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crs_R42825 | crs_R42825_0 | These efforts have resulted in state and local variability of laws and regulations. Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) amended the FDA's nutrition labeling requirements in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which were established by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). Both were previously exempt from the FDA's nutrition labeling authority. This report provides a discussion of the role of nutrition labeling in combating obesity, an overview of the FDA's authority to regulate nutrition labeling under the FFDCA, the restaurant menu labeling provision in Section 4205 of the ACA, and the proposed rule implementing this provision. Studies have shown that the number of calories consumed by individuals in the United States has risen concurrent with rising rates of obesity. The FDA is authorized to create nutrition labeling requirements for most foods, and to regulate nutrient content claims and health claims on food labels. The ACA amended the FDA's authorities to require certain restaurants, SRFE, and vending machine operators to provide calorie and other nutrient information. Overview of the Proposed Rule
Introductory material for the proposed rule on nutrition labeling in restaurants and similar retail food establishments provided background information on food consumption outside the home, current nutrition labeling requirements as they apply to packaged foods, and the historic exemption for restaurants and SRFE under NLEA. It also listed the requirements of Section 4205 of the ACA, and the proposed rule included definitions for a number of terms that were not defined in the law. The proposed rule set requirements for covered restaurants and SRFE to implement the rule, provided detail for voluntary registration of establishments that are not covered by the law but that elect to be subject to the requirements of the law, set an effective date, and outlined enforcement mechanisms for establishments that fail to comply. The proposed rule was available for public comment through July 5, 2011, and a final rule is expected by the end of 2012. While some definitions are clear and straightforward, others have generated debate, including the FDA's determination of the scope of covered establishments, variation among establishments, the cost of providing the required information, and the accessibility of calorie and nutrition information to consumers. Specific concerns regarding the impact of the proposed rule, and the industry and congressional response, are also discussed in this section. FDA's Proposed Rule
The FDA has proposed two options for the definition of "restaurants or similar retail food establishments" to be covered by the rule. At issue is the scope of covered establishments. The proposed rule further specifies the foods that would require labeling and food that would be exempt under the proposed rule are listed in Table 2 . These include the cost and burden imposed on businesses implementing the rule. | Rising rates of obesity and the resulting effects on citizens' health and health care costs have prompted federal, state, and local policymakers to consider a number of policy options to reduce obesity levels in the United States, such as exercise promotion, nutrition education, and taxation of certain foods. Labeling of the nutritional content of foods purchased and consumed outside the home has been recommended by researchers and policymakers as one tool to address rising obesity rates.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA, P.L. 75-717, as amended) authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate labeling of most foods other than meat and poultry. Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) amended the FDA's nutrition labeling authorities under the FFDCA to require nutrition labeling of foods sold in some chain restaurants and vending machines, both of which were previously exempt from the FDA's nutrition labeling regulations. While the ACA provided general requirements for restaurant menu nutrition labeling, it required the FDA to promulgate regulations specifying the scope of entities affected by the law, the scope of food covered by the law, and certain details regarding how the required calorie and nutrition information is conveyed to consumers.
The FDA's proposed rule on nutrition labeling in restaurants and similar retail food establishments (SRFE), published in April 2011, proposed definitions for a number of terms that are not defined in law. It proposed two options for determining the entities affected by the rule, set requirements for covered restaurants and SRFE to implement the rule, provided details for voluntary registration of establishments that are not covered by the rule but that elect to be subject to the requirements of the rule, proposed an effective date, and outlined enforcement mechanisms for establishments that fail to comply. The comment period on the proposed rule ended on July 5, 2011. The FDA is currently finalizing the rule, and the agency has indicated that it expects to issue the final rule in November 2012.
Several potential concerns for Congress have been emphasized regarding implementation of the proposed rule. First is the scope of the entities affected by the rule. The second is the food that will require calorie and nutrient information under the rule. Other related concerns include the presentation of calorie and nutrient information and the amount of time businesses will have to implement the rule. Some Members of Congress are concerned that the FDA's proposed rule reaches beyond congressional intent and the agency's authority, and have introduced legislation that would limit the scope of the FDA's proposed rule.
This report provides a brief overview of the FDA's authority to regulate nutrition labeling, modifications to these authorities under the ACA, and a discussion of selected aspects of the proposed rule. Concerns regarding the proposed rule raised by industry, Congress, and the public are also discussed. |
crs_R40819 | crs_R40819_0 | USDA's Research, Education, and Economics (REE) Mission Area
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) combines its research activities into the Research, Education, and Economics (REE) mission area. The mission area is composed of four agencies with the federal responsibility to advance scientific knowledge for agriculture. Federal Funding
The majority of federal funding for agricultural research, education, and extension activities is from annual discretionary appropriations in the Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriations bill. In FY2016, discretionary funding for the entire REE mission area totaled $2.937 billion ( Table 1 ). The 2014 farm bill provides an average of $120 million per year of mandatory funding to agricultural research ( Figure 3 ). Formula Funds vs. Competitive Grants
Policymakers continue to debate the appropriate role and implications of various funding mechanisms for agricultural research. Some argue that the stagnant growth in inflation-adjusted USDA funding for agricultural research, education, and extension over the past few decades has hurt the ability of the U.S. agricultural sector to stay productive and competitive. Others believe that the states and the private sector should fill the research funding gap left by the federal government. | The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Research, Education, and Economics (REE) mission area has the primary federal responsibility of advancing scientific knowledge for agriculture through research, education, and extension. USDA REE responsibilities are carried out by four agencies: the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), the Economic Research Service (ERS), and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). USDA conducts its own research and administers extramural federal funding to states and local partners primarily through formula funds and competitive grants.
Discretionary funding for the REE mission area totaled $2.937 billion in FY2016, and mandatory funding from the 2014 farm bill adds another $120 million per year on average.
Debates over the direction of public agricultural research and the nature of its funding mechanism continue. Ongoing issues include the need, if any, for new federal funding to support agricultural research, education, and extension activities, and the implications of allocating federal funds via formula funds versus competitive grants. Many groups believe that Congress needs to increase support of U.S. agriculture through expanded federal support of research, education, and extension programs, whereas others believe that the private sector, not taxpayer dollars, should be used to support these activities. |
crs_RL34396 | crs_RL34396_0 | In response to concerns about U.S. competitiveness, the act invest in science and engineering research, and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education today so that the United States can enhance its potential to be more competitive with other nations in the future. Overview of the America COMPETES Act
The America COMPETES Act was a response to concerns that the United States may not be able to compete economically with other nations in the future. The act mainly addresses concerns about insufficient investment in science and engineering research; STEM education; and STEM workforce development. The act authorizes funding increases for the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science through FY2010. The act also established new STEM education programs at DOE and the Department of Education (ED), and enhances the authorization level for NSF STEM education programs. The America COMPETES Act is an authorization act. New programs established by the act will not be initiated unless funded through subsequent appropriations. Similarly, increases in the authorization level of existing programs may or may not translate into increased funding. Based on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) model, ARPA-E is designed to support transformational energy technology research projects with the goal of enhancing the nation's economic and energy security. Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes would be multidisciplinary research institutes located at DOE national laboratories that would apply fundamental science and engineering discoveries to technological innovations. The goal of EFRCs would be to focus on transformative research. Congress appropriated FY2008 funding for the Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow program, which supports the development and implementation of higher education programs including a STEM baccalaureate degree with concurrent teacher certification, a part-time master's degrees in STEM or critical foreign languages for current teachers, and programs for professional scientists and engineers to pursue master's degrees that enable teacher certification. This new direction included increasing access to classes and tests for low-income students, preparation of teachers in high-need schools, and non-federal organizations contributing funds to the program. 110-329 ) that became law on September 30, 2008. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
The 111 th Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. The act includes funding for NIST's research and construction activities, NSF, ARPA-E, and DOE's Office of Science. At NSF, funding is provided for its Research and Related Directorate ($2,500 million); Education and Human Resources Directorate ($100 million); and the Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction ($400 million) activity. 111-8 ). 111-5 ). Programs Funded at Authorized Levels
A review of Table 1 finds that the combined funding provided by the Omnibus Appropriation Act (Omnibus) and the American Investment and Recovery Act (ARRA) led to funding of several America COMPETES Act programs at the authorized level (see Table 2 ). Other programs were either funded below authorized levels, or not funded. However, at this time, there is insufficient evidence that the following new America COMPETES Act programs are funded:
DOE
Pilot Program of Grants to Specialty Schools for Science and Mathematics Experiential Based Learning Opportunities Summer Institutes National Energy Education Development Nuclear Science Talent Expansion Program Hydrocarbon Systems Science Talent Expansion Program Early Career Awards for Science, Engineering, and Mathematics Researchers Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes Protecting America's Competitive Edge Graduate Fellowship Program Distinguished Scientist Program
ED
Advanced Placement & International Baccalaureate Program Math Now Summer Term Education Program Math Skills for Secondary Skill Students Advancing America Through Foreign Language Partnership Program Mathematics and Science Partnership Bonus Grants
NSF
Laboratory Science Pilot Program
Obama Administration Implementation of Programs Funded by FY2009 Appropriation
This section discusses several aspects of the implementation of programs funded by the FY2009 appropriations by federal agencies that members of Congress might wish to monitor. | The America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) became law on August 9, 2007. The act responds to concerns that the United States may not be able to compete economically with other nations in the future due to insufficient investment today in science and technology research and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and workforce development. The America COMPETES Act is intended to increase the nation's investment in science and engineering research, and in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education from kindergarten to graduate school and postdoctoral education. It is designed to focus on two perceived concerns believed to influence future U.S. competitiveness: inadequate research and development funding to generate sufficient technological progress, and inadequate numbers of American students proficient in science and mathematics or interested in science and engineering careers relative to international competitors.
The act authorizes increases in funding for the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science over FY2008-FY2010. If maintained, the increases would double the budgets of those agencies over seven years. Within DOE, the act would establish the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E), designed to support transformational energy technology research projects with the goal of enhancing the economic and energy security of the United States. A new program, Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes, would establish multidisciplinary institutes at DOE National Laboratories to apply fundamental science and engineering discoveries to technological innovations.
Among the act's education activities, many of which are focused on high-need school districts, are programs to recruit new K-12 STEM teachers, enhance existing STEM teacher skills, and provide more STEM education opportunities for students. The new Department of Education (ED) Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow and existing NSF Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship program provide opportunities, through institutional grants, for students pursuing STEM degrees and STEM professionals to gain teaching skills and teacher certification, and for current STEM teachers to enhance their content and teaching skills. The act also authorizes a new program at NSF that would provide grants to institutions of higher education to create or improve professional science master's degree (PSM) programs that emphasize practical training and preparation for the workforce in high-need fields.
The America COMPETES Act is an authorization act, so new programs established by the act will not be initiated, and increases in the authorization of appropriation level of existing programs may not occur, unless funded through subsequent appropriations. An issue for Congress was whether to fund America COMPETES Act programs at authorized funding levels. The 111th Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) to supplement FY2009 funds. While some America COMPETES Act programs were funded at authorized levels, others were not. The following activities were funded at or above authorized levels: NIST Scientific & Technical Research and Services; NIST Construction & Maintenance; DOE Office of Science; NSF and its Research & Related Activities; Major Research Instrumentation; Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction; and its Professional Science Master's; Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship; and Graduate Research Fellowship programs. Other programs were funded either below authorized levels or not funded. The acts provide funding to establish DOE's ARPA-E and NSF's PSM program. |
crs_R44481 | crs_R44481_0 | R apidly evolving technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some technological advances have arguably opened a treasure trove of information for investigators and analysts; others have presented unique hurdles. On the other hand, some posit that law enforcement is "going dark" as their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. Other factors influencing law enforcement's ability to obtain information, and thus contributing to the going dark debate, include provider limits on data retention; bounds on companies' technological capabilities to produce specific data points for law enforcement; tools facilitating anonymity online; and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks through which individuals and information are constantly passing. They have been evaluating whether legislation may be a necessary or appropriate element in the current debate on going dark—particularly on the encryption aspect. A range of legislative options exists that could impact law enforcement capabilities or resources. Legislation could also place certain requirements on technology companies or individuals utilizing certain communications systems and devices. The report also outlines the current environment and discussion around legislation impacting law enforcement access to encrypted data and communications. This dichotomy has received congressional attention for several decades and remains a central point of contention between law enforcement and technology companies. Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414 ) to help law enforcement maintain its ability to execute authorized electronic surveillance in a changing technology environment. The so called "crypto wars" pitted the government against data privacy advocates in a debate on the use of data encryption. This tension was highlighted by proposals to build in back doors to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to block the export of strong encryption code. The going dark debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. More recent technology changes have potentially impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications but stored content, or data at rest. A central element of the debate now involves determining what types of information law enforcement is able to access and under what circumstances. What Can Law Enforcement Obtain Now? Cell phones have advanced from being purely cellular telecommunications devices into mobile computers that happen to have phone capabilities; concurrently, the scope of data produced by and saved on these devices has morphed. In addition to voice communications, this list can include call detail records, Global Positioning System (GPS) location points, data stored on mobile devices (including emails and photos), and data stored in the "cloud." Some of these data can be obtained directly from telecommunications providers or individuals, and some may be obtained without going through such a middle man. Rather than pushing for legislation that would address these concerns from the technology end, through diluting encryption, the Obama Administration took steps to urge the technology community to develop a workaround solution and took steps to bolster law enforcement capabilities. How might this impact companies operating internationally? Exceptional Access
In considering future legislation on or regulation of encrypted systems and communications, the issue of exceptional access has been raised: is it possible to create a system with sufficiently narrow and protected access points that these points can only be entered by authorized entities and not exploited by others? | Changing technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some technological advances have arguably opened a treasure trove of information for investigators and analysts; others have presented unique hurdles. While some feel that law enforcement now has more information available to them than ever before, others contend that law enforcement is "going dark" as their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change. These hurdles for law enforcement include strong, end-to-end (or what law enforcement has sometimes called "warrant-proof") encryption; provider limits on data retention; bounds on companies' technological capabilities to provide specific data points to law enforcement; tools facilitating anonymity online; and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks through which individuals and information are constantly passing. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. Much of the current debate surrounds how strong encryption contributes to the going dark issue, and thus it is the focus of this report.
The tension between law enforcement capabilities and technological change has received congressional attention for several decades. For instance, in the 1990s the "crypto wars" pitted the government against technology companies, and this tension was highlighted by proposals to build in back doors to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to restrict the export of strong encryption code. In addition, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414) in 1994 to help law enforcement maintain their ability to execute authorized electronic surveillance as telecommunications providers turned to digital and wireless technology.
The going dark debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. However, more recent technology changes have impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications but stored content, or data at rest. As such, a central element of the debate now involves determining what types of information law enforcement is able to access and under what circumstances. Cell phones have advanced from being purely cellular telecommunications devices into mobile computers that happen to have phone capabilities; concurrently, the scope of data produced by and saved on these devices has morphed. In addition to voice communications, this range of data can include call detail records, Global Positioning System (GPS) location points, data stored on the devices (including emails and photos), and data stored in the "cloud." Some of these data can be obtained directly from telecommunications providers or individuals, and some may be obtained without going through such a middle man.
The Obama Administration took steps to urge the technology community to develop a means to assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted data and took steps to bolster law enforcement capabilities. In addition, policymakers have been evaluating whether legislation may be a necessary or appropriate element in the current debate on going dark—particularly on the encryption aspect. A range of legislative options exist that could impact law enforcement capabilities or resources. Legislation could also place certain requirements on technology companies or individuals utilizing certain communications systems and devices. In debating these options, policymakers may consider a number of questions, including the following:
How effective might mandating law enforcement access to products or services manufactured, sold, or otherwise used in the United States be, given the borderless nature of modern communications? Is it possible to create a system with sufficiently narrow and protected access points that these points can only be entered by authorized entities and not exploited by others? What is the appropriate balance for personal privacy and data security with public safety and national security? What precedents might be set for U.S. companies operating both domestically and internationally if the United States mandates the ability for law enforcement to access encrypted data and communications? |
crs_R42791 | crs_R42791_0 | It is quite common for Congress to enact tax legislation that applies retroactively. One question often asked is whether legislation that amends the federal tax laws in a way that retroactively increases a taxpayer's tax liability is constitutional. As such, there are few examples of retroactive tax legislation being struck down as unconstitutional. Having said that, it is possible for retroactive tax legislation to violate the Constitution. For example, extended periods of retroactivity might raise concerns under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Other provisions of the Constitution may be implicated depending on the particulars of a specific bill (e.g., if the bill appears to target certain taxpayers or penalize past conduct). Specifically, it looks at how a court might analyze whether retroactive tax legislation violates the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment; is a taking for purposes of the Fifth Amendment; violates the prohibition against ex post facto legislation; is an unconstitutional bill of attainder; or violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. This suggests that it would be rare for a tax provision to be characterized as a "wholly new tax" so long as taxpayers were on some kind of notice that a tax might be imposed. Takings
While it is often asked whether retroactive tax legislation would violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it seems unlikely this would be the case. Since the 19 th century, the Supreme Court has ruled that the sovereign's taxing power and its power to take private property upon payment of just compensation are distinct. Most of the retroactivity challenges to taxes have been litigated on a substantive due process, rather than takings, theory. If a court can be convinced that what looks like a tax is, in reality, an arbitrary confiscation of property, then the principle that taxes are not takings is circumvented. It prohibits Congress from enacting retroactive penal legislation. Having said that, there may be cases where a tax provision appears to be a criminal punishment. The two main criteria which the courts look to in order to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether specific individuals are affected by the statute (specificity prong), and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those individuals (punishment prong). Rather, the Court has identified three types of "punitive" legislation that are barred by the ban on bills of attainder: (1) where the burden is such as has traditionally been found to be punitive; (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot reasonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes; and (3) where the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. Equal Protection
Finally, if retroactive tax legislation seemed to target certain taxpayers for unfavorable treatment, this could also raise potential equal protection concerns under the Fifth Amendment. | The question is frequently asked whether Congress can enact retroactive tax legislation. It can be an important one for Congress because (1) an ever-growing number of tax provisions have expiration dates and some may not always be extended in a timely manner; (2) an interest in finding new revenue can encourage making a provision retroactive in order to increase the amount raised; and (3) an intent to influence behavior by means of a tax provision can sometimes include a desire to "penalize" past conduct.
It is clear there is no absolute constitutional bar to retroactive tax legislation. Nonetheless, it is possible, albeit rare, for retroactive tax legislation that increases a taxpayer's tax liability to violate the Constitution. For example, some cases where retroactive taxes have been struck down suggest that extended periods of retroactivity and lack of notice of a wholly new tax can raise due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment.
While it is often asked whether such legislation would violate another of the Fifth Amendment's provisions—the Takings Clause—it seems unlikely this would be the case. The Supreme Court has long ruled that the sovereign's taxing power and its power to take private property upon payment of just compensation are distinct. Most of the retroactivity challenges to taxes have been litigated on a substantive due process rather than takings theory. On the other hand, if a court can be convinced that what looks like a tax is, in reality, an arbitrary confiscation of property, then a taking might be found.
Other provisions of the Constitution may be implicated if the legislation appears to target certain taxpayers or attempts to penalize past conduct. Any retroactive tax legislation found to be a criminal penalty will likely be struck down as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which the Supreme Court has done on at least one occasion. In extremely rare circumstances, tax legislation that seems to target certain taxpayers might raise concerns under the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, it might also be asked whether such legislation is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. While there do not appear to be any instances of this occurring, it seems possible that retroactive tax legislation could, depending on its specifics, meet the criteria to be a bill of attainder. The two main criteria that courts have used to determine whether legislation is an unconstitutional bill of attainder are (1) whether specific individuals are affected by the statute ("specificity" prong), and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those individuals ("punishment" prong). The Supreme Court has identified three types of legislation that would fulfill the "punishment" prong of the test: (1) where the burden is such as has "traditionally" been found to be punitive; (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot reasonably be said to further "non-punitive legislative purposes"; and (3) where the legislative record evinces a "congressional intent to punish." |
crs_R43629 | crs_R43629_0 | Introduction
Several issues related to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting on federal and state lands are addressed in various bills in the 113 th Congress. Hunting and conservation have been linked since the advent of federal wildlife legislation, such as the Lacey Act of 1900 (the first federal wildlife law, making it a federal crime to ship game killed in violation of one state's laws to another state) or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (regulating the killing, hunting, buying, or selling of migratory birds). Controversy exists about exactly what hunting, fishing, or shooting sports currently are allowed on federal land and when. This report focuses on the Bipartisan Sportsmen's Act of 2014 ( S. 2363 ), now pending in the Senate. Among other things, it covers land management priorities for hunting, trapping, fishing, and recreational shooting on various categories of federal lands; changes to the duck stamp program; recreational shooting; imports of polar bear trophies; hunting waterfowl over baited fields; and funding for land acquisition to support hunter access. S. 2363 would permanently authorize the electronic issuance of duck stamps. States would apply to the Secretary of the Interior for authority to issue the electronic stamps, under a procedure specified in the section. 718a, which requires waterfowl hunters to purchase the duck stamp. Polar Bear Import Permits
Before May 15, 2008, when the listing of polar bears as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) took effect, it was legal under U.S. law to import polar bear trophies legally taken in Canada. After that date, import was not allowed. Instead, it refers to the Sporting Conservation Council, which was established a year earlier by the Department of the Interior. Section 201 of S. 2363 would amend the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (LWCF) by directing that the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture prepare priority lists to identify land or rights-of-way acquisition projects where access to federal public land for hunting, fishing, and other recreational purposes currently is "significantly restricted." National Fish and Wildlife Foundation Act
Section 204 of S. 2363 would amend the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation Establishment Act. | For several years, the House and Senate have been considering various approaches to improve hunting and recreational fishing opportunities both on and off federal lands. The Bipartisan Sportsmen's Act of 2014 (S. 2363) is pending in the Senate, and addresses many of the same topics considered by recent Congresses.
Hunting, fishing, and conservation have been linked since the advent of federal wildlife legislation. Among early examples are the Lacey Act of 1900, the first federal wildlife law, which made it a federal crime to ship game killed in violation of one state's laws to another state, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which regulated the killing, hunting, buying, or selling of migratory birds. Today's controversies concern, among other things, exactly what hunting, fishing, or shooting sports should be allowed on federal land, and when. S. 2363 seeks to increase the priority of hunting, trapping, fishing, and recreational shooting on federal lands.
S. 2363 would also address the issuance of import permits to trophy hunters who legally killed Canadian polar bears in the months before the species was listed under the Endangered Species Act. These hunters have not been allowed to import their trophies; the bill would allow specified imports of these trophies.
The bill would amend the federal duck stamp program to allow electronic sales of duck stamps in any state that meets certain requirements for such sales. It would also allow the Secretary of the Interior to increase the price of the stamp at specified intervals. Such a change, which would provide additional funding for acquisition of waterfowl habitat, has been advocated by many waterfowl hunters for several years.
The bill also addresses somewhat related miscellaneous issues: filming permits on public lands, baiting of game birds, federal land transfers, changes to the management of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, and other matters.
S. 2363 was not referred to a committee, and consequently lacks a committee report. It was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders on May 20, 2014; on May 22, 2014, a motion to proceed to consideration of the measure was made in the Senate. |
crs_RL31793 | crs_RL31793_0 | Vaccines are biologics -- their basic components begin as living material -- that introduce"weakened or killed disease-causing bacteria, viruses, their components" (1) (such as proteins, recombinantproteins, or polysaccharides) or toxoids into a person or animal to stimulate an immune reaction thatthe body will remember if exposed to the same pathogen in the future. There is no central authority for vaccine policy within the federal government. In theDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO)coordinates vaccine-related activities and the FDA is responsible for the regulation of humanvaccines and other biologics. TheNational Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), which is jointly administered by the HealthResources and Services Administration (HRSA), where it is located, and the U.S. Court of FederalClaims and the U.S. Department of Justice, "provides compensation for injuries judged to have beencaused by certain vaccines." The Department of Defense (DOD)maintains research and development programs for vaccines against both naturally occurringinfectious diseases and bioweapons. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports routine immunizationprograms in developing countries and works to reduce the impact of vaccine-preventable diseaseworldwide. Laws Approved by the 107th Congress
Concerned about bioterrorist attacks in the United States, the 107th Congress approvedseveral bills that included vaccine-related issues:
The USA PATRIOT Act ( P.L. Cost -- of research, development, production, regulation and oversight, for example -- underlies eachof these concerns. Reasonsgiven are mostly economic. Problems
Production Costs. Chiron wasslated to supply approximately half of the vaccine for U.S. use in the 2004-2005 flu season. (26)
Possible Legislative Solutions
Congress may consider at least four kinds of measures to enhance vaccine availability: financial incentives, public-private partnerships, improved coordination, and alternatives to safetyand effectiveness documentation. The Food and Drug Administration ModernizationAct of 1997 (FDAMA, P.L. Otherprovisions of the act address spending authority for medical countermeasure (such as vaccines)development and purchase. Safety and Effectiveness
A pillar of U.S. policy on drugs and vaccines is the protection of the individuals who usethem. Vaccines cannot be marketed within the United States without a license from FDA; and FDAdoes not license a product until it is satisfied that the vaccine is safe and effective and that themanufacturing process can produce it. Scientists, clinicians, Members of Congress, and public policy analysts continue to face choices onrisk -- hypothetical and real -- that do not offer clear alternatives. (49)
Possible Legislative Solutions
Improving Post-Licensure Adverse-EventSurveillance. Education and Risk Communication. Studies in Pharmacoepidemiology andPharmacoeconomics. Access
Successful development and production of a safe and effective vaccine does not ensure thateveryone who needs a vaccine gets it. Coordination of Government Financing Programs. Congress may consider funding levels and financing strategies for vaccine-related care inthe United States. Payment for Vaccination and Follow-Up Care. (62)
Global Health. Some Members noted concern forpublic health needs of developing countries worldwide and the need to assist those countries in fightsagainst infectious diseases. | This report's focus is on vaccination, one of the most cost-effective methods available toprevent infectious diseases. Whether a vaccine's target is naturally occurring or present because ofhostile intent, the issues policy makers must deal with include vaccine development, production,availability, safety, effectiveness, and access. Vaccines are biologics: their basic components beginas living material. They introduce bacteria or dead or weakened viruses into a person or animal tostimulate an immune reaction that the body will remember if assaulted by the same pathogen in thefuture.
There is no central federal authority for vaccine policy. In the Department of Health andHuman Services (HHS), the National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO) coordinates vaccine-relatedactivities, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for the regulation of vaccinesand other biologics. Also involved in vaccine activities are other components of HHS (e.g., theNational Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the HealthResources and Services Administration), the Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, andHomeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Concerned about bioterrorist attacks in the United States, the 107th Congress passed severalvaccine-related measures and the 108th Congress continued with legislative and oversight activitiesregarding the development and purchase of vaccines against possible bioterrorist attacks and dealingwith the sudden shortage of influenza vaccine at the outset of the 2004-2005 flu season.
Obstacles to vaccine availability -- such as production costs, concern for liability expenses,weak markets, and difficulties in predicting need -- often have economic roots. As mechanisms toenhance availability, Congress may consider financial incentives, public-private partnerships,improved coordination, and alternatives to safety and effectiveness documentation.
A pillar of U.S. policy on drugs and vaccines is the protection of the individuals who usethem. FDA does not license a product for sale in the United States until it is satisfied that thevaccine is safe and effective. Scientists, clinicians, Members of Congress, and the public must makedecisions of vaccine safety despite uncertainties and varying perceptions of risk. To ameliorate thedifficulties, Congress could address post-licensure adverse-event surveillance, education and riskcommunication, studies in pharmacoepidemiology and pharmacoeconomics, and improving availablemechanisms to compensate individuals injured by vaccinations.
Successful development and production of safe and effective vaccines does not ensure thateveryone who needs a vaccine gets it. Congress may take up the coordination of governmentchildhood immunization programs and financing levels and strategies for vaccine-related care. Noting concern for health needs of developing countries, some Members seek to increase access toexisting vaccines and to spur development of affordable vaccines for global health threats. Thisreport will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R42009 | crs_R42009_0 | Introduction
Behavioral health disorders affect a large number of people and contribute costs to the health care system, even as indicated treatment is often not received by individuals in need. In the United States, an estimated 26% of non-institutionalized adults experience behavioral health disorders in a given year; over the course of a lifetime, the estimate rises to 46%. One study estimated spending on behavioral health care in 2005 to be $135 billion, of which $40 billion was paid by the federal government (including $10 billion by Medicare) and $44 billion by state governments. Both higher and lower cost estimates have been found in other studies. Among U.S. adults suffering from a behavioral health disorder severe enough to interfere with major life activities in 2009, 40% received no treatment. The federal government has a role in both the financing and the delivery of behavioral health care services, as a payer, regulator, and provider. Congressional interest in behavioral health care is reflected in the recently enacted health reform law (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [PPACA], P.L. 111-148 , as amended). Although transforming the behavioral health care delivery system was not an explicit focus of the law, it includes sections that are expected to increase access to behavioral health services through changes to the financing and the delivery of health care services. This report provides an overview of sections in PPACA identified as having relevance to behavioral health. PPACA and Financing of Behavioral Health Care
Access to health care services is determined by multiple factors, including (among other things) financing arrangements and covered benefits. Financing Arrangements
PPACA may increase access to behavioral health services by increasing the availability and affordability of financing arrangements. PPACA contains sections that will affect both the coverage of behavioral health services, as well as the conditions under which those services are covered. PPACA contains sections that are likely to affect the way in which health care services are delivered. The first five tables address topics described under " PPACA and Financing of Behavioral Health Care ": (1) essential health benefits; (2) mental health parity; (3) private health insurance; (4) Medicare; and (5) Medicaid. The remaining tables address topics described under " PPACA and Delivery of Behavioral Health Care ": (6) safety net services; (7) workforce; and (8) miscellaneous sections (e.g., sections on research, education or community-based services, among others). Relevant Indian Health Service (IHS) sections are in Appendix A . | Behavioral health disorders (including both mental disorders and substance use disorders) affect a large number of people and contribute costs to the health care system, even as indicated treatment is often not received by individuals in need. In the United States, an estimated 26% of non-institutionalized adults experience behavioral health disorders in a given year; over the course of a lifetime, the estimate rises to 46%. One study estimated spending on behavioral health care in 2005 to be $135 billion, of which $40 billion was paid by the federal government (including $10 billion by Medicare) and $44 billion by state governments. Both higher and lower cost estimates have been found in other studies. Among U.S. adults suffering from a behavioral health disorder severe enough to interfere with major life activities in 2009, 40% received no treatment; despite spending on behavioral health care, cost remains the most common barrier to treatment reported by adults with unmet need.
The federal government has a role in both the financing and delivery of behavioral health care services, as a payer, regulator, and provider, and as such, Congress may have an interest in behavioral health care broadly. This interest was reflected in the recently enacted health reform law (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [PPACA], P.L. 111-148, as amended). Although transforming the behavioral health care delivery system was not an explicit focus of the law, it includes sections that are expected to increase access to behavioral health services through changes to the financing and delivery of health care services.
This report provides an overview of sections in the health reform law that are expected to affect the financing and delivery of behavioral health care services. Access to health care services is determined by multiple factors, including (among other things) financing arrangements and covered benefits. PPACA may increase access to behavioral health services by increasing the availability and affordability of financing arrangements; the law also contains sections that will affect both the coverage of behavioral health services, as well as the conditions under which those services are covered. In addition, PPACA contains sections that are likely to affect the way in which health care services are delivered, specifically through changes to the workforce, the safety net, and new care delivery models.
The report concludes by presenting the relevant sections in a series of nine tables: (1) essential health benefits; (2) mental health parity; (3) private health insurance; (4) Medicare; (5) Medicaid; (6) safety net services; (7) workforce; (8) miscellaneous sections (e.g., sections on research, education, or community-based services, among others); and (9) relevant Indian Health Service (IHS) sections (in an appendix). |
crs_R43539 | crs_R43539_0 | Introduction
Since its inception, Congress has used commemoratives to express public gratitude for distinguished contributions; dramatize the virtues of individuals, groups, and causes; and perpetuate the remembrance of significant events. During the 19 th century, Congress gradually broadened the scope of commemoratives by recommending special days for national observance; funding monuments and memorials; creating federal holidays; authorizing the minting of commemorative coins; and establishing commissions to celebrate important anniversaries. In the 20 th century, it became increasingly commonplace for Congress to use commemorative legislation to name buildings and other public works, scholarships, endowments, fellowships, and historic sites. This report provides a discussion of commemorative options available to Congress. These commemorative options are divided into those that require legislation and those that do not. Types of commemoratives requiring legislative action include naming federal buildings, including post offices; creating postage stamps; minting commemorative coins; awarding of Congressional Gold Medals; authorizing monuments and memorials, both in the District of Columbia and on federal land in other parts of the United States; establishing commemorative commissions; authorizing commemorative observances and federal holidays; and requesting presidential proclamations. Over the years, both the House and Senate have adopted policies and practices for considering and enacting post office naming bills. Postage Stamps
Each year, the U.S. Commemorative Observances and Days
As discussed above in the section " House Ban on Commemorative Legislation ," House Rule XII, clause 5 prohibits the introduction or consideration of commemorative legislation that includes a "remembrance, celebration or recognition for any purpose through the designation of a specified period of time." These include certificates of recognition, floor speeches, and the purchasing of American flags. | Since its inception, Congress has used commemorative legislation to express public gratitude for distinguished contributions; dramatize the virtues of individuals, groups, and causes; and perpetuate the remembrance of significant events. During the past two centuries, commemoratives have become an integral part of the American political tradition. They have been used to authorize the minting of commemorative coins and Congressional Gold Medals; fund monuments and memorials; create federal holidays; establish commissions to celebrate important anniversaries; and name public works, scholarships, endowments, fellowships, and historic sites.
Current congressional practice for commemoratives includes a House Rule (Rule XII, clause 5, initially adopted during the 104th Congress [1995-1996]) that precludes the introduction or consideration of legislation that commemorates a "remembrance, celebration, or recognition for any purpose through the designation of a specified period of time." Such a rule does not exist in the Senate. This House Rule, together with the passage of more restrictive laws, rules, and procedures governing the enactment of several other types of commemoratives, has substantially reduced the time Congress spends considering and adopting such measures.
This report summarizes the evolution of commemorative legislation as well as the laws, rules, and procedures that have been adopted to control the types of commemoratives considered and enacted. Included in the discussion of commemorative options for Congress are those that require legislation, such as
naming federal buildings, including post offices and other federal structures; postage stamps; commemorative coins; Congressional Gold Medals; monuments and memorials, both in the District of Columbia and elsewhere; commemorative commissions; commemorative observances; federal holidays; and requesting presidential proclamations.
Also included are commemorative options that do not require legislation. These include
certificates of recognition; floor speeches; and flags flown over the U.S. Capitol. |
crs_R44119 | crs_R44119_0 | In a major diplomatic initiative, President Obama announced in December 2014 a significant shift in relations with Cuba with the goal of transitioning from a decades-long policy of sanctions that were designed to isolate Cuba toward a more normal bilateral relationship. This report reviews the current state of agricultural trade between the United States and Cuba, identifies key impediments to expanding bilateral trade in agricultural products, identifies key provisions in the law to which these obstacles are anchored, and considers the potential consequences for trade in agricultural goods in the event that the current thaw in diplomatic relations was to be extended more broadly so that bilateral trade was returned to a more normal footing. Among the plethora of restrictions that remain in place, those frequently identified as suppressing trade in U.S. products to Cuba include the following:
a prohibition on the provision of credit and financing for U.S. exports; denial of access to government programs and commercial facilities that otherwise would be available to promote and facilitate U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; the ban on general U.S. tourism to Cuba; and a general ban on U.S. imports of goods from Cuba, with a recently introduced exception for goods produced by Cuban entrepreneurs. USDA Identifies Key Barriers to Expanded Agriculture Exports to Cuba
That significant barriers continue to restrict the potential for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba was acknowledged by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in April 2015 testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee. But USDA contends that these potential advantages are more than offset by a number of policies governing food and agricultural exports to Cuba, pointing to the prohibition on any U.S. government export assistance under TSRA, such as credit guarantees and market promotion programs, as one. A number of close observers have suggested the decline in U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba in recent years is likely the product of several factors, among which are a preference within the Cuban government for diversifying its supplier network; an effort to establish closer relations with certain allies, such as China and Vietnam; and the availability of credit offered by some non-U.S. suppliers that U.S. competitors are prevented from providing under the U.S. trade sanctions regime. The committee subsequently expanded its request to include the following elements:
A qualitative analysis of existing Cuban non-tariff measures, Cuban institutional and infrastructural factors, and other Cuban barriers that would inhibit U.S. and non-U.S. firms in conducting business in and with Cuba, including restrictions on trade and investment; property rights and ownership; customs duties and procedures; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; state trading; protection of intellectual property rights; and infrastructure affecting telecommunications, port facilities, and the storage, transport, and distribution of goods; A qualitative analysis of any effects that such measures, factors, and barriers would have on U.S. exports of goods and services to Cuba in the event of changes to statutory, regulatory, or other trade restrictions on U.S. exports of goods and services to Cuba; and To the extent feasible, a quantitative analysis of the aggregate effects of Cuban tariff and non-tariff measures on the ability of U.S. and non-U.S. firms to conduct business in and with Cuba. Overall, ITC concluded in its March 2016 report that U.S. agricultural exports could expand significantly if U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba were removed. A University of Florida economist raised an agriculture-specific word of caution in citing a number of potential concerns for Florida agriculture in the event the current ban on imports from Cuba were to be lifted, among which were subsidized competition from Cuban farmers—who pay no rent to the government for their land, among other subsidies—and the possibility that imported Cuban produce could introduce new pests and diseases into Florida agriculture. USDA suggests that exports of other U.S. commodities that have flagged in recent years, such as dry beans, wheat, and dry milk, could also rebound if normal trade relations were restored. USDA suggests that Cuba could exploit comparative advantages it has in the production of certain crops, such as tropical fruit, vegetables, sugar, and tobacco, to boost its agricultural exports to the United States if the embargo on its products were lifted. Although the United States is the world's largest sugar importer and Cuba was the largest foreign source of sugar for the U.S. market prior to the U.S. embargo, any post-embargo access to the U.S. sugar market would have to be negotiated. Recognizing that U.S. farmers and exporters are competing for food and agricultural markets in Cuba under terms that place them at a distinct disadvantage compared with foreign competitors that are not subject to restrictions under the U.S. embargo, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation that would ease various elements of the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba, or repeal it entirely. A brief review of several of the legislative initiatives that address agricultural aspects of the trade embargo against Cuba follows. | After more than half a century during which trade relations between the United States and Cuba have evolved from a tight economic embargo to a narrow window of trade in U.S. agricultural and medical products, the diplomatic initiative that President Obama announced in December 2014 to restore more normal relations with Cuba has raised the possibility that bilateral relations could move toward an expansion in commercial opportunities.
Many U.S. agricultural and food industry interests believe the Cuban market could offer meaningful export expansion potential for their products—but only if a number of restrictions under the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba were to be removed. Among the measures most often cited as inhibiting exports of U.S. products, while simultaneously benefiting foreign competitors, are a prohibition on the provision of private financing and credit on sales to Cuba; denial of access to U.S. government credit guarantees and export promotion programs; the ban on general tourism to Cuba; and the general prohibition on U.S. imports of Cuban goods.
A question that arises for policymakers as diplomatic relations with Cuba are restored is what the potential opportunity is for U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba if bilateral relations are returned to a more normal status in the future. Corollary questions are what agricultural products Cuba might export to the United States if the existing prohibition on Cuban products were to be removed, and what implications trade in Cuban products could hold for U.S. agriculture.
Numerous stakeholders within the food and agriculture industry, as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), contend that U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba could expand markedly if key elements of the embargo against Cuba were removed. The prohibition on providing private credit and financing and the ban on access to government export promotion programs are two that are often cited. USDA asserts that basic commodities, like U.S. rice, wheat, dry beans, and dried milk could readily gain market share in Cuba under more normal trade relations in view of the close proximity of U.S. ports to Cuba compared with export competitors. Higher value food and agricultural products might make inroads in Cuba over time, it is argued, particularly if Cuba could increase its access to foreign exchange by selling its products in the United States.
Similarly, a report on Cuban imports and the effects of U.S. restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that the U.S. International Trade Commission issued in March 2016 at the request of the Senate Finance Committee concluded that the removal of U.S. restrictions on trade could result in significant gains for U.S. agricultural exports.
A concern voiced by some in agriculture is that opening the U.S. market to Cuba could pave the way for a new influx of tropical fruit and vegetable products that would compete directly with winter-season production in Florida, particularly if foreign investors perceive the opportunity to create an export platform for the U.S. market in Cuba. Among the concerns raised is that Cuban production is often subsidized by the government; also, that allowing Cuban produce into the U.S. market could become a conduit for introducing new pests and plant diseases. While Cuba was once a leading sugar producer and the largest foreign supplier to the U.S. market prior to the embargo, its sugar industry has undergone a steep decline since the demise of the Soviet Union. Cuba continues to export limited quantities of sugar and might very well request access to the lucrative U.S. sugar market if normal trade relations were restored. But any such opportunity would most likely be the result of a negotiated agreement between the United States and Cuba.
Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation in the 114th Congress that would ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba. These bills span a broad range of approaches, from a narrow focus on removing the ban on providing private financing and credit for the sale of agricultural goods to Cuba to far broader legislative initiatives that seek to lift the Cuban embargo altogether. |
crs_R45338 | crs_R45338_0 | The FCC's policies seek to encourage four distinct types of diversity in local broadcast media:
diversity of viewpoints, as reflected in the availability of media content reflecting a variety of perspectives; diversity of programming, as indicated by a variety of formats and content, including programming aimed at various minority and ethnic groups; outlet diversity, to ensure the presence of multiple independently owned media outlets within a geographic market; and minority and female ownership of broadcast media outlets. In addition to promoting diversity, the FCC aims, with its broadcast media ownership rules, to promote localism and competition by restricting the number of media outlets that a single entity may own or control within a geographic market and, in the case of broadcast television stations, nationwide. The National Association of Broadcasters, Nexstar Broadcasting Inc. (an operator of broadcast television stations), and Connoisseur Media (an operator of radio stations) filed petitions with the FCC requesting that the agency reconsider its 2016 decision by repealing and/or relaxing the media ownership rules, and adopting rules creating a new "incubator program" to enhance ownership diversity. In August 2018, the FCC issued rules governing a new incubator program. Parties, including the Prometheus Radio Project, have appealed these orders. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is scheduled to hear arguments regarding the legal challenges to all of the FCC's recent broadcast media ownership rule changes. The FCC's next quadrennial media ownership review is scheduled to begin in 2018. News Consumption Trends
The debate over media ownership rules is occurring against the background of sweeping changes in news consumption patterns. Based on surveys conducted by Pew Research Center, the percentage of adults citing local broadcast television as a news source declined from 65% in 1996 to 37% in 2017. Consolidation Trends
As broadcast stations face competition for viewers' attention from other media outlets, and thereby financial pressures, some have sought to strengthen their bargaining relative to program suppliers (i.e., broadcast networks), advertisers, and/or programming distributors (i.e., cable and satellite operators) by consolidating. The extent to which such media consolidation can occur is directly related to the FCC media ownership and attribution rules in place at the time. UHF Discount
In 1985 the FCC adopted a rule that, for the purpose of applying its national ownership rule, discounted the number of television households reached within a DMA by stations operating in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band by half in measuring a station owner's reach. With the discount, a single entity that owns exclusively UHF stations could effectively reach 78% of U.S. television households, or double the current national ownership cap of 39% of U.S. television households. In December 2017, the FCC launched a new rulemaking proceeding to examine whether to modify or rescind the UHF discount and national ownership cap. Instead, it has either articulated its policy on an ad hoc basis in reviewing merger applications, or remained silent. Because Tribune already owned newspapers in those markets, it did not attempt to take control of the broadcast licenses in those markets in order to comply with the FCC's now-defunct rule prohibiting common ownership of newspapers and television stations within the same DMA (described in " Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule "). Among their concerns was that Sinclair's proposed sale of Tribune's Chicago station WGN-TV could effectively be a "sham" transaction because (1) the proposed buyer had no previous experience in broadcasting, (2) the proposed buyer served as CEO of a company in which Sinclair's executive chairman had a controlling interest, (3) the proposed buyer would have purchased the station at a price that appeared to be significantly below market value, (4) Sinclair would have had an option to buy back the station in the future, (5) Sinclair would have owned most of WGN-TV's assets, and (6) pursuant to a number of agreements, Sinclair would have been responsible for many aspects of the station's operation. The FCC commissioners were silent, however, with respect to how, post-transaction, Sinclair's potential remote operation of four television stations within the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton-Hazleton, PA, television market might cause it to breach the national ownership cap. Gray does not own any stations in the market. The FCC initially adopted a TV duopoly rule in 1941, barring a single entity from owning two or more broadcast television stations that "would substantially serve the same area." Generally, the four broadcast networks covered by this definition are ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC. | The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) aims, with its broadcast media ownership rules, to promote localism and competition by restricting the number of media outlets that a single entity may own or control within a geographic market and, in the case of broadcast television stations, nationwide. In addition, the FCC seeks to encourage diversity, including (1) the diversity of viewpoints, as reflected in the availability of media content reflecting a variety of perspectives; (2) diversity of programming, as indicated by a variety of formats and content; (3) outlet diversity, to ensure the presence of multiple independently owned media outlets within a geographic market; and (4) minority and female ownership of broadcast media outlets.
Two FCC media ownership rules have proven particularly controversial. Its national media ownership rule prohibits any entity from owning commercial television stations that reach more than 39% of U.S. households nationwide. Its "UHF discount" rule discounts by half the reach of a station broadcasting in the Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) band for the purpose of applying the national media ownership rule. In December 2017, the commission opened a rulemaking proceeding, seeking comments about whether it should modify or repeal the two rules. If the FCC retains the UHF discount, even if it maintains the 39% cap, a single entity could potentially reach 78% of U.S. households through its ownership of broadcast television stations.
An important issue with respect to the national ownership cap, which the FCC has not addressed in a rulemaking, is how the agency treats a situation in which a broadcaster manages, operates, or sells advertising for a television station owned by another. In some cases, the FCC has articulated its policy on an ad hoc basis in the context of merger reviews, while in other instances it has effectively consented to such arrangements through its silence. Thus, a single entity could comply with the national ownership cap while still influencing broadcast television stations it does not own, reaching more viewers than permitted under the cap. For example, in reviewing the now-cancelled proposed merger between Sinclair Broadcast Group and Tribune Media Company in 2018, FCC commissioners raised concerns that Sinclair's proposed sale of Tribune's Chicago station WGN-TV in order to comply with the national ownership cap could effectively be a "sham" transaction due to Sinclair's relationships with the proposed buyer. Nevertheless, neither Sinclair's application nor the FCC's order for a designated hearing addressed whether Sinclair's intention to operate four television stations owned by others within the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton-Hazleton, PA, television market might cause it to breach the national ownership cap.
In November 2017, acting in response to petitions from broadcast station licensees, the FCC repealed or relaxed several local media ownership rules. The repealed rules limited common ownership of broadcast television and radio stations within the same market, and of television stations and newspapers within the same market. The FCC also relaxed rules limiting common ownership of two top-four television stations (generally, ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC stations) within the same market. In August 2018, the FCC issued rules governing a new "incubator" program designed to enhance ownership diversity. Parties, including the Prometheus Radio Project, have appealed these orders. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is scheduled to hear arguments regarding the legal challenges to all of the FCC's recent broadcast media ownership rule changes. The FCC plans to launch its next quadrennial media ownership review later this year.
These regulatory changes are occurring against the background of significant changes in media consumption patterns. Based on surveys conducted by Pew Research Center, the percentage of adults citing local broadcast television as a news source declined from 65% in 1996 to 37% in 2016. As broadcast stations face competition for viewers' attention from other media outlets, and thereby financial pressures, some station owners have sought to strengthen their positions by consolidating. The extent to which such media consolidation can occur is directly related to the FCC media ownership and attribution rules in place at the time. |
crs_R44064 | crs_R44064_0 | The package subsequently passed into law as the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, P.L. Substantive Offenses
Most federal sex trafficking prosecutions arise under one of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. 1591, which outlaws commercial sex trafficking that has an impact on interstate or foreign commerce, and the Mann Act, which outlaws transportation and travel for unlawful sexual purposes. Advertising profiteers are liable only if they knew of the victim's status:
Whoever knowingly-(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits ... advertises ... ; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or , except where, in an offense under paragraph (2), the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising , in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) [language added by the amendment in italics]. Crime Victims' Rights
Section 3771 provides victims of federal crimes and victims of crime under the District of Columbia Code with certain rights, including the right to confer with the prosecutor and to be heard at public proceedings concerning pleas and sentencing in the case. Finally, P.L. The House committee report indicates that the amendment was designed to "clarif[y] Congress' intent that crime victims be notified of plea agreements or deferred prosecution agreements, including those that may take place prior to a formal charge." 114-22 establishes a second Fund, the Domestic Trafficking Victims Fund, and second special assessment, this one for $5,000 directed to the Fund for the assistance and compensation of victims of trafficking and sexual abuse. Defendants convicted of human trafficking offenses must be ordered to pay victim restitution. Criminal Procedure
P.L. 114-22 bolsters existing law enforcement tools in the area of bail, wiretapping, and sex offender registration. 114-22 amends the definition of "a crime of violence" for these purposes to include any of the human trafficking offenses. It also permits state prosecutors to engage in state court-supervised interceptions in cases of human trafficking, child pornography production, and child sexual exploitation, to the extent that state law permits. 114-22 directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the Attorney General with the information described in Section 114 relating to military sex offenders whom SORNA requires to register with state or tribal authorities. | The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, P.L. 114-22 (S. 178), establishes and enhances a host of federal programs designed to prevent human trafficking and assist its victims. It also adjusts federal criminal law in the areas of substantive criminal law, victims' rights, and related criminal procedure. It is these adjustments that are the subject of this report.
P.L. 114-22 amends the federal commercial sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. 1591, to clarify the criminal liability of the advertisers and customers of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise. It modifies the Mann Act, which outlaws interstate and foreign travel for unlawful sex purposes, to encompass travel for the purpose of producing child pornography and to narrow the ignorance-of-age defense available in some cases involving travel in order to engage in sexual activity with children.
It also seeks to make clear that the victims of federal crimes, victims of both sex trafficking offenses and other crimes, have a right to be notified of plea agreements and deferred prosecution agreements, even when the bargains are struck before formal charges are filed. It establishes a Domestic Trafficking Victims Fund to receive the special assessments levied on convicted trafficking and sex abuse offenders. Victims become entitled to access to confiscated proceeds for restitution purposes.
P.L. 114-22 modifies federal bail laws so that defendants charged with human trafficking offenses may be held on preventive detention. Moreover, it authorizes court-supervised wiretaps in federal and state cases involving human trafficking. Finally, it directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the Attorney General with information concerning individuals convicted of offenses under military law which require them to register as sex offenders. |
crs_R40507 | crs_R40507_0 | Political Background
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. While significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. In May 2006, René Préval began his second five-year term as President of Haiti. During his first three years in office, Préval has established relative internal political stability. The government presented the revised strategy and received $353 million in new aid commitments at a donors' conference on April 21, 2009. Haiti's fragile stability has been repeatedly shaken, however, if not by political problems, then by climatic ones. In April 2008, a worsening food crisis led to violent protests and the removal of Haiti's Prime Minister. Parliament, having rejected Préval's first two choices for a new prime minister, finally confirmed Michele Pierre-Louis, a highly-regarded educator and economist who has worked on behalf of Haitian poor and youths, as Prime Minister in September 2008. Relations with Donors and Donors Conference
Since Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy that attempts to address these many needs simultaneously. The United States pledged $68 million in new FY2009 assistance, including $20 million in targeted budget support, in addition to the $245.9 million already requested for FY2009. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), has been in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government. U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. U.S. Assistance to Haiti
U.S. assistance for Haiti in FY2007 totaled $225 million. The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. Several Members have already requested that the Obama Administration grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians living in the United States because of the disastrous conditions in Haiti. Congress may once again take up debt relief for Haiti. Legislation in the 111th Congress
P.L. 111-8 . H.Con.Res. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 730 . S. 1183 . 110-161 . P.L. P.L. 110-246 . Section 549 (c) prohibits any 'International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement' funds from being used to transfer excess weapons, ammunition, or other lethal property of an agency of the United States government to the government of Haiti for use by the Haitian National Police until the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that (1) the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has carried out the vetting of the senior levels of the Haitian National Police and has ensured that those credibly alleged to have committed serious crimes, including drug trafficking and human rights violations, have been suspended; and (2) the Transitional Haitian National Government is cooperating in a reform and restructuring plan for the Haitian National Police and the reform of the judicial system as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1608 adopted on June 22, 2005. P.L. Provides an additional $22.5 million for Haiti. 109-432 . | Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. While some progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, they remain weak. Economic and social stability have improved considerably. But poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide.
In May 2006, René Préval began his second five-year term as President of Haiti. During his first two years in office, Préval began to establish internal political stability by attempting to strengthen democratic institutions and creating an environment that would attract private investment and spur job creation. Haiti's fragile stability has been repeatedly shaken, however, if not by political problems, then by climatic ones. In 2008, a worsening food crisis led to violent protests and the removal of Haiti' s Prime Minister. Parliament rejected Préval' s first two choices for a new prime minister, but finally confirmed Michele Pierre-Louis, a highly-regarded educator and economist, as Prime Minister in September 2008. In the summer of 2008, four major storms caused widespread devastation in Haiti.
Haiti remains the poorest country in the western hemisphere. Over half the population of 8.2 million people live in extreme poverty. Since Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy to address these many needs simultaneously. The Préval administration presented a revised strategy at a donors' conference on April 14. Haiti received aid commitments of $353 million. The United States pledged $68 million in new FY2009 assistance, including $20 million in targeted budget support. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government in 2004. MINUSTAH's current strength is 9,089 troops.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. The FY2009 aid request for Haiti was $246 million. The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8) provided for an additional $41 million in bilateral economic and international security assistance for Haiti. The FY2010 aid request for Haiti is $293 million.
The 111th Congress may consider the balance and scope of assistance to Haiti. Members have already requested that the Obama Administration grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians living in the United States. Of immediate concern to Congress may be ensuring that second round elections scheduled for June 21 for 11 Haitian Senate seats are free, fair, and—in light of recent violent protests—peaceful. Prohibited from running on technicalities, former President Aristide's Lavalas party boycotted the first round vote; turnout nationwide averaged 11%. Congress may take up debt relief for Haiti again.
Current law related to Haiti includes P.L. 111-8, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-246, and P.L. 109-432. Pending legislation related to Haiti includes H.Con.Res. 17, H.R. 144, H.R. 264, H.R. 331, H.R. 416, H.R. 417, H.R. 1567, S. 730, and S. 1183; for details see sections on Legislation.
This report on conditions in Haiti will be updated as necessary. For additional information see CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43891 | crs_R43891_0 | Introduction
Three royalty debates may be revived in the 114 th Congress: (1) whether to increase the statutory minimum rate for onshore federal oil and gas leases from 12.5% to 18.75%, (2) whether to enact revenue sharing laws for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leases to include all coastal states, and (3) whether to charge a royalty on hardrock locatable minerals produced on federal public domain lands. House and Senate bills in the 113 th Congress proposed to raise the minimum royalty rate from 12.5% to 18.75% on oil and gas produced on federal leases, improve the permitting process, provide for revenue sharing of OCS revenues, or establish a "gross proceeds" royalty on federally owned locatable mineral production. A mineral royalty is a payment to the resource owner for the extraction of the mineral. In the mining industry the royalty is typically based on production ($/ton) or income (percent of gross or net income). For federal oil and gas leases, royalties are assessed on the gross value of production minus allowable deductions. Raising Royalty Rates
There is precedent for raising federal oil and gas lease royalty rates (which the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to do). Under the Bush Administration in 2008, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne raised the deepwater rate for new leases from 12.5% to 16.67%. Then, in March 2009, Secretary Ken Salazar of the Obama Administration increased the royalty rates for new offshore leases to 18.75%. The lower federal onshore royalty rate for oil and gas may be viewed as an incentive rate to encourage bidding on federal lands when competing for industry investment spending and to provide some balance from the disproportionate time it takes to process applications for permits to drill (APDs) on federal lands. The largely decentralized revenue sharing system for onshore federal energy and mineral resources under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides the states generally with a 50% share of revenues collected (rents, bonuses, and royalties), less 2% for administrative costs; Alaska, however, receives 90% of all revenues collected on federal leases. These onshore receipts are intended to maintain or establish infrastructure, and mitigate environmental, social, and other impacts from the development of mineral resources. This is different from the much more centralized system used for offshore revenue. The Mining Law continues to provide the structure for much of the western mineral development on public domain lands. Western mining, although not as extensive as it once was, is still a major economic activity, and a high percentage of hardrock mining is on public lands. They contend that restrictions on free access and security of tenure would curtail exploration efforts among large and small mining firms. Mining Law critics consider the claim-patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the small charges associated with keeping a claim active and obtaining a patent and the absence of royalties. | Three royalty debates may be revived in the 114th Congress: (1) whether to increase the statutory minimum rate for onshore federal oil and gas leases from 12.5% to 18.75%, (2) whether to enact revenue sharing laws for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leases to include all coastal states, and (3) whether to charge a royalty on hardrock locatable minerals produced on federal public domain lands. House and Senate bills in the 113th Congress proposed to raise the minimum rate from 12.5% to 18.75% on oil and gas produced on federal leases, provide for revenue sharing of OCS revenues, and establish a "gross proceeds" royalty on federally owned locatable mineral production.
Raising the Onshore Oil and Gas Royalty Rate
A mineral royalty is a payment to the resource owner for the extraction of the mineral. Typically, in the mining industry the royalty is based on production ($/ton) or income (percent of gross or net income). For federal oil and gas leases, royalties are assessed on the gross value of production minus allowable deductions. There is precedent for raising federal oil and gas lease royalty rates. Under the Bush Administration in 2008, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne raised the deepwater rate for new leases from 12.5% to 16.67%. Then, in 2009, Secretary Ken Salazar of the Obama Administration increased the royalty rates for new offshore leases to 18.75%. The lower federal onshore royalty rate (12.5%) for oil and gas may be viewed as an incentive rate to encourage bidding on federal lands.
Revenue Sharing
The largely decentralized revenue sharing system for onshore federal energy and mineral resources under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides states generally with a 50% share of revenues collected (rents, bonuses, and royalties), less 2% for administrative costs; Alaska, however, receives 90% of all revenues collected on federal onshore leases (less administrative costs). These onshore receipts are intended to maintain or establish infrastructure, and mitigate environmental, social, and other impacts from the development of mineral resources. This is different from the much more centralized system used for offshore revenue, which has much less revenue sharing.
Establish a Locatable Minerals Royalty
The Mining Law continues to provide the structure for much of the western mineral development on public domain lands. Western mining, although not as extensive as it once was, is still a major economic activity. Industry officials argue that the current claim-patent system enhances a company's ability to bring an economic deposit into production. They contend that restrictions on free access and security of tenure would curtail exploration. Mining Law critics consider the claim-patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the absence of royalties and the small charges associated with keeping a claim active and obtaining a patent. |
crs_R41667 | crs_R41667_0 | These officials are therefore critical not only to the successful administration of federal elections, but also to the implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. The demographic characteristics of LEOs differ from those of other government officials. LEOs believed that several groups have too great an influence on the acquisition of voting systems, including the federal government, the media, advocates, political parties, and vendors, and that local elected officials have too little influence. Attitudes Toward Voting Systems
LEOs were highly satisfied with whatever voting system they were using but were less supportive of other kinds of systems. Satisfaction with the voting systems LEOs used declined from 2004 to 2006 but rebounded in 2008. LEOs rated their primary voting systems as very accurate, secure, reliable, and voter- and pollworker-friendly, no matter what voting system they used. For most of those characteristics, LEOs were less happy with the performance of their voting system in 2006 and 2008 than in 2004, especially with respect to optical scan and DRE systems, which they rated lower for cost, size, storage requirements, and machine error in the second and third surveys. Most LEOS who did not use DREs believed that VVPAT should be required, but most DRE users disagreed. Most VVPAT users were satisfied with them. LEOs believed that HAVA is making moderate improvements in the electoral process overall in their jurisdictions. LEOs reported in 2008 that HAVA has improved the accessibility, fairness, and reliability of elections but has made them more complicated to administer. Election Assistance Commission
When HAVA created the Election Assistance Commission, the law gave it several specific responsibilities. Most LEOs found most activities of the EAC moderately important. LEOs supported requiring photo identification for all voters, even though they believed it would negatively affect turnout and did not believe that voter fraud is a serious problem in their jurisdictions. The results appear to suggest an apparent discrepancy between, on the one hand, the overall support of LEOs for photo ID and their average views about its effects on security, and, on the other hand, their views about impacts on turnout and the risk of voter fraud—that is, they tended to support photo ID and believed it would increase security but at the same time they tended to believe that fraud was not a problem and that requiring photo ID would depress turnout. Election Administration Issues
Election Preparations
The time that LEOs reported spending preparing for elections increased from 2004 to 2008. Consistent with the perception of LEOs that HAVA has made elections more complex to administer ( Figure 33 ), three-quarters found that they spent more time preparing for the 2006 than the 2004 election, and almost 90% reported spending more time in 2008 than 2006. However, the time spent did not change from 2006 to 2008—it was 24 hours in 2008 as well. The most commonly reported incident in the 2006 and 2008 elections was malfunction of a DRE or optical scan system. The incidence of long lines at the polling place was highest in jurisdictions using DREs. The percentage of jurisdictions offering early voting increased from about half in 2006 to nearly two-thirds in 2008, and most LEOs reported that the number of early voters increased in 2008. All except lever-machine users believed on average that early voting should be a right, and users of all systems believed that absentee voting should be a right. In 2006, most also expressed concern that the increased complexity of elections would have a negative impact on recruitment of pollworkers, and more than a third of respondents were "extremely concerned" ( Figure 54 ). Possible Caveats
As with all surveys, care needs to be taken in drawing inferences from the results. Some survey results suggest areas of potential professional improvement, such as in education and in professional involvement at the national level. | Local election officials (LEOs) are critical to the administration of federal elections and the implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252). Three surveys of LEOs were performed by academic institutions in collaboration with the Congressional Research Service. Although care needs to be taken in interpreting the results, they may have implications for several policy issues, such as how election officials are chosen and trained, the best ways to ensure that voting systems and election procedures are sufficiently effective, secure, and voter-friendly, and whether adjustments should be made to HAVA requirements. Major results include the following:
The demographic characteristics of LEOs differ from those of other government officials. Almost three-quarters are women, and 5% are minorities. Most do not have a college degree, and most were elected, although those characteristics appear to be changing. Some results suggest areas of potential improvement such as in training and participation in professional associations.
LEOs believed that the federal government has too great an influence on the acquisition of voting systems, and that local elected officials have too little. Their concerns increased from 2004 to 2006 about the influence of the media, political parties, advocacy groups, and vendors. Concern about the influence of these groups increased again, slightly, from 2006 to 2008.
LEOs were highly satisfied with whatever voting system they used but were less supportive of other kinds. Their satisfaction declined from 2004 to 2006 for all systems except lever machines, but rebounded in 2008. They also rated their primary voting systems as very accurate, secure, reliable, and voter- and pollworker-friendly, no matter what system they used. However, the most common incident reported by respondents in both the 2006 and 2008 elections was malfunction of a direct recording (DRE) or optical scan (OS) electronic voting system. The incidence of long lines at polling places was highest in jurisdictions using DREs. Most DRE users did not believe that voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) should be required, but nonusers believed they should be. However, the percentage of DRE users who supported VVPAT increased from 2004 to 2008, and more VVPAT users were satisfied with them in 2008 than in 2006.
On average, LEOs mildly supported requiring photo identification for all voters and believed it would make elections more secure, even though they strongly believed that it will negatively affect turnout and did not believe that voter fraud is a problem in their jurisdictions.
In all three surveys, LEOs believed that HAVA is making moderate improvements in the electoral process. The level of support declined from 2004 to 2006 but increased to its highest point in 2008. LEOs reported that HAVA has increased the accessibility of voting but has made elections more complicated and has increased their cost, though fewer believed so in 2008 than in 2006. LEOs spent much more time preparing for the election in 2008 than in 2004. They also believed that the increased complexity of elections is hindering recruitment of pollworkers. Most found the activities of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that HAVA created moderately important, and that its helpfulness improved from 2006 to 2008. Their assessment of the statewide voter-registration database was neutral in 2006 but positive in 2008. They believed that it was more accurate and fair than their previous registration system. |
crs_RL32718 | crs_RL32718_0 | Until the next time. In examining these theories, this report focuses on the internal controls on American corporations (including corporate governance, business ethics, managerial structure and compensation, internal counsel, and whistleblowers), as well as external controls (government regulation, external auditors and accountants, and the judicial process). This report surveys the barriers to corporate fraud within the context of the competing explanations: the cycle vs. the perfect storm. If the series of corporate scandals that began with Enron represents an unfortunate result of a unique set of market conditions, one might conclude that the restraints now in place are sufficient to prevent outbreaks of fraud under normal circumstances. On the other hand, if fraud is cyclical and can be expected to reappear once stock prices begin to climb again, one might conclude that the post-Enron scandals have revealed fundamental weaknesses in law and regulation. This report provides a broad perspective for considering major issues in antifraud law and regulation. To protect shareholders from managerial abuse, corporate governance practice and securities law, respectively, take a carrot-and-stick approach. In the case of Enron, directors were paid up to $380,000 annually. Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, on August 29, 2002, the SEC adopted new rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 under the Securities Exchange Act, which require a company's CEO and CFO to certify in each quarterly and annual report that
he or she has reviewed the report; based on his or her knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by the report; based on his or her knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report; he or she and the other certifying officers: (1) are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures; (2) have designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information is made known to them, particularly during the period in which the periodic report is being prepared; (3) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of the report; and (4) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on the required evaluation as of that date; he or she and the other certifying officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and to the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function): (1) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls (a pre-existing term relating to internal controls regarding financial reporting) which could adversely affect the issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and (2) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal controls; and he or she and the other certifying officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses. An assertion of ignorance may now carry criminal penalties. The legal entity that is the corporation? It is a great advantage to anti-fraud efforts if employees feel a responsibility to report fraud within a corporation. The DOJ also failed to identify corporate fraud as a high-priority problem. In the wake of the collapse of Internet and other technology stocks, and the discoveries of control fraud at Enron and other prominent companies in 2001, serious questions were raised about analyst objectivity. Economic Implications
By all accounts, the cost impact of white-collar crime is large. It remains to be seen whether recent corporate scandals like Enron will reverse this protectionist trend. | The collapse of Enron Corp. in the fall of 2001 had a peculiar side effect: accounting became front page news. For the next year, accounting fraud at a long series of Fortune 500 companies made headlines. The worst cases led to spectacular bankruptcies, mass layoffs, and criminal prosecutions. Many other companies remained intact, but paid millions of dollars to settle charges that their books did not correspond to financial reality.
The economic costs of the corporate scandals were substantial: trillions of dollars in shareholder wealth lost and a climate of uncertainty that may have suppressed business investment and hiring after the 2001 recession ended. The barriers to corporate fraud set in place after the Great Depression had clearly failed to protect public investors and were put under close scrutiny. Congress responded by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, strengthening regulation of auditors, directors, and corporate executives and increasing criminal penalties for fraud.
During the 2003-2004 school year, Professor William Black's class at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas examined corporate fraud from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Rather than viewing fraud as simply a securities law matter, the class considered the insights of criminology, sociology, management science, business ethics, behavioral economics, complex systems theory, and other fields. This report is the result of their investigations.
The report focuses on the internal controls on American corporations (including corporate governance, business ethics, managerial structure and compensation, internal counsel, and whistleblowers), as well as external controls (government regulation, external auditors and accountants, and the judicial process). A recurring theme is the limited efficacy of many safeguards and watchdogs in cases of "control fraud," where fraud is directed or abetted by top management, and where unethical or abusive practices may become the organizational norm. It may then be easier for employees, directors, auditors, and even government regulators to go along with the prevailing trends, rather than take a stand which might disrupt the smooth functioning of the business, and could bring on devastating personal and organizational consequences.
Another broad question raised by the report is whether the post-Enron scandals were a one-time event, made possible by the stock market bubble of the 1990s and several other unique historical developments which together constituted a "perfect storm," or whether fraud is a cyclical phenomenon associated with the end of long bull markets. The question has policy implications: if recent corporate scandals represent an unfortunate result of a unique set of conditions, one might conclude that the restraints now in place are sufficient to prevent outbreaks of fraud under normal circumstances. On the other hand, if fraud is cyclical and can be expected to reappear once stock prices begin to soar again, one might conclude that the post-Enron scandals have revealed fundamental weaknesses in law and regulation. This report provides an overview of anti-fraud barriers and will not be updated. |
crs_R44007 | crs_R44007_0 | 181 ) (Representative Poe) (House passed); Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act ( S. 178 ) (Senator Cornyn) ( P.L. 114-22 ); Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act ( H.R. 1201 ) (Representative Granger); Combat Human Trafficking Act ( S. 140 ) (Senator Feinstein); Human Trafficking Fraud Enforcement Act ( H.R. 114-22 . Commercial Sex Trafficking
The proposals would amend §1591 to (1) confirm the coverage of the customers of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise; (2) outlaw advertising of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise; (3) clarify the government's burden of proof with regard to the age of the victim; and (4) enlarge the permissible term of supervised release for commercial sex trafficking conspirators. 114-22 adopts the proposal. 114-22 extends the reach of a number of the Mann Act's prohibitions to encompass activities involving child pornography. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 1311 (Representative Carolyn B. Maloney) would increase the penalties associated with various tax offenses committed by sex traffickers, and would direct the creation of an office of tax law enforcement to invest tax offenses committed by sex traffickers. H.R. 1311 would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to create an Internal Revenue Service office specifically for the investigation and prosecution of designated sex trafficking-related tax offenses. Here, too, in its victims' rights treatment, P.L. 296 suggested, P.L. 296 proposed, and P.L. 114-22 , as S. 178 and H.R. 114-22 , as proposed in S. 178 and H.R. Sex Offender Registration
The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), as the name implies, requires individuals convicted of a federal, state, tribal, foreign, or military sex offense to register with, and continue to provide current information to, state or tribal authorities (jurisdictions) in any location in which they live, work, or attend school. As previously proposed in S. 178 (Senator Cornyn), S. 409 (Senator Burr), and H.R. 956 (Representative Speier), P.L. 956 , like S. 178 and S. 409 , would require the Secretary of Defense to include the same information within his registry regarding a recently released sex offender that states and tribes are required to capture: physical description of the sex offender; text of the law proscribing the conduct for which the sex offender was convicted; the sex offender's criminal history; fingerprints, a DNA sample, and a photograph of the sex offender; a copy of the offender's driver's license or other official identification of the sex offender; and any additional information required by the Attorney General. | Existing federal law outlaws sex trafficking and provides a variety of mechanisms to prevent it and to assist its victims. Members have offered a number of proposals during the 114th Congress to bolster those efforts. Several clarify, expand, or supplement existing federal criminal law.
For instance, Senator Cornyn's S. 178, which was packaged with Representative Poe's H.R. 181 and several proposals and enacted as the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-22), confirms that federal commercial sex trafficking prohibitions apply to the customers of such enterprises. P.L. 114-22 also constricts the defense of those who engage in illicit sexual activities with children. In addition, it affords state and federal law enforcement officials greater access to court-supervised electronic surveillance in trafficking cases. It expands victims' statutory rights and removes stringent limits on appellate enforcement of those rights.
As suggested in S. 178, Senator Kirk's S. 572, and Representative Wagner's H.R. 285, P.L. 114-22 brings culpable advertisers within the reach of the federal law which proscribes commercial sex trafficking.
P.L. 114-22 lengthens the permissible term of supervised release for those convicted of plotting to engage in commercial sex trafficking, language reminiscent of Senator Feinstein's S. 140, Representative Poe's H.R. 296, and Representative Granger's H.R. 1201.
S. 178 and Senator Burr's S. 409 proposed requiring Department of Defense (DOD) officials to provide the Attorney General with information relating to military sex offenders required to register under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). P.L. 114-22 requires them to do so. Representative Speier's H.R. 956 would establish a separate DOD sex offender registry.
Representative Carolyn B. Maloney's H.R. 1311 would increase the penalties for tax evasion by sex traffickers and call for the establishment of a dedicated office within the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and prosecute tax-avoiding sex traffickers.
See also CRS Report R44064, Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act: A Legal Analysis of the Criminal Provisions of P.L. 114-22, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22516 | crs_RS22516_0 | In the process of obtaining a patent, the information associated with the patent is published and made available to the public. Gene Patents
In a June 2013 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , that genomic DNA was ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. However, some experts believed that the decision to patent human genes misconstrued the "product of nature" principle. §101. Although the Supreme Court declared that genomic DNA may not be patented, it held that cDNA fulfills the requirements of 35 U.S.C. However, other experts disagree. | In the past, the U.S. courts upheld gene patents that met the criteria of patentability defined by the Patent Act. However, the practice of awarding patents on genes came under scrutiny by some scientists, legal scholars, politicians, and other experts. In June 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. that genomic DNA was ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. §101 due to the "product of nature" doctrine. However, the Court adopted the view that cDNA could be patented. The Myriad holding attempts to provide inventors and firms with incentives to conduct R&D while recognizing that patent proprietors might obtain too much control over medical practice and future research. |
crs_R44749 | crs_R44749_0 | Introduction
The Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the aviation trust fund, is the major funding source for federal aviation programs. In order to for avoid disruptions, both the authority to collect aviation excise taxes and to spend from the trust fund must be reauthorized periodically by Congress. Aviation Taxes and Fees
Trust fund revenue is derived principally from a variety of taxes paid by users of the national aviation system. Revenue sources for the trust fund include taxes on airline passenger ticket sales, segment fees, air cargo fees, and aviation fuel taxes paid by both commercial and general aviation aircraft (see Table 1 ). In FY2016, the AATF received revenues of over $14.4 billion, with nearly 70% coming from taxes and fees levied on transportation of passengers. Although the stream of trust fund revenues has been relatively stable in recent years, the long-term vitality of the AATF remains a concern for many. If airlines continue to seek additional revenue from ancillary fees as an alternative to increasing base ticket prices, federal aviation programs and activities may become more dependent on contributions from the general fund. It also modified the taxes to form the aviation tax structure in place today. The Administration's budgets for FY2016 and FY2017 did not include such a proposal. Federal aviation taxes would remain in place to fund other FAA operations. Between FY2012 and FY2016, the general fund provided between 7.2% (FY2015) and 28.9% (FY2012) of FAA's total annual funding. Conceptually, that portion of the cost of operating the airway system that is appropriated from the general fund is supposed to equate to the amount military, government, and untaxed beneficiaries of the aviation system might have contributed to the trust fund through the payment of user fees, if there were user fees to be paid. The FAA budget is divided into four major accounts:
Grants-in-Aid for Airports (Airport Improvement Program, or AIP) Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) Operations and Maintenance (O&M) (partly supported by the trust fund, with the remainder coming from the general fund)
The first two accounts, AIP and F&E, are considered "capital" accounts or programs because they deal with the development of airport and airway infrastructure. It funds the technological improvements to the air traffic control system, including installation of a satellite-based air traffic control system referred to as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Annual Appropriations
Most FAA spending, including most spending from the AATF, requires annual appropriations by Congress. Status of the Trust Fund
At the end of FY2016, the aviation trust fund was projected to have a cash balance of over $14.3 billion. The prospect of user-fee funding for air traffic services could raise a number of issues regarding AATF revenues and expenditures. To offset user-fee collections, Congress may consider options to restructure AATF revenues, such as lowering fuel, ticket, and cargo taxes. | The Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the aviation trust fund, has been the primary funding source for federal aviation programs since 1972. It provides all funding for three major accounts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), Facilities and Equipment (F&E), and Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D). It also pays for most spending from FAA's Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account.
The trust fund is funded principally by a variety of taxes paid by users of the national aviation system. Revenue sources for the trust fund include taxes on airline passenger ticket sales, the flight segment tax, air cargo taxes, and aviation fuel taxes paid by both commercial and general aviation aircraft. In FY2016, the trust fund received revenues of over $14.4 billion in aviation taxes and fees. Between FY2012 and FY2016, the trust fund provided between 71% and 93% of FAA's total appropriations, with the remainder coming from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury.
In order to avoid disruptions, both the authority to collect aviation excise taxes and to spend from the trust fund must be reauthorized periodically by Congress. The latest such legislation, P.L. 114-190, reauthorized FAA, other civil aviation programs, and the collection of taxes to fund the AATF through FY2017. However, a full FY2017 appropriation has not been enacted. P.L. 114-254 extended funding of FAA programs and activities at the FY2016 annualized level of $16,281 million through April 28, 2017.
The balance in the aviation trust fund is projected to increase over the next few years. However, the AATF's long-term vitality remains subject to a variety of forces. Poor economic conditions or external events could curb demand for air travel, reducing revenue from the ticket taxes that are the main source of AATF funding. Changing airline business practices, particularly unbundling of ancillary fees for particular amenities from airfares, are adversely affecting AATF revenue, as only base airfares are subject to ticket taxes. The financial future of the trust fund also depends on future spending decisions, including FAA plans for substantial investment in the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) satellite-based air traffic control system.
Proposals to shift air traffic control services from FAA to a government-owned corporation with an independent board of directors, which are expected to reemerge, raise a number of issues regarding AATF revenues and expenditures. A version of such a proposal approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 2016 would have allowed the corporation to impose user fees on some flights, principally commercial aviation. If user fees were to fund air traffic services, FAA would no longer require aviation tax revenues for this purpose. Congress might then consider options to restructure FAA's financing mechanisms, such as lowering the aviation taxes that flow into the AATF or eliminating the general fund component of FAA funding. |
crs_R41012 | crs_R41012_0 | Introduction
Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle questions of order and procedure. A committee's rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. This report analyzes the different approaches Senate committees have taken with their rules, focusing on additions to the overall Senate committee rules structure or unique provisions. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or that are essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules for committees, then explore how each Senate committee handles 11 specific procedural issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. Also, the report looks at unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in a "miscellaneous" category. Rules. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Reporting. | Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle its business. Rules adopted by a committee may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate" (Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules.
This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then compares the different approaches Senate committees have taken when adopting their rules. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare selected, key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to, or that are essentially restatements of, the Senate's standing rules are not included.
This report will review the requirements contained in Senate rules pertaining to committees; it will then explore how each Senate committee addresses 11 specific issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at the unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category.
This report will be updated during the first session of each Congress after all Senate committees have printed their rules in the Congressional Record. |
crs_R40523 | crs_R40523_0 | Introduction
Nearly all state and local governments sell bonds to finance public projects and certain qualified private activities. The federal government subsidizes state and local bond issuances through a number of policies. The mostly widely utilized policy instrument is the tax-exempt bond, which excludes bond interest payments received from the investor's federal taxable income. Tax credit bonds (TCBs) offer an alternative to municipal bonds, providing a tax credit or direct payment proportional to the bond's face value in lieu of the tax exemption. Most TCBs are designated for a specific purpose. TCBs have been used by issuers to finance public school construction and renovation; clean renewable energy projects; refinancing of outstanding government debt in regions affected by natural disasters; conservation of forest land; investment in energy conservation; and for economic development purposes. The relative appeal of TCBs and municipal bonds is dependent on issuer and investor characteristics and on economic conditions. Bonds that are no longer being issued may still be held by the public. In the 114 th Congress, multiple bills have been introduced to extend or modify certain TCB programs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) extended the issuing authority of QZABs for the 2015 and 2016 tax years, and provided for $400 million of issuing capacity for each year. Other legislation, including H.R. 2676 and S. 1515 would extend the BAB program indefinitely. Additionally, the President's FY2017 Budget included a number of proposals related to TCBs, including the creation of a new TCB for certain infrastructure programs. Qualified School Construction Bonds (QSCBs) are for school construction, Build America Bonds (BABs) are for any governmental purpose, and Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds (RZEDBs) are for economic development purposes. The method of determining the credit rate differs across types of TCBs: the credit rate for investor and issuer credit TCBs depends on a national credit rate set by Treasury, while the credit rate for direct payment TCBs is dependent on interest rate negotiations between the issuer and investor. The investor credit TCB rate is set at the higher amount to ensure the market for the bonds clears. Note that P.L. 110-246 , enacted in June of 2008, created Section 54A of the tax code. As Table 2 shows, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 , ARRA) included several bond provisions that use a tax credit mechanism. Specifically, ARRA created QSCBs. These new bonds, BABs and RZEDBs, are also unlike other tax credit bonds in that the interest rate on the bonds is a rate agreed to by the issuer and bond investor. The resulting investor tax credit amount or issuer direct payment is equal to 35% of the interest payment for BABs and 45% for RZEDBs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. To qualify for the program, the school must also be a "Qualified Zone Academy." Clean Renewable Energy Bonds26
As authorized by P.L. The Secretary of the Treasury reviews applications and selects projects "as the Secretary deems appropriate." Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds
QECBs were first created under P.L. Similar to the new CREBs, these tax credit bonds offer a credit rate that is 70% of the credit rate offered on old CREBs and other TCBs. | Nearly all state and local governments sell bonds to finance public projects and certain qualified private activities. The federal government subsidizes state and local bond issuances through a number of policies. One such policy is the Tax Credit Bond (TCB), which provides a tax credit or direct payment to the issuer or investor that is proportional to the bond's face value. TCBs represent an alternative to tax-exempt bonds, which exclude interest earnings from the investor's federal taxable income. This report explains the tax credit mechanism and describes the market for TCBs.
The majority of TCBs are designated for a specific purpose, location, or project. Issuers use the proceeds for public school construction and renovation; clean renewable energy projects; refinancing of outstanding government debt in regions affected by natural disasters; conservation of forest land; investment in energy conservation; and for economic development purposes. The relative appeal of TCBs and municipal bonds is dependent on issuer and investor characteristics and on economic conditions.
The first tax credit bonds, qualified zone academy bonds (QZABs), were introduced as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) and first issued in 1998. Clean renewable energy bonds (CREBs) were created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), and were later modified as "new" CREBs in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343). Gulf tax credit bonds (GTCBs) were created by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-135). Qualified forestry conservation bonds (QFCBs) were created by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246). Qualified energy conservation bonds (QECBs) and Midwest Disaster Bonds (MWDBs) were created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343).
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, ARRA) included several bond provisions that use a tax credit or issuer direct payment. Specifically, ARRA created Qualified School Constructions Bonds (QSCBs), Build America Bonds (BABs) and Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds (RZEDBs). Unlike other tax credit bonds, the interest rate on the BABs and RZEDBs is a rate agreed to by the issuer and investor and the issuers receive direct payments from the Treasury. In contrast, the Secretary of the Treasury sets the credit rate for the other TCBs. The credit rate differs across TCB programs. The QZAB and QSCB credit rate is set at 100% and the "new CREB" and QECB credit rate is set at 70% of the interest cost. In contrast, the BAB tax credit rate is 35%.
Most of the TCBs to date have been established as temporary tax provisions. The authority to issue several TCBs, including GTCBs and CREBs, has expired in recent years. The only permanent TCB, QECBs, are currently fully subscribed. Bonds that are no longer being issued may still be held by the public. In the 114th Congress, multiple bills have been introduced to extend or modify certain TCB programs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) extended the issuance authority of QZABs for the 2015 and 2016 tax years, and provided for $400 million of issuing capacity for each year. Other legislation, including H.R. 2676 and S. 1515 would extend the BAB program indefinitely. Additionally, the President's FY2017 Budget included a number of proposals related to TCBs, including the creation of a new TCB for certain infrastructure programs. |
crs_RL33705 | crs_RL33705_0 | Introduction
Oil is a dominant source of energy in the United States, accounting for approximately 37% of total energy consum ption in 2016. Vast quantities of oil continuously enter the country via vessel or pipeline. Vast quantities continually move throughout the country to various destinations. With such widespread use and nonstop movement, it is inevitable that some number of spills will occur. Over the past few decades, two major U.S. oil spills have had lasting repercussions that transcended local environmental and economic effects:
1. 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill: On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred at the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in 11 fatalities. According to estimates, the well released more than 100 million gallons of oil before it was contained 86 days later. 2. The spill data include incidents from vessels, facilities, and pipelines. This historical decline is likely related, at least in part, to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which was enacted after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. PHMSA Data
PHMSA collects oil spill data for pipelines and rail transportation—two modes of oil transportation that have received attention in recent years. Impacts of Oil Spills in Aquatic Environments
The impacts of an oil spill depend on the size of the spill, the rate of the spill, the type of oil spilled, and the location of the spill. Depending on timing and location, even a relatively minor spill can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from days to years, or even decades for certain spills. The governing framework for oil spills in the United States remains a combination of federal, state, and international authorities. Within this framework, several federal agencies have the authority to implement oil spill regulations. OPA Section 4201 amended Section 311(c) of the CWA to provide the President (delegated to the U.S. Coast Guard or EPA) with authority to perform cleanup immediately using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or direct the spiller's cleanup activities. The federal government—specifically the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for spills in the Coast Guard's jurisdiction—determines the level of cleanup required. OPA provided limited defenses from liability: act of God, act of war, and act or omission of certain third parties. The fund may be used for several purposes:
prompt payment of costs for responding to and removing oil spills; payment of the costs incurred by the federal and state trustees of natural resources for assessing the injuries to natural resources caused by an oil spill, and developing and implementing the plans to restore or replace the injured natural resources; payment of parties' claims for uncompensated removal costs, and for uncompensated damages (e.g., financial losses of fishermen, hotels, and beachfront businesses); payment for the net loss of government revenue, and for increased public services by a state or its political subdivisions; and payment of federal administrative and operational costs, including research and development, and $25 million per year for the Coast Guard's operating expenses. In complementary legislation, Congress imposed a 5-cent-per-barrel tax on the oil industry to support the fund. At the end of FY2017, the projected balance is $5.4 billion. Agency responsibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) oil spill response and cleanup and (2) oil spill prevention/preparedness. Oil spill response authority is determined by the location of the spill: the Coast Guard has response authority in the coastal zone, and the EPA covers the inland zone. Prevention and Preparedness
Regarding oil spill prevention and preparedness duties, jurisdiction is determined by the potential sources (e.g., vessels, facilities, pipelines) of oil spills. A series of executive orders (EOs), coupled with memoranda of understanding (MOU), have established the various agency responsibilities. | Oil is a primary source of energy in the United States. Domestic oil production has increased in recent years, and vast quantities of oil continually enter the country via vessel or pipeline, moving throughout the country to various destinations. With such widespread use and nonstop movement, it is inevitable that some number of spills will occur.
Oil spills have raised environmental concerns for decades. Several major U.S. oil spills have had lasting repercussions that transcended local environmental and economic effects: the1969 well blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara, California; the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska; and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. More recent spills in various locations from other sources, including pipelines and rail transportation, have garnered attention from policymakers. The impacts of an oil spill depend on the size of the spill, the rate of the spill, the type of oil spilled, and the location of the spill. Depending on timing and location, even a relatively minor spill can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from days to years, or even decades for certain spills.
Over the past two decades, the annual number and volume of oil spills have shown declines—in some cases, dramatic declines. However, this trend was altered dramatically by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The incident led to a significant release of oil: According to estimates, the well released more than 100 million gallons of oil before it was contained on July 15, 2010 (86 days later). Scientists continue to study the fate and impact of the spill.
The governing framework for oil spills in the United States remains a combination of federal, state, and international authorities. Within this framework, several federal agencies have the authority to implement oil spill regulations. Agency responsibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) oil spill response and cleanup and (2) oil spill prevention/preparedness.
Oil spill response authority is determined by the location of the spill: the U.S. Coast Guard has response authority in the U.S. coastal zone, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) covers the inland zone. The Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990, provides the federal authority to perform cleanup immediately using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or direct the spiller's cleanup activities. The lead federal responder (either from Coast Guard or EPA) determines the level of cleanup required. Federal responders have immediate access to funds in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to support cleanup activities. The trust fund is primarily financed by a per-barrel tax on domestic crude oil and imported petroleum products. The fund's balance is estimated to reach $5.4 billion at the end of FY2017.
Parties responsible for an oil spill may be liable for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and specific economic damages, including personal property damage and lost profits or earning capacity. OPA provided (1) limited defenses from liability—act of God, act of war, and act or omission of certain third parties—and (2) conditional liability limits (or caps) for cleanup costs and other damages.
Jurisdiction over oil spill prevention and preparedness duties is determined by the potential sources (e.g., vessels, facilities, pipelines) of oil spills. A series of executive orders, coupled with memoranda of understanding, have established the various agency responsibilities. For example, EPA oversees onshore facilities, the Coast Guard oversees vessels, the Department of Transportation oversees pipelines and rail transportation, and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management oversees offshore facilities (e.g., oil platforms). |
crs_R44760 | crs_R44760_0 | S ection 1332 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) allows states to apply for waivers of specified provisions of the ACA. Under a state innovation waiver, a state is expected to implement a plan (in place of the waived provisions) that meets certain minimum requirements. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS's) initial interpretation of these requirements was published in guidance released in 2015 but has since been superseded, as with other aspects of the waiver process, in updated guidance released by the agency on October 24, 2018. Under current guidance, the state's plan must provide health insurance coverage to as many state residents as would be covered absent the waiver and must make available to a comparable number of residents coverage that is both as affordable and as comprehensive as it would be absent the waiver. However, applications do not need to demonstrate that the affordable and comprehensive health insurance coverage will be purchased by a comparable number of state residents. Additionally, the state's plan cannot increase the federal deficit. A state may apply to waive any or all of the ACA provisions listed below for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017. In general, the provisions in Part I relate to the establishment of qualified health plans (QHPs). The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to review and grant waiver requests for provisions not included in the IRC; the Secretary of the Treasury is to review and grant requests to waive provisions in the IRC (the availability of premium tax credits and the application of the employer and individual mandates). The materials include, but are not limited to, information about the enacted state legislation allowing the state to carry out the actions under the waiver, a description of the plan or program the state expects to implement in place of the waived provisions, and analyses showing that the state's plan or program meets the requirements for granting a waiver. How Long Can a State Innovation Waiver Be in Effect? How Many States Have Applied for State Innovation Waivers? As of the date of this report, 14 states have submitted applications for state innovation waivers—Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. All of these waivers were considered and approved under the initial state innovation waiver guidance, and all but one of the approved waivers implement a variant of a statewide individual market reinsurance program. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Vermont received notification from HHS and the Treasury that their applications were incomplete, and it does not appear that any of these states has modified its application in response to the notification. If one of these three states does take action, any further review of its waiver application would be under the updated state innovation waiver guidance. California, Iowa, and Oklahoma have withdrawn their applications. | Section 1332 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) provides states with the option to waive specified requirements of the ACA. In the absence of these requirements, a state is to implement its own plan to provide health insurance coverage to state residents that meets the ACA's terms.
Under a state innovation waiver, a state can apply to waive ACA requirements related to qualified health plans, health insurance exchanges, premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, the individual mandate, and the employer mandate. The state can apply to waive any or all of these requirements, in part or in their entirety.
To obtain approval for a waiver application, a state must show that the plan it will implement in the absence of the waived provision(s) meets certain requirements. Under current guidance, the state's plan must provide coverage to as many state residents as would be covered absent the waiver and must make available to a comparable number of residents coverage that is both as affordable and as comprehensive as would be absent the waiver. However, applications do not need to demonstrate that the affordable and comprehensive coverage will be purchased by a comparable number of state residents. Additionally, the state's plan cannot increase the federal deficit.
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Secretary of the Treasury share responsibility for reviewing state innovation waiver applications and deciding whether to approve applications. The earliest a state innovation waiver could have gone into effect was January 1, 2017.
In October 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released updated guidance regarding the state innovation waiver process that superseded previously issued CMS guidance from December 2015. In general, the updated guidance attempts to make it easier for a state plan to be approved. The updated guidance applies to all waiver applications that had not been approved prior to the date of the guidance's release. Waivers approved under the previously issued guidance did not require reconsideration.
As of the date of this report, eight states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin—have approved state innovation waivers. All of these waivers were considered and approved under the initial state innovation waiver guidance, and all but one of the approved waivers implement a variant of a statewide individual market reinsurance program.
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Vermont have submitted applications and received notification that their applications were incomplete. It does not appear that any of these states has modified its application in response to the notification (as of the date of this report). If these states take action, any further review of their waiver application would be under the updated state innovation waiver guidance. Three states—California, Iowa, and Oklahoma—submitted waiver applications and have since withdrawn their applications. |
crs_RL31884 | crs_RL31884_0 | Background
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, there has been considerable interest in legislation to expand the citizenship benefits of aliens serving in the military. The reported deaths in action of noncitizen soldiers drew attention to provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that grant posthumous citizenship to those who die as a result of active-duty service during a period of hostilities and to the advantages of further expediting naturalization for noncitizens serving in the United States military, beyond the former special naturalization rules for aliens with service in the U.S. military. Title XVII of P.L. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Executive Order 13269
On July 3, 2002, President George W. Bush officially designated the period beginning on September 11, 2001, the War on Terrorism, as a "period of hostilities," which triggered immediate naturalization eligibility for active-duty U.S. military service members. There continues to be congressional interest in further streamlining and expediting the naturalization process for military personnel and in providing immigration benefits specifically for immediate relatives of such personnel. 108-136
P.L. 1588 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, became P.L. 108-136 on November 24, 2003. 1588 , entitled "Naturalization and Other Immigration Benefits for Military Personnel and Families," amended existing military naturalization statutes by:
reducing the period of service required for naturalization based on peacetime service from three years to one year; waiving fees for naturalization based on military service during peacetime or wartime; permitting discretionary revocation of naturalization granted on or after the date of enactment through peacetime or wartime service if the citizen were discharged from military service under other than honorable conditions before serving honorably for an aggregate period of five years; permitting naturalization processing overseas in U.S. embassies, consulates, and military bases; providing for priority consideration for military leave and transport to finalize naturalization; extending naturalization based on wartime service to members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary's designee within the USCIS is authorized to request posthumous citizenship immediately upon obtaining permission from the next-of-kin. The law also expanded immigration benefits available to the immediate relatives of citizens, including posthumous citizens, who die from injuries or illnesses resulting from or aggravated by serving in combat. The effective date of the provisions is retroactive to September 11, 2001, except for the fee waivers and provision for naturalization proceedings abroad, which took effect on October 1, 2004. Legislation in the 110th Congress
Sections 673 and 674 of P.L. 110-181 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (January 28, 2008), respectively, (1) ensure reentry into the United States by LPRs who are spouses and children accompanying a military service member abroad who might otherwise be deemed to have abandoned their LPR status and (2) provide for the treatment of periods abroad accompanying the service member as periods in the United States for residence and physical presence purposes and also provide for overseas naturalization for such spouses and children. P.L. 110-382 , the Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act, expedites certain military service-related applications by establishing a FBI liaison office in USCIS to monitor the completion of FBI background checks and setting a deadline for processing such naturalization applications. | Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, there has been and continues to be considerable congressional interest in further streamlining and expediting the naturalization process for military personnel and in providing immigration benefits specifically for immediate relatives of such personnel. The reported deaths in action of noncitizen soldiers drew attention to the immigration laws that grant posthumous citizenship and to the advantages of further expediting naturalization for noncitizens serving in the United States military. President George W. Bush officially designated the period beginning on September 11, 2001, as a "period of hostilities," which triggered immediate naturalization eligibility for active-duty U.S. military service members. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are cooperating to ensure that military naturalization applications are processed expeditiously.
Title XVII of P.L. 108-136, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (November 24, 2003), amended existing military naturalization statutes by reducing the period of service required for naturalization based on peacetime service from three years to one year; waiving fees for naturalization based on military service during peacetime or wartime; permitting naturalization processing overseas in U.S. embassies, consulates, and military bases; providing for priority consideration for military leave and transport to finalize naturalization; and by extending naturalization based on wartime service to members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve. The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary's designee within the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services was authorized to request posthumous citizenship with permission from the next-of-kin. The law also expanded immigration benefits available to the immediate relatives (spouses, children, and parents) of citizens, including posthumous citizens, who die from injuries or illnesses resulting from or aggravated by serving in combat. The effective date was retroactive to September 11, 2001, except for the fee waivers and provision for naturalization proceedings abroad, effective October 1, 2004.
Efforts since P.L. 108-136 have focused on further streamlining procedures or extending immigration benefits to immediate relatives of U.S. service members. Most recently, P.L. 110-382, the Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act, expedited certain military service-related applications by establishing a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) liaison office in USCIS to monitor the completion of FBI background checks and by setting a deadline for processing such naturalization applications. P.L. 110-251, the Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act, streamlined background checks, particularly regarding biometric data. Sections 673 and 674 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (January 28, 2008), ensured reentry into the United States by lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who are spouses and children accompanying a military service member abroad (whose presence abroad might otherwise be deemed as abandonment of LPR status) and also provided for overseas naturalization for such LPRs. This report will be updated as legislative activity occurs or other events warrant. |
crs_R40095 | crs_R40095_0 | The United States has provided virtually no assistance since early 2009, though episodically there have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama Administration, like the George W. Bush Administration, has said that it would be willing to provide "significant" energy and economic assistance to North Korea if Pyongyang takes steps to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program. However, due to the deterioration in U.S.-North Korea relations, at the time of this writing there is little likelihood the Obama Administration will provide assistance to North Korea in the near future. From July 2007 to April 2009, the United States provided technical assistance to North Korea to help in the nuclear disablement process. North Korea again tested a nuclear device in February 2013. As discussed in the U.S. Food Assistance section below, Members of Congress have a number of tools they could use to influence the implementation of future aid programs with North Korea. According to the WFP and the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, in 2013, an improved harvest appeared to reduce North Korea's chronic grain shortfall to some of the lowest levels since the 1990s. The fact that as of March 2014, such South Korean government aid has been relatively small-scale and has not been provided directly to North Korea may be a factor in U.S. support for South Korea's policy. U.S. Energy Assistance
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
From 1995 to 2002, the United States provided over $400 million in energy assistance to North Korea under the terms of the U.S.-North Korean 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the DPRK agreed to halt its existing plutonium-based nuclear program in exchange for energy aid from the United States and other countries. The United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia also stated their "willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK." In separate committee actions, House and Senate appropriators rejected these requests, in large part due to North Korea's withdrawal from the Six-Party process and subsequent missile and nuclear tests in the spring of 2009. Since the 2009 tests, Congress has specifically prohibited energy assistance to North Korea. Congress and Denuclearization Assistance
The last time the Obama Administration requested funds specifically for denuclearization work in North Korea was in the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Request: $47 million for the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) "to support dismantlement of nuclear facilities in North Korea" and $34.5 million for Department of Energy (DOE). Since then, funding requests for NDF have not referenced North Korea. Pyongyang has resisted making economic reforms that would help pay for food imports or increase domestic production, as well as the political reforms that would allow for a more equitable distribution of food. Additionally, the North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to monitor shipments of aid. Multiple sources have asserted that a sizeable amount of the food assistance going to North Korea is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses. In a February 2014 report, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea's human rights conditions stated that the North Korean government "has used food as a means of control over the population." North Korea's rulers, according to the Commission, by "knowingly causing prolonged starvation" were found to have committed to crimes against humanity. In part because of the North Korean government's unwillingness or inability to ensure a more equitable distribution of food, some contend that it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans who may not otherwise have had sufficient access. According to this line of reasoning, food aid possibly staved off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in the mid- to late 1990s. North Korea then began asking outside donors—including the United States and South Korea—for additional aid. Options and Considerations for Future Food Aid to North Korea
Along the spectrum of continuing the status quo (i.e., no food aid) and providing food without any conditions, the Administration and Congress face a number of options and considerations when deciding whether and how to resume food aid to North Korea, including the following:
Establish explicit "diplomatic" linkages by conditioning food aid on progress in security-related talks, such as negotiations regarding the North's nuclear programs. Park Geun-hye's government has indicated that it is willing to provide humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people regardless of the diplomatic situation. | Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance: slightly more than 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea, though episodically there have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama Administration officials have said that they would be willing to consider other types of aid if North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear program, a prospect that most analysts view as increasingly remote. As of March 2014, barring an unexpected breakthrough, there appears little likelihood the Obama Administration will provide large-scale assistance of any type to North Korea in the near future. Members of Congress have a number of tools they could use to influence the development and implementation of aid programs with North Korea.
Food Aid. Large swathes of North Korea's population have suffered from chronic malnutrition since the mid-1990s. Food aid—largely from China, South Korea, and the United States—has been essential in filling the gap between North Korea's supply and demand, though since 2009 donations from all countries except China have dwindled to a minimal amount. Observers and activists attribute the North Korea's malnutrition and occasional starvation problems to food shortages—which at times have been massive—and more fundamentally to the unequal distribution of food caused in large measure by the North Korean government's deliberate decisions and policies. In 2013, an improved harvest appeared to reduce North Korea's chronic grain shortfall to some of the lowest levels since the 1990s. Yet outside food groups reported continued malnutrition among vulnerable sectors of the population, especially children. In 2014, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korea's human rights conditions found that the North Korean government's "act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation" amounted to crimes against humanity.
Providing food to North Korea poses a number of dilemmas. Pyongyang has resisted reforms that would allow the equitable distribution of food and help pay for food imports. The North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country. Additionally, multiple sources have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses. However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, at times possibly staving off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid-late 1990s, when 5%-10% of the population died. South Korean President Park Geun-hye's government has indicated that it would be willing to offer North Korea food aid as part of her plan to foster a "new era" in inter-Korean relations. In 2013, the South Korean government donated around $12 million to United Nations humanitarian organizations that supply humanitarian aid, including some food, in North Korea.
Energy Assistance. Between 1995 and 2009, the United States provided around $600 million in energy assistance to North Korea. The aid was given over two time periods—1995-2003 and 2007-2009—in exchange for North Korea freezing its plutonium-related nuclear facilities. In 2008 and 2009, North Korea also took steps to disable these facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided since 2009, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Six-Party Talks—involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—over North Korea's nuclear program. The move followed condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea's April 2009 launch of a suspected long-range missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device.
Denuclearization Assistance. In 2007 and 2008, the United States gave technical assistance to North Korea's nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea's actions in the spring of 2009, Congress rejected the Obama Administration's requests for supplemental funds to use in case of a return to denuclearization. Since then, Congress has not approved and the administration has not requested any funds for denuclearization since North Korea has not agreed to return to the nuclear disarmament process. |
crs_R41960 | crs_R41960_0 | Introduction
The federal government consumed roughly 57.4 million megawatt-hours (0.1958 quads) of electricity to operate all of its U.S. facilities in FY2007 (the latest information available), making it the single largest U.S. electric consumer. The Department of Defense (DOD) alone consumed more than half, some 29 million megawatt-hours. However, the federal Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) generate hydropower at more than twice the volume of annual federal power consumption, over 127 million megawatt-hours. EPAct 2005 required federal agencies to reduce energy consumption and improve energy efficiency through increased use of renewable energy. As federal agencies work to meet their renewable energy goals, they encounter a number of options and barriers in contracting with small renewable power generators. This report summarizes the various statutes and regulations authorizing the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and other federal agencies to enter into contracts for their electric utility services and purchase of renewable generated electricity. Utility services include electricity, natural gas, water, sewerage, thermal energy, chilled water, hot water, and steam. GSA, in turn, has delegated to DOD the authority to enter into utility service contracts on behalf of the military departments. The FAR describes an "area-wide contract" as a "contract entered into between the GSA and a utility service supplier to cover utility service needs of Federal agencies within the franchise territory of the supplier" (the utility's geographically regulated service area). Demand-Side Management
Demand response and load management programs are a form of utility incentive programs. In these programs, utility companies typically provide rate incentives and/or cash payments to their customers in exchange for curtailing their energy demand during peak usage periods. Federal agencies can take advantage of this opportunity through their utility service provider. Utility Energy Service Contracts
Utility energy service contracts (UESCs) enable federal agencies to enter contracts with utilities to implement energy- and water-related improvements at their facilities. Agencies may fund projects with appropriations, or the utility may arrange to finance the project and recover the cost through its billing charge. Energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) enable federal agencies to install energy efficiency improvements with no upfront capital expenditure, thus eliminating the need for directly appropriating funds for the energy efficiency improvement. 101-508 ) pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. EISA also authorized federal agencies to combine appropriated funds with ESCO private financing for ESPCs' improvements. Contracts for Energy for Military Installations
DOD has the unique authority to enter into contracts for up to 30 years for services that provide and operate energy production facilities on military installations, and, in turn, purchase the energy generated from such facilities (in 10 U.S.C. Under the 1978 Public Utilities Regulation Policies Act (PURPA), the Southern California Edison (SCE) must buy the power. PURPA defined a new class of generating facilities that would receive special rate and regulatory treatment. PURPA also required utilities to buy power from QFs within their service territory (with some exceptions) at the utility's "avoided cost" of power production via a state authorized "power purchase" contract—more commonly referred to as a "power purchase agreement." However, state laws and regulations vary on allowing small qualified generators to sell the agreements. States are more likely to permit their use for renewable generated power when the purchaser is a utility, because the utility is responsible for providing firm uninterrupted power to its customers. The 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct) directed a study to determine the economic and engineering feasibility of combining wind generated energy with hydropower and a demonstration project that uses wind energy generated by Indian tribes. Contracts for public utility services have terms up to 10 years, funded through annual appropriations. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA, P.L. | The federal government purchases roughly 57 million megawatt-hours of electricity annually (based on FY2007 data, the latest information available), making it the single largest U.S. energy consumer. The Department of Defense (DOD) alone consumes over 29 million megawatt-hours. The federal Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) sell electricity at more than twice the volume of federal power purchases, over 127 million megawatt-hours of hydropower annually, and are projected to produce wind-generated energy far in excess of the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct) mandates for increasing federal use of renewable energy.
Various statutes and regulations authorize federal agencies to enter into contracts for their utility services and designate the General Services Administration (GSA) as the lead federal contracting agency. Utility services include electricity, natural gas, water, sewerage, thermal energy, chilled water, hot water, and steam. GSA may enter into "area-wide contracts" for up to 10 years with electric utility service suppliers to cover the needs of federal agencies within the supplier's franchise territory. GSA has delegated certain authority to DOD to enter into utility service contracts on behalf of the military departments, and delegated similar authority to other federal agencies. DOD can also enter into contracts for up to 30 years for services to operate energy generating facilities on military installations. To meet the EPAct renewable energy goals, multi-year "power purchase agreements" (upwards of 10 to 20 years) are proposed with small and merchant renewable power generators. The agreements would fully commit funds up front, contrary to the pay-as-you-go rules of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act.
In addition to utility service contracts, federal agencies can also take advantage of utility sponsored incentive programs for reducing energy demand. Demand response and load management programs provide rate incentives and/or cash payments to utility customers in exchange for curtailing their energy demand during peak usage periods. Utility energy service contracts (UESCs) enable federal agencies to enter into contracts with utilities to implement energy and water related improvements at their facilities. Agencies may also fund energy-savings improvement projects with appropriations, or the utility may arrange to finance the project's capital cost up front and recover the investment through its rate charge. Energy saving performance contracts (ESPCs) enable federal agencies to install energy efficiency improvements with no upfront capital costs. The 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) authorized federal agencies to combine appropriated funds and energy service companies' (ESCO) private financing for ESPCs. The authority expands agencies' opportunities to install solar energy generation.
The 1978 Public Utilities Regulation Policies Act (PURPA) defined a new class of small renewable energy generators that produce less than 80 megawatts and required electric utilities to purchase the electricity generated at the utility's "avoided cost" of power production via a state-authorized "power purchase" contract (also referred to as a power purchase agreement). However, state laws and regulations vary on the use of the contracts. States are more likely to permit the contracts when the purchaser is a utility, because the utility is responsible for providing firm uninterrupted power to the customer. Four PMAs market and distribute hydropower in 34 states to public utility districts and cooperatives at cost-based rates. EPAct directed the PMAs to study the economic and engineering feasibility of combining wind-generated energy with hydropower and to conduct a demonstration project that uses wind energy generated by Indian tribes. Short of amending federal contract authority, federal agencies may have recourse to meet EPAct mandates by purchasing power through the PMAs. |
crs_RL34272 | crs_RL34272_0 | If Congress establishes a federal program to manage or reduce GHG emissions, the emission requirements would likely impact different states differently. However, predicting the different impacts of policies is a complicated task, because multiple factors play a role. Such factors include alternative design elements of a GHG emissions reduction program, the availability and relative cost of mitigation options, and the regulated entities' abilities to pass compliance costs on to consumers. In this report, GHG emissions intensity is a measure of GHG emissions from state sources divided by the state's overall economic output, or gross state product. An analysis of these factors and how they compare among the states may contribute to a more informed debate regarding potential policy approaches. Annual growth rates for GHG emissions and the emission drivers vary significantly among the U.S. states. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensity
Of the three GHG emission drivers—population, per capita income, and GHG emissions intensity—the most relevant in terms of climate change policy is GHG intensity. In fact, if the United States is to reduce its emissions, while maintaining population and per capita income growth rates, a stringent reduction in GHG emissions intensity would be required. The primary factors that determine CO 2 emissions intensity in a state are its energy intensity and the carbon content of its energy use (or fuel mix). Energy Intensity
Energy intensity is the amount of energy a state consumes—typically measured in tons of oil equivalent (toe)—per its level of economic output (gross state product). Economic Structure
A state's economic structure likely plays an important role. A measure that tracks personal transportation use in a state is vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per person. A state's per capita VMT is another factor that likely impacts a state's energy intensity. Electricity Exports/Imports
Another important factor that affects a state's carbon content of energy use is whether the state is a net importer or exporter of electricity. In the above carbon content of energy data ( Table 7 ), if one state uses an energy source (e.g., coal) to generate electricity and then sells the electricity to a consumer in a second state, the CO 2 emissions are attributed to the generating state, but the energy use is attributed to the consuming state. States with high energy intensity may have a high percentage of carbon-intensive industries (e.g., manufacturing). To stabilize national GHG emission growth, the entire United States would need to achieve annual reductions in GHG intensity of approximately 3% (assuming population and income continue to grow at a combined rate of 3%). Reducing GHG emissions in the United States would necessitate further declines in GHG intensity. | Instituting policies to manage or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would likely impact different states differently. Understanding these differences may provide for a more informed debate regarding potential policy approaches. However, multiple factors play a role in determining impacts, including alternative design elements of a GHG emissions reduction program, the availability and relative cost of mitigation options, and the regulated entities' abilities to pass compliance costs on to consumers.
Three primary variables drive a state's human-related GHG emission levels: population, per capita income, and the GHG emissions intensity. GHG emissions intensity is a performance measure. In this report, GHG intensity is a measure of GHG emissions from sources within a state compared with a state's economic output (gross state product, GSP). The GHG emissions intensity driver stands apart as the main target for climate change mitigation policy, because public policy generally considers population and income growth to be socially positive.
The intensity of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions largely determines overall GHG intensity, because CO2 emissions account for 85% of the GHG emissions in the United States. As 98% of U.S. CO2 emissions are energy-related, the primary factors that shape CO2 emissions intensity are a state's energy intensity and the carbon content of its energy use.
Energy intensity measures the amount of energy a state uses to generate its overall economic output (measured by its GSP). Several underlying factors may impact a state's energy intensity: a state's economic structure, personal transportation use in a state (measured in vehicle miles traveled per person), and public policies regarding energy efficiency.
The carbon content of energy use in a state is determined by a state's portfolio of energy sources. States that utilize a high percentage of coal, for example, will have a relatively high carbon content of energy use, compared to states with a lower dependence on coal. An additional factor is whether a state is a net exporter or importer of electricity, because CO2 emissions are attributed to electricity-producing states, but the electricity is used (and counted) in the consuming state.
Between 1990 and 2000, the United States reduced its GHG intensity by 1.6% annually. Assuming that population and per capita income continue to grow as expected, the United States would need to reduce its GHG intensity at the rate of 3% per year in order to halt the annual growth in GHG emissions. Therefore, achieving reductions (or negative growth) in GHG emissions would necessitate further declines in GHG intensity. |
crs_R41103 | crs_R41103_0 | Introduction
In 2007, the Supreme Court rendered one of its most important environmental decisions. The case, Massachusetts v. EPA , was a challenge to the denial by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of a petition asking it to take two actions—(a) find under the Clean Air Act (CAA) that greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted from new motor vehicles "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," through their climate change effects, then (b) issue standards for those GHG emissions. EPA chose option (a)—that is, to make a positive "endangerment finding" for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles. In 2014, the Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA rejected EPA's argument that regulation of motor vehicle GHG emissions necessarily triggers PSD new source review of the same emissions from stationary sources. This report is a chronology of the major climate change-related actions taken by federal agencies, principally EPA, in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA . Most of the listed actions trace directly or indirectly back to the Massachusetts decision. In contrast, a few were included solely because of their relevance to climate change and their occurrence post- Massachusetts . That is, they were not legally compelled by Massachusett s v. EPA or EPA actions in compliance therewith. More analytical treatment of the listed agency actions may be found in other CRS reports. 2008
Mar ch 6: EPA denies California's request for waiver of CAA preemption . This document sets out EPA's view of the legal implications were EPA to make a positive endangerment finding for GHGs from new motor vehicles—as discussed in the introduction of this report, "option (a)" offered by the Supreme Court. Dec ember 15: EPA finalizes endangerment finding for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles . The memorandum directs EPA to issue a revised version of its 2012 proposed new source performance standards for GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants. November 4: EPA proposes emission guidelines for CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units in Indian country and U.S. territories. December 24 : Council on Environmental Quality issues revised draft guidance . As asserted in the revised draft guidance, its purpose is "to provide Federal agencies direction on when and how to consider the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate change in their evaluation of all proposed Federal actions in accordance with [NEPA and CEQ regulations]." | In 2007, the Supreme Court rendered one of its most important environmental decisions. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held 5-4 that greenhouse gases (GHGs), widely viewed as contributing to climate change, constitute "air pollutants" as that phrase is used in the Clean Air Act (CAA). As a result, said the Court, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had improperly denied a petition seeking CAA regulation of GHG emissions from new motor vehicles by citing, among other reasons, the agency's lack of authority over such emissions.
This report offers a chronology of major federal agency actions, mainly by EPA, that involve GHGs or climate change and that occurred after Massachusetts v. EPA. Most of the listed actions trace directly or indirectly back to the decision. Examples include EPA's "endangerment finding" for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles; the resulting EPA standards (issued on multiple occasions) for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles; EPA's proposal of performance standards (again on separate occasions) for CO2 emissions from new, and modified or reconstructed, fossil fuel-fired power plants; and EPA's proposal of emission guidelines for CO2 emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants. Several listed EPA actions, taken on the agency's view that regulation of GHG emissions from new motor vehicles triggers new source review of GHG stationary sources, are now either void or will have to be limited slightly in scope, owing to the 2014 decision of the Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.
A few agency actions were included in the report solely because of their relevance to climate change and their post-Massachusetts occurrence—that is, they were not legally compelled by Massachusetts v. EPA or EPA actions tracing back to that decision. Examples include EPA's responses to California's request for a waiver of CAA preemption allowing that state to set its own limits for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles; OMB's "social cost of carbon" dollar amount to be used in agency cost-benefit analyses; the Council on Environmental Quality's draft guidance on how climate change is to be considered in environmental impact statements; and EPA's monitoring rule for GHG emissions.
More analytical treatment of the government actions in this report may be found in other CRS reports listed in footnote 16 herein. |
crs_RL33938 | crs_RL33938_0 | Starting in 2006, commercial migratory beekeepers along the East Coast of the United States began reporting sharp declines in their honey bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). Current reports indicate that beekeepers in most states have been affected. Overall, the number of managed honey bee colonies dropped an estimated 35.8% and 31.8% in the winters of 2007/2008 and 2006/2007, respectively. Preliminary loss estimates for the 2008/2009 winter are reported at 28.6%. To date, the precise reasons for colony losses are not yet known. In the United States, bee pollination of agricultural crops is said to account for about one-third of the U.S. diet, and to contribute to the production of a wide range of high-value fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, forage crops, some field crops, and other specialty crops. The monetary value of honey bees as commercial pollinators in the United States is estimated at about $15 billion annually ( Table 1 ). How CCD Differs from Past Bee Colony Losses
Current bee colony losses seem to differ from past losses in that colony losses are occurring mostly because bees are failing to return to the hive (which is largely uncharacteristic of bee behavior); bee colony losses have been rapid; colony losses are occurring in large numbers; and the reason why these losses are occurring remains still largely unknown. As outlined in USDA's 2007-2008 progress report, the available research over the past few years on the numerous possible causes for CCD has led USDA and university researchers to conclude that "no single factor alone is responsible" for CCD. Currently, USDA states, researchers are focusing on three major possibilities:
1. pesticides that may be having unexpected negative effects on honey bees; 2. a new parasite or pathogen that may be attacking honey bees, such as the parasite Nosema ceranae or viruses; and 3. a combination of existing stresses that may compromise the immune system of bees and disrupt their social system, making colonies more susceptible to disease and collapse. Stresses could include high levels of infection by the V arroa mite; poor nutrition due to apiary overcrowding, pollination of crops with low nutritional value, or pollen or nectar scarcity; exposure to limited or contaminated water supplies; and migratory stress. As outlined in USDA's progress report, prior study of the numerous possible causes for CCD has led researchers to further examine the hypothesis that CCD may be "a syndrome caused by many different factors, working in combination or synergistically." Available USDA Research Funding
Funding for honey bee and CCD research at USDA's ARS has increased, following enactment of the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ) and also FY2009 and FY2010 appropriations ( P.L. 111-8 and P.L. 111-80 , respectively), which, among other things, provide additional funding for research and conservation programs addressing honey bees and pollinators. | Starting in late 2006, commercial migratory beekeepers along the East Coast of the United States began reporting sharp declines in their honey bee colonies. Because of the severity and unusual circumstances of these colony declines, scientists named this phenomenon colony collapse disorder (CCD). Reports indicate that beekeepers in most states have been affected. Overall, the number of managed honey bee colonies dropped an estimated 35.8% and 31.8% in the winters of 2007/2008 and 2006/2007, respectively. Preliminary loss estimates for the 2008/2009 winter are reported at 28.6%. To date, the precise reasons for colony losses are not yet known.
Honey bees are the most economically valuable pollinators of agricultural crops worldwide. Scientists at universities and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) frequently assert that bee pollination is involved in about one-third of the U.S. diet, and contributes to the production of a wide range of fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, forage crops, some field crops, and other specialty crops. The monetary value of honey bees as commercial pollinators in the United States is estimated at about $15-$20 billion annually.
Honey bee colony losses are not uncommon. However, losses in recent years differ from past situations in that colony losses are occurring mostly because bees are failing to return to the hive (which is largely uncharacteristic of bee behavior); bee colony losses have been rapid; colony losses are occurring in large numbers; and the reason(s) for these losses remains largely unknown.
Based on the available research over the past few years on the numerous possible causes of CCD, USDA concluded in its 2007-2008 progress report (released in June 2009) that "it now seems clear that no single factor alone is responsible for the malady." This has led researchers to further examine the hypothesis that CCD may be "a syndrome caused by many different factors, working in combination or synergistically." Currently, USDA states, researchers are focusing on three major possibilities:
pesticides that may be having unexpected negative effects on honey bees; a new parasite or pathogen that may be attacking honey bees, such as the parasite Nosema ceranae or viruses; and a combination of existing stresses that may compromise the immune system of bees and disrupt their social system, making colonies more susceptible to disease and collapse. Stresses could include high levels of infection by the Varroa mite; poor nutrition due to apiary overcrowding, pollination of crops with low nutritional value, or pollen or nectar scarcity; exposure to limited or contaminated water supplies; and migratory stress.
Funding for honey bee and CCD research at USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) has increased sharply, following both the enactment of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) and the FY2009 and FY2010 appropriations process (P.L. 111-8 and P.L. 111-80, respectively). These legislative actions contained additional provisions that would, among other things, provide additional funding for research and conservation programs addressing honey bees and pollinators. Total ARS funding for honey bee and CCD research averaged more than $7.7 million each in FY2007 and FY2008, increasing to $8.3 million in FY2009 and $9.8 million for FY2010. |
crs_RL33776 | crs_RL33776_0 | Introduction
Attention to environmental issues in the 110 th Congress focused early and heavily on climate change. Hearings were held by at least 10 committees, and 17 bills to cap emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) were introduced. One of the bills, S. 2191 , was reported, May 20, 2008, by the Environment and Public Works Committee, and Senate debate on a modified version ( S. 3036 ) began June 2, 2008. A motion to invoke cloture failed June 6, on a vote of 48-36. Whether or not climate change legislation would amend the Clean Air Act, climate change hearings and markup were among the highest priorities for the committees that have jurisdiction over air issues (principally the Senate Environment and Public Works and House Energy and Commerce Committees). Other clean air issues were not the main focus of attention, but they were addressed, primarily through oversight of Administration actions. And it might affect whether states have authority independent of the federal government to control certain greenhouse gas emissions. A U.S. cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions would face a number of challenges. No federal standards address greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, so the requirement that the state's standards be at least as protective as federal standards would appear to be met. Nevertheless, the EPA Administrator announced on December 19, 2007, that he would deny the waiver request. On February 29, 2008, the Administrator signed a formal decision document denying the waiver. Following the Administrator's decision, legislation was introduced in both the Senate ( S. 2555 ) and the House ( H.R. 5560 ) to overturn the Administrator's denial. The Senate bill was reported, June 27 ( S.Rept. 110-407 ), but no further action was taken. The Court's decision left EPA three options: (a) make a finding that motor vehicle GHG emissions may endanger public health or welfare, and issue emissions standards; (b) make a finding that such emissions do not endanger public health or welfare; or (c) decide that climate change science is so uncertain as to preclude making a finding either way (or cite some other "reasonable explanation" why EPA will not exercise its discretion either way). With this background in mind, the remainder of this report provides a discussion of several interrelated air issues of interest in the 110 th Congress, including revision of the ozone, particulate, and lead standards, the role of independent scientific review in the setting of air quality standards, multi-pollutant legislation and the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) for electric power plants, mercury from power plants, and New Source Review. Challenged in the D.C. The centerpiece of the Bush Administration's approach to regulating power plants has been the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a cap-and-trade regulation designed to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, reducing the downwind effects of these pollutants on attainment of the ozone and PM 2.5 air quality standards. Circuit July 11, 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA , dealing a serious setback to the Administration's approach to controlling power plant pollution. On February 8, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated these regulations as well and remanded them to EPA for reconsideration. Next Steps
Under the D.C. Circuit Rejects EPA ' s Mercury Rules: New Jersey v. EPA , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court rulings in a unanimous decision, finding that EPA's regulations, promulgated in 1980, clearly specified an increase in actual annual emissions as the measure of whether a permit for a modification was required. | Attention to environmental issues in the 110th Congress focused early and heavily on climate change—the state of the science, and whether (and, if so, how) to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Seventeen bills were introduced to establish GHG emission caps, and hearings on climate change were held by at least 10 committees. The Lieberman-Warner bill to establish a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions (S. 2191) was reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, May 20, 2008. Senate debate began on a modified version of the bill (S. 3036) June 2 but ended June 6, as the Senate failed to muster sufficient votes to invoke cloture.
Climate change hearings and markup were among the highest priorities for the committees that have jurisdiction over air issues (principally Senate Environment and Public Works and House Energy and Commerce). Other clean air issues were addressed largely through oversight of Administration actions. Oversight issues included how best to control emissions of mercury and other pollutants from electric power plants; whether EPA's new standards for ambient air concentrations of fine particulates, ozone, and lead adequately reflect the state of the science; and whether EPA's new process for setting ambient air quality standards politicized what traditionally have been scientific judgments.
In addition to EPA, state governments and the courts have taken action on air issues that has stirred congressional interest. On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that EPA has authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles and requiring EPA to make a finding as to whether such emissions endanger public health or welfare. On February 8, 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in New Jersey v. EPA, found EPA's approach to the regulation of power plant mercury emissions to be unlawful. On July 11, 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which would have controlled emissions from power plants affecting air quality in downwind states. Other cases involving climate change, clean air standards, and the regulation of power plants are pending at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and in a number of federal and state courts. Decisions in these cases may prompt hearings or legislation.
States interested in setting more stringent environmental standards are continuing to develop and implement regulations that go well beyond the requirements of federal law. Of particular interest is California's request for a waiver of federal preemption to control greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks. On December 19, 2007, EPA announced that it would deny the waiver request, and the agency's Administrator signed a decision document formalizing his denial, February 29, 2008. California and more than a dozen other states are challenging the denial in court. Legislation was introduced in both the Senate (S. 2555) and the House (H.R. 5560) to overturn the Administrator's decision. The Senate bill was reported June 27, 2008, but no further action was taken. |
crs_RL32852 | crs_RL32852_0 | After the budget was submitted, both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees voted to reorganize the subcommittee structure, and with it the programs included in specific appropriations bills. Under the reorganization, the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill acquired Department of Energy (DOE) programs that previously had been included in the appropriations bill for Interior and Related Agencies. Including these programs, the requested amount for FY2006 Energy and Water Development totaled $29.75 billion. For FY2005, $30.17 billion was appropriated for comparable programs (including emergency supplemental appropriations for the Corps of Engineers). 109-86 ). 2419 would have appropriated $29.75 billion for FY2006 for energy and water development programs, including those formerly included in the Interior and Related Agencies bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of H.R. 2419 on June 16 ( S.Rept. 109-84 ). The bill totaled $31.245 billion. On November 7, 2005, the House-Senate conference on H.R. 2419 agreed to a bill funding these programs at $30.49 billion. The House approved the conference report ( H.Rept. 109-275 ) on November 9; the Senate approved it on November 14. President Bush signed the bill on November 19 ( P.L. 109-103 ). Status
Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill has historically included funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of DOE, and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). 2419 , as reported out by the House Appropriations Committee May 18 and passed by the House May 24, would have appropriated $29.746 billion for energy and water development programs for FY2006. The major actions by the conference committee were to raise funding for the Corps of Engineers by $749 million over the requested amount, in the wake of the Katrina and Rita disasters, and to resolve a difference in the House and Senate bills regarding reprogramming of funding and contracts for Corps projects. (See " Title I: Corps of Engineers .") The conference also reduced funding for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste disposal project. (See " Title III: Department of Energy ," " Nuclear Waste Disposal .") 2419 ( H.Rept. The Senate version of H.R. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill in the past included funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies.
After the budget request for FY2006 was submitted in February 2005, both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reorganized their subcommittee structure and with it the content of the various appropriations bills to be introduced. In the case of Energy and Water Development, the only changes were the consolidation of DOE programs that had previously been funded by the Interior and Related Agencies bill. When these programs are included, the requested amount for FY2006 Energy and Water Development totals $29.75 billion. For FY2005, $30.17 billion was appropriated for comparable programs.
On May 18, 2005, the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 2419 (H.Rept. 109-86), with a total appropriation of $29.75 billion, including the programs formerly funded in the Interior and Related Agencies bill. The House passed the bill May 24. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of H.R. 2419 on June 16 (S.Rept. 109-84), and the Senate passed it June 30. The Senate bill totaled $31.245 billion.
On November 7, 2005, the House-Senate Conference on H.R. 2419 agreed to a bill funding Energy and Water Development programs at $30.49 billion (H.Rept. 109-275). The House approved the conference report November 9, and the Senate November 14. President Bush signed the bill November 19 (P.L. 109-103).
Key budgetary issues involving these programs include:
— the effects of performance-based budgeting and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Army Corps of Engineers priorities, and limiting the reprogramming of funds from one Corps project to another and restricting the use of multiyear contracts (Title I);
— support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) (Title II);
— funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal);
— funding for developing nuclear warheads, in light of congressional action last year to cut funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and for a "Modern Pit Facility" to build nuclear weapons components (Title III: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship); and
— plans to reduce the time necessary to prepare the Nevada Test Site to resume nuclear weapons testing (Title III: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship).
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43691 | crs_R43691_0 | Introduction
Members of Congress have more choices and options available to communicate with constituents than they did 20 years ago. The rise of electronic communications has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members and constituents. Although virtually all Members continue to use traditional communications tools, the use of new technology is increasing. By January 2013, 100% of Senators and 90% of Representatives had adopted Twitter. More recently, Members have begun to adopt video and picture sharing social media services. This report examines Members' use of one of these new electronic communications platforms: Vine. After providing an overview of Vine, the report analyzes patterns of Members' use of Vine. Second, as with any new technology, the number of Members using Vine and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot be easily generalized. Finally, these results cannot be used to predict future behavior. The proportion of adoption by party is consistent with previous research on the adoption of other social media platforms—such as Twitter and Facebook. Concluding Observations
The Evolution of Social Media
The use of Vine by Members of Congress is an evolving phenomenon. Consequently, the opportunities for Members of Congress to use these applications and websites to disseminate public policy positions and constituent services information are also increasing. Regulation
Electronic communications have also raised some concerns. First, existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communications media such as the franking privilege have proven difficult to adapt to new electronic technologies. | In the past 10 years, the rise of social media has expanded the number of options available for communication between Members of Congress and their constituents. Virtually all Members, including all 100 Senators, use Twitter as a tool to communicate legislative, policy, and official actions to interested parties; and the use of other forms of social media, including Facebook, has also proliferated.
The adoption of these technologies has enhanced the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for constituents to communicate with Members and their staff. Electronic communications have also raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communications media such as the franking privilege have proven difficult to adapt to new technologies.
More recently, Members have begun to adopt video and picture sharing social media services. This report examines Members' use of one of these new electronic communications platforms: Vine. After providing an overview of Vine, the report analyzes patterns of Members' use of Vine. This report is inherently a snapshot of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Vine and the patterns of use may change rapidly. Thus, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot be easily generalized, nor can these results be used to predict future behavior.
For more information on the adoption and use of social media by Members of Congress, see CRS Report R43018, Social Networking and Constituent Communications: Members' Use of Twitter and Facebook During a Two-Month Period in the 112th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R43477, Social Media in the House of Representatives: Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33848 | crs_RL33848_0 | As the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, the U.S. government has an interest in ensuring the United Nations operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. On several occasions, it has sought to link U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific reform benchmarks. Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and past secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. The Summit Outcome Document, which was adopted by consensus, laid the foundation for a series of reforms that included improving U.N. management structures; strengthening the Security Council (see text box ); enhancing U.N. system coordination and coherence; and creating a new Human Rights Council (see text box ). Since the World Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward implementing these reform initiatives with varied results. Some reforms are stalled or have not been addressed, while others are underway or completed. Congress and U.N. Reform
Generally, Congress supports the United Nations and its overall mission. Perspectives on Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform
Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that doing so may weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting the United States' ability to conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions. Supporters of linking U.S. funding to specific reforms argue that the United States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. They note that despite diplomatic and political pressures from many countries, the United Nations has been slow to implement substantive reform. In various statements and documents, the Administration has highlighted the following areas of priority:
enforcing budget discipline by taking cost-saving measures such as eliminating vacant U.N. posts, freezing U.N. staff salaries, and exploring alternate budget practices; improving transparency and accountability by strengthening the effectiveness of U.N. bodies charged with evaluating performance and investigating abuses, including the Ethics Office, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, the Board of Auditors, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); reforming human resources practices to create a more mobile and merit-based workforce by further streamlining U.N. staff contracting and conditions of service across the U.N. system; and overhauling day-to-day business practices such as upgrading information technology, and improving procurement procedures, accounting procedures, and budgeting processes. Administration officials expressed dissatisfaction with the overall effectiveness of some previously implemented reforms, as well as the pace of reform efforts. Reform Perspectives and Priorities
A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is finding common ground among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. There is no common definition of U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often debate over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. The Volcker Commission
In April 2004, then-Secretary-General Annan, with the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, appointed an independent high-level commission to inquire into corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq Oil-for-Food Program. The report was presented to member states as a starting point for discussion at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, and included the following management reform recommendations:
the review of all U.N. mandates over five years old; a one-time staff-buyout to ensure U.N. Secretariat staff meets current needs; the establishment of a Cabinet-style decision-making body in the Secretariat to improve management and policy activities; the review of all budget and human resource operations; and a comprehensive review of Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine ways to enhance its authority and effectiveness. These reforms might be achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter reforms. Non-Charter reforms are more common and comparatively easier to achieve. Article 108 states that a proposed Charter amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the full General Assembly, and be ratified "according to the constitutional processes" of two-thirds of U.N. member states, including all permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly has also implemented reforms on its own by adopting proposals introduced by member states or the Secretary-General. | Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) has undergone numerous reforms as international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. system. During the past two decades, controversies such as corruption in the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, and instances of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N. staff have focused attention on the need for change and improvement of the United Nations. Many in the international community, including the United States, continue to promote substantive reforms. The 114th Congress may focus on U.N. reform as it considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United Nations and monitors the progress and implementation of ongoing and previously approved reform measures.
Generally, Congress has maintained a significant interest in the overall effectiveness of the United Nations. Some Members are particularly interested in U.N. Secretariat and management reform, with a focus on improving transparency and strengthening accountability and internal oversight. In the past, Congress has enacted legislation that links U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Supporters of this strategy contend that the United Nations has been slow to implement reforms and that linking payment of U.S. assessments to progress on U.N. reform is the most effective way to motivate member states to efficiently pursue comprehensive reform. Opponents argue that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may negatively impact diplomatic relations and could hinder the United States' ability to conduct foreign policy.
In September 2005, heads of U.N. member states met for the World Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York to discuss strengthening the United Nations through institutional reform. The resulting Summit Outcome Document laid the groundwork for a series of reforms that included enhancing U.N. management structures; strengthening the U.N. Security Council; improving U.N. system coordination and coherence; and creating a new Human Rights Council. Since the Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward implementing these reforms with varied results. Some reforms, such as the creation of the Human Rights Council and improving system-wide coherence, are completed or ongoing. Others reforms, such as Security Council enlargement and changes to management structures and processes, have stalled or not been addressed.
One of the key challenges facing reform advocates is finding common ground among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. There is no single definition of U.N. reform, and consequently there is often debate over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. U.N. member states disagree as to whether some proposed reforms are necessary, as well as how to most effectively implement reforms. Developed countries, for example, support delegating more power to the U.N. Secretary-General to implement management reforms, whereas developing countries fear that giving the Secretary-General more authority may undermine the power of the U.N. General Assembly and therefore the influence of individual countries.
Generally, U.N. reform is achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter reforms. Charter amendment, which requires approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification "according to the constitutional processes" of two-thirds of U.N. member states (including the five permanent Security Council members), is rarely used and has been practiced on only a few occasions. Non-Charter reforms—which include General Assembly action or initiatives by the U.N. Secretary-General—are more common and comparatively easier to achieve. This report will be updated as policy changes or congressional actions warrant. |
crs_R42363 | crs_R42363_0 | Introduction
The status of Burma's political prisoners is an important issue for U.S. policy towards Burma (Myanmar). As President, Thein Sein granted amnesty to hundreds of political prisoners, but his government and the Burmese military continued to arrest and incarcerate alleged political prisoners. On November 8, 2015, The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, won a majority of the seats in nationwide elections for both chambers of Burma's Union Parliament. Despite these actions, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), and the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS), two nonprofit organizations dedicated to identifying, locating, and assisting political prisoners in Burma, the Htin Kyaw government was incarcerating 67 political prisoners as of May 31, 2016, and another 189 were awaiting trial (including 47 in detention). All of Burma's security forces, including the national Myanmar Police Force (MPF), are controlled by the Tatmadaw and its Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Burma's security forces allegedly use laws—some promulgated by the military juntas and some passed during the Thein Sein government (2011-2016)—to arrest and detain people for political reasons. The Obama Administration has recognized past releases of political prisoners as evidence of political progress in Burma, while reportedly continues to work with the new NLD-led government to press for the release of the remaining political prisoners and the prevention of the arrest and detention of new political prisoners. Defining Political Prisoners
At present, there is no consensus on how many political prisoners there are in Burma. Similarly, Burma's military prefers to restrict the definition of political prisoner to only include "prisoners of conscience." Current Estimates
Different groups provide varying estimates of the number of political prisoners being detained in Burma. According to the AAPP(B), as of June 30, 2016, 83 political prisoners remained in prison and an additional 203 were awaiting trial. This number did not include detainees in Rakhine State, estimated to be in the hundreds. One possible approach is to amend or repeal some of the laws that have been used in the past to arrest and imprison people for political reasons, including:
The Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act : 30 The act places a number of conditions and restrictions on the right to hold peaceful protests or assemblies. Similarly, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) ( P.L. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act) ( P.L. The release of all political prisoners is also one of the preconditions for the removal of many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma (see Table 1 ). Beyond the laws imposing sanctions on Burma, Congress has also enacted legislation addressing the issue of political prisoners in Burma. The State Department welcomed the April 2016 release of political prisoners by the NLD-led government, but it remains to be seen how active it will be in encouraging the release of any remaining political prisoners and/or assisting the new government's efforts to prevent the arrest and detention of new political prisoners. No similar statement was made following the political prisoner release on April 17, 2016. It may also assess the political prisoner issue, either in isolation or as part of a broader consideration of human rights in Burma and U.S. policy. As previously mentioned, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 ( H.R. 113-76 ) required the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to "support programs for former political prisoners" and "monitor the number of political prisoners in Burma," as well as develop a "comprehensive strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Burma," including support for former prisoners. The Senate version of the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Other Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 ( S. 3117 ) would reinstate the requirement in P.L. 113-76 that funds be provided for the implementation of the mandated comprehensive strategy, which would presumably include support for former political prisoners. | The release of all Burma's political prisoners is one of the fundamental goals of U.S. policy towards the nation. Several of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma—including the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA, P.L. 108-61) and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act, P.L. 110-286)—require the release of all political prisoners before the sanctions contained in those laws can be terminated.
Although the outgoing President Thein Sein provided pardons or amnesty for more than 1,000 alleged political prisoners, security forces continued to arrest new political prisoners and over 100 political prisoners remained in jail when he left office in March 2016. Burma's new President, Htin Kyaw, released more than 200 political prisoners in his first month in office. The leadership of the new Union Parliament, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi holds a majority in both chambers, has stated plans to revise, amend, or repeal laws that have been used by Burma's security forces to detain people for political reasons.
While the new NLD-led government appears willing to address the political prisoner issue, it is unclear if Burma's military leadership and its security forces, which retain substantial power under Burma's new political structure, will desist in arresting and detaining people allegedly for political reasons. All of Burma's security forces, including the national Myanmar Police Force, report directly to the Burmese military and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. In the past, Burma's security forces have used provisions in laws promulgated by the nation's past military juntas to arrest and try political dissidents and protesters. Burma's courts and judges have demonstrated a willingness to convict these people.
Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary. According to two nonprofit organizations dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), and the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS), the Burmese government, as of June 30, 2016, was incarcerating 83 political prisoners and an additional 203 were awaiting trial.
Differences in estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma can be attributed to two main factors. First, Burma's prison and judicial system is not transparent, making it difficult to obtain accurate information. Second, there is no consensus on the definition of a "political prisoner." Some limit the definition of "political prisoner" to "prisoners of conscience;" others include detained members of ethnic militias as political prisoners.
The State Department consulted with the government of former Prime Minister Thein Sein to promote the release of Burma's political prisoners, but Administration interest in the issue appears to have declined over time. The State Department commended the NLD-led government for its first political prisoner release on April 8, 2016, but did not issue a similar statement of support for the second such release on April 17, 2016.
Congress may choose to examine the political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L.113-76) required the Secretary of State to submit to Congress "a comprehensive strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Burma," including support for former political prisoners. The State Department, Foreign Operations, and Other Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (S. 3117) would require funds be provided to implement the strategic plan, presumably including support for former political prisoners.
This report will be updated as circumstances require. |
crs_R40618 | crs_R40618_0 | Introduction
In 2009, teen births (for women ages 15 through 19) accounted for 10.1% of all births in the United States and 21.4% of all nonmarital births. The birth rate for U.S. teenagers increased in 2006 and 2007 after a steady decline since 1991. Recent data indicate that the teen birth rate dropped in 2008 and 2009, reversing the two-year increase. In recognition of the negative, long-term consequences associated with teenage pregnancy and births, the prevention of pregnancy among teenagers is a major public policy goal of this nation. 111-117 , the Consolidated Appropriations for FY2010 (enacted December 16, 2009), included a new discretionary teenage pregnancy prevention program, identical to the one proposed in the President's FY2010 budget, that provides grants and contracts, on a competitive basis, to public and private entities to fund "medically accurate and age appropriate" programs that reduce teen pregnancy. P.L. 112-10 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (enacted April 15, 2011) included funding of $109.5 million for the TPP program for FY2011 ($105 million for the grant program plus $4.455 million for program evaluation). 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)), signed into law on March 23, 2010, includes the teen pregnancy prevention provisions that were included in the Senate version of the bill ( H.R. This report provides a brief discussion of the debate on comprehensive sex education and abstinence education, highlights evaluations of both types of programs, describes youth programs that address teen pregnancy, and examines the new Teen Pregnancy Prevention program established by P.L. 111-117 (which was first proposed in the Obama Administration's FY2010 budget and then again in its FY2011 budget). It also describes the teen pregnancy prevention programs authorized and established in PPACA ( P.L. 111-148 ). In addition, it identifies teen pregnancy prevention legislation that was introduced in the 111 th Congress. P.L. 111-117 also provides a separate $4.5 million (within the Public Health Service Act program evaluation funding) to carry out evaluations of teenage pregnancy prevention approaches. After several temporary funding measures were enacted, P.L. 112-10 also included a 0.2% across-the-board rescission that is not reflected in the $109.5 million funding total. P.L. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PPACA) established a new state formula grant program and appropriated $375 million at $75 million per year for five years (FY2010-FY2014) to enable states to operate a new Personal Responsibility Education program, which is a comprehensive approach to teen pregnancy prevention that educates adolescents on both abstinence and contraception to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Until FY2010, three federal programs included funding that was exclusively for abstinence education: the Title V Abstinence Education Block Grant to states, the Community-Based Abstinence Education (CBAE) program, and the "prevention" component of the Adolescent Family Life (AFL) demonstration program. President Obama's FY2010 budget included funding for a new teen pregnancy prevention initiative. FY2011 Budget
President Obama's FY2011 budget proposed to increase funding for the new discretionary teen pregnancy prevention (TPP) program to $129 million for FY2011 (from $110 million for FY2010 enacted by P.L. H.R. 463/S. 1551/S. H.R. 3288
H.R. P.L. H.R. H.R. 3590
H.R. PPACA also restored funding to the Title V Abstinence Education formula block grant to states at the previous annual level of $50 million for each FY2010-FY2014 ($250 million over five years). 3962
H.R. 6283/S. 3878
H.R. 3590 . | The birth rate for teenagers (ages 15 through 19) in the United States increased in 2006 and 2007 after a steady decline since 1991. In 2008 and 2009, the teen birth rate dropped below the 2007 teen birth rate, reversing the two-year upward trend. In 2009, teen births accounted for 10.1% of all U.S. births and 21.4% of all nonmarital births. In recognition of the negative, long-term consequences associated with teenage pregnancy and births, teen pregnancy prevention is a major goal of this nation.
President Obama's FY2010 and FY2011 budgets supported state, community-based, and faith-based efforts to reduce teen pregnancy using models that have been rigorously evaluated. The Administration's new discretionary Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program funds models that stress the importance of abstinence while providing medically accurate and age-appropriate information to youth who have already become sexually active. The Obama Administration's FY2010 and FY2011 budgets did not provide any funding in FY2010 or FY2011 for the Title V Abstinence Education Block Grant to states (which was a mandatory program) or the Community-Based Abstinence Education (CBAE) program (a discretionary program); nor did they continue to provide funding in FY2010 or FY2011 for abstinence-only demonstration grants through the Adolescent Family Life (AFL) program.
Nonetheless, P.L. 111-148, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), signed into law on March 23, 2010, by President Obama included the two teen pregnancy prevention provisions that were in the Senate version of the bill (H.R. 3590). P.L. 111-148 established a new state formula grant program and appropriated $75 million annually for each of FY2010-FY2014 to enable states to operate a new Personal Responsibility Education Program. P.L. 111-148 also restored funding to the Title V Abstinence Education formula block grant to states at the previous annual level of $50 million for each of FY2010-FY2014.
P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations for FY2010 (enacted December 16, 2009), included a new discretionary Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program that provides grants and contracts, on a competitive basis, to public and private entities to fund "medically accurate and age appropriate" programs that reduce teen pregnancy. The TPP program was funded at $110 million for FY2010. P.L. 111-117 also provided a separate $4.5 million to carry out evaluations of teenage pregnancy prevention approaches. After several temporary funding measures were enacted, P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (enacted April 15, 2011) included funding of $109.5 million for the TPP program for FY2011 ($105 million for the grant program and $4.455 million for program evaluation). P.L. 112-10 also included a 0.2% across-the-board rescission that is not reflected in $109.5 million funding total.
This report provides a brief discussion of the debate on comprehensive sex education and abstinence education, highlights evaluations of both types of programs, describes youth programs that address teen pregnancy, and examines the new teen pregnancy prevention program established by P.L. 111-117 that was included in the Obama Administration's FY2010 budget and again in his FY2011 budget. It also describes the teen pregnancy prevention initiatives included in PPACA. In addition, it identifies teen pregnancy prevention legislation introduced during the 111th Congress (H.R. 463/S. 21, H.R. 1551/S. 611, H.R. 3288, H.R. 3293, H.R. 3312, H.R. 3590, H.R. 3962, H.R. 6283/S. 3878, and S. 1796). |
crs_R42991 | crs_R42991_0 | In addition to evaluating the need for supplemental appropriations in response to this catastrophic disaster, the 112 th and 113 th Congresses considered reforming provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended). The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, as passed as Division B of P.L. 113-2 , the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, revises the Stafford Act as a result of these concerns as well as other considerations. Division A of P.L. 113-2 provided a $50.7 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy. Additionally, Congress increased the National Flood Insurance Program's borrowing authority by $9.7 billion, from $20.725 billion to $30.425 billion ( P.L. 113-1 , To temporarily increase the borrowing authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for carrying out the National Flood Insurance Program). Both of these supplemental relief laws are discussed separately in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief . Part of the legislative intent of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 is to streamline administrative procedures and improve the effectiveness of several disaster assistance programs authorized by the Stafford Act, namely the Public Assistance Program, the Individual Assistance Program, and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. Tribal Requests for a Major Disaster or Emergency Declaration under the Stafford Act
Section 1110 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 amends Sections 401 and 501 of the Stafford Act which contain the procedures for requesting types of disaster declarations. In approaching how to address the identified needs, Section 1108(a) includes "child care" as an eligible expense under the Other Needs Assistance (ONA) program. Lease and Repair of Rental Units for Temporary Housing
Section 1103 also authorizes FEMA to enter into lease agreements with private owners of multi-unit apartment facilities. Following submission of this report, the President is instructed to direct the Administrator to establish a new ceiling for small project eligibility in the appropriate amount. Recommendations for Reducing Costs of Future Disasters
Section 1111 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 requires the Administrator of FEMA to provide recommendations to Congress on the development of a national strategy "for reducing future costs, loss of life, and injuries associated with extreme disaster events in vulnerable areas of the United States." It is in keeping with existing practice that the changes in law effectuated by the act will apply to disasters declared on or after this date. However, it is less clear whether, and to what extent, these provisions will apply to disasters declared before January 29, 2013, although support can be found in the text and legislative history for applying at least some of these amendments to the declarations arising out of Hurricane Sandy. The same could be said of Section 1105 (directing the Administrator to create an alternative dispute resolution program that includes arbitration before an independent review panel), Section 1106 (directing the establishment of a unified federal review for environmental and historic requirements), Section 1107 (directing the Administrator to review and modify, as necessary, the dollar thresholds for projects to qualify for simplified procedures), Section 1108 (authorizing the President to offer additional forms of assistance), and Section 1109 (directing the Administrator to review and revise individual assistance factors). | Hurricane Sandy caused extensive human suffering and damage to public and private property. In response to this catastrophic event, Congress considered legislation to provide supplemental appropriations to federal disaster assistance programs. In addition, Congress considered revisions to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended), which is the primary source of authorities for disaster assistance programs for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a result, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, which was included as Division B of the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2). Division A of P.L. 113-2 provided a $50.7 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy. Additionally, Congress increased the National Flood Insurance Program's borrowing authority by $9.7 billion (from $20.725 billion to $30.425 billion) (P.L. 113-1). Both of these supplemental relief law are discussed separately in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief.
This report analyzes the provisions of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA). In general, these provisions amend the Stafford Act with a stated goal of improving the efficiency and quality of disaster assistance provided by FEMA. Briefly, the amendments to the Stafford Act include:
Establishing a new set of alternative procedures for administering the Public Assistance Program, which provides assistance for debris removal and the repair and restoration of eligible facilities (Section 1102 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013); Authorizing FEMA to enter into agreements with private owners of multi-family rental properties to expand post-disaster housing resources (Section 1103); Revising the administration of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, to include a possible advancement of 25% of grant funds (Section 1104); Directing the establishment of alternative dispute resolution procedures (including binding arbitration), building on FEMA's current appeals process, to resolve federal and state disagreements on costs and eligibility questions (Section 1105); Directing the creation of a joint process for environmental and historical review for disaster recovery projects with the goal of increasing the speed of the process (Section 1106); Directing FEMA to study, and report to Congress, whether it is appropriate to increase the dollar size of "small projects" eligible for simplified procedures (Section 1107); Including child care as an eligible expense under the "other needs assistance" provided in certain disasters (Section 1108(a)); Specifically authorizing the reimbursement of the base wages of government employees providing emergency work under certain circumstances (Section 1108(b)); Directing FEMA to update the factors considered when assessing the need for Individual Assistance in the declaration process (Section 1109); Authorizing the chief executive of a tribal government to directly request disaster or emergency declarations from the President, much as a governor can for a state (Section 1110); and Directing FEMA to create a comprehensive national strategy for reducing the cost of future disasters (Section 1111).
Prospectively, the changes in law apply to disasters declared on or after the date of enactment, January 29, 2013. Further, support can be found in the text and legislative history of the bill for applying at least some of these amendments retrospectively to Hurricane Sandy-related disaster declarations. However, it is less clear whether, and to what extent, some of these revisions will apply to disasters declared before Hurricane Sandy.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33334 | crs_RL33334_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released two recent documents that renewed public and congressional interest in animal biotechnology in general and animal cloning in particular. On January 15, 2009, the agency released final guidance representing its current thinking on the regulation of genetically engineered (GE) animals for food or drugs. FDA did so under its existing statutory authority and regulations. A year earlier, on January 15, 2008, FDA had unveiled its final risk assessment and industry guidance on the safety of milk and meat from cloned animals and their offspring. The first U.S. approval of a commercial product from a GE animal is for the drug ATryn, an anticoagulant agent being produced in the milk of transgenic goats. FDA announced its approval on February 6, 2009. As technologies move toward commercialization, Congress is being asked to examine these issues and possibly to refine the current federal regulatory structure governing the technologies and their agricultural products. With the development in the 1970s and patenting in the 1980s of recombinant DNA techniques, and the subsequent analysis of genes, their resulting proteins, and the role played by the proteins in animal biochemical processes (functional genomics), modern biotechnology is increasingly equipped with a set of sophisticated tools holding the promise of transforming the selective breeding of animals. The anti-clotting agent in goat milk is the first such application to be approved by FDA (March 2009). Regulation and Oversight
The basic federal guidance for regulating the products of agricultural biotechnology is the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (51 Fed. In the approval of GE sugar beets, which was primarily a USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service action, FDA also reviewed the application and concluded that the sugar from GE beets posed no dangers to human health. FDA Guidance on GE Animals
On January 15, 2009, FDA's CVM released its industry guidance on how it plans to regulate GE animals. In other words, it is illegal to introduce food from a GE animal into the food supply that has not been approved by FDA. Congressional Members have raised concerns about FDA's approval process. In addition to concerns about the adequacy of the data supporting the safety for human consumption of the GE salmon, Members also expressed their concerns that the GE fish could pose serious risks to the wild population of fish, such as Atlantic, Coho, and Chinook salmon. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Several USDA agencies, operating under a number of statutory authorities, also have at least potential roles in the regulation of transgenic and cloned animals and their products. Cloning in animal agriculture is generally not applied in isolation from other biotechnologies such as genetic engineering. The risk assessment also focused only on cloning from non-transgenic cells. The final risk assessment concluded—as had the December 26, 2006, draft—that the meat and milk of clones of adult cattle, pigs, and goats, and the meat and milk from the offspring of these clones, were as safe for human consumption as the food from conventionally bred animals. The agency said it would not require any special measures (including labeling) relating to the use of food products or animal feed derived from cloned cattle, goats, and pigs because they are "no different from food derived from conventionally bred animals. In October 2006, a coalition formally petitioned FDA to impose a moratorium on producing foods from cloned animals, and to establish rules for mandatory pre-market review and approval of cloned foods by regulating clones as new drugs under the food and drug act. FDA is currently discussing this and other environmental issues as they consider approving GE salmon. Meanwhile, USDA has reminded stakeholders that products from cloned animals are not eligible to be labeled as organic, under its National Organic Program (NOP). Some scientists have countered that animal welfare problems have been exaggerated and tend to recede, particularly as the technologies are perfected. H.R. 6636 would have required the labeling of all foods produced with GE material. 521 / S. 230 ) would prevent FDA from approving the GE salmon. The bills would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to state that GE fish "shall be deemed unsafe." | Animal agriculture is being transformed by rapid advances in biotechnology—a term that encompasses a variety of technologies, including genetic engineering (GE), genetic modification, transgenics, recombinant DNA techniques, and cloning, among others. Producers are interested in the application of biotechnology to improve productivity, consistency, and quality; to introduce new food, fiber, and medical products; and to protect the environment. Potential human health applications of transgenic animals include producing biopharmaceuticals and generating organs, tissues, and cells for xenotransplantation. Criticisms of such applications involve issues ranging from food safety and social resistance to potential negative impacts on animal welfare and on ecosystems. Questions also have arisen about the adequacy of the current regulatory structure to assess and manage any risks created by these technologies.
On January 15, 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released final guidance on how it is to regulate GE animals and products. Consistent with the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, FDA will do so under its existing statutory authority and regulations. Generally, GE-derived foods, for example, will be regulated like non-GE foods; if their composition does not differ from their conventional counterparts, they will not have to be labeled. Nonetheless, developers of GE animals and of GE-derived products must gain FDA pre-market approval.
On February 6, 2009, FDA announced the first approval of a drug from a GE animal. The drug is a human anti-clotting agent produced in the milk of transgenic goats. FDA is also currently considering approval of the first genetically modified animal for human consumption, having declared in August 2010 that a GE salmon—AquaAdvantage Salmon—is safe to eat and poses no threat to the environment. FDA is considering environmental and labeling issues, and has not issued a final decision on the commercialization of the GE salmon. In letters from both houses, 40 Members have asked the FDA Commissioner to halt the approval process for the GE salmon, citing serious concerns with FDA's review and approval process. The congressional letters have been endorsed by over 50 consumer and environmental groups.
Although animal biotechnology involves many techniques other than cloning, this latter technology has attracted widespread attention. A final risk assessment and industry guidance on the safety of meat and milk from cloned cattle, pigs, and goats and their offspring were released January 15, 2008, by FDA. The documents generally echoed FDA's December 28, 2006, draft risk assessment, which found that such products are as safe to eat as those of conventionally bred animals. FDA also concluded that cloning poses the same risks to animal health as those found in animals created through other assisted reproductive technologies—although the frequency of such problems is higher in cloning. (Scientists stress that cloning is an assisted reproduction technique that does not involve any transfer or alteration of genes through GE.) The agency said it was no longer asking industry to refrain voluntarily from marketing the products of cloned animals and their offspring, although the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did ask that it be continued for products from clones (but not from the offspring of clones).
Bills on animal cloning introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses would have required all food from cloned animals or their offspring to be labeled, and prohibited food from cloned animals from being labeled as organic. The bills have not been reintroduced in the 112th Congress. A bill that would amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prevent the approval of genetically engineered fish (H.R. 521/S. 230) was introduced in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R42591 | crs_R42591_0 | Introduction
After over two years of deliberations, spanning the 112 th and 113 th Congresses, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (the "2014 farm bill") was enacted on February 7, 2014. While the reauthorization maintained the vast majority of prior law eligibility and benefit calculation policies, the new law does change the impact of the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) in the calculation of SNAP monthly benefit amounts. Under the 2014 farm bill, LIHEAP can only impact a household's benefit if a household receives more than $20 a year. This policy contained in the farm bill conference agreement follows similar changes in the Senate- and House-passed bills, with the Senate passing a $10 threshold and the House passing a $20 threshold. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that this LIHEAP-related change included in the 2014 farm bill would reduce SNAP spending by approximately $8.6 billion over the 10-year budget window of FY2014-FY2023. Detractors argue that ending the so-called "Heat and Eat" practice reduces benefits for those in need. 113-79): Summary and Side-by-Side , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R43332, Reauthorization of SNAP and Other Nutrition Programs in the Next Farm Bill: Issues for the 113 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R42353, Domestic Food Assistance: Summary of Programs
CRS Report R42505, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Primer on Eligibility and Benefits
SNAP Benefit Calculation, Prior Law, and the 2014 Farm Bill
Brief Overview of SNAP Benefit Calculation8
SNAP benefits are a function of a household's size, its net (counted) monthly income, and inflation-indexed maximum monthly benefit levels (in some cases, adjusted for geographic location). LIHEAP's Role in SNAP Deductions and Benefit Calculation
In most states, SNAP programs can use LIHEAP payments as proof that households have incurred heating and cooling costs. Under prior law, if a SNAP household received a LIHEAP payment in any amount , then that household could receive a higher SNAP benefit than if the household had not received LIHEAP (assuming they did not document heating and cooling costs in some other way). The higher SUA is based on the assumption that households incur expenses for heating and cooling. Under the 2014 farm bill, without receipt of LIHEAP over $20 per year, households must document heating/cooling expenses another way or risk a reduction from what their benefit amount had been. For households with an elderly or disabled member, net monthly income equals gross monthly income minus:
The same standard , child support , earned income , and dependent care deductions noted above; Any out-of-pocket medical expenses (other than those for special diets) that are incurred by an elderly or disabled household member, to the extent they exceed a threshold of $35 a month; and An uncapped excess shelter deduction , to the extent such expenses exceed 50% of counted income after all other deductions; 2014 FARM BILL NOTE: Because the excess shelter deduction is uncapped for households with elderly or disabled members, the change to LIHEAP in SNAP benefit calculation has the potential to make a larger difference for these households. An SUA often "tips the scale" toward enabling an applicant household to qualify for an excess shelter deduction, which in many cases will result in an increased monthly benefit. "Heat and Eat" is a phrase that the low-income and hunger advocacy community has used to describe state and program policies that leverage nominal (as low as 10 cents) LIHEAP payments into an increase in households' SNAP benefits that is larger than the initial LIHEAP payment. In June 2012, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) surveyed states and determined that 16 states (including the District of Columbia) had implemented or would soon implement "Heat and Eat," and one state provided the standard utility allowance based on LIHEAP application (see Text Box , below). Payments to households that are not provided for one of these purposes could be inappropriate. First, this change is expected to affect some households' SNAP benefit amounts, but it will not affect households' eligibility for SNAP benefits. Second, this change is expected to affect states that have implemented "Heat and Eat" policies. When Will States Reduce Affected Households' Benefits? The new law indicates that when a new SNAP household applies for benefits, if that is 30 days after the law's enactment, the benefits will be calculated based on the $20 threshold rule, but for households already receiving SNAP it will be only when they apply to recertify that their benefit calculation will be subject to the $20 rule. This recertification scenario, though, is subject to a state's decision to delay implementation. If a household can document heating or cooling costs in another way, then the higher SUA can continue to be included in the household's excess shelter deduction even if the household does not receive more than $20 of LIHEAP assistance. 3102 . The total number will also depend on whether households are able to document their utility costs in other ways. | The Agricultural Act of 2014 ("the 2014 farm bill") was enacted on February 7, 2014. Included in the law's reauthorization of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a change to how Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payments are treated in the calculation of SNAP benefits. This change is expected to reduce some households' monthly benefit amounts, particularly households in states that have adopted the so-called "Heat and Eat" practice, where states leverage a nominal LIHEAP benefit into a larger SNAP benefit. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that this change will reduce SNAP spending by approximately $8.6 billion over the 10-year budget window of FY2014-FY2023. Based on CBO's May 2013 baseline, this is approximately a 1% reduction in forecasted program spending over the 10-year period.
SNAP law provides for both eligibility rules and, for eligible households, benefit calculation rules. The SNAP statute allows for certain deductions from income when calculating a household's monthly benefit amount; one of these deductions is the "excess shelter deduction," which incorporates utility costs. If a family incurs heating and/or cooling expenses, this deduction from income can be higher than for households not incurring these expenses, allowing for a higher SNAP benefit for the household. One way households can document heating and cooling expenses is by showing receipt of LIHEAP assistance. Under prior law, any amount of LIHEAP assistance could increase benefit amounts; under the 2014 farm bill change, LIHEAP assistance will have to be greater than $20 per year in order to be included in a household's benefit calculation.
In SNAP benefit calculation, a LIHEAP payment documents that the household has incurred heating and cooling costs. This documentation triggers a standard utility allowance (SUA), a figure intended to represent typical state-specific utility costs, which enters into the SNAP benefit calculation equation. (Most states use an SUA, but some opt not to and use only actual utility costs.) Unless the household is receiving the maximum SNAP benefit already, a household's monthly benefit can increase if the inclusion of an SUA results in an excess shelter deduction. Proof of heating or cooling expenses will trigger a higher SUA than proof of only telephone or water expenses. The higher SUA then gets factored into the calculation of a household's excess shelter deduction. In many cases, the higher the excess shelter deduction, the higher the monthly SNAP benefit will be.
The 2014 farm bill's change is expected to impact the "Heat and Eat" practice. Approximately 16 states provide nominal LIHEAP benefits through a "Heat and Eat" practice. "Heat and Eat" is a phrase that the low-income and anti-hunger advocacy community has used to describe state and program policies that leverage nominal (as little as 10 cents) LIHEAP payments into an increase in households' SNAP benefits that is larger than the initial LIHEAP payment. Also, a 17th state allows SNAP applicants to benefit from an SUA if the household applies for LIHEAP. Thus, the farm bill is expected to change 17 states' administration of SNAP and is expected to reduce some households' benefit amounts.
The 2014 farm bill's change in the law will require more than $20 a year in LIHEAP assistance in order to trigger the potential increase in benefits. The exact implementation timeline, details, and share of households affected will depend upon the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service's (USDA-FNS) interpretation and implementation of the policy, the options states choose in their implementation, and the share of households that will be able to document their heating and cooling expenses in other ways.
Congress's final decision to change the law came after the passage of related proposals in both the House and the Senate. The 113th Congress's Senate-passed farm bill (S. 954) would have set a $10 threshold for LIHEAP payments to confer this potential advantage. The House-passed farm bill (H.R. 2642 combined with H.R. 3102) included the $20 threshold. |
crs_RL34738 | crs_RL34738_0 | Introduction
Cellulosic biofuels are produced from cellulose derived from renewable biomass feedstocks such as corn stover (plant matter generally left in the field after harvest), switchgrass, wood chips, and other plant or waste matter. Current production consists of a few small-scale pilot projects—and significant hurdles must be overcome before industrial-scale production can occur. The Renewable Fuel Standard: A Mandatory Usage Mandate
Principal among the cellulosic biofuels goals to be met is a biofuels usage mandate—the renewable fuel standard (RFS) as expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. The RFS mandate for cellulosic biofuels in the EISA begins at 100 million gallons per year in 2010 and rises to 16 billion gallons per year in 2022 ( Figure 1 ). This mandate represents a prodigious challenge to the biofuels industry in light of the fact that no large-scale commercial production of cellulosic biofuels yet exists in the United States. Indeed, in March 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule for implementation of the RFS that sets a new, lower cellulosic biofuel mandate of 6.5 million gallons for 2010. In December 2010, EPA issued a final rule to lower the 2011 cellulosic biofuel mandate of 250 million gallons to 6.6 million gallons (actual volume). This goal was given substance in December 2007, when Congress passed EISA, mandating the RFS for the use of specific volumes of renewable biofuels through 2022 and setting a goal of commercial-scale cellulosic biofuels production by 2012. This report provides background on the current effort to develop industrial-scale, competitive technology to produce biofuels from cellulosic feedstocks. Finally, the report reviews the role of Congress with respect to the emerging cellulosic biofuels industry, reviews recent congressional actions affecting the industry, and discusses key questions facing Congress. Cellulosic Feedstock Supplies
Feedstocks used for cellulosic biofuels are potentially abundant and diverse. The USDA estimate also predates the definition of renewable biomass eligible for the RFS. Impacts on Food Supplies
Compared with corn, cellulosic feedstocks are thought to have smaller impacts on food supplies. As a result, even though cellulosic biofuels benefit from a production tax credit of up to $1.01 (discussed below), which is $0.56 per gallon higher than the blender's tax credit of $0.45 per gallon for corn ethanol, it remains at a substantial cost disadvantage compared with corn-starch ethanol. Prairie grasses and woody crops require reduced inputs compared with corn—and have lower greenhouse gas emissions. Private Investment
Private investment is viewed by many to be critical to the development of the cellulosic biofuels industry. 110 - 140 ), the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 farm bill, P.L. BRDI plays a major role in R&D for the cellulosic biofuels industry. Debate may continue on the appropriate level of incentives needed to jump start the industry. In the long term, Congress might also consider the ongoing level of government support that is appropriate for the cellulosic biofuels industry—considered by some to be essential, especially if the RFS is to be met. The general level of support in the form of grants and loans has been determined in the 2008 farm bill but will likely be revisited as appropriations are considered. The cellulosic biofuels tax credit applies to fuel produced from 2009 through 2012 and extension of this credit could be the subject of debate during the 112 th Congress. Expanding Biomass Eligible under the RFS
The definition of forest-based renewable biomass under the RFS is considered by some to be too restrictive because it limits eligible woody biomass to privately planted trees and tree residue from actively managed tree plantations, and slash and pre-commercial thinnings from non-federal forests. Some small-scale plants came online in 2010. | Cellulosic biofuels are produced from cellulose (fibrous material) derived from renewable biomass. They are thought by many to hold the key to increased benefits from renewable biofuels because they are made from potentially low-cost, diverse, non-food feedstocks. Cellulosic biofuels could also potentially decrease the fossil energy required to produce ethanol, resulting in lower greenhouse gas emissions.
Cellulosic biofuels are produced on a very small scale at this time—significant hurdles must be overcome before commercial-scale production can occur. The renewable fuels standard (RFS), a major federal incentive, mandates a dramatic increase in the use of renewable fuels in transportation, including the use of cellulosic biofuels—100 million and 250 million gallons per year (mgpy) for 2010 and 2011, respectively. After 2015, most of the increase in the RFS is intended to come from cellulosic biofuels, and by 2022, the mandate for cellulosic biofuels will be 16 billion gallons. Whether these targets can be met is uncertain. In March 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a final rule that lowered the 2010 cellulosic biofuel mandate to 6.5 million gallons. In December 2010, EPA lowered the 2011 mandate to 6.6 million gallons. Research is ongoing, and the cellulosic biofuels industry may be on the verge of rapid expansion and technical breakthroughs. There are no large-scale commercial cellulosic biofuel plants in operation in the United States. A few small-scale plants came online in 2010.
The federal government, recognizing the risk inherent in commercializing this new technology, has provided loan guarantees, grants, and tax credits in an effort to make the industry competitive by 2012. In particular, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246) supports the nascent cellulosic industry through authorized research programs, grants, and loans exceeding $1 billion. The enacted farm bill also contains a production tax credit of up to $1.01 per gallon for fuels produced from cellulosic feedstocks. Private investment, in many cases by oil companies, also plays a major role in cellulosic biofuels research and development.
Three challenges must be overcome if the RFS is to be met. First, cellulosic feedstocks must be available in large volumes when needed by refineries. Second, the cost of converting cellulose to ethanol or other biofuels must be reduced to a level to make it competitive with gasoline and corn-starch ethanol. Third, the marketing, distribution, and vehicle infrastructure must absorb the increasing volumes of renewable fuel, including cellulosic fuel mandated by the RFS.
Congress will likely continue to face questions about the appropriate level of intervention in the cellulosic industry as it debates both the risks in trying to pick the winning technology and the benefits of providing start-up incentives. The current tax credit for cellulosic biofuels is set to expire in 2012, but its extension may be considered during the 112th Congress. Congress may continue to debate the role of biofuels in food price inflation and whether cellulosic biofuels can alleviate its impacts. Recent congressional action on cellulosic biofuels has focused on the definition of renewable biomass eligible for the RFS, which is considered by some to be overly restrictive. To this end, legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress to expand the definition of renewable biomass eligible under the RFS. |
crs_R41703 | crs_R41703_0 | Introduction
The extended appropriations process for FY2011 began with the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget requested in February 2010 and culminated with the enactment of P.L. 1 . This report is intended to facilitate comparative analysis of the key proposals in the now completed FY2011 appropriations process. The report begins with a brief analysis of how each proposal could be expected to impact the federal budget deficit, which was a consideration of great importance to many lawmakers. This is followed by a table depicting discretionary funding levels provided in each of the three proposals by appropriations subcommittee and bill title, and comparing the FY2010 and FY2011 enacted appropriations. This will be the final update of this report. FY2011 Funding Proposals and the Budget Deficit2
A key issue in the FY2011 appropriations debate was the impact of discretionary federal spending on the nation's budget deficit. 112-10 —$1,365 billion
H.R. The final column compares the FY2010 and FY2011enacted funding levels. | FY2011 funding levels were not enacted in the 111th Congress. Thus, the debate over FY2011 appropriations continued into the 112th Congress and FY2011 spending proposals became a key focal point in the budget debates between the now-Republican-controlled House of Representatives and the Obama Administration.
This report was originally intended to facilitate comparison of three key spending proposals for FY2011—the Administration's budget request, H.R. 1, and S.Amdt. 149 to H.R. 1—to FY2010 enacted funding levels. It has been updated to include the enacted FY2011 appropriations in P.L. 112-10. The report begins with a brief analysis of how each proposal could be expected to impact the federal budget deficit. The bulk of the report consists of a funding table that details the recommended discretionary appropriations in these proposals, by subcommittee and bill title, and compares the enacted FY2010 and enacted FY2011 appropriations. More detailed analysis of individual appropriations measures can be found at CRS.gov.
This is the final update of this report. |
crs_R40163 | crs_R40163_0 | Disapproval of Regulations Under the Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act ("CRA" or the act) establishes a statutory procedure by which Congress can disapprove a regulation issued as a final rule by a federal agency. If a disapproval resolution under the CRA is enacted into law, the disapproved rule becomes of no force and effect; even if it has already taken effect, the CRA specifies that it is to be treated as though it had never taken effect. In addition, if a rule is disapproved under the CRA, the issuing agency may not reissue the same or a substantially similar rule without subsequent statutory authorization from Congress. In the House, similarly, although the time for consideration of any measure always either is limited, or can be limited by majority vote (for example, by adoption of a special rule), significant time might also be consumed not only in debate, but also in roll call votes (such as on ordering the previous question on each special rule and adoption of each special rule itself, as well as on adoption of each disapproval resolution). Section 802(a) of the CRA, however, specifies that, for purposes of its congressional disapproval procedure:
the term 'joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the date when [Congress receives the rule, as described earlier] and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the _____ relating to _____, and such rule shall have no force or effect.' Possible Form of and Proceedings on Consolidated Measures
Framing and Effect
Although it appears that a joint resolution "bundling" several disapproval provisions into a single measure could not have standing as a disapproval resolution under the CRA, it may be possible to frame such a measure in a form that would allow it to accomplish effects similar to those intended by the CRA with respect to multiple rules. For example, the text required by the CRA permits disapproval under the act only of a single regulation in its entirety. Consideration
A consolidated measure that lacked the form prescribed by the CRA also would not be eligible for consideration under the terms provided by the CRA, including the statutory expedited procedures for Senate consideration and the automatic procedures to facilitate clearance for Presidential action. Presumably, as a result, the Senate would have to choose between considering either (1) a consolidated measure under its regular procedures or (2) a series of individual disapproval resolutions, each under the expedited procedures of the CRA (or, perhaps, both). Assuming sufficient support to invoke cloture, nevertheless, action on the consolidated measure might permit the Senate to dispose, in a relatively limited time, of a significant number of disapproval proposals. In this way, the House would still retain the opportunity to reject any individual disapproval resolution. Additional complications could arise if certain regulations are disapproved by one chamber in a consolidated measure and by the other in separate resolutions under the CRA. This chamber might be able to provide that, upon passage of its own measure, if any disapproval resolution already received from the other corresponds to a provision of the consolidated measure, it be deemed to have passed the received resolution, or that it be in order immediately to consider and pass that resolution without debate. In the House, it might be possible to provide for these proceedings through the terms of a special rule for considering the consolidated measure, but in the Senate unanimous consent would presumably be required. If each of these separately engrossed joint resolutions had the text required by section 802(a) and originated during the period required by that section, it might be possible for it to be regarded as satisfying the requirements for a disapproval resolution under the CRA, so that it could be eligible for the expedited procedure in the Senate, automatic clearance for presentation to the President, and the additional effects of enactment prescribed by the statute. In either chamber, however, it appears that separate engrossment of provisions in this way might be feasible only by unanimous consent. | The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes expedited procedures for Congress to disapprove regulations issued by Federal agencies. Disapproval under these procedures requires enactment of a joint resolution that has a specified text and is submitted within 60 days (excluding recesses) after Congress receives the regulation. For these disapproval resolutions, the act provides expedited procedures for Senate consideration and to clear the measure for Presidential action. If the resolution becomes law, the rule not only becomes of no force and effect, but is treated as if it had never taken effect, and the issuing agency may issue no "substantially similar" rule without subsequent authorization by law.
If vetoed, a disapproval resolution can become law only if Congress overrides the veto. For regulations submitted 60 or fewer session days before a sine die adjournment, however, the CRA provides a further 60-day period for submitting disapproval regulations, starting on the 15th session day of the next session. Interest has arisen in using the CRA in this way in the 111th Congress to disapprove regulations issued late in the Bush Administration. Using the CRA in this way for numerous regulations, however, could consume large amounts of floor time. The question has accordingly been raised whether the CRA permits multiple disapproval resolutions to be "bundled," or consolidated into a single measure.
Congress could always overturn regulations through a consolidated measure under its general legislative powers. Even if such a consolidated measure was submitted during the required time period, however, it would not have the text required by the CRA, which permits the statement only of a single disapproval. If enacted, as a result, it would not have the special effects for which the act provides. A consolidated measure, nevertheless, could include provisions specifying that the component disapproval provisions have the same effects as if they were separate disapproval resolutions enacted pursuant to the CRA.
Any consolidated measure also would not be eligible for the expedited procedures provided in the CRA. In the Senate, as a result, its approval might be possible only by constructing it to include provisions that could attract sufficient support to invoke cloture. If the Senate could dispose of some disapprovals in this way, moreover, it might be able to deal with others through individual disapproval resolutions under the expedited procedure, especially by persistent use of its provisions for limiting debate by majority vote. In the House, a special rule could limit debate and amendment of a consolidated measure. Alternatively, a single special rule might provide for limited and consolidated debate on a group of individual disapproval resolutions. House rules protecting the motion to recommit would require final action on each resolution to be separate.
If each chamber agreed to some disapprovals in a consolidated measure and others in separate resolutions under the CRA, the two chambers would have to resolve differences between the consolidated measures under their general rules. Either chamber might also provide for routine passage, when received, of any separate disapproval resolution of the other that corresponded to a provision in its own consolidated measure. The House might provide for this treatment of Senate disapproval resolutions, through a provision in its special rule for considering its consolidated measure, more easily than could the Senate for those of the House. No update of this report is planned. |
crs_RL32583 | crs_RL32583_0 | Introduction
Average U.S. gasoline prices have risen sharply during 2004, beginning the year at $1.50 pergallon and peaking at $2.06 in late May. Among the factors causing 2004's gasoline price volatility has been a shortage of domesticrefining capacity, which has affected gasoline supply availability, creating a need for substantialimports. Potential policy concerns raised by growing reliance on gasoline imports include theavailability of foreign supplies that meet U.S. specifications, the speed at which incremental foreignsupplies can be provided to meet shifting domestic demand, and the delivered price of importedsupplies. This would have made it easier to ship gasoline between markets when neededto balance supply. On June 16, the House passed the United States Refinery Revitalization Act( H.R. Gasoline Demand
Gasoline demand in the United States continues to grow. Between 1999 and 2003, petroleum consumption increased byhalf a million barrels per day (mbd), rising from 19.5 mbd in 1999 to 20.0 mbd in 2003. Figure 1. Gasoline use has continued to grow during the first half of 2004, as almost 9.0 mbd ofgasoline was supplied to consumers, an increase of about 1.9% over the previous year's first half.While there is some preliminary evidence that high pump prices may have begun to retard growthin gasoline demand, it is still too soon to evaluate whether this trend has shifted, and how overallpetroleum demand might track for all of 2004. Gasoline Supply
Gasoline is manufactured in U.S. refineries and imported from foreign refiners as well. Gasoline components are imported with increasing frequency, amounting to50% of imports during 2004. (3) Imports of finished gasoline and components -- which have averaged, respectively, about 500,000barrels per day and 400,000 barrels per day during the past 12 months -- bridge the gap betweenU.S. refinery production and demand. Without this supplement, there would be a supply shortfall. The increasing use of blending components in building up the gasoline pool is seen in the riseof components as a proportion of nationwide gasoline inventories. Currently, one-third of gasoline imports comes from Canada and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Another third comes from Argentina, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela;the remainder is imported in smaller quantities from a diversity of nations. In addition to Canada and the Virgin Islands, increased gasoline imports now come from theUnited Kingdom and the Netherlands, where refinery utilization is much lower than in the UnitedStates; many other nations with spare refinery capacity are suppliers as well. A recent enhancement to the supply of imported gasoline has been made by PDVSA, whichhas started shipping the complete cocktail for ethanol blended gasoline (without the ethanol, whichis blended near the point of sale). The higher import costs impact the last units of gasoline supply, providing a price umbrellafor domestic refiners, whose pricing -- like all industrial pricing -- is linked to the cost of the lastincrements of the good involved. Lags in getting foreign supply may have contributed to 2004's price increases. H.R. 4517 , theRefinery Revitalization Act -- which passed the House, but has not seen Senate action -- is aimedat facilitating increases in capacity by fast-tracking the environmental review and permitting offacilities in a designated Refinery Revitalization Zone. | Gasoline demand in the United States has grown consistently during the past decade,increasing by a total of 20%. Between 1999 and 2003, gasoline consumption grew by 500,000barrels per day, accounting for all of the increase in petroleum consumption during that period. While 2004 may see growth slow down because of high prices, during the first seven months of theyear gasoline demand was up by another 1.9%.
The fact that gasoline supply has not kept up with demand has been reflected in pump pricesthat have risen from $1.50 at the start of 2004 to as high as $2.06 per gallon in late May. Whensupply and demand become out of sync with their previous relationship, prices change to establisha new balance. The outcome has been a period of volatile gasoline prices, which have set recordhighs that have become a focal point for consumers and policy makers, and raised concerns abouttheir impact on the economy.
Gasoline is supplied both by U.S. and foreign refiners. Domestic producers' capacity islimited. As a result, nearly 1 million barrels per day of gasoline and its components are imported.Imported blending components -- especially those used in ethanol-blended fuel -- are increasinglyimportant to total U.S. supply. Without this supplemental supply, gasoline would be less availableand prices likely higher.
Imports most recently have come from Canada and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which supplyone-third of the off-shore supply. Argentina, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, andVenezuela provide another third. Imports peaked in March 2004, took a dip, and reached new highsin July. Increased imports may have contributed to pump prices backing off their May highs in latesummer.
New gasoline blending components from Venezuela and the rehabilitation of a refinery inAruba may also contribute to enhanced gasoline component supply later this year. Gasolinecomponent availability -- which has increased during 2004 -- gives domestic refiners an addedmeasure of flexibility in using their capacity, and contributes to enhanced supplies of fuels neededto meet demand for ethanol-based gasoline and other specialized regional blends.
Potential policy concerns raised by growing reliance on gasoline imports include theavailability of foreign supplies that meet U.S. specifications, whether incremental foreign suppliescan be provided quickly enough to meet shifting demand, and the delivered price of importedgasoline.
Two legislative efforts were debated in the House regarding gasoline supply issues during2004. One, H.R. 4517 , has passed the House but not been taken up in the Senate. Itwould provide for easier permitting for refinery capacity expansion. And H.R. 4545 ,which did not pass the House, would have limited the growth of special regional fuel blends, oftencalled "boutique fuels."
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS20849 | crs_RS20849_0 | Campaign Finance Reform: Constitutional Issues Raised by Disclosure Requirements
RS20849 -- Campaign Finance Reform: Constitutional Issues Raised by Disclosure Requirements
Updated March 20, 2001
Reporting of Contributions and Candidate/Party Expenditures
In its landmark decision, Buckley v. Valeo, (2) the Supreme Court upheld the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)applicable to contributions and expenditures by candidates and political parties. For example, in Vote Choice,Inc. (21)
On the other hand, the current prevailing view of the courts is that disclosure requirements for non-candidate expenditures, which do not expressly advocate theelection or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, are unconstitutional. That is, according to most courts,expenditures for communications that merely relate topolitical issues, without meeting the "express advocacy" standard, are constitutionally protected issue advocacycommunications, which cannot be subject todisclosure requirements or any other regulation. Asnoted by the Court, "Congress has merely refused to pay for lobbying out of public moneys." Instead, such a requirement might be held to infringe on a First Amendmentright, ( i.e. | Current federal election law contains reporting and disclosure requirements related tocampaign financing. (1) TheSupreme Court has generally upheld such provisions, although imposing disclosure requirements on spending forcommunications that do not meet the strictstandard of "express advocacy" may be held unconstitutional.
Campaign finance reform legislation often contains provisions that would impose additional reporting anddisclosure requirements under the Federal ElectionCampaign Act (FECA). For example, S. 27 (McCain/Feingold), would require disclosure of disbursementsof expenditures over $10,000 for"electioneering communications," which are defined to include broadcast ads that "refer" to federal officecandidates, with identification of donors of $500 ormore. S. 22 (Hagel/Landrieu) would increase and expedite current disclosure requirements under FECA. H.R. 380 (Shays/Meehan)would lower the current FECA threshold for contribution reporting from $200 to $50 and impose reportingrequirements for soft money disbursements by personsother than political parties. This report will discuss some of the constitutional issues relating to these and other suchdisclosure requirements. |
crs_R41446 | crs_R41446_0 | Overview and Key Issues
Lebanon's Hezbollah ("Party of God") is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country's political system and security sector. Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties have long emphasized the need to assert control over remaining disputed areas with Israel. However, current Hezbollah policy statements suggest that, even if disputed areas were secured, the group would seek to maintain a role for "the resistance" in providing for Lebanon's national defense and would resist any Lebanese or international efforts to disarm it as called for in the 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war and more recently in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Hezbollah continues to define itself primarily as a resistance movement and remains viscerally opposed to what it views as illegitimate U.S. and Israeli intervention in Lebanese and regional affairs. It categorically refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and opposes all concluded and pending efforts to negotiate resolutions to Arab-Israeli disputes on the basis of mutual recognition, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given these positions, most observers believe that prospects for accommodation and engagement between the United States and Hezbollah are slim, even as the group's close relationships with Syria and Iran, its pivotal role in Lebanese politics, and reinvigorated U.S. engagement in regional peace efforts increase Hezbollah's potential influence over stated U.S. national security objectives. The Obama Administration is requesting $246 million in FY2011 foreign assistance to continue a multi-year program specifically designed to increase the central authority of the Lebanese state and deter the use of force by non-state actors. Since FY2006, the United States has provided more than $1.35 billion in assistance for Lebanon. Key issues facing U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress include:
Assessing the goals and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs — Identifying the most urgent capabilities that are still lacking among the LAF and ISF and deciding whether to tailor pending assistance programs to create or improve them. Understanding the key political and organizational obstacles to the further expansion or improvement of Lebanon's security forces and developing strategies to overcome them. Managing relations with other external actors —Preventing destabilizing actions by regional parties that could renew conflict. Limiting the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. Recognizing and seizing opportunities for the United States and its allies to influence the decisions of regional actors in support of U.S. objectives in Lebanon. Safeguarding Israeli security. Influencing Lebanon's National Dialogue —Determining the preferred versus likely outcomes of the current Lebanese National Dialogue discussions about a national defense strategy and Hezbollah's weapons. Deciding if and how the United States should seek to influence these discussions and identifying potential pitfalls. Preparing for potential negative consequences including the potential for return to civil conflict in Lebanon. | Lebanon's Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. Its armed element receives support from Iran and Syria and possesses significant paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country. Lebanese factions are working to define Hezbollah's role through a series of "National Dialogue" discussions.
Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties have long emphasized the need to assert control over remaining disputed areas with Israel. However, current Hezbollah policy statements suggest that, even if disputed areas were secured, the group would seek to maintain a role for "the resistance" in providing for Lebanon's national defense and would resist any Lebanese or international efforts to disarm it. Hezbollah continues to define itself primarily as a resistance movement and remains viscerally opposed to what it views as illegitimate U.S. and Israeli intervention in Lebanese and regional affairs. It categorically refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and opposes all concluded and pending efforts to negotiate resolutions to Arab-Israeli disputes on the basis of mutual recognition, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Given these positions, most observers believe that prospects for accommodation and engagement between the United States and Hezbollah are slim, even as the group's close relationships with Syria and Iran, its pivotal role in Lebanese politics, and reinvigorated U.S. engagement in regional peace efforts increase Hezbollah's potential influence over stated U.S. national security objectives. The Obama Administration is requesting $246 million in FY2011 foreign assistance to continue a multi-year program specifically designed to increase the central authority of the Lebanese state and deter the use of force by non-state actors. Since FY2006, the United States has provided more than $1.35 billion in assistance for Lebanon. Key issues facing U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress include:
Assessing the goals and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs—Assessing the goals of U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) and deciding whether to tailor pending assistance programs to create or improve them. Understanding the key political and organizational obstacles to the further expansion or improvement of Lebanon's security forces and developing strategies to overcome them. Managing relations with other external actors—Preventing destabilizing actions by regional parties that could renew conflict. Limiting the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. Recognizing and seizing opportunities for the United States and its allies to influence the decisions of regional actors in support of U.S. objectives in Lebanon. Safeguarding Israeli security. Influencing Lebanon's National Dialogue—Determining the preferred versus likely outcomes of the current Lebanese National Dialogue discussions about a national defense strategy and Hezbollah's weapons. Deciding if and how the United States should seek to influence these discussions and identifying potential pitfalls. Preparing for potential negative consequences including the potential for return to civil conflict in Lebanon. |
crs_RL32534 | crs_RL32534_0 | Introduction
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus's modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created an authoritarian regime shortly after being elected as president in 1994. In response, the EU and United States have imposed strengthened sanctions against key Belarusian leaders, businessmen, and firms. The government responded to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in central Minsk with the arrest (and in several cases vicious beatings) of seven of the nine opposition candidates as well as the detention of over 700 other persons, including activists, journalists, and civil society representatives. Relations with Russia
Belarus has close historical and cultural ties with Russia. Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus's key economic assets, while limiting subsidies to the country. Lukashenko has also barred opposition figures from attending conferences in the EU, in retaliation for visa sanctions against his officials and supporters. Belarus reduced the number of its diplomats in Washington to five persons, and demanded that the United States do the same. The United States has not appointed a new Ambassador to Belarus. On January 31, 2011, in a move timed to coincide with a similar EU statement, the United States announced a package of measures in response to the situation in Belarus. In addition to sanctions against persons and firms for the regime's undemocratic actions, the United States has imposed sanctions on Belarusian firms on non-proliferation grounds. The United States is concerned about human trafficking in Belarus. 515 , the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011. The law reauthorizes the Belarus Democracy Act (BDA) of 2004. It updates the provisions of the legislation to sharply condemn the fraudulent December 2010 presidential election and the ensuing crackdown. The legislation updates the BDA by including the post-December 2010 events in the section of the earlier law that expressed support for U.S. sanctions against Belarus. The law also says it is the policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its plan to hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk until the government of Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to Lukashenko personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan. 105 sharply condemned the conduct of the December 2010 presidential vote, applauded the sanctions imposed by the United States and EU on the Lukashenko regime and their commitment to provide assistance to civil society in Belarus, and called for the 2014 World Hockey Championship not to be held in Belarus unless all political prisoners are released. | Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus's modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy in the early 1990s and created an authoritarian, Soviet-style regime. Belarus has close historical and cultural ties to Russia. Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus's key economic assets while reducing the costs of subsidizing the Lukashenko regime.
For many years, the United States has limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions against Belneftekhim, the state-owned petrochemicals firm. Belarus also limited the number of U.S. diplomats in Belarus to five persons.
From 2008 to 2010, the United States and European Union suspended some sanctions in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues. This policy suffered a setback in December 2010, when Belarus held presidential elections that observers from the OSCE viewed as falling far short of international standards. Moreover, in response to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in a square in central Minsk, the Lukashenko regime arrested over 700 persons, including most of his opponents in the election, as well as activists, journalists, and civil society representatives. Some of them were viciously beaten by police.
In January 2011, the EU and the United States imposed enhanced visa and financial sanctions against top Belarusian officials. The United States re-imposed sanctions against two key subsidiaries of Belneftekhim. They also pledged enhanced support for Belarusian pro-democracy and civil society groups. Although Lukashenko has released most of the political prisoners, about a dozen remain imprisoned. In response, the United States and the EU have imposed sanctions against additional prominent Belarusian officials, and businessmen and firms associated with them.
Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation. In January 2012, President Obama signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act. The legislation reauthorized the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. It updated the provisions of the legislation to include the fraudulent December 2010 election and the ensuing crackdown. It also updated the report the Administration is required to file to include assistance provided by other governments or organizations to assist the Belarusian government's efforts to control the Internet. The legislation stated that it is the policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to not hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk unless the government of Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to Lukashenko personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan. |
crs_RL30110 | crs_RL30110_0 | Introduction
This report describes the terms most commonly used when discussing the federal individual income tax. An exclusion is an item of income that is not included as income for tax purposes because the tax code explicitly excludes—or exempts—it from taxation. Except for tax-exempt interest, exclusions generally are not required to be reported to the Internal Revenue Service. These payments are deducted from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income. Adjustments to income function similarly to deductions. However, unlike deductions, adjustments are made to arrive at adjusted gross income, and hence can be claimed by all qualified taxpayers, whether or not they use the standard deduction amount or have itemized deductions (see " Deductions "). AGI is the basic measure of income under the federal income tax and is the income measurement before deductions and personal exemptions are taken into account. Deductions
Deductions from adjusted gross income are allowed for certain types of expenditures of income. Deductions function like adjustments and exclusions in their effect on tax liability. Exemptions
Before calculating total income, personal exemptions are allowed for the taxpayer, his or her spouse (if married and filing a joint return), and each dependent. Taxable Income
Taxable income, the narrowest measure of income used on the income tax return, is equivalent to adjusted gross income reduced by either the standard deduction or itemized deduction and the personal exemption. Taxable income is the base upon which the income tax rates are applied to calculate income tax liability. For most taxpayers, gross tax liability is equal to regular income tax liability, which is calculated by applying the marginal tax rate schedule to taxable income. Nonrefundable Credits
Nonrefundable tax credits are subtracted from gross tax liability to arrive at a taxpayer's final tax liability. Thus, nonrefundable tax credits generally reduce an individual's tax liability directly, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and are available to all qualified taxpayers. Refundable tax credits are discussed later in this report. Total Tax Liability
Total tax liability, also sometimes referred to as final tax liability, is the amount of federal income tax owed by the taxpayer to the federal government after taking into account allowable refundable tax credits. Tax Refund
A tax refund is a payment by the federal government to a taxpayer whose withheld taxes, estimated tax payments, and refundable credits exceeded final tax liability, entitling him or her to a refund for overpayment of the tax bill. Amount Owed
When a taxpayer's total tax liability exceeds federal taxes withheld, estimated tax payments, and refundable credits, then the taxpayer will owe the federal government an additional amount to cover the shortfall in paid taxes. 2016 IRS Form 1040
2016 IRS Schedule A (Form 1040)
Appendix B. | Described in this report are the terms most commonly used when discussing the federal individual income tax. Most of these tax terms are explained in the order that they occur in the process of determining one's income tax on the Form 1040. Total income is the sum total of all income required to be reported for tax purposes before adjustments to income are made for special types of expenses which Congress has determined should be considered in calculating gross income. These adjustments function like deductions, except that unlike deductions, adjustments are calculated in arriving at adjusted gross income, and thus can be claimed by all taxpayers, not just those who itemize deductions. An exclusion from income refers to an item specifically excluded from determination of gross income.
Adjusted gross income (AGI) equals gross income less qualifying adjustments to income. It is the income measurement before deductions and personal exemptions are taken into account. Deductions from adjusted gross income are allowed for certain types of expenditures for which income taxation is deemed inappropriate or inadvisable. Deductions function like adjustments and exclusions in their effect on tax liability. In addition to the standard deduction, an additional standard deduction amount is available to certain individuals, for example the blind or elderly. Personal exemptions are allowed for the taxpayer, his or her spouse, and each dependent. Exemptions affect tax liability like deductions, adjustments to income, and exclusions.
Taxable income is adjusted gross income reduced by either the standard deduction (plus the additional standard deduction in some cases) or itemized deductions along with personal exemptions. Taxable income is the base to which the income tax rates are applied to calculate income tax liability. Tax liability is calculated by applying the marginal tax rate and schedule to taxable income. Tax credits are then subtracted from gross tax liability to arrive at a taxpayer's final tax liability. Hence, tax credits reduce tax liability directly, on a dollar for dollar basis. Tax credits are available to all qualifying taxpayers, whether they itemize deductions or not. Total tax liability is the amount of federal income tax owed by the taxpayer to the federal government. When a taxpayer's final tax liability exceeds federal taxes withheld, estimated quarterly taxes paid, and certain other credits, then the taxpayer has taxes due and must pay the federal government additional federal income taxes to cover the shortfall. A refund is a payment by the federal government to a taxpayer whose withheld taxes and/or estimated tax payments or refundable credits exceeded his final tax liability.
A copy of the 2016 IRS Form 1040 is included at the end of this report.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative events. |
crs_RL34553 | crs_RL34553_0 | Turnover of membership in the House and Senate necessitates closing congressional offices. The closure of a congressional office requires an outgoing Member of Congress, or congressional officials, in the case of a deceased Member, to evaluate pertinent information regarding staff; the disposal of personal and official records; and final disposition of office accounts, facilities, and equipment. The House and Senate have developed extensive resources to assist Members in closing their offices. These services are typically used at the end of a Congress, when a Member's term of service ends, but most services are available to an office that becomes vacant for other reasons. This report provides an overview of issues that may arise in closing a congressional office, and provides a guide to resources available through the appropriate support offices of the House and Senate. | Turnover of membership in the House and Senate necessitates closing congressional offices. The closure of a congressional office requires an outgoing Member of Congress to evaluate pertinent information regarding his or her staff; the disposal of personal and official records; and final disposition of office accounts, facilities, and equipment. In the past several years, the House and Senate have developed extensive resources to assist Members in closing their offices. These services are most typically used at the end of a Congress, when a Member's term of service ends, but most of the services are available to an office that becomes vacant for other reasons. This report provides an overview of the issues that may arise in closing a congressional office, and provides a guide to resources available through the appropriate support offices of the House and Senate.
This report, which will be updated as warranted, is designed to address questions that arise when a congressional office is closing. Another related report is CRS Report R41121, Selected Privileges and Courtesies Extended to Former Members of Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45004 | crs_R45004_0 | In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. This report identifies, for the 114 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 114th Congress
Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 114 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 30 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 114 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For executive department nominations confirmed in the 114 th Congress, a mean of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5. | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 350 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 114th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments.
Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix.
During the 114th Congress, the President submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 30 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2016 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33974 | crs_RL33974_0 | In 2006, Congress began looking into why certain oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—specifically, some 1,024 deep water leases in the Gulf of Mexico issued in 1998 and 1999—did not contain "price thresholds." A price threshold in an OCS oil and gas lease means that once the market price for oil and natural gas rises above a certain price, the lessee's freedom from having to pay royalties no longer applies. Such freedom from paying royalties was thought necessary by Congress to promote exploration and production in deep water areas of the Gulf, and was embodied in the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), enacted in 1995. More to the point, various legislative proposals surfaced to encourage holders of the 1998/1999 leases to renegotiate the terms of their leases so as to include price thresholds for future production of oil and gas. This report looks at the legal issues that may be raised by such proposals, focusing on a proposal which on January 18, 2007, passed the House of Representatives as section 204 of H.R. 6 , the House energy bill. 6 is now being considered in the Senate. The second, alternative condition that a threshold-less leaseholder can meet is to pay a "conservation of resources" fee established by the Secretary of the Interior. More particularly, does section 204 (1) work a "taking" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) offend the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, (3) violate either the substantive due process or equal protection guarantees applied by the Fifth Amendment, or (4) effect a breach of contract? Finally, the report deals with whether an action against the leaseholders in question might be possible under the contract theories of unilateral or mutual mistake. With regard to section 204 of H.R. | In February 2007, Congress began looking into why certain oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—specifically, some 1,024 deep water leases in the Gulf of Mexico issued in 1998 and 1999—did not contain "price thresholds." A price threshold in an OCS oil and gas lease means that once the market price for oil and natural gas rises above a certain price, the lessee's freedom from having to pay royalties no longer applies. Such freedom from paying royalties was thought necessary by Congress to promote exploration and production in deep water areas of the Gulf, and was embodied in the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), enacted in 1995. Various legislative proposals surfaced to encourage holders of the 1998/1999 leases to renegotiate the terms of their leases so as to include price thresholds for future production of oil and gas.
This report looks at several of the legal issues arguably raised by one such proposal, which on January 18, 2007, passed the House of Representatives as section 204 of H.R. 6, the House energy bill (more formally, the Creating Long-Term Energy Alternatives for the Nation Act of 2007 or the CLEAN Energy Act of 2007). Section 204 provides that a party that holds one of the 1998 and 1999 leases will not be eligible to bid on future leases auctioned by the Secretary of the Interior, generally through the Minerals Management Service (MMS) unless the lessee either renegotiates the lease terms to include a price threshold or pays a "conservation of resources" fee established by the Secretary of the Interior. H.R. 6 is now being considered in the Senate.
This report analyzes potential legal challenges to section 204, including whether the provisions of section 204 (1) work a "taking" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) offend the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, (3) violate either the substantive due process or equal protection guarantees applied by the Fifth Amendment, or (4) effect a breach of contract. Finally, the report deals with whether legal action against the leaseholders in question independent of section 204 might be possible under the contract theories of unilateral or mutual mistake. |
crs_RS22773 | crs_RS22773_0 | This latter category of jurisdictions is sometimes referred to as "sanctuary cities." Supporters argue that immigration enforcement is the responsibility of the federal government, and that local efforts to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, interfere with local enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles. Opponents of sanctuary policies argue that they encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts. Applicable Law
The primary federal restrictions on state and local sanctuary policies are § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104 - 193 ) and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104 - 208 ). It bars any prohibition on a federal, state, or local governmental entity or official's ability to send or receive information regarding immigration or citizenship status to or from federal immigration authorities. Reportedly, some states and localities seeking to limit assistance to federal immigration authorities have barred agencies or officers from inquiring about persons' immigration status, a practice sometimes described as a "don't ask, don't tell" approach. Though this method does not directly conflict with federal requirements that states and localities permit the free exchange of information regarding persons' immigration status, it results in specified agencies or officers lacking any information about persons' immigration status that they could share with federal authorities. Legislative Activities
In the 110 th Congress, several bills were introduced that attempted to limit formal or informal sanctuary policies and induce greater sharing of immigration information by state and local authorities. Bills have been introduced in the 111 th Congress to modify requirements on states and localities concerning the sharing of immigration-related information with the federal government. | Controversy has arisen over the existence of so-called "sanctuary cities." The term "sanctuary city" is not defined by federal law, but it is often used to refer to those localities which, as a result of a state or local act, ordinance, policy, or fiscal constraints, place limits on their assistance to federal immigration authorities seeking to apprehend and remove unauthorized aliens. Supporters of such policies argue that many cities have higher priorities, and that local efforts to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, interfere with local law enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles. Opponents argue that sanctuary policies encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts. Pursuant to § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193) and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208), states and localities may not limit their governmental entities or officers from maintaining records regarding a person's immigration status, or bar the exchange of such information with any federal, state, or local entity. Reportedly, some jurisdictions with sanctuary policies take a "don't ask, don't tell" approach, where officials are barred from inquiring about a person's immigration status in certain circumstances. Though this method does not directly conflict with federal requirements that states and localities permit the free exchange of information regarding persons' immigration status, it results in specified agencies or officers lacking information that they could potentially share with federal immigration authorities. In the 110th Congress, several bills were introduced that attempted to limit formal or informal sanctuary policies and induce greater sharing of immigration information by state and local authorities. Bills have also been introduced in the 111th Congress to restrict or expand states and localities' information-sharing requirements. |
crs_R41301 | crs_R41301_0 | Introduction
Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act, or ACA) is having a significan t impact on federal mandatory—also known as direct—spending. Most of the projected spending under the law is for expanding health insurance coverage. This includes premium tax credits and cost-sharing reduction payments for individuals and families who purchase private insurance coverage through the health insurance exchanges established under the ACA, as well as federal matching funds for states that choose to expand their Medicaid programs. The ACA also included numerous appropriations that are providing billions of dollars in mandatory funds to support new and existing grant programs and other activities. Several other provisions in the law require the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to transfer amounts from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds for specified purposes. A companion CRS report discusses the ACA's impact on discretionary spending, which is controlled by the annual appropriations process. The law appropriated significant amounts to support the following short-term health care programs for targeted groups prior to the health insurance exchanges becoming operational in 2014: (1) $5 billion for the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP), a temporary insurance program that provided health insurance coverage for uninsured individuals with a pre-existing condition; (2) $5 billion for a temporary reinsurance program to reimburse employers for a portion of the costs of providing health benefits to early retirees aged 55-64; and (3) $6 billion for the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program, to support temporary health insurance cooperatives. The law established the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) within CMS and appropriated $10 billion for the FY2011-FY2019 period—and $10 billion for each subsequent 10-year period—for CMMI to test and implement innovative payment and service delivery models. The ACA created four special funds and appropriated substantial amounts to each one:
The Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) , to which the ACA appropriated a total of $11 billion in annual appropriations over the five-year period FY2011-FY2015, has helped support the federal health centers program and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC). The Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) , for which the ACA provided a permanent annual appropriation, is intended to support prevention, wellness, and other public health-related programs and activities authorized under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) is supporting comparative effectiveness research with a mix of annual appropriations—some of which are offset by revenues from a fee imposed on private health plans—and transfers from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds through FY2019. The Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund (HIRIF) , to which the ACA appropriated $1 billion, has helped cover the administrative costs of implementing the law. Impact of Sequestration
While the federal spending on insurance expansion coverage under the ACA is almost entirely exempt from annual sequestration, the ACA appropriations discussed in this report are, in general, fully sequestrable at the percentage rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense mandatory spending (see Table 1 ). Key Takeaways
Overall, the ACA provided more than $100 billion in mandatory appropriations and Medicare fund transfers over the 10-year period FY2010-FY2019. In a series of legislative actions (described in more detail in Table 2 and Table 3 ), Congress extended funding for several programs whose ACA appropriations were about to expire. | Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act, or ACA) is having a significant impact on federal mandatory—also known as direct—spending. Most of the projected spending under the law is for expanding health insurance coverage. This spending includes premium tax credits and other subsidies for individuals and families that purchase private insurance coverage through the health insurance exchanges established under the ACA, as well as federal matching funds for states that have expanded their Medicaid programs.
In addition, the ACA included numerous appropriations that have provided billions of dollars in mandatory funds to support new and existing grant programs and other activities. Other ACA provisions require the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to transfer amounts from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds for specified purposes. The law appropriated significant amounts to support short-term health care programs for targeted groups prior to the health insurance exchanges becoming operational in 2014. It also created a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and appropriated $10 billion for the FY2011-FY2019 period—and $10 billion for each subsequent 10-year period—for CMMI to test and implement innovative payment and service delivery models.
The ACA established four special funds and appropriated substantial amounts to each one. First, the Community Health Center Fund, to which the ACA appropriated a total of $11 billion over the five-year period FY2011-FY2015, has helped support the federal health centers program and the National Health Service Corps. Second, the Prevention and Public Health Fund, for which the ACA provided a permanent annual appropriation, is supporting prevention, wellness, and other programs authorized under the Public Health Service Act. Third, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund is supporting comparative effectiveness research through FY2019 with a mix of annual appropriations, fees assessed on private health insurance, and Medicare trust fund transfers. Finally, the Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund, to which the ACA appropriated $1 billion, helped pay for implementing the law. Overall, the ACA included more than $100 billion in appropriations over the 10-year period FY2010-FY2019, including $40 billion to fund the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for FY2014 and FY2015.
In subsequent legislative actions, Congress has extended funding through FY2017 for several programs whose ACA appropriations were about to expire, and reduced or rescinded ACA funding other some other activities.
Federal outlays on insurance expansion coverage under the ACA, which constitutes most of the law's mandatory spending, are almost entirely exempt from sequestration. However, the mandatory appropriations in the ACA are, in general, fully sequestrable at the percentage rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense mandatory spending.
Besides the mandatory appropriations discussed in this report, the ACA also is having an effect on federal discretionary spending, which is controlled by the annual appropriations acts. A companion report, CRS Report R41390, Discretionary Spending Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), discusses the law's impact on discretionary spending. |
crs_R41754 | crs_R41754_0 | The account includes funding for HUD's Community Development Block Grant Program, Section 108 loan guarantees, the Administration's Sustainable Communities Initiative, and Section 4 capacity-building activities. The Administration's Budget Request
The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2013, released on February 13, 2012, includes $3.143 billion for activities funded under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Fund (CDF) account. For FY2013 the Administration is requesting an appropriation of $100 million. Senate Appropriations Committee Bill (S. 2322)
On April 19, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2322 , a bill recommending appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies for FY2013. The bill recommends $3.210 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.100 billion for CDBG formula grants awarded to states, entitlement communities, and insular areas. As reported by the committee, the bill recommends an appropriation of $50 million for SCI activities. 5972)
The House Appropriations Committee reported the Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies Appropriations act on June 20, 2012. 5972 , recommends $3.404 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.344 billion for CDBG formula grants awarded to states, entitlement communities, and insular areas. FY2012 Appropriations, P.L. 112-55
During the second half of 2011, Congress considered and debated the Administration's budget recommendations for FY2012. The Administration's FY2012 budget recommended a total funding level of $3.804 billion for programs funded under the CDF account. The subcommittee draft bill recommended $3.501 billion for CDF activities, including $3.466 billion for CDBG formula grants to states, local governments, and insular areas; and $35 million for Indian tribes. 738 ) to H.R. 112-55
On November 3, 2011, the House requested a conference on H.R. 112-284 ) on November 14, 2011. 2112 was approved by the House and Senate on November 17, 2011, and the act was signed into law by the President as P.L. 112-55 on November 18, 2011. 112-55 included $400 million in CDBG supplemental disaster assistance. 1)
On April 15, 2011, the President signed into law P.L. 112-10 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2011. The measure, which passed the House and Senate on April 14, 2011, after months of intense budget negotiations, included a provision appropriating $3.508 billion for the Community Development Fund (CDF). 1 , a bill providing continuing annual appropriations for FY2011. The measure was passed by both the House and the Senate on the eve of the expiration of P.L. 112-10 appropriated $3.508 billion for activities in the CDF account, including $3.343 billion for CDBG formula funds. The act also includes a 0.2% mandatory across the board rescission of all appropriated funds and a 1% discretionary transfer from designated HUD funds, including CDF activities to HUD's Transformation Initiative. The mandatory across the board cut reduces the CDF account by $7 million to $3.501 billion, while the 1% discretionary transfer would move $35 million from the CDF account and its components to the Department's Transformation Initiative. S.Amdt. He argued that, given the need to address the larger issue of reducing the federal debt and deficit, funding for NSP-3 should be rescinded. | The FY2013 budget debate will take place within the context of growing concerns about the need to address federal budget deficits, the national debt, and a sluggish economic recovery following the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression. The 112th Congress will continue to consider and debate a number of approaches to spur economic activity and job growth, including federal public works and community and economic development programs.
On February 13, 2012, the President released the Administration's proposed federal budget for FY2013. The Administration's budget proposal includes $3.143 billion for activities funded under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) Community Development Fund (CDF) account. This includes $2.948 billion for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) formula grants awarded to states, entitlement communities, and insular areas; and $60 million for Indian tribes. The Administration is also requesting $100 million for its Sustainable Communities Initiative (SCI), which did not receive an appropriation for FY2012, and $35 million for capacity-building grants awarded to three national intermediaries to provide technical assistance to local community development organizations. The President's budget request included $500 million in CDBG Section 108 loan guarantee authority. On April 19, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2322, a bill recommending appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies for FY2013 (THUD). The bill recommends $3.210 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.100 billion for CDBG formula grants. The House Appropriations Committee reported the THUD Appropriations act on June 20, 2012. The bill recommends $3.404 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.344 billion for CDBG formula grants.
On April 15, 2011, the President signed into law P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2011. The measure, which passed the House and Senate on April 14, 2011, after months of intense budget negotiations, appropriated $3.508 billion for activities in the CDF account, including $3.343 billion for CDBG formula funds. P.L. 112-10 included two provisions that reduced the account's overall appropriations: (1) a 0.2% mandatory across the board rescission of all appropriated funds; and (2) a 1% discretionary transfer from designated HUD funds, including CDF activities, to HUD's Transformation Initiative (TI). The mandatory across-the-board rescission reduced the CDF account by $7 million to $3.501 billion, while the 1% discretionary transfer moved up to $35 million from the CDF account to the Department's Transformation Initiative. The act also appropriated $98 million for the SCI.
Having completed action on the FY2011 appropriations, Congress began consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2012 budget proposals during the spring of 2011. The President's proposed FY2012 budget recommended $3.804 billion for the CDF account. Unable to enact final FY2012 appropriations before the end of FY2011, Congress enacted a series of continuing resolutions to maintain funding for government activities. On November 1, 2011, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 738 to H.R. 2112, a bill consolidating recommended appropriations of three appropriations subcommittees: Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development; Agriculture; and Commerce, Justice, and Science. A conference report accompanying this "Minibus" was filed on November 14, 2011 (H.Rept. 112-284). The bill was passed by the House and Senate on November 17, 2011, and signed by the President, as P.L. 112-55, on November 18, 2011. P.L. 112-55 included an appropriation of $3.408 billion for CDF activities, including $400 million in CDBG disaster relief supplemental funding and $2.948 billion for CDBG formula grants to states and local governments. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34603 | crs_RL34603_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has two missions—criminal investigations and protection. Criminal investigation activities encompass financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure. Additionally, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing entitled "White House Perimeter Breach: New Concerns about the Secret Service," on September 30, 2014, which addressed a security breach on September 19 th , where a person gained unauthorized entrance into the White House after climbing the perimeter fence, and previous incidents. The committee inquired if deficient protection procedures, insufficient training, inadequate funding, personnel shortages, or low morale contributed to these security breaches. Later, on the same day as the hearing, it became public knowledge that earlier in the year a private security contractor at a federal facility, while armed, was allowed to share an elevator with President Barack Obama during a site visit, in violation of U.S. Secret Service security protocols. The following day, October 1, 2014, USSS Director Julia Pierson resigned. Congress transferred USSS to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 legislation. In 1894, the Service informally acquired the protection function at the request of President Grover Cleveland. Another law was the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. In addition to the expansion of the protection of the President and the President's family, the White House Police Force was created in 1922 to secure and patrol the Executive Mansion and grounds in Washington, DC. In 1954, Congress used the title "U.S. Secret Service" in an appropriation act for the first time. In 1982, the list was increased again by Congress with the addition of former Vice Presidents and their spouses for a period to be determined by the President. The most recent congressional action on the Service's protection mission was the enactment of the Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011, which amended 18 U.S.C. The relevant statutes discussed above illustrate the Service's expanding protection mission which includes what federal officials are authorized, through statute, USSS protection; the role and responsibilities of the Secret Service Uniform Division; and the Service's role in security for NSSEs. An example of this is Congress's enactment of P.L. One argument for this is that the majority of the Service's resources are used for its protection mission, and that Congress has raised the issue of the Service's competing missions of protection and investigation. Recently the Service has increased its efforts in cybersecurity and its protection activities due to certain events, such as the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The missions of the Service have evolved and conformed to presidential, departmental, and congressional requirements. Statutes Addressing U.S. Secret Service Activities | The U.S. Secret Service has two missions—criminal investigations and protection. Criminal investigation activities have expanded since the inception of the Service from a small anti-counterfeiting operation at the end of the Civil War, to now encompassing financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas. Protection activities, which have expanded and evolved since the 1890s, include ensuring the safety and security of the President, Vice President, their families, and other identified individuals and locations.
In March 2003, the U.S. Secret Service was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the U.S. Secret Service had been part of the Treasury Department for over 100 years.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, there have been consistent and continuing questions concerning the U.S. Secret Service. Are the two missions of the Service compatible and how should they be prioritized? Is the Department of Homeland Security the most appropriate organizational and administrative location for the Secret Service? These, and other policy issues such as the Secret Service's role in securing presidential inaugurations, have been raised and addressed at different times by Congress and various administrations during the long history of the Service. Additionally, there has been increased interest in the Service due to the inaugural security operations and the protection of President Barack Obama. Some may contend that these and other questions call for renewed attention given the recent increase in demand for the Service's protection function (for example, see P.L. 110-326 enacted by the 110th Congress) and the advent of new technology used in financial crimes. Numerous pieces of legislation related to the Service have been introduced and enacted by the 113th Congress, with all of the enacted legislation being appropriation bills. Introduced in the 113th Congress, H.R. 1121, Cyber Privacy Fortification Act of 2013; H.R. 1468, SECURE IT; S. 1193, Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2013; and S. 1897, Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014 are related to personal data privacy and security, and confidential informant security. Additionally, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing entitled "White House Perimeter Breach: New Concerns about the Secret Service," on September 30, 2014, which addressed a security breach on September 19th, where a person gained unauthorized entrance into the White House after climbing the perimeter fence, and previous incidents. The committee inquired if deficient protection procedures, insufficient training, inadequate funding, personnel shortages, or low morale contributed to these security breaches. Later, on the same day as the hearing, it became public knowledge that earlier in the year a private security contractor at a federal facility, while armed, was allowed to share an elevator with President Barack Obama during a site visit, in violation of U.S. Secret Service security protocols. The following day, October 1, 2014, USSS Director Julia Pierson resigned.
This report discusses these issues and will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant. |
crs_R40728 | crs_R40728_0 | In an effort to stem a sharp decline in domestic economic activity that began in late 2007, Congress passed and President Obama signed in February 2009 an economic stimulus bill known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ). The measure contains a variety of tax cuts, loans and loan guarantees, and spending initiatives, whose estimated 10-year cost comes to $787 billion. Most of the cost of the tax provisions is due to tax benefits for individuals, as the 10-year cost of the business tax incentives in the act totals only $6.2 billion, or about 2% of the aggregate cost of the tax cuts. This report identifies the tax provisions in ARRA that have the potential to benefit a large number of small firms in a broad range of industries and discusses how each provision is likely to affect small firms as a whole in the next year or two. It will not be updated. What Is a Small Firm? An important and problematic issue in assessing how small firms are likely to be affected by the business tax provisions in ARRA is the definition of a small firm. No standard or uniform definition undergirds the federal laws and regulations aimed at providing assistance to small business. Instead, several criteria are used to identify eligible firms. Tax Provisions in ARRA That Could Benefit Many Small Firms in a Wide Range of Industries
A review of the business tax provisions included in ARRA suggests that 11 of them have the potential to benefit a large number of small firms in a broad range of industries:
Extension of the bonus depreciation allowance Extension of enhanced expensing allowance Extended net operating loss carryback period Expanded work opportunity credit Deferral of income from discharge of business debt Increased exclusion of gain on the sale of small business stock Reduction in recognition period for built-in gains tax Extension of option to monetize a portion of unused pre-2006 research and corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) credits Lower estimated tax payments in 2009 for qualified small business owners Credit against employment tax payments for employer COBRA subsidies Increase in the exemption amounts for the AMT and an extension through 2009 of the full use of non-refundable personal credits against the tax
Five of them are targeted at small firms: (1) extension of the enhanced expensing allowance through 2009; (2) extended net operating loss carryback period for losses incurred in 2008; (3) temporary increase in the exclusion of gain on the sale of small business stock; (4) temporary reduction of the recognition period for the built-in gains tax for S corporations; and (5) lower estimated tax payments for certain small business owners in 2009. The six other tax provisions could offer significant benefits to small as well as large firms. Excluded from the list are tax provisions in ARRA that target specific sectors (e.g., the credit for production of electricity from renewable sources), and that encourage investors to purchase government bonds (e.g., credit for recovery zone bonds) or buy equity in entities that invest in low-income and economically distressed communities (e.g., new markets tax credit). On the whole, the provisions seem intended to spur greater investment and hiring in 2009 (and to a lesser extent in 2010) by small firms than otherwise would be the case. ARRA tries to accomplish this mainly by temporarily lowering the cost of capital for purchases of certain tangible assets, increasing the cash flow of many small firms, and reducing the after-tax cost of hiring certain individuals. But available evidence suggests that the unanticipated and extraordinary severity of the current economic downturn, as manifested in part by sharp declines in business profits, domestic employment, and gross domestic product (GDP) since early 2008, is outweighing the stimulus imparted by these tax benefits. ARRA extends the option of claiming the refundable tax credit in lieu of a bonus depreciation allowance through 2009. | In a bid to arrest a sharp downturn in the U.S. economy that is thought to have begun in late 2007, Congress passed and President Obama signed in February 2009 a bill to stimulate the economy known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Among its many provisions, the act contains a variety of tax cuts and spending initiatives, whose estimated 10-year cost comes to $787 billion. The tax provisions account for 36% of that amount, or $285.6 billion. Most of this cost is due to tax benefits for individuals, as the 10-year cost of the business tax provisions totals $6.2 billion, or about 2% of the total cost of the tax incentives.
This report identifies the tax provisions in ARRA that have a significant potential to benefit a large number of small firms in a wide range of industries. It also explains the intended purpose of each provision and discusses how it might affect the performance of small firms in the next year or two. It will not be updated.
An important and problematic issue in determining how most small firms are likely to be affected by the business tax provisions in ARRA is the definition of a small firm. No standard or uniform definition undergirds the federal laws and regulations that provide assistance to small business. Instead, a variety of standards (e.g., employment or asset size) is used to identify eligible firms. In collecting and releasing economic data on small business, the Small Business Administration defines a small firm as any firm with 500 or fewer employees in a recent year. A similar definition implicitly guides the analysis presented here.
A review of the business tax provisions included in ARRA suggests that 11 of them have the potential to benefit a large number of small firms in a broad range of industries. They include one-year extensions of the bonus depreciation allowance, the enhanced expensing allowance, and the option to claim a refundable tax credit in lieu of the bonus depreciation allowance for unused research and alternative minimum tax credits from tax years starting before 2006.
Five of the provisions are targeted at small firms: (1) extension of the enhanced expensing allowance through 2009; (2) extended net operating loss carryback period for losses incurred in 2008; (3) temporary increase in the exclusion of gain on the sale of small business stock; (4) temporary reduction of the recognition period for the built-in gains tax for S corporations; and (5) lower estimated tax payments for certain small business owners in 2009. The six other tax provisions could offer significant benefits to many small as well as large firms.
Excluded from the list are tax provisions in ARRA that target specific sectors (e.g., the credit for production of electricity from renewable sources), and that encourage investors to purchase government bonds (e.g., credit for recovery zone bonds) or buy equity in entities that invest in low-income and economically distressed communities (e.g., new markets tax credit).
On the whole, the provisions seem intended to spur greater investment and hiring in 2009 (and to a lesser extent in 2010) by small firms than otherwise would be the case. They try to accomplish this mainly by temporarily lowering the cost of capital for purchases of certain tangible assets, increasing the cash flow of many small firms, and reducing the after-tax cost of hiring certain individuals. But available evidence suggests that the unanticipated and extraordinary severity of the current economic downturn, as manifested in part by sharp declines in business profits, domestic employment, and gross domestic product (GDP) since early 2008, is outweighing the stimulus imparted by these tax benefits. |
crs_R40566 | crs_R40566_0 | No migration talks have been held since January 2004, however, because DOS cancelled them due to Cuba's refusal to discuss the following key issues: Cuba's issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; Cuba's cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; the need for a deeper Cuban port utilized by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; Cuba's responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and Cuba's obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be excludable from the United States. U.S. Coast Guard Interdictions
Since the May 1995 agreement, the U.S. Coast Guard interdictions of Cubans have fluctuated, but trended upward over time. Interdictions hit a 12-year high of 2,868 in FY2007. In FY2008, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 2,199 Cubans. The number of Cubans that the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended dipped slightly to 3,351 in FY2008. Inadmissible Cubans arriving at ports of entry reached a high of 13,019 in FY2007 and fell slightly to 11,278 in FY2008, as Figure 3 illustrates. The U.S. Although actual admission numbers have been jagged over this period, the trend line has moved upward. Cuba consistently ranks among the top 10 source countries for LPRs. A total of 49,500 Cubans became legal permanent residents in FY2008. Cuba ranked fifth as a top immigrant-sending country—after Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines—in FY2008. The change in leadership of both the United States and Cuba may provide openings for revisions in U.S. policy on Cuban migration. Semi-annual migration talks between Cuba and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords for a decade. Fidel Castro's departure as head of government in July 2006 has prompted some observers to call for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba overall, and a potential opportunity to restart the migration talks. After serving temporarily, Raúl Castro, brother of the former dictator, officially assumed the Cuban presidency in February 2008. This transfer of power between the Castro brothers led some to question whether there would be much of an opening for renewed migration talks between the United States and Cuba. During the 2008 presidential campaign, however, President Barack Obama stated he would seek to change U.S. policy by allowing unlimited family travel and remittances to Cuba, signaling to some the possibility of resuming the migration talks. In his opening speech at the Summit of the Americas on April 17, 2009, President Obama expressed the hope of "a new beginning with Cuba," specifically mentioning migration as an issue. On May 31, 2009, an official at the U.S. Department of State reported that the Cuban government had indicated that it wants to resume talks on the legal immigration of Cubans to the United States. | Many of the issues surrounding Cuban migration are unique but not new. Normal immigration from Cuba has been elusive since Fidel Castro came to power. Over the past 50 years, the practice of Cubans fleeing by boat to the United States has become commonplace, and at some points reached the levels of a mass exodus. Since the last upsurge of "boat people" in the mid-1990s, the United States and Cuba worked toward establishing safe, legal immigration, which includes returning migrants interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard. These migration policies, however, are not without critics.
The immigration of Cubans to the United States has increased since 1995, although the actual admission numbers have ebbed and flowed over this period. Cuba consistently ranks among the top 10 source countries for legal permanent residents (LPRs). Cuba ranked fifth as a top immigrant-sending country—after Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines—in FY2008. A total of 49,500 Cubans became LPRs in FY2008.
U.S. Coast Guard interdictions of Cubans have fluctuated since the mid-1990s, yet the general trend has moved upward. Cuban interdictions reached a 12-year high of 2,868 in FY2007. In FY2008, the U.S. Coast Guard reported 2,199 Cuban interdictions. Similarly, U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of Cubans peaked at 4,295 in FY2007 and slipped to 3,351 in FY2008. Cubans who arrived at ports of entry without documents exhibited a comparable pattern, reaching a high of 13,019 in FY2007 and falling slightly to 11,278 in FY2008.
The change in leadership of both the United States and Cuba may provide openings for revisions in U.S. policy on Cuban migration. Fidel Castro's departure as head of government in July 2006 has prompted some observers to call for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba overall, and a potential opportunity to restart the migration talks that had occurred semi-annually for a decade after the 1994 U.S-Cuba Migration Accord. After serving temporarily, Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel Casto, officially assumed the Cuban presidency in February 2008. This transfer of power between the Castro brothers led some to question whether there would be much of an opening for renewed migration talks between the United States and Cuba.
During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, however, President Barack Obama stated he would seek to change U.S. policy by allowing unlimited family travel and remittances to Cuba, signaling to some the possibility of resuming the migration talks. In his opening speech at the Summit of the Americas on April 17, 2009, President Obama expressed the hope of "a new beginning with Cuba," specifically mentioning migration as an issue. A bipartisan group of congressional leaders are expressing support for a resumption of the migration talks with Cuba. On May 31, 2009, a U.S. State Department official reported that Cuban officials had indicated that they want to resume migration talks.
This report does not track legislation but will be updated if policies are revised. For a discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] |
crs_RL31133 | crs_RL31133_0 | To buttress the nation's ability to prosecute a war or armed conflict, Congress has also enacted numerous statutes which confer standby authority on the President or the executive branch and are activated by the enactment of a declaration of war, the existence of a state of war, or the promulgation of a declaration of national emergency. It (1) provides historical background on each of the declarations of war and on several major authorizations for the use of force that have been enacted; (2) analyzes the implications of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force under both international law and domestic law; (3) lists and summarizes the more than 250 standby statutory authorities that can come into effect pursuant to a declaration of war, the existence of a state of war, and/or a declaration of national emergency; (4) describes the procedures in Congress governing the consideration of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force, including the procedures under the War Powers Resolution; and (5) sets forth in two appendices the texts of all of the declarations of war and the major authorizations for the use of force that have been enacted. The report will be updated as circumstances warrant. Previous Declarations of War
From the Washington Administration to the present, there have been 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations enacted by Congress and the President, encompassing five different wars—the War of 1812 with Great Britain, the War with Mexico in 1846, the War with Spain in 1898, the First World War, and the Second World War. In each case the enactment of a formal declaration of war has been preceded by a presidential request to Congress for such an action, either in writing or in person before a joint session of Congress. These reasons have included armed attacks on United States territory or its citizens, and attacks on or direct threats to United States rights or interests as a sovereign nation. In most cases such legislation has been preceded by a specific request by the President for such authority. Authorizations for the use of force, in contrast, have not been seen as automatically creating a state of war under international law. But an authorization for the use of force, in itself and in contrast to a declaration of war, does not trigger any of these standby authorities. On the other hand, the authorization to use force in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 has been asserted as legal authority for executive actions in the domestic context, the validity of which remains unresolved. The War Powers Resolution
Both a declaration of war and an authorization for the use of force have significant implications with respect to the War Powers Resolution (WPR). None appear necessarily to require a declaration of war to be applicable, but a declaration can trigger their application. They do not appear to be triggered by an authorization for the use of force unless a state of war develops. Whereas, by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled , That, for the purpose of enabling the government of the United States to prosecute said war to a speedy and successful termination, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ the militia, naval, and military forces of the United States, and to call for and accept the services of any number of volunteers, not exceeding fifty thousand, who may offer their services, either as cavalry, artillery, infantry, or riflemen, to serve twelve months after they shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged, according to the time for which they shall have been mustered into service; and that the sum of ten millions of dollars, out of any moneys in the treasury, or to come into the treasury, not otherwise appropriated, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this act into effect. | From the Washington Administration to the present, Congress and the President have enacted 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars. Each declaration has been preceded by a presidential request either in writing or in person before a joint session of Congress. The reasons cited in justification for the requests have included armed attacks on United States territory or its citizens and threats to United States rights or interests as a sovereign nation.
Congress and the President have also enacted authorizations for the use of force rather than formal declarations of war. Such measures have generally authorized the use of force against either a named country or unnamed hostile nations in a given region. In most cases, the President has requested the authority, but Congress has sometimes given the President less than what he asked for. Not all authorizations for the use of force have resulted in actual combat. Both declarations and authorizations require the signature of the President in order to become law.
In contrast to an authorization, a declaration of war in itself creates a state of war under international law and legitimates the killing of enemy combatants, the seizure of enemy property, and the apprehension of enemy aliens. While a formal declaration was once deemed a necessary legal prerequisite to war and was thought to terminate diplomatic and commercial relations and most treaties between the combatants, declarations have fallen into disuse since World War II. The laws of war, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, apply to circumstances of armed conflict whether or not a formal declaration or authorization was issued.
With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with respect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing, alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered automatically by an authorization for the use of force, although the executive branch has argued, with varying success, that the authorization to use force in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 provided a statutory exception to certain statutory prohibitions.
Most statutory standby authorities do not expressly require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war; however, courts have sometimes construed the word "war" in a statute as implying a formal declaration, leading Congress to enact clarifying amendments in two cases. Declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force waive the time limitations otherwise applicable to the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution.
This report provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force and analyzes their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. The report includes an extensive listing and summary of statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The report concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorization for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution. The report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R43201 | crs_R43201_0 | Other parties including Senator Richard Lugar had proposed a U.S.-Russian-facilitated disarmament initiative prior to the announcement. On September 10, Syrian officials signaled their willingness "to disclose the locations of chemical weapons, to stop producing them, and to reveal these locations to representatives of Russia, other states, and the United Nations" with the goal of "ending our possession of all chemical weapons." Others reportedly are drafting proposals that would reflect the disarmament proposal under consideration and could seek to make an authorization for the use of U.S. military force contingent on the satisfaction of criteria related to the enforcement of a disarmament agreement. Assessment
The war in Syria and the debate over possible punitive U.S. military action against the Asad regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons pose a uniquely challenging series of questions for policy makers. A mass casualty chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21 was the latest and most deadly of a string of reported instances where Syrian forces allegedly have used chemical weapons despite President Obama's prior statement that the transfer or use of chemical weapons is "a red line" that would "change his calculus." The President and senior members of his Administration have argued that the United States has a national security interest in ensuring that "when countries break international norms on chemical weapons they are held accountable." By his own account, President Obama believes that extensive, sustained U.S. military intervention to shape the outcome of Syria's civil conflict is undesirable. Still other critics of the Administration, including some Members of Congress, charge that U.S. hesitation to intervene militarily to protect Syrian civilians and/or help oust the Asad government has unnecessarily prolonged the fighting. Sorting through these competing perspectives and prescriptions now falls to Members of Congress as they consider the President's proposed course of action, his request that Congress authorize the use of force, the feasibility of international disarmament proposals for Syria, and the future of U.S. policy with regard to the conflict in Syria and its regional consequences. The August 21 attack appears to have been part of a fierce and ongoing Syrian military bombardment of rebel-held eastern suburbs of Damascus. In statements reacting to alleged chemical weapons incidents in Syria, U.S. officials have referred to several distinct reasons why the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government raises fundamental concerns for the United States:
the unacceptability of any use of chemical weapons, given the large international consensus that views chemical weapons as having inherently malicious qualities; the targeting of a civilian population, especially in large numbers, regardless of the weapons employed; the potential for the proliferation of chemical weapons to other parties, such as those hostile to the United States; and the potential ramifications of escalated or expanded violence in Syria, including the loss of control of chemical weapons and/or their use on neighboring countries and U.S. interests in the region. The United Nations Security Council may discuss proposals to accomplish this goal. What funding sources are available for U.S. military intervention in Syria? What would constitute failure and how might that affect U.S. objectives? What force might the Syrian government bring to bear to resist or respond to a military operation against it? How might opposition groups receiving U.S. support benefit or be put at risk by U.S. military operations? Is the U.S. military in a position to sustain military operations in the region? That is now known." China has consistently opposed outside military intervention in Syria in response to the August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack. | Reports of a mass casualty chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Damascus are reshaping the long-running and contentious debate over possible U.S. intervention in Syria's bloody civil war. Obama Administration officials and some foreign governments report that on August 21, 2013, forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al Asad attacked opposition-controlled areas in the suburbs of the capital with chemical weapons, killing hundreds of civilians, including women and children. The Syrian government has denied the accusations categorically and blames the opposition for the attack. United Nations inspectors who were in Syria to investigate other alleged chemical weapons attacks collected and are analyzing information related to the incident. Varying accounts suggest that several hundred to more than 1,000 people were killed from exposure to a poisonous gas, with symptoms consistent with exposure to the nerve agent sarin.
Possible punitive U.S. military action against the Asad regime is now the subject of intense debate, amid the broader ongoing discussion of U.S. policy toward the Syrian civil war and its regional consequences. The August 21 incident is the latest in a string of reported instances where Syrian forces appear to have used chemical weapons despite President Obama's prior statement that the transfer or use of chemical weapons is "a red line" that would "change his calculus." The President and senior members of his Administration have argued that the United States has a national security interest in ensuring that "when countries break international norms on chemical weapons they are held accountable." At the same time, President Obama still maintains that extensive, sustained U.S. military intervention to shape the outcome of Syria's civil conflict is undesirable. Prior to the August 21 incident, U.S. military leaders had outlined options to accomplish a range of U.S. objectives, while warning that U.S. military involvement "cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict."
Alternatives to military action also are under intense consideration. On September 10, Syrian officials responded to a Russian disarmament proposal by signaling their willingness "to disclose the locations of chemical weapons, to stop producing them, and to reveal these locations to representatives of Russia, other states, and the United Nations" with the goal of "ending our possession of all chemical weapons." Members of the United Nations Security Council began discussing proposals to implement an international framework for such a disarmament initiative.
Members of Congress have expressed a broad range of views on the question of an immediate U.S. military response and the proposed disarmament initiative. Some express support for military action and others express opposition or question how a military response would advance broader U.S. policy goals. Similarly, some Members seek to explore the potential of disarmament proposals and others warn that it may delay a forceful U.S. response or undermine U.S. policy with regard to Syria's civil war. For more than two years, many Members of Congress have debated the potential rewards and unintended consequences of deeper U.S. involvement in Syria. Some Members express concern that the Administration's policy of providing support to the fractured Syrian opposition could empower anti-American extremist groups, while others warn that failure to back moderate forces could prolong fighting and strengthen extremists.
As Members of Congress consider the merits of possible military intervention in Syria, they also are reengaging in long-standing discussions about the proper role for Congress in authorizing and funding U.S. military action abroad and the use of force in shaping global events or deterring dictatorships from committing atrocities. This report attempts to provide answers to a number of policy questions for lawmakers grappling with these short- and long-term issues. |
crs_RL32729 | crs_RL32729_0 | The chip automatically blocks the display of any programs deemed unacceptable; use of the V-chip by parents is entirely optional. Since January 1, 2000, all new television sets with a picture screen 13 inches or greater sold in the United States have been required to be equipped with the V-chip. On March 2, 2009, the FCC adopted and released a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to implement the Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007. The Child Safe Viewing Act directed the FCC to initiate a proceeding within 90 days after the date of enactment to examine "the existence and availability of advanced blocking technologies that are compatible with various communications devices or platforms." Congress defined "advanced blocking technologies" as "technologies that can improve or enhance the ability of a parent to protect his or her child from any indecent or objectionable video or audio programming, as determined by such parent, that is transmitted through the use of wire, wireless, or radio communications." Congress's intent in adopting the act was to spur the development of the "next generation of parental control technology." The FCC released its report based on the NOI on August 29, 2009. Effectiveness of the V-Chip
From 1998 through 2007, the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) conducted research into the impact of media violence on children and the effectiveness of the V-chip and television ratings as tools for parents to control access to undesirable television content. Websites
Federal Communications Commission V-chip Information, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/ . | To assist parents in supervising the television viewing habits of their children, the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996) requires that, as of January 1, 2000, new television sets with screens 13 inches or larger sold in the United States be equipped with a "V-chip" to control access to programming that parents find objectionable. Use of the V-chip is optional. In March 1998, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted the industry-developed ratings system to be used in conjunction with the V-chip. Congress and the FCC have continued monitoring implementation of the V-chip. Some are concerned that it is not effective in curbing the amount of TV violence viewed by children and want further legislation.
On August 31, 2009, the FCC released a report implementing the Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007. In the act, Congress had directed the FCC to examine "the existence and availability of advanced blocking technologies that are compatible with various communications devices or platforms." Congress defined "advanced blocking technologies" as "technologies that can improve or enhance the ability of a parent to protect his or her child from any indecent or objectionable video or audio programming, as determined by such parent, that is transmitted through the use of wire, wireless, or radio communications." Congress's intent in adopting the act was to spur the development of the "next generation of parental control technology." In a second inquiry issued in October 2009, the FCC is addressing additional issues it was unable to fully address based on its first inquiry.
There has been no action related to the V-Chip in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R40948 | crs_R40948_0 | I n general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised. This report will be updated as events warrant. Raising a Constitutional Point of Order
The process for raising a constitutional point of order against a pending question does not differ from that for raising other points of order. Sustaining the submitted point of order requires an affirmative vote of a majority of Senators voting, assuming a quorum is present. A point of order submitted to the Senate for decision is debatable except when the Senate is operating under cloture. Availability of the Motion to Table
While a submitted point of order is generally subject to extended debate, it is also subject to a non-debatable motion to table. The tabling motion could be made at any time after the point of order has been raised unless the Senate had agreed by UC to provide a specific amount of time for debate on the point of order, in which case the tabling motion could not be made until the time has expired or been yielded back. Effect of Unanimous Consent Agreements
A unanimous consent agreement may affect the debatability of a submitted point of order. | In general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised, and will be updated as events warrant.
A Senator can raise a constitutional point of order against any pending matter unless a unanimous consent agreement prohibits points of order or provides for a vote on the pending matter without any intervening action. A unanimous consent agreement may also affect the time at which it is in order to raise a point of order. If a specific amount of debate has been agreed to for the pending matter, the point of order cannot be raised until the time has expired or been yielded back. While past practice has varied, the Senate's rules and precedents currently require a constitutional point of order to be submitted to the Senate for disposition, with a majority of those voting (a quorum being present) required to sustain the point of order. The point of order is debatable, though the time for debate may be subject to limitations under a unanimous consent agreement or under cloture, in some circumstances, pursuant to statutory provisions. The submitted point of order is, however, subject to a non-debatable motion to table.
This report identifies 17 constitutional points of order that have been raised and received a Senate vote since 1989. Eleven of these cases were disposed of negatively. |
crs_RS22137 | crs_RS22137_0 | The recent scandals have led to calls for tighter regulation of the data brokerage industry, creating the need for more complete information on the types of businesses that make up this industry, and the types of services they provide. This report provides an overview of the industry and specific case studies of ChoicePoint and LexisNexis. As the following case studies show, the danger of identity theft remains, despite the implementation of tighter safeguards by data brokers. ChoicePoint sells data to a wide variety of entities, from insurers to law enforcement. The ChoicePoint and LexisNexis scandals, however, have spurred debate over the security of personal information collected and sold by data brokers. | Disclosures of breaches of the customer databases of LexisNexis and ChoicePoint have raised interest in the business and regulation of data brokers, companies that collect personal information from public and private records and sell this information to public and private sector entities. The growth of this industry has generally tracked the increase in government and private sector use of personal information. The vast amount of personal information that data brokers collect and the improper access to such data, however, have spurred concern as to the dangers of identity theft. Identity theft is reportedly the fastest growing crime in America. This report provides an overview of the data brokerage industry and more specific background on LexisNexis and ChoicePoint. |
crs_R42609 | crs_R42609_0 | Introduction
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides an array of benefits to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include, but are not limited to, disability compensation, education and training benefits, dependent and survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance and burial benefits, and home loan guaranty. In order to apply for these benefits, in most circumstances, the claimant will send an application to his or her local VA office. If, after the local VA makes a determination on the claim, the claimant is not satisfied with the results, he or she has the right to appeal that decision. The report will then provide a step-by-step breakdown of the appeal process within the Department of Veterans Affairs followed by a description of further judicial review from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States. Two Types of Appeals
When making an appeal on an initial determination, the claimant may choose to proceed with the traditional method of review or may choose to have a Decision Review Officer (DRO) review the case. If the claimant is not satisfied with the DRO's decision, the claimant may proceed with the traditional review process and have the appeal heard by the BVA. The Board of Veterans' Appeals
When a claimant is not satisfied with the initial determination on the application for benefits, an appeal can be made to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the determination reached by the CAVC, the claimant may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). The local VA office will also send a blank VA Form 9—Appeal to Board of Veterans' Appeals—which must be filled out and returned to continue the appeal process. Hearings with the BVA
When the claimant submits VA Form 9, the claimant will indicate whether he wishes to have a hearing with a Board member from the BVA. There are three kinds of hearings: (1) an in-person hearing at the local RO; (2) an in-person hearing in Washington, DC; or (3) a teleconference hearing. Unlike court proceedings, hearings are informal and nonadversarial. The claimant can be represented at a BVA hearing. If the claimant's file is still located at the local VA office, any additional evidence should be submitted to that office. At this point, as stated earlier, the local VA office will provide the claimant with a Supplemental Statement of the Case. However, if the appellant files a motion for CUE after filing an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, or if the appellant files an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims prior to the BVA reaching a determination on the motion, the BVA will stay the CUE proceeding until the CAVC appeal has been concluded. In order to have the CAVC hear an appeal from the BVA, the appellant must submit a notice of appeal to the court within 120 days of the date that the BVA mailed its decision. However, in 2011, the Supreme Court clarified that the CAVC deadline was not jurisdictional and, therefore, an appeal will not necessarily be precluded if the deadline is missed. The Federal Circuit provides the last appeal of right during the appeal process. The Supreme Court does not have to hear the case and may deny certiorari. If the Supreme Court decides to hear the case, any decision reached by the Court is final. | Congress, through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides a variety of benefits and services to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include disability compensation and pensions, education benefits, survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and burial and memorial benefits. In order to receive these benefits, a veteran (or an eligible family member) must apply for them by submitting the necessary information to a local VA office. The local VA office will make an initial determination on the application for benefits. Any veteran who is not satisfied with the local VA's determination is permitted to appeal the decision. This report provides a step-by-step breakdown of the appeal process for veterans' claims.
When making an appeal on an initial determination, the claimant may choose to proceed with the traditional review process or may choose to have a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the local VA office review the case. In the event the veteran opts for a DRO review and is not satisfied with the result, the claimant may still avail himself/herself of the traditional process and appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). The local VA office will prepare the claim file for the appeal and provide the claimant with a blank VA Form 9—a form that must be completed to make an appeal to the BVA. Claimants must follow specific procedures to request the appeal and must meet certain deadlines for submitting the proper information.
The claimant may choose to have a hearing with the BVA during the appeal process. There are three different types of hearings that the claimant may choose (1) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held in Washington, DC; (2) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held at a local VA office; or (3) a teleconference hearing. The hearings with the BVA are informal and nonadversarial in nature. The claimant will be given the opportunity to explain the reasons for the appeal and to submit additional evidence during the hearing. The claimant may be represented during the appeal process.
After the BVA reaches a decision on the appeal, there are further options the claimant may pursue if he or she is still not satisfied with the BVA decision. A claimant may file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). The CAVC, an Article I court, has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the BVA. A claimant must submit a notice of appeal within 120 days of receiving the decision from the BVA. However, the Supreme Court in Henderson v. Shinseki clarified that the 120-day deadline is not a "jurisdictional" deadline. Therefore, an appeal to the CAVC will not necessarily be dismissed for missing the deadline. However, the claimant must have a good reason for filing late, such as an inability to meet the deadline due to mental incapacity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from a CAVC decision. The Federal Circuit provides the last appeal of right during the appeal process. If either party is dissatisfied with the ruling from the Federal Circuit, an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court does not have to hear the case and may deny certiorari. If the Supreme Court decides to hear the case, any decision reached by the Court is final. |
crs_R42971 | crs_R42971_0 | On December 7, 2012, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued its final regulations that provide guidance on both who must pay the excise tax and the scope of products encompassed by the excise tax. This report provides a brief overview of the regulations, discusses the extent to which the rules have clarified the excise tax imposed on the sale of medical devices, and answers frequently asked questions about the medical device tax. Treasury, in the newly released regulations on the medical device excise tax, states that the "existing chapter 32 rules," including the definitions for "manufacturer," "producer," and "importer," apply with respect to the medical device excise tax. As such, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) casts a wide net with the term "taxable medical device." Moreover, the statute empowers the Secretary of the Treasury under the "retail exemption" to exempt "any other medical device" which is determined to be of a "type which is generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use" from the 2.3% excise tax. The Retail Exemption
The regulations issued by Treasury on December 7, 2012, provide a broad framework as to which medical devices fall within the "retail exemption" to the excise tax under IRC §4191(b)(2)(d). Specifically, the new Treasury regulations provide a two-prong test to resolve whether a device should fall within the residual exception to the excise tax. Factors implicating the question of whether a device is regularly available for purchase by individual consumers include (1) the ability of end consumers to purchase the device in person through a drug store or other retailer that primarily sells a particular device; (2) the need of a consumer to seek help from a medical professional to use the device safely and effectively; and (3) whether the device has been classified by the Food and Drug Administration as a "physical medicine device" for human use. Notably, Treasury explained in issuing the medical device excise tax regulations that two potential factors—the packaging or labeling of a medical device and the nature of documents submitted to the FDA in obtaining approval of a device—are irrelevant in assessing whether a device should fall within the retail exemption to the excise tax. The purpose of the safe harbor provisions is to "provide greater certainty" with respect to which devices are subject to the retail exemption. However, the safe harbor provisions are narrow, and the regulations open-ended two-part test defining the limits of the retail exemption, while providing flexibility as to the scope of the exemption, naturally creates ambiguity with respect to which products are exposed to the excise tax, save those specifically exempted under the regulations. The statute imposing the medical device tax lists three specific devices that are not subject to the tax: eyeglasses, contact lenses, and hearing aids. Generally under section 6656 of the Internal Revenue Code, failure to deposit the requisite tax subjects delinquent taxpayers to certain penalties. However, the Internal Revenue Service has waived such penalties for the first three quarters of 2013. | On December 7, 2012, the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service issued final regulations explaining the scope of the medical device excise tax created by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), which modified the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The new regulations were issued less than a month before the 2.3% excise tax took effect on January 1, 2013. This report provides a brief overview of the recently enacted Treasury regulations, analyzes the legal implications of the regulations, and answers frequently asked questions about the medical device tax.
The Treasury regulations on the medical device excise tax explain both who is subject to the excise tax and the scope of the statutory exemptions provided for the tax. Specifically, the regulations incorporate by reference the general definitions for a "manufacturer, producer, or importer" outlined in the Internal Revenue Code, meaning that the excise tax will be directly paid by manufacturers, as opposed to consumers or others that use a given medical device.
Furthermore, the regulations attempt to clarify the limits to the medical device excise tax. Beyond the statutory exemptions created for eyeglasses, contact lenses, and hearing aids, the law created a "retail exemption" to the excise tax, excluding from the tax medical devices that are "generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use." The Treasury regulations attempt to simultaneously provide certainty to potential taxpayers as to which devices are subject to the retail exemption, while allowing the government the flexibility to properly apply the retail exemption to the variety of devices that could be exposed to the excise tax. The regulations provide a flexible two-prong test to determine whether a device should fall within the retail exemption, applying the exemption when the device is (1) regularly available for purchase by non-professional consumers and (2) not primarily intended for use by medical professionals. The regulations provide several factors to consider when applying the two-prong test. To provide some certainty to the scope of the retail exemption, the regulations also included several "safe harbor" provisions, explicitly acknowledging that certain devices, such as "over-the-counter" devices, fall within the retail exemption.
The new Treasury regulations on the medical device excise tax, while providing some certainty with respect to what devices will be exempt from the tax, generally favor a more flexible approach to defining the scope of the central exemption to the tax. As a consequence, uncertainty remains as to which medical devices will be subject to the tax. Indeed, Treasury, in releasing the medical device excise tax regulations, notes that further clarification on various issues implicated by the tax is still needed. As such, the regulations constitute only the first step in defining the limits of the medical device excise tax. |
crs_RS22534 | crs_RS22534_0 | The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) is the most recent effort by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and African Development Bank (AfDB) to provide poor country debt relief. Proposed by G8 finance ministers in June 2005, the MDRI provides 100% debt relief to select countries that are already participating in the joint-IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. | In June 2005, G8 finance ministers proposed the new Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The MDRI proposes to cancel debts of some of the world's poorest countries owed to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and African Development Bank. This report discusses MDRI's implementation and raises some issues regarding debt relief's effectiveness as a form of foreign assistance for possible congressional consideration. |
crs_R44023 | crs_R44023_0 | Introduction1
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a congressionally mandated document, originating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-433 , §603/50 U.S.C §3043). The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. Key Points of the 2015 National Security Strategy
The Obama Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on February 6, 2015. It was the second NSS document to be published by the Obama Administration; the first was published in May 2010. The 2015 document states that its purpose is to "set out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world." The 2015 NSS emphasizes the role of U.S. leadership; the words "lead," "leader," "leading," and "leadership" appear 94 times in the context of the U.S. role in the world. It also acknowledges national limitations and calls for strategic patience and persistence. The 2015 NSS retains much of the underlying thought of the 2010 version. This appears to be a shift in emphasis away from the U.S. role in the world being largely a catalyst for action by international institutions to more involved leadership both inside those institutions and between nations. The 2015 NSS also takes a tougher line with both China and with Russia, while emphasizing the desirability for cooperation with both. Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
The 2015 NSS raises a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the following:
Does the 2015 NSS accurately identify and properly emphasize key features and trends in the international security environment? Does it adequately address the possibility that since late 2013 there has been a fundamental shift in the international security environment from the familiar post-Cold War era to a new and different strategic situation? Does the 2015 NSS qualify as a true strategy in terms of linking ends (objectives) to means (resources) and ways (activities), and in terms of establishing priorities among goals? Is it reasonable to expect the unclassified version of an NSS to do much more than identify general objectives? Does the 2015 NSS properly balance objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011? Are Administration policies and budgets adequately aligned with the 2015 NSS? Are NSS statements functioning in the way that Congress intended? How valuable to Congress are they in terms of supporting oversight of Administration policies and making resource-allocation decisions? Should the mandate that requires the Administration to submit national security strategy reports be repealed or modified? If it should be modified, what modifications should be made? This replaced language in Section 153(b) Title 10, United States Code , which required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
articulate how the U.S. military will help achieve objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy Review, and the Secretary of Defense's annual report to Congress; include a description of the strategic environment, challenges, and opportunities the United States faces; international, regional, transnational, hybrid, terrorist, cyber, asymmetric, and weapons of mass destruction threats (along with others the Chairman identifies); include the implications of force planning and sizing for the strategy; the capability, capacity, and availability of U.S. forces to achieve identified missions; identify areas wherein U.S. forces seek to synchronize with interagency and multinational partners and areas in which the U.S. military may be augmented by other coalition partners and organizations (such as NATO); identify requirements for operational contractor support; and state all the assumptions leading to the conclusions derived in the above assessments. Mandate. | The Obama Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on February 6, 2015. It was the second NSS document to be published by the Administration; the first was published in May 2010. The 2015 document states that its purpose is to "set out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world." The NSS is a congressionally mandated document, originating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433, §603/50 U.S.C §3043).
The 2015 NSS emphasizes the role of U.S. leadership; the words "lead," "leader," "leading," and "leadership" appear 94 times in the context of the U.S. role in the world. It also acknowledges national limitations and calls for strategic patience and persistence.
The 2015 report retains much of the underlying thought of the 2010 version. However, its emphasis appears to shift away from the U.S. role in the world being largely a catalyst for action by international institutions to one that reflects more involved leadership both inside those institutions and between nations, both bilaterally and through facilitating cooperation between nations.
It also takes a tougher line with both China and with Russia, while emphasizing the desirability for cooperation with both.
The 2015 report raises a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the following:
Does the 2015 NSS accurately identify and properly emphasize key features and trends in the international security environment? Does it adequately address the possibility that since late 2013 a fundamental shift in the international security environment has occurred that suggests a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era to a new and different strategic situation? Does the 2015 NSS qualify as a true strategy in terms of linking ends (objectives), means (resources), ways (activities), and in terms of establishing priorities among goals? Is it reasonable to expect the unclassified version of an NSS to do much more than identify general objectives? Does the 2015 NSS properly balance objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011? Are Administration policies and budgets adequately aligned with the 2015 NSS? Are NSS statements performing the function that Congress intended? How valuable to Congress are they in terms of supporting oversight of Administration policies and making resource-allocation decisions? Should the mandate that requires the Administration to submit national security strategy reports be repealed or modified? If it should be modified, what modifications should be made?
The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 114-328, modified requirements for the NSS only in mandating a classified format. More significant changes in the act occurred in establishing a National Defense Strategy and in requirements for the National Military Strategy. |
crs_R44492 | crs_R44492_0 | 3713 , the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, for himself, ranking Judiciary Committee Member Representative Conyers, and a number of others on October 8, 2015. The proposal addresses four issues: the so-called safety valve that permits courts to disregard otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in certain drug cases; the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in such cases; the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in firearms cases; and the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. That is, H.R. | H.R. 3713, the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, addresses the sentences that may be imposed in various drug and firearms cases. It proposes amendments to those areas of federal law that govern mandatory minimum sentencing requirements for drug and firearm offenses; the so-called safety valves which permits court to impose sentences below otherwise required mandatory minimums in the case of certain low-level drug offenders; and the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.
Related reports include CRS Report R44246, Sentencing Reform: Comparison of Selected Proposals, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_97-589 | crs_97-589_0 | The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes so enacted to apply them in concrete cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court, and may guide courts in future cases. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in interpreting meaning also can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties. That is, to inform Congress on how the Court might go about analyzing the meaning of particular legislative language, this report emphasizes "textualist"-based means of interpretation. When reading statutory text, the Supreme Court uses content-neutral canons developed by the judiciary that focus on word usage, grammar, syntax and the like. To this end, the Court has expressed an interest "that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." (These canons are discussed below.) In any event, one possible suggestion of the indeterminacy of canons is that statutory construction should be a narrow pursuit, not a broader one:
[C]anons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others.... [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. In this exercise, a threshold inquiry is whether language is being used in the "ordinary," "general dictionary" sense or in a narrower, specialized sense or as a term of art. Statutory Language Not to be Construed as "Mere Surplusage"
A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." The modern variant is that statutes should be construed "so as to avoid rendering superfluous" any statutory language: "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...." A related principle applies to statutory amendments: there is a "general presumption" that, "when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must intend to change the statute's meaning." Context and statutory history can override the presumption. "Substantive" Canons of Construction
In some circumstances, the Court subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that, unless rebutted, favor particular substantive results. Application of a substantive canon often, but not always, results in some form of "clear statement" rule, requiring that Congress, if it wishes to achieve a particular result inconsistent with the Court's view of legal traditions, must state such an intent with unmistakable clarity. 2), federal law supersedes inconsistent state law. Findings and Purposes Sections
To apply the principle that statutory language be interpreted consistent with congressional intent, courts may consult the stated purposes of legislation to resolve ambiguities in the more specific language of operative sections. The primacy of text in discerning meaning is expressed in the "plain meaning rule." When the Court does infer acquiescence, the most important factor seems to be congressional awareness that an interpretation has generated widespread attention and controversy. | The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes to apply them in particular cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of the meaning of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in discerning meaning can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties.
The Supreme Court has expressed an interest "that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." Though the feed-back loop of interpretive practices coming from the courts may not always speak well to actual congressional practice and desires, the judiciary has developed its own set of interpretive tools and methodologies, keeping in mind that there is no unified, systematic approach for unlocking meaning in all cases.
Though schools of statutory interpretation vary on what factors should be considered, all approaches start (if not necessarily end) with the language and structure of the statute itself. In this pursuit, the Court follows the principle that a statute be read as a harmonious whole whenever reasonable, with separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context.
Still, the meaning of statutory language is not always evident. To help clarify uncertainty, judges have developed various interpretive tools in the form of canons of construction. Canons broadly fall into two types. "Language," or "linguistic," canons are interpretive "rules of thumb" for drawing inferences based on customary usage, grammar, and the like. For example, in considering the meaning of particular words and phrases, language canons call for determining the sense in which terms are being used, that is, whether words or phrases are meant as terms of art with specialized meanings or are meant in the ordinary, "dictionary" sense. Other language canons direct that all words of a statute be given effect if possible, that a term used more than once in a statute ordinarily be given the same meaning throughout, and that specific statutory language ordinarily trumps conflicting general language. "Ordinarily" is a necessary caveat, since any of these "canons" may give way if context points toward a contrary meaning.
Not infrequently the Court stacks the deck, and subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that favor particular substantive results. When one of these "substantive" canons applies, the Court frequently requires a "clear statement" of congressional intent to negate it. A commonly invoked "substantive" canon is that Congress does not intend to change judge-made law. Other substantive canons disfavor preemption of state law and abrogation of state immunity from suit in federal court. As another example, Congress must strongly signal an intent to the courts if it wishes to apply a statute retroactively or override existing law. The Court also tries to avoid an interpretation that would raise serious doubts about a statute's constitutionality.
Interpretive methods that emphasize the primacy of text and staying within the boundaries of statutes themselves to discern meaning are "textualist." Other approaches, including "intentionalism," are more open to taking extrinsic considerations into account. Most particularly, some Justices may be willing to look to legislative history to clarify ambiguous text. This report briefly reviews what constitutes "legislative history," including, possibly, presidential signing statements, and the factors that might lead the Court to consider it. |
crs_R42700 | crs_R42700_0 | Introduction
A major policy concern for Congress has been when and whether to address the "fiscal cliff," tax increases and spending cuts that would have substantially reduced the deficit in 2013 relative to 2012. According to projections in March 2012 by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this fiscal restraint constituted 5.1% of output in 2013 and was projected to reduce growth to 0.5% from 4.4%. Unemployment would have increased by 2 million. The American Taxpayer Relief Act, H.R. Policy choices with respect to the fiscal cliff are difficult because of the conflict between short-run and long-run economic and budgetary objectives. In the short run, the reduction in demand from the reduced budget deficit could damage an already fragile recovery. In the longer run, however, deficit reduction is needed to address a projected unsustainable debt level. 111-5 ). It allowed some of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts to expire for higher-income individuals but at a higher level than S. 3412 . Other expiring tax provisions were extended through either 2017 (the 2009 stimulus provisions) or through 2013 (depreciation provisions and the other "extenders" that have been enacted on a temporary basis). The 2001 tax cuts include the 10% rate bracket (lowered from 15%) and the lower rates for higher-income individuals (25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%, compared with 28%, 31%, 36%, and 39.6%); the elimination of the phase-out of itemized deductions and personal exemptions (PEP and Pease); the increase in the child credit; the provisions reducing the marriage penalty (increasing the standard deduction and width of lower rate brackets for joint returns); the reduction in the estate tax; and some other smaller provisions. The temporary two-percentage-point reduction in the employee's share of the Social Security payroll tax that was to expire at the end of 2012. While CBO's baseline reflects current laws (and hence assumed the Bush tax cuts would expire at the end of 2012), the alternative baseline assumed that all tax cuts except the payroll tax reduction would be extended, the AMT patch would occur, the doc fix is made each year, and the Budget Control Act automatic spending cuts do not occur, although the discretionary spending caps remain. Expirations of individual income tax cuts are largely combined into one major category that accounts for 44% of the policy-related fiscal cliff of $502 billion. 813
As compared with the original policy-related fiscal cliff, H.R. These calculations compare effects from H.R. The decrease in the deficit is 54% of the total fiscal restraint including non-policy-related effects. CBO projected that not eliminating the fiscal cliff would have increased unemployment by 2 million. Thus, the effects might have been considerably smaller, but they also could have been much larger. The contractionary effect of spending cuts and tax increases occurs because these changes reduce spending and contract demand. These results are similar to the CBO calculations for the extenders. 8 . Implications for Policy Choices
The policies that have received significant legislative attention during 2012 that would change the size of the fiscal cliff—extending the expiring tax cuts—are a majority of the fiscal cliff but a minority of the economic effects, although the economic effects are still notable. As shown in Table 8 , presenting Zandi's estimates of provisions in the original fiscal cliff and a percentage of spending and a percentage of the contraction, many of the items omitted from the legislation had a more powerful than average effect on the economy per dollar of deficit, especially the payroll tax cut and the budget cuts. Proposals in both the House and Senate addressed the expiring tax cuts from 2001, 2003, and 2009, which had been extended in 2010, along with the AMT patch, which together contributed $221 billion (44%) of the policy-related fiscal cliff. | A major policy concern for Congress has been when and whether to address the "fiscal cliff," a set of tax increases and spending cuts that would have substantially reduced the deficit in 2013. In projections made in March 2012 by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this fiscal restraint, constituting 5.1% of output in 2013, would have reduced growth to 0.5% from 4.4%. Unemployment would increase by 2 million. In August, updated estimates projected growth at a negative 0.5%. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (H.R. 8) eliminated part of the fiscal cliff.
Policy choices with respect to the fiscal cliff are difficult because of the conflict between short-run and long-run economic and budgetary objectives. In the short run, the reduction in demand from the reduced budget deficits could damage an already fragile recovery. In the longer run, however, deficit reduction is needed to address a projected unsustainable debt level.
For FY2013, compared with FY2012, the original policy-related fiscal cliff was projected at $502 billion, 80% reflecting tax increases, with an additional $105 billion from other changes. The expiration of the 2001, 2003, and 2009 tax cuts (extended in 2010) and the expiration of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) "patch," which indexes the AMT exemption for inflation, accounted for 44% of the policy-related fiscal cliff. Other tax provisions included expiration of the temporary two percentage-point reduction in the employee's Social Security payroll tax (19%); the expiration of other tax cuts, including depreciation and the "extenders" (13%); and taxes scheduled to come into effect as a part of health reform (4%). Spending reductions included the automatic spending cuts under the Budget Control Act (13%); the expiration of extended unemployment insurance benefits (5%); and the "doc fix" that would have lowered Medicare payments (2%). Most changes would have taken effect after 2012, although the AMT and many of the extenders expired after 2011.
CBO estimates were similar to those of other forecasters. Estimates are uncertain; CBO suggested a range of potential reductions in growth from 0.9% to 6.8% if the fiscal cliff occurred. Thus, the effects could have been much smaller, but they could also have been significantly larger, than CBO's mid-point estimate. Different parts of the cliff were projected to have different effects per dollar of budgetary effects, with larger effects from the automatic budget cuts and ending extended unemployment benefits than from ending tax cuts for higher-income individuals.
H.R. 8 passed by the House on January 1, 2013 (after previous Senate approval) eliminated two-thirds of the policy-related fiscal cliff, and slightly over half of the total (including non-policy-related provisions). Thus about half of the contractionary effect remains, which would appear to reduce output by about 2%. H.R. 8 permanently extended the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts, except for high-income taxpayers and the $5 million exemption for the estate taxes (but with a higher rate). It extended the 2009 cuts through 2017. It extended unemployment insurance benefits, the doc fix, and bonus depreciation and the "extenders" through 2013. It delayed the automatic spending cuts for two months. Elements of the fiscal cliff that will continue to reduce the deficit in 2013 compared with 2012, and potentially exert a contractionary effect, are the payroll tax reduction, which expired; some individual income tax cuts for high-income individuals; tax increases enacted in health reform; the remaining budget cuts; and non-policy-related effects. |
crs_R41299 | crs_R41299_0 | Introduction
On May 10, 2010, President Obama nominated Solicitor General Elena Kagan to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens. If confirmed, Elena Kagan would be the first serving Solicitor General to be appointed to the Court since the elevation of Thurgood Marshall in 1967. She would also be only the fifth of 111 Justices to come to the bench with such experience. Given that Solicitor General Kagan has made few public statements on important legal and policy issues, some have looked to her record as Solicitor General for some indication of her views. Others have looked to her time as Solicitor General as an important element of her professional experience, especially in light of the criticism of some that her lack of judicial and litigation experience make her unqualified to sit on the bench. Understanding the role and responsibilities of the Solicitor General can provide a useful backdrop against which to evaluate Elena Kagan's statements and official actions and assess her professional qualifications. Concluding Observations
The role of the Solicitor General is unique in the American legal system. Not only does the Solicitor General represent the interests of the U.S. government before the Court, but the office is also charged with assisting the Supreme Court in the exercise of its judicial function. Through repeated opportunities to argue before the Court, some suggest that the office of the Solicitor General has built a "special relationship" with the Supreme Court based on trust and interdependence established over multiple and continuing interactions. The Court relies on the Solicitor General to perform a "gatekeeping" function by recommending for review only the most meritorious of the government's cases and providing the highest quality arguments for the Court's consideration. Through these actions, the Solicitor General seeks to convince the Supreme Court that the government's position is the correct one. Although scholars disagree on the exact nature of the office's influence, most of the time, the Solicitor General is successful in this task. Despite this close relationship and the institutional knowledge that comes with it, few Solicitors General have been appointed to the Supreme Court. Since the creation of the office in 1870, only four former or current Solicitors General have been elevated to the highest bench. The first, William Howard Taft, served in both the executive and judicial branches before his joining the Court, most notably as the 27 th President of the United States. Stanley Reed, who was elevated directly from the position of Solicitor General to the Court, spent most of his professional career in private practice and had never been a judge before becoming an Associate Justice. Robert Jackson, like Reed, had no judicial experience before his appointment. He had, however, served in five different positions in the Department of Justice, including that of Attorney General, prior to his elevation. Unlike Reed and Jackson, Thurgood Marshall, who had served as a federal appellate judge, had little experience in private practice and had only served as a government attorney for two years prior to his nomination to the Court. However, between working as the director and general counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for 21 years and serving as Solicitor General, Justice Marshall had extensive Supreme Court litigation experience before joining the bench. If Elena Kagan is confirmed, she would be the fifth Solicitor General to serve on the Court. Although service as the Solicitor General has generally been viewed as an important and relevant qualification, her lack of judicial and litigation experience has raised questions by some as to whether she is qualified to sit on the Court. Although the ultimate judgment as to appropriate qualifications to be a Supreme Court Justice must be left to the Senate, it is clear that the experience of serving as Solicitor General provides the occupant of the office with unique insights into the Supreme Court. | On May 10, 2010, President Obama nominated Solicitor General Elena Kagan to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens. If confirmed, Elena Kagan would be the first serving Solicitor General to be appointed to the Court since the elevation of Thurgood Marshall in 1967. She would also be only the fifth of 111 Justices to come to the bench with such experience.
Given that Solicitor General Kagan has made few public statements on important legal and policy issues, some have looked to her record as Solicitor General for some indication of her views. Others have looked to her time as Solicitor General as an important element of her professional experience, especially in light of the criticism of some that her lack of judicial and litigation experience make her unqualified to sit on the bench. Understanding the role and responsibilities of the Solicitor General can provide a useful backdrop against which to evaluate Elena Kagan's statements and official actions and assess her professional qualifications.
The role of the Solicitor General is unique in the American legal system. Not only does the Solicitor General represent the interests of the United States government before the Court, but the office is also charged with assisting the Supreme Court in the exercise of its judicial function. Through repeated opportunities to argue before the Court, some suggest that the office of the Solicitor General has built a "special relationship" with the Supreme Court based on trust and interdependence established over multiple and continuing interactions. The Court relies on the Solicitor General to perform a "gatekeeping" function by recommending for review only the most meritorious of the government's cases and providing the highest quality arguments for the Court's consideration. Through these actions, the Solicitor General seeks to convince the Supreme Court that the government's position is the correct one. Although scholars disagree on the exact nature of the office's influence, most of the time, the Solicitor General is successful in this task.
Despite this close relationship and the institutional knowledge that comes with it, few of the 45 Solicitors General have been appointed to the Supreme Court. Since the creation of the office in 1870, only four former or current Solicitors General have been elevated to the highest bench. The first, William Howard Taft, served in both the executive and judicial branches before his joining the Court, most notably as the 27th President of the United States. Stanley Reed, who was elevated directly from the position of Solicitor General to the Court, spent most of his professional career in private practice and had never been a judge before becoming an Associate Justice. Robert Jackson, like Reed, had no judicial experience before his appointment. He had, however, served in five different positions in the Department of Justice, including that of Attorney General, prior to his elevation. Unlike Reed and Jackson, Thurgood Marshall, a former federal appellate judge, had little experience in private practice and had only served as a government attorney for two years prior to his nomination to the Court. However, between working as the director and general counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for 21 years and serving as Solicitor General, Justice Marshall had extensive Supreme Court litigation experience before joining the bench.
If Elena Kagan is confirmed, she would be the fifth Solicitor General to serve on the Court. Although service as the Solicitor General has generally been viewed as an important and relevant qualification, her lack of judicial and litigation experience has raised questions by some as to whether she is qualified to sit on the Court. Although the ultimate judgment as to appropriate qualifications to be a Supreme Court Justice must be left to the Senate, it is clear that the experience of serving as Solicitor General provides the occupant of the office with unique insights into the Supreme Court. |
crs_RL33803 | crs_RL33803_0 | This report discusses the political context and congressional consideration of various funding and other restrictive legislative language applying to military operations in Indochina between 1970 and 1973. Table 1 includes funding restrictions on military operations and Table 2 includes other non-funding approaches. Those provisions that were enacted are listed first followed by provisions that were not enacted but where there was a roll call vote in either house. Vietnam War Policy Context for Congressional Legislation
During the 1970-1973 period, Congress considered a variety of proposals to restrict U.S. military operations in Indochina and require a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in response to the growing controversy in the United States over U.S. military involvement in Vietnam during the 1965-1969 period. According to Department of Defense statistics, U.S. troop levels fell from 539,000 in June 1969 to 415,000 in June 1970, 239,000 in June 1971, 47,000 in June 1972, and 21,500 in January 1973. In 1974, a non-funding bill was passed to cap personnel levels in Indochina at 4,000 by mid-1975 (2,500 of whom could be members of the armed forces), and at 3,000 by the end of 1975 (1,500 of whom could be members of the armed forces). U.S. ground troops withdrew by June 30, 1970, but U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia continued. The "Cooper-Church" amendment, enacted into law in January 1971, prohibited the reintroduction of U.S. ground forces into Cambodia. The restrictive bills passed in June and July 1973 terminated funding for the bombing in Cambodia on August 15, 1973, and bombing stopped on that date. President Nixon and other Administration officials hinted publicly in March 1973 that the United States would intervene militarily if North Vietnam violated the cease-fire agreement. These indications of Nixon's policy intention no doubt influenced the legislation proposed and passed by Congress in mid-1973 to cut off funding for combat operations "in or over or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam...."
For a CRS Report that compares Congressional funding cutoffs of U.S. military forces to use of the War Powers Act, see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments , by [author name scrubbed]. Prohibiting the Obligation or Expenditure of Funds
The proposals to cut off funds generally prohibit obligating or expending funds in a particular bill or bills after Congress has appropriated the funds. In other cases, the funding cutoff was contingent upon certain conditions or events taking place, such as the negotiation by the President of a cease-fire, the release of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs), or a presidential determination that personnel can be withdrawn safely (entries 12, 13, 14, 16). Congress also considered and passed a repeal of the August 10, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that gave congressional approval to "take all necessary measures" to repel an armed attack against the United States in January 1971, but military operations continued in Vietnam for another two years (entry 22). Appendix. 15628
In concert with the declared objectives of the President of the United States to avoid the involvement of the United States in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, and to expedite the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia, it is hereby provided that unless specifically authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this act or any other law may be expended after July 1, 1970 for the purpose of:
(1) retaining United States forces in Cambodia;
(2) paying the compensation or allowances of, or otherwise supporting, directly or indirectly, any United States personnel in Cambodia who furnish military instruction to Cambodian forces or engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces;
(3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement to provide military instruction in Cambodia or to provide persons to engage in any combat activity in support of Cambodian forces; or
(4) conducting any combat activity in direct support of Cambodian forces; nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief, including the exercise of that constitutional power which may be necessary to protect the lives of U.S. armed forces wherever deployed; nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional powers of the Congress including the power to declare war and to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States. Non-Funding Restrictions on Military Operations
22. | The main body of this report is a series of tables and an Appendix that summarize and cite bill language that was intended to end or restrict U.S. military operations in Vietnam and Indochina, Somalia, and Kosovo. The report covers enacted provisions as well as those where there were roll call votes but the provision was not ultimately enacted. The first table outlines proposals that restrict funding and the second table describes other types of restrictions.
The other legislation discussed in this report either cut off funding or called on the President to take certain military actions, such as troop withdrawals. The cutoffs generally prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds that Congress had appropriated, and they applied to military activities ranging from combat operations to initial deployments in specified countries. Some legislative language cut off funding for certain military operations but permitted exceptions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. troops, or was contingent upon meeting certain conditions, such as the release of prisoners of war. Other language prohibited continued funding unless military operations were authorized.
Congress also considered non-funding approaches that urged the President to withdraw forces, negotiate or terminate military operations, seek congressional authorization for military operations, or set a date for U.S. troop withdrawals. Another approach was congressional repeal of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which authorized the President to use military force in Vietnam.
Language attempting to restrict later conflicts continued to use these two main categories of approaches, funding and non-funding, adding new elements and criteria to the restrictions as the conflicts themselves evolved.
In the case of Indochina, a major demarcation was the signing of the Vietnam peace accords and a cease-fire agreement between the United States and North Vietnam in January 1973 that required the total withdrawal of U.S. troops by March 1973. Congress continued to provide funds for U.S. troops as levels fell from a peak of 539,000 in June 1969 to 21,500 in January 1973. In 1974, a non-funding bill was passed to cap personnel levels in Indochina at 3,000 by the end of the year.
In response to the invasion of Cambodia from April to June 1970, Congress enacted the Cooper-Church amendment in January 1971, which prohibited using any appropriated funds to introduce ground troops into Cambodia. Legislation enacted in 1973—after the cease-fire agreement—that cut off funds for combat "in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia" was designed to prevent President Nixon from reintroducing troops or bombing if the North Vietnamese violated the cease-fire. The 1973 legislation also terminated funding for the U.S. bombing of Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia by August 15, 1973. The U.S. bombing did end on that date. |
crs_R43257 | crs_R43257_0 | Based on legislation passed in the 111 th Congress, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) benefits, which were temporarily increased beginning in April 2009, are scheduled to be reduced after October 31, 2013. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided the legislated response to the recession, which included an across-the-board increase in SNAP benefits. Maximum monthly benefits were increased substantially, increasing the June 2008 TFP calculation by 13.6%. In FY2009, for a one-person household, the added benefit was $24 a month; for two persons, $44 a month; for three persons (the most typical household), $63 a month; for four persons, $80 a month; and for larger households, higher amounts. When enacted originally, the ARRA benefit increase was to continue until food-price inflation caught up with the ARRA add-on. Since regular food-price inflation (blue area) has been well below ARRA's 13.6% increase to FY2009 maximum benefits, the sunset of the ARRA benefit will result in a reduction in the maximum benefit after October 31, 2013, and therefore a reduction in all benefit amounts calculated based on the maximum benefit. The result of the sunset is a scheduled reduction in maximum SNAP benefits on November 1, 2013, of about 5.5%. Although the actual percentage reduction will vary for each household, it can be said, for most SNAP households, that if no household circumstances change, the benefit reduction is scheduled to be
$11 a month for a one-person household; $20 a month for a two-person household (the average sized household) ; $29 a month for a three-person household; and $36 a month for a four-person household. The President's FY2014 Budget Proposal and Pending Legislation
The President's FY2014 budget proposed to delay the sunset of the ARRA benefit increase to March 31, 2014. This is the date that the ARRA increase was first scheduled to sunset, before the enactment of the child nutrition reauthorization legislation ( P.L. According to Administration cost estimates, extending the ARRA benefit increase for an additional five months of FY2014 would cost approximately $2.26 billion. Neither the House nor the Senate conference farm bill proposals contain any changes to the ARRA increase and its sunset. 2642, H.R. 3102) Bills with Current Law . ) 111-296 . Funding for Medicaid and Education Jobs
The 2010 law that provided funding for Medicaid and education jobs ( P.L. Child Nutrition and WIC Legislation
On December 13, 2010, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-296 ) was enacted. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) included an across-the-board increase in benefits provided under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program), effective in April 2009. ARRA substantially raised maximum monthly benefits, by 13.6% in FY2009. For a one-person household, the added benefit was $24 a month; for two persons, $44 a month; for three persons (the most typical household), $63 a month; for four persons, $80 a month; and for larger households, higher amounts. As a result, average household SNAP benefits (typically less than the maximum) were boosted by more than 15%. (Note: A household's SNAP benefit is calculated by subtracting the household-specific countable (or "net") income from the maximum benefit; percentage increases varied on a case-by-case basis.)
Originally, the ARRA increase was to be effective until regular SNAP cost-of-living adjustments "caught up" with the 13.6% increase (as compared to FY2009) to the maximum benefit, but Congress amended the law so that the increase is now scheduled to sunset after October 31, 2013. (Under "regular" SNAP law, maximum SNAP benefits are adjusted annually for changes in food prices on October 1.) To help meet congressional pay-as-you-go rules, the 111th Congress made two changes to this effective date, which resulted in savings to offset other new spending. First, P.L. 111-226 (a law providing funding for Medicaid and education jobs) added a March 31, 2014, sunset date to the ARRA benefit increase. Second, in the child nutrition reauthorization legislation (the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010; P.L. 111-296), the sunset date was moved to October 31, 2013.
The sunset date in current law means that maximum SNAP benefits will decrease by about 5.5% on November 1, 2013. For a one-person household, the benefits will decrease by $11 a month; for two persons, $20 a month; for three persons, $29 a month; for four persons, $36 a month; and for larger households, higher amounts.
President Obama's FY2014 budget proposed to delay the sunset of the ARRA benefit increase to March 31, 2014. This is the date the benefit increase was to sunset before the enactment of the child nutrition legislation (P.L. 111-296). The Administration estimates that this extension of the increase for five months would cost approximately $2.26 billion. Neither the House (H.R. 2642) nor the Senate (S. 954) 2013 farm bill proposals would delay the sunset date. |
crs_RL30415 | crs_RL30415_0 | Introduction
Since 1995, at least thirty-one states have enacted laws banning the so-called "partial-birth" abortion procedure. Although many of these laws have not taken effect because of permanent injunctions, they remain contentious to both pro-life advocates and those who support a woman's right to choose. The U.S. Supreme Court has also addressed the performance of partial-birth abortions. In Gonzales v. Carhart , a 2007 case, the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, finding that, as a facial matter, it is not unconstitutionally vague and does not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. The term "partial-birth abortion" refers generally to an abortion procedure where the fetus is removed intact from a woman's body. The procedure is described by the medical community as "intact dilation and evacuation" or "dilation and extraction" ("D & X") depending on the presentation of the fetus. Intact dilation and evacuation involves a vertex or "head first" presentation, the induced dilation of the cervix, the collapsing of the skull, and the extraction of the entire fetus through the cervix. D & X involves a breech or "feet first" presentation, the induced dilation of the cervix, the removal of the fetal body through the cervix, the collapsing of the skull, and the extraction of the fetus through the cervix. The Sixth Circuit was the first to consider whether a ban on partial-birth abortions imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to have an abortion. First, the Court concluded that the Nebraska statute lacked any exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. 108th Congress
S. 3 , the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, was signed by the President on November 5, 2003 ( P.L. In Gonzales v. Carhart , the Court distinguished the federal statute from the Nebraska law at issue in Stenberg . | The term "partial-birth abortion" refers generally to an abortion procedure where the fetus is removed intact from a woman's body. The procedure is described by the medical community as "intact dilation and evacuation" or "dilation and extraction" ("D & X") depending on the presentation of the fetus. Intact dilation and evacuation involves a vertex or "head first" presentation, the induced dilation of the cervix, the collapsing of the skull, and the extraction of the entire fetus through the cervix. D & X involves a breech or "feet first" presentation, the induced dilation of the cervix, the removal of the fetal body through the cervix, the collapsing of the skull, and the extraction of the fetus through the cervix.
Since 1995, at least thirty-one states have enacted laws banning partial-birth abortions. Although many of these laws have not taken effect because of temporary or permanent injunctions, they remain contentious to both pro-life advocates and those who support a woman's right to choose. This report discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, a case involving the constitutionality of Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban statute. In Stenberg, the Court invalidated the Nebraska statute because it lacked an exception for the performance of the partial-birth abortion procedure when necessary to protect the health of the mother, and because it imposed an undue burden on a woman's ability to have an abortion.
This report also reviews various legislative attempts to restrict partial-birth abortions during the 106th, 107th, and 108th Congresses. S. 3, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, was signed by the President on November 4, 2003. On April 18, 2007, the Court upheld the act, finding that, as a facial matter, it is not unconstitutionally vague and does not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. In reaching its conclusion in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court distinguished the federal statute from the Nebraska law at issue in Stenberg. |
crs_RL34522 | crs_RL34522_0 | Recent Developments1
Since January 2007, Bangladesh has been ruled under a state of emergency by a military-backed caretaker government led by "Chief Adviser" Fakhruddin Ahmed. The current government's anti-corruption drive appears to be aimed at ridding Bangladesh of what many see as endemic corruption associated with Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League (AL) and Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), both of whom are former Prime Ministers of Bangladesh. In discussing the shift to the new military-backed caretaker government, he stated that U.S. was initially "troubled that this dramatic shift in government might signal a hidden agenda to indefinitely delay a return to democracy and conceal a secret military coup." The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and has viewed Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. It has received more than $30 billion from foreign donors since its independence in 1971. These are democracy, development, and preventing terrorists from gaining influence in the country. He also stated that credible and transparent elections will be extremely difficult to conduct under a state of emergency, and he believes the caretaker government is taking steps to hold elections by the end of the year and that progress has been made in the area of human rights. There has been much political violence in Bangladesh in recent years. The State Department issued a statement that "strongly condemned" the bomb attack that killed four, including former Awami League Finance Minister A.M.S. Kibria, and injured 70 at a political rally of the Awami League on January 27, 2005. On August 21, 2004, grenades were hurled in an apparent political assassination attempt on opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at a political rally in Dhaka and killed 22. These two attacks, and widespread bombings on August 17, 2005, marked a rising tide of political violence in Bangladesh. Political Dynamics
The intense and at times violent political rivalry between the BNP and the AL, and the presence of radical Islamist parties and groups, have defined Bangladesh's poor political environment in recent years. There is also increasing concern that the military may continue to play a political role in the future despite its pledge to return Bangladesh to democratic government. As a result of a court ruling, the breakaway group led by Hafizuddin Ahmed has strengthened its claim to the leadership of the BNP. There has been some rioting in Dhaka as a result. While initially welcomed as a stabilizing influence, the military-backed interim government is increasingly viewed in Bangladesh, and abroad, as a potential threat to democratic government in Dhaka. Many believe this has created political space for the Islamists to gain influence. The political context for the potential influence of Islamist extremism is demonstrated by the role that Islamist parties played as coalition partners in the previous BNP government. The Bangladeshi opposition, analysts, and media observers have alleged that the presence in the former ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Coalition government of two Islamist parties, the Islamiya Okiyya Jote (IOJ) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, had expanded Islamist influence in Bangladesh and created space within which terrorist and extremist groups could operate. The Hindu nationalist BJP is the leading opposition party in India. | Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan) gained its independence in 1971, following India's intervention in a rebellion against West Pakistan (currently called Pakistan). The Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which led the ruling coalition of the previous government, and the leading opposition party, the Awami League (AL), traditionally have dominated Bangladeshi politics. The BNP has been led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia; the AL has been led by Sheikh Hasina. In the years since independence, Bangladesh has established a reputation as a largely moderate and democratic majority Muslim country. This status has been under threat from a combination of political violence, weak governance, poverty, corruption, and Islamist militancy. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades.
Bangladesh is now ruled by a military-backed caretaker government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed that appears unlikely to relinquish power until at least the end of 2008. It is pursuing an anti-corruption drive that has challenged the usual political elites. It is also seeking to put in place voter reforms, including issuing identity cards, and has moved against militant Islamists. Although there is some concern that the new military-backed caretaker government may be reluctant to relinquish power, it has presented a roadmap for new elections and a return to democracy in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh's status as a secular and moderate state, as well as its democratic process, has been jeopardized as a result of the approach taken by the two main political parties and by the takeover of government by a military-backed caretaker government. Further, there is concern that should Bangladesh become a failed state, or a state with increased influence by Islamist extremists, it could increasingly serve as a base of operations for terrorist activity.
Political violence has become part of the political landscape in Bangladesh under previous governments. A.M.S. Kibria, a finance minister in a previous Awami League government, and four others were killed in a bomb attack that also injured 70 at a political rally of the Awami League in early 2005. In mid 2004, an apparent political assassination attempt on opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at a political rally in Dhaka killed 22. These two attacks, and widespread bombings in mid 2005 that claimed 26 lives and injured dozens others, are the most notable incidents among many in recent years.
U.S. policy toward Bangladesh emphasizes support for political stability and democracy, development, and human rights. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and views Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. Some analysts are concerned that Islamist parties and groups have gained influence through the political process and that this has created space for militant activities inside the country. Some allege that the presence in the former ruling Bangladesh National Party coalition government of two Islamist parties, the Islamiya Okiyya Jote (IOJ) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, contributed to the expansion of Islamist influence in Bangladesh. |
crs_RL31171 | crs_RL31171_0 | These 36 nominations that did not lead to confirmation represent 31 individuals whose names were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents (some of those 31 individuals were nominated more than once). The Supreme Court nominations discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the nominating President, the nominee's views, or the incumbent Court; senatorial courtesy; perceived political unreliability of the nominee; perceived lack of ability; interest group opposition; and fear of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has played an important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868. Summary of Unsuccessful Nominations
The 36 Supreme Court nominations not confirmed by the Senate represent 31 individuals. The first of the six nominees who were not confirmed only to be later re-nominated and confirmed was William Paterson, nominated by President George Washington. | Since 1789, Presidents have submitted 160 nominations to Supreme Court positions. Of these, 36 were not confirmed by the Senate. The 36 nominations represent 31 individuals whose names were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents (some individuals were nominated more than once). Of the 31 individuals who were not confirmed the first time they were nominated, however, six were later nominated again and confirmed. The Supreme Court nominations discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the nominating President, nominee's views, or incumbent Court; senatorial courtesy; perceived political unreliability of the nominee; perceived lack of ability; interest group opposition; and fear of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has played an important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868.
All but the most recent of these nominations have been the subject of extensive legal, historical, and political science writing, a selected list of which is included in this report.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL34371 | crs_RL34371_0 | 4986 was subsequently passed by the Senate and signed by the President on January 28, 2008, becoming P.L. 110-181 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Within Division A, Titles XVI ("Wounded Warrior Matters") and XVII ("Veterans Matters") address matters related to the care and treatment of injured or ill servicemembers. These individuals are widely referred to as "wounded warriors." Provisions in the act reflect congressional concern about the quality and availability of medical, mental health, and dental care services for servicemembers returning from active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the difficulties that some of these individuals have experienced in their transition from military service to veteran status. The provisions vary in scope. Some of them alter specific aspects of existing services or benefits programs in either the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Others call for comprehensive and long-term assessment and/or redesign of programs or systems in one or both of the departments. This report does not attempt to analyze each of the provisions in the act, but provides brief outlines of the matters addressed. In addition, each report shall include current information on the status of the implementation of modifications to disability evaluation processes of the DOD in response to recommendations in the reports listed in the previous paragraph. | This report summarizes provisions in Division A, Titles XVI and XVII, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, signed by the President on January 28, 2008. Titles XVI and XVII address matters related to the care and treatment of servicemembers and former servicemembers (i.e., veterans) who were wounded, or who contracted an illness, while serving on active duty. These individuals are widely referred to as "wounded warriors."
Provisions in the act reflect congressional concern about the quality and availability of medical, mental health, and dental care services for servicemembers returning from active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the difficulties that some of these individuals have experienced in their transition from military service to veteran status. The provisions vary in scope. Some of them alter specific aspects of existing services or benefits programs in either the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Others call for comprehensive and long-term redesign of programs or systems in one or both of the departments. Congress and others have determined that certain programs and systems that involve both departments are particularly problematic in providing continuity and quality of care and services to wounded warriors. Among the problems addressed in the act are the efficient maintenance and transfer of servicemembers' health and benefits records between the departments, and the separate evaluations of disability by each department. Efforts to address these and other transition problems were already underway in both departments, partly in response to the recommendations of several DOD and independent commissions and task forces. The act codifies various mandates for these activities, including deadlines.
This report does not attempt to analyze provisions in the act, but provides brief outlines of the matters addressed. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS21532 | crs_RS21532_0 | The Obama Administration has tried to balance a bilateral relationship that is highly focused on counterterrorism and on Algeria's oil and gas sector with measured encouragement of greater political and economic openness. This balance has taken on added significance amid unrest and political transitions in neighboring states, during which Algeria's political structure has remained largely unchanged. Broadly, Algeria has the financial and human resources to support its claims to regional leadership. U.S. concerns with security threats in the region surrounding Algeria have heightened since 2011 as violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—an Algerian-led network and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)—have exploited regional political instability and gaps in state capacity to expand their activities and influence. In January 2013, an AQIM splinter-faction carried out a mass hostage-seizure in southeast Algeria in which three Americans were killed. While economic and political grievances have driven some domestic unrest, popular enthusiasm for dramatic political change appears limited. Politics
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's reelection to a fourth five-year term in April 2014 underscored Algeria's political continuity, while focusing attention on succession issues. Algeria's political system is dominated by a strong presidency and security apparatus. Algeria's factionalized and opaque decision-making process often appears to inhibit a clear trajectory on political and economic reforms, as well as a more proactive Algerian foreign policy. Algerians refer to Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to designate opaque political and military elite networks that are broadly thought to control major policy decisions. Regional Counterterrorism Efforts
As a regional economic and military power, Algeria has sought to lead a response to terrorist threats in coordination with the poorer Sahel states of West Africa. A desire to deter direct Western military intervention has often appeared to be a primary motivation for Algeria's regional cooperation efforts, although France has nevertheless recently established an enduring regional counterterrorism presence in the Sahel. These laws—along with red tape, corruption concerns, and security threats—have reportedly dampened foreign investor interest. Bouteflika has also pursued closer relations with the United States, France, and the European Union. Algeria's leaders criticized NATO's intervention in Libya and have urged a non-interventionist approach to the conflict in Syria. Relations with Morocco are strained over the issue of Western Sahara and due to a rivalry for regional power. The Western Sahara is a disputed territory claimed and largely administered by Morocco; Algeria hosts and supports the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) and its self-declared government-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. U.S. leverage may be further reduced by Algeria's often opaque decision-making, frequent preoccupation with internal affairs, ties to non-Western strategic players such as Russia, and storied reputation for resistance to outside pressure. U.S. military leaders, while pointing to the importance of bilateral cooperation, have also regularly emphasized that the United States does not seek to impose its views or install a military footprint in the region, in apparent recognition of Algerian sensitivities. The role and influence of Algerian Islamist political parties and movements may also be of interest in the context of regional developments. | U.S.-Algeria ties are highly focused on counterterrorism cooperation and U.S. interest in Algeria's oil and gas production. The Obama Administration has indicated a desire to deepen and broaden bilateral relations, including security assistance, while periodically urging greater political and economic openness. While both governments express appreciation for bilateral cooperation, U.S. officials may lack well-developed levers of influence in Algiers due to Algeria's economic self-reliance and ties to non-Western strategic players such as Russia, along with Algerian leaders' storied reputation for resistance to outside pressure. Congress appropriates and oversees small amounts of foreign aid and reviews notifications of occasional arms sales.
Algeria's political system, which is dominated by a strong presidency and security apparatus, has remained stable amid ongoing regional upheaval. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was first elected in 1999 amid the waning of Algeria's decade-long counterinsurgency against armed Islamist groups. His reelection to a fourth five-year term in April 2014, despite his evident ill health, has focused popular attention on succession issues. Bouteflika has initiated a process aimed at revising Algeria's constitution, but reforms proposed to date appear unlikely to substantially affect the political system. Algerians use the term Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to refer to the opaque elite political and military networks that are widely viewed as driving policy decisions.
Strong global prices for Algeria's energy resources have allowed the country to amass large foreign reserves as a buffer against economic instability, despite declining export volumes in recent years. However, bureaucratic red tape, corruption concerns, and stringent restrictions on foreign investment have inhibited growth and job creation. Localized public unrest over political and economic grievances periodically occurs, and ethnic violence has recently afflicted parts of the country. Yet public enthusiasm for dramatic political change appears limited, potentially due to factors such as the memory of violence during the 1990s and more recent examples of turmoil in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere.
A terrorist attack at a natural gas compound in southeastern Algeria in January 2013, in which three Americans were killed, highlighted the challenges the United States faces in advancing and protecting its interests in an increasingly volatile region. The group that claimed responsibility is a breakaway faction of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional network with Algerian roots and leadership. Given its large military, available financial resources, and desire to avert direct Western military intervention in neighboring states, Algeria has periodically sought to lead a regional response to security threats. Yet Algeria's complex and sometimes distrustful relations with neighboring states may hinder cooperation. Meanwhile, U.S. unilateral action in response to security threats may present significant risks and opportunity costs.
Algeria's foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the United States. Strained relations with neighboring Morocco continue, due to the unresolved status of the disputed territory of Western Sahara and a rivalry for regional influence. Morocco claims Western Sahara; Algeria supports and hosts a long-running independence movement. The legacy of Algeria's anti-colonial struggle contributes to its leaders' stance on the Western Sahara, their emphasis on sovereignty as a principle of foreign relations, and their frequent skepticism of Western and NATO intentions. The strategic importance of Algeria's natural gas exports to Europe may increase amid efforts to reduce reliance on supplies from Russia. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara. |
crs_R44677 | crs_R44677_0 | Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended as a group by Congress, rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled, are often referred to as "tax extenders." There are several options for Congress to consider regarding temporary provisions. Another option would be to allow expired provisions to remain expired. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis, in theory, would provide Congress with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of specific provisions before providing further extension. Reasons for Temporary Tax Provisions
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. 114-113 ), extended all expiring provisions. Tax policy may also be used to address temporary circumstances in the form of economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax policies on a temporary basis for budgetary reasons. Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016
Thirty-four temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2016. The other two individual extender provisions are housing-related. The one business provision expiring at the end of 2016 that has not been extended in past tax extender legislation was enacted at the end of 2015, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Recent "Tax Extender" Legislation
The most recent "tax extenders" legislation was enacted as the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. The PATH Act either extended or made permanent all of the 52 temporary tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Of the 30 business tax provisions that expired at the end of 2014, 12 were made permanent in the PATH Act, while another 5 were extended through the end of 2019. However, no long-term or permanent extensions of energy-related provisions were included in the PATH Act. The provisions that had expired at the end of 2011 were extended retroactively. The Cost of Extending Expired Tax Provisions
As lawmakers consider whether to extend expired tax provisions beyond 2016, cost is one factor. Since many provisions were made permanent in the PATH Act, a temporary extenders package for provisions that expired in 2016 would cost less than past extender packages. There are fewer provisions to extend, and many provisions with the largest revenue cost were made permanent in the PATH Act. Cost of Extending Provisions that Expired in 2016
As discussed above, most provisions that expired at the end of 2016 were previously extended for two years in the PATH Act. | In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Most recently, in December 2015, Congress addressed tax extenders in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). This legislation extended all of the 52 provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Unlike past tax extenders legislation, however, a number of provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 were made permanent. Several others were extended through 2019. Many provisions were temporarily extended for two years, through 2016.
Thirty-four temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2016. Most of these provisions were extended for two years as part of the PATH Act. Options related to extenders in the 115th Congress include (1) extending all or some of the provisions that expired at the end of 2016 or (2) allowing expired provisions to remain expired. If temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016 are extended, retroactive extensions may be considered so that tax incentives and provisions are available in 2017. In the past, retroactive extensions have been common for expired temporary tax provisions.
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis provides legislators with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of tax policies prior to expiration or extension. Temporary tax provisions may also be used to provide economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary rather than permanent basis due to budgetary considerations, as the foregone revenue from a temporary provision will generally be less than if it were permanent.
The provisions that expired at the end of 2016 are diverse in purpose. There are education- and housing-related provisions for individuals. For businesses, there are several provisions related to the territories, Indian tribes, and economic development, in addition to provisions for specific industries. There are also a number of energy-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016.
As lawmakers consider whether to extend expired tax provisions beyond 2016, cost is one factor. Since many provisions were made permanent in the PATH Act, a temporary extenders package for provisions that expired in 2016 would cost less than past extender packages. There are fewer provisions to extend, and many provisions with the largest revenue cost were made permanent in the PATH Act. |
crs_R44069 | crs_R44069_0 | The three bills compared are
the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA, H.R. 1560 as passed by the House), the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA, H.R. All three bills focus on information sharing among private entities and between them and the federal government. In addition to other provisions, NCPAA would explicitly amend portions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. ), and PCNA would amend parts of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Private-sector entities often claim that they are reluctant to share such information among themselves because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust violations, and potential misuse, especially of intellectual property, including trade secrets and other proprietary business information. Institutional and cultural factors have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to emphasize secrecy and confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information. While reduction or removal of such barriers may provide cybersecurity benefits, concerns have also been raised about potential adverse impacts, especially with respect to privacy and civil liberties. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA, H.R. NCPAA ( H.R. 1731 would be appended to H.R. 1560 , and H.R. The bill was offered as an amendment to H.R. More than 70 amendments to the bill were filed. The cloture motion was withdrawn on August 5 after a unanimous consent agreement was reached permitting consideration, and the Senate began debate on a manager's amendment on October 20. The substitute included several of the filed amendments. Several additional amendments were considered, but most did not succeed. The Senate passed CISA, as amended, on October 27. Other Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress
Two other bills on information sharing have been introduced in the 114 th Congress, one in the House and one in the Senate. The White House has also submitted a legislative proposal (WHP) and issued an executive order on the topic. Overview of the Legislative Proposals
All the bills would address common concerns about barriers to sharing of information on threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of cybersecurity—both within and across sectors—but they vary somewhat in emphasis and method. NCPAA focuses on the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in particular the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), the role of which is also addressed in S. 456 and the WHP. Similar authorizing language was included in H.R. All five bills and the WHP have provisions aimed at facilitating sharing of information among private-sector entities and providing protections from liability that might arise from such sharing. In general, the proposals limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and specified aspects of law enforcement, and they limit government use for regulatory purposes. All the proposals require reports to Congress on impacts of their provisions. All also include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government from public disclosure, including exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). NCPAA and CISA also contain provisions relating to cybersecurity of federal agencies and their information systems and of critical infrastructure sectors. CISA also has provisions on international cybersecurity policy and cybercrime. Privacy and Civil Liberties. Concerns relating to privacy and civil liberties, especially the protection of personal and proprietary information and uses of shared information, have been a subject of considerable debate in the development of legislation on information sharing. Sharing of information among private-sector entities might not be substantially increased by the actions contemplated in the legislation. Most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary or at least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included. This may be especially true for information shared with the federal government. Information sharing is only one facet of cybersecurity. Side-by-Side Comparison of NCPAA, PCNA, and CISA
The remainder of the report consists of four tables comparing provisions in NCPAA and PCNA as passed by the House and CISA as passed by the Senate:
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of sections with corresponding provisions in the three bills and includes all the provisions specifically related to information sharing. | Effective sharing of information in cybersecurity is generally considered an important tool for protecting information systems from unauthorized access. Five bills on such sharing have been introduced in the 114th Congress—H.R. 234, H.R. 1560, H.R. 1731, S. 456, and S. 754, and relevant provisions have appeared in other bills. The White House has also submitted a legislative proposal and issued an executive order on the topic.
H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), and H.R. 1731, the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), passed the House the week of April 20. The bills were then combined as separate titles in H.R. 1560.
In the Senate, S. 754, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), was reported in March and was proposed to be considered as an amendment to H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). More than 70 amendments to CISA were submitted, a managers amendment was circulated, and a cloture motion was filed on August 3. On August 5, a unanimous consent agreement was reached permitting consideration, and the Senate began debate on a manager's amendment on October 20. The substitute included several of the filed amendments. Several additional amendments were considered, but most did not succeed. The Senate passed CISA, as amended, on October 27. Presumably, any inconsistencies between CISA and the two titles of H.R. 1560 could be reconciled during the process for resolving differences between the House and Senate bills.
PCNA, NCPAA, and CISA have many similarities but also significant differences. All focus on information sharing among private entities and between them and the federal government. NCPAA would explicitly amend portions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and PCNA would amend parts of the National Security Act of 1947. CISA addresses the roles of the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community but does not explicitly amend either act. NCPAA and CISA also contain provisions relating to cybersecurity of federal agencies and their information systems and of critical infrastructure sectors. CISA also has provisions on international cybersecurity policy and cybercrime. The bills differ in how they define some terms in common, the roles they provide for federal agencies, processes for nonfederal entities to share information with the federal government, processes for protecting privacy and civil liberties, uses permitted for shared information, and reporting requirements.
All the bills would address concerns about barriers to sharing information about cybersecurity within and across sectors. Such barriers are considered by many to hinder protection of information systems. Private-sector entities often express reluctance to share such information because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust violations, regulatory requirements, and protection of intellectual property and other proprietary business information. Institutional and cultural factors have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to emphasize secrecy and confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information.
All the bills have provisions aimed at facilitating information sharing among private-sector entities and providing protections from liability. While reduction or removal of such barriers may provide benefits, concerns have been raised about potential adverse impacts, especially on privacy and civil liberties, and potential misuse of shared information. The bills address many of those concerns. In general, they limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and law enforcement, and they limit government use, especially for regulatory purposes. All include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government from public disclosure and to protect privacy and civil liberties with respect to shared information that is not needed for cybersecurity purposes. All require reports to Congress on impacts of their provisions.
Most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary or at least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included—but additional factors may be worthy of consideration as the legislative proposals are debated. In particular, resistance to information sharing among private-sector entities might not be substantially reduced by the actions contemplated in the legislation; and information sharing is only one of many facets of cybersecurity that organizations need to address to secure their information systems. |
crs_R40960 | crs_R40960_0 | And should the delay be judged by speedy trial or general due process standards? The United States Supreme Court agreed to consider the issue in Alvarez v. Smith (Doc. Had the property owners prevailed, adjustments in federal law might have been required. The case was complicated by several factors. Before the Court could rule on the merits, the city returned the cars it had seized from the claimants and settled their other claims. Alternatively, it may be seized without a warrant or process, if there is probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture and seizure would be otherwise reasonable. The state may confiscate the property administratively (without a court hearing), if the forfeiture is uncontested and the property is valued at under $20,000 or is a car or other conveyance. Then, the circuit court felt bound by the Supreme Court's $8,850 (Vasquez) decision, which held that the Barker v. Wingo speedy trial factors govern the outcome, that is, "the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of this right, and prejudice to the defendant." In Smith , the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to dismiss . More to the point, it declared that the question of whether the circumstances of a particular case warranted an exception must be answered using the factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge : "the risk of erroneous deprivation of [a private] interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would impose." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a State or local government to provide a post-seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850 , 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972) or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Fourth, the Illinois statute is modeled after the federal statute, neither of which offends due process, in light of the right under either law to seek return of seized property. Alvarez v. Smith
The Court learned upon inquiry that the groups' claims had been resolved. Since the group had been denied certification to act as representatives in a class action, they stood before the Court only on the basis of their individual claims. The members of the Court were only slightly more divided over whether the Seventh Circuit opinion should be vacated or allowed to stand. | Alvarez v. Smith became moot while pending before the United States Supreme Court. At the time, the Court had agreed to decide whether a six-month delay between a state's seizure of property and its forfeiture hearing requires additional procedural safeguards. Traditionally, forfeiture hearing delays have been judged by the speedy trial standards of Barker v. Wingo. The Court had been asked to decide whether they should instead be judged by the general due process standards of Mathews v. Eldridge.
Alvarez v. Smith arose in Chicago where a group of property owners filed a civil rights class action against city and state officials over city practices under the Illinois drug forfeiture statute. Under the statute, cars and trucks regardless of their value and money or other property valued at under $20,000 may be seized without a warrant by officers with probable cause to believe it is subject to confiscation. The forfeiture hearing may be held as late as 187 days after the seizure. The Smith group argued their property could not be held for that long without intervening safeguards against hardship and erroneous seizure. The district court dismissed their suit using the higher threshold Barker speedy trial standards to assess the delay and its impact. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It felt use of the Mathews standards better suited and returned the case to the lower court for determination of an appropriate remedy. At that point, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Before the Court could rule, however, the city returned the cars it had seized from members of the group and settled the group's claims relating the other property seized. In the absence of a case or controversy, the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit opinion and returned the matter to the lower court.
The Illinois statute tracks the federal statutes in several respects. Thus, had the Seventh Circuit view prevailed, changes in federal law might have been required.
Related reports include CRS Report 97-139, Crime and Forfeiture, by [author name scrubbed], which is also available in abbreviated form as CRS Report RS22005, Crime and Forfeiture: In Short, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40607 | crs_R40607_0 | Introduction
This report focuses on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) provisions pursued through international and U.S. trade policy and access to medicines. Patents, a form of IPR, constitute the most common method by which governments encourage research and development (R&D) in order to find treatments and cures for diseases and other illnesses. A patent is a legal, exclusive right granted for the invention of a new product, process, organism, design, or plant that allows the right holder to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention for a period of 20 years. IPR protection and enforcement have evolved from an area primarily of national concern to an area of international trade policy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) established minimum standards for IPR protection and enforcement. Some policymakers also have expressed concern about the health and safety implications of counterfeit goods, including pharmaceutical drugs. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) considers the protection and enforcement of international IPR standards to be a high priority for U.S. trade policy. As such, the USTR has pursued strong IPR regimes by participating in multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs, as well as through unilateral trade policy tools, namely the Special 301 process and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). IPR provisions in trade policies are among the range of social, economic, and political factors that may affect public health. Through their possible impact on innovation and drug prices, patents may affect the ability of countries to provide medicines to their populations and for populations in general to access medicines. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), about one-third of the world's population, primarily residing in poorer parts of Africa and Asia, lacks regular access to essential medicines. At the center of the debate is the question of how to balance providing long-term incentives for innovation through patents and addressing the short-term need to provide affordable access to medicines. The debate over IPRs and access to medicines represents one component of a broader debate over the relationship between international trade policy and global public health. Issues for Congressional Consideration
Possible issues of interest for Congress include incorporating public health input into the U.S. trade policy advisory process, developing new U.S. trade policy guidance on public health, considering the implications of the U.S. strategy on IPRs and trade for U.S. access to medicines, and reviewing the range of options utilized for expanding global access to medicines. | A patent, which is a form of intellectual property right (IPR), is a legal, exclusive right granted for the invention of a new product, process, organism, design, and plant. It allows the right holder to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention for a period of 20 years. Patents constitute the most common method for governments to encourage research and development (R&D) in order to find pharmaceutical treatments and cures for diseases and other illnesses.
IPR protection and enforcement have evolved from an area primarily of national concern to an area of international trade policy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) established minimum standards for IPR protection and enforcement.
The U.S. government considers the protection and enforcement of international IPR standards, including those for patents, to be an important goal of U.S. trade policy for economic, health and safety, and national security reasons. As such, the United States has pursued strong IPR regimes through multilateral, regional, and bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations and unilateral trade policy tools, namely the Special 301 process and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
IPR provisions in trade policies are among the range of social, economic, and political factors that may affect public health, including the ability of countries to deliver health services to their populations. Patents, through their possible impact on innovation and drug prices, may affect access to existing medicines and the development of new medicines. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), about one-third of the world's population, primarily those residing in poorer parts of Africa and Asia, lacks regular access to essential medicines.
While the United States places priority on promoting a strong international IPR regime, some Members of Congress have expressed concern over how to balance the goals of providing long-term incentives for innovation through patents and addressing the short-term need to provide affordable access to medicines.
This report focuses on the relationship between IPR provisions in international and U.S. trade policy and access to medicines. This issue represents one component of a broader debate about the relationship between trade policy and public health. Possible issues of interest for Congress include incorporating public health concerns into the U.S. trade policy advisory process, developing new U.S. trade policy guidance on public health, considering the implications of the U.S. strategy on IPRs and trade for U.S. access to medicines, and reviewing the range of options utilized for expanding global access to medicines. |
crs_RL33153 | crs_RL33153_0 | The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China's naval modernization effort includes a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including programs for ASBMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital ships, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Roles and Missions for China's Navy
Observers believe China's naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following:
addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting and defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), and more generally, achieving a greater degree of control or domination over the SCS; enforcing China's view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the legal right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power. Most observers believe that, consistent with these goals, China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China's navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Issues for Congress
Future Size and Capability of U.S. Navy
One potential oversight issue for Congress, particularly in the context of the constraints on U.S. defense spending established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 as amended, is whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also adequately performing other missions around the world of interest to U.S. policymakers. Long-Range Carrier-Based Aircraft and Long-Range Weapons
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether the Navy's plans for developing and procuring long-range carrier-based aircraft and long-range ship- and aircraft-launched weapons are appropriate and adequate. Position in Western Pacific
Observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of a broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. | The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning and budgeting.
China has been steadily building a modern and powerful navy since the early to mid-1990s. China's navy has become a formidable military force within China's near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
Observers view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of a broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.
China's naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
Observers believe China's naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting and defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and more generally, achieving a greater degree of control or domination over the SCS; enforcing China's view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power.
Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China's navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also adequately performing other missions around the world; whether the Navy's plans for developing and procuring long-range carrier-based aircraft and long-range ship- and aircraft-launched weapons are appropriate and adequate; whether the Navy can effectively counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China's maritime A2/AD capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture. |
crs_R40753 | crs_R40753_0 | Immigration is a leading policy concern for many countries around the world. For Members of Congress, immigration policy has been one of the main legislative issues for several years. Yet, determining an optimal immigration policy has grown increasingly complex as economic, cultural, and security pressures all compete for political consideration. This report serves as a broad overview of the standard theory of international migration and offers a brief synopsis of the major immigration-related policy challenges relative to the legislative debates in Congress. The overview provides several possible issues for Congress as it considers new legislation on immigration reform, including (1) how new immigration legislation might affect migratory behavior and (2) the possible effects of increased or decreased migration on related policy issues. Push/Pull Factors in International Migration
With the exception of certain trafficking circumstances, all migration is based on a decision-making process by the individual migrant (or in some cases by the migrant's household). "If," "when," "where," and "how" questions of migration are commonly referred to as "push/pull" factors. Essentially, while some factors appeal to potential migrants to "pull" them toward another country, other circumstances tend to "push" them away from their place of residence. Institutions and Behavior
Despite there being several possible motivations to migrate, the range of choices available for an individual to migrate are limited. Limitations occur in part because of the constraints placed on human behavior by institutions. In other words, institutions are the so-called "rules of the game." Future Challenges for Governments in aGlobal Economy
The increasingly global nature of the market economy, and the migration of individuals associated with the pursuit of growing or emerging labor needs, has created both challenges and opportunities for advanced industrial countries. Despite the idiosyncrasies and unique policies of certain countries, a string of commonalities underlies the pressures all open economies face. Several of the themes partially mirror debates occurring in the United States. Perhaps most prominent of these are integration efforts to peaceably adjust society to accommodate any new demographic dynamics. A second recurring theme is the alleged burden placed by some immigrants on the state, including acts of violence, threats to security, crime, and supposed net non-contributions to the welfare state. A final theme concerns how international migration may provide numerous benefits (particularly of an economic nature) that could be used to help alleviate labor shortages, address an aging society, and otherwise provide cultural diversity. For policy makers in the United States, the growth and development of the EU is an experiment that is being closely observed. | Immigration is a leading policy concern for many countries around the world, including the United States. Members of Congress have for several years had immigration policy as one of their main legislative issues. Yet, determining an optimal immigration policy has grown increasingly complex as economic, cultural, and security pressures all compete for political consideration. In an effort to tackle some of this complexity, this report serves as a broad overview of the standard theory of international migration and offers a brief synopsis of the major immigration-related policy challenges potentially involved in the legislative debates in Congress. The overview examines several possible issues for Congress as it considers new legislation on immigration reform, including (1) how new immigration legislation might affect migratory behavior and (2) the possible effects of increased or decreased migration on related policy issues.
In addressing these issues, this report lays out a basic theoretical foundation for migration, as well as the mitigating role of laws and regulations on migratory behavior. With the exception of certain trafficking circumstances, all migration is based on a decision-making process by the individual migrant (or in some cases by the migrant's household). The decision-making elements are commonly referred to as "push/pull" factors. Essentially, while some factors appeal to potential migrants to "pull" them toward another country, other circumstances tend to "push" them away from their place of residence. If the perceived benefits of these push/pull factors outweigh the perceived cost, an individual is expected to migrate.
Despite there being several possible motivations to migrate, the range of choices available for an individual to migrate are limited. Limitations occur in part because of the constraints placed on human behavior by institutions—or "rules of the game"—such as laws, regulations, or even cultural expectations. Policy makers can actively modify a number of institutions to both deter some forms of migration and facilitate others, thereby mitigating the impact of push/pull factors to the policy maker's advantage. Consequently, institutional manipulation plays a key role in addressing numerous immigration-related policy challenges, because it can be used to facilitate the migration of some potential migrants and deter the migration of others.
The increasingly global migration of individuals has created both challenges and opportunities for advanced industrial countries. Despite the idiosyncrasies and unique policies of certain countries, a string of commonalities underlies the pressures all open economies face. Several of the themes partially mirror debates and efforts occurring in the United States. Perhaps most prominent of these is integration, that is, efforts to peaceably adjust society to accommodate any new demographic dynamics. A second recurring theme is the alleged burden placed by some immigrants on the state, including acts of violence, threats to security, crime, and supposed net non-contributors to the welfare state. A final theme concerns how international migration may provide numerous benefits, including alleviating labor shortages, addressing an aging society, and otherwise providing cultural diversity.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42080 | crs_R42080_0 | Introduction
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are congressionally chartered, stockholder-owned companies known as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs or the enterprises ) that receive special favorable treatment in return for limiting their businesses to purchasing existing mortgages and either holding them as investments or pooling them into mortgage-backed securities, which are sold to institutional investors. Some of the mortgages that Fannie and Freddie purchase must meet certain affordable housing goals. In September 2008, as a result of losses and insufficient capital reserves, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), to go into conservatorship with the goal of returning the GSEs to financial health. Since the start of conservatorship, the government has purchased more than $150 billion in special preferred stock issued by the two GSEs. Since the financial crisis, the two GSEs have accounted for more than half of all new mortgages in the country. On January 26, 2011, Representative Jason Chaffetz introduced the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Transparency Act of 2011 ( H.R. 463 ), which would make Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subject to FOIA. On July 12, 2011, the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises forwarded H.R. 463 to the full committee by a voice vote. No further action has been taken on the bill. When should private entities in federal conservatorship be considered federal agencies for the purposes of certain recordkeeping and records accessibility laws? Would making Fannie and Freddie subject to FOIA prompt serious concerns for private institutions that in the future are found in federal conservatorship? Not all of these questions can be answered in this report. It then identifies additional policy options for Congress. Possible FOIA Requests
As stockholder-owned and -controlled companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not usually considered government agencies and would not appear to be covered by FOIA. government." FOIA applies only to agencies in the executive branch of the federal government. Applying this test to the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac campaign contribution records, the district court found that although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac voluntarily agreed to the conservatorship and, thus, to FHFA's taking control of their records, and although FHFA has "virtually unrestricted ... use of the records," "the records ... are not relevant to the supervisory mission of the FHFA and ..., for that reason, no agency employees have read or relied on the requested records" and "the FHFA ... plans to return the records to the Enterprises once the conservatorship ends...." For the appellate court, because the FHFA did not use the records, access to them would in no way further the objectives of the FOIA:
[t]he public cannot learn anything about an agency decisionmaking from a document the agency neither created nor consulted, and requiring disclosure under these circumstances would do nothing to further the FOIA's purpose of 'open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny.... On May 23, 2011, H.R. 463 was referred to the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises. At the hearing, Edward J. DeMarco, acting director of the FHFA, testified that FOIA was not designed to apply to private companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. | The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. §552) grants the public presumptive access—without explanation or justification—to certain existing, identifiable, unpublished, executive branch agency records. FOIA includes nine categories of exemption from disclosure, including information that could prompt national security concerns, invade privacy, or damage financial markets, among other concerns. Disputes over the accessibility of requested records can be appealed administratively or ultimately settled in court.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are congressionally chartered, stockholder-owned companies known as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Their charters grant them special favorable treatment in return for supporting the nation's housing by limiting their businesses to purchasing existing mortgages and either holding them as investments or pooling them into mortgage-backed securities, which are sold to institutional investors. In addition, Fannie and Freddie are charged with meeting certain affordable housing goals.
In September 2008, as a result of losses and inadequate capital reserves, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed with the federal government to go into conservatorship. In conservatorship, the government takes control of a failing financial institution with the goal of returning it to financial health and stockholder control. Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac went into conservatorship, the government has purchased more than $150 billion in special stock issued by the two organizations. Since the financial crisis in 2008, the two GSEs have helped to finance more than half of all new mortgages in the country.
As stockholder-owned and -controlled companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not normally be considered government agencies and would not appear to be covered by FOIA. On January 26, 2011, Representative Jason Chaffetz introduced the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Transparency Act of 2011 (H.R. 463) that would make Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subject to FOIA by requiring them to be considered federal "agencies" for the purposes of FOIA. H.R. 463 was referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on March 23, 2011.
On May 25, 2011, Edward J. DeMarco, acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, testified that making Fannie and Freddie subject to FOIA could generate operational, compliance, and legal costs.
On July 12, 2011, the House Committee on Financial Services' Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises voted to approve the bill at markup, and it was then forwarded to the full committee. No further action has been taken on the bill.
This report examines some possible effects of applying FOIA to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and identifies some open questions that Congress may address in this context. The report analyzes how certain FOIA requirements and guidelines may pose concerns if they are applied to private institutions. The report explores cases in which members of the public sought information from an entity in federal conservatorship, as well as how Amtrak, a shareholder-owned company that is financially dependent on the federal government through grants and entitlements, administers FOIA. |
crs_RL33033 | crs_RL33033_0 | Introduction
This report examines the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) intelligence program and its reform. While the report serves as an update of the FBI's efforts in these areas, a substantial part of its focus is on the implementation on the FBI's intelligence reform in the field. An important question is whether intelligence policy designed by senior level Intelligence Directorate personnel at FBI headquarters, with field input, has been accepted, adopted and implemented within the FBI's field structure. This service would include the Bureau's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence. While observers generally agree that the FBI has made substantial progress in reforming its intelligence program, they sharply disagree as to whether the FBI's changes are adequate. Two "Schools of Thought"
The first school of thought argues that the FBI's vision for intelligence reform is sound; the FBI must, however, overcome certain capacity constraints in order to implement successfully its vision. They argue, however, that the FBI has developed a coherent and sound vision for an intelligence program that integrates and leverages what they assert is a synergy between the FBI's criminal and national security missions. As a result, skeptics of the FBI's approach believe the FBI's vision for intelligence reform is fundamentally flawed. Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. A central tenet of a high-order functioning intelligence organization is that it is able to harness its collection resources to nationally developed and coordinated intelligence priorities and gaps. While pockets of promise exist, field research indicates that the FBI ' s ability to formally harness intelligence collection ( including systemic accountability mechanisms) to analytically identified intelligence gaps, remains nascent. Congress could confront a number of issues in measuring FBI performance in this critical area. He has (1) established a new DI within the FBI that will have "broad and clear authority over intelligence related functions at the Bureau"; (2) established a new position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (3) created a new Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program; (4) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; (5) established intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters, and (6) based on the recommendations of the WMD Commission and subsequent White House guidance, created a National Security Branch within the FBI that will integrate "...the FBI's national security mission with the Director of National Intelligence and the Intelligence Community." One observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't fit ... law enforcement always wins." Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has been under tremendous pressure to hire, train, and retain intelligence professionals. Budget—Strategic Issues and Options
With respect to the budget, there are both strategic and tactical options. For example, one could fully fund salaries and expenses for additional special agents working, yet tie the appropriation for 500 intelligence analysts to one or more of the following: (1) ensuring that all analysts hired during the last three years at HQ and in the field, have taken the Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-1 course; (2) the development of regional training programs modeled on those provided to other intelligence analysts in the intelligence community; (3) the provision of all intelligence analysts with Internet terminals on their desks; (4) the demonstrated implementation of the expanded human resource authorities (including exemptions from Title 5), including the implementation of a Senior Analytic Service or Senior Intelligence Service within the DI for regional and functional intelligence and/or terrorism threats, (yet not policy advisers); (5) the implementation of new performance evaluation systems for special agents and intelligence analysts that focus on qualitative versus quantitative output, and (6) the development of formal mechanisms to ensure that field intelligence collectors are responsive to filling intelligence gaps assigned to them by the FIGs. They are
Foreign Intelligence . | In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) embarked on a program to reform its intelligence and national security programs. In the nearly four years since 9/11 many experts agree the FBI has made progress in some areas (dissemination of raw intelligence), but some believe that the FBI has shown little progress in other areas (establishing an integrated and proactive intelligence program) while the FBI's budget increased by 68% from FY2000 to FY2005. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has recommended, and the White House has approved, the establishment of a National Security Service within the FBI. This Service would integrate the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions with the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Whether this organizational change will yield substantive results is an open question.
There are at least two schools of thought with respect to how the FBI has performed in implementing its intelligence reform initiatives. The "optimists" believe there is a critical synergy between the law enforcement and intelligence disciplines, and that the FBI has successfully made changes throughout its history to respond to the threats of the time. Since the FBI's vision for intelligence reform is sound, success is simply a matter of implementing that vision. Alternatively, the "skeptics" believe that law enforcement and intelligence are distinct disciplines demanding different skill sets to achieve different ends. They argue the FBI's vision is fundamentally unsound, and its ongoing implementation has not yielded an integrated intelligence program. According to this group, intelligence collection remains effectively separated from intelligence analysis at the FBI.
This report analyzes the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field. Reform policies designed at FBI Headquarters, with field input, may be of marginal utility unless they are fully and effectively implemented across the 56 FBI field offices. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined the FBI's reform initiatives with a focus on the implementation of the field intelligence group concept, at five field offices. Allowing for varying levels of progress across field offices, a central tenet of a high-order functioning intelligence organization is its ability to harness collection resources to nationally developed intelligence priorities and gaps. While areas of promise exist, field research indicates that the FBI's ability to formally harness intelligence collection (including systemic accountability mechanisms) to analytically identified intelligence gaps, remains nascent.
In addition, this report discusses several overall options for Congress in addressing FBI intelligence reform. Organizationally and structurally, Congress could establish a stand-alone domestic intelligence agency. Alternatively, it could codify the recently announced National Security Service within the FBI. Potential areas are outlined for functional oversight, including the FBI-CIA relationship, and the FBI's efforts to stanch terrorism finance. And finally, the report reviews options for addressing the FBI's intelligence budget, both at the strategic and tactical levels. |
crs_R40901 | crs_R40901_0 | Background
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., "connecting the dots") as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (commonly known as the "ISE"). Congress intended the ISE to be a "decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment ... with 'applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.'" The act also directed that the ISE provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. Also after 9/11, states and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism intelligence and analysis. The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within communities. Third, "[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources." Suspicious Activity Reporting
Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and combining them with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States. The NSI responds to the strategy's mandate that the federal government support the development of a nationwide capacity for a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. Issues for Congress
Too Many "Dots"
The NSI is designed to increase the amount of information—the intelligence "dots"—that will flow from state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to the federal government. | The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., "connecting the dots") as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Two of the efforts undertaken since 2001 to tackle these issues included
Congress mandating the creation of an information-sharing environment (commonly known as the "ISE") that would provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. States and major urban areas establishing intelligence fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism intelligence and analysis.
The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities. Third, "[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources."
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States.
The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is an effort to have most federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, and analyzing terrorism-related SARs. The NSI is designed to respond to the mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), for a "decentralized, distributed, and coordinated [information sharing] environment ... with 'applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.'"
This report describes the NSI, the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress. |
crs_98-892 | crs_98-892_0 | Since at least 1973, DOJ has taken the position that any executive department or agency whose authorizing legislation vests all powers and functions of the agency in its head and allows the head to delegate such powers and functions to subordinates in her discretion, does not have to comply with that Act, which limits the time during which advice and consent positions may be filled by temporary designees before a nomination is forwarded to the Senate. All executive departments have such provisions. As a consequence, during 1998 some 20% of the 320 advice and consent positions in the departments were being filled by temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period of the Act without presidential submissions of nominations. Following hearings on S. 2176 , the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 was reported by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on July 15, 1998. Although the bill failed to survive a cloture vote on the Senate floor on September 24, 1998, negotiations between the Senate sponsors and the Administration continued, and a compromise was reached on a revision and included in the FY 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which became law on October 21, 1998 ( P.L. The new Vacancies Act rejects the DOJ position on temporary appointments and makes it clear that the Act is the exclusive vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. The court held that the Vacancies Act applied to the situation. 105-277
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, Pub. | Since at least 1973, the Justice Department (DOJ) has taken the position that any executive department or agency whose authorizing legislation vests all powers and functions of the agency in its head and allows the head to delegate such powers and functions to subordinates in her discretion, does not have to comply with the Vacancies Act, which limits the time during which advice and consent positions may be filled by temporary designees before a nomination is forwarded to the Senate. All executive departments have such provisions. As a consequence, during 1998 some 20% of the 320 advice and consent positions in the departments were being filled by temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period of the Act without presidential submissions of nominations. The designation by the Attorney General of an acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in December 1997 in apparent contravention of the Vacancies Act precipitated congressional hearings and the introduction of legislation in both Houses to remedy the perceived noncompliance. Also, a federal appeals court ruling in March 1998 narrowly construing the Vacancies Act further piqued congressional concerns. On July 15, 1998, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 2176, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. Although the bill failed to survive a cloture vote on the floor, a compromise version was included in the FY 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which became law on October 21, 1998 (P.L. 105-277). The new Vacancies Act rejects the DOJ position and makes it the exclusive vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions and provides substantial incentives for the President to send forth timely nominations for Senate consideration. |
crs_R43930 | crs_R43930_0 | Families participate on a voluntary basis. In FY2017, the MIECHV program served 156,297 individual parents and children who participated in 942,676 home visits. In practice, it generally entails visits to the homes of families on a regular basis (e.g., weekly or monthly) over an extended period (e.g., six months or longer). Depending on the program model, visits may be conducted by nurses, mental health clinicians, social workers, or paraprofessionals who have received specialized training. The programs can help achieve positive benefits for children, parents, and possibly their communities. Overview of the MIECHV Program
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended; P.L. 11-148) established the MIECHV program under Section 511 of the Social Security Act. The program—jointly administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and Administration for Children and Families (ACF)—seeks to strengthen and improve home visiting services and support to families residing in at-risk communities, while also referring families to services outside of the program. The most recent reauthorization of the program, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ) extended funding through FY2022. Jurisdictions must give priority to serving eligible families who meet any of the following criteria:
reside in communities that are in need of home visiting services, as identified in the needs assessment conducted by the jurisdiction and accounting for other factors (staffing, community resources, and other requirements) that are necessary to operate at least one approved home visiting model in those communities; are low-income; include a pregnant woman under the age of 21; have a history of child abuse or neglect or have had interactions with child welfare services; have a history of substance abuse or need substance abuse treatment; have users of tobacco products in the home; have children with low student achievement; have children with developmental delays or disabilities; or individuals who are serving, or formerly served, in the Armed Forces, including such families that have members of the Armed Forces who have had multiple deployments outside of the United States. The authorizing law requires that 3% of the annual funding is to be reserved for Indian tribal entities, and another 3% is to be reserved for selected technical assistance, research, and evaluation. The law does not specify how the funds are to be awarded, though the most recent reauthorization of the program under BBA 2018 included language that directs HHS to use the most accurate data available for eligible jurisdictions if funding is awarded on the basis of relative population or poverty considerations. In practice, HHS has distributed MIECHV funds by both formula and competitive grants to states and other jurisdictions. BBA 2018 extended funding of $400 million for the program for each of FY2017 through FY2022. Jurisdictions are required to update the needs assessment by October 1, 2020. These jurisdictions were required to conduct an initial needs assessment to identify communities with concentrations of poor infant health and mortality, poverty, and other negative outcomes. Jurisdictions must also ensure that the program
adheres to a clear, consistent home visiting model that meets the requirements for being research-based (discussed further in the next section) and is linked to the benchmark areas and outcomes for individual families; employs well-trained and competent staff, as demonstrated by education or training (such as nurses, social workers, educators, and child development specialists) and provides ongoing and specific training on the home visiting model; maintains high-quality supervision to establish "home visitor competencies"; demonstrates strong organizational capacity to implement the activities involved; establishes appropriate linkages and referral networks to other community resources and supports for eligible families; and monitors how the home visiting model is implemented to ensure that services are implemented with fidelity to the model. Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness (HomVEE)
In 2009, prior to implementation of ACA, HHS/ACF created the Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness (HomVEE) initiative to determine which home visiting models have shown evidence of effectiveness. The evaluation, known as the Mother and Infant Home Visiting Program Evaluation (MIHOPE), is examining programs that use the four most common evidence-based home visiting models: Early Head Start-Home Visiting (EHS), Healthy Families America (HFA), Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP), and Parents as Teachers (PAT). Legislative History of Home Visiting
Federal Efforts to Establish a Home Visiting Program
Congressional and executive branch interest in early childhood home visiting programs predated the Affordable Care Act and implementation of the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program. 111-148 . | The federal Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program supports home visiting services for families with young children who reside in communities that have concentrations of poor child health and other indicators of risk. Home visits are conducted by nurses, mental health clinicians, social workers, or paraprofessionals with specialized training. Generally, they visit the homes of eligible families on a regular basis (e.g., weekly or monthly) over an extended period (e.g., six months or longer) to provide support to caregivers and children, such as guidance on creating a positive home environment and referrals to community resources. Families participate on a voluntary basis. Research on the efficacy of home visiting has shown that some models can help improve selected child and family outcomes, such as reducing child abuse. In FY2017, the MIECHV program supported 156,297 individual parents and children involved in 942,676 home visits.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended; P.L. 111-148) established the MIECHV program under Section 511 of the Social Security Act in March 2010. The program is jointly administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and the Administration for Children and Families (ACF). The ACA, and amendments to the act, have directly appropriated mandatory funding for the program. Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123) provided $400 million annually through FY2022.
The law is silent about how funds are to be distributed under the program, except to require that HHS reserve 3% of the annual appropriation for Indian tribal entities and another 3% for training, technical assistance, and evaluations. BBA 2018 directs HHS to use the most accurate data available for eligible jurisdictions if funding is awarded on the basis of relative population or poverty considerations. In practice, HHS has distributed MIECHV funding based on a formula that accounts for poverty and based on a competitive award process. States, territories, and tribes must carry out their home visiting programs as specified in the law. Among other requirements, these jurisdictions had to carry out a needs assessment by September 20, 2010, to identify communities with concentrations of poor infant health and other negative outcomes for children and families; the availability and use of home visiting services; and the capacity for providing substance abuse treatment and counseling in the jurisdiction. BBA 2018 directs jurisdictions to update this assessment by October 1, 2020. Under the program, these jurisdictions are required to achieve gains in four of six "benchmark" (outcome) areas pertaining to family well-being and coordination of community resources.
The law requires that the majority of annual funding (a minimum of 75%) for jurisdictions that administer home visiting programs must be used to support a program model that has shown sufficient evidence of effectiveness. The remaining 25% of funds may be used to implement models that have promise of effectiveness. HHS has established criteria for determining whether home visiting models are effective and reviews home visiting models on an ongoing basis via the Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness (HomVEE) project. The project has determined that 18 models are evidence-based. Generally, these models have shown impacts in one or more outcomes in maternal and child health; early childhood social, emotional, and cognitive development; family/parent functioning; and links to other resources.
In FY2017, jurisdictions had implemented 10 of the 18 models using MIECHV funding: Child First, Early Head Start-Home Visiting (EHS-HV), Family Check-Up (FCU), Family Spirit, Health Access Nurturing Development Services (HANDS) Program, Healthy Families America (HFA), Home Instruction for Parents of Preschool Youngsters (HIPPY), Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP), Parents as Teachers (PAT), and SafeCare Augmented. |
crs_R42742 | crs_R42742_0 | This report examines the provisions in current federal tax law that benefit most or many manufacturing firms. Basically, it tracks the manufacturing sector's share of non-agricultural employment, gross domestic product (GDP), business investment in research and development (R&D), exports, and domestic investment in capital assets between 1960 and 2010. The tax relief is mainly intended to promote certain policy goals. Table 2 shows the tax preferences from which manufacturing companies derive the most benefit. The exception is the first preference in the table: the deferral of the active income of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) under Section 11(b). Arguments For and Against Federal Support for Manufacturing
The current debate over whether to expand federal support for manufacturing is reminiscent of the lively (and at times acrimonious) debate over industrial policy that influenced the formulation and implementation of U.S. economic policy in the 1980s. The question of whether federal assistance for manufacturing is justified on economic grounds also has noteworthy implications for the debate in the 114 th Congress over reforming the federal tax code. Several proposals to expand federal support for manufacturing have been introduced, a few of which include new or expanded targeted tax incentives. More specifically, they focus on the importance of manufactured products to U.S. exports, the wages and benefits available in the manufacturing sector, the role of manufacturing in technological innovation, the links between manufacturing and other sectors, and actions taken by other countries to support manufacturing. Proponents maintain that product innovations in manufacturing have had a major impact on the growth prospects for firms that use those innovations in a variety of non-manufacturing industries. In their view, such a focus makes sense for two reasons. They can be summarized as follows: (1) the lack of any market failures linked to the performance of the manufacturing sector, (2) a sustained decease in the contributions of the manufacturing sector to job creation and GDP over the past 50 years, and (3) the untapped potential for growth in U.S. exports of services in which the United States may have a comparative advantage. Some critics say it would be misguided in light of recent history for the federal government to target assistance at manufacturing in the expectation that doing so would be likely to spark large employment gains over time. Promoting Service Exports Would Do More to Stimulate the Economy
Critics also say the U.S. economy would benefit more in the short run from government efforts to dismantle foreign barriers to U.S. exports of services than from new programs to bolster the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers, especially SMFs. Such an increase would support or create nearly three million U.S. jobs, according to Jensen, and those jobs would be likely to pay higher wages than manufacturing jobs, on average. Implications of the Arguments for Federal Policy toward Manufacturing
The debate over whether manufacturing industries should receive federal assistance raises several issues that Congress may wish to take into consideration as it examines options for reforming the federal income tax or laying a foundation for future robust economic growth. In 1981, Congress added a temporary research tax credit to the tax code. In an economy marked by uneven and relatively weak job growth more than six years after the end of the 2007-09 recession, it can be argued that increased federal assistance for manufacturing would do less to spur faster job growth in the short run than policy measures that deliver a greater stimulus to aggregate demand, such as increased federal spending on the rebuilding and expansion of the U.S. transportation network. Proponents of a greater federal role in revitalizing the domestic manufacturing base say that the future growth potential of the U.S. economy hinges in part on finding ways to convince more manufacturing firms to perform a substantial share of their R&D and production in the United States. Rather than focusing on manufacturing as the primary pathway to growing the U.S. economy, Congress might consider policy options for providing more R&D support, improving worker training to reduce mismatches between employer skill needs and the skill sets of workers, expanding access to credit for small- and medium-sized companies, and encouraging the growth of industry-specific networks that could offer a range of collaborative services for the mutual benefit of individual firms that would apply to all industries. Permanent tax incentives require no annual appropriations or other congressional action to have their intended effect. Some options would seek to achieve revenue neutrality by lowering business income tax rates and expanding the business tax base by reducing or repealing certain business tax incentives. | Fueled in part by certain policy initiatives advocated by President Obama, a lively debate over whether additional federal assistance should be provided for manufacturing is taking place among some analysts and lawmakers. Several issues are central to the debate: (1) the contributions of manufacturing to the performance and growth of the U.S. economy, (2) whether the federal government should do more to promote the growth of the sector, and (3) if so, what measures would be likely to have the intended effect?
The federal government supports manufacturing in a variety of ways. This report focuses on the support provided through the federal tax code. Current federal tax law contains nine provisions with the potential to provide significant tax relief to firms primarily engaged in manufacturing. A few are targeted at manufacturing, while the others offer more benefits for manufacturers than for firms in most other sectors. The most important provisions, ranked on the basis of estimated foregone revenue, are the deferral of the active income of controlled foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations, the research tax credit, the expensing of outlays for research and experimentation, and accelerated depreciation for a variety of capital assets.
A number of proposals are being considered in the 114th Congress to expand federal tax benefits for the manufacturing sector. Some of the bills would create new tax incentives intended to increase domestic investment and job growth in manufacturing. Their prospects for passage have become intertwined with the growing debate in Congress over reforming the federal tax code. Most proponents of tax reform favor an approach that would combine a broadening of the income tax base (e.g., by eliminating certain business tax incentives) with a lowering of corporate and individual tax rates, in a revenue-neutral fashion. Such an approach could have a significant effect on the taxes paid by many manufacturing companies.
Proponents of boosting federal assistance for manufacturing say the added support would benefit the U.S. economy in several important ways. In their view, a revitalized manufacturing sector might enable the United States to derive more of its economic growth from exports and domestic production than it has in the past two decades or so. Proponents also contend that average domestic wages would be likely to rise in response to growing manufacturing output, as manufacturing jobs historically have paid higher wages and benefits, on average, than have non-manufacturing jobs. In addition, according to proponents, a growing manufacturing sector would help lay a foundation for future U.S. economic growth, since manufacturing industries perform the vast share of private-sector research and development (R&D), which fuels the innovation that serves as a primary engine of economic growth. Finally, proponents argue that the United States would lose its long-standing leadership in advanced manufacturing technologies in the absence of increased federal support for manufacturing R&D and worker training.
Critics of greater federal assistance for manufacturing maintain that there is no economic justification for additional support. In their view, in the absence of a market failure linked to goods production in general, government aid for manufacturing should be decreased or eliminated, not increased. Critics also say that promoting job growth in manufacturing would do little to create the millions of jobs needed to bring domestic full-time employment back to the levels that prevailed on the eve of the severe recession from 2007 to 2009. And, say critics, U.S. gross domestic product and employment would receive a greater boost from federal initiatives to dismantle foreign barriers to expanding exports of services than from targeted assistance aimed at boosting the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing companies. |
crs_R40233 | crs_R40233_0 | To create such a committee, the House approves a simple resolution, or incorporates language creating a select committee into another resolution, such as the ones reported by the Rules Committee or the House Administration Committee. The resolution may create a study committee, with directions to make recommendations for legislation, or it could grant legislative authority to the select committee—authority to report legislation to the House. There have been four ad hoc select committees with legislative authority created since 1974—
Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf (94 th -95 th Congresses), Ad Hoc Select Committee on Energy (95 th Congress), Select Committee on Homeland Security (107 th Congress), and Select Committee on Homeland Security (108 th Congress). The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not included in this group or this analysis since it is a permanent committee. Past Ad Hoc Select Committees
The principal explanation offered in creating each of the four select committees with legislative authority was that their creation solved jurisdictional problems. The proponents in each case indicated that multiple committees claimed jurisdiction over a subject and that the House would be unable to legislate, or at least legislate efficiently, in the absence of a select committee. The reason advanced for creating the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 108 th Congress was slightly different: it provided a transition committee responsible for homeland security while the House decided whether and how to reorganize its committees to accommodate the new Department of Homeland Security. The aspects analyzed are the purpose of granting legislative authority, jurisdiction and referral, the relationship between the select committees and the standing committees of jurisdiction, reporting deadlines, membership and chairmanship, resources made available to the select committees, floor and post-passage consideration of the legislation reported by the select committees, and the select committees' life-spans. While this report focuses on the creation of ad hoc select committees with legislative authority, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the justification given for this decision in the case of the four select committees. In the instance of the Outer Continental Shelf select committees, Energy select committee, and Homeland Security select committee (107 th Congress), majority leadership firmly supported the select committees once they were created. Conclusion
In developing legislation matched to a strategic policy goal, a number of advantages can accrue to the House by using an ad hoc select committee with legislative authority. A select committee, however, cannot guarantee success, although there are some factors that might increase the potential for success. One option is to use a select committee with legislative authority. | The House can readily create an ad hoc (temporary) select committee by approving a simple resolution that contains language establishing the committee—giving a purpose, defining membership, and detailing other aspects. The House may create a study committee, with directions to make recommendations for legislation, or it may grant legislative authority to the select committee—authority to report legislation to the House. This report analyzes the use, results, components, and attributes of House ad hoc select committees with legislative authority.
There have been four ad hoc select committees with legislative authority created in the last 35 years, which are examined in this report—
Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf (94th-95th Congresses), Ad Hoc Select Committee on Energy (95th Congress), Select Committee on Homeland Security (107th Congress), and Select Committee on Homeland Security (108th Congress).
The principal explanation offered in creating each of the four select committees with legislative authority was that their creation solved jurisdictional problems. The proponents in each case indicated that multiple committees claimed jurisdiction over a subject and that the House would be unable to legislate, or at least to legislate efficiently, in the absence of a select committee. The creation of the Outer Continental Shelf select committee may have been a early test case of new House rules that recognized the potential need for such a committee. The Energy select committee and the Homeland Security select committee (107th Congress) centralized important aspects of committee decision making to develop comprehensive legislation on subject matter that was widely diffused in House committees. The reason advanced for creating the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 108th Congress was slightly different: it provided a transition committee responsible for homeland security while the House decided whether and how to reorganize its committees to accommodate the new Department of Homeland Security.
In creating a select committee with legislative authority, considerations include what legislative authority to grant, jurisdiction and referral, the relationship between the select committee and the standing committees of jurisdiction, reporting deadline, membership and chairmanship, resources made available to the select committee, floor and post-passage consideration of the legislation reported by the select committee, and the select committee's life-span.
In developing legislation matched to a strategic policy goal, a number of advantages can accrue to the House by using an ad hoc select committee with legislative authority, including efficiency, transparency, a new forum, coherence, and cohesiveness. A select committee, however, cannot guarantee speed after the committee phase, majority support, compromise and comity, or bicameral agreement. Some factors that might better ensure the effectiveness of a select committee are its bipartisan creation, leadership support for its work, the support of standing committees, adequate time for deliberation, and a single purpose for the select committee's existence and work.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not analyzed in this report since it is a permanent, not an ad hoc, committee. |
crs_R40205 | crs_R40205_0 | Introduction
U.S. dairy producers are caught in a classic "price-cost squeeze," with farm milk prices declining sharply from record highs while feed costs remain high. From January through September 2009, the all-milk price received by farmers was 36% below a year earlier. Meanwhile feed costs, as measured by alfalfa prices, were down only 20% from a year earlier. The deteriorating economic picture has prompted calls for policymakers to consider how well current dairy policies are assisting dairy producers and what other options might be available. Second, the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program was established in the 2002 farm bill as a government payment for dairy farmers in times of low milk prices. However, milk prices have since declined below the trigger for MILC payments. In late 2008 and 2009, after several years of relative inactivity, the price support program resumed purchases when dairy product prices approached support levels. As of September 11, 2009, USDA estimated that it purchased 111 million pounds of nonfat dry milk under the program in 2008 and expects to purchase 379 million pounds in 2009, along with small amounts of butter and cheese (including amounts exported under the Dairy Export Incentive Program). However, the conference agreement for the FY2010 Agriculture appropriations bill, which was enacted on October 21, 2009, provides for a different use of the funds ($60 million to purchase dairy products and $290 million in direct payments to farmers). The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), the largest trade association representing milk producer cooperatives, wrote to the Secretary of Agriculture on January 8, 2009, asking the Department to take several steps to assist dairy producers. In early May 2009, the National Milk Producers Federation reiterated its request that the U.S. government restart the Dairy Export Incentive Program to help remove excess dairy products from the market. USDA Actions To-Date
USDA has taken several actions in 2009 to support dairy farm income, including increasing dairy product price supports, transferring dairy products to domestic feeding programs, and activating the Dairy Export Incentive Program. Increase Price Support for Cheese and Nonfat Dry Milk
Following heightened industry and congressional interest in taking action to boost milk prices for farmers, USDA announced on July 31, 2009, a temporary increase in price support for cheese and nonfat dry milk from August 2009 through October 2009. Potential Policy Responses
Most policy responses that are currently being discussed fall into three categories: (1) maintain the status quo and allow remaining programs to operate, (2) implement a new program such as a dairy buyout, and (3) modify existing programs to enhance dairy farmer income. However, the full effect of the production decisions is expected to take several more months. Supporters of the status quo argue that current dairy programs already encourage additional milk production when the market is not calling for it. At any rate, any proposals that involve new budgetary outlays could be challenged as adding to an already large federal deficit and/or burdening consumers with higher costs. Proponents of additional action point out that many producers are facing significant income loss and that without additional assistance, they may not survive financially. However, opponents of this option argue that additional payments could slow the supply adjustment process needed to bring the dairy market back into balance. | In 2009, U.S. dairy producers have been caught in a classic "price-cost squeeze," with farm milk prices declining sharply from record highs while feed costs remain high. From January through September 2009, the all-milk price received by farmers was 36% below a year earlier, when prices were near a record high. Meanwhile, feed costs, as measured by alfalfa prices, were down only 20% from a year earlier.
Declining milk and dairy product prices in late 2008 and early 2009 reactivated government programs to support dairy prices and dairy farm income. During this period, after several years of relative inactivity, the dairy price support program resumed purchases of surplus dairy products as prices approached support levels. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that it removed 111 million pounds of nonfat dry milk in 2008 and expects to remove 379 million pounds in 2009, along with small amounts of butter and cheese. In February 2009, milk prices declined below the trigger for Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) payments to dairy farmers for the first time in two years. Payments have been triggered in all subsequent months to date, totaling $775 million as of October 26.
The deteriorating economic picture has prompted calls for policymakers to consider how well current dairy policies are assisting dairy producers and what other options might be available. Throughout 2009, the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), the largest trade association representing milk producer cooperatives, has requested that USDA take steps to assist dairy producers. Members of Congress have also engaged the Secretary of Agriculture. On May 22, 2009, USDA restarted the Dairy Export Incentive Program to help remove excess dairy products from the market. On July 31, 2009, USDA announced a temporary increase in price support for cheese and nonfat dry milk. Since then, Congress has considered additional support for dairy farmers. In October, Congress passed the conference agreement for the FY2010 agriculture appropriations bill, which includes an extra $350 million for emergency dairy assistance ($60 million to purchase dairy products and $290 million in direct payments to farmers). The bill was enacted on October 21, 2009.
Given the economic climate, producers are making business choices that are expected to reduce milk production and lift prices. However, the full effect of those decisions is underway, raising the question of what, if any, policy changes are needed. Options to address the current dairy market situation include (1) keeping the status quo and allowing remaining programs to operate, (2) implementing a new program such as a dairy buyout, and (3) modifying existing programs to enhance dairy farmer income.
Proponents of keeping the status quo argue that current dairy programs—specifically the dairy product price support program and the MILC program—already encourage additional milk production, and that more production-related support will slow the supply adjustment process needed to bring the dairy market back into balance. At any rate, any proposals that involve new budgetary outlays could be challenged as adding to an already large federal deficit, and/or burdening consumers with higher costs. Proponents of additional action point out that many producers are facing significant income loss and that without additional assistance, they may not survive financially. Producer groups and processors alike want to increase demand as a way to bolster milk and dairy product prices. |
crs_RL32113 | crs_RL32113_0 | One manifestation of this struggle occurs when congressional committees engage in oversight of the administrative bureaucracy; another when Members of Congress attempt to intervene in administrative proceedings on behalf of private constituents or other private entities with interests affecting the Member's constituency. Both such interventions involve varying degrees of intrusion into agency decisionmaking processes. Toward that end, Part II reviews the judicial development and application of standards for determining whether congressional pressure or influence will be deemed to have tainted an agency proceeding. It concludes that the courts, in balancing Congress's performance of its constitutional and statutory obligations to oversee the actions of agency officials against the rights of parties before agencies, have shown a decided predilection for protecting the congressional prerogatives. Thus where informal rulemaking or other forms of informal decisionmaking are involved, the courts will look to the nature and impact of the political pressure on the agency decisionmaker and will intervene only where that pressure has had the actual effect of forcing the consideration of factors Congress did not intend to make relevant. Part III of the report examines the conduct of Members of Congress and their staffs intervening in administrative matters from the perspective of ethics and conflict of interest rules, statutes and guidelines bearing upon a Member's and staffer's official duties in this area. It notes that since congressional intervention and expressions of interest in administrative matters from a Member's office are recognized as legitimate, official representational and oversight functions and duties of Members of Congress, the primary focus of these ethical and statutory conduct restraints is limited to(1) any improper enrichment or financial benefit accruing to the Member in return for or because of his or her official actions and influences, including the receipt of gifts or payments, or existing financial interests in, or relating to the matter under consideration; and (2) any overt coercion or threats of reprisals, or promises of favoritism or reward to administrators from the Member's office which could indicate an arguable abuse of a Member's official representational or oversight role. Such guidance would counsel a Member to adopt office procedures and systems for evaluating requests for assistance which would prevent any appearance that interventions decisions are based upon the receipt of things of value, particularly legitimate campaign contributions, and which would assure that decisions to intervene are, rather, based on the merits of a particular matter. A. Where agency adjudication is involved a stricter standard is applied and the finding of an appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to taint the proceeding. But even here the courts have required that the pressure or influence be directed at the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to the merits of the proceeding and that it does not involve legitimate oversight and investigative functions before they will intervene. | When congressional committees engage in oversight of the administrative bureaucracy, or when Members of Congress intervene in agency proceedings on behalf of private constituents or other private entities with interests affecting the Members's constituency, such interventions involve varying degrees of intrusion into agency decisionmaking processes. This report will briefly examine the currently applicable legal and ethical considerations and standards that mark the limits of such intercessions.
The report initially reviews the judicial development and application of standards for determining whether congressional pressure or influence will be deemed to have tainted an agency proceeding. It concludes that the courts, in balancing Congress's performance of its constitutional and statutory obligations to oversee the actions of agency officials against the rights of parties before agencies, have shown a decided predilection for protecting the congressional prerogatives. Thus where informal rulemaking or other forms of informal decisionmaking are involved, the courts will look to the nature and impact of the political pressure on the agency decisionmaker and will intervene only where that pressure has had the actual effect of forcing the consideration of factors Congress did not intend to make relevant. Where agency adjudication is involved a stricter standard is applied and the finding of an appearance of impropriety can be sufficient to taint the proceeding. But even here the courts have required that the pressure or influence be directed at the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to the merits of the proceeding and that it does not involve legitimate oversight and investigative functions, before they will intervene.
The report next examines the conduct of Members of Congress and their staffs intervening in administrative matters from the perspective of ethics and conflict of interest rules, statutes and guidelines bearing upon a Member's and staffer's official duties. It notes that since congressional intervention and expressions of interest in administrative matters from a Member's office are recognized as legitimate, official representational and oversight functions and duties of Members of Congress, the primary focus of the ethical and statutory conduct restraints is limited to(1) any improper enrichment or financial benefit accruing to the Member in return for, or because of, his or her official actions and influences, including the receipt of gifts or payments, or existing financial interests in, or relating to the matter under consideration; and (2) any overt coercion or threats of reprisals, or promises of favoritism or reward to administrators from the Member's office which could indicate an arguable abuse of a Member's official representational or oversight role. Additionally, ethical guidelines in Congress incorporate an "appearance" standard for Members which would counsel a Member to adopt office procedures and systems which would prevent an appearance of a "linkage" between interventions and the receipt of things of value, particularly legitimate campaign contributions, and which would assure that decisions to intervene are based on the merits of a particular matter. |
crs_R44293 | crs_R44293_0 | 115-97 ) included a new excise tax on the net investment income of certain college and university endowments. For 2017, endowments earned an average return of 12.2%. Spending, or payouts, from endowments supports various higher education activities. On average, in recent years, institutions with the largest endowments have tended to have payout rates that exceeded average payout rates for institutions with smaller endowments. This report begins by providing background information on college and university endowments, and discussing their current-law tax treatment. The report concludes with a discussion of several policy options to change the current tax treatment of college and university endowments. Endowments may also hold cash or property. Tax Treatment of College and University Endowments
Endowments are tax-exempt for one of two reasons. These include the deduction for charitable contributions to educational institutions, estimated to reduce revenues by $10.5 billion in FY2017 (while the deduction is claimed by individuals and corporations, the benefit also accrues to institutions of higher education); private activity tax-exempt bonds for nonprofit educational institutions, estimated at $3.8 billion; and the share of general obligation tax exempt bonds benefits that accrue to public institutions of higher education, which are estimated at around $1.4 billion. To be subject to the tax, private colleges and universities must meet the following criteria:
1. have at least 500 tuition-paying full-time equivalent (FTE) students in the previous tax year (with more than 50% of these students located in the United States); and 2. have assets of at least $500,000 per student (excluding assets that are used directly in carrying out the institution's exempt educational purpose). National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) : NACUBO regularly gathers endowment data from a large number of public and private colleges and universities and affiliated foundations. Endowment values decreased substantially during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and took several years to recover to precrisis levels. As illustrated in Table 1 , endowment balances are heavily concentrated in a small share of institutions, with 12% of institutions holding 75% of endowments. Yale held 4.8% of endowment assets in that same year, with Princeton holding 4.2% of endowment assets. In 2017, the average payout rate was 4.4%. In FY2017, institutions with larger endowments tended to earn higher returns. Table 5 also provides information on the share of assets invested in alternative strategies (which includes hedge funds and private equity). Institutions with larger endowments tend to have a higher share of their endowment assets invested in alternative strategies. For example, is the goal of the policy to encourage colleges and universities to use endowment funds for a specific purpose? Alternatively, the tax could be waived for institutions that meet a fixed payout objective (discussed further below) or as part of a policy requiring increased reporting related to endowments and uses of endowment funds (discussed further below). The tax on net investment returns of private college and university endowments enacted in the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. Endowment earnings could also be subject to tax. Net investment earnings on endowment funds were reported to be $20.3 billion in 2012, or 5.4% of total endowment funds. | Colleges and universities maintain endowments to directly support their activities as institutions of higher education. Endowments are typically investment funds, but may also consist of cash or property. Current tax law benefits endowments and the accumulation of endowment assets. Generally, endowment fund earnings are exempt from federal income tax. The 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97), however, imposes a new 1.4% excise tax on the net investment earnings of certain college and university endowments. Taxpayers making contributions to college and university endowment funds may be able to deduct the value of their contribution from income subject to tax. The purpose of this report is to provide background information on college and university endowments, and discuss various options for changing their tax treatment.
This report uses data from the U.S. Department of Education, the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and Commonfund Institute, and the Internal Revenue Service to provide background information on college and university endowments. Key statistics, as discussed further within, include the following:
In 2017, college and university endowment assets were $566.8 billion. Endowment assets have been growing, in real terms, since 2009. Endowment asset values fell during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and took several years to fully recover. Endowment assets are concentrated, with 12% of institutions holding 75% of all endowment assets in 2017. Institutions with the largest endowments (Yale, Princeton, Harvard, and Stanford) each hold more than 4% of total endowment assets. The average spending (payout) rate from endowments in 2017 was 4.4%. Between 1998 and 2017, average payout rates have fluctuated between 4.2% and 5.1%. In recent years, institutions with larger endowments have tended to have higher payout rates. In 2017, endowment assets earned a rate of return of 12.2%, on average. Larger institutions tended to earn higher returns. Larger institutions also tended to have a larger share of assets invested in alternative strategies, including hedge funds and private equity.
Changing the tax treatment of college and university endowments could be used to further various policy objectives. Current-law tax treatment could be modified to increase federal revenues. The tax treatment of college and university endowments could also be changed to encourage additional spending from endowments on specific purposes (tuition assistance, for example).
Policy options discussed in this report include (1) a payout requirement, possibly similar to that imposed on private foundations, requiring a certain percentage of funds be paid out annually in support of charitable activities; (2) modifying the excise tax on endowment investment earnings; (3) a limitation on the charitable deduction for certain gifts to endowments; and (4) a change to the tax treatment of certain debt-financed investments in strategies often employed by endowments. |
crs_RS21288 | crs_RS21288_0 | Smallpox is estimated to have killed between 300 and 500 million people in the twentieth centuryalone. About 30% of unvaccinated victims die (some sources suggestup to 50%). Although the vaccinia vaccine is very effective at preventing smallpox, it is not without risks. Its complication rate is higher than that associated with anyroutinely used vaccine. This technological barrier wouldbe much lower for a terrorist. Some experts believe that it isvery unlikely that Iraq has smallpox since they did not use it during the Gulf War. Policy Implications
Although most experts deem the risk of a smallpox attack to be very low, the high consequences of a release have led the President to order the vaccination ofapproximately 500,000 people in the armed forces and to initiate a voluntary program to encourage as many as 10million medical workers and first respondersto be vaccinated. The United States is helping to increase the security of the former Soviet Union's biological weapon stockpiles. For a comprehensive discussion of these programs, see CRS Report RL31368(pdf) PreventingProliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to theFormer Soviet States . | Smallpox, which kills approximately 30% of its victims, is estimated to have killedbetween 300 and 500 millionpeople in the twentieth century before the World Health Organization's successful eradication program. Thesmallpox vaccine is effective at preventingsmallpox but has a higher complication rate than any other currently used vaccine. The terrorist attacks of 2001have increased fears that smallpox might beused as a weapon of terror. Smallpox has several properties that might make it desirable by terrorists, such ascontagiousness and high lethality. These factorsand its limited availability also make it difficult for a terrorist to use. Most experts agree that it is very unlikely thatsmallpox will be used as a weapon, but thehigh consequences of a successful attack have prompted exploration of methods to counter this threat. Also seeCRS Report RL31694 Smallpox VaccineStockpile and Vaccination Policy and CRS Report RL31368(pdf), Preventing Proliferation of BiologicalWeapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States. This report will updated as warranted. |
crs_R43521 | crs_R43521_0 | For almost as long as these services have been in existence, debates over the effectiveness, strategic direction, and necessity of U.S. international broadcasting have persisted. Since the creation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in the 1990s, and its establishment as an independent government agency in 1999, arguments over its structure, as a government agency headed by a nine-member bi-partisan Board, have only added to these debates. In addition, a number of issues concerning the BBG and U.S. international broadcasting continue to spark debate, including
problems with Board operations and the possible need to create a new position for executive leadership; recommendations for the strategic direction and allocation of resources in U.S. international broadcasting; the effect of shifts in information communication technologies, especially the importance of the Internet and digital media, on U.S. international broadcasters; proposals for improving the efficiency of U.S. international broadcasting, including possible consolidation of the several U.S. international broadcast entities; continuing disagreements over the role of U.S. international broadcasting in advancing U.S. foreign policy goals and promoting democracy; and assessment and improvement of U.S. international broadcasting effectiveness. Beginnings of U.S. International Broadcasting
The modern structure of U.S. international broadcasting had its beginnings in World War II. ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. International Broadcasting Bureau
The BBG has responsibility for supervising, directing, and overseeing the operations of the International Broadcasting Bureau. The IBB implements the BBG's strategic vision, and supports the worldwide broadcasting services of the Voice of America, as well as the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí). Grantee Broadcasters
The BBG also has funding and oversight authority over surrogate radio grantees: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) which also operates services targeting populations in the Middle East and Central and South Asia; and Radio Free Asia (RFA). U.S. international broadcasting, however, is only one piece of the entirety of U.S. government efforts in foreign countries, and operates in an ever more crowded communications space in foreign countries. The VOA mission, as stated in the bill, emphasizes what is considered VOA's "public diplomacy" role as well as its role in providing objective, comprehensive news coverage. Reform Provisions in the FY2017 NDAA
The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( H.R. 4909 ; NDAA) includes two sections, Sections 1259D and 1259E, that would accomplish a number of reforms to the structure of U.S. international broadcasting and the BBG. Among other things, the provisions would
replace the BBG Board with a permanent CEO position at the head of the agency; create in the BBG Board's place a successor advisory board without any executive powers but with a duty to advise the CEO and report to appropriate congressional committees; transfer all powers of the Board to the CEO and authorize the CEO to "direct" all U.S. international broadcasting activities within the agency's purview; provide the CEO with blanket personnel appointment authority and expanded, detailed procurement authority; authorize the CEO to change the name of the agency from "Broadcasting Board of Governors" (presumably to reflect new agency structure without a Board); authorize the CEO to establish a new grantee broadcaster and condition continued federal grants to existing grantees (RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN) on their agreement to merge into one surrogate broadcaster; and authorize the CEO to appoint the board of any grantee broadcaster, including a possible consolidated grantee broadcaster. | Since the beginning of modern U.S. international broadcasting during World War II, debates over the effectiveness, strategic direction, and necessity of broadcasting activities have persisted. Longstanding arguments over the structure and operation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) have only added to these debates, prompting recurring efforts to reform the organization and its programs. Many Members of Congress have consistently shown concerted interest in U.S. international broadcasting, conducting oversight over the BBG and its individual broadcasters, and calling for increased resources and programming for certain regions, countries, and language services as well as streamlining of broadcast structures and resources. Interest in this area is expected to continue into the 115th Congress and with the start of a new Administration.
Headed by a Board of eight presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed members, and the Secretary of State, the BBG has responsibility for supervising, directing, and overseeing the operations of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), the Voice of America (VOA), and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB, operating the Radio and TV Martí services to Cuba), as well as funding and oversight of the grantee broadcasters Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).
Current Issues Facing the BBG and U.S. International Broadcasting
Although U.S. international broadcasters enjoy an audience in the hundreds of millions and seem to be effective in providing objective news coverage to populations that might otherwise not receive it, many observers perceive the BBG as a flawed structure that is inefficient, duplicative in its activities, and ineffective. A number of issues concerning the BBG and U.S. international broadcasting continue to spark debate in Congress, including
BBG operations and changes to executive leadership; strategic direction and allocation of resources in U.S. international broadcasting; the effect of shifts in information communication technologies, especially the importance of the Internet and digital media, on U.S. international broadcasters; the need for greater efficiency of U.S. international broadcasting, including possible consolidation of the several U.S. international broadcast entities; continuing disagreements over the role of U.S. international broadcasting in advancing U.S. foreign policy goals and promoting democracy; and means to assess and improve U.S. international broadcasting effectiveness.
Reform Efforts in the 114th Congress
In December 2016, Congress adopted provisions within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (S. 2943) that would make significant changes to the structure of U.S. international broadcasting, including abolishing the Board of Governors as head of the BBG agency, as well as significantly increasing in law the responsibilities and authorities of the BBG Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to direct international broadcasting activities and restructure U.S. international broadcasting overall. As of December 14, 2016, the bill has been presented to the President for signature. In addition, previously during the 113th and 114th Congresses, the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered two bills, more recently the United States International Communications Reform Act of 2015 (H.R. 2323), which also would have significantly changed the structure of U.S. international broadcasting. Major provisions in each of these proposals are compared at the end of this report. |
crs_R45078 | crs_R45078_0 | T he U.S. Constitution expressly grants each house of Congress the power to discipline its own Members for misconduct, including through expulsion, stating that:
[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. This report discusses the nature of the power of Congress to remove a Member, including the historical background of the Expulsion Clause, the implications of the limited judicial interpretations of the Clause's meaning, and other potential constitutional limitations in the exercise of the expulsion power. The report then explores a number of issues of debate as to Congress's power to expel, including whether past practice is legally binding on a given body; which acts may be sufficient to warrant expulsion; and whether acts that occurred prior to the Member's election or reelection to Congress are subject to the expulsion power. Defining Expulsion
Expulsion is the process by which a house of Congress may remove one of its Members, after the Member has been duly elected and seated. Exclusion occurs when a body of Congress refuses to seat a Member-elect. The Supreme Court has reflected this reasoning in some of the cases that have touched on the Expulsion Clause. The Court acknowledged the broad power to discipline Members held by the houses of Congress and the discretion with which they could exercise that power, ultimately declining to "encroach upon the province of that body." No court, however, has held that there are external constraints to the expulsion power, and such a view may be in tension with the text and intent of the Clause, which has generally been viewed as vesting broad power in both the House and the Senate. In total, 20 Members of Congress have been actually expelled from their respective bodies—5 in the House and 15 in the Senate. While the grounds for these expulsions may illustrate the potential bases upon which the House or Senate may decide to expel a Member, as historical practice, they are not necessarily the exclusive grounds for expulsion. The two most recent expulsions—both Members of the House—concerned a broader range of behavior, beyond disloyalty to the country, for which Congress would expel one of its Members. Those expulsions resulted after the Representatives were convicted of criminal charges under various public corruption statutes. Misconduct Occurring Prior to Election or Reelection as Potential Grounds for Expulsion
As discussed above, the text of the Expulsion Clause, its history, and subsequent historical practice all support a broad, but not unlimited, power in both the House and Senate to expel Members for conduct occurring during a Member's term of office. It also finds support in Justice Joseph Story's early view that although the expulsion power was both necessary and critical to the integrity of each house, exercise of the power was "at the same time so subversive of the rights of the people," as to require that it be used sparingly and to be "wisely guarded" by the required approval of a two-thirds majority. Such limited practice suggests that the Senate does not appear to have a clearly established view on whether a Member may be expelled for conduct that occurred prior to the Member's election to the Senate. | The U.S. Constitution expressly grants each house of Congress the power to discipline its own Members for misconduct, including through expulsion, stating that:
[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Expulsion is the process by which a house of Congress may remove one of its Members after the Member has been duly elected and seated. The Supreme Court has considered expulsion to be distinct from exclusion, the process by which the House and Senate refuse to seat Members-elect. In so concluding, the Supreme Court has held that exclusion cannot be used as a disciplinary tool, and Congress, accordingly, cannot undertake disciplinary measures on Members until after those Members have taken the oath of office.
The constitutional limits on the power of expulsion are informed by the Expulsion Clause's text, historical background, judicial precedent, and historical practice. Presently, the only explicit standards for expulsion are the requirement for approval of two-thirds majority of the body imposing the punishment and the requirement that the individual subject to the expulsion has been formally seated as a Member of that body. The history of the Expulsion Clause suggests that the expulsion power is broad and confers to each house of Congress significant discretion as to the proper grounds for which a Member may be expelled. Accordingly, courts generally have declined to adjudicate the standards by which expulsions might be considered in the House or Senate. To date, 20 Members of Congress have been expelled: 5 in the House and 15 in the Senate. A large majority of those expulsions were predicated on Members' behavior deemed to be disloyal to the United States at the outset of the Civil War. Nonetheless, the two most recent expulsions followed Members' convictions on public corruption charges. One significant area of debate is whether a Member can be expelled for behavior arising prior to his or her election. The historical practice in each house of Congress is limited and mixed as to whether such expulsions are appropriate. The extent to which these historical practices could be said to bind Congress as precedent is unclear, as is Congress's authority to discipline Members for conduct that occurred prior to their election or reelection to office. These debates are centered on two general concerns that may be in tension with each other: maintaining the ability of each house of Congress to preserve the integrity of the institution and overriding the will and right of constitutents to choose their representatives.
This report discusses the nature of the power of Congress to remove a Member, including the historical background of the Clause, the implications of the limited judicial interpretations of the Clause's meaning, and other potential constitutional limitations in the exercise of the expulsion power. The report then analyzes the potential grounds upon which a Member might be expelled, including an overview of past cases resulting in expulsion and a discussion of the potential exercise of the expulsion power for conduct occurring prior to the Member's election or reelection to Congress. |
crs_R41641 | crs_R41641_0 | In recent years, deficits have reached historically high levels relative to the size of the economy, leading to concerns over fiscal sustainability in the long run. This report addresses revenue options, highlighting proposals made by the President's Fiscal Commission and the Debt Reduction Task Force. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), revenues remain at historically low levels while spending remains elevated, contributing to budget deficits. After examining the current fiscal situation, this report analyzes current federal revenues. The United States currently raises most federal revenues through the individual income tax and payroll taxes. In recent months, a number of groups and individuals have issued proposals for deficit reduction. On September 19, 2011, President Obama submitted recommendations for deficit reduction to the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects a FY2011 budget deficit of nearly $1.5 trillion, or 9.8% of GDP. Over the past three decades (1980 through 2010), the average budget deficit was 3% of GDP. Increasing federal deficits in 2009 and 2010 are largely attributable to the economic recession and subsequent policy responses. The low levels of individual and corporate income tax collections can be partially explained by the recession. Eliminating education tax incentives, however, could reduce economic efficiency. Individual Income Tax Reform
There are two broad options for generating additional revenues using the individual income tax. Second, additional tax revenues can be generated by eliminating various exemptions, deductions, and credits available under the current tax code (i.e., broaden the tax base). Details of the Fiscal Commission's tax proposals are compared to the tax proposals put forth by The Debt Reduction Task Force in Restoring America 's Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System . The overall goal of the proposed reform is to broaden the base by reducing tax expenditures, allowing for lower tax rates, while still raising revenues for deficit reduction. If the Committee chooses to use a ratio of spending cuts to revenues similar to that of the Fiscal Commission, and considers the fact that $900 billion in deficit reduction has already been enacted in the form of spending cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011, revenues may be used to generate roughly $550 billion to $650 billion in deficit reduction. The Debt Reduction Task Force's Proposal
Like the Fiscal Commission's proposal, the Debt Reduction Task Force's Proposal included comprehensive tax reform as part of a broader strategy for deficit reduction. Enhancing progressivity in the tax code was another objective. With respect to the individual income tax, the Debt Reduction Task Force's plan would eliminate most tax expenditures, eliminate the standard deduction and personal exemption, eliminate the AMT, and move from six tax brackets to two. Like the Fiscal Commission's proposal, the Debt Reduction Task Force's plan would raise additional revenues through the payroll tax, corporate tax, and excise taxes. Changes in the income tax system noted above were designed to address this concern. Unlike the Fiscal Commission and the Debt Reduction Task Force plans, the President's proposal does not propose comprehensive tax reform. Achieving fiscal sustainability, reducing the budget deficit, and bringing the national debt to sustainable levels, will likely involve some combination of spending and revenue measures. The majority of federal revenues are collected through the individual income tax system and through payroll taxes. A broader tax base could allow for lower tax rates, which may enhance economic efficiency. Tax reform was a substantial component of both proposals. | Tax reform and deficit reduction are two issues being considered by the 112th Congress. In recent months, a number of groups have published various plans for tackling the nation's growing deficits. On September 19, 2011, President Obama submitted recommendations to the Joint Select Committee for Deficit Reduction.
This report analyzes various revenue options for deficit reduction, highlighting proposals made by the President's Fiscal Commission, the Debt Reduction Task Force, and the President's proposal. Others, such as House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan and the Obama Administration, have noted the importance of tax reform as part of deficit reduction plans. These plans, however, do not provide the same level of detail with respect to tax provisions as the Fiscal Commission, Debt Reduction Task Force, and President's proposal, and are therefore not reviewed in detail as part of this report.
Large budget deficits, rising national debt, and the growth of entitlement spending have raised questions regarding fiscal sustainability in the United States. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts a FY2011 budget deficit of nearly $1.5 trillion, or 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP). Over the past three decades, budget deficits have averaged 3% of GDP. Large budget deficits have contributed to an increased level of federal debt, relative to the size of the economy. Increased debt levels are expected to lead to increased federal interest payments. If not addressed, the current fiscal situation could undermine economic growth.
Reducing federal deficits will likely require reductions in spending, increased federal revenues, or some combination of spending cuts and revenue increases. Federal revenues in 2009 and 2010, relative to the size of the economy, were low by historical standards. Reduced federal collections may be partially attributable to the weak economy and the fiscal policy response. Historically low individual income tax collections may also be partially explained by the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. Spending through the tax code, via tax expenditures, also reduces federal revenues. The use of tax expenditures may undermine economic efficiency and equity in the tax code.
The primary sources of federal revenues are individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, and excise taxes. Additional income tax revenues could be raised with a broader tax base, which could be achieved by eliminating various exemptions, credits, and deductions. A broader tax base could also allow for lower tax rates, without a loss in federal revenues. Broadening the tax base could enhance the economic efficiency of the tax system.
The Fiscal Commission, the Debt Reduction Task Force, and the President's proposal took different approaches in the tax reform components of their fiscal sustainability plans. The President's Fiscal Commission raised additional tax revenues primarily through comprehensive income tax reform. The Fiscal Commission chose to broaden the tax base, allowing for both lower tax rates and increased federal revenues. The Debt Reduction Task Force's proposal also recommended individual income tax reform. The individual income tax reforms recommended by the Debt Reduction Task Force were designed to enhance efficiency and increase progressivity in the income tax system. Additional revenues in the Debt Reduction Task Force's plan originate from the proposed 6.5% debt-reduction sales tax. The President's proposal does not propose comprehensive tax reform, but instead highlights various provisions that could be modified or eliminated to generate additional federal revenues. |
crs_R42952 | crs_R42952_0 | The enactment of various conservation and environmental protection statutes in the 1960s and 1970s created a new awareness of environmental harms. At the same time, the civil rights initiatives also secured nondiscrimination in a number of legal rights, including education, employment, housing, voting, etc. Over the following decades, the development of these movements eventually converged, raising concerns that minority groups face disproportionate exposure to environmental risks and harms. Although Congress has not enacted generally applicable legislation on the issue, concerns regarding disproportionate adverse environmental impacts that result from how an agency implements environmental regulations have been litigated under a number of legal theories and have been addressed administratively for several decades. This report will examine the relevant legal authorities that may be asserted to address disproportionate environmental impacts that result from how an agency implements environmental regulations, including the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and selected environmental and conservation statutes. It also will analyze the use of these authorities to prevent such impacts and the likelihood of success for future challenges under each legal theory. The report also will discuss administrative efforts to address "environmental justice," a term used by some advocates to refer to the distribution of environmental quality across various demographic groups, including the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Plan EJ 2014. Those who wish to challenge the effect of environmental harms also may seek relief under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or the discretionary authority of agencies under their statutory mandates. Equal Protection Under the U.S. Constitution
Alleged disproportionate impacts resulting from environmental regulation by government agencies inevitably raise questions regarding whether constitutional protections may apply to protect affected communities. Nondiscrimination in Federal Programs Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs or activities. The focus on environmental justice expanded under President Bill Clinton, who directed federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice into their mission and operations. 12898. | The enactment of various conservation and environmental protection statutes in the 1960s and 1970s created a new awareness of environmental harms. At the same time, the civil rights initiatives also secured nondiscrimination in a number of legal rights, including education, employment, housing, voting, etc. Over the following decades, the development of these movements eventually converged, raising concerns that minority groups face disproportionate exposure to environmental risks and harms.
Individuals and communities claiming to be disproportionately and adversely affected by how an agency implements environmental regulations may seek legal relief under a variety of federal laws, including equal protection under the U.S. Constitution and nondiscrimination requirements under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, in many cases, these laws require proof of discriminatory intent, which can make success under these claims difficult because individuals and communities generally allege that they are subject to disproportionate adverse environmental effects as a consequence of how an agency implements environmental regulations, but not that the regulation itself is discriminatory. Alternatively, relief may be available in some circumstances under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or statutory authorities for specific agencies' actions related to the environment.
Congress has never enacted generally applicable legislation on the subject, but concerns regarding disproportionate impacts arising from environmental regulation have been addressed administratively over the past two decades. Federal agencies are required by Executive Order 12898 to incorporate environmental justice into their mission and operations, and a number of agencies have reiterated their commitment to these goals in recent years.
This report will examine the relevant legal authorities that may be asserted to address disproportionate impacts that result from how an agency implements environmental regulations, including the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and various environmental and conservation statutes. It will discuss administrative efforts to address "environmental justice," a term used by some advocates to refer to the distribution of environmental quality across various demographic groups, including the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Plan EJ 2014. It will also analyze the use of these authorities to prevent such impacts and the likelihood of success for future challenges under each legal theory. |
crs_R44058 | crs_R44058_0 | The Reconciliation Process
The purpose of the reconciliation process is to allow Congress to use an expedited procedure when considering legislation that would bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. In adopting a budget resolution, Congress is agreeing upon budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year (as well as for a period of at least four additional outyears). Budget reconciliation is an optional, expedited legislative process that consists of several different stages (as described below) beginning with the adoption of the budget resolution. If Congress intends to use the reconciliation process, reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) must be included in the annual budget resolution. The Budget Act also provides that committees may be directed to report any of these types of budgetary changes. As a consequence, reconciliation measures, like budget resolutions, are privileged, so motions to proceed to their consideration are not debatable. | The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities and goals established in the annual budget resolution. In adopting a budget resolution, Congress is agreeing upon its budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. Because it is in the form of a concurrent resolution, however, it is not presented to the President or enacted into law. As a consequence, any statutory changes concerning spending or revenues that are necessary to implement these policies must be enacted in separate legislation.
Budget reconciliation is an optional congressional process that operates as an adjunct to the budget resolution process and occurs only if reconciliation instructions are included in the budget resolution. Reconciliation instructions are the means by which Congress can establish the roles that specific committees will play in achieving these budgetary goals. Reconciliation consists of several different stages, which are described in this report. For more information on budget reconciliation bills enacted into law, please see CRS Report R40480, Budget Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law: 1980-2010, by Megan S. Lynch. |
crs_R42367 | crs_R42367_0 | Background
In March 2010, the 111 th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Following the enactment of the ACA, state attorneys general and others brought several lawsuits challenging various provisions of the ACA on constitutional grounds. In NFIB , the Court held that the withdrawal of all Medicaid funds from the states for failure to comply with the expansion of the program did violate the Tenth Amendment, but that withholding of just the funds associated with that expansion raised no significant constitutional concerns. For instance, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court had held that a grant condition imposed on a state failed either a relatedness or coercion test. An example of a grant condition that does not violate the Tenth Amendment can be found in South Dakota v. Dole. Finding that the legislation was a clear exercise of Congress's power under the Spending Clause, the Court went on to hold that, under this Clause, the condition must be related to the particular national projects or programs to which the money was being directed (relatedness). The Supreme Court went on to hold, however, that to the extent that enforcement of the ACA Medicaid expansion through withdrawal of existing Medicaid funds was unconstitutional, that the remedy was to sever that enforcement mechanism. Thus the Court limited withholding of funds for failure to serve the expanded Medicaid population to withholding of those new funds, effectively making state participation in the Medicaid expansion voluntary. It should be noted, however, that these categories are not presented by Justice Roberts systematically, but rather are identified explicitly or implicitly at various places in the opinion. Finally, if a grant condition is unrelated to the general policy goals of the underlying grant, then it is most likely unconstitutional under the Spending Clause. Thus, if these factors mark the outer limits of Congress's power, then the case may have minimal impact on existing or future funding grant conditions. In Justice Roberts' opinion, however, the "contract" analogy serves a different purpose. In NFIB , Justice Roberts took a similar approach. It is unclear, however, whether NFIB has significantly changed the Dole analysis, or whether the combination of factors that led to the Court's decision to limit how the ACA Medicaid expansion would be enforced is likely to be repeated. Prior case law holds (and NFIB confirms) that if a grant condition is directly related to the expenditure of federal funds in a state program or activity, then the condition is constitutional under the Spending Clause. Second, if the grant condition is generally related to the policy goals of the underlying grant, then, under Dole and NFIB, withdrawal of all program funds would, in most foreseeable cases, be constitutional under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment. However, if the grant condition is attached to a new and independent program; the government threatens the funding of an existing program; and the withholding of federal funding represents a significant portion of a state's budget, then that condition may be unconstitutionally coercive under the Tenth Amendment. Justice Roberts did not identify a standard to determine what level of funding withholding would be coercive, although he did conclude that withdrawal of federal program funds which represents 10% of an average state's budget constituted a "gun to the head" and was a form of "economic dragooning." How courts are to consider grant withdrawals below 10%, however, is not addressed by the Roberts opinion, and Justice Roberts declined to speculate where such a line would be drawn. | In March 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA, among other things, requires states to expand Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid funding. Following the enactment of the ACA, state attorneys general and others brought several lawsuits challenging various provisions of the act on constitutional grounds. In National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court, among other things, decided that the enforcement mechanism for the ACA Medicaid expansion, withdrawal of all Medicaid funds, was a violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Court went on to hold, however, that the remedy was to sever that enforcement mechanism, effectively making state participation in the Medicaid expansion voluntary.
In the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court held that, in order for a federal grant condition imposed on a state to pass constitutional muster under the Spending Clause, the condition must be related to the particular national projects or programs to which the money was being directed. In addition, in order to comply with the limits of the Tenth Amendment, the level of funds withheld for failure to comply with that condition cannot be coercive. In a controlling opinion in NFIB, Justice Roberts suggested that this analysis may vary based on the type of grant condition that was at issue. It is unclear, however, whether NFIB significantly changed the Dole analysis, or whether the combination of factors that led the Court's decision to limit how ACA Medicaid expansion would be enforced is likely to be repeated.
For instance, if a grant condition is directly related to the expenditure of federal funds in a state program or activity, then, according to Justice Robert's opinion in NFIB, the condition is usually constitutional under the Spending Clause. Or even if a grant condition is only generally related to the policy goals of the underlying grant, NFIB suggests that withdrawal of all program funds would still, in most foreseeable cases, be constitutional under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment. If a grant condition is unrelated to the general policy goals of the underlying grant, however, then it is most likely unconstitutional under the Spending Clause. This latter standard, however, has been in place since the Dole case, and no court has ever struck down a federal law on this basis.
Justice Roberts' concern in NFIB arguably dealt with a different question: whether a grant condition attached to a new and independent program (here, the Medicaid expansion) which threatens the funding of an existing program (here Medicaid) is constitutional. In such cases, if the withholding of federal funding represents a significant portion of a state's budget, and there are distinguishing factors among the programs, then that condition may be unconstitutionally coercive under the Tenth Amendment. Justice Roberts did not identify a standard to determine what level of withholding funds would be coercive, or specify what kind of distinguishing factors were necessary. He did conclude, however, that withdrawal of federal program funds which made up 10% of an average state's budget represented a "gun to the head" and was a form of "economic dragooning."
How courts are to consider grant withdrawals below 10%, however, is not addressed by the Roberts' opinion, and Justice Roberts declined to speculate where such a line would be drawn. It should be noted, however, that few federal programs even approach the level of Medicaid funds provided to the states. Thus, if the 10% threshold and the need for distinguishing factors mark the outer limits of Congress's power, then the case may have minimal effect on existing or future federal grant conditions. |
crs_R40916 | crs_R40916_0 | The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) together comprise the majority of both the total funding and the total staffing of the federal government's food regulatory system. The 111 th Congress is considering legislation to revise the U.S. food safety system, focusing primarily on those laws and programs administered by FDA. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions has reported S. 510 , the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. The ultimate goal of the House and Senate food safety bills is to reduce foodborne illness, which is a considerable and persistent public health problem in the United States. However, a comprehensive understanding of the burden of illness caused by foodborne hazards, the risks posed by different types of foods, and the types of safeguards that can effectively address these problems has been elusive. This report describes several systems to monitor foodborne illnesses and define the burden of this public health problem in the United States. Next, this report presents recent data on more serious recalls of FDA-regulated foods. Finally, this report describes three recent foodborne outbreaks that led to nationwide recalls of FDA-regulated foods: (1) Salmonella in peanut products, (2) melamine in pet foods and dairy products, and (3) E. coli in spinach. Following each description are discussions of associated policy issues, and, if applicable, how these issues are addressed in the food safety legislation pending before the 111 th Congress. Descriptions of selected authorities in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), FDA's principal food safety law, are provided in the Appendix . The Burden of Foodborne Illness
Overview and Estimates
Health officials monitor and investigate foodborne illness in a number of ways. For example, surveillance is used to track trends in the incidence of several common bacterial and parasitic foodborne illnesses. Tracking of outbreaks of foodborne illness helps improve approaches to investigation, among other things. Genetic "fingerprinting" is used to identify infections from a common source, including large multistate outbreaks. Collectively, these tools shed light on the burden of foodborne illness in the United States, and ways to decrease it. However, these tools also have two significant shortcomings. First, because they monitor a limited number of known food safety threats, and because foodborne illnesses are substantially underreported, these systems do not, individually or collectively, capture the magnitude of foodborne illness that occurs each year. Second, they often detect the contaminant that causes illness, rather than the type of food that was contaminated, although it is the latter that government officials actually regulate. In many, but certainly not all, cases, products subject to a recall may have sickened or killed people or animals. It is not clear, however, how useful FDA recall data are as a measure of the burden of foodborne illness or the effectiveness of federal food safety programs. For example, does a relatively high number of recalls signify a failure of the system to keep unsafe products from being consumed, or does it indicate that the safety system is working by finding unsafe products and removing them from the market? Conversely, is a relatively low number of recalls an indication of the system's effectiveness, or simply of not finding and/or reporting all unsafe food products? Because of these questions, care should be exercised in using recall data as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of food safety efforts. 2749 and S. 510 ). H.R. With respect to the general safety of food, adulteration is defined in FFDCA § 402(a) [21 USC § 342(a)], as follows:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated—
(1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health; [or]
(2)(A) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance (other than a substance that is a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity or processed food, a food additive, a color additive, or a new animal drug) that is unsafe within the meaning of section 406; or (B) if it bears or contains a pesticide chemical residue that is unsafe within the meaning of section 408(a); or (C) if it is or if it bears or contains (i) any food additive that is unsafe within the meaning of section 409; or (ii) a new animal drug (or conversion product thereof) that is unsafe within the meaning of section 512; or
(3) if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; or
(4) if it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health; or
(5) if it is, in whole or in part, the product of a diseased animal or of an animal which has died otherwise than by slaughter; or
(6) if its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health; or
(7) if it has been intentionally subjected to radiation, unless the use of the radiation was in conformity with a regulation or exemption in effect pursuant to section 409. | The 111th Congress is considering legislation to revise the U.S. food safety system, focusing primarily on those laws and programs administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The House has passed a comprehensive bill, H.R. 2749, and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions has reported its comprehensive proposal, S. 510. The ultimate goal of both bills is to reduce the burden of foodborne illness, which is a considerable and persistent public health problem in the United States. However, an understanding of the true burden of illness caused by foodborne hazards, the risks associated with various types of foods, and the types of regulatory and other approaches that can effectively address these problems has been elusive.
Public health officials monitor and investigate foodborne illnesses in a number of ways. For example, active surveillance is used to track trends in the incidence of several common bacterial and parasitic foodborne illnesses. Outbreaks of foodborne illness are tracked to help improve approaches to investigation and to identify the foods that cause illnesses, among other things. Genetic "fingerprinting" is used to identify infections from a common source, including large multistate outbreaks, and can also help identify the foods that cause illnesses. These systems are administered jointly by various federal agencies, in partnership with state health officials. Collectively, these tools and others can shed light on the burden of foodborne illness in the United States, and ways to decrease it. However, these systems also have two significant shortcomings. First, because they monitor a limited number of known food safety threats, and because foodborne illnesses are substantially underreported, these systems do not, individually or collectively, capture the magnitude of foodborne illness that occurs each year. Second, these systems often detect or track the contaminant that causes illness, rather than the type of food that was contaminated, although it is the latter that government officials actually regulate.
Consumers and the media often focus on recalls—particularly those that are extensive and/or that involve widely consumed products—as indicators of the safety of the U.S. food supply. In many but certainly not all cases, products subject to a recall may have sickened or killed people or other animals. It is not always clear, however, how useful recall data are as a measure of the burden of foodborne illness or the effectiveness of federal food safety programs. For example, does a relatively high number of recalls signify a failure of the system to keep unsafe products from being consumed? Or is it actually an indication that the safety net is working by finding and getting tainted products off the market? Conversely, is a relatively low number of recalls an indication of the system's effectiveness, or simply of not reporting or finding all defective food products? Because of these questions, caution should be exercised in using recall data as the basis for concluding that certain changes are needed in the nation's food safety systems.
This report describes several systems to monitor foodborne illnesses, discussing their strengths and the gaps that remain in understanding the burden of foodborne illness in the United States. Next, this report presents recent data on more serious recalls of FDA-regulated foods, also discussing the strengths and gaps associated with the information. Finally, this report describes three recent foodborne outbreaks that led to nationwide recalls of FDA-regulated foods: (1) Salmonella in peanut products, (2) melamine in pet foods and dairy products, and (3) E. coli in spinach. Following each description are discussions of associated policy issues, and, if applicable, how these issues are addressed in food safety legislation pending before the 111th Congress. Descriptions of selected authorities in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), FDA's principal food safety law, are provided in the Appendix. |
crs_R41464 | crs_R41464_0 | Mission and Programs
In 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) specifically identified a new mission—prompt global strike (PGS)—that sought to provide the United States with the ability to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour, without relying on forward based forces. DOD argued that this capability would bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by providing the United States with the ability to attack high-value targets or "fleeting targets" that might be visible for only a short amount of time promptly, at the start of or during a conflict. DOD has considered a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities. The Pentagon is also conducting research, through DARPA and the Air Force, into shorter-range, air-delivered, hypersonic cruise missiles. Some analysts have questioned the need for these programs, raising concerns, for example, about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. This report provides an overview of the rationale for the PGS/prompt strike mission and the possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles or boost-glide systems in support of this mission. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy efforts to develop these systems. However, it has continued to support funding for hypersonic technologies in its FY2019 defense budget request. Even without direct substitution, however, CPGS still might reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, because, with more conventional options, a President might be less likely to authorize the use of a nuclear weapon to attack a critical target. Plans and Programs
Both the Air Force and the Navy have studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles in the past. Air Force Programs
The FALCON Study
In 2003, the Air Force and DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) initiated a program, known as FALCON (force application and launch from continental United States) that was designed to develop both a launch vehicle similar to a ballistic missile and a hypersonic reentry vehicle, known as the common aero vehicle (CAV) that, together, would provide the United States with the ability to meet the requirements of the prompt global strike mission. Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon
The Army also developed a hypersonic glide vehicle, known as the advanced hypersonic weapon (AHW). The capability, even when fully deployed, would be limited by the small number of available warheads. Moreover, funding for the program is expected to increase significantly, from a request for $278 million in FY2019 to a request for $478 million in FY2022, for a total of $1.9 billion between FY2019 and FY2022. Congress authorized and appropriated the requested funds for FY2010. As the CPGS program has evolved in the past 15 years, and as the United States has placed a higher priority on long-range strike and hypersonic weapons in recent years, analysts have questioned the shifting and expanding rationale for the programs. Congress has supported the development of a new land-based intermediate-range missile as a part of the U.S. response to Russia's violation. This technology remains in its early stages, and could not contribute to the PGS mission for several years. They have both noted that, by strengthening the U.S. ability to attack at long ranges with conventional weapons, these systems could help reduce the number of circumstances when the United States might have to consider using nuclear weapons to defend its interests. The same could be true for the adversaries who are the intended targets of U.S. conventional prompt strike weapons. Some have argued that the possible crisis instabilities associated with long-range ballistic missiles should not eliminate them from consideration for the conventional prompt strike mission because the United States can work with Russia, China, and other nations to reduce the risks; also because no other weapons, at least in the short term, provide the United States with the ability to attack promptly anywhere on the globe at the start of an unexpected conflict. | Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or "fleeting targets" at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but restricted funding for several years. Recently, efforts to develop a long-range prompt strike capability, along with other efforts to develop extremely fast hypersonic weapons, have garnered increased support.
CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. Officials have argued that the long-range systems would provide a "niche" capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.
The Air Force and Navy have both pursued programs that would lead to the deployment of conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles. During the 2000s, the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought to develop a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile, but test failures led to the suspension of this program; research continues into a vehicle that might be deployed on air-delivered or shorter-range sytems. In the mid-2000s, the Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but Congress rejected the requested funding for this program. Since then, the Pentagon has continued to develop a hypersonic glide vehicle, now known as the Alternate Reentry System, which could be deployed on long-range missiles. At present, it seems likely that this vehicle could be deployed on intermediate-range missiles on Navy submarines, for what is now known as the Prompt Strike Mission. Congress may review other weapons options for the deployment of hypersonic weapons, including bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies.
The Pentagon's budget request for FY2019 increases funding for the CPGS program from around $201 million in FY2018 to $278 million in FY2019; it also shows significant increases in funding over the next five years, with a total of $1.9 billion allocated to the program. This shows the growing priority placed on the program in the Pentagon and the growing interest in Congress in moving the program forward toward deployment.
When Congress reviews the budget requests for prompt global strike and hypersonic weapons, it may question DOD's rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. At the same time, Members of Congress and officials in the Pentagon have both noted that Russia and China are pursuing hypersonic weapons, leading many to question whether the United States needs to accelerate its efforts in response, or whether an acceleration of U.S. efforts might contribute to an arms race and crisis instability.
This report will be updated as needed. |
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