by contractor organizations; YouthBuild , a competitive grant program that emphasizes job training and education in construction; Reintegration of Ex-Offenders , a demonstration program for juvenile and adult offenders that provides job training and other services and is authorized under WIA's pilot and demonstration authority; and Youth Opportunity Grants (YOG) , a multi-site demonstration program funded through FY2003 that created centers in low-income communities where youth could receive employment and other services. For further information about the programs, see CRS Report R40929, Vulnerable Youth: Employment and Job Training Programs . Overview of Issues
Congress has taken steps toward reauthorizing WIA since the 108 th Congress. Advocates for consolidation say that it could make the programs more efficient and less costly. Other stakeholders assert that at-risk youth and other groups with barriers to employment could be overlooked if workforce programs were collectively funded. Another issue is the perceived lack of coordination between the workforce system and other systems that serve youth, such as the education system. Stakeholders have suggested that greater coordination can help meet the varied needs of youth, as intended by WIA. Members of Congress and others have also continued to inquire about the effectiveness of youth workforce programs in meeting their objectives and serving the most at-risk youth. To date, only an impact evaluation of Job Corps has been completed; however, DOL recently awarded a contract to a social policy research organization to conduct an impact evaluation of YouthBuild. In addition to these broader concerns, Congress is interested in issues specific to Youth Activities and Job Corps:
Since the start of the Youth Activities program, as authorized under WIA, policy makers and others have discussed the extent to which youth should have to prove their eligibility for the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) temporarily enabled youth ages 22 through 24 to access services under the Youth Activities program. Whether WIA ought to target these older youth, particularly in light of the possible cost of doing so, could be addressed in any reauthorization legislation. In addition, stakeholders have raised issues about the school status of youth in the Youth Activities program—specifically, whether the program should focus more on out-of-school youth, including those who are not working. Related to this is the age of youth who ought to be eligible for the program. Congress has considered proposals to provide federal funding for states to operate Job Corps centers, at state option, or to close centers. This is due to concerns that the program has had mixed performance outcomes, and that some centers are low performing. SDAs were similar to local workforce investment boards.) | The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA, P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal law that provides job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals, including vulnerable young people with barriers to employment. All youth job training programs and related services are authorized under Title I of WIA and administered by the Department of Labor (DOL). These programs include the WIA Youth Activities formula program, Job Corps, and YouthBuild. The Job Corps program was established in the 1960s and is the oldest federal job training and employment program (among recent programs) for young people. Under the pilot and demonstration authority in Title I, DOL has also carried out the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders program for both youth and adults. Although the programs have distinct activities and goals, each of them seeks to connect eligible youth to educational and employment opportunities, as well as leadership development and community service activities. WIA authorized funding through September 30, 2003; however, WIA programs continue to be funded through annual appropriation acts. Both the Senate and House of Representatives have taken steps toward reauthorizing WIA since the 108th Congress.
This report provides an overview of issues that have been raised by stakeholders about youth programs authorized under WIA. First, some policy makers have proposed consolidating these and other workforce programs to make them more efficient and less costly. Other stakeholders assert that at-risk youth and other groups with barriers to employment would be overlooked under such a consolidation. Another issue is the perceived lack of coordination between the workforce system and other systems that serve youth, such as the education system. Stakeholders have suggested that greater coordination can help meet the varied needs of youth, as intended by WIA. Members of Congress and others have also continued to inquire about the effectiveness of programs that serve youth in meeting their objectives and serving the most at-risk youth. To date, only an impact evaluation of Job Corps has been completed; however, DOL recently awarded a contract to a social policy research organization to conduct an impact evaluation of YouthBuild.
In addition to these broader issues, Congress is interested in issues specific to Youth Activities and Job Corps. Youth Activities provides funding for youth employment and training services overseen by a state workforce investment board (WIB) and the governor, in coordination with local WIBs and community organizations. The program targets youth ages 14 through 21 who are low-income and have one or more barriers to employment. Since the start of the program, policy makers and others have considered the extent to which youth have had to prove their eligibility for the program. Some local workforce investment boards have reported challenges with documenting income and other eligibility criteria, and some proposals would establish different methods for determining eligibility. Further, stakeholders have raised issues about whether the program should focus more on out-of-school youth. Local workforce investment boards have reported challenges recruiting and retaining these youth. Related to this is the age of youth who ought to be eligible for the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) temporarily enabled youth ages 22 through 24 to access services under the program. Whether WIA ought to target these older youth, particularly in light of the possible cost of doing so, could be addressed in any reauthorization legislation. Congress has considered proposals to provide federal funding for states to operate Job Corps centers, as a state option, or to close centers. This is due to concerns that the program has had mixed performance outcomes, and that some centers are low performing.
This report accompanies two CRS reports—CRS Report R40929, Vulnerable Youth: Employment and Job Training Programs, and archived CRS Report R40830, Vulnerable Youth: Federal Policies on Summer Job Training and Employment, both by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40892 | crs_R40892_0 | Introduction
Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111 th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. On November 7, 2009, by a vote of 220-215, the House approved the Affordable Health Care for America Act ( H.R. The legislation, introduced by Representative Dingell on October 29, 2009, is based on an earlier measure, the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 ( H.R. 3200 ), which was jointly developed and reported by the House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor. This report summarizes the workforce, prevention, quality, and related provisions in H.R. While primarily focused on health care financing issues, the health reform debate has encompassed a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on (1) expanding the primary care workforce, (2) encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and (3) strengthening the role of chronic care management. Drivers of Reform
Health care delivery reform relies on putting in place mechanisms to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, most important, alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care. ARRA incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. Division C, entitled "Public Health and Workforce Development," includes a series of provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. It also would create a multi-billion dollar Public Health Investment Fund to provide additional funds for the programs. Medicare pays the costs of graduate medical education (GME) by making two types of payments to teaching hospitals. National Health Service Corps
Sec. The first such provision would create a new loan repayment program, analogous to the NHSC program, for individuals who agree to practice in medically underserved areas whose health care needs are not being met by the NHSC. In addition, it would amend new PHSA Sec. Title VIII, Sec. Other Workforce Provisions
H.R. A number of provisions in H.R. Medicare and Medicaid Nursing Homes
Secs. Electronic Health Records
Congress enacted the HITECH Act to encourage the use of electronic health records (EHRs). | Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans.
The health reform debate has encompassed a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on expanding the primary care workforce, encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and strengthening the role of chronic care management. Health care delivery reform relies on putting mechanisms in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, most important, the alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care. In February 2009, Congress enacted the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act to promote the widespread adoption of electronic health records for sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders.
On November 7, 2009, by a vote of 220-215, the House passed a comprehensive health reform bill, the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962). The legislation, introduced by Representative Dingell on October 29, 2009, is based on an earlier measure, the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200), which was jointly developed and reported by the House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor. This report, one of a series of CRS products on H.R. 3962, summarizes the bill's workforce, prevention, quality, and related provisions.
H.R. 3962 includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. The legislation would amend and expand on many of the existing health workforce programs authorized under Title VII (health professions) and Title VIII (nursing) of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). It would create a Public Health Workforce Corps and establish a new loan repayment program, modeled on the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), for individuals who agree to practice in medically underserved areas with unmet health care needs. The bill also would make a number of changes to the Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, in part to encourage the training of more primary care physicians.
In addition, H.R. 3962 would bolster quality improvement activities, including performance measurement, and broaden Medicare and Medicaid coverage of clinical preventive services. The legislation would establish a multi-billion dollar Public Health Investment Fund to provide additional funding for these and other new programs and activities. |
crs_RL33842 | crs_RL33842_0 | For a corporation, however, indictment can be fatal. Soon thereafter, the Department of Justice announced a revised policy concerning the circumstances under which a corporation's failure to waive its attorney-client privilege might influence the decision to prosecute it. The 110 th Congress concluded without further action, although a related amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence did pass. Proposals similar to that passed by the House in the 110 th Congress have been introduced in the 111 th Congress, H.R. 4326 (Representative Scott); S. 445 (Senator Specter). v. United States , 212 U.S. 481, 495-96 (1909). Constitutional Concerns
In ther summer of 2006, a court in the Southern District of New York held that implementation of the Thompson Memorandum's policy with regard to a corporation's reimbursement of the attorneys' fees of its employees and pressure on them to make incriminating statements violated the Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights of the employees, their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as well as their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The case began with the criminal tax investigation of an accounting firm and its employees. The Fifth Amendment due process clause and its twin in the Fourteenth Amendment contain both procedural and substantive components. On appeal, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to address either Fifth Amendment issue because of its treatment of the Assistance of Counsel issue. They heard contentions from some witnesses that:
The policy represented a departure from past practices, since historically, Justice Department requests for waivers of corporate attorney-client and work product protection were unheard of. In the final days of the 109 th Congress, Senator Specter introduced S. 30 which, among other things, would have prohibited federal authorities from requesting a waiver of organizational attorney-client or work product protection or predicating the adverse exercise of prosecutorial discretion on the absence of such a waiver or the payment of attorneys' fees for their employees or officers. A corporation's refusal to waive could not be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, id. :
the McNulty Memorandum changes the tone of the policy, abandoning the aggressive implications of the Thompson Memorandum in favor of statements that confirm the Department's recognition and respect for the importance of the attorney-client privilege; the Memorandum establishes a strict procedure for waiver requests and generally bars prosecutors from holding against a company its payment the legal expenses of an employee; the Memorandum strikes the proper balance between the public's interest in vigorous investigation and prosecute white collar crime and fairness to corporations and their officers and employees; experience since the issuance of the McNulty Memorandum refute the suggestion of widespread prosecutorial abuse; "legislative action is simply not needed;" although the bills have no explicit enforcement mechanism and the courts are generally reluctant to impose sanctions in the absence of statutory authority, the bills' proposals are likely to bring forth a "cottage industry of prosecutorial abuse claims" that may deter the prosecution of worthy cases; even if the Memorandum fosters an environment in which employees must waive their Fifth Amendment privilege or be fired, it results in no more than a situation in which the guilty suffer; the legislative proposals will make prosecution of white collar crime more difficult because they reduce the incentive for corporate cooperation and thereby encourage "stonewalling." Attorneys Manual. | The Justice Department enjoys prosecutorial discretion to bring criminal charges against a corporation, its culpable officers or employees, or both. For a corporation, indictment alone can be catastrophic, if not fatal, in some instances. The Thompson Memorandum, since replaced with guidelines in the U. S. Attorneys Manual, described the policy factors to be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Two of the factors explicitly mentioned were whether a corporation had waived its privileges and whether it had cut off the payment of attorneys' fees for its officers and employees.
Justice Department policies and practices under the Thompson Memorandum led to constitutional challenges based on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Amendment's due process clause, and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel clause. Due process and right to counsel concerns were enough for a federal district court in New York to throw out the indictments of thirteen former partners and employees of an accounting firm, charged with creating and marketing fraudulent tax shelters, United States v. Stein. The Second Circuit affirmed on right to counsel grounds and consequently found it necessary to address the merits of the due process argument.
The House addressed the conflict in attorney-client protective legislation which it passed in the 110th Congress. Soon thereafter, the Department of Justice announced a revised policy concerning the circumstances under which a corporation's failure to waive its attorney-client privilege might influence the decision to prosecute it. The 110th Congress, which had previously amended the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to the inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege, adjourned without taking further action on the House-passed legislation. Similar proposals, however, have been introduced in 111th Congress, H.R. 4326 (Representative Scott); S. 445 (Senator Specter). This report provides a brief discussion of the legislation, the legal background, and a chronology of related issues and events. Also available is an abridged report, stripped of its footnotes and most of its citations to authority (CRS Report RS22588, The McNulty Memorandum In Short: Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, by [author name scrubbed]). |
crs_R42353 | crs_R42353_0 | The report is split into two main parts: programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS), and programs administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Community Living (HHS-ACL). Within the HHS-ACL section, Table 3 provides an overview of the Older Americans Act (OAA) nutrition programs. Hunger and Food Insecurity
Congress has long been interested in issues of hunger and allocating federal resources to address hunger in this country. The following sections of the report and the accompanying tables provide more details about the services, eligibility, participation, and funding for each program. USDA-FNS Programs
USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) administers domestic food assistance programs authorized in the farm bill ( Table 1 ), as well as WIC and Child Nutrition Programs ( Table 2 ). The programs in this report that include USDA commodity foods are The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), National School Lunch Program (NSLP), Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), and Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP). Most recently, Congress passed the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ). Broadly, the programs contained in these laws are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) as well as the "child nutrition programs." The Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), or snack program (see Table 1 ), is sometimes referred to as a child nutrition program. In this report, it is included in farm bill programs because FFVP was included in the 2008 farm bill. AOA also administers the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP), which provides funds to the same entities to purchase food for these programs. Older individuals who meet certain income and other requirements may also be eligible for other domestic food assistance programs administered by USDA, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (SFMNP), and the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP). | Over the years, Congress has authorized and the federal government has administered programs to provide food to the hungry and to other vulnerable populations in this country. This report offers a brief overview of hunger and food insecurity along with the related network of programs. The report is structured around three main tables that contain information about each program, including its authorizing language, administering agency, eligibility criteria, services provided, participation data, and funding information. In between the tables, contextual information about this policy area and program administration is provided that may assist Congress in tracking developments in domestic food assistance. This report provides a bird's-eye view of domestic food assistance and can be used both to learn about the details of individual programs as well as compare and contrast features across programs.
This report includes overview information for the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs as well as nutrition programs administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Community Living (HHS-ACL). USDA-FNS nutrition programs include those most recently reauthorized by the 2014 farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79). Programs included in the farm bill are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), and the Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (SFMNP). USDA-FNS also administers programs not contained in the farm bill: the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and Child Nutrition programs (School Breakfast Program [SBP], National School Lunch Program [NSLP], Summer Food Service Program [SFSP], Special Milk Program [SMP], and Child and Adult Care Food Program [CACFP]). HHS-ACL programs are the nutrition programs contained in the Older Americans Act (OAA)—Congregate Nutrition Program; Home Delivered Nutrition Program; Grants to Native Americans: Supportive and Nutrition Services; and the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP). |
crs_R45210 | crs_R45210_0 | T he farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress to address agricultural and food issues comprehensively about every five years. Over time, farm bills have tended to become more complicated and politically sensitive. This has made the timeline for reauthorization less certain. Recent farm bills have been subject to developments that have delayed enactment, such as insufficient votes to pass the House floor, presidential vetoes, and short-term extensions. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-334 ), often called the "2018 farm bill," was enacted on December 20, 2018. In the House, the Agriculture Committee reported the bill on April 18, 2018. An initial floor vote on May 18 failed by 198-213, but procedures allowed that vote to be reconsidered ( H.Res. 905 ). The House passed H.R. 2 in a second vote of 213-211 on June 21. In the Senate, the Agriculture Committee reported its bill ( S. 3042 ) on June 13, 2018, by a vote of 20-1. The Senate passed its bill as an amendment to H.R. 2 by a vote of 86-11 on June 28. Conference proceedings officially began September 5 and concluded on December 10. In contrast, the 2014 farm bill took more than 21 months from introduction to enactment, spanning two Congresses. This report examines the major legislative milestones for the last 12 farm bills over 54 years, a period representing modern farm bills with growing complexity. Timeline Relative to the Two-Year Congressional Term
Since 1965, 8 out of 12 enacted farm bills were introduced in the first session of a two-year Congress (the odd-numbered year). Of the four bills introduced in a second session, the 1970, 1990, and 2018 farm bills were enacted during a lame duck Congress (after an election) in November and December of the same year. The 2014 farm bill, which was introduced in 2012, was the first farm bill to start in one Congress, remain unfinished, and require reintroduction in a subsequent Congress. President George W. Bush vetoed the 2008 farm bill ( H.R. The overrides in 2008 were the only time that a farm bill was enacted as a result of a veto override. | The farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress to address agricultural and food issues comprehensively about every five years. Over time, farm bills have tended to become more complicated and politically sensitive. As a result, the timeline for reauthorization has become less certain. With the exception of the 2018 farm bill, recent farm bills have taken longer to enact than in previous decades. Beginning in 2008, farm bills have been subject to various developments that have delayed enactment, such as insufficient votes to pass the House floor, presidential vetoes, or short-term extensions.
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334), often called the "2018 farm bill," was enacted on December 20, 2018. In the House, the Agriculture Committee reported the bill on April 18, 2018. An initial floor vote on May 18 failed in the House 198-213, but floor procedures allowed that vote to be reconsidered (H.Res. 905). The House passed H.R. 2 in a second vote of 213-211 on June 21. In the Senate, the Agriculture Committee reported its bill (S. 3042) on June 13, 2018, by a vote of 20-1. The Senate passed its bill as an amendment to H.R. 2 by a vote of 86-11 on June 28. Conference proceedings officially began on September 5, 2018, and concluded in December with a Senate vote of 87-13 and a House vote of 369-47 (H.Rept. 115-1072).
The 2018 farm bill took 8 months from introduction to passage. By comparison, the 2014 farm bill took more than 21 months from introduction to enactment, and spanned the 112th and 113th Congresses. The 2008 farm bill took more than a year to enact and was complicated by revenue provisions from another committee of jurisdiction, temporary extensions, and vetoes.
Most farm bills have been introduced in the first session of a two-year Congress (the odd-numbered year). Three of the farm bills that were introduced in the second session—the 1970, 1990, and 2018 farm bills—were enacted during a lame duck Congress of the same year. The 2014 farm bill was the first farm bill to start in one Congress (2012), remain unfinished, and require reintroduction in a subsequent Congress.
This report examines the major legislative milestones for the last 12 farm bills covering 54 years. |
crs_R41481 | crs_R41481_0 | Major Developments in 2017
The Overall State of U.S.-South Korea Relations
Between 2009 and the end of 2016, relations between the United States and South Korea (known officially as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) arguably were at their most robust since the formation of the U.S.-ROK alliance in 1953. North Korea's escalation of provocations, and particularly its two tests in July 2017 of long-range ballistic missiles, which some observers characterized as having intercontinental range, have driven closer security cooperation in recent weeks. Additionally, many analysts think that cost-sharing for defense will become an issue of greater friction than in the recent past, with the Trump Administration demanding more from South Korea. The Administration has stated that it hopes that pressure will convince the North Korean regime "to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue." Thus far, the Administration has emphasized pushing China, which accounts for around 90% of North Korea's trade, to fully implement United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and take other steps to pressure North Korea. But ... it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to North Korean nuclear capability. President Moon has argued against what many critics called the Park-Obama "sanctions-only" approach toward North Korea. The essence of his approach appears to be that denuclearization policy—including sanctions—and low-level inter-Korean initiatives—such as humanitarian assistance—are complementary and for the time-being should operate on parallel tracks. Producing nuclear fuel for such submarines would require negotiations with the United States. THAAD Deployment
On July 29, 2017, shortly after North Korea's long-range ballistic missile test, President Moon's government agreed to a full deployment of the controversial U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea. The Trump Administration has focused specifically on the growth in the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with South Korea over the five years the agreement has been in effect. Since early 2016, the three countries appear to have closely coordinated their responses to North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches. Background on U.S.-South Korea Relations
Overview
While the U.S.-South Korea relationship is highly complex and multifaceted, five factors arguably drive the scope and state of relations between the two allies, as well as congressional interest in U.S.-South Korea relations:
the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass destruction programs and perceptions in Washington and Seoul of whether the Kim Jong-un regime poses a threat, through its belligerence and/or the risk of its collapse; China's rising influence in Northeast Asia, which has become an increasingly integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic and economic policymaking; South Korea's transformation into one of the world's leading economies—with a strong export-oriented industrial base—which has led to an expansion in the number and types of trade disputes and helped drive the two countries' decision to sign the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which Congress approved in 2011; South Korea's continued democratization, which has raised the importance of public opinion in Seoul's foreign policy; and the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country's middle-power status to play a larger regional and, more recently, global role. North Korea in U.S.-ROK Relations
Coordination over North Korea Policy
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant strategic element of the U.S.-South Korean relationship. Under the Obama Administration and the successive South Korean presidencies of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), the United States and South Korea in effect adopted a joint approach to Pyongyang, sometimes called "strategic patience," that had four main components:
keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program but refusing to restart them without a North Korean assurance that it would take "irreversible steps" to denuclearize; insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in North-South Korean relations; gradually attempting to alter China's strategic assessment of North Korea; and responding to Pyongyang's provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities and conducting a series of military exercises. Under the agreement, U.S. military personnel have maintained a continuous presence on the Korean Peninsula and are committed to helping South Korea defend itself, particularly against any aggression from the North. South Korea is included under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," also known as "extended deterrence." The United States maintains about 28,500 troops in the ROK. At the same time, provocations from North Korea have propelled more integrated bilateral planning for responding to possible contingencies. The Relocation of U.S. Economic Relations
South Korea and the United States are major economic partners. Five Years of the KORUS FTA
For five years, the KORUS FTA has been the centerpiece of U.S.-South Korean trade and economic relations. Reviews of the agreement to date are mixed. The Trump Administration has repeatedly criticized the KORUS FTA. | Overview
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea or ROK) is one of the United States' most important strategic and economic partners in Asia. Since the early 1950s, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty commits the United States to help South Korea defend itself. Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK, which is included under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." Washington and Seoul cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by North Korea. The two countries' economies are joined by the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and the United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner (China is its first-largest). Political changes in both countries in 2017 along with North Korea's increasing military capabilities have produced strains in the relationship.
Coordination of North Korea Policy
Dealing with North Korea is the dominant bilateral strategic concern. The Trump Administration appears to have raised North Korea's nuclear and missile programs to a top U.S. foreign policy priority, and has adopted an approach of increasing pressure on Pyongyang in the hopes of convincing the North Korean regime "to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue." The Administration has emphasized pushing China, which accounts for around 90% of North Korea's trade, to do more to pressure North Korea. North Korea's two tests in July 2017 of long-range ballistic missiles, which some observers characterized as having intercontinental range, has heightened the U.S. sense of urgency over the North Korean issue.
ROK President Moon Jae-in, elected in May 2017, has said he supports the continuation of sanctions against North Korea if it is aimed at bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. He also argued, however, against a "sanctions-only" approach toward North Korea. Instead, President Moon envisions denuclearization policy and low-level inter-Korean initiatives as complementary and in July 2017 proposed holding several inter-Korean dialogues. These initiatives appear to have caused some tension in U.S.-ROK relations, but North Korea's lack of a response to them and its continued missile testing appear to have ameliorated disagreements between Washington and Seoul, at least temporarily.
The U.S.-ROK Alliance
Since 2009, the United States and South Korea have accelerated steps to reform their alliance, including the relocation of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula and boosting ROK defense capabilities. Provocations from North Korea have propelled more integrated bilateral contingency planning, for instance by adopting policies to respond more swiftly and forcefully to attacks and by deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea. China has protested the THAAD deployment and appears to have taken retaliatory measures against ROK companies and economic interests. President Moon at first delayed finishing the deployment but then reversed himself after North Korea's July 29, 2017, long-range missile test. According to U.S. military officials, South Korea pays roughly half of the nonpersonnel costs of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea. Many analysts think that the Trump Administration will demand that South Korea increase its cost-sharing payments.
Bilateral Economic Relations
The KORUS FTA has been the centerpiece of U.S.-Korea trade and investment relations since its entry into force in 2012, but views on KORUS FTA's economic outcomes are mixed. Most U.S. business groups highlight market access improvements and a more robust mechanism for dispute resolution, but others have raised concerns over implementation, for example with respect to specific issues such as country-of-origin verifications. The Trump Administration has repeatedly criticized the agreement, focusing on the growth in the bilateral trade deficit since its entry into force, and has called for modifications. Following a U.S. request, the two nations are expected to convene a special committee under the KORUS FTA to discuss the agreement and possible changes. The scope of these discussions remains unclear but may be limited to date, as the Administration has yet to officially notify Congress of its intent to negotiate with South Korea, a requirement for any trade agreement negotiation to receive expedited legislative consideration. |
crs_R44207 | crs_R44207_0 | Overview
On April 20, 2015, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a proposed rule that would expand the definition of investment advice within employer-sponsored private-sector pension plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Individuals who provide recommendations that meet the definition of investment advice are held to a fiduciary standard, which is a higher standard of conduct than for individuals who provide recommendations that do not meet the definition. Individuals who are held to fiduciary standards are required to act solely in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. Regulations for Pension Plans and IRAs
To protect the interests of pension plan participants and beneficiaries, Congress enacted Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406 ). These exemptions are referred to as prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs). Generally, brokers and dealers who receive commissions are not subject to the act. The current rule was promulgated in 1975. DOL issued regulations that created a five-part test to determine whether an individual provided investment advice and thus was subject to the fiduciary standard. To be held to ERISA's fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual must (1) make recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis, (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions and (5) will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan. The proposed rule generated considerable controversy. DOL received 202 public comments on the proposed rule between October 26, 2010, and February 11, 2011. Although DOL has not indicated when it will publish the final rule, it proposed that the final rule would be effective 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register and that the requirements of the rule would generally become applicable 8 months after publication. The following are the types of activities that constitute investment advice under the proposed rule, if they are done for a fee or other compensation:
investment recommendations; recommendations as to the advisability of taking a distribution from a plan or IRA; recommendations for the investment of securities or other property that are rolled over from a plan or an IRA; recommendations for the management of securities or other property, including rollovers from a plan or IRA; the appraisal or a fairness opinion of the value of securities or other property if connected with a specific transaction by a plan or IRA; or a recommendation of a person to provide investment advice for a fee or other compensation. Accompanying the 2015 proposed rule that would update the definition of investment advice, DOL has proposed a best interest contract (BIC) exemption so that certain broker-dealers and others who act as plan fiduciaries would be able to continue to receive compensation that would otherwise be prohibited. Comparison of Current and Proposed Rule
Table 1 compares the definition of investment advice under DOL's current regulation and under the proposed regulation. Issues
The proposed fiduciary rule has generated much controversy. Such communications could be prohibited under the proposed rule. Legislation in the 114th Congress
The following legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would prevent or delay implementation of the fiduciary rule. Passed the House of Representatives
H.R. 1090 , the Retail Investor Protection Act, introduced on February 25, 2015, by Representative Ann Wagner, would (1) prohibit DOL from issuing a fiduciary rule until 30 days after the SEC issues a rule for the standards of conduct for brokers and dealers and (2) require the SEC to report to the House Committee on Financial and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on, among other items, whether retail investors would be harmed by the rule and whether there are alternatives to the rule that the SEC could pursue. On October 27, 2015, H.R. Companion legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. 4294 , the Strengthening Access to Valuable Education and Retirement Support Act of 2015 (or the SAVERS Act of 2015), introduced by Representative Peter Roskam on December 18, 2015, are nearly identical bills which would define investment advice in U.S. Code and also provide for a best interest PTE. S. 2502 , the Affordable Retirement Advice Protection Act, was introduced by Senator Johnny Isakson on February 4, 2016, and S. 2505 , the SAVERS Act of 2016, was introduced by Senator Mark Kirk on February 4, 2016. 4293 and H.R. Such a recommendation would not be considered investment advice and would not be held to a fiduciary standard. The bills provide for several "carve-outs" in which information or recommendations would not be considered investment advice. Provisions in H.R. 4294 but are not in H.R. 3020 , the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, introduced by Representative Tom Cole on July 10, 2015, and S. 1695 , the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, introduced by Senator Roy Blunt on June 25, 2015, contain provisions that would prohibit DOL from using any funds to "finalize, implement, administer, or enforce the proposed" fiduciary regulation. H.R. 3922 , the Retirement Choice Protection Act of 2015, introduced by Representative Mike Kelly on November 4, 2015, would (1) transfer authority for issuing regulations on IRAs from DOL to the Department of the Treasury and (2) establish a best interest standard for fiduciaries who provide investment advice. | On April 20, 2015, the Department of Labor (DOL) proposed redefining the term investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406), a person who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants. Thus, redefining the term investment advice could affect who is subject to this fiduciary standard.
Regulations issued in 1975 define investment advice using a five-part test. To be held to ERISA's fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual must (1) make recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, and (5) will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan. DOL proposed broadening the term's definition to capture activities that currently occur within pension and retirement plans, but do not meet the existing definition of investment advice.
The proposed rule would replace the current five-part test with a more inclusive definition. Table 1 in this report compares the current and proposed definitions. For example, under the current regulation, an individual must provide advice on a regular basis to be a fiduciary, which generally would not include recommendations on whether or not to roll over a 401(k) account balance to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). The expanded definition would remove the requirement that advice be given on a regular basis.
Securities brokers and dealers who provide services to retirement plans and who are not fiduciaries under current regulations are not required to act in the sole interests of plan participants. Rather, their recommendations must meet a suitability standard which requires that recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an individual's income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard. Under DOL's proposed regulation, brokers and dealers could be considered fiduciaries when they provide recommendations to participants in retirement plans.
In addition to broadening the definition of investment advice, the rule would provide carve-outs for situations that would not be considered investment advice. For example, providing generalized investment or retirement education would not be considered investment advice under the proposed rule.
The proposed rule is accompanied by proposed prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) and proposed amendments to existing PTEs. These proposals would allow fiduciaries to continue to engage in certain practices that would otherwise be prohibited (such as charging commissions for products that they recommend or having revenue-sharing agreements with third parties).
DOL first proposed broadening the definition of investment advice in October 2010. The proposed regulation generated much controversy and was withdrawn in September 2011. The revised proposals issued in April 2015 also have generated considerable controversy. Following the release of the proposals, DOL received public comments and held three and a half days of public hearings on the proposals. DOL has not indicated when it expects to issue the final rule.
In the 114th Congress, bills have been introduced that would, among other provisions, delay or prohibit the implementation of a final rule or establish a best interest standard for advice in retirement plans.
H.R. 1090, the Retail Investor Protection Act, would prohibit DOL from issuing a final rule on the definition of investment advice until at least 30 days after the SEC were to issue a rule for the standards of conduct for brokers and dealers. On October 27, 2015, H.R. 1090 passed the House of Representatives.
H.R. 3020 and S. 1695, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, would prohibit DOL from using any funds to finalize, implement, administer, or enforce the proposed fiduciary regulation.
H.R. 3922, the Retirement Choice Protection Act of 2015, would (1) transfer authority for issuing regulations on IRAs from DOL to the Department of the Treasury and (2) establish a best interest standard for fiduciaries who provide investment advice.
H.R. 4293, the Affordable Retirement Advice Protection Act, and H.R. 4294, the Strengthening Access to Valuable Education and Retirement Support Act of 2015 (or the SAVERS Act of 2015), would, among other provisions, add a statutory definition of investment advice and a best interest prohibited transaction exemption. In addition, the bills would require Congress to approve of investment advice regulations that have been issued after January 1, 2015. Companion legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. S. 2502, the Affordable Retirement Advice Protection Act, was introduced by Senator Johnny Isakson on February 4, 2016, and S. 2505, the SAVERS Act of 2016, was introduced by Senator Mark Kirk on February 4, 2016. |
crs_R45308 | crs_R45308_0 | Introduction
The JOBS and Investor Confidence Act ( S. 488 ) is a capital markets package consisting of 32 titles that have mostly already passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills. A substitute amendment to S. 488 was passed by the House on July 17, 2018, in a 406-4 vote (hereinafter, all discussion of S. 488 refers to the House-amended version of the bill). The package has been referred to as JOBS Act 3.0, following after the initial Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106 ) in 2012 and the financial services provisions signed into law as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P.L. 114-94 ), which are referred to as JOBS Act 2.0. 115-174 , many of which are related to capital markets, are included in S. 488 . S. 488 's capital markets provisions are largely focused on smaller companies' access to capital. Capital markets, for purposes of this report, refer to the segments of the financial system under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight and in which funding is raised through equity or debt securities. The report divides the 18 provisions into four general categories: (1) expand investor access, (2) reduce compliance costs, (3) promote financial intermediation, and (4) increase investor protection. Two common approaches to expanding capital access are to expand the investor pool or enhance investor communication for private offerings. Some of the S. 488 provisions propose to expand (1) the type of eligible investors by widening the accredited investor definition, as seen in Titles IV and X; and (2) the communication to eligible investors by allowing broader outreach, as seen in Title I. Title I attempts to address the aforementioned concerns related to demo days. Some believe the compliance costs associated with capital markets regulation could potentially outweigh the benefits of being a public company and are disproportionately burdensome for small and medium-sized businesses. In response to these concerns, certain S. 488 provisions aim to reduce (Titles V and IX) or better understand (Titles XXII and XXXI) compliance costs for publicly listed companies. The JOBS Act aims to stimulate corporate capital formation and the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) particularly for emerging and smaller firms. Promote Financial Intermediation
Capital markets consist of numerous players. Between investors and company issuers, who are the end contributors and recipients of funding, there are financial intermediaries that serve to channel funding or execute trades. Some provisions in S. 488 , for example, Titles XXVI and XXXII, promote the use of pooled investment vehicles to channel funding from investors to issuers. For example, Title XXIV would promote investment research of small issuers, and Title XX would create a designated new marketplace, called venture exchange, for smaller issuer stock trading. The SEC promulgated Regulation Crowdfunding pursuant to Title III of the JOBS Act in October 2015. Expanding capital formation allows for greater access of investment opportunities for more investors and increased funding for businesses. There are multiple titles in S. 488 that would create investor protection safeguards as part of a capital formation oriented provision. For example, Titles XXVII and XXIX would provide protection to general investors against corporate insiders and Title XXX would provide targeted protection to senior investors who are victims of financial exploitation. | Capital markets provide financing for businesses to fund their growth that would facilitate innovation and jobs creation, and enhance the society's overall standard of living. They are segments of the financial system in which funding is raised through issuing and trading equity or debt securities, which are forms of financial assets representing ownership or indebtedness of a firm. They are considered the largest source of financing for U.S. nonfinancial companies, significantly larger than bank loans and other forms of financing.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets. In recent years, Congress and the SEC began to increasingly direct capital markets regulation away from its traditional "one size fits all" approach. Starting in 2012, the bipartisan Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) has scaled regulation for smaller companies and reduced regulations in general for certain types of capital formation. It established a number of new options to expand capital access, including a new provision for crowdfunding. Starting in 2015, parts of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (P.L. 114-94)—referred to as JOBS Act 2.0—provided additional scaled disclosure and reporting related regulatory relief for smaller companies. Following the JOBS Act and JOBS Act 2.0, capital markets regulation has become even more tailored to suit companies of different sizes and with different needs.
However, concerns over capital formation persisted, given that smaller companies continue to face challenges to accessing capital, and the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) remained at far below long-term average levels post-JOBS Act. To address these concerns, Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to further expand the scaled approach, with some proposals building on existing JOBS Act provisions. The most notable of these proposals is the JOBS and Investor Confidence Act of 2018 (House-amended S. 488), a capital markets package referred to as JOBS Act 3.0. The House replaced the content of the original S. 488 and passed the amended measure by a 406-4 vote on July 17, 2018. The package includes 32 titles, many of which have previously passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills. Of the 32 titles, 18 are more capital markets related. They can be grouped under four general categories:
Expand Investor Access. One approach to expand capital access is to expand the investor pool or enhance investor communications. Some of the provisions propose to expand (1) the type of eligible investors by widening certain eligible investor definitions, as seen in Titles IV and X; (2) the number of eligible investors allowed to participate in certain offerings, as seen in Title XXXII; and (3) the communication to eligible investors by allowing broader outreach, as seen in Title I. Reduce Compliance Costs. Some believe compliance costs could potentially outweigh benefits and are disproportionately burdensome for small and medium-sized businesses. In response to these concerns, certain provisions aim to reduce (Titles V and IX) or better understand (required studies in Titles XXII and XXXI) compliance costs for publicly listed companies. Promote Financial Intermediation. Capital markets consist of numerous players. Between investors and company issuers, who are the end contributors and recipients of funding, there are financial intermediaries that serve to channel funding or execute trades. Titles XXVI (a required study) and XXXII would promote the use of pooled investment vehicles to channel funding from investors to issuers. Title XXIV would require a study on investment research of small issuers, and Title XX would create a designated new marketplace for smaller issuer stock trading. Increase Investor Protection. Multiple S. 488 titles would create investor protection safeguards as part of a provision related to capital formation. Other provisions center on investor protection. For example, Titles XXVII (a required study) and XXIX would provide protection to general investors against corporate insiders, and Title XXX would provide targeted protection to senior investors who are victims of financial exploitation. |
crs_R43791 | crs_R43791_0 | This could occur in a number of ways. As natural gas supplies have increased and prices have dropped, automakers and truck manufacturers have begun taking steps to introduce new vehicle lines fueled by natural gas, principally compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). On an energy-equivalent basis, oil has been more expensive than natural gas in recent years. Only 2.9% of U.S, natural gas production is currently used in transportation, mainly to move gas through the pipelines, and expanded use of natural gas vehicles would likely lead to increased demand for natural gas. Among the key factors determining the attractiveness of natural gas as a transportation fuel is its price relative to diesel fuel. Some of them require pressurized systems to burn the fuel in a gaseous state, and others convert natural gas to a liquid. The vehicles return each day to a central garage or maintenance yard, where refueling infrastructure may be installed. Long-haul trucks are a target market for use of LNG because of the fuel's price advantage and environmental benefits over diesel fuel. In addition, LNG is most effective when the vehicle it fuels is used regularly, such as long-haul trucks. It is known as autogas or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) when used as a motor vehicle fuel. Hydrogen, produced mainly from natural gas, can be used to power fuel cell vehicles. Natural-Gas-Based Electricity
Spurring the production and use of electric vehicles is another way to use natural gas in vehicles. Prospects for Growth
Future consumer and commercial interest in natural gas vehicles hinges on the relative price of petroleum to natural gas, refueling infrastructure, environmental concerns, federal and state incentives, and the price of natural gas vehicles relative to traditional gasoline vehicles. Cars and CNG
Natural gas fueling is less expensive than gasoline. Similarly, if there are fewer fugitive emissions, total lifecycle emissions would be lower. Congressional Involvement
As the availability of domestic natural gas supplies has increased, so too has congressional interest in finding ways to use more natural gas in the transportation sector. Legislation to promote natural gas as a vehicle fuel has been introduced in the 113 th Congress (and in previous years), including proposals that would change the taxation of alternative fuels and vehicles, modify the regulation of natural gas vehicles under federal CAFE standards, increase the weight limit for natural gas trucks on interstate highways, provide loans and grants for deployment of alternative fuel vehicles and recharging stations, and raise federal agency use of alternative fuel vehicles. A broad energy efficiency bill ( S. 761 ) reported out of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on June 3, 2013, includes a provision (Section 403) amending the National Energy Conservation Policy Act to authorize the use of energy savings performance contracts and utility energy service contracts for projects that support the use of natural gas and electric vehicles or the related fueling or charging infrastructure. S. 1486 , the Postal Reform Act of 2014, among other provisions, would require the postmaster general to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of a pilot program to use natural gas and propane in U.S. 3940 and S. 2721 , Natural Gas Long Haul Truck Competitiveness Act of 2014 , would require DOT to issue regulations to allow natural gas vehicles to exceed federal weight limitations to operate on U.S. interstate highways by an amount equal to the weight of the vehicle's natural gas tank and fueling system, less the weight of comparable diesel tanks and fueling systems. | The increase in domestic supplies of natural gas has raised new interest in expanding its use in the transportation sector. This report considers issues related to wider use of natural gas as a fuel in passenger cars and commercial vehicles.
The attractiveness of natural gas as a vehicle fuel is premised in large part on its low price (on an energy-equivalent basis) compared to gasoline and diesel fuel. When prices for gasoline and diesel are relatively low or natural gas prices are relatively high, natural-gas-based fuels lose much of their price advantage. While natural gas has other benefits—such as producing lower emissions than gasoline and diesel and protecting users of transportation fuels from the volatility of the international oil market—it is largely the cost advantage, if any, that will determine the future attractiveness of natural gas vehicles.
There are a number of technology pathways that could lead to greater use of natural gas in transportation. Some require pressurized systems to use natural gas in a gaseous state, and others convert natural gas to a liquid. Two of the most widely discussed options use compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Other technological approaches use liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), propane, and hydrogen. In addition, natural gas can be used to generate electricity to power electric vehicles.
Increasing the use of natural gas to fuel vehicles would require creation of an extensive nationwide refueling infrastructure. Although a small number of CNG vehicles have been on U.S. roads for more than 20 years, CNG use has been limited to vehicles that return to a central garage for refueling each day, such as refuse trucks, short-haul trucks, and city buses. LNG, on the other hand, requires large insulated tanks to keep the liquefied gas at a very low temperature and is therefore seen as more suitable for long-haul trucks. In both cases, the limited availability of refueling stations has limited the distances and routes these vehicles may travel.
Congress has taken a strong interest in spurring production and use of natural gas vehicles. Legislation has been introduced on a wide range of proposals that would equalize the tax treatment of LNG and diesel fuels, provide tax credits for natural gas vehicles and refueling equipment, require the production of vehicles that could run on several different fuels (such as gasoline and CNG), increase federal research and development on natural gas vehicle tank and fuel line technologies, and revise vehicle emission regulations to encourage manufacturers to produce more CNG passenger cars.
Legislation pending in the 113th Congress includes proposals that would extend expired tax credits for refueling property and fuel cell vehicles (S. 2260), authorize the use of energy savings performance contracts to support the use of natural gas and electric vehicles (S. 761), and require the U.S. Postal Service to study the feasibility of using natural gas and propane in long-haul trucks (S. 1486). |
crs_RS22836 | crs_RS22836_0 | Since democratic elections were held in 1990, Nicaragua has adopted pro-market economic reforms, held free and fair elections, and worked toward building democratic institutions. Political Situation
On January 10, 2007, Sandinista leader and former President Daniel Ortega was inaugurated to a five-year presidential term. Foreign Relations
President Ortega is working with the United States and the IMF to boost the country's long-term prospects for economic development, but is also seeking aid from Iran and Venezuela to meet more immediate needs. U.S.-Nicaraguan Relations
Despite initial concerns about the impact of Ortega's November 2006 re-election on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, the bilateral relationship, though tense at times, appears to be generally intact. His government is also implementing the CAFTA-DR. The FY2009 request includes increases in funds for security reform and combating transnational crime, democracy and civil society programs, and trade capacity building programs to help Nicaragua benefit from CAFTA-DR.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In addition to traditional development assistance, Nicaragua benefits from its participation in the MCA, a presidential initiative that increases foreign assistance to countries below a certain income threshold that are pursuing policies to promote democracy, social development, and sustainable economic growth. As noted above, other assistance could be provided through the proposed Mérida Initiative. | Nicaragua, the second poorest country in Latin America after Haiti, has had a difficult path to democracy, characterized by ongoing struggles between rival caudillos (strongmen), generations of dictatorial rule, and civil war. Since 1990, Nicaragua has been developing democratic institutions and a framework for economic development. Nonetheless, the country remains extremely poor and its institutions are weak. Former revolutionary Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega, was inaugurated to a new five-year presidential term in January 2007 and appears to be governing generally democratically and implementing market-friendly economic policies. The United States, though concerned about Ortega's ties to Venezuela and Iran and his authoritarian tendencies, has remained actively engaged with the Ortega Administration. The two countries are working together to implement the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), control narcotics and crime, and promote economic development through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). Nicaragua is receiving some $28.6 million in U.S. assistance in FY2008 and could benefit from the proposed Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America. This report may not be updated. |
crs_R43118 | crs_R43118_0 | Introduction
The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (DPA), provides the President a broad set of authorities to ensure that domestic industry can meet national defense requirements. Through the DPA, the President can, among other activities, prioritize contracts for goods and services, and offer incentives within the domestic market to enhance the production and supply of critical materials and technologies when necessary for national defense. Since 1950, the DPA has been reauthorized over 50 times by Congress, most recently in 2009. H.R. 4809 would reauthorize the DPA for five years and would reform other provisions, as discussed later in the report. Committee Jurisdiction
Though commonly associated with industrial production for the Department of Defense (DOD), the DPA currently lies within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. However, upon passage of P.L. 111-67 on September 30, 2009. 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness . The section highlights substantive changes made to these authorities in the Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009 (Reauthorization of 2009). Therefore, the use of DPA authorities extends beyond shaping U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, as the authorities may also be used to enhance and support domestic preparedness, response, and recovery from hazards, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies, among other purposes. In its original 1950 form, the DPA defined national defense as "the operations and activities of the armed forces, the Atomic Energy Commission, or any other department or agency directly or indirectly and substantially concerned with the national defense.... " Over the many reauthorizations and amendments to the DPA, Congress has gradually expanded the scope of the definition of national defense, and did so again in 2009. Authorities under Title I of the DPA
Priorities and Allocations Authority
Section 101(a) of Title I of the DPA states:
The President is authorized (1) to require that performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of assuring such priority, to require acceptance and performance of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by any person he finds to be capable of their performance, and (2) to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense. While the priorities authority is used far less frequently by other departments and agencies, it has been used for both the prevention of terrorism and natural disaster preparedness. These authorities include, but are not limited to:
purchasing or making purchase commitments of industrial resources or critical technology items; making subsidized payments for domestically produced materials; and installing and purchasing equipment for industrial facilities to expand their productive capacity. Prior to being struck from the statute by the 2009 reauthorization, the President's determination requirement under this section also included the conditions that
purchases, purchase commitments, or other action pursuant to this section are the most cost effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the need; and
the combination of the United States national defense demand and foreseeable nondefense demand for the industrial resource or critical technology item is not less than the output of domestic industrial capability, as determined by the President, including the output to be established through the purchase, purchase commitment, or other action. In addition, the law previously contained a limitation on the amount of money that could be spent on actions to rectify a domestic industrial base shortfall. Title III of the DPA also establishes a Treasury account, the Defense Production Act Fund, that is available to carry out all of the provisions and purposes of Title III. §2751, et seq.) Issues for Congress
Reauthorization of the DPA in the 113th Congress
All DPA authorities in Titles I, III, and VII are scheduled to terminate on September 30, 2014, with the exception of four sections. Appx. §2170, Section 721 of the DPA, the so-called Exon-Florio Amendment, that gives the President and CFIUS review authority over certain corporate acquisition activities. H.R. 4809 passed the House under suspension of the rules on July 29, 2014. Section 2 of the bill would make several revisions to the Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC), which was established in the Reauthorization of 2009 and is currently authorized in Section 722 of the DPA. Similarly, a rulemaking requirement exists for the voluntary agreement authority in Title VII. | The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. Appx §2061 et seq.), as amended, confers upon the President a broad set of authorities to influence domestic industry in the interest of national defense. The authorities can be used across the federal government to shape the domestic industrial base so that, when called upon, it is capable of providing essential materials and goods needed for the national defense.
Though initially passed in response to the Korean War, the DPA is historically based on the War Powers Acts of World War II. Gradually, Congress has expanded the term national defense, as defined in the DPA, so that it now includes activities related to homeland security and domestic emergency management. The scope of DPA authorities extends beyond shaping U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, as the authorities may also be used to enhance and support domestic preparedness, response, and recovery from natural hazards, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies.
The current authorities of the DPA include, but are not limited to:
Title I: Priorities and Allocations, which allows the President to require persons (including businesses and corporations) to prioritize and accept contracts for materials and services as necessary to promote the national defense. Title III: Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply, which allows the President to incentivize the domestic industrial base to expand the production and supply of critical materials and goods. Authorized incentives include loans, loan guarantees, direct purchases and purchase commitments, and the authority to procure and install equipment in private industrial facilities. Title VII: General Provisions, which includes key definitions for the DPA and several distinct authorities, including the authority to establish voluntary agreements with private industry; the authority to block proposed or pending foreign corporate mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers that threaten national security; and the authority to employ persons of outstanding experience and ability and to establish a volunteer pool of industry executives who could be called to government service in the interest of the national defense.
The authorities of the DPA are generally afforded to the President in statute. The President, in turn, has delegated these authorities to department and agency heads in Executive Order 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness, issued in 2012. While the authorities are most frequently used by, and commonly associated with, the Department of Defense, they can be, and have been, used by numerous other executive departments and agencies. The DPA lies within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Nearly all DPA authorities will terminate on September 30, 2014, though a few, such as the Exon-Florio Amendment (which established government review of the acquisition of U.S. companies by foreigners) and anti-trust protections for certain voluntary industry agreements, have been made permanent. Since 1950, the DPA has been reauthorized over 50 times, though significant authorities were terminated from the original law in 1953. Congress last reauthorized the DPA in 2009 (P.L. 111-67, the Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009). This reauthorization amended some of the current DPA authorities and extended the termination of the act by five years.
H.R. 4809, as passed by the House under suspension of the rules on July 29, 2014, would reauthorize the DPA until September 30, 2019. Among other changes, H.R. 4809 would reform the purpose and structure of the Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC), emphasize an existing rulemaking requirement for Title I priorities and allocations authority, and restore several limitations on the President's Title III authorities that were removed in the Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009. The bill would also authorize appropriations for the carrying out of the provisions and purposes of this act in the amount of $133 million every fiscal year beginning in FY2015. |
crs_R43854 | crs_R43854_0 | Although many receive coverage through publicly funded programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid), private health insurance is the predominant form of health coverage in the United States. Most individuals and families obtain private insurance through small- or large-group coverage, such as employer-sponsored insurance; some individuals and families purchase private insurance on their own in the non-group market. 111-148 , as amended) includes several provisions that affect the private health insurance market. To help accommodate individuals who have access to private health insurance as a result of these (and other) provisions, individuals and small businesses can shop for and purchase private coverage in health insurance exchanges (marketplaces). The ACA's individual mandate requires most individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty for noncompliance. The ACA created three risk mitigation programs—reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment—to help health insurance issuers adjust to the reformed private health insurance landscape, particularly the new entrants to the market and the changes to how issuers set premiums. The ACA also includes some provisions that states may choose to implement. This report provides an overview of many of the ACA provisions that affect the private health insurance market. 104-191 ), which requires guaranteed issue in the small-group market in all states. Related CRS Reports
CRS Report RL32237, Health Insurance: A Primer CRS Report R42069, Private Health Insurance Market Reforms in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) CRS Report R44163, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's Essential Health Benefits (EHB) CRS Report R42735, Medical Loss Ratio Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA): Issues for Congress CRS Report R44065, Overview of Health Insurance Exchanges CRS Report R44425, Eligibility and Determination of Health Insurance Premium Tax Credits and Cost-Sharing Subsidies: In Brief CRS Report R41331, Individual Mandate Under the ACA CRS Report R43981, The Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Employer Shared Responsibility Determination and the Potential ACA Employer Penalty CRS Report R44414, Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) Program: Frequently Asked Questions | Private health insurance is the predominant form of health insurance coverage in the United States, covering about two-thirds of Americans in 2014. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) builds on and modifies existing sources of private health insurance coverage—the non-group (individual), small-group, and large-group markets. The ACA provisions follow a federalist model in which they establish federal minimum requirements and give states the authority to enforce and expand those federal standards.
The ACA includes provisions that restructure the private health insurance market by
implementing market reforms that impose requirements on insurers and sponsors of health insurance (e.g., employers); creating health insurance exchanges (marketplaces) in which individuals and small businesses can shop for and purchase private health plans that meet or exceed federal standards; providing financial assistance to qualified individuals and small employers who purchase health plans through an exchange; establishing an individual mandate, which requires most individuals to either maintain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty; creating three risk mitigation programs to help health insurance issuers adjust to the reformed private health insurance landscape; assessing penalties on certain employers that either do not provide health insurance or provide health insurance that does not meet certain criteria; and including some state-option provisions, which states may choose to implement.
This report provides a broad overview of some of the private health insurance provisions in the ACA and directs readers to more in-depth CRS reports. |
crs_R44620 | crs_R44620_0 | Introduction
A biologic or biological product is a preparation, such as a therapeutic drug or a vaccine, made from living organisms, either human, animal, yeast, or microorganisms. Biologics are composed of proteins (and/or their constituent amino acids), carbohydrates (such as sugars), nucleic acids (such as DNA), or combinations of these substances. Biologics may also be cells or tissues used in transplantation. A biosimilar, sometimes referred to as a follow-on biologic, is a therapeutic drug that is similar but not structurally identical to the brand-name biologic made by a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company. A generic drug is chemically identical to its reference brand-name drug. Inflectra, which is biosimilar to Remicade, was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in April 2016. The FDA regulates both biologics and chemical drugs. Biologics and biosimilars frequently require special handling (such as refrigeration) and processing to avoid contamination by microbes or other unwanted substances. Also, they are usually administered to patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream. For these reasons, biologics often are referred to as specialty drugs. The cost of specialty drugs, including biologics, may be extremely high. In Europe, the introduction of biosimilars has reduced prices for biologics, in some cases by 33% compared with the original price of the reference product; for one drug in Portugal, the price reduction was 61%. In contrast, the pathway to marketing biosimilars in Europe seemingly had fewer barriers. In April 2006, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorized for marketing in Europe the first biosimilar product, Omnitrope, a human growth hormone. At the time of the Omnitrope approval in 2006, the FDA indicated in a document on the agency's website that this action "does not establish a pathway" for approval of other follow-on biologic drugs. "The agency has said that Congress must change the law before it can approve copies of nearly all other biotech products, and lawmakers haven't moved on the issue." New Regulatory Pathway for Biosimilars
In March 2010, Congress established a new regulatory authority for FDA by creating an abbreviated licensure pathway in Section 351(k) of the PHSA for biological products that are demonstrated to be "highly similar" (biosimilar) to or "interchangeable" with an FDA-licensed biological product. This authority was accomplished via the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009, enacted as Title VII of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 ). FDA Approval of Biosimilars
Although FDA has approved seven biosimilars for marketing in the United States, sales of five biosimilars have been delayed, or alleged to be adversely impacted, by actions of the brand-name manufacturers. The marketing launch of three U.S. biosimilars (see " Erelzi ," " Amjevita ," and " Cyltezo ") is being delayed by patent infringement lawsuits filed by brand-name manufacturers. In addition, Pfizer, which has FDA approval to market biosimilar Inflectra, has sued Johnson & Johnson (J&J), maker of brand-name biologic Remicade, for allegedly using "exclusionary contracts" and other anticompetitive tactics to prevent insurers from covering Inflectra (see " Inflectra "). Such anticompetitive practices would be expected to have a negative impact on the sales of another recently approved biosimilar (see " Renflexis "). The high costs of pharmaceuticals in general—and biologics in particular—have led to an increased interest in understanding the federal government's role in the development of costly new therapeutics. Note that for six of the seven biosimilars described below, the brand-name drug was originally discovered by scientists at public-sector research institutions (see Table 6 and " Federal Research and New Drug Development "). Several of these brand-name biologics (Remicade, Enbrel, Humira, Avastin) are among the top-selling drugs—both worldwide and in the United States (see Appendix C ). The FFDCA was amended by the Biosimilar User Fee Act of 2012 (BsUFA I), which authorizes FDA to collect fees for agency activities associated with the review of biosimilars from October 2012 through September 2017. The five-year biosimilars user fee authority was scheduled to sunset on October 1, 2017. Congress reauthorized the biosimilar user fee program via the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. | A biological product, or biologic, is a preparation, such as a drug or a vaccine, that is made from living organisms. Compared with conventional chemical drugs, biologics are relatively large and complex molecules. They may be composed of proteins (and/or their constituent amino acids), carbohydrates (such as sugars), nucleic acids (such as DNA), or combinations of these substances. Biologics may also be cells or tissues used in transplantation.
A biosimilar, sometimes referred to as a follow-on biologic, is a therapeutic drug that is similar but not structurally identical to the brand-name biologic made by a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company. In contrast, a generic chemical drug is an exact copy of a brand-name chemical drug. Because biologics are more complex than chemical drugs, both in composition and method of manufacture, biosimilars will not be exact replicas of the brand-name product, but may instead be shown to be highly similar. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates both biologics and chemical drugs.
Biologics and biosimilars frequently require special handling (such as refrigeration) and processing to avoid contamination by microbes or other unwanted substances. Also, they are usually administered to patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream. For these reasons, biologics often are referred to as specialty drugs. The cost of specialty drugs, including biologics, can be extremely high.
In April 2006, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorized for marketing in Europe the first biosimilar product, Omnitrope, a human growth hormone. The EMA lists a total of 40 biosimilars on its website; 2 products were refused authorization and 3 were withdrawn, leaving a total of 35 biosimilars authorized for the European market. The introduction of biosimilars in Europe has reduced prices for biologics overall, in some cases by 33% compared with the original price of the brand-name product. For one drug in Portugal, the price reduction was 61%.
In contrast, the pathway to marketing biosimilars in the United States has had several barriers. FDA approved Omnitrope in June 2006, following an April 2006 court ruling requiring the FDA to move forward with consideration of the application. At the time Omnitrope was approved, FDA indicated that this action "does not establish a pathway" for approval of other follow-on biologic drugs and stated that Congress must change the law before the agency can approve copies of nearly all other such products.
Four years later, in March 2010, Congress established a new regulatory authority for FDA by creating an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products demonstrated to be "highly similar" (biosimilar) to or "interchangeable" with an FDA-licensed biological product. The new authority was accomplished via the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009, enacted as Title VII of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148). Congress authorized FDA to collect associated fees via the Biosimilar User Fee Act of 2012 (BsUFA, P.L. 112-144). The five-year biosimilars user fee authority was set to expire on September 30, 2017. Congress reauthorized the biosimilar user fee program via the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. 115-52).
As more biosimilars enter the U.S. market, analysts expect to see U.S. price reductions similar to those that have occurred in Europe. However, of the seven biosimilars approved by FDA, sales of five biosimilars have been delayed, or (allegedly) adversely impacted, by actions of the brand-name manufacturers. Three biosimilars (Erelzi, Amjevita, and Cyltezo) have had their marketing launch delayed by patent infringement lawsuits filed by brand-name manufacturers. In addition, Pfizer has sued Johnson & Johnson (J&J) alleging that J&J has entered into anticompetitive contracts with insurers that prevent coverage of Pfizer's biosimilar (Inflectra), a less expensive substitute for J&J's best-selling biologic (Remicade). The alleged anticompetitive practices would be expected to have a negative impact on another recently approved biosimilar (Renflexis).
The high costs of pharmaceuticals in general—and biologics in particular—has led to an increased interest in understanding the federal government's role in the development of costly new therapeutics. In the case of six of the seven biosimilars approved by FDA, the associated brand-name drug was originally discovered by scientists at public-sector research institutions. Several of these brand-name biologics (Remicade, Enbrel, Humira, Avastin) are among the top-selling drugs in the United States and worldwide. |
crs_RS22629 | crs_RS22629_0 | Emergence of Documentary Requirements for Medicaid Eligibility
Since 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act ( P.L. 99-603 ) has mandated Medicaid to have applicants declare under penalty of perjury that they are citizens or nationals of the United States (or that they are aliens in a satisfactory immigrant status). Subsequently §432 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish procedures for persons applying for federal public benefits to "provide proof of citizenship in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner." States could accept self-declaration of citizenship for Medicaid, although some chose to require additional supporting evidence. 109 - 171 ) and modified by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109 - 432 ). This requirement, found in §1903(x) of the Social Security Act (SSA), lists 4 documents that meet the statutory requirements: a U.S. Passport, a Certificate of Naturalization, a Certificate of United States Citizenship, or a state-issued driver's license or other identity document for which the state has verified the citizenship of the holder. Additional documents that can be used in tandem to meet the citizenship requirement include birth certificates and other documents the Secretary of Health and Human Services designates by regulation. The citizenship documentation requirement in §1903(x) of the Social Security Act does not specifically apply to the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Legislative Activity in 111th Congress
One of the first pieces of legislation taken up by the 111 th Congress— H.R. 2 , the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA 2009)—contains an alternative option to the current documentary requirements of § 1903(x) of the SSA to establish citizenship for Medicaid eligibility. 2 , and President Barack Obama signed CHIPRA 2009 into law as P.L. 111-3)
Section 211 of CHIPRA 2009 (enacted as P.L. Under the §211 option, the name and SSN of an applicant could be submitted to the Commissioner of SSA . The Commissioner would check the information received from the states against the SSA database and determine whether the name and SSN match and whether the SSA database shows that the applicant is a citizen. If the SSA cannot confirm the applicant's name, SSN and citizenship, the applicant would have to either resolve the inconsistency or provide satisfactory documentary evidence of citizenship as defined in §1903(x)(3), or else be disenrolled. Section 211(c) of CHIPRA 2009would provide that the Medicaid citizenship documentation requirements currently required under Section 1903(x), and as amended by the provisions of §211 of CHIPRA 2009, would apply to SCHIP, Title XXI of the Social Security Act. | Since 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (P.L. 99-603) has mandated Medicaid to have applicants declare under penalty of perjury that they are citizens or nationals of the United States (or that they are aliens in a satisfactory immigration status). Subsequently, §432 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish procedures for persons applying for federal public benefits to "provide proof of citizenship in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner." States could accept self-declaration of citizenship for Medicaid, although some chose to require additional supporting evidence.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), as amended by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432) enacted §1903(x) of the Social Security Act, which requires states to obtain satisfactory documentation of citizenship to determine eligibility for Medicaid. There are 4 documents that meet the statutory requirements: a U.S. Passport, a Certificate of Naturalization, a Certificate of United States Citizenship, or a state-issued drivers license or other identity document for which the state has verified the citizenship of the holder. Additional documents that can be used in tandem to meet the citizenship requirements include birth certificates and other documents the Secretary of Health and Human Services designates by regulation.
One of the first pieces of legislation taken up by the 111th Congress—H.R. 2 and S. 275, the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA 2009)—contains a provision, § 211, that would give states an alternative to the documents required to establish U.S. citizenship for Medicaid. Under the §211 data matching option, the name and social security number (SSN) of an applicant could be submitted to the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (SSA). The Commissioner would check the information received from the states against the SSA database and determine whether the name and SSN match and whether the SSA database shows that the applicant is a citizen. If the SSA cannot confirm the applicant's name, SSN and citizenship, the applicant would have to either resolve the inconsistency or provide satisfactory documentary evidence of citizenship as defined in § 1903(x)(3), or else be disenrolled. Section 211(c) of CHIPRA 2009 would provide that the Medicaid citizenship documentation requirements currently required under Section 1903(x), and as amended by the provisions of §211 of CHIPRA 2009, would apply to the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Title XXI of the Social Security Act.
On February 4, 2009, President Barack Obama signed CHIPRA 2009, which includes §211, into law as P.L. 111-3.
This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity. |
crs_R43409 | crs_R43409_0 | Pending before the 113 th Congress is legislation, S. 1737 (Senator Harkin) and H.R. The minimum wage would be adjusted for inflation thereafter. Low-wage workers with children may receive additional income supplements through the child tax credit, and might qualify for certain need-tested government benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps). If Congress sought to pursue an increase in incomes for low-wage earners, there is a debate over whether increases in the minimum wage or expansions of government aid through the tax system or benefit programs are more effective in helping low-income families and addressing poverty. The minimum wage affects workers regardless of their family status; the federal tax system and government benefit programs take into account family circumstances in determining tax liabilities and benefits. Therefore, minimum wage and earnings supplement policies have differing impacts, depending on a worker's family type. This report
describes current law minimum wage and tax-transfer earnings supplement policies; provides the illustrations of gross earnings and net income (after taxes and SNAP benefits) for full-time full-year minimum wage workers at both the current minimum wage ($7.25 per hour) and the proposed $10.10 minimum wage; and discusses some of the policy implications of addressing poverty through both the minimum wage and federally-funded earnings supplements. However, such a worker in a family of two or more people has gross earnings less than the 2014 poverty guidelines. This section illustrates the effect of the federal minimum wage, federal taxes, and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits on the net income of families, and relates that net income to the official federal poverty guidelines by family type. The main distinction is the presence of children in the family. However, because the tax credits (earnings supplement) depend on the number of children in the family, this family's net income is less than that of the single mother with two children. On an annual basis, such an increase would boost gross earnings by $5,928. Employment Effects
A minimum wage increase would improve the well-being of workers—regardless of their family type—only if they remain employed. Following the research in the 1990s and early 2000s, a few reviews and "meta studies" came out in the 2000s that attempted to examine the voluminous research on the minimum wage:
In an extensive review of minimum wage studies, economists David Neumark and William Wascher in 2007 noted that there is a "lack of consensus about the overall effects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage" but "a sizable majority of the studies surveyed … give a relatively consistent (although not always statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages." In recent years, there have been numerous studies suggesting little or no disemployment effects of minimum wage increases. A minimum wage increase would raise the earnings of those who support families and have greater need, as well as those who do not. Federal policy has increasingly relied on increases in refundable tax credits and SNAP to assist the working poor, particularly those in families with children. The Budget Costs of Earnings Supplements
Recently, there has been increased attention to the federal budget costs of low-income aid. Research has also found that the EITC is more likely to result in spending on large items: durable goods and vehicles. However, if EITC increases the number of people in the labor force, it could also affect wage rates through the operation of supply and demand. As the illustrations in this report show, not all workers benefit from the EITC. Several reference points along the horizontal (hourly earnings equivalent) axis are highlighted, with corresponding vertical markers on each income source/definition:
full-time full-year work at the current federal minimum wage ($7.25/hour), shown at 1.00; full-time full-year work at $8.16 per hour (about 1.13 times the current federal minimum wage), which marks the point at which the depicted worker would begin to incur a regular federal income tax liability (before credits); full-time full-year work at $8.57 per hour (about 1.18 times the current federal minimum wage), which marks the point at which the depicted worker would begin to incur his or her EITC begin to phase-out; full-time full-year work at $8.37 per hour (about 1.29 times the current federal minimum wage), which marks the point at which the depicted worker would lose food assistance under SNAP, due his or her gross earnings reaching the program's gross income limit, set at 130% of the Federal Poverty Level; full-time full-year work at $12.66 per hour (about 1.75 times the current federal minimum wage), which marks the point at which the depicted worker would begin to incur a positive net tax liability (i.e., combined FICA taxes and regular federal tax liability begin to exceed combined EITC and CTC benefits); and full-time full-year work at $18.51 per hour (about 2.55 times the current federal minimum wage), which marks the point at which the depicted worker would no longer be eligible for the EITC. | Pending before Congress is legislation (S. 1737 and H.R. 1010) that would raise the federal minimum wage from its current $7.25 per hour to, ultimately, $10.10 per hour. The minimum wage would be adjusted for inflation thereafter. Whether the minimum wage or alternative policies, namely government-funded earnings supplements such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), are more effective in addressing poverty has been long debated.
The minimum wage affects workers regardless of their family status. A full-time, year-round worker at the current minimum wage would gross $15,080 in the year. A worker's poverty status, however, depends on family circumstance, specifically family size. A single full-year, full-time worker earning the current federal minimum wage would have gross earnings above the 2014 poverty guidelines, but the same worker in a family of two or more people would have gross earnings that fall below these guidelines.
The federal tax system and government benefit programs take into account family circumstances in determining tax liabilities and benefits. Therefore, minimum wage and earnings supplement policies have differing impacts, depending on a worker's family type. The main distinction is the presence of children in the family. Low-wage workers heading families with children receive considerable benefits from federal income tax credits and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) food assistance. Childless singles do not benefit from refundable tax credits as do households with children. The effect of federal tax and SNAP benefits is to partially mitigate differences in net incomes relative to poverty among the family types.
An increase in the minimum wage would boost gross earnings and increase the net incomes of families with a worker employed full-time, all year earning the minimum wage. However, because the federal tax system is progressive and need-tested benefits pay more to families with less income, the income boost would be less than $1.00 for each $1.00 increase in gross earnings, as workers pay more taxes and lose some benefits. The degree to which workers would gain net income because of a minimum wage increase also differs by family type.
The impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the well-being of minimum wage workers depends in great part on whether the wage increase would cause a loss in employment. Some economic studies have found that increases in minimum wages cause job loss; other economic studies have found no such job loss. A previous consensus that increasing the minimum wage reduces employment, at least among teenagers, has been challenged by numerous recent studies suggesting little or no dis-employment effects of minimum wage increases. However, the debate over the employment effects of the minimum wage is likely to continue.
There are also some considerations to expanding government-funded earnings supplements, such as the EITC, child tax credit, and SNAP. Expanding these earnings supplements would result in costs to the federal budget. In addition, these programs too might affect the labor market, albeit in ways different from a minimum wage increase. Research has provided evidence that the EITC has increased the number of workers in the labor market. Through the operation of supply and demand, this could suppress wage rates. Since all workers do not qualify for earnings supplements through the EITC, the child tax credit, or SNAP, lower-wage workers who do not receive them might be harmed economically. There has been some recent attention to considering minimum wage policies and earnings supplements as complementary, rather than alternative, policies. |
crs_RS20906 | crs_RS20906_0 | The USPTO Appropriations Process
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examines and approves applications for patents on claimed inventi ons and administers the registration of trademarks. It also assists other federal departments and agencies to protect American intellectual property in the international marketplace. The USPTO is funded by user fees paid by customers that are designated as "offsetting collections" and subject to spending limits established by the Committee on Appropriations. In 1980, P.L. Critics argued that those fees not appropriated to the USPTO were used to fund other, non-related programs under the purview of the appropriators. For FY2016, the USPTO budget supported by patent fees is $3.231 billion. The Administration's request for a fee-based budget authority for FY2017 is $3.244 billion. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
P.L. However, to address the issue of fees withheld from the office in the past, the America Invents Act creates within the Treasury a "Patent and Trademark Fee Reserve Fund" into which fee collections above that "appropriated by the Office for that fiscal year" will be placed. These funds will be available to the USPTO "to the extent and in the amounts provided in appropriations Acts" and may only be used for the work of the USPTO. They claimed that all fees were necessary to cover actual, time-dependent activities at the USPTO and that the ability of the appropriators to limit funds severely diminished the efficient and effective operation of the office. Under the America Invents Act, the budget authority to use fees collected by the USPTO remains within the congressional appropriations process. | The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examines and approves applications for patents on claimed inventions and administers the registration of trademarks. It also assists other federal departments and agencies protect American intellectual property in the international marketplace. The USPTO is funded by user fees paid by customers that are designated as "offsetting collections" and subject to spending limits established by the Committee on Appropriations.
Until recently, appropriation measures limited USPTO use of all fees accumulated within a fiscal year. Critics of this approach argued that because agency operations are supported by payments for services, all fees were necessary to fund these services in the year they were provided. Some experts claimed that a portion of the patent and trademark collections were used to offset the cost of other, non-related programs. Proponents of limiting use of funds collected maintained that the fees appropriated back to the USPTO were sufficient to cover the agency's operating budget.
On December 9, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Further Continuing and Security Assistance, Appropriations Act of 2017 (P.L. 114-254). This act, among other provisions, continues USPTO's budget supported by patent fees at $3.231 billion. For FY2017, the Administration's request for a fee-based budget authority was $3.244 billion.
P.L. 112-29, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, keeps the use of fees collected within the congressional appropriations process, but requires that fees generated above the budget authority provided by the Committee on Appropriations be placed in a separate fund within the Department of the Treasury. While use of these "excess" funds still remains under the control of the appropriators, they may only be used for the work of the USPTO. |
crs_RS20060 | crs_RS20060_0 | Introduction
In an effort to protect the purchasing power of Social Security recipients, Congress in the early 1970s indexed benefit increases to the only consumer price index available at the time. The index to which Social Security benefits are linked became known as the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) after the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began publishing the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in 1978. Concern has periodically been expressed that the CPI-W may not accurately reflect the inflation experience of the elderly, who make up the majority of Social Security beneficiaries. Several plans to curb the growth in the U.S. budget deficit, which were put forth in 2010 and 2011, recommend that inflation-indexing be based on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) rather than on the CPI-W or CPI-U. Because the C-CPI-U has typically risen more slowly than the two indexes, this proposal raised concern at that time among those Social Security recipients who believe they already are being insufficiently compensated for increases in their cost of living. A bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute to the FY2013 budget resolution in the House, which was introduced but not approved in March 2012, suggests that interest remains in slowing the growth in the deficit by changing the price index on which Social Security COLAs are based. Today, it reflects changes in the cost of living of about 32% of the population. The Experimental CPI for the Elderly
In 1987, Congress amended the Older Americans Act of 1965 to direct BLS to develop an experimental price index to track inflation in the population aged 62 and older. Switching from the CPI-W or CPI-U to the Chained CPI-U may reduce government outlays and raise revenue in future years because the Chained CPI-U has risen more slowly than the two official indexes—and therefore, more slowly than the CPI-E. Leaving aside whether the Chained CPI-U is a more accurate measure of inflation than the CPI-W and CPI-U, it would not appear to achieve the purpose of those who have proposed changing to the Chained CPI-U to instead switch to the CPI-E for calculation of Social Security benefits as some have suggested. Were BLS to replace the experimental index with a newly developed index more representative of the elderly population, there also is no guarantee it would bear the same relationship to the CPI-W and Chained CPI-U as that of the CPI-E. | The federal government, in an effort to protect the purchasing power of Social Security beneficiaries, indexes benefits to increases in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Concern has periodically been expressed that the CPI-W may understate the impact of inflation on the elderly population and that it therefore may not be the most appropriate measure of inflation's impact on the elderly.
At the behest of Congress, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) developed an experimental price index to track changes in the cost of living for the population aged 62 and older. In most years since 1982, the start of the experimental consumer price index (CPI-E) for the elderly, the annual rate of change in the CPI-E has exceeded that of the CPI-W and CPI-U. But, methodological limitations in the experimental index may have contributed to this pattern. Were BLS to construct an index that is more representative of the elderly population than the CPI-E, there is no guarantee that the relationship between the new index and the CPI-W would be the same.
Interest in the CPI-E most recently emerged in response to deficit-reduction plans issued in 2010 and 2011 that recommend inflation-indexed provisions in federal law be based on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U). Because the C-CPI-U has typically risen more slowly than the CPI-W, this proposal raised concern at the time among those Social Security recipients who already believe they have not been fully compensated for increases in their cost of living. Bills were then introduced to switch for purposes of Social Security indexation from the CPI-W to a CPI for those aged 62 and older (H.R. 456, H.R. 539, H.R. 776, H.R. 798, and S. 1876). As suggested by an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the FY2013 budget resolution in the House, interest has lingered into 2012 among some Members to switch to the C-CPI-U as a means of curbing the rate of growth in the budget deficit. |
crs_R43826 | crs_R43826_0 | Regional Accrediting Agencies
There are currently seven regional accrediting agencies operating in six regions of the United States. These accreditation agencies concentrate on specific regions of the country. National Accrediting Agencies
These entities operate across the United States and also accredit entire institutions. National accreditation agencies started as associations of schools with a common theme. Specialized or Programmatic Accrediting Agencies
These entities also operate nationwide and review programs and single-purpose institutions (e.g., engineering and technology). The Accreditation Process
The accreditation process is voluntary and must be requested by educational institutions or programs. These procedures are guided, in part, by the federal requirements discussed later in this report. However, the specific procedures for evaluation reviews adopted by accreditation agencies do vary among them. The process typically begins with institutional self-study. Peer review is conducted by an outside team primarily composed of higher education faculty and administrators. Interim reviews are required when issues are left unresolved from a comprehensive evaluation. Role of the U.S. Department of Education in Accreditation
ED does not accredit IHEs or programs of higher education. Evolution of Federal Requirements for Accrediting Agency Recognition
Section 496 of the HEA sets forth the standards and criteria accrediting agencies must meet to be recognized by ED as reliable authorities as to the quality of education offered at IHEs. Regardless of the type of accrediting association or agency, the organization must consistently apply and enforce standards that ensure that the education programs, training, or courses of study offered by an IHE are of sufficient quality to meet the stated objectives for which they are offered. The standards used by the accrediting agency or association must assess student achievement in relation to the institution's mission, including, as applicable, course completion, passage of state licensing examinations, and job placement rates. Specifically, NACIQI provides recommendations to the Secretary regarding
the establishment and enforcement of criteria for recognition of accrediting agencies or associations under Subpart 2 of Part H, Title IV, of the HEA; the recognition of specific accrediting agencies or associations or a specific state approval agency; the preparation and publication of the list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies and associations; the eligibility and certification process for IHEs under Title IV of the HEA; the relationship between (1) accreditation of IHEs and the certification and eligibility of such institutions and (2) state licensing responsibilities with respect to such institutions; and any other advisory functions relating to accreditation and institutional eligibility that the Secretary may prescribe. Some issues that may receive attention include the use of accreditation as a measure of quality, potential ways of restructuring or streamlining the accreditation process, accreditation's role in the changing postsecondary education landscape, and transparency and potential conflicts of interest in the accreditation process. Institutional accreditation by an ED-recognized accrediting agency may be considered a measure of institutional quality, because it indicates that an IHE meets performance standards delineated by the accrediting agency and maintains financial stability, as determined by an accrediting agency's review. Competency-Based Programs
Undergraduate educational programs at public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions must meet standards pertaining to minimum amounts of instructional time to be eligible to participate in Title IV federal student aid programs. | Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). IHEs wishing to participate in Title IV federal student aid (FSA) programs must meet several requirements, including being accredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education (ED) as a reliable authority on the quality of the education being offered.
There are three general types of accrediting agencies, each of which serves a specific purpose. Regional accrediting agencies operate in six regions of the United States and concentrate their reviews on IHEs within specific regions of the country. National accrediting agencies operate across the United States and review institutions with a common theme (e.g., religiously affiliated institutions). Finally, programmatic accrediting agencies operate nationwide and review programs and single-purpose institutions.
The accreditation process is voluntary and must be requested by educational institutions or programs. While accrediting agencies' review processes are guided, in part, by federal requirements, specific procedures for reviews are adopted by the individual agencies and vary among them. In general, however, the review process begins with an institutional self-assessment, then an institution is reviewed by an outside team of peers primarily composed of higher education faculty and practitioners, and finally, a comprehensive report is submitted by the team of peers to the accrediting agency, which then makes an accreditation determination.
Although the federal government relies on accrediting agencies to evaluate the quality of education offered at IHEs, the HEA and ED regulations provide a variety of requirements that accrediting agencies must meet to be recognized by ED. Key provisions require that accrediting agencies
meet general membership requirements (e.g., agencies must have a voluntary membership of IHEs); consistently apply and enforce standards that ensure the education programs, training, or courses of study offered are of sufficient quality to meet the stated objective for which they are offered; use review standards that assess student achievement in relation to the institution's mission, including, as applicable, course completion, passage of state licensing examinations, and job placement rates; evaluate, among other considerations, an institution's or program's curricula, faculty, facilities, and fiscal and administrative capacity; and meet due process requirements with respect to the institutions and programs they accredit.
Congress may wish to focus on several issues related to accreditation as it considers HEA reauthorization. These issues may include further development of institutional quality measures, the potential to restructure or streamline the accreditation system, accreditation's role in the changing higher education landscape, and transparency and potential conflicts of interest in the accreditation process. |
crs_98-1006 | crs_98-1006_0 | Many military retirees and othersseeking these increases, or attempting to prevent any decrease in their benefits, often argue theirclaims based on assertions that the medical care promised to them is no longer available. (2) In certain instances,organizations representing military retirees have alluded to broken promises. Some individuals havestated that the promised benefits included what they term "free" health care for life; others describethe promise as "free care for life in military health care facilities." As implemented by the Department of Defense, and interpreted by the courts, retireesand their dependents , while eligible for care on a space- or service-available basis, have no statutoryentitlement to such care, thereby taking the position that the military services have full discretiondetermining when and under what circumstances retirees and their dependents will receive care frommilitary treatment facilities or MTFs. Although it required no premiums, CHAMPUS didrequire cost sharing on the part of the beneficiary. Many appear to believe that they were "promised freehealth care for life at military facilities." Efforts to locate written authoritative documentation ofsuch "promises" have not been successful. Other sources have stated that such promises, whether or not actually made, are groundless. (B) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.- It is the sense of the Congress that-
(1) the United States has incurred a moral obligation to provide health care tomembers and former members of the Armed Forces who are entitled to retired or retainer pay(or its equivalent);
(2) it is, therefore, necessary to provide quality, affordable health care to such retirees;and,
(3) Congress and the President should take steps to address the problems associatedwith the availability of health care for such retirees within two years after the date of theenactment of this Act. Among their provisions, H.R. Lawyers representing Schismargued to the court that Schism was promised "free lifetime care at military facilities." Some have claimed that these are the most generous health carebenefits offered by the Federal government. From their perspective, theUnited States has made good on those benefits afforded military retirees under law. The report encouraged an increase in fees. The eligible employee may receive full health benefits coveragefrom TRICARE and the TRICARE Supplement (no deductibles, no co-pays, and noout-of-pocket costs). | Many military health care beneficiaries, particularly military retirees, their dependents, andthose representing their interests, state that they were promised "free health care for life at militaryfacilities" as part of their "contractual agreement" when they entered the armed forces. Efforts tolocate authoritative documentation of such promises have not been successful. Congressional reportlanguage and recent court decisions have rejected retiree claims seeking 'free care at militaryfacilities' as a right or entitlement. These have stated that the medical benefit structure made up ofmilitary health care facilities, Tricare and Medicare currently provide lifetime health care to militarymembers, retirees and their respective dependents. Nevertheless, claims continue to be made,particularly by those seeking additional benefits from the Department of Defense, or attempting toprevent an actual or perceived reduction in benefits.
Recent changes in the availability of military benefits and eligibility for these benefits havelead to speculation that retiree out-of-pocket costs may be increased. Growth in military health carespending, it has been argued, will lead to increased competition for defense dollars. Groupsrepresenting military retirees have stated that it is among their objectives to prevent what theydescribe as cost-shifting from the military to the beneficiaries. Although military health care isarguably among the most generous health benefit programs available, these groups see potentialincreases in out-of-pocket beneficiary payments as a part of the "broken promise." |
crs_RL33821 | crs_RL33821_0 | Introduction and Issues for Congress
Congress' ongoing interest in America's strategic and defense relationships in the Asia-Pacific region was reflected in a September 2006 House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing on America and Asia in a Changing World. These developments include the rise of China, continuing potential for interstate conflict, the struggle against Islamist militancy, and Asia-Pacific arms expenditures. The Rise of China5
China's rapid economic growth and its emergence as a great power is a defining event in the current geopolitical landscape of Asia. While the United States is hedging against the possibility that China's rise will be less benign, it welcomes a peaceful and prosperous China. This is most likely in three areas: between China and Taiwan, on the Korean Peninsula, and between India and Pakistan. Some view the United States' relationship with Pakistan on a more tactical level and focused on the struggle against militant Islamists while the evolving relationship with India is viewed as a more strategic partnership. After observing that the United States has "extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia" the 2006 National Security Strategy Statement of the United States of America (NSSS) points to the need to have sustained U.S. engagement, "maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights." The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discusses the need to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and "hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future." The U.S. Strategic Response to the Evolving Correlates of Power in Asia
The United States has undertaken a number of initiatives at the strategic level to address rising regional security concerns. These include the Trilateral Security Initiative between the United States, Australia and Japan, the opening of a strategic relationship with India, efforts to develop enhanced cooperation with ASEAN and some structural changes in the U.S. government to be better configured to bureaucratically deal with the region. U.S. Security Relationships in Asia
An assessment of America's regional alliance and security relationships reveals that there are some areas for concern and that efforts to restructure these relationships, while generally moving in the right direction, need to continue to adjust to the shifting geopolitical realities of Asia. Some regional observers have remarked that the United States is increasingly insecure, not only as a result of the post 9/11 environment but also because of a "China threat" and a concern that America's presence and role in Asia is declining. That said, others have experienced difficulties. The attention surrounding the creation of the East Asia Summit in early 2006, which now includes China, Japan, Korea, the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states as well as India, Australia, and New Zealand, can be attributed to regional states' desires not to be excluded from a potentially influential regional organization even if it has China and not the United States as the grouping's most influential member. While the challenge of Islamist terrorism has brought the United States and the Philippines closer together China's shift from support of communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and confrontation in the South China Sea to a more conciliatory and diplomatic posture, is improving relations between the Philippines and China. It is also strategically significant because Singapore is the only non-U.S. base port capable of docking an American aircraft carrier in the region. This is a struggle that is part military but largely political. Renew Emphasis on Regional Organizations
The strategic and defense context in Asia is largely defined by regional trade and economic ties. | This report begins with a question. What changes in U.S. strategic and defense relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, if any, are needed to respond to major developments in the region, particularly China's emergence as a major power, the continuing potential for inter-state conflict, and the struggle against militant Islamists? The report addresses this central question by setting it within the larger dynamics of American strategy in both a global and regional context. It discusses the shifting correlates of power in Asia before considering the current strategic debate, force structure, and key American security relationships with regional states. It also considers the United States' strategic response to recent developments and provides several policy options.
East Asia is rapidly changing, largely due to the rise of China which is fueled by China's impressive economic growth. China's new economic clout is giving it new power and influence in the region. Many Asia-Pacific analysts and observers, both in the region and in the United States, feel that the United States is preoccupied in the Middle East and as a result is not sufficiently focused on the Asia-Pacific at a critical point in the evolution of what may prove to be a new era in Asia. China is the only power that is presently thought capable of becoming a peer competitor of the United States. To many the overwhelming challenge is the need to try to shape the global and regional geo-strategic and economic environments to encourage and facilitate China's peaceful and constructive evolution as a great power. There is concern by some that a policy towards China that assumes China will become a threat to the United States and its interests in Asia will become a self-fulfilling prophesy. That said, many feel that a strategy that hedges against the possibility that China's rise is less than peaceful and cooperative is a prudent course of action.
Other key strategic challenges facing the United States at present in Asia include the ongoing real prospect of interstate conflict, particularly on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan, and the ongoing struggle against militant Islamists in Southeast Asia. A war over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to embroil the United States in a large scale war that could be very costly in terms lives, wealth, power, and prestige. The United States' main focus on the war against militant Islamists is viewed by some in Southeast Asia as an insufficient lens in and of itself for broad based U.S. engagement with the Southeast Asian region.
Some alliances have proven to be more resilient and adaptable in adjusting to evolving challenges than others. Several factors appear to be linked to the durability of America's alliances in Asia, including common perceptions of threat, shared strategic objectives, diplomatic attention, shared values, and common history. A better understanding of the disposition of America's forward deployed force structure, alliance ties, defense partners, and working relationships in Asia in the context of U.S. strategic priorities and shifting geopolitical realities can inform assessments of the future direction of American strategic posture in the region. |
crs_RL34481 | crs_RL34481_0 | These factors—a devastating natural disaster and lack of access by the international humanitarian community—combined with a controversy over the recent constitutional referendum and the extension of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest for the sixth consecutive year, have the potential to foster significant political change within Burma. Official Burmese figures have now been revised to 84,537 dead and 53,836 missing. An unnamed U.S. envoy in Burma told reporters on May 7, 2008 that the death toll could reach 100,000. In addition to loss of life, injury, and massive displacement, the cyclone also caused extensive damage to much of Burma. The nation's telecommunications system—including telephone and internet service—was disrupted. In addition, there reportedly was widespread criticism about how the military junta has managed the disaster. According to the United Nations, more than 230 international staff have been granted visas and are now in the country. It is responsible for providing non-food humanitarian assistance and can quickly assemble DARTs to assess conditions. The SPDC reported a heavy turnout on both dates, with few voting irregularities. On May 14, 2008, the military junta announced the official results of the May 10 vote (see Table 2 ). On May 29, 2008, the SPDC announced the final vote count for the constitutional referendum, which was published the next day in the New Light of Myanmar . The NLD compiled a list of voting irregularities on the day of the vote that included the following:
The distribution of pre-marked ballots, already checked in favor of the constitution, to voters at polling stations; Election officials watching voters as they marked their ballots; Intimidation and threats to voters; The confiscation of identity cards of voters who voted against the constitution; Reports that voters were told that ballots had already been submitted in their name by local government officials; Refusing to allow eligible voters to vote; Pressuring people to vote yes, and to vote yes for relatives not at the polling station; The arrest of people distributing anti-constitution literature at polling stations; and Denying NLD and other opposition members access to the polling stations to observe the referendum. On the same day the SPDC announced the official results of the May 10 vote, the NLD released a statement condemning the junta's decision to go ahead with the constitutional referendum in the areas of Burma most severely damaged by Cyclone Nargis. U.S. Policy towards Burma106
Two days before Cyclone Nargis struck Burma, President Bush issued an executive order expanding U.S. trade and economic sanctions effective May 1, 2008. These laws and Executive Orders:
Prohibit the import into the United States products from Burma; Ban the export or re-export of financial services to Burma by U.S. persons; Prohibit a U.S. person or company from approving, aiding, or supporting a foreign party's investment in Burma; Prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing shares in a third-country company if the company's profits are predominantly derived from the company's development of resources in Burma; Authorize the President to impose a freeze on funds or assets in the United States of the Burmese Government and individuals who hold senior positions in that government; Freeze all property and interests in property held in the United States or that come to the United States of the Myanmar Gem Enterprise, the Myanmar Timber Enterprise, the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise, and any person determined by the Secretary of Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to be either directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the SPDC or supportive of the SPDC; and Require U.S. representatives in international financial institutions to vote against the extension of any financial assistance to Burma. In the case of Burma, the response to the natural disaster is closely linked to political developments both within the country and in its relationships with the international community. Long-Term Food Shortages
Even after the immediate post-cyclone emergency has passed, experts expect the country to face a potentially severe food shortage for up to two years. The areas struck by Cyclone Nargis were important sources of rice, seafood, pork, and chicken for Burma; it is unlikely that the rest of the country will be able to step up food production to replace the lost output of the cyclone-devastated regions. As a result, Burma may require food assistance for many months and possibly years. It is noteworthy to recall that widespread protests in Burma in September 2007 began as a demonstration against an unannounced increase in fuel prices. Potential Political Instability
The possible combined effects of public dissatisfaction with the SPDC's response to the cyclone disaster, a potential rejection of the junta's proposed constitution, and widespread food shortages and food price inflation could combine to pose a threat to the political survival of Burma's ruling military junta. | Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma in the evening of May 2, 2008 and cut a path of destruction across the southern portion of the country. The storm left in its wake an official death toll of 84,537 and 53,836 more missing, and extensive damage to the nation's premier agricultural areas. Some have speculated that the final number of dead is actually more than 130,000. Vital infrastructure was destroyed by the storm, severely limiting the ability to assess the loss of life and provide assistance to the survivors for weeks following the cyclone. In addition, much of Burma's most productive agricultural land has been severely damaged; some experts expect that it will take up to two years for Burma's production of rice, seafood, pork and poultry to recover, and that the nation may face chronic food shortages and the need for international assistance for many months.
Burma's ruling military junta quickly faced both domestic and international criticism for its response to Cyclone Nargis, including accusations that it failed to provide adequate warning, its slow emergency response, and its reluctance to allow international relief workers into the country. The United States has offered so far contributed $40.17 million in relief aid.
Even before Cyclone Nargis struck, the junta was already facing a highly controversial referendum on a proposed constitution scheduled for May 10, 2008, that could shape U.S. and other countries' policies toward Burma. As a consequence, the evolution and implications of the humanitarian crisis became inextricably linked to Burma's political situation and its relations with the international community. In a widely criticized move, the military junta decided go ahead with the vote, holding the constitutional referendum in most of Burma on May 10, 2008, and in the more severely affected areas on May 24, 2008. The SPDC reported a heavy turnout on both days and few voting irregularities. Opposition groups state that the turnout was light, and there were many cases of voting fraud and voter intimidation. On May 29, 2008, the junta announced the promulgation of the new constitution, on the basis of on its approval by 90.7% of the eligible voters. According to the new constitution, elections to form a new government are to be held in 2010.
Some experts are speculating that Cyclone Nargis may precipitate major political change in Burma, including the destabilization of Burma's military regime. The junta has already faced domestic and international pressure to cancel the constitutional referendum. Local dissatisfaction with the speed and quality of the junta's provision of emergency assistance may heighten domestic opposition to the junta and its proposed constitution. Also, rising food prices and food shortages may feed popular discontent, much like fuel price increases led to protests in Burma of September 2007. In addition, two days before announcing the official results of the constitutional referendum, the SPDC extended opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest for the sixth consecutive year. This report examines the scope of and response to the disaster, as well as its links to Burma's political situation and U.S. policy. The report will be updates as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R41691 | crs_R41691_0 | Forests respond to various factors, such as amount of sunlight, temperature levels and variations, precipitation amounts and timing, and a host of disturbances (fire, pests, invasive species). Many are concerned that the natural ability of U.S. temperate forests to adapt to changing climate conditions may be insufficient to sustain production of desirable ecosystem services—timber, recreation, water, carbon sequestration, and more. To date, legislative direction and funding for management of federal lands and for federal assistance in managing nonfederal lands has, at most, indirectly encouraged management for resilience (recovery from) and adaptation to changing conditions. Forests can be managed to improve their resilience and adaptation to disturbances and possible climatic change and variability. Within each of the many temperate forest types, often relatively few tree species dominate the overstory, and more tree and shrub species occur in the understory. Forest Resilience and Adaptation
The Importance of Biodiversity
Forest resilience—the ability to respond to and recover from disturbances and changing conditions—and forest adaptation—the ability to change or migrate in response to disturbances and changing conditions—historically have been key to ecosystem sustainability. Possible Congressional Role
Congress could have an expanded role in promoting resilient and adaptable forests. Congress establishes direction and provides funding for federal forests and for financial and technical assistance for management of nonfederal forests. For federal forests, current congressional direction indirectly encourages management that promotes resilient forests. Instead, forest management approaches could emphasize responses to disturbances to provide and enhance forest resilience and diversity at the genetic, species, and stand levels. Annual variability and the unknowns about the long-term nature of climate change suggest an approach of monitoring changes in conditions and results, and of adjusting management to assist forests in recovering from and adapting to changing conditions. Some advocate more intensive actions to support forest adaptation, such as reducing forest fragmentation, protecting habitat corridors, and even managing species relocation. Many argue that forest management strategies need to respond and adjust to new insights about forest health from research and monitoring. If so, climate change could substantially change domestic forests and possibly degrade their value in providing desired goods and services. Traditional forestry practices, such as wildfire management and timber harvesting, can be tweaked to emphasize structures and diversity that enhance the ability of forests to respond and adapt to change. Prescribed burns are not perfect tools. Thinning
Thinning is the practice of cutting and removing a portion of the trees in a stand. However, planting species and species mixes could promote resilient, adaptable forests. | U.S. forests are primarily temperate forests, often with relatively few species dominating over wide areas. Such forests respond and adapt to an array of environmental factors—sunlight levels and duration, temperature, precipitation, and a multitude of disturbances (e.g., fires, pests, and storms)—and these factors could be further altered by long-term shifts in natural climate variability and climate change. Many domestic forests are already under stress from drought, severe wildfires, and insect epidemics. Changing conditions and disturbances could diminish the goods and services that forests provide—timber, clean water, scenic vistas, carbon sequestration, and much more. Forests can be subject to management techniques to improve their resilience and adaptability, to assure continued production of the economically desired ecosystem goods and services.
Congress provides management direction and funding for federal forests and financial and technical assistance for management of nonfederal forests. To date, such legislative direction and funding have at most indirectly encouraged management that promotes resilient forests. Congress could decide to broaden its role in promoting resilient and adaptable forests. However, thus far, no broad-based legislation has been introduced calling for direct federal forest management and nonfederal forestry assistance to sustain forests in the face of changing conditions.
Biologically diverse forests are generally more resilient (better able to recover from changes and disturbances) and more adaptable (better able to respond to changing conditions), because they have a broader biological base from which to respond. Diversity occurs at the genetic level (among trees of a given species), at the species level (among trees in a stand), and at the stand level (among the ages and sizes of trees in a stand). Many are concerned that climate change and increased climate volatility may be too rapid for natural adaptation and migration to sustain production of the desired goods and services, because some species require special habitat conditions and because forest fragmentation from human development hinders forest migration. Others argue that natural variability is sufficient to sustain forests, even in the face of climate change.
Research and monitoring are important components of understanding the extent and success of forest management efforts to promote resilient and adaptable forests. Management efforts could then respond to changing forest conditions by adjusting traditional forestry practices (e.g., prescribed burning, thinning, timber harvesting, tree planting, and more) or even by taking more intensive action to assist forest adaptation (e.g., reducing habitat fragmentation, creating habitat corridors, and assisting species relocation). A question for Congress and resource managers is whether or how to fund and implement research and monitoring programs to provide information for forest management in a time of changing conditions. |
crs_R40471 | crs_R40471_0 | Federal Role in Hazard Mitigation
Fiscal Management Challenge
Since 1989, the federal government has spent over $96.1 billion for disaster assistance provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Mitigation activities are generally categorized as structural and nonstructural. Structural mitigation activities may include physical changes to a structure or development of standards such as building codes and material specifications. Physical changes to a structure could include retro-fitting a building to be more resistant to wind-hazards or earthquakes, or elevating a structure to reduce flood damage. Nonstructural activities may include community planning initiatives such as developing land-use zoning plans, disaster mitigation plans, and flood plans. Other nonstructural community activities may include participating in insurance programs and developing warning systems. Federal disaster mitigation assistance provides funding for both structural and nonstructural mitigation activities. A primary source of federal disaster mitigation assistance is the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), authorized by Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). In an effort to alleviate the costs of future disasters through mitigation, Congress amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act in 1988. While the 1988 amendment established the foundation of hazard mitigation, the devastating disasters of the 1980s and 1990s led Congress to reassess the role of HMGP. 110th Congress Legislation
Legislation introduced in the 110 th Congress would have expanded allowances for the use of HMGP funds administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the Gulf Coast. These bills include the following:
H.R. 1239 , a bill that would establish a homeowner mitigation loan program; H.R. 308 , a bill that would provide a tax credit for mitigation expenditures; and, H.R. 327 , a bill that would create a National Hurricane Research Initiative to improve hurricane preparedness. Though some federal grant programs provide funding for planning and technical assistance, Congress may wish to consider increasing the funding to provide a greater degree of technical expertise in risk assessment and disaster impact predictions. Assistance to Small Businesses
Under current authorities, private businesses are not eligible to apply for HMGP funding. One area of complication is the lag between a major disaster declaration and expenditure of federal hazard mitigation assistance. | Since 1989, the federal government has spent over $96.1 billion for disaster assistance provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Over $4.4 billion of the disaster assistance was for hazard mitigation of natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes. The unpredictable nature of the location and scale of natural disasters poses a significant fiscal management challenge to Congress. To alleviate the federal costs of disasters, Congress amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 in 1988 (P.L. 100-707), which was renamed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (commonly known as the "Stafford Act"), to provide federal assistance to mitigate the impacts from future disasters.
Hazard mitigation activities are generally categorized as structural and nonstructural. Structural mitigation activities may include physical changes to a facility or development of standards such as building codes and material specifications. Examples of physical changes to a structure are retrofitting a building to be more resistant to wind-hazards or earthquakes, or elevating a structure to reduce flood damage. Nonstructural activities may include community planning initiatives such as developing land-use zoning plans, disaster mitigation plans, and flood plans. Other nonstructural community activities may include participating in property insurance programs and developing warning systems.
Federal disaster mitigation assistance provides funding for both structural and nonstructural mitigation activities. A primary source of federal disaster mitigation assistance is the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress would have expanded allowances for the use of HMGP funds administered by FEMA in the Gulf Coast. Legislation introduced in the 111th Congress include provisions that would establish a homeowner mitigation loan program (H.R. 1239), provide a tax credit for mitigation expenditures (H.R. 308), and create a National Hurricane Research Initiative to improve hurricane preparedness (H.R. 327).
Issues that Congress may wish to consider, in addition to eligible uses of HMGP funds, include the role of federalism in disasters, the lag between a major disaster declaration and expenditure of HMGP funds, the accuracy of risk assessment and disaster predictions, consolidation of hazard mitigation grant programs under a block grant, and disaster assistance to small businesses.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_R41039 | crs_R41039_0 | Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA; P.L. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the program. CERCLA established a broad liability scheme that holds both past and current owners and operators of contaminated facilities financially responsible for the costs of cleanup. At waste disposal sites, generators of the waste sent to the site for disposal, and transporters of the waste who selected the site for disposal, also are responsible for the cleanup costs. A combination of special taxes on industry and revenues from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury initially financed the Superfund Trust Fund, but the authority to collect the industry taxes expired at the end of 1995. As the remaining revenues were expended over time, Congress increased the contribution of general Treasury revenues in an effort to make up for the shortfall from the expired industry taxes. The availability of Superfund Trust Fund monies to finance the cleanup of contaminated sites is subject to appropriations by Congress. Considering the liability of the federal government as a potentially responsible party at its own facilities, the cleanup of federal facilities is not funded with Superfund Trust Fund monies under the Superfund program, but with other federal monies appropriated for other programs administered by the agencies responsible for these facilities. EPA and the states are responsible for overseeing and enforcing the implementation of CERCLA at federal facilities to ensure that applicable requirements are met. To prioritize cleanup actions, CERCLA directed EPA to establish and maintain a National Priorities List (NPL) of the most contaminated sites in the United States which present the greatest risks to human health and the environment. The topics discussed herein include the overall scope and reach of these statutory authorities, the process under which cleanup actions are selected and carried out at individual sites, the financial liability of potentially responsible parties for the costs of cleanup actions, the Superfund Trust Fund that may pay for cleanup actions when the potentially responsible parties cannot pay or cannot be found, enforcement of cleanup liability against the potentially responsible parties to minimize the need for federal tax revenues to finance the cleanup of contaminated sites, the applicability of CERCLA to federal facilities, and federal assistance for the cleanup of brownfields properties. In addition to providing relief from liability for certain categories of parties, P.L. Other federal laws also provide authorities to respond to petroleum releases in specific situations. Categories of Potentially Responsible Parties
Section 107(a) identifies four categories of potentially responsible parties who are liable for the costs of response actions, natural resource damages, and public health assessments associated with the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance:
any person who currently owns or operates a facility or vessel from which a hazardous substance was released; any person who at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance owned or operated the facility at which such disposal occurred; any person who arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance (often referred to as a generator of waste), and any person who arranged for the transport of a hazardous substance for disposal or treatment; and any person who accepts or accepted a hazardous substance for transport to a disposal or treatment facility, incineration vessel, or site selected by such person. Reach of Liability
Over time, the courts have interpreted liability under Section 107 of CERCLA to be strict, joint and several, and retroactive. Congress has established other trust funds to address releases of petroleum. Interest also accrues on the trust fund balance. These private settlement funds are deposited into site-specific Special Accounts within the Superfund Trust Fund, which are dedicated to the cleanup of the sites covered under the settlements. These funds are available directly to EPA and are not subject to discretionary appropriations by Congress. Section 120 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 added Section 120 to CERCLA to clarify that federal departments and agencies are subject to the requirements of CERCLA to the same extent as other entities, including the liability and enforcement provisions of the law. States and local governments also may play a role in the cleanup of federal facilities listed on the NPL. | Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA; P.L. 96-510) in response to a growing desire for the federal government to ensure the cleanup of the nation's most contaminated sites to protect the public from potential harm. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-499, SARA) clarified the applicability of the statute's requirements to federal facilities, and modified various response, liability, and enforcement provisions. Several other laws also have amended CERCLA for specific purposes, including relief from cleanup liability for certain categories of parties, and the authorization of federal assistance for the cleanup of abandoned or idled "brownfields" where the presence or perception of contamination may impede economic redevelopment.
CERCLA authorizes cleanup and enforcement actions to respond to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances into the environment, but generally excludes releases of petroleum and certain other materials covered by other federal laws. Considering the limitation of federal resources to address the many contaminated sites across the United States, CERCLA directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to maintain a National Priorities List (NPL) to identify the most hazardous sites for the purpose of prioritizing cleanup actions. The states and the public may participate in federal cleanup decisions at NPL sites. The states primarily are responsible for pursuing the cleanup of sites not listed on the NPL, with the federal role at these sites limited mainly to addressing emergency situations.
CERCLA established a broad liability scheme that holds past and current owners and operators of facilities from which a release occurs financially responsible for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and the costs of federal public health studies. At waste disposal sites, generators of the wastes and transporters of the wastes who selected the site for disposal also are liable under CERCLA. The liability of these "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) has been interpreted by the courts to be strict, joint and several, and retroactive. At contaminated federal facilities, federal agencies are subject to liability under CERCLA as the owners and operators of those facilities on behalf of the United States. Federal agencies also may be liable in instances in which an agency generated or transported waste for disposal at a non-federal facility.
CERCLA established the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund to pay for the cleanup of sites where the PRPs cannot be found or cannot pay. A combination of special taxes on industry and general taxpayer revenues originally financed the Superfund Trust Fund, but the authority to collect the industry taxes expired on December 31, 1995. Over time, Congress increased the contribution of general revenues to make up for the shortfall from the expired industry taxes. General revenues now provide most of the funding for the trust fund, but other monies continue to contribute some revenues (i.e., cost-recoveries from PRPs, fines and penalties for violations of cleanup requirements, and interest on the trust fund balance). The availability of these trust fund monies under the Superfund program is subject to appropriations by Congress. Private settlement funds deposited into site-specific Special Accounts within the Superfund Trust Fund also are available to EPA, but are not subject to discretionary appropriations.
Considering the liability of the federal government at its own facilities, the cleanup of federal facilities is not funded with Superfund Trust Fund monies under the Superfund program, but with other federal monies appropriated to the agencies responsible for administering the facilities. However, EPA and the states remain responsible for overseeing and enforcing the implementation of CERCLA at federal facilities to ensure that applicable cleanup requirements are met. |
crs_R41524 | crs_R41524_0 | The Stuxnet Worm: Possible Developers and Future Users
In attempting to assess the Stuxnet worm's potential targets and ascertain how best to identify and slow progress of its spread to other ICSs, numerous researchers have speculated as to the identity of the software code's developer. The Stuxnet code itself is now freely available on the Internet, as are the particular vulnerabilities it exploits, as well as the web addresses of unsecured SCADA systems. Early reports indicated that the intended target of Stuxnet may have been SCADA-controlled nuclear facilities in Iran that used the Siemens product. Iranian officials have indicated that the worm infected computers associated with the country's nuclear power plant under construction near Bushehr. The advent of the Stuxnet virus has raised questions on the vulnerabilities of national critical infrastructure. Many observers fear that a successful infiltration and attack could degrade or stop the operation of a critical infrastructure facility that delivers water, gas, or other essential utility, or affect multiple facilities due to the interdependent nature of the nation's infrastructure sectors responsible for providing essential services. SCADA systems can be accessed and managed directly at computer terminals, either from remote locations that are connected to the control system, or through the emerging trend of controlling these systems from mobile wireless devices. Another option is to enhance the protection of the physical aspects of the nation's critical infrastructure, thus mitigating possible damage from a Stuxnet worm type of attack and also better preparing facilities to respond to natural or man-made threats. Should the ICS of a critical infrastructure facility become affected by a Stuxnet worm or similar malicious code, disruptions could hamper the government's ability to provide domestic and international security, safety, and essential services for lengthy periods of time. The predominant view of many security observers appears to be that the recent emergence of the worm may be a new type of threat that could potentially lead to short- and long-term adverse global security consequences. Although the full extent of damage caused by Stuxnet is unknown, the potential implications of such a capability are numerous in that the worm's ability to identify specific ICSs and wait for an opportune time to launch an attack could have catastrophic consequences on nations' critical infrastructures. What authorities should be in place if such an attack were deemed to warrant an immediate response from the affected nation? Is an international treaty or convention necessary to curb proliferation and use of cyber-based weapons? Another issue raised by Stuxnet is the government's role in protecting critical infrastructure. | In September 2010, media reports emerged about a new form of cyber attack that appeared to target Iran, although the actual target, if any, is unknown. Through the use of thumb drives in computers that were not connected to the Internet, a malicious software program known as Stuxnet infected computer systems that were used to control the functioning of a nuclear power plant. Once inside the system, Stuxnet had the ability to degrade or destroy the software on which it operated. Although early reports focused on the impact on facilities in Iran, researchers discovered that the program had spread throughout multiple countries worldwide.
From the perspective of many national security and technology observers, the emergence of the Stuxnet worm is the type of risk that threatens to cause harm to many activities deemed critical to the basic functioning of modern society. The Stuxnet worm covertly attempts to identify and exploit equipment that controls a nation's critical infrastructure. A successful attack by a software application such as the Stuxnet worm could result in manipulation of control system code to the point of inoperability or long-term damage. Should such an incident occur, recovery from the damage to the computer systems programmed to monitor and manage a facility and the physical equipment producing goods or services could be significantly delayed. Depending on the severity of the attack, the interconnected nature of the affected critical infrastructure facilities, and government preparation and response plans, entities and individuals relying on these facilities could be without life sustaining or comforting services for a long period of time. The resulting damage to the nation's critical infrastructure could threaten many aspects of life, including the government's ability to safeguard national security interests.
Iranian officials have claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage to its nuclear program, yet the potential impact of this type of malicious software could be far-reaching. The discovery of the Stuxnet worm has raised several issues for Congress, including the effect on national security, what the government's response should be, whether an international treaty to curb the use of malicious software is necessary, and how such a treaty could be implemented. Congress may also consider the government's role in protecting critical infrastructure and whether new authorities may be required for oversight.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33141 | crs_RL33141_0 | Introduction
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coastbetween the major cities of New Orleans, Louisiana, to the west, and Mobile, Alabama, to the east. Along the Gulf Coast and inland in the swath of the storm, Hurricane Katrina impacted hundreds ofthousands of families in three states (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) and contributed to thedeaths of more than 1,000 people. (1) While CRS estimates that 5.8 million people in three states mayhave experienced hurricane-force winds, the majority rode out the storm safely. (3) ) Property damage, loss of life,and sizeable displacement of population appear to have been largely concentrated within a 100-mileradius of where the storm made landfall. Within this area, damage due to high winds and stormsurge resulted in significant devastation, but flooding, largely resulting from breached levees andflood walls, affected the greatest number of people, with much of New Orleans flooded. Using a combination of FEMAdamage assessment and Census data, CRS estimates that within these 14 counties,about 700,000 people may have been the most acutely impacted by HurricaneKatrina, experiencing flooding and/or significant structural damage. Population Estimates. People who lived in areas that were affected only with limited damage (144,000), ornon-flooded saturated areas (not assessed in this analysis) are grouped with theremainder of the population in the 14 counties/parishes chosen for this analysis,based on the FEMA damage/flood assessment (see Table 1 ). In Mississippi, nearly 22,000 people appear to have been affected by flooding,with the majority (20,000) concentrated in Hancock County, the western most countyon the Mississippi Gulf Coast, just to the northeast of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mass Displacement
The economic and social impact of Hurricane Katrina will be felt for yearsto come. Regardless, individuals, families, and communities havebeen, and will be, dramatically transformed by the storm. CRS estimates that about one-fifth of the populationmost directly impacted by the storm was poor. Blacks are estimated to haveaccounted for 44% of storm victims. Some may have been more isolated, living alone, or homebound due to frailty ordisability. Anestimated 88,000 persons age 65 and older were likely displaced by HurricaneKatrina, or 12.4% of the population affected by flooding and/or storm damage.Among the aged population affected, an estimated 27,000 lived alone, in one-personhouseholds, which accounted for 41% of households with an aged member. Hurricane Katrina struck at thebeginning of the school year, potentially displacing an estimated 183,000 children,based on CRS analysis of 2000 Census data, including an estimated 136,000 childrenwho were of school age. Over half (55%) of the children most likely to have been displaced by thehurricane were African-American based on 2000 Census data. The data that were used in this report are not the only data being developedto assess Hurricane Katrina's impact. The FEMA flood and damage assessments are as of September 21, 2005. Numbers presented inthis report are estimates, providing a rough approximation of the numbers andcharacteristics of persons, families, and households that are most likely to have beenimpacted by the hurricane. | On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coastbetween the major cities of New Orleans, Louisiana, to the west, and Mobile, Alabama, to the east. Along the Gulf Coast and inland in the swath of the storm, Hurricane Katrina impacted hundredsof thousands of families in three states (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) and contributed to thedeaths of more than 1,000 people. While CRS estimates that 5.8 million people in three states mayhave experienced hurricane-force winds, the majority rode out the storm safely. Property damage,loss of life, and sizeable displacement of the population appear to have been largely concentratedalong the Gulf Coast within a 100-mile radius of where the storm made landfall. Within this area,damage due to high winds and storm surge resulted in significant devastation, but flooding, largelyresulting from breached levees and flood walls, affected the greatest number of people, with muchof New Orleans flooded.
CRS estimates that 700,000 or more people may have been acutely impacted by HurricaneKatrina, as a result of residing in areas that flooded or sustained significant structural damage. Thisestimate is based on geographical analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)flood and damage assessments and year 2000 Census data. The estimates in this report are subjectto the methods and assumptions used. Other agencies and organizations are conducting assessmentsusing alternative and complementary methodologies; estimates may differ depending upon thespecific methodologies used. In the case of this analysis, the estimates reflect the numbers andcharacteristics of people, families, and households in 2000, who lived in areas that suffered damageor flooding from the hurricane in 2005.
The analysis shows that the Louisiana parishes of Orleans and St. Bernard were especiallyhard hit by flooding, with an estimated 77% of Orleans's population affected, and nearly all residentsof St. Bernard. In Mississippi, 55% of Hancock County's population is estimated to have beenaffected by flooding and/or structural damage, and in the more populous Harrison County, about19% of its population. In Louisiana, an estimated 645,000 people may have been displaced by thehurricane (based on 2000 Census data), and in Mississippi, 66,000.
Hurricane Katrina had varying impacts on the population. CRS estimates that of the peoplemost likely to have been displaced by the hurricane, about half lived in New Orleans. Due to thecity's social and economic composition, the storm impacted heavily on the poor and AfricanAmericans. CRS estimates that one-fifth of those displaced by the storm were likely to have beenpoor, and 30% had incomes that were below 1½ times the poverty line. African Americans areestimated to have accounted for approximately 44% of the storm victims. An estimated 88,000elderly persons (age 65 and older), many with strong community ties, may have been displaced,along with 183,000 children, many of whom were just starting the school year when the storm struck. Katrina's impact on individuals, families, and communities will be felt for years to come, and willtake time to fully comprehend.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43343 | crs_R43343_0 | Introduction
Coal has long been the major fossil fuel used to produce electricity. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lists coal-fired electric power plants as one of the largest sources of air pollution in the United States, with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from burning fossil fuels believed to be the largest contributor to global climate change. Regulations under development at EPA would impose new requirements on power plants to control GHG emissions. First, in September 2013 EPA proposed standards for the control of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from new electric generating units burning fossil fuels. EPA's proposals for control of GHG emissions from existing power plants are expected by June 2014, with many options for reducing GHGs under consideration. EPA may target emissions on a state or plant-by-plant basis, with companies likely given choices for compliance, and increasing coal-fired power plant (CFPP) efficiency may be one of those choices. In its simplest form, a plant's heat rate (for a particular period) can be defined as follows:
HR = F / E
where,
HR = heat rate (Btu/kWh)
F = heat energy input supplied by fuel to the power plant for a period (BTU)
E = energy output from the power plant in a period (kWh)
Since the equivalent BTU content of a single kWh of electricity is 3,412 BTU, thermal efficiency can be calculated as:
TE = (100) ( 3412 ) / HR
where ,
TE = thermal efficiency (%)
As an example, using the average heat rate in 2011 of 10,444 BTU/kWh for coal-fired power plants (i.e., all coal types), the average efficiency for coal-fired plants was 33%. Efficiency Improvements to Reduce GHG Emissions
The overall efficiency of a power plant encompasses the efficiency of the various components of a particular generating unit. Lower power plant efficiency results in more CO 2 being emitted per unit of electricity generated. The options most often considered for increasing the efficiency of CFPPs include equipment refurbishment, plant upgrades, and improved O&M schedules. Cost of the improvements is often compared to the expected return in increased efficiency as a primary determinant of whether to go forward with a program. According to an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Working Group (APWG) study in 2001, projects to improve combustion, steam cycle, and O&M required low to medium costs, and these expenditures were predicted to produce as much as a 3.5% net overall efficiency improvement. However, the study found that replacing the older CFPPs with new power plants was not practical because the expenditure for a new plant could not be justified by the improved performance. Instead, efficiency and operational improvements were seen as a possible alternative considering a range of equipment upgrades and refurbishment options to various CFPP systems. NETL then undertook an analysis of the efficiency of U.S. CFPPs, concluding that while the average efficiency was 32% in 2007, the efficiency of the top 10% was five points higher at 37.4%. NETL suggested that if GHG emissions reduction was a goal, then heat rate efficiency improvements could enable a power plant to generate the same amount of electricity with lower CO 2 emissions. In 2010, NETL completed a new study of U.S. CFPP efficiency, dividing the results into 10 deciles of equal capacity (see Table 2 ). According to NETL's analysis, retirements of lower efficiency units combined with increased generation from higher efficiency refurbished units, and advanced refurbishments with improved operation and maintenance, would be the key to potentially increasing average fleet efficiency beyond the best-in-class units. However, IEA affirmed that major plant retrofits and upgrades (i.e., conversion of subcritical PC units to super- or ultra-supercritical PC units) would raise efficiencies more substantially. Within such a system, efficiency improvements can be an important contributor. NETL observed in its 2010 report that based on a scenario where CFPP generation was constant at the 2008 level, increasing the average efficiency from 32.5% to 36% could reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 175 MMmt per year or 2.5% of total U.S. emissions in 2008. One possible approach might be to follow NETL's suggestion of using the top decile of CFPP efficiency as a benchmark for U.S. fleet efficiency, used with an efficiency frontier. Using statistical methods, benchmarks could be used to improve efficiency of the CFPP fleet. The efficiency standards could increase over time, and require CFPPs not meeting these standards to retire. | Coal has long been the major fossil fuel used to produce electricity. However, coal-fired electric power plants are one of the largest sources of air pollution in the United States, with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from burning of fossil fuels believed to be the major contributor to global climate change. Regulations under development at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would impose new requirements on fossil-fueled (mostly coal-fired) power plants (CFPPs) to control GHG emissions. The first of these requirements was issued in September 2013 with proposed standards for the control of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from new electric generating units burning fossil fuels. EPA's proposals for control of GHG emissions from existing power plants are expected by June 2014, with many options under consideration. EPA may target emissions on a state or plant-by-plant basis, with companies likely given choices for compliance. Within such a system, efficiency improvements can be an important contributor.
The overall efficiency of a power plant encompasses the efficiency of the various components of a generating unit. Minimizing heat losses is the greatest factor affecting the loss of CFPP efficiency, and there are many areas of potential heat losses in a power plant. Efficiency of older CFPPs becomes degraded over time, and lower power plant efficiency results in more CO2 being emitted per unit of electricity generated. The options most often considered for increasing the efficiency of CFPPs include equipment refurbishment, plant upgrades, and improved operations and maintenance schedules.
Cost of the improvements is often compared to the expected return in increased efficiency as a primary determinant of whether to go forward with a program. A study by the Asia-Pacific Working Group (APWG) found that at the low to medium end of cost expenditures are combustion, steam cycle, and operations and maintenance improvements. Replacing the older CFPPs with new power plants was not generally seen as being practical because the expenditure for a new plant could not be justified by the improved performance. Instead, efficiency and operational improvements were seen as a possible alternative considering a range of equipment upgrades and refurbishment options to various CFPP systems.
The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) took APWG's analysis a step further, finding that while the average efficiency of U.S. plants was 32% in 2007, the efficiency of the top 10% was five points higher at 37.4%. NETL suggested that if GHG emissions reduction was a goal, then heat rate efficiency improvements could enable a power plant to generate the same amount of electricity from less fuel and decrease CO2 emissions.
In 2010, NETL completed a new study of U.S. CFPP efficiency, concluding that if generation levels were held constant at 2008 levels, overall fleet efficiency could be raised from 32% to 36%, resulting in an overall reduction in U.S. GHG emissions of 175 million metric tonnes per year, or 2.5% of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2008.
According to subsequent analyses, NETL concluded that retirements of lower efficiency units combined with increased generation from higher efficiency refurbished units, and advanced refurbishments with improved operation and maintenance, would be necessary to achieve this goal. These improvements would generally be considered low to medium cost upgrades. However, at the higher cost end are major plant retrofits and upgrades (i.e., conversion of subcritical CFPP units to super- or ultra-supercritical CFPP units), which would raise efficiencies more substantially.
One possible approach to achieve fleet-wide efficiency improvement might be to follow NETL's suggestion of using the top decile of CFPP efficiency as a benchmark for the U.S. fleet, and establish an "efficiency frontier" that would be revisited periodically to reset the benchmark. This could be combined with possible incentives to improve efficiency or retire less efficient power plants. Other federal approaches could use tax incentives to encourage greater efficiency, or employ energy efficiency standards focused on improving efficiency of CFPPs. The overall cost of these or other programs to increase CFPP efficiency has yet to be determined. |
crs_R40161 | crs_R40161_0 | Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 111-5 ), incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. The HITECH Act, based on legislation introduced in the 110 th Congress, is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. HIT, which generally refers to the use of computer applications in medical practice, is widely viewed as a necessary and vital component of health care reform. It encompasses interoperable electronic health records (EHRs)—including computerized systems to order tests and medications, and support systems to aid clinical decision making—and the development of a national health information network to permit the secure exchange of electronic health information among providers. First, it codifies the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Created by Executive Order in 2004, ONCHIT was charged with developing and implementing a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of HIT in the public and private health care sectors. ONCHIT has focused its activities in the following areas: (1) developing vocabulary, messaging, and functional standards necessary to achieve interoperability among varying HIT applications; (2) establishing criteria for certifying that HIT products meet those standards; (3) ensuring the privacy and security of electronic health information; and (4) helping facilitate the creation of prototype health information networks. Second, the HITECH Act through a number of mechanisms provides financial incentives for HIT use among health care practitioners. It establishes several grant programs to provide funding for investing in HIT infrastructure, purchasing certified EHRs, training, and the dissemination of best practices. It also authorizes grants to states for low-interest loans to help providers finance HIT. Beginning in 2011, the legislation provides Medicare incentive payments to encourage doctors and hospitals to adopt and use certified EHRs. Those incentive payments are phased out over time and replaced by financial penalties for physicians and hospitals that are not using certified EHRs. In addition to the Medicare incentives, the legislation authorizes a 100% federal match for payments to certain qualifying Medicaid providers for the acquisition and use of certified EHR technology. Finally, the HITECH Act includes a series of privacy and security provisions that amend and expand the current HIPAA requirements. Among other things, the legislation strengthens enforcement of the HIPAA privacy rule and creates a right to be notified in the event of a breach of identifiable health information. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the HITECH Act payment incentives (and penalties) will increase spending for the Medicare and Medicaid programs by a total of $32.7 billion over the 2009-2019 period. Over the 2009-2019 period, it estimates that the HITECH Act will save the Medicare and Medicaid programs a total of $12.5 billion. Under current law, CBO predicts that about 45% of hospitals and 65% of physicians will have adopted HIT by 2019. CBO estimates that the incentive mechanisms in the HITECH Act will boost those adoption rates to about 70% for hospitals and about 90% for physicians. 111-16), the economic stimulus bill that the President signed into law on February 17, 2009 ( P.L. | Lawmakers incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1), the economic stimulus bill that the President signed into law on February 17, 2009 (P.L. 111-5). The HITECH Act is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) to support the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. HIT is widely viewed as a necessary and vital component of health care reform. It encompasses interoperable electronic health records (EHRs)—including computerized systems to order tests and medications, and support systems to aid clinical decision making—and the development of a national health information network to permit the secure exchange of electronic health information among providers.
The HITECH Act builds on existing federal efforts to encourage HIT adoption and use. It codifies the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT) within the Department of Health and Human Services. ONCHIT was created by Executive Order in 2004 and charged with developing and implementing a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of health information technology (HIT) in the public and private health care sectors. ONCHIT has focused on developing standards necessary to achieve interoperability among varying HIT applications; establishing criteria for certifying that HIT products meet those standards; ensuring the privacy and security of electronic health information; and helping facilitate the creation of prototype health information networks.
The HITECH Act provides financial incentives for HIT use among health care practitioners. It establishes several grant programs to provide funding for investing in HIT infrastructure, purchasing certified EHRs, training, and the dissemination of best practices. It also authorizes grants to states for low-interest loans to help providers finance HIT. Beginning in 2011, the legislation authorizes Medicare incentive payments to encourage doctors and hospitals to adopt and use certified EHRs. Those incentive payments are phased out over time and replaced by financial penalties for physicians and hospitals that are not using certified EHRs. The legislation further authorizes a 100% federal match for payments to certain qualifying Medicaid providers who acquire and use certified EHR technology.
Finally, the HITECH Act includes a series of privacy and security provisions that expand the current requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Among other things, the legislation strengthens enforcement of the HIPAA privacy rule and creates a right to be notified in the event of a breach of identifiable health information.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that Medicare and Medicaid spending under the HITECH Act will total $32.7 billion over the 2009-2019 period. CBO anticipates, however, that widespread HIT adoption will reduce total spending on health care. Through 2019, CBO estimates that the HITECH Act will save the Medicare and Medicaid programs a total of about $12.5 billion. Under current law, CBO predicts that about 45% of hospitals and 65% of physicians will have adopted HIT by 2019. CBO estimates that the incentive mechanisms in the HITECH Act will boost those adoption rates to about 70% for hospitals and about 90% for physicians. |
crs_R42988 | crs_R42988_0 | Introduction
This report is a chart book of selected immigration trends. Key immigration issues that Congress has considered i n recent years include increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, reforms to the system for legal temporary and permanent immigration, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. The report offers snapshots of time series data, using the most complete and consistent time series currently available for each statistic . The key findings and elements germane to the data depicted are summarized with the figures. For those who seek more complete analyses of the issues, the report cites Congressional Research Service (CRS) products that discuss the policies underlying the data presented in each figure. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was first codified in 1952, contains the provisions detailing the requirements for admission (permanent and temporary) of foreign nationals, grounds for exclusion and removal of foreign nationals, document and entry-exit controls for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, and eligibility rules for the naturalization of foreign nationals. Legal immigration encompasses permanent admissions (e.g., employment-based or family-based legal permanent residents (LPRs)) and temporary admissions (e.g., guest workers, foreign students). Immigration control encompasses an array of enforcement tools, policies, and practices to secure the border and to prevent and investigate violations of immigration laws. Historical Immigration Trends
Immigration to the United States was peaking at the beginning of the 20 th century. Immigration to the United States today has reached levels comparable to the early years of the 20 th century. Figure 2 illustrates that immigration over the last few decades of the 20 th century was not as dominated by three or four countries as it was earlier in the century. The total number of foreign-born residents in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history. In the past 50 years, the number of foreign-born residents of the United States has gone from just under 10 million in 1960 to 42 million in 2014 ( Figure 3 ), a 338% increase. The foreign born represented 13.3% of the U.S. population in 2014, approaching a level not seen since the proportion of foreign-born residents reached 14.8% in 1910. In FY2013, about 991,000 aliens became LPRs ( Figure 5 ). Of this total, 65% entered on the basis of family ties. The pool of people who are potentially eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds the worldwide level set by the INA. Over half (56%) of the 4.6 million approved LPR visa petitions pending at the close of FY2015 were brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens ( Figure 7 ). Nonimmigrant visa issuances reached 9.9 million in FY2014. Generally speaking, all of the temporary employment-based visa categories have increased since FY1994, as Figure 11 illustrates. Although there was another dip during the recent recession, the temporary employment-based visas have increased each year since FY2010. More recently, prior removals/illegal presence has become the top single ground of inadmissibility, followed by labor certification. Border Security
Border Patrol apprehensions of foreign nationals between ports of entry fell to a 40-year low in FY2011 and then fluctuated more recently as Figure 17 shows. The number of employers enrolled in E-Verify grew from 5,900 in FY2005 to 617,000 by the end of FY2015. These data indicate that roughly 10% of U.S. employers were participating in E-Verify by the close of FY2015. Employers who engage in unlawful employment may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties. A total of $16.3 million in administrative fines were imposed in FY2014—a figure that exceeds the level of total fines imposed cumulatively from FY1999 through FY2009. The number of criminal aliens removed from the United States has increased 137% over the past decade, from 73,298 in FY2001 to 198,394 in FY2013 ( Figure 22 ). Unauthorized Resident Aliens
The three main components of the unauthorized resident alien population are (1) aliens who enter the country surreptitiously without inspection, (2) aliens who overstay their nonimmigrant visas, and (3) aliens who are admitted on the basis of fraudulent documents. Estimates derived by the Pew Research Center using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population rose from 8.6 million in 2000 to a peak of 12.2 million in 2007. The most recent OIS report estimated that 42% of the 11.4 million unauthorized residents in 2012 had entered from 2000 to 2010. Apprehensions of UAC, mainly at the Mexico-U.S. border, increased from 8,041 in FY2008 to a peak of 68,445 in FY2014, before declining to 39,970 in FY2015 ( Figure 24 ). Four countries account for almost all of the UAC cases (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico) and much of the recent increase has come from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. | This report is a chart book of selected immigration trends. Key immigration issues that Congress has considered in recent years include increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, reforms to the system for legal temporary and permanent immigration, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. The report offers snapshots of time series data, using the most complete and consistent time series currently available for each statistic. The key findings and elements germane to the data depicted are summarized with the figures. The summary offers the highlights of key immigration trends.
The United States has a history of receiving immigrants, and these foreign-born residents of the United States have come from all over the world.
Immigration to the United States today has reached annual levels comparable to the early years of the 20th century. Immigration over the last few decades of the 20th century was not as dominated by three or four countries as it was earlier in the century, and this pattern has continued into the 21st century. The absolute number of foreign-born residents in the United States is at its highest level in U.S. history, reaching 42.4 million in 2014. Foreign-born residents of the United States made up 13.3% of the U.S. population in 2014, approaching levels not seen since the proportion of foreign-born residents reached 14.8% in 1910.
Legal immigration encompasses permanent immigrant admissions (e.g., employment-based or family-based immigrants) and temporary nonimmigrant admissions (e.g., guest workers, foreign students). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) contains the provisions detailing the requirements for admission (permanent and temporary) of foreign nationals and the eligibility rules for foreign nationals to become U.S. citizens.
In FY2013, about 991,000 aliens became U.S. legal permanent residents (LPRs). Of this total, 65% entered on the basis of family ties. The pool of people potentially eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds the worldwide level set by the INA. Most of the 4.6 million approved petitions pending at the close of FY2015 were for family members of U.S. citizens. After falling from 7.6 million in FY2001 to 5.0 million in FY2004, temporary visa issuances reached 9.9 million in FY2014. Generally, all of the temporary employment-based visa categories have increased since FY1994. Although there was a dip during the recent recession, the number of employment-based temporary visas increased each year between FY2010 and FY2014.
Immigration control encompasses an array of enforcement tools, policies, and practices to secure the border and to prevent and investigate violations of immigration laws. The INA specifies the grounds for exclusion and removal of foreign nationals as well as the documentary and entry-exit controls for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals.
U.S. State Department denials of petitions for LPR visas have increased in recent years, and prior removals from the United States or past illegal presence in the United States has become the leading ground of inadmissibility. U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of foreign nationals between ports of entry fell to a 40-year low of 327,577 in FY2011 and were 337,117 in FY2015. The number of employers enrolled in the E-Verify employment eligibility verification system grew from 5,900 at the close of FY2005 to 617,000 by the end of FY2015. These data indicate that approximately 10% of U.S. employers were participating in E-Verify by the close of FY2015. A total of $16.3 million in administrative fines was imposed on employers who engaged in unlawful employment in FY2014—a figure that exceeds the level of total fines imposed over the entire period from FY1999 through FY2009. Formal removals grew from 30,039 in 1990 to 462,463 in FY2015. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) typically identifies many more potentially removable aliens than are ultimately placed in removal proceedings. The number of criminal aliens removed from the United States increased from 73,298 in FY2001 to 198,394 in FY2013.
The three main components of the unauthorized resident alien population are (1) aliens who enter the country surreptitiously without inspection, (2) aliens who overstay their nonimmigrant visas, and (3) aliens who are admitted on the basis of fraudulent documents.
Estimates indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population rose from 8.5 million in 2000 to 12.2 million in 2007, before leveling off at 11.3 million in 2014. The latest available estimates indicate that 42% of the 11.4 million unauthorized resident aliens in 2012 had entered from 2000 to 2010. Apprehensions of unaccompanied alien children, mainly at the Mexico-U.S. border, increased from about 8,000 in FY2008 to 68,000 in FY2014 before declining to 40,000 in FY2015. In the first four months of FY2016, such apprehensions reached about 20,000. Most of this recent increase has come from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
For those who seek more complete analyses of the issues, this report cites Congressional Research Service (CRS) products that discuss the policies underlying the data presented in each of the figures. |
crs_RL33322 | crs_RL33322_0 | Many believe thatChina's national currency, the yuan or renminbi (RMB), may be seriously undervalued compared tothe dollar and other major currencies. Many in the United States believe that the large volume of Chinese exports to the UnitedStates is damaging the U.S. manufacturing sector and feeding the U.S. trade deficit. It is difficult to know on a net basis whether the U.S. economy benefits or whether on a netbasis it is hurt from the low cost of products it imports from China. Whether China would be themain country affected, whether the United States and other countries would allow the IMF todetermine their exchange rates, and what impact these rule changes might have on the policies of thecountries with the world's largest economies are matters for speculation. However, they say, the goal is not the attainment of unfair trade advantage but rathercontinued growth in the export sector. Chinese officials have not entered into the debate concerning the "real" value of China'scurrency, though some say there is no convincing evidence that the yuan is undervalued. On July 21, 2005,China's central bank announced a new exchange rate system for China's currency. If the new procedure had been allowed to function as announced, the yuan could haveincreased in value by 30% in five months. Rather, it said, China's newsystem would be a "managed float." Aslong as there is a general expectation that the yuan is underpriced and as long as these speculativeflows continue, Chinese officials are reluctant to allow the market to determine the yuan's value. Congress is currently considering several bills which wouldrequire the United States to limit trade with China if it does not revalue the yuan or direct thePresident to take the yuan-dollar exchange rate issue to the IMF or WTO for action. By contrast, other scholars have found, using essentially the same statistics,that the yuan has been substantially undervalued in recent years. The inflow of funds, in turn, helps generate more demand for imported goods. TheU.S. Others believe, however, that -- while more reformis needed -- China's banking system should be able to accommodate more flexibility in the value ofthe yuan. (95)
First, the U.S. government might continue pressing China publicly for additional changes inits foreign exchange system in order to make the international value of the yuan better reflect marketconditions and economic realities. This option is predicated on the expectation that reformers willbe able to move China more rapidly towards currency liberalization if China is not pressured fromabroad. Fifth, the U.S. government might refer the issue to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), alleging that the United States has been injured by unfair tradepractices linked to the undervaluation of China's currency. Arguably, the Treasury Department has shown restraint of this sort when it said, in itsrecent reports, that China was not manipulating the value of its currency. By raising the U.S. price of Chinese imports, they would presumably reducethe flow of Chinese exports to the United States, raise the prices paid by U.S. consumers (perhapshelping some U.S. producers) and stimulate the growth of export industries in other countries thatwould take China's place. It is not clear how much the price of Chinese goods would need to increase, or the volumeof Chinese exports to the United States would decrease, though, if the value of the yuan increased. Some believe, however, that if the United States complained to theWTO that China was manipulating its currency in order to gain unfair trade advantage and the IMFagreed, the WTO could authorize the United States and other countries to put special tariffs onChinese goods. | In recent years, the United States and other countries have expressed considerable concernthat China's national currency (the yuan or renminbi) is seriously undervalued. Some analysts saythe yuan needs to rise by as much as 40% in order to reflect its equilibrium value. Critics say thatChina's undervalued currency provides it with an unfair trade advantage that has seriously injuredthe manufacturing sector in the United States. Chinese officials counter that they have not peggedthe yuan to the dollar in order to gain trade advantages. Rather, they say the fixed rate promoteseconomic stability that is vital for the functioning of its domestic economy.
On July 21, 2005, China announced a new foreign exchange system which is intended toallow more flexibility and to permit the international value of the yuan to be established by marketforces. The yuan was increased in value by 2% and a "managed float" was introduced. However,the value of the yuan has changed little since then. Despite the publication of many studies, scholarsdo not agree whether or by what percent the yuan is undervalued. The wide range of estimatessuggests that there is no reason to believe that any particular figure is correct. It is not clear that theU.S. trade deficit would be lower or U.S. manufacturers would benefit if China raised the value ofthe yuan. In the short run, U.S. producers might be able to sell higher-priced products to U.S.consumers if the inflow of Chinese goods were reduced. In the long run, though, as long as the United States is a net importer of capital, it would have a trade deficit and other countries wouldultimately replace China as suppliers of low-cost goods to the U.S. market.
The Treasury Department has strongly urged China in recent years to adopt procedures thatwould allow the yuan to rise in value. Congress is considering legislation that would penalize Chinaif its currency is not revalued. The United States has pursued the yuan-dollar exchange rate issueas a bilateral U.S.-China issue. Other countries are also affected by the presumably undervaluedyuan -- some more than the U.S. -- but they have allowed the United States to take the lead.
There are at least five ways the United States could deal with the yuan exchange rate issue. Some of these would involve other countries more explicitly in the process. First, the UnitedStates could continue pressing China publicly to raise the value of the yuan on the assumption thatchange will not occur without foreign pressure. Second, it could stop pressing China publicly, on theexpectation that China might move more rapidly towards reform if it is not pressured. Third, theUnited States could restrict imports from China pending action to revalue the yuan. Fourth, the U.S.could ask the IMF to declare that China is manipulating its currency in violation of IMF rules. Fifth,the United States could refer the issue to the World Trade Organization (WTO), asserting that theUnited States has been injured by unfair trade practices linked to the undervaluation of China'scurrency. The WTO, in turn, could authorize trade remedies (tariffs on Chinese goods, for example)aimed at correcting this abuse. This report will be updated as new developments arise. |
crs_R44665 | crs_R44665_0 | Introduction
From postal mail to social media, Members of Congress have regularly adopted and utilized new communications tools to better inform constituents about the workings of Congress and important policy matters. Many people are familiar with congressional video because it is continually broadcast on the privately operated, nonprofit Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN). One C-SPAN channel was created for House proceedings in 1979, another for Senate proceedings in 1986, and a third for additional congressional or public affairs programming in 2001. Congressionally produced video feeds are available for free to any accredited news organization. Beginning in 2011 and 2012, respectively, the House and Senate began streaming their floor video feeds directly to the public over the Internet, in addition to allowing C-SPAN and other media outlets to rebroadcast their video feeds. Most committees also provide Internet video broadcasts of their open proceedings. Additional technological advancements in recent years, like the ubiquity of smartphones with video cameras and the ability to broadcast over wireless networks, may challenge the ability of the House and Senate to maintain exclusive control over video coverage of their proceedings. For example, the House Recording Studio generally operates the video equipment to film the House floor and the Clerk of the House maintains the online video services provided by the House. House Committees
Section 116(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 enabled House committees to allow photographic, radio, and television coverage of their proceedings. House Floor Proceedings
By the 1970s, many House Members were interested in television as a means to better inform the public about the workings of Congress, yet others were concerned that cameras in the chamber might be distracting or cause disruptions. Senate Broadcast Operations
Video broadcasts and recordings of Senate floor proceedings and many Senate committee proceedings are available to the media and the public. People outside of the House chamber, however, still watched the sit-in occur live, as some Members broadcast video from the floor via Facebook Live and Twitter's Periscope. Concerned that video coverage may be restricted arbitrarily, some believe that there should be an alternative means to provide real-time information about what is happening in Congress, like allowing credentialed press to record and broadcast their own footage. 5 , language was added to Rule II, clause 3, authorizing and directing the Sergeant at Arms to impose a fine against Members who use an electronic device in the House chamber for photographs, audio or video recordings, or broadcasts in violation of Rule XVII, clause 5. Since the decisions were made to broadcast from the House and Senate, the cameras have operated with little controversy. Video broadcasts have become a common part of congressional life, valued for facilitating public information about Congress and information within Congress. The House and Senate initially sought the commitment of a network to ensure an audience for their broadcasts, and C-SPAN needed access to the video content exclusively provided by the House and the Senate. As video footage becomes easier for anyone to produce and broadcast, the House and Senate may continue to address institutional rules regarding technology use and video coverage of their proceedings. | Video broadcasts of congressional proceedings enable constituents, policy professionals, and other interested individuals to see Congress at work, learn about specific Members, and follow the legislative process. Members of Congress have always considered communication with constituents an essential part of their representational duties. Members also often utilize new tools and technologies to reach and engage their constituents and colleagues.
Background
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 first enabled congressional committees to broadcast their proceedings, if desired. Separate decisions were then made by the House and the Senate in 1977 and 1986, respectively, to provide audio and video broadcasts of chamber proceedings.
Congressional video and audio feeds are operated by the House and Senate but are available for any credentialed press gallery member to broadcast. Many Americans are familiar with these feeds in video format, as the primary content on the privately operated, nonprofit Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN). C-SPAN launched a dedicated television channel for House proceedings in 1979 and another for Senate proceedings in 1986, and they continue to be key information resources for Congress and the public.
Live broadcasts provided real-time information about Congress to anyone outside of the Capitol. Previously, only credentialed press or members of the public seated in the galleries could see floor proceedings as they occurred. In addition to augmenting the legislative information available to the public, these broadcasts arguably were also of value to Congress. Broadcasts diminished the need to wait for transcripts or a reporter's account of events. Members and congressional staff could follow a variety of live proceedings from their offices or elsewhere.
Key Issues
Technological advancements over the last decade have presented new considerations for congressional video broadcasting. The House and Senate video feeds and C-SPAN all originated in an era when television was the presumed source for video-based news, and the ability to record or transmit video required specialized equipment. As the Internet became an influential medium, the House, Senate, and C-SPAN each adjusted and began to provide online access to live video streams and past recordings. These online videos expand the potential reach of congressional video, as cable television subscriptions are no longer required to watch Congress in action.
The House and Senate continue to maintain exclusive control over their video and audio feeds, whether they are broadcast on television, radio, or over the Internet. Yet technology now exists enabling anyone with a smartphone to produce and broadcast an online video. This creates a greater potential for unauthorized videos to be broadcast from the House and Senate chambers. Some believe that these videos may disrupt decorum in Congress, while others view them as an essential alternate means of distributing congressional information. In light of these new technological capabilities, the use and regulation of wireless devices or broadcasting from the chambers may be reexamined. New rules adopted by the House at the start of the 115th Congress, for example, enable the Sergeant at Arms to impose fines on Members who disrupt decorum by taking photographs, recording audio or video, or broadcasting using an electronic device. |
crs_RS22928 | crs_RS22928_0 | Introduction1
In 2008, oil prices nearly doubled, reaching record levels, before falling back to below $40 per barrel by the end of the year. In the 110 th Congress, proposals included a number of legislative initiatives to increase domestic oil production. These proposals fell into two broad categories: to (1) open areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) which were under a leasing moratoria; and to (2) encourage companies holding oil and gas leases to diligently develop leases to bring them into production. As the 111 th Congress begins, Congress is faced with issues such as enhancing domestic energy supply and security while assessing areas of environmental concern. The Bush Administration lifted the OCS moratoria on July 14, 2008 and Congress allowed its annual OCS moratoria (see details below) to expire on September 30, 2008 under a continuing resolution—Continuing Appropriations Act for 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ). The continuing resolution expires on March 6, 2009 or when a permanent appropriations bill for FY2009 is enacted. Based on the executive branch relaxation of the OCS ban, the Bush Administration began the process of preparing the OCS five-year leasing program in August of 2008, two years ahead of schedule. The Draft Proposed OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 2010-2015 was published in early January 2009. This draft proposal, if finalized, would supersede the current five-year program which runs from 2007-2012. The Obama Administration has not yet made a decision to move forward with the proposal. If the early draft is finalized by the Administration, Congress can accept or reject the plan. 6515 , and H.R. On June 26, 2008, under suspension of the rules, H.R. The OCS Moratoria
Under an annual Congressional funding prohibition (in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriation bill) and a Presidential Withdrawal, oil and gas leasing and development has been banned in the offshore OCS areas along the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. However, on July 14, 2008, under a Presidential Directive, the Bush Administration lifted the Executive OCS moratoria that had been in place since 1990, first imposed by President George H.W. However, separate withdrawals might be enacted legislatively, such as provided in the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA, P.L. 109 - 432 ) which placed nearly all of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico under a leasing and drilling moratorium until 2022. The recent congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 ( P.L. 110 - 329 , enacted September 30, 2008), that continued the funding of government activities through March 6, 2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Those areas may now be made available for preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. | Over the past year, crude oil prices have nearly doubled, reaching record levels, before falling below $40 dollars per barrel by the end of the year. In the 110th Congress, proposals included a number of legislative initiatives to increase domestic oil production. These proposals fell into two broad categories: (1) to open areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) which were under a leasing moratoria; and (2) to encourage companies holding oil and gas leases to diligently develop leases to bring them into production. Two bills were introduced that would have denied new leases to those lessees who were not developing their leases or producing oil or gas (H.R. 6251 and H.R. 6515). The two bills, which included similar provisions, were introduced under suspension of the rules in the House and both failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds support. Comparable legislation was introduced in the Senate (S. 3239).
As the 111th Congress begins, Congress is faced with issues such as enhancing domestic energy supply and security while assessing areas of environmental concern. The Bush Administration lifted the OCS moratoria on July 14, 2008 and Congress allowed its annual OCS moratoria (see details below) to expire on September 30, 2008 under a continuing resolution—Continuing Appropriations Act for 2009 (P.L. 110-329). The continuing resolution expires on March 6, 2009 or when a permanent appropriations bill for FY2009 is enacted.
Under an annual Congressional funding prohibition (in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriation bill) and a Presidential Withdrawal, oil and gas leasing and development has been banned in the offshore OCS areas along the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. However, on July 14, 2008, under a Presidential Directive, the Bush Administration lifted the Executive OCS moratoria that had been in place since 1990. The recent congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329, enacted September 30, 2008), that continued the funding of government activities through March 6, 2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Those areas may now be made available for preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. The moratorium, however, would remain in place for nearly all of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico as it was placed off-limits separately under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432) until 2022.
Based on the executive branch relaxation of the OCS ban, the Bush Administration began the process of preparing the OCS five-year leasing program in August of 2008, two years ahead of schedule. The Draft Proposed OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 2010-2015 was published in early January 2009. This draft proposal, if finalized, would supersede the current five-year program which runs from 2007-2012. The Obama Administration has not yet made a decision to move forward with the proposal. If the early draft is finalized by the Administration, Congress can accept or reject the plan. |
crs_R45175 | crs_R45175_0 | Background
Prior to 1974, no statute existed that enabled Congress to conduct oversight of the intelligence community. In the 1970s, controversy over public disclosure of CIA's covert action programs in Southeast Asia and the agency's domestic surveillance of the antiwar movement spurred Congress to become more involved in intelligence oversight. In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§32 of P.L. 93-559 ) provided the first statutory basis for congressional oversight and notification to Congress of covert action operations. These committees became the model for a permanent oversight framework that could hold the intelligence community accountable for spending appropriated funds legally and supporting identifiable national security objectives. In 1975, Congress established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). In the field, the military and intelligence communities increasingly integrated their activities for greater effect in the post-9/11 environment. Yet, in Congress, the intelligence and defense committees have different notification standards and processes. Historic examples of covert action include the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran; the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; the Vietnam-era secret war in Laos; and support to both the Polish Solidarity labor union in the 1970s and 1980s and to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan during the 1980s. DOD doctrine defines clandestine activities as "operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment" that may include relatively "passive" intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert , using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. 102-88 , the conference committee provided an extended discussion of its intent as to the meaning of traditional military activities :
It is the intent of the conferees that 'traditional military activities' include activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authorities for the activities and or operational planning for hostilities) to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. This statutory definition allows Congress to provide oversight of the sort of military operations that have significant bearing on U.S. foreign and defense policy but are not clearly defined elsewhere in statutory oversight provisions. | While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as "operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment" that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert operations are "planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor."
Since the 1970s, Congress has established and continued to refine oversight procedures in reaction to instances where it had not been given prior notice of intelligence activities—particularly covert action—that had significant bearing on United States national security. Congress, for example, had no foreknowledge of the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran's only democratically elected government, or of the U-2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union that ended with the Soviet shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Eventually, media disclosures of the CIA's domestic surveillance of the anti-Vietnam War movement and awareness of the agency's covert war in Laos resulted in Congress taking action. In 1974, Congress began its investigation into the scope of past intelligence community activities that provided the basis for statutory provisions for intelligence oversight going forward.
The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§32 of P.L. 93-559) provided the earliest provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. In the late 1970s, Congress established a permanent oversight framework, standing up the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). These committees were given exclusive oversight jurisdiction of the intelligence community.
Recent events in North Korea, Yemen, and elsewhere have underscored the important function Congress can have in influencing the scope and direction of intelligence policy that supports United States national security. However, despite Congress's work during the past decades to establish statutory provisions for conducting intelligence oversight, those efforts have not always achieved Congress's desired result.
For example, there has been occasional confusion over whether the congressional intelligence or defense committees have jurisdiction for oversight purposes. This confusion is due in part to overlapping or mutually supporting missions of the military and intelligence agencies, particularly in the post-9/11 counterterrorism environment. Intelligence and military activities fall under different statutory authorities, but they may have similar characteristics that warrant congressional notification (e.g., a need to conceal United States sponsorship and serious risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of life). |
crs_RL34086 | crs_RL34086_0 | Overview
The United States plays an overarching security role in the Southwest Pacific, but it is not the only provider of security, nor the principal source of foreign aid, and has relied upon Australia and New Zealand to help promote development and maintain political stability in the region. Key areas of U.S. engagement in the Pacific include its territories (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa), the Freely Associated States (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau), military bases on Guam and Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands), and relatively limited aid and economic programs. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the major providers of development assistance. In the past several years, China has asserted increasing "soft power" in the region—primarily diplomatic and economic influence. Some experts suggest that the United States should pay greater attention to or more directly engage the Southwest Pacific. In some Pacific Island countries, weak political and legal institutions, corruption, civil unrest, and economic scarcity could lead to "failed states" and/or become springboards for terrorism. According to some observers, unconditional and unregulated foreign aid and business investment from China and Taiwan—provided without goals related to democracy, sustainable development, fair working conditions, and the environment—may exacerbate underlying political, economic, and social problems in the region. Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders and Policy Proposals
In May 2007, the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders (PICL), a triennial meeting of Pacific states and territories sponsored by the East-West Center, gathered for the eighth time since the organization was founded in 1980. The Bush Administration pledged to "re-engage" with the region and declared 2007 the "Year of the Pacific." Among the main topics, aims, and initiatives under discussion were: expanding public diplomacy efforts through a new public affairs office in Fiji; strengthening the Joint Commercial Commission; Pacific fisheries management; the U.S. military expansion in Guam and its impact on the region; global warming and rising sea levels; and establishing a regular U.S.-Pacific Islands dialogue. With the end of the Cold War, U.S. attention to the Pacific region, including foreign aid and public diplomacy, has waned. Several bills to increase U.S. foreign aid to the region have been introduced in the 110 th Congress. Although China's influence is largely limited to diplomatic and economic "soft power," some analysts worry about the PRC's long-term intentions. The ethnic Chinese population in the Pacific Island region is economically influential but remains relatively small numerically. Pacific Island Countries at a Glance | This report focuses on the 14 sovereign nations of the Southwest Pacific, or Pacific Islands region, and the major external powers (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, and China). It provides an explanation of the region's main geographical, political, and economic characteristics and discusses United States interests in the Pacific and the increased influence of China, which has become a growing force in the region. The report describes policy options as considered at the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders, held in Washington, DC, in March 2007.
Although small in total population (approximately 8 million) and relatively low in economic development, the Southwest Pacific is strategically important. The United States plays an overarching security role in the region, but it is not the only provider of security, nor the principal source of foreign aid. It has relied upon Australia and New Zealand to help promote development and maintain political stability in the region. Key components of U.S. engagement in the Pacific include its territories (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa), the Freely Associated States (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau), military bases on Guam and Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands), and relatively limited aid and economic programs.
Some experts argue that U.S. involvement in the Southwest Pacific has waned since the end of the Cold War, leaving a power vacuum, and that the United States should pay greater attention to the region and its problems. They contend that in some Pacific Island countries, weak political and legal institutions, corruption, civil unrest, and economic scarcity could lead to the creation of failed states or allow for foreign terrorist activity within their borders. According to some observers, unconditional and unregulated foreign aid and business investment from China and Taiwan, which may be attractive to some Pacific Island states, may exacerbate underlying political, social, and economic tensions in the region. While China's influence is largely limited to diplomatic and economic "soft power," many analysts disagree about the PRC's long-term intentions.
In 2007, the Bush Administration pledged to "re-engage" with the region and declared 2007 the "Year of the Pacific." Among the main topics, aims, and initiatives under discussion at the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders were: expanding U.S. public diplomacy efforts and foreign aid activities; strengthening U.S.-Pacific trade and preferential trade programs for Pacific Island countries; addressing global warming and other environmental concerns in the region; and enhancing educational and cultural exchanges. Several bills to increase U.S. foreign aid to the region have been introduced in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41201 | crs_R41201_0 | Introduction
The United States and Russia signed a new START Treaty, officially known as the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms , on April 8, 2010. New START entered into force on February 5, 2011, after the United States and Russia exchanged the instruments of ratification. The provisions were designed to build confidence in compliance with the specific limits and restrictions in the treaty, but they also provided a level of detail in information that contributed to each nation's general understanding of the other's forces and activities and helped build cooperation between them. It would also mandate the exchange of some telemetry generated during missile flight tests. It does not evaluate whether the provisions in the new START Treaty are sufficient to judge that the treaty is "effectively verifiable," but, instead, identifies some of the differences between the verification provisions in START and new START, then describes how these changes derive from differences in the limits in the two treaties. Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control
The Components of a Verification Regime
Verification is the process that one country uses to assess whether another country is complying with an arms control agreement. To verify compliance, a country must determine whether the forces or activities of another country are within the bounds established by the limits and obligations in the agreement. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection more timely. During the 1970s, when the United States and Soviet Union were participating in the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks, the United States assessed a treaty to be "adequately verifiable" if it had high confidence that it could detect evidence of militarily significant violations in time to respond to the violations and offset any potential security risk they might create. For the most part, the parties to these treaties planned to rely on NTM to monitor the forces and activities of other participating states. However, even with the information collected by the monitoring mechanisms in START, the United States and Russia did not have the information needed to verify compliance with the Moscow Treaty. Monitoring and Verification in New START
The new START Treaty contains a monitoring and verification regime that resembles the regime in START, in that its text contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of NTM to gather data on each side's forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. The United States would still want to detect and deter Russian efforts to deploy extra missiles and warheads under new START. On-Site Inspections
On-Site Inspections in START
The 1991 START Treaty contained 12 different types of on-site inspections. Assessing the Verification Regime in New START
Participants in the debate about the new START Treaty, both in the Senate and in the public at large, sought to compare the verification regimes in the two treaties to determine whether the regime in the new START Treaty can provide the United States with the information it needs to effectively verify Russian compliance. | The United States and Russia signed a new START Treaty on April 8, 2010, and the treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Many analysts, both in the United States and Russia, supported negotiations on a new treaty so that the two sides could continue to implement parts of the complex monitoring and verification regime in the 1991 START Treaty. This regime was designed to build confidence in compliance with the START and to provide transparency and cooperation during the treaty's implementation. The verification regime in the new START Treaty differs in some respects from the regime in START. These differences reflect an interest in reducing the cost and complexity of the regime, updating it to account for changes in the relationship between the United States and Russia, and tailoring it to address the monitoring and verification complexities presented by the new limits in the new treaty. The verification regime received scrutiny in both the Senate, which voted on December 22, 2010, to consent to ratification, and the public.
Verification is the process that one country uses to assess whether another country is complying with an arms control agreement. To verify compliance, a country must determine whether the forces or activities of another country are within the bounds established by the limits and obligations in the agreement. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection more timely. In the past, the United States has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if it has confidence that it can detect militarily significant violations in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the United States.
The United States and Russia rely on their own national technical means of verification (NTM) to collect most of the information needed to verify compliance with arms control agreements. But, since the 1980s, the treaties have also mandated that the two sides share information through data exchanges and notifications, and conduct on-site inspections to confirm that information. The verification regime in START used these monitoring measures not only to confirm that forces were consistent with the limits in the treaty, but also to detect and deter potential efforts to violate the treaty. With the end of the Cold War and the new relationship with Russia, the United States and Russia may both have more confidence in the other side's intent to comply with its arms control obligations. However, both will still want to monitor the other's forces and activities to confirm compliance and to foster cooperation and transparency.
This report reviews some of the monitoring and verification provisions in the new START Treaty and compares these with some of the provisions in the original START Treaty. It focuses, specifically, on differences between the treaties in the provisions governing the exchange of data, known as telemetry, generated during missile flight tests; provisions governing the monitoring of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); and differences in the numbers and types of on-site inspections.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R45022 | crs_R45022_0 | Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations
The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittees in the House and Senate are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and six small related agencies. Title III of the THUD appropriations bill generally funds a collection of agencies involved in transportation or housing and community development. Table 3 shows the discretionary funding provided for THUD in FY2017, the Trump Administration request for FY2018, and the informal suballocations made by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to the THUD subcommittees. Thus the discretionary funding provided is only about half of the total funding provided in this bill. FY2018 THUD Funding
As shown in Table 4 , the Trump Administration's FY2018 budget included $106.65 billion for the programs in the THUD bill, $9.7 billion less than the $116.3 billion provided in FY2017. The request represented a reduction of roughly $2 billion for DOT and $7.5 billion for HUD. The House-passed H.R. 3354 would provide $115.3 billion for THUD; this represents a reduction of less than 1% from the comparable figure for FY2017. The Senate-reported S. 1655 recommended $119.1 billion for THUD; this represents an increase of just over 2% over FY2017 funding. With inflation forecast at 1.9% for FY2018, the House bill would result in a reduction of roughly 3% in real THUD funding, while the Senate bill would result in a slight increase in real funding, compared to FY2017. How Lower Budget Authority Becomes Greater Funding—the Impact of Offsets
In the case of the THUD bill, net discretionary budget authority (which is the level of funding measured against the 302(b) allocation) is typically not the same as the amount of new discretionary budget authority made available to THUD agencies, due to budgetary savings available from rescissions and offsets. DOT in Brief
President's Budget
The Trump Administration requested a $1.1 billion reduction in DOT from FY2017 levels, chiefly by zeroing out the Essential Air Service program (-$150 million) and the TIGER (National Infrastructure Investments) grant program (-$500 million) and reducing funding for the transit New Starts program by $400 million. In addition to providing more funding than in the House-passed bill, the Senate bill includes several policy provisions different from those in the House bill. A proposal to eliminate funding for several HUD grant programs. Large funding reductions for public housing, including a 68% cut relative to FY2017 for the capital fund and elimination of funding for the Choice Neighborhoods program. House Action
As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, H.R. ($38.3 billion in net discretionary funding.) 3354 , which includes as Division H the text of H.R. Senate Action
As reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, S. 1655 would provide the following for HUD:
$49.9 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, which is 4% more than was enacted for FY2017 and 23% more than was proposed by the President ($40.2 billion in net discretionary appropriations). Level funding, relative to FY2017, for the grant programs slated for elimination in the President's budget request (CDBG, HOME, and the programs included in the SHOP account). The House committee bill would adopt the President's request, allowing for the termination of the USICH; the Senate committee bill would not, funding the USICH at FY2017 levels and permanently eliminating the statutory sunset. Both the House and Senate committee bills would continue to fund NeighborWorks at the FY2017 level. | The House and Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. THUD programs receive both discretionary and mandatory budget authority; HUD's budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations in the THUD bill, but when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget. Mandatory funding typically accounts for around half of the THUD appropriation.
The Trump Administration requested net new budget authority of $106.65 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments), including $47.9 billion in discretionary funding, for the departments and agencies funded in the THUD bill for FY2018, $9.65 billion (8%) less than the FY2017 level. The House Appropriations Committee reported its version of an FY2018 THUD appropriations bill on July 17, 2017 (H.R. 3353). It recommended $115.3 billion ($56.5 billion in discretionary funding), less than 1% below the FY2017 level. The text of that bill was incorporated into a consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 3354), amended (with no change in total funding for THUD, but changes in some accounts within THUD), and passed by the House on September 14, 2017. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of an FY2018 THUD bill on July 27, 2017 (S. 1655). It recommended $119.1 billion ($60.1 billion in discretionary funding), 2.4% more than FY2017. With inflation forecast at 1.9% for FY2018, the House bill would result in a roughly 3% decrease in real THUD funding, while the Senate bill would result in a slight increase in real funding, compared to FY2017.
With no agreement on FY2018 funding, Congress passed a continuing resolution (H.R. 601) to provide funding through December 8, 2017, for federal agencies. That act extended FY2017 funding levels for the THUD agencies, less an across-the board rescission 0.6791%.
DOT: The Trump Administration requested $75.1 billion in net new budgetary authority for DOT for FY2018. That was about $2 billion less than the comparable figure ($77.1 billion) for FY2016, with significant cuts requested for transit and rail programs. Both the House and Senate bills largely rejected the proposed cuts; the House approved $77.5 billion in new funding, and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $78.6 billion.
HUD: The Trump Administration requested $31.4 billion in net new budget authority for HUD for FY2018, $7.4 billion less than FY2017 (-19%). It requested no funding for several major grant programs, including the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and the HOME Investment Partnership program. The House bill proposed $38.3 billion, a small increase in overall funding relative to FY2017 (-1.3%), and did not include the proposed eliminations of HOME and CDBG funding. The Senate committee bill recommended $40.2 billion, a 4% increase over FY2017.
Related Agencies: The Trump Administration requested $226 million for the agencies in Title III of the THUD bill (the Related Agencies). This was about $113 million less than was provided in FY2017. The major change in funding from FY2017 levels in the request was proposals to terminate funding for the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC) and the Interagency Council on Homelessness (ICH). The President's budget requested only enough funding to close out the commitments of those two entities. Neither the House nor Senate committee bills included the President's proposal to wind down funding for the NRC; the House bill, but not the Senate committee-passed bill, would eliminate funding for the ICH. |
crs_R42581 | crs_R42581_0 | Overview
Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) additional funding, authorized several SBA pilot programs, and enhanced several of the SBA's lending programs in an effort to assist small businesses access capital. As a result, Treasury role in administering the program sunset on September 27, 2017. The SSBCI provided funding, allocated through a statutorily created formula and distributed in one-third increments (called tranches), to states, the District of Columbia, eligible territories, and eligible municipalities (hereinafter states) to expand existing or create new state small business investment programs, including capital access programs, collateral support programs, loan participation programs, loan guarantee programs, and venture capital programs. As of December 31, 2016, SSBCI participants had leveraged $8.95 in new financing for every $1 in SSBCI funds. There are 57 participants: 47 states; American Samoa; the District of Columbia; Guam; the Northern Mariana Islands; Puerto Rico; the U.S. Virgin Islands; Anchorage, Alaska; two consortiums of municipalities in North Dakota; and a consortium of municipalities in Wyoming. The Obama Administration recommended in its FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 budget requests that another $1.5 billion round of funding take place. Under their proposal, $1 billion would have been competitively awarded to states "best able to target local market needs, promote inclusion, attract private capital for start-up and scale-up businesses, strengthen regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, and evaluate results," and $500 million awarded "by formula based on economic factors such as job losses and pace of economic recovery." Legislation containing provisions similar to the Obama Administration's proposal was introduced during the 113 th Congress ( H.R. This report examines the SSBCI and its implementation, including Treasury's response to initial program audits conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Treasury's Office of Inspector General (OIG). These audits suggested that states generally met the statute's requirements but that there were some compliance problems. They also indicated that Treasury's oversight of the program could have been improved and that performance measures are needed to assess the program's efficacy. H.R. SSBCI Funding
P.L. The application for funding requested information concerning such items as
the amount requested; how the funds are to be used (state capital access program, collateral support program, loan participation program, loan guarantee program, venture capital program, or other small business support program); confirmation that, at a minimum, $1 of public investment will result in at least $1 of new private credit; that there is a reasonable expectation the funding will result in new small business lending of at least 10 times the amount of the SSBCI federal contribution; that the funding targets small businesses with 500 employees or fewer, does not support borrowers that have more than 750 employees, targets loans with an average principal of $5 million or less, and does not extend credit support to loans that exceed $20 million; documentation describing the operational capacity, skills, and experience of the applicant's management team in operating capital access and other small business capital support programs; documentation describing the internal accounting and administrative control systems used to safeguard against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation; and documentation describing how the participant planned to use the funds "to provide access to capital for small businesses (1) in low- and moderate-income communities, (2) in minority communities, (3) in other underserved communities, and to (4) women- and minority-owned small businesses." As mentioned previously, most states received their initial tranche in FY2011 and, as of December 31, 2016, all 57 participants had received their first tranche, 56 had received their second tranche, and 53 had received their third tranche. | Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs.
During the 111th Congress, P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) additional funding and enhanced several SBA lending programs in an effort to assist small businesses access capital. The act also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish and administer a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI). Treasury's role in administrating the program ended on September 27, 2017.
The SSBCI provided funding, allocated by formula and distributed in one-third increments, to states, territories, and eligible municipalities (hereinafter referred to as states) to expand existing or create new state small business investment programs, including state capital access programs, collateral support programs, loan participation programs, loan guarantee programs, and venture capital programs. In most instances, the initial round of funding (called a tranche) took place in FY2011. Most states received their second tranche during FY2013. As of December 31, 2016, 98% of total allocated funding had been disbursed to the states and all 57 participants had received their first tranche, 56 had received at least two tranches, and 53 had received their third and final tranche.
SSBCI participants were expected to leverage their SSBCI funds to generate new small business lending that is at least 10 times the amount of their SSBCI funds. As of December 31, 2016, SSBCI participants had leveraged $8.95 in new financing for every $1 in SSBCI funds. Forty-seven states; American Samoa; the District of Columbia; Guam; the Northern Mariana Islands; Puerto Rico; the U.S. Virgin Islands; Anchorage, Alaska; two consortiums of municipalities in North Dakota; and a consortium of municipalities in Wyoming participate in the program.
The Obama Administration recommended in its FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 budget requests that another $1.5 billion round of funding take place, with $1 billion competitively awarded to states and $500 million awarded "by a need-based formula based on economic factors such as job losses and pace of economic recovery." Legislation with provisions similar to the Obama Administration's proposal was introduced during the 113th Congress (H.R. 4556 and S. 2285), the 114th Congress (S. 1901, H.R. 5144, and H.R. 5672), and the 115th Congress (S. 1897).
This report examines the SSBCI and its implementation, including Treasury's response to initial program audits conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Treasury's Office of Inspector General (OIG). These initial audits suggest that SSBCI participants generally met the statute's requirements but that there were some compliance problems. They also indicate that Treasury's program oversight could have been improved and that performance measures are needed to assess the program's efficacy. |
crs_RL34462 | crs_RL34462_0 | Introduction
During 2007, both the House and Senate established new earmark transparency procedures for their separate chambers. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors. In addition, they require disclosure of further information from each congressional sponsor, such as a certification that the sponsor has no financial interest in the earmark. Each House has also established procedures regarding new spending earmarks added to conference reports. The House originally established its procedures through adoption of two House resolutions. On January 5, 2007, the House completed action on H.Res. 6 (110 th Congress), adopting the 110 th Congress rules package, including new provisions in House Rule XXI to require public disclosure of approved earmarks, their sponsors, and the additional information. On June 18, 2007, the House adopted a standing order, H.Res. 491 (110 th Congress), to require transparency for new spending earmarks added to conference reports on the 12 annual regular appropriations bills. On January 6, 2009, the House adopted the rules package for the 111 th Congress, H.Res. 5 (111 th Congress), which incorporated the provisions of H.Res. In the Senate, Rule XLIV was adopted through the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-81 ), which became law on September 14, 2007. The new rule provides for public disclosure of each "congressionally directed spending item," its sponsors, and "no financial interest" certifications. It also includes a procedure to strike certain new items of spending added to conference reports. Similarly, the Senate can not vote on adoption of a conference report unless the chair or Majority Leader (or designee) makes a similar certification. Specified Information (Including Certifications) From Congressional Earmark Sponsors
Both House and Senate rules require earmark sponsors to provide similar information on each earmark to the committee of jurisdiction, but these rules include different public disclosure requirements regarding the information. Neither requirement is enforced by points of order. Regarding the differing House and Senate public availability requirements, in the House, the applicable committee is to make "open to public inspection" the Member's written statement on any earmark included in a measure or conference report. Conference Report Procedures Affecting New Earmarks
House Rule XXI, clause 9(b), and Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 8, both address certain spending earmarks, sometimes referred to as "air-drops," added in a conference report (and joint explanatory statement under the House rule) that were not specified in the House- or Senate-passed versions of the applicable bill (or in the accompanying House or Senate committee reports in the House rule). The Senate rule, by contrast, provides a procedure to strike certain spending add-ons, including applicable spending earmarks. It prohibits House consideration of a conference report to a regular appropriations bills, unless either
a list of new earmarks added to the conference report or joint explanatory statement and the name of any Member who requested an earmark(s) on the list is included in the joint explanatory statement; or a statement that there are no earmarks is made available. | During 2007, both the House and Senate established new earmark transparency procedures for their separate chambers. They provide for public disclosure of approved earmarks and the identification of their congressional sponsors. In addition, they require disclosure of further information from each congressional sponsor, such as a certification that the sponsor has no financial interest in the earmark. Each House has also established procedures regarding new spending earmarks added to conference reports.
The House originally established its procedures through adoption of two House resolutions. On January 5, 2007, the House completed action on H.Res. 6 (110th Congress), adopting the 110th Congress rules package, including new provisions in House Rule XXI to require public disclosure of approved earmarks, their sponsors, and the additional information. On June 18, 2007, the House adopted a standing order, H.Res. 491 (110th Congress), to require transparency for new spending earmarks added to conference reports on the 12 annual regular appropriations bills. On January 6, 2009, the House adopted the rules package for the 111th Congress, H.Res. 5 (111th Congress), which incorporated the provisions of H.Res. 491 into House Rule XXI, clause 9.
In the Senate, Rule XLIV was adopted through the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), which became law on September 14, 2007. The new rule provides for public disclosure of each "congressionally directed spending item," its sponsors, and "no financial interest" certifications. It also includes a procedure to strike certain new items of spending added to conference reports.
The House rule generally prohibits consideration of a measure, manager's amendment, or conference report unless a list of earmarks and the name of each sponsoring Member (or a statement that there are no earmarks) is available before consideration. The Senate rule prohibits a vote on a motion to proceed to consider a measure or a vote on adoption of a conference report, unless the chair of the committee or Majority Leader certifies that a complete list of earmarks and the name of each Senator requesting each earmark is available on a publicly accessible congressional website 48 hours before the vote.
Both House and Senate rules require earmark sponsors to provide similar information on each earmark to the committee of jurisdiction, but these rules include different public disclosure requirements regarding the information. Neither requirement is enforced by points of order. In the House, the applicable committee is to make "open to public inspection" the Member's entire written statement on certain approved earmarks. The Senate rule requires the applicable committee to make available on the Internet the certifications of no financial interest.
With regard to certain spending earmarks first specified in conference, the House requires public disclosure of those earmarks and the names of those Members that requested each earmark identified. The Senate rule provides a procedure to strike certain new items of spending, including earmarks, from a conference report. |
crs_R44845 | crs_R44845_0 | Introduction
The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program is authorized under Title IV, Part D of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) and is the primary federal student loan program. It makes available loans to undergraduate and graduate students and the parents of dependent undergraduate students to help them finance postsecondary education expenses. Direct Loan program loans make up approximately $963.5 billion (74%) of ED's loan portfolio. Under the Direct Loan program, the federal government essentially serves as the banker by providing loans to students and their families using federal capital (i.e., funds from the U.S. Treasury). The federal government is also the owner of the loans and assumes the risk of loss through borrower default. The Office of Federal Student Aid
The U.S. Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) is tasked with administering the Title IV federal student aid programs, including the Direct Loan program. The key parties involved in this phase of the process are the following:
FSA , which develops and maintains the FAFSA, contracts for the operation and maintenance of information technology systems, and provides oversight of Title IV participating IHEs and third-party servicers; IHEs , which verify student eligibility for loans, asses students' levels of need for financial assistance and package financial aid, disburse funds (received from FSA) to students and parent borrowers, provide loan counseling to students, and periodically report to the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) to confirm students' enrollment/aid eligibility status; and/or Third Party Servicers , which may perform any or all of the administrative duties of an IHE as a contractor for it. Loan Servicing
After a borrower's first Direct Loan is disbursed, it is assigned by FSA to a loan servicer, which performs a variety of Direct Loan program administrative functions as an FSA contractor. Loan Servicer Functions
After a Direct Loan is disbursed to a borrower, it is assigned to one of several federal student loan servicers with which FSA has contracted to perform myriad loan servicing functions. Although the precise method through which this is achieved may vary among servicers, in general, the following tasks are performed by all loan servicers for a large proportion of Direct Loan borrowers:
providing required disclosures to borrowers about various Direct Loan terms and conditions before a first payment on the loan is required and periodically during repayment; providing information to borrowers on the several repayment plan options, such as the Standard Repayment Plan and the various income-driven repayment plans, while the borrower is in school and during repayment; processing applications for enrollment in a borrower's selected repayment plan, calculating the amount of payments owed monthly by a borrower, and sending occasional communications to borrowers regarding their selected repayment plans; recertifying borrower eligibility for income-driven repayment plans and recalculating monthly payments based on borrower income and family size information provided during the annual recertification process; collecting and applying loan payments to outstanding balances; processing requests for loan deferment or loan forbearance; processing applications to consolidate federal student loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan; reporting loans and loan status to consumer reporting agencies and reporting loan status to NSLDS; providing information to borrowers about loan cancellation, discharge, and forgiveness benefits; reporting loan interest payments to the IRS and providing loan interest payment statements to borrowers; and providing delinquency and default prevention activities. Default and Debt Resolution
If a borrower defaults on his or her Direct Loan, a variety of actions may be taken by FSA and its contractors to attempt to reinstate it as a loan in active repayment and recover payment on it. Private Collection Agencies
In many instances, if a borrower becomes more than 360 days delinquent on his or her Direct Loan, the account is assigned to one of several PCAs with which FSA has contracted to perform myriad debt resolution functions. Depending on individual borrower circumstances, a PCA may also offer a compromise of loan payment or determine whether a borrower is eligible for administrative wage garnishment. | The William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program, authorized under Title IV, Part D of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), is the primary federal student loan program. It makes available loans to undergraduate and graduate students and the parents of dependent undergraduate students to help them finance postsecondary education expenses. As of the end of FY2016, there was approximately $949.1 billion in outstanding Direct Loan program loans. Direct Loan program administrative expenses totaled approximately $771 million in FY2016.
Under the Direct Loan program, the federal government essentially serves as the banker by providing loans to students and their families using federal capital and assuming the risk of loss against borrower default. In addition, the federal government, via the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), manages the outstanding loan portfolio and is responsible for the program's administration. FSA is primarily responsible for developing the administrative functions and processes and performing oversight activities for the Direct Loan program to enable its day-to-day operation. Additional parties, including institutions of higher education (IHEs), contracted loan servicers, and contracted private collection agencies (PCAs), perform many of the routine administrative tasks for the program.
The first step in administering a Direct Loan is processing a student's Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). After a student has completed his or her FAFSA, FSA's automated systems process the application and make an initial determination regarding a student's eligibility for federal student aid. IHEs then receive the processed information and take a variety of steps to award financial aid, including Direct Loans, to the student. Steps taken by the IHE at this point include packaging available aid for the student, originating and disbursing any Direct Loans the student is eligible for and has accepted, and managing Direct Loan program funds available to the institution.
After a borrower's Direct Loan is disbursed, the loan is then assigned to one of multiple loan servicers with which FSA has contracted. Functions performed by loan servicers vary depending on the loan's status (e.g., repayment, grace period) and individual borrower circumstances; however, there are several tasks loan servicers typically perform. These include providing information to borrowers on loan terms and conditions, collecting and applying loan payments to outstanding balances, processing requests for loan deferment or forbearance, processing applications to consolidate federal student loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan, and providing delinquency and default prevention activities.
If a borrower defaults after entering repayment on a Direct Loan, then a variety of actions may be taken to attempt to reinstate the loan into good standing and recover payment on it. Loan servicers provide initial outreach to defaulted borrowers and attempt to enter into repayment or rehabilitation agreements with them. If the loan servicer is unsuccessful, a borrower's defaulted loan is transferred to FSA and then may also be transferred to one of multiple PCAs with which FSA has contracted. FSA and PCAs will attempt to enter into voluntary repayment agreements with borrowers; however, a variety of other debt collection tools may also be used if these attempts are unsuccessful. For instance, a borrower may be determined eligible for administrative wage garnishment or income tax offset. If a borrower successfully brings his or her loan into good standing, the account is transferred back to a loan servicer, which will continue to service it. |
crs_R45151 | crs_R45151_0 | C ongress's power to establish rules for the admission of non-U.S. nationals (aliens ) has long been viewed as plenary. In the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Congress has specified various grounds for the exclusion or removal of aliens, including grounds related to the commission of criminal conduct. Some criminal offenses committed by an alien who is present in the United States may render that alien subject to removal from the country. And certain offenses may preclude an alien outside the United States from either being admitted into the country or being permitted to reenter following an initial departure. Further, committing certain crimes may disqualify an alien from many forms of relief from removal, prevent an alien from adjusting to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, or bar an LPR from naturalizing as a U.S. citizen. This report provides an overview of the major immigration consequences of criminal activity. The report begins by briefly discussing the laws governing the immigration consequences of criminal conduct and the government entities charged with administering U.S. immigration laws. Next, the report enumerates specific crimes and categories of crimes that may render an alien inadmissible or deportable. "Deportable" refers to aliens who have been lawfully admitted to the United States, but have engaged in proscribed activities that render them removable from the country. The list includes many specific offenses, as well as several broad categories of crimes. Additionally, an alien who has committed an aggravated felony and is removed from the United States will become inadmissible indefinitely, and may be ineligible for various forms of relief from removal. However, certain criminal activity may bar an alien from being eligible for some types of relief. Concerning the criminal grounds for inadmissibility, the scope of this waiver authority differs depending on whether the alien is seeking admission as an LPR, or whether the alien is, instead, seeking admission into the country temporarily as a nonimmigrant. For non-LPRs, the Attorney General may exercise discretion to cancel the removal of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable and adjust the alien's status to LPR if the alien
1. has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least 10 years immediately preceding the application for relief; 2. has been a person of good moral character during that 10-year period; 3. has not been convicted of an offense described in INA § 212(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility), § 237(a)(2) (criminal grounds of deportability), or § 237(a)(3) (failure to register and falsification of documents); and 4. establishes that his removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a spouse, parent, or child who is a U.S. citizen or LPR. There are two forms of voluntary departure. Certain conduct renders an alien ineligible to obtain withholding of removal. An alien is ineligible for withholding of removal, however, if, among other things, the alien
participated in Nazi persecution, genocide, or the commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing; ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual on account of a protected ground; is "a danger to the community of the United States" as a result of having been convicted of "a particularly serious crime"; committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before arriving in the United States; or is otherwise a danger to the security of the United States. However, certain criminal activity can make an alien ineligible to receive TPS relief. Numerous criminal grounds for inadmissibility and deportability require the rendering of a conviction for a particular crime to be applicable. Approaches to Determine Whether a Criminal Conviction Triggers Immigration Consequences
Although the INA, on some occasions, expressly identifies conduct referenced in a criminal statute that would render an alien removable or ineligible for certain relief, in many instances the INA simply refers to a general category of criminal behavior that carries immigration consequences. Congress also could add or subtract crimes from those listed as aggravated felonies and clarify what crimes involve moral turpitude. | Congress's power to create rules governing the admission of non-U.S. nationals (aliens) has long been viewed as plenary. In the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Congress has specified grounds for the exclusion or removal of aliens, including on account of criminal activity. Some criminal offenses, when committed by an alien who is present in the United States, may render that alien subject to removal from the country. And certain criminal offenses may preclude an alien outside the United States from being either admitted into the country or permitted to reenter following an initial departure. Further, criminal conduct may disqualify an alien from certain forms of relief from removal or prevent the alien from becoming a U.S. citizen. In some cases, the INA directly identifies particular offenses that carry immigration consequences; in other cases, federal immigration law provides that a general category of crimes, such as "crimes involving moral turpitude" or an offense defined by the INA as an "aggravated felony," may render an alien ineligible for certain benefits and privileges under immigration law.
The INA distinguishes between the treatment of aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States and those who are either seeking admission into the country or are physically present in the country without having been lawfully admitted. Aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the country may be removed if they engage in conduct that renders them deportable, whereas aliens who have not been legally admitted into the United States—including both aliens seeking initial entry into the United States as well as those who are physically present in the country but were never lawfully admitted—may be excluded or removed from the country if they have engaged in conduct rendering them inadmissible. Although the INA designates certain criminal activities and categories of criminal activities as grounds for inadmissibility or deportation, the respective grounds are not identical. Moreover, a conviction for a designated crime is not always required for an alien to be disqualified on criminal grounds from admission into the United States. But for nearly all criminal grounds for deportation, a "conviction" (as defined by the INA) for the underlying offense is necessary. Additionally, although certain criminal conduct may disqualify an alien from various immigration-related benefits or forms of relief, the scope of disqualifying conduct varies depending on the particular benefit or form of relief at issue.
This report identifies the major criminal grounds that may bar an alien from being admitted into the United States or render an alien within the country removable. The report also discusses additional immigration consequences of criminal activity, including those that make an alien ineligible for certain relief from removal, including cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, withholding of removal, and asylum. The report also addresses the criminal grounds that render an alien ineligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, as well as those grounds barring LPRs from naturalizing as U.S. citizens. The report also discusses the scope of several general criminal categories referenced by the INA, including "crimes involving moral turpitude," "aggravated felonies," and "crimes of violence." |
crs_R44953 | crs_R44953_0 | Introduction
Congress has led both U.S. and international efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, particularly with its enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 ). With the objective of linking U.S. trade policy to antitrafficking outcomes, Congress in 2015 prohibited Tier 3 countries from participating in authorized trade negotiations. In light of ongoing congressional scrutiny of the State Department's TIP Report and its country ranking process, several bills in the 115 th Congress have been introduced to further modify requirements associated with the TIP Report. A critical question is whether further changes to the TIP Report's methodology will incentivize countries to boost their antitrafficking efforts or, in contrast, may erode the legitimacy of the TIP Report as a credible tool to advocate for human trafficking concerns. This CRS report describes the legislative provisions that govern the U.S. Department of State's production of the annual TIP Report, reviews country ranking trends in the TIP Report, and identifies recent congressional oversight of and legislative activity to modify the TIP Report. A key element of the CSPA is the requirement to include in the annual TIP Report an additional list of foreign governments that recruit and use child soldiers in their armed forces or in government-supported armed groups. Over time, the report draft cycle has evolved. Allegations of Political Influence in Country Rankings
Although many observers view the TIP Report as a credible reflection of global efforts to address human trafficking, some have been critical of the methodology used to evaluate foreign country efforts and assign tier rankings. Report Release
Although not required by law, the State Department has always publicly released the report and the Secretary of State has personally presided over the launch of the annual TIP Report. The report, however, has never been published by its statutory June 1 deadline. Current law provides that the Secretary-hosted ceremony occur "as soon as practicable after the date on which the Secretary submits to Congress the [TIP R]eport.... "
Human Trafficking Trends
An implicit objective of the TVPA was to leverage the country ranking process of the TIP Report as a foreign policy tool to motivate foreign governments to prioritize and address human trafficking. 2200 , the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017, which passed the House on July 12, 2017, and contains several changes to the TIP Report's country ranking process. 436 , the Human Trafficking Prioritization Act; S. 377 , the Trafficking in Persons Report Integrity Act; H.R. 1191 , the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017; and H.R. 2219 and S. 952 , the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2017. Common themes in the legislative proposals to modify the TIP Report's methodology focus on reducing the prospects for political interference, while also increasing public transparency and congressional oversight into the State Department's country ranking process. Various bills seek to modify:
the number of years a country may remain on the Tier 2 Watch List, from a maximum of four years (two consecutive years on Tier 2 Watch List, plus a maximum of two waivers to remain on the list for two more years) to three (two consecutive years on Tier 2 Watch List, plus one waiver); the conditions under which a country may remain on the Tier 2 Watch List (excluding those that have committed to take future antitrafficking steps, but have not already taken concrete steps to implement policies that would constitute significant efforts toward becoming compliant with the TVPA's minimum standards for eliminating trafficking); expectations for upgrading a Tier 2 Watch List country that exhausted its permitted time on that list and was subsequently downgraded to Tier 3 for lack of progress, including whether or how long it would be permitted to return to the Tier 2 Watch List in the future; public documentation requirements to justify the continued listing of a country on the Tier 2 Watch List; and country narratives in the TIP Report to explicitly rationalize a country's upgrade or downgrade compared to its previous-year ranking. Some bills also seek to further define key terms in the TVPA used by the State Department to determine country rankings, including proposed
changes to the scope of foreign assistance subject to restriction; changes to the TVPA's four minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; additions to the currently 12 criteria used to evaluate whether a country is making serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking (the fourth minimum standard); revisions to what constitutes significant efforts to become compliant with the four minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; and new definitions for the terms concrete actions and credible evidence . A critical issue is whether changes to the TIP Report's methodology would motivate countries to do more to combat human trafficking or, in contrast, could undermine its value as a tool of soft power diplomacy. | The State Department's annual release of the Trafficking in Persons report (commonly referred to as the TIP Report) has been closely monitored by Congress, foreign governments, the media, advocacy groups, and other foreign policy observers. The 109th Congress first mandated the report's publication in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA; Div. A of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386).
Over time, the number of countries covered by the TIP Report has grown, peaking at 188 countries, including the United States. In the 2017 TIP Report, the State Department categorized 187 countries. Countries were placed into one of several lists (or tiers) based on their respective governments' level of effort to address human trafficking between April 1, 2016, and March 31, 2017. An additional category of special cases included three countries that were not assigned a tier ranking because of ongoing political instability (Libya, Somalia, and Yemen).
Its champions describe the TIP Report as a keystone measure of government efforts to address and ultimately eliminate human trafficking. Some U.S. officials refer to the report as a crucial tool of diplomatic engagement that has encouraged foreign governments to elevate their own antitrafficking efforts. Its detractors question the TIP Report's credibility as a true measure of antitrafficking efforts, suggesting at times that political factors distort its country assessments. Some foreign governments perceive the report as a form of U.S. interference in their domestic affairs.
Continued congressional interest in the TIP Report and its country rankings has resulted in several key modifications to the process. Such modifications have included the creation of the special watch list, limiting the length of time a country may remain on a subset of the special watch list, expanding the list of criteria for determining whether countries are taking serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking, establishing a list of governments that recruit and use child soldiers, and prohibiting the least cooperative countries on antitrafficking matters from participating in authorized trade negotiations. These modifications were often included as part of broader legislative efforts to reauthorize the TVPA, whose current authorization for appropriations expires at the end of FY2017.
Recent Developments
On June 27, 2017, the U.S. Department of State released the 17th edition of the TIP Report—the first for the Administration of President Donald J. Trump. In spite of State Department efforts to alleviate congressional concerns that the report's methodology is susceptible to political pressure, several Members in the 115th Congress have introduced legislation to further modify key aspects of the annual country ranking and reporting process.
The most significant changes to the TIP Report methodology are contained in H.R. 2200, the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017, which passed the House on July 12, 2017. If enacted, the changes could reduce State Department flexibility and discretion in assigning tier rankings to countries and increase the number of countries that would fall into the worst category (Tier 3)—while also making it potentially more difficult for countries to attain the best category (Tier 1). Other proposed changes to the TIP Report methodology are contained in S. 377, S. 952, H.R. 436, H.R. 1191, and H.R. 2219.
While some observers may anticipate that changes to the TIP Report's methodology will improve its overall credibility and country ranking process, others may question whether such changes will confuse foreign governments and be perceived as too complex. The reputational harm of a poor ranking in the TIP Report has motivated some countries to improve their antitrafficking efforts. It is not clear, however, if this scenario will hold true indefinitely. If the prospect of achieving a top ranking in the TIP Report begins to appear unattainable, could the TIP Report's ability to motivate countries to improve their antitrafficking efforts—and thus its value as a policy tool for international engagement to combat human trafficking—diminish? |
crs_R43753 | crs_R43753_0 | The growth in domestic natural gas and crude oil production has fundamentally shifted the energy supply and demand balance in key U.S. energy markets. Many analysts and energy producers argue that there is currently an oversupply of natural gas in U.S. gas-producing regions (with some important exceptions), and that supplies of certain light sweet Western crudes (notably from the Bakken region of Montana and North Dakota) exceed the demand of Gulf Coast refineries, which are configured primarily to process heavy crudes. The result has been a spate of applications by the U.S. natural gas industry for federal permits to export natural gas to overseas buyers. Such exports are permitted by statute, subject to a national interest determination by the Department of Energy. Perceived oversupply of Bakken crude oil has similarly led to calls by some market stakeholders and policy makers for a relaxation of the federal restrictions on crude oil exports. Numerous legislative proposals in the 113 th Congress, such as the Natural Gas Export Promotion Act of 2014 ( S. 2494 ) and the Crude Oil Export Act ( H.R. 4349 ), would facilitate increased exports of domestic energy resources. Whether—or to what extent—the United States should allow overseas exports of crude oil and natural gas is the subject of ongoing Congressional debate. However, it may be noted that U.S. exports of both natural gas and crude oil are not new. Congress and prior presidential administrations have authorized such exports before in circumstances where they were viewed as beneficial to the United States. The case of Alaska is of particular relevance because it is a major energy producer and has a history of both crude oil and natural gas exports going back several decades. In the context of the current export debate, a review of Alaska's experiences with crude oil and natural gas exports may offer historical perspectives of value to policy makers. These provisions were incorporated by reference in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Alaska LNG Project
Arctic Alaska has substantial natural gas resources. Alaska's experience shows that—under a specific set of circumstances—such exports have been viewed as in the national interest both by Congress and successive presidential administrations. Regional production trends, market prices, and local commodity demand have all been important considerations in establishing export policies for Alaska. It is also instructive to note that, even with long-standing export approvals in effect, exports of crude oil and natural gas from Alaska have been relatively modest. Ten years between crude oil export cargoes from TAPS, for example, suggests that production economics and competitive market forces will be the ultimate determinant of export volumes where exports are permitted. In the context of broader U.S. oil and natural gas export policy the Alaska experience may raise several key questions. To what extent does the rationale for energy exports from Alaska—which is geographically isolated—apply to other U.S. supply regions? What is the interplay between overseas exports and the maritime shipping industry? What are the expectations for capital investment by developers to support export production and how might they affect the nation's overall oil and gas supplies? What are the environmental impacts of increased production for export? How might international trade agreements influence the U.S. government's ability to tailor its oil and natural gas export policies by region? As Congress continues its oversight of the nation's energy resources, understanding these issues may be important. (2) Crude oil subject to the prohibition contained in paragraph (1) may be exported only if—
(A) the President so recommends to the Congress after making and publishing express findings that exports of such crude oil, including exchanges—
(i) will not diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum refined within, stored within, or legally committed to be transported to and sold within the United States;
(ii) will, within 3 months following the initiation of such exports or exchanges, result in (I) acquisition costs to the refiners which purchase the imported crude oil being lower than the acquisition costs such refiners would have to pay for the domestically produced oil in the absence of such an export or exchange, and (II) not less than 75 percent of such savings in costs being reflected in wholesale and retail prices of products refined from such imported crude oil;
(iii) will be made only pursuant to contracts which may be terminated if the crude oil suppliers of the United States are interrupted, threatened, or diminished;
(iv) are clearly necessary to protect the national interest; and
(v) are in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and
(B) the President includes such findings in his recommendation to the Congress and the Congress, within 60 days after receiving that recommendation, agrees to a joint resolution which approves such exports on the basis of those findings, and which is thereafter enacted into law. | Recent growth in U.S. natural gas and crude oil production has fundamentally shifted the energy supply and demand balance in key U.S. energy markets. Many analysts and energy producers argue that there is currently an oversupply of natural gas in U.S. gas-producing regions, and that supplies of certain light sweet Western crudes (notably from the Bakken region) exceed the demand of Gulf Coast refineries. The result has been a spate of applications by the U.S. natural gas industry for federal permits to export natural gas to overseas buyers. Such exports are permitted by statute, subject to a national interest determination by the Department of Energy. Perceived oversupply of Bakken crude oil has similarly led to calls by some market stakeholders and policy makers for a relaxation of the federal restrictions on crude oil exports. Numerous legislative proposals in the 113th Congress, such as the Natural Gas Export Promotion Act of 2014 (S. 2494) and the Crude Oil Export Act (H.R. 4349), would facilitate increased exports of domestic energy resources.
Whether—or to what extent—the United States should allow overseas exports of crude oil and natural gas is the subject of ongoing Congressional debate. However, U.S. exports of both natural gas and crude oil are not new. Congress and prior presidential administrations have authorized such exports before in circumstances where they were viewed as beneficial to the United States. The case of Alaska is of particular relevance because it is a major energy producer and has a history of both crude oil and natural gas exports going back several decades. Exports of crude oil from Alaska are currently authorized by three different statutes pertaining to (1) crude transported via the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, (2) Cook Inlet crude, and (3) crude oil exported to Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Export of Cook Inlet natural gas from the Kenai LNG terminal has been authorized repeatedly since 1969. Export of natural gas from Alaska's North Slope was authorized in 1988, although the applicability of this authorization to the proposed Alaska LNG Project has not been resolved.
In the context of the current export debate, a review of Alaskan crude oil and natural gas exports may offer historical perspectives of value to policy makers. Alaska's experience shows that—under a specific set of circumstances—such exports have been viewed as in the national interest both by Congress and successive presidential administrations. Regional production trends, market prices, and local commodity demand have all been important considerations in establishing export policies for Alaska. It is also instructive to note that, even with long-standing export approvals in effect, exports of crude oil and natural gas from Alaska have been relatively modest. Production economics and competitive market forces will be the ultimate determinant of export volumes where exports are permitted.
In the context of broader U.S. oil and natural gas export policy the Alaska experience may raise several key questions. To what extent does the rationale for energy exports from Alaska—which is geographically isolated—apply to other U.S. supply regions? What is the interplay between overseas exports and the maritime shipping industry? What are the expectations for capital investment by developers to support export production and how might they affect the nation's overall oil and gas supplies? What are the environmental impacts of increased production for export? How might international trade agreements influence the U.S. government's ability to tailor its oil and natural gas export policies by region? As Congress continues its oversight of the nation's energy resources, understanding these issues may be important. |
crs_R42931 | crs_R42931_0 | Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) have become an important part of these efforts. Congressional appropriations for NTDs have grown from $15 million in FY2006 to $100 million in FY2014. Heightened congressional interest in combating NTDs has been reflected not only in higher appropriation levels but also in the development of caucuses on these issues. The 17 NTDs are found mostly among the poorest people in 149 countries and territories ( Figure 1 ), primarily where access to clean water, sanitation, and health services is limited. Global Progress in Combating NTDs
Since WHO coined the phrase "neglected tropical diseases" in 2003, global efforts to address these ailments have accelerated. These pledges included the following:
$785 million (includes preexisting commitments) to strengthen drug distribution and program implementation; 1.4 billion drug treatments annually; access to drug compound libraries to identify new treatments; increased financial support for NTD programs (some of which amended previous commitments to ongoing efforts), such as: commitments by the governments of Bangladesh, Brazil, Mozambique, and Tanzania to devote political and financial resources to combat endemic NTDs. In addition to the above-mentioned diseases, dengue has become a growing global health problem. More than 2.5 billion people are now at risk of infection, close to 40% of the world's population. Key U.S. government players include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Department of Defense (DOD). On May 8, 2014, the Obama Administration announced that it had administered its one billionth NTD treatment, reaching 465 million people and surpassing one of its goals. In FY2014, Congress appropriated $100 million for NTD programs and the Administration requests $86.5 million for NTD programs in FY2015. Issues for Congress
The international community has made substantial progress in combating select neglected tropical diseases. Some NTDs have been tackled more effectively than others. Guinea worm disease, for example, is on the cusp of eradication and with expanding mass drug administration campaigns, the prevalence of several NTDs is declining, particularly in Latin America. Despite these advancements, WHO cautions in the 2020 Roadmap that these diseases cannot be banished without expanding global access to clean water and sanitation, improving hygiene practices, strengthening local health capacity (veterinary as well as human), and intensifying case detection and management. The United States has played an important role in combating NTDs and will likely be a central player in global efforts to advance the 2020 NTD goals. Some of the discussion includes an analysis of steps the 113 th Congress might consider. Documents by the Administration maintain the NTD Program is part of a complete package of services the United States provides to improve the health of women and children across sectors. These two accounts support a wide range of governance and economic development activities, which do not typically focus on health objectives. The international community is increasingly integrating treatments and services, particularly for multiple diseases that can be treated with one pill. One argument is that disease-specific efforts divert investments from the very public health systems that are needed to support vertical programs. | The term "neglected tropical diseases" (NTDs) was coined by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003 to describe a set of diseases that are ancient, worsen poverty, and typically impair health and productivity while carrying low death rates. While the use of the term "NTDs" has helped to raise awareness about these long-standing health challenges, its use risks simplifying a complicated health challenge. Some of the diseases are treatable with drugs that can be administered by lay health workers irrespective of disease status, while others require diagnosis and can be treated only by trained health professionals who have access to appropriate equipment, electrical power, and refrigeration (to store the temperature-sensitive therapies).
Neglected tropical diseases primarily plague the poorest people in developing countries. Changes in the environment and population flows, however, make industrialized countries, including the United States, increasingly vulnerable to some NTDs, particularly dengue haemorrhagic fever, which can cause death and has no cure. Health interventions to address the array of NTDs vary, but a common factor to an enduring solution to these illnesses is economic development. Industrialized countries, including the United States, have controlled these diseases in their territories by combining drug treatment with the construction and use of improved sanitation, modernization of agricultural practices, and utilization of improved water systems.
The international community has made substantial progress in combating select NTDs, though some have been tackled more effectively than others. Guinea worm disease, for example, is on the cusp of eradication. More generally, expanding access to mass drug administration is contributing to decreases in prevalence of several NTDs, particularly across Latin America. Despite these advances, WHO cautions that these diseases cannot be banished without improving global access to clean water and sanitation, strengthening local health capacity (veterinary as well as human), and intensifying case detection and management. Making improvements in these areas will require long-term investments that are complex and may entail facing thorny issues such as addressing corruption, transferring ownership of health programs from donors to recipient countries, and evaluating the impact of political and economic policies on health programs (e.g., international lending requirements).
The United States has played an important role in combating NTDs. Congressional interest in NTDs has been growing. Appropriations for NTD programs have steadily increased from $15 million in FY2006 to $100 million in FY2014. In May 2014, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had supported the delivery of the one billionth NTD treatment and had reached nearly half a billion people. The Administration requested $86.5 million to support NTD programs in FY2015. Between FY2006 and FY2012, U.S. funding has supported the delivery of nearly 585 NTD treatments, reaching 258 million people. This report discusses the prevalence of NTDs, U.S. and global actions to address them, and options the 113th Congress might consider. For additional background on NTDs, including photographs and discussions about transmission of NTDs, descriptions of activities to combat NTDs by other agencies, and additional policy issues, see CRS Report R41607, Neglected Tropical Diseases: Background, Responses, and Issues for Congress. |
crs_RS22870 | crs_RS22870_0 | Background and Recent History
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58 ) established a renewable fuel standard (RFS), requiring the use of biofuels (such as ethanol) in the nation's fuel supply. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. Under the provisions of EPAct and EISA, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to waive the RFS requirements in whole or in part, in response to a petition by a state or a fuel provider, or on her own motion. In August 2008, EPA denied the waiver request because the agency found that the effects of the RFS on food, feed, and fuel prices was minimal, and thus the economic effects of the RFS "could not be categorized as severe." However, EPA denied these petitions for similar reasons as in 2008. The vast majority of the RFS is met using ethanol blended into gasoline at the 10% level (E10). However, there is a limit to the amount of ethanol that can be blended into gasoline at this level, and other options for supplying ethanol (e.g., higher-level ethanol blends such as E15 and E85) are currently constrained because of infrastructure and other impediments. In prior years this had not been a problem because the volume of biofuels needed to meet the RFS mandate was below the maximum amount of ethanol that could be supplied as E10; but stakeholders were especially concerned about the possibility of facing this "blend wall" in either 2013 or 2014. In November 2013 EPA proposed using its general authority to lower the RFS mandates in cases of "inadequate supply." Within the overall RFS there are sub-mandates for the use of cellulosic biofuels, biomass-based diesel fuels, and other advanced biofuels. However, questions have been raised over whether there is enough feedstock supply and production capacity to meet some of these carveouts, especially the cellulosic biofuel carveout. In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2012 cellulosic mandate and remanded the rule back to EPA. Current RFS Requirements
The RFS requires the use of 16.55 billion gallons of renewable fuel in transportation fuels in 2013—corn ethanol is limited to 13.8 billion gallons of the 2013 mandate. Waiver Provisions
As amended by EISA, Section 211(o)(7) of the Clean Air Act gives the EPA administrator the authority to waive, in whole or in part, the total volume of renewable fuel mandated by the RFS if, in her determination, there is inadequate domestic supply to meet the mandate, or if "implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States." Proposed Waiver of 2014 Standards
In November 2013, EPA, under its own authority, proposed lowering the 2014 overall RFS mandate from 18.15 billion gallons to 15.21 billion gallons, and the advanced biofuel mandate from 3.75 billion gallons to 2.20 billion gallons. EPA has proposed using its general authority to lower the RFS mandates in cases of "inadequate supply." In this case, they interpreted "inadequate supply" to include an inability to deliver the necessary biofuels to consumers, even if there is sufficient production of said biofuels. Gasoline and diesel fuel suppliers and other stakeholders have generally been supportive of EPA's proposal, while many biofuel producers believe that EPA is overstepping its authority. Ultimately, for 2010 thorough 2013, EPA found that there was insufficient production capacity to meet the scheduled levels of cellulosic biofuel, a situation likely to be continued in 2014. | Transportation fuels are required by federal law to contain a minimum amount of renewable fuel each year. The renewable fuel standard (RFS), established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58) and amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), required that a total of 16.55 billion gallons of renewable fuels be used to offset gasoline and diesel fuel in 2013. Under EISA, the scheduled mandates grow each year (to 36 billion gallons in 2022). However, the ability of fuel suppliers to meet the growing RFS mandates has been questioned. For 2014, instead of a total of 18.15 billion gallons scheduled in EISA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed using waiver authority within the statute to lower the mandate to 15.21 billion gallons. Within the overall RFS there are sub-mandates (or "carveouts") for advanced and cellulosic biofuels. EPA has proposed lowering these as well.
Most of the overall RFS mandate (84% for 2013) is currently met using corn-based ethanol. The vast majority of the ethanol supplied to meet the RFS is blended into gasoline at the 10% level (E10). However, there is a limit to the amount of ethanol that can be blended into gasoline at this level, and other options for supplying ethanol (e.g., higher-level ethanol blends such as E15 and E85) are currently constrained because of infrastructure and other impediments. In prior years this had not been a problem because the volume of biofuels needed to meet the RFS mandate was below the maximum amount of ethanol that could be supplied as E10; but stakeholders were especially concerned about the possibility of facing the "blend wall" in either 2013 or 2014.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in the law are present. Under EISA the overall RFS is scheduled to grow to 18.15 billion gallons in 2014. In November 2013 EPA proposed using its general authority to lower the RFS mandates in cases of "inadequate supply." In this case, they interpreted "inadequate supply" to include an inability to deliver the necessary biofuels to consumers, even if there is sufficient production of said biofuels. Gasoline and diesel fuel suppliers and other stakeholders have generally been supportive of EPA's proposal, while biofuel producers and corn growers believe that EPA is overstepping its authority.
Questions have also been raised over whether the overall mandate diverts enough corn supply from food/feed production to dramatically raise prices in those markets, and whether there is enough feedstock supply and production capacity to meet the carveouts for fuels other than corn ethanol. In 2008 the governor of Texas requested a waiver of the RFS because of high grain prices, although that waiver request was denied because EPA determined that the RFS requirements alone did not "severely harm the economy of a State, a region, or the United States," a standard required by the statute. A similar waiver petition was filed by the governors of several states in August 2012. That petition was denied for similar reasons.
In February 2010, as part of a final rulemaking implementing the RFS as expanded by EISA, EPA waived most of the 2010 cellulosic biofuel carveout—as they have in each subsequent year. In cases where EPA projects inadequate production of cellulosic biofuels to meet the schedule in EISA, the agency must lower the mandate to the projected level, although EPA's process for doing so has been controversial, and the agency's 2012 cellulosic mandate was remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. EPA ultimately revised the 2012 standard to zero.
This report discusses the process and criteria for EPA to waive various portions of the RFS. |
crs_RL34322 | crs_RL34322_0 | In pursuit of these objectives, successive U.S. administrations have demonstrated security commitments to the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)âSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The Gulf Security Dialogue
Structure and Objectives
The Administration is seeking to establish the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) as the principal security coordination mechanism between the United States and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The core objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion of intra-GCC and GCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common perceived threats. The Dialogue provides a framework for U.S. engagement with participating GCC countries in the following six areas: (1) the improvement of GCC defense capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Lebanon; (3) counter-proliferation; (4) counter-terrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection; and (6) Iraq. Related Arms Sale Proposals and Notifications to Congress
The Administration has proposed a series of arms sales intended to enhance the defense capabilities of the GCC countries and improve the interoperability of their militaries in line with the objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue. In particular, the Administration has proposed the sale of defense systems designed to strengthen the maritime, air, and missile defenses of some GCC members. In the Middle East region, to date, the United States has sold JDAM kits to Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Since August 2007, the Administration has notified Congress of proposals to sell 10,000 JDAM kits to Israel and 200 JDAM kits to the United Arab Emirates. On January 14, 2008, the Administration formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia. Congressional Review Procedures13
As noted above, under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar-days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment to a non-NATO government valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In response, some Members of Congress began expressing concern about the potential sale of JDAM technology to Saudi Arabia. On January 14, 2008, the Administration formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia. On January 15, Representative Anthony Weiner introduced a joint resolution of disapproval ( H.J.Res. 76 ) to prohibit the sale. The bill was cosponsored by 104 Members of Congress, but was not considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee within the 30-calendar day review period provided by the AECA. Congress has the option of passing legislation to block or modify any arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved. 08-18. Transmittal No. | In May 2006, the Administration launched an effort to revive U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security cooperation under the auspices of a new Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD). The Dialogue now serves as the principal security coordination mechanism between the United States and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)âSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The core objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion of intra-GCC and GCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common perceived threats. The Dialogue provides a framework for U.S. engagement with the GCC countries in the following six areas: (1) the improvement of GCC defense capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Lebanon; (3) counter-proliferation; (4) counter-terrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection; and (6) commitments to Iraq.
The Administration has proposed a series of arms sales intended to enhance the defense capabilities of the GCC countries and improve the interoperability of their militaries in line with the objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue. In particular, the Administration recently has proposed the sale of defense systems designed to strengthen the maritime, air, and missile defenses of some GCC members. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar-days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government Foreign Military Sale of: 1) major defense equipment to a non-NATO government valued at $14 million or more, 2) defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or 3) design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. Congress may review proposed sales and take steps to amend or prohibit them.
In late 2007, some Members of Congress expressed concern regarding an Administration proposal to sell satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits to Saudi Arabia. In the Middle East region, to date, the United States has sold JDAM kits to Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Since August 2007, the Administration has notified Congress of proposals to sell 10,000 JDAM kits to Israel and 200 JDAM kits to the United Arab Emirates. On January 14, 2008, the Administration formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia (Transmittal No. 08-18). On January 15, 2008, Representative Anthony Weiner introduced H.J.Res. 76 to prohibit the JDAM sale to Saudi Arabia. The bill was cosponsored by 104 Members of Congress, but was not considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee within the 30-calendar day review period provided by the AECA. Congress has the option of passing legislation to block or modify any arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved.
This report describes the structure and objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue; briefly assesses its regional implications; summarizes related proposed arms sales; provides an overview of congressional notification and review procedures; and analyzes recent related activity in the Administration and Congress. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42932 | crs_R42932_0 | Introduction
This report explains the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). It also identifies, for the 111 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 41 organizations in the executive branch (28 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection and nomination, confirmation, and appointment. There are a number of steps in this stage of the process for most Senate-confirmed positions. First, with the assistance of, and preliminary vetting by, the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, the President selects a candidate for the position. Senate Consideration
In the second stage, the Senate alone determines whether or not to confirm a nomination. Appointment
In the final stage, the confirmed nominee is given a commission, which bears the Great Seal of the United States and is signed by the President, and is sworn into office. Appointments During the 111th Congress
During the 111 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted to the Senate 107 nominations to full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 92 were confirmed, 14 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. The President made five recess appointments during this period to positions in organizations covered in this report. The mean (average) number of days taken by the Senate to confirm a nomination to a position covered by this report was 93.1. It identifies the agency involved and the dates of nomination. | This report explains the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (also referred to as PAS positions). It also identifies, for the 111th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 41 organizations in the executive branch (28 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports.
The appointment process for advice and consent positions consists of three main stages. The first stage is selection, clearance, and nomination by the President. This step includes preliminary vetting, background checks, and ethics checks of potential nominees. At this stage, the President may also consult with Senators who are from the same party if the position is located in a state. The second stage of the process is consideration of the nomination in the Senate, most of which takes place in committee. Finally, if a nomination is approved by the full Senate, the nominee is given a commission signed by the President and sworn into office.
During the 111th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted to the Senate 107 nominations to full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 107 nominations, 92 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 14 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 93.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation.
The President made five recess appointments to full-time positions in independent agencies during the 111th Congress.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44046 | crs_R44046_0 | The two large legislative overhauls of financial regulation in the past two decades, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), expanded the federal role in insurance, but the states continued as the primary regulators of insurance following these acts. The act gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury. Legislation in the 114th Congress
Insurance regulatory issues before the 114 th Congress include
overseeing the implementation of, and possible amendments to, the Dodd-Frank Act, including specific legislation, such as H.R. 1478 / S. 798 , and provisions in S. 1484 / S. 1910 , which would limit the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) authority over insurers and H.R. 26 / P.L. 114-1 , which attempts to streamline the state regulation of insurance producer licensing; and responding to international developments, such as the changes to the European Union's regulatory scheme known as Solvency II and the development of international standards by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). Legislation addressing U.S. involvement in the IAIS includes S. 1086 , H.R. 5143 and H.R. In addition to the insurance-focused Title IV, Title III addresses the designation of nonbank financial companies as systemically important, which has been a major concern of insurers since Dodd-Frank. It would also increase public disclosure requirements surrounding the designation process. 2141)
H.R. 6436)
H.R. P.L. The international standard setting by the IAIS and the G-SII designations have raised concerns in Congress, particularly with regard to the effect these efforts might have on the competitiveness of U.S. insurers and possible weakening of the U.S. regulatory system. In the past, this requirement generally was for a 100% collateral deposit. State Regulatory Modernization Efforts
Following the passage of GLBA, state insurance regulators working through the NAIC embarked on a regulatory modernization program. Since the financial crisis, the NAIC has undertaken another round of regulatory changes. Enterprise risk management . Such proposals for increased federal involvement usually spurred a series of regulatory reform efforts at the individual state level and by state groups, such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL). Another state reform largely implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the introduction of state insurance guaranty funds. Some insurance companies believe that in the post-GLBA environment, state regulation places them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. This crisis overlaid a range of new issues and arguments to the previously existing debate on insurance regulatory reforms. The financial crisis grew largely from sectors of the financial industry that had previously been perceived as presenting little systemic risk, including insurers. The 111 th Congress responded to the financial crisis with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which enacted broad financial regulatory reform as detailed above. 4557 would have amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to declare that any regulation, order, or other action of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System requiring a bank holding company to provide funds or other assets to a subsidiary depository institution shall not be effective nor enforceable with respect to an entity that is a savings and loan holding company that is also an insurance company, an affiliate of an insured depository institution that is an insurance company, or any other company that is an insurance company and that directly or indirectly controls an insured depository institution if (1) such funds or assets are to be provided by the entity and (2) the state insurance authority for the insurance company determines that such an action would have a materially adverse effect on the entity's financial condition. First, it called for the creation of a federal insurance regulator to oversee an optional federal charter for insurers as well as federal licensing for agents and brokers. | The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance since 1868. Following the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, this system has operated with the explicit blessing of Congress, but has also been subject to periodic scrutiny and suggestions that the time may have come for Congress to reclaim the regulatory authority it granted to the states. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, congressional scrutiny was largely driven by the increasing complexities of the insurance business and concern over whether the states were up to the task of ensuring consumer protections, particularly insurer solvency.
Immediately prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, congressional attention on insurance regulation focused on the inefficiencies in the state regulatory system. A major catalyst was the aftermath of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), which overhauled the regulatory structure for banks and securities firms, but left the insurance sector largely untouched. Many larger insurers, and their trade associations, had previously defended state regulation but considered themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the post-GLBA regulatory structure. Various pieces of insurance regulatory reform legislation were introduced, including bills establishing a broad federal charter for insurance as well as narrower, more targeted bills.
The financial crisis refocused the debate surrounding insurance regulatory reform. Unlike many financial crises in the past, insurers played a large role in this crisis. In particular, the failure of the insurer American International Group (AIG) spotlighted sources of risk that had gone unrecognized. The need for a systemic risk regulator for the entire financial system was a common thread in many of the post-crisis financial regulatory reform proposals. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), enacted following the crisis, gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Three insurers have since been designated as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) although one of these designations has been overturned in federal court. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury.
The states, particularly working through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), have generally not been idle following congressional attention. They reacted quickly to GLBA requirements that related to insurance agent licensing and to the changes enacted in Dodd-Frank, including engaging with the FSOC and FIO. The regulatory initiatives undertaken by the NAIC since the financial crisis include increased oversight of holding companies and new enterprise risk management requirements. Because enactment by the state legislature is necessary before the NAIC's suggested legal changes can take effect in that state, the process typically does not move rapidly.
Among the insurance regulatory issues addressed by legislation in the 114th Congress are the licensing of insurance agents and brokers (H.R. 26/P.L. 114-1), the degree of the authority of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) over insurers (H.R. 1478/S. 798), and international insurance standards (S. 1086, H.R. 2141, H.R. 5143, and H.R. 6436). S. 1484/S. 1910 and H.R. 5983, broader bills addressing financial regulation, also include provisions on the latter two topics and would modify the SIFI designation process. In addition, other international issues have been of concern to Congress, such as the European Union's Solvency II project to overhaul the European insurance regulatory system and the U.S. state requirements on non-U.S. insurers for reinsurance collateral. |
crs_R41547 | crs_R41547_0 | Introduction
In the last two decades, organized crime has grown more complex, posing evolving challenges for U.S. federal law enforcement. This is largely because these criminals have transformed their operations in ways that broaden their reach and make it harder for law enforcement to define and combat the threat they pose. In response to these forces, organized criminals have adopted more-networked structural models, internationalized their operations, and grown more tech savvy. Modern organized criminals may prefer cellular or networked structural models for their flexibility and avoid the hierarchies governed by elaborate initiation rituals that were favored by their predecessors. Fluid network structures make it harder for law enforcement to infiltrate, disrupt, and dismantle conspiracies. Many 21 st century organized crime groups opportunistically form around specific, short-term schemes. Further, these groups may outsource portions of their operations rather than keeping all of their expertise "in-house." In July 2011, to address these and other issues, the Obama Administration issued its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime ( 2011 Strategy ) . Complicating all of this, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), there has been a shift in law enforcement attention and resources more toward counterterrorism-related activities and away from traditional crime fighting activities—including the investigation of organized crime. The report includes a discussion of how U.S. law enforcement conceptualizes organized crime in the 21 st century and concludes by examining potential issues for Congress, including the extent to which organized crime is a national security threat (partly to be tackled by U.S. law enforcement agencies), congressional oversight regarding the federal coordination of organized crime investigations, and the utility of current resources appropriated to combat organized crime. They have helped to reduce national trade barriers, widen transportation infrastructure, and bolster volumes of international business. The Internet and extensive cellular telephone networks have fostered rapid communication, simultaneously revolutionizing licit and illicit commerce. For example, integrated financial systems allow for easy global movement of money. Estimates suggest that money laundering annually equals between 2% and 5% of world GDP. Organized Crime and Technological Change
Organized criminals have expanded their technological "toolkits." They have adapted to incorporate technology-driven fraud into their capabilities. Their operations can harm U.S. citizens without ever having a physical presence in the country. All of this covers a range of activity including cyber intrusions into corporate databases, the theft of individual consumer credit card information, and a wide variety of fraudulent online activity. Historically, criminal groups have burrowed into their immediate surroundings, but now this is enhanced by the fact that they can leverage Internet connectivity and extensive, international transportation linkages from localities around the globe. However, although the effects of organized crime may not be seen in a consolidated attack resulting in the physical loss of life, the effects are far-reaching. As mentioned, organized crime impacts economic stability, public health and safety, and national security. Coordination of Domestic Efforts
As mentioned, the federal investigation of organized crime matters has not historically been a centralized effort, and even with the 2011 Strategy, there is no single lead agency charged with investigating organized crime. | In the last two decades, organized crime has grown more complex, posing evolving challenges for U.S. federal law enforcement. These criminals have transformed their operations in ways that broaden their reach and make it harder for police to combat them. They have adopted more-networked structural models, internationalized their operations, and grown more tech savvy. They are a significant challenge to U.S. law enforcement.
Modern organized criminals often prefer cellular or networked structural models for their flexibility and avoid the hierarchies that previously governed more traditional organized crime groups such as the Cosa Nostra. Fluid network structures make it harder for law enforcement to infiltrate, disrupt, and dismantle conspiracies. Many 21st century organized crime groups opportunistically form around specific, short-term schemes and may outsource portions of their operations rather than keeping it all "in-house."
Globalization has revolutionized both licit and illicit commerce. Commercial and technological innovations have reduced national trade barriers, widened transportation infrastructure, and bolstered volumes of international business. The Internet and extensive cellular telephone networks have fostered rapid communication. Integrated financial systems, which allow for easy global movement of money, are exploited by criminals to launder their illicit proceeds. Estimates suggest that money laundering annually accounts for between 2% and 5% of world GDP. Simultaneously, borders are opportunities for criminals and impediments to law enforcement.
Organized criminals have expanded their technological "toolkits," incorporating technology-driven fraud into their capabilities. They can harm U.S. citizens without ever having a physical presence in the country via crimes such as cyber intrusions into corporate databases, theft of individual consumer credit card information, fencing of stolen merchandise online, and money laundering. Further, criminal organizations—which have historically burrowed into and exploited local ethnic communities—can now rely on Internet connectivity and extensive, international transportation linkages to target localities around the globe.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a shift in law enforcement attention and resources toward counterterrorism-related activities and away from traditional crime fighting activities including the investigation of organized crime. Although the effects of organized crime may not be seen in a large-scale attack, they are far-reaching—impacting economic stability, public health and safety, and national security.
In July 2011, the Obama Administration issued its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. It addresses the fact that federal investigation of organized crime matters has not historically been a centralized effort. Regardless, there still is no single agency charged with investigating organized crime in the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been designated the lead investigative agency for terrorism. Further, resources to tackle this issue are divided among many federal agencies. As such, Congress may exert its oversight authority regarding the federal coordination of organized crime investigations via the 2011 strategy. Policymakers may also debate the efficacy of current resources appropriated to combat organized crime. |
crs_R44348 | crs_R44348_0 | Estimating the Total Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation
Federal agencies issue thousands of regulations every year. Over the past 70 years, Congress and various Presidents have created a set of procedures agencies must follow to issue these regulations, some of which contain requirements for the calculation and consideration of costs, benefits, and other economic effects of regulations. In recent years, many Members of Congress have expressed interest in various regulatory reform efforts that would change the rulemaking process. As part of this debate, it has become common for supporters of regulatory reform to comment on the total cost of federal regulation. Estimating the total cost of regulations is inherently difficult. Current estimates of the cost of regulation should be viewed with a great deal of caution. In short, the bottom-up approach aggregates individual cost estimates produced by federal agencies. In 2014, the most frequently cited cost estimates resulting from each of these studies ranged from $57-$87 billion (using the bottom-up method) to $2 trillion (the majority—almost $1.5 trillion—of which was arrived at using the top-down method). The estimates that agencies produce under Executive Order 12866 are subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Why Use the Bottom-Up Approach? Costs Not Estimated for Every Rule
One of the main challenges to calculating accurately the total costs and benefits of federal regulations is that agencies are not required to estimate costs and benefits for all regulations. Because most cost-benefit analysis requirements do not extend to the independent regulatory agencies, the bottom-up approach to estimating the costs and benefits of regulation does not include costs and benefits of regulations issued by those agencies. A number of other reasons may contribute to inaccuracies in agency estimates of costs. This could include indirect economic effects, as well as direct effects that are not monetized. Specifically, they looked at the relationship between each country's economy and a proxy measure of the amount of regulation in each country over eight years. Importance of Accurate Measures of Regulation in Top-Down Approach
One challenge for the top-down approach to estimating the cost of regulation is that the accuracy of the findings is dependent on the validity of the proxy measure of regulation. Proxy measures of governance indicators are inherently imprecise, and they cannot be reliably used to estimate macroeconomic outcomes. With any top-down model of the economic effects of regulation, the validity of a proxy for regulation is essential—and measuring an inherently abstract concept like the stringency of regulation in a country is difficult. Although the top-down method does not appear to be intended to measure costs and benefits, having an estimate of costs without an estimate of benefits does not provide the complete context for evaluating whether a country's amount of regulation is appropriate. The bottom-up approach to estimating the total costs and benefits of regulations, such as the approach taken by OMB in its annual report to Congress, has several advantages. However, the individual estimates used in the bottom-up approach can be validated by comparing the ex ante estimates of costs and benefits to ex post estimates. Because of these limitations about what may be missing from the bottom-up estimate, a top-down approach may be more likely to capture fully the overall cost of regulations, as the top-down approach could conceivably provide a way to include in its estimate of indirect costs and effects of regulations that are not included in the bottom-up approach. For the reasons discussed throughout this report, both approaches to estimating the total cost of regulation have inherent—and potentially insurmountable—flaws. The discrepancy between the two approaches and their associated estimates raises the question of the utility of using such figures in the regulatory reform debate. | Federal agencies issue thousands of regulations each year under delegated authority from Congress. Over the past 70 years, Congress and various Presidents have created a set of procedures agencies must follow to issue these regulations, some of which contain requirements for the calculation and consideration of costs, benefits, and other economic effects of regulations. In recent years, many Members of Congress have expressed an interest in various regulatory reform efforts that would change the current set of rulemaking requirements, including requirements to estimate costs and benefits of regulations. As part of this debate, it has become common for supporters of regulatory reform to comment on the total cost of federal regulation.
Estimating the total cost of regulations is inherently difficult. Current estimates of the cost of regulation should be viewed with a great deal of caution.
Scholars and governmental entities estimating the total cost of regulation use one of two methods, which are referred to as the "bottom-up" and the "top-down" approach. The bottom-up approach aggregates individual cost and benefit estimates produced by agencies, arriving at a government-wide total. In 2014, the annual report to Congress from the Office of Management and Budget estimated the total cost of federal regulations to range between $68.5 and $101.8 billion and the total benefits to be between $261.7 billion and $1,042.1 billion. The top-down approach estimates the total cost of regulation by looking at the relationship of certain macroeconomic factors, including the size of a country's economy and a proxy measure of how much regulation the country has. This method estimates the economic effect that a hypothetical change in the amount of regulation in the United States might have, considering that economic effect to represent the cost of regulation. One frequently cited study estimated the total cost of regulation in 2014 to be $2.028 trillion, $1.439 trillion of which was calculated using this top-down approach.
Each approach has inherent advantages and disadvantages. The bottom-up approach relies on agency estimates of the effects of specific regulations and can also be used to estimate benefits, because agencies typically estimate both costs and benefits under current requirements so that they may be compared and evaluated against alternatives. The bottom-up approach does not, however, include estimates of costs and benefits of all rules, nor does it include costs and benefits of regulations that are not monetized—meaning that the bottom-up approach is likely an underestimate of the total cost of regulation. Furthermore, the individual estimates produced by agencies and used in the bottom-up approach may not always be accurate.
The top-down approach can be used to estimate effects of rules that are not captured by the bottom-up approach—such as indirect costs and costs of rules issued by independent regulatory agencies, which are not included in the bottom-up approach—thus theoretically capturing the whole universe of regulatory costs. Its results are, however, entirely reliant upon a number of methodological challenges that are difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. The biggest challenge may be finding a valid proxy measure for regulation: proxy measures of the total amount of regulation in a country are inherently imprecise and cannot be reliably used to estimate macroeconomic outcomes. Because of this difficulty in identifying a suitable proxy measure of regulation, even if the total cost of regulation is substantial, it cannot be estimated with any precision. The top-down method is intended to measure only costs; measuring costs without also considering benefits does not provide the complete context for evaluating the appropriateness of a country's amount of regulation.
For these and other reasons, both approaches to estimating the total cost of regulation have inherent—and potentially insurmountable—flaws. The discrepancy between the two approaches and their associated estimates raises the question of the utility of using such figures in the regulatory reform debate. |
crs_R43633 | crs_R43633_0 | The Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), is a wholly owned government corporation that employs offenders incarcerated in correctional facilities operated by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FPI manufactures products and provides services that are primarily sold to executive agencies in the federal government. It was created to serve as a means for managing, training, and rehabilitating inmates through employment in prison industry jobs. The FPI's mandatory source clause has been the focus of congressional scrutiny, in part because some policymakers believe that it has a deleterious effect on private vendors' ability to secure federal contracts. This report provides an analysis of the FPI's sales from FY1993-FY2013. Between FY1993 and FY2013, the FPI sold products and services to 59 different federal departments, agencies, offices, and boards; and, during this time period, the Department of Defense (DOD) was the FPI's biggest customer. Despite the variety of products and services offered by the FPI, a majority of its sales involved seven products (hereinafter, these seven products will be referred to as the "FPI's core products"):
cable, cord, and wire assemblies (PSC 5995); miscellaneous electrical power/distribution equipment (PSC 6150); household furniture (PSC 7105); office furniture (PSC 7110); cabinets, lockers, bins, and shelving (PSC 7125); household furnishings (PSC 7210); and clothing, special purpose (PSC 8415). Between FY1993 and FY2013, sales in the FPI's core products accounted for, on average, 62% of the FPI's sales of products and services. It is the mandatory source clause, and its effect on private businesses, that has drawn controversy over the years. Since 2001, Congress has made a series of changes to the FPI's mandatory source clause in response to these concerns. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 ( P.L. 108-199 , hereinafter "FY2004 Omnibus") requires all federal agencies to use competitive procedures for the procurement of a product if the agency determines that the FPI's product is not comparable in price, quality, and time of delivery to products available from the private sector. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( P.L. For the FPI's sales to DOD, the analysis focuses on three distinct periods: FY1993-FY2001, the period before changes to the way DOD procured products from the FPI; FY2002-FY2007, the period when DOD had to competitively procure products from the FPI if those products did not meet their needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery; and FY2008-FY2013, when DOD had to compete contracts for products in which the FPI had more than 5% of the market. The Federal Prison Industries' Sales
The FPI is a self-sustaining wholly government owned corporation, meaning that the FPI's ability to provide work opportunities for federal inmates is contingent on its ability to generate revenue through sales to other federal entities. However, the FPI's total nominal sales in FY2013 were $352 million below the peak of $885 million in nominal sales in FY2009. In general, the FPI generated a profit most of the fiscal years between FY1993 and FY2007 (see Figure 2 ); however, the FPI reported losses each fiscal year between FY2008 and FY2013. Civilian agencies were required to use competitive procedures for procuring products from the FPI if its products did not meet their need in terms of price, quality, and timeliness during the period when the FPI's sales decreased 51% (FY2009-FY2013), but the same requirements were in place for FY2004-FY2009, when the FPI's sales to civilian agencies generally increased. The data in Figure 4 , however, show that competition did not have a uniform effect on the FPI's share of DOD's market for the selected products. The FPI's sales of core products to DOD did start to decrease after FY2009, shortly after Congress required DOD to compete any PSC in which the FPI had more than 5% of the market, but the FPI's sales to DOD in non-core products and services started to decline before this requirement went into effect. Sales of non-core products and services to civilian agencies did decline between FY2003 and FY2004, which roughly coincides with when Congress required civilian agencies to only purchase products from the FPI if they meet their needs in terms of price, quality, and timeliness, but the FY2004 decrease appears to be more of a regression towards the mean after the FPI's sales of non-core products and services to civilian agencies uncharacteristically increased between FY2001 and FY2003. Even though the FPI's market share for core products for both DOD and civilian agencies decreased after Congress made modifications to the FPI's mandatory source clause, it appears that those decreases were the continuation of a long-term trend. In addition to changes in its mandatory source clause, the FPI's declining sales might also be the result of decreased federal spending. Between FY2008 and FY2013, there was a significant decrease (64%) in DOD's total purchases in the PSCs in which the FPI made a sale. The FPI's declining sales to DOD roughly coincide with decreasing DOD purchases, though the FPI's sales to DOD peaked in FY2007 while DOD's purchases peaked one fiscal year later. Also, the FPI's sales did not decrease at a rate commensurate with the decrease in DOD's purchases (the FPI's sales decreased 31% between FY2008 and FY2013), which would be expected given the increase in the FPI's share of DOD's market since FY2008. The FPI's declining sales to civilian agencies coincide with the decrease in civilian agencies' total purchases in PSCs which the FPI made a sale. One possible reason is the federal government began spending less money purchasing products offered by the FPI. It is more difficult to determine what effect legislative changes to the FPI's mandatory source clause had on the FPI's sales. The FPI's share of the federal market, for all of its products and its core products, decreased after Congress made changes to the mandatory source clause, but it appears that this was the continuation of a trend that began before those changes were implemented. It might be that the FPI's sales would have declined even if Congress had not made changes to the mandatory source clause. Even if the FPI's share of the federal market remained consistent year-to-year, the fact that the federal government was spending less purchasing products and services offered by the FPI would have likely resulted in declining sales for the FPI. However, opening the FPI to more competition might have affected the FPI's ability to continue to generate revenue at a time when there were fewer opportunities for the FPI to make sales. The FPI's declining sales, regardless of the reason, might be of interest to policymakers because the FPI is a self-sustaining government corporation. In order for the FPI to provide work opportunities for inmates, it has to generate revenue. Methodology
Section 827 of the FY2008 NDAA requires DOD to use competitive procedures to procure any product for which DOD determines that the FPI's share of the market is greater than 5%. | The Federal Prison Industries (FPI) is a government-owned corporation that employs offenders incarcerated in correctional facilities operated by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FPI was created to serve as a means for managing, training, and rehabilitating inmates in the federal prison system through employment in one of its industries.
The FPI manufactures products and provides services that are primarily sold to executive agencies in the federal government. In the past, federal departments and agencies were required to purchase products from the FPI. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the FPI's "mandatory source clause." It is the FPI's mandatory source clause that has been the focus of congressional scrutiny, in part because some policymakers feel that it has a deleterious effect on private vendors' ability to secure federal contracts.
Since 2001, Congress has made a series of changes to the FPI's mandatory source clause in response to concerns about the FPI's effect on private businesses. Congress requires all federal agencies to use competitive procedures for the procurement of a product if the agency determines that the FPI's product is not comparable in price, quality, and time of delivery to products available from the private sector. Congress, through section 827 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), also requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to use competitive procedures to procure products and services when it determines that the FPI share of DOD's market for a product is greater than 5%.
Between FY1993 and FY2013, the FPI sold products and services to 59 different federal departments, agencies, offices, and boards. During this time period, DOD was the FPI's biggest customer, accounting for, on average, 61% of the FPI's sales to government agencies. Also, over the same time period, the FPI sold products and services in 160 different product and service codes (PSCs); yet, a majority of the FPI's sales were for seven products (hereinafter, the "FPI's core products"). The core products include cable, cord, and wire assemblies; miscellaneous electrical power/distribution equipment; household furniture; office furniture; cabinets, lockers, bins, and shelving; household furnishings; and clothing, special purpose.
This report provides an analysis of the FPI's sales from FY1993 to FY2013 in order to evaluate whether its sales changed following amendments to the mandatory source clause. Findings from the analysis include the following:
There has been a significant decrease in the FPI's sales since FY2009. The FPI's nominal sales in FY2013 were $533 million, which is $352 million below the FPI's peak sales of $885 million in FY2009. The FPI generated a profit most fiscal years between FY1993 and FY2007. The FPI, however, reported losses each fiscal year between FY2008 and FY2013. The FPI's sales to DOD generally increased between FY1993 and FY2007, but they have declined since then. In addition, the FPI's sales to civilian agencies generally increased until FY2008, but they have decreased every fiscal year since. The FPI has experienced significant decreases in its sales of non-core products and services to DOD since FY2007 and in its sales of core products to DOD since FY2009. The FPI's sales of non-core products and services to civilian agencies have decreased since FY2008 and its sales of core products to civilian agencies have decreased since FY2010; these sales have not declined to the same extent as sales of comparable products to DOD. The FPI has experienced a significant decrease in its share of both DOD and civilian agencies' markets for its core products since Congress made changes to the mandatory source clause, but those decreases might be the continuation of a long-term trend. The FPI's declining sales might be the result of federal agencies spending less money on products offered by the FPI. Between FY2008 and FY2013, there was a sizable decrease (64%) in DOD's purchases in the PSCs in which the FPI made a sale in a given fiscal year (this serves a rough estimate of the size of DOD's market for FPI products). The FPI's declining sales to DOD roughly coincides with decreasing DOD purchases. The FPI's sales to civilian agencies decreased 51% between FY2009 and FY2013, which coincides with a 21% decrease in civilian agencies' purchases in PSCs in which the FPI made a sale. Competition pursuant to section 827 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act did not have a uniform effect on the FPI's share of DOD's market for six selected products. For some products, the FPI lost market share when that product was opened to competition and it never recovered. In other instances, the FPI's share of DOD's market for some products increased even though DOD has used competitive procedures to procure the product.
There is not a single cause that explains why the FPI's sales decreased after FY2009. One factor that might have contributed to the FPI's declining sales is that the federal government spent less money on products offered by the FPI. It is harder to determine what effect legislative changes to the FPI's mandatory source clause had on the FPI's sales. It might be that the FPI's sales would have declined even if Congress had not made changes to the mandatory source clause. Even if the FPI's share of the federal market remained consistent year-to-year, the fact that the federal government was spending less on products and services offered by the FPI would likely have resulted in declining sales for the FPI. However, opening the FPI to more competition has probably not made it easier for the FPI to continue to generate revenue at a time when there are fewer opportunities for the FPI to make sales.
The FPI's declining sales, regardless of the reason, might be of interest to policymakers because the FPI is a self-sustaining government corporation. In order for it to provide work opportunities for inmates, it has to generate sufficient revenue. The FPI has been employing a smaller share of the federal prison population since the late 1980s. At the same time, Congress has placed a greater emphasis on preparing inmates for life after prison, and the BOP asserts that the FPI is one of its most effective tools for rehabilitating inmates and managing its prisons. The tension between providing work opportunities to inmates through the sale of goods to federal agencies and the desire to provide contracting opportunities to private vendors continues to fuel the debate about the future of the FPI. |
crs_RL33063 | crs_RL33063_0 | (12) Several developments inthe modern research environment have contributed to this trend towards collaboration. Cooperation may benefit firmsby allowing them to share risks and costs. (16)
Congress has also endeavored to create an environment conducive to research associationsbetween and among public, private, and non-profit entities. (37)
Patent Acquisition and Enforcement
In order to obtain patent protection, innovative individuals and firms must prepare and submitapplications to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). As the Patent Act states:
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, eachof the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention in theUnited States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of andwithout accounting to the other owners. The Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 provided a response to this situation by retainingthe rule that identifying the correct inventor or inventors is a condition of patentability. In particular, when a claimed invention resulted from joint researchbetween two or more entities, the CREATE Act excludes certain prior art developed by one of theresearchers from the nonobviousness analysis if:
the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a joint researchagreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention wasmade;
the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within thescope of the joint research agreement; and
the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended todisclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement. (86)
Some examples illustrate this standard. (91)
As a result, some commentators have called for more specific legislative guidance on thejoint inventorship standard. One possible reform would be to stipulate a clear rule, or possibly a listof factors that courts should consider, with respect to joint inventorship. (92)
On the other hand, fashioning a workable standard of joint inventorship might prove verydifficult. As discussedpreviously, if more than one individual qualifies as an inventor of a particular patented invention,then these individuals are deemed to be "joint owners" who hold the patent as"tenants-in-common." (95) Under this legal arrangement, each joint owner owns an undivided interest in the entire property. In light of the usual rule governing a tenancy-in-common relationship, however, somecommentators have observed that joint owners of a patent are at each other's mercy. (99) The policy basisfor this rule appears to be premised upon creating the maximum opportunity for the patentedtechnology to be exploited in the marketplace. Some observers believe that it is inappropriate to"transpose pre-1984 concepts of joint ownership into the new post-1984 inventorship law .. . ." (108) Inparticular, a broad conception of joint inventorship, in combination with atenancy-in-common ownership paradigm, may allow a joint inventor to enjoy economicrewards that are not commensurate with his contribution to the patent. Another possibility would be to consider ownership issues on a claim-by-claim basis,rather than a patent-by-patent basis. (112) In weighing the desirability of any alternative to the current regime, one factor to beconsidered is ease of judicial administration. (113) Anotherconcern may be diminution of the incentives of one joint owner to commercialize the patentedinvention. Concluding Observations
Although amendments to the patent statute have clarified rules pertaining tocooperative research and development endeavors, concerns about the standards of jointinventorship and joint ownership persist. | Innovative individuals and firms have increasingly engaged in collaborative research. Thegreater complexity of modern technology, heightened specialization in advanced fields, improvedmeans of communications, and the desire to share the risks and expenses of high technology researchhave each contributed to this trend. Congressional interest in creating an environment conducive tocollaborative research has resulted in numerous legislative initiatives. The Patent Law AmendmentsAct of 1984 and the Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004are among those that have clarified patent law rules regarding joint inventors and cooperativeresearch endeavors.
Observers have nonetheless expressed concerns that applicable patent law standards maydiscourage, rather than foster, collaboration among researchers. Some patent law experts believe thatcurrent rules identifying the members of a research team who qualify as joint inventors are toolenient, vague, and unpredictable. This standard may lead to uncertainties with respect to patentownership. It may also encourage strategic claims drafting during patent acquisition andenforcement.
Another target of concern is the current legal rule governing the joint ownership of patents. In the event more than one individual is considered to be a co-inventor of an invention that ispatented, each such person is regarded as a joint owner of that patent. U.S. patent law further deemsa joint owner of a patent to enjoy a "tenancy-in-common," which allows him to exploit a patentwithout regard to the other owners. This property rule appears to maximize the opportunity forexploitation of the patented invention in the marketplace. Yet, because every inventor receives fullrights in an invention no matter what the extent of his contribution, this ownership principle couldpossibly lead to inequitable distributions of the profits of patented inventions.
If Congress should deem a legislative response to be appropriate, some commentators havecalled for more specific legislative guidance on the joint inventorship standard. A possible reformwould be to stipulate bright-line rules, or possibly a list of factors that courts should consider, withrespect to joint inventorship. On the other hand, fashioning a workable standard of jointinventorship might prove difficult or ultimately be unnecessary.
In addition, alternative ownership rules--such as considering ownership on a claim-by-claim,rather than a patent-by-patent basis--are a possibility. In weighing the desirability of any alternativeto the current regime, concerns for ease of judicial administration and the diminution of theincentives of one joint owner to commercialize the patented invention may be appropriate. However,the patent statute's joint inventorship and joint ownership standards are effectively default rules. Ascollaborative researchers may reach alternative arrangements via contract, legal reform in this areamay not be a compelling need. |
crs_R43887 | crs_R43887_0 | Introduction
Originally enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act (OAA) supports a wide range of social services and programs for individuals aged 60 years and older. These services include supportive services, congregate nutrition services (i.e., meals served at group sites such as senior centers, community centers, schools, churches, senior housing complexes), home-delivered nutrition services, family caregiver support, community service employment, the long-term care ombudsman program, and services to prevent the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of older persons. Except for Title V, Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA), all programs are administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA) in the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Title V is administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration. Since the enactment of OAA, Congress has reauthorized and amended the act numerous times. The last OAA reauthorization occurred in 2006, when Congress enacted the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 ( P.L. 109-365 ), which authorized appropriations through FY2011. Although the authorizations of appropriations under the act expired at the end of FY2011, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for OAA-authorized programs and activities. FY2015 Overview
The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 113-235 ) funded OAA programs at $1.878 billion, which is $6.5 million (0.3%) more than FY2014 funding. Title III programs received the largest proportion of OAA funding, with 70.7% of funding appropriated to nutrition, supportive services, family caregivers, and health promotion activities. Almost one-fourth of OAA funding (23.1%) was allocated to Title V, the CSEOA Program. The remaining funds were allocated to AOA-administered activities under Titles II (2.7%) and IV (0.7%), grants to Native Americans under Title VI (1.7%), and vulnerable elder rights protection activities under Title VII (1.1%). Also under Title IV, Elder Rights Support Activities received $4.0 million in new FY2015 funding for an Elder Justice Initiative. 5464 , Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015. For most OAA programs, the bill proposed to fund OAA programs relative to their FY2014 levels, with two exceptions. 5464 did not specify funding for Holocaust survivors. | The Older Americans Act (OAA) is the major federal vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for individuals aged 60 and older. These include supportive services, congregate nutrition services (i.e., meals served at group sites such as senior centers, schools, churches, or senior housing complexes), home-delivered nutrition services, family caregiver support, community service employment, the long-term care ombudsman program, and services to prevent the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of older persons. The OAA also supports grants to older Native Americans and research, training, and demonstration activities.
The Administration on Aging (AOA), which is a program office under the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers most OAA programs. The exception is the Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA) program, which is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Funding for OAA programs is provided through the annual Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education) Appropriations Act.
Since the enactment of OAA in 1965, Congress has reauthorized and amended the act numerous times. The last OAA reauthorization occurred in 2006, when Congress enacted the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365), which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations for FY2007 through FY2011. The authorizations of appropriations for most OAA programs expired at the end of FY2011. However, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for OAA-authorized activities.
The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) funded OAA programs at $1.878 billion, which was $6.5 million (0.3%) more than FY2014 funding. The increase was due to new OAA funding for supportive services for Holocaust survivors ($2.5 million) and an Elder Justice Initiative ($4.0 million).
Title III programs received the largest proportion of OAA funding, with 70.7% of funding appropriated to congregate and home-delivered nutrition programs (commonly referred to as "meals on wheels"), supportive services, family caregivers, and health promotion activities. Almost one-fourth of OAA funding (23.1%) was allocated to Title V, the CSEOA Program. The remainder was allocated to AOA-administered activities under Titles II (Administration on Aging), IV (Activities for Health, Independence, and Longevity), VI (Grants for Native Americans), and VII (Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Activities). |
crs_RL33200 | crs_RL33200_0 | It then describes U.S. efforts to deal with trafficking in persons in the region and discusses recent country and regional anti-trafficking efforts. Human Trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean
Human trafficking is a growing problem in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region that contains major source, transit, and destination countries for trafficking victims. In Guatemala, relatively large crime groups are transporting women from other countries—primarily from other countries in Central America—for sexual exploitation. U.S. Policy
Congressional Action39
Legislation
Anti-TIP efforts have accelerated in the United States since the enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386 ). The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P.L. In February 2016, Congress enacted legislation referred to as the International Megan's Law ( P.L. 114-119 ) requiring registered sex offenders to carry passports with "unique identifiers" and U.S. agencies to notify foreign governments when registered sex offenders are visiting their countries. Import Restrictions
Congress also enacted the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. 1307), which had allowed goods produced by forced labor to be imported if demand for those items could not be met by U.S. producers. On December 18, 2015, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. The act places numerous conditions on the aid for Central America, including a requirement that 25% of the funds for the "central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras" be withheld until the Secretary of State can certify that the governments are "taking effective steps" to deter emigration, combat alien smuggling and human trafficking, improve border security, and receive and reintegrate citizens repatriated from the United States. The report categorized 188 countries into tiers based on their government's level of effort to address human trafficking: Tier 1 (best), Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, and Tier 3 (worst). Only Tier 1 countries, approximately 19.5% of those assessed, are fully compliant with U.S.-established minimum standards to eliminate severe forms of human trafficking; the other countries are noncompliant and vary in terms of their level of effort to improve. In 2016, the Trafficking in Persons Report listed 27 countries as Tier 3. Countries on the Tier 2 Watch List include Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Belize, Venezuela, and Haiti are the only Latin American countries identified as Tier 3. U.S. Government Anti-Trafficking Programs in Latin America
In FY2016, the U.S. government provided more than $11 million to support anti-TIP projects in Latin America. A significant percentage of the total U.S. anti-TIP obligations are provided by the State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP). How to Measure Success
It is often difficult to measure success in the fight against human trafficking. They also pale in comparison to the number of victims that have been identified in Latin America (9,661 in 2015 alone). | Countries in Latin America serve as source, transit, and destination countries for trafficking in persons (TIP). Victims are exploited within their own countries and trafficked to other countries in the region. Latin America is also a primary source region for people trafficked to the United States, including by transnational organized crime groups. In FY2015, Mexico was the primary country of origin for foreign trafficking victims certified as eligible to receive U.S. assistance. Recent victims identified in the United States also have originated in Brazil and Central America. Smaller numbers of Latin Americans are trafficked to Europe and Asia. Latin America also serves as a transit region for Asian victims.
On June 30, 2016, the State Department issued its 16th annual congressionally mandated report on human trafficking. The report categorizes countries into four "tiers" according to the government's efforts to combat trafficking. Only Tier 1 countries, approximately 19.5% of those assessed, are fully compliant with U.S.-established minimum standards to eliminate severe forms of human trafficking. Those countries that do not cooperate in the fight against trafficking (Tier 3) have been made subject to U.S. aid restrictions. Chile, Colombia, and the Bahamas received the top Tier 1 ranking in this year's report. Belize, Haiti, Suriname, and Venezuela are the only Latin American countries ranked in Tier 3, as Cuba remained in the Tier 2 Watch List. Other countries in the region—Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Costa Rica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago—are on the Tier 2 Watch List.
Since enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA; P.L. 106-386), Congress has taken steps to address human trafficking through legislation (including reauthorizations of the TVPA in 2005, 2008, and 2013), appropriations, and oversight. In February 2016, Congress enacted the International Megan's Law (P.L. 114-119) requiring U.S. agencies to notify foreign governments when registered sex offenders are visiting their countries. Congress also enacted the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) eliminating an exception that had allowed goods produced by forced labor to be imported if demand for those items could not be met by U.S. producers.
Congress provided funding for anti-TIP programs in the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), including $5 million for programs in Guatemala and $4 million for forensics to solve TIP cases in Central America. P.L. 114-113 withheld some aid to the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras until they demonstrated anti-TIP efforts. Congress is monitoring human trafficking trends in the region and overseeing U.S.-funded anti-TIP programs, including U.S.-Mexican law enforcement efforts to disrupt cross-border TIP networks.
For more information, see CRS Report R44581, Trafficking in Persons and U.S. Foreign Policy Responses in the 114th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31707 | crs_RL31707_0 | U.S.-Sri Lanka Relations
U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka has historically supported Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its democratic institutions and socio-economic development. Since 2009, U.S.-Sri Lanka relations have centered on human rights abuses committed at the end of the civil war. U.S. Assistance to Sri Lanka
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has maintained a presence in Sri Lanka since 1948. Domestic Politics
The Republic of Sri Lanka has a multi-party democratic structure with high levels of political conflict and violence. President Rajapaksa gained widespread popularity among the Sinhalese majority for ending the war. The government has been accused by the international community of favoring the Sinhalese people, and doing little to promote equal political voice and economic opportunities for its Tamil population. The human rights abuses that the Sri Lankan government has been accused of include control over the media and harassment of journalists, sudden "disappearances" in the forms of arrests or abductions of Tamil sympathizers, the military's monitoring and control of Tamil populations in the north and eastern provinces, and insufficient government interest in investigating the location and status of former Tamil militants, despite family requests. Abuses against women have also increased in recent years. On March 21, 2013, with support from the United States and India, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to pass a resolution which is
critical of the Sri Lankan government's failure to take action to stop ongoing human rights violations and calling for an investigation into abuses committed during and in the aftermath of the country's 26-year civil war. Although India has and continues to be a strong economic partner of Sri Lanka, the connection between the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and the native Tamil populations in India have been a factor in relations between Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka-China Relations
China and Sri Lanka have developed increasingly close ties in recent years. In the last five years, China has invested heavily in Sri Lanka's defense and security. Development Factors
Sri Lanka holds the status as the only South Asian nation with a relatively high Human Development Index score, demonstrating the focus of government policies on social factors. In particular, the island nation has excelled in health and education, though concerns about the environment and the nation's susceptibility to natural disasters remain significant. Sri Lanka has had a susceptibility to a number of natural disasters due to its geographic position. | The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, is a constitutional democracy with a relatively high level of development. For two and a half decades, political, social, and economic development was seriously constrained by years of ethnic conflict and war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers. After a violent end to the civil war in May 2009, in which authorities crushed LTTE forces and precipitated a humanitarian emergency in Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated north, attention has turned to whether the government now has the ability and intention to build a stable peace in Sri Lanka.
This report provides historical, political, and economic background on Sri Lanka and examines U.S.-Sri Lanka relations and policy concerns. In recent years interest in Sri Lanka has focused on human rights issues related to the final stages of Sri Lanka's 26-year civil war with the LTTE, and its attendant humanitarian emergency. Sri Lanka has faced criticism for what has been viewed as an insufficient response to reported war crimes, a more nepotistic and ethnically biased government, as well as increasing restrictions on media and an unequal distribution of economic development.
Between 1983 and 2009, a separatist war costing at least 70,000 lives was waged against government forces by the LTTE, a rebel group that sought to establish a separate state or internal self-rule in the Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east. The United States designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997.
Sri Lanka offers a test case of how to respond to a brutal military victory over a violent ethno-nationalist separatist movement. The situation presents decision-makers questions of how to balance the imperatives of seeking accountability and resolution, providing development assistance, and promoting broad geopolitical interests. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has a firm hold on government and popular support among the Sinhalese majority for his leadership in presiding over a military victory over the LTTE. But Sri Lanka remains a multi-ethnic society, where long-held historic grievances have been deepened still further by the conflict's brutal end.
Although Sri Lanka maintains strong economic ties with countries in its close geographic proximity, Sri Lanka-India relations have been strained due to political and ethnic tensions (Sri Lanka's minority Tamils have strong linkages with Tamil communities in India), and there has been an increase in military and energy related investments from China in recent years. Sri Lanka remains the only South Asian nation with a high human development index ranking.
The United States recognizes the importance of the nation with its significant geographic positioning, and has paid close attention to human rights in the island nation. The U.S.-Sri Lanka relationship has been focused on human rights issues over the last few years, with an emphasis on U.S. sponsorship of resolutions through the United Nations Human Rights Council. |
crs_RS22798 | crs_RS22798_0 | Legislative and local elections are currently scheduled to be held on November 10, 2010. Presidential elections are anticipated in April 2011. The Darfur conflict has also heightened political instability in Chad. The two governments renewed diplomatic ties in November 2008 after mediation by Libya, but allegations of support for each other's respective rebel groups continued. The U.N. Secretary-General reports that relations between the governments have "improved significantly." Multinational Peacekeeping Operations
On September 25, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1778, approving the establishment of a multinational presence in Chad and the Central African Republic to (1) contribute to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and civilians in danger; (2) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (3) create favorable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development. The U.N. presence, known as the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), has been responsible for police training and reinforcing judicial infrastructure, and is working with Chadian forces to reinforce safety for refugees, IDPs, and aid agencies in the camps in the east. The U.N. Security Council extended MINURCAT's mandate through Resolutions 1834 in September 2008 and 1861 in January 2009, but logistical challenges impeded the deployment of the mission. In January 2010, the Chadian government issued a formal request to the United Nations not to renew the mandate of MINURCAT's military component, which was due to expire in March 2010. Child Soldiers
According to U.N. estimates, as many as 10,000 children may have been used in combat and non-combat roles by Chadian rebel groups, paramilitary forces, and the national army in recent years. In October 2008, however, the U.N. Secretary-General noted that the government had begun an effort to sensitize military commanders and personnel on the issue of child recruitment, and in April 2010, the Secretary-General reported that the Chadian government has "shown a consistent policy position and commitment against child recruitment," and has granted the U.N. and the International Committee for the Red Cross access to military camps to verify the presence of children and facilitate their release from the army. Almost 40% of Chadian children are chronically malnourished, In the western Sahelian region of the country, the World Food Program warns that an estimated 60% of households, some 1.6 million people, are currently food insecure. Humanitarian organizations warn that the situation is critical, particularly for remote areas in the west with little international aid presence, and that the upcoming rainy season is likely to further complicate aid delivery. In addition to numerous hearings on the conflict in neighboring Darfur and resulting refugee situation, hearings addressing Chad include a March 2007 hearing on Chad and the CAR and a November 2009 hearing on U.S. counterterrorism priorities in the Sahel, both by the Senate Foreign Relations Africa Subcommittee. | As the Sahel region weathers another year of drought and poor harvests, the political and security situation in Chad remains volatile, compounding a worsening humanitarian situation in which some 2 million Chadians are at risk of hunger. In the western Sahelian region of the country, the World Food Program warns that an estimated 60% of households, some 1.6 million people, are currently food insecure. Aid organizations warn that the situation is critical, particularly for remote areas in the west with little international aid presence, and that the upcoming rainy season is likely to further complicate the delivery of assistance.
In the east, ethnic clashes, banditry, and fighting between government forces and rebel groups, both Chadian and Sudanese, have contributed to a fragile security situation. The instability has forced over 200,000 Chadians from their homes in recent years. In addition to the internal displacement, over 340,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan's Darfur region have fled violence in their own countries and now live in refugee camps in east and southern Chad, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With Chadian security forces stretched thin, the threat of bandit attacks on the camps and on aid workers has escalated. The instability has also impacted some 700,000 Chadians whose communities have been disrupted by fighting and strained by the presence of the displaced.
The United Nations and the European Union (EU) began deployment of a multidimensional presence in Chad and the CAR in late 2007 to improve regional security so as to facilitate the safe and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The U.N. mission, known as MINURCAT, assumed peacekeeping operations from the EU force in March 2009, but it faced logistical challenges in its deployment and a shortage of troops. In January 2010, the Chadian government requested that the mission's mandate not be renewed. After consultations between the government and the U.N. Secretariat, the U.N. Security Council resolved in May 2010 to begin a reduction in MINURCAT's presence in Chad, to be completed by December 31, 2010. The Chadian government has expressed a commitment to protecting civilians and humanitarian workers, but some observers question the capacity of its security forces to fulfill this mandate.
A January 2010 agreement between the governments of Chad and Sudan has led to improved relations between the two countries, and they have allegedly ceased to provide support for each other's respective rebel groups. Legislative elections, postponed since 2007, are scheduled for November 10, 2010, and presidential elections are to be held in April 2011. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21556 | crs_RS21556_0 | Background
In May 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina requested consultations—the first step in WTO dispute settlement—with the European Union (EU) concerning the latter's de facto moratorium since 1998 on approving new genetically engineered (GE) products. Although the EU recommenced approvals in May 2004 with the approval of a GE corn variety for human consumption, a number of EU member states continue to block dissemination of approved biotech varieties. In the three years before the de facto ban, U.S. corn exports to the EU averaged about $300 million annually, according to USDA data (Spain and Portugal were the largest EU importers). The EU announced on December 19, 2006, that it would not appeal the panel's ruling in the case. The United States and EU agreed that a reasonable period of time would be until November 21, 2007, a deadline subsequently extended by mutual agreement until January 11, 2008. In May 2004, the EU effectively ended the moratorium by approving a GE corn variety (Syngenta Bt-11) for human consumption. While the United States and the EU are continuing technical discussions on market access issues for biotech products, both Canada and Argentina have settled their disputes with the EU. On July 15, 2009, Canada and the EU signed a final settlement of the WTO dispute that Canada had brought against the EU in May 2003. Similarly, Argentina and the EU announced their final settlement of the biotech dispute on March 18, 2010. All three parties have notified these settlements to the DSB as mutually agreed solutions. Both settlements provide for bilateral, biannual meetings between competent services of the European Commission and the co-complainants' authorities regarding the application of biotechnology to agriculture and related trade issues of mutual interest, including
follow-up of authorizations of genetically modified products of interest to each of the parties; measures related to biotechnology that may affect trade between the parties, including measures adopted by EU member states; specific issues that arise in the context of requests for authorization submitted to regulatory evaluations; any trade impacts of asynchronous authorizations of genetically modified products; renewal of authorizations of genetically modified products; and exchanges of information regarding such issues as new legislation affecting biotechnological agriculture, or coordination mechanisms to solve eventual cases of adventitious presence of non-authorized GMOs in shipments of authorized products. The options for the Obama Administration appear to be either to continue a dialogue with the EU on biotechnology policy and trade or to pursue retaliation for failure to comply with the earlier adverse ruling. Before the United States could impose retaliatory measures, however, it would have to request establishment of a panel to determine whether the EU had complied with the November 21, 2006, decision in the dispute. Chronology of the U.S.-EU Biotech Dispute (DS291) | In May 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina initiated a dispute with the European Union concerning the EU's de facto moratorium on biotechnology product approvals, in place since 1998. Although the EU effectively lifted the moratorium in May 2004 by approving a genetically engineered (GE) corn variety (MON810), the three complainants pursued the case, in part because a number of EU member states continue to block already approved biotech products. Industry estimates are that the moratorium costs U.S. corn growers some $300 million in exports to the EU annually. Corn gluten exports from the United States to the EU have been blocked since 2007 because of a zero tolerance policy governing the accidental presence of non-approved U.S. GE corn in such shipments.
On November 21, 2006, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the dispute panel's report, which ruled that a moratorium had existed, that bans on EU-approved GE crops in six EU member countries violated WTO rules, and that the EU failed to ensure that its approval procedures were conducted without "undue delay." The EU announced it would not appeal the ruling. The United States and EU agreed on November 21, 2007 (subsequently extended to January 11, 2008), as a deadline for EU implementation of the panel report. On January 11, 2008, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that, while it was reserving its rights to retaliate, it would hold off seeking a compliance ruling while the United States sought to normalize trade in biotechnology products with the EU.
In the meantime, co-complainants Canada (July 15, 2009) and Argentina (March 18, 2010) have reached "final settlements" in the biotech dispute with the EU. Canada, Argentina, and the EU notified the DSB of their mutually agreed solution under Article 3.6 of the DSU. The parties agreed to establish a bilateral dialogue on agricultural biotech market access issues of mutual interest.
U.S. agricultural and trade officials continue to criticize the EU for its biotech approval processes. During the second session of the 111th Congress, Members with agricultural interests may debate the issue of whether to continue a dialogue with the EU on re-establishing trade in biotechnology products or to seek retaliation for presumed lack of EU compliance with the panel decision. |
crs_R43856 | crs_R43856_0 | These include museums that have become part of the Smithsonian Institution (e.g., the National Museum of the American Indian and the National Museum of African American History and Culture) and museums that operate independently (e.g., the National Gallery of Art and the U.S. For most museums operated in whole or in part by the federal government, congressional authorization is required. In the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), legislation was introduced to authorize the National Museum of the American Latino, and to authorize a commission to study the potential creation of a National Women's History Museum. For the National Museum of the American Latino, a commission reported to Congress in 2011 that the museum should be established and made part of the Smithsonian Institution. Since then, proposals to authorize the museum have been introduced, but no further action has been taken either by the committees of jurisdiction or the House or the Senate. In December 2014, the Commission to Study the Potential Creation of a National Women's History Museum was established in the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( P.L. 113-291 ). It will report "not later than 18 months after the date of the first meeting of the Commission" on whether the museum should be authorized, how it should be funded, and whether it should be a Smithsonian museum. Issues for Congress
Since 1980, Congress has authorized four new museums in the District of Columbia—the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the National Law Enforcement Museum, the National Museum of the American Indian, and the National Museum of African American History and Culture. Regardless of the process employed, if Congress considers authorizing a new museum in the District of Columbia, several issues might warrant consideration. These include the subject matter, management and operations, location, funding, and the role of the Commemorative Works Act (CWA). Independent Entity
Some museum sponsors would prefer a new museum to be independent of the Smithsonian or other federal agencies. For future museums, either option might be used. The process used to create new museums has varied historically. | Congress has played a role in establishing museums that have become part of the Smithsonian Institution (e.g., the National Museum of the American Indian and the National Museum of African American History and Culture) and museums that operate independently (e.g., the National Gallery of Art and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). Historically, for most museums operated in whole or in part by the federal government, congressional authorization has been required.
Congressional action is likely required to authorize a new federal museum. In the 113th Congress (2013-2014), legislation was introduced to authorize the National Museum of the American Latino and to authorize a commission to study the potential creation of a National Women's History Museum. For the National Museum of the American Latino, a commission reported to Congress in 2011 that the museum should be established and made part of the Smithsonian Institution. Since then, proposals to authorize the museum have been introduced, but no further action has been taken either by the committees of jurisdiction or the House or the Senate.
In December 2014, the Commission to Study the Potential Creation of a National Women's History Museum was established in the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291). It will report "not later than 18 months after the date of the first meeting of the Commission" on whether the museum should be authorized, how it should be funded, and whether it should be a Smithsonian museum.
If Congress considers creating a new museum in the District of Columbia—either the National Museum of the American Latino, the National Women's History Museum, or another yet-to-be proposed museum—several issues might warrant consideration:
the museum's subject matter and whether it might conflict with existing federal museums or other local museums; the museum's funding and if federal appropriations, private donations, or a combination of both will be used; the museum's potential location; the museum's proposed management (i.e., Smithsonian, another federal agency, or an independent entity); and the Commemorative Works Act's (CWA's) role, if any, on the museum authorization process.
This report examines the contemporary process used to authorize new museums in Washington, DC, and evaluates potential issues for congressional consideration if new museum legislation is introduced, examined by committee, and potentially advanced for consideration on the House or Senate floor. |
crs_R42062 | crs_R42062_0 | In 1920, Congress again stepped into the operation of the nation's weapons factories by requiring the Secretary of War to have all of the supplies needed by the Army to be produced in government-owned factories or arsenals, so long as it could be done on an "economical basis." Others have expressed concern that the act could place the arsenals at a disadvantage should DOD to look to base closures as a means to reduce defense spending. Several attempts to privatize arms production were made prior to the Civil War, culminating in a provision written into the Army Appropriations Act for 1854, addressed below, that gave the Secretary of War the explicit statutory authority to abolish any arsenal that he deemed unnecessary or useless. Factories and arsenals: manufacture at; abolition of
(a) The Secretary of the Army shall have supplies needed for the Department of the Army made in factories or arsenals owned by the United States, so far as those factories or arsenals can make those supplies on an economical basis. Nevertheless, during floor debate in the House on February 1, 1853, Representative Willis Arnold Gorman, chair of the Committee on Military Affairs, proposed an amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill on behalf of the committee stating that "That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized to abolish such of the arsenals of the United States as, in his judgment, may be useless or unnecessary." The Defense Act of 1920
In 1920, the emphasis was somewhat different. Hence, the reorganization of the Army embodied in the Defense Act of 1920 included the creation of a permanent Assistant Secretary of War and his appointment as the individual charged with responsibility for procurement of all military supplies and for the regulation of the federal arsenals. The policy for implementing this provision of the Arsenal Act is outlined in detail in the current Army Regulation (AR) 700-94, Army Industrial Base Process , dated December 14, 2004. §4532(a), noting that the statute does not define the term "supplies," but suggesting that the term's definition in 10 U.S.C. Commanding General, Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for a. managing government-owned, government-operated (GOGO) production installations (para. b. performing the "make or buy" analysis under the authority of 10 U.S.C. Conclusion
Federal manufacturing arsenals have supported the Army and the nation virtually since their births. Among other functions, the arsenals have designed and manufactured military arms and supplies, nurtured the country's early industrialization, and provided competition to private enterprise. The sophistication evident in arsenal facilities has evolved along with the nation's industrial base, sometimes leading, often trailing commercial industry in technological development, particularly during the years prior to World War I. The statute gives the Secretary of the Army the authority to "abolish" any arsenal that he considers unnecessary. It also requires the Secretary of the Army to have the supplies needed by the Department of the Army made at factories and arsenals owned by the United States, so long as this production can be carried out "on an economical basis." Yet, this section fails to define "supplies," or to explain what is meant by an "economical basis." The Department of the Army interprets the Arsenal Act in AR 700-94, Army Industrial Base Process , and lays out policy for its implementation. The ASA(ALT) retains the authority to decide whether a given article shall be manufactured in a federal facility or by a commercial supplier. To make that decision, he relies on AMC and the individual PEOs/PMs to assess the relative merits of the two choices and perform the analyses necessary to provide a basis for the decision. | The Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. §4532) requires the Secretary of the Army to have all supplies needed by the Army to be made in government-owned factories or arsenals if this can be accomplished "on an economical basis." It also grants the Secretary the authority to "abolish any United States arsenal that he considers unnecessary." This broad mandate, and even broader authority, has lead some observers to question whether the Department of the Army is abiding by either the spirit or the letter of the law in awarding development and procurement contracts. Others have expressed concern that the seeming unilateral authority to abolish arsenals could place them at a disadvantage should the Department of Defense (DOD) seek to close military installations.
Federal arsenals, those government-owned industrial sites that have produced the engines of war for the United States Army virtually since the birth of the nation, exist and operate under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army. They, along with their naval counterparts in the form of federally owned shipyards, have sustained the military services for more than two centuries.
The two sections of the act were written approximately seven decades apart and are grounded in the events of their time. The authority to abolish dates to the era just prior to the Civil War, when the arsenals functioned not only as the nation's principal source of military arms, but also helped to nurture and sustain the country's early commercial industrialization. It was a period when the arsenals were beginning to experience competition in satisfying the Army's needs.
The requirement to have Army supplies made in U.S.-owned factories or arsenals dates to the years immediately following the conclusion of World War I, when Congress, realizing that the United States faced increasing global responsibilities at a time of much-reduced defense appropriations, moved to ensure the continued existence of this "in-house" industrial base. Nevertheless, the statute does not define "supplies," nor does it spell out what is meant by making supplies "on an economical basis."
The Department of the Army has promulgated policy for the implementation of the authority to produce supplies, embodying it in Army Regulation (AR) 700-94, Army Industrial Base Policy, of December 2004. AR 700-94 assigns the responsibility for deciding whether a given article is to be manufactured at a government-owned facility or contracted to a commercial vendor to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (ASA(ATL)). It also requires the Commanding General of Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the individual Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Program Managers (PMs) to provide the Assistant Secretary with the analyses needed to make that decision.
This report describes the roles of the federal manufacturing arsenals during the years surrounding the enactment of the two sections of the Arsenal Act, one as part of the Army Appropriations Act for 1854, and the other within the Defense Act of 1920, also known as the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, and provides historical context. The report also shows the change in language between the sections' original enactment and today, and it provides details on the Army's policy in implementing the manufacturing sourcing portion of the statute. |
crs_RL32517 | crs_RL32517_0 | Introduction
Tax reductions enacted in 2001 through 2004, as well as some under consideration, reduce the effective tax rate on capital income in several different ways. Taxes on capital arise from individual taxes on dividends, interest, capital gains, and income from non-corporate businesses (proprietorships and partnerships). Reductions in marginal tax rates as well as some tax benefits for business reduce these taxes. Taxes on capital income also arise from corporate profits taxes, which are affected not only by rate reductions but also by changes to provisions affecting depreciation, interest deductions, other deductions, and credits. Finally, taxes can be imposed on capital income through the estate and gift tax. Bonus depreciation was deliberately set to be temporary, and expired in 2004. This report addresses these distributional issues, in the context of behavioral responses. Income from unincorporated businesses is not separated into labor and capital income, but the distribution of income of different types can be compared by examining passive capital income sources. Those over $200,000 had 26% of income, 19% of wages, 39% of taxable interest income, 39% of taxable dividends, and 57% of taxable capital gains. Note that there are also significant amounts of capital income that are not subject to tax. Cuts in capital gains tax would most favor higher-income individuals, but in general, all tax cuts on capital income are likely to benefit higher-income individuals. Table 1 does not contain any information about the estate and gift tax. However, the estate tax is highly concentrated among top asset classes, with only 2.1% of decedents paying estate taxes in 2000 (before the recent round of tax cuts). Based on this distributional data, capital income taxes fall on higher-income individuals and contribute to the progressivity of the tax system. Thus, introducing an open economy is not likely to change the conclusion that the ultimate burden of capital income taxes falls on capital in general and therefore falls more heavily on higher-income individuals, even in the limited case of the corporate tax. The Effect of the Savings Response
The burden of a capital income tax could be shifted, in all or in part, to labor, if individuals respond to the reduction in return by reducing savings. Indeed, there is considerable reason to believe that individuals may employ rule-of-thumb guidelines to saving behavior that suggest that taxes on capital either have no effect or increase savings. Ramsey (Infinite Horizon) Model
Because of its infinite horizon, the long run supply of savings is perfectly elastic in this model, which leads to a lot of response to a change in tax rate on capital income. The magnitude and direction of outcomes depend on many factors: how substitutable consumption is over time, whether individuals take into account the effects of behavioral response on future returns, why bequests occur and how they change or do not change with a change in the interest rate, the amount of savings that is for precautionary purposes rather than for retirement, the expected period of retirement relative to the working period, and the pattern of wage growth over the career, and the use of the revenues. Special Issues with the Estate and Gift Tax
Most of the intertemporal models studied have focused on taxes on the return to capital such as individual income taxes and state and local taxes. This assessment is based on the observation of a relatively constant estimated pre-tax return, despite significant variations in the tax rate over the twentieth century. For those who doubt that most individuals possess the sophistication and ability to plan (whether over a finite lifetime or an infinite family dynasty), the rule of thumb approaches that involve targeting or fixed savings rates seem consistent with bounded rationality models and suggest that capital income taxes are more likely to have little effect or increase savings. | Tax reductions enacted in 2001-2004 reduce the effective tax rate on capital income in several different ways. Taxes on capital arise from individual taxes on dividends, interest, capital gains, and income from non-corporate businesses (proprietorships and partnerships). Reductions in marginal tax rates, as well as some tax benefits for business, reduce these taxes. Taxes on capital income also arise from corporate profits taxes, which are affected not only by rate reductions but also by changes to provisions affecting depreciation, interest deductions, other deductions and credits. Finally, taxes can be imposed on capital income through the estate and gift tax.
Tax cuts on capital income through capital gains rate reductions, estate and gift tax reductions, and dividend relief are estimated to cost about $57 billion per year, with about half that amount attributable to the estate and gift tax. Lower ordinary tax rates also affect income from unincorporated businesses. These tax cuts are temporary and proposals to make some or all of them permanent are expected. Bonus depreciation appears less likely to be extended.
While there are many factors used to evaluate the effects of these tax revisions, one of them is the distributional effect. This report addresses those distributional issues, in the context of behavioral responses.
Data suggest that taxes on capital income tend to fall more heavily on high-income individuals. All types of capital income are concentrated in higher-income classes. For example, the top 2.8% of tax returns (with adjusted gross income over $200,000 in 2009) have 26% of income, 19% of wages, 39% of interest, 39% of dividends, and 57% of capital gains. Taking into account a very broad range of capital assets, a 2012 Treasury study found that the top 1% of the population has about 19% of total income and about 12% of labor income, but receives almost half of total capital income. Estate and gift taxes are especially concentrated in the higher incomes: prior to the tax cuts enacted in 2001-2004, only 2% of estates paid the estate tax at all.
If there is a significant reduction in savings in response to capital income taxes, in the long run the tax could be shifted to labor and thus become a regressive tax. Some growth models are consistent with such a view, but generally theory suggests that increases in taxes on capital income could either decrease or increase savings, depending on a variety of model assumptions and particularly depending on the disposition of the revenues. There are also many reasons to be skeptical of these models, which presume a great deal of skill and sophistication on the part of individuals. New models of bounded rationality suggest that taxes on capital income are likely to have no effect or decrease saving, as individuals rely on common rules of thumb such as saving a fixed fraction of income and saving for a target.
Empirical evidence in general does not suggest significant savings responses, as savings rates and pre-tax returns to capital have been relatively constant over long periods of time despite significant changes in tax rate. If capital income taxes do not reduce saving, these taxes fall on capital income and add to the progressivity of the income tax system. This report does not track legislation and will not be updated. |
crs_RL34667 | crs_RL34667_0 | This report provides a side-by-side comparison of three bills and two proposals— H.R. 6899 (the House Leadership Proposal), and the Senate Draft Proposal—which address oil and gas development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). None of the bills has passed its respective chamber. The legislation section of this report summarizes several of those bills, including the House Leadership proposal ( H.R. On September 16, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6899 by a vote of 236-189 and defeated an alternative bill, H.R. 6709 , by a vote of 191-226. Background
Oil and gas leasing has been prohibited on much of the outer continental shelf (OCS) since the 1980s. | This report provides a side-by-side comparison of three bills and two proposals, each of which addresses oil and gas development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). None of the bills has passed its respective chamber. One of the proposals, H.R. 6899, the "Comprehensive American Energy Security and Taxpayer Protection Act," is expected to come to the House floor the week of September 15, 2008.
The moratoria on oil and gas leasing in much of the OCS has become a major issue in Congress and also in the Presidential campaign. This report describes the background of OCS leasing and the various positions taken by proponents and opponents of leasing. It then compares the provisions of three bills that have been introduced with reported summaries of the House proposal and the Senate proposal, the "New Energy Reform Act of 2008."
On September 16, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6899 by a vote of 236-189 and defeated an alternative bill, H.R. 6709, by a vote of 191-226. |
crs_R45239 | crs_R45239_0 | Rapid expansion of the U.S. natural gas pipeline network to accommodate new supplies of domestic shale gas has been a focus of Congress, prompting hearings and legislative proposals over the last decade regarding the federal role in pipeline siting. Nine related bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress, including the Promoting Interagency Coordination for Review of Natural Gas Pipelines Act ( H.R. 2910 ), which passed in the House in July 2017, and provisions in the Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 ( S. 1460 ). The growth in U.S. shale gas production is driving the expansion of natural gas pipeline infrastructure at the local level (to gather and process the gas) and at the national level to transport natural gas from producing regions to consuming markets, typically in other states. However, if the growth in U.S. shale gas continues as projected, the need for new pipelines could be substantial. One recent analysis by the INGAA Foundation, a pipeline industry research organization, projected the need for approximately 26,000 miles (1,400 miles annually) of new natural gas transmission pipeline between 2018 and 2035; total capital expenditure for these projects could range from $154 billion to $190 billion. Therefore, companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from FERC. Nonetheless, aspects of FERC's current practices remain a focus of attention among policymakers because they have been the subject of FERC dissent, debate in Congress, or litigation in federal court. The Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations issued a series of executive orders intended to facilitate or expedite the federal permitting of infrastructure projects, specifically including energy infrastructure. Exactly how all of these orders have affected, or may affect, federal review of interstate natural gas pipeline siting under FERC's jurisdiction is not entirely clear, however, due to the complexity of the certification process and permit obligations under related statutory requirements (e.g., NEPA). On April 9, 2018, the FERC chairman signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with other federal agencies to implement E.O. 13807 of reducing the time to two years for each agency to complete all environmental reviews and authorization decisions for major infrastructure projects" through implementation of One Federal Decision, communication, concurrent reviews, adherence to a review timetable, and commitment to agency-specific and collective review process enhancements (§V). Accordingly, on April 19, 2018, the commission issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) "to examine its policies in light of changes in the natural gas industry and increased stakeholder interest in how it reviews natural gas pipeline proposals." According to its notice, FERC's inquiry focuses on four general aspects of its certificate application review, with specific questions posed under each aspect
relying on precedent agreements to demonstrate project need, eminent domain and landowner interests, evaluating project alternatives and environmental effects, and the efficiency and effectiveness of FERC's certificate processes. FERC's inquiry was opened for public comments through July 25, 2018. FERC's recent Notice of Inquiry covers a number of the key congressional concerns raised either in oversight hearings or bill provisions in the 115 th Congress. Therefore, while FERC's policy review does not guarantee any changes to the gas pipeline certification status quo, it may provide valuable information and context for congressional oversight. If Congress disagrees with FERC's future policy choices based on the findings of its NOI, those findings presumably would provide an informed basis and clear policy context for subsequent legislative proposals. Although recent executive and agency actions, including FERC's agreement with other agencies and its NOI, may lead to changes in FERC policies or process, they are limited to those aspects of gas pipeline regulation which fall directly within the commission's statutory authority under the Natural Gas Act or within its discretion under other federal statutes. | Growth in U.S. shale gas production is driving the expansion of natural gas pipeline infrastructure to transport natural gas from producing regions to consuming markets, typically in other states. If the growth in U.S. shale gas continues as projected, the need for new pipelines could be substantial. One recent industry analysis projected the need for approximately 26,000 miles of new natural gas pipeline between 2018 and 2035; total capital expenditure for these projects could range from $154 billion to $190 billion.
Under the Natural Gas Act, companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The commission's regulatory process for the review of certificate applications consists of application pre-filing, certificate application, application review (including environmental and other agency review), authorization, and post-certificate proceedings. Several aspects of FERC's certificate review practices have been the focus of attention among policymakers because they have been the subject of FERC dissent, debate in Congress, or litigation in federal court. Key challenges to FERC certification involve the assessment of environmental impacts, evaluating project need, review timing, relations with other agencies, changes in industry structure, and issues related to export.
The Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations issued a series of executive orders intended to facilitate the federal permitting of infrastructure, specifically including energy infrastructure. Exactly how all of these orders have affected, or may affect, federal review of natural gas pipeline siting is not clear. However, on April 9, 2018, FERC signed a memorandum of understanding with other federal agencies to meet the goals in President Trump's E.O. 13807 "of reducing the time to two years for each agency to complete all environmental reviews and authorization decisions for major infrastructure projects."
Expansion of the pipeline network has prompted Congressional hearings and legislative proposals over the last decade regarding the federal role in pipeline siting. At least nine related bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress, including the Promoting Interagency Coordination for Review of Natural Gas Pipelines Act (H.R. 2910), which passed in the House in 2017, and provisions in the Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460), pending in the Senate.
On April 19, 2018, FERC issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) "to examine its policies ... in how it reviews natural gas pipeline proposals." The commission's inquiry focuses on four general aspects of its certificate application review: relying on contracts from future customers to demonstrate project need, eminent domain and landowner interests, evaluating project alternatives and environmental effects, and the efficiency and effectiveness of FERC's certificate processes. FERC's inquiry was opened for public comments through July 25, 2018. The commission has not stated any timetable for completing this proceeding.
FERC's NOI covers key congressional concerns raised either in hearings or bill provisions in the 115th Congress, as well as issues arising in certificate proceedings and litigation. Therefore, while FERC's policy review does not guarantee any changes to the gas pipeline certification status quo, it may provide valuable information and context for congressional oversight. If Congress disagrees with FERC's future policy choices based on the findings of its NOI, those findings presumably would provide a basis and policy context for subsequent legislative proposals. Furthermore, although recent executive and agency actions, including FERC's agreement with other agencies and its NOI, may lead to changes in FERC policies or process, FERC is limited to those aspects of gas pipeline regulation which fall directly within the commission's statutory authority under the Natural Gas Act or within its discretion under other federal statutes. |
crs_R43985 | crs_R43985_0 | T he mission of the Department of Justice (DOJ) is to "enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishmen t for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans." DOJ, through agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), investigates organized and violent crime, illegal drugs, and gun and explosives violations. The department, through the U.S. DOJ's Bureau of Prisons (BOP) incarcerates individuals convicted of violating federal laws. Marshals Service (USMS)
The U.S. FY2015 and FY2016 Appropriations for DOJ
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ) provided a total of $27.030 billion for DOJ for FY2015. The Administration requested $29.240 billion for DOJ for FY2016, a proposed increase of 8.2%. The House recommended $28.007 billion for DOJ, while the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $27.828 billion. The FY2016-enacted appropriation for DOJ is $29.090 billion, an amount that is 7.6% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 0.5% below the Administration's request. Select Legislative Proposals
This section of the report provides an overview of some of the Administration's proposals in its FY2016 budget for DOJ. While policymakers might have an interest in a wide variety of topics within the purview of DOJ's responsibilities, the proposals discussed in this section are based on topics that either tend to be a perennial interest for policymakers or which have become topics of national significance due to recent events. Attorneys office. For FY2016, the Administration requested $15 million in funding for grants and training and technical assistance to help state and local governments counter violent extremism (CVE). | The mission of the Department of Justice (DOJ) is to "enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans." DOJ carries out its mission through the activities of agencies and bureaus such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Attorneys Office; and the Bureau of Prisons.
This report provides an overview of the FY2015 appropriations, the Administration's FY2016 request, House and Senate committee action, and FY2016 appropriations for DOJ.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided a total of $27.030 billion for DOJ for FY2015. The Administration requested $29.240 billion for DOJ for FY2016, an increase of 8.2%. The House recommended $28.007 billion for DOJ, while the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $27.828 billion. The FY2016-enacted appropriation for DOJ is $29.090 billion, an amount that is 7.6% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 0.5% below the Administration's request.
The Administration put forth several budget proposals for DOJ for FY2016. While policymakers might have an interest in a wide variety of topics within the purview of DOJ's responsibilities, the proposals discussed in this report are based on topics that either tend to be a perennial interest for policymakers or which have become topics of national significance due to recent events. Such topics might include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosive's efforts to combat firearm violence in the United States through its administrative and enforcement functions; DOJ's efforts to combat cybercrime and ensure cybersecurity; grant funding for state and local law enforcement; federal marijuana enforcement efforts in light of state efforts to liberalize their marijuana policies; and federal efforts to combat violent extremism. |
crs_RL34288 | crs_RL34288_0 | To try to maximize operation of existing infrastructure, efforts are being made in both industry and government to modernize electric distribution equipment to improve communications between utilities and the ultimate consumer. The goal is to use advanced, information-based technologies to increase power grid efficiency, reliability, and flexibility, and reduce the rate at which additional electric utility infrastructure needs to be built. The term Smart Grid refers to a distribution system that allows for flow of information from a customer's meter in two directions: both inside the house to thermostats and appliances and other devices, and back to the utility. Both regulatory and technological barriers have limited the implementation of Smart Grid technology. At issue is whether a distinction for cost allocation purposes can be made between Smart Grid technologies' impact on the wholesale transmission system and retail distribution system. Another issue limiting the deployment of this technology is the lack of consistent standards and protocols. There currently are no standards for these technologies. This limits the interoperability of Smart Grid technologies and limits future choices for companies that choose to install any particular type of technology. 6 Smart Grid Provisions
H.R. The Smart Grid is defined to include: increasing the use of additional information controls to improve operation of the electric grid; optimizing grid operations and resources to reflect the changing dynamics of the physical infrastructure and economic markets, while ensuring cybersecurity; using and integrating distributed resources, including renewable resources; developing and integrating demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-efficiency resources; deploying smart technologies for metering, communications of grid operations and status, and distribution automation; integrating "smart" appliances and other consumer devices; deploying and integrating advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies; transferring information to consumers in a timely manner to allow control decisions; developing standards for the communication and the interoperability of appliances and equipment connected to the electric grid; identifying and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services. | The term Smart Grid refers to a distribution system that allows for flow of information from a customer's meter in two directions: both inside the house to thermostats and appliances and other devices, and back to the utility. This could allow appliances to be turned off during periods of high electrical demand and cost, and give customers real-time information on constantly changing electric rates. Efforts are being made in both industry and government to modernize electric distribution to improve communications between utilities and the ultimate consumer. The goal is to use advanced, information-based technologies to increase power grid efficiency, reliability, and flexibility, and reduce the rate at which additional electric utility infrastructure needs to be built.
Both regulatory and technological barriers have limited the implementation of Smart Grid technology. At issue is whether a distinction for cost allocation purposes can be made between the impact of Smart Grid technology on the wholesale transmission system and its impact on the retail distribution system. Another issue limiting the deployment of this technology is the lack of consistent standards and protocols. There currently are no standards for these technologies. This limits the interoperability of Smart Grid technologies and limits future choices for companies that choose to install any particular type of technology.
H.R. 6, as signed by the President, contains provisions to encourage research, development, and deployment of Smart Grid technologies. Provisions include requiring the National Institute of Standards and Technology to be the lead agency to develop standards and protocols; creating a research, development, and demonstration program for Smart Grid technologies at the Department of Energy; and providing federal matching funds for portions of qualified Smart Grid investments. |
crs_RL30513 | crs_RL30513_0 | 4942 , theDistrict of Columbia Appropriations Act forFY2001, two-weeks after the Houseapproved its version of the bill on September 14, 2000. The House bill includes $414million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. The Senate billincludes $448 million in special federal payments to the District. A significantpercentage of these payments is for court operations and criminal justice activities.The city's general fund budget, as passed by the council and approved by the controlboard, includes increased funding for public education and economic development.On June 7, 2000, the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and ManagementAssistance Authority approved a city council-passed budget for the 2001 fiscal year.The $5.5 billion operating budget, which must be approved by Congress, includes$445.4 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. The mayor and the city council settled on a hybrid board comprising both elected and appointed members after considering and rejecting proposals that wouldhave:
allowed the mayor to appoint the superintendent and a five-member Board of Education; transferred control of the schools, including thehiring and firing of the superintendent, to the mayor for a specific period afterdeclaring a state of emergency, and then returning power to a restructured andsmaller seven member elected board;
reduced the Board of Education from 11 to seven electedmembers; and allowed District residents to choose between a nine-member electedschool board and a five-member board appointed by themayor. The National Capital Revitalization and SelfGovernment Improvement Act of 1997, Title XI of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997( P.L. 105-33 ), mandated the restructuring of the city's sentencing system to complywith federal truth-in-sentencing guidelines. Budget Request
No Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000
No additional funding for the District of Columbia was requested by the Clinton Administration or the authority, and none was included in the House version of H.R. FY2001: The President's Budget Request
On February 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration released its FY2000 budget recommendations. The Administration's proposed budget includes $445.5 millionin federal payments to the District of Columbia. The Appropriations Committee bill includes $414 million in special federal assistance. Senate Bill S. 3041/H.R. The Senate Appropriations Committee bill includes $445 million in special federal assistance. The District's budget as approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee includes $4.680 billion ingeneral fund operating expenses and $654 million in enterprise funding for a total of$5.334 billion in total operating expenses for FY2001. The budget supports aproposed $3.360 million increase in funding for the Authority for FY2001. On September 27, 2000, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 4942 . 4942 included appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State. On October 26, 2000, the House approved H.R. Thisis $142 million more than the District budgeted in FY2000. | On February 7, 2000, President Clinton submitted his budget recommendations for FY2001. The Administration's proposed budget includes $ 445 million in federal payments and assistance tothe District of Columbia. On March 13, 2000, D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams submitted hisproposed budget for FY2001. The proposed budget included $4.7 billion in general fundexpenditures and $695 million in enterprise funds. The District of Columbia Financial Responsibilityand Management Assistance Authority (Authority), on June 7, 2000, approved a budget compromisereached by the city council and the mayor, which includes $137 million more in funding for publiceducation than appropriated for FY2000, and $47 million more than requested by the mayor. Inaddition, the city's budget appropriates $214.6 million for economic development, which is $24million more than appropriated in FY2000, and $197.8 million for governmental support activities,which is $62.0 million more than appropriated in FY2000.
The District budget, which must be approved by Congress, requests $445 million in special federal payments. On September 27, 2000, the Senate completed action on its version of theDistrict's Appropriations Act for FY2001, H.R. 4942 (previously S. 3041 ) , which includes $445 million in special federal payments. On September 14, 2000, the Housepassed its version of the District's appropriation bill, H.R. 4942 , which includes $414million in special federal payments to the District. On October 26, 2000, the House approved aconference version of H.R. 4942 , which included appropriations for the Departmentsof Commerce, Justice, and State. The conference bill includes $448 million in special paymentsto the District.
Earlier this year District residents approved by referendum an amendment to the District's home rule charter that restructures the city's Board of Education. The charter amendment reconfigures theschool board from an 11 member panel with eight members elected by ward and 3 at-large to a boardcomprising five elected members and four members appointed by the mayor. The referendum, whichwas approved by voters on June 27, 2000, will give the mayor greater influence over educationpolicy, funding, and resource allocation through his appointed members on the Board of Education. It also means the mayor assumes greater accountability for the state of the city's public schools.
In addition, the council must complete its work on revising sentencing guidelines governing convicted felons as mandated by the National Capital Revitalization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-33 . The1997 Act transferred to the federal government funding responsibility for criminal justice activities. These activities account for $244.9 million (55%) of the total $445 million in requested specialfederal payments. This report will be updated to reflect the latest action affecting the District'sFY2001 appropriations.
Key Policy Staff
DSP= Domestic Social Policy Division, GF=Government and Finance Division |
crs_R42445 | crs_R42445_0 | Introduction
Surface transportation authorization acts authorize spending on federal highway and mass transit programs, surface transportation safety and research, and some rail programs. The most recent multi-year authorization for federal surface transportation programs, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59 ), expired on September 30, 2009. Since then these programs have operated on a series of extension acts and continuing resolutions. The highway trust fund (HTF) has provided most of the funding for surface transportation authorization bills since the fund was created in 1956, but the revenues from highway taxes (mostly on gasoline and diesel fuel) that support the HTF have declined in recent years due to the condition of the economy and improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency. Consequently, how to pass a multi-year bill without cutting infrastructure spending, raising the gas tax, or increasing the budget deficit is an underlying theme in the ongoing debate. On March 14, 2012, the Senate passed MAP-21, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21). 7 , the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act ( H.Rept. Counting the already-appropriated FY2012, H.R. 7 is a five-year bill providing for a total authorization of roughly $260 billion. The bill, as reported, would link the usual surface transportation reauthorization components with provisions designed to increase oil and gas production, the revenues from which would be provided for highway infrastructure. 7 differ significantly in programmatic content and treatment of the HTF. Both, however, reduce the number of programs by roughly two-thirds and are free of program earmarks. On April 18, 2012, the House passed the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2012, Part II ( H.R. 4348 ). The bill would extend surface transportation authorizations through the end of FY2012. This action enabled the House and Senate to send the measure to conference. All of the large highway programs are formula/apportioned programs. 4348 . Highways
Senate Bill
MAP-21 is a two year reauthorization bill that basically funds the Federal-Aid Highway Program at the baseline level, adjusted for inflation. A total Federal-Aid Highway Program authorization of $39.5 billion for FY2012 and $40.5 billion for FY2013 (reflecting rescissions), and $400 million for research and education in each fiscal year (see Table 3 ). MAP-21 would reduce the number of programs by roughly two-thirds. The deposits include
$3 billion from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) trust fund balance would be transferred immediately, as well as $685 million of projected LUST fund revenues over the next 10 years; $697 million (over 10 years) from the transfer of the Gas Guzzler Tax from the general fund to the HTF; $743 million (over 10 years) consequent of the revocation of passports of tax delinquents; $841 million (over 10 years) consequent of allowing the Treasury to levy up to 100% of the payment to a Medicare provider to collect unpaid taxes; $4.52 billion from the transfer of future import tariffs on automotive products (FY2012-FY2016); $244 million (over 10 years) from a change in tax treatment of securities of a controlled corporation that are exchanged for assets as part of certain types of corporate reorganizations; $25 million (over 10 years) from the clarification that the Internal Revenue Service may levy a federal employee's Thrift Savings Account to satisfy tax liabilities; $363 million (FY2014-FY2022) from the extension for transfers of excess pension assets to retiree health accounts and allowing Section 420 of the U.S. tax code to apply to life insurance benefits; $9.467 billion (over 10 years) from pension funding stabilization, based on the revenue increases from the stabilization of the fluctuation of interest rates attributable to concomitant changes in Pension Guarantee Benefit Corporation premiums; $4.970 billion transfer from the Treasury general fund to the HTF ($2.183 billion in FY2012, $2.277 billion in FY2013, and $510 million in FY2014); $459 million (over 10 years) from allowing federal agencies to offer phased retirement; $244 million (over 10 years) from the reporting of the sale of life insurance policies to third parties; $99 million (over 10 years) from extending taxes on cigarette manufacturers to entities operating roll-your-own machines; $3.627 billion (over 10 years) from delaying the use of worldwide interest expense allocation by one year; $1.022 billion (over 10 years) from authorizing special measures against foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions that significantly impede enforcement of regulations against money laundering. The program would be funded at roughly $2 billion annually for FY2012 and FY2013. Equity Bonus Program (EB)
H.R. Both the House and Senate proposals include provisions intended to expedite project delivery by changing elements of the environmental review process. The Senate has agreed to an amendment that substitutes the language of MAP-21 for the House-passed language of H.R. The House Bill (H.R. | The federal government's highway, mass transit, and surface transportation safety programs are periodically authorized in a multi-year surface transportation reauthorization bill. The most recent reauthorization act, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59), expired at the end of FY2009. Since then, the surface transportation programs have been funded under extension acts.
The main obstacle to passage of a new multi-year bill during the past two years has been the disparity between projected spending and the much lower projections of the revenue flows to the highway trust fund (HTF). Taxes on gasoline and diesel provide 90% of the revenues for the HTF, which historically has funded the entire highway program and roughly 80% of the mass transit program. The rates on these taxes, which are on a cents-per-gallon basis, have not been increased since 1993. In addition, the condition of the economy and improvements in fuel economy have held down fuel consumption and as a result are adversely affecting HTF revenues. Consequently, authorizers face a dilemma: how to pass a bill without cutting infrastructure spending, raising the gas tax, or increasing the budget deficit.
The Senate has passed the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21, S. 1813, H.R. 4348, as amended), which would authorize surface transportation programs through September 30, 2013. MAP-21 proposes:
A total Federal-Aid Highway Program authorization of $39.5 billion for FY2012 and $40.5 billion for FY2013 (reflecting rescissions), and $400 million for research and education in each fiscal year. To reduce the total number of highway programs from roughly 90 to 30. The overall Federal-Aid Highway Program would be structured around five large "core" programs. The existing Equity Bonus Program would be discontinued. To accelerate project completion and speed up the environmental review process. $10.458 billion, annually, for FY2012-FY2013, for transit programs.
The House bill, the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act (H.R. 7), links the usual surface transportation reauthorization components with provisions designed to increase oil and gas production, the revenues from which would be provided for highway infrastructure. H.R. 7, counting the already-appropriated FY2012, is a five-year bill providing for a total authorization of roughly $260 billion. The House and Senate bills differ significantly in programmatic content and treatment of the HTF. Both, however, would reduce the number of programs by roughly two-thirds, would accelerate project delivery, and are free of program earmarking.
H.R. 4348, the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2012, Part II, as passed by the House, would extend surface transportation authorizations through the end of FY2012. The Senate, on April 24, 2012, agreed to an amendment to H.R. 4348, striking the House-passed bill text and substituting the language of MAP-21. This action enabled the House and Senate to send the measure to conference. |
crs_RS22281 | crs_RS22281_0 | Introduction and Background
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, causing significant infrastructure damage to 83 GSA owned and leased federal buildings and courthouses in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi, necessitating the eventual relocation of 2,600 federal employees from 28 federal agencies. GSA, through its Public Buildings Service (PBS), is the primary federal real property and asset management agency, with 11 regional offices that oversee GSA owned and leased federal buildings and courthouses. GSA's Southeast Region 4 includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Tennessee. As of September 21, 2007, one leased facility remained closed (see Table 1 ). The 109 th Congress authorized $38 million to GSA's Federal Buildings Fund for repairs to the damaged federal facilities. Pending Legislation in the 110th Congress
No legislation pertaining to hurricane-damaged federal facilities has been introduced in the 110 th Congress. Table 2 indicates the one federal facility that remained closed in GSA Region 7, as of September 21, 2007. | Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, causing widespread flooding and significant infrastructure damage to 83 federal facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The General Services Administration (GSA) is the federal government's primary real property agency, with 11 regional offices that oversee GSA owned and leased federal buildings and courthouses. As of September 21, 2007, one leased building remained closed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in GSA's Southeast Region 4, which includes Alabama and Mississippi. In GSA's Greater Southwest Region 7, one GSA facility remained closed in Louisiana. GSA courthouse facilities in New Orleans, LA, which were temporarily relocated to Houston, TX, reopened in New Orleans on January 9, 2006. The 109th Congress authorized $38 million to GSA's Federal Buildings Fund for repairs to damaged federal facilities (119 Stat. 2782). No legislation pertaining to hurricane-damaged federal facilities has been introduced in the 110th Congress. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS20678 | crs_RS20678_0 | RS20678 -- Hate Crimes: Sketch of Selected Proposals and Congressional Authority
Updated May 17, 2002
Introduction
S. 625 , the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001, introduced by Senator Kennedy on March 27, 2001, has 50 cosponsors; its companionin the House, H.R. 3473) to the NationalDefense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001( H.R. The second applies to crimes motivated by the victim's gender, sexual orientation, disability, race, color,religion, or national origin and contains a seriesof alternative jurisdictional elements of a commerce clause stripe. 74 would establish the same two offenses, but hasno certification requirement. Grants : Each of the proposals features a grant program to help the states combat hate crimes committed by juveniles, authorizing such appropriations as arenecessary. Sentencing Guidelines : Each proposal instructs the Sentencing Commission to study and make any appropriate adjustments in the federal sentencing guidelinesconcerning adult recruitment of juveniles to commit hate crimes, consistent with the other federal sentencingguidelines and being sure to avoid duplication. The commerce clause, section 5of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment, are the grantsof power most often mentioned whendiscussing Congress' authority to proscribe hate crimes, and to enact other forms of civil rights legislation. The Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison identified the threeways in which Congress may exercise its prerogatives under the clause:"First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. First, they create a federal crime for which an aspect of interstatecommerce is an element, i.e., in the case of H.R. , religion, national origin). The hate crime proposals would have encloaked groupssubject to classification by "race, color, religion, or nationalorigin." | Hate crime legislation (S. 625/H.R. 1343), comparable to a measure whichpassed the Senateas an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (but which was dropped prior topassage), has been introduced with a substantialnumber of cosponsors in both the House and Senate. It outlaws hate crimes, establishes a system of JusticeDepartment and grant program assistance, andinstructs the Sentencing Commission to examine adult recruitment of juveniles to commit hate crimes. It has beenreported out of committee unchanged in theSenate, S.Rept. 107-147 (2002). An alternative (H.R. 74), more sweeping in its criminal provisions and moremodest in its grant provisions, has alsobeen proposed.
In both alternatives, the newly established federal offenses take two forms and are based on Congress'legislative authority under the commerce clause, thelegislative sections of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment. One species outlaws hate crimescommitted on the basis of race, color, religion,national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or disability under various commerce clause circumstances and appearsconsistent with the Supreme Court'spronouncements in Lopez and Morrison. The other forbids hate crimes committed on thebasis of race, color, religion or national origin. Although its claim toCongressional authority seems strongest when based on the Thirteenth Amendment and proscribing violencecommitted on the basis of race, its hold appearsotherwise more tenuous.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report RL30681(pdf), Hate Crimes: Summary of Selected Proposalsand Congressional Authority, stripped of the footnotes,authorities, and appendices of that report; for additional related information, see also CRS Report 98-300, Hate Crime Legislation: An Update. |
crs_R42966 | crs_R42966_0 | Introduction
Federal assistance to public transportation is provided primarily through the public transportation program administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). The federal public transportation program was authorized through FY2014 as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) and extended through May 31, 2015, as part of the Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-159 ). While maintaining the previous funding level, MAP-21 simplified the structure of the public transit program by eliminating some programs and consolidating others, recast some discretionary programs as formula programs, strengthened FTA's role in safety oversight, and introduced performance management into the planning process. MAP-21 authorized $10.6 billion for the federal public transportation program in FY2013 and $10.7 billion in FY2014. It should be noted, however, that the distinction between money from the highway trust fund and money from the general fund has become artificial to an extent, in that Congress authorized a $4.8 billion transfer of general fund money into the mass transit account of the highway trust fund in FY2010 and another $4.0 billion transfer in FY2014. The federal government supports less than 10% of operating expenditures, but more than 40% of capital expenditures ( Table 2 ). Program Structure
There are six major funding programs administered by FTA: (1) Urbanized Area Formula; (2) State of Good Repair (SGR); (3) New Starts; (4) Rural Area Formula; (5) Bus and Bus Facilities Formula; and (6) Enhanced Mobility of Seniors and Individuals with Disabilities. Fixed-guideway includes transit rail, bus rapid transit, and ferry. MAP-21 made substantial changes to the New Starts Program, allowing program funds to be used for investments in existing fixed-guideway systems that increase the capacity of a corridor by at least 10%. These types of projects are termed "core capacity improvement projects." Specific issues that may come up as Congress considers extending or reauthorizing the programs include funding levels and revenue sources (particularly as they relate to the highway trust fund), problems with the Bus and Bus Facilities Program, support for operating expenditures, privatization, the operation of the New Starts program, and special-needs paratransit. All of these assessments estimate a substantial gap between current levels of public transportation capital spending and the amount required to prevent an overall deterioration in the condition of public transportation assets and ultimately operational performance. Use of the Highway Trust Fund
Traditionally about 80% of the funding for the federal public transportation program has come from the mass transit account of the highway trust fund and about 20% from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Outlays from the mass transit account have outpaced receipts over the past few years, an imbalance the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects will continue in the future under current law. The primary revenue source for the highway trust fund is the fuels tax. The tax was last raised in 1993. Because of the imbalance between receipts and outlays, a more sustainable solution for the mass transit account would have to involve a cut in program spending, an increase in revenues paid in to the account, or a combination of the two. Because of the serious budget problems faced by many transit agencies whose local revenue sources have been squeezed, there has been pressure to increase the availability of federal funding for operating expenditures. | The federal public transportation program, administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), is the primary means by which the federal government funds and regulates public transportation, such as local buses, subways, and ferries. The program was reauthorized through FY2014 as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) and extended through May 31, 2015, as part of the Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-159). Funding was authorized at $10.6 billion in FY2013 and $10.7 billion in FY2014, with the extension continuing the FY2014 level of funding for eight months. About 80% of the funding for the federal public transportation program comes from the mass transit account of the highway trust fund and about 20% from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, although the mass transit account, itself, has received transfers from the general fund, including $4.8 billion in FY2010 and another $4.0 billion in FY2014.
MAP-21 simplified the structure of the public transit program by eliminating some programs and consolidating others. The law also recast some discretionary programs as formula programs, strengthened FTA's role in safety oversight, and introduced performance management into the planning process. FTA's six major funding programs and their authorized funding shares are (1) Urbanized Area Formula, 42%; (2) State of Good Repair (SGR), 20%; (3) New Starts, 18%; (4) Rural Area Formula, 6%; (5) Bus and Bus Facilities Formula, 4%; and (6) Enhanced Mobility of Seniors and Individuals with Disabilities, 2%.
The authorization of the public transportation program expires May 31, 2015. Extension or reauthorization legislation will be considered in the context of a federal budget deficit that has put pressure on many areas of federal spending, including public transportation assistance. Some Members of Congress have urged that transit spending be supported mostly at the local level. Others argue for higher federal spending to address a backlog of capital expenditures, growing transit and paratransit ridership, and the desirability of encouraging use of public transportation. There has also been pressure to increase federal support of operating expenditures due to budget problems at the local level.
An obstacle to greater federal spending, however, is the condition of the highway trust fund. Over the past few years the revenue flowing to the mass transit account has been less than its outlays, a situation that is expected to continue under current law. The primary revenue source for the highway trust fund, the fuels tax, was last raised in 1993. The precarious situation of the mass transit account may require some action before the end of FY2015, depending on the actual amounts of revenue and outlays, but action will almost certainly be needed in FY2016 and beyond. This might involve a cut in program spending, an increase in revenues paid in to the account, or another transfer from the general fund.
Other issues that may come up in the debate are privatization and the operation of the New Starts program. Privatization, such as competitive contracting, is frequently touted as a means of controlling costs and improving quality in public transportation. Consequently there have been proposals in Congress for the federal government to promote greater private-sector involvement, and these might come up again in reauthorization. MAP-21 made several changes to the New Starts program to speed project delivery and to allow spending on expanding existing transit rail and other fixed guideway systems. How well these changes work may be an issue in reauthorization, as might the types of projects funded, particularly streetcar and bus rapid transit projects. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.